PHILIPPINE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
Volume 1

INTRODUCTION

A. CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTION

Meaning of constitution.
.
In its broad sense, the term constitution refers to "that body
of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of
sovereignty are habitually exercised." 1 As thus defined, it covers
both written and unwritten constitutions.
With particular reference to the Constitution of the Philippines, it
may be defined as that written instrument by which the fundamental
powers of the government are established, limited, and defined
nnd by which these powers are distributed among the several
departments or branches for their safe and useful exercise for the
benefit of the people.2

Nature and purpose or function

of a constitution.
(1) An instrument with the status ofa supreme law.-A constitution
IH the charter creating the government, or the organic or basic law
l)y virtue of which the government exists as such.

1
( '(X)Ll!Y, I' rl 11rlp lcs of Cons lilu lio na l Low, p . 22.
1Hw M i\l J 'OLM 1111J 1,/\\Jl{ Ei ,, Phil. Co n~lilutiona t Law, p. 6 (1936).

11111
 l ' I 111 , ll'l'I N I·'.'O N STITUTIONALLAW
Principles and Cases
(a) The Constitution has the status of a supreme or
fundamental law as it speaks for the entire people and in full
authority for all that is done in pursuance of its provisions.3
(b) It is binding on all individual citizens and all organs of
the government for it is the law to which all other laws must
conform a~d in accordance with which all private rights must
be determined and all public authority administered. (State v.
Main, 37 Atl. 80.)
(c) It is the test of the legality of all governmental action,
whethc l' proceeding from the highest official or lowest
4 and protect human rights. - Every constitution is adopted _for one
functionnry. As the paramount law, it is deemed written on
every stotute and contract.
(2) A11 i11strumentofapermanentnature.-Theterm "constitution"
Implies an ins trument of a permanent anq abiding nature.
(a) While it contains provisions for amendment or for
'~is~on, it indicates the will of the people that the underlying
I'
p r111c1p!C8 upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety
of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nn~urc. Understood in the sense of an enactment by the direct
r1cl1on of the people, it creates a fundamental law which is
Huprcn:1 •, imperio~s, _absolute and unalterable except by the
: u ~h~n Ly .'.rom which 1t e~ana~ed. (Lopez vs. De Leon-Reyes, 55
I h II. 170 I1930]; see Manila Prmce Hotel Corp. vs. Government
Sl'l'vicc Ins urance System, 267 SCRA480 [1997].)
(b) Neither public sentiment nor a desire to advance the
public wl'lfare will justify the promulgation of a law which
l'Onlrovt'n '8 an express provision of the Constitution. Amend-
ni •n t1, l'lwl' to must first be made. (People vs. Pomar 46 Phil. 440
I 1992].) '
(:1) I\ 11 ilmlr11 //lent establishing certain basic principles ofgovernment
1111d 1111feg11r11·,lf11gfundamental rights. - The purpose of a constitution
I I lo pr 'HCrlbc the permanent framework of the system of
HHV<•rnm('11l rnd to assign to the different departments or branches,
1111 /\ 111, 1111 Jd IHO,
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11
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INTRODUCTION 3
A. Concept of Constitution
their respective powers and duties, and to establish certain basic
principles on which the government is founded.5
(a) It is not the function of a constitution to legislate in
detail but to set limits on the otherwise unlimited power of the
government.
(b) By its very nature, a constitution cannot be as specific as
the laws that are passed by the legislature. (infra.) It should serve
only as general guidelines for the government therein provided.
(4) An instrument designed primarily to promote the common good
fundamental objective, which is the purpose of government itself: to
ensure domestic tranquility and progress and provide for the well-
being and happiness of the people.6
It is primarily designed to preserve and prote~t the rights ?f
individuals and minorities against the arbitrary actions of those m
authority.
Meaning and scope of constitutional law.
Constitutional law may be defined as that branch of jurispru-
dence which treats of constitutions, their nature, formation and
amendment, operation and interpretation.
(a) It refers to the law embodied in the Constitution as
well as the principles growing out of the interpretation and
application made by the courts (particularly the Supreme Court,
being the court of last resort) of the provisions of the Constitution
in specific cases.7 Thus, the Philippine Constitution itself is brief
sMALCOLM and LAUREL, op. cit., note 2 at p. 2.
6The Constitution, aside from being an allocation of powers to the different organs
of 1he government, is also in the nature of a social contract whereby the people have
,iu rrcndercd their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. (Marcos vs.
Mnnnlnpus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989].) .. .
'1constilutional law is included in the study of political law which embraces also
ndmlnistrnlivc lnw, law of public officers, election law, ~d law of J:>Ublic corpo~ations.
/111//tlrnl /mu hos been defined as that branch of pubhc law which deals ~1th the
orr1n11lzotlon nnd opcrntion of the governmental organs of the State and defin~s the
1i•lnllon11 of 1ho Slnto with lhc inhabitants of its territory. (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887
11 •1221; M11r,1rl(")l11 vt1. AR11nclon, 1'14 SCRA 77 (1982].) While public (aw go~e~s ~e relati~n
1111h11 111t,1,, wllh 11111JL1bjo 111, /Jl'lvnlc /mu IHconcornccl with the r~lahons of 11~d1~1duals with
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 4 5
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
~ut the law of the <:o_nstitution lies scattered in thousands of
u~reme Court dec1s10ns,s giving meaning to its provisions
whrch are, for the most part, very general and indefinite.
. (b) Al~o forming part of constitutional law are bindin
mterpretatrons of constitutional provisions by Congress ( g
~r~~gh the_ ~lect~ral Tribunals), the President, and qu:t~
JUd1c1_al admm1stratrve agencies in cases involving constitutional
questions where exclusive competence is lodged in them.
withAthmajor area. .in the .study of cons t·t • .
1 utrona1 1aw rs concerned
(see Ar;
~~rtah4on) of the body of rules governing judicial review.
, ec. .
Kinds of constitution.
Constitutions may be classified as follows:
(1) As to their origin and history:
(~) Conventional or enacted. - One which is enacted b a
~~nst1tucent as_se~bly or granted by a monarch to his subj!cts
1 e e onshtubon of Japan in 1889; and
(b) _Cu7:1ulative or evolved. - Like the English Constitution
o~e ~h1
0
?11~
a product of growth or a long period of developmen;
ngmatmg m c~stoms, traditions, judicial decisions, etc., rather
t11an from a dehberate and formal enactment.
. The above classification substantially coincides with that of
wntten and unwritten constitutions.
(2) As to their form:
(a) Written. - One which has been given definite wrr'tten
fo rm at 'a par t'icu1~,r bm~,
. ..· · usually by a specially constituted
autho~1ty_called a constitutional convention." The American
ons t1tuhon belongs to this category; and
_(?) l.Jnwritl·:n. - O1:e which is entirely the product of
poh~•~~l evo!uti?1:, cons~sting largely of a mass of customs,
u~agcs and Judicw l decisions together w ith a smaller bod
of Hl alulol'y 0na lnwnl:, o f a fun dom cnl ol chorn lt' r' LJf-lu all y
b1•t11·inn di ff1•r(•n1 d ll('H,'1 'l'lw lfogli1-1h C nnHlil11l inr1' iH rt:pt.'r l':I 1-~
~VI, 'llN I II l~li ll l'1<llllt ,d l ,1w, ll1l 11•d I' t,? ( IIJJ,')
I' ~l•i
"i 1111l, /\ l(N I I( 1'1111111 li' 11 1t111, • 1111dl ,11111111111111I
INTRODUCTION
A. Concept of Constitution
be a classic example of an unwritten one but it is unwritten only
In the sense that it is not codified in a single document. Indeed,
there is no constitution that is entirely written 01; unwritten.
(3) As to manner of amending them:
(a) Rigid or inelastic. - One regarded as a document of
special sanctity which cannot be amended or altered except
by some special machinery more cumbrous than the ordinary
legislative process;10 and
(b) Flexible or elastic. - One which possesses no higher legal
authority than ordinary laws and which may be altered in the
same way as other laws.11
The present Philippine Constitution may be classified as
t'On ventional or enacted, written, and rigid or inelastic. It was,
however, drafted not by an elected constituent assembly as in the
l-'UMC of the 1935 and 1973 Charters but by an appointive body called
11
onstitutional Commission." (infra.)
Advantages and disadvantages
of a written constitution.
(1) Clearness, definiteness, and stability. -
It has the advantage
of clearness and definiteness over an unwritten one. This is because
it is prepared with great care and deliberation. Such a constitution
annot be easily bent or twisted by the legislature or by the courts
lo meet the temporary fancies of the moment. Hence, the protection
It affords and the rights it guarantees are apt to be more secure.
Moreover, it is more stable and free from all dangers of temporary
•x itement and popular whim or passion.
(2) Difficulty of amendment. - Its disadvantage lies in the
difficulty of its amendment. (see Art. XVII.) This prevents the
ln.1media te introduction of needed changes and may thereby retard
11'STRO NG, Modern Political Constitutions, p. 6.
11 :ARNER, Politico! Science and Government, p. 508.
Tho olmpllclly of the amending procedure does not necessarily result in frequent
110 1 ndnrnnto, noi: docs the difficulty with wh ich a constitution is changed provide
1111 11rr1111llv1 KlllH'fl nluu ng11lnot frequent nmondmonts, Thus, although the American
unNlllutlon I~n rlKld omJ, It 11110 u11duq~o111 lt'IOJ'O ch1mgo11 than the English Constitution
whlch l11 ~uu~ldm·ud flu><lbh1, Th Phlllpplno 'omllllutlon of 1973 hM boun subjected to
H11v11r11l 1un11mh11u111t1un tour (4) ucaMlunli, <l11Jh1,)
 1
fl, l11dpll 'II 111,d l '1111,••1
11,~· lwallhy growth ond progress of the 1-1 tatc.12 Wi1:1dom warns
•g 1fn1-1l lompcring capriciously with the Constitution for "light and
It· 11 nll 'nt cauHes," but neither should it be regarded as too sacred
1111 lo b ' beyond amendment or replacement when, because of
drnnging conditions, it no longer meets the needs and expectations
of 1h, pcop.le.
Roqulsltes of a good written constitution.
(1) J\s toform, a good written constitution should be:
(a) Brief - If a constitution is too detailed, it would lose
lhc advantage of a fundamental law which in a few provisions
outlines the structure of the government of the whole state and
Ihe l'ights of the citizens. It would probably never be understood
by the public. Furthermore, it would then be necessary to amend
it every once in a while to cover many future contingencies; 13
(b) Broad. - A statement of the powers and functions of
government, and of the relations between the governing body
and the governed, requires that it be as comprehensive as
possible. The scope and meaning must be wide enough to make
I be onstitution easily adaptable to changing social, economic,
ond political conditions, and thus enable it, without requiring, if
possible amendment, to meet every exigency, for a constitution
iH designed to be a permanent document (infra.) to serve a
country for many generations - indeed, if possible "to endure
for ages to come"; and
12
1/Jid., p. 524.
1
3:The rea_der will find ~ e 1987 Constitution rather verbose and contain many
provlmons which are mere styhsh embellishments of fundamental precepts, or are better
left lo lmp(e_menti~g statutes, or express thoughts which properly belong more to the
flclcl of pohhcs or hterature than of law, using words and terms imprecise in meanings
find ~ '.~h,?ut accepted !~gal c?nnotations such as, "love," "rhythm and harmony of
nnlurc, total human liberation and development," "patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness," etc.
About 97 of its provisions are open-ended, i.e., they are made dependent on the
11ubscquent enabling action of Congress, by the addition of the phrase "as may be defined
l>y low,'' "prescribed by law," "established by law," "in accordance with Jaw," or "as the
'ongress may prescribe." Congress has to pass the necessary laws that would make these
provisions fully operative.
Some cri~cs ~onsider the Constitution even specific in many of its provisions saying
that the Constitution could pass more as an omnibus law than a fundamental law. This is,
of course, an obvious exaggeration but it does give an idea of their perception regarding
this particular defect.
(\') J)cfi11 ile. - I( the language of its prov1s1ons is
on,biguous, Lheir application to concrete situations m~y prove
undul.y difficult if not impossible. Any ~agueness which may
I •ad to oppoi;ing interpretations of essential fea~ ~es may cause
incalculable harm. Political instability and even civil war and the
cl i!!ruption of the s tate may conceivably follow from ambiguous
expressions in a constitution.14
(2) As to contents, it should contain at least three (3) sets of
provisions:
(a) That dealing with the framework of government and
its powers, laying down certain rules for its administration and
defining the electorate. This group of provisions has been called
the constitution of government;
(b) That setting forth the fundamental rights of the
people and imposing certain limitations on the powers of the
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these
rights. This group has been referred to as the constitution of
liberty; and
(c) That pointing out the mode or procedw-e for amending
or revising the constitution. TI1is group has been called the
constitution of sovereignty.15
Constitution distinguished from statute.
(1) A constitution is a legislation direct from the people, while
a statute (see Art. VI, Sec. 1.) is a legislation from the people's
representatives;
(2) A constitution merely states the general framework of the
law and the fundamental powers of the government, while a statute
provides the details of the subject of which it treats;
(3) A constitution is intended not merely to m~et_ existing
conditions but to govern the future, while a sta tute 1s rntended
primarily to meet existing conditions only;
(4) A constitution, being the direct expression of the sovereign
will, is the supreme or fundamental law of the State to which statutes
See MALCOLM and LAUREL, op. cit., note 2 at pp. 15-16.
14
15seeGARNER, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 397-398.

und nU other law:, must conform although there is a presumption
lhut the latter are in accord with the former; and
(5) A constitution requires a more difficult and intricate
procedure for adoption or amendment than a statute. (supra.)
A constitution and a statute, though of unequal dignity, are,
howeve1~ both "laws" and each rests upon the voice of the people.16
Authority to interpret the Constitution.
(1) Private individuals. -
Even a private individual must
ascertain the meaning and effect of the Constitution in order to
govern his own actions and his dealings with other men.17
. (2) Agencies charged with official duties. - It is evident, however,
that only those charged with official duties, whether executive,
legislative, or judicial, can give authoritative exposition of the
Constitution.
(a) Final decision belongs to courts. - Firstly, it must be borne
in mind that this function is the peculiar province of the courts.
The executive and legislative departments or their officials may
at times be required to pass upon a constitutional question and
make similar determination. But the ultimate determination of
such questions belongs to the judiciary. To the courts belongs
the final decision which is binding on all departments or organs
of the government, including the legislature.
(b) Power of judicial review. - The court will thus construe
the applicable constitutional provisions not in accordance with
how the executive or legislative department may want them
construed, but in accordance with what said provisions say
and provide. (Sarmiento III vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 [1987].)
Actually, the power and authority of courts to interpret and
co~stri:e the Constitution involves an exercise of judicial power
which 1s commonly referred to as the "power of judicial review."
(see Art. VIII, Sec. 4.)
(c) Limitations on power. -There are, however, well-settled
11
limitations to the courts' power of judicial review." For one
1616 Am. Jur. 2d, 181-182.
17
BLACK, Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., p. 55.
I l' I I 1, \ 11 I I I \ I I 11 ' l
A. t 't111t'l•p11>1 t 'n1111tlt11t lo11
th in~, th,,. • or• conHlituli.onnl questions (i. e., political questions)
whl •h under the onstitution are addressed to the discretion
of th • other deportments and, therefore, generally beyond the
power of the judiciary to decide. Thus, the determination by the
President as to which foreign government is to be r~cognized by
the Philippines cannot be passed upon by the courts. (see Art.
Vlll, Sec. l[par. 2], Sec. 4.)
Interpretation and construction
of the Constitution.
(1) Meaning. -Interpretation or construction is the act or process
of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
nuthors of the law with respect to its application to a given case.
( altex [Phils.], Inc. vs. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966].) Since they
have the same object or purpose, they are often used interchangeably.
(a) Strictly speaking, "construction," as a process for deter-
mining the meaning of statutes, is the drawing of conclusions
with respect to subjects which lie beyond the direct expression
of the text from elements known from, and
. given. in, the text.
(b) "Interpretation," on the other hand, is limited to
exploration of the written text itself.18
It is, therefore, stated that while the second utilizes intrinsic aids
or matters found in the law itself, the first resorts to extrinsic aids or
circumstances not found in the language of the law. And since the
words or language of the statute itself furnishes the best means to
ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, extrinsic aids must
be resorted to only after utilizing and exhausting intrinsic aids.
(2) Necessity. - Questions of constitutional interpretation or
construction are in the main governed by the same general principles
which control in ascertaining the meaning of all written instruments,
particularly statutes. Consequently, in the determination of
constitutional questions, the same rules of construction may be
resorted to as with other laws.
(a) Where provision is plain. - It is to be observed that
it is not in every case involving a constitutional provision
that interpretation or construction is required. The first and
1882 C.J.5. 529.

f111)dom •nlol duly of the court is to apply the law with the
\m1-1 litul'ion ot the top rung ln the hierarchy of legal norms. (see
I ,i,,;o r1·ogo I Icrm anos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504 [1913].)
A constitutional provision which is positive and free from
nll ombiguily must be accepted by the courts as it reads; in such
case, no interpre tation or much less construction, is permissible.19
(b) Where provision is ambiguous. - Ambiguity has been
defined as doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinctions
or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written
s totc ment.20
Interpretation comes in only after it has been demonstrated
th at application is impossible or inadequate without its aid.
(see Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, supra.) If the language
of the provision is ambiguous such that reasonable minds
cl isagree as to its meaning, then interpretation or construction
of the Constitution becomes necessary. Judicial interpretation
is not only proper but an essential responsibility of the courts.
(State ex rel. Swan v. Jones, 289 P2d 982.) Wisely employed,
interpretation or construction can make the fundamental law
attuned to changing conditions and to be adaptable to various
crises of human affairs without need of resorting to the difficult
process of formal amendments.
(3) Modification of rules of statutory construction. - Generally
npcoking, the principles of construction applicable to statutes are
11pplicable also to constitutions but not to the extent of defeating the
purposes for which a constitution is adopted. (Egbert v. Dunseith,
168 ALR 621.)
By reason of their fundamental dignity and weight and because
of the manner in which they are adopted, constitutions are subject
19
16 AM. JUR. 2d, 230-231. As otherwise stated, if the constitutional provision is
ck•or in its terms and the intention of the electorate is clearly embraced in the language
11f the provision itself, the court must apply and not interpret the provision. (State ex
1·el. Trent v. Sims, 77 SE 2d 122.) Interpretation by the courts is improper. The provision
Hpcnks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to
obscurity. Resort to extrinsic aids (infra.), like the records of the constitutional convention
fo r its interpretation is neither necessary nor permissible. (People vs. Amigo, 252 SCRA
,,:i [1 996).)
20
0LACK's Law Dictionary, p. 105.
I I ~ I 1'-'- ..,,..., , ' I I I '"'I
In Ih •ir interpretation to certain modifications of thos_e well-
known doctrines of statutory construction, due regard bemg had
lo the broader objects and scope of the constitution as a ~harter of
popular government. External aids or arbitr~ry rules apphed to the
cum;truction of a constitution are of uncertam value ap.d should be
u:;cd with hesitation and circumspection.21
Common rules of interpretation
and construction.
(1) Effectuation of intent of the framers or the people. ~ Th~ fun-
damental principle or purpose of constitutional construction ~s that
effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the orgamc law
and of the people who adopted or approved i~ or. its amendments.
This is the polestar in the construction of constitutions.
(a) The intent must be gathered from bo~h the lett~r ~nd
spirit of the document, the rule be~g ~hat a _wn_tten constitution
is to be interpreted in the same spmt m whic~ it ~as prod~c~d.
The court should put itself as nearly as possible m the position
of the men who framed the instrument.22 •
(b) There must be attributed to the framers an int~ntion
to construct the instrument as a consistent whole without
contradictory provisions at cross-purposes, and the~e must _be
attributed to the separate provisions a meaning consistent with
such an intention, if that is possible. (Tucker v. State, 35 NE 2d
270.)
(c) It is, therefore, the duty of the cour!s to con~tantly k~ep
in mind the objectives sought to be accomplished by it~ adoption
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or reme.die~. It may
be assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanations given by the framers on
the meaning of its provisions. (Nitafan vs. Comm. of Internal
Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 [1987].)
(2) Uniform construction. -A cardinal rule is that _a constitutio~
should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so tha~ it
shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another thmg
21
See 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 231-232.
22
Ibid., pp. 239-240.
 12
P {HLIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
at another, e:en though the circumstances may have so changed as
to make a different rule seem desirable. The Constitution should
no~ ~hange in m~aning jus~ because of the varying tides of public
opimon and des1re. The will of the people therein recorded is the
same inflexible law until changed by their own deliberative action.23
(a) The r_ule of stare decisis is peculiarly applicable in
the constructio~ .of the Constitution. (McCuley v. State, 53
SW 134.) A familiar rule of constitutional construction is that
con_stitutional provisions are to be interpreted not only on the
basis of current events and developments but likewise on the
basis of the historical background and environment at the time
of its adoption ~at cau~e~ their being written as part and parcel
thereof. (Legaspi vs. Miruster of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 [1982].)
(b) Note that it has also been said that constitutional
questions must be deterrnined as of the time the questions
are presented for determination, and not as of the time of the
~doption o~ ~ e applicable constitutional provision, or as of the
time of decision of an earlier case involving similar questions.24
(~) Flexible construction. - A constitution usually announces
certam basic principles to serve as the perpetual foundation of the
State. It is not intended to be a limitation on the State's h ealthful
development nor an obstruction to its progress. Accordingly,
the courts are not inclined to adopt such a technical or strained
con~tt:uction ~s.':i_II undul~ impair the efficiency of the legislature to
rneet 1esponsib1hties occas10ned by changing conditions of society.25
(a) The United States Supreme Court has said that the
scope .of ~he vague, undefinable, admonitory provisions of the
onst1Lu_t10n ~e.g., due process guarantee) is inevitably addressed
to changmg CU"cumstances. (Villamann v. United States, 350 U.S.
11
I(, /\111. Jul'. 2d, 232-233.
1'1TI I /
,
4
n lrmu11 v. llonrrl of l."rl11cnlio11 (347 U.S. B3.), the United Stoics Supr(•mc
itt. ,
11111
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11
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1 1
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INTRODUCTION 13
A. Concept of Constitution
422.) In other words, while the powers granted ~o not chan?e,
they apply from generation to generation to th~gs _to which
they are, in their nature, applicable. Thus, _cons~tutio~al law
may, to some extent, be likened to a progressive science.
(b) In interpreting broad and indefinite provision~,. the
courts should thus take into account not only conditions
existing at the time of their adoption but also those prevailing
at the moment. On the other hand, the principle of flexibility
does not overbalance or destroy the doctrine of uniformity;
the actual meaning of the provision always remains the same.
Constitutions are not so flexible as to bend to circumstances or
be modified by public opinion. 27
(4) Liberal construction. - The wordings of a constitutional
provision do not have a narrow or co~tracted me~ning ~ut are us~d
in a broad sense with a view to covering all contingencies. (Occena
vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 755 [1980].)
(a) Constitutional provisions should always receiv~ a
broader and more liberal construction than statutes, smce
the power dealt in the former case is. ori?in~l and unlimited,
and in the latter case, limited. A constitution is expected to be
effective over a longer period of time than a statute, and its
method of revision or amendment is more cumbersome than
the legislative process. It cannot, by construction, be carried out
with mathematical nicety to logical extremes.
(b) Consequently, a constitution is not subject to _rules of
strict construction, such as, for example, the rules applicable to
construction of penal statutes. That a constitution should rece~ve
a liberal interpretation in favor of a citizen is specially true with
respect to those provisions which are designed to safeguard the
26]6 A m. Jur. 2d 235-236. Under the test of reasonnbleness, for examp~e, ai:1 act m~y
be susta ined todny wh ich would not have been sustain~d 100 years ago smce_ mdustnal
co nditions a nd political theories are constantly changmg. (O~p- C?t!on Mills, Inc. v.
/\d rnlnlstrn to,· of Woge a nd Hour Division, 312 U.S. 126.) Precisely, 1t 1~ assumed to be
111
,,,w uf lhl' virtue~ of a wrillcn constilulio n th.i t it suffices to gover~ the life of the ~eople
no t on ly 111 1lw 1lnll' of itH frnm ing bu t into the indefin ite future. It 1s not to be considered
1111,.11 lr1d<ln11 In (lp,(ihlllty 1hnl It n,ny lw I bnr lo 111cn,iurcs, novel nnd ~northodox as they
11 11111 y •1Jlfll' tt1' 111 1,1111 11 ,, h111 11n11,•tl wh•~•1, l111p111·,1tlv1•ly cnlkd for. (J.M. 1uazon, Co., Inc. vs.
I 111111'lnt1111,• A~l,1111111 l1,1lll•ll, 'I I •i RA 111'1 1l1)'lOj,)
It, 1\ 111 1111 .Id, p J \It

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
liberty and security of the citizens in regard to both person and
28
propert!': Every doubt should be resolved in favor of the right
of the citizen.
(~). Pr~ctical construction. - This construction of a constitutional
provision is to be followed in order that effect may be given 1·t
purpose.
. (~J. It shou~d not be disregarded unless the terms of the
p10v1s10~ furnish clear and definite support for a contrary
construction. A constitution viewed as a continuously operative
~harter .of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the
1mposs1b~e o: the impracticable. However, the rule of practical
~o~stru~hon 1s of no value in construing the Constitution where
it is plam that the practice has been in open violation of that
document.29
__ (~) The Co~stitution should be construed so as to give it
effective oper~h?n and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.
(supra.) Thus, 1t 1s said that a constitution must be interpreted so
as to carry out the general purposes of the government and not
to defeat them. 30 ' idle and nugatory.33
(6) Constitution to be construed as a whole. - In co t ·
the .C onstit~tion, the courts should have recourse to th:s :~:~
lnt;twment, if necessary, to ascertain the true intent and meaning of
nny po rticular provision.
(a? Constitutional provision must be read and construed not
as rin ISOiated and independent precept, but as an integral ~art
of ~he ~hol~ doc_ument in which it is embodied and in the light
of th~ ~usto1 y of its e~actment and insertion in the fundamental
ltiw. (labora vs. Gavma, 79 Phil. 421 [1947J.) It should function
tu l·h: fu 11 extent of its substance and its term, not by itself alone
but 111 conjunction with all its other provisions. (Chiongbia~
~H. l ' L •on, 82 Phil. 771 [1949); Macalintal vs. Commission on
hi<• ·ll.ona, 405 SCRA 614 [2003).)
(6) Wh re the meaning of the provision standing by itself is
:.rtain, re1:iort may b had to other portions of the
o h l'll'I 11•1• or 1n1
'~l/11,1, l'I' i 17 1'1H,
1
//J/,I , p 'J Ill
1 1
" 1/i/,t I I ' 'JitO
INTRODUCTION 15
A. Concept of Constitution
Constitution with a view to arriving at the true intention of each
part. And the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restricted
by referring to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.31
>
(c) If there is an apparent repugnancy between different
provisions, the court should harmonize them,32 if possible,
s upon the theory that the instrument was carefully prepared
and intended to be a consistent whole. (Tucker v. State, 35 NE
2d 270.) The Constitution must be construed in its ehtirety as
one single instrument. (Valenzuela vs. Vallarta, 298 SCRA 408
[1998).)
(7) Every part to be given effect. - If possible, effect should be
given to every part and every word of the Constitution.
(a) Unless there is some clear reason to the contrary,
no portion of the fundamental law should be treated as
superfluous. A court should avoid a construction which renders
any constitutional provision meaningless or inoperative, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may render some words
(b) It is not to be supposed that a single word was inserted
in the organic law without the intention of conveying thereby
some meaning. (State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 21 NE 252.) A
constitution is an instrument of such high and solemn import
that every word thereof is to be regarded as though hammered
into place. (State ex rel. Lewis v. Smith, 158 Ind. 543.)
(8) Conflicting provisions to be harmonized. - Distinct provisions
of the Constitution are repugnant to each other in such a way as to
be irreconcilable only when they are related to the same subject, are
adopted for the same purposes, and -cannot be construed together
· without material and substantial conflict.
(a) In such a case, if there is a conflict between a general and a
special provision in the Constitution, the special provision must
prevail in respect of its subject matter since it will be regarded as
a limitation on the general grant, but the general provision will
,I I /Ii///,, !), 2'14,
ii11,1,1,, p. 1'1~.
' //1/d,1 1111, 2M-Wl,
 l (i
P f.llLIPJ JNH ONSTITUTIONAL LAW INTRODUCTION 17
Principles and Cases A. Concept of Constitution

be left to control in cases where the special provision does not 1hey did say. 38 It is their responsibility and duty to ascertain
apply.34
the meaning of the Constitution as written, neither adding to
(b) Where, however, one provision cannot be considered as nor subtracting from it, and neither deleting n?r distorting.
an exception to another, and they are repugnant to each other, (Ranking v. Love, 232 P. 2d 998.)
that which is last in order of time and in local position being (c) It is presumed that the words in a constitution have
deemed the latest expression of the will of the people, will be been carefully selected to convey a certain definite meaning
preferred. (Montenegro vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 [1952].) Thus, and that the framers and the people adopting it intended what
where there is a real inconsistency between a constitutional they said. But where a term or phrase ~as acquired a. fixed
amendment and an antecedent provision, the amendment must technical meaning at the time of the framing and adoption ?f
prevail on the same theory that it is the latest expression of the instrument, it will be presumed to have been employed m
the sovereign will of the people. In such case, there is no room that sense (Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 401 [1947].)
for t~1~ application of the rule as to harmonizing inconsistent unless it appears it was used in its popular sense.
prov1s1ons.35
(d) And where words are used which have both a restricted
(9) Words to be given their ordinary meaning. - Words are the and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the
mn,1 m.on signs that mankind make use of to declare their intentions restricted unless the nature of the subject matter or of the context
Io ? nc •H~o~1er. When the words of a man express his meaning
d early indicates that the limited sense is intended. (Marcos vs.
ph,111ly, dis tmctly, and perfectly, there is no occasion to have recourse
Chief of Staff, 89 Phil. 247 [1951].) .
lo olh •r means of interpretation.36 This is also true in construing a
conHtilutional provision. (10) Consideration of the spirit as against the letter. -. A
cons titutional provision should receive a fair and libera~ construct~o:'
(a) Ordinarily then, words used in the Constitution should
not only according to its letter but also according to its true spmt
be. given their plain, natural and usual signification unless
ond the general purpose of its enactment.
chnical. terms are employed, in which case, the sense attached
1·0 them prevails. (Cordillera Regional Assembly vs. Commission Where a constitutional provision is plain and easily understood,
on nJcctions, L-93054, Dec. 4, 1990.) Words or terms used in a no construction is possible and no intent can be derived other than
COnHIitution, _being dependent on ratification by the people that which may be d erived from the meaning of the language
voll ng upon 1t, should be understood, as much as possible, in itself. However, whenever the language is not explicit, or admits
l'I it• 8 .,, sc most obvious to common understanding at the time of of doubt, it is presumed that it is intended to be in accordance with
IIHodoplion.37 the acknowledged principles of justice and liberty, even though,
(b) Th cour ts may not be governed by wha t the framers according to some views, this would require a deviation from the
mny hov · rncont to say, but .is of necessity controlled by what strict letter.39

1111,lt/,, 11· ' (i'/, :18'1 6 i\m. Jur. 2d, p. 249.

'% /rl., p. 2,17,
lfl/11/, / , I' 2•1/l
11
''lliltl I I' 2 1 , /111 1h11 C'oi111ll1 11lh1n 111 11111 p, ln i.11 lly II lr1wy1•1•'11 tl1111 11111•111, ll>1 l1111g 1111w•
1111 111111h 1111 1•1 1..,11,11, 11h1111 ltl h" 1111tl1111111111d 111 1h11 , 11 ,1 1111,y ln1v11 111 111 111 11 11111 ,,1 hy
111
111,111111 y 1111111 t1111I wn1111111 l1.t1i11d 1111 11 11 1 p11 ,111 h1f1111111111111 h ,111 11 •1 , 1111d 1111' pt·11plt• 1111,,111
w l1111 11t1,y "•'Y (I M 1~111111111 ,11,, t '11 , '111 v" 1 ,,11t1 Ii 11111,, Ad11 11111i.1i ,1111111, 11 1,1 l<A ,11 1
I IIJ/ 11 1 11111,11111 1V" ( 111111111 •1h111111 1 I,, 1111111• 1111 ' I 11-\ 1,, I l•J•"II)
1
!1Jl,id., p. 250. There seems to be a conflict in theory, and the place wh7r: one ru~e
<'l'OHl'q lo opcrnlc nnd the other starts is not clear!}'. marked out~}'. the dec1510ns. If, m
w ·ck-1· 11, gi ve ('(feet: to the tTue intention, the spmt of the prov1s10ns_ra~her tha_n the
ll'll t•r 11ho11ld br looked into, the case is in accord with the general pr'.nc1pl~ of _hbe:al
111111111•111'tlo11, (111111m,) On the olher hnnd, if lhe court cat~ search for an mtenh~n msp1te
11 ( pl 11 111 11 11d 111 u1111blf1u(1u11 word~ nnd ehn11gc the meanmg of these words, this would,
In 11111111, vlt1li11t• 11t1• prl111'1 pl1• thnl 1lw l11ln111lon In lo be gathered from the words of the
p1n v lHl111111 w li1111 tl 111N11w111d1111 11 • pl11l11 (//1/,/ )

ltt l'I 111.ll'l'I NH t'ON!;' l'l'l'lJ'I H )N /\ 1, 1,/\W
Pl'lndpkHn11d 'o11Jl•11
(11) Doctrine of necessary implication. -A constitution, being
generally brief and comprehensive, is not likely to express all
that may be done under it. It is, therefore, a rnle of constitutional
construction that whatever is necessary to render effective a
constitutional provision, whether the same is a grant of power or
right or a prohibition, or a restriction, must be deemed implied or
intended in the provision itself.
In other words, in construing the Constitution, what is implied
is as much a part of the document as that which is expressed. This is
known as the "doctrine of necessary implication."
(a) Thus, a court in construing a provision of the Constitu-
tion may imply a negative from affirmative words where the
implication promotes, but not where it defeats, the intention. 40
For example, prohibitions need not be expressly made in the
Constitution, for a declaration of a fundamental right may be
the equivalent of a prohibition against legislation impairing the
right. (Laurence F. Turney Coal Co. v. Smith, 203 SW 781.)
(b) A grant of a power in general terms shall be understood
to include all such auxiliary or incidental powers as are neces-
sary to make it effective.41 This is so because the greater includes
the lesser. But it is certainly not permitted to imply an inten-
tion that conflicts with a definite and express intention. (Tucker
v. State, 35 NE 2d. 270.) Where no exception is made in terms,
none will be made by mere implication or construction. (Occefia
vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 755 [1980].)
The doctrine does not apply where the contrary clearly appears,
as where other means for the exercise of a power granted are
expressly provided for.
(12) Other rules. - The following rules are also applied:
(a) Constitutional provisions generally mandatory. - It is the
general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory,
and not to leave any discretion to the will of Congress to obey
or to disregard them, unless it clearly appears either by expr ss
Atatemcnt or by necessary imp.licntion, thnt they are intended
to be dir clory only. Th rules dit-1linguh-1hing mandatory ond
,fjt//i/t/ I jl , 2'il ,
41 111 /\( ' , l11h1q 1111h,ll1111 ,1f I .o1w~, p ltl
I N 'l l·H ll H JI, l' I{ lN
A, '01111•pl ol r 111111lllt1l l1111
d ,·t•('to,·y I t11lutct-1 m· , of lltLlc vnlu , in this connection and are
l'tll't'ly .,ppll •1.1.' 1
Mnndnlt)1'y provisions are binding on al1 departments of the
,,owrnni •nl. (Vorgas vs. Rilloraza, 80 Phil. 297 [1_948].)
1
(b) 011sl'it11tionnl provisions presume~ sev-executing: -. A
('01lt-1lit11lionnl provision is self-executing 1~ no l:g1slation
In 1w , w mry to give effect to it and if there 1s nothing t~ ~e
dww by ongress to put it h~ operati?n. In other ~rds, it 1s
di rt' ' tly or immediately apphcable without need of_sta~t?ry
1,npl mcntnlion. On the other hand, a constitutio~al provision
l'Ont •mplaling and requiring legislation or_ whic~ assumes
1h, •xistcnce of certain machinery to carry 1t out 1s not self-
i•Xl' uting.
A constitutional provision may be self-executing_ in. part
11
nd not so in another part. Even in the case of a constit:t1tio~al
provision which is self-executing, Congres~ may enact legislation
to fn ilitate the exercise of the powers drrectly granted by the
Con!-llilulion.
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the pres~ption is
th 1t all provisions of the Constitution are self-executing. The
rourls may be influenced in treating a provision as self-exec1:1tory
rnth r thnn as requiring legislation by the knowledge th.a~ 1£ not
1,·t•al •cl as such, the Legislature would have the power to ignore
43
H1d pra LicoUy nullify the directions of the fundamental law.
( ) Office of n proviso. - A "proviso" is a clause. (~s ~ a
conlrn t, stnlute, or cons titution) that introduces a qualification,
l·ondilion or limitation, and usually begin with the word
~l l( /\ni )lir ')cl 277 The word "shall" is generally considered as an indi<;ation of
i ' ' , , • .. h. h d ,, . " hould
1lw m,u,dutoi y drnrfl t1•r of the conslilutwnal prov1s1011 w ile t e wor may s
111
111
,t hti wn,ituwd f\fl "!lhnll" unle~s from the whole context, the purpo~e. clearly _a pe~s
lw nHindul.wy. Ae ordln , to 1he Supreme Court, constitutional prov1s1ons wh1c re
1
1 ;r
11,,," lhfll 1111, mi·it•ly pro edurol nre d irectory. (sec Rona vs. Court of Appeals, 1 2
1 1 11111
: tV\ ,Oil I 1'11WI: Mnlocor,1 vll, 'ourl of /\ppcnls, 117 SCRA 435 [1983); see Art. VI, Sec.
1111II ) h c · ·
••111111 , pp ')'/'/ W I. Whlli• flA II fl(>nernl rule, the provi<;ions oft_ e ?_nstitution are
111111, 1 111,1( l'Ktll 11 11 11~ ruid do 11111 1't1qllh'1• fllhll'C leKlillnllon fo, theu enforcement
1111 111 11 1
• ., , p,,,vllihuv, hi,v,, 11 1t,•<11ly ht•,111 t,1h•Kmkolly d1•clrm•d by the Supreme Court a~n~~
1111
1
,,tt '"""' 1tll•II\ ( 1i1111111 M1•rllt ,,I t'l•llllll' lln1pt11y1••"i 1\11•10<', v~. Cn11rt of /\ppeal11, 527
•1111, IJtWI l
20 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
"provid~d."·11 The o~,ce of a proviso is to limit the application
of a section o:prov1s10n or to qualify or restrain its generality,
(Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA318 [1978).) However, a
proviso may also enlarge what otherwise is a phrase of limited
import had there been no proviso qualifying it. (Comm. of
Internal Revenue vs. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil.
1055 [1960]; U.S. vs. Sto. Nino, 13_Phil. 141 [1909).)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
The GSIS sold the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
to a foreign corporation.
Facts: ~e_titioner MPHC, a domestic corporation, filed a petition
for proh1b1tion and mandamus to stop the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation on the ground
among_ others, that the sale violates the second paragraph of Section
10, Article XII of the Constitution, which provides:
11
X XX XX X
. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
nat10nal economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
XX X XX X"
Issue: Two of the issues raised are:
(1)_ Whether the above constitutional provision is self-
executmg and, therefore, does not need implementing legislation
to carry it into effect; and
(2) Assuming that it is self-executing, whether the controlling
shares of ~he Manila Hotel Corporation form part of the patrimony
of the nat10n under the provision.
Held: (1) When a constitutional provision self-executing, and not
self-exec~ting. - ~,':dmittedl?, ~ome constitutions are merely
declarations of policies and prmc1ples. Their provisions command
the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers ":'ho merely establish ed a n outline of govern rnentproviding
for t~e d1ffere~t departments of the goV('rnmcntal machinery and
securmg certain fundamcntol ond i1111 lk n11hlv rli{hti; of citizens.
INTRODUCTION 21
A. Concept of Constitution
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
cxecuting. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary orenaBlin~ legislat~on,
Ol' that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the nght
It grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus, a
c;onstitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent
of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action."
11
(2) Presumption in case of doubt. - As against constitutions of
the past, modern constitutions have been gene~ally drafted u~on
a different principle and have often become m effect exten~1ve
codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people m a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function
of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that
of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enf~r~e a constituJion~l ~andate, the
presumption now is that all prov1s1ons of the constitut10n are self-
cxecuting.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
h ave the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -
'x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x.
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Con stitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature dis<;r:etion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be.
subordinated to the will of the law-making body, which could
moke them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.' "
(3) Provision in question is self-executing. - "Respondents argue
thnt Sec. 1O, Becond par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is clearly
n<H M!'Jf•cxe uting, as they quote from discussions on the floor of
tlw '1 986 ( 'on!4Utnlional ommission -
' MR. RODl<l ;o. M odnrn Pr •s iclcnt, I am asking this
q111 ••1t l1111 1111 tlu• ( 'Ii il1•n11111 (1( l'lw ( 'om,uitll'r on Slyle. If the

22 PHILlPP INIJ ' N S'J'l'fU'l'l N/\L LAW
Principles and Ca:;es
wording of 'PREFERENCE' is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,
can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-ti-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it
clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word 'QUALIFIED'?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely 'TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS' as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is
understood. We use the word 'QUALIFIED' because the
existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down conditions
under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on
capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures,
et cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-
self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,
the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated
s tatu te squ ares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left
to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.' "
(4) Power of Congress to enact further legislation involving self-
executing provisions. - "In self-executing constitutional provisions,
the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise
of powers directly granted by the Constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be u sed for
its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reason able
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a p en alty for
the violation of a self-executing con s titutional provision d oes n o t
render such a provision ineffective in l·h(' ob11cncc o f s uch legisla tio n.
The on1ission fro m a o n11Lll~11io11 of n11y ,•xprcHA proviRlon
for n rcnwd y for l nfmri ng 11 11ig lt1 111• II ,l>lllly !~1 nnl nt i.::t•1111nrlly
1 ~ir,1•, 1, , ) , 1111• 111111cl li y nf f,Hnil y life, l·ht' v ila l role of the youth m
.i11 ii1d k ,11io11 lh.il ii w ,1 1 11111 l11l1111d1 •d 111 111 • ttM 1• 11r11l lng, Tlw
111h · I• llt,11 ,1 1wll 1•x111111 11111 p111v l1,lt111 111 1111• 1•rn 1,11l111llor1 tlrn •t1
I N 'I IH ll )I J( 11( ) N 2.1
/\ , { '111w11 p 1 u l ( 'oi111tll11l ltlll
11 11 1 111 •1·••1111uril ,, houHl ll'gi:;lnti vc power o n the subject, but any
11,,11111.11!1 111 111w,l ht· in linrn,on y wi th the C01~s titution, f':1rther
1111 • l 'lll' l\ ' itil' nf conHLiluliona l rig ht and m ake 1t more available.
1 1i 1 •qill' lll lcp,i8l.:1Lion, howeve1~ does no t necessarily mean that the
111 11
111d1j1•rl l'Orrnlilulio nnl provision is n ot, by itself, fully"enforceable."
(!5) Co11slil11lio11nl provision may be self-executing in one part
,,,,,1 IH!II st'/f-1·x1•rn /:i118 i11 n110/:her. - "Respondents also argue th~t
1111' 1\011 :;vlf-1.' <' uting n ature o f Sec. 10, second par. of Art. XII is
l111pl ll'd from 1h , te nor of the firs t and third paragraphs of the same
tWl'I io n w h iC'h und oub tedly a re not self-executing.
'l'lw cHp ume nt is fl awed. If the first and third paragraphs are
11 0 1 Ht· lf•l'X~culing because Con gress is still to enact measures
111 t'lll'0L11-.1,; e the form a ti.o n and operation of enterprises ful~y
ow rwd by Pi lipinos, as in the firs t paragraph, an_d the State ~till
,wvd H legis la tion to regulate and exercise authority over fore1_gn
ln vvsl me n ls w ithin its na tional jurisdiction, as in the third
pi1r,1grn p h, then nforl:iori, by the same logic, t~e second paragra~h
c,111 only be self-executing as it does not by its l~i~gua?~ ~eqm:e
.t ny I 'gis la tio n in order to give preferenc~ to quah~e d Fihpm?s m
1lw g rnnt o f ri g hts, privileges and concessions covermg the national
l'Conomy a nd patrimony. A constih1tional provision may be self-
l'XC uling in o ne part and n on -self-executing in another.
(6) Co11sl'il:11./ional provisions in the nature of guidelines for legisla-
lio11. - Eve n the casei:; cited by respondents holding that certain
conHlitutional provis ions are merely statements of principles ~d
po licies, which a re basically not self-executin~ and only pla~e_d m
1hc 'o ns lilution as moral incentives to legislat10n, not as Judicially
c n forcc11ble r ights, are simply not in point.
Hnsco vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (197
S ' I{;\ 52 l1 991].) sp e aks o f con s titutional provisions on personal
di g nity (sec A rt. II, Sec. 11.), the sai~ctity ?f fam~ly_life (see Art. II,
Sec. ·12.), the v ita l ro le of the youth m nahon-bmldmg (Art. II, Sec.
13.), l'hc pro mo tion of social justice (see Art. XIU,
~ecs. 1, 2.), and
l'lw v,, lll Hof cdu a tio n. (see Art. XIV, Sec. 2.) Tolentino vs. Secretary
({ J"i111111c1• (23r.: S ' IV \ 630 r199~].) refers to con s tit~tional provisions
on HOciHI jL1HIic.: , ond hu ma n ri ghts and on education. (see Art. XIV,
!-it'l-', I.) 1,,1111ly, Ki/oslmyn11, l11c. vs. Momto (240 SCRA 540 [1995].)
d 11•>1 p 1•11v i ilo11H 0 11 1'11, proinolion o f gene ral welfare (see Art. ~I,
1111111111 l.111 lld l11r, 1111d llw pmmnllo n 11f lol,11 hcmHm lib crati.on and
d1 •v1•le1111111 •11 I. ( "11 /\ 1'1, II, fi111' 17.)
1 1
24 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they
are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely
guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest
that they are only principles upon which legislations must be based.
"Res ipsa loquitur."
(7) Constitutional provision in question is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself. - On the other hand, Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
When our Constitution mandates that (i)n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that-
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
a ction may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absen ce of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
s ta tute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. "Ubi jus ibi remedium."
(8) Concept of national patrimony. - "The concept of national
patrimony under the Constitution refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the historical and cultural heritage
o f our race. By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel which 'has
become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine h eritage,'
£alls withiI1 the coverage of the second paragra ph of Section 10,
Article XII of the Con stitution. Therefore, the petitioner should be
prefe rred after it has matched the bid offer of the foreign firm."
(Mn11iln. Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, 267
SCRA 408 [19971, En Bnnc, through Justice Bellosillo.)
P11110, ]., co11c11rring nnrl dissenting:
('I ) Delcm1ini11g wlic/'11cr n co11stitutio11nl prov1s1on is seff-
1•x1•r11Ji11s or 110/. - "To dc t(•rminr w he the r n porli ulor prov is ion
of , Co11Htitnl io11 i,1,1 s1·lf•1· 111•111inn iH , hnrd row lo hm-. Th• kL'Y
111••1 1111 1111 • i1ih•nl of llw f1°i11111•1 1111' llw f1111d11 nwn t.il luw t1fl\'ntiml'S
111 1h1111 •1g11d 111 1111 111111•,tlill\l' A 111•.111 l,11111 li1qtil1 y Hl11111ld l1t• 11111d1•
111 111111 11111 II 1111 • p111vl11l1111 b, li1l1 •111li •d 1111 11 111,•>11'11/ " '"" '11111 1111,
JNTR DU Tl N 25
A. onccpt of Conslilulion
1, 1111 p lelc in itself as a de finitive law, or if it needs futurelegislation
1111· romplclion a nd enforcem ent. The inquiry demands a micro-
111111lysis of the text and the context of the provision in question ."
(2) Provisions are generally considered self-execul'ing. - " Courts
1111 n r11le con sider the provisions of the Constitution as self-
1•)11•euling, rnthe r than as requiring future legislation for their
1•nl111·ct•n.,ent. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are
1101 t 1'1•n lc d os self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law
1111111,·d by the sovere ign p eople can be easily ignored and nullified
I 1y ( 'ongr •s:,. Suffused with w isdom of the ages is the unyielding
11111• 11,nLlegislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights
I II ii ('ongrcRsional inaction should n ot suffocate them."
(J) StJCcific provisions treated as self-executing. - "Thus, we have
111 •11h·d os Helf-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art.
111.) o,, ,ll'l'CHls, searches and seiz ures (Sec. 2.), the rights of a person
1111111•1· cu1-1loclinl .investigation (Sec. 12.), the rights of an accused
(' 11•1•, I '1 .), nnd the privilege a gainst self-incrimination. (Sec. 17.)
II 111 l'l'rogni:t, d that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
1•fl 1•t 1111l, o nslilutio nal provisions guaranteeing the fundamental
1l11li1,1 11f life, libe rty, and the protection of property. The same
l11•11l1l11 •11I i1-1 nccorded to constitutional provisions forbidding
1h11 111ld ng or d nmag ing of property for public use without just
, 11111 111•1111110 11. (Sec. 9.)"
(11) S/Jl'Cijic provisions treated as not self-executing. -
" 1 '11111 1•111·lwhic, case la w lays down the rule that a constitutional
11111vl1il111~ 111 nOI' He lf-executing w h ere it merely announces a policy
1111d 111 l11np,uogc• e mpowers the Legislature to prescribe the means
l,y wlt idi 1lw pnlicy sha ll be carried into effect. Accordingly, we
l111Vi' llt·ld tli(II lhc provisions in Article II of our Constitution
1•1111l1 •tl ' l k d nrnl io n of Principles and State Policies' should
l\1•111•1111 ly I w co111,1 Lrucd os me re statements of principles of the
111 ,111' W1• llilvt· ,1IH0 ruled in Dnsco vs. Phil. Amusements and Gaming
I 1111111111//1111 ( I')'/ S ~RA 52 (1991).), that some provisions of Article
111 (! 11•1•, 1:1,) on 'So iol Jus tice a nd Human Rights,' and Article XIV
('11•1 ~I, ) tlll ' l!d11cnl lon, Science a nd Technology, Arts, Culture and
1,1'111 lti' , ,11111111 lw the bMiA o f judicia lly enforceable rights. Their
11il11111•1111 •111 11111dd1'<•flHC•cl to th discre tio n of Congress though they
1•111vld1• 1111• (1·,tnll' work for k'gis lolion lo e ffectuate the ir policy
I 111 1111111 H
(ii) t '1111,1/ 1/ 11 I 101111/ 11m1i/1,lm111 :,:1•111•rn/ly 1n•m,1u•cliv,· i11 opcrnlio11.
1 111111tll11 ll1 11 111I p111vl1il111111 1liP11ld 11111 bt• 1•,iv1•11 11 1'Pl1'0Hpt•cliv1•
26 PHILIPPINE C<;)NSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
operation unless that is the unmistakable intention of the words
used or the obvious design of the framers (e.g., Sec. 1 of Art. IV,
referring to citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution).
In short, the rule is prospectivity; the exception, retrospectivity.
(Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA4 [1975]; Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague,
196 SCRA221 [1991]; Drenon v. Bennett, 322 S.W. 2d 585.) "Were the
rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might be unduly
disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence of unmistakable
intention to place them within the scope of the Constitution. (Union
Carbide Labor Union vs. Union Carbide Phils., Inc., 215 SCRA 554
[1992], citing 10 Constitutional Law, I. Cruz, 1991 ed.)"
(e) Principle of implied exclusion. - "The expression expressio
unius est exclusio alterius may also be applied though it is not
applicable with the same force to a .constitution as to a statute.
The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional
command. It expresses a rule of construction and serves only as
an aid in discovering a legislative intent, where such intent is not
otherwise manifest. (see Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA 779
[1 991], given under Art. VI, Sec. 16[3].) It should not be applied
where the doctrine of necessary implication (supra.) is applicable.
(see Chua vs. Civil Service Commission, 206 SCRA 65 [1992].)"
(f) Fundamental objective of the Constitution to be considered. -
" Al I over the world, Constitutions share one purpose: to protect
a nd enhan ce the people's interest as a nation collectively and as
pcrnons individually. The Philippine Constitution is no exception.
Int ' rpreta tion of its provisions, therefore, should be done with a
view to realizing this fund amental objective, particularly those on
:m ia l justice as they affect the people at large. (Acar vs. Rosal, 19
S 'H/\ 625 IJ 967].)"
(p;) tnglislt text prevails in case of conflict with Filipino version. -
"The obviomi reason for the rule is that the proceedings as of the
1986 (\,ni,itilut'ionol ommission were conducted in Eng lish a nd
lhl' 'on11lilulion wns officia lly p ro mulgnlcd only in that .language.
(14t'l' /\i'I. XIV, St'C. 8.)"
(h) Vn,1:111· l11fl •n•111·1·11 1111111/ yit'irl l o t'o111:f//11//n11n/ /1111'/ IOl!t', - "Th111-1,
1111 • lt111d 11 nu ·11l1II p 111•p w11• ol 1111• C'0111ili111tltH1 111 en•1li11r; ln,pa rll nl
0 I , 111111111111 111, II l11 11111 "111 pt 111l1111 1h111 tllll11l1111 j11 rl,1t,11111d lq1,1I ttcho lnrRcloflnc nnd explain
11,,tl l1 •, 11•1t ..1,1 l!h •1•1l11•,il '1'1 lh11111tln 111 111111, I IIH1111•1 of C (lllf'/ vH11 1n11 11
11111 Iii• tl1 1l1 •111, 1d l 1y dn11lillttl 111111 lw,1! 11 111 l111111tl11d ni, 1111111 1 11111ll1•1'1-l
111 1111111 n111 Ii 1111 liit, ,,, 11111••• 111 1111lli11 1111 ,11 11111 11 l 11•1l 1ii1111111vl11l n111
INTRODUCTION 27
A. Concept of Constitution
in the Constitution and from the use of possessive words which do
not necessarily imply superiority. Such inferences which are vague
and uncertain must yield to the vital purpose of the <;:onstitution of
safeguarding such impartiality and independence of the Electoral
Tribunals in ascertaining the true will of the sovereign people.
(Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil. 818 (1948].)"
(i) Questions of wisdom, justice, or expediency are non-justiciable.
- "They are beyond the province of the courts to take into account
in the construction of laws or the Constitution where the language
is otherwise clear. (Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 [1950]; see
Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 [1979]; see Art. VIII, Sec. 4.)"
Extrinsic aids to construction.
(1) Primary aids to construction. - The meaning and intent of
1111y provisions of the Constitution should be sought in the words of
I h • document itself rather than in some place outside of it. This is
llil' first and fundamental rule, and the reason is that the very words
, ;t' I he Constitution are the best guides in interpreting its provisions.
' l'l wy are, thus, the primary aids to interpretation and construction.
11111 where the text of the Constitution itself does not reveal the
1111,•nlion of the framers and of the people in adopting it, resort may
lw hod to extrinsic aids to constitutional construction.
(2) Similarity to other constitutions. - The framers of a new
( '1lllfl lilution who adopt provisions contained in the constitution
111 nnother State to which a certain construction has been given are
p11 111t11ncd, as a general rule, to have intended that these provisions
~111ot dd h ave the meaning attributed to them under the earlier
I 111111·11111 n t. The general principle is universally applied unless
111111(' IHHon:1.e thing to indicate an intention of the framers of the new
1111H1lltut·lon to alter the accepted construction. A corollary to the
111l11l'l ple ii, that where a word in the original provision is omitted,
1111 1111nlm-1 ion should be presumed to have been intentional.45
(:1) n,111e111pornry nnd practical construction. -By "contemporary
111111 1111\'l lon" .i H mea nt t·he interpre tation given to a provision of
1 It, A111 111,• ?d , 11( 'on11ld t•1•l1111 lhl' Anwrlr11n mod el nnd o rig in of the Philippine
11,, 11111111• 111 1111• l'hlll111•h11• ~ ·,1111llll11I IP11 l11 Nlt11ll,11• 11,, ,,111 1h01 Amol'ici1 n ·onstilutionol.
l ro , 11111!11~ 1n,ph1l11 I 111h I 'i 111Mli t11t l,111" (1'111111, / , !111p111•,11(1 O plt,lnn; l{t1p11bllc VR,
11,o111,.11 ,1 111y,11,, ,1H1, 1 1tA 1111.mn q )
28
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
lhe Constitution by those who framed it or their contemporaries
including legislative and executive officials particularly where they
likewise served in the constitutional convention. On the other hand,
the construction given by the legislative department as shown by the
Ii1 ws it has passed over the years or by executive officials which they
hnvc consistently fo11owed in the enforcement of such provision is
known as "practical construction." They cannot, of course, prevail
over judicial interpretation.
(a) Legislative construction. - Though not conclusive, such
interpretation is generally conceded as being entitled to great
weight and should not be departed from unless manifestly
e rro neous. While neither length of time nor legislative action,
w i11 sanction a violation of the organic law, resort may be had to
s uch sources to discover the meaning of a provision of doubtful
import. Legislative interpretation may even be determinative
when questions are very close but 'it is of no force where no
doubt exists.46 In any case, such interpretation is not conclusive
l1nd will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous.
The principle of contemporaneous construction may
be npplied to the construction given by the legislature to the
1·nns lilutional provisions d ealing with legislative powers and
procedure. (Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 [1950}.)
In the absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality
or o cha llen ged legislative practice, the repeated erroneous
h111,is ll live interpretation of a constitutional provision does not
V( •1-lt poweron the legis lature. No practice or tradition, established
hy m ' re to le rance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen
l nl o n doctrine of practical cons truction of the Constitution.47
(( :uingonn, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326 [1993].)
'1"111A,n, Ju r. 2d. Ibid., pp. 267-268.
"'lly l1•11lnli11 lw Cini, n~ cnunciotcd in Section 13 of R.A. No. 590, Congress soys thot
i.,~l,111 1111•H11l111 y nf ,1 )udlclnl officer iRnot II dccrcnsc of compensaHon. According to the
1111111•1111•C1111r1, 1hl11111 r, rlcfl r exnmplc of inlcrprelillion or nsccrtninment of the mcnnlng
1111111' pl11 ,11H• " whh I, 1111011 not be dl minlHhcd durlnVi their contlnunnce In office," found
hi 111•1111111 11, Atlli It• VIII 11( the (11/:15) C.:011,11l1111ln11 ( llt)W 8('C, 10, Art. VIII.) rdcrrl nfl I()
M,11,11 l1"1 1111111111h1I 11lf111•rn, 'l'l,l,1 1111 of ln1t·11 11,,1l11g lilt' C'1111,11l1111lnn or nny pllrl thoroof
lty ( 1111111, ,,, 111 , n1dl1111 In 11,,, H11p11111w t '111111, h11111 l11v,1M l1m of 1lw Wt•ll•dl•fhwd rllld
1 l,1hll•i111tl p111v1111,, ,111d 1111 IMdli 111111 ,111111• 11111111111 y l'lti• h111l•1h1l1111111nclt•r our form nf
1111v11111111i,111111 11 ..111111•!1 1l 11• 1,u1I• ,11111/"'w1•1111 1111111•1111d 111111, 1 l11w11 hut 11t1t 111 l11l11rp1,11
1111 111 I 11111 1• 111111,111111111111 ,p,., 1111 I 11 1111, II ''' 1111t,1111I 1'111 l11111h h,w, 1l11, ('1111111l111111111,
(1 111 !1 111t.1 v111 l l11\hl 1111''1 11 hlJ11i l'l" 'il
INTR I ti "J'I N 29
A.. onccpt of ·onslllutlon
(b)'J::xec11tive and administrative construction. The
1 •nn1➔ twction, esp ecially if gen erally accepted and acted upon
over o long p eriod of time, is likewise entitled to great respect.
/\11oln, this rule applies only in case of ambiguity ot doubt.48
(ii ) 011te111pornneous circumstances. - In constitutional cons-
I1111 llon, n court may look to the history of the times and examine
1
tltn 111 ,1 , o f things exis ting when the Constitution was framed and
11111111tt>cl in order to ascertain the prior law, the mischief or evil
,111111\hl Lo be rem edied, and the remedy.
Hw,ry cons titution has a history of its own which is likely to be
11 11 111 or less p eculiar. A constitutional provision must be presumed
111 hnvt· b n framed and adopted in the light and understanding of
111 1111• 111 I exis ting Jaws and with reference to them and, like a statute,
ti, I 11•111 w1·.ly to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at
11111 11111 , of its adoption, the general spirit of the times, and the
pH1v1tlJlng Aen timents among the people49 (see Santos vs. Mallari,
111111111; 'omrn. of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, 21 SCRA 180 [1967];
I 1111d ( ' r•t k Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 [1938].), and
' 1111 It •1111 In l rpreted in the light of this history, a constitution is liable
4~11,1,1, pp, 269-270. As o genernl rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt
,1111I 11111hlf\t1lly 1h01 the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has
r111y 11ppll1t1tlo11, Thua, where the meaning of a constituHonal provision is clear, a
, 1111l1011\111r1rnno11n or prnctlcnl executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight
m11 I w ll 11111h nllowcd to distort or in any way change its natural meaning. The reason
I• 1'11111111, 11pplkntion of the doctrine is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of
11111•111 111 1!11u11provl11lonu lhnn when op plied to statutory provisions and that, except as to
1111111, •~ 1,1111111111('(1by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department,
111111! 11111P1111 y or proclicol construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts.
I 111n111l11 VN ('111•nro, 103 Phll. '1051 [1957].)
~' li t 1111, 111•111\•li for lh • mcr111ing of the language of the Constitution, reference may
I 1,111il11 111 11w hli11orl nl boult1 of the provision. (Cecena vs. Commission on Elections, 95
1 • ti,\ 7•1'1 I 11/HOI,) 11111 hl11toricol discussion, while valuable, is not necessarily decisive.
I Ii, 111 111I ,wtl 11r111111ml condlllonHnrc not static; they change with the times. To identify
1l11 1, , I 111 11 wil11111, tt11111tll111lon with t·he clrcumstonces thnt inspired its inclusion may
1, ,1,t11II 111111p11hl11 ur lwlng 1'('•1pon11lvc to future needs. {J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land
I 11111,1Atl111l11l1i1111tlo11, :I I SC.' l{A 41 3 [1970).)
111 ,\111 1!11 ,,1, pp, 27:1-275, A11 1111 proceedInga were preliminary to the adoption by
tit, \'' "I'''' 111llm Co1111lll11llo111 1hr 11nderAlrtndlnf~ by the convention as :What :was meant
I t I II It 111111111 11 1 t1111111t111lo,111I provltiln11 which wns the H 11bjccl of dchbcrahon, goes a
I ,1 1 w,1y l11w111d 1• ph1l11h111 1l111 1111d1•1M l1111tlln1~ of tlw people when they rotificd It. (Luz
I 1111 v11 •11•11111t11 y ol A111111 l11111(11(111 ,11, 1'/2 Ht'l<A 111119901; tt!'t' 1Jn1Jn, Jr. vs. Cnpco, Jr.,
, • II ,\ 1'1/ 11111ml, 1111111,r A11 X, 1,111' H; Mu, ~11111111v 11, C'nm111l11'1l1111 on Hh1rtl111111, ~05
I II,\ ,,1 ,1 IJllll 11, I 111111 VII Vll1111, 1/1~1 It I( ,\ ' ,'/fl IJ017I)
30 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
to be made to express purposes which were never within the minds
of the peop1'.e in agreeing to it." (People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 481.)
(5) Proceedings at constitutional convention and debates. - In
the construction of the Constitution, recourse may be had to
proceedings in the convention which drafted the instrument. This
rule also applies to debates in Congress upon the form and effects of
proposed amendments to the country, and even legislative reports
benring upon constitutional provisions.
At the same time, it is generally recognized that debates at a
m ns titutional convention are of only limited value and may be an
11111-mfe guide. The opinions of individual members of a convention
l' pressed during a debate, although they are occasionally referred
lo, ore seldom considered as of material value as expressions of
I Ill' view of the convention as a whole. The Constitution derives its
fore' no t from the action of the convention but from the people who
hove ratified and adopted it. Accordingly, debates of a convention
l 'M never be resorted to for the purpose of overruling a plain and
11110 mb ig uous provision.
But the debates in the convention may be of material assistance
111 r,1 howing that a word or clause was used in a certain sense by the
f1·1,111t•rs. And the reports of its committees may be resorted to for the
p,, rprn,c of ascertaining the intent of the framers of a constitutional
wovit-iio n of ambiguous or doubtful meaning.50
(6) Spf'ech of author or sponsor. - The speech of the author or
11ptu11-1or of o provision of the Constitution may be taken as embodying
IIH· inlt•n tio n of the framers of the organic law. This is particularly
11•11(' w hcr no mnendment was offered and there was no debate,
1111d tlw outho r's resolution was readily and totally approved by the
''1111 Ain, J11 r. 2d., pp. 273-275. AH its proceedings were preliminary to the adoption
loy lh1• 1wopl1• or tlw ( 'on8lilu tion, the understnnd ing by the convention ns whnt wns
1111•11111 hy 1lw 1,•l'm,1 or n con11titullonnl p1.·nvision which was the subject of delibernlion,
g.11"1111111111 w11y lnw,ll'd 1•xplni nini:; the undcrRlnnding of t:ho people when they rntiflcd It.
(I 111 1'11111111 v11. St•<T<1h11·y of Agr,1rla 11 Rdorm, 192 S Rt\ 51 [1990:I; sec 13orjo, J,·. vs. ·npco,
I• , 1111, ! t l{t\ 111'/ I 11J9H I, unclnr Al't. X, 811c, 8; M11c,1lln1nl v11. om mitt~lon on [lltclium1, ~05
I( l( A /,I 11 1:mu II; 11111111 Vii, Vi lln1; 6'/0 8C'I<A 579 120 I 21,)
V,,, lly, wlt111l11•1• w,, lllw Ii 111 1101, II IH ,1 hit t.111 111111h In 111111111111' lhfl t c•v11ry u1H' uf
1
ilill II wlt11 v111,•d In 1,111fy 11111 p111pc•~11d , 111111111• tlld "11 only 11 /1,11• 1,1l'flfnlly rcmdl1111 und
11 11 111'1111 ttV1'1 II, p111v l11i,111 hy p1uv l11lt111 111 11•,tlll y, 11 I\IIIH-1 p1111Hllhl J\I' ul thu>it• wl1t1 Ir,
l11v111 111 tl111t"' 11111 I 11111lltnth111dirt _,, 11111\1111111111 l11lllt 1111d 11 11111 (ll11J111l ll' IHlln 'IHh11 I
/\ ' " 1111 1111 1<,,1111•~, ,w1 111 1<A 1 11m, 11 1
31
INTRODUCTION
A. Concept of Constitution
1•onvention. (Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, 84 Phil. 847
11 94:9].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Executive Order No. 284 (issued July 25, 1987) authorizes a
member of the cabinet, undersecretary, or assistant secretary, or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department, to hold in addition to
his primary position, not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor.
Facts: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order runs
counter to Section 13 of Article VII which provides as follows:
"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. x x x." .
The Secretary of Justice, in construing Section 13, Article VII in
relation to Section 7 (par. 2.), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987,
Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, declaring that Cabinet members,
their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may
hold other public office, including membership in the boards of
government corporations: (a) when directly pro~ided fo~ in the
onstitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who 1s made
on ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section
8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed
by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on
the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July
25, 1987, or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987,
promulgated Executive Order No. 284.
Section 7 (par. 2.) of Article IX-B provides:
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary func-
Lions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
off! c or employment in the government or any subdivision,
og1•11r.y or inFIITLHncntality thereof, including government-
ow1w<1 ~11· ronl rolled i:orporotions ot· their subsidiaries."
1011111•: 'l'lw 1h1·,•i,.1l111ld q1u•11lhrn 111: J) 1w!-I thl' prohibition in Section
I ::\ 111 A1•tll'l1• V II, 111 111(,11· 1111 1111• ( ' 11hl1H'I 1111•11,liv1'M, d e. nrc con crncd,

32 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
r
a~mit of the broad exceptions provided for appointive officials in
general under Section 7 (par. 2.) of Article IX-B.
Held: "We rule in the negative."
(1) Ascertainment of the reason and purpose of the framers in
enacting the provision under consideration. - A foolproof yardstick
11
in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. the
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole
as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose."
(2) Evils sought to be remedied by prohibition. - "The practice
of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and
assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of
various government agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, became
prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were
exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his
martial law authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created
agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled
corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of
presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies, or
assi:;tants w ere designated to head or s it as members of the board
with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances
und other pe rquisites o f office. Most of these instrumentalities have
1·cmoined up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in
Hw ,g overnme nt soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public
offlcm lH who took advantage of this sche me for purposes of self-
11nrld1nwn1·. l'n fact, the holding of multip le offices in government
wi111 Hl1't).11g ly dt•11.otin cd on 1·h1.· Ao<w of th, lJntnsnng Pn111lm11sn.
Tlil11 1•rn1d1 1111nn1k,n cnn:w hi 1,•11111l011 10 tl·w publiHhod rcpol't of
11111 ( 'ur1111d11tilu11 011 Audit, 1111111111d I ll1H:1 !1w11mory Annual Audit
l(11p111 I ui1: C1w111•111111111I Ownrnl 1111d l '1111l 1n ll1 d 'twpm•l\llom11 !-Jdf•
t 111 v1•11111111 ll11111d11 fllld t 'n u1111l,u 1ltu11' whl11h t'lll'th1d 1111 1111 l'lKlll'I
INTRODUC TION 33
A. Concept of Constitution
No. 4 a 'Roster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-
wned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983.'"
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved, into one of
Ihe serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It
was, therefore, quite inevitable and in consonance with the
overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional
'ommission, convened as it was after the people successfully
unsea ted former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed
'ons titution the provisions under consideration which are
•nvisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the
hold.i ng of multiple governmental offices and employment. In
( ,ct, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the
ti •liberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling points of
lhc 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its ratification was
1I1c assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous practice
of 'obinet members holding multiple positions in the government
nnd collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom
wQuld be discontinued."
(3) Constitutional intent is to impose a strictet prohibition on the
/lrc,q/r/e11t nnd his official family. - "But what is indeed significant is
1lw fnct that although Sec. 7, Art. IX-B already contains a blanket
pmhibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment
l11 1h ' government subsuming both elective and appointive public
ornciols, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formu-
lnl\.' anothe r provision, Sec. 13, Art. VII, specifically prohibiting the
I '1'l'Hldcnt, Vice President, m embers of the Cabinet, their deputies,
11 11d 01-1sistnnts from holding any other office or employment during
1lwl1· lcnmc, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
llvlcle ntly, from this move as well as in the different phraseo-
lnt1ll'Hof the constitutional provisions in question the intent of the
I 1·111111•1'il o f 1:hc Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on
1lw l'rtHid ' nt and his official family in so far as holding other offices
111· 1•n1ploymcnt in the governme nt or elsewhere is concerned."
(ii) S11r/1 i11 /·<111/: is underscored by comparison with other provisions.
" Mcm :ovc1~ 11uch inte nt is underscored by a comparison of
t 11~'. 1:), Ml. VII with o the r provisions of the Constitution on the
d l,u p111l lflrnllum1 of CN ta in public officials or employees from
l111ld l111', nlli\1 1· offkt'H o r t•mployrn •nt. Unde r Sec. 13, Art. VI, '(N)
11 :11111 11111· 01• Mt111ilw 1· of l'lw I lc111Ht' nr R<: prc1-1cnta ti vcs may hold
1111y 11111111• olfk" ,w 1•111pluy 11111111 In t·lw C:nvl.'1·11111C'nl . . .' U nde r
! 111• 11(11), A1I VI, ' (N)ll 11111111l 1111• pl 11\11 ,1111111d fnr \'H In 1h1 1 11r livf'
II l'I Ill ,I 1'1 'INH 'UNS' l 'l' l'I I I H l NA I , LAW
1'1'111 lpil'fl und t ',111t• 1
1t•rvlr(• flh11II, nt uny tim e, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian
prn1IIIP11 In lh • Covcrnment, including government-owned or
l P1 ii 1'(11 lvd corpon1liorn; or any of their subsidiaries.' Even Sec. 7(2),
/\ ,•1. I -H, rdil'd upo n by .respondents provides '(U)nless otherwise
1tllowed by low en by the primary functions of his position, no
11ppolnll w tifficia l :.;ha ll hold a ny other office or employment in the
( :ov1'1·nnwnt.'
11 111 q1tile notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications
lo hold nllwr office o r e mployment, the prohibition pertains to an
11ffk 1• or· vn,plnymcnt in the government and government-owned or
11111 I 1'<11 l(•d corpora lions or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is
1111 • wording of Sec. 13, Art. VII which s tates that: "(T)he President,
Vl1•1·•l '1·1•,"lidl' lll', the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
111•il1111111li,1 shall 1101·, unless otherwise provided in this Cons titution,
lt11ld un y ul'lwr office or cmpl.oyment during their tenure." In the
I 11 ll •1• pl'OviAion, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified
I I ti 11' ph1·01w ' in th ' ;overnmcnt.' The prohibition imposed on the
l'11·1rl dl'nl ond hiK official fam ily is, therefore, all-embracing and
1l!V1•1'Hboth public ond pdva te offices or employment."
(!-i) S11ch i11t·e11/ wns nrt-iculnted during floor deliberations and
tl1•/mt1•, "Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be
111, k l1 1' wl1l1 thl' Pr 'Kident and his official family was also succinctly
1
111111 1t11111•d hy 'omm issioncr Vicente Foz after Commissioner
l<1•111tl11tlo Mr1111nbong no ted during the floor deliberations and
1h 1lr11l1• 11111 tlwn• wos no syn:nnetry between the Civil Service
p111ltllllllon11, ol'iginolly fo und in the Gen eral Provisions and the
11111 kl p111vd l'l'f)(ll't· on the Executive Department. Commissioner
1111/. 1•11n1111t'nl!•d, 'We nctu olly have to be stricter with the President
1111d tl1t• 11wmb1•l'Hof Hie 'abinct becnusc they exercise more powers
1111d, llll'l'l'fo,·l', m<H'C ch 'cks and restrnints on them are called for
lw1,11 1111• tlw,·t• is mon' poHs ibility of abuse in their case.'
'l'lt11tr, wlt lk· oll o the r appointive officials in the civil service
11 11• 1lluw1·d lo htlld othe r offi ce or employment in the government
d111'111n th1•l1· 11'11111'(' w h ' n s uch is allowed by law or by the primary
t11,1vll1 ►11111 1f tlw lr· positi.ons, members of the Cabinet, their dcputieH
111ul 11111111110111 11 rnny do so only when cxp,·ci;Hly author.ized by th,
{ '111 111tll 11l lo11 11,wlf. lr1 Mlwr word11, S1•1·. 7, Art. IX-13 .is meant Lo lay
d11 w 11 th1 • g1•1w,·,il 1•1tl1 1 llPf)ll1·i1hh• lo 11 11 l'i1'l'll v<,• ond nppohHlvt'
l'I ti 11 h•oil h 111111 ,111d 1•1npl11y111••1, wlill11 :i111•, I:1, A ,•t. VII is nwant· lobt•
1111 1 l'\ 11111111111 •'l 'l'l k,il 1l1• 11,d y 111 1111' 1'1, 0 ild1 1111, tlw Vlw ,1'1·(•i1tdl'11l,
M1i11il 11 •1111111111• t 'i1lil111•I 1l u1l1 d111111lli•11 111111 11 1•1l11t111ll11,"
I N l 'I{( JI H Jt l'I( ) N 35
A, ( '111H1'pl ol (.'01111lllul1011
(/1) ( 't111/ rot y i11/1•1•11rclnl /cm wo11/d rc11clcr nugatory such intent.
" I hl11 lwln11 tlw cnH•, the quolify ing phrnse 'unless otherwise
I1111vh l1 •d l11 lltiK ·0111-itllution' in Section 13, Art. VII cannot
I It 111Mlhly n·l'1'1' Lo th • broad exceptions provided unq~r Section 7,
AI I. I ll of I lw '1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying
pit, ,11111lill 1·1·Hpondcnts woul.d h ave u s do, would render nugatory
1111tl ,111•111il11g lcliH the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of
I ltti ( '1111~11 ILu tIon lo i111 pose a s tricter prohibition on the President,
Vh ,, 1'11• 1ld(•nl, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
111t1il11l1111tr1 with 1"1,pect to holding other offices or employment in
1111· 1',llwl'l1nwnt during their tenure.
H1•11p1)ntknl.H' inte rpretation that Section 13 of Article VII
111 111111 11 of 1lw 1,•xccptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B
w111 tld nhlll1•1·nt • the dis tinction so carefully set by the framers of the
t ', 11 111111LI I ion ui; lo when the high-ranking officials of the Executive
11111111'11 from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand,
1111d tl1l' 1trwra lily of civil servants from the rank immediately
lr1di 1w AHHiHLont Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any
111111•1' 11l fk • 1ll' position in the government during their tenure."
('/) Co11trnry i11t·er11retntion would render inoperative certain
11111 /1 11/' //It' 011t1lil11fio11. - "Moreove1~ respondents' reading of
llu • p1 ovlr-lon1-1 of question would render certain parts of the
( '111111tll111ion inopcrnli ve. This observation applies particularly to
1111' Vkt• l'rl'Hitknl who, under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed
ltt hold o lhPI' office o r employment when so authorized by the
( \ 11111tl11,lion, bul who as an elective public official under Sec. 7,
j111t , ( I ) 11f M l k l' IX-13 is nbsolutely 'ineligible for appointment or
d1 ·1il1111ulhrn In nny capacity to a ny public office or position during
111111\11\lll'(','
!1111,•ly, lo t'l ny that the phrase 'unless otherwise provided in this
t 't1111111111 1011' fo1md in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Sec-
111111 'l, p111·. ( I) of Article JX-B would render meaningless the spe-
1111, p1•11vit1h11H-1 of lhL' onstitution authorizing the Vice-President
111 I l\lll lltl\' n nwmbc r of lhc abinct and to act as President without
1,1ll ,1q11 l1hl,11•, lhv VI c-l'rcHiclcncy where the President shall not
l~11v11111 11•11 !'110111•11 o,· fo ils to qua lify. Su ch absurd consequence can
111• 11v11h l1 1d nnly by ln ll't'pr,•Ling l·hc two provisions under consid-
1•11 11 11111,111 11111 •, /,1·., S1'1·tlon 7, po,·. ( I) of Al'ti.clc lX-B providing the
II"' 11 11,ii 11 rl11,111d Ih1 • ntlw,; /,1•., S(lcllon IJ, A rti.ck VJI as constituting
II 11 • 1•,111pl In, 1 Ih1•11110, I11 IIii • t1 11111 • rll 11111t•1· rnuHI' St'cti on 7, pnr. (2) of
/\ , 11111• I 11111 • l lllllil l 1111d /1/11 ,r y,/1, !<i111•tloi1 1:1, Arllcl1• Vil."
36 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
(8) Constitutional provisions are to be interpreted together. -
"It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that
no provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable,
a nd must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle
a nd nugatory."
(9) Prohibitory language is intended to be a positive negation of
privilege. - "Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
'onstitu tion is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their depu ties and assistants
with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the
government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition
must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege
l)f hold ing multiple government offices or employment. Verily,
wherever the language used in the Constitution is prohibitory, it
IH lo be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
n 'golion.
The phrase ' unless otherwise provided in this Constitution'
rnu1-1 t be given a literal in terp retation to refer only to those particu-
h11· in1-1tances cited in the Constitution itself to wit: the Vice-President
hl'ing oppointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), /\ rlidc VII; or acting as President in those instances provided
11111.k r Scclion 7, pan;. (2) and (3), Article VII; and the Secretary of
Ju111irt· bclng ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
vlr'lllt• <i Sc lion 8(1.), A rticle VIII."
( 10) C'tmRlil11/io11 is /·o Ile i11/cr1m•led 1w ns to nvoid n/J:mrd
uw1111q111°11c1•11.
0
"'f'hc prohlblllun ""1tln11t hold ing dun l or
1111tll lpl1· offl1 11111 or t1rn p loy n1111 1l 11111lt 11' S11t•tlnn IJ, A11lld1· VII of
II IC' { '111111ll 1t11 h,11 11111111 11111, h11w1•v1•1, 111• 111111111111d 1111 11.p p ly l1111 lu
p1,Ml11 rn1 1q ilrn l hy 1111 • tl1w111111111111t h hil111q11 11lflntl 1l w111l 11 wllh1111I
INTRODUCTION 37
A. Concept of Constitution
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office.
The reason is that these posts do not comprise 'any other office'
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials.
To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd
consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines
cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized under
Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-
President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National
Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit
in this Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack
of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries would also be prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the
Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council
(NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employmet1t Administration
(POEA), both of which are attached to his department for policy
coordination and guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and
Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the
Monetary Board. Neither can their respective undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be
assisted by lower ranking employees in providing policy direction
in the areas of money, banking and credit.
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have
j ntended such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed
OH n con tinuously operative charter of government, is not to be
interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable;
nnd unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be
11voidecl."
(1 'I) "Primnry fu nctions" as basis of an exception to the general
m lc. - - "Jt lHinteresting to note that during the floor deliberations
011 1lw propoaol of Commissioner Ch ristian Monsod to add to
H1•elIon 7, f>.!11', (2), Arliclc IX-B, the exception 'unless required by the
I 111 11•lio1111of hlt-J poH1tk>n,' l.'Xprcs1,1 reference to certain high-ranking
11ppplnl llll' p11bl lv offlcli1l» Ill«.• m •mbcn, of the abinet was mad e.
l~1•11111111dl 1111 In II q111 i·y of 'um111ltt1-Jlon•r 13JoA O pie, om-
111111'11! 1111'1' M1 11111nd pol11 l11d 111 11 1h11 t th ,11•11 111·11 l111 1t.1111t11't1 w lwn
 P Tll LI 111'1 N H ' ONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
a lthou gh not required by current law, membership of certain
high-ranking executive officials in other offices and corporations
iH necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions. The
example given by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of
Trade and Industry.
This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in
the plenary session of September 27, 1986. Unde r consideration
1·hen was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the
proposed article on General Provisions. At that time, the article on
Iht.: Civil Service Commission had been approv ed on third reading
l>n July 22, 1986, while the article on the Executive Department,
m ntaining the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also
bten earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986. It was
o nly a fte r the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and
"HLy ling" by the Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the
( ; ' nc ral Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and
1\ 'worcled 'Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
f1111clion1:i of his p osition .. .'
What was clearly b eing discussed then were general principles
w hich would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of
14 peeifi c con s titu ti on a l provisions on the matter. What was primarily
11L iH!-lue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the
qunlified a nd d elimited phrase 'primary functions' as the basis
pf un •xcc ption to the general rule covering all appointive public
uffidnb. Had the Con s titutional Commission intende d to dilute
Ill\' 141M :ific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could
li11w re wo rded sa id Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions
p1·ov kkcl in the n Section 3 of the proposed General Provisions,
lnlt•1· plorecJ ns Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-Bon the Civ il Service
t 'u inmisHio n. At any rate, w e h ave made it clear tha t only the
11ddlll on 11 fu nd io ns a nd duties 'required,' as opposed to 'allowed,'
I, llw pl'imn ry fu nctio ns may be con side red as n o t con stituting a ny
u lIl\'I"offl c '."
( 12) i<t!11orl lo floo r clc/Jales proceedings mny be hnc/ only wl,e11 vllier
Nlt/d1•11fr11/. - " Whit ' ii· is pcrrnissiblc in this jurisdiction to co ns u It the
dtoh11l1 •11 011d p1·on·cd ingH of tht· conKlilulio na l conven tion in orclt•r
lo 111 iv1' 11' llw l'('i1H1)11 .ind p uq ,01-1v o f llw 1'('Htill lng Con s lilullo11 1
11 ••1111•1 1l11 11·1•ll• 11>.iy lw lmd 0 1il y w l11111 111 111•1° t•,1iidw, fnil 0 1-1 Ht1id
p11 1tn11d l11g 11 11 1• p11 w1•1il1"1•1 111 v.i , y 1111 • !1•111111 of 1111· ('o n11li111 l11111
w lt1•111 l1c< 111, •t1 11l111•, 1111'11•,11 I h1l1,111 •,,. l1 11111 • 111111illl1 11i111111 I 1•1111 vP11l h11 1
1111 1 111 v1 ll111 • w111l111 wl111•, 1h11 , l,•w 1 11 1 11111 l11ill vld111il 11 11 11111!111'4, 11 11d
INTRODUCTION 39
A Concept of Constitution
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light
as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law.
We think it safer to construe the Constitution from what
appears upon its face. The proper interpretation, ther~fore, dei:ends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting than m the
framers' understanding thereof."
(13) Prohibition was one of the best selling points of the 1987
Constitution. - "It being clear, as it was, in fact, one of its best selling
points, that the 1987 Constitution ~eeks to _prohibi~ the Pre~ident,
Vice-President, members of the Cabmet, their deputies or ass1stan:s
from holding during their tenure multiple ~~ce~ or employ11:en~ m
the government, except in those cases specified m the Constl~tion
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the d ebate and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be consi.der~d ~s mer~ pe~sonal
opinions which cannot override the Con~tltu~1?n ~ ma~ufest ~tent
a nd the people's understanding thereof. (Civil Liberties l_lmon ~s.
Tl,e Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991], through Chief Justice
Fernan..)
2. Vice-mayor who succeeded to the office of mayor by op_eratio~. of
/mu n11rl served the remainder of the term was sought to be disqualified
Jm111 r111t11ing for reelection on the theory that he had already served as
111nyorfor three consecutive terms.
Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-
n, nylll' of Pa te ros on Jan uary 18, 1988 for a term endin? June 30,
1992. On Septembe r 2, 1989, he b ecame mayor, by operation of law,
upon Hw dcoth of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On Ma~ 11, 1992, h e
,·11 n .ind wus •k•cLccl m nyo r for a te rm. of three years which ended on
'"'"' :\0, l'JlJ!1. ( n Mny 8, ·1995, h e was reelected m ayor for another
1111•111 of Ih l'l tl' y1•11t'H1•11d Ing J111w 30, 'I 998.
l'11tlll1111v1· lh•11 j1111il11 U, li1wjt1, JI'., w hn w.11-1 nltm n ca nd id a te for
111 11 y111•,
HPlll',111 l '1 qwo'1-1 dl11q1111lllic,1l lo11 oi1 tlw l'IWOl'Y 1h,1L 1·hc latte r
wn, tld 1111v1, 11 l1 ,1,1d y 1111v11d 1111 111,1y111' fn 1' 1111 111 1 (:1), 1'111141°1'111 lv1•
40 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
r·
terms by June 30, 1998 and would, therefore, be ineligible to serve
for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission
on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private
respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as
mayor of Pateros. However, ort motion of private respondent, the
COMELEC en bane, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared
Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution,
dated May 7, 1998, of the COMELEC and to seek a declaration that
private respondent is disqualified to serve another term as mayor
of Pateros, Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco' s service as
mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered
as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served from
1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to
have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of
Art. X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death
of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent
became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term.
Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became
mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional
provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials
may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:
"SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
th ree years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected."
This provision is resta ted in Section 43(6) of the Local
Gov rnmont ode. (R.A. No. 7160.)
lt1111lt': 'J'hc ttllCRlion iAwlw1+w1· 11 v i l'•mayor who Hucco •dH to
1h11 offl ' I' uf 11 11\y<:i)' by op1w111l1111 uf l11w 111d 1w1·vcH the nmrnlndcr of
ll 11 • lrn•11111111on11ld1•r11d 1u h11vn 11111v11d l11 lhnl ofllrt1 few 1h11 p11 rpo1w
ol 1111 , 11 11 111• l1•1111 lln1ll,
INTRODUCTION 41
A. Concept of Constitution
Held: Petitioner's contention will not bear analysis. Not only
t •xtual analysis but historical examination as well supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Article IX, Section 8 contemplates
!'ll!l'Vice by local officials for three (3) consecutive terms as a result of
election.
(1) Historical background of Article X, Section 8. - "x x x to
prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only
policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The
other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the
people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how
the official concerned came to that office - whether by election or
by succession by operation of law -would be to disregard one of
I he purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article
X, Section 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of
I he Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
r •jected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia
thnt after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should
be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead,
1'11ey adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian
Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the
Home position in the succeeding election following the expiration of
lh • third consecutive term. Monsod warned against 'prescreening
cnndidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result of
th ' proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft
con1:1 tltution contained provisions 'recognizing people's power.'"
(2) Views of other drafters of the Constitution. - Commissioner
llloHl1. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:
'The principle involved is really whether this Commission
Ahall impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualification on
tho!Je who have served their terms in accordance with the
lirniti; on consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional
·ommi!Jsion. l would be very wary about this Commission
t'Xl'I' lHlng a ROrt of omnipotent power in order to disqualify
llimw w ho h nv • already served their terms from perpetuating
1l1111wwlvl'tt In offic-(•, J l·hink the ommission achieves its
p111•pn110 111 t·t1h1blh1hl11g md1 1gunrchi against the excessive
111, 1111111111!11111 o f pow111• 111 n 1'1•111 111 nf ron1◄tr11liv lo rmR. We do
 PHILIPPIN E CON STIT UT IONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
put a cap on consecutive service - in the case of the President,
six years; in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the
case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members
of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the
party-list and sectoral representation, this is now under
discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials
will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments.
The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent
future situations where, as a result of continuous service and
frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the
municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their
positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that
permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts
lo members of their families in a subsequent election. I think
that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity
0 1' the unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we
nQw decide to put these prospective· servants of the people
0l' politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a
p ·rpetual disqualification. I have a feeling that we are taking
nwt1y too much from the people, whereas we should be giving
1111 much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom
of choice. x x x'
C lhcl' commissioners went on record against 'perpetually
di11q11olify ing' elective officials who have served a certain number
t II ll'rl11Has this would deny the right of the people to choose. As
( 't JI II m iHHioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, 'why should we arrogate
111110 011 l'sclves the right to decide what the people want?'
( 'om missioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when
11lw c 1llcd on her colleagues to 'allow the people to exercise their
11w11 Hl'l1H ' of proportion and [rely] on their own strength to curtail
pow<•1· when it overreaches itself.'
(\1111misHioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: 'Why should we not
11,aV<' I1wrpctual disqualification after serving a number of terms] to
1111• prt•nilH• accepted by practically everybody here that our people
1111• polillro lly mature? Should we use this assumption only when
11 In <'oirvt•ffit•nt .for us, and not when it ,nay also lead to a freedom
t ii d 1okc · flll' llw people and for poHliclnmi who may aspire to serve
I I II 111 lw11w1•?'
1
(:I} 'Hu11 ltl11m1 /11(1 / 1•111,•r,1~11tl JitWI ti,,• 111r11•11mllnx11. "'l'wo idvHH
11111•1 111111111•,i' 1111111 II t't1111,ldc 11•11llt111 111 Ilic• prm•rn1dh11w of IIH•
< 111111lll 11l lt 11111l C'11111111lm1l1111 '1111 1 11 1111111 iii,• 11111 1011 ,1f 111'111/,•1, o/ /1'1111,
INTRODUCTION 43
A. Concept of Constitution
derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a
result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election,
derived from the concern that the right of the people,to choose
those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the
drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the
officials concerned were serving by reason of election. This is clear
from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission
concerning term limits, now embodied in Article VI, Sections 4 and
7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard
to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to
rest for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before
- if the Gentlemen will remember - was: How long will that
period of rest be? Will it be one election which is.three years or
one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Com-
missioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election
following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such
election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter,
this particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really
a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's
stand.
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy
i:-1 thot the people should be allowed to choose those whom they
plcosc to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because
ht! hos olready served three terms, although the first as a result of
tiucccssion by operation of law rather than election, would therefore
hC' to violate this principle. (Borja, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 295
SC /<I\ ·157 {'I 998.1, through Justice Mendoza.)
Pormanence of the Constitution.
( I ) ('(wtilll11lio11 i11tcnrferl to govern far into the indefinite future. -
" 'l'l w Hod ii 111d t·conon, i cond itions are not static. They change
wl lll 1111· tl nm 1, fo idt•nlify lhl' lt'Xt of a written constitution with the
t l11111111 1111111•1•11 1!1111 111 1plrpd lttt Jnd11Hlon rnay render it incapable of
'1111 111,1 1c 0 q111111il v c• 111 f111111•t• 111 111d 11, l'r11d 1wly, II IN 1mi11n·wd to be one
44 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
r
of the virtues of a written constitution that it suffices to govern the
life of ·the people not only at the time of its framing but far into the
indefinite future."
(2) Constitution intended to have an indefinite life. - "The
continuing life of a constitution was stressed by one of the chief
architects of the 1935 Constitution~ Manuel A. Roxas, later to be the
first President of the Republic. For him, it is the 'essence [of such
an] instrument.'51 It was his view that the constitution to be adopted
by the Constitutional Convention of 1934 would 'have an indefinite
life, will be permanent, subject, of course, to revisions, amendments
and other changes that may be adopted constitutionally.'52 That
would be an assurance that constitutional guarantees 'will be
maintained, property rights will be safeguarded and individual
rights maintained immaculate and sanctified. x x x.'53
Another prominent delegate, Gregorio Perfecto, later a
member of this Tribunal, aptly noted that the transitory character
is essentially incompatible with the nature of laws, and necessarily
so of a constitution, which is the supreme law of a people and,
therefore, must be impressed with such attribute of permanency,
much more than ordinary statutes passed under its authority."54
(3) Constitution intended to be adapted to changing conditions. -
"It could thus be said of our Constitution as of the United States
onstitution, to borrow from Chief Justice Marshall's pronounce-
ment in McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat 316 [1819].), that it is 'in-
tended to endure for ages to come and consequently, to be adapted
to the various crisis of human affairs.' It cannot be looked upon as
other than, in the language of another American jurist, Chief Justice
Stone, 'a continuing instrument of government.' (United States v.
'lassie, 313 U.S. 299 [1941].)
Its framers were not visionaries, toying with speculations or
theories, but men of affairs, at home in statecraft, laying down the
foundations of a government which can make effective and operative
all the powers con ferred or assumed, with the corresponding
~11 ll1•m ·1tlllh11c1 I o ( Lhc Philippliw C',11111lll11l lom1I C'o11vc1111.lon, LllUR'I nd,, p, 566
(1'11111),
'•AU,/rl , p, 11i',I
' \Jlil,I (I ',i',t
• m
1
,,1 "', ,,111,.i 1
INTRODUCTION 45
B. Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
l't·lltdctions to secure individual rights and, anticipating, subject
lu the limitations of human foresight, the problems that events to
c11mc in the distant days ahead will bring. Thus, a constitution, to
quote from Justice Cardozo, 'states or ought to state not rules for the
pnHf;ing hour, but principles for an expanding future."' 55
(4) Constitution intended to be construed with a measure of
flexibility. - "To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our
'onstitution, any constitution, is not to be construed narrowly or
I> ·dontically, for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase
Jufl tice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence
111 their form, but are organic living institutions, the significance
of which is vital, not formal. There must be an awareness, as with
JI ultice Brandeis, not only of what has been, but of what may be. The
words employed by it are not to be construed to yield fixed and rigid
11111:1 wers but as impressed with the necessary attributes qf flexibility
nnd accommodation to enable them to meet adequately whatever
l 1.·oblems the future has in store. It is not, in brief,_a printed finality
but a dynamic process." (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [19701, per Justice Fernando.)
B. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES
The 1935 Constitution.
(1) Framing and ratification. - Briefly stated, the steps which
led to the drafting and adoption of the 1935 Constitution of the
11hilippines are as follows:
(a) Approval on March 24, 1934 by President Franklin
0. Roosevelt of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, otherwise known
QR the Philippine Independence Act, enacted by the United
StoteA Congress, authorizing the Philippine Legislature to
·oil a cons titutional convention to draft a constitution for the
Philippines;
(b) A cep tance on May 1, 1934 by the Philippine Legislature
by ron un· nt rcRolution of the Tydings-McDuffie Independence
J,11w 1111 1'('q11!rvd Jn 1-mid Jnw;
- ~"'rhu N 11t1111, ~
1rfmlld 11l 1111:1,,•~••• I' fl I ( lV:n ),
 If
46 PI-IILIPPINE CONSTITUTIO NAL LAW
Principles ahd Cases
(c) Approval on May 5, 1934 by the Philippine Legislature
of a bill calling a constitutional convention as provided for in
the Independence Law;
(d) Election on July 10, 1934 of delegates to the convention;
(e) Inaugural session on July 30, 1934 of the Constitutional
Convention;
(£) Approval on February 8, 1935 by the convention with
a vote of 177 to 1 of the Constitution (the signing began on the
following day and was completed on February 19, 1935);
(g) Submission on March 18, 1935 of the Constitution to
President Franklin D. Roosevelt by a committee composed of
Senate President Manuel L. Quezon, Convention President
Claro M. Recto, and delegate Manuel A. Roxas;
(h) Approval on March 23, 1935 by President Roosevelt of
the Constitution as submitted to him,· together with a certification
that the said Constitution conformed with the provisions of the
Independence Law; and
(i) · Ratification on May 14, 1935 of the Constitution by the
Filipino electorate by a vote of 1,213,046, with 44,963 against.
(2) Limitations and conditions. - While the Tydings-McDuffie
Law empowered the Filipinos to frame their own cons~tution'. it
contained, however, provisions limiting such authority. Aside
from other specific limitations and conditions laid down the~ein, _it
enjoined that the constitution to be drafted should be ~epubh~a:11 m
form, should include a bill of rights, and should contam prov1s10ns
intended to define the relations between the Philippines and the
United States during the commonwealth period and after the
establishment of the Philippine Republic.
(3) Sources. - The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines _did
not contain original ideas of government. While the domin~tin?
influence was the Constitution of the United States after which it
was modelled, the following sources were also consulted by the
framers:
(a) The Malolos Constitution;
(b) The three (3) organic laws enforced in the Philippines
before the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, namely: the
Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second
INTRODUCTION 47
B. Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
Philippine Commission on April 7, 1900; the Philippine Bill
of July 1, 1902; and the Jones Law of August 26, 1916 which,
of the three mentioned, was the nearest approach to a written
constitution; •
(c) The German Constitution;
(d) The Spanish Constitution;
(e) The Mexican Coflstitution;
(f) The unwritten English Constitution; and
(g) The constitutions of several South American countries.
(4) Scope. -The Constitution as approved by the 1935 Consti-
tutional Convention was intended both for the Commonwealth and
the Republic. Thus, Article XVII (which later became Article XVIII
after the Constitution was amended) declares: "The government
established by this Constitution shall be known as the Common-
wealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Phil-
ippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall
thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."
(5) Amendments. - The 1935 Constitution had been amended
three (3) times, as follows:
(a) In a plebiscite on October 24, 1939, our people ratified
the changes to the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution in
accordance with the requirements of the Tydings-Koscialkowski
Act which liberalized the onerous economic provisions of the
Tydings-McDuffie Law;
(b) In a plebiscite on June 18, 1940, our people ratified three
amendments proposed by the National Assembly, namely: the
establishment of a bicameral legislature; the re-eligibility of the
President and the Vice-President for a second four-year term of
office;1 and the creation of a separate Commission on Elections;
and
(c) In a plebiscite on March 11, 1946, our people ratified the
so-called "Party Amendment" which gave to American citizens
1The 1935 Constitution provided for one six-year term for the President. It was
amended to favor President Quezon whose term was expiring in 1941 to enable him to
run for reelection for another two years.
 I J
,1u l'.I IIJ ,ll' l' I NH ON: 'l'l rlJ'J I NAI, I. AW
Pdnciples nnd Coses
equal rights with the Filipinos in the exploitation of our natural
resources and the operation of public utilities.
Concerning women suffrage, the issue was settled in a
plebiscite held on April 30, 1937, when 447,725 women reportedly
voted yes and 44,307 women voted no. In compliance with the 1935
Constitution (Art. V, Sec. 1, thereof.), the National Assembly passed
a law which extended right of suffrage to women.
(6) Suspension of operation. - The 1935 Constitution ceased
to operate during the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1944. It
automatically became effective upon the re-establishment of the
Commonwealth Government on February 27, 1945 (supra.) and the
inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines on July 4, 1946.
The 1973 Constitution.
· (1) Framing. - The experience of more than three (3) decades as
a sovereign nation had revealed flaws and inadequacies in the 1935
Constitution. Swept along in the current of global developments
and confronted within by a roused citizenry clamoring for social,
economic, and political reforms, the Filipino people realized that
their basic law needed overhauling if it was to remain responsive to
the people's needs. Indeed, it had been vulnerable to such criticisms
as "colonial," "outmoded," "over-centralized," "devoid of social
and economic rights," and others.
(a) Taking into account the "felt necessities of the times,"
particularly the new and grave problems arising from an ever-
increasing population, urgently pressing for solution, Congress
in joint session on March 16, 1967, passed Resolution of Both
Houses No. 2 (as amended by Resolution No. 4, passed on June
17, 1969.), authorizing the holding of a constitutional convention
in 1971.
(b) On August 24, 1970, Republic Act No. 6132 was ap-
proved setting November 10, 1970, as election day for 320 dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention. The convention started
its work of rewriting the Constitution on June 1, 1971. The 1935
Constitution was made the working basis for the drafting of the
proposed Constitution with the Malolos Constitution as "point
of reference" but there was no consensus as to what was meant
by the quoted expression.
I N I N.UUU l'LUN 11!)
U. Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
After 15 months, on its 291st plenary session on November
29, 1972, the convention approved the new proposed charter
of the land. The vote was 273 in favor, 15 against, 27 absent.
One refused to vote. There were no abstentions. Th~ proposed
Constitution was signed the following day, November 30, 1972.
(2) Approval by the Citizens Assemblies. - Earlier on September
21, 1972, the President of th~ Philippines issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the entire country under Martial Law.
(a) "To broaden the base of citizens' participation in the
democratic process, and to afford ample opportunities for the
citizenry to express their views on important matters of local
or national concern," Presidential Decree No. 86 was issued on
December 31, 1972 creating a Citizens Assembly in each barrio in
municipalities and in each district in chartered cities throughout
the country.
- Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 86-A was issued on
January 5, 1973 defining the role of barangays (formerly Citizens
Assemblies). It provides that the barangays created under
Presidential Decree No. 86 "shall constitute 't he base for citizens'
participation in governmental affairs and their collective views
shall be considered in the formulation of national policies or
programs and, whenever practicable, shall be translated into
con,crete and specific decisions."
(b) Under Presidential Decree No. 86-A, the barangays were
to conduct a referendum on national issues between January 10
and 15, 1973. Pursuant to the Decree, the following questions
were submitted before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays:
1) "Do you approve of the New Constitution?"; and
2) "Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify
the new Constitution?"
(3) Ratification by Presidential Proclamation. - According to
Proclamation No. 1102 issued on January 17, 1973, 14,976,561
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the
adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against 743,869 who
voted for its rejection. On the question as to whether or not the
people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution, it stated that 14,298,814 answered that there was no
need for a plebiscite.
~ II II ll
1'1llLIL1l'lNJl ' N ' ' l'J'l'U'l'I NAI , LAW
Principles and Cases
On the basis of the above results purportedly showing that more
than 95% of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
were in favor of the new Constitution and upon the allegedly "strong
recommendation" of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay, the President of
the Philippines, through Proclamation No. 1102 issued on January
17, 1973, certified and proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been ratified by the Filipino
people and had thereby come into effect.2
(4) Amendments. - The 1973 Constitution had been amended
on four (4) occasions: 3
(a) In the referendum-plebiscite held on October 16-17, 1976,
seven (7) amendments to the 1973 Constitution as proposed
under Presidential Decree No. 1033 were ratified by the people.
The amendments, amorig others, created an interim Batasang
Pambansa, made the then incumbent President the regular
President and regular Prime Minister, and granted concurrent
lawmaking powers to the President which the latter exercised
even after the lifting of martial law in 1981.4
(b) In the plebiscite held simultaneously with the January
30, 1980 local elections, the amendment making 70 years as
2In cases involving the above proclamation, the Supreme Court on March 31,
1973, by a vote of six (6) to four (4), dismissed all the petitions filed. It said that "this
being the vote of the majority there is no further obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect." (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, et al.; Tan vs. Executive
Secretary; Roxas vs. Melchor; Montedaro vs. Executive Secretary; Dilag vs. Executive
Secretary, 6 SCRA 1048 (1973]; see also Aquino vs. Commission on Elections and National
Treasurer, 62 SCRA 276 (1975].) There was, however, no ruling that the 1973 Constitution
has been validly ratified, because six (6) out of ten (10) justices held that there was no
valid ratification, but the votes were not enough to declare that the Constitution was
not in force. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court recognized the validity of the 1973
Constitution. (see Occei\a vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1 (1981].)
Under the 1935 Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 10 thereof.) "No treaty or Jaw may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
Court." The Supreme Court under the 1935 Constitution was composed of 11 members.
3There was a general perception that the results of the electoral processes, particularly
those conducted during the period of martial rule, were not necessarily reflective of the
popular will.
4
President Marcos maneuvered to have the constitutional convention approve
the parliamentary system so that he could stay in power as Prime Minister. Later, he
successfully obtained the constitutional amendment that combined in his person the
offices of both President and Prime Minister.
IN rt, JIJU J'IUN II
B. Constitution of the Republlc of the Philippines
the retirement age for members of the judiciary under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 54, was approved by the people.
(c) In the third plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, the following
amendments were likewise ratified by the people:
1
1) establishing a modified parliamentary form of
government;
2) instituting electoral reforms; and
3) permitting natural-born citizens who have lost their
citizenship to be a transferee of private land, for use by them
as residence.
(d) In the fourth plebiscite held on January 27, 1984, the
amendments ratified by the people are the following:
1) apportioning the members of the Batasang Pamban-
sa among the provinces, cities, and Metropolitan Manila or
its districts;
2) providing for an ordinance to be appended to the
Constitution containing such apportionment;
3) establishing a different mode of presidential succes-
sion by creating the office of Vice-President and abolishing
the Executive Committee;
4) allowing the "grant" of lands of the public domain
to qualified citizens;
5) providing that at least a majority of the members of
the cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the
elected representatives of the Batasang Pambansa; and
6) providing for urban land reform and social housing
program.
The 1987 Constitution.
(l) The Constitutional Commission of 1986. - The 1987 Consti-
tution was drafted by a Constitutional Commission created under
Article V of Proclamation No. 3 issued on March 25, 1986 which pro-
mulgated the Provisional Constitution or "Freedom Constitution"
following the installation of a revolutionary government "through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people." Said Article Vis
quoted below:
II I I
1' 111.1 11 °1111 ll t I IN 11111 / 1 II JNA I, LAW
1 lNTR OU TION
JJrfo lple11 und /lfl\lll
"Adoption of a New Constitution
,\•
Section 1. Within sixty (60) days from date of this Procla-
mation, a Commission shall be appointed by the President to
draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed
of not less than thirty (30) nor more than fifty (SO) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, of recognized . probity, known for
their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be
chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors
of society.
Section 2. The Commission shall complete its work within
as short a period as may be consistent with the need both to
hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to
draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of
the Filipino people.
Section 3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to
insure that the people will have adequate participation in the
formulation of the New Constitution.
Section 4. The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be
public and fully recorded.
Section 5. The New Constitution shall be presented by the
Commission to the President who shall fix the date for the
holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite
which shall be held within a period of sixty (60) days following
its submission to the President."
(2) Law governing the Commission. - Pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 and "in accordance with the mandate of the people to work
toward the establishment of a just, free and democratic constitutional
order within the shortest time possible," the President promulgated
on April 23, 1986 Proclamation No. 9, the "Law Governing the
Constitutional Commission of 1986," "to organize the Constitutional
Commission, to provide for the details of its operation and establish
the procedure for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new
Constitution."
(a) Under the Proclamation, the Constitutional Commission
"shall be composed of not more than fifty (50) national, regional,
and sectoral representatives who shall be appointed by the
I J
53
B. Constitution-of the Republic of the Philippines
President." As coI,1stituted, the Commission was composed
only of forty-eight (48) members5 -forty~two (42) men and six
(6) women, with a preponderance of lawyers - beca,use of the
withdrawal of an opposition appointee and non-acceptance by
the Iglesia ni Kristo of the President's offer to submit a nominee.
'
'
(b) Proclamation No. 3. did not fix a definite time frame
for drafting the Constitu.tion except that the Constitutional
Commission "shall complete its work within as short a period
as may be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of
normal constitutional government and to draft a document truly
reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people."
In contrast, Proclamation No. 9 mandated the Constitutional
Commission to "endeavor to complete its work on or before
September 2, 1986 and thereafter, present to the President the
proposed new Constitution."
(3)' Framing and ratification. - The Constitutional Commission,
whidn marked the fourth exercise in the writing of a basic charter
in Philippine history since the Malolos Constitution at the turn of
the century/ convened on June 2, 1986 at the Batasang Pambansa
Building in Diliman, Quezon City. With the Malolos Constitution of
1898, the 1935 Constitution, and the 1973 Constitution as "working
drafts," the Commission, in addition to committee discussions, public
hearings, and plenary sessions, conducted public consultations in
different parts of the country.
The proposed new Constitution was approved by the Constitu-
tional Commission on the night of Sunday, October 12, 1986, culmi-
nating 133 days of work, by a vote of 44~2. A Commissioner7 signed
subsequently by affixing his thumbmark at his sickbed on October
14, 1986 so that 45 actually voted in favor of the draft. Another Com-
5
Many of the members appointed were believed to be either related to the high
officials of the administration and / or other close friends or recommendees. Some were
persons who suffered or were imprisoned during the martial law regime.
6This does not include the 1943 Constitution which was drafted and ratified
by a special National Convention of the Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sn Bngong Pilipinns
(KALIBAPI) when the Philippines was under Japanese occupation from 1942-1944
during World War II.
7
Decoroso R. Rosales, at St. Luke's Hospital, Quezon City.
J IJ IJ 11 I II IJ
l'J JLU l'J '! Nil 'O N STl'J'U'l'JON/\L LJ\W
Principles and Cases
missioner8 had resigned earlier. The two Commissioners9 who dis-
sented also signed "to express their dissent and to symbolize their
four (4) months of participation in drawing up the new Constitu-
tion."
The Constitutional Commission held its final session in the
morning of October 15, 1986 to sign the 109-page draft consisting
of a preamble, 18 Articles, 321 Sections and about 2,000 words, after
which, on the same day, it presented to the President the original
copies in English and Filipino. The draft Constitution was ratified by
the people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987. It superseded
the Provisional Constitution which had abrogated the 1973 Charter.
(4) Merits and demerits of an appointive framing body. -
Admittedly, there were some merits or advantages in delegating
the drawing up of the new charter to an appointed Constitutional
Commission rather than to an elected ~onstitutional Convention.
(a) The Constitutional Commission was not expensive
and time-consuming, unlike our experience with the 1971
Constitutional Convention and it was thus practical because
the country could not then afford the cost of electing delegates
because of lack of funds, and time was of the essence in view of
the instability inherent in a revolutionary government and the
ne·ect to accelerate the restoration to full constitutional democracy.
There was also no assurance that a better Constitution would
have been drafted by delegates elected by the people than
one prepared by a select group composed of individuals and
"chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors
of society," with the people, through public hearings, having
"adequate10 participation in [its] formulation."
Moreover, the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were available
as guidelines for the new organic law, and in the light of
our recent political experiences as a people, there was little
8
Lino 0. Brocka.
9
Jose E. Suarez and Jaime S.L. Tadeo.
10
On the basis of the canvass made by the Commission on Elections as per
Proclamation No. 58 of the President dated February 11, 1987, 16,622,11 voted "yes"
(76.30% of the total votes cast) as against 4,953,375 representing "no" votes (22.74%) with
209,780 abstentions (0.96%).
I l J
I N'J'J.{OUUC'J'lON 55
B. Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
disagreement then as to the flaws or defects to be corrected in
either Constitution or the improvements needed to be made
therein.
(b) Two fundamental arguments against this method are:
first, an appointive body is susceptible to the charge of lack
of independence and to the suspicion of pressure and even
manipulation by the appointing power; and second, the writing
of a · Constitution as the highest expression of the people's
"ideals and aspirations" is a political exercise of transcendental
importance in a republican democracy and, therefore, only
those directly elected and empowered by the people mus t be
entrusted with the task to discharge this grave and solemn
responsibility.
Infirmities in the formulation and/or ratification
of the Philippine Constitutions.
Th~. Philippines has had six (6) Constitutions within a period of
88 yeari.since 1899 to 1987 but not a Constitution desirable in stable
democracies, namely, a charter authorized under an independent
Republic, framed by elected delegates, and ratified under a
democratic government.
(1) The 1899 Malolos Constitution. - It was drafted by non-
elective delegates, not ratified, and not implemented. (infra.)
(2) The 1935 Constitution. - It was formed by elected delegates
and ratified by the electorate but it did not fully reflect the voice of
the Filipinos because it was drafted and approved at a time when the
Philippines was not yet a free and independent nation. Moreover,
the Constitution adopted had to be approved by the President of the
United States before it would become effective. It was, therefore, to
an extent, a colonial document.
(3) The 1943 Constitution. - It was ordered by an occupying
army, drafted by commissioners who were not elected by the p eople,
and not ratified by the electorate. (infra.)
(4) The 1973 Constitution. - It was framed by elected delegates
but was not ratified by the electorate in a plebiscite. It was drafted
and arbitrarily implemented and amended under a martial law
regime.

1'1 HI ,ll'l'I N l1. 'UN:3'l'l'J'U'J'1U NAI, L AW
· Prlnclples and Cases
(5) The 1986 Provisional Constitution. - It was drafted admi-
nistratively by a revolutionary government and not ratified. (infra.)
(6) The 1987 Constitution. - It was authorized by a revolutionary
government, framed by appointive commissioners, and ratified
under the authority and auspices of said government. The theory
is posited that having it amended by elected delegates and having
the amendments ratified under the present democratic government,
will cure any infirmity in its formulatiofi; and ratification.11
Basic principles of government underlying
the Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution is founded upon certain fundamental
philosophies or principles of government which have become
part and parcel of our cherished democratic heritage as a people.
A knowledge of these principles is, therefore, essential to a proper
understanding of our organic law. Among these principles as
contained in the Constitution are the following:
(1) Recognition of the aid of Almighty God (see Preamble.);
(2) Sovereignty of the people (see Art. II, Sec. 1.);
(3) Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy (see
Ibid., Sec. 2.);
(4) Supremacy of civilian authority over the military (see Ibid.,
Sec. 3.);
(5) Separation of church and State (see Ibid., Sec. 6.);
(6) Recognition of the importance of the family as a basic social
ins titution and of the vital role of the youth in nation-building (see
Ibid., Secs. 12, 13; Art. XV.);
(7) Guarantee of human rights (see Art. III, Secs. 1-22; Art. XIII,
Secs. 17-19.);
(8) Government through suffrage (see Art. V, Sec. l.);
(9) Separation of powers with the concomitant checks and
balances (see Art. VI, Sec. 1.);
(10) Independence of the judiciary (see Art. VIII, Sec. l.);
115ee "Thoughts: RP Constitution," by Former President DIOSDADO MACAPA-
GAL, p . 7, Manila Bulletin, Feb. 5, 1989.
lN'J'H.Ul.)U ''!'!ON 57
C. Concepts of State and Government
(11) Guarantee of local autonomy (see Art. X, Sec. 2.);
(12) High sense of public service morality and accountability of
public officers (see Art. XI, Sec. 1.);
•
(13) Nationalization of natural resources and certain private
enterprises affected with public interest (see Art. XII, Secs. 2, 3, 17,
18.);
(14) Guarantee of social justice and promotion of individual
and social welfare (Art. XIII, Secs. 1-16.);
(15) Non-suability of the State (see Art. XVI, Sec. 3.);
(16) Rule of the majority (see Art. II, Sec. l.); and
(17) Government of laws and not of men. (Ibid.)
The above principles are discussed under the corresponding
provisions indicated.
. C. CONCEPTS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
Meaning of state.
A state is a community of persons more or less numerous,
permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, having a
goverrun.ent of their own to which the great body of inhabitants
render obedience, and enjoying freedom from external control. 1
Elements of state.
The modern state has four (4) constituent elements.
(1) People. -This refers to the mass of population living within
the state constituting the body politic. The people forming the state
need not have common racial, culture, ideological or commercial
interests. It is sufficient that they are bound together by political
ends. Without people there can be no functionaries to govern and
no subjects to be governed.
There is no requirement as to the number of people that should
compose a state. But it should be neither too small nor too large: small
enough to be well-governed and large enough to be self-sufficing.2
1
See GARNER, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 38-41.
2
See GARNER, Political Science and Government, p. 74.
 II
111 l'I 111 ,ll ' l 'I N I( tlNI II 11 I J I IU NA I , 1,/\W
Prl11clpl 'll lllld '.ltlCil
Reputedly, the smallest state in point of population is Vatican City.
Its estimated 900 citizens, mainly clerics and some Swiss guards, are
ruled by the Pope. China is the largest state in point of population
placed at more than 1.6 billion. The population of the Philippines
breached the 100 million in July 2014 based on the court conducted
by the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). It has now an
estimated population of more than 105 million.
(2) Territory. - It includes not only the land over which the
jurisdiction of the State extends, but also the rivers and lakes therein,
a certain area of the sea which abuts upon its coasts, and the air
space above them. Thus, the domain of the state may be described
as terrestrial, fluvial, maritime, and aerial. Within its territory, the
state alone and no other, can make and enforce laws.
The smallest independent state in point of territory is the Vatican
City State3 located just outside the w~stern boundary of Rome in
Italy with an area of only 0.17 square mile or 0.44 square kilometer.
It would fit in Rizal Park in Manila. The erstwhile United Soviet
Socialist Republic (USSR) was the largest state in point of territory
with its total land area of about 8,599,776 square miles.• Now, the
biggest state is Canada, having an area of 3,599,776 square miles or
about 22, 273, 410 square kilometers which covers a surface nearly
as large as Europe. The Philippines has a total land area of 115,813
square miles or 299,599 square kilometers.5
(3) Government. - It refers to the agency through which the will
of the state is formulated, expressed and carried out. The word is
3The Supreme Court discusses its status as a sovereign state in The Holy See vs.
Rosario, Jr. (238 SCRA 524 [1994].} given as illustrative case under Section 2, Article II.
The Vatican City State is governed by a commission appointed by the Pope. He has
a cabinet and ambassadors but it maintains no army except the Swiss Guards.
4With the collapse of communism in the USSR, the break-up of the Soviet Union into
eleven (11} independent states followed. Eleven (11} of the twelve (12} Soviet Republics
which remained after the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania reclaimed their
independence, formed in December 1991 a loose political alliance called "Commonwealth
of Independent States" (CIS). However, only seven (7) of the eleven (11) republics signed
the CIS charter in January 1993.
2 2
5 A square mile is equivalent to 2.59 square kilometres (km } and km is equal to
0.3861 sq. m. The Philippines is an archipelago, with more water than land . With the
effectivity on November 15, 1994 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS} establishing the marine territories of countries and a nation's right to explore
its marine resources, the Philippines is now the 23rd largest country in terms of territory.
(see Article I, Notes 12 to 15.}
J
I N ll-!)I U ' l'J N S9
C. Concepts of State and Government
sometimes used to refer to the person or aggregate of those persons
in whose hands are placed for the time being the function of political
control. This "body of men" is usually spoken of as"administration."
I
The ordinary citizens of a country are a part of the state, but are
not part of the government.
(4) Sovereignty. - The term may be defined as the supreme
power of the state to command and enforce obedience to its will from
people within its jurisdiction and corollarily, to have freedom from
foreign control. Sovereignty, has been referred to as the supreme,
absolute and uncontrollable power by which any State is governed.
(see U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332 [1903].)
State as an entity distinct
from the people.
The state, as a juristic or legal person, refers to the group
of hu.man beings organized as a body politic that constitutes the
repository of sovereignty. However, the Constitution calls upon the
state to promote the welfare and protect the rights of the people
subject 'to its authority. Thus, the Constitution speaks of the rights
of the people to h ealth (Ibid., Sec. 15.) and to social justice. (Art. XIII,
Sec. 1.) By said provisions, the state is envisaged as an entity distinct
and separate from the people considered as a body of individual
persons.
The people then, as an organized legal community, is the state
in which sovereignty resides and which, through the government,
is entrusted with the necessary authority to ensure the well-being
and security of the people who, in turn, as individual members,
are under obligation to support and defend the state as the legal
association of all of them collectively.
The state in international law.
States are members of the family of nations regardless of
their forms. So long as a state possesses the requisite attributes,
international law does not concern itself with the form of its
government.
It would be advisable to make a distinction between two
international groups, namely: the Family of Nations and the United
Nations. Any state is a member of the Family of Nations if recog-
nized by enough members to give it international p ersonality. The
 _1'II11.ll'l'I NH ~ l IN!• I I I I I I It )NA I , I .AW
JJl'lndplc11 ond 'nHcll
United Nations, on the other hand, is an organization of sovereign
or semi-sovereign states that are accepted as members in a~cordance
with its charter. The Philippines is a member of both.
State distinguished from nation.
Nation should not be confused with state as they are not the
same.
(1) State is a legal or political concept, while nation is a racial
or ethnic concept. A nation is a group of people bound together
by certain characteristics such as common social origin, language,
customs, and traditions, and who believe that they are one and
distinct from others. The term is more strictly synonymous with
"people." Thus, a state is considered an ideal person, intangible
and immutable, while a nation refers to a distinctly identifiable and
visible group of people;
(2) A state is not subject to external controt while a nation may
or may not be independent of external control; and
(3) A single state may consist of one or more nations or peoples
and conversely, a single nation may be made up of several states. The
United States is a melting pot of several nationalities. On the other
hand, the Arab nation is divided politically into several sovereign
states. Among them are: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and others. The Philippines is a state consisting of one
nation although the Filipinos are composed of Christians, Muslims,
and those identified as indigenous cultural communities.
In common usage, however, the two terms are often used
synonymously. The United Nations is actually composed of States
and not nations. The Constitution uses them interchangeably.
State distinguished from government.
In common speech, they are usually regarded as identical.
As ordinarily, the acts of the government (within the limits of the
delegation of powers) are the acts of the state, the former is meant
when the latter is mentioned, and vice-versa.
(1) Relationship of principal and agent. -The government is only
the agency through which the state expresses its will. A state cannot
exist without a government but it is possible to have a government
without a state. Thus, we had various governments nt different
I N I 1( 4 II ll ll I II l t J
' 'on 'CJ)lil o( SLnlc 1111d (.;own1111cnl '"
periods of our history, from pre-Spanish time to the present.
Government is only one of the essential requisites of a state.
(2) Change in system of government. - The government may
change, its form may change, but the state, as a juridical entity, is not
affected. As long as the requisites are present, the state remains the
same although with a different system of government. Any change
of government or administration through direct action of the people
(e.g., revolution) would be lawful, for it is considered the direct act
of the state itself.
(3) Imputation of wrongdoing. - The maxim that "the King can
do no wrong" has no place in a democratic system of government.
The state can speak and act only by law. Whatever wrong is
committed by the government in the name of the state is imputable
to the govemment"itself and not to the state. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it: "The state itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible,
immutable. The government is an agent, and within the sphere of
the agl'mcy, a perfect representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless
usurpa't!on." (Poinidexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270.)
Forms of government.
(1) As to number of persons exercising sovereign powers:
(a) Monarchy or one in which the supreme and final
authority is in the hands of a single person without regard to
the source of his election or the nature or duration of his tenure.6
Monarchies are further classified into:
1) Absolute monarchy or one in which the ruler governs
by divine right; and
2) Limited monarchy or one in which the ruler governs
in accordance with a constitution;
(b) Aristocracy or one in which political power is exercised
by a few privileged class which is known as an aristocracy or
oligarchy; and
(c) Democracy or one in which political power is exercised
by a majority of the people.7 Democratic governments are
further classified into:
6
GARNER, Political Science and Government, p. 315.
7
See Ibid.
f II II I IJ II
()'J. l'l lll ,ll ' l'I N II '-.'UN( 11 l'lJ l lUNA I. l ,AW
Principles nnd Cases
1) Direct or pure democracy or one in which the
will of the state is formulated or expressed directly and
immediately through the people in a mass meeting or
primary assembly rather than through the medium of
delegates or representatives chosen to act for them;8 and
2) Indirect, representative, or republican democracy or one
in which the will of the state is formulated and expressed
through the agency of a relatively small and select body of
persons chosen by the people to act as their representatives.9
(2) As to extent of powers exercised by the central or national
government:
(a) Unitary government or one in which the control of
national and local affairs is exercised by the central or national
government; and
(b) Composite or federal government or one in which the
powers of government are divided between two (2) sets of
organs, one for national affairs and the other for local affairs,
each organ being supreme within its own sphere. It actually
creates two (2) layers of government. 10
811 is no longer possible in any country today because of increase of population,
expansion of territory, and complexity of modern day problems.
9GARNER, Political Science and Government, p. 316.
10S/rift to federalism. - A federal form of government is being pushed by the
incumbent administration as a solution to the concentration of powers in the national
government (derisively called "Imperial Manila"), which its proponents claim prevents
or hinders the even and full development of local government units (LGUs). This problem
which, incidentally, is not shared by most of the regions, can be addressed by legislative
action through revision/ amendment/full implementation of the Local Government
Code (LGC) (and amendment of pertinent laws) without amending the Constitution
which is relatively an irreversible process. The Constitution expressly mandates the State
"to ensure the autonomy of local governments" (Sec. 25, Art. II.) and declares as a basic
state policy that "[t)he territorial and political subdivisions [including the autonomous
regions) shall enjoy local autonomy." (see Secs. 3, 5, 6, 7, ibid.) LGUs can accomplish a
wide range of development goals without having to depend on the national government
through a vigorous decentralization or redistribution of powers to them.
There are requirements needed of a federal structure, such as financial resources and
contiguity of provinces or regions to be grouped together as states. Normally, federalism
is more advisable for countries with large territory. The Philippines is a relatively small
country. Under existing conditions in the country, it may promote negative consequences,
such as the rise of local tyrants, further entrench the control of political dynas ties, a nd
complicate the enforcement of laws and the administration of justice with each state hav-
ing its own constitution, set of laws, and court system. The costs of shifting to federalism
are expensive as they entail billions of p esos and it will take many years to set up func-
tioning state governments.
1 J
I N I I~\ IJJI It I II 1N
'onecpl9 of ~Hale 01,ll Covcrnmcnl
(3) As to relationship between the executive and the legislative
branches of the government:
(a) Parliamentary government or one in whi~h the state
confers upon the legislature the power to terminate the tenure
of office of the real executive. Under this system, the Cabinet or
ministry is immediately and legally responsible to the legislature
and mediately or politically responsible to the electorate, while
the titular or nominal executive - the Chief of State - occupies
a position of irresponsibility; and
(b) Presidential government or one in which the state makes the
executive constitutionally independent of the legislature as regards
his tenure and to a large extent as regards his policies and acts,
and furnishes him with sufficient powers to prevent the legislature
from trenching upon the sphere marked out by the constitution as
executive independence and prerogative.11
(4) Other forms:
• · ,. (a) Civil government or one in which the affairs of the
state are administered and directed by the citizens or their
representative;
(b) Military government or one established and administered
.by a belligerent in the territory of an enemy occupied by him;
(c) Constitutional government or one in which the powers of
those who rule are defined and limited in their exercise by a
constitution so as to protect individual rights, and shield them
against the assumption of arbitrary powers;
According to former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, federal
systems are the results either of the agreement of several existing states (with common
history and culture) to form a state or organization of several territories or colonies under
colonial power into a federal system; like th e United States of America and the Federation
of Malaysia. The Philippines will go through the reverse process or opposite direction
(see Manila Bulletin, Aug. 8 / 20/16, p . 12.) The Philippines is already a unified country
with nary experience in federalism which still have to be introduced, organized, and
d eveloped primarily for economic reasons with its unknown risks. • .
The main issue is the readiness of the country for the drastic change. "Should the
federal system fail, its effect will be more devastating for each part than the break-up of a
federal state formed by the corning together of separate states." ([bid.) There is no turning
back should the shift to the federal syste m fail. It may be more advisib le that we fine-tune
our present unitary system, through congressional action which can be done quickly and
with much less expense.
11
See GARNER, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 97-100.
IJ ll II IJ
l'LUUl'PI N H 'UN,Li'l 'l l U'l'l, NAI. 1./\W
Principles and Cases
(d) Despotic. government or one in which the powers of those
who rule are not defined and limited in their exercise by a
constitution;
(e) Elective government or one in which the state confers
powers of the government upon a person, or an organization
of persons, chosen by qualified voters, and holding the powers
thus conferred for a definite term and under certain conditions;
(f) Hereditary government or one in which the state confers
the powers of government upon a person, or an organization
composed of persons standing in a certain family relation to his
or their immediate predecessors;
(g) Coordinate government or one in which the state distributes
the powers of government according to their nature among
separate departments or bodies each equally independent of,
but coordinate with the other or others;12
(h) Consolidated government or one in which the state
confides all governmental powers to a single body;13
(i) De jure government or one which is established according
to the constitution of the state and has the general support of the
people;
(j) De facto government or one which is not established
according to the existing constitution of the state and is
maintained against the rightful and lawful government;14
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
To a certain extent, this kind of government may be recognized by international
law for the protection of the interests of the people. There are three kinds of de facto
government.
"The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that
gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the
rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the
government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by
Cromwell as Protector.
The second is"that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade
and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Main, which was reduced to
British possession in the war of 1814, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war
with Mexico, and by the troops of the United States.
The third is that established as an independent government b y the inhabitants of a
country who rise In insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the
Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of secession."
I II
I N 11-{t )I H ) l'IUN
C. Concepts of Stale and Government
(k) Revolutionary government or one installed, whether
by force or otherwise, not in accordance with the procedure
prescl'.ibed in an existing constitution or legal order; and
I
(1) Totalitarian government or one in which governmental
powers are concentrated in one man who is the head of the only
one political party, and the existence and power of which are
based on military force .•
On fhe basis of the above classifications of government, it can be
said that the Philippine government is a representative democracy,
a unitary, presidential, civil, constitutional, elective, coordinate,
and de jure government.15 It also embodies some aspects of a pure
democracy such as, for instance, the constitutional provision on
initiative and referendum. (see Art. VI, Sec. 32.)
Purpose and necessity of government.
(1) Government exists and should continue to exist for the
ben~fit of the people governed. It is necessary for the protection of
society and its members, the security of persons and property, the
administration of justice, the preservation of the state from external
danger, and the advancement of the physical, economic, social and
cultural well-being of the people.
(2) Government exists to do these things which by their very
nature, it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare
than any private individual or group of individuals. It is obvious
Among these three classes, the second may give rise to much problems. When the
legal government regains control, difficulties may be encountered in the readjustment of
interests and rights acquired.
"Th~ distinguishing characteristics of the second kind of defacto government, more
ap tly denominated a government of paramount force," says the Supreme Court, are:
"(1) existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against
the rightful authority of an established and lawful government and (2) while it exists, it
must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience
rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the Jaws of the rightful governmen t. Actual governments
of this sort are established over districts administered by military authority, but they
may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military
force." (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332 [1903]; see Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez, 75 Phil. 113 [1965].)
15
The original 1973 Constitution ad~pted the parliamentary system of government.
With the amendments effected in 1976 and 1981, the 1973 Constitution instituted a
government which was essentially presidential in character even with the adoption of
certain aspects of a parliamentary system. The provisional government ins talled by the
February 1986 "people power revolution" was, of course, a revolutionary government.
(see infra.)
 II II
l'llll,ll'l'l NH ' )Nt-l l 'II' '1'I NA.I.LAW
· Principles and Cases
that without an organized structure of government, anarchy and
disorder, and a general feeling of fear, insecurity and helplessness
will prevail in society, progress and development will not be
possible, and values taken for granted in a free modern society such
as truth, freedom, justice, equality, rule of law, and human dignity
can never be enjoyed.
The need for government is so apparent that even the most
primitive societies, history shows, had some form of it.
Traditional classification of governmental
functions.
In Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation (100 Phil. 468 [1958].),
the functions of government have been classified into governmental
or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves
the exercise of sovereignty and is considered as compulsory; the
latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and this
is considered as optional.
(1) Constituent functions. - They are those which constitute
the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, and may
include the following:
(a) the keeping of order and providing for the protection of
persons and property;
(b) the fixing of the legal relations between man and wife,
and between parents and child;
(c) the regulation of property and the determination of its
liabilities for debt or for crime;
(d) the determination of contract rights;
(e) the definition and punishment of crimes;
(f) the administration of justice in civil cases;
(g) the determination of political duties, privileges, and
relations of citizens;
(h) dealings of the State with foreign powers;
(i) the preservation of the State from external danger or
encroachment; and
(j) the advancement of its international interest.
(2) Ministrant functions. - They are those that are undertaken
only by way of advancing the general interests of society and are
I
I N 'J'l<. I U ~n N 67
C. Concepts of State and Government
merely optional. The most important of these functions are public
works, public education, public charity, water supply sewerage
service, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and
industry. The principles determining whether or not a government
shall exercise certain of these optional functions are:
{a) that a government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital could not naturally undertake; and
{b) that a government should do those things which by its
very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than any private individual or group of indjviduals.
(see ACCFA vs. Confederation of Unions in Government
Corporations and Offices, 30 SCRA 649 [1969]; Fontanilla vs.
Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486 [1991].)
Classification no longer controlling.
(1) Laissez faire principle considered repugnant to philosophy of
previous and present charters. - Under the above classification, the
constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people - these latter functions being ministrant,
the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
The doctrine is based on the classification by President Wilson
of the tasks incumbent on government in accordance with the
laissez faire principle. In the United States until the administration of
President Roosevelt, this principle resulted in the contraction of the
sphere where governmental entry was permissible. The object was
to protect property even if thereby the needs of the general public
would be left unsatisfied. However, the laissez faire concept never
found full acceptance in our jurisdiction even during the period of
its full flowering in the United States. (ACCFA vs. Confederation
of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices, supra.) It is
considered repugnant to the philosophy of the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and more so, of the present Charter. 16
16
"The regime of liberty contemplated in the Constitution with social justice as a
fundamental principle to reinforce the pledge in the Preamble of promoting the general
welfare reflects traditional concepts of a democratic policy infused with an awareness
of the vital and pressing need for the government to assume a much more active and
vigorous role in the conduct of public affairs. The framers of our fundamental law were
11 11 II ■ IJ IJ II
611 l 1lJILJl'l'INH '()N !:l'ffl'U'l 'lUNAL LAW
• Principles and Cases
(2) Growing complexities ofmodern society have rendered distinction
obsolete. - The irrelevance of the distinction, considering the
needs of the times, was pointed out by Justice (later Chief Justice)
Makalintal:
"The growing complexities of modern society, however,
have rendered this traditional classification of the functions
of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas
which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and
which the government was called upon to enter optionally,
and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for
the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing
social challenges of the times. Here, as almost everywhere else,
the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization
of economic forces. Here, of course, this development was
as one in their strongly-held belief that thereby the grave and serious infirmity then
confronting our bod~ politic, on the whole still with us now, of great inequality of wealth
and mass poverty, with the great bulk of our people ill-clad, ill-housed, ill-fed, could be
remedied. Nothing else than communal effort, massive in extent and earnestly engaged
in, would suffice.
To paraphrase Laski (The State in Theory and Practice, pp. 35-36 (19351), with the
necessary modificati?n ~ line with such worthy constitutional ends, we look upon
the state as an orgaruzatton to promote the happiness of individuals, its authority as a
power bound by subordination to that purpose; liberty while to be viewed negatively as
absence of restraint; impressed with a positive aspect as well as to assure individual self•
fulfill:°ent in the attairunent of which greater responsibility is thrusted on government;
and rights as boundary marks defining areas outside its domain. From which it would
follow, as Laski so aptly stated, that it is the individual's 'happiness artd not its well-being
[that is] the criterion by which its behavior [is] to be judged. His interests, and not its
power, set the limits to the authority it [is) entitled to exercise.' We have under such a test
enlarged its field of competence.
With the decision reached by us today, the government is freed from the compulsion
exerted by the Bacani doctrine of the 'constituent-ministrant' test as a criterion for the
type of activity in which it may engage. Its constricting effect is consigned to oblivion.
N? doubts or misgivings need assail us that governmental efforts to promote the public
will, whether through regulatory legislation of vast scope and amplitude or through the
undertaking of business activities, would have to face a searching and rigorous scrutiny.
It is clear that their legitimacy cannot be challenged on the ground alone of their being
offensive to the implications of the laissez faire concept. Unless there be a repugnancy
then to the limitations expressly set forth in the Constitution to protect individual rights,
the government enjoys a much wider latitude of action as to the means it chooses to
I
cope with grave social and economic problems that urgently press for solution." (Justice
Fernando, concurring.)
IJ IJ
JN'!'l{ l)U ~n N OY
C. Concepts of State and Government
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice.17
I
In Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Court of Industrial
Relations (65 SCRA 416 [1975].), the Supreme Court reiterated the
ruling in the ACCFA case.
Kinds of sovereignty.
(1) As to its aspects. - Sovereignty has two manifestations:
(a) internal, which is the power of the State to rule within its
territory; and
(b) external, which is the freedom of the State to carry out
its activities without subjection to or control by other States.
External sovereignty is often referred to as independence.
(2) As to its nature. -A distinction has also been made between:
·-,. (a) legal sovereignty, which is said to pertain to the unlimited
competence of the state to promulgate laws binding upon all;
and
(b) political sovereignty, which refers to the other sources of
power behind the legal sovereign, particularly public opinion.
It has been said, however, that "all sovereignty is essentially
legal and you cannot divide what is essentially legal into the legal
and the other-than-legal." 18
17
"It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted
and the various agencies, the ACA (Agricultural Credit Administration), among them,
established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land
reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprises to translate into reality. It is a purely goverrunental function, no less than,
say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And
when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the
implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the
ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested
no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land
R~f?rm C~uncil, itself a government instrume_ntality; and that its personnel are subject to
C1v1l Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries,
any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears." (Ibid.,
p. 662.)
18BARKER, Principles of Social and Political Theory, p. 68 (1952), cited Jn V.G.
SINCO, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed., p. 17 (1962),
'lU l'l lll,ll'l 1l NI! 'UN!1'1'1 I LJ 11 N/\ 1. l~/\W
Principles and Cases
Limitations on the exercise of sovereignty.
The internal and external aspects of sovereignty are not abso-
lutely true in practice because of the development of international
relations and consequently, of international law. It is not, therefore,
correct to say that an independent state has a right to determine its
conduct free from any restriction on the part of the other states.
(1) In international relations, a state, supposed to be inde-
pendent, may be dependent economically or militarily on one or
more of the so-called "big powers," and be subject to continuous
interference by other states and even by international organizations.
(2) The free flow of information, investments, goods and services
in the era of globalization also has had an impact on the sovereignty
of states. It is no longer possible for a state to autonomously pursue
its own goals without any restraint at all.
(3) The independence of action of a state may be curtailed by its
own consent, such as by treaty.
Legal or juristic concept of sovereignty.
(1) The equivalent of legal omnipotence. - As a legal or juristic
concept, sovereignty is identified with absolute legal omnipotence
residing in the state considered as a juridical person. Adopting this
concept, the United States Supreme Court says: "Sovereignty itself
is, of course, not subject to law for it is the author and source of
law." (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356.) The state is thus, legally
supreme; its command constitutes the law and it is above the law. Its
will is unchallengeable and illimitable since otherwise, it could not
be supreme.
(2) A purely puristic idea. - But the conception of legal
omnipotence of sovereignty is a purely puristic idea and "in no
way implies that the actual power of the state has no limits or those
who control or influence the policies of the state may disregard the
obligations which ethical justice and right impose." 19 The sovereign
is not entirely free from limitation. For one thing, there are the law
of nations and the laws of God and of nature. In a democratic and
republican state, there is the Constitution; there is also the basic
19WILLOUGHBY, Fundamental Concepts of Public Law, Preface, cited in V.G.
SINCO, p. 19.
l N 'l'l{()l)U "l'l()N
C. Concepts of State and Government
doctrine of the Rule of Law (see Art. II, Sec. 1.) which is made the
basis of judicial review. (Art. VIII, Sec. 4.)
Sovereignty under our Constitution.
T~e concept of_ co~stitution here is important and as applied
especially to constitutional states, a distinction should be made
between the possession of sovereignty and the exercise of sovereignty.
Sovereignty itself always resides in and remains with the state
as a legal entity while its exercise is delegated, as a rule, to the
government or its organs which cannot transgress constitutional
restrictions. The Constitution states: "Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." (Art. II,
Sec. 1.) It means that the Filipino people, that is, the entire ci tizemy
(not merely the electorate), considered collectively as a unH that
co~re~ponds :o the state, constitute the ultimate source of authority.
!his _is sometimes referred to as popular sovereignty. The implication
1s th<;1t the people as the sovereign in a "democratic and republican
state," have the right to change their government and in all ways
to limit its jurisdiction and powers as seems to them best for their
safety and happiness.
While sovereignty lies in the state and the state has absolute
legal competence, the government must abide by and submit to
the commands of the Constitution which is the expression of the
sovereign will of the state itself.
Existence of sovereignty, a question
of fa ct.
F:om the distinction between possession of sovereignty and
l exercise of sovereignty, it is evident that the existence or non-
existence of sovereignty is, strictly speaking, more a question of fact
f: rather than of law.
I
(1)_ Sus?ension of political laws. - It may happen that the
sov~re1gn 1s unabl~ to actually enforce its commands. During a
belhgeren: oc~upahon, for instance, the political laws, particularly
the Constitution of the occupied territory, insofar as its civilian
inhabitants are concerned, cease to be effective. They are, however,
merely suspended, there being no change in sovereignty (see Co Kim
Chan vs. Valdez, 75 Phil. 113 [1945]; Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,

'IJ I ' I I IJ.ll'l 'JN JI 'U NI I I J l U 1 IU N/\ l. l,/\W
Principles and Cases
75 Phil. 709 [1946]; Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946].),
although the concept of suspended allegiance has no application to
the law on treason.20 (Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 [1946].)
(2) Change of sovereignty. - Where there is a change of
sovereignty, the political laws are not merely suspended; they are
ipso facto abrogated unless they are adopted or re-enacted by some
affirmative act of the new sovereign.
In any case, sovereignty itself is not deemed suspended.
Essential characteristics of sovereignty.
The juristic theory establishes certain essential characteristics of
sovereignty.
(1) Absoluteness. -This imports the idea of legal omnipotence.
Within the state, there is no other power that possesses equal
or superior authority to it. From this flows another quality:
exclusiveness. Being the source of law, it can not be restrained by law.
But the possession of supreme legal authority to govern does not
necessarily mean that the sovereign has also the physical power to
enforce its commands. (supra.)
(2) Comprehensiveness. -Sovereignty extends to all the persons,
property, and organizations within the boundaries of the state. The
political control exercised by the state over persons and things
is known as jurisdiction.21 Another term used is imperium. It is to be
distinguished from dominium which is the power or right of the state
to become an owner of property. (see Art. XII, Sec. 2.) The use of the
20According to the Supreme Court in the Laurel case: "A citizen or subject owes not
a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government
or sovereign, and this 'allegiance' is not arrogated or severed by the enemy occupation
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby
to the occupier." A contrary rule "would lead to disastrous consequences x x x for it
would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the inhabitants of the occupied territory
to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being
prosecuted for treason."
21 When the jurisdiction of a state is exercised within its territory, it is known as
territorial jurisdiction; and when it is exercised on the basis of the nationality of the person
affected, whether residing in its territory or not, it is referred to as personal jurisdiction.
Immunity granted to heads of states, diplomatic representatives, and military units
within the territorial limits is an exception to local jurisdiction. But the exemption is
voluntary, imposed by the state itself and Is based upon customary rules of international
law observed among nations. (infra.)
41 II
1N1'ROD'C.J TION 73
C. Concepts of State and Government
~at~er term ~s appropriate with reference to lands held by the State
m its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
e~ploi~a~ion and use of_ l°:1ds and natural resources, including their
d1spos1tlon except as limited by the Constitution. (Lee Hong Hok
vs. David, 48 SCRA 372 [1972]; see Art. XII, Sec. 2.)
(3) Permanence. - Sovereignty, being an inherent attribute
of the state, exists as long as. 0-e _state exists. It is imprescriptible.
Governments may change from one form to another, rulers may
be ousted through election or overthrown through revolutions, or
the country_ may succ~mb t~ belligerent occupation, but as long as
the state exists, sovereignty is always present as one of its essential
qualiti~s. It is not d~emed suspended although the legitimate
authonty cannot exercise acts of sovereignty.
(4) Indivisibility. - This characteristic proceeds from the fact
that sovereignty resides in the state as a single unit. There can be no
two sqpreme powers in a state. _Sovereignty is not the sum total of
the po~ers of the state such as police power, taxation, and eminent
domain nor is it the aggregate of the functions of the state, such
as the legislative, executive, and judicial functions. The exercise of
authority is or may be delegated to various organs and subdivisions
of th~ state for cert~in pu_rposes but such exercise is not strictly an
exercise but a manifestation of sovereign authority. The powers of
sovereignty are divisible but sovereignty itself is indivisible.
(5) Inalienability. - This quality proceeds from the state's
attribute of legal omnipotence. While the exercise of sovereignty
may be delegated, the possession is not delegable. The reason is
quite obvious. For a state to transfer its sovereignty to another state
or entity is to destroy itself - if to another state, it is absorbed by
the latter, and if to another entity, it transforms the entity to another
state. Being no longer legally omnipotent, it cannot withdraw the
so_vereignty so gi:en; and even if it still retains the authority to
~ithdraw, such withdrawal would be a legal impossibility, because
1t would mean the subjection of a state equally sovereign.
Auto-limitation of sovereignty.
(1) Fundamental principle of jurisdiction. - "Nothing is better
~ettled th~n that the Philippines being independent and sovereign,
its authonty may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no
portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees
74
•
Y,HILlPPlNE CON STITUTIONAL LAW
II
Principles and Cases
are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein,
and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is
the extent of its jurisdiction, territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty."
(2) Self-imposed restriction of jurisdictional powers. - "It is to be
admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied,
submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a
curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character.- That
is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which is the property
of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal
self-determination and self-restriction. A state then, if it chooses
to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence."
(3) Effects of self-imposed restrictions. - "Its laws may, as to some
persons found within its territory, no ·1onger control. Nor does the
matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power
to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain
portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain
their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is
with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue
of the military agreement of 1947. They are and cannot be foreign
terri tory."22
(4) Jurisdiction over embassy premises. - "Not even the embassy
premises of a foreign power are to be considered outside the
territorial domain of the host State. Thus:
'The ground occupied by an embassy is not in fact the terri-
tory of the foreign State to which the premises belong through
possession or ownership. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of
22 As was emphatically set forth in People vs. Acierlo (92 Phil. 534 [1952].): "By the
Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as a
matter of comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated
its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the t_erm_s o_f tl:e ~reaty,
the United States Government has prior or preferred but not exclusive 1unsd1chon of
such offenses." (People vs. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476 ll973], infra.)
lNl'H.ODUC'fION 75
C. Concepts of State and Government
acts there committed is determined by the territorial sovereign.
If an attache commits an offense within the precincts of an em-
bassy, his immunity from prosecution is not because he has not
violated the local law, but rather for the reason tl-tat the indi-
vidual is exempt from prosecution.
If a person not so exempt, or whose immunity is waived,
similarly commits a crime therein, the territorial sovereign, if it
secures custody of the offender, may subject him to prosecution,
even though its criminal code norm ally does not contemplate
the punishment of one who commits an offense outside of the
national domain. It is not believed, therefore, that an ambassador
himself possesses the right to exercise jurisdiction, contrary to
the will of the State of his sojourn, even within his embassy with
respect to acts there committed. Nor is there apparent, at the
present time, any tendency on the part of States to acquiesce in
his exercise of it.'23
'All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power
of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to
the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source."' 24 (Reagan vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 30 SCRA 95 [1969], per Justice Fernando.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Appellant claims that city is devoid of authority to require building
permits for construction of buildings inside a United States Naval
Reservation.
Facts: Appellant G seeks to set aside a judgment of the trial
court convicting her of a violation of an ordinance requiring a
permit from the city mayor for the construction or erection of a
building, as well as any modification, alteration, or demolition
thereof. She denies the applicability of the ordinance to her on
the ground that her house was constructed within the naval base
leased to the American Armed Forces under the 1947 Philippines-
U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
23
Citing 2 HYDE, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States, pp. 1285-1286 (1947).
24
Citing Schooner Exchange v. M. Faddon, 7 Cranch 116.

'/t, 1'1111 ,ll'l'I NI! 'UN/-i 111 U I IUN/\ 1, I ,AW
· PrJnciplei; and Coses
It appears that G bought a house and lot located inside the
United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction
of Olongapo city. She demolished the house and built another
one in its place without a building permit from the City Mayor of
Olongapo.
Held: "The decision must be affirmed with the sole modification
that she is given 30 days from the finality of the judgment to obtain
a permit failing which, she is required to demolish the same."
(1) Authority to require building permit predicated upon gen-
eral welfare clause. - "It would be fruitless for appellant to assert
that local government units are devoid of authority to require
building permits. This Court, from Switzer vs. Municipality of Cebu
(20 Phil. 111.) decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such
measures. Even appellant had to concede in her brief. 'If, at all, the
questioned ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare
clause x x x. Its scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering
every aspect of public health, public morals, public safety, and the
well-being and good order of the community. It goes without say-
ing that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its exer-
cise is violative of any constitutional right, then its validity could
be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability to the person
adversely affected could be questioned. So much is settled law."
(2) Extent ofPhilippine sovereign ti; over American bases. - "As was
so emphatically set forth in People vs. Acierto (92 Phil. 534 [1953].):
'By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Phili~pin_e ~ov_er:1111e~t
merely consents that the United States exercise iunsdictlon. m
certain cases. This consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein.
Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has
prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights
not granted, but also such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of."'
(3) Municipal corporation retains administrative jurisdiction.
- "Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a
turnabout, unwarranted and unjustified, from what is settled
and orthodox law can lend the slightest degree of plausibility to
the contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it was
II
LN ' L'H.00 U C'l'lON 77
C. Concepts of State and Government
otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason "as a matter
of comity, courtesy, or expediency" becomes one of obeisance and
submission. If on a concern purely domestic in its implications,
devoid of any connection with national security, the MiHtary Bases
agreement could thus be interpreted, then sovereignty indeed
becomes a mockery and an illusion.
Nor does appellant's thesis rest on less shaky foundation by
the mere fact that People vs. Acierto and Reagan vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (30 SCRA 968 [1969].) dealt with the competence of
the national government, while what is sought to be emasculated in
this case is the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a municipal
corporation. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory
powers are vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual
authority not therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly,
belongs to the national government, not to an alien country,"
(People vs. Gazo, 53 SCRA 476 [1973), through Justice Fernando.)
Doctrine of parens patriae.
(1) Concept. - Parens patriae means parent or guardian of the
country. The doctrine has been defined as the inherent power and
authority of the State, whether through the legislature or a royal
person, to provide protection to the persons and property of those
persons who are non sui juris such as minors, insane, and incompetent
persons. (see McIntosh v. Dill, 205 Pac. 917.)
Under the doctrine, the State has the sovereign power of
guardianship over persons under disability. In that capacity, it may
bring suit not merely for itself as sovereign but also to protect the
property rights of the people, enforce charities of a public nature,
defend the interests of helpless infants and lunatics, or provide for
the confinement of minors in reformatories where they may receive
training and education. Thus, the State is considered the parens
patriae of such classes of persons who are incapable of protecting
themselves. (Gov't. of the Phil. Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil.
728 [1916].)
(2) Constitutional provisions. - The Constitution contains in
Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) and elsewhere
provisions imposing certain duties upon the State as parens patriae,
such as to adopt policies that/4ill free the people from poverty, to
promote social justice, to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
'lll j ' l llUl'l'IN II 'UNV l'l'l U l 'IUNJ\L L A W
Principles and Cases
autonomous social institution, to protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn, to support the parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character,
to promote the well-being of the youth, to insure the fundamental
equality of women with men, to protect and promote the health of the
people, to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,
and to promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities.
The absence, however, of said provisions would not be fatal to
the existence of the prerogative of parens patriae for it is inherent in
the supreme power of every state.
(3) Dispute involves mother and uncle of minor. - In a case
involving a dispute between the mother and the uncle of a minor
over the possession and administration of the proceeds of an
insurance policy belonging to the child, the Supreme Court, in
upholding the decision of the lower court in favor of the mother to
be the trustee of the insurance proceeds left by the father who had
expressly designated the uncle, said:
"The appealed decision is supported by another cogent
consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept
that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens
patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation
affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest.
It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may
press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance
not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of
the country for a parent to be preferred. It could have been
different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is
not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly, the
judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens
patriae cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea."25
(Cabanas vs. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94 [1974].)
25In a case, there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court: 'This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every ~ta:e,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affiruty
to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the
great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.' What is more, there
is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: 'The ~late s~all stre_n9then
the family as a basic social institution.' If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, 1t 1s ~he
family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of do~1bt, that even 1£ a
stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutiona l mandate
would have led the lower court to decide as it did." (Ibid.)
l N 'l'l<.OOU '1'1 N 7!1
C. Concepts of State and Government
(4) Cases involving minors. - Where minors are involved, the
State acts as parens patriae. 26 To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights
of persons or individuals, who, because of age or incapacitY. are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take
due care of what concerns them, they have the political community
to look after their welfare. This obligation, the state must live up to.
It cannot be recreant to such a trust.27 (Martin Nery vs. Lorenzo, 44
SCRA 431 [1972].)
(5) Duty of court to do substantial justice to all parties. - In another
case, however, where the trial court granted (six [6] months after
the perfection of the appeal) the motion for the execution, pending
appeal, of a judgment ordering the payment by the father of
monthly allowance for support of his two (2) illegitimate child ren,
the Supreme Court found the appeal of the father meritorious
because the trial court, after the perfection of the appeal, had lost
jurisdis:tion over the case, and the general rule is that an appeal
stays the execution. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the trial
court's order of execution cited the demands of substantial justice
and the role of the State as parens patriae in protecting the interest of
minors.28 (Vasco vs. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 763 [1978].)
26"The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them
from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as
responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired
by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns
their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage." (Concepcion vs. Court of
Appeals, 468 SCRA 438 [2005].)
27
1n a case, where the complainant was only 13 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime of rape, the Supreme Court spoke of the duty of the State as
parens patriae: "The State, as parens palriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of
harm to those who, because of their minority, are yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases
of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it causes her
fam ily must also be taken into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced
concern in the fundamental Jaw for such institution. There is all the more reason then for
the rigorous application of the penal Jaw with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever
warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advancement of civilization, the
dismption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation, much more so in
view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where the
prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, self-restraint should even
be more marked." (People vs. Baylon, 57 SCRA 114 [1974].)
28The Supreme Court, in reversing the d ecision, said: "It is axiomatic that the courts
should endeavor to do subs tantial jus tice in all cases and that as much as possible,

HO J:' JJJl..ll'l! IN I•: ' N !-J'l'J T U 'l'I N A I. LI\W
· Principles and Cases
Acts of State.
An act of state is an act done by the state in the exercise of
sovereign power, acting through its government or its delegate
within the limits of the power vested in him.
(1) In its broad sense, it refers to political acts of the government,
such as the recognition of a newly established foreign state or
government and the fixing of boundaries - matters which are
within the control of the political department of the government
and are not subject to judicial review.29
(2) In a more restricted sense, it refers to any act done by or under
the authority of the sovereign power affecting aliens.
(a) As an act of the state, the power to deport aliens is
lodged in the President who is given full discretion to determine
whether the continued stay of an alien within the country is so
undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare, or interest
of the state (Tan Tong vs. Deportation Board, 96 Phil. 934 [1955].),
subject to the requirements of due process. (Kiani vs. Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, 483 SCRA34 [2006).) To preserve
its integrity and sovereignty, the state may restrict the admission
of foreigners into its territory and this right is not affected by
existing treaties of commerce and intercourse between nations:
(In Re Patterson, 1 Phil. 93 [1902].)
(b) The right of a country to expel or deport undesirable
aliens is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun H ai vs. Com-
missioner of Immigration, 104 Phil. 949 [1958].) as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. As a police
power measure, it may be exercised by the President even in the
absence ofexpress law. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield,
16 Phil. 534 [1910]; In Re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]; see
Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 [1990].)
technicalities should be eschewed. As has been said, 'a technicality should be an aid
to justice and not its great hind rance and chief enemy.' However, we should not forget
that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration
of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the rl1les in order ·to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice or whimsicality. As to the doctrine of parens patriae (father of his
country), its relevancy to the case is doub tful because the recipients of the support
granted by the lower court are no longer minors."
29See BLACK's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 44.
.11 lJ
I N '.l'l{ Ul.)U "l'lU N IJ I
D. The Government of the Philippines in Transition
This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not
part of the nation, their admission into the territory .is a m atter
of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no
obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.
(Djumantan vs. Domingo, 240 SCRA 746 [1995].)
(c) Congress may, however, limitthe grounds for deportation
to specified causes as it w ould be undemocratic to make the
deportation of an alien d ependent merely on the unlimited
discretion of the President. (Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation
Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]. ) Although a deportation proceeding
does not partake of a criminal action, con sidering that it is a
harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting
the freedom and liber ty of a person, the constitutional right to
due process is accorded such p erson . Thus, the provisions in
criminal procedure are applicable to dep ortation p roceedings.
(L~o Gi vs. Court of Ap peals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]. )
Be that as it may, the interest which an alien has in b eing
admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country
is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it.
(Djumantan vs. Domingo, supra.)
(3) The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by States
to prevent their national courts from deciding disputes which
relate to their n ation al affairs of another state, the other two being
immunity and non-justifiability. It is an avoidance technique that is
directly related to a State' s obligation to respect the independence
and equality of other States by not requiring them to submit to
t adjudication in a national court or to settlement of their disputes
I
r w ithout their consent. (PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, 530 SCRA 13
[2007].)
D. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
IN TRANSITION
The pre-Spanish government.
Prior to the arrival of the Spaniards, the Philippines was
composed of settlem ents or villages, each called barangay. Every
barangay was virtually a state, for it p ossessed the four basic
elements of stateh ood . At tim es, however, some barangays joined
 1' 1111 , ll ' l ' I N I~ I._ U N: 1111 l / I H >NA I , I AW
Principles oncl 'nseH
together as "cop.federations" mainly for the purpose of mutual
protection against common enemies.
Each barangay was ruled by a chief called datu in some places,
and rajah, sultan, or hadji in others. He was its chief executive, law-
giver, chief judge, and military head. In form, the barangay was a
monarchy with the datu as the monarch.
Government during the Spanish period.
Spain's title to the Philippines was based on the discovery made
by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, consummated by its conquest by
Miguel Lopez de Legazpi forty-five years later and long possession
for almost four centuries, until it was terminated in 1898, when by
the Treaty of Paris, the Philippines was ceded by Spain to the United
States.
(1) Union ofchurch and state. -From 1565 to 1821, the Philippines
was indirectly governed by the King of Spain through Mexico.
From 1821 when Mexico obtained her independence from Spain,
to 1898, the Philippines was ruled directly from Spain. Three times
during the Spanish period (1810-1813, 1820-1823, and 1836-1837)1
the Philippines was given representation in the Spanish Cortes, the
legislative body of Spain. A basic principle introduced by Spain to
the Philippines was the union of the church and the state.
(2) Central and local governments. - The government which
Spain established in the Philippines was centralized in structure
and national in scope. The barangays were consolidated into towns
(pueblos), each headed by a gobernadorcillo (little governor), popularly
called capitan, and the towns into provinces, each headed by a
governor who represented the Governor-General in the province.
Cities governed under special charters were also created.
(3) Governor-General. - The powers of the central government
were actually exercised by the Governor-General who was appoint-
ed initially by the Viceroy of Mexico and later by the King of
Spain. He was "Governor-General," "Captain General," "vice-
royal patron," and President of the Royal Audiencia. As Governor-
General, he had executive, administrative, legislative, and judicial
powers. As Captain-General, he was Comman der-in-Chief of all
the military forces in the Philippines. As the vice-royal patron, he
exercised certain religious powers.
11 J I 1( 1 11 II H I II II J
I) , 'I Ill' C o v1•1 n1i H.'1ll ol llil• Jlhlll1J!)ltll1•1 lr1 l'1 t11111lt lon
In the administration of the Philippines, the Governor-General
was assisted by many boards and officers, particularly the Board of
Authorities and the Council of Administration.
(4) Judiciary. - The Royal Audiencia which was established
•
in 1583 was the Supreme Court of the Philippines during the
Spanish times. Its decision was final except on certain cases of great
importance which could be appealed to the King of Spain. Below the
Royal Audiencia, were two Territorial Audiencias established in 1893
- one in Cebu and the other in Vigan - which exercised appellate
jurisdiction over criminal cases coming from the surrounding areas.
Courts of first instance with both civil and criminal jurisdiction
.were established in 1896 in the provinces. At the bottom of the
judicial system were the justice of the peace courts which were
establi;,hed in the different towns in 1885. In addition, there were
special courts.
Governments during the revolutionary era.
(1) The Katipunan government. - The Katipunan was the secret
society that precipitated the revolution against Spain on August 26,
1896. It was organized by Andres Bonifacio. The central government
of the Katipunan was vested in a Supreme Council (Kataastaasang
Sanggunian). In each province there was a Provincial Council (Sang-
guniang Bayan) and in each town, a Popular Council (Sangguniang
Balangay). The judicial power was exercised by a Judicial Council
(Sangguniang Hukuman).
(2) The Biak-na-Bato Republic. -On November 1, 1897, a republic
was established by Gen. Aguinaldo in Biak-na-Bato (now San Miguel
de Mayumo, Bulacan). It had a constitution which w as to take effect
for two years only. The Biak-na-Bato Republic lasted u p to December
15, 1897, with the conclusion of the "Pact of Biak-na-Bato."
(3) The Dictatorial Government. - Following the outbreak of the
Spanish-American war on April 25, 1898, Gen. Aguinaldo, in view
of the chaotic conditions in the coun try, established the Dictatorial
Government on May 24, 1898. The most important achievements
of the Dictatorial Government were the Proclamation of Philippine
Independence at Kawit on June 12, 1898 and the reorganization of
local governments.

1'1111.Jl'l ' I N I ( 'UN/ 1111 I J I IUNA I, l, AW
Principles and Coses
(4) The Revolutionary Government. - On June 23, 1898, Gen.
Aguinaldo established the Revolutionary Government which
replaced the Dictatorial Government. The decree making such
change stated that the aims of the new government were "to struggle
for the independence of the Philippines, until all nations including
Spain will expressly recognize it," and "to prepare the country for
the establishment of a real Republic."
(5) The First Philippine Republic. - On September 15, 1898,
a revolutionary Congress of Filipiri.o representatives met in
Malolos, Bulacan and framed the so-called Malolos Constitution.
The Constitution established a "free ~nd independent Philippine
Republic" which was inaugurated on January 23, 1899 with Gen.
Aguinaldo as President.1 Our First Philippine Republic was not
recognized by the family of nations. It existed from January 23, 1899
to March 23, 1901. In February 1899, the United States annexed the
Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American War and in April
1901, Gen. Aguinaldo was captured.
Governments during the American regime.
(1) The Military Government. - The American military rule in
the Philippines began on April 14, 1898, the day after the capture of
Manila. The existence of war gave the President of the United States
the power to establish a Military Government in the Philippines, as
Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the United States. His
authority was delegated to the Military Governor who exercised, as
long as the war lasted, all powers of government.
(2) The Civil Government. - Pursuant to the so-called Spooner
Amendment (on the army appropriations act passed in the U.S.
1
The Philippine Republic is regarded as the first constitutional democracy
proclaimed in Asia. However, American history textbooks erroneously refer to the
Philippine-American War as a mere "insurrection" and the Philippine Revolution as "an
act of brigandage."
The Philippine Revolution against both Spain and the United States was in fact a
legitimate exercise by the Filipino people of their natural and inalienable right to be free
of foreign domination. The Philippine-American War stands on a moral plane even higher
than the American Revolution against the British Crown and their own Motherland, and
the French Revolution against the existing social and political systems of France and
their own government, because it was a nationalistic struggle by the Filipinos, already
independent and free from Spanish rule, in defense of their own country against the
colonial designs of a new foreign invader.
W IU
lN'fl{ODU 'TION 85
D. The Government of the Philippines in Transition
Congress on March 3, 1901) which ended the military regime in the
Philippines, the Civil Government was inaugurated in Manila on
July 4, 1901, headed by a Civil Governor whose position was created
on October 29, 1901. The Civil Governor (the title was later changed
to Governor-General on February 6, 1905) also exercised legislative
powers. He remained as President of the Philippine Commission, the
sole law-making body of the government from 1901 to 1907. From
1907 to 1916, the Philippine Commission acted as the upper house
of the legislative branch with the Philippine Assembly serving as
the lower house. With the passage of the Spooner Law in 1916, these
two bodies gave way to the Philippine Legislature.2
(3) The Commonwealth Government of the Philippines. - The
next stage in the political development of the Filipinos was the
establishment of the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines
pursuant to an act of the United States Congress on March 24, 1934,
commonly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Law. Among other
things, the law provided for a transition period of 10 years during
which the Philippine Commonwealth would operate and at the
exptration of said period on July 4, 1946, the independence of the
Phil~ppines would be proclaimed and established.
The Commonwealth Government of the Philippines was
republican in form under the presidential type. The legislative
power was first vested in a unicameral National Assembly and later
in a bicameral Congress composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The judicial power was vested in the Supreme
Court and inferior courts provided by law. The Government of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines was very autonomous. The
Filipinos had almost complete control over the domestic affairs, the
United States retaining control only over matters involving foreign
affairs.3
2
The Philippines was represented in the United States by two Resident
Commissioners who were elected by the Philippine Legislature. These Commissioners
had seats in the United States House of Representatives, receiving the same emoluments
and other privileges as the American members of that body, but without the right to vote.
3
During World War II, the Commc;mwealth Government functioned in exile in
Washington from May 13, 1942 to October 3, 1944. It was reestablished in Manila on
February 27, 1945 when Gen. Douglas McArthur, in a ceremony held at Malacanang
Palace on behalf of the United States Government, turned over to President Sergio
Osmefta the full powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government under
the 1935 Constitution.

/l(I 1'1111 ,ll'l ' I N I! U N !J 111 U I IU NA I , 1,A W
Principles and Cases
Governments during the Japanese occupation.
(1) The Japanese Military Administration. - It was established
in Manila on January 3, 1942, one day after its occupation. Under
a proclamation issued by the Japanese High Command, the
sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines was declared
terminated.
(2) The Philippine Executive Commission. - A civil government
known as the "Philippine Executive Commission" composed of
Filipinos, headed by a Chairman, was organized by the military
forces of occupation. The members of the Commission, called
Commissioners, in effect functioned as cabinet members. The
Commission exercised both the executive and legislative powers.
The laws enacted were, however, subject to the approval of
the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces. The judiciary
continued in the same form as it was under the Commonwealth.
However, it functioned without the independence which it had
traditionally enjoyed.
(3) The Japanese-sponsored Republic of the Philippines. - On
October 14, 1943, the so-called Japanese-sponsored Republic of the
Philippines was inaugurated with Jose P. Laurel as President. It
was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission.
Like the latter, the ultimate source of its authority was the Japanese
military authority and government. (see Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez, 75
Phil. 113 [1945].) On August 17, 1945, President Laurel proclaimed
the dissolution of the Republic.
The previous Philippine Republics.
The first Republic was established on January 23, 1899 under
the Malolos Constitution; the Second, on October 14, 1943 under
the Japanese-sponsored Constitution, and the Third, on July 4, 1946
under the 1935 Constitution. President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his
inaugural address on June 30, 1981, proclaimed the birth of what
he referred to as the Fourth Republic4 under the 1973 Constitution
which, as amended in a plebiscite on April 7, 1981, installed a
modified parliamentary system of government.
It remains to be seen whether this characterization will be accepted as a his torical
4
fact.
I N I l{ U I JLJ I IUN tW
0 . The Government of the Philippines in Transition
All in all, there were nine Presidents5.in the previous three (3)
republics, including President Marcos in his two (2) terms in the
Third Republic.6
Under Joint Resolution No. 93, approved by the Urlited States
Congress on June 29, 1944, the President of the United States
was authorized to proclaim the independence of the Philippines
prior to July 4, 1946, after the Japanese had been vanquished and
constitutional processes in the country restored. The Republic of the
Philippines was formally inaugurated on July 4, 1946 with Manuel
A. Roxas as the first President and Elpidio Quirino as the first Vice-
President. Roxas and Quirino also served from May 28, 1946 to July
4, 1946 as the last Commonwealth President and Vice-President,
·respectively.
The 1935 Constitution served as the fundamental law not only
for the Commonwealth Government which was interrupted by the
Second World War but also for the Republic of the Philippines until
the "ratification" of the 1973 Philippine Constitution establishing
a parliamentary form of government, effected by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1102 of President Ferdinand E. Marcos on Janua1y
17, 1973, after the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972.
The present Republic came into being upon the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution on January 2, 1987.
Establishment of the Provisional Government
of 1986.
Before Corazon C. Aquino took her Oath of Office on the
morning of February 25, 1986 at Club Filipino, San Juan, Metro
Manila, the last day of a four-day "people power" revolt (Feb. 22-
25) that culminated in the ouster and subsequent exile to Hawaii of
incumbent President Ferdinand E. Marcos, she read Proclamation
No. 1 wherein she declared that she and her Vice-President were
"taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people
as President and Vice-President, respectively," on the basis of
5Namely: Emilio Aguinaldo, Jose P. Laurel, Manuel A. Roxas, Elpidio Quirino,
Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos P. Garcia, Diosdado P. Macapagal, and Ferdinand E. Marcos.
6The last 14-year rule of President Marcos from the declaration of martial law on
September 21, 1972 until his overthrow on February 25, 1986 by the so-called "people
power revolution," was generally described as dictatorial or authoritarian.
131.l l'J llLJl ' l'I NI'. 'UN~1·n ru l 'I Nt\l. 1./\W
Principles and Cases
the clear sovereign will .of the people expressed in the election of
February 7, 1986. In her oath, she swore to preserve and defend the
"fundamental law" (not the "Constitution") and execute "just laws"
instead of "its laws."
This new Government of the Philippines came to power not
through the method or mechanism outlined_by the 1:73 C_onstitut~on_
for determining the winners in the special presidential elect10n
held on February 7, 1986. This is explicitly indicated in the first ~o
"whereas" clauses of Proclamation No. 3 (March 25, 1986) which
state that "the new government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines" and that this "heroic action
of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended"; and in the third which enumerates the
measures "the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their
sovereign action demands" of the government to undertake.
Nature of the Provisional Government.
(1) Revolutionary and transitory. -A revolutionary government
is one instituted not in accordance with the procedure provided in
an existing Constitution or political system, nullifying or r~p~acing
the same, usually effected by a revolution or general upnsmg or
at least with violence or some acts of violence. A revolution is the
overthrow of the established government in a state or country and
the substitution of another by the governed.
There is a definite acknowledgment in Proclamation No. 3 that
the provisional government established thereund~r was re~olution-
ary in character (without calling itself as such) havmg been mstalled
by direct action of the people or by "people power," deriving its
existence and authority directly from the people themselves and not
from the then operating 1973 Constitution. When the deposed Presi-
dent and his family left the Philippines on the night of February 25,
1986, there was acceptance of the success of the revolution.7
7It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino's rise to the Presidency. 'l;as not due to
constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the prov1s1ons of the 1973
Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the
winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus, it can be said that the organization of
the Aquino government which was met by little resistance and her control ~f _the s~ate
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the admm1stration,
IN l'l{UUU l'I N
D. The Government of the Philippines in 1i'nnsition
From a legal standpoint, however, it is not the proclamation
of the head of a revolutionary government that determines its
existence but rather the circumstances under which it toqk power.
Proclamation No. 3 was but a formal affirmation of what had already
been existing as an established fact.
A revolutionary government being a direct creation of the
people, derives its powers from the people to whom alone it is
accountable. It is said that a revolutionary government is clothed
with unlimited powers because it makes its own laws; it is "a law
unto itself." It exists independently of the existing constitution and
laws of the deposed regime, which it may adopt, suspend, amend
or even abrogate. However, with the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution, the revolutionary government opted to abide with
ctnd to subject itself to the provisions thereof, pending approval of a
new charter, to avoid abuses of the absolute powers possessed by it.
I"
A revolµtionary government has unrestricted power to adopt a new
constitution, interim or otherwise.8
(2) De jure/de facto. - The first is one constituted or founded in
accordance with the existing constitution of the state (according to
law), while the other is not so constituted or founded but has the
general support of the people and effective control of the territory
over which it exercises its powers.9
At its inception, the revolutionary government was considered
illegal for lack of constitutional basis, not having been sanctioned
by either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution on the assumption that
the departure of the Marcos cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military
signalled the point where the legal system then in effect had ceased to be obeyed by the
Filipinos." (Letter of Assoc. Justice R.S. Puno, 210 SCRA589 [1992] .)
8"The resulting government [following the EDSA revolution that took place
on February 23-25, 1986], was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international
law." x x x During the interregnum [after the actual and effective take-over of power by
the revolutionary government up to March 24, 1986, immediately before the adoption of
the Provisional Constitution], the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
were the s upreme law. x x x There was neither a constitution nor a bill of rights during
the interregnum. x x x Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino people
continued to enjoy under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Universal Declaration of Human Righ ts almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution." (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003].)
9
See Note 17, Introduction-C.

l 'l Jll , I 1'1 'l N H 'U N: J' l'l l'U'fl N/\1, 1,/\W
Principles and Cases
both Constitutions did not sanction an overthrow of the existing
government through direct action of the people. 10 As the source of
supreme political power in a republican state (see Art. II, Sec. 1, 1973
Constitution.), however, the people are above the Constitution.
Ade facto government acquires a de jure status when it gains wide
acceptance from the people and recognition from the community of
nations. There was no question that the revolutionary government
had won continuous public acceptance and support without
any resistance whatsoever anywhere in the Philippines and the
recognition of practically all foreign governments.n
(3) Constitutional. - Be that as it may, the issuance of Procla-
mation No. 3 by the President promulgating the Provisional
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippine~ "by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the sovereign mandate of the people"
abrogated the 1973 Constitution ~d set at rest any doubts as to the
legitimacy and constitutionality of the provisional govei;nment. It
also rendered academic discussion of the view advanced by some
1°Thi~ assumption is debatable. From the point of view of the existing Constitution,
the establishment of a new government as a result of a successful revolution would be
illegal. But considered as the act of the people themselves regarded as the State distinct
from the government, it would be legal, for whatever is attributable to it is lawful.
11
By way of analogy, the 1973 Constitution was perceived to be originally invalid
because it was not validly ratified by the people but eventually became valid and binding
through the years by the general acquiescence of the people and by their performing acts
pu~suant thereto such as going to elections. But the question of whether a government is
de Jure or merely de facto is unimportant for as long as it is in full control and possession of
power a~d authority and is recognized by the majority of foreign governments. It i s the
law, and 1s the legal government of the territory to the exclusion of any other.
In Re Saturnina vs. Bemmdez (145 SCRA 160 (1986].), the Supreme Court ruled: "In
previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was
likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to
the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held
that:
'Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitioners state no cause of action.
For the legi~1:1acy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of pohl!c~ where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the Judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members
of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government.' "(Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 (Lawyers'
League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et nl.]; G.R. No.
73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution, etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino,
et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 (Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, cl al.].)"
I N' l'I' ) U LJ I.IO N ') I
D. The Government of the Pl•ilippines in Transition
quarters that the 1973 Constitution continued to be in full force and
effect on the basic premise that the four (4) days "bloodless and
peaceful revolution" was not a total repudiation of the Constitution
but was merely a corrective struggle to effectuate the true will of the
people as expressed in the February 7, 1986 election held under said
Constitution - to recognize and support the incumbent President
and Vice-President on the basis of their having won in the said
election.
(4) Democratic. - The provisional government was claimed
to be democratic because it was installed by direct action of the
people as a direct expression or manifestation of their sovereign
will, and, therefore, it was based on the consent of the governed
and the approval of the people. However, this is not the only test.
It is essential to the existence of a democratic government that it
contin~es as an embodiment of the popular will.
(5, Constitutional and revolutionary at the same time. - The
provi:sional government was not a purely revolutionary one but a
hybrid constitutional revolutionary government, i.e., a revolutionary
government governing under a provisional or interim Constitution
the people could invoke to protect their rights and to promote
their welfare, to exist for a limited period until the ratification and
effectivity of a permanent Constitution. (supra.) There was nothing,
however, to prevent the government from amending, suspending or
abrogating the Provisional Constitution and adopting a new one or
operating without any constitution. 12
The Provisional Constitution.
(1) Replaced 1973 Constitution. -Instead of declaring the 1973
Constitution with certain amendments minus certain articles
and provisions, as the interim Constitution, Proclamation No. 3
promulgated a Provisional Constitution to replace the former:
(a) adopting in toto or insofar as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Proclamation, the provisions of the
121n other words, the Provisional Constitution did not have the status of a supreme
or fundamental Jaw because the government was not created by it and was not bound
to obey it. But by promulgating the Provisional Constitution, the government, in effect,
made a covenant with the people that its provisions would be observed in the exercise of
its powers. The essence of constitutional government is that the people know the limits
and extent of its powers.
11) 111111 , ll ' l'I N I( t U N /1 111 l } 1 IUN/\ 1, I.AW
J>rlnclplcs nnd Cases
Articles13 of the 1973 Constitution enumerated in Sections land
2 of Article I of the Provisional Constitution; and
(b) superseding the provisions of the Articles14 of the 1973
Constitution mentioned in Section 3 of Article I of the Provisional
Constitution. The idea it seems was to completely do away with
the 1973 Constitution on the theory that the revolution waged
by the people was a revolt against the entire political and legal
apparatus of the fallen government, including its Constitution
and that the direct mandate of the people demanded "the
transition to a government under a new Constitution in the
shortest time possible." (see third "whereas" clause.)
On the whole, however, the Provisional Constitution was
essentially that of the 1973 Constitution.
(2) Subject to legislative power of President. - Under Article II,
Section 1 of the Provisional Constituti9n, the President shall exercise
legislative power "until a legislature is elected and convened under
a new Constitution." As head of the revolutionary government,
President Aquino could have exercised this power to amend,
suspend or abrogate the Provisional Constitution limited only by
her own judgment.
(3) Intended to be transitory. - By its very nature, the Provisional
Constitution (as well as the revolutionary government which
operated under it) self-destruct upon the ratification and effectivity
of the new Constitution on February 2, 1987.
-oOo-
13
National Territory, Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Duties and Obligations of Citizens,
Suffrage, Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the President, the Judiciary, Local
Government, the Con stitutional Commissions, Accountability of Public Officers, the
National Economy and Patrimony of the Nation, and General Provisions.
14
The Batasang Pambansa, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, Amendments,
Transitory Provisions and all amendments thereto.
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals
and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, free-
dom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
Meaning of Preamble.
The term preamble is derived from the Latin word preambulare
which means "to walk before."1 It is an introduction to the main
subject: It is the prologue of the Constitution.
Preamble not essential in a constitution.
Technically speaking, the Preamble forms no integral part of
the Constitution. Of itself alone, it cannot be invoked as a source
of private right enforceable by the courts or of any governmental
power not expressly granted or at least clearly implied therefrom,
since its function is only to "introduce" the Constitution. It imposes
no duties and creates no office. It may expound the nature and
extent .and application of the powers actually conferred by the
Constitution but it cannot substantially create or enlarge them.2
Legal powers and rights stem only from the provisions in the
body of the Constitution expressly or by implication. (Jacobson v.
Massachussetts, 197 U.S. 11.)
It is significant, however, that a majority of the constitutions of
the world contain a preamble.
1
TUCK_ER on the Constitution, p. 381.
2
See 1 STORY on the Constitution, p. 351.
93
IJI 1'111111 ' 1'1 1'1 1! 1 t1 N t 11111Jllt1NA l , 1,AW
• Pl'ln lpk•Hnnd 'nscs
Object and value of Preamble.
(1) Sets down origin and purposes of the Constitution. - While a
preamble is not a necessary part of a constitution, it is advisable to
have one. In the case of the Constitution of the Philippines, it serves
two (2) very important ends:
(a) It indicates who are the authors of the Constitution and
for whom it has been promulgated; and
(b) It enumerates the primary purposes which are intended
to be achieved by the Constitution and the government
established under it, and declares certain basic principles
underlying the fundamen tal charter.
(2) May serve as an aid in its interpretation. - The Preamble has
a value for purposes of construction. The statement of the· general
purposes may be resorted to as an aid .in determining the meaning
of vague or ambiguous provisions of the Constitution proper and in
their correct interpretation.
By way of illustration, the government is without power to
impose taxes for private purpose because according to the Preamble,
it is established for public purpose - the promotion of the common
good - and not for private purpose.
Source of Constitution's authority.
(1) The Filipino people. - The Preamble begins and ends with
the words, "We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God x x x do ordain and promulgate this Constitution."
Thus, the Filipino people themselves (not just their representatives)
are the source from which the Constitution comes and being so, it is
the supreme law of the land.
The Preamble retains the use of the term "Filipino people" to
signify their oneness and solidarity. It is different from the term
"people of the Philippines" which may refer to the entire body of
inhabitants, including aliens. It calls the Filipino people "sovereign."
(2) A sovereign people. - The more forceful first person approach
in the 1973 Constitution consisting of the use of the pronouns "we"
and "our" has also been retained instead of the impersonal third
person approach (i.e., "the Filipino people" and "their") in the
Preamble of the 1935 Constitution. The intention is to stress that the
l ' J{Ll/\MULLl
Filipino people in ordaining and promulgating the Constitution do
so on their own authority as a sovereign people and not by virtue of
the authority or permission given by a superior foreiSJ: p9wer.
Belief in God stressed.
Our Preamble is in the form of a collective prayer. The Filipinos
are basically religious people. In imploring the aid of Almighty God,
they declare and affirm their belief in the existence of a universal
Supreme Being that guides the destinies of men and nations. They
recognize the fact that with the help of God they w ill be able to
achieve the ideals and aspirations to which they are committed. In
a sense, they acknowledge God as central in their laws and as the
source of their authority.
TheJJ-rilippines is a predominantly Christian and partly Muslim
nation: 11here are other minority groups. (see Art. II, Sec. 22.)
Meaning of people as used
in the Constitution.
The word "people" appears in our Constitution several times. It
is to be construed in the light of the context in which it is used.
(1) Citizens. - It may refer to the citizens of the Philippines.
Thus, this is the sense which the term has in the Preamble, and in
the d_eclarati,on that "sovereignty resides in the people" (Art. II, Sec.
1.) and that "the Government may call upon the people to defend
the State x x x." (Ibid., Sec. 4; see also Art. XI, Sec. 1 and Art. XVI,
Secs. 1 and 2.)
(2) Inhabitants. - It may mean the entire body of inhabitants,
citizens and aliens alike, in our country. This is the sense of the
term in the provisions which require the Congress "to give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity xx x" (Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. 1.)
and the State "to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach
to _h ealth development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost" (Ibid., Sec. 11.); the provision which safeguards
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures" (Art. III,
Sec. 2.); that which guarantees "the right of the people peaceably
96 J-'H lL11"1-'lNJJ ' NS'l'l'l'Ul'!ONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances"
(Ibid., Sec. 4.); and that which declares that "the prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people." (Art. II, Sec. 4.)
(3) Voters. - It may have reference only to the voters as in
Section 25 of Article XVIII which states the requirements for the
continued use of U.S. military bases in the Philippines beyond 1991.
It provides that "when the Congress so requires, the treaty allowing
military bases must be ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a referendum held for the purpose xx x." Section 4 of
Article XVIII provides that "any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution will be valid when ·ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite xx x." Had the Constitution spoken of "the votes
cast by the people," then the term would denote only the voters or
citizens who have the right to vote.
National purposes and aims in adopting
the Constitution.
As set forth in the Preamble, they are:
(1) To build a just and humane society; and
(2) To establish a Government that shall:
(a) embody our ideals and aspirations;
(b) promote the common good;
(c) conserve and develop our patrimony; and
(d) secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings
of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a
regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace.3
The things mentioned in (b), (c), and (d) are actually included
in (a), but they are enumerated to emphasize in clear and specific
terms the basic ideals and aspirations that we cherish as a people.
3The two goals - to build the kind of society and to establish the kind of government
set forth in the Preamble - are attainable only if the government established is of the
character envisioned. in the Constitution. That government must be democratic, i.e.,
based on the consent of the governed, and it must be so not only in its structure but more
importantly, in its actual operation and administration. (see Art. II, Sec. 1.) Clearly, good
governance (together with responsible citizenship) is a crucial element in the success of
a democracy.
l 1 J.{ IJAMU I ,IJ
Changes in the Preamble.
The Preamble, consisting of 75 words is one of the world's
longest preambles. It has 15 words more than that 9f the 1973
Constitution. It is substantially that of the 1973 Constitution which,
in tum, was based on the Preamble of the 1935 Constitution.
(1) The phrase "Almighty God" replaced "Divine Providence"
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which was considered vague
and impersonal. The latter term was used in the 1973 Constitution
as a compromise to accommodate some atheists in the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
(2) "Common good" is used to refer to all the people in place of
"general welfare" which is not as inclusive as it admits of exceptions
and may be interpreted to refer only to the welfare of the greater
majority_(even to the great prejudice of the minority).
(3) "Our" is used instead of "the" before "patrimony" for
greater emphasis; and "freedom" in lieu of "liberty" because the
latter word does not cover freedom from want, fear, and ignorance.
(4) Other amendments are the insertion of the phrases and
words:
(a) "to build a just and humane society," to stress that in
ordaining and promulgating the Constitution, the purpose is
not only to establish a government but also such a society of
which the government is merely a part, where inequalities or
inequities in any form do not exist or are corrected;
(b) "the rule of law" (see Art. II, Sec. 1.), the Constitutional
Commission apparently having in mind the country's experience
of authoritarian rule under the Marcos' regime which had been
accused, among others, of human rights violations, electoral
frauds and terrorism, suppression of dissent, and abuse of his
decree-making power;
(c) "aspirations," to stand for the unrealized dreams of the
nation as distinguished from "ideals" which refer to accepted
norms and principles;
(d) "truth," to emphasize the need for transparency and
accountability in the conduct of public affairs; and
 ' 99
90 J' l J lLll'PlN.Ll 'O N S'l'l'l'U'l'lUNAL LAW PH.JJAMULJJ
Principles and Cases

(e) "love," as a directive principle of the Preamble together (a) The Constitution is speaking of domestic peace, and it
with truth, justice, freedom, equality and peace.4 exists not merely when there is absence of hostilities, armed
conflicts, or lawlessness. As used in the Preambl~ the term
(5) The word "independence" in the 1935 text of the Preamble
"peace" should be understood more in its positive sense,
(which was almost an exact reproduction of the Preamble of the
meaning the presence and primacy of law, order, and justice
U.S. Constitution except for some alterations in phraseology) was
which after all are the very foundations as well as ends of every
changed to "democracy" in the 1973 Constitution for the reason that
government.6
the term denotes the idea of a colonial status (which was existing
at the time of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution), and it is long (b) Equality among individuals regardless of one's station in
after 1946 when the Philippines had become legally independent life is one of the fundamental tenets of democracy. (Art. III, Sec. 1.)
from the United States.5 It is restored in the present Preamble to Thus, the idea which "equality" signifies is already embodied in
stress our being an independent nation. A democratic government the term "democracy." Nevertheless, it was deemed imperative
pressupposes that governmental authority resides in the people. that emphasis should continue to be made in the new Charter of
(see Art. II, Sec. 1.) the egalitarian objectives of our body politic. But the intended
principal beneficiaries of a regime of equality are the poor
(6) The words "peace" and "equality" were inserted in tne 1973
and/<:lisadvantaged in our society. As to them, equality really
Constitution in view of the turbulence and the waves of protest
means protection, for implicit in the constitutional provisions
against "basic social and economic inequalities" then prevailing in
on social justice, especially those which deal with the rights of
the country at the time of the framing of the same. These conditions
the working men in industry and agriculture (Art. XIII.), is the
continued to exist up to the last days of the Marcos administration.
mandate imposed on the State to accord preferential attention to
and solicitude for their welfare.
4
The new Constitution is the only one in the world to enshrine "love" in its text
which can also be read as "human fraternity" or "brotherhood."
5The independence day of the Philippines was proclaimed on July 4, 1946. lt was not
-oOo-
till 1962 under Proclamation No. 28 on June 12, 1962 of President Diosdado Macapagal
(confirmed by Congress in R.A. No. 4166 approved on Aug. 4, 1964.) that the Philippines
started to celebrate its independence day on June 12 on the theory that it was General
Emilio Aguinaldo who formally declared our independence on June 12, 1898. The
declaration was formally ratified by the Malolos Congress on September 29, 1898. Since
the Philippines was not really independent on June 12, 1898, we celebrate on June 12, not
our independence day but the declaration of our independence from foreign rule and
the exercise by the Filipinos of their right to self-determination although the government
then had not yet been finally established. On July 4, 1946, America recognized Philippine
Independence declared 48 years earlier on June 12, 1898. The declaration of independence
by a people is not always followed by its immediate attainment. In the case of the United
States of America, its government was still a confederation when independence was
proclaimed on July 4, 1776 and it was about seven (7) years later when it finally become
a federal government. In the case of the Philippines, it took much longer, after years of
struggle both peaceful and violent.
R.A. No. 4166 fully changed the date of Philippine Independence from July 4 to June
12, and at the same time declared "July 4 as Philippine Republic Day."
The late Sen. Raul S. Roco filed a resolution asking for a Senate inquiry on the wisdom
of changing the date of Philippine Indep endence Day from June 12 to August 26. He said
that the declaration of June 12 was made by "a short-Jived dictatorial government" and
6Peace cannot but reign wh en there is national unity particularly in the pursuit of
is "anathema to the celebration of independence of a free people." On the other hand,
he said August 26, 1896 was the day the Filipino people, under the leadership of Andres common goals, and in a democratic society, no greater unifying force can be conceived
Bonifacio, declared their independence from colonial domination. than a government that commands the confidence and respect of the people.

Article I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
SECTION 1. The national territory comprises the
Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains including its ter-
ritorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves,
and other submarine areas. The waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless
of their breadth and dimensions,. form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.
Necessity of constitutional provision
on National Territory.
The Constitution begins with a delimitation of our national
territory.
(1) Binding force ofsuch provision under international law. - There
is no rule in international law which requires a State to define its
territorial boundaries in its Constitution. The reason is that with or
without such a provision, a State under international law has the
unquestioned right to assert jurisdiction throughout the extent of
its territory. Nor is such delimitation binding upon other States
who are not precluded from claiming title to territories which they
think is theirs. A constitution is not an international law but only a
municipal law; as such, it is binding only on the state promulgating
it.
In any case, territorial disputes have to be settled according to
the rules of international law. 1
1The 1935 Constitutional Convention saw the need for careful delineation of
Philippine territory in the 1935 Constitution because of the fear that the United States
might later allow slicing off any portion of our territory which it could do then, for the
100
Sec. 1 ART. 1. NATIONAL TERRITORY
' 101
(2) Value of provision defining our national territory. - It is
important, nevertheless to define as precisely as possible our
national territory for the purpose of making known to the world
the areas over which we assert title or ownership to ~void future
conflicts with other nations. As a sovereign state, the Philippines
can promulgate and enforce laws within our country. Every other
power is excluded from exercising dominion or jurisdiction without
the consent of the Philippines.
International law recognizes the supreme authority of every
state within its territory, although foreign sovereigns and diplomatic
envoys are entitled to exemption from local civil and criminal
jurisdiction.2
(3) Acquisition of other territories. - Incidentally, the definition
of our national territory in our Constitution does not prevent the
Philippfues from acquiring other territories in the future through
any ,of the means (e.g., purchase, exchange, etc.) sanctioned by
international law.
National Territory of the Philippines.
As provided in Article I, it comprises:
(1) The Philippine archipelago3 with all the islands and waters
embraced therein;
(2) All other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction;4
Philippines would not yet be politically independent. Since the 1935 Constitution was
required to be submitted to the U.S. President for approval before its ratification by the
people, such approval would convert the Constitution into an international agreement
binding the United States to respect the provision on the national territory.
The 1973 Constitution likewise contains a provision on the national territory.
2Every Filipino citizen, however, whether he is inside or outside the country, is
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Philippines. Thus, under the National Internal
Revenue Code, he is subject to Philippine income tax on income derived from Philippine
sources. (Sec. 23(B], Sec. 24[A, 1, b) thereof.)
3The Philippines is one of the largest archipelagos in the world. Its estimated 7,100
islands cover an area of about 300,440 square kilometers in lengthy discontinuous
coastline of 300,500 kilometers.
4The Philippines' title to Batanes is covered b y the phrase "all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction." Actual exercise of sovereignty is
not essential to the acquisition or retention of sovereignty rights over a territory. The fact
that a territory is under the control of a foreign power does not prevent a country from
establishing its sovereignty or jurisdiction in the future.

102 !Jl llLUJP! NJ.:: 'ONS'l'l'l'U'J'lUNAI, L/\W
Principles and Cases
(3) The terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains including the
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas corresponding to Nos. (1) and (2); and
(4) The internal waters. (Sec. 1.)
The Philippine Archipelago.
The Philippine archipelago referred to in Article I are:
(1) The territories ceded to the United States by the Treaty of
Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on December
10, 1898, the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said Treaty;
(2) The islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington
between the United States and Spain on November 7, 1900. This
treaty expressly included the Islands of Cagayan, Sulu, and Siboto
which Spain was supposed to relinquish in favor of the United
States but by error of delimitation were not included within the
boundaries of the Philippines as described in Article III of the Treaty
of Paris;
(3) The islands embraced in the treaty concluded between the
United States and Great Britain on January 2, 1930. (see Art. 1, Sec.
1 of the 1935 Constitution.) By virtue of this Treaty, the Turtle and
Mangsee islands situated between Borneo and Sulu were recognized
by Great Britain as parts of the Philippine archipelago; and
(4) The islands of Batanes which lie outside of the boundaries
fixed in the Treaty of Paris over which the Philippines has asserted
title, not by virtue of any cession from the United States or from Spain,
but by virtue of its own occupation and possession of the same. The
clause "and all territory over which the present Government of the
Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction" was inserted in the 1935
Constitution to cover the case of this province which has always
been an integral part of the Philippines.5
5The 1971 Constitutional Convention decided not to mention the above treaties
which were incorporated in Article 1, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution d efining the
territory of the Philippines, in deference to a clamor from certain quarters to remove from
the new fundamental law any vestige of colonialism for said treaties 8howccl thnt the
Philippines had been the object of international com merce.
/\ IU. I. Nl\'l'I UN/\J, '11 \N l<I I' I( l(J,I
Meaning of archipelago.
The term archipelago is derived from the Greek word pelagos
meaning "·sea."
It has been defined as a sea or part of a sea studded with islands,
often synonymous with island groups,6 or as a large group of islands
in an extensive body of water, such as sea.7 In other words, it includes
both sea and islands which geographically may be considered as an
independent whole.
"All other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction."
(1) Pending Philippine claim to Sabah, etc. - The ph rase "a nd all
the other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic r.ight or
legal title{/ in the former provision was amended as indicated nbove.
The phrase acquired a definite meaning in the 1973 Constitution as
a cover-all for pending Philippine claim to Sabah9 (formerly North
6See Glossary of Oceanograph ic Terms (1960), U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office.
7
See Meritt Students Encyclopedia (1960).
8Historic right has been taken to mean title created in derogation of international
law through historical process by which one state h as asserted jurisdiction originally
illegal, which has been acquiesced in by the community of nations. Legal title, on the
other hand, refers to a derivative title, such as cession by a State of its sovereign rights
over a territory. (Justice F.Q. Antonio, "For and against the RP Sabah Claim," The Bulletin
Today, September 23, 1977.)
9The Philippine Government officially claimed Sabah, which is about the size of
Mindanao on June 22, 1962, du ring the term of President Diosdado Macapagal in a
communication of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the United Kingdom (UK)
through the British ambassador. The United Kingd om previously sent a note dated May
25, 1962 to the Philippine Government asserting British ownership of, and sovereignty
over the territory.
The Sultan of Brunei gave the island as a gift to the Sultan of Sulu for the latter's
assistance in quelling the revolt of the farmer's subjects in a deed dated 1781. In 1878 or
97 years later, the 27th Sultan of Sulu leased North Borneo to two European adventurers,
Baron Von 'Overdeck (a German), and Alfred Dent (a British national) of the British East
Ind ia Trading Company, who agreed to pay an annu al rental of RMS35,300 Malaysian
dollars. The two, in turn, without the knowledge and consent of the Sultan of Sulu
sold their lease contract to the British Government which chartered th e British North
Borneo Comp any with the latter taking possession of the leased property. Thus, North
13orneo came und er British jurisdiction. Britain annexed Sabah on July 10, 1946 six (6)
days after the Philippines became independent on July 4, 1946 as a crown colony of the
British throne and made the land part of the Federation of Malaysia when it granted
independence to Malaysia in 1957.
The Philippines maintained that the contract with Overdeck and Dent was for lease
but the United Kingd om insisted it was for cession. The dispute revolves around the
101 J~IllLH l"lNJJ 'ON '1'1TU'1'1U NAI. LAW
Principles and Cases
Borneo) against Malaysia and to the so-called Kalayaan, a distinct
island group within the Spratly island chain,10 and possibly, to the
Marianas Islands, including Guam (which according to historical
documents were under the control of the civil and ecclesiastical
authorities in the Philippines during the Spanish Regime), or any
other territory over which the Philippines may in the future find it
meaning of the term padyak used in the agreement, which in tausug means lease whereas
the British version says the word means "grant" or "cede." The Malaysian Embassy in
Manila continues to pay "cession money" to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu.
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, the then reigning Sultan of
Sulu ceded the territory of North Borneo to the Republic of the Philippines, giving the
Philippine government full authority to pursue their claim in international courts. In
1962, the government filed a claim over Sabah with the United Nations.
President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines announced before the meeting of
ASEAN heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur on August 4, 1977 that "decisive steps
will be taken to eliminate the Philippine claim to Sabah." On the move to assert in the
new Constitution the claim over Sabah, ConCom member Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., has
this to say: "If the purpose is to strengthen Philippine claim over Sabah, it will not work.
A Constitution is a municipal law. Philippine municipal law does not bind Malaysia. A
unilateral declaration by Manila will not be law for Kuala Lumpur. Moreover, there is also
the question of due process. The move to constitutionally assert jurisdiction over Sabah
virtually asks the members of the Commission to pass judgment on the evidence for the
Philippines. Presumably this has to be done with due process, which is a process which
hears before it decides. But the Commission has neither the time nor the facilities for
assessing whatever evidence there might be. At a time when there is need to strengthen
ASEAN, enshrining the Sabah claim in the Constitution will not serve Philippine interests
and will only exacerbate the friction between Manila and Kuala Lumpur. What is there to
gnin from that?" (Manila Bulletin, July 8, 1986, p. 5.)
It was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission to abandon the Sabah
claim. It simply left the matter to be settled through normal foreign relations and
processes, judicial or diplomatic. The Philippines has border, maritime fishing and other
problems with Malaysia.Any withdrawal of our claim should be an integral part of the
comprehensive settlement of these other problems.
President Fidel Ramos formed in January 1993 a body, the Executive-Legislative
Advisory Council, to undertake legal and political studies on the Philippines' territorial
claim. The heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu who are pursuing on their own their claim over
Sabah, are demanding the Malaysian government to recognize their proprietary rights,
over Sabah and the payment of $10 billion rental for occupying Sabah from 1963 to
1993 and thereafter a 5% royalty for incomes derived from the national resources of the
island. The Philippines has not abandoned its claim to territorial sovereignty over Sabah.
Without the Philippines' claim which is intertwined with the Sultanate's proprietary
claim, the Sultanate would have no clout to press its demand for pecuniary settlement.
1°The Spratly archipelago is a collection of isles, reefs and atolls on the South China
Sea that are being claimed in whole or in part, by six (6) nations of Southeast Asia. These
are the Philippines, the Republic oJ China (Taiwan), People's Re~ubli~ of_China, Vi~tn~m,
Malaysia, and Brunei-. The Spratlys, which also straddle strategic sh1ppmg lanes lmkmg
the Pacific and Indian Oceans, are believed to be atop huge mineral deposits of oil and
natural gas.
/\ I"( I , I, N /\ I II ) N /\ I , I I I ( I( I I t 11(
has a right to claim. 11 Its inclusion in the definition of our national
territory merely provided for the possibility that said territories
might eventually become a part of the Philippines but it did not
settle the question of whether they belong to the Philippines by
historic right or legal title.
(2) Future claims by the Philippines to other areas. - The deletion,
however, of the words "by historic right or legal title" is not to be
construed as precluding future claims by the Philippines to areas
over which it does not actually exercise sovereignty. The change is
designed to improve our relations with Malaysia while allowing
flexibility in pursuing the Sabah claim. 12 There is no constitutional
abandonment of such claim which subsists unless and until the
Philip'p ine government gives it up in accordance with the accepted
procedures., in international law.
Othe~ are.as included in the Philippine
archipelago.
The Philippine territory consists of its terrestrial, fluvial, and
aerial13 domains. Included in its fluvial domain, in addition to the
inland waters, are:
(1) The territorial sea. - It is that part of the sea extending 12
nautical miles (19 kms.) from the baselines. It is also called the
"marginal sea," the "marginal belt," or the "marine belt;" 14
11
Presidential Decree No. 1596 (dated June 11, 1978) declares the area within the
Kalayaan Island Group part of the Philippine Territory and constitutes such area as a
distinct and separate municipality of the province of Palawan to be known as "Kalay,um."
12
The catch-all claim has created irritants in our ties with Malaysia, a member of
ASEAN, which considered the phrase as an assertion of Philippine claim over Sabah. The
deletion of the clause has removed a possible constitutional obstacle to the dropping of
the Sabah claim by the Philippines if it desires to do so.
13
The terrestrial domain refers to all surfaces of land above the sea that belong to the
Philippines. The fluvial domain includes the inland waters as well as the waters of the
territorial sea and other submarine areas. The aerial domain refers to the air space or that
part of the air directly above the land and water territory of the Philippines.
The present state of development in space navigation does not permit any
delimitation of the height of air space subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of a state. (see
Committee on National Territory Report No. 01 [1971 Constitutional Convention], dated
Jan. 15, 1972.) The present Constitution uses "aerial domain" in lieu of "air space" in the
1973 Charter.
1
4The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which was
approved on April 30, 1982 by the majority of the members of the United Nations (except
the United States, Venezuela, Israel and Turkey) at its third of the sea conference (UNCLOS

106 J\I IIUJ'l' INE ' NS'l I l'lJ l'I ( NA I. I.AW
Principles ond 'oscs
(2) The seabed (or sea floor or sea bottom). -This refers to the land
that holds the sea, lying beyond the seashore, including mineral and
natural resources. It is the top portion of the submarine area;
(3) The subsoil. - This refers to everything beneath the surface
soil and the seabed including mineral and natural resources;
(4) Insular shelves (or continental shelves). - They are the sub-
merged portions of a continent or offshore island, which slope
gently seaward from the low waterline to a point where a substantial
break in grade occurs, at which point the bottom slopes seaward
at a considerable increase in slope until the great ocean depths are
reached; and
(5) Other submarine areas. - They refer to all areas under the
territorial sea. Among oceanographic_terms used are seamount,
trough, trench, basin, deep, bank, shoal, and reef.
As part of the national territory, the seabed, the insular shelves,
and other submarine areas are necessarily co-extensive with the
territorial sea. The Philippines has a right or title to them to the
extent recognized by international law.
Three-fold division of navigable waters.
From the standpoint of International Law, the waters of the
earth are divided into:
(1) Inland or internal waters. -They are the parts of the sea within
the land territory. Under the Constitution, they are w aters "around,
between and connecting the islands of the archipelago." They are
considered in the same light as rivers, canals, and lakes within the
15
land territory of a state. They are sometimes called national waters;
Ill) and signed on December 6-10, 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica permits coas~al states to
assume jurisdiction over territorial seas 12 miles off the shore. The former 3-mile rule was
considered obsolete. The treaty regulates virtually all the u sers of the world's ocean and
gives to coastal states rights over natural resources and economic activllics in a 200-milc
exclusive economic zone. 159 states and organizations had signed the trenty on December
10, 1984, the deadline for signing. The UNCLOS took effect on Novcmbrr 15, 1994, lly tho
new s tandards set by UNCLOS, the Philippines Is now the 23rd lflrf\<'llt 1•01111t1 y In 1111'
world In terms o f territory, (6CC note 15.)
1~" /\rchlpclo11t1 wntcrn" nrc more l1 Xtc11nlv11 1hn11 l111c1111nl w11111111, 11~ 1111, 1111111111
l11r h1d1•H th11 lnttM, 1h11111rl'ltorl11I ,11•~1 1111d 1h11 111t11'11l1111 ~111111 (~1111 N111,1 111 )
1 1111
Iii I I ll llllrlA I 111( 111 1 II ,
(2) Territorial sea (supm.). - lt ls a belt of wntcr o utside nnd
parallel to the coastline or to the outer limits of the inland or internal
waters;16 and
(3) High or open seas. - They are waters that lie seaward of the
territorial sea.
Jurisdiction over navigable waters.
The inland or internal waters and the territorial sea together
comprise what is generally known as the territorial waters of a state.
Over these waters, a state exercises sovereignty to the same extent
as its land territory but foreign vessels have the right of innocen t
passage through the territorial sea. Innocent passage is any passage,
not contrary to recognized principles of international law. For
example, a, foreign ship when in grave distress or overcome by a
force majeure.may anchor within the territorial waters of the coastal
state. 1n so doing, it does not become subject to the jurisdiction of
the said state.
)
On the other hand, the open seas are international waters which
means that they are not subject to the sovereignty of any state but
every state has equal rights of use in them.17 As a general rule, the
Philippines has no jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high
seas.18
. 16The Philippine terri~orial seas are estimated to have a total area of 498,000 square
miles or 1,289,820 square kilometers. See Note 20.
17
Presidential Decree No. 1599 (June 11, 1978) establishes an Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines extending to a distance of 200 nautical miles beyond and
from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured; except that where the limits
overlap the economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state, common boundaries shall
l be determined by agreement with the state concerned, or in accordance with generally
I
recognized principles of international law on delimitation.
The country's h istoric territorial sea delineated by the Treaty of Paris of 1898 has
an area of 263,300 nautical miles. The Philippine EEZ under the UN Law of the Sea
t Convention_ (see Note 12.) covers an area of 395,400 square nautical miles of water, or 132
square n~utical miles bigger than the territori<!l sea previously claimed by the Philippines.
The area 1s actually not_a part of the national territory but is under Philippine jurisdiction
for the exclusive exploitation of all the resources, living and non-living, in the area. The
economic zone is subject to the general principles of international law since this is part
of the high seas.
18
" Art. 2. Applicnlio11 ofits provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential npplication, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Phlllpplne /\rchipelngo, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone,
but nlso outside of its jurisdiction, ngninst those who:
·1, Should comm l.t nn offe nse while on n Philippine ship or nlrship;
IUIJ l'l 111.I PP I N I ( I NS'l'l'l'U l'IONAI, LAW
Principles ond Coses
The archipelago concept or principle
of territoriality.
By this concept is meant that an archipelago shall be regarded
as a single unit, so that the waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the state, subject to
its exclusive sovereignty. 19
The second sentence of Section 1 is an affirmation of this
doctrine. The use of the word "archipelago" in Article 12° is intended
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Shauld be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions; or . · as follows: ·
5. Should commit any of the crimes against n ational security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code." (Revised Penal Code.) · . "To apply the three-mile rule to the Philippines, with every
19The salient provisions of the draft articles for the recognition of Philippine
territorial waters based on this principle submitted by the Philippine delegation to the
U.N. sea-bed committee at its last session from July 2 to August 24, 1973 in Geneva are:
(1) Archipelago states may draw straight baselines joining outermost points of outermost
islands; (2) Waters enclosed in baselines known as archipelagic waters belong to and
are subject to sovereignty of an archipelago state regardless of their depth or distance
from shore including air space over it and sea-bed, sub-soil and resources under it; (3)
Territorial sea is to be measured from baseline; (4) Foreign ships are allowed to pass
through archipelagic waters on sealanes established by an archipelagic state which
may be changed by the archipelagic state; (5) An archipelagic state may make laws not
inconsistent with the articles and having regard to other applicable rules of international
law relating to passage through sealanes and traffic separation schemes; (6) Foreign
warships violating passage law may be required to leave archipelago waters; and (7) An
archipelagic state may not suspend passage of foreign ships through designated sealanes
except when essential for protection of its security and substituting other sealanes.
2
°'The provision in Article I that "the waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines" spells out the archipelago doctrine of the Philippine
government. It has been lifted from the third whereas clause of Republic Act No. 3046.
(June 17, 1961, amended by R.A. No. 5446, Sept. 18, 1968.) In Republic Act No. 3046, the
Philippines has declared that the waters between the different islands are internal waters,
while the waters from the outermost islands to the boundaries set forth in the Treaty of
Paris comprise her territorial sea. (see Committee on National Territory Report No. 01,
dated January 15, 1972.) This law extends the baselines of the Philippine territorial sea to
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which, the law declares, "the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion
and sovereignty."
R.A. No. 9522, amended R.A. No. 3046 (as amended by R.A. No. 5446), adjusting the
country's archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territori~s.
It increased the Philippines' total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 squ are nautical miles. Complying with
Sl!C. 1 ./\RT. I. NATJ.ONAL TERRITORY 109
to p~oject the idea that the Philippines is an archipelago (a state
composed of a number of islands) and bolster the archipelagic
concept (or archipelago doctrine) which the Philippines, together
':ith Indonesia, Fiji, Mauritius and other archipelago states similarly
situated had steadfastly espoused in international conferences on
the Law of the Sea.
The Philippine position.
The archipelago theory is in reality an exception to the three-
rni!~ ru~e
21
\now 12-mile rule). This rule does not adequately protect
Ph1hppme interests at all because of our extensive coast lines.
(1) ~~ta~ effect of application of12-rnile rule upon territorial integrity
ofthe Phtltppmes. - In the International Convention on the Law of the
Sea held in ~eneva in 1958, the Philippine position was explained22
island having its own territorial sea, would have a fatal effect
upon the territorial integrity of the Philippines. It would mean
the dismemberment of the archipelago with the Sibuyan sea
separating the Visayas, and the Mindanao Strait and the Sulu
isolating Palawan from the rest of the archipE;?lago.
These and other areas of waters would cease to be Philippine
water~; :hey would become international waters or high seas,
and •fishing vessels from all nations can enter to get the fish
and other living resources of the sea which nature and Divine
Providence intended for the Filipinos. Furthermore, warships of
even unfriendly nations could enter these waters and stay there
with perfect legal right to do so. At the same time, we would
lose a large part of our territory on both sides of the archipelago,
towards the China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
the UN _Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Ill which prescribes the water-
land rat10, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic states like the Philippines,
R.A. N?: 95~2 short~ned one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around
the Phi11pp1~e archipelago, and classified adjacent territories, namely, Kalayaan Island
Gr~up (KIG, and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regime of islands," whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zone. (see Magallona vs. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476 (2011].)
21
. The limit was made at a time when the cannon's maximum range was only three
miles.
22
By Senator ARTURO M. TOLENTINO.
 1 l 'I'. I 1\ 1< I'. I. NJ\'11 N l\1. 'J'Hl{l{l'I' RY
110 PHILIPPINE ONST11'UTIO NAL LAW Sec. J
Principles and Cases

As. long as the Philippine Constitution stands, as long as the The archipelago principle and the exclusive economic zone
Philippines continues as one united country, and as long as the rights2' a.re now fully recognized in the U.N. Law of the Sea
Philippines constitutes one nation, the three-mile limit can never be Convention and, therefore, form part of public international law.
acceptable to us." The convention was ratified by the interim Batasang Pambansa on
February 27, 1984. . ·
(2) The Philippines, a single nation and a united state. - In a
statement before the Sub-Committee II of the Committee on
Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits -oOo-
of National Jurisdiction at Geneva on August 16, 1971, the Solicitor
General23 of the Philippines reiterated the reasons why the over
7,100 islands composing the Philippines should be treated as one
whole unit:
"More than seven thousand islands comprise the Philippines
ruled by one whole unitary government, bound by a common
heritage, beholden to the same tradition, pursuing the same
ideals, interdependent and united politically, economically and
socially as one nation. To suggest that each island has its own
territorial sea and that baselines must be drawn around each
island is to splinter into 7,000 pieces what is a single nation and
a united state.
One need only imagine a map of the Philippines with
territorial seas around each island and with pockets of high
seas in between islands to realize the absurdity of the resulting
situation. Depending on the breadth of the territorial sea that
may emerge, such pockets on high seas in the very heart of the
country may be such small areas of no more than 5 to 10 or 15
square miles. And yet, on account of this, on the pretext of going
to those pockets of high seas, any vessel may intrude into the
middle of our country, between, for example, the islands of
Bohol and Camiguin which from shore to shore are separated
by no more than 29 miles."
Even, therefore, a twelve-mile breadth of the territorial sea
would not be acceptable to the Philippines as it would still result
in having some pockets within the sea between some islands which
would be considered international waters.

24
23ESTELITO
See Note 17.
P. MENDOZA.

Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
Nature of Article II.
This portion of our Constitution may be called the basic political
creed of the nation.
(1) Fundamental obligations of the government in the conduct
of public affairs. - It lays down the fundamental principles and
policies the government is committed to observe in the conduct of
public affairs, and prescribes the fundamental obligations of the
government, particularly the legislative and executive departments
as its policy-determining organs.
(2) Guidelines for legislative or executive action. - The principles
and policies are not intended to be self-executing. They do not
confer judicially enforceable rights but only provide guidelines
for legislative or executive action.1 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs.
Morato, 250 SCRA 130 [1995]; Tondo Medical Center Employees
Assoc. vs. Court of Appeals, 527 SCRA 746 [2007]; Ta:fiada vs.
Angara, 272 SCRA 18 [1997].)
(3) Remedy of the people. - The enforcement of the duties
consequently rests with the executive and the legislative
1It has been held, however, that all provisions of the Constitution are self-executing,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate. A contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when or
whether, they sh all be effective. In case of doubt, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. (Manila Hotel vs.
GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997]; Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr. 972 SCRA 146 [2014]
There are about 97 provisions in the Constitution qualified by the phrase "as may be
defined by law," or "as may be provided by Jaw" or "as Congress m ay provide," the most
significant of which are those on political dynasty (Sec. 25.), freedom of information (Art.
Ill, Sec. 7), and the economic provisions on National Economy and Patrimony. (Art. XII.)
112
l\ lf l', I I. IJH<..'L /\ 1·.:t\'l'IUN II J'l<I N 'IPl.ll~ 11:l
AND STATE POLICIES
Principles
departments, and the electorate cannot demand their enforcement
through the courts. The remedy is political. It is incumbent on
the people to demand the fulfillment of these government duties
through the exercise of the right of suffrage. •
(4) Value of provisions. - Indirectly, some of these principles
may gui~e the courts in determining the validity of implementing
statutes or executive acts in justiciable cases.2 (see Art. VIII, Sec. 4[2,
3].) They may c!lso shed light in ascertaining the meaning of other
provisions of the Constitution.
PRINCIPLES
SEC;f!ON 1. The Philippines is a democratic and re-
publicatt State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
The Philippines, a democratic
and republican State.
The above declaration is a restatement (see Preamble) of the
democratic and representative character of our government.3 It
implicitly proclaims our aversion to totalitarian or autocratic rule.
It makes clear that the government is controlled by the people and
based on their consent.
(1) Essence of republicanism. - A republican government is a
democratic government by representatives chosen by the people at
large. The essence, therefore, of a republican state is indirect rule
determined by the rule of the majority.
The government is established by the people to govern
themselves. Its officers from the highest to the lowest, both elective
and appointive, are agents, representatives and servants of the
people and not their rulers or masters, serving for a limited period
and discharging the duties of their positions as a public trust. They
2See VG. SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 11th ed., p. 116 (1962).
3Historically, the description "republican" in Section 1 in the 1935 Constitution was
in coi:i1pl!ance with one of the conditions imposed by the Tydings-McDuffie Law on the
constitution to be drafted by the 1934 Cons titutional Convention.
 1' 1111.ll ' l ' I N l l 'UN! il I l'U I IO N A I , I.AW
• Prlndplc1:1 nnd CnscA
can only exercise the powers delegated to them by the people who
remain as the fountainhead of political power and authority.4
(2) Features of pure democracy present. - Since direct rule by the
people is out of the question, all modern democracies are republics.
Section 1, however, adds the word "democratic" because the
government, while essentially a republican democracy, embodies
some features of a pure democracy such as initiative, referendum,
and recall. (see Art. VI, Sec. 32; Art. X, Sec. 3.)
(3) Presidential system of government adopted. - A republican
democracy has different forms of government. The Constitution
has adopted what is known by students of political science as the
"presidential system" with a bicameral Congress, a popularly
elected President enjoying a fixed tenure, and an independent
judiciary based on the theory of separation of powers among the
three branches and its characteristic fe~ture of checks and balances.5
Manifestations of a democratic
and republican state.
Among the manifestations of a republican and democratic state
are the following: ' officials who, as public servants, are accountable to the people. (Art.
(1) The existence of a bill of rights (Art. III.);
(2) The observance of the rule of the majority (infra.);
(3) The observance of the principle that ours is a government of
laws, and not of men (infra.);
(4) The presence of elections through popular will (Art. V.);
(5) The observance of the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances (see Art. VI, Sec. 1.);
40ur Supreme Court, paraphrasing President Lincoln, spoke of a republican
state as one with "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people - a
representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and
discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare."
(Metran vs. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819 [1948].)
5In the final analysis, the kind of men and women who serve in government,
more than its structure, determines its responsiveness and effectiveness in promoting
the public welfare and the nation's progress. No system of government can change the
quality of holders of public office. If the system fails, the failure is not the working of the
system but the people who run it.
I Iii ' , I A l{ I', II , ! Jill l ,A NA I l\.)N l )I I l ' l { I N l 11 ' 1.I.' 11'1
AND S'l'./\'l'.E P O LI 'll.lS
Principles
(6) The observance of the principle that the legislature cannot
pass irrepealable laws (see Art. VI, Sec. 26.);
(7) The observance of the laws on public officers (Art.
I
XL); and
(8) The observance of the principle that the State cannot be sued
without its consent. (Art. XVI, Sec. 3.)
Repository of sovereignty.
(1) Sovereignty resides in the people. - Sovereignty implies the
supreme authority to govern. As the State in whom sovereignty
resides, the Filipino people have the right to constitute their own
government, to change it, to set up a new government, and to organize
it in such form as seems to them best to promote their welfare and
happiness. Thus, the people, not the government functionaries, are
the reposi~bry of sovereignty. All government authority emanates
from them. This is the concept of popular sovereignty.
(2:) Exercised indirectly through public officials. - In a republican
state, the people do not govern themselves directly. Sovereignty (i.e.,
making laws, enforcing the same, and deciding cases involving life,
liberty, and property) is exercised through duly constituted public
XI, Sec. 1.) Their acts, if within the scope of their delegated powers,
are, in effect, the acts of the people.
(3) Exercised directly through suffrage. - In a Republic, actual
sovereignty is exercised by the people through the electoral process
(Art. V.t that is, through the enfranchised citizens.
(a) Popular sovereignty rests on popular representation.
The popular will is best expressed when electoral processes are
free, clean, and honest, on the basis of universal suffrage (i.e. ,
not granted by status or property) and through secret vote. It
is also imperative that the broadest choice of representatives is
available to the people. Since we are a representative democracy,
the free and true expression of the people's sovereignty is of
great importance in determining popular representation in
government.
(b) Sound policy dictates that public elective officers are
filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office and it is a fundamental idea in
all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
 j J
l'I 111.ll'JII NI( (.'U NI 111 I ) I It )N/\ 1, J. /\W ! I t' , I
l1dnclplcs ond Coses
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or
it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (Santos vs. Commission on Elections, 137 SCRA 740
[1985].)
Right of the people to revolt.
(1) Nature of right. - Section 1 above impliedly recognizes that
the people, as the ultimate judg!:!s of their destiny, can resort to
revolution as a matter of right. As has been aptly said by a former
President6 who himself, ironically, was overthrown in a successful
bloodless revolution and died in exile: "Of all the established forms
of government, democracy is the only one which recognizes the
inherent right of the people to 'cast out their system of government
or institutions by force or general uprising, when the legal and
constitutional methods of making such changes have proved
inadequate or so obstructed as to be unavailable.'
The right to rebel is an elemental human right just as the right to
repress rebellion is an elemental public right." 7
(2) Need for constitutional provision expressly recognizing right. -
A provision in the Constitution expressly recognizing the people's
right to revolt against an oppressive or tyrannical government is not
necessary and proper.
(a) Being an inherent right, it exists whether or not such
right is embodied in the Constitution and, regardless of the
Constitution, the people will revolt if sufficiently provoked by
oppression, injustices, or abuses by their rulers.
6FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Today's Revolution: Democracy, p. 1.
7"From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as
'an inherent right of a people to cast out their rules, change their policy, or effect radical
reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when
the legal or constitutional methods of making such changes have proved inadequate
or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.' It has been said that 'the locus of positive
law-making power lies with the people of the state' and there is derived 'the right of
the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without
regard to the existing constitution."' (Letter of Associate Justice R.S. Puno, 210 SCRA 589
(1992) and Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 [2003], citing H. Black, Handbook of
American Constitutional Law Il, 4th ed., [1927) and Political Rights as Political Questions. The
Paradox of Luther v. Borden, 100 Harvard Law Review, 1125, 1133 [1987),)
l
J
I Ill', I /\ 1{ 1', II. J) l ~t J. /\ 1-!A' I IU N O Ii l ' l{ I N ' 11•1,1~• I IY
AND STA'fE POLICIES
Principles
(b) The right is not included in the organic laws of other
nations because it implies the political instability of a State.
(c) A constitution in a democratic State enshrines the rule
of law and, therefore, any allusion to the right of violent or
armed revolution (which connotes an act committed beyond the
framework of the rule of law) would be inconsistent with the
conce·pt ·of a constitution.
(d) Furthermore, to constitutionalize the right to revolt
might encourage mob rule and set off a chain of revolutions for
capricious reasons. In any case, in a democratic society where
the consent of the governed is regularly expressed through open
debates and free elections, "prudence, indeed, will dictate that
Governments long established should not be changed [through
revoluti6n] for light and transient causes."
Rule o! the majority.
(1) Inherent in every democracy. - The observance of the rule
of the majority is an unwritten law of every popular government.
Without the rule, no democracy would be able to operate. The
wishes of the majority prevail over those of the minority who are,
however, given certain rights, like the right to express their opinions,
to dissent freely and publicly, to protest the acts of the majority, and
challenge said acts in courts.
(2) Instances. - In many instances, the rule of the majority is
observed in our government. Thus, under the Constitution:
(a) A majority vote of all the respective members of Congress
is necessary to elect the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives (Art. VI, Sec. 16[1].), and a majority
of all the members of Congress to concur to a grant of amnesty
(Art. VII, Sec. 19.) and to pass a law granting tax exemptions.
(Art. VI, Sec. 28[4].) In case of a tie in the election for President
(or Vice-President), the President shall be chosen by the majority
vote of all the members of both Houses of Congress. (Art. VII,
Sec. 4.)
(b) A two-thirds majority of all its respective members is
required to suspend or expel a member of either House (Art.
VI, Sec. 16[3].); of all the members of Congress to d eclare the
existence of a state of war (Ibid., Sec. 23[2].), to reconsider a bill
I IH J'l 111.ll ' l'I N I! t U N/ ii 11 l J I IU N /\1. I.AW
Pdnclples nnd Coses
vetoed by the President (Ibid., Sec. 27[1].), to call a constitutional
convention (Art. XVII, Sec. 3.); of all the members of the Senate
to concur to a treaty or international agreement (Art. VII, Sec.
21.) and to render a judgment of conviction in impeachment
cases. (Art. XI, Sec. 3[6].)
(c) Any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution
may be proposed by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members (Art. XVII, Sec. l[l].), and it shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite. (Ibid., Sec.
4.)
(d) Decisions of the Supreme Court En Banc have to be
concurred in by a majority of the members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
to pronounce a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law unconstitutional. (Art. VIII, Se_c. 4.)
In the Court of Appeals, the vote of at least the majority is
necessary in many cases. Even in the passage of local ordinances,
the rule of majority is observed.
(3) A practicable rule of law. - The device of the majority is a
practicable rule of law based on reason and experience. Democracy
assumes that in a society of rational beings, the judgment and
experience of the many will, in most instances, be superior to the
judgment and experience of the few; and hence, that the verdict of
the majority will more likely be correct than that of the minority. It
is, of course, to be understood that the majority acts within the pale
of the law.8
(4) Tyranny of the majority not contemplated. - In a free society,
tyranny, whether by the few or by the many, is condemned. While
the majority opinion ought to prevail, this does not mean that the
majority is always right. The rights of the minorities were developed
precisely to protect them against the tyranny of the majority for
democracy presupposes not only a government by the majority but
likewise the assurance of certain fundamental rights including the
right to oppose the government in power.
8See Schmandt & Steinbicker, Fundnmen/.nls ofGovernment, The Bruce Publishing Co.,
p. 265 (1954).
Al<'I'. II . IJE 'LJ\H/\'l'!UN OJ I JJH.JN 'JPLJ_:S ll9
AND STATE POLICIES
Principles
To ~e sure, the strength of a democracy lies in its recognition
of the rights of each and every minority in society. De Tocqueville
stated the matter succinctly:
"A majority taken collectively is only an individual whose
opinions, and frequently whose interests, are opposed ;o those
of another individual, who is styled a minority. If it be admitted
that a man possessing absolute power may misuse that power
~y wronging his adversaries, why should not a majority be
hable to the same approach? Men do not change their characters
by uniting with one another; nor does their patience in the
presence of obstacles increase with their strength." 9
Government of laws and not of men.
By this principl~, which is also known and has the same import
as the rule of law, 1s meant that no one in this country, not even
the government, is above or beyond the law which includes the
C_onstit~tion. It mandates equality before law. Every man, however
high and exalted his station may be, possesses no greater rights 10
than every other man in the eyes of the law.
(1) Exercise of governmental powers. - Under our Constitution
~nlimited or absolute powers are inconceivable. Our governmen;
1s one of la~s a_nd not of men. It has only the powers given it
by the Constitution and the laws, and it may not go beyond the
grants and limitations set forth therein.11 Official discretion must be
within the bounds of law. Once it goes beyond its pale, it ceases to
be legal discretion but becomes tyranny or despotism. (Cortez vs.
Commission on Elections, 79 Phil. 352 [1947].)
The law is the only supreme power in our system of government;
and every man who, by accepting an office by appoinhnent or
election,_ participates in its function, is only the more strongly bound
to submit to such supremacy and to observe the limitations which it
imposes upon every aspect of the authority it confers. (Alejandro vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 [1924]; Peralta vs. Mathay, 38 SCRA 256 [1971].)
9
Democracy in America, Bradley ed., Vol. 1, p. 259.
10
But _wh~re there ar~ ~ational grounds for so doing, the law may constitutionally
gra~t special ~1ghts or privileges to persons belonging to a class (e.g., to the President)
which are denied to persons who are not similarly situated. (see Art. III, Sec. 1.)
11
See V.G. SINCO, op. cit., p. 126.
 al
IJtl 1' 1111 , ll ' l ' II I ll I I 11 li d 111 / 1 II l l lA I , I
1
111"'1dplt•11 1111d t'11 11'11
(2) Rationale. - The rationale for the rule of law was best
expressed by Justice Brandeis in this wise:
"In a government of laws, existence of the government will
be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. O~r
government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or 111,
it teaches the people by example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the
law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law
the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution."
(Dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438; Ilagan vs.
Enrile, 139 SCRA349 [1985].)
(3) Enforcement of private rights. - Private individuals in the
community are also bound to respect the sovereignty of the law. A
person may not agree with the wisdom and expediency of the law
but it is his duty to follow the law so long as it remains in the s:atute
books. He cannot take the law into his own hands by resorting to
violence or physical force to enforce his rights or achieve his ends
without being criminally held liable for his action.
The princ~ple is thus intended as a safeguard against arbitrary
government. It protects most especially the liberties of the weak and
the underprivileged. Indeed, the democratic freedoms the citizens
cherish and enjoy shall cease when the rule of law no longer reigns.
The supremacy of the Constitution.
(1) As a criterion for validity of any public act. - "The concept
of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the
criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from
the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our
system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law,
with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in
the legal hierarchy."
(2) As a restraint on all organs of government. - "The three
departments of government in the discharge of the functions with
which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its
commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
I l
11 I I I I A l( I 11 , 111~\ I A IIC A IIPN \U l l 'l( I N l 11'1 ,l(t
I\W
AN I S'l.'1\'l'H I' LL 'WS
Principles
(a) Congress, in the enactment of statutes, must ever be on
guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive
or formal, be transcended. I
(b) The Presidency, in the execution of the laws, cannot
ignore or disregard what it ordains.
(c) l1;1 its task of applying the law to the facts as found
in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its
power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts
of ~e coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a
logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is
paramoµnt. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to
live up to its mandate. Thereby, there is recognition of its being
the supreme law." (Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections, 36
SCRA 228 [1970], per Justice Fernando.)
~EC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instru-
ment of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Renunciation of war as an instrument
of national policy.
The w·ord "renounces" would seem to imply that at one time
war was part of our national policy. That is not true, of course. The
word "condemns" would have been more accurate.1
~l) Philippines bound by a policy of peaceful international
relationship. - This is the first aspect of the above declaration. 2 It
is in accordance with the principle in the United Nations Charter
binding all members to "refrain in their international relations from
1
See V.G, SINCO, op. cit., p. 120.
2Thep~ovision in the 1935 Constitution was probably inspired by the principles
annmmced m the Bnand-Kellog Anti-War Pact (after Prime Minister of France and
Secretary of State of the United States, respectively, who negotiated the same) or the
Pnct o~ Paris_signed on ~ugust 27, 1928 by 56 countries, which bound the signatory
countries to follow a pohcy of peaceful international relationship and to consider wars
of nggrcssion illegal.
 ,1'1 11 1. ll ' l'l tll , I U N ! il 111 / I H H✓ A l , I AW
l'rllll lph•11 llld t'IHll ' 'I
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of ~ny state." (Chap. 1, Art. 2[4] thereof.)
(2) Aggressive war against the Philippines not contemplated. -
The declaration refers only to the renunciation by the Philippines
of aggressive war, not war in defense of her national honor and
integrity. Men and nations cannot waive in advance the basic right
to self-preservation and existence against aggression or unprovoked
attacked.
Under Article VI, Section 23(1) of the Constitution, Congress,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, voting
separately, may declare the existence of a state of war presumably
started by another state.
Adoption of the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of our law.
This second portion of the declaration binds the Philippines,
by reason of its membership in the family of nations, to enforce
or observe within its jurisdiction generally accepted principles of
international law,3 whether customary or by treaty provision, as part
of the law of the land, notwithstanding that they are not embodied
in statutory enactments. International law refers to the body of rules
and principles which governs the relations of nations and their
respective peoples in their intercourse with one another.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international
3"Generally accepted principles of international law" refer to norms of general or
customary international law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life,
liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others. The concept of'generally
accepted principles of law' has also been depicted in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges look u pon certain 'general principles of law'
as a primary source of international law because they have the 'character of jus ra-
tionale' and are 'valid through all kinds of human societies.' (Judge Tanaka in his
dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 1.C.J. 296.) Certain prin-
ciples are part of international law because they are 'basic to legal systems generally'
and hence, part of the ;us gentium. These principles, he believes, nrc cstnblishcd by
a process of reasoning based on the common identity of nll lognl oyAtomt1. If lhoro
should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to otntc prnctlco nnd d1lt(•rml no
whether th e municipal low principle p rovldcRn juRt nnd ncC<'J)tnbh ttohtthlli, x Xx"
(Phnrmncoutlcnl nnd I lcnllh MO Aaqoc. vu. Duq110 lll, ~1'1 !K'HA 7'1~ 170071)
A l< I II Ill \ I A l{A II I IN \l l ' l 'l<IN l 11 '1. 1 1 I.' \
/\N I ) ~, l'/\' l'I! l'OUl'l HS
Principles
law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine
of incorporation, as applied in most countries, rules of international
law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national,legislative
enactments. (Philip Morris, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,4 224 SCRA 576
[1993].).
. (1) Diplomatic immunity. -The Philippines is a signatory to the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.5 Conformably with
the convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by
and large, the representation of the interests of the sending State
~~ prorn?ting fri~ndly relations with the receiving State. Only
diplomatic agents under the terms of the convention, are vested
with the bl:m1<-et diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits.
The Convention defines "diplomatic agents," as the heads
of. missio_ns or members of the diplomatic staff, thus, implied ly
withholding the same privileges from all others such as the
members of the administrative, technical aid service staff of the
~ission ~h? are not accorded diplomatic rank. The main yardstick
~ ascertammg.wh~ther a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity
1s the determmahon of whether or not he performs duties of
d~plomat~c na~r_e, i.e., he is charged with the duty of representing
his State m political rnatters.6 (Minucher vs. Court of Appeals, 397
SCRA244 [2003].)
I (2) Protection of foreign embassies. - The Vienna Convention
l on J?iflomatic Relations, which makes it "the special duty of the
I
t
rece1vmg _State to take appropriate steps for the protection of the
Ii 4
Citing PARAS, International Law and World Organization, 1971 ed., p. 20 and
SALONGA & YAP, Public International Law, 1974 ed., p. 16.
. 5?1e convention _is a codification of centuries-old customary law, and by the time of
its ratification on Apnl 18, 1961, its rules of Jaw had become stable.
6
It is a reco~nized P:~ciple o~ in~ernatio~al law and under our system of separation
l of powers that diplomatic immunity 1s essentially a political question (see Art. VIII, Sec.
4.) and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of
the gove~ent. Where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by
~he exe:11tive branch of t~e government, it is the duty of the courts to accep t the claim of
•m~~ruty upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government
(Sohc,tor General) or other officers acting to render his declaration. (.World Health
Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972); see Lasco vs. UN Revolving Fund for
Nntural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 680 (1995).)
Cou,rts,_ however, are not bound to adhere blindly and take on its face the
commumcnhon ,from the Department of Foreign Affairs that a certain person is covered
by Immunity. (Lmng vs. People, 323 SCRA 692 [2000).)
II II II II ' II
124 ~'J llLIPl'l N l·'. 'ONS'l'l'J'U'l'IU N/\ 1. 1./\.W
Principles and Cases
premises of a diplomatic mission against any intrusion or damage
and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity." To the extent that the Vienna Convention
is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international
law, it is part of the law of the land. (Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125
SCRA 553 (1983].) Diplomatic envoys are accorded privileges and
immunities on the theory that they are representatives of their home
States. Moreover, they cannot exercise their diplomatic functions,
free and unhampered, unless they enjoy such privileges.
In case a diplomatic envoy disturbs the internal order of the
receiving State, the latter may request his recall or order him to
leave the country.
(3) Prosecution of war criminals. - The declaration binds the
Philippines to recognize even rules and principles of international
law as contained in treaties to which O\lf government is not a signa-
tory. Thus, although the Philippines was not yet then a signatory to
the Hague Convention, the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction
of the military commission trying the petitioner for war crimes com-
mitted in violation of the convention as against the argument that
the Philippines was not covered by the Convention, holding that
the Convention embodied generally accepted principles of interna-
tional law binding upon all states including the Philippines. (see
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171 [1949}.)
(4) Installation of road safety signs. - It has been held that the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals which was
ratified by the Philippine Government (under Pres. Decree No.
207.) partakes of the character of "generally accepted principles of
international law" which under the Constitution the Philippines
adopts as part of the law of the land. The said Convention
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation
of road safety signs. Pursuant to said recommendation, Presidential
Letter of Instructions No. 229 was issued requiring the installation
of early warning devices (EWD) to motor vehicles. (Agustin vs.
Edu, 88 SCRA 195 [1979}.)
(5) Right of an alien to be released on bail while awaiting deportation.
- In a case, an alien who was ordered deported had been in detention
for more than two years because the government had been unable
to ship him abroad due to the fact that no country would accept
him.
IJ
A l,t l , II, 111(( I.A l(/\ 1 l l-JN l- JII l ' l'l l NC. 11 ' 1, 11'
AND ST/\.'1'.Ll PO Ll '11.lS
Principles
The Supreme Court granted the petition for habeas corpus.
"The protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and except for crimes committed against the
laws of the land, is not limited to Filipino citizens but extends
to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
However, by its Constitution, the Philippines 'adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the Nation.' And in a resolution entitled 'Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' and approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a
member at its plenary meeting on December 8, 1948, the right to
life and "f.iberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all
human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that 'x xx
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile
(Art. 9.), etc."' (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 [1951).)
(6)_ Right of a citizen to return to the Philippines/Right to travel.
- The right to return to one's country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to travel. It may be considered
as a generally accepted principle of international law and under
_ Section 2 is "part of the law of the land." However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel, and enjoys a different protection
under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being arbitrarily deprived thereof. (Art. 12[4].) (Marcos vs.
Manglapus,_177 SCRA 668 [1989].)
(7) Right of extradition. - The principles of international law
recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from a treaty.
Pursuant to these principles, States enter into treaties or extradition
principally for the purpose of bringing fugitives within the ambit of
their laws.7 (Wright vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 341 [1994]; see
Cuevas vs. Munoz, 348 SCRA 542 [2000]; see Art. VII, Sec. 3.)
~E~tra~ition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and
a dehm1tation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory. As it is an
act of "surrender" of an individual found in a sovereign State to another State which
demand~ ~is _surrender, an ~ct of extradition, even with a treaty rendered executory
upon ratifica!Jon by appropriate authorities, does not impose an obligation to extradite
on the reques_ted State, until the l~tter has made its own determination of the validity
of the requesting States demand m accordance with the requested State's own interest.
'.' paramount principle of the law of extradition is that a State may not surrender any
mdiv1dual for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. (Ibid.)
 l!l lll,ll'l'I N I \ l 'UNl, 111 IJ I IU NA I. 1,AW
Principles nnd '011c1-1
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and
detained to avoid his flight from justice. But after bail is granted,
it cannot b e cancelled without notice and hearing. (Rodriguez vs.
Presiding Judge, 483 SCRA 290 [2006].)
(8) Law on trademarks. -A fundamental principle of Philippine
Trademark Law8 is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines
is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over trademark
or a trade name. (Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 203 SCRA 583 [1991].) Following universal acquiescence and
comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement
of actual use in the Philippines (Secs. 2, 2-A, Ibid.) must subordinate
an international agreement (Paris Convention of 1965 to which the
Philippines is signatory) where the conflict is being decided by a
local court.
(9) Intellectual Properh; Code of ·the Philippines/World Trade
Organization. - This Code declares that"an effective intellectual and
industrial property system is vital to the development of domestic
and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology, attracts
foreign investments, and ensures market access for our products." It
took effect on January 1, 1998 and by its express provision, repealed
the Trademark Law, the Patent Law, Articles 188 and 189 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Decree on Intellectual Property, and the
Decree on Compulsory Reprinting of Foreign Textbooks. The Code
was enacted to strengthen the intellectual and industrial property
system in the Philippines as mandated by the country's accession to
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).9
(Mirpuri vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA516 [1999].)
8R.A. No. 166. The basic law now governing the registration and protection of
trademarks, trade names and service marks is RA. No. 8293, known as the "Intellectual
Property Code."
9The WTO is a common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations
among its members in matters related to the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements
annexed to the WTO Agreement. The WTO framework ensures a "single undertaking
approach" to the administration and operation of all agreements and arrangements
attached to the WTO Agreement. This Agreement has revolutionized international
business and economic relations among states, and has propelled the world towards
trade liberalization and economic globalization. Protectionism nnd isolntionlsm belong
to the past. Trade is no longer confined lo a bilateral system. There Is now "n new crn of
global economic cooperation," reflecting the widesprnnd deAirc lo opornlu In n fnll'Or nnd
more open multilaternl trnding system." (Ibid.)
A I ( I II I II I I A It I I I " I I I I , • I I II " II I I I • I
A N I) ! , I'A I I! 11( l I , I 11 11 ,
l 11ofncl plc11
(10) Application of international usages. - International usages
or the customs of civilized nations are given effect by our courts in
the absence of any treaty, executive order, legislative act, or judicial
1
decision. An example of a principle established by international
usage is that fishing boats belonging to an enemy are not subject to
seizure i.n time of war. (The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Assignee of buyer of lots brought suit against the Holy See (seller) for
the annulment of the deeds ofsale subsequently executed by the latter over
the same lots in favor of third parties, reconveyance of the lots in question,
specific performance, and damages.
Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over
the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippit1c8
by the Papal Nuncio.
, Private respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
The petition (for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court)
arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters registered in the name of petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-8 and 5-D which are
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo
A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent of the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his
rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold
to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has
the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner
of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court, for annulment of the sale of the three
parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC, and
Tropicana.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved
to dismiss the complaint-petition for lack of jurisdiction based

I I
J2U J'l l ll,ll'l'I N I-. l'U N h 111 lJ I H->NA I , L AW
Prlnclplcs nnd '11scli
on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an
improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private
respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among
others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner
"shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business
contract in question."
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privileg: of s?".'ereign immui:uty
only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative,
the Papal Nuncio.
Issue: The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court
has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying
sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists
that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that
petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free
will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel
of land locat.e d in the Philippines.
Held: (1) Procedure for pleading sovereign or diplomatic immunity
in a foreign state. - "In Public International La~, when ~ state ~r
international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
I mitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through
I
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreig_n Office of ~e
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is
entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process
of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the international
organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of
State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity.
If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from
suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England,
a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issued to
a certification to that effect instead of submitting a 'suggestion.'
(O'Connel, I International Law 130 [1965); Note: Immunity from Suit
of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale
Law Journal 1088 [1941).)
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign governm~nt
or the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.
But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to
IJ J
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the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs,
Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just
sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
informing the latter that the respondent-employer co\.ild not be
sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer
vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of
the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zamb;les, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General
embodied the 'suggestion' in a Manifestation and Memorandum,
as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through
the Office of Legal Affairs, moved with this Court to be allowed
to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said
Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's
claim of sovereign im:rimnity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was sub-
their private counsels. (Raquiza vs. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945);
Miquiabas vs. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948);
United States of America vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990) and
companion cases.) In cases where the foreign states bypass the
Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their
own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions
involved."
(2) Status of the Holy See as sovereign state. - "Before we
determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into
its status as a sovereign state is in order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the
Pope was the monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered
a subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States
and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area
of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in International Law
became controversial. (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-
37 [1992).)
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty,
where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign
jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized
the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send
I Ill i' IIII l1 '1' 111 1 I I II P il 11111 II ltll\ 1 I AW
I 11lt1d ph 0 11111d \ '11111"1
lls own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties
according to International Law. (Garcia, Questions and Problems in
International Law, Public and Private 81 (1948].)
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City
'for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible
independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty
also in the field of international relations.' (O'Connell, I International
Law 311 [1965].)
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to
determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or µ1 the
Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created
two international persons - The Holy See and Vatican City.
(Salonga and Yap, supra, 37.) · Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of
states, and the attribution to it of 'sovereignty' must be made in
a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states.
(Fenwick, International Law 124-125 (1948); Cruz, International Law
37 [1991)). In a community of national states, the Vatican City
represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical
purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object,
the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with
the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the
Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and
the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the worldwide
interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it
in a sense an 'international state.' (Fenwich, supra, 125; Kelsen,
Principles of International Law 160 (1956].)
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City
as a state has significant implication - that it is possible for any
entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued
by states to be invested with international personality. (Kunz, The
Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 the American Journal of
International Law 308 [1952).)
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and
enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the
Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the
Holy See that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the
status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambnssaclo1~
the Papnl Nuncio, has had diplomatic reprcsentnlionH w it·h the
1 ft I 1
!t i II I II I I 1\ 11 I II H I I ll l' ll lt l~ 11 '1 I ' 1 II
/\ N I J !1I /\'I I! l'Ul.1(. 11~:;
Prlncl plefl
Philippine government since 1957. This appears to be the universal
practice in international relations."
(3) Conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity. - "There are two
c_onflicting c~ncepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the
courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the ~munity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regar~ to pubhc acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard
to pn~te acts or acts jure gestionis. (United States of America vs.
Ruis, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public
International Law 194 [1984].)
executive or judicial determination when an act may be considered
as jure ?~stionis. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign
~n:imuruhes Act of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as
either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act.' Furthermore, the law declared
that the 'commercial character of the activity shall be determined
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.' The
Canadian parliament enacted in 1982 an 'Act to Provide For State
Immunity in Canadian Courts.' The Act defines a 'commercial
activity' as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular
course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a commercial
character.
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to
the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity,
has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions
in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in
characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private
party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of
sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is
particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took
control of nationalized business activities and international trading.
(4) Acts considered jure imperii/jure gestionis. - This Court has
considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private
parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government
I IJ 1' 1111 ,11 ' 1' 111 1 11111 , IIII I III III A I I AW 11,
• JI, liu lplt"I 1111d ( '11111111
of apartment buildings for use of its military officcrn (Syquia vs.
Lope~, 84 Phil. 312 [1949].); (2) the conduct of public bidding for the
repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of
America vs. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status
of base employees. (Sanders vs. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988].)
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following
transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure
gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting
of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and
pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater
to American servicemen and the general public (United States of
America vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA_644 [1990].); and (2) the bidding
for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles
City. (United States of America vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990].)
The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the
general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not
a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract
with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the
United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit."
(5) Acquisition and transfer of the property clothed with a
governmental character. - "In the absence of legislation defining
what activities and transactions shall be considered 'commercial'
and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our
own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can
only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether
the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business
or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by
its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is
not undertaken for gain or profit.
As held in United States of America vs. Guinta, 182 SCRA 644
(1990):
'There is no question that the United StalcHof /\n1Nlcn, llkt•
any other Hlale, will be deemed Lo huvc ln1pli(1dly w11lv11d 1111
non-H110blllty If ll hOH ~•nlt·rrd lnlo n rnnl 1'nt'l 111 11,1 p111p111,1111 y
w· rwlvn t1• 1· 1p11rlly, II 111 wil y wlw11 1lw 101111 111 I li1v11l v1•'I 11 ,1
1
A l( I II fli t 1 /\ 11,'\ l lllt /t lll l 'll l f lt ll ' II ' I ll
AN I) ! 1l 'l\'l 'n 1'0 1,1 "IIJ!
l' tfo lpl •tJ
sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may
be implied.'
. In the _case at bench, if petitioner has bought and 'sold lands
m the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said
trax:i~action can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal
of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in
the PhiJ~ppines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
fore~g~ sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
rece1vmg state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. (Arts. 20-22.) This treaty was concurred in
by the _Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines
on Nov. 15, 1965.
. In Arti~le 31(a) of th~ ~onvention, a diplomatic envoy is grant-
ed 1mmumty from the c1v1l and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the
envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the
mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with
all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the
sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent
disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It
merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied
and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to
leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its
complaint."
(6) Determination of issue of non-suability/diplomatic immunity.
- "T~e issue of_ petitioner's non-suability can be determined by
the ~rml court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings,
pa:rttculady the admission of private respondent. Besides, the
1ll 1' 1111 ll ' l ' lt l l I l l l/! d lll l ll1 H I I\I I A\V
1•t1 1u 11>1t••1 1111d t'1111t•11
privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently
established by the Memorandum and Certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the
conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code
of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3.), the Department of Foreign Affairs
has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the
Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to
the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and
entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic
mission or embassy in this country.
The determination of the executive arm of government that
a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic
immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the
courts. (International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja,
190 SCRA 130 [1990].) Where the plea of immunity is recognized
and affirmed by the executive braRch, it is the duty of the courts
to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of
the government in conducting the country's foreign relations.
(World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1971).) As in
International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health
Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and
order the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish the facts
alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view of said certification, such
procedure would, however, be pointless and unduly circuitous.
(Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No.
109645, July 25, 1994.)"
(7) Remedy of private respondent. - "Private respondent is not
left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances.
Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can
ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic
channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through
the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. !ts
first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with
the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office
shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on
the relations between the Philippine government and l·hc Holy See.
A I( I II I J"' I /\ I(/\ I It , N t II I ' I{ I N ( II I I. I I
!\N I S l '.l\' l 'f ,: PO U ' lfl.S
Principles
(Young, Remedies ofPrivate Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected
Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments, 905,
919. [1964].) Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the
cla1m, the latter ceases to be a private cause. '
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
forerunner of the International Court of Justice:
'By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting
to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on
his pehalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its
rigi t to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules
of international law. (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions,
1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924].)'
The petition for certiorari is granted." (The Holy See vs. Rosario,
Jr., 238 SCRA 524 [19941, through Justice Quiason.)
(11) Immunity from suit of the United Nations and its specialized
agencies. ~ Being a member of the United Nations (UN) and a
party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippines adheres
to the doctrine of immunity granted to the UN and its specialized
agencies dedicated to specific universal endeavors, su ch as health,
agriculture, science and technology, and environment. The reason
behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international
organizations, its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal
and practical independence in fulfilling their duties. The purpose is
"to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance
with international practice, from political pressure or control by the
host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization,
and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions."
(Lasco vs. UN Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration,
supra.)
With respect to foreign states and international organizations,
the immunity from suit or the jurisdiction of local courts can only
be waived expressly by said entities and n ot by their employees or
agents. (Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 241 SCRA580 [1995].)
(12) Immunity from suit of a foreign State and foreign officials.
- The doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without
I 111 1' 1111.IIIJ 'IN I! ~ U Nl 1I 111 111\ IN/\ 1, I A W
1
J'dn lplc1H And 01Je11
its consent (see Art. XVI, Sec. 3.) is of undoubted applicability in
our jurisdiction as it is one of the widely accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our
land in Section 2. (Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 [1974].) The doctrine
is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the foreign
State for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. (M.H. Wylee vs. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357 [1992].) Courts
cannot assume jurisdiction in the absence of express waiver by the
respondent himself.
Even without the affirmation in Section 2, our country would still
be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation. Under the doctrine, as accepted
by the majority of States, such principles are deemed incorporated
in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence
of its membership in the society of 11ations. Upon its admission to
such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with
these principles in its relations with other States. (U.S. vs. Guinto,
182 SCRA 644 [1990]; The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524
[1994].)
The doctrine of State immunity is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of State. However, the rules
of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of States have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them, between sovereign
and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jus gestionis). The result' is, State immunity now
extends only to jure imperii. (U.S. vs. Ruiz, 153 SCRA [1987].)
Doctrine of incorporation/transformation.
Under the Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by incorporation or transformation.
(1) Section 2 embodies the incorporation method. It has been
held thus: "[G]enerally accepted principles of international law,
by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those
customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination
[of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consi!,tent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological elcrrwnt known
A ll( I , II , J II I I ANA I It IN t Iii l ' l( I N ( ll 'l, 111 11/
/\ NI ) S'l'/\'J'I! PO LI 'IJ \8
Principles
as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."
(2) The transformation method requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law
is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part
of the law pf the land through transformation pursuant to Article
VII, Sectio,n 21. Thus, treaties or conventional international law
must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to
be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts.10 (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. vs. Duque III,
535 SCRA 265 [2007].)
Binding force of treaties and
executive agreements.
(1) A-treaty has force of a statute. - The Constitution11 gives a
treaty the same weight and value as a statute of Congress. Thus, it
constitutes part of the internal law of the land. In case of irreconcil-
able conflict between a treaty and a statute, the _prior act is super-
seded by the Jater one in point of time. 12
When a treaty is superseded by a subsequent statute of
Congress, the treaty is repealed or abrogated or amended as part
of the law of the land (see Abbas vs. Commission on Elections,
179 SCRA 287 [1989].) but it still subsists as an engagement of the
10
Citing Joaquin Bernas, SJ, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government,
Part I (2005); An Introduction to International Law, 2002 Ed., p. 57; see Mijares vs. Ranada,
455 SCRA 397 (2005).
11
See Section 4(1) of Article VIII, which speaks of "constitutionality of a treaty, x x x."
and Section 5(a), or is " constitutionality or validity of any treaty xx x."
12
"From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over
municip al law pursuant to the principle of pacla sun/ servanda. Hence, "[e)very treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Our Constitution espouses the
?PPOSing view. (Lim vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002.) As the de
J11re government, the revolutionary government (resulting from the EDSA Revolution
!hat took pince on February 23-25, 1986), could not escape responsibility for the State's
good fnith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law." (Republic vs.
Snndignnbaynn, 107 SCRA 10 (2003); see Introduction-D, Note 8.)
130 l'JJILll'l'INJ \ ' M-J'Jl'l 'U lJ l N/\ 1.1.AW
· Principles and Cmies
Philippines, although it may not be enforceable by our courts. The
other State may only present its complaint to the political organs
(i.e., the President and Congress) of our government.13
(2) A treaty prevails over executive orders. - Executive orders
issued by the President must conform to the generally accepted
principles of international law. Hence, they cannot prevail over a
treaty which has the force of a statute.
. (3) Statute prevails over executive agreements. - The theory that
in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute that one which
is latest in point of time shall prevail is not applicable to executive
agreements because they are not treaties. (see Art. VII, Sec. 21; Art.
VIII, Sec. 4[2].) Although the President may enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not,
on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, by executive
agreement enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of
the Chief Executive is to enforce the laws enacted by Congress. He
may not defeat legislative enactments by indirectly repealing the
same through an executive agreement. (Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9
SCRA230 [1963].)
(4) Rules of court prevail over executive agreements. - Neither
may the Executive Department encroach upon the rule-making
powers of the Supreme Court. Thus, in a case, the Supreme Court
upheld, as against a "Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise
of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and Spanish
State," the constitutional prerogative of the Court to promulgate
rules for admission to the practice of law by denying the petition
of a Filipino citizen for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examination,
although he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. (In
re Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961].)
(5) Constitution prevails over a treaty. - The phrase "law of the
nation" in the 1935 Constitution was changed to "law of the land"
in the 1973 Constitution in order to avoid any conjecture that the
generally accepted principles of international law are incorporated
13See V.G. SINCO, op. cit., p. 293.
A l~ l II , J JI I. I A liA ll t!N tJII l ' l( I N ~ 11 ' 11 1' I l'I
A N IJ S'.l'J \TH PU! .J. 'I J\8
Principles
into Philippine law with the force of constitutional provisions. 14 The
change is retained in the present Constitution. Thus, should a conflict
arise between the Constitution and a treaty, the former prevails. (see
Art. VIII, Sec. 4[2]; see Abbas vs. Commission on Electiods, supra.)
Adherence to the policy of peace, etc.,
with all nations.
This third aspect is a corollary to the foregoing portions of
the above d_eclaration of principle. It shows a positive attitude on
the part of t_he Philippines toward the observance of the rules and
principles of international law.
In line with the objectives of the United Nations, the Philippines
seeks only peace and friendship with her neighbors and the rest of
the world on the basis of mutual trust, respect, and cooperation. It
supports the right of all nations, big and small, to equality, freedom,
and jl!stice in their relations with one another and the policy of
non-interference and peaceful settlement of international disputes.
It does not mean, however, that the Philippines is duty bound to
extend diplomatic recognition to all nations. (see Secs. 7 and 8.)
SEC. 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the
protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure
the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the na-
tional territory.
Supremacy of civilian authority
over the military.
(1) Inherent in a republican system. - The basic tenet of the
supremacy of civifom authority, the highest of such authority being
the President, over the military has always been recognized in our
jurisdiction by implication from express provisions of the 1935
Constitution1 and by practice. This deeply rooted political tradition
is also inherent in a republican system of government.2
141970 U.P, Law Center Constitution Revision Project, p. 20.
1Particularly Art. VII, Sec. 10(2) of the 1935 Constitution, and Art. VII, Sec. 12 of
the 1973 Constitution, now Art. VII, Sec. 18 (Commander-in-Chief provision) of the new
Constitution .
2The reason for the precept has been presented thus: "To allow the military to tread
 1' 1111 11 ' 1' 1111 I I II l' tl 111 J llll t I I l AW o,
1111111 lplt"I 111111 { 'tllll"i
(2) Needfor express declaration. - This, notwithstanding, the 1971
Constitutional Convention and the 1986 Constitutional Commission
have included the above provision as they felt the need for a clear
expression in the Charter concerning the supremacy of the civilian
authority over the military at all times, particularly during periods
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. (see Art. III, Sec. 15; Art. VII, Sec. 18; see Gonzales vs. Abaya,
498 SCRA 445 [2006).)
Even in war, the armed forces is subordinate to civilian authority
as the latter is, at all times, supreII1e over the former.
(3) A safeguard against military dictatorship. - A civilian, the
President is the Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the
Philippines (Art. VII, Sec. 18) - the army, the navy, the air force, and
the marines. As commander-in-chief, he issues orders to the armed
forces.3 (see Gudani vs. Senga, 498 SCRA 671 [2006].) Even the
appointment of their high ranking officers is vested in the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of Congress.
(Ibid., Sec. 16.) Along with Congress, the President determines the
military budget and defines the national policy on defense and
security.
This arrangement is considered an important safeguard against
the rise of military dictatorship.
Armed Forces of the Philippines, protector
of the people and the State.
(1) Fearsome image acquired during martial rule. - Under the
Marcos regime, particularly during.the early part of martial law, the
into the arena of policy making, indeed, to open the avenue for the military to pre-empt
the shaping of national policies is to give it the right and the power to project military
concepts and attitudes and to shape civilian frame of mind in the values of the military.
No one will seriously question the implication of such development upon the democratic
process and the lives of our people x x x." (Del. Abraham F. Sarmiento, Sponsorship
Speech, April 25, 1972, 1971 Constitutional Convention.)
3"The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that
a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal, and administratives head of the nrmcd forces
'The Cons titution does not require that the President be possessed of militnry training
and talents, but, as commander-in-chief, he has the power to direct mllitnry opcrnliona
and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be cxpcclod to dolcKnlo nct11nl
command of the armed Corces lo militnry experts but the ultlmntc commnnd 111 hl11."
(Kulnynn vs. Tnn, 672 SCRA 182 12014].)
I ,,,,, A l I II III I I A l(A lli lll llli l ' IW /1 11 ' 11' 1
A N I ) h l'A'I I\ 1'01.1( ' 11!!1
111-ln cl pl •11
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), became a highly policitized
military. It acquired a fearsome image. Rightly or wrongly, it had
been accused of having committed, abetted, or tolerated numerous
abuses and violations of human rights both against rebels and the
civilian population.4
(2) Constitutional mandates. - The Constitution seeks to change
this state of affairs.
(a) 1i'~rough Section 3 above, it defines in positive terms the
functiot). of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its
goal in the discharge of this function. It shall be "the protector of
the people and the State" 5 to secure the sovereignty of the State
and the integrity of the national territory.
(b) Through another provision (see Art. XVI, Sec. 5.), the
Constitution mandates professionalism in the armed forces
ancl its insulation from partisan politics. Furthermore, it directs
the State to' "strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in
the performance of their duty." The Constitution aims to ensure
civilian supremacy, at all times, over the military. (Sec. 3.)
SEC. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided
by law, to render personal military or civil service.
4
Many believed that the military organization was being used as an instrument
to prop up the continued stay in office of the incumbent President who at the time of
his overthrow in a peaceful revolution on February 25, 1986, had held ~ower for more
than 20 years. '.his perception was strengthened by the lion's share given to the defense
establishment m the annual budget and the appointment to sensitive positions in the
armed_forces of g~nerals known for their personal loyalty to the President and the repeated
extensions of their tour of duty. Many of these generals allegedly enriched themselves
while in the service but the government remained silent on their cases although they
were a matter of public knowledge.
5'fhere are those who want this provision deleted because by it the military could
tnkc over the government it perceives, rightly or wrongly, to be corrupt and no longer
enjoying populnr support, in the guise of protecting the people.

1' II11 ,ll 'l' I N I , l. l >Nt1 I II IJ I IUNA I. I.AW
· Pdnd pl.es nnd 'nHCH
Prime duty of the Government to serve
and protect the people.
Section 4 enunciates the first and foremost duty of the
Government - to serve the people and protect their rights.
In our contemporary setting, when the country is beset by
formidable social and economic problems all demanding priority
attention, particularly the problems of mass poverty and widespread
unemployment, the above principle is most proper and timely. It is
consistent with the most basic democratic tenet that the government
exists for the people and not the people for the government. The
State fulfills this prime duty by pursuing and implementing the
State Policies mandated by the Constitution in Sections 7 to 28.1
Defense of the State by the people
against foreign aggression.
(1) While the defense of the State is no longer the prime duty
of the government, it may call upon the people to defend the State.
(Sec. 4; see Art. XVI, Sec. 4.)
(2) For self-preservation and to defend its territorial honor
and integrity, the Philippines can engage in a defensive war. In
recognition of this fact, the Constitution has provided for the above
principle. The defense of the State is one of the duties of a citizen.
(3) The term "people" may also include aliens s_ince they are
likewise subject to regulations adopted by the government for the
defense of the State.
Right to renounce one's citizenship
during time of war.
The constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time
of war. It is, however, brought more immediately into play when the
country is involved in war.
During such a period of stress, the citizen cannot be considered
free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward his country by the
simple expedient of doing acts which operate to cause the loss of his
1In both the l935 and 1973 Constitutions, "the defense of the State is the prime duty
of the Government xx x." (Art. II, Sec. 2 thereof.) This concept is considered anachronistic.
It was taken from the Constitution of the Spanish Republic. To defend the State, howevct;
is, in effect, to serve and protect the people wh o are only one of the elements of the State.
I
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Principles
citizenship, as for instance, by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution and laws of a foreign country, particularly
an enemy country, or by accepting a commission in the armed forces
of such country, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Fortes.2
Military and civil service by the citizens.
(1) Defen~f of the State. - The duty of the government and the
people to defend the State cannot be performed except through an
army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens
would be to make this duty excusable should there be no sufficient
men who volunteer to enlist therein. (People vs. Lagman, 66 Phil.
13 [1938].) This principle is reinforced by the provision on the
formation of a citizen armed force. (see Art. XVI, Sec. 4.)
(2) Compulsory. - The duty of a citizen to render military or civil
service is an obligation inherent in his membership in the poli tical
commu_nity. It is the price the individual pays for the protection and
other benefits he is entitled to receive as a result of the organization
of the community. 3 Thus, the citizens may be compelled to render
personal military or civil service.4 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
upheld in a case (People vs. Lagman, supra.) the validity of the
. National Defense Act (C.A. No. 1.) requiring compulsory military
service. Any citizen recruited for the army or civil service pursuant
to law for the defense of the State may not refuse on the ground
that to go to war is against his religion. The constitutional provision
removes all doubt as to the validity of such law. Note that the duty
is imposed upon all citizens, including women.
The term "civil service," as used above, refers to any non-combat
or civil duties for the defense of the State other than as soldiers, like
workers in ammunition factories.
2
Thus, in a case, the Supreme Court held as untenable th e theory of the appellant
that by joining the Makapili, a league of pro-Japanese Filipinos, he had lost his citizenship,
and, therefore, he could not commit treason. lt appeared that together with a group of
Japanese soldiers and other Makapili members, he was responsible in the massacre of
Filipino civilians. The Supreme Court said that "if this were so, his very crime would be
the shield that would protect him from punishment." (People vs. Manayao, 78 Phil. 721
[1947].)
3
V.G. SINCO, op. cit., p. 119.
4
Citizens under the provision include not only private citizens but also citizens who
have retired from military service. (Parreno vs. Commission on Audit, 523 SCRA 390
(2007].)
 1' 111). llil 'll l l l l lNl 1IIII J lll l/l A l , I AW
Jlrln lpl(•il n11d 0/lflCI~
(3) Personal. - One cannot render the service required through
another or in the form of money or other contributions. The service
must be "personal" or direct.
(4) By law. - The phrase "under conditions provided by law"
is intended to prevent arbitrariness on the part of certain officials
to require military or civil service. It seeks to emphasize the
primordial responsibility of the Government "to serve and protect
the people" even when they are called upon "to defend the State."
The Constitution does not make any exception.
Congress may or may not exempt the so-called "conscientious
objectors" from rendering military service.
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the pro-
tection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential f~r the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.
Maintenance of peace and order, etc.
The State (Government) shall pursue the maintenance of peace
and order (see Art. XVI, Sec. 6.), the protection of life, liberty and
property (see Art. III, Sec. 1.), and the promotion of the general
welfare.I Only when peace and order, security, and a life of dignity
(see Sec. 11.) are established and maintained, will political and social
stability and economic prosperity become attainable and the people
truly enjoy the "blessings of independence and democracy." (see
Preamble.)
SEC. 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
Principle of separation of the Church
and State.
(1) Meaning. -The principle simply means that the Church is
not to interfere in purely political matters or secular or temporal
1The above declaration is already embodied in the inherent police power of the State
(see Art. III, Sec. 9.) and the guarantees of due process and equal protection (see Ibid., Sec.
1.) in the Bill of Rights; hence, the power mentioned may be exercised by the State even
without Section 5.
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Principles
aspects of man's life and the State, in purely ecclesiastical affairs
which are the exclusive concern of the other.I This is not as simple
as it appears for the exact demarcation or boundary line between
the respective exclusive domains or jurisdictions of the Church and
the State has always been the subject matter of much disagreement
or misunde~standing.2 It cannot be exactly delineated. Be that as it
may, ecclesiastical laws cannot prevail against the valid laws of the
I
State.
(2) Principle implied in other provisions. - The principle of the
separation of Church and State is implied from the constitutional
prohibitions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," that "no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights"
(Art. III, Sec. 5.), and that "no public money or property shall ever
be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly,
for the. use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution or system of religion." (Art. VI, Sec. 29[2].)
Section 6 merely affirms this old constitutional principle but
renders it more emphatic by expressly declaring the separation as
1"An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of
the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful
Jaws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding
from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Based on this definition,
an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members
and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which
the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious
significance. The case at bar does not e.ven remotely concern any of the abovecited
examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does
not ipso facto give the case a religious significance." (Austria vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 312 SCRA 410 (1999]; United Church of Christ in the Phils., Inc. vs. Bradford
United of Christ, Inc., 674 SCRA 92 (2012].)
2
The Catholic Ch urch, for example, considers the renewal of the temporal order
according to the gospel as falling within its divine mission. It has concerned itself to some
extent with secular activities (e.g., constitutional changes, E-VAT, oil price hikes, illegal
gambling, peace and order.), it believes are not conducted in accordance with the law
of God and the common good. It claims the right to denounce graft and corruption in
government, election frauds, abuses of official power, and other inequitable practices in
society, opposes artificial family planning methods, and espouses causes that concern the
poor. Also, since its members are also citizens of the State, they cannot but be concerned
about affairs of government.
 l 'J Ill ll ' l ' l t I I I I ltJ 1 d 111 1111 tt I I I A\V
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"inviolable." The term "church" as used in Section 6 does not mean
one particular religious denomination. It covers all faiths. 3
(3) Adjudication ofsecular disputes. - While disputes or conflicts
involving matters of faith are beyond the jurisdiction of secular
authorities, those affecting property rights of any religious group
or its members are proper subjects for adjudication by civil courts.'
(see Fonacier vs. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417 [1955]; Gonzales
vs. Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil. 420 [1928]; Negros District
Conference, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 458 [1981].)
(4) Adjudication of purely eccesiastical matters. -The jurisdiction
of the courts extend only to public and secular morality. The State, is
not precluded to pursue legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any religion. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr.,
721 SCRA 146 [2014].) In matters, however, purely ecclesiastical, the
decisions of the proper church tribunal are conclusive upon the civil
tribunals.5 The separation principle bars the State from establishing
through laws, rules and regulations, moral standards according to a
specific religion. (Perfecto vs. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323 [201~].)
In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations,
there is one area which the courts should not touch: doctrine and
disciplinary differences. It is not for the courts to exercise control
. and State, and keeping them separate, James Madison wrote:
over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and
official functions6 (Taruc vs. De la Cruz, 453 SCRA 123 [2005].) or to
rule on ecclesiastical matters but they have authority to determine
3The Constitution utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a
temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the" church" means the religious congregations collectively.
(Irnbong vs, Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146 [2014].)
~Thus, the State through the Labor Arbiter or the National Labor Relations Commis-
sion, has the right to take cognizance of a case to determine whether a church rightfully
exercised its management prerogative to dismiss employees. What is involved here is
purely secular and has no relation whatever with the practice of faith, worship or doc-
trines of the church. (Austria vs. NLRC, 312 SCRA 410 [1999].)
5Thus, a church member who is expelled from membership by the church authorities,
or a priest or minister who is by them disciplined or deprived of his sacred office, is
without remedy in the civil courts, which will not inquire into the correctness of the
decision of the ecclesiastical tribunals. (U.S. vs. Canete, 38 Phil. 253 (1918]; see Verzosa vs.
Fernandez, 55 Phil. 307 [1930].)
6In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Supreme
Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality (Imbong vs. Ochon, Jr., 721 SCRA 146
[2014].), as decided by the Court in Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006), sec lllus trntive
Case (No. 6) under Art. III, Sec. 6.)
l II I I II 111 If 11 11 1' 111111 11 ' 1 I 1 1 II
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11,fodpll'II
whether a law (i.e., Reproductive Health Law) contravene the
guarantee of religious freedom. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA
146 [2014].)
Reasons underlying principle.
I
The ratiq11ale of the principle of separation of Church and State
is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good
neighbors." (Austria vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
supra.)
(1) Danger of union. - The importance of separation of Church
and State especially in the Philippines has been set forth by Justice
Jose P. Laurel in these words:
"Without the necessity of adverting to historical background
of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our.·
history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that
the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions
might arise when the state will use the church, and the church
the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends
and aims." (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 164 Phil. 201 [1937].)
(2) Need for separation. - On the need for separating Church
0
"Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may
have found an established clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just
government instituted to secure and perpetuate it needs them
not. Such a government will_ be best supported by protecting
every citizen in the enjoyment of his religion with the same
equal hand which protects his person and property ...
While we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to
profess and to observe the religion which we believe to be of
divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose
minds have not yielded to the evidence which has convinced
us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offense against God, not
against man. To God, therefore, not to men, must an account of
it be rendered.
. .. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.
This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of
obligations, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be
' 1411 t >Ni i 1111 / 11( JNA J, I AW
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Principles Md 'Meo
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considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered
as a subject of the Governor of the Universe."7
No hostility towards religion.
(1) Moral influence of religion recognized. - The command that
Church and State be separate is not to be interpreted to mean hostility
to religion. It is not, according to Justice Laurel, "an inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and a denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so
far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated." (Ibid.)
(2) Preamble. - As a matter of fact, the Preamble of the
Constitution starts with these words: "We; the sovereign Filipino
people, imploring the aid of Almighty God ..." With these words,
the Filipino people "manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon him who guides the destinies of
men and nations." (Ibid.)
(3) "Establishment of religion" clause. - This provision in the
Constitution (see Art. III, Sec. 5.) does not require the State to adapt
an attitude of active antipathy towards religion but instead permits
both to exist without hostility to one another. (Meek v. Pilttenger,
421 US 349.) Indeed, understood alongside the other provisions
of the Constitution on religion, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 charters
indubitably show not hostility nor indifference, but benevolence, to
religion.
(4) Other pertinent provisions/laws. - Thus:
(a) Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation,
properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (Art. VI,
Sec. 28[3].);
(b) The use of public money or property is not prohibited
when a priest, preacher or dignitary as such is assigned to
the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium (Art. VI, Sec. 29[2].);
7The Writings of James Madison, Vol. II, pp. 184-186, 188, The Knlckorbockor Pros11
(1901).
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111,
(c) Optional religious instruction in public elementary and
high schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (Art. XVI,
Sec. 3[3].);
t
(d) M~undy Thursday (movable date) and Good Friday
(movable d,ate) of Holy Week, Christmas Day (Dec. 25), Sundays,
and All Saints Day (Nov. 1) are made nationwide legal holidays8
because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to
beneficial moral results; and
(e)' The law punishes polygamy and bigamy, and certain
crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against
the fundamental laws of the State. (see Revised Penal Code,
Arts. 132-133; see Aglipay vs. Ruiz, supra.)
Within the limits prescribed by the principle of separation of
Church and State, these two great entities could work together in
harmony to serve the welfare of the people.
STATE POLICIES
SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign
policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity, national interest, and the right to self-determina-
tion.
8
Proclamation No. 44 (Nov. 1986) calls for the observance of National Bible Week on
the last week of January each year with the last Sunday as Bible Sunday. Proclamation
No. 498 (Nov. 26, 2003) declares November 26, 2003, the end of Ramadhan, as a special
non-working day throughout the country (Feast of Ramadhan). R.A. No. 9177 (Nov. 13,
2002) declares the first day of shawwal, the 10th month of the Islamic Calendar, a national
holiday for the observance of Eidul Filr, and the 10th day of Zhu/ Hijja, the 12th month
of Islamic Calendar, a regional holiday in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) for the observance of Eidul Adha. Eidul Fitr is the first day marking the end of the
30-day fasting period of Ramadhan. Eidul Adha is a 10th d ay in the month of Hajj or Islamic
Pilgrimage to Mecca wherein Muslims pay homage to Abrahim's supreme act of sacrifice
and signifies mankind obedience to God. The date of the celebration of Eidul Fitr depends
upon the sighting of the new moon based on the Islamic Calendar.
R.A. No. 10525 (April 23, 2013) declares the first week of February of every year:
"World 111/erfnith Harmony Week in the entire country and mandating its observance by
the different government agencies, to advance the m essage of interfaith harmony and
BOOclwill in accordance with religious traditions and practices."
I I
I •I 111 ,I I 'I ' I N 1,: C't>N! 1 I I I U I I t )N A I , l ,AW
Principles and 'ascs
Foreign policy of the Philippines.
Foreign policy is the basic direction underlying the conduct by a
State of its affairs vis-a-vis those of other States.
(1) Formulation and conduct of foreign policy. - Under our
constitutional system, Congress, through legislation, and its
upper chamber, the Senate, through its power to ratify treaties or
international agreements, share with the President the responsibility
of formulating the country's foreign policy although the initiation
of policies and the conduct thereof are primarily reposed in the
President. (see Art. VII, Sec. 22.)
(2) Importance of foreign policy. - The importance of foreign
policy to a country cannot be over-emphasized. It is the sole weapon
of a State in the pursuit of certain objectives for the enhancement
of national interest in international affairs. Thus, foreign policy is
but an extension and an implementation of domestic policy, the
former being related to and dictated by the latter which should
be paramount and supreme. 1 Our foreign relations, in fact, are
inextricably linked to our national security, stability, and progress
and the welfare of our people.
(3) Pursuit of independent foreign policy. - The Constitution
mandates the State to pursue an independent foreign policy, aware
of the unwelcome consequences of a policy characterized by
excessive dependence on another country.2
An independent foreign policy simply means one that is not
subordinate or subject to nor dependent upon the support of
another government. But it is not one that completely rejects advice
or assistance from without. Neither does it mean abandoning
traditional allies or being isolated from the international community
nor does it rule out security arrangements with a country or a group
of foreign countries.3
1By way of illustration, the domestic policy of our country after becoming
independent in 1946 was to reconstruct the economy ravaged by World War II for which
the Philippines needed foreign aid readily available from the United States. As a result,
the foreign policy of the country was to align itself with the United States as against the
former Soviet Union (USSR) and other socialist states on many international issues.
2This was the case after World War II when the Philippines, claimed as a trusted ally
by the United States, was regarded with suspicion by the new small States and seen as a
foe by most of the socialist nations of the world.
3The lessons of World War I and World War II and recently of aggressions in Asia
point to the ineffectiveness of pursuing a policy of neutrality or neutralis m by n country
as a means of protection against attack from without.
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State Policies
Within the context of international affairs, howeve1~ there are
things that every self-respecting State must do on its own and
for itself, uru~uenced by external pressure or interest. ~llowing
foreign intervehtion in our domestic affairs is an abject surrender of
our national d:i'gnity and sovereignty.
(4) Paramount considerations in conduct of foreign policy. - The
Constitution recognizes that in the pursuit of an independent
foreign policy in an interdependent world, geopolitical realities as
well as opportunities for economic advantage in trade with other
countries may dictate that the Philippines make a reappraisal or
review of its diplomatic engagements:' Independence in the making
and conduct of foreign policy is relative. Diplomacy, it must be
borne in mind, is not static; it is kinetic. In an era of shifting power
relations in our region and the world, the national interest will not
be served by trying to deal with regional and international issues
in absolute terms. Ours must be a policy of prudence, flexibility,
and pragmatism guided only by the welfare of our people and the
security of our Republic.
In the conduct of its relations with other States, the paramount
considerations of the Philippines, according to the Constitution,
"shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest,
and the right. to self-determination" 5 (Sec. 7.), but tempered with
4
With the collapse of communist regimes in the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) and Eastern Europe, the notion of a world dominated by the two an-
tagonistic superpowers (U.S. and USSR) engaged in Cold War rivalry has likewise dis-
appeared. Alignments in the world dictated by clashing national interests have changed,
and newly industrialized countries (N!Cs) in Asia-Pacific have been at the forefront of
trade, investments, and industrial technology in the region. Today, with the liberaliza-
tion of international trade under the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GAIT; its
primary objective is to eliminate barriers to trade) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO: the organization of signatory states committed to trade globalization), rivalries
among nations are no longer waged on the military battlefields but are being decided in
the economic arena and research laboratories. Our foreign relations must adjust to these
developments in the global environment if we are to keep in step with the times.
Established in 1995, the WTO facilitates trade negotiations, administers trade
agreements, settles trade disputes, and monitors trade policies of member nations. Unlike
most international bodies, the WTO has the legal authority to require nations to comply
with their agreements or face costly economic sanctions.
5The right to self-determination includes the right of a people to freely determine
their political status as well as the right to freely pursue their economic, social, and
political development.
 1~1 111 ll'l ' IN l. l l lNl 1llll / llU N A l , I A W
111'111 lpil'll nnd '119c9
its adherence "to the policies of peace, equality, justice, freedom
and cooperation, and amity with all n ations." (Sec. 2.) It is the
responsibility of the government to determine what our paramount
national interests are.
SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national
interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nu-
clear weapons in its territory.
Freedom from nuclear weapons.
(1) Aim of provision. - The intent of Section 8 is to forbid the
making, storing, manufacture or testing in our country of nuclear
weapons, devices or parts thereof as well as the use of our territory
as dumping site for radioactive wastes and the transit within our
territory of ships or planes with nuclear weapons. It does not,
however, prohibit the use of nuclear energy for medicine, agriculture,
and other peaceful or beneficial purposes.
Congress will have to provide the mechanics to effectively
implement Section 8.
(2) Effect on military bases agreement. - It is important to mention
that the Constitutional Commission voted down a move to forbid
in the Constitution foreign military bases, troops and facilities and
adopted instead a provision that bans foreign bases "except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, and when Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in
a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state." (Art. XVIII, Sec. 25.)
The Philippines may demand removal of nuclear weapons and
conduct ocular inspection of military bases. 1
(3) No absolute prohibition. - The records of the Constitutional
Commission support the position that Section 8 does not absolutely
ban nuclear weapons from Philippine territory. The phrase "consis-
tent with the national interest," may reasonably be interpreted to
mean "subject to n ational interest." 2 In other w ords, if the national
1 change or amendment by virtue of which the rule became absolute without any excep tion
The 1947 military bases agreement with the United States expired on September
16, 1991. A proposed new bases treaty was rejected by the Senate on September 16, 1991.
2
A clarificatory resolution that such is the meaning of the ph rnse "consistent with
the national interest" was approved by the Constitutional Commission by AIIC'ncc.
A l~ I , I I. 111,l l , A l<A I IO N UP l 't< IN 11 ' 1,1 :::l 1!11
/\ND STATL:: PO U ·ms
State Policies
interest so dictates, the storing of nuclear weapons in our territory
may be permitted at least on a transitory basis, considering that it
was not pro~bited under the then existing military bases agree-
ment whose Vplidity and term of effectivity until 1991 are implicitly
recognized by the Constitution.
The President is vested with the discretion to determine
departures from or exceptions to the constitutional policy on
nuclear weapons in keeping with our national interest subject to the
legislative prerogative to adopt a measure on the implementation of
Section 8.
(4) Contrary view. - The phraseology, howeve1~ of Section 8
may be understood as providing no qualification, exception, or con-
dition if the phrase "consistent with national interest" is taken as the
reason for the policy, that is, the Philippines "adopts and pursues"
the policy because it is "consistent with national interest." The pro-
vision does not say, " .. . unless required by or inconsistent with the
national interest" or" . . . if consistent with the national interest, shall
adopt and pursue a policy . . ." The Constitution itself bans nuclear
weapons as a policy and precisely emphasizes that such policy is
"consistent with the national interest."3
SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and inde-
pendence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and
an improved quality of life for all.
Just and dynamic social order.
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order. This is
accomplished through policies that provide adequate social services
(in the field of health, education, housing, etc.), and promote full
employment (see Art. XII, Sec. 1, par. 2; Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par 1.), a
3
According to Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, "before the provision was voted upon
and approved by the Constitutional Commission, it suffered a drastic and fundamental
or leeway for deviation. This mad~ all the expressions of intent in the debates on the
earlier formulation of the provision' inapplicable and irrelevant under the new and final
phraseology which the Commission approved." (Manila Bulletin, July 28, 1988, p. 7.)

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rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
(Ibid., Sec. 1.)
Such a society must insure the prosperity or progress and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty. (see
Sec. 5.) The Preamble calls for the establishment of a "just and
humane society." The goal is the same: to reduce the political and
economic power of a privileged few and lift the masses of our people
from their poverty and helplessness to a qualitative life worthy of
human dignity. · inability or failure to rectify wrongs committed against the people
SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development.
Social justice.
This policy mandates the State to promote social justice in all
phases of national development. In the fulfillment of this duty, the
State must give preferential option or attention to the welfare of the
less fortunate members of the community- the poor, the weak, the
handicapped, those who have less in life who constitute the great
majority of our people.
Social justice cannot be invoked, however, to trample on the
rights of property owners, who under the Constitution and laws
are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in the
Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person
and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. (Salonga vs.
Farrales, 105 SCRA 360 [1981]; Allon vs. Development Corporation,
207 SCRA 748 [1992].)
This topic is discussed fully under Article XIII (Social Justice
and Human Rights).
SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Human dignity and human rights.
The value accorded to human dignity is measured by the extent
of respect for human rights. In a democratic state, the individual
enjoys certain rights which cannot be modified or taken away by
the lawmaking body. These rights are recognized, promoted and
protected because of the belief in the equal worth of every human
I
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Sta te Policies
person, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
religion, prop,erty, or other status.
Tyranny, e~ploitation and oppression, and for that matter, any
act of injustice stem from the lack of respect for human dignity, and
they, in turn, spawn discontent, strife, and violence which cannot
but affect p·ublic peace and order, and may, in some cases, even
endanger a country's political stability. Not a few governments
have, in fact, been overthrown because of their repressive rule, or
and redress their legitimate grievances.
This topic is discussed at length under Article III (Bi1l of Rights)
and Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights).
SEC. 12. The SJate recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
aufonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from concep-
tion. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the devel-
opment of mo,ral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Strengthening the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
(1) Sanctity offamily life and solidarity of the family. - The above
declaration not only has given constitutional basis to the family as a
basic autonomous social institution, but, in addition, mandates the
State to recognize the sanctity of family life and to strengthen the
family. (see Art. XV.) Under the provision, the government may not
enact any law or initiate measures that would break up or weaken
the family as a social unit, or in the guise of protecting the family,
interfere in purely internal family matters which do not involve the
social order or any public policy. There is, however, no prohibition
on diyorce which is left to Congress to allow in its discretion.1
1
The Civil Code (Arts. 216-222 thereof.) lays down certain general principles
which sustain the solidarity of the family not only for the guidance of the courts and
administrative officials, but also fo r their wholesome influence upon the members of
every family. (See Arts. 56-60, 68, 149-151, Family Cod e.)
156 l' l llLll'l' lNJJ 'OM:l'fl'l'U'l'lONAL LAW !.:lu •, l2
· Principles and Cases
(2) Interference by the State. - In referring to the family as a
basic social institution, the Constitution recognizes that the family
is anterior to the State or before any governing institution and,
therefore, is not a creature of the State. The family is described
as "autonomous" because it is invested with rights and duties
independent of the civil community and which the State must
protect against improper interference or intrusion. (see Ai;t. XVI.)
Protection of the life of the unborn
and that of the mother.
(1) Human life is commonly believed to begin from the moment
of conception when the female egg and the mal~ sperm merge at
fertilization. 2 A fertilized egg is the starting point of the life of the
fetus. From that moment, the unborn child is considered a subject
or a possessor of human rights.3 He has a basic human right to life
which the State is mandated by Section 12 to protect, along with
infants and children.4
The provision protecting the unborn prevents the possibility
of abortion being legalized by future legislation.5 It manifests the
Constitution's respect for human life which is also expressed in the
provision abolishing the death penalty. (Art. III, Sec. 19[1].)
(2) The State has still another compelling interest'aside from the
right to life of the unborn - the health of the mother whose life it
shall equally protect.6 The sacrifice of the life of the unborn when
2["There are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation
of the fertilized ovarum in the uterus. Hence, the issue of when life begins x x x The
framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that
would allow it to determine when life begins." However, whether it be taken from a
plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly following
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that x x
x the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of
conception, that is, upon fertilization." (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146 [2014].)
3But it is not considered a person under the law until it is born. However, a conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided, it be born
later with the conditions specified in the law. (see Arts. 40-41, Civil Code.)
41£ from the moment of conception, an embryo is a human being with all the attendant
rights and privileges, legalization of human cloning, reproductive or therapeutic, is
constitutionally debatable.
5The Revised Penal Code penalizes the crime of abortion. (Secs. 256-259 thereof.)
6The Constitution emphasizes that the State shall provide equal protection to both
the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
S • •. J'.l A l{'J'. Jl. IJ H ' l , A l{/\l 'ION U 11 1' l<I N 'll'Ll (8
AN D STATE POLICIES
State Policies
medically established as necessary to save the life of the mother is
not abortion. 7
'\,,,
Rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character.
(1) Right of State to interfere with education of children. - Section
12 gives due recognition to the complementary roles of parents
and the government in the proper upbringing of the youth. It
must not, however, be interpreted to mean that, as in a totalitarian
State, the children will be considered the property of the State. So,
the State cannot by law compel the parents to make their children
accept instruction in, public schools only. Such a law constitutes an
unreasonable interference w ith the liberty of parents to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control. The child
is not a mere creation of the State.7
Not~ that the obligation of the parents with regard to the rearing
of their children goes beyond civic efficiency, a matter that involves
the relationship between the individual and the State. They are also
made guardians of their morals.
(2) Right of State to regulate all schools. - The State, however,
has the power reasonably to regulate all schools, their teachers
and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend same
school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
must be taught, and that nothing be taught, which is manifestly
inimical to public welfare. (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 U.S. 510
[1925]; see Art. XIV, Sec. 3[2].)
(3) State and parental obligations. - ,While the natural (i.e.,
not created by state law) and primary (i.e., superior to the State)
responsibility for educating the child rests in the family, the State
also has a distinct interest in this matter since a proper education
- humanistic, vocational, moral, religious, civic - is necessary for
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. (Imbong vs.
Ochoa, Jr., supra.)
7The State, cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in
the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a State substitution of their
parental authoril):, (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr., supra.)

158 (>l lJLlPPlN.Ll 'UNS'lTJ'U'l 'IONAL LAW !:l ' ', 1:.l
Principles and Cases
social well-being. It is, therefore, the duty of the State to see that
these obligations are fulfilled by parents (through such means as
compulsory education laws), and to supply the essential educational
facilities which private initiative is unable to furnish.
(4) Duty of State to encourage educational institutions. - Viewed
in this light, the State should encourage rather than hinder the
operation of private and parochial schools so long as these schools
meet the secular educational requirements which the government.
has the authority to impose.8
SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.
Role of the youth in nation-building.
The above declaration is related to the preceding provision.
The youth constitute a rich reservoir of productive manpower.
Recognizing their vital role in the development of society, and the
need to fully prepare them when they eventually assume the mantle
of leadership in directing the course of our country's destiny, the
Constitution lends its support to the promotion of their welfare.
It is not only the constitutional duty of the State to promote
the civic efficiency and moral character of the youth. (Sec. 12.) The
State is also mandated to promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being and thus, transform them
into healthy, upright, intelligent, and useful citizens and potential
community leaders. It shall incalculate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism (Art. XIV, Sec. 3[2].) and encourage their active
involvement and participation (e.g., by giving them representation)
in public and civic affairs (Sec. 13.) to the fullest extent possible.
By effectively harnessing their enterprising spirit and progressive
idealism, young people can help hasten the establishment of "a
just and dynamic social order that will insure the prosperity and
8
Schmandt and Steinbicker, op. cit., p. 180.
J J
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AND S'f/\TLl POI .1 ·u.::s
State Policies
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty..."
(Sec. 9.)
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women,in na-
tion-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
Role of women in nation-building.
The Constitution also gives recognition to the role women
have played and continue to play in the task of nation-building.
They constitute one-half of the population, a powerful political
and economic force indeed in Philippine society. By sheer force of
number alone, it is only right that their voice be heard on matters
affecting their welfare and the country as a whole; it is simple justice
that they be given a legitimate share with men in leadership at all
levels and in all spheres of human activity outside their homes. After
all, wo;nen carry with them the great responsibility of preserving
the nation's posterity.
The health and well-being of women serve as the pivotal point
in determining what kind of citizenry a nation will produce. They
ought then to be the serious concern not only of the State but of all
sectors of society.
Equality before law of women and men.
Except for obvious biological differences, men and women
are fundamentally equal. (see Art. XIII, Sec. 14.) It is the duty of
the State to ensure that equality before the law in all aspects of
national life by rectifying or ending all practices and systems that
are disadvantageous to women or discriminate against them by
reason merely of sex where it is not a relevant factor in making a
distinction.
In economic life, for instance, the State must promote and
uphold the equality of men and women in employment, terms of
employment, opportunities for promotion, the practice of profession,
the acquisition, control, and disposition of their property, pursuit of
business, etc. The principle of equal pay for work of equal value
should be put into practice to ensure equality for women workers.
But while men and women are of equal dignity, the Constitution
recognizes that women are indeed different and may be "treated
 11
ltlU 1'1 JlLllll' I NI( 'UN/111.l lJ IIUNA l , l , AW ! 1•~11, 1 1 ■ 1<,
Principles and Cases
differently" by the State in the promotion of their rights. Thus, in
certain situations, women are entitled to special protection from the
State.1 (see Art. XIII, Sec. 14.)
SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
Right of the people to health.
A component of the right to life (Art. III, Sec. 1.) is the constitu-
tional right to health. The State has the obligation to promote and
protect the right of the people to health. To better fulfill this duty, it
must instill health consciousness among the people.
The right to health does not focus only on a person's physical
well-being. The realm of health and ·well-being also considers
the mental, psychological, and emotional aspects of human
development. There can be no disagreement that the strength and
progress of any nation depend on the quality of its human resources.
This topic is discussed under Article XIII (Social Justice
and Human Rights), Sections 11 to 13 and Article XVI (General
Provisions), Section 9. These provisions are self-executing. (Imbong
vs. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146 [2014].)
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in ac-
cord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. ·
Right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology.
Ecology is that branch of science that deals with the study of the
interrelationships of living things (organisms, plants and animals)
and their environments. (see Art. XII, Sec. 3.)
1 the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether fo r it concerns
"The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women, all make for real differences justifying the classification under
the law'' (Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 [2013).) The law refined to is R.A. No. 9262, (U\
act defining violence against women and their children.
J I J l I 1
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A N IJ S'l'l\'l'U PO U 'IUS
State Policies
The Constitution takes cognizance of the continuing deteriora-
tion of the Philippine environment1 which has become a matter of
national concern caused by rapid urbanization, industrial growth,
population expansion, natural resources utilization, the use 1of mod-
ern technology, and other socio-economic factors, and consequently,
the need for an environmental protection program to prevent fur-
ther injury and/ or damage to plant and animal life and p roperty
and, more important, to protect human life, h ealth, and safety.
The people have a right "to a balanced and h ealthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." 2 This right unites
with the right to health which is provided in Section 15. (Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 [1993]; see Resident Marine Mammals,
etc. vs. Reyes, 756 SCRA 513 [2015]; International Service, etc. vs.
1"The (Supreme] Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's
forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fau na
peculiar to,.the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic
social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods
and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required
by the people seriously depleted. While there is a desire to harness natural resources
to amass profit and. to meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the more
essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable
environment demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check
.further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of
the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology." (F. Ysmael, Jr. & Compan y, Inc. vs. Depu ty Executive Secretary, 190
SCRA 673 [1990).)
2
"Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class s uit. Their personality to
sue in behalf of succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergeneration
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such
right, as hereinafter expounded, consid ers the 'rhythm and harmony of nature.' x xx.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to p reserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come." (Oposa vs. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993]; see Province of
Rizal vs. Executive Secretary, 477 SCRA 440 (2005]; Ruzol vs. §andiganbayan, 696 SCRA
742 (2013].)
"While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be fow1d under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is Jess important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by
the petitioners - the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind." (Oposa vs.
Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 [1993).)
162 1'1111.U'J'I NJJ 'UN8'1'1'J'UT1UN/\L LAW S •ct:J. l '/- L!;I
Principles and Cases
Greenpeace Southeast Asia. [Phils.], 776 SCRA 434 [2015].) The
State is mandated to protect and advance this right. (Sec. 16.) It has
the responsibility to take measures that will preserve and enhance
the quality of the environment "under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other," an
environment "that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being."3 •
SEC. 17. The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development.
Priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture and sports.
This topic is discussed under Article XIV with the above subjects
as title. .
SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
Labor, a primary social economic force.
This topic is discussed under Article XIII (Social Justice and
Human Rights), Section 3.
SEC. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and in-
dependent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
3The Supreme Court promulgated the "Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases" (~.M: ~o. ~9-6-8-SC, Apr~ 13, 2010) governing the procedure in civil, criminal,
and special civil actions before regional and municipal trial courts involving enforcement
or vio)ation~ of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations. The writ
of Kalikasan 1s a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, or any public interest
group, accre~it~d by, ~r registered with, any government agency, on behalf of persons
whose constitutional nght to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated or threatened
~ith v~olation. The petition for t~e issuance of the writ in a special civil action shall be
filed with ~e Supreme Court or with a~~ of the stations of the Court ofAppeals. The filing
of the petition shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal, or administrative
actions.
The writ is categorized as a special civil action. (see Paje vs. Casino, 749 SCRA 39
[2015]; People vs. Wahlman, 758 SCRA 366 (2015].)
S ' '. 2U /\R'J'. 11. IJJJ 'LAHJ\'1'1 N 11 PWN 'UJI.US 163
AND STATE POLICIES
State Policies
Self-reliant andlindependent
national economy.
Section 19 states the constitutional guidelines in the develop-
ment of the national economy: economic self-reliance, ~conomic
independence, and effective Filipino control of the economy. It
elevates the nationalistic "Filipino First" policy also embodied in
0
Sections 10 (par. 2.) and 12 of Article XII, as a constitutional com-
mand addressed to the State which embraces all branches, agencies,
and instrumentalities of the Government.
(1) The words "self-reliant" and "independent," as used in
Section 19, are not to be equated with "self-sufficient." Even the
richest nations today depend heavily on other countries for their
raw materials and manpower, and as markets for their industrial
products, and even encourage foreign investments. No country can
ever hope to achieve economic growth and development by relying
solely o,n its own resources.
(2) Filipino "control" of the national economy should refer
not only to Filipino enterpreneurs but also to the great majority of
Filipino consumers who are entitled to protection from high-priced
and low-quality products which result from absence of sufficient
competition due to prolonged protectionist policies. It does not,
therefore, prohibit a policy that allows the entry of foreign business
enterprises. Properly regulated, foreign investments can actually
be vehicles for more effective control by Filipinos of the national
economy by generating more employment and higher income for
Filipino workers and greater profits to local suppliers of goods and
services to foreign companies.
(3) The Constitution does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to
prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic
policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of
development. (Espina vs. Zamora, Jr., 631 SCRA 17 [2010].)
This topic is further discussed under Article XII (National
Economy and Patrimony), Section 1.
SEC. 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of
the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and pro-
vides incentives to needed investments.
II J J
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Principles and Cases
Role of the private sector
in the economy.
In recognition of the indispensable role of the private sector1 as
the main engine of economic development, the State is mandated to
encourage private enterprise and to provide incentives to needed ·
investments, whether local or foreign. The Constitution does not
favor an economy managed or controlled by the State.
Under the principle ofsubsidiarity adopted by the Constitution in
the above provision, the government should not engage in business
activities which can be competently and efficiently undertaken by the
private_~ector. (see Art. XII, Sec. 6.) Private sector entrepreneurship
should be relatively free from government intervention. The
business of government is governance and not money-making. 1
Encouragement of private enterprises.
Section 20 and other provisions of the Constitution prescribing
and encouraging private sector participation, especially in the field
of economic activity, come no more as responses to State monopoly
of economic forces which has unfairly kept individual initiative
from the economic processes and has held back competitiveness in
the market. The Constitution, however, does not bar the government
from undertaking its own initiatives, especially in the domain of
public service, and neither does it repudiate its supremacy as chief
economic caretaker of the nation. 2
1
The government and its political subdivisions constitute the public sector. Their
function is not to engage in business or produce wealth but the promotion of the general
welfare. They may engage in business but the aim must be "to serve the people."
2 development. Thus, the State is bound to consider the customs,
Thus, in a case, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of petitioners (operators
of "shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore" public marine coastal radio stations) that the
government .cannot compete in the business of public correspondence - providing
ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship public correspondence, free of charge - holding that
the communication system project which is designed to insure the safety of lives at sea
is compatible with the State aims as expressed in the Charter, among others, "to serve
the people" (Sec. 4.), to promote a just and dynamic social order ... through policies that
provide adequate social justice (Sec. 10.), and to achieve the goals of the national economy
(Art. XII, Sec. 1, par. 1.), "and certainly, amid these hard times, the State can do no less."
According to the Court, Section 20 "is no more than an acknowledgment of the
importance of private initiative in building the nation. However, it is not a call for official
abdication of duty [of the State] to the citizenry" (Marine Radio Communications Ass' n.
of the Phils., Inc. vs. Reyes, 191 SCRA205 [1990).) "to promote distributive justice nnd to
intervene when the common good so demands." (Art. Xll, Sec. 6.)
j
!h;1 11, J, 1 :t:J. A l{ I , 11 , I H•:t 1,A l{A'I I U N UJI l ' H I N 11 '1 ,l l!
ANL) S'fA'.l'.12 POU ms
State Policies
This topic ;_is- discussed lengthily under Article XU (National
Economy and Patrimony), Sections 1, 2, 6, 10, 16, 17, and 18.
SEC. 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
developme~t and agrarian reform.
Comprehensive rural development
and agrarian reform.
"Comprehensive rural development" covers all phases of rural
development - economic, social, political, cultural, and even
industrial. It also includes agrarian reform. In a country, like the
Philippines, where the bulk of the population are farmers living in
the countryside, national development cannot take place without
rural development.
This topic is discussed under Article XIII (Social Justice and
Human Rights), Sections 4 to 8 and Article XII (National Economy
and Patrimony), Section 1.
SEC. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the frame-
work of national unity and development.
Rights of indigenous cultural
communities.
This section recognizes constitutionally the existence and the
rights of the indigenous cultural communities. It directs the State
to promote their rights within the framework of national unity and
traditions, beliefs, and interests of indigenous cultural minorities in
the formulation and implementation of state policies and programs.
In a multi-ethnic society like ours, the above provision is necessary
in promoting the goal of national unity and development. 1
1
Other constitutional provisions dealing on indigenous cultural communities are
found in Article VI (Legislative Department), providing for the election or selection of
party-list representatives in the House of Representatives from, among others, indigenous
cultural communities (Sec. 5 thereof.); Article X (Local Government), authorizing the
creation of autonomous regions (Secs. 15-21 thereof.); Article XII (National Economy
and Patrimony), directing the State to protect their rights to their ancestral lands (Sec. 5

.1'1111.ll'l'I NII. 'UM,' lll 'IJ l'IUN/\ 1.1 ,/\W !11•111.2 1 n /\ II( I ' 11 , I I U\ I ' /\ I /\ I " ll'-l \ JI I I I~ 111 I 11 I I I
Principles nnd Cnses
Under the prov1s1on1 the government may even enact laws
especially for them taking into account their customs1 traditions1
beliefs1and interests/while retaining their rights to participate fully,
if they so choose, in the political, economic, social, and cultural .life
of the State.
Meaning of term "indigenous cultural
communities."
The term "cultural communities" is departure from the term
"cultural minorities" as used in Republic Act No. 1888, the law
which created the Commission on National Integration.3 The latter
term, it is claimed, connotes cultural inferiority. The word "national"
was added to obviate any misinterpretation that the term includes
alien commm1ities. The new Constitution changed the word to
"indigenous."
As used in the Constitution, "the term national cultural communi-
ties (now indigenous cultural communities) includes the minority
groups as defined by the United Nations Subcommission on Pre-
vention and Protection of Minorities, those non-dominant groups
in a population which possess and wish to preserve stable ethnic,
religious or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly differ-
ent from those of the rest of the population."
As strictly applied to the Philippines, it refers to those who are
somewhat outside the orbit of the Hispanic Christian Culture which
has characterized the majority of inhabitants of the Philippines.4
thereof.); Article Xlll (Social Justice and Human Rights), recognizing their prior rights to
their ancestral lands in the disposition of public lands under the agrarian reform program
(Sec. 6 thereof.); Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and
Sports), directing the State to protect their rights, to preserve and develop their cultures,
tr_aditions, and institutions (Sec. 17 thereof.); and Article XVI (General Provisions),
dtrecting Congress to create a consultative body to advise the President on policies
affecting indigenous cultural communities. (Sec. 12 thereof.)
2
"ln line with the national policy to facilitate the integration of the members of
indigenous cultural communities and accelerate the development of the areas occupied
by them," the Civil Service Commission is required by Jaw to give special civil service
examinations to qualify them for appointment in the civil service (P.O. No. 807, Sec. 23;
see P.D. Nos. 832 and 1125.) Consistent also with the spirit of the constitutional provision,
the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines" recognizes the system of Filipino
Muslim law, codifies Muslim laws, and provides for its administration among Muslims.
(P.D. No. 1083, dated Feb. 4, 1977.)
3
Abolished by P.O. No. 190, dated April 22, 1975.
4 cultural p rojects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction. (Local Government
Committee on National Integration Report No. 1, Annex B-1, p. l, Feb. 2, 1972, 1971
Constitutional Convention. See P.D. No. 1414, dated June 9, 1978.
•
I I II,
/\N I) S'l '/\'1'1 \ I ' } 1,1 'I i!~
Stntc Policies
SEC. 23:--1:_he State shall eri.courage non-governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote
the welfare of the nation.
Non-governmental, community-based,
or sectoral organizations.
The State is required to encourage these organizations because
recent events have shown that, under responsible leadership, they
can be active contributors to the political, social, and economic
growth and progress of the country. It should refrain from any
actuation that would tend to interfere or subvert the rights of these
organizations which in the words of the Constitution are "non-
governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations thnt
promote the we1fare of the nation."
The term "non-governmental organizations" (NGOs) is now
used to refer to such community-based and / or sectoral organiza-
tions which include several development agencies, civic, profes-
sional, and cause-oriented organizations. The last are the so-called
"people's organizations" since they invariably work or struggle for
the cause of the people. 1
This topic is discussed at length under Article XIII (Social Justice
and Human Rights), Sections 15 and 16 which categorically state the
role and rights of people's organizations as vehicles to enable the
1"SEC. 34. Role of People's and Nongovernmental Organizations. - Local government
units shall promote the establishment and operation of people's and nongovernmental
organizations to become attive partners in the pursuit of local autonomy.
SEC. 35. Linkages with People's and Nongovernmental Organizations. - Local
government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements
with people's and non-governmental organizations to engage in the delivery of
certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects, and to develop local
enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversify agriculture, spur
rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and enhance the economic and social
well-being of the people.
SEC. 36. Assistance to People's and Nongovernmental Organizations. - A local
government unit may through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of
the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such people's
and nongovernmental organizations for economic, socially-oriented, environmental, or
Code (R.A. No. 7160].)
 IJ
IOU 1'1111 ,ll'l ' IN P. U N /, 111 l J I lt JNA I , I. A W
lJrl.nclplcs nnd Cnacs
people to participate and intervene meaningfully and effectively in
decisions which directly affect their lives.
SEC. 24. The State recognizes the vital role of commu-
nication and information in nation-building.
Vital role of communication and information
in nation-building.
Communication and information, as used above, include not
only print or broadcast media (radio and television) but also motion
pictures, advertising, cable, telephone, and telegraph. These means
of communication are called mass media because they reach the
mass of the people. (see Art. XVI, Sec, 11[1].) That they play a critical
role in nation-building is very obvious.
(1) Formation of an enlightened citi~enry. - Mass media shape
people's thoughts and attitudes, their standards and ideals
and, therefore, a great force to reckon with. In a country like the
Philippines composed of people with diverse cultures, they can
be an effective instrument in promoting national integration and
preserving Filipino values and traditions. They can be used to link
our geographically dispersed population and help effect faster
delivery of educational, medical, and other public services in remote
areas of the country. By educating the citizenry on important public
issues, they help create a strong, vigilant and enlightened public
opinion so essential to the successful operation of a republican
democracy.
(2) Development of society. - On the material side, it is difficult
to imagine a progressive country, in today's high-tech age of
computers, intemets, windows, cyberspace and information
highways, with antiquated communication and information
structures. In the last two decades, the world has witnessed a steady
stream of technological progress in this field. The Philippines must
keep abreast of communication innovations but at the same time be
selective and discriminating to insure that only those "suitable to
the needs and aspirations of the nation" (Ibid., Sec. 10.) are adopted.
Utilized and managed wisely and efficiently, communication and
information are very useful tools for the economic, social, cultural
and political development of society.
J
11
! 11, 11, :.l(t A l< I , II , ll H~ 1,/\ l~A I It.IN ()11 1'1-t lt"l ~ 111 11 1 1111,
AND 8'J:A:fU l'(.)LJ 'ILlS
Stnte Policies
(3) Protectiort-(}f national welfare and security. - The operation of
communication and information industries directly affect national
welfare and security. Mass media are clothed with public interest.
For this reason, the Constitution·Jimits ownership and mattagement
of mass media exdusively to Filipino citizens. (Ibid., Sec. 11[1].)
SEC. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
Autonomy of local governments.
This topic is discussed in Article X (Local Government).
SEC. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to op-
portunities for public service, and prohibit political dy-
nasties as may be defined by law.
Equal access to opportunities
for public service.
This topic is discussed under Article VI (Legislative Department),
Sections 4, 5, and 7 and Article X (Local Government), Section 8.
Additionally:
(1) Democratization of elections and appointments. - The
constitutional policy on the prohibition of political dynasties
expresses ·a national commitment to democratize elections and
appointments to positions in the government and eliminate a
principal obst,u:le to "equal access to opportunities for public
service" in both elective and appointive offices. The dominance of
political dynasties in the past not only kept more deserving but poor
individuals from running or winning in elections; it also enabled
powerful and affluent elective politicians to corner appointive
positions for their relatives and followers. Their existence breed
graft and corruption, inefficiencies in public administration, and
indifference to the general welfare.
(2) Prohibition of political dynasties. - The provisions limiting
the terms of office of elective officials (President, Vice-President,
Senators, Representatives, and local officials) beyond which the
incumbents are disqualified from running for the same office
enhance equal access to political opportunities although they
 Ill
JII 111 ,ll'l ' I N I I,
• aJ
'I.> M 1111 t J l l~)NA l , 1, AW
• tJdnclplc1J 11ncl C.:11scs
may not completely do away with the evils spawned by political
dynasties that proliferated in the country in the past. With his
political and economic resources, an elective official can have a close
kin or trusted follower run for the same position and continue to
exercise control through the latter. Hence, the need for a declaration
expressly prohibiting political dynasties.
(3) Implementing law. - The law implementing the constitutional
policy shall define what constitutes political dynasties having
in mind the evils sought to be eradicated and the need to insure
the widest possible base for the selection of elective government
officials regardless of political, economic, and social status. Note
that the State is expressly mandated to prohibit "political dynasties."
Congress has no discretion on the matter except merely to spell out
the meaning and scope of the term,1 specifically the extent of the
degree of relationship by consanguinity or affinity.
(4) Provision not self-executing.2 - The "equal access" provision
in Section 26 is a subsumed part of Article II whose provisions are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to said provision. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action
before the courts. (Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections, 427
SCRA 96 [2004].)
SEC. 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integ-
rity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption.
Honesty and integrity in public
service.
(1) Perennial problem ofgraft and corruption. -In the Philippines,
every new administration since the postwar period, has made
a pledge to eradicate graft and corruption in government. The
1
The term has been defined to mean a powerful or influential political group or
family which continues in existence for an umeasonable length of time. (Black's Law
Dictionary [5th ed.], p. 454.) In the Philippines, it h as been associated with fa milies
with deeply entrenched political interests whose members always win the elections in a
province or city because of "guns, goons, and gold."
2
See, however, note 1, Art. II.
A l{ I , II , I JI ~ I .A l{A I lt-) N t )I I
IIJ
l ♦ i 1U N t 11 ' 1. l t 111
/\ N l S' I'/\'J'JJ l '<J L.l 'l lJS
Sta le Policies
popular p erception, however, is that this baneful ill has become
more rampant and sophisticated through the years. To be sure, the
above provision was incorporated in the Constitution because of
revelations of "unprecedented magnitude" of graft and cbrruption
allegedly perpetrated by officials in the highest circle of the
government during the Marcos regime.
(2) Ways to attack the problem. - The malady of graft and
corruption must be eradicated or at least effectively reduced to a
tolerable degree because of the staggering amount of public money
that has been lost through it. 1 Having honest Presidents with the
best of intentions is not enough to reduce corruption to minimal
proportion. What is needed is strong political will and the power of
example on the part of top officials of the government. 2
(3) Needfor honesty and integrihJ in public service. - The fulfillment
of the constitutional mandate will go a long way in strengthening
the pe6ple' s trust in the government and its leaders. It will also
ensure 'the efficient use of resources, encourage investments, and
bring about faster development in ter ms of global competitiveness.
Effective and honest government can make the difference in the
long-term economic performance of a nation .
This topic is further elaborated under Article XI (AccountabUity
of Public Officers), Sections 1 and 2.
1
Corruption and frauds against the government, frauds against consumers and
business, and corporate illegality are known as "white-collar crimes" in the United
States. They are those classes of non-violent illegal activities which principally involve
traditional notions of deceit, deception, concealment, manipulation, breach of trust,
subterfuge and illegal circumvention. Anti-bureaucratic corruption policies must be
formulated as part of the large package of anti-white collar crimes policy with a view to
the eradication or control of white-collar criminality or corruption in the society and not
simply from within the government and bureaucracy. There is a recognition of the link
between governmental and societal corruption. It is axiomatic that as long as corruption
is rampant in society, corruption from government and bureaucracy cannot be eradicated
or even drastically reduced. ("White-collar criminality," by Former President Diosdado
Macapagal, Manila Bulletin, Oct. 7, 1988, p. 7.)
2
Graft and corruption is a two-way street. There will be no bribe takers if there are
no bribe givers. The public, too, must recognize its responsibility. The most effective way,
it seems, is to put some well-known public and private figures behind bars as concrete
examples to demonstrate the government's determination to achieve decency and
morality in the public service.
IJ
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1'1111,IPl'I N l i
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AN I) S'l '.A'l'JJ PO L! '1.LlS
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· Principles nncl Cnf:lCS
State Policies

SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democ-
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full racy. (Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 [2002]; Ini-
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public tiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal
interest. Service, Inc. {IDEALS, Inc.] vs. Power Sector Assets and•Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM), 683 SCRA 602 [2012].)
Full public disclosure by the State
of all its transactions.
-oOo-
(1) Transactions covered. - The State policy of full transparency
expressed in Section 28 covers all State transactions involving public
interest, i.e., transactions which the people have a right to know
particularly those involving expenditures of public funds. The law,
however, may prescribe reasonable conditions for the disclosure.
The policy will not apply to records involving the security of the
State or which are confidential in character. (see Art. III, Sec. 7.)
(2) Full disclosure even without demand. - Section 7 of the Bill
of Rights (Art. III.) guarantees the people's right to information on
matters of public concern and access to records pertaining to official
transactions of the government. On the other hand, Section 28
requires the State to make public its transactions without demand
from individual citizens. It stresses the duty of the State to release
the information. This policy of full public disclosure is in line with
the constih1tional mandate of an open, accountable and transparent
government. (see Art. VI, Secs. 12, 16{4], 20; Art. VII, Secs. 12, 13
[par. l], 20; Art. VIII, Sec. 8[3]; Art. IX, D-Sec. 3; Art. XI, Sec. 17; Art.
XII, Sec. 21.)
(3) Aim and importance of provisions. - These twin provisions
of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making
and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the peo-
ple sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional
rights. They are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If
the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and
decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed with-
out any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. They
are also essential to hold public officials "at all times xx x account-
able to the people," (Art. XI, Sec. 1.) for unless citizens have the
proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable
for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can partici-
pate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry

Article Ill
BILL OF RIGHTS
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Concept of a bill of rights.
A /iill ofrights may be defined as a declaration and enumeration of
,1 1'1'nion's rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed
In protect against violations by the government, or by individuals
1 ,,. i•,mups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual
1 (2)
,11111 n limitation upon the power of the St~te. 2
1111 lln• absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
t 1111•,lll11lion cannot be invoked against the State. The Constitution in laying down the
! "11 11 lpl1"l of government and fundamental liberties of the people does not govern the
111l111i1111'1hipHuetween individuals, between a private individual and other individuals.
I h1• llill uf l~ighli; governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its
,11•,1°11111. II unly lempers governmental power and protects the individual against any
11gn11""1111· nnd tmwm·ranted interference by any department of government and its
1lf,••111 lt••1. Wh,,1: il docs is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible
In ,11,v I 111w1•r lwlder. Th us, alleged violations of the right against reasonable search and
•1..J .-1111• (!;,.v. 2.) mny only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced
1°111•"'" 1•a• nf nnvereign authority. The protection cannot be extended to acts committed
I •\I 1'IIV,1h• l11cllvid11nls as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
11,., l',"\1" 1'111111•1,1 (l'coplc vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 [1991]; People vs. Hipol, 407 SCRA 179
I '1111")
1111• 11111 of l{ighl1; cnnnot be invoked against acts o f private individuals, being
,11.,,. 1,,,1 ""'Yng,, im,I the government and its law-enforcement agencies as a limitation
1111 .. 11111.,1 ,11•111111, (l'Pople vs. Domnsim1, 219 SCRA 24.5 [1993].) The prohibition, therein
111,· I" 11111,l'lly ,1ddn·~•J1•d lo lhe Stnle nnd its agents. They confirm certain rig hts of-the
l11di vh l1 11il ,·xl111 willtoul need ol' nny govern,nental grnnt, rights tlrnt mny not Lw taken
,1w111• I, 11• ,v,•111n11•nl, l'ighls lhnt governmen t has the duty to protect. (People vs. O rdo1'o,
I i.J ,, 1(/\ t,'/ ,1 1?.otKI!,) Thu•,, cqun l protedion erects no s hk•ld ,,gn in~t privn1·1• rondt1<:1,
l1u w,·v,•1' il l,11•1•i111i11,1tory or wrongful. Privntc actions, no mall'cr how <'!\1""1\io11s, c.in1111l
v1..1.,,., 1111' ,·q1111I l' r11l,•1 •tlo111•,un1-.111let•. (Yrasnl.!gui Yij, l'hilippi1w /\irli1ws, Inc, 56'1 Sl 'I{/\
11,,/ I 'illlHI,)
I\ 1~,:/1I 1rn1y lw d,•fh,..cl nil " n llC>Wl'I; privill')\1', or im1111111ily gu,11·,111l1·1•d 1111d1·r
1'11• l ,.,111111111 11111, ,1 11.iwl 1,r llil11,li111d ,1.,,,1°,1011, or 11·1'og11i1eod ,l'i ,, 1·1•s11ll 11I lo ng 11~.l)'o' ',
I""'""' l I,,.,
1111,.. , ..111h·n,ill v 1111l111n•,,lsl1· 11,1111•11 ,, 1111,·
llPII 111•,.iln·,I !1111utl11•1·I '' (M,·I up11lll,111
W,1l111 w11il •1l11It I ' •l'Wl'l',11','' i:v1,lo·111 YPI /\, I l'lw,111•1·, ltll , ,1 l~ !ll ' l{A ,, HI IJL)l)II I.)
0
'•,1•1• I t t Ii 11 l •V, l ·,,11•,1111111,m ,1/ / 111111,11,,,,,,, 11th I'd, l'I' '• M ', I',, .I Ill 1\1 I,,
I ,,,,.,ir,,,,,.,,,,1/ / 1111', 11 d ••d , I'I' ,, III
I' I
ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 175
Preliminary Considerations
Basis and purpose of a bill of rights.
Article III contains the chief protection for human rights but the
body of the Constitution guarantees other rights that are secured to
all the people.
(1) Bedrock of constitutional government. - The Bill of Rights is
the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped
naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive
and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill
of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies
a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles
on governmental power. (Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals, 538 SCRA
41 [2009]; People vs. Friedrich, 412 SCRA 142 [2003].)
Importance accorded to the dignity and worth of the individual.
- A bill of rights embodies a basic dogma of democracy - the
transc~ndental importance of the individual. Thus:
"In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the
dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core
as well as the cardinal article of a faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be 'protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as
the citadel of his person.' (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189 [1973],
citing American Communication Association v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382.)
(3) Protection against arbitrary actions of government and other
1111.:mliers of society. - A bill of rights lays downs the limitations on
governmental power. It reserves for the people certain areas of
liberty against aggression and arbitrary actions by the government
nnd its agencies. While intended precisely to restrict the authority of
1·hc State, it also guarantees a measure of freedom from unwarranted
rc•straints of other members of society.
I
Tlw l\l'W ~ ',111•,1i l11l i1111 1111·11q1or,1l1•,4 .,II tlw lia~i<' rights in t·he former Charter. It also
,1w111d11 11.-,v 111•,l1l•1 lo th,, h1d1vid11,1I, (i:1·1· S,·r11. H, 'l'I, '12, '13, 18[:I ), 19.) '11ms, it has a
•,111•111•,1•1' lltll 111 lli~1h1°, th,111 th,• l1l 11, 1111il 1'17 1 t l1,1l'll'1't1. In 11Jdili111) lo the bill nf rights,
11tli, 'I l'I llYl>oillll'• I ,1 I1,,, I '" ,, III II IIPII n11111 ,111h ,. 111lio1• l'i11ht,1 u( IIIll I....,, ,I,• t,lll'h llMlhc ri~ht
l111 •1h11,tlh•11 fl\ ll \I V l ,111,I ll11 • 1lj1lt l lo> 1111,i,1lj11•,lli1• (Ail '<1 11 )
 PHILIPPINE C O NSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
'l'hc purpose of a bill of rights has been variously set forth as
fo llows:
(a) To preserve democratic ideals. -"The Bill of Rights
is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and
:;1•curity 'against the assaults of _opportunism, the expediency
, if the p assing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and
the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general p rinciples.'3 Respect for human rights is the heart of all
democratic values.
(b) To safeguard fundamental rights. - "The purpose of the
I H1111f Rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
,rn1jorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles
lo hl' applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty and
pm1w rly, to free speech or free press, freedom of worship and
,1Wil'ntbly and other fundamental rights, may not be submitted
Io o1 vole: they depend on the outcome of no elections." (West
Virginia State Board v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.)
(<:) './ii promote the happiness of the individual. - "The
I1,11 >f >iness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, is the
1 rlh•rinn by which its behavior is to be judged. Its interests, not
111 , power sd the limits to the authority it is entitled to exercise." 4
(11•1• l'liili ppine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs.
I'I 1llipp in · Blooming Mills, supra.) "Every State is known by the
rlglit n tlinl it maintains. One method of judging its character lies,
,1liow ,111, in t·hc contribution that it makes to the substance of
1111111'" lrn ppiness.".,
N111 d for n blll of rights.
'I Ill' 111·1•d for n bill. of rights is beyond question especia lly
l11d11y wl11•11 ,1ctivilic1-1 of government h ave expan ded a nd arc still
,., 1111111 ll11r,, ,,ml privnl<' rights and the exercise of governmcntnl
1111 wP111 ofl1•11 rn11fl k t wilh cuch o t·hc r.
( I) '/'//1' /'1'111'/1• 11111tJI 11:,t11•rf n11r/ 111·011•,·f llll'il' rig/1/H. - Without n
11111 ul I lglil11, 1111'11• ii, nothing 1>111 11,1k1•d pow<'!' l 'Vl'll if l'Xl'l"ll•d in
•11•1• 111•,ll1" ( !\Ill" >/11, I h1• N11IIIII' 111 J111lh ,,ii 1'1111 ,..,.,. l'I' ., ... IJ I
1
1 "Y'•lt•m I ol 1•,11v1·1111111•11I 1,111 I 111111 111"11 11I 1\• 11,dwfll
1 l\'l~I llu•• ,1,11,, 1111h,111v,1111ll'1.1,1t, 1• l'I' I', 11,11 111',J
I ..... ~ I I ,1,1111111,11 ,,, 1',,lllh ' I' 11•111 11 I II
ART. III. BILL O F RIGHTS 177
Preliminary Considerations
the name of law. But a d eclaration of rights in the Constitution
would not necessarily make available the blessings of constitutional
democracy to all unless the people themselves assert and protect
their "liberties and immunities so that their persons, ~heir homes,
their peace, their livelihood, their happiness, and their freedom may
be safe and secure from an ambitious ruler, an envious neighbor, or
a grasping state." 6 The Constitution, the laws, and the courts can lay
down the ground rules for fairness but it is the people who must
understand and abide by them if they wish to have them preserved.7
(2) The people must guard against misguided reformers. - The
danger to our free institutions, however, lies not only in those who
openly defy the authority of the government and violate its laws.
The greater menace is in those who, in the name of democracy,
destroy the very things it stands for and so undermine democracy
itself. Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are
degraded and diminished. Liberty is indivisible; it is a right that
inheres in every one of u s as a member of the human family. It is not
derived from the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity
or even from the Constitution itself which merely affirms but does
not grant it. We should realize that when the bell tolls the death
of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee and for all of us." 8 Oustice
6JU. S. LAUREL, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, p. 334
(1966).
7
As stressed by the Supreme Court:
"The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of
the people lo invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons
1111 the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
wt•apons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill
lhe mlc as11ignc?cl to them in the free society, if they a re kept bright and sharp with use
by Ihose who arc not nfraid to assert them." (Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
St 'l{A 6591 1987], per Justice Cruz.)
"Thl11 rcl1•vant and timely warning is also expressed in two memorable admonitions
(w111 Mnrj11rle <.:. Fribourg and Justice William 0. Douglas.
Mrn. Frit,ouri;, in lwr inimitublc phrase, tells u s that - "x x x. Time h as taught its
111\1' old 11..,•,011. W,•11-me;inin~ people burnt witches. Well-meaning prosecutors have
, 1111vl, lo•d Iii<' 11111110•111. W,•11-mcnning objectives espoused by those not grounded in
l1l,11111y 1,111 h11 ,• 11•1 tr11111 prolt•rllng our hcrilngc of equal justice under the Jaw. They can
,1111 11 ,. 11111 1,..,1,•1· ll m11 w,• Ilk,· 1111t,·1l,,v1•, ln lncndnngeringour liberties." (The Bill of Rights,
I' ;•II I l'llii'I) And 111, ..,,. ""' lh, , unf111w•ll ,1hl1• words of Ju$l:icc Douglas: "The challenge
l11 11111 llh.,,11,•~ 1111111·, l11•,1111•11llv 11111 fi11111 lh11Ht• who ronsclowily seek to destroy our
1,r111d llll'II who allow their proper
, 11111 ... 1111 l11 lilh11I llu,111 111 1111' l,11 I 1h,11 wl111I lh, ,y 11111p11•.1• In 1un11npli•,h involves a n
11111•11111111 111 "' lllorn I1 ", , ~ ~ 1111• 1111111\•1·,, 11I lh, 1• 111, 11 ,.,,. 11111•11 , n1111111111dnhlt•. Whn t
178 PHILIPPINE C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 179
Principles and Cases Preliminary Considerations

( 'rnz, dissenting in Guazon vs. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 [1990]; see (3) Statuton; rights. - They are those rights which are provided
Ordonez vs. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 [1994].) by laws promulgated by the law-making body and, consequently,
may be abolished by the same body. Examples are the right to
Classes of rights. receive a minimum wage and the right to inherit property.
The rights that a citizen of a democratic state enjoys may be Constitutional and statutory rights are also referred to as civil
t foss ifled into: rights in the sense that they are acquired rights under an organized
(1) Natural rights. - They are those rights possessed by every society and are protected by constitutions or other laws. They are,
1' il izt!n without being granted by the state for they are conferred therefore, non-existent in the absence of law. There are civil rights
11pon him by the Creator as a human being so that he may live a which are also natural rights and which are not. The concept of
l1,1pµy life. These rights which belong to man by virtue of his nature, human rights encompasses both the civil rights and the natural
ill't' viewed as inherent and inalienable, existing independently of rights of an individual person.
,1'1 hum an authority. Examples are the right to life, liberty, and
prop1•rly, and the right to love;9 Classification of constitutional rights.

(2) Constitutional rights. - They are those rights which are
nu1ft•1Tcd and protected by the Constitution. Since they are part of
lltl' f11ndmnental law, they cannot be modified or withheld by the
l.1w-mnking body; and
1\ ,, 11111•,l 1<·m,•mber, however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives.
/\ '•"l'l'r,•i,•, ion of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a reformer or an
1111ll,11v. ·rlw only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness to infractions of
1111' 111111r,111ll'c:-. of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
d,·111,11111~ of lhc moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of
li ll',hli1 1•1 ,l never ending one. xxx xxx The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of
11'1 "" ll~'< In short, the liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
111111•v1•11 if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because
w,• l11•l1111g !11 n gl'oup thnt is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of
H11\hl•11,i ,1 code of fo ir ploy for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience
11111"1! obsl'rv(•." (A Living Bill of Rights, pp. 61, 62, 64 [1961], cited in separate opinion of
h1•,l11 ,, l'.hlro in Ch,wcs vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 [1968].)
''Wi th llw CtJlabli~hmcnt of civil government and a constitution, there arises a
111111 ••11111,11 dil,l lnction between nnlurnl rights and civil rights, difficult thoui.;h to define
ll wlr l>l "I''' ,111d dc•lineolion. ll hn~ been proposed that notural rights arc those rights lhol
",1p111•rt,iln lo 1111111 i11 right of hill <'Xi~lencc•." Tlwsc were fundnment.11 rit;hts endowed by
< ,od 11po11 l1un11111 h1•i11g,1, "all 1110~1' rlf.1hl~ of ,,cling .1~ ,m ind ividual for hi•J own crnuforl
1111d h,111pl111", 1, whlr h ,in• nol lnjuriou~ lo lhl' 11,1lurnl l'lght ~of olhcrn.'' On the olhur hand,
0
1ivd I ll',hl•1 ,111• 1lm•11• lha l ",1pp1•1l,ri11 lo 1111111 in I l11hl nf hi•• b1•i11f.1 n llll'mb,•r of ~or h•ly."
1111 '•" 1lgh1-t, l111w1•v,•1; un• .i .. rlv ..d 110111 1111' 11111111 ,11 l'ighl•1 of i11dlvld11,1l1111l11<'1'; " M1111
,lid 11111 1·111.. r 111111 11111 il'ty 111 111·1111111• w111111• 11H lh,111 lw w,1,i h,•11111', 11or 111 h,1v,• lc•w,•r
1l11l1l•1 lh,111 h,, l1111I li,•11111°, l1111 !11 l111v1• lhu•u• 1111h1°, l11 •ll1•1· ,.,., uwd I 11•1 m1lurnl rl11hl11 ,111°
lh,• 11111111l1111111111I 1111 hl11 1l11h1" " I 1v1I I l)';l11,, 111 1h1,," 11•11•1 w,•11• 1h11•11• 11,11111,11 d1•,hl•1
1•,11lh11l,11h 111:lii., 111 • • 1111ll y ,111.J I""", !11111 wl11,lt l,y lf11,111111•lv,..,, l11,llvh l11,,l.,1 1111f,I
11111 1 11, 111111,I 1,,1l111 u ,111lih111ll11 11111,,111, 11111•1'lltl11l 1hll 11111ll'ly11111IK11V1•1111m•11I"
11II 1'•11 ,Ill' t lpl11l1111 I'111111 / ' Iii ,,..1,11, \" 111111111)',•IIII ••I\ 111! ,(ti/ 1 ,t II/\ Ill ll I I)IN!., )
The rights secured by the Constitution may be classified into
fo u~ (4) categories, as follows:
(1) Political rights. -
Th~y are such rights of the citizens
which give them power to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or administration of the government (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 221 [1946].), including the right to discuss matters
o( public interest and to criticize the government. Among these
rights are the right of citizenship (Art. IV.), the right of suffrage (Art.
V.), H,c right to information on matters of public concern (Sec. 7.),
llw right to form political parties (see Art. IX-C, Sec. 6.), the right
lo sPuk or hold public office (see Art. XI, Sec. 1.), and, in general,
1I1t• rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship vis-a-
oi.•1 lht! management of government (Simon, Jr. vs. Commission on
1111111.in Rights, 229 SCRA 117 [1994].);
(:1.) U/Jil riglrts. - They are those rights not connected with the
nl)',,111i1/.,1lion or administration of the government, which the law
wlll 1•11forl'l' 0 1· redress .i n a civil action at the instance of private
111dlvld11 il14 for th ' purpose of securing to them the enjoyment of their
1111•111111 of h11ppi11ess.10 They include the rights against involuntary
1.1•1 vllwl,• (Sl'l', IHl2J.) nnd imprisonment for non-payment of debt
111 ,1 11t1ll l,P1 (S1•1·. W.); llw l:Onstilutional rights of the accused (Secs.
11 l1, :1: 1, ); Ilic •1awial and 1•<·onomic rights (i11frn.); liberty of abode and
11l, l11111g i11)i llw 1,1111w (~i1•,·. <>.), rh·,
I ' " •• M/\1 t t II M ,1111( I 1\1 llll I , l'lill I '1111,,11111111111111 I 11\Y, I' li'll ( ('I It,)
 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 181
180 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases Preliminary Considerations

Freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, the right of or happiness of the individual may in all cases be sacrificed. Neither
assembly and petition, and the right to form associations (Secs. 4, is it a means for the realization of the best life only by the individual
8.) are likewise civil rights. However, they partake of the nature of for which the group may at all times, if necessary, be staked. 12
l
political rights when they are utilized as a means to participate in Liberty is blessing without which life is a misery, but it should
the government; not be made to prevail over authority because then society will
(3) Social and economic rights. - They are protected mainly in fall into anarchy. (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 720 [1940].)
other provisions of the Constitution not because of the primacy of The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the
civil and political rights but because, unlike the latter which are individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the
designed to be immediately enforceable in courts of law, they are past. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919].) They have to
usually addressed to the political organs, requiring the adoption of some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the
legislative measures for their realization. They include those rights right of intervention even in contractual relations, when they are
which are intended to insure the well-being and economic security c1ffected with public interest. (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs.
of the individual. Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 340 [1940].)
The right to property (Sec. 1.) and the right to just compensation But neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
for private property taken for public use (Sec. 9.) belong more becau se the individual will fall into slavery. (Calalang vs. Williams,
appropriately under this third category of rights. They are also supra.) The State in modern tim es is an instrument to enable more
provided in the articles dealing with the promotion of social justice both the individual and society together to attain their greater
(Art. XIII.), the conservation and utilization of natural resources happiness, progress, and welfo.re.13
(Art. XII, Sec. 2.), and the promotion of education (Art. XIV, Secs. 1, (2) Conflict between individual rights and group welfare. - Conse-
2, 3[4, 5].), science and technology (Ibid., Secs. 10-13.), and arts and quen tly, in some cases, the individual must yield to the group;
rnllure (Ibid., Secs. 17, 18.); and .,nd in other cases, the group to the individual rights and liberties,
(4) Rights of the accused. - They are the (civil) rights intended which are protected from encroachments whether by individuals or
fo r the protection of a person accused of any crime, like the right groups of individuals, and even by the government itself. For the
lo presumption of innocence, the right to a speedy, impartial, and 11,111 \l' reason, the Constitution provides, expressly or impliedly, that

public trial, and the right against cruel, degrading, or inhuman 111 c,•rtoin cases, w hen demanded by the necessity of promoting the
punishment. The provisions (Secs. 11 to 22.) particularly and directly 1•,1•111•r,il welfore of society, the government may interfere with these
d <~aling with these rights are discussed subsequently.11 right:-; and liberties.14
(~) lxo/(' cf j11cliciary. -
How far, consistently with freedom, m ay
State authority and individual freedom. I'"' right:-; and libel·lies of the individual be subordinated to the
(1) Promotion of both individual and social welfare. - The State, will of llw government is a question which has assailed the very
ns an organization, exists to promote the happiness and welfare of n h lt•1H' 1• of gove rnmen ts from the beginning of time. (Rubi vs.
both the individual and the group of which he is part. It is not an l'111v l 111•i,II llonnl, s11pm.)
end by itself for the glorification of which the life, liberty, properly, (.i) ll11/1111d11s if i11taests. - The effective balnncing of the
, l,tl111'1 111' 1111· i11div idw:i l and those of the community, the so-

11 Hxn•pl 1Ji,. polilk,11 l'll\hl•1, pr,u lli•,11ly 1111 llw nho\l(' <:«11vllll11llim,1l rl ►•,hh,
p,1rl i<-11l11rly 1111• l'l11h1,111f llw 11,, 11•,1·d, 111,· 11111 li 11, l1,·ol to, ltl,-p11•111l111w hul 1111• g11,11·,11111•1•,I
1111•v1•1 y p1•p,1111 wi1h111 11111 1,·111inil11 I llc11II•• w Ul11111I 11•g!ll'd lo ,111y ,lif (.-11·1111"• .,( 1,111•, ' I fll i\lH II 1 ,1 l, l'hll 1 ,11v1•1111111·11l l11 A, lloll, p, 111 (I%~}.
, 11!111, "' 1h1li111111lllv (•11•1• 11 l11111p, \tt 11111111111!1•, 1111 l'ltll I I','• I 1111,'/J,) All,•1111, 1lw11•l1111•,
111o11• l11 v11~" 11t .. 11,
' '""'
II 1/oit/
182 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
called "balancing of interests" - individual freedom on one
hand and substantial public interests on the other - is the
essence, or the indispensable means for the attainment of the
legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can
be no absolute power whoever exercises it, for that would be
tyranny; yet there can neither be absolute liberty for that would
mean license and anarchy. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957].)
(b) Function and duty of the courts. - In every case where
there arises a clash between an assertion of State authority and
the exercise of liberty, it is the high function and duty of the
courts, ultimately of the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
power of judicial review (see Art. VIII, Secs. 4, 5.), to locate the
point of accommodation and equilibrium and draw the line
between permissible regulation anq forbidden restraint taking
into account the nature and substantiality of the community
interest sought to be protected or promoted, in relation to
the nature and importance of the freedom restricted and the
character and extent of the restriction sought to be imposed.
(( ;onzales vs. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835 [1969].)
(c) Waiver of constitutional rights. - The waiver, such as,
for example, of the rights against unreasonable searches and
Sl'izurcs (Sec. 2.), the right to counsel and to remain silent (Secs.
12., 17.), the right to bail (Sec. 13.), and the right to be heard (Sec.
111.), has been held valid. (People vs. Donato, 197 SCRA 130
I llJYI I.) The courts, however, should indulge every reasonable
pn•sumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
right:-; (People vs. 13urgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986].) and accord good
f,1ilh in their exercise. Consequently, the prosecution .m ust prove
with strong and convincing evidence thrit the alleged waiver by
,111 .icc11sC>d was give n freely rind voluntarily, knowingly and
inh'lligl'nlly, nnd on rll•nr and unequivocal terms which h•nvL' no
dn11ht ns 111 tlw inlcnlion of o person lo nhandon n right known
lo ,1nd VPHll'd in HtH'h 1wn,on. 1'•
(,!} / )11/,11 Cl/ //,(1/1(' '11 1/,1) ,1;11/ 'l'rl/, F11r 1•vNy right of llw p1•1111h•
)'.11.ll',llllt'l'd hy 1111· ( .llll/,lll11l11111 ,111d 1111' l,1w11, llwn· li1•i, ,,
I' N,1 I"' ,111111•111111 111 "1•,111,1111\ 1111\ l•I' 111\ll~t•d t,y ,Il l 11llh l 'I 111 111111Jly ,111
1111 '"'" 11111• 111 nl 1111111, , ,, 1111 ,I I•\ 1111 1 "" 1111111"11 ll',•111•h• ~~ I ,11, 111 ',I ll \ Ill I 'tkl 11 I
ART. UL BILL OF RIGHTS 183
Preliminary Considerations
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect
and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights
in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating under
fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield
individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim
to be constitutional. Without a government's acceptance of the
limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold
individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of
those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill
of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.
(Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987].) 16
Liability for damages for violation
of constitutional rights.
(1) Presence of malice or bad faith not essential. - Pursuant to
t\ rticle 3217 of the Civil Code, a person whose constitutional rights
have been violated or even merely impaired is entitled to actual and
moral damages, and when warranted, exemplary damages, from
I he public officer or employee, or any private individual responsible
Ihcrefor. To be liable under Article 32, it is enough that there was
,1 v.i olation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not
n'quired that the defendant should have acted with malice or bad
f.lilh. (Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 60 SCRA 299 [1975].)
11' 1'lwy w ho are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
11,.,111 ~ of the ind ivid ual in the name oforder. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of
llh,•fly. /\q JuHlicc l lolmes declared, "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than
i I 1.11 I hl' g11vcrnnwnt should play an ignoble part." It is simply no t allowed in free society
111 v111l.1li• ,1 la w lo enforce nno lhe1~ especially if the law is the Constitution itself. (People
1111 /\1111,1, 2HI{ SCI{/\ 626 [1998),)
11 /\rl. :\2. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
111 1111 '111•,·tly nh:,lruct,, clcft•alli, violates o r in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
l11ll11wl11g light,, ,11111 lilJl'rl il'~ of anothe r person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
~ ~ \
111 ,111y 111 1111• 1·,1•,1"1 n•f1•1Tl'd lo in thiq article, whether or not the defendant's act or
P111I• ·,11111 11•n•,l1l 11 h"1 ,1 t rin1111,1I 11ffl•nq1•, the aggrie ved pa rty has a right to commence
11 1 ,•11l 111•ly 111•p,u·,11,, mid d i•,11 11•1, ivil ,1clion for damages, a nd for other relief. Such civil
11 111111 ,,l u11l pi 1111•,•d l11d1•1 >t•11d1 •11lly 11( ,my ,Timin,,I proRt'culion (if the latter be instituted)
111d 111,11· h,• 1•111v,•,I l>v ,11 •11•1111111h•r,11 11 ,. 111 l'vid1•1H·1•.
1111• 111,l,·1111111v 11l11ill 1111 h11l1· 111111,11 d,111111g1"1. Fw mplary d,11nngefl may also be
,1o l111d11 ,1tc·1I
I It, • 11 •1•1111•,1lt11il\ lw11111 •,Pl 1111 iii h 11111 d,11111111d.1l,l1• l,11111 ,1 j11dg1• 11111, ..,., hi•, nrl m·
, •1111• ,11111, ,.,,.,111111< , ,, \ 1111,1111111 111 1111· I', 111111 ,,d1· " ' 11llw1· p,111111 ,,(,11111"
184 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 185
Principles and Cases Preliminary Considerations

Precisely, the object of the provision is to eliminate the defense is suspended" and moreover, the defendants are immune from
of good faith; otherwise, the effective protection of the constitutional liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.
rights would be defeated. Issue: The question presented in the petition for certiorari is
(2) Reasons for grant of separate civil remedy. - Article 32 further whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
implements the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
including freedom of suffrage. 18 (No. 5.) The following reasons were military personnel and other violations of rights and liber ties
given to justify the creation of an independent civil action under guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may
Article 32: be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only
the military personnel directly involved and/ or their superiors as
(a) Not infrequently, because the prosecuting officer is well?
burdened with too many cases or because he believes the
e vidence is insufficient, or on account of a disinclination to At the heart of the petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the
pro secute a fellow public official, especially if he is of high rank, Civil Code.
no criminal case is filed; Held: (1) Purpose of Article 32 of the Civil Code. - "It is obvious
that the purpose of the codal provision is to provide a sanction
(b) Even when the prosecuting officer files a criminal
to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
case, the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt often
Constitution. Its message is clear: no man may seek to violate those
prevents punishment. On the other hand, an independent
sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social
ci vii action affords the proper remedy by a preponderance of
and political stress, when the temptation is Strongest to yield -
e vidence; and
borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee - to the
(c) There are unconstitutional acts which do not yet law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind
rnnstitute a criminal offense. The injured citizen will always ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and
linvc adequate civil remedies before the courts because of the cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of
ind ependent civil action.19 the ruling power."
(2) Doctrine of immunity from suit is not applicable where rights
11,LUSTRATIVE CASES: and liberties are violated. - "The cases invoked by respondents
1. Illegal searches and seizures and other violations of rights and actually involved acts done by officers in the p erformance of
/i/,crties of suspected communist-terrorists were alleged to have /Jeen official duties within lhe ambit of their powers. It may be that the
z,io{nled /Jy military personnel, at a time when the privilege of the writ of respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
lmlwns corpus had been suspended. w c•rc merely responding to their duty, as they claim, 'to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion'
F11c/'s: Plaintiff sought actual, moral and exemplary damages
In accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos,
,111d nttorn.ey's fees. In their motion to dismiss (which was grnnt·ed
tl1•11pilc lhc lifting of ma rtial law on January 27, 1981, and in
by the trial court), throu gh the Solicitor General, defcndan t·s
p 11rmu:m cc of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against
,,lll'W' thnt the "plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry inl:o
llw cin,;umfJtances of their detention in the guise o f n damag(• allq ~cJ ,~oonnunis t terrorist u nde rground houses. But this cannot be
,•011/lln u•d as a blonkct license or a roving commission unlTamelled
1,11it· lwcnusc m, tn the m, the pri vilege of the wr i.t o f lu1IJt:flG c·or1111I;
l1y any mm1tilut ionnl n•strninl·, lo d isregard or transgress upon the
ilr,t.1,1 .11111 lilJ11rli1·i1 of llw ind ividua l cili:r.e n enshrined in and by
1"An 1111lt•p1•111l1•11l , 1v 1I ,11 111111 1111 ,l,1111,11\• , ln 1 vlnl11i l1111 111 111 1w 111•,ht•, prov11l1·d 111 Ilic• <'011',lil11t lo 11, Tlw <·0111 til ul ion re-maim, lh<: supreme law o f
,,.,,tJ111111'/, I 'Ill, lll(l ),111,I )'l( ,') 111 /\ 1l l1h· Ill 111o1v,1l•,nb1• i11r,filt1fi'd lh,• I 11 111 l o Wl111•l1 ,1ll o Uki.1l1, h iJ~h or low, d vllia n or milil,u·y, owe
"H,•11,,11 ,1111,,q 11d 1•( lllllllll"•IIIII 1'1 ' ~I II ,,l,.·cllc-1111• ,,oil ,1llc-1•,i.i11u· ut 111 tmw•,,
186
llJ II ti
.PHlLll-'l"J.N.12 CONS'l'l'fUT!O Ni\L LAW
• ■
Principles and Cases
Article 32 of the C{vil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating
the constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated
therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute."
(3) Constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed. - "This
is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing
their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We
have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its
enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or
without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions
and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say
is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith
will start to unravel." · G~vernment, was sued by respondent for damages on a counterclaim in
(4) Person's cause ofaction is not barred by suspension ofthe privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. - "The suspension o'f the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does
not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty."
(5) Person indirectly responsible also has to answer for damages. -
"The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to the case. It has
been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant (i.e., employer and employee) relationship. No
such relationship exists between superior officers of the military
and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in
our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer
or employee or person 'directly' or 'indirectly' responsible for
the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of
A L-t'.J'. 111.. UJ I ,I, L1 !,Lt.a LJ'S 187
IJ
Preliminary Considerations
accountability ~of public officials under the Constitution acquires
added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a
superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise
his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the
constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen."
(6) Plaintiff's action is not limited to acts of physical violence. - "It
is wrong to limit the plaintiff's action for damages to 'acts of alleged
physical violence' which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32
clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner
impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties
enumerated therein." (Aberca vs. Ver, 60 SCRA 299 [19881, through
Justice Yap.)
2. The Solicitor General, in his capacity as counsel of the
the same case he has filed as such counsel against respondent.
Facts: The petitioner Solicitor General challenges two resolu-
tions of the Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which
granted the motion of private respondent, one of the defendants in
the civil case, to implead the petitioner as additional party defen-
dant in respondent's counterclaim in the same civil case and denied
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with
the assistance of the Solicitor General filed with the respondent
Sandiganbayan a complaint against respondent JPE, among
others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and
damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent filed
his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with
damages for lodging what he claimed as "harassment suit" against
him.
Issue: The lone issue in the petition is the propriety. of
impleading petitioner as additional defendant in the counterclaim
filed by respondent in Civil Case No. 0033.
Held: (1) There is no general immunity arising solely from occupying
a public office. - "The general rule is that public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
lllll
.l'I 111 ,ll ' l'I N I \ 'UN!, 111 U l 'ION /\ 1, 1,/\W
Prlnciplcs nnd Cases
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or
where there is a showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case:
'A number of cases decided by the Court where the
municipal mayor alone w~s held liable for back salaries of, or
damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion
of the municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In
Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408 [1978].), for instance,
the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of
the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the
dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to
reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of
Civil Service to reinstate.
In Nemenzo vs. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968].), the municipal
mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police
corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility,
the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without
any administrative investigation.
In Rama vs. Court of Appeals (148 SCRA 196 [1987].),
the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer, and
provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally
in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200
employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from
their positions because of their party affiliations.' (Laganapan
vs. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987].)"
(2) Mere invocation of immunity does not ipso facto result in
dropping of charges. - "Moreover, the petitioner's argument that
the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being
automatically dropped.
In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government vs.
Peiia (159 SCRA 556 [1988].), then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials
under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
'With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice
Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish to point out
two things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute
immunity for the members of the Commission. The cited
A f.!. J'. JLI . Ull ,f , J1 J< IC J f' I'~ 189
Preliminary Considerations
section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's
members immunity from suit thus: 'No civil action shall lie
against the Commission or any member thereof for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task colllt:emplated
by this order.' No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr.
Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is
herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted
the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable
magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the
State's exercise of police power was immunity from liability
for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the
members of the Commission much in the same manner that
judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the
functions of their office.xx x'
Justice Feliciano stated in the same case:
'It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that
- Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 was intended merely to
restate the general principle of the law of public officers that
the PCGG or any member thereof may not be held civilly liable
for acts done in the performance of official duty, provided
that such member had acted in good faith and within the
scope df his lawful authority. It may also be assumed that the
Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction to determine whether
the PCGG or any particular official thereof may be held liable
in damages to a private person injured by acts of such member.
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a
member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required
to testify before the Sandiganbayan or th<!t such members were
exempted from complying with orders of this Court.'
(3) Public official who persecutes or recklessly injures another
in bad faith is liable for damages. - "Immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General,
acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent,
'maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in
persecuting respondent Emile by filing against him an evidently
baseless suit in derogation of .the latter's constitutional rights and
liberties,' there can be no question that a complaint for damages
may be filed against him. High position in government does not
190 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
confer a license to persecute or recklessly m1ure another. The
actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private
citizens alike. The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file
an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not
that action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case
filed against him."
(4) Remedy is a separate civil action for damages, not a counterclaim.
- "Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges
pressed by respondent Emile for damages under Article 32 of the
Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit
with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory
counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a
separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor
General.
In the case of Tiu Po vs. Bautista (103 SCRA388 [1981].), we ruled
that damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an
action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action
as to compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a
case filed by private respondent against the petitioners or parties
in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed
against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself." (Chaves vs.
Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991], through Justice Gutierrez, Jr.)
-oOo-
DUE PROCESS OF LAW l
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
A. INTRODUCTION
Meaning of due process of law.
Under the Constitution, a person may be deprived by the State of
his life, liberty, or property provided due process of law is observed.
Thus, two conditions must concur, namely: there is deprivation of
life, liberty, or property and the deprivation is done w ith proper
observance of due process of law.
(1) Concept made adaptable°to diverse conditions. - But what is
111L·nnt by "due process of law"? No exact and controlling meaning
or definition for all purposes has been given to the concept, the
n•nson being that the idea expressed therein is applicable under so
111,111 y di verse conditions as to make any attempt at precise definition
l111possible. To be sure, the concept, like equal protection of the
haws (nnd police power), has been intentionally made indefinite
,11111 vngue, although comprehensible, to make it adaptable to
I I II' d rcumstances of particular cases, and thereby accord greater
I1rnh•ctiun to individual rights. (infra.)
(2) lfrquisites for deprivation. - For our purpose, however, we
1 •,111 1-1 ,,fl'ly ~my thnt any deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the
: :1.111• ,11: I ing through the government is with due process if it is done
(11) 1111d,•r lhc authority of a law that is valid (i.e., not contrary to the
< '11111,lil11lion) or nf the Constitution itself and (b) after compliance
wlll1 llu• n•,wonnbk· methods of procedure previously established
liy llw lo1w. 1 ii' iH nl 1llll'l' Pvidcnt that due process limits not only
11 1,•p 11 1, I 11 1 1" , ,1111111 M I,, 11c •N, 111, ·1Ju• F1111cl,11111•11t,1l•111{ •1;1xnlinn, p. 3::1 (2016).

192 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
what the government may do (substantive) as well as its method or
manner of doing it (procedural).
But whether viewed from its substantive or procedural
s ignificance (infra.), their common thread is law, reason, and fairness.
Judicial definitions of due process
of law.
Judicially viewed, the term has been defined as follows:
(1) "Due process of law is a process or proceedings according
!'he law of the land. It is not that the law shall be according to the
11,
wishes of all the inhabitants of the state but simply means:
First, That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony
with the general powers of the legislative department of the
( ;nvernment; · Aspects of due process of law.
Second, That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
Third, That it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and
Fourth, That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of
a sl:nle or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104
11 lJ()Hl.)
(?.) "Due process of law, in any particular case, means such an
P'<l'rdse of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of
l,1w 1w1rnit: and sanction under such safeguards for the protection
ul individunl rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases
tu whid-1 the one in question belongs." (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16
1'1111. :>:1I 19241,)
(~) "I hie prnccss of la w implies the right of the person affected
tlu•n•l>y tu lw preslml before the tribunal which pronounces
l11d)•,1111•11t upon l'l1e qtwslion of li fe, liberty, and property in its most
111111pt'1•lw11:,;iv1• s1•11s1•; lo b1• lll',ml, by testimony or otherwise, and
11, hi1v1• llw t'iglit of nmlrov1•rling by proof, 1•very ·m .il·et'i.-d foci·
whi1 h l1Po1 t'1l 1111 1111· q111•lolim1 nl 1111• ril',hl in tlw n1aU1•r involved."
(M1•dc-11lll11 v•,. < 'lvil ~,1•1v l11• < '0111111 1•,•,1011, [IJ,1 ~;n,A '.~'/H I 11, 1,1 ].)1
'1 111111, Ill A( ~ "I ,111 f 111 lln11,111 llii, .J I' ','HI
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 193
Due Process of Law
A. Introduction
(4) "By 'due process of law,' as Mr. Daniel Webster said in
his arguments before the Supreme Court of the United States in
the famous Dartmouth College v. Woodward case (4 Vfheat 518.), is
more clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment
only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property and immunities, under the protection of general
rules which govern society.'
'Due process of law' contemplates notice and opportunity
to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one's person
or property. 'Due process of law' is not every act, legislative in
form . . . Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the
person and property of the citizens, is not law." (Lopez vs. Director
of Lands, 47 Phil. 23 [1924]; U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, supra.)
Due process of law has been the most frequently litigated
t.:onstitutional limitation. It has been interpreted ·as having a two-
fold aspect: procedural and substantive.3
(1) Procedural due process refers to the method or manner by
which the law is enforced. Its basic elements are notice, opportunity
I1, be heard, and jurisdiction. Its essence is simply the opportunity to
I,,• I1c.ird 0 1~ as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
lo l'Xplain one's side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or
111li11g complained of! (Bautista vs. Secretary of Labor, 196 SCRA
,l'/ 0 l'l 991]; Sunset View Condominium Corp. vs. National Labor
'.%1/11/111'1/ ,/111! 1m1cess should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitu-
,1,,,.
1/,,11,1/ {'l'rn ·, ,11:1. "C'onutilulionnl due process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid
,111d ,111th11d :r.1·d l ',IUtiC~ vf employment termination un<ler the Labor Code; and proce-
•h11,1I. r 1·., 11,,, rnnnner of di8missa l. Procedural due process requirements for <lismissal
,11,• 10111111 h1 the l111pl1•11w11ling Rules of P.O. No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as
Jiu• I ,1loo1· 1 'od,• 11( th1• l'hilippinc~ in 13ook VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department
111-11•1 N 1111 •1 ,111d 10. Brc•,,l'lw~ of illl'~l' due process requirements violate the Labor Code.
t Ii, u •h1111 1,t,1111t111 y tllll' prn<'ei.~ ~ho11ld be differentiated from failure to comply with
, ""' tll11ll111111I ,1111• p1111'1•1,01, ( '1111•1tit11lionnl due process protects the individual from the
1,.. ,, 1111111·111 ,111d m ,•1111 , .. , l,1111 nl hi•i right•, i11 ,•ri111inal, dvil or ;idministrativeproceedings;
1, hll•• t,lt1lulu1y ,Im, p1111 , .. ,,, 1111111d 111 lh1• l.,1li11r l 'otl,• r,nd Implementing Rules protects
, 1111•11 ,y,, •1 f111111 li,•1111\ 11111111,tly h•1•111l11,11<·d wllh1111t 111•11 c,11w1• nfl<•r 1101-ice ;ind henring."
1 1l11• 1.,,.,,11.. , 111 d1u• p111H"1'1 ioi d il,tlll,·d l11 il11• i111111nrl,1I cry of Them istocles
'" 1111 1,t,l,uhtt " lhl~••, l,111 111',u 11w l11 nl!' I, ..., d1,1111,1t l,,11ly, ii 11i111ply 1•1111n11lcs an
"l'l'"'h1111t y ,., 1.. , 111',11d " t11,1d11lo1, v11 1 1vll 'tt•1 vlt ,, 1 111111111°,,,h,11, ~1•.• I 'l< Iii\ 'J 11'I I 1'111;1].)
191 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
Relations Commission, 228 SCRA 466 [1993].) before judgment is
rendered.
(a) There is no particular form of procedure required for the
proper observance of due process of law but it does not mean
that any procedure laid by law will do. The procedure should
be one that assures adequate protection to a person's life, liberty,
and property.
(b) Nor does due process necessarily mean a judicial
proceeding in the regular courts, but an indispensable requisite
or basic tenet of this aspect of due process is the requirement
of notice and hearing; or at least, a reasonable opportunity to
be heard. A judgment rendered without such opportunity is
null and void from its inception and may be attacked, directly
or collaterally. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all.
(David vs. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707 [1°979].)
(c) Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect.
There are no vested rights in rules of procedure. A remedial
s tatute may be made applicable to cases pending at the time
of its enactment (Aris [Phil.], Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 200 SCRA 246 [1991].) except where vested rights
may be prejudiced. (Tayag vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 665
[1992].)
(2) Substantive due process requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair,
reasonable, and just.5 (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Ass'n. of
the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997], citing DE LEON, Textbook on the
Philippine Constitution, 1991, p. 81.) It connotes that there is an
adequa te reason or sufficient justification for governmental action
laking away or interfering with the right of a provision to his life,
liberty, or property.
(a) In other words, no person shall be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property for arbitrary reasons or on flimsy grounds.
I lcrc, the inquiry is cc•nl'C•rcd upon l'hc substnncc and not the
form of n lnw or govl•rnnwnl,il al'lio11, upon ilH inlrinsk vnlidily
'I Ill' .1111• 111,11 ,. ,., 111i.11,111h•,• W•"' tlro111•,IH 111 1•111lt1,11t• tlt1h•ly p111tc•,l11111I, 1111, 1•11111
c ,1,11111,1111', 1111' 1,1,,,1 11111~ lrulol 111111 ol111• 11111, c•••• 11111'""'''' 1, ..1l1h 111111•1 11p1111 th,,
111 1111•ll11ocl lo\ whhlt 1•,111 ,·1111111111 n,I, 11 , 11,II ,,., "I'"" lit,• '""I''' 111111 cltn1,111t·1 111
I',• 1\'IIIIIIIIC 11(111 111 1i1111u
Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 195
Due Process of Law
A. Introduction
or compatibility with the Constitution or the law, as the case may
be, and not the manner of the exercise of governmental power.
Thus, not only what may be done by any government agency
but also how it may be done should satisfy the requirements of
due process in order to make the deprivation valid under the
Constitution.
(b) It must appear that the interests of the public justify
State's interference and furthermore, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. A
desirable end cannot be promoted by oppressive or prohibited
means.
(c) A law that suffers from such vagueness or uncertainty
that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application" violates due process.
(People vs. Nazareno, 165 SCRA 186 [1988], infra.)
Scope of the guarantee.
(1) Applies to violation by the government and also by private
persons. - The due process guarantee applies only if a governmental
action will constih1te a deprivation of some person's life, liberty, or
property. It is a constitutional safeguard against arbitrariness on
the part of the government, whether committed by the Legislative,
the Executive, or the Judiciary, and also each and every one of its
branches, agencies, or instrumentalities. (Halili vs. Public Service
Commission, 93 Phil. 357 [1953].) It is, however, directed particularly
ngainst the executive and legislative departments of the government
although its violation may also be committed by private persons.
(2) Applies to all kinds of government proceedings. - Much of the
process by means of which the government is carried on, and the
order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative
which is as much due process of law as is judicial process. The
prntcctivc mantle of the guarantee, therefore, is not confined to
judicial proceedings, but extends to every case which may deprive a
J1l'rson of life, liberty, or property, whether the proceeding is judicial,
lq•,isl,1liv1•, .idminis lrnliVl', or executive in its nature.6 (see Cornejo
I'"" 1••111 ''i\,,1 ,I,, t 1,11111h,· 111, ..,11111pll1111111 v,tll, Illy"", ,111•,lll11lln1111lltyof h•glslntiveorcxecutive
111 I, lh.,,,, ,., ,111:11 llr1• 1•1t"c11111pll1111111111 nllh l,11 d11ly lmd lll•1•1111'):lllurly p,•rfm111NI illld th.it
,1 1•111,,, ,111111 \\,111 " 11111,11 ,111,I ,,111111• 1.i,11••1 "''1111,, ·,I loy l,1w 111 ltt< l,1~1•111111" nrnllcr hnd
 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 197
196 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases Due Process of Law
A. Introduction

vs. Provincial Board of Rizal, 41 Phil. 188 [1920); Austria vs. Solicitor 383 [2014].) Indeed, a decision rendered without due process is void
General, 71 Phil. 288 [1941); City of Manila vs. Posadas, 48 Phil. 309 ab initio.
r1925J.> (a) Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can
(3) Accorded to all persons, and even to the State. - Indeed, the deny due process only under pain of nullity,8 and judicial pro-
guarantee is said to be the most basic right serving as it does as ceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same
t:he anchor of the other rights secured by the fundamental law sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary nohvithstand-
by virtue of the all-embracing protection it accords to all persons ing. (Cuaycong vs. Sengbengco, 110 Phil. 113 [1960]; see Devel-
without distinction within a State's territorial jurisdiction, whatever opment Bank of the Phils. vs. Bautista, 26 SCRA 366 (1968).) A
1·11e source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself, or only a judge may be suspended for violating the constitutional right
~.i·atute, or a rule of court. But the government may likewise invoke of a litigant to due process. (Gardones vs. Delgado, 58 SCRA 58
1I1c guarantee of procedural due process when it believes that it has [1974).)
I1l•en denied its right to a fair hearing such as in cases where the trial (b) Even a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme
rnurt has granted bail to an accused charged with a capital offense Court must give way to a constitutional right. (Phil. Blooming
w i1·hout affording the State (prosecution) the opportunity to present Mills Employees Organization vs. Phil. Blooming Mills, 51
il s e vidence regarding the guilt of the accused. (see Sec. 13.) SCRA 189 [1973).)
(c) A decision or judgment rendered in clear or apparent
Nature of the guarantee. disregard of the fundamental right of a litigclJlt to due process
(1) A safeguard of the highest order. - The due process is totally defective, i.e., it is' null and void for lack of jurisdiction
l'l'q11ircment is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at (People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 [1985]; Montoya vs. Varella, 574
will or performed perfunctorily.7 Its disregard is a matter of serious SCRA 831 [2008].) and may be struck down at any time, even
1'1111cern since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in on appeal, except where the party raising the issue is barred
l'c'! iponse to man's innate sense of justice. (Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. by estoppel. 9 (see Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72
llc•i 011, 31 SCRA513 [1970); Natividad vs. Workmen's Compensation [1989].)
( '0111111ission, 85 SCRA 115 [1978]; Miguel vs. National Labor (2) Primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedoms. -
l~c•l c1liuns Commission, 162 SCRA 441 [1988); People vs. Murillo, "l)ue process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of
'1 '.VI, Sl 'RA 342 [2004); Shippers United Pacific, Inc. vs. Maguad, 498 ind ividual freedoms; it is the basic and essential term in the social
~,<'RA 639 [2006].) An apparent lack of due process may be raised by 1'11rnpnct which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the
n 11,1rly at any time since due process is a jurisdictional requisite that powt•rs which the State may exercise. In evaluating a due process
ull Lribunals, whether judicial or administrative, are duty bound to 1'1,1im, the court must determine whether life, liberty, or property
ol n,c•rve. (A po Cement Corp. vs. Mangson Mining Corp., 740 SCRA ,dsls, nncl if so, what procedures are constitutionally required, to
, 0

I,,·,·11 l,1l,.p11 . ((J11i1•111 vH. Sl'1:ii\o, 17 SCRA 567 N966].) The burden then of showing essentia l
1111l,1lt·111",'' 11111',I lu•11lm11ld1•n•d by him who d :,inm m1d 1 injustice. (Phil. Air Lines, Inc. vtt.
c 1v1l A1•1011,111lh11 ll11o1 rd, 20 SCRA 727 11%7(,)
,., h,• 1li:h1 I•, 1111111' lh,111 11 pn•1111•,,1ll v◄ ' II h\1•1 tw,·11 u·f,•m •d 111 lltl "1111 i111mn1111nt ond
111,1l1,·11,1loli• iii:hl 11( ..v,•ry 1111111, wo11 111111 ,11111 , l1tld whl, h ,•,111111,1 bt• d i•1p1•n,wd wilh or
lo1 11• lll'd 111,ltli• ,•llh,w 111 tl11 w ol w,11 "' 111 11111" ,:ii p,•,111•" (l~nq11!'l11 v11, llr,11lf11rd, '/11 l'htl,
•11111 111!''1 ) II J'.IC.11,1111,,, .. , lo ..v,••v 1~'""11 11, ,.,1,1111 "!''""''•'•" lh,11 1•1 "d111•" bl'(,11,• lw 111
'% ·1• "lilh','1 In hl' givl•n tu o $tnlutc subsequently declared invalid," under Section
•I, A1lh 11• VIII. (Vol. 2.)
"A 11111110,11 lor r,•1•1111,1id l'l',t lion mny I.Jc d ispensed with prior to commencement of
"'' 111111111 lu1· 11'l'lflt111r i whl'l'l' ihl' d,·d,,i1111 iH ,1 patent nullity or where the petitioner w as
, h 1•1 lv1•d 11! d11,• p1 " ' ,·•1•1, (l'hll. N11ll1111,1l (,,',)n1oll'UClion Corp. VH. National Labor Relations
1 111111111,,•,11111, /'I/ Pt l( A \'i,11 I 1'1'1111,) A void j11d t,111K•11l or vrdc r hnHno force or efficacy for
•OIi\ 11111 l'P ,, 111, nn1<•11111l,11io11 111 lr1w1 It 1~ 1111n,,•xl•11cnt. 1t lHnot cv,•n neces~ary to take

""I'' Iv, ii 111 Ill,• lll•n1 ly, 01 1'"'1"'11~· 111 • • 1I •Ill 1,1_,,,., l,11 w1 v,•11 lh1• t1ov,•1111111•11I 11,,,.,1 11111 cu1v 1111, I' 1.. v,to ,,1, , ,.,, av,•lil ,1 j11df',lll"lll (A1,1111111 v11, U(ll1·1• of lh1• <Jmh11d11111nn, '1 U SCRA
,II ' ""' ,c I'' '""ti ,111y 111 ,11 Il l)\ ,11 I'"" I I 1d11,'1 \I I ' II I JUI ql
l98 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
protect that right. Otherwise stated, the due process clause calls
fo r two separate inquiries in evaluating an alleged violation: did
t:he plaintiff lose something that fits into one of the three protected
1·ritegories of life, liberty, or property?; and, if so, did the plaintiff
receive the minimum measure of procedural protection warranted
under the circumstances?" (Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660
I 11) 19].)
A flexible concept adaptable to changing times and conditions.
(3)
What is due process of law depends upon the circumstances. It
v,1rics with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.
(IJ,i,I.)
"It is part of the art of constitution-making that the
provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable
l,111guage to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct
interpretation. That i.s the ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to
de lineate it more clearly was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully
nrgued against it. He was sustained by the body.10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so
ii would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
11t·ccssmy because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fttndmnental law, an 'iron rule' laying down an implacable and
l In mu table conm,and for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility
111w,t be the best virtue of the guarantee. The very elasticity
of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily
lo t•vcry situation, enlarging, or constricting its protection as
Ilw changing times and circumstances may require." (Ynot vs.
l11IPrn1cd iate AppelfateCourt, 148 SCRA 659 [1981], p er Justice
l 'ruz.)
(,'J.) A 1111111rl11/·(' <!f reason 111,rl n gunra11tec of justice and fairness. -
" /\w.1n· of this, l'lw 1·ourlf, hnv(' ,1 lso hcsilnl:cd to adopt their own
11p1•1 •ifk d1•~•!·1·iplio11 of d111• lll'01 '1•t1•, 1i,,,1·.1lwy n111finc tlwmselv!'S in n
11•1•,.11 ~.ir,iir,lil j,11•k1•I th.ii wi ll dq11l v1• IIH'n1 of 1111• l'lhow morn l'lwy
"'•~·••I r,.1 ,\11111 t .c I 1111'11,1111111,111111!, l'h1h1•1•1111•I 111111ICl11l l1<11 1'1' 1',I l',' 1 11'11111
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 199
Due Process of Law
A. Introduction
may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.
Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection
open-ended, as it were, to be gradually ascertained by the process
of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as
they arise. (Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78.) Thus, Justice Felix
Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no
farther than to define due process - and in so doing sums it all up
- as nothing more and nothing less than 'the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play."' 11 (Ibid.)
Persons protected.
(1) The term "person," as used in the above constitutional
provision, embraces all individuals within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Philippines, without regard to any difference of race, status,
or nationality, including aliens.
(2) Private corporations,12 likewise, are persons within the
scope of the guarantee but only in so far as their .property is con-
cerned. (see Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 137 [1919].) The
~uarantee of due process of law was intended as a protection to the
Ii fe and liberty of persons as human beings. (Nor thwestern Life Ins.
( 'o. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243; Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. John-
llon, 303 U.S. 77.) The life and liberty of artificial persons are derived
frum and, therefore, are subject to control or regulation by law. But
inlt>rprcled substantially as "reasonable" and "in the public inter-
l'HI," due process of law protects the property rights of corporate
I l!'l'~lons ns much as individuals.
11
l '11r1•1•1·11y, ii h,1~ I.wen iden tified as freedom from unreasonableness or arbitrariness.
111 111111 w11•,1·, ii is :i 111n11dal<.: of nmson, rmd s tands as a guarantee of justice and fairness.
Whtie• tlll'tt' 1,. 111> rnnlrolling nnd precise definition of due process, it furnishes though a
11,11111.11.f t,, wlil<'l1 gov1•n11m·11l,1I nclio n should conform in order thnt deprivation of the
1,
Iii,.,, 1 111' pt np1•1·ty, 1n 1•,1ch npprnprinlc cnHe, be valid. The s tandard of due process which
11111',I ,,, 1,11 li11tli ,1•1 ,1 procud ur,11 n111I a su bstnntivc requisite to free any governmental
111111111 1111111 ,1,., 1111p11t.il1011 of ll'g,11 i11fir111ily, i~ rl'~pnnsiveness to the supremacy of
1, ,t• 1111 ,1111111lit•.llo111 ,. 111 llw d lt'l ,111•11t>I' j11~l ki.'. Nq;ntive ly put, nrbitrariness is ruled out
1111, I 1111l,1lt 111"•·• 111111ld1•d , I 1111' 1•1rn t"1'1 Jq lh 1t1J ho•1tilt• lo ,111y offidn l nction marred by lack
,.( I.tit pl,1v '' IM11l,1I,• I l11fol 111111 .M11l1•I l lf11'r,1l111'•i' J\Nsn., Im-. IIH. l.'ily Mnyor of Manila,
'ti ',I It/\ II 1•1 I 1%'/l l
1 ~111111111•,il 11111•111.,111111•11111,,tl 1111\1'1111111•111•.J ,11,· 11111 ct>Vl'tt·d l>y llw pr11h•1•lit>11 ,1•;
1111~''" 111,,,, 11,,11111111111111, •,,.,,,. (•11•111~ W11\ ll111•l• i11•, 11111•, 'V,r,)
 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 201
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Due Process of Law
Principles and Cases A Introduction

exist, or it may refer to the rights with respect to the thing. The
Meaning of life.
constitutional provision, however, has reference more to the rights
l .ife, as protected by due process of law, means something more over the thing. It includes the right to own, possess, v,se, alienate
1Ium mere animal existence. The prohibition against its deprivation and even to destroy, subject to the right of the State and of other
w ithout due process extends to all the limbs and faculties by which persons.
1111' is enjoyed. (Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 133.) It extends even to the
lif1• l)f the unborn. (Art. II, Sec. 12.) (1) One's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property
right" and the wrongful interference therewith, is an actionable
The right to life includes the right to live a decent life worthy of
wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection
1111111,111 d ignity. (Art. II, Secs. 9, 11; Art. XIIl.)
of the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. (Callanta vs.
Carnation Philippines, Inc., 145 SCRA 268 [1980]; Sibal vs. Notre
Moaning of liberty.
Dame of Greater Manila, 182 SCRA538 [1990].)
/ ,i/1t'r ty, as protected by due process of law, denotes not merely
l11•1•d o m from physical restraint (e.g., imprisonment). It also (2) Labor is property for it is the foundation of all wealth.
1•111lir.ices the right of man to use his faculties with which he has (see Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 111. 66.) Since the right of
l•c•1•11 1•ndowed by his Creator as his judgment may dictate subject the employee to his labor is property, his summary and arbitrary
, 111 Iy 1,, Ihe limitation that he does not violate the law or the rights of dismispal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
11IIH•rs, 11 process. (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 71
SCRA 470 [1976]; Phil. Movie Pictures Workers' Ass'n. vs. Premier
I ,ihe1'ly, as pointed out by Justice Malcolm, is not absolute. It
"' 11111 license or unlimited freedom to act according to one's will. Productions, 92 Phil. 845 [1952].) · ·
l1 11 pli1•d in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual (3) An export quota allocation, although a mere privilege, may
,>IHI 1\ ,r 1·he greater good of society. No man can do exactly as he become impressed with some form of property right where it has
I il1•,1•;1•H. ('Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919].) Thus, one been accorded to the grantee for so long a time (above 10 years)
111,,y 1•11joy the liberty of speech, but he could not use it to urge the and hence, should not be revoked or cancelled without due process.
11v1•1 lltmw of the government, or to defame another. (American Inter-Fashion Corp. vs. Office of the President, 197 SCRA
409 [1991].)
M• .i11lt1EJ of property.
(4) A certificate of public convenience is included in the term
/'11111,•l'fy, os protected by due process of law, may refer to the
"property" in the broad sense of the term because it has considerable
1l 1111g ilH•lf w i th respect to which legal relations between persons material value and can be sold by the owner thereof. (Cogeo-Cubao
Operators & Drivers Ass'n. vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 343
11!\,, 111 dl11)', lo j114licc Mnlcolm: "Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of ll992].)
l11·nln1 11 wl11, h 111,1y t,,, Pnjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peuceful
, 11!.. v•11••1il 111 lilw ln•1•drnn i11 o thers. The right to liberty gunrnnlced by the Constitution (5) But a license to operate a cockpit is not property, and is,
1111111, 1,•·• 1111' 111•,hl tp P,1fll ,uul thu ri)-\hl to lw frne from urbitrary pcrso1ml ruHlrninl or
' ''" lludl' ·1'111' 1t·1 m r,1111101 bl•dwnrfr d into mtJrc freed om from phy$icnl ll!Slrninl t>f llw Ihe re fore, revocable when public interest requires its withdrawal.
1'' , 11111 111 1h,, , 1li11•11, ltul 111d1•1•11w1l lt> P111lir,H'1• the right pf mnn In enjoy tlw f,1culli1'~ 111 {l \ :<.!ro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123 [1931]; Du vs.
wl11, Ii lwli,111 111•1•11 ..11dnw,·d hy hli1l ·,·,·,1lllr, M 11ltJ<-d l>n ly 1<1l:lud1 rc~lrninl•J m, ,1r1• 1WCl''l'lillY lnyona, 670 SC RA 333 r2012].) Neither is a license authorizing a
1111 11w , 111111111111 w1·ll,111•, A•1 l't111rn l,11t11l 111 ,1 l11ng m'l',1y nf ru1lhvrltk11l11d111li111~ 1•1)llrli•
111111·,,,,., d,·, 1'1l11111, 11I 1111· lJ11ll11,l 1,1,,h.. , :111p11•1111• 1 ·,t111I, lllwrly l111'111d1••1iii,• rlgh l 1111111· p1•rnon lo l njoy a <"l•rtn in p rivilege a property nor a property right.
1

, 111,, 11 l11 lo•111 1• 1111111• lii>1 l,1111111, ~ l11 ,,II l,1wl11l w,1y11: 111 llv,• ,111d wnrl\ wli1•11• h1• wlll•1: In
, .1111 111,, llv.,lll11111d l•v ,111y l.1wl11l , .,111111•. 111 p111 11111: ,111y ,1v111,1ll1111, 111111 lt>1' 1lu1I 11111 p1"11•,
,,. 1•111,,, 1111,. ,111 , 1,.,1, '" 1,, wlil, I, urny 1,,, 1•1111•••1, ,,.., 1••1•1.11 y, ,111111••1•,1•1111,,1 111 !iii, , ,11, yl11g
111111111, ,, 1•1111•n~••• l,1,1 1,111,, l11I111111 1111,111,1 11,,,, lih•l l'1'•1111•11l•1t>l 1111• 1:11,11 ,uil y 1111•1h1•
1lt\hl 111111111,.1, I 1111 ,1,,h1 In• h1111 ,, 11111 "' lll['lt•\ 1111 11I 1h1° 1111111l1111111111 1111d Iii,•ilgl,111I
(( 'liaw,. vti. 1<0 11111101 4'.1"1 St 'R A 534 r2004].) A d river's license
11wr1•ly ,ill11wH1llll' 111 driv1• a p,1rl il'11l,11· mocl1 of tnmsportation. It is
1
11111 ,, lh-1•1 11,1• 111 d d v1• n r up1 •r.il1• any f11n11 o f lr,11wporlalion o n any
lyp,• 111 111,111 (M l1•,11111I v•1 I >••p l, 111 1 111,lk W111•k11 ,111d I li)';hwny,
1

11 ........ ,11..11. 11 111l•l I 11111\ llll 1,11111,11,l 1'1 l'hll 111~1 11•11•11)
II
202 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 203
Principles and Cases Due Process of Law
A. Introduction

•190 SCRA 318 [2006].) Nor is public office regarded as property
which may not be disturbed by legislation but is a public trust or
ngency. (see Art. XI, Sec. 1.)
The use of property bears a social function. (Art. XII, Sec. 6.)
1-'or this reason, the State is empowered "to regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments."
(Art. Xlll, Sec. 1, par. 2.)
Primacy of human rights over
property rights.
In mentioning "life and liberty" ahead of "property," the
( ·onslil:ution underscores a certain hierarchy of importance in the
md1•r of enumeration. While property is accorded the same basic
11rolPl'lion given to life and liberty, the Constitution recognizes the
,,1 qwrim· position of "life and liberty," including the "security or
'.i.ifd y" or freedom from danger of a person14 more popularly known
,1•1 "Im man rights," 15 over property rights.
16
1-11'111• Supreme Court promulgated on September 25, 2007, the "Rule on the Writ of
• \11111111,," (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) to cover cases involving extralegal killings and enforced
, lt•,,11 ,, ,,.,11-.11u·(•~ or threats thereof. The petition for a Writ of Amparo is a remedy availab)e
1,, ,111y 1•c•rso11 (or q1rnlified person or entity), whose right to life, liberty or security 1s
\ 1111.11,·,I 11r 1hr0ntened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
11 1 1·111plt1yn•, or of a private individual or entity. The rule took effect on October 24, 2007.
I It,· p1n11111lgn!i(111 of the Rule was a response to the recomm_endation of the Nat~ral
l 1111•,11l1.,tiv,• Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances orgamzecl
l•1 tho• '. :upn·nll' ( 'ourl to study the Writ of Amparo as a protective and remedial tool for
1111• 1•1 ,111•, th111 of cun$tilutionnl rights. (see Sec. 15.)
1··111lt,11,1·, ,.1d Henne, the term is used to include property rights. Thus: "The Universal
11,•, l,11i1l1111111f I h11na11 Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the Internntional Covenant
1111 I , 1,111111111', f.,wlnl ,111d ·ulturnl Rights and International Coven.mt on Civil and Politirn l
l<tr,l11111 1o11,•,g1•'il•i lhllt lhc: 8copc of human rights can be understood to include tho~e thnl
1,11111,, 111 .11, 11Hlivid 11al'1, Hocinl, economic, cultural, politic11l nnd dvil relntions. It lhuY
1 11•111•1 t11 1lo•,t•l y lde>nlify llw term to the 1miverHally accepted trnit~ and nltribulcH of ,rn
1111l1vld11,1I 11 l111 w, with whnl iH gP1u;1-.11ly conHidcrcd lo be hi6 inhernnt nnd innlil•nabk
, lt•,ht,,, 1•1111111111,u,•il1111 11h11w1! ,111 !l'lpci:h of lire." (Simon, Jr. VH. CommiAAion on I lumn11
llif:ltt•,, .'.''I 1:1 "l(t\ 11'/ I 1•11>1!1,l
1' l lw 11•,1111111•1 lt,1111• li1•1•11 amply 1•~1•111111,l,,,I, 11111'11
"Whd,· 11,,, 11111 ol Rlf:hl•111h11p111lc-11•1 1•111p1•1'ly rlghl•J, th,• pl'ill1,1<'Y ol h111111111
1lf•,hl•1 11111•1 p1111•1•1 ly I lf\hl11 11111·, 11p,11l11•d 111•1 ,111111• 1111"11' frl c·d11111'11111• ',lc•lh ,ti•• 1111,I
1 While· p111111•1ty •,llll 1•11j11y11 th,• 111II p1'11h•1'lio11 11f procl'dural due process, the
\ 11 1t 111 ,1\il,•, ,111 w,·11 ,,~ 1111i•11•1111•lv 1,1,, 11111•111111111 '"" lt•ty' 1111d th,· 'lh11•,1111111,11H 1l1111•1
111,11 ,le 1, 1 1111111 1•-,•11 i,i• ,1111111"1 ,11, 1•11h·11lly 11'1 1111• 11111h1111pplh ,1llo111 nl ti,1111 llllll'•."
1111 1 11, 1•d l111•,1lhl1111 ~l',11 ,, tn "111 \I\" ' I'' 11111ll1111•, ,,,11111•1111111•111 11•1:111,11111111111lv 'wtlli
t h ll 1111\ ,,, ••. , 111, II\
What constitutes deprivation.
What the Constitution prohibits is the deprivation of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.
(1) Deprivation of life. - It refers not merely to the extinction of
human existence. It includes the loss of any of the various physical
and mental attributes (e.g., limbs, eyes, brain, power of reproduction,
etc.) which man must have to live as a human being. To be sure,
some people would prefer death to living without eyesight or as a
bedridden invalid.
The right to life begins from the conception of the fetus. (see Art.
II, Sec. 12.)
(2) Deprivation of liberty. - To constitute deprivation of liberty,
it is not necessary that a person be detained or confined. Liberty
need not be lost in its entirety. To the extent that one is unduly
prevented from acting the way he wishes to do, there is a diminution
of liberty. For example, a law which requires every parent to
send their children only to pul;>lic schools is unconstitutional as
an unreasonable restriction on the liberty of parents to direct the
education of their children under their control. Such a law deprives
the parents of their liberty without due process of law. (see Ibid.)
Property and property rights can be lost through prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy
n preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil
nnd political institutions; and such priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the
Hnnction not perm itting dubious intrusions.
The ~upcriority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the
(net l·hat a mere re.isonable or rational relation between the means employed by the
lnw ilnd its objccl' or purpose - that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory
nor oppn•sAiVl' - would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
l'l1;lt111. O n the other hand, n constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
rc•quircHn 11101·,• ntri11p;t:nt criterion, nmnely, existence of a grave and immediate dan-
/\l"i" 111' 11 t1t1h1111111ti\ll' (•vii whirh the St.ite h.is the right to prevent." (The Philippine
llli111ml11g Mlllil l•:111pl11y(•1•, <>1wrnizntion v.4. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51
HI 'l{A 11111 I 1'1'7,11, po·r 111•,tic l' f\.fokn•,li1r.)
1lf•,ht 111 1,11l01l,1111lv1• due• p1011•·,•, 111 , n11,,1 ll111i,111,1lly Jiml!Pd hy provisions which al-
l, ,w th,• ,,1 ,11,, 1111111111,1,, 111111 1•1111 •c•1 IV 1•11:ht,1 I•V l,11:l•1l,1 ll1111, A1110111; lhc,•111 ,m' S(•ctions
11 Ill, 11,, ,111,I ,'I, 111 J\1lli I,• II. 1 11•1 llt111 1i, J\111, Ii • 11 1, ,11,d ',,,, 111111•1 17, IH, ,111,I 111, Artklc
\ II 1•••1•11 l111ly II 1111 y ,111• J'l<11ll11II\ 11111 11111t•,no1l 111 ""' 1,tl Jll•tlh 1•
204 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
(3) Deprivation of property. - With reference to property, it is
not necessary that it be physically taken away from one entitled
lo it. There is also deprivation, when its value is destroyed or its
adaptability to some particular use, or its capability for enjoyment
is impaired. Thus:
(a) There is deprivation of property without due process
of law where the owner is constrained to devote it, wholly or
in part, to public use without compensation, as where carriers
are required to furnish free transportation of persons or goods
under certain circumstances, or where the value of an exclusive
franchise (see Art. XII, Sec. 11.) is destroyed by government
competition. (see Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad, 22 Phil. 411
[1912]; see Art. III, Sec. 9; Art. XII, Secs. 3, 17, and 18; Art. XIII,
Secs. 1, 4, and 9 which, among others, constitutionally limit the
right to substantive due process in property.)
(b) A resolution of the Commission on Elections prohibiting
the posting of decals and stickers (as election propaganda) on
cars and moving vehicles was held unconstitutional because
"!'he prohibition would not only deprive the owner who
consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his
property but more important, in the process, it would deprive
I he citizen of his right to free speech and information." (Adiong
vs. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712 [1992].)
(c) A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable
use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to
compensation. (see Sec. 9.) The State would be acting beyond
the bounds of police power (infra., under Sec. 9) in totally
prohibiting small owners/ operators from collecting parking
h•es from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities.
(Office of the Solicitor General vs. Ayala Land, Inc., 600 SCRA
<, 17120091.)
B. PROC EDURAL I >UI•: PROC ESS
Duo procos1> In Juctlclal proGooctlng!:>.
'1'111• r,111111,11114'1' ol d111• 111111 l",'i llf li1w, .Il l pn•vi1111,;ly 1,l,1ll•d,
1•1\!1•111111 l111•v1 •1y g11v1•1111111•11l,II 1111111'1'd1111•, wl1id11n,1y i11l1•1'11•1l' wllli
1w111n11,1I 111 1•1n1•1•11 v 111•,lih w lll'll11'1' llw 1111111•1•d1111','• l11• lq•,i•,l,11lv1•,
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 205
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
judicial, administrative, or executive, but they relate specially to
that class of rights the protection of which is peculiarly within the
province of the judicial branch of the government. 1 ,
For the most part, procedural due process has its application in
judicial proceedings, civil or criminal. It requires:
(1) An impartial and disinterested court2 clothed by law with
authority to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of the party
or property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(3) Notice and opportunity to be heard given to the parties to
adduce evidence in their behalf; and
1
12 C.J. 961. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger
and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court (Green
Ac res Holdings, Inc. vs. Cabral, 697 SCRA 266 [2013); Olongapo City vs. Subic Water and
Sewerage Co., Inc., 732 SCRA 132 [2014].) A decision that has be~ome final and executory
rnndered without due process is void ab initio and may still be set aside, or attacked at
unytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action or by resisting such decision
l11 action or proceeding where it is invoked. (Garcia vs. Molina, 627 SCRA 540 [2010];
11h,na vs. Balangue, 668 SCRA 22 [2013].) When a decision is void, as when there is a
d,·11ii1l of due process or when it is rendered without jurisdiction, there can be a reopening
, ,f Ihe c.i~e. The reason is that a void judgment is no judgment at all and a new one must
l11• e nte red in the fulfilment of the courts' dispute resolution function. All acts performed
l'll l'A Unnt to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect; hence, it can never
lwcomc finnl, and any writ of execution based on it is void. (Koppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc.
vi,. l'nwer lnsurnnce & Surety Corporation, 681 SCRA 44 [2012]; Land Bank of the Phils.
\IN. t >rilla, 690 SCRA 610 [2013].)
2
Thc i mpa rtia liry of the judge who sits and hears a case, and decides it is an
l11d1•,1wn~ablc requi:;ite of procedural due process. (Lai vs. People, 761 SCRA 156 [2015].)
i;l',;lion I. Disq1111/ificatio11 of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
, ,,•.t• ln whil'h lrn, o r his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
, 1 1h1•1 ·will1·, 111· In which he is re lated to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
tt l' 11ffi11ily, l)r l.o m11n~cl within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
, lvll l11w, 11r 111 whid1 he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
111 w lii, Ii lw hn•1 JJl'l"lid,·d in nny lower court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
11•1111•w, wl1ho11t lh,· wrill,•n eunsc nl: of nll parties in interest, signed by them and entered
1q•o11 ihP n•,·nrd . (1{1111• 1:17, Rulr~ of Court.)
A. j11d111• 11111y, in 1h111•x1•rl'i•,e of hi~ sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
111 11, ,111111 f111•1w,I 111• v,,lld 1·,•,l'loll',. Tilt' purpose of the inhibition is "to preserve the prized
lo t, •.,1 111 Iii,·, old 1w11I 1•,dlly 111 ,11 1l111p.ir1i,1I j11d1;c" implicit in the guarantee of d ue process.
1~1,11,·11, 11 vH V,ll,1111 1, ',O :·H Iii\ HI I l'l7:J I; Ma»odno vH. Elcwga, 155 SCRA 75 [1987);
1 ,, 111111,1 v~ I ,11111t1lt·•1, ,1I !,I l! A '/,1 I P)'l l I; lJl!l{M Hm11Juy,·c•1 Union vs. Minister of Labor
,11111 I 11q•loyn11·11I , l'.1/ ',I IU1 1,,1, I i<JH0 I,) [,.•rn11d 1111 ly lo lh,· duty of r<>ndering a just
,Ii, 1~11111, 1,, 1lu· il111 y 111 ilol11r, ti i11 ,, 111,111111•1 1l1111 wl ll 110111rn11111• .1ny 1<11 1,pi<'ion, ns t·o its
I 111111 ,·1 ,111,I lh•• l111t1111ll v nl lh, • j11dl"," 1' n11111•,1111111 1ly, 1111 j11dH1' 1,h,111 l'l'l",ld1• in ,1 1:,tr.,•
111 ,d,1, h lu• 111 11ul ,, 111 ,li\ 111•1•, ,li~ll ,l,11, 11,1,1, l11q 11111 l11I ,111d h,il,·1••·11d,·11t (< :11tl,·n·,·~ vM.
11111111' 11 ,1 11 '\ .,,,, I p 1, ,1 I l

206 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
(4) Judgment to be rendered after lawful hearing (see Banco
Espanol vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 [1918]; Lorenzana vs. Cayetano,
78 SCRA 485 [1977].) and consideration of such evidence by the
tribunal in deciding the case.
Thus, under No. (3), there is a denial of procedural due process
where an accused has been charged with an offense (e.g., theft) and
convicted of another. A stranger to a proceeding is not bound by any
judgment rendered by a court, nor may a writ of execution be issued
against a party who did not have his day in court. Of course, the
plaintiff has also a right to be given opportunity to be heard on his
claim. If a party has been afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain his side of the controversy, there is no denial of procedural
due process. There is no denial of due process when the trial comt
rejects the presentation of evidence which it believes is irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent for the purpose which counsel states
ns the ground for offering it although admissible for some other
purposes. (Catacutan vs. People, 656 SCRA 524 [2011].)
In connection with No. (4), it is a requirement of due process
lhat the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual findings and legal justifications
that led to the conclusion of the court. (see Art. VIII, Sec. 4.) Thus,
a bare adjudication that the accused is not guilty of the offense
charged is null and void as it is not based upon a consideration of
t·he evidence or of the merits of the case. (People vs. Bellaflor, 233
SCRA 196 [1994].)
Due process in administrative proceedings.
Due process of law, as a constitutional precept, guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.
(Velez vs. De Vera, 496 SCRA345 [2006].)
(l) Strict observance not indispensable. - Due process is not
always jndi.dal process. While a day in court is a matter of rig ht in
judicial proceedings it is otherwise .i n administrative proceedings,
since Lhc lnttcr rc.-st upon diffcrl•nf· prindples. (Cornejo vs. Cnb rid,
41 l'hil. IHH I 1'J1I?.!.) 111 1·1•rl,1i11 11rnn•l·dings of n11 ndminislr,1liw
d1.ll',H"l1•r, d111• 11n11 ·1•1o'l, 111 1l11• 1ol1 i1 I lq•,1il s1•11Kl', is 11111 i11di!,1'l'll'it1lil1•.
'1'l11• 11igld 11•q1111C'1111•111ti ,it p11111·d11r,1l l,1w•, ,1n· 11111 1,lri1 !Iv 11li111•1 v11d
,111 111111•, ,1•, l.111111",'1 I•, 11111 111111111111111,,,,d, A lri.tl lyp1 p11111·1•d1111•, i •1
1
11111 ,1hv,1v11 ,111il Ill ,di •,ll1 i.1l1n11•, 11·q11111•d
Sec. 1 ART. Ill. BILL OF RIGHTS 207
Due Process of Law
£3. Procedural Due Process
(2) Necessity ofnotice and hearing. -As applied to administrative
proceedings, the minimum requirements of due process are satisfied.
when_ a far~ is afforded a fair ~nd r~asonable, opportunity to
explam his side or to seek a recons1derahon of the ruling or action
complained of.
(a) Indeed, in administrative proceedings, notice and
hearing ma:y be dispensed with, where, because of public need
or for practical reasons, the same is not feasible. Thus, without
1:~tice and hearing, an offender may be arrested pending the
fi~mg ?f charges; property of a taxpayer may be levied upon or
d1stra~ned for tax delinquency; nuisances per se may be abated;
an offic~r.or e°:1p1oyee may be suspended pending investigation
of admm1strahve charges against him;3 an acting or temporary
offi~er _or en:p_loyee may be removed; or a court may grant a
prehmmary m1unction ex parte.
" . _(~) It is sufficient if opportunity is later given to the
mdividu_al_ adv~rsely affected to test the validity or propriety of
the adm1mstrat1ve action 9n appeal to superior administrative
authorities or to the court, or both. Decisions of administrative
bodies are not rendered invalid. merely because they are subject
t_'.) a _court. (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218 (1915].) Their
I Ind mgs of f~ct, ~f based on substantial evidence, are controlling
on the rev1ewmg authority. (Gonzales vs. Civil Service
Corn miss.ion, 490 SCRA 741 [2006].)
(~) As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
n•qu1re1~1~nts o:f procedural due process are essential only when
:•11 <1dm1n1:<;trative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but
111 tlw pc1'l'ormance of its executive or legislative functions such
,1,; i•,:-,11in)., rules and regulations, an administrative bod; need
11111 rn111ply with sa id requirements. (Corona vs. United Harbor
1'11111:, Ass'n. of the Phils., 283 SCRA312 [1997].)
(. I) lfr,111!n:11_1,•J1/' /vr discipline of civil service officers and employees.
l li1• pml11li1l11m 111 Article IX, B-Section 2(3) against suspension
I Ii, 11 • 1,, 1111lli11,g 1111p1np1·r l11 1,111,p1·1Hli11g an officer before the charges against
lt1 111 •111 ' lu ,11,I 1111,I lod,111• h.. I,, 1•,lv1111 llll "l'l'"''l1111lly In pro v1• hiHinnocence. Preventive
It I' It' IPil "' ,1ll11w,•d ''" 1li,,1 Iii,, l•"•l'lllldt·11I 111,IV 11111 h r1111r,·r 11i,, normnl Ci1U8C of
1111 • ll1,,1ll,111111111111•,lt Iii,· IP,. 111 Ii,,, l11lli1,·111 ,, 1111d ,111llt11dly 11v1·r tlw pn•,~iblt· wil11l'S~i•s.
11 1•h 1111 \" I\ 1,,1,:,11 'IU, ',I IV\ -''•It 11 •1•1 'I ) It 1,, ""' Ill I Ii,• 11,1111 It' t1I p1•11o1II V,
208 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
or dismissal of an officer or employee of the Civil Service "except
for cause provided by law" is a guarantee of both procedural and
substantive due process.
(a) To the extent that a law dispenses with the need to
inform respondent officer or employee of the charg~s levelled
against him and to accord him reaso~able opportu1:1ty to meet
those charges by presenting evidence m support of his defenses,
such law is invalid under both the general due process clause
under Article III, Section 1 and the guarantee of the due process
to Civil Service officers and employees w1der Article IX-B,
Section 2(3). (Government Service Insurance System vs. Court
of Appeals, 201 SCRA 661 [1991}.)
(b) Notice to enable the respondent to be heard and
present evidence is not a mere tecl::micality or a _tri~ial matter
in any administrative proceedings but an md1spen~able
requirement of due process. (Pablo Borbon, etc. vs: ~lb1s~or,
468 SCRA 128 [2005}.) But a respondent in an admm1strabve
c.i:;e is not entitled to be informed of the preliminary findings
and recommendations. It is the administrative order not the
prel.iminary report, which is the basis of any further remedies
1·he losing party in an administrative case may pursue. (VIVA
Footwear Manufacturing Corp. vs. SEC, 522 SCRA 609 [2007}.)
(c) Neither are prior notice and hearing required. in the
h,suance of a preventive suspension order, such susp~n~1on 1~ot
being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an admnustratlve
investigation. (Carabeo vs. Court of Appeals, 607 SCRA 394
[20l0J.)
(d) The charge against the respondent in an ad~inistral_ive
case need not be drafted with the precision of an mformat10n
inn criminal prosecution. ll is sufficient that he is apprb_cd l:f
l'l,c substance of the charge ag.i inst him; what is control11n.g 1s
1·hc allc.walion of foci's complnincd of, not th' dPsig11<1lion of· lhe
offt'l1!-il'.-,(1 >,idulio vs. Civil St•rvin• ( 'ommission, 27.~' Sl'RA 7'1,'7
11 'J'):\ 1-)
(,I) /~tgltl /(I 11 11111•,1•/ Wliilt• ,111 ii1v, .. ,ti1 ,,1lio11 1'0111l111'11•d Ii~ ,111
1 m.,y l,urlv ••·IV of th,· 11111 ol l(l1:ht1. in 1:.-11.-r,11, anti th,· Dm· Pn1<:css Oausc in partirular,
111 111111111 ,1 111 1, v,· t,udv 11u1v 111 111111", 111• ,11-111111 ,, , 11111111,11p11111•1•d111g,
1111' 1,11 t 1, 11,,1111•, 1l1o1I 1111d,·r 1·,1,,11111•, l,1w1,, 111'•11tv 111,111 ,11!111111i• il1.r
0
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 209
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
tive inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent
himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furp.ish the person
being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not imper-
ative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees,
with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
(Carbonel vs. Civil Service Commission, 630 SCRA202 [2010].)
Liberal judicial policy on rules
of procedure.
(1) Purpose of rules of procedure. - The purpose is not to thwart
justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of the contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
In proceedings to apply justice, it is the duty of the courts "to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpen..sive determination"
of their rival claims. Thus, the Rules require that they should be
liberally construed "to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceedings." (Pajarito vs. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275 [1978].)
(2) Lapses in literal observance of a rule of procedure. - Procedural
due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal appli-
cation of a rule such that any deviation is inexorably fatal. Lapses
in the literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked
when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and have not
deprived the court of its authority.4 (E.L. Mercantile of Intermediate
Appellate Court, 142 SCRA385 [1986]; Philippine National Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA453 [1988].)
4
A:. <·lo<1uc ntly cxpn.•sscd by the U.S. Supreme Court in one case (Stanley v. Illinois,
1105 U.S. 6'15, (,!>6, rit(!d in 1-labana vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 314 SCRA
IK7 ( I')'J'JI.); "'1111: c•,t.1bli11hmenl of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate
1,1;11<· •·111111 i11 a propc·r :.t.11t· int,·n•-,t worthy of coi,;niwnce in constitutional adjudication.
Uul the- ( ow,lih1t11u1 wn,;:ni✓t··i l111;lll'r v,,lm"'l than s pe,.'<.I and efficiency. Indeed, one
0
1h111 th,·y w,·no ch .1,:1w,I to I''""" I lh•· h,11•,tlc• v,1h11"• or., vuhwn,bfo c•iti;wnry from the
o,;1•1l1t•,1111111 • oi ' " 11, le 11 ,,fh, 11 m r ,"" I ,,ui, ,H \' th'II m,,y , h,11 , 11 lc 0 11✓t 0 x x x 1;ovcrnmc nt
.,1111 l!1l~1 Ill It • .,
?.10 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
(3) Relaxation of procedural rules. - Courts have the prerogative
lo relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put
,ltl end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. Liberal
l'<instruction is attained when to do so would serve the demands
of substantial justice and equity. (Ong Lim Sing, Jr. vs. FEB Leasing
,md Financing Corp., 524 SCRA 333 [2007].)
Right to notice whet!J?roceedlng
in personam.
/\n action in personam is one the object of which is to bind a
p,1rl icular person although the suit may concern the right to, or
11 ,~;session of, a tangible thing, such as an action for the rescission of
1
,1 \'.<>nlract of, sale or the recovery of a parcel of land. (Allied Banking
( 'orp. vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA578 (1993].)
(I) Need for notice. - Notice is an essential element of due
11n u·ess otherwise the court will not acquire ju~isdiction ~nd
il--l judgment will not bind the defendant.5 But the Judgment ma
1t•pn•s1•ntative or class suit to which some members of the class
,in• p.Hlies, will bind all the other members. (Hansberry v. Lee, 311
I JS . ~7..) Notice to be meaningful must be both as to time and place.
i:,1il11n• to notify a party or his counsel of the change of venue of a
1·,11"' l'onslitutes a denial of procedural due process. (lnsular Bank
11( At-li,1 and America vs. Borromeo, 81 SCRA 167 [1978].) But notice
ii; of lill'lc value unless the person receiving it has a reasonable
npporlunily to be heard or to respond to allegations that affect him.
(2) /,'{)rt// of notice. - In an action strictly in personam, summons
hy p11blicalion cannot, consistently with due process, confer u~on
Ihl' vou rt ju risd icti.on over a defendant. Due process of law reqt11 res
p<•rsonnl service to s upport a persona} judgment. (Citizens Surety
,ind l mH.1rc1nce Co., Inc. vs. Mclcncio-1 Ierrcra, 38 SCRA 369 11971 I.)
In 1hosv rnrc cases wlw n tlw defen dant o r his address is 11nk 11own
,11ul ,·,1111H>I lw nsn•rlai1wd by d ili)!;Onl inquiry, Hl'l'Vk<• mny, by
li•,1vc• of 1•1111rl, h1• l'l'f<•1·lc•d by p11hlit',1lio11 i11 n 1wwi;p,qwr of g1•1wr,1I
1 in 1il11li1111. (s 1•c• l{11h·11 of ( 'ourl, l,111<· 1'1, S1•r . 11>.)
'•,111111111111• 111 llu• w r it I•\ 1d,1, h lh1• .11 lo 11,l,1111 l>c 111111111·.I C1I 1111' 111111111 ,111,,1h1•1I hllll
•u<1v1,,, ,,111u1h l\lll l►o llu 111< 111•, 1•1 h l1hlitlu•111111l 1111w ,11q11llc• 111111ull•IIC1IIC1V111 Iii••
1,,., "" 11 ,11 "' "'' 1 • A11 ,1, l 1 1 'd ',< 11" ~r, I 'l"H•I I
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 211
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
Right to notice where proceeding
in rem or quasi in rem.
In an action in rem, the object is to bar indifferently all who might
be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established. An action quasi in rem while not strictly speaking
an action in rem partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
(1) Need for notice. - In all action, quasi in rem, an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
his interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment
against him. All proceedings having for their object the sale or other
disposition of the defendant's property, whether by attachment,
foreclosure or other form of remedy, are, in general, thus designated.
An action for partition and accounting is in the nature of an action
quasi in rem. (Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 [1918];
Val~onte vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 92 [1996].)
(2) Form of notice. -Notice by publication, however, is sufficient
compliance with due process in such proceeding as in probate (In
Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil: 156 [1918].) and land registration
proceedings (Roxas vs. Enriquez, 39 Phil. 31 [1915]; Greg Alba vs. De
la Cruz, 17Phil. 49 [1910].)whichare both proceedings in rem. In such
case, the court acquires jurisdiction over the res and its jurisdiction
over the person of a non-resident is not essential. The requirement
that summons be served on·the defendant by publication is merely
to satisfy the constitutional requirement of fair play or due process.6
Opportunity to be heard.
(1) Stranger to a case not bound by any judgment thereon. - It is
a basic doctrine of the law that a party to be affected by a personal
judgment must have a day in court and an opportunity to be heard.7
''l11i-; is nlso the rule in actions for foreclosure of mortgage. The reason is that
"propl•l'ly is alwny~ assumed to be in the possession of the owner, in person orby agent,
,md lw mny bll ~nfcly held, u nder certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge
tl,,11 pror<•edings haw been instituted for its condemnation and sale." (Banco Espafiol-
1:1lipl110 v11. l'11la11cn, :,llf'l'lr,)
71lndl•r 1111• l,111•,1! C:ovt•rnmcni- <.:ode (R.A. No. 7160, Secs. 175[b], 176.), notice to
llw d1'1h1<1ut•11I 11w111•1· I,; l'l't[lllrl'cl 11-i II p1l'rcquiqite lo 11 vnlid tax sale. Administrative
I''"' l'"dl11w1, ..,l,1hli•1lwd fnr tlw 11,d,• ,1( priv,11t• land11 for non-pay ment o f taxes being in
11111~r111r1ru, 11 l111••••11"1111,11 lli,11 th111c, 11., ,11111111 11011, 1• In tlw d1•linq11Pnl; otherw ise, the sale
I~ 1111ll ,111,I vulcl ,111111,111\I, I' ' "' ,•dc,cl hv l''''P''r ,1clvc•1 tl•,1•11w11I or p11hlk,1l lon. Tlw holding
cil ,1 1,1\, .th• cl1·••['llc• llt" ,1b•,c,111 1• «I 1111• ' '''i11l•,1h• 11ulic" 1•1 l,1111,1111011111 h• 11 v111l,111011 of lhe
11W1u•1 ,, 111:'11111 d111• 1•111ic•••H (1111• 1'1111,11 v11 i\ l,11111•1,1 1 11,•1 ',C l{i\ '1H'I ( i'l!NI)
212 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 213
Principles and Cases Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process

It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which (4) Formal hearing not always required. - There is no violation of
he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any the procedural due process even where no hearing was conducted
judgment, rendered by the court. Due process requires that a court for as long as the party was given a chance to present his evidence
decision can only bind a party therein and not against one who did and defend himself (Domingo vs. Development Bank of the Phils.,
not have his day in court. (Maricalum Mining Corp. vs. Brion, 482 207 SCRA 766 [1992]; Stayfast Philippines Corp. vs. National Labor
~CRA87 [2006]; Galicia vs. Mondiquez Vda. de Mindo, 521 SCRA85 Relations Commission, 218 SCRA 516 [1993].), or his interests in due
12007].) course.
(2) Previous notice not always necessan;. - Due process in its "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
procedural aspect, contemplates notice, actual or constructive, one may be heard also through pleadings. There is no denial of
and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting procedural due process:9
one\; person or property. (Carandang vs. Cabatuando, 53 SCRA 383 (a) where the opportunity to be heard, either through
['1973].) The right to be heard or to have one's day in court is the oral arguments or pleadings, or counter-affidavits is accorded
most basic tenet of due process. Lack of opportunity to be heard, or (Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 [1988]; Yap Say vs.
lo ('Xplain or present evidence in support of one's case, or to seek Intermediate Appellate Court, 159 SCRA 325 [1988]; Llora
.i n•consideration of the action or ruling complained of, and not Motors, Inc. vs. Drilon, 179 SCRA 175 [1989]; Alba vs. Nitorreda,
necessarily absence of previous notice, constitutes violation of due 254 SCRA 753 [1996]; Batul vs. Bayron, 424 SCRA 26 [2004].); or
proct•ss.K (Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice, 57 SCRA 663 [1974]; Vda.
(b) where a party was given the chance to explain his side
,/,• Hrnmas vs. Emmas, 95 SCRA 470 [1980]; Unson ill vs. Navarro,
of the controversy (Phil. Air Lines, Inc. vs. National Labor
Ill I SCRA 183 [1980].)
Relations Commission, 198 SCRA 748 [1991]; Richards vs. Asoy,
(3) Presence of party not always essential. - The presence of a 152 SCRA 45 [1987].) or to present his case (Ong, Sr. vs. Parel,
11,1rl y nl a trial is not always of the essence of due process, provided 156 SCRA 768 [1987].) such as with respect to his motion for
IH' wns accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to reconsideration (Cuerdo vs. Commission on Audit, 166 SCRA
n11h111 il any evidence he may have in support of his claim. (Auyong 657 [1988]; Sto. Domingo vs. Ordonez, 166 SCRA 123 [1988];
I lia11 v8. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110 [1974]; Sunga vs. Macayagong vs. Ople, 204 SCRA 372 [1991].), or defend its/his
National Labor Relations Commission, 43 SCRA 338 [1989]; Relucio interest in due course. (Air Phils., Inc. vs. hlternational Business
Ill vs. Macaraig, Jr., 173 SCRA 635 [1989].) "Hearing" embraces Aviation Services, Phils., Inc., 438 SCRA 51 [2004].)
1101 only Lhe right to present evidence one may nave in support of
(c) where petitioners, although they were not duly furnished
liii; defense or case, but also a reasonable opportunity to know the
any notice of the respondent's motion for reconsideration,
d,1ims of the opposing party and meet them. What is repugnant to
were nonetheless able to file their arguments or opposition to
procedural due process is denial of the opportunity to be heard.
the allegations raised therein, before said motion was resolved
(Ambns vs. Buenaseda, 201 SCRA308 [1991].); or
Kl)jfft•n•nlly :,t.11ed, ii is not lhc denial of the ri~ht lo be lward or lo appeal but lht' (d) where the decision of the Labor Arbiter was based on
clt·pdv,11io11 of the opporlunily lo h,• lwMd which con<ililul<:11 a violnlion of th,, 1;11aranlcc. the rc•spcclive position papers and memoranda submitted as
(lmpc·rl.,I 'li•xllll' Mill••• hu·. vN. Nnt irnml 1..abor l<c·lnli1111J1 Commii~.lon, 217 SC:RA 2.'l'/
lt•N:ll.) ~.inn· wh,11 dtw f"'H'"•·• ,011h·mpl111t••l i•1 (n...,Jom lmrn arhi11.1d11,.'','l and wh.11
II 11'<11"""' h l,111111•1,•1or u11,1k ,·, 1h11 .uh•,laru,· 1,1ll1rr lh,111 1l11• (rnm hc·l111: p.1nmm1111I, n
1111•w ,1ll1·1:,1111111 (..,.,_..,J 1.olc•ly 011 1l11• h11 Ii. nl 01111oil1111ily In l11· l1r,111I wllhuul 11111111· dtH"I ''•'I )111• pao, 1•~~·' w,111 d1",ig1ll'd 10 afford nn opportunity to be heard, not that an actual
uni f"', ,,,.
nu 111111u ........ lnu ,I ••l~1•nn1.,I (•,up•'• 'h• <'uru u ~h ~l'an,hu I, . hM Vrt Wc>1~nwu•,, lw,11 h1K 1eh1111hl ,1lw,1y11 ,111d i11d l•,p1·11•1,1hly 1>1· h,•ld. (1 1nmnnt,1qan ng 1.ungsod ng Maynila
C "'"I" 11•, 11i1111 ( rn11111b ,11111 111 ' " l!I\ 'Ill I l't/111) ,\,; lcHI/\ ,,,, ,, p1uly w,111 1•,1vr11 1111, \II t 11111 :~•1Vh<' < 11111111l•,•,h111, ,1•11 ',( HA ',ll(, ll'l'l', I) A lorn1,1I or ll'inl"lyp<• procPcding,

"J!l"''""'llv '" ,I, I, 1111111 i11h n I Ill.,. . '""' . . '·"'" , .,

w11I, ".,,... ,'"hi•, 1111,lltHI Im
"""' 1.t, 1 1111111 1l11" , , nllh le 111, c11upll "'" wlllc II" 11,11111, 1111·111" 1111h11· 1•n11, •-•
,1ltl11,1111h 1•11•11•111•,I. ,,. n11I ,1lw,1v11 11·q111!,•d ,,,, l1111g ,,,. llw J',11 llc-, ,111• 11fl11r,lc·d f,1ir and
1, ,111u11,1l•lc• 111•1•11111111111 1111•,111,1111 lh1•11 11",p•·c ll\-1' """', 111 lh,•, 11nl 111v,·1•,v
214 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
per agreement of the parties. 10 (St. Mary's College vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 181 SCRA 62 [1990]; Salonga vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 254 SCRA 111 [1996].)
(e) where the respondent agreed to do away with the formal
investigation and to the submission of the case for reporting and
recommendation on the basis of the affidavits on record, as he is
deemed to have waived his formal investigation. (Huertas vs.
Gonzales, 451 SCRA256 [2005].)
(5) Party made admission in pleadings. - Due process is not
denied where admission of a party in his pleadings dispenses with
Lhe need for formal h earing. Allowing him to present his evidence
would have been a useless formality. The result would not have
been any different. (Dizon vs. Public Service Commission, 50 SCRA
500 [1973].)
(6) Submission of additional proof uniucessary. - Plea for submis-
sion of additional proof before grant of overtime compensation to
winning laborers may be denied without violating due process of
lnw where the case has long been pending execution and there is
sufficient basis in the record for determining the amount of overtime
l:ompcnsation. (Lao Oh Kim vs. National Labor Relations Commis-
sion, 81 SCRA 650 [1978].)
Sec. 1
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 215
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
What the law proscribes is not the absence of previous notice,
but absolute absence thereof, and the consequent lack of opportunity
to be heard. (see Eden vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 182
SCRA 840 [1990); Medenilla vs. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA
278 [1991].)
(8) Full-dress hearing would result in another protracted trial. - The
grant of a full-dress hearing should be denied where it would result
in another "protracted trial" and from a doctrinal standpoint, run
counter to what is expressly set forth in the Act creating the Court
of Industrial Relations (now National Labor Relations Commission)
t·hat it "shall act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case without regard to technicalities or legal forms."
(I ,ao Oh Kim vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 81 SCRA
(,50 [1978].)
(9) Right to due process waived. - Denial of the due process
connot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of right has
been made. (Sayson vs. People, 66 SCRA 680 [1988].) Where he has
l'hosen, for whatever reasons, to be silent when he has a right to
11peak, he cannot later be heard to complain violation of his right to
1 Iuc process. (Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,

(7) Motion for reconsideration considered. - A denial of due
prnccss cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given
Ihe chance to b e heard on his motion for reconsideration (T.H.
Valderama & Sons vs. Drilon, 181 SCRA308 [1990].) of the action or
ruling complained of as it constitutes "sufficient opportunity" for
him to inform the tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. 11
1°There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of procedura l
due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position
papers and other documentary evidence. (Odin Security Agencies vs. De la Serna, '182
SCRA 472 [1990]; Yap vs. Inciong, 186 SCRA 664 [1990]; Salonga vs. National Lnbor Rl'-
lations Commission, 257 SCRA 111 [1996]; Cabalit vs. Commission on Audit, l:.R. No.
180236, Jan. 17, 2012.)
nwhere the employer who d id not fil1? ,my notice of controvcrsion or nppoHllinn ,,,,
required by law to a claim for workmcn'scompt•nHnlinn, fill'd ., motion for r,•ronHidl'r,11io11
in volving n dcninl of dut> pron·,H nml llw ~IH1H' w,1•1 1h·11it-d by tlw I l,•,11 In)', (>Ii i<,,,, .111d
llw 1,lllt•r'll .1w,1rd w,,,. lht'11 <'11•v,1h•tl lo 1111• l '11111111p,•1lrn1 I 11 1111111· whit h , n11.. 1d1111•d
1111• ,11g11m1•11I of 1111' 1•111pl11y1•1 lh,11 111• w,1•, d,1111,·d du,• 11111, ,.•,,,, 1111'11' v.,1•1 1111 d1111l11 I
111 ,h11• !'""'"•·• ,,,, ,1II 1111·• ,, 11111d1 •11l•1 1ol11m tlt,11 111• w,111 olulv lw,11d ,11111 hh ,11,11111111111,,
d11h tlh1111•1·cf ,,1 ('1111~•11111 I 11111 '""' l'1111l11tl,o "" v~ w..1~111111'11 I IIIIIJ't'llfl1lllt1t1
I 111111111'•111111 'll/t/11 I ,,lit• 11, I t 111111 '(',II(\ 111'1 lfllf, ' I)
?.05 SCRA 605 [1992); see Palagpag vs. National Labor Relations
I. ·om mission, 218 SCRA 510 [1993].)
(a) The right to present evidence may be forfeited by
negligence of counsel. (Aguilla vs. Court of First Instance, 160
S RA 352 [1988).)
(b) The employer's failure to controvert a claim for
compensation as required by law is equivalent to waiver of his
right to due process. (Caleb vs. Workmen's Compensation
( 'ommission, 88 SCRA 114 [1979).) It cannot be said that the
1•mploycr was denied his day in court. As he failed to controvert
1111• claim for workmen's compensation, there was no more
tll'l'CSRiLy of n formal hearing. (Nocnoc vs. Vera, 88 SCRA 529
I 198111.) Hut foilureof the Workmen's Compensation Commission
lo p,1HH 11 pon the issue of denial of due process presented by
d,li1111111l's 1·rnrnsCI consti111tes grave abuse of discretion and a
d1•11i.il In d,ii111,111l of lwr dny in cou rt. (Bnutista vs. Workmen's
< ·11111p1•111.. 11 i1111 < ·01111 11i•,1,i1111, tm ~.c ·1u, 121 I l<lHO I.)
216 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 217

Principles and Cases Due Process of Law

B. Procedural Due Process

(c) One who was given full opportunity to present his of jurisdiction] on the part of the trial court which did not prejudice
evidence and who failed to do so cannot complain that he was the right of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision
denied due process when the court rendered its decision on of the trial court nor of the promulgation of the decision.xx x (Lindo
the basis of petitioner's evidence given ex parte. (Ganadin vs. vs. Commission on Elections, 194 SCRA 25 [1991]; Macabingkal vs.
Ramos, 99 SCRA 613 [1980].) The essence of due process is the Yatco, 21 SCRA 150 [1967].)
opportunity to be heard. (Carvajal vs. Court of Appeals, 280 As long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard
SCRA 351 [1997).) If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or before the judgment was rendered, the demands of due process are
forfeited. (Maminta vs. Masongsong, 523 SCRA 244 [2007].) sufficiently met.
(d) Defendant, by failing to appear at the hearing of the (13) Hearing before an officer, determination by another. - Due
main case, waived his right to adduce additional evidence and process does not require that actual taking of testimony be before
may not complain that he was denied due process. (Amurao vs. the same officer who will decide the case. As long as a party is not
Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 734 [1988].) deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence
Lack of due process cured. - The alleged lack of due process
(10)
in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in
may be cured by the appeal taken to a higher body. (Gas Corp. of the lhe record, the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully
met.
Phils. vs. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653 [1979].) A motion for reconsideration
or appeal is curative in character on the issue of denial of due It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing,
process. (Rosales vs. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 344 [1988]; T.H. which is for the purpose of making determination upon evidence,
Valderama & Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon, supra; Medenilla vs. Civil Service 1lw officer who makes the determination must consider and appraise
Commission, supra; see Development Bank of the Phils. vs. National 1Iu: evidence which justifies them." (American Tobacco Company vs.
Labor Relations Commission, 218 SCRA 183 [1993).) I >ir •ctor of Patents, 67 SCRA 287 [1975].) This principle is applicable
(11) Motion to dismiss denied. -Due process does not require a in rriminal prosecutions. (People vs. Narajos, 149 SCRA 99 [1987];
formal hearing on a motion to dismiss prior to its denial (see Rules I ii '(' Sl! C. 14.)
of Court, Rule 16, Sec. 13.), since the court can still conduct trial on Decision reviewed on appeal by the same officer who rendered the
('I 4)
l·he merits during which time it can grant the motion after sufficient 1>11111,·. -There is a violation of due process when the same officer
l!vidence has been presented justifying said action. It would be dif- who made the decision or recommendation under review decides it
ferent if the court sustained the motion to dismiss without a hear- 1111 11ppt!al. Thus, it was held the decision of a Department Secretary
ing. In such case, the corrective writ of certiorari would properly be 11Hl nning his own in a case when he was still a Bureau Director
issued against said court. In the absence of a hearing, the appellate w,1•1 V<)id becnuse it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
court, in an appeal from an order of dismissal, would have no means ,1111 I waH a mockery of administrative justice.12 (Zambales Chromite
of determining or resolving the legality of the proceedings and the Ml11l11g Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261 [1979]; Anzaldo vs.
sufficiency of the proofs on which the orde1· was lx1scd. (Marubeni 1 '1 "'', I I CJ S( 'RA 353 [1987].)
Nedl'rland B.U. vs. Tensunn, 190 SCRA '1()5 fl990l.)
('12) l'11r/y 1111/ 110/((ii·rf iii mlv1111n· cf 111m1111/g11/io11 •f tl,•, ·i,,.;{011 oH
n·,111fn•d /1_11 I/ti' ml,·•1. TIii' nth•. of l'lll' C oi11111ish ii>11 n 11 lilt•('li1111H '111111• 1111111•11•1 111' low nwrrn,, I11nclonwnl,1I rninwi.>H. "In order that the review of the
proviil<•d 1'11,II "lli1• d,·, i•,11111 111 1111' 1'1111rl t,hnll 111• prrn1111lg,1l1•d 011 ,1 ,I,, 1011111 111 11 "11lt111dlm1I" 111111 1·1• rulHhi 11111 111rn out lo bun force, the reviewing officer
11111111 l'"ril1111 ,, lr1111lh11r 1111111 llu- 11111, ,,,, whor,,, ,lc•1•l•il1111i•1111.1tlc•1· re view; otherwise, there
d.i(c»,1•l l1y it nl w l11d1 ,liu• 1111lll ,, 11111 ,I lit• )',iv1•11l111111 • p,11•lh .. ,." II w.1•, , ,1111,11,,, 11111/1/J, "'"' ,,/Mr,• 111' 1111•11• w1111ld Ir;• 111111•,1111•vh•w or tin· ,•1111P. Tlw <ll'c'1-llon of the
Iu·ld · " 1114' l.111 II (I' It l',l'I \'I "•I .. Ii 11111 it I' iII .,d V ,1111 '. 111 I I11' I'" 11111 llr,·•' i, II I 11 t• 1¥11111111th, ,, w1111ld 111• ltl,1•111cl vlt•w, 1m,vll,1hly, II would l>c• lhl' 1,w11n,il'l11, 11h11•p lwing
111 I IV I 1, . I ' II I' 111 lo ' (I ,, I I I I " I ,, I , , I I II • d I. I I II II. I .ii I I lj,.j I I I I',I I 11., II 11 I I I 11111 I I,,. I. 11 I- l,111111111, Ii" W1111ld 1111111,111111 llt,1t h,· 1v,111 111!111,1~ 1·11111 ht,, 1111,I vl,1•w ol the•, ,11,c•" (//,/11)
218 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIG HTS 219
Principles and Cases Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process

(15) Hearing required in case of indirect contempt. - In cases (4) The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may
of indirect contempt, the party proceeded against could not be be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he
adjudged guilty without a hearing or without due process of law. has fled. (Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833 [1957].)
(Gardones vs. Delgado, 58 SCRA 58 [1974).) Section 3, Rule 17 of '
(5) The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the
the Rules of Court is quite explicit. Afte1· charge in writing has tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at
been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by the time of apprehension. Under such circumstances, notice and
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may hearing would be superfluous. (Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, 711 SCRA
be punished for contempt." ... (b) disobedience of or resistance to a 971 [2013).)
lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court** *." 13
(6) Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the
interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public
Exceptions to requirements
morals. (12 C.J. 1224.)
of notice and hearing.
In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted
"The minimum requirements of due process which are notice
without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
nnd hearing may not, generally speaking, be dispensed with because
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It has
from a clear and present danger. The protection of the general
Lo be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the
welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would
restrains and is restrained by due process. (Ynot vs. Intermediate
d egrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
Appellate Court, 168 SCRA 659 [1987], per Justice Cruz.)
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every
(7) Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
<"nse for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions.
rq~ulation to be issued by and enforced by administrative agencies
(1) The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission i11 the exercise of its pervasive, sovereign power. (Pollution
1,f contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA112 [1991).)They
ex pcrience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved 111,1y be nlso empowered by law to approve provisionally rates, tolls, or
and the act ultimately presumed therefrom. (Manley v. Georgia, 279 d1111·sc~ proposed by public utilities without the necessity of a prior
U.S. 1; 1 Cooley 639.) 111•.tring si nce such rates are by their nature temporary and subject to
(2) There are instances when the need for expeditious action will ,11 lj11slmenl or denial after final hearing. (Radio Communications of

justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of flit' l'liils. vs. Nntiona] Telecommunications Commission, 186 SCRA
n nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed I,I '/ 11 'JI)() I.)
on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the sa fety and (H) I 11 11/lnc/1111('//f cnses, the absence of notice or hearing is
lives of the people. ,tl l11w1 •d 11n lhe ground that the defendant might dispose of his
(3) Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcolic I" t ,p1•1·t y li1•forl' n writ of nttachmentis issued. As a matter of fact, a
drugs nrc inherently pernicious and may be smrnnarily destroyed. l11•,11 l11g w1tttld dl'feal· lhe principle of this provisional remedy. (Tay
« I 11111 S11 y v:,,. <'nlll't of /\ pp1'n Is, 2·12 SCRA 713 [1992) .)

11 11111 t 11'1(', pt•llllo111•1• w,1•1 lll'ltl 1111 011h·111pl ltor "u111l111111ll'illll'•' Y r.1lli11!i Ito l<'J'lll'I 1,,r "l'J'lii·11li1111': ji,r 1irdi111i11nry i11j1111ction, the requirement of
l'l) 111
, t111l11111111 P In 1111111d,11111• with 1111' 111d1•1 111 th,· l '11111 I ' ' ' ," 111 ,111ollwr 111•d1•r, 11111pl,11111•tl 111rl1t1• ,111,I 111 111-lng (,don· i11j1111clion mny issue has been relaxed
1

111, 111, w,1~ 111, 11..1.,I t1I ·t1 .. 1111111lr 1,,111,,111n 111, ,1111111v·· with wh111 w,1•, 1t"q11111•d "' 111111 l•1· 111 llw 1•111111 1'1,1 1 1101 .di jll'fil io11H l'nr pn•li1ni11nry injunction must
11111, 11111 I II w,11, lr,•ld •1 h •,11 I\ 1111', 111111 1111 •111,,1111, 0111111, I l111p11lt·d '" 111111 d1• 111 ,,.,11,·11, ,., 1111111•1gtII11,1 I I vp,• '11•,111111•,. ( I ,1•v I i it 1·,111•,i: & < ·o. vi, .< 'I inion/\ pparelle,
, ,1ll1•,I 1i,1 h1,1 I•• 111111111111 tit,, 111•1•11111111111 111 11w11l 1111, It ,1, lt,1111•• I ,11lt111' 111 '", 111d 1111, It
11l11•111l111111111111111l1J11,1il111l11lnl1lll••1•11111• 1 11 ( 1,1111,1\" l1111lt1t1t1l lll 11I 111\'•ll'I Ill)
1111 l'/11 ',( IU\ I 11, I 11Hl'1l )
 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHT S 221
220 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process

Subsidiary liability of employer. (b) The filing of an appeal is allowed where a stringent
There is no deprivation of due process where the employer application of the rules would have denied it, but only when
it would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his employee's (e.g.,
exercise of the courts' equity jurisdiction. (Villanueva vs. Court
driver's) conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in the
same way that acquittal wipes oµt not only the employee's primary of Appeals, 205 SCRA 537 [1992].)
civil liability, but also his employer's subsidiary liability for criminal (c) The constihttional requirement of due process may
negligence. be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal
for the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be
The application of the rule is merely the enforcement of a
procedural remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation heard and to present evidence in support of one's case. (Alba vs.
for recovery of indemnity by the victim of a judicially declared Deputy Ombudsman, 254 SCRA 753 [1997].)
criminally negligent act.14 (Alvarez vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA (2) Remedies available in lieu of appeal. - The fact that a law
5'7 [1988].) does not specifically provide for judicial review of decision s of an
administrative agency affirmed or reversed by the President, does
Right to appeal of losing party not necessarily preclude judicial review. The extraordinary writs
as part of due process. of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, or quo warranto are always
(1) Statutory, not a natural right. -
The right to appeal to a available in proper cases where there is no appeal or other plain,
higher court, or from administrative agencies to the courts, is not speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. No
n nalural right nor embraced in the right to be heard, except where statute is necessary to bring unconstitutional or arbitrary acts or
il is granted by the Constitution (see Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2].) or by decisions within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Tropical
Htnlute in which case it becomes demandable, and so comes under Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, supra.)
rlw protection of the due process guarantee. It should, however,
Ill' l'Xcrcised in the manner and strictly in accordance with the Cardinal primary requirements of due process
prnvisions of law. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and in administrative proceedings.
not constitutional origin. (Bello vs. Francisco, 4 SCRA 134 [1966]i As set forth in Ang Tibay vs. Court ofIndustrial Relations 15 (69 Phil.
Rodriguez vs. Director of Prisons, 47 SCRA 153 [1972]i Tropical 635 [1940].), they are as follows:
1 lomcs, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 (1987); (1 ) The right to a hearing which includes the right to present
Z,1rngoza vs. Nobleza, 428 SCRA410 (2004); St. Louis University vs. one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;
t 'ordcro, 434 SCRA 575 [2004].)
(a) Parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply 1~'I'he Ang Til,ay formulation was simplified in .4.ir Manila, Inc. vs. B11/atb11t (38 SCRA
wit'h the statutes and rules. (Dalton Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 1189 [1971].) into four (4) basic rights, as follows: (1 ) The right to notice, be it actual or
4.53 SCRA 498 [2005].) .:nns!ructivc, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right;
(2) 'J'lw right to a reasonable opportunity to appear personally or with the assistance
of cowi~c•I nnd defend his rights and to introduce wih1esses and relevant evidence in
li i•1 f,iv,11, by lci,timony or otherwise, and to controvert the evidence of the other party;
1·111 i•1 lnll' lhri! ,m , 111ploy,•1; Hlriclly AJ'l'i.lking, is no t ri pnrly to tho crim inal ra~o
0
(;\) Tlw t'ight lo a lribunnl vested w ith competent jurisdiction, so constituted as to give
111',llt111t·d ,1n,1ii1•,t hl•1 l'111ployt•1·, h11I 111 :.11h~ln1H ,. nnd in efft•ct·, lw iH, rorn1id,•1.·in1: th,• l1illl r,•,1sll11,1blc nq~urnncc of honesty and impartiality; and (4) The right to a find ing or
,,11l•·1ld l,11 v ll11bllity l111p,,.,,.,1111'011 hin, hy luw II l,1 lii•1Ct\11('t'l'II t11• w,•11 n11 o( hi•l t•111ployf',•1 cl,•, i•,1(111 hy th,11 lribunnl hll pportcd by substnntial evidence presented at the hearing or at
ltH,1•1• lo ii th,1l hl'1 i11h•11"•1I hi' l'lnl1·, t,·d i11lh,•111111111,11, ,I'•<' by l,1kln1; vi l'llm l p111·1kl p11 ll1111 l1w ol ,1•a•,•r'l,1i111•d in tlw r,•cnrd s, lll' diRd O~l'd o.r mnde known to the parties affected. (see
111 th1• d1·h•11•,,• 111 hi•, 1•1111•11111111• I I, • , ,11111111 l1 ·,iv1• lili 11 111 lil•1 own i,111• 1'11•, ,11111" hi,, 1,ilhu,• 'lllh•11t i111, v,1 I 0lllllll il•,•,in11 llll Fh•<'lio11111 (,1 7 !i('I{/\ :i75 [2010].)
1•1 ,,l,.11 hi•• 1\11,I II Ii,•, ,111,.,. 111 hi~ 111d111i 1, 11, , , i ll lw" tl11n tlw 1111,l'loy,·,• l11 11111\lh t, ·d ,111cl I Ill' d111• 1•111, ,. ,., •d,111d,1rd" ,.,,1 l11 A11x 'I 1/11111 \'over 1111 ly adminb lralive bodies created
d,1111,1p,•·•• ,111· ,1w,11,li cl ,,,.,,1111°,1 li1111 1111, ,1111 1111 l,11,•1 Iii• h1·.11cl 111 , 11111pl,1h1, 11 li11111r,hl 111 l 1y tli, · ',l.1lo· 1l111111r,l1 wlll,li ,,·1t,,11111ov,•11111"'11l,1I ,11'1•1 "r fi1111•tl11n~ ore performed. The
,111111 1,,1 1111• 111l,11,, 1111111 111 l,1, , 111,,1,11,111• li,,loill lV, 1l1111 lw w 111, 11111 1•,l v1111 hi•, ,11111 111 111q11t1111111 11h ,,1 ,11l111lid11ho1ll-.1• cl11,• 1•1111 ,.. .,, dt1 1101 ,IJ'l'I V111 Ilic• ii1l1'1'1H1I nrfnirn of 1111/ilica/
111111 l I1/•t,/ J 1•111/11, 11\11111•1 Ir Vt, ( lll1 111111 ·,11111 P11 l lc,ll1111•1 tol '',1 l< 1\ 1td l,'lllell,l

222 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial, and "substantial evi-
dc•nce" means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
.idcquate to support a conclusion; ·
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at
1I1chearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
p,1rlics affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
1·c,n Imversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; and
(7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions,
n•mlc1· ils decisions in such manner that the p arties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason
lnr the decision rendered. (see Jose Rizal College vs. National Labor
I~, •In Iions Commission, 150 SCRA27 [1987]; Doruelo vs. Commission
11n l•:l1•c..: Lions, 133 SCRA 382 [1984]; Associated Communications &
Wlrl'11•ss Services vs. National Telecommunications Commission,
:11J'/ ~;( 'l~A 574 [2003]; Nicolas vs. Desierto, 447 SCRA 154 [2004].)
Standards of due process in administrative
tribunals.
(I) Certain latitude allowed. - While administrative tribunals
1•x1•rdsing quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain
prrn·Pdurnl requ irements, they are bound by law and practice to
oli:;Prv1• lhc funda mental and essential requirements of due process
i11 j1wtidnbk• cases prcslmted before them. (Daguio Country Club
( 'urpor-.1tion vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA
!ii , I 1982I.) Due process mus t still be satisfied by a n administrativc-
111•,l'111·y. I l11wcve1~ the sta ndard of d ue process thnt n1ust be me t
111 ,1dnli1iiHtrnliv1· lrih11nnl:-1 nllows n t'<•ttain lc1Litudc ns long as lhc
1•ll'm1 •11I of f,1il'lll'SS is not ignon•,I. (C ;aH ( 'orporntion of the Phils. vs.
llll'IOIII',, 11~\ '.1( 'IV\ 111i:\ I l<)'/'ll,)
(:') J<,·,1•,111//1/1/,· "!'!'"' /11111/11 /11 /11'11,·,11tf gi·111•11. A11 .1 l'llh·, .1 l11ir .111d
"I'''" hl'111 l11)\ 111 "'·'11•1111.11 111 1111' v,1'llllly ,,1 p ro, <•1•di11gn l,1'11111 • ,mdt
l,odit·•• wlwll' llw 1•,11111"1 ,111• ,1llt11il1·d 111111111l y llw ilgltt 111 1•1•"•••111
1•vld1•1lll" l,111 111111, 1111' 1,•,1•j1111,1l•li· 111•1•111l1111ilv In ~1111\V 1111' 1 l,111111,
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL O F RIGHTS 223
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
of the other and to meet them. While a notice is not indispensable,
the deprivation of the opportunity to be heard will be violative of
due process. (Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. vs. Royal Class
Limousine Service, 179 SCRA 569 [1989).) Hence, there is no denial
of due process where the records show that hearings w ere held with
prior notice to adverse parties. (Jacqueline Industries vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 69 SCRA 262 [1976].)
Even in the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of
procedural due process as long as the parties have been given the
opportunity to be heard (Superior Concrete Products vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 82 SCRA 270 [1976].) or explain their
side of the controversy, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. 16 (Helpmate, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 276 SCRA315 [1997].)
(3) Right to counsel. - Under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
16Dased on the foregoing, the Supreme Court ruled in a case: "The petitioner was not
deprived of its right to procedural due process in the Board of Investments (BOI). In the
nrst place, it was notified of the May 14, 1980 hearing. The notice specified that the hearing
was on the petition although it also stated therein with particularity, petitioner's prayer
for a stop and desist order. Necessarily, it is immaterial that said notice was sent before
Johnson filed its answer to the petition and there was yet n o joinder of issu es considering
that the proceeding was before an administrative tribunal where technicalities that
~.hould be observed in a regular court may be dispensed with.
Secondly, during the hearing, p etitioner was given the opportunity to present its
t·,1~c, including its prayer for a s top and desist order. As clearly enunciated in the minutes
or lhc hcilring which We have painstakingly studied and set-forth herein to determine
If riny irregularity a ttended the question ed BOI proceeding, it was conducted for the
purpose of hearing the arguments and receiving evidence of the parties ' to resolve the
, ,1~e expeditious ly.' Havi11g been given the opportunity to put forth its case, p etitioner has
only ilsl'II', or, be tter still, its counsel and officers who were present therein, to blame for
lh f,1ilure lo do so.
Pl'liliuner's !'ight to p rocedural due process was not violated when the hearing
w11•1 , 11111l11dct! before a director of the DOI and not before the members of the Board
1li1•111•,,•lv1•M who d edt!cd the case. The requirements of a fair hearing do not mandate that
11.,. ,11 •111,11 111kin1; of le~timo ny or the presentation of evidence sh ould be before the same
11ll ii ,•r who will r11oke the deris it1n on the case.
Nl'it l11•r d111••1 tlw abM•nc,• of stenographers during the hearing affect petitioner's
ilghl 111 d11,· p r1111"1•1. S,•cl 1011 Ih nf R,•pu blic Act No. 5186, which provides for the power s
1111d d111J. .. , 111 lhl' Ill ll, dt11"1 11111 1,p1·cify lhnl 8nicl board is a board of record. The first
l''"•'ll'•'l'h 111 1i.tld 111·111011 111,,,,.Jy 11tl'11li1111•1 'minuh•:,' in connection with proceedings
111 lh,· 1111111d I 111•11•11111·, 1111• ,1h•,1•11, ,, 111 11 lr,111•1t rlpl of Atcnogrnphic notes taken during
1111• Ill 11 lrr•,111111: 1,11111111 l•1• 11,11111ml 111 l111 v,• d1•p11v,•d pl'lllimwr 11f d 111• proces~ of law."
( i\,l,1111• 1111 ,'!. A,l,111111111 lit, v,, A1111 111· 1 I '••' •,1 HA.'\'/ I 11111'/ I, 1w1· l11•1lk1• Jll'l'nnn.)
?24 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
n•Hpective of the nature of the charges and the respondent's capacity
lo represent himself, and no duty rests on the administrative body
to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Admi-
11iHlrative investigations or inquiries are conducted merely to
, lclcnnine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures
,tgninst existing public officers and employees, with the purpose of
111t1intaining the dignity of government service.
Dlsmissal under the Labor Code.
( I ) Requirements ofnotice and hearing. - While the law recognizes
!Iii' right of an employer to dismiss employees in warranted cases,
1111· law frowns upon the arbitrary and whimsical exercise when
,•111ployees are not accorded due process. (Tan, Jr. vs. National Labor
l{1•l,1lions Commission, 183 SCRA 651 [1990].) A dismissal without
d111• process is null and void. (People vs. Castaneda, 165 SCRA 327
I l'IHH!.)
(t1) Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements
for the lawful dismissal of an employee by his employer are
I wo-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only must
llll' dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause as provided
liy lnw (Arts. 279, 281, 282-284 thereof.), but the rudimentary
r,•qu ircments of due process- notice and hearing- must also
I1c observed before an employee may be dismissed. (Art. 277[b]
lh1m.1of.) One cam1ot go without the other, for otherwise, the
tcrrni nation would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.
(b) To effect a completely valid and unassailable dismissal,
111 employer must show not only sufficient ground therefor
hut must also prove that procedural due process has been
obHcrvcd by giving an employee two (2) notices: one, of the
i11lt..'lllion to dismiss indicating therein the acts or omissions
complnin<.•d against; nnd two, notice of the decision to dismisH,
and ,111 o pportunity to nn1-1wcr ond r('bul: l'hc charges ngainsl
lii111, i11 bt' lw1•t•n Ht1('h nolic1•s. (< 'ocol,,nd Development Corp.
Vii, N.illo11,il L,1bo1" l{Pl11 lin1 1'1 < '11111111i1Nio11, 251) S< 'RA [i i I 1996!;
I ',111111111!!10 VH, ( . A I' I '!iii ipptlH"•, I 11, ,, 'i I 1i ! i( 'l{A :1?.~ l?.0071,)
ll') Ht1 11'1 t1dlw11•1111• Ii, 1111• 11•1pd11•11w11t,i ,11,1 1111•1'1 In llw
lh1• di11111ln•utl uf
l.11'1111 < 'od,•, 11'1 111111•11111',I. 111 , .. ,,,1•1111.11 l,,-, •,H1111•
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RICI-ITS 225
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
an employee affects not only his position but also his means of
livelihood and his dependents' sustenance. 17
(d) Giving an employee "notice pay" equivalent to his one-
month salary in lieu of the notice in the contract ;f employment
could not take the place of notice before dismissal as required
by law. The notice required is not a mere technicality but a
requirement of due process to which every employee is entitled
to ensure that the employer's prerogative to dismiss is not
exercised in an arbitrary manner. UGB & Associates, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 254 SCRA 457 [1996].)
(e) Managerial employees, no less than rank-and-file
laborers, are entitled to due process. They may not be arbitrarily
dismissed, at any time and without cause as established in
an appropriate investigation. Loss of confidence which is the
usual ground for the removal of managerial employees, must
be established like any other lawful cause. (Hellenic Philippine
Shipping, Inc. vs. Si.ete, 195 SCRA 179 [1991].)
(f) The due process requirement in the dismissal process is
different from the due process requirement in labor proceedings
and both requirements must be separately observed. Thus,
the employer's method of "fire first the employee and let him
explain later," is not in accord with the mandate of the law.
The belated act of the employer in attempting to show a just
cause in lieu of a doubtful one cannot be given a semblance of
legality. The legal requirements of notice and hearing cannot be
supplemented by the notice and hearing in labor proceedings.
(Lawrence vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 205 SCRA
737 [1992]; Pili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 217
SCRA 338 [1993].)
17Thus, in the case of Ce11t11ry Textile Mills, Inc. i•s. NLRC (161 SCRA 528 [1988].), the
Supreme Court stated: "TI1e requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee
concerned of lhe employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal;
upon the olhcr hnncl, lhe requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to
1111,;w<'r hlo ,•111ploypr'Br hor1-1r4 :,gninqt him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom
l1t•f111·1· dl11111l,,•1,1I 1•1 l'lf,·, ll•d, N,•llhl'r of llwqt• lwo requirements can be dispensed with
w1lh1111I , 111111111g ,1111111 ul llw d11l' f'l'r1t-1'•;•1 n·qui n•nwnt of !he 1987 Constitution." (San
Mltl'"'' I '1111'1>1,1111111 v11 N,,t l111111l I ,1l•111• lfrl111l1111•1 I '11111111i•.,iio11, 17:l SCRA 314 [1989]; see
M1111ll,1 11,·, t1 h 1 11 v" N111i111111I I 111\,,1 H,,111111111•1< 111111111•,•,11111, 1/!'l SI 'l{A "f I 1990J.)
 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 227
226 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process

(g) While due process required by law is applied on Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., 153 SCRA 500 [1987];
dismissal, the same is also applicable to demotions as demotions Family Planning Org. of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Labor
likewise affect the employment of a worker whose right to Relations Commission, 207 SCRA415 [1992].)
continued employment, under the same terms and conditions, (4) Right to damages for illegal dismissal. - The dismissal of an
is also protected by law. 18 (Jarcia Machine Shop & Auto Supply, employee is without due process where it is effected without written
Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 266 SCRA 97 notice to him of the charges against him and without a formal
[1997]; Leonardo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 333 investigation where he could have defended himself personally
SCRA589 [2000].) or through a representative. He is entitled to damages. 19 (Seahorse
(2) Burden of proof - The burden of proof in termination cases Maritime Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
n•i,;ts upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and 173 SCRA 1390 [1989]; Kwikway Engineering Works vs. National
valid cause and the failure to do so means that the dismissal is not Labor Relations Commission, 195 SCRA526 [1991].)
j1111tificd and the employee is entitled to reinstatement. (Offshore (5) Award of nominal damages. - Under the new doctrine (as
l11dustries, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 held in Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA573
~;{ 'IV\ 50 [1989].) The totality of the infractions committed by the 12004].); where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory
.-mpl.oycc may justify the severe penalty of dismissal rather than of due process should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or
r,t1H1wnsion. (Mendoza vs. National Labor Relations Commission, ineffectual. The employer should indemnify the employee, however,
/,/II l/'/1') in the form of nominal damages for the violation of his right to
~tn tu tory due process (King of Kings Transport, Inc. vs. Mumar,
(:1) /Jrior clearance rule. - Despite the legality and justifiableness
ul lilt' grnund for the dismissal of an employee with at least one [i26 SCRA 116 [2007]; Maquiling vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society,
.-r
y.. of service during the last two years (Labor Code, Sec. 278[b].), Inc., 450 SCRA 465 [2005]; Caingat vs. National Labor Relations
c 'ommission, 453 SCRA 142 [2005]; Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc. vs.
wl11•n· 110 clearance was secured from the Secretary of Labor and
N1•w DFA, 453 SCRA 256 [2005].), the amount of which would be
l1111pluymcnt by the employer prior to the termination of his
1•111ploy111cnt, the dismissal is conclusively presumed to be without .1dd ressed to the sound discretion of the court taking into account
1111' relevant circumstances. Such form of damages is designed as
jw,I 1\1use.
.i dl'lcrrcnt to employers from committing in the future similar
'l'lw prior clearance rule is not a trivial technicality. This viol,1lion. (Agabon vs. National Labor Relation Commission, supra;
1c•q11in-nwnt is p,,rt of due process which must not be denied to : ;,1111:ir-Mcd Distribution vs. National Labor Relation Commission,
,111 c•111ploy1·c. (Needle Queen Corporation vs. Nicolas, 180 SCRA '/ II I Sl 'l~A '148 r2013].)
!,11H I l'JH1ll; Nnlional Labor Union vs. National Labor Relations
c ·11111111it1~lio11, '1!13 SCRA 228 [1987].) It was designed to ensure thnt
1111' !'111ploy1•r's prcn>)!,ntive to dismiss or lay off an employcl' is
c•,1•n •i11l'd williout nbw,e of discretion or nrbitrnrineHs, (Pit•d,1d vs.
1'''1It,• 11111• p111viding f11r lht: entitlement of an illegally dismissed employee to only
1111, ,. ( \J y1°,11"1 li,u•l...w,11•r; "wilhnul chx luction 01· qualification" to obviate the need for
'"II 111 11nl 111°11",'ioUY, h11w1•v1•r, 111111 11i,• 111',lll11)', or 111 v,·•,tlr,,1l it111 l•P, 1111<111, h·d 111 llw 11111'1" 1 I'"" 1•1•,11111:1 , 111 th1• ,•rntr~•· of r•xcculinn, otherwise known as the "Mercury Drug
111111111111• nl ,1 1q~11IM lli,il i11 111111 I l'•,1)1111,11, \ ,, N11tl1111,1 I ) ,r1bor l{,•l,11 11111'1 l 'n111111 l1,•,ln11, l'11h •" l1ol'1 ln,11; l,1•,•11 ,1li.1111l111wd 11111111111· promulgation of R.A. No. 6715 which amended
1111 •,< I~/\ Ill' 11'••~11) No1 j,, II 11111"1'1oll\ 11,.,1 Iii, · 1111, .. , l,11,I dt1w11 l,y 1l11• 11111111,111v 1111 '\111, h• 1/ 11 ol 11t,, I ,111111 l 'i,d1• Ill 11/H'I, /\l,1,1'111 ,lll)' CXCl•plional. circumstances, it is now
,111 '""'' ,tlf\01111111 111 ,Ill 1•11111111111' , ... ,it,,,, I\ Id '" 1'1,· lo1ll1 •1 Wl1111 ,1111• I''"',. ,, 11''111111' I I•, 1111,·,I 111111 ,111 1·11q•l11y,•1• whn 1•1 1111j11•il ly d l•,1111•,•,,•,I frn111 wmk Hhnll be entitled to full
111°,11, ,, Ill l,1il 111 ,,, lli1• 1,11I I ,l,1111 ,, 1,11 III I 11, 111 I111 1111 Ill t,, 1111', p,11,11111111111 WI 11111 II 11,11 II h,11, I ,, I 1~,lf\''" 111, l111.i v1•t1I ,11l11w,111, 1 11,11111111111•111llw1 J.1 •1111(/1•1or llwlr mo,wtnry cquiv11lent
l•1tllf\l\tllllt1•pp1•111l1111ll11,,1,, 111 11,I 1111111,, 1,,111,1tl111,li·dd111·1>11111 I IP>.lo•11d11 •,l l"I 111,111 1111• 11111,• )11,, , ,,1111•111111,1114111 w,111 w l1hl1t•lol 1111111 hl111 1111 111 1111• 111'111,11 n•in••l.nlomcnl.
I ,1l•11e l'••l,1lh1,111 I l11t1111l1 11,-, l 1) 11 1 1 14 \ t,llf, I 11tlJJ I) illl'I I 11,,•111111 I 111111111 YN 1111111 "' Ill<' l'l1flt111•l11t• l11l,111ol , ·1' 1•I 1,( HA l',,' j'}(Kl1,l,)
 228 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 229
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process

Duration of contracts of schools with Disciplinary cases involving students.

college students and teachers. (1) Procedural due process not strictly observed. - Under similar
The rule now is that a school, after having accepted a student for circumstances where students have been refused re-enrollment
enrollment in a given course, may not expel him or refuse to enroll hut without allegation of termination of contracts, or in cases
him until he completes his course/2() except w hen he is academically where students have been su spended expelled from the academic
deficient or has violated rules of discipline. institution pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards
(,•.~., for violating a school rule which prohibits participation in
However, there is n o contract between students and the school fr; ternity hazing activities), due process in disciplinary cases
for the latter to remain open for the entire duration of the course. involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar
If the school doses or is forced to close for financial or other Lo those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
valid causes (e.g., where all the teachers and students struck and Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not
abandoned classes until the end of the semester and refused to 1~ven an essential part thereof. (De la Salle University, Inc. vs. Court
desis t from continuing m ass actions) or is dosed by proper authority of Appeals, 541 SCRA 222 [2007).)
at the end of the semester, the student has no action for breach of
(2) Minimum standards to satisfy procedural due process. -
onh'act against the school. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. vs. Court
/\i.;cordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Supreme
of Appeals, 178 SCRA493 [1989); see Regino vs. Pangasinan College
(_ 'mn't to satisfy the demands of procedural due process specifically
of Science and Technology, 443 SCRA 56 [2004].)
with respect to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
ins titutions are:
(a) The students must be informed in writing of the nature
70
nnd cause of any accusation against them;
111 Alrnaz vs. PSBA, Q.C. Branch (161 SCRA 7 [1989).), the Supreme Court ruled that
11 •,lmlcnl once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester, relying (b) They shall have the right to answer the charges against
1111 l',1rngrnph 137, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that "when a college them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
11111d,·11l registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester
h ,r collegiate courses." Likewise, it is provided in the Manual that the "written contracts" (c) They shall be inform ed of the evidence against them;
ll'lJll lrcd for college teachers are for "one semester." Thus, after the close of the first
,.,•111c,1lc1; a college no longer has any existing contract either w ith the students or with the (d) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
lt'olt hcr·s. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process in case of non-renewal own behalf; and
11f conlrncts was held untenable. The reversal of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, insofar
,111 ii nllowed schools to bar the readmission or re-enrollment of students on the ground (c) The evidence must be duly considered by the
of "h:rn1innlion of contract" is the issue squarely raised in Non vs. Dnmes II (185 SCRA inwsligating committee or official designated by the school
'i'..l'l 11\/<JOI.). Overturning the "termination of contract doctrine," the Supreme Court said: ,lllfhoritics to hear and decide the case. 21 (Guzman vs. National
"x x x. The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract.
It i•1 i111b11cd with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution l Jnivcrsity, 1.42 SCRA 706 [1986]; Ateneo de Manila University
lo ,•JU1·,11ion nnd the grant to the State of supervisory nnd regulatory powers over nil vs. npu long, 222 SCRA 644 [1993); Aicuaz vs. PSBA, Q.C.
,·duc,1llonnl innlilutions. (sec Art. XIV, Secs. 1, 2, 4[1].) llr,111ch, s11pm.)
R,i11pondcnt ~.:h ool cnnnot julltify ilR nclion~ by relying on Pnrngrnph 137 of lhc
M,mu,11 ,,r Hc•gulation~ for Prival<• Schools which the Court in Alcuaz conqtrucd n~ (:1) 1'1'1111//11 to /Jc imposed. - Moreover, the penalty imposed
1111lhlll'lly for 11rhoolll to rd11111• l'IH'ollnw nt lo ,1 11t11dcnl on the ground 1lu11 hiH rontr,,ct, 111111,I Ii,· prop;,,·tionafc lo t·he offense committed. (Non vs. Dames II,
whic Ii h1111 11 (111•111 of Olli' 1a•111t",lt•1; h11•1 11l11•,1dy 1•xpln•d. l'nrngr,,ph l:l7 nwrl'ly r lnrlfl1°11
11ml ,1, nll,•H•' ul1111'•11l 1•111·11l1•1 for lhr• 1•111111• ,,.,1111"1h•r, II w 1·v, .., lo pn>ll'• I 1o1 hoo l,i wlll'r1•h1
.,,,,,,.,,,)
1111111111 li11"11111• 1ollnlr•d 111111 p,rld 1111 l1111l,1ll1111·11I b,1111•1 , Th1111, 1•v1111 If' n 11111d,,r1I drn"• 1101
111111ph·ti• lh" 1.111111"11111' 1111' whl, Ii hr• w,1111111111lh•ol, lo111 hm1 11l11y.,,1 1111 lor 1111111° 1h1111 lwo
w,111~"• ' "' 11111 v "" 11•q11la, ol 111 ('II\ 1,,1 1111 1 "'""'"I""'' ~,..r (,c,fn11• l11 • 111 glVllll hl11 , 11·,h•11ll,1l11
1111 11 ,111•1(111 I hl•1 h '"" ill\('"' I 111 1'111 ,11•1 ,11•11 I I,' '"" lllrllllhll ,.,, 11g11l/c I 1111• 1l11li11111111,
1tl11,f1111I 111 l•1•, 11111111 ol 111 lot,, 111111 ,, 1.., 1(1, 1111 11,, I" il1,cl h1• l•c ••••'('•le h d lq 1"1111•111111 II"
230 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
Notice and hearing not required
in rule-making.
Previous notice of hearing, as element of due process, is
constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property
rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place
in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding generally
dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or
ascertained.
The requirements are not essential to the validity of the general
rnle or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class
of persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. For
example, the Central Bank is supposed to gather relevant data and
make the necessary study, but has no legal obligation to notify and
hear anybody, before exercising its power to fix the maximum rates
of interest that banks may pay on deposits or any other obligations.
(Central Bank vs. Claribel, 44 SCRA 307 [1972]; see Philcomsat vs.
Alvarez, 180 SCRA 218 [1989].)
Prior publication required for
effectivity of laws.
(1) Rationale for requirement. - The publication of laws is a
rt•quirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
111ay be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. Unless laws are published (not necessarily
in l'hc Official Gazette unless required by statute), there will be
no legal basis or justification for the rule in Article 3 of the Civil
l'odc that "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
Iherewith" which presupposes that the law has been published.
(Tnnada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985].) The publication must be of
!he full text of the law or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
tu inform the public of the contents of the laws. (Tafiada vs. Tuvera,
146 SCRA 466 [1987J; Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic, 686 SCRA 472
l211'l2I; sec Sec. 7.)
(2) Nc·n•:,:,ify ,fr, quin·1111•11/·. - •Prior publication of lows cannot· bP
0
dit,pt•ma•d wit·h, Tlw n•nso11 iH!lint 1-1 11d1 omission would offeJ1d dm•
pro,•c•:,i, i1111ofi1r ,1'1 ii would d,·11y llw p11hlic, knowlt•dgt• of llw lmvH
11ml ,111• ""l'l''11a•d lo 1•,,1v1•111 ii 'Jlii•1 l11 p,11'lk11l,11·ly lr111• of 1w1111I l.iwu.
llc,h11c• 1111' p11lilic 11111y 111• li111111d liy 1111• 1 1111!1•111-i of ,I pc•1111I 11!,1!11(1•,
1 ,1tli,•1• .t,,t,, wlll11111l 1111 1•11•vl1111•, p11hl11 ,1111111 1'11hll~.1tl1111 111 h1dl•,p<'11~n!Jle in every Cilse,
l't1pc iully lh pc·11,1I p111vt11t1111'1, 1111' l,1w 1111111! lw p111>l111l11'cl ,1111I 1111'
1,
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 231
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
people officially informed of its contents and/ or its penalties. For if
a statute has not been published before its violation, then in the eyes
of the law, there was no such law to be violated, and consequently,
the accused could not have committed the alleged cr'ime. (People vs.
Veridiano II, 132 SCRA523 [1984].)
The subsequent publication would not cure the defect for the
reason that publication is required as a condition precedent to the
effectivity of law. (Philippine International Trading Corporation vs.
Commission on Audit, 309 SCRA 177 [1999].)
(3) Scope of "laws." - For purposes of prior publication
requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" should refer to all laws
and not only to those of general application, including those of
local application and private laws, executive orders of the President
and administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation. The fact that the parties participated in the
public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not
compliance with the mandat9ry requirement.22 But interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of an administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. (Ta:fiada vs. Tuvera,23 supra; see Almario
22
The obvious purpose of the preliminary procedures of public consultation and
s ubmission of comments is to give the parties the opportw1ity to air their views and
express their concerns on particular subject matters before legislative measures or
Implementing rules and regulations addressing these matters are promulgated. On the
other hand, the avowed rationale for the requirement of publication of statutes is to
11pprise the public of the contents of the laws or rules and regulations that have a lready
been promulgated or adopted. {National Assoc. of Electricity Consumers vs. Energy
Rc13ulatory Commission, supra.)
2JNote: The Supreme Court was divided in the Taiiada case, on whether or not
publicatio n has to be in the Official Gazette. Under Executive Order No. 200 (June 18,
1!187), immcd by President Aquino in the exercise of her revolutionary legislative powers
(11cc Art. XVIII, Sec. 6.), which amended Article 2 {It provides that "Laws shall take effect
11fter fi(tecn clays, following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
1111h••111 it lH o lhorwine provided xx x.") of the Civil Code, publication may be "either in
t!w Offlclnl Ca:rd tc o r in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
11tlwrwls1• pn,vlclecl."'lo the same effect is Section 18 of Executive Order No. 292 (July 25,
l'IH7) o( 1111' Acl111l11i11tr11tlVI' ( ·0<11• o( 1!187. The Court .i n said case ruled: "x xx: the clause
' 1111l1•tt11 It 1-i 11l lll'rwl111• p mvldc•d' ,~•fpn\ lo 1111' date o( effcctivity nnd not to the requirement
11/ p11ltlli ,1th,11 t1,1l'lf, whi, Ii 1,m,1111 111 n11y l'Vl'nl ht• ornitted. This clause does not mean
th11 t 1h11 lc111l11la lur mny 111111_., lh,• lnw l'lfi•,•tlv1• l1111111•di11tPly upon npproval, o r on any
hut llw 111111>11,111111 1 11111y 111 ii•• dl'l111'111111 1'111vl,I., ll1o11 till' 11'111111 lill111•11 dr1y 1wriod ~hnll
111• • li,11 t, 1j1 rl Ill ,,, h 111fc•d , , , " (/Ir/,/ ; ttl'I' 111111111 Y" I •,t.111111(1111, ~•t~J ',I IV\ 11'11> 11 ')'J'.?I.)
232 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
vs. Alba, 127 SCRA 69 [1984]; see National Assoc. of Electricity
Consumers vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, 481 SCRA 480
[2006].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:24
1. Employee's civil service eligibility was cancelled without a
hearing, on the assumption that he had already admitted his guilt.
Facts: The Commissioner of Civil Service cancelled ex parte or
without a hearing the civil service eligibility of an employee or
terminated his employment without a formal investigation upon a
doubtful assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense
ngainst civil service rules.
Issue: Has the Commissioner the power or authority to do what
be did?
I-leld: No. A civil service employee should be heard before
11
he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such
unrelen tless grasp that by now it would appear trite to make
ci lation thereof." (Perez vs. Subido, 23 SCRA 1074 [1968}, through
Jm; fice J.13.L. Reyes.)
2. The word "pre-trial" was not specified in the notice of hearing.
Facts: ln the no tice of hearing of the suit filed by a p arty, it was
not specified that the purpose thereof w as for a pre-trial.
Issue: The issue is whether or not the party was denied his
cons titutional right to due process.
Held: Hearing not confined to trial. - "Such a failure does not
dep ri ve a party of his day in court. A hearing as known to the law is
not confined to a trial but embraces the several stages of a litigation.
11. doc•s not p reclude p re-trial. A h earing does not necessarily
ml'nn presentation of evidence. It could cove r the dcte rminnlion
o f: whelher nn accused is Pntitlcd to ba il, o r the submission to 1·lw
l'ourl's d l'lt•rminnlion of ;1 motio n to d ismiss, or nny mo tion for
tlic1 f• m.il lt•r. ~)ud, ,, p11n•ly kclrnh-.i l objl'<'l-ion should not· lw t,1k1•11
llln ht•1·io11..,ly. ('/i oi lo •11•1. / .11/1111/P, .', l .' i( '/~ll 97 f'/97,1 /, lhrot18ii /1111/in·
11
/'r-11/1///1/11.)
Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 233
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
3. Squatters were ejected without judicial proceedings.
Facts: Pres. Decree No. 1472 authorizes the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to eject squatters from government resettlement
projects without the necessity of a judicial order.
Issue: Petitioners contend that the enforcement of the Decree is
unconstitutional as it would deprive them of their property without
due process of law.
Held: Squatters are a public nuisance. - "The petitioners are not
owners of the land occupied by them as it belongs to the govern-
ment. At any rate, the Decree does not violate constitutional due
process. Procedurally, it requires notice and hearing. Proper notices
were served upon the petitioners after it had been determined
that they are not "Tatalon Estate Beneficiaries," and consequently,
squatters on the land occupied by them. As squatters, they are
, a public nuisance which can be abated even without judicial
proceedings." (Mendoza vs. National Housing Authority, 11 SCRA 637
(1982}, through Justice Concep_cion, Jr.)
Note: Nuisances per se are subject to summary abatement
without judicial process or proceeding. In case of nuisances per
accidens, there must be notice to the person alleged to be doing or
maintaining the same, and hearing before a tribunal authorized to
decide whether an act or thing constitutes a nuisance. (see Arts.
694-707, Civil Code; Monteverde vs. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1928];
Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 24
Phil. 471 [1913].)
4. No notice was given that case was submitted for decision without
nny memoranda.
Facts: P ursuant to Section 18 of Pres. Decree No. 946, an appeal
was taken by the petitioners from the decision of the Court of
Agrarian Relations to the Court of Appeals. Under said Section
1.8, the Court of Appeals, may, if it deems necessary, require the
p11 rli1•Hto file sim ultaneous memoranda and decide the case within
~10 day:, from n:cc?ipt of said records and memoranda.
Tl H• <'ou rl of App«.•mls promulgnted its decision without
ln•111ilw, nny nol k 1• lhnt ii wnf, "ll i:,;pern1i11g wi th t·hc usual practice
111 w q11 ll'i11g llw p111•l i1"1 It , 1111l 1111i l lo 1111 lll!'ir m1•mm,111da in lieu of
l11•l1•l11,1'
IJ 11 II II
l' IIILll 'l' IN H ' N,1 l'll'U l 'IUNAl , l,A W
· Principles and Cases
Issue: Petitioners allege, among others, violation of their consti-
tutional right to due process.
Held: (1) Submission of case for decision without any memoranda.
11
- Although Section 18 of P.D. No. 946, in the interest of the
expeditious administration of justice, empowers the Court of
Appeals to dispense with memoranda in deciding agrarian cases,
a division of this Court has held as follows: 'Notwithstanding the
foregoing, we hold that, as a matter of orderly procedure and to
dispel the impression that a litigant in an agrarian case has been
denied due process or was not accorded a hearing in the Court
of Appeals, it is advisable that if the Appellate Court finds that
memoranda are not necessary, it should at least issue a notice to
the parties that the case is submitted for decision without any
memoranda.' (Ty vs. Elale, 115 SCRA 29 [1982].)
In the case at bar, no notice was given to the parties, and
particularly to petitioners, that the ca~e was submitted for decision
without any memoranda. The former Solicitor General, in his brief
for the public respondents (no briefwas filed by private respondent),
argued that due process was not violated because petitioners could
have submitted their memorandum any time between perfecting
the appeal and the forwarding of the complete records to the Court
of Appeals, and they could also have done so after receipt by the
Court of Appeals of the records of the case, before a decision had
been made. However, there is no provision in P.D. No. 946 that
authorizes the appellant to file a memorandum any time after the
perfection of the appeal and before the forwarding of the complete
record to the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the reG:ords show that no notice of the receipt of the
records from the lower court was issued by respondent Court of
Appeals, and petitioners did not know that said appellate court
had dispensed with the usual practice of requiring the parties to
submit their memoranda until they were notified of its decision."
(2) Requirement of procedural due process. - "Procedural due
process contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered. If the appellate court had notified the
parties that the case would be submitted for decision without any
memoranda, petitioners would have had the opportunity before
the case was decided to submit a brief or memorandum pointing
out the errors of fact or law committed by the agrarian court."
(Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 183 [1 987], through Justice
Feria.)
11 Ill
/\ lf l ', Ill. llll.l , ii l{ l(..; l l' l'~l
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
5. Notice ofhearing was ambiguous.
Facts: The ambiguity is such that the counsel for the 9-efendants
had good reason to believe that the hearing was only on the
incidents and motion, and not on the merits of the case. Hearing of
the case·on the merits was conducted without petitioners' counsel.
Issue: Should petitioners be given an opportunity to prove their
defense?
Held: Rigid application of technical rules. - "The absence of
counsel at the hearing of the case was excusable, and hearing of the
case on the merits conducted without counsel constitutes a denial
of due process. Where the rules which are merely secondary in
importance are made to override the ends of justice and the techn icAI
rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantia l rights
of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced. In the
interest of justice, the petitioners should be given an opportunity to
prove their defense. Technicalities should give way to the realities
of the situation." (Salonga vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 665 [1980),
through Justice Fernandez.)
6. Defendants residing abroad acknowledged territorial service of
summons.
Facts: Q an heir and administrator of a hereditary estate, filed
a complaint against two other heirs residing abroad for settlement
of the ownership of some real properties. The defend.ants
acknowledged the service of summons. Later, they filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdh;tion.
Issue: Was there compliance with the requirements of due
process?
Held: Service ofsummons. - The lower court acquired jurisdiction
by their voluntary appearances. "Even granting that the lower court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, still her
motion to dismiss was properly denied because Q's action against
her may be regarded as a quasi in rem action where jurisdiction over
the person of the non-resident is not necessary and where service
of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with
the requirement of due process. An action quasi in rem is an action
between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of
property owned by them, or of some interests therein. Q's action
J in I 'I 111 ,11 'I 'I N I \ \ \ JNI I I I I l J I I\ I N A I , I ,A W
11dnclplcs nncl 'n11cB
falls within that category." (Sofia Pastor de Midgely vs. Ferandos, 64
SCRA 25 [1975], through Justice Aquino.)
7. Petition failed to ask for a hearing.
Facts: Petitioner company argues that it was denied due
process of law when the Hearing Officer resolved the factual issues
involved in the case through the position papers and enclosures
submitted by the parties without calling the parties to a formal
hearing to prove their respective claims. It did not, however, insist
on a hearing to present his witness and for him to testify.
Issue: Could petitioners rightfully impute lack of due process
on the ground that no actual hearing was conducted?
Held: (1) Petitioners were heard on their memorandum appeal and
motion for reconsideration. - "Having failed to ask for a hearing, it
cannot claim lack of due process. As held in Tajonera vs. Lamorosa
(110 SCRA 438 [1981].): "What the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard. Petitioners have no reason to impute lack
of due process because they were 'heard' on their memorandum
appeal and motion for reconsideration. They, therefore, had
sufficient opportunity for them to inform the tribunal concerned of
their side of the controversy."
(2) Substance rather than form being paramount in due process.
- "What due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness,
and what it requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than
the form being paramount. x x x Although there was no actual
hearing conducted, petitioners were afforded time to explain their
side. There were no refutations made nor was there.any hint on
the record that they can present any meritorious defense which
would warrant a reversal of the questioned orders." (B. Sta Rita &
Company, Inc. vs. Arroyo, 168 SCRA 581 [1988], through Justice Paras.)
8. Law bans transportation of carabaos from one province to
another.
Facts: The thrust of the petitioner is that the law, Executive
Order No. 620-A, is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of transported carabaos across provincial
boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
Al{ ' I'. Ill. lJ l l.l, 11 l{tt.ar, s 237
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
imposed without according to the owner a right to be heard before
a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
Issue: Is the executive order unconstitutional for being violative
of due process.
Held: (1) Law allows outright confiscation without judicial hearing.
- "Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the
end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities,
usually the police only. In U.S. vs. Toribio (15 Phil. 85 [1910].), the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction
of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly,
no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported
is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
me~sure itself, as forfeited to the government."
(2) No justification exists for omission of right to a previous hearing.
- "In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or
action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved
first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering
that, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation ·
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but
by a court of justice, which alone would hav,; h~d the author_i~ to
impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conv1ct10n
of the accused."
(3) Law is invalid on several grounds. - "To sum up then, we
find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is
not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse,
is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the ~wner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard m his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. there is, finally, also an invalid
 II
J IH l'.llll ,ll'lll N l l 1
U N!1 JII IJ JI )N /\J.1 ,/\ W
Principles nnd t nscs
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken." (Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
of Appeals, 148 SCRA 659 [1987], through Justice Cruz.)
.9. Supreme Co~rt resolved disbarment and contempt charges
against respondents without hearing.
Facts: An attorney and a party litigant were given a "show-
ca~se" order and they replied thereto but their arguments were not
believed by the Supreme Court which resolved the case without
ordering a hearing to the plea that the Supreme Court violated due
process.
Issue: Did the Supreme Court violate respondents' right to due
process?
f!eld: _(1)_ Resp~~dents were given sufficient opportunity to
explain their side. - What due process abhors is absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard. (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438
[1981].) The word 'hearing' does not necessarily connote a 'trial-
type' proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated
January 29, 1987, Atty. WL was given sufficient opportunity to
~o~m. this Co~rt of the reasons why he should not be subjected to
d1sc1plmary action. EMI was also given a like opportunity to explain
her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/
or the official ~ctions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance
Answer, wherem she prayed that the contempt proceeding against
her be dismissed contained 19 pages double-spaced. Both were
afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully."
,, (2) Furthe~ eviden_tiary hearing was rendered unnecessary. -
A:tty. WL demed havmg authored the letters written by EMI, his
bemg her coun~el before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized
to tJ:te press c~p1es of the complaint filed before said body, and his
having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court
believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges
levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by
themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous
character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts
of the Ian~, a complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle
of se~arati~n of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal
doctrine of independence of ~he Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing
more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct
any further evidentiary hearing was obviated. (see People vs. I-Ion.
A l ' I', Ill , llll.1. l )II 1,m :1 LI H
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712 [1985].) Atty. WL and EMI were given
ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard." (In re
Wenceslao Laureta, 149 SCRA 570 [1987], En Banc.)
10. Motion for postponement based on meritorious grounds was
denied.
Facts: It was not the petitioner but the private respondents who
requested for several postponements. A motion for postponement
filed by the petitioner was denied notwithstanding that it was
based on meritorious grounds.
Iss_ue: Did the judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion in violation of due process?
Held: Yes. (1) Speed is not the chief objective of a trial. - "Although
a speedy determination of an action implies a speedy trial, speed is
not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration
for the administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights
of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process
and an adherence to the Court's standing admonition that the
discretion given to judges in the granting or denial of motions for
postponement and the setting aside or denial of orders previously
issued should always be predicated on the consideration that more
than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the
case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby, are
more important than a race to end the trial. (Amberti vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 240 [1979].)"
(2) Court's discretion must be exercised wisely. - "While it is
true that motions for postponement are addressed to the sound
discretion of the courts, discretion must be exercised wisely. Thus,
in considering motions for postponement, two things must be
considered, namely: (1) the reason for the postponement; and (2)
the merits of the case of the movant. Thus in the case of Pebeauco
vs. Director of Lands (119 SCRA 102 [1982].), the trial judge rather
. adhered to the technical and rigid enforcement of the rule thereby
defeating the purpose thereof which is to help and secure to the
parties substantial justice.
In the case of PLDT vs. Genovea (116 SCRA 395 [1982].), the
Court stated that 'Even if PLOT had sought several postponements
due to absence of its witnesses, substantial justice demands that it
be given its day iri court."' (De Guzman vs. Elbinias, 172 SCRA 240
{1989], through Justice Paras.)

.I Ill l'J 111.11 '1'1 1 JU l I IM 1f I Ill 11~ INA l.1 ./\ W
Pl'ln lplcs ond 'Ol:!cs
11. Law limits appeal to questions oflaw and only to Supreme Court.
Facts: Before the creation o( the Sandiganbayan on December
10, 1978 by Pres. Decree No. 1486 (as amended by Pres. Decree
No. 1600.), all persons accused of malversation of public funds or
graft and corruption and estafa were entitled to review of a trial
court's judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals on all
questions of fact and law and thereafter by the Supreme Court also
on both questions of fact and law. This right to a review by two
appellate tribunals on both factual and legal issues was taken away
by Pres. Decree No. 1606. Thus, there is only one chance to appeal
conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court so that appeal as a
matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion
- appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law.
Issue: It is claimed, among others, that the Decree denies due
process. There is the allegation of uni:airness.
Held: (1) Justice is due to both accused and accuser. - "Much
is made of what is characterized as 'the tenor and thrust' of the
leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts.
(291 US 97 [1934].) Again, the citation cuts both ways. With his
usual felicitous choice of words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the
opinion, emphasized: 'The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in
maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of
procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend.
Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept
of a fair trial that could b~ acceptable to the thought of reasonable
men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may
be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to
the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must
not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true.' (Ibid., 122.)"
(2) Requirements of criminal due process. - "What is required for
compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings?
In Arnault vs. Pecson (87 Phil. 418 [1950]1 this Court, with Justice
Tuason as ponente, succinctly identified it with 'a fair and impartial
trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.'
(Ibid., 422.) In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied
if the accused is 'informed as to why he is proceeded against and
what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest
on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for
IJ
J\1{' 1,'. Ill. IHI.I , 0 11 l<JC I 1'1'8
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with
a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the
decision is one of competent jurisdiction." (Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan,
111 SCRA 433 [1982], through Chief Justice Fernando; see 'Escafio vs.
Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 429 [1988]; Mejia vs. Pamaran, 160 SCRA
457 [1988].)
12. Judge hearing criminal proceeding receives certain amount as fee
under a liquor statute.
Facts: The statute provides that no fee or costs shall be paid to
the judge except when the defendant is convicted.
Issue: Is the statute violative of due process?
Held: Pecuniary interest of the judge. - "The statute deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process ·of law as it subjects his
liberty or property to the judgment of the court which has a direct,
pe,sonal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him on his case. Because of the direct pecuniary interest of
the judge as to the outcome of each case and because of his official
motive to convict and to graduate the fines to help the financial
need of the village, no fair and impartial hearing could be given the
accused." (Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 [1927].)
13. A subordinate official and his superior differed in their points of
view.
Facts: An attempt is made by petitioner to demonstrate that an
affirmance of the appealed decision could be a denial of procedural
due process on the ground that the Commissioner of Customs
as well as the Court of Tax Appeals could not reverse what the
petitioner considered to be a finding of the then Collector of
Customs.
Issue: Does the difference of points of view sufficient to warrant
a finding of denial of due process?
Held: Substantial evidence to establish denial of due process. - "The
very concept of an appeal implies that the authority to which the
matter is elevated could, by an exercise of independent judgment,
reach the conclusion it did. The mere fact that there was a difference
of points of view between the subordinate and the official of a
higher category who can properly entertain such an appeal does
not suffice to warrant a finding of denial of due process. Only by a
 II 11
IJ "
1'1111 .ll'l ' I Nn l >NI ii 111 J I IUN/\ J. I.AW l ltw . I
IJdncl.plcs nnd t:oscil
showing that there was no substantial evidence could a due process
question be raised." (Raymundo vs. De Joya, 101 SCRA 495 [1980],
through ChiefJustice Fernando.)
14. Conclusions of court conflict with detailed factual findings.
Facts: The tenant was not ejected by the landowner but
voluntarily abandoned his landholding. Inspite of this clear finding
by the Court of Agrarian Relations, it ordered the reinstatement of
the tenant who, by his act of abandonment, severed his relationship
with the landlord.
Issue: Is the order of reinstatement violative of due process?
Held: Court acted with manifest unfairness. - "For the lower court
to make such detailed findings of fact and thereafter disregard with
impunity what as a consequence is required by law was to act with
manifest unfairness. There was denial of due process." (Rosello vs.
Reyes, 99 SCRA 1 [1980], through Chief Justice Fernando.)
15. Court, upon motion, dismissed a case instead of trying the factual
issues.
Facts: Plaintiff raised several factual issues in his complaint
which were traversed by the defendant. Its complaint shows on its
face a cause of action for damages. Upon a motion to dismiss, the
court dismissed the case.
Issue: Does the dismissal constitute a denial of due process?
Held: Issues offact cannot be decided without trial on the merits. -
"The dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a
denial of due process of law if from a consideration of the pleadings
it appears there are issues of fact which cannot be decided without
a trial of the case on the merits." (De Leon vs. Henson and Castaneda,
1 SCRA 1171 [1961], through Tustice Labrador; see Socorro vs. Vargas,
25 SCRA 592 119681; Republic vs. Cuaderno, 19 SCRA 671119671;
Camon vs. Abiera, 80 SCRA301 [19771.)
16. Court failed to consider all issues raised in the complaint.
Facts: The Court oflndustrial Relations dismissed the complaint
for reinstatement but did not rule anymore on the other money
claims of complainant.
IJ
/\ 1'{ 1'. Ill. 1111 ,l, U[l N.J ,11 l l
Due Pl'OCCSS of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
Issue: Does the failure of the court to rule on the other money
claims constitute a denial of due process?
Held: Yes. Duty of court to resolve all issues raised by a party. -
"The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all corltroversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The failure of the respondent court to
pass upon the monetary claims raised by the petitioner, amounted
to a disregard of such a -cardinal right embraced in due process,
namely, that the issues raised by a party should not be ignored
or left undecided, especially so, where the monetary claims were
timely .raised and insisted upon at all stages of the proceeding."
(Gracilla vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 25 SCRA 242 [1 968], through
Justice Fernando.)
17. Labor case was summarily resolved by Regional Director after
submission by parties of their position papers.
Facts: Petitioner claims that it was denied due process because
the assailed orders were rendered without benefit of hearing on a
factual issue not resolvable by summary investigation. The records
show, however, that following the practice and procedure before the
Regional Office, Ministry of Labor, the workers' complaint was set
for hearing where the parties were given opportunity to conciliate
their differences, after which they were required to submit positio:n
papers.
Issue: Did the Regional Director violate petitioner's right to' due ·
process?
Held: Issue raised did not involve intricate questions of law. -
"Another hearing on the complaint could be dispensed with
as, according to respondent Acting Director, '(T)he facts are not
substantially in dispute.' There is no violation of due process where
the Regional Director merely required submission of position
papers and resolved the labor case summarily thereafter against
the employer without submitting the case for arbitration. Summary
investigation and decision on the merits are proper where the
issues raised by the parties did not involve intricate questions of
law. What the law prohibits is the absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard." (Blue Bar Coconut Phils., Inc. vs. Minister of Labor, 174 SCRA
25 [19891, through Justice Padilla.)
 Ill
l'l lll.ll'!'IN H 'UN !-J'IT J'U'J'l N A J. 1.1\W !; '(,;, 1
Principles and Cases
18. Additional defendant was included in the execution stage.
Facts: By mere resolution changing the title of the case, the
Court of Appeals impleaded Gas an additional defendant in a case,
more than six (6) years after it had rendered judgment therein.
Issue: Was the inclusion of the additional defendant violative of
his right to due process?
Held: Judgment had become final and executory. - "The resolution
was null and void for lack of jurisdiction, which ceased after the
judgment had become final and executory. Impleading G as an
additional defendant in the execution stage of the case violated his
right to due process." (Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. vs. Canada,
165 SCRA 207 [1988], through Justice Griiio-Aquino.)
. 19. I! ~s claimed that_ the law in_ question does not provide the people
with sufficient opportunity to be informed of proposed constitutional
amendments.
Facts: R.A. No. 4913 fixed the details of the date and manner
of .s:u,b~tting proposed amendments to the people for their
ratification.
Issue: One of the issues is whether the measures provided by
the law are sufficient, from a constitutional standpoint, to inform
the people of the amendments sought to be made.
Held: (1) Sufficient opportunity to be informed provided by law. -
"An examination of the provisions of the law shows no violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution. The publication in
the Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting
of notices in public building not later than October 14, 1967, to
remain posted until after the elections, the placing of copies of the
proposed amendments in the polling places, aside from printing
the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to
the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal."
(2) No guarantee that opportunity given will in fact, be availed of
- "Due process refers only to providing fair opportunity; it does
not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of;
that is the look-out of the voter and the responsibility of the citizen.
As l~n? as fair and reasonable opportunity to be informed is given,
and 1! ~s, the due process cause is not infringed. Non-printing of the
prov1s10ns to be amended as they now stand, and the printing of the
full proposed amendments at the back of the ballot instead of the
substance thereof at the face of the ballot do not deprive the voter
J
~ ', ,I A l, (J'. 11 l. IHL, L 11 l{ l ta I m
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
of fair opportunity to be informed." (Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, 21 SCRA 774 [1967/, concurring opinion of Justice Bengzon.)
Other cases where there is denial
of procedu~al due process.
Due process was held denied in the following cases:
(1) Where an application for probation was denied before the
applicant was given a chance to be heard and to present evidence
in support of her application (Cabatingos vs. Sandiganbayan, 102
SCRA 187 [1981].);
(2) Where a mortgage is cancelled before the mortgagee was
heard (In re Nicanor T. Santos, 102 SCRA 747 [1981].);
(3) Where claimant for workmen's compensation was not given
notice and the Workmen's Compensation Commission ign ored his
claim of denial of due process (Capinpin vs. WCC, 103 SCRA 270
[1981].);
(4) Where the proclamation of a winning candidate was set
aside without due notice and hearing (Jagunap vs. Commission on
Elections, 104 SCRA204 [1981).);
(5) Where the COMELEC relied on its handwriting experts
without affording petitioner the chance to refute their opinions
(Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 105 SCRA 250 [1981).);
(6) Where plaintiff's complaint was precipitately dismissed '
in an order that is plainly deficien t in cogency and plausib ility,
showing that the plaintiffs were not accorded,, their full day in court
(Negros District Conference, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA
i '
i 458 [1981).);
,.
(7) Where the judge did not hold a hearing and allowed the
case to proceed on the basis of the evidence submitted by the private
I .
respondent (Salandanan vs. Tuzon, 62 SCRA 338 [1975].);
(8) Where a party or his counsel was not given notice of p re-
trial (Loquias vs. Rodriguez, 65 SCRA 659 [1975}.);
(9) Where the right to appeal is granted by statute and it is
denied (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 144 [1977]; see Nunez
vs. Sandiganbay an, 111 SCRA433 [1982}.);
 I II
1'1111.IJll ' I N I~ l U N/ ii 111 J I IU N/\ 1. J./\W
• l'rlnclplcfl nncl CoAcfl
(10) Where a motion for postponement is based on serious
ailment of counsel and consent to postponement of opposing
counsel is justified, but the motion is denied (Amberti vs. Court
of Appeals, 89 SCRA 240 [1979].); and where a timely and well~
founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal or acquittal is arbitrarily denied without giving the State
a day in court especially where no substantial right of the accused
would be prejudiced by setting aside said order (People vs. Navarro
63 SCRA 264 [1975); People vs. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 [1997].);
(11) Where counsel was absent a~the hearing of a case because
of ambiguity in the notice of hearing which was conducted without
counsel (Salofiga vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 665 [1979).);
(12) Where a Presidential Assistant renders a decision concur-
ring with the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission
which he heads (Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 SCRA 353 [1982]; see Zam-
bales Chromite vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261 [1979].);
(13) Where the labor arbiter schecluled a complaint for hearing
and heard the same before the answer was filed (M.F. Violago Oiler
Tank Trucks vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 117 SCRA
544 [1982].); . Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 481 [1967].);
(14) Where the judge denied the first postponement requested
and ordered the premature dismissal of petitioner's claim (Davao
Light & Power Co., Inc. vs. Canizares-Nye, 116 SCRA312 [1982].);
(15) Where the trial court proceeded to hear evidence of the
mortgage creditor ex parte despite absence of petitioner who was ill
and refused to allow her to cross-examine witnesses (Policarpio vs.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 51 [1984].);
(16) Where the resolution disqualifying a candidate was issued
without benefit of a hearing, the resolution b eing in the nature of
summary adjudication on the pleadings, consisting only of the
petition for disqualification, its annexes, and the petitioner's answer,
for there must be an actual hearing of the case where respondent's
defenses can be "fully presented and assessed" (Iturriaga vs.
Commission on Elections, 136 SCRA 247 [1985].);
(17) Where the petitioner was denied a chance to present
evidence even after satisfactorily explaining its absence at the pre-
trial hearing and the opportunity to regain its s tanding in court
Ill! I
A I{ I', 111. UI I ,I , l )JI 1rn. : 1 J'J'l-J 24'/
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
(Continental Leaf Tobacco [Phils.], Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 140 SCRA269 [1985).);
(18) Where, the petitioner was not given the opportunity to
elevate to the Supreme Court the question of jurisdiction (Averia, Jr.
vs. Coquioa,.146 SCRA 459 [1980].);
(19) Where a civil case for damages was dismissed without
giving the petitioner the opportunity to submit evidence in support
of her. allegation (Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 597
[1987].);
(20) Where arraignment was made in absentia for actual
arraignment of the accused is a matter of due process (Nolasco vs.
Emile, 139 SCRA 302 [1985] .);
(21) Where an action is dismissed upon motion, where from a
consideration of the pleadings it appears that there are issues of fact
which ~annot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits (De
Leon vs. Henson, 1 SCRA 1171 [1961].);
(22) Where a judgment is rendered against a surety in an
injunction bond without notice to the surety (People's Security &
(23) Where the trial court orders the testimony of a vital witness
stricken off the records when it appears that the failure of said
witness to appear on the day set for continuation of her testimony
was due to justifiable circumstances (Espeleta vs. Aquino, 62 SCRA·.
395 [1975). ); .
(24) Where the order of the Public Service Commission
prescribing public utility rates was issued upo'n an ex parte motion
without giving the party adversely affected an opportunity to
oppose it and present its side of the question (Manila Electric
Co. vs. Medina, 14 SCRA 510 [1965].); and where the National
Telecommunications Commission fixed a tempor ary rate pending
determination of the application of a public service communications
company without notice and hearing as required by Section 16(c} of
the Public Service Act (Philippine Communications Satellite Corp.
vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA218 [1989].);
(25) Where the occupants of units in a condominium, social-
ized housing project, or apartment pay, under an ordinance, gar-
bage fees twice the rates being charged occu pants of lots when there

PJ Ill ,ll ' l ' I NI! NI ii 11 U 11 J'NA I, L A W
Pdnclples nnd CftACS
is no substantial distinction between them. ·(Ferrer, Jr. vs. Bautista
760 SCRA 652 [2015].) · '
. (26) Where the award for workmen's compensation was made
m ~e absence of records showing the factual or legal basis for such
outright award (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Maniego 84
SCRA 630 [1978].); ' vs. Commission on Elections, 104 SCRA 204 [1981].);
(27) Where the petitioner was declared in default for his
Ia~yer's ten-minut~ delay, for courts should not be obsessively
stnct over the occasional lapses of litigants (Africa vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 188 SCRA586 [1990].);
(28) Where workers had failed to establish their claims
before the Labor Arbiter because access to the evidence needed
for that purpose was under the absolute control of the employer
(Independent Sagay-Escalante Planters, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 207 SCRA 218 [1992].);
. (29) Where. the :-vrit _of. execution ·is not in harmony with
a Judgment ~h!ch gives _it hfe and exceeds it. The writ has pro
tanto . n? vahd1ty. _T? mamtam otherwise would be to ignore the
co_nshtuhonal provision agai~st depriving a person of his property
without due process (Matugumai Incorporated Wood Products, Inc.
vs. <;:ourt of Appeals, 263 SCRA 490 [1996].);
(30) Where a writ of execution was issued against one who was
not imple~ded as a party to the case and not accorded his day in
court (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 370 SCRA 208 [2001].);
. (31) Where the adverse court ruling was attributable to the
mexcusable negligence of appellate counsel (Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. vs. Goimco, Sr,, 476 SCRA 361 [2005].); and
(32) Where a municipal ordinance recommended the closure
transfer of a gasoline filling station maintaining that the same was
less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church
but the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the
distance. (Parayno vs. Jovellanos, 495 SCRA 85 (2006].)
. (33) Where electric service was immediately disconnected
without due prior written notice (as required by Sec. 4, R.A. No.
7832~ to _the person affected, such disconnection being a form of
depnva~10n of p~operty without due process of law. (Quisumbing
vs. Manila Electric Company, 380 SCRA 195 [2002]; Manila Electric
Company vs. Castillo, 688 SCRA455 [2013].)
A I( I 111 1111 I t II I It I i ,I I I l
IJ11l' 111Ot'l'lltt ol Lttw
13. Procedural Due Process
Other cases where there is no denial
of procedural due process.
There was no denial of due process:
(1) Where the losing candidate was notified of the opening of
ballot bbxes and recount and recanvass of election returns (Jagunap
(2) Where a party who has knowledge of and holds a document
that would bring out the'truth as to a given situation withholds such
document (San Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Ancheta, 108 SCRA 695
[1981].);
(3) Where the National Labor Relations Commission decided
a labor dispute without giving the company a chance to submit the
case for arbitration as provided by law, where the company was
given a chance to be heard, and to refer the case to an arbitrator would
only unduly delay its final disposition (San Miguel Corporation vs .
Secretary of Labor, 64 SCRA 56 [1975].);
(4) Where, although the provincial government of Lopez was
not included as party respondent, the respondent Governor and
Provincial Treasurer are charged in their official capacity, since its
inclusion was a mere formality and furthermore, the respondents
were represented by the Provincial Attorney (Balquidra vs. Court of
First Instance, 80 SCRA 123 [1974].);
(5) Where the petitioner was ordered to pay backwages
allegedly in disregard of the proof submitted by it that it had already
closed to do business in the face of stubbornness on its part to
refuse compliance with what the law requires (()mmunity Sawmill
Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 89 SCRA 164 [1979].);
• (6) Where the trial court issued its' order granting .a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court in the
ejectment case, on the basis of the evidence then submitted after the
parties agreed to the resolution of the said motion without further
hearing (Umali vs. Cruz, 101 SCRA510 [1980].);
(7) Where the law (Pres. Decree No. 1472.) requires proper
notice of ejectment to the squatters or illegal occupants concerned
either by the personal service or by posting the same in the lot, or
door of the apartment, as the case may be, at least 10 days before
his scheduled ejectment from the premises, which has been amply
 1' 1111.ll'l'I NI! l t >N !1 111 lJ I IU Nl"\ 1. LAW
Principles 11nd Coses
complied with in the case of the petitioners (Mendoza vs. National
Housing Authority, 111 SCRA 637 [1982].);
(8) Where the Regional Director merely required submission of
a position paper and resolved the labor case summarily thereafter
against the employer without submitting the case for arbitration
(Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 257
[1982].);
(9) Where the claim of denial of due-process is belied by the
records (Cruz vs. Minister ot Labor and Employment, 120 SCRA 15
[1983].);
(10) Where the decision is based on evidence adduced at the
hearing or at least contained on the record (Provincial Chapter of
Laguna, N.P. vs. Commission on Elections, 122 SCRA 423 [1983].);
(11) Where the petitioner received notice of the scheduled
summary investigation a day before the hearing date and it failed
to present evidence (Marvel Building Corp. vs. Ople, 122 SCRA 405
[1983).);
(12) Where no manuscript of stenographic notes was sub-
mitted by the Board of Investigators but the decision of the Police
Commission shows that both complainant and respondent were
given the opportunity to be heard by the board and to adduce their
respective evidence, which were duly considered and taken into
account in its decision (Police Commission vs. Load, 127 SCRA 757
[1984).);
(13) Where the labor court adopted the report of the hearing
officer thereof (Alba Patio de Makati vs. APM Employees
Association, 128 SCRA 253 [1984].);
(14) , Where the actioh is a class suit and judgment is rendered
against all parties within that class even if not expressly impleaded
(Ernesto vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA347 [1984).);
(15) Where the declaration of default by the parties was
brought about by their own inaction (Paredes vs. Court of Appeals,
132 SCRA 501 [1984).);
(16) Where petitioner's failure to adduce evidence was due to
her counsel's manifestation to waive presentation of evidence and to
adopt the recorded testimony and evidence in the other annulment
case (Aquino vs. Navarro, 135 SCRA 361 [1985].);
! l '\.-' , I /\ I{ I', 111. Ul l,I , U 11 I{ I : I I I tJ ?!H
Due Process of Law
B. Procedural Due Process
(17) Where th_e COMELEC failed to notify the defeated party
of the date fixed 'for promulgation of its decision but the party
later asked-. for a reconsideration of said decision (Pimpong vs.
Commission on Elections, 140 SCRA 192 [1985].);
(18) Where the employer's failure to be heard was due to the
various postponements granted to it and failure to reply to the
union's successive letters to bring the company to the bargaining
table (I<iok Loy vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 141
SCRA 179 [1980).);
(19) Where the defendants actually received the summons and
copies of the complaint, although service thereof may be defective
but which was corrected by the court (Cariaga, Jr. vs. Malaya, 143
SCRA441 [1980].);
(20) Where the petitioner wrote the COMELEC three (3) letter
petitions questioning his opponent's qualifications but did not ask
for a formal hearing of the case so that he could present testimonial
evidence and the COMELEC found on the basis of the documents he
had attached, that there was no sufficient factual basis for the charge
(De Leon vs. Commission on Elections, 129 SCRA 117 (1984].);
(21) Where the adverse parties were given the opportunity
to file a motion for reconsideration of an order which was issued
pursuant to a petition filed without prior notice to them as the
failure to give notice had been cured (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, 72
SCRA 388 [1970].);
(22) Where, even though no hearing was conducted, a party
was given a chance to explain or present his _side or an opportunity
to be heard (Associated Citizens Bank vs. Ople, 103 SCRA 130 [1981];
Tajonera vs. Lamoraza, 110 SCRA 438 (1981]; Superior Concrete
Products, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 82 SCRA
270 [1978]; Victoria Milling Co., Inc. vs. Ong Su, 79 SCRA207 [1978];
Unson III vs. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183 [1980]; Pantranco North
Express, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 126 SCRA
526 [1983); Divine Word High School vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 143 SCRA 346 (1980]; Ong, Sr. vs. Paul, 156 SCRA 768
[1987]; In re Atty. Asoy, 152 SCRA45 [1987].);
(23) Where the decision of the labor arbiter is supported by
substantial evidence though received ex parte because of failure of
252 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
petitioner to attend scheduled hearings (St. Michael Security Service
vs. Inciong, 85 SCRA207 [1978].);
(24) Where notices of proceedings and the judgment of the court
were sent to counsel of record and they were returned unclaimed,
for such fact should not militate_against putting an end to a litigation
(Vda. de Mintu vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 353 [1980).);
(25) Where adverse judgment was attributable to counsel's
faulty mismanagement of the case or his negligence and incom-
petence. As a general proposition, a client is bound by the mistakes
of his counsel (Que vs. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980).);
(26) Where the complaining party caused the delay in the
disposition of the case by many motions for postponement and
by his failure to appear during the scheduled hearing despite due
notice (Estrella vs. Court of Appeals, 1!2 SCRA 613 [1989).);
(27) Where the judge who wrote the decision did not hear the
case for while it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing
would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the
testimonies of witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge
who was not present during the trial court cannot render a valid
and just decision since the latter can also rely on the transcribed
stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision
(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56 [1992]; Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corp. vs. Gobonseng, Jr., 496 SCRA 305 [2006].); and
(28) Where the accused was able to testify on his own behalf,
and though he was unable to adduce additional documentary
evidence that he claims would establish his innocence, he had
sought postponements and cancellations of the hearings for not less
than 40 times, from the date of assignment to the promulgation of
judgment. (Maliwat vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 718 [1996].)
Note: Rulings on the right of the accused to due process in
criminal cases are given under Section 14.
(29) There is no provision in R.A. No. 7653 (new Central Bank
Act) nor section in the procedures o f tlw 131111,c-:ko Sentral 11g Pili1iinns
(BSP) that shows that the BS I' iMn •q1iin•d 1'<1 give banks copies of
Reports of Examinati.o n of b,111ki11g i1111lill1liom1. I l11dt•r llw lnw,
the "close now, he,,r l,1lc•r" d111111111· (i.,•., 11,111dio11 11f d11111m• ,·v1•n
wilh1111I nolic,• ,ind l11•,11 l11)'.l 1'1 1•,1u1111d1•cl 1111 pr,11 lk,il ,11111 1<•1•,,il
1·11111,icl1•r111l1111•1 111 p u •v,·111 111m ,111.111lc•cl el l, •,ip,1t l1111 of 1111• li1111h.
Sec. 1
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 253
Due Process of Law
C. Substantive Due Process
nssets and as a valid exercise of police power for the protection of
public interest. (BSP Monetary Board vs. Valenzuela, 602 SCRA 698
12010].)
C. SUBSTANTNE DUE PROCESS
Requirement of valid law or act.
Due process is both a procedural and a substantive guarantee.
Viewed in its substantive aspect, due process of law requires that
llie law in question affecting life, liberty, or property be valid (i.e.,
the law, is within the power of the law-making body to enact or
llw act in question is done under the authority of such a law or the
< 'onstitution) and is reasonable and not arbitrary in its operation.
If all that the guarantee requires is observance of proper
procedure, then the protection it assures to life, liberty, and property
liPcomes illusory since any exercise of arbitrary power cannot be
, 111cstioned provided such observance can be shown. Thus, it is a
11n 1tcction not only against the arbitrary exercise of lawful power
I11 tl also against the exercise, albeit the procedure prescribed by law
wo~; followed, of arbitrary power.
( l) A tax which is imposed for a private purpose constitutes a
I.ti ing of property without due process as it is beyond the authority
111 lhe legislature to levy. (see Preamble.) There is still a denial of
•1111>s tnntive due process even if the law provides for a notice and
lw,11-ing in the assessment and collection of the tax. The reason is
1l,,11 lax can be imposed only for a public purpose (e.g., construction
111 I111blic school buildings, promotion of science, payment of salaries
, II gowrnme nt officials and employees, etc.).
(2) J ,ikcwisc, the taking of property for private use or without
11,1y 1111•nl of just compensation offends substantive due process. (see
',, ,, ·. tJ, i1(lhr.)
r 1) A s l,1tult• 1·hat imposes excessive fines, or authorizes the
11
!1tlll11 ll1111 of 1Tttl'I, dq~rnding or: inhuman punishment" (Sec. 19.),
111• prnvid1'.Y impriso1111wnl for debt or non-payment of poll tax (Sec.
'0 ), or, in ,111y w,1y, d1•11i1•11 or ntrl.,iils n person's substantive right
r,11,11,111h·1·d l11 A rlic·h• Ill d1•11it"1dill' pron•ss of ln w.
(•I) A •,l.11111,, wlili li 1•lllw1° p1·11liiliil1o or n•q11i1·1•11 1·li1• doJng of
1
,111 111 I 111 l1•111Pt 1111 vo1g11,· 11,,it 1111•11 111 , 111111111111 i11ll'llig1•11n• m11s l
 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 255
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1 Due Process of Law
Principles and Cases C. Substantive Due Process

(a) Where the right is granted by statute, as it has, in fact,

111•,·cssarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
been established by statute, its denial, in the absence of waiver,
viol..tes due process. (Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
would deprive the accused of the full measure of his right,
I 1.S. ~85.) Thus, a statute which provided that it would be a criminal
to due process and render void a criminal progecution. It is
1111'1•11sc for a state railway company to run on "insufficient" number
not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right,
of cars to accommodate passengers.without "crowding" was held
a component part of substantive due process in the adminis-
void because the quoted words were considered indefinite and
11111·1•rl:nin. (United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592, tration of criminal justice accorded the accused before trial. The
accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged
lH /\m . Cas. 68.) The accused should have notice as to the nature of
1111 • <·1md uct forbidden or required. Thus, the statute also violates anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense.
11 r,11·1•durnl due process. Thus, this right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to
any one, save perhaps to hardened criminals, is a valuable right.
Hluht to preliminary investigation (Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 158 [1992]; Matalam vs.
as part of due process. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736 [2005].)
/lrdillli11ary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine (b) The lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground
wl11•tl11!r t·hcre is sufficient grow1d to engender a well-founded belief to quash or dismiss a complaint or information as it does
tli,11 ,1 lTime has been committed and the respondent is probably not impair its validity; much less does it affect the court's
guilty thereof, and should be h eld for trial.1 (Rules of Court, Rule jurisdiction. (Kilusang Bayan, etc. vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92
11 ;>, Sl'c. I.) It is thus merely inquisitorial to determine whether [1992]; Budiongan, Jr. vs. De la Cruz, Jr., 502 SCRA 626 [2006].)
tlwn· i~: a probable cause. The prosecutor does not determine the Under the Rules of Court, the respondent is given the right to
1•.11111 or innocence of the accused, but whether the offender should submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents and
I,., l wld for trial or be released. to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant. (Rule
112, Sec. 3[b, c] thereof.) This right may be waived.
{I) f{i:,:J,t purely statutonJ - The right to preliminary inves-
llr.111 Ion lll'forc being bound over to trial for an offense is also purely (c) If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is
r1J.1t11fory (Mal'inns vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423 [1981].), rather than flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order an
, 1111•ilil11fio11nl, and like the right to appeal, the law may validly investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the
p1•·1o1·ril•l' limit·otions or qualifications thereto. (Maranaw Hotel criminal cases in abeyance. In the absence of arbitrariness, its
lfr•1orl ( 'orp. vs. Notional Labor Relations Commission, 238 SCRA judgment shall be sustained. (Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
I11(111 '''"' I.) 627 [1993].)
(d) The right to preliminary investigation is not available
1/\ 1•1t•ll1111t1111 y lnve~lig,,lion seek!! lo ens ure that probable criminals are prosecuted, during the preliminary examination which refers to the requisite
1111 lh1• 11111• 11111111, ,111d on tlw oth c1; the innocent am spared from baseless prosccuHon. proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search
( 11111, Jr v11 M11h111fo11, l•HH SCR/\,20:l l201 3l.) Unlike the highcrqunnlum of pmofbcyoncl
11·,1· 1111.1l•h· doubt lo t-1•, un• ,, ,•rnwlclion, it it; llw lower slnnclnrd of probable cnusc which
wmrnnl. (s(~e Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sec. 3.)
1,, •'1'1'11,.,1 d111 In,-, 1111• p11·hmi11,11 y l11 v,·•1ll!j11ll11n to cleh•rminc wlwllwr 1h,· 1wc11~1•d nho uld (2.) Waiv<'r ,/ rig!,/. - The rule is that the right to preliminary
111• 11,•lol 1111 1, 1,,1 'l'ltl1111l,11Hl,1rd i•. 1111•1 If llw f.u 1•1 1111,I C'i rcum~t.mr•,•q l11rll1• a l't•n•11111rtbl1J
l•lllh•I 111111 111.. .,l'I Ill' 111111•,••lt111 '111111•l,1l11i,d "' I 01111fll11hu1 tit,• nffl'lllll' ,•hn1)),(·tl. (NIii• lnVl' ,ligalion iH wnivC'd when the accused fails to invoke it before
Mh ,,. 1111 I 1111•111 ,1111111 v11 I lw,11111, 111>11 •11 HA ,i:111 l,'IMl'•l,l 111 ullwr wn1,l-i, 1111ly 111/,,111 111• al tlu• li111L' of 1•11ll'ri11~ n pica nt orrnignment. It is waived by the
/11t 1,• Pvhl11111 ,. 1-o 11·,pth,·ol l 11111 .,,,. 11,1ll1 n1; •,11/ ••c l<A 7}'1 j.'OOH l,l '1It,· d,;1i,1mh mlln11
p1111fIng of hail l,111 11111 wlil'I'<' tlw .1Cl'uscd daimcd also the right, and
111 1•1111•,1lol1• , ,1111,,• 111 ,...,.,,111,111\ ,111 , ,, • 1111\1• 111111111111 l11tl ~1••d 111 tl w 111111 pl.u" 1111 1lt,•
••••••• 11111, 1vli11 •11111111• 1, o1 1111 I''' 11111111111 1111,•,,11 1111111111 , ("tu, y11 1,,.,,. '/.' 1 !lt l<A '>IJ th1• ,11 r11ir,111111•11I 1111d I rl,1( pron•1•ded ,1g,1i11sl his objection. (Go vs.
I •111 I( I 1111• 111:l,1 111 • 11t111 • I 1>o 11111 th 11\'u 11111'•' •••111,• 111 •11l111l11hl1 ,1ll1 " 1,,..,, ..,11,1,1111111•1
IA11111t\'ll1111111 1111111•11111111\111111 I~, ....,, •11•,· HA •1 1•111 II I
I '11111 I 111 AppP.al11, ••/1/1111.)
 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
No vested property right in existing law,
judicial doctrine, or judicial relief.
(1) Existing law subject to amendment or repeal. - Subject to the
pmhibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts (Sec.
10.), "there can be, in th~ nature of things, no vested property right
111 on existing law which would preclude its amendment or repeal."
(Marquez vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 47 Phil. 701 [1925].)
(a) For example, the right of taxpayers subject to value-
udded taxes (VAT) to credit input tax against the output tax is
d early a privilege created by law, a privilege that also the law
1·nr1 limit or even remove. (Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita,
r169 SCRA 1 [2005].)
(b) For the same reason, the fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigant's rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. Such application
iH not violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected; nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. (Atienza
VH . 13rillantes, 243 SCRA 32 [1995]; Cabalit vs. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 180236, January 17, 2012.)
(2) Judicial doctrine subject to modification or reversal ln; Supreme
·1111rl. - Neither can there be a vested right in a judicial doctrine
wliit.:h would prohibit its modification or reversal by the Supreme
<'ou rt. .H.e nce, it is not a violation of due process that the Supreme
<'011rt, for example, has reversed an earlier decision, or adopted a
drnngc in the interpretation of a law (or even that its decision upon
" qui:Hlion of law is found to be wrong). "There is no constitutional
righl lo have all general propositions of law once adopted remain
1111r hnngccl." (Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454; American R.
l•:xpn'HH Co. v. Kentucky, 273 U.S. 269.)
(:I) Judiciaf relief uot a right but a mere statutory privilege. - There
1·,111 alHo lw no vested right in n judicin) relief for thiH is a mere
r1l,1l11lory privil1 1gl' and nol .i propNly rig ht. Persons hnvc no Vl.!Htcd
l'lr,lil u 111 ~11,11111.ury privilt•i•,<'N.
Ad l1,l l111•I11111 11111•11 1H•I1111111 • 111 111 Ii II I '11'1 w1•<•n hl,1t 11tory privi 11•1•,1•
u11d v1"1ti-d 1•l11li1•1. 'I Ii,• 1 ,1,,11• 111,1v I l1,111r,1• ur t,d,1• 11w,1y right11 whld,
Wllll' 111•,11t•d l,y l11 w, 11lll1n11r,l1 ti 11111\' 11111,.,h.1 1 11w,,y p111pl'l'ly whh 1li
w1111 v1•11ll'd l,y v Ii I111• 111 1111 Ii , 11•,lil11 I h•,1ld1•,i, 11 II' 11ght lu l11dli l111
Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 257
Due Process of Law
C. Substantive Due Process
relief is not a right which may constitute vested right because to be
vested, a right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the
present or future enjoyment of property, or to the pres,ent or future
enforcement of a demand or legal exemption from a demand made
by another. (United Paracale Mining Co. vs. Dela Rosa, 221 SCRA
108 [1993).) It is a right that has become definitely fixed and thus, is
no longer subject to question or controversy.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Petitioner claims that the municipal ordinances under which he is being
charged are ambiguous and uncertain and, therefore, unconstitutional, or
in any event, are not applicable to him.
Facts: The petitioner (P) was charged with violation of certain
municipal ordinances. By way of confession and avoidance,
P would admit having committed the acts charged but would
claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their
constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any event. The
salient portions thereof are quoted below:
"Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places
within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a
municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond or
part thereof per annum." (Ordinance No. 4.)
XXX
"Sec. l(a). For the convenience of those who have or
owners or managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of
this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative
thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting
from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of
Fisheries." (Ordinance No. 15.)
XXX
"Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places
within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal
lox in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof
/11'1' 11111111111 beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fiHhpond 14l,1rlt•d opt·rnling before the year 1964." (Ordinance
No. t;>,)
'I Ill' liirll 11hj1•111irn1 ll'h•1•1; 111 lilt' onli11,111c1•:,; !wing .illcgedly
"11111h1g11111111 ,111d 111111•1 l.1111 " '1111· ,,l'l illorll'r' 1'1111ll'1HI!; th.ii being

J'lll 1' 1111 , ll ' l ' IN II l I l N/ 11 111 J 111 JNA1. I AW 111 ,
• l 1fodplt•1J 1111d 'nses
1
a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said
ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains
that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment:
Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence
payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date
said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." Ordinance
No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues ''beginning and taking
effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before
the year 1964."
Issue: Are the municipal ordinances in question unconstitu-
tional?
Held: (1) Vague statute or act is unconstitutional. - "As a rule, a
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men' of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (a) it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (b) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle."
(2) Act must be utterly vague on its face. - "But the act must
be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by
either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City
of Cincinnati (402 U.S. 611 [1971].), ~he U.S. Supreme Court struck
down an ordinance that had made it illegal for ' three or more
persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves
in a manner annoying to persons passing by.' Clearly, the ordinance
imposed no standard at all 'because one may never know in
advance what annoys some people but does not annoy others.'
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague'
act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished,
however, from legislation couched in imprecise language - but
which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased
- in which case, it may be 'saved' by proper construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are appar-
ently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities.
In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever di-
rected against such activities. In Parker v. Levy (17 U.S. 733 (1974].),
a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military
Justice (prohibiting, specifically, 'conduct unbecoming an officer
I\ I~ I 111 1111 I I I I I'I I , I I I I
I
I ) lit' 1'1 Ull'H'l ul I ,llW
C. Substantive Due Process
and gentleman'), the defendant, an army office~ who had ur~ed his
men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces_ trained to
fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to mvo~~ the
void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted m1htary
interpretation and practice had provided enou_gh stan?a~ds, ,~nd
consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was 1mperm1ss1ble.
(3) Ordinances are not tainted with vagueness. - "In no way may
the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness.
It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant
falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds,
he comes within the term 'manager.' He does not deny the fact
that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish
fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maint~in
them. While it appears that it is the National Government which
owns them, the Government never shared in the profits they had
generated. It is, therefore, only logical that he shoulders the burden
of tax under the said ordinances. x x x
-Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds
in question, and as the recipient of profits brought_ a_bout by ~e
business, the appellant is clearly liable for the ~uruc1?al taxes m
questions. He cannot say that he did not have a £arr notice of such a
liability to make such ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment.
There is no merit to the claim that the imposition of tax has to
depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (~ee y~ars
after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of F1shen~s),
and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond st~t:d _o~erating '
before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain ind1v1dual or
individuals. Ordinance No. 15, in making t}:le tax payable 'after
the lapse of three (3) years starti1:g ~r?m the ~ate said fishpond is
approved by the Bureau of Fisheries, 1s u~eqmvocal about the d_ate
of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckorung
liability thereunder 'beginning and taking effect from the year 1964
if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964,' does not
give rise to any ambiguity. x x x
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough
standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards
are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the
intent of the said ordinances."
(4) Ordinances are not ex post facto measures. - "The next
inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto
 IJ
I ' I 111 , 11 ' 1' I N H l t JNI I I I I U I It )NA I, I.A W
• Pi:ln lplcti nnd '00c1:1
measures. The appellant argues that they are: 'Amendment No. 12
passed on September19, 1966,'clearly pmv.ides &at the payment of
the imposed: tax shall begin and take effect in the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964. In other words, it
penalizes acts or events occurring before its1passage, that is to say,
1964 and even prior thereto.' ... •
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor
General notes, 'Municipal Ordinance Np. 4 was passed on May
14, 1955. Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under
Ordinance No. 12.) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964)
since the reckoning period is 1955 (date· of enactment). Essentially,
Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures
intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the
original act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed.
· Moreov_er, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since
1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No.
12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we
have noted, it operates to
grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955
and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective
one."' (People vs. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 [1988], through Justice
Sarmiento.)
Requisites to justify State's interference
in behalf of the public.
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority fu.behalf
of the public (i.e., to make the question!;id law or government act
valid), in the exercise of police power (infra, under Sec'. 9), requires
the concurrence of a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method .
of accomplishing the goal. In more familiar words, it must appear:
(1) Requirement of public interest. -First, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require such interference. In this particular, a large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the
interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for
the protection of such interests. But the legislature may not, under
the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as
to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or
condusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts; and
I ' I\ •, I t!l I A l I Ill 1111 ,1, \111 l{ ll,111
Uuc J11·oc:~111J of Lnw
C. Substantive Due Prncess
(2) Requirement of reasonableness. - Second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly.oppressive upon individuals. (U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil.
85 [1910]; Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 S'CRA 659
[1987).) This requirement implies that the interference is neither
arbitrary nor reasonable in its consequences.2
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:3
1. Law extinguishes all mortgages and other liens attaching to the
assets of a bankrupt company.
Facts: Pres. Decree No. 1717 ordered the rehabilitation of the
Agrix Group of Companies to be administered by the National
Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for filing
claims against the Agrix companies (which are privately-owned)
and created a committee on claims to process these claims. Section
4(1)_of the decree provided, among others, that all mortgages and
other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved
corporations are hereby extinguished."
The respondent is a mortgage creditor of one of Agrix compa-
nies which went bankrupt. In defending the decree, the petitioners
2
1n this connection, it has been stated by the highest authority in the United States
that: '
"x xx. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.
XXX
:r So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction, a state is free to. adopt whatever economic policy may rea-
sonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or,
when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discrimi-
natory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court fimctus officio. x x x." (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 US 502, 537 (1934);
see People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972).)
Another authority states the principle thus:
"x xx. Too much significance cannot be given to the word 'reasonable' in con-
side.ring the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used
to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to
inquire whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the
Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such
rights. xx x." (Ibid., cited in Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 195 [1957], infra.)
3
0n substantive due process.
 1•111111 1 11 r1 1 1 11~ 1•, 11 11 111 1 •11 w t,
111h H 1,1[1'11 HIii I l 'IIIU'H
I I J1111 1 11111°11'1 111 I IIW
argue that the properly rights, like all rights, are subject lo regula-
tion under the police power for the promotion of the·common wel-
fare.
Issue: The issue is whether the interests of the public are
sufficiently involved to warrant interference of the government
with the private contracts of Agrix. • engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade.
Held: No. The decree is an invalid exercise of police power (see
Sec. 9.) not being in conformity with the,tf.a ditional requbrements of
a lawful object and lawful method.
(1) There is no public interest involved. - "The decree speaks
vaguely of the 'public, particularly the small investors,' who would
,be prejudiced.if the -corporation were not to be assisted. However,
the record does :not state how many there are of such investors,
an,;:l who they are, and why they are be~g preferred to the private
respondent and other creditors with v_ested property rights.
The public interest supposedly involved is not identified or
explained. The indispensable link to the welfare of the greater
number has not been established. On the contrary, it would appear
that the decree was issued to favor only a special group of investors
who, for reasons not given, have been preferred to the legitimate
creditors of Agrix."
(2) Means employed are oppressive. - "Assuming there is a
valid public interest involved, the Court still finds that the means
employed to rehabilitate Agrix fall far short of the requirement that
they shall not be unduly oppressive. The right to property in all
mortgages, liens, interests, penalties and charges owing to creditors
of Agrix is arbitrarily destroyed. No consideration is paid for the
extinction of mortgage rights. the accrued interests and other
charges are simply rejected by the decree. the right to property is
dissolved by legislative fiat without regard to the private interest
violated and, worse, in favor of another private interest. Private
property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given
to another without compensation and any known public purpose.
(see Sec. 9.) This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under
the Constitution.
the extinction of the mortgage and other Hens and of the
interests and other charges pertaining to the legitimnto crodlLt,1· of
Agrix constitutes taking of 'properly without clue p 1'0C('tltl or lnw,"
(National Development Company vs. Fhilippi11e Vt /1•n 11111 llrt1tA', I 1/J
SCRA 257 [1990), through Justice Cmz.)
I I 1( 1 I ll 11111 1 11 111 , 111 I I I
1
V, /, 111 111111111lv1• IJ11t• l'1t H'<'llll
2. Law excludes aliens from the retail trade.
Facts: R.A. No. 1180 entitled "An Act to regulate \he retail
business," in effect, nationalizes the retail trade business. Among
others, it prohibits persons, not citizens of the Philippines, from
Issue: Is the exclusion of aliens from the retail trade unreason-
able, arbitrary; and capricious?
Held: No. (1) Test of reasonableness of law. - "Taking into account
the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which aliens
have heretofore engaged therein, the law in question is deemed
absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective,
i.e., to free the national economy from alien control and dominance.
It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights
and privileges.
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or
adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out
its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the disputed legislation,
which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness."
(2) Law's objective is legitimate. - "If political independence is
i
a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is
d nonetheless legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive
if the people are subject to the economic control and domination
of others, especially if not of their own race or countrymen. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic
control and domination is one of the noblest motives that a national
legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation
that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation
of due process.
The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never
be beyond the limits of legislative authority." (Ichong vs. Hernandez,
101 Phil. 1955 [1957], through Justice Labrador.)
3. Ordinance makes it unlawful to lease any hotel, motel, etc., room
rnore'tfwn twice every 24 hours.
Facts: The provision in Ordinance No. 4760, of the City of
Manila making it unlawful for the owne1~ mnnage1~ keeper, or duly

nl l ' llllll ' l ' l t fl I I lfl'• I II I II II l t J I I AW
• 1'1 ht~lplt 1t1111 1t l l 'rttU't1
authorized representatives of any hotel, m otel, lod ging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion
thereof more than ~wice ~very 24 hours, with a proviso that in all
cases full payment shall be charged, is vie':'ed as a transgr~ssion
against the command of due process.
The prohibition is claimed to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and
aggressive in character.
Issue: Does the ordinance transgres~ tpe due process clause?
Held: No. (1) Ordinance is presumed valid. - "The presumption
is all in favor of validity. The action of the elected representatives
of the people cannot be lightly set aside. [They] must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts or circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has, in effect, given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well-being of the people."
(2) Evidence to rebut presumption is required. - "There being
a presumption of validity, the necessity of evidence to rebut it is
necessary unless the ordinance is void on its face. No such factual
foundation has been laid in the case (which· was decided on the
pleadings and stipulation of facts) at bar and the ordinance is not
void on its face."
(3) Ordinance is a police power measure. - "The challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
harmful to public morals. It proposed to check the alarming increase
in the rate of prostitution, aduftery, and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to the existence of motels which provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and
thus, become the ideal haven for prostitution and thrill seekers."
(4) Restriction on freedom to contract is reasonable. - "Nor does
the restriction on the freedom to _contract, insofar as the challenged
ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all
cases full payment shall be charg~d, be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary. Precisely, it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which su ch premise1:1 could be, nnd,
according to the explanatory note, are being d evoted."
1 1
th I I 111 I \ I I Ill 1111 I , ~ )I I l( lt ,III '
IJu1 1'11111••~•1 ot l.11w
·. SubnlMtlvc IJue Proc:c1ltl
(5) Means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose. - "There appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of ai;t undesirable situation and the le!Jislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct
amounts to curtailment of liberty which cannot be absolute."
(6) Standard is less rigorous where property rights are involved.
- "The policy of laissez faire has to some .extent given way to
the assumption by the government of the right of intervention.
Moreover, if the liberty inv.o ked were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most, the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is wider."
(7) Ordinance is not vague or uncertain. - "Lastly, there is th e
attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. Petitioners point
to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship,
age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and
uncertain in view of the necessity for determin ing whether the
companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the
customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room
with him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time
later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which casts doubt as
to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent
upon the discretion of its owners or operators; and another proviso
which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether
the 'full rate of payment' to be charged for every such lease thereof
means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate.
These allegations do not suffice to render the ordinance void
on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty. The principle has
been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to
such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the
doing of an act ·that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. This is not the .
situation in its case. There is no canon against using common sense
in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." (Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [19671, through Justice Fernando.)
J
266 . PlllLU'l~lNH ' N !J'lTl'UTl )N~1, .1 ,1\W
Principles and Cases
4. Ordinance makes it unlawful for-an alien ·to be employed without
first securing an employment permit.
· Facts: An ordinance of the City of 'Ma'riila makes 3:t unlawful
for any alien to be employed in any place· of employment or to be
engaged in any kind of trade or business or occupation within"the
City of Martila without first securing an·employment permit from
the Mayor of Manila.
Issue: Does the observance violate d)Eq~uatantees of due process
of law and equal protection?
Held: Guarantee includes the means oflivelihood. - "The ordinance
in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule
of the Constitution. Requiring an alien before he can be employed
to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold
or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of
the people of the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he canno.t be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes
the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens." (Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA
270 [1978], through Justice Fernandez.)
5. Building permit was denied under an ordinance on the ground
that the proposed construction would block view from the highway towards
the municipal plaza.
Facts: The appellants assail the ordinance as unreasonable and
oppressive in that it operates to permanently deprive them of the
right to use their own property.
Issue: Is the ordinance violative of due process for depriving
lot owners of the beneficial use of their property without just
compensation?
Held: (1) Ordinance divests lot owners of the beneficial use of their
propertt;. -The ordinance "oversteps the bounds of police powe1~
and amounts to a taking of appellant's property without just
compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency ls
to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive lo l'h<•
comfort and happiness of residents. But while ,, ,·opNly nrny lw
regulated in the interest of the general welfare, und In lt11 p1111111lt, tlw
! 1 V, I A l~ I', Ill , 1111 ,1, ~)11 J'{J(. d 111
Duo Pwccss of Low
C. Substantive Due Process
State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may
not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners
of the beneficial use of their property and practically' confiscate
· them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on
appellant's land regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance il;l,question, because it would interfere with
the view of the public'plaza from the highway."
(2) Power of eminent domain is constitutionally available. - "The
appellant would, in effect, be constrained to let his land remain idle
and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being
urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality
must give appellant just compensation and an opportunity to be
heard." (People vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443 [1958], through Justice J. B.L.
Reyes.)
6. Law requires public officials and employees to submit periodically
a sworn statement of assets and liabilities.
i' Facts: The law, the Anti-Graft and Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019,) was enacted to deter public officials and employees from
committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality
in the public service. A provision in the law which required public
officers to submit periodically a sworn statement of assets and
liabilities was challenged as an oppressive exercise of police power
and violative of due process.
Issue: Is the law unconstitutional for being an oppressive
exercise of police power and violative of due process?
Held: (1) Due process guarantee is available to a public official or
employee. - "If due process may be relied upon by a public official
to protect the security of tenure which in that limited sense is
analogous to property, could he not likewise avail himself of such
constitutional guarantee to strike down what he considers to be an
infringement of his liberty? Even a public official has certain rights
to freedom the government must respect. To the extent then, that
there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the due
process mandate is not disregarded."
(2) Requirement is not nr/Jitrnry nnrl oppressive. - "Is the
provision for a periodical submission of 11worn Hlntcmcnt of nssets
I
2h11 l'l lll.ll ' l'I N l l VUNl il 111 / I ltJNA l, I.AW
1
' I
JJl'lnclplmi 11nd flll(:ll
and liabilities after he had filed one ·u pon assumption .of •office
beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly,. without
the challenged provision, a public officer.would be free from such a
requirement. To the extent then that there is a compulsion to act in
a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot, however, be denied
that under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long
as due process is observed. It would b~ to.dwell in the realm of
abstractions and to ignore the harsh ;~i;\Q- _cop,.p,el!iD.g :realitiei, of
public service with its ever-pre~ent tentptation to heed tbe call of
greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive such a
requirement." (Morfe vs. Mutuc, supra, through Justice Fernando.)
7. Law outlaws Communist Party of the Philipp,ines and punishes
knowing membership in said party.
Facts: R.A. No. 1700,4 the Anti-Subversion Act, outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines. Under the Act, the guilt of
the accused must be judicially established. The membership must
be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal
objectives of the Party.
Issue: The issue is the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1700.
Held: (1) Right of Government to protect itself - "That the
Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration. Self-preservation is the
'ultimate value' of society. It surpasses and transcends every other
value 'for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed
internal attack, no subordinate value can be protected."'
(2) Basis for penalizing membership. - "The requirement of
knowing membership, as distinguished from nominal membership,
has been held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membership
in a subversive organization like the Communist Party of the
Philippines which has been established by legislative findings as
an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government."
(3) Requirement of reasonableness. - If the laws are seen to have
a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due proccAR nrc
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders n COlll't
4
Sec Nole 7 unclcl' Section 8.
I A H I Ill t l l t I ~ 11, I It ,111
I ) ·111• I 111111 111•1 ill 1,IIW
fi '
', S11bt111-1 n1 lv11 I u • 1'1'tll'CIJII
functus officio." (People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972], through Justice
Castro.) ·· .
8. Law requiresdhe installation of early warning de'Oices to>motor
vehicles. .
Facts:. The validity of the law, Letter of Instruction No, .229
(1974), is assailed ina prohibition proceeding.
Issue: Is theJaw viola,tive of the constitutional guarantee of due
process for being arbitr4ry and oppressive.
Held: The law here deals with a subject clearly within the s~ope
of police power.
(1) Presu,;;ption of validity must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record in overthrowing a police power statute.
- "The· Pre~ident certainly had in his possession the necessary
statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter
of instruction, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated
by petitioner'~ naked assertion that early warning devices 'are
not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents'
because allegedly only 390 or 1.5% of the supposed 26,000 motor
vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976 involved rear-end collisions.
Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on,
record. There being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavojdable, unless the statute or ordinance
is void on its face, which is not the case here."
(2) Requirement is not expensive redundancy; said device is
universally recognized. - "The rather wild and fantastic nature
of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was
exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: 'Such early
warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy,
nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped
with 1) 'blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,'
2) 'battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,' 3)
'built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles,' or 4) 'well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinks)
* * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to
the said 1968 Vie1m a Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from
this country or from any part of the world, who sees a ref!ectorized
 I ~
2i'U .l'l Ill ,l l' l'I N H ( 'ON/ 1I !l 'W' I IUNA J, I.AW
l'rlnclples ond 'oses
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways
or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere
along the travelled portion of that road, lµghway, or expressway,
there is a motor vehicle which is statiopary, stalled or disabled
which obstructs or endangers passing traffic."
(3) Car owners are not compelled to ·purchase the prescribed early
warning device. - "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of
Instruction No. 229, as amended, or. m,}..dministrative Order No.
1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase
the early warning device prescribed Vt~reby. All that is required is
for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their
motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning-device i.rr question,
procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with
a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners
can even personally make or produte ·this early warning device
so long as the same substantially confotms with the specifications
laid down in said letter of instruction ano administrative order."
(Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 [1979], 'thtou,gh Justice Fernando.)
9. Tax provision is enforced only against manufacturers of filled
milk.
Facts: Under Section 169 [repealed] of the National Internal
Revenue Code, containers of milk :,hould be marked with the
following lines: "This milk is not i,uitable for nourishment for
infants less than one year of age" or.with other equivalent words.
The law is not enforced against manufach1rers of skimmed milk.
Filled milk is different from skimmed milk. The difference
between the two is that, in the latter, the fatty part has been
removed, while in the former, the fatty part is likewise removed but
is substituted with refined coconut oil or com oil or both. These is
no dispute that filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of all ages.
Issue: Is there violation of due process of law?
Held: Yes. "The declaration required by Section 169 that filled
milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year
of age would, in effect, constitute a deprivation of propei:ty without
due process of law." (Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 [1979], through
Justice De Castro.)
A l{ I , Ill, 1111 ,l , l )II 1{1 .I 11 1 , 11
l) uo Pt'() CIIH o( Luw
C. Substantive Due Proces!l
IO. Section 21(a, b) of the Tax Code provides different rates of income
tax on citizens or cresidents.
Facts: The provision, as amended by Section 7 of B.P.,Blg. 135,
provides for the imposition of higher rates of tax upon income
derived from business and the exercise of a profession than upon
fixed compensation or salary.
Issue: Petitioner alleges, among others, that Section 21(a, b~
is oppressive and captitious in character, transgressing the due
process guarantee.
Held: The petition i~ ·without merit.
(1) Alleged arbitrariness was not shown. - "The power to tax is
not unconfined. Adversely affecting as it does property rights, both
the due process and equal protection guarantees Ipay properly be
invoked to invalidat,~ in appropriate cases a reven\,\e measure. But
a mere allegation of a~bitrariness will not suffice. There must be a
factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. Considering that
these guarantees are n9,t fixed rules but rather broad standards,
there must be proof of such persuasive character as would lead
to such conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of
validity must prevail."
(2) Instances when due process may be invoked. - "It is undoubted
that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is
so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious
example is where it can be shown to amount to confiscation of
property. That would be a clear abuse of power. It then becomes the
duty of the Court to say an arbitrary act amounted to the exercise
of an authority not conferred. It has also been held that where the
assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not
for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute, is so harsh
and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds."
(Sison, Jr. vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654 [1984], through Chief Justice
Fernando.)
Note: Other rulings on substantive due process as a restraint
on the exercise of police power, power of taxation, and power of
eminent domain are given under Section 9.
- oOo -
 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 273
Equal Protection of the Laws

liberty, and property. It is a restraint on all the organs of the government

and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof,
and on the three inherent powers of government, j.e., police power,
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS taxation, and eminent domain. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937].)
(2) The guarantee is a'l.,ailable to all persons. Aliens, subject
to certain exceptions (infra.), are thus included; so are private
Meaning of equal protection of the laws. corporations but only insofar as their property is concerned. (Smith
Bell vs. Natividad, 110 Phil. 136 [1960].) But municipal corporations,
Section 1 further states: "Nor shall any person be denied the
being a creature of the State, cannot invoke the protection.
equal protection of the laws."
Equal protection of the laws signifies that "all persons subject to (3) It extends only to civil rights as distinguished from rights
legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and which are political or such as arise from the form of government
conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed." 1 and its mode of administration. (Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339.) The
State is not prevented from restricting the enjoyment of political
The guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege to privileges (e.g., right to vote) to such classes of its citizens as it may
some and unjust discrimination against others when similar subjects
s~e fit.
are treated differently. It does not require that persons or things
different in fact or circumstance be treated in law as though they (4) It is also not intended to enforce social equality. While all
were the same. Indeed, inequality or discrimination may result if persons are equal in worth, they are not equal in all things. (see Art.
the law will treat them the same or alike as when different incomes XIII, Sec. 1.) What is guaranteed is legal equality, i.e., equality of
(c.~., Pl00,000 and Pl0,000) are taxed at the same amount. persons before the law.3
(5) The guarantee is intended as a safeguard against acts of the
Scope of the guarantee. State and does not extend to discrimination by private individuals unless
(1) The prohibition contained in the guarantee of equal the discrimination is aided or supported by State action. It does not
protection (and due process of law)2 protects the rights to life, add anything to the rights which one citizen has against another
under the Constitution. (People vs. Vera, supra.)
1
COOLEY, op. cit., 824-825. The denial of equal protection of any law may be raised only by
2"The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as l'hc party who supposedly suffered it. (Araullo vs. Aquino, III, 728
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been SCRA 1 [2014].)
C"mbodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guarantee against
any form of undue favouritism or hostillty from the government." (Biraogo vs. Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010, 637 SCRA 78 [2010].)
Like the due process guarantee, the equal protection guarantee amounts at the most
lo n broad standard intentionally made so as to provide more adjustability to changing
i111pw11• n burden as the means to achieve its end, will be subjected to the equal protection
lin1cs nnd conditions so long as certain cardinal principles of justice arc not ignored.
g11,1r,1111t·1•. Th11n, n governmental act which is not offensive to the due process guarantee
In ,nnny cases, laws which hove been held invalid as d enying d ue process of lnw
111,1y ni11 co1111l~•r lo thnt of equal protection, where there is no rational basis for the
hnw nbn b1•1' n hf'ld. n~ denying 1•q11nl protPr.tion of th<• law11 M 11irl'•t>cr s11. Bu t wh<' r(I
t l,1•,•,llic,111011 (ollow1·1l.
1111' 11rbilrr11·y gov<'rrllll<'nl,11 ncli1111 l,1k1"1 thP form of 1111wnn·,111tcd pnrtinllly 111· 11nd111· 1"Hqunlily bt"fon• tlw law iHnot litcn1l and mathematical but relative and practical.
fovorili•,111, ii i•; m(ir,• 11pp1'oprl111<· lo ir111111r,11 1,11,' h 111' 1 1111 llw gm1111d of d<'nlnl of 1·q1111l
1•111h•1 li1111 (•,t'I' .I W1lli•11nhhv 111}11) I hnl 11, 11111 , .. ,.,,1rily Ho lwr.111~,• h11mn11 bPingRm:c not born equal and do not all start in life
11 11 l11w d11, .., 111,1, 1111 ~11 11 p1•1,,11111,. 11 will 1,,. h· ,lt•d 1111d1•1· 1111• d111• 1•11 111",'' l',1111r,111l<'1' ht11u 111 1•,11< Ii: 111,111y l111v1• h,111dk,1p·, 111,1lt•ri,1l, physical, or intc•llectunl. It is not within
I l11w1•v,·r, ,1 l,11V 1vlol, Ii 111,1I, •, ,1, l,11 ,llh ,1ll1•11111 1'"" 1111111 ,·ltli,•1 t,111111h•r ,I b1'111•lrl rn' In 1h,· 1•11w,•1' 111 "'" h,ly 11111l•oll,,h ,,111 h 1'1t11t•,1•ni1,1l lill'q11,,ll1y. All it ,-.111 do by way of remedy
i;, 1111•1111,·,1111,r 111 ,1ll1 ,1 d 1·111•1 ylo11tl y ,•q1i.1I 111 'I'"' t 11nr1 y " (l',,!,pli· vr1, ( 'hing 1111,111, 74 Phil.

.' I 11•1•1 'I l

274 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONA L LAW Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. ID. BILL OF RIGHTS 275
Principles and Cases Equal Protection of the Laws

A guarantee of equality of rights Legislative discretion as to classifications.

and in application of law. Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinc-
(1) Equality of rights. -
"The guarantee of equal protection of tions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by
the laws is not a guarantee of equality4 in the application of the laws the equal protection of the laws guarantee.
upon all citizens of the state. It i_s not, therefore, a requirement, in (1) The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion
o rder to avoid the cons titutional prohibition against inequality, that (particularly in the field of taxation), and a law can be violative of
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate reasonable basis, and, therefore, is purely arbitrary.
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. The Constitution does not require (2) A classification having some reasonable basis does not
!hat things which are different in fact be treated in law as though offend against that guarantee merely because it is not made with
they were the same. The equal protection guarantee does not forbid mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some
discrimination as to persons and things that are different." (Basa vs. inequality.
FOITAF, 61 SCRA 93 [1974]; Anucension vs. National Labor Union, (3) When the classification in such a law is called in question,
80 SCRA 350 [1971]; Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, 562 if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
SCRA 251 [2008].) it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
The prohibition guarantees equality, not identity, of rights. It must be assumed.
1locs not require absolute equality under all circumstances. It does (4) One who assails the classification in such a law must carry
1101· preclude classification by law. What it forbids are distinctions the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
hnsccl on impermissible criteria unrelated to a proper legislative basis, but is essentially arbitrary.5 (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil.
1111rpose. 1155 [1957]; see B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Reyes, Sr., 121
(2) Equality in application law. - It is not enough, however, SCRA 363 [1983].)
I lt,1L a law guarantees equality. It is also required that it be applied (5) The courts cannot require the legislature to specify its
1•111111/Jy. Thus, a law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial reasons for classification, but they will always presume that the
on nppearance, but, if it is administered "with an evil eye and an legislature acted on the legitimate ground of distinction if any such
uneven hand," or even without actual denial of equal protection, ground exists.6
yl'l, i( it permits of nnjust discrimination, there is violation of the (6) The protection does not require Congress to deal with all evils
rnnstitutional prohibition. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937], infra.; CH' problem s of the same kind or none at all. It does not mean that all
Ml/\/\ v~. Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc., 543 SCRA 269 occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way.
120081.) 'l'he State may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil
nnd stops short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned
is not less than harm to the public. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249
ll.S. 26!'i, cited in Basco vs. Phil. Amusem ents and Gaming Corp .,
'11'1,·, l'Jl'ly, tlw g11M,11 1lt•l· 111,111tl111t.,, c·q11,il l1y (nmnng <'qtrnls) in tlw t1pplk,1lio11 of
tho• I.av n11 clo•h•rn111wd ,le ccon 111111 111 11 v,,licl olu•,•,lfh ,1licm. Wlrnl ii prol11hll11 IH lo li·c•,11,
cllll1•1o<11tly 1"'1••1111•1 wh11 ,111• 1111ol1•1 IIJ-,, 111 ,11111l11111111•1 c ltc lllll~l,mc •"I ur c011tllll11114 ,111cl lco 'Ti u• d,,. II Ille' i•1 lh,11 wlwn• llw gw1r,111tcc nnd that of due process are invoked,
lco •,11 1111~,• p,•1 ..1111•1 wh11 ,111• 11111 ,,111111111 h ,,1111,11,·ol l'h,•11• wilt hc• 1•q11,1llly II pc•1111111•111nd1•r , 11111,1cl1•1 111,; lh,11 lh,•y 111·1• 1111111\0'cl 1111, .., hut r,111)()1' hroad stnndnrds, there is n eed for proof
Ii~,. , Ii, 11111•,l,1111 ,"' ,11 ,, I11',111 , I 11111 1 ,,. ,ol I ,111 11111, 1111ol1•r ol lll,•11•111 , Ii, 11111,,t,1111 ,.,, 111 ,. I11•,1kcl cot ,,111 Ii 1•••1 ,,11,u,1v,• , lm1 ,1111•1· "" w1111lol t,v, •1, ,1111" llw prt•~11mplion of vnlidity. (Sison vs.
ohll1•11•11II\ ,11, 111,111111111 ~,thl I Ill 11111,,t,111,, • Wli, tli,•1 111' 11,tl p1•11,111111 CII l''"l'"ltlc"o ,c11li!Pc 1 t\111 l11•l,1 I Ill I,( 1( /\ 1o11,1 I l'JtMI, l\lo,11, ,rol,1 < ;11111 l',11ty I 1•,I v11. Fnnll,,, 11(,9 Sl 'l{t\ I [2005].)
111 I, 111ul,1ll111111w Id, 11llo 11 "' j., h•1111 I« II" ,, 11111• , ]111,11 '" 11 'I"' •,111111111 l,11 I ' r, I( < I Iii I
276 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
197 SCRA 52 [1991].) In Lutz vs. Araneta (98 Phil. 148 [1955].), it held
that "the legislative is not required by the Constitution to adhere
to a policy of 'all or none. This is so for under inclusiveness is
111
not an argument against a valid dassification.7 (De Guzman, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 188 [2000].)
(a) Thus, the mere fact 'that some gambling activities like
cockfighting (Pres. Decree No. 449.), horse racing (R.A. No.
206, as amended.), gambling casinos (Pres. Decree No. 1869.),
sweepstakes lotteries and races (R.A. No. 1169, as amended.) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited
does not render applicable laws unconstitutional. (Basco vs.
Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, supra.)
(b) Similarly, the withdrawal by law (Expanded VAT
Law.) of the exemption previously granted to certain business
activities, while maintaining that- granted to others is no
justification for the claim of violation of equal protection of the
laws. "The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of
'all or none' in choosing the subject of taxation." (Tolentino vs.
Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 [1994].)
(c) Section 44 of RA. No. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act
of 1996) which singles out the City and Municipality Election
Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in
l·he same city or municipality for more than four (4) years "to
''"If l'he law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt it is not to be overthrown
l>1·1·,1ww there nre other instances to which it might have been applied." (Gomez vs.
l',1lomM, 25 SCRA 827 [1968], infra; see Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 [1984).) A law
1wl'd 1101 opcrnle with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Section
I. (I ,1:,1g11<: of Cilies of l'he Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, 608 SCRA636 [2010].)
N1•v,•1·1hl'lcss, equal protection should extend to every person under circumstances,
whl,,h, if nnl identical nre analogous. (Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA433 [1982).)
• ~·011rl~, in susl'.1 ining the claim against rt constitutionally under inclusive scheme,
,1r1• 111,·,•d with lwo n•mcclinl nllernatives. It- may either declare the statute 11 nullity and
urclc•f tlrnt ilf, lw1wfit~ not oxlencl tt1 1·he cln~s that the legislature intended lo benefit or
11 nH1y c•xt,•1111 th,• c11v,•rn1w of llw 1:l,1l11 le lo include those who arc aggrieved by the
l'\I 1111,ion. Tlw l,1111'1' i•1 11111 1111p1•,•r11d1•11ic•cl In thi•, juri1,dicllon. In R11l>/u 1,. l',·1111/t''.•; I lo1111•11i/1•
,1111/ I l,111•,111,'-: l ·.,,,,.,,,11ii111 (Ill'; lit HA/,',/, I l'l'I0I ), thl,, < '11111•[· l'Xl.1•11<ll'd tlw prnvi•1io1111 of
:h,c 11011 '/1, of th,· ih1111 I 111 ,ii l :11v,•1111111•11I I 'ud<' (Hnl,111 1'11n1b,11111,1 Big, :i:·11/,) hy 1;r,111tlnt\
'·''1'•"•111011 p.1y l" 1lhw1llv d l1,111h• "" 1111v1•1111111•111 1•P1 1.11111wl (not offl11•n1 ,111cl Pllll'l11y,·,·••
"' lc11 ,11 l'"lllh ,,I 1,11l•dll 1••1111\'1} wl111 I ,1111,1 1111 l,1111•,1·1· 11,• ll'll\11l,1ic·d" rn,• lfrq111°1I 111
A• •<11,l,1111 I 11111 I /\!11111111 ,11 ,11, II I ,, If ''I 'I,''" l1111•, ''"'" lfo11l, 1l,1l,11 y ,11111 1'1111lh•t•,•··· 11111111 1h11
, lit 111111 \11111~ A t~,, '' '" 1111 1 ,1 Ill\ Ir, I ''""I)
Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 277
Equal Protection of the Laws
ensure the impartiality of election officials in preventing them
from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment" does not violate the equal protection guarantee.8
Requirement of reasonableness
in classification.
The equal protection guarantee is directed principally against
undue favor and individual or class privilege. It does not absolutely
forbid or preclude classifications by law.
(1) Where there are reasonable grounds for so doing, persons
or their properties may be classified or grouped into classes to
each of which special legal rights or liabilities may be attached.9
No violation is committed when one class is treated and regulated
differently from another as long as the classification is reasonable10
or· based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be
accomplished, and those within the specified class are treated
alike. The presumption is that every classification made by law is
reasonable.
(2) A law is not invalid simply because of simple inequality.
(Aquino vs. Philippine Ports Authority, 696 SCRA 666 [2013]; see
Villanueva vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 755 SCRA 182 [2015].)
8"It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners
are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this
case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would
be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by
brcnking up each and every link thereof.
Verily, tmder Section 3(n} of R.A. No. 8189, election officers are the highest officials
or m1thorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to sav
llmt· without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration ~f
voters rnn hnrclly be cnuied out. Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all em-
1111>.YW'• (n1111wcll•d _wil·h ~·he registration of voters) who have served at least four years in
.1 g1w11 nly or 11111111dpahty would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the
(' ( lMl-.1 il( ', (D,• l ;11;,n1,111, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, supra.)
''W1lh1111:hhy i'l:17.
1'1/ \ 1l11•,••ll1< ,1111111 lw,,·d 1111 pr,1,•tic,11 cnnvenicncc: and common knowledge is not
'"" 11111,11111111111,11 1,11t1['IY '11•, ,1111.1• ll 111,1v l,11·1-. ptrrPly l'iwnrc l'ical or scientific uniformity.
N11t ,,II 1111111111.-,·d v,•loh le .. , ,11,• , , ... ,t,•d 1•q11,1l n•,11 11ml ~ubst·nntial differences exist
11111\'1'<'11,111111[1111 y, le• 1111,I 11ll11•1 11111111111111,111•,1111111,11ffli lc•nl l<• j11~lify ils cln~sification
,11111111t11111, ,, 1'111l11l,11o d 1111111 l'I~ 11111, lh,· 11111 w,1v11 (M11w.11l vN I >,•pl, 111 l'11hlir Work~ ond
llt1 1J11,,1\" l1nP,I ii,<\ 11111 'tMij,i I
278 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 279
Principles and Cases Equal Protection of the Laws

(3) The limited application of a statute, either in the object to (1) foreign corporations are made to pay higher amount of taxes
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate, than that paid by domestic corporations;
does not necessarily violate the guarantee of equal protection
(2) certain professions are limited to persons bf the male sex
of the laws. It is sufficient, for purposes of complying with this
constitutional mandate, that the _classification be reasonable, not (e.g., wrestling and boxing), or of a certain age and other qualifica-
tions;
,1rbitrary or capricious, although the law may apply only on some
,md not all of the subjects thereof. (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (3) certain privileges for leaves and shorter hours of labor
I 1939]; Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 2 SCRA extended to women (by reason of their physical structure and
'103 l1968]; see Comm. of Customs vs. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, maternal functions) are not extended to m en;
l>h4- SCRA 666 [2012]; Sameer Oversees Placement Agency, hie. vs.
( 'nbiles, 732 SCRA 22 [2014].) (4) preference is given to Filipino citizens (as against aliens) in
the lease of public market stalls (Co Chiong vs. Cuaderno, 83 Phil.
When classification considered 242 [1949].);
reasonable. (5) employment in factories of children under designated ages is
I 1or the classification to valid, it must pass the test of reasonable- prohibited. 12 (see Labor Code, Art. 139.);
111 ·ss. The test has four (4) requisites: "(6) shorter period of redemption (three months) for juridical
( I) It must be based on substantial or material distinctions persons whose properties are foreclosed and sold and the more
w hich m ake real differences; liberal period of one-year redemption period for natural persons. 13
(2) It must be germane to the purpose or purposes of the law;
12
(3) It must apply equally to existing and future conditions; and Section 12, Article VIII of R.A. No. 7610, as amended by R.A. No. 7658, prohibits
employment of children 15 years of age or below except in two (2) exceptional cases.
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class under Classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivor's
Himilar conditions. (Ibid. ) pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement
of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to
Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., "provide meaningful protection to
,mot her class provided there are real and substantial differences to members and their beneficiaries against the h azard of disability, sickness, maternity, old
age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden." The
d islingu ish one class from another. 11 (Farinas vs. Executive Secretary,
nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such
11
-17 SCRA 503 [2003]; GSIS vs. Montesclaros, 434 SCRA 441 [2004]; da~sifi~atim~ of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective. The
H<'l.! lleltrmi vs. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168 [2005]; see British legislative history of R.A. No. 8282 (which amended R.A. No. 1161, the Social Security
/\nwricnn Tobacco vs. Camacho, 562 SCRA 511 [2008].) Law) does not bear out the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso "as of th e date
of his retirement" to qualify the term "primary beneficiaries" in Section 12-B{d) thereof.
By w,1y of illustration, there is no denial of the protection where The classification with respect to entitlement to benefits similarly violates the due process
1111d1•r tlw law - guarantee. (Dycaico vs. Social Security System, 476 SCRA 538 [2005J; see Bartolome vs.
Social Security Systems, 740 SCRA 78 [2014).)
lo the Court's mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with the possibility of
rdalionq~ips entc•rcd after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular,
lhP provt~o wns npparl'lltly inl·cndccl In prevent sham marriages or those contracted by
11/\,, <11 d111g 1t1 lhc• 11lrn I 11 111/11111 ,,t,111,/111,/, ,111 A11wri1·,111r1111~lil11l io11,1( 1·rn1sln11 I 11•11'd pt•rm111,1tlolc·ly lo L'IHlhlr 0 11(' spou~c to claim bt•nefils upon the anticipated death of the
111 d11l1•11111111111•, llw, 1111•111l11ll111111hl\l 111 l,1w11111111 1,•11<1 111 l,u·gc-1 ,111111,•1, of 1l1111w• ol' pl'nl, 11111, ollwr •1p1111•,1•.
,, l11g1•,h11tv,•, l,t•,•.ilic ,1111111 lh,11 i111111•11111•,•11ltl1 1111,,, 1,.11 .., wUh llw ••~••re,,,,, 111 I 1111d,mw11l,tl 1
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280 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases . • .
(Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, 693
SCRA 439 [2013]; and
(7) The poor are given priority in the government's reproductive
health program. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr., 721 S<;::RA 146 [2014].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
l. Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any
kind.
Facts: The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native
wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed to take.
Issue: Does the law deny equal protection to one prosecuted
and sentenced for violation of said law?
Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification,
one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on
real or substantial distinctions.
(1) Distinction is reasonable. - ·"The classification between the
members of the non-Christian and the members of the Christian
tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. The term 'non-Christian tribes'
refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the
Philippines of a low grade of civilization usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is
reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions
existing in the non-Christian tribes."
(2) Prohibition is germane to the purpose of the law. - "The
prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to
in:,ure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It
has been the sad experience of the past that the free use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes has often resulted
in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts o( the
(3overnment to rai se their standards of life and civilization."
(3) /.mu is 1101' li111it,·d i11 its 1l/l/J/iml'io11. - " T his l aw is not limited
i11 il'H n pplkal io11 1·0 ("0111lit iow;c•XiHling nl' l'lw lime of l'lw 1•11,wlml'n l'.
fl j,, i11l1•11d1 1d lo ,q111ly lor ,,II 111111•1, u•, long nt-: lhoi;p co11dilio11•1
('Xl1tl."
{II) / ,111 ,,,,,,1,,. I''"''"''
1 1 /fl 11/1 (l'llllill //1,· ,•,,1111,·
,,,,,,,,,,
1111' t\1I,11•1 •ltc•1 111q1111lh 111 1ill 1111·111li,•1 11 ol 1111° 1 l,111 1 1 'I Ii.it 11 11urv 111·
Sec. 1 Sec. 1 ' ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 281
Equal Protection of the Laws
unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians
by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against
the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the
classification thus established." (People vs. Cayat, '68 Phil. 12 [1939],
through Justice Moran.)
2. Accounting Law authorizes accountants to practice their
profession under a trade name, but does not mention other professions.
Facts: The law, C.A. No. 342, known as Philippine Accountancy
Law, grants to accountants a privilege not accorded to other
professions.
Issue: Is this enough to render the Act discriminatory or
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
Held: No. (1) Law applies alike to all persons pursuing the same
calling or profession. - "C.A. No. 342 does not offend against the
equal protection clause on the ground of class legislation, for the
reason that said Act applies alike to all persons pursuing the same
calling or profession under the same conditions or requirements.
Said Act gives the same rights or affords the same privileges to all
accountants without distinction or discrimination. So long as the
law applies to all alike, the requirements of equal protection are
rnet. The discriminations which are open to objections are those in
which persons engaged in the same business are subject to different
r~t>lrictions or are held to different privileges under the same
1'(>11ditions."
(2) Otlrer professions or callings are not precluded from using
,, lmtlc 11ame. - "The legislation may classify professions,
01·cupnlions, and businesses, according to natural and reasonable
ll111'H of di:;tinction, and if a statute affects alike all persons of the
11111111· dnss it is not .i nvalid as class legislation. C.A. No. 342 does
11111 pn•(fode practitioners of other professions, occupations, or
rnllit1!',Hfrolll 11:-;ing a trade name in connection with the practice of
llu•ir prnf,•:,iilinns, m' cupations, or cc11lings. While said Act does not
1111•11Ih>11 n IIw1· p rnfp:,;sions, occupations or callings, it does not mean
lli,,1 tlwy ,11'1• p1'('1'ltHltiil from using n trade name as this privilege is
l1l, .,w 111c• g i v1•11 111 ll'w111 in olhl'l' s imilar laws." ("folentino vs. Board of
\, c ,11111/111111/, 1
111 /'It,/, /1,1 / /lJ.'d /, J/1m11gl, /tl!llil',' /\11,1wlo Jla11tistn.)
"Pl11,ill y,

~'llll ll ' l 'I N II tlN!1 IIII J ll~JNA l , l ,/\W
1il'111clpll.'fl rnd 'ru,t'H
3. Law excludes aliens from the retail trad,e,
Facts: R.A. No. 1180, the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, 14
prohibits aliens from engaging in the retail' trade. The law was
challenged.
Issue: Is the law unconstitutional?
Held: (1) Law was deemed absolutely necessary. - "Taking into
account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which
aliens had engaged in retail trade, the law was deemed absolutely
necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free
the national economy from alien control and dominance. The above
objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by
the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for
legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens."
(2) Classification is reasonable. - "Some may disagree with the
wisdom of the legislature's classification. Tei this we answer that
this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court
finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all
persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that
the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded,.it is in
duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its.legitimate
prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit
of equal protection established by the Constitution." (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957], through JustiC{! Labrador.)
4. Tenant, an alien, was not allowed to lease expropriated lot.
Facts: Act No. 1162 provides for the expropriation of landed
estates and their subdivision into small lots and the sale of such
lots to tenants. Appellant, not being qualified to purchase the
land involved in the case on account of her Chinese citizenship,
insists, however, that as a bona fide tenant, she is entitled to lease
the property citing in support of her allegation Section 3 of the Act
14
Repealed by RA. No. 8762, An Act Liberalizing the Retail Trade Business,
Repealing for the Purpose R.A. No. 1180, as amended. The old law was passed in 1960 at a
time when nationalism was at the highest and the country's isolation from foreign trndcrs
had little effect on our economy following the country's recovery from ihc rnvngc~ of
World War II. The very slow development and progress in nctivilics rclnlod to 1.-ndc In
the country had been attributed in part to the constraints imposed by ICA . No. 1 IH0. 'J'lw
new law provides for some safeguards so that not just nny foreigne r c11 11 (ll))lflt1'' h, 1\\1 111 1
trade in the country.
1
11111•, I A I~ I , 111 , 1111 , I. l )11 l•m d I I ! 1 ~II I
.l(q1rnl i11'()lt' tlo,1 or the LOWtl
to the effect that a tenant who is not able to purchase any given
lot shall be given a lease thereof until such time as he is able to
purchase the same.
Issue: Would the non-extension of the lease benefit amount to a
denial to appellant, a resident, of the equal protection guarantee of
the Constitution?
Held: No. (1) Law applies uniformly to everyone belonging to the
same class. - "Tl;le fact alone that the law withdraws from non-Fili-
pinos the enjoyment of certain rights exclusively reserved to Philip-
pine citizens does not expose such law to charges of constitutional
infirmity. For classification will constitute no violation of the indi-
vidual's right to equal protection as long as it is not unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious. The established and recognized principle is
that classification is not unreasonable where it is based on substan-
tial distinctions that make real differences, is germane to the aim
anq purpose of the law, is not limited to existing conditions, and
it applies equally to all members of the same class, under similar
conditions. A legislation that affects a particular class would not in-
fringe the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws,
provided said statute applies uniformly and without discrimina-
tion to everyone of that class."
(2) Classification based on citizenship is justified. - "In this case,
a classification based on citizenship is more than justified. The
requirement that lots in an expropriated estate shall be leased only
to those who are qualified in law to buy the same can hardly be
considered unreasonable. R.A. No. 1162 was not enacted to allow
the government to go into the real estate business, by leasing lots to
those who desire and can afford to rent. It is rather aimed at giving
realization and meaning to the policy of the State to provide land
for the.landless citizens and enabling them to acquire home-lots at
minimum cost. Clearly, the measure of reasonableness is reached."
(3) No vested right was acquired on the leased property. - "Neither
can it be seriously contended that by the government's denial of
appellant's application to lease the lots, and their allocation in favor
of other persons, appellant was deprived of property rights without
due process. It was said, not inappropriately, that due process, as
a constitutional mandate, is based on reason. No irrationality can
be said to characterize the denial of appellant's application. Her
occupancy of the lots as a tenant of the previous owner on a month-
to-month basis did not confer upon her any vested right on the

! i 'i
Jtl I L'l lll ,ll'l'I Ntl <., U N : '111 lJTIUN /\J. t,/\W
Prlnclp.lcs nnd Cases
property leased that the new owner was bound to respect." (Tan Ty
vs. Land Tenure Administration, 35 SCRA 350.(1970], through Justice
J.B.L. ReiJes.)
5. Regulation prohibits employment ofaliens in any Filipino-owned
establishment engaged in rice and corn industry. · ·
Facts: Pursuant to the power vested m· the Rice and Corn
Board by Section 6 of R.A. No. 3018, the above regulation was
promulgated.
Issue: Petitioners, alien employees, challenged the constitution-
ality of the resolution on the ground that it violates the guarantees
of due process and equal protection.
Held: (1) Aim of the prohibition. - "It is hard to see how the
nationalization of employment can run counter to any provision of
o~~ Consti~tion considering that its aim is not exactly to deprive a
citizen of a nght that he may exercise under it but rather to promote,
enhance and protect those that are expressly accorded to a citizen.
The nationalization of an economic measure when founded on
ground~ of public policy cannot be branded as unjust; arbitrary or
oppressive or contrary to the Constitution because its aim is merely
to further the material progress and welfare of the citizens of the
country."
_(2) Employer's right of choice is merely limited. - "The right of
ch01ce of an employer is not impaired but its sphere is merely limited
to the citizens to the exclusion of those of other nationalities."
(Universal Corn and Products, Inc. vs. Rice and Corn Board 20 SCRA
1
1048 [1967), through Justice Fernando.)
6. Law authorizes issue ofsemi-postal stamps to raise funds for the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society.
Facts: To help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis
Society, R.A No. 1635, otherwise known as the "Anti-TB Stamp
Law," enjoins the Director of Posts to order for the period from
August 19 to September 30 of each year the issue of semi-postal
stamps showing the regular postage charge plus the additional
amount of PO.OS for the said pu~pose, and during the said period,
no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such
semi-postal stamps.
J
, I /\ 1{ 1. Ill.11ll ,J.UJ1 1,m :1 I I ~
Uqunl J'tolcctlon of the Laws
It is claimed that R.A. No. 1635 is violative of the equal
protection guarantee of the Constitution because it constitutes mail
users into a class for the purpose of the tax while leaving untaxed
the rest of the population and that even among postal patrons the
statute discriminatorily grants exemptions.
Issue: Does the fact that the law single out tuberculosis to the
exclusion of other diseases which are equally a menace to public
health render the act unconstitutional?
Held: No. Inherent legislative power to grant tax exemptions.
"It is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select
the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. The classification
of mail users is based on the ability to pay, the enjoyment of a
privilege, and on administrative convenience. Tax exemptions have
never been thought of as raising issues under the equal protection
clause." (Gomez vs. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827 [1968), through Justice
Castro.)
7. Law provides for bigger share to sugar planters in big milling
districts than those in small milling districts and excludes from its
application laborers in sugar centrals.
Facts: The law, RA. No. 809, is claimed to discriminate in favor
of planters of big milling districts and workers in other sugar
plantations.
Issue: Does the Act violate the equal protection guarantee?
Held: No. (1) Distinction is based on amount of production. -
" Anent the indictment that the law discriminates between the
planters in the big milling districts, on the one hand, and those in
small milling districts, on the other, by providing for bigger shares
to the planters in the former and smaller shares to those in the
latter, it appears to us to be obvious that as the standard used by the
legislature is the amount of production in each district, naturally,
the planters adheted to the bigger centrals should be given bigger
shares, considering that the more a central produces, the bigger
would be its margin of profit which can be correspondingly cut for
the purpose of enlarging the share of the planters.
Understandably, the smaller centrals may not be able to afford
to have their shares reduced substantially, which is evidently
the reason why the law has not been made applicable to centrals
having a production of less than 150,000 piculs a year."
21111 !'I Ill 11 ' 1' 11 II ! ! ll 1' 11 111 1111 It 11\1 I AW
I1il1H lplt 4 111-id ( 'rt/It'll
1
(2) Distinction is based on nature of work. - "Much less is there
substantial basis for the claim that it is within the constitutional
proscription under discussion for the Act to discriminate against
the workers in the centrals by not including them among the
components of labor in the apportionment of the fruits of their joint
efforts with the planters. We have looked i,nto tµe corresponding
factual premises of this contention of the Central relative to the
equal protection clause with .the care they deserve, .and We are of
the considered opinion that the criterion -on whi~h the provisions
in issue is predicated precludes the conclusion of capricious and
arbitrary discrimination which the Charter abhors. The laborers in
the centrals perform work the nature of which is entirely different
from that of those working in the farms, thereby requiring the
application to them of other laws, advantageous to labor, which,
upon the other hand, do not correspondingly favor plantation or
purely agricultural manpower.
Besides, there is no denying the £~ct that as industrial or semi-
industrial workers, the laborers in the centrals, even the farmhands
therein, are being more or less sufficiently taken care of under
other existing laws and the prevailing terms and conditions of their
employment, for which reason there is no known nor demonstrated
demand, much less perceptible urgent need, to bring them W1der
the coverage of the instant legislative boW1ty." (Asociacion de
Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88
SCRA 294 [1979], through Justice Barredo.)
8. Agricultural landowners complain that other property owners
are not made to share the burden in the implementation ofagrarian reform.
Facts: Petitioners who are small agricultural landowners
question the constitutionality of several agrarian reform laws (P.D.
~o. 27,_ E.O. No. 22~, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.) on grounds
inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection of
the laws, and the constitutional limitation that no private property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
There is the complaint that they should not be made to share
the burden of agrarian reform, on the ground that they belong to a
particular class with particular interests of their own.
Issue: In the implementation of agrarian reform, a re agricu1tu ra I
landowners discriminated against in favor of otbor properly
owners?
1
11 11 J A I~ I 111 I Ill ,I I ll 1<11 ,I I I •
l!qt1 1d J11nl111 11011 nl ll w I ,11w 11
£-leld: (1) Classification defined. - "Classification has been defined
as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same 1tarticulars.
(International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199.) To be valid,
it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. (People vs.
Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939].) The Court finds that all these requisites
have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory."
(2) Substantial distinction exists. - "Equal protection simply
means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.
The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class
and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowne.rs but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.
There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
There is no need to elaborate on this matter." (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343 [1989], through Justice Cruz.)
9. The Probation Act applies only in those provinces in which their
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer.
Facts: The law involved, Act No. 2221, was assailed as violative
of equal protection of the law.
Issue: Does the act deny the equal protection of the laws?
Held: Law permits discrimination. - "The law is unconstitutional
because prisoners who happen to be in a province would be
deprived of the benefits of the law simply because the provincial
board does not set aside funds for the maintenance of the probation
system, and those prisoners in other provinces that can afford to
provide for a probation system can enjoy the full benefits of the
Jaw. A law which appears to be fair and impartial is still within
the constitutional prohibition if it permits unjust and illegal
discrimination as in this particular case.
IJ IJ
l'_I IIJ ,ll ' l'I N H 'ON: I 1'1 U l'IUN/\l , I.AW
t-ll 'l ' , I
Principles ond Cases
There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection
and a law which permits such a denial. The law even permitted denial
of equal protection to inhabitants of the same province in that the
provincial board might appropriate money to sup·p ort the system
in one year and refuse to do the same in another year:" (People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937], through Justice Laurel.)
10. Public official is placed under indefinite preventive suspension.
Facts: The petitioner, a duly elected mayor, against whom an
information was filed by the Tanodbayan under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019.) accusing him of "grave
abuse of authority and evident bad faith in the exercise of his official
duties," was suspended pendente lite by the Sandiganbayan under
the mandatory provision of the Act.
Issue: May a law be valid and yet be susceptible to the charge of
its being unconstitutionally applied?
Held: (1) A valid law is unconstitutionally applied. - "There is an
unconstitutional application of the assailed provision of the Act.
A law may be valid and yet susceptible to the charge of ifs being
unconstitutionally applied.
A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises not only a due
process question. There is likewise an equal protection question.
Under the Local Government Code (B.P. Big. 337, Sec. 63[2].),
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days after
the start of said suspension."
(2) Indefinite suspension negates equal protection guarantee.
"The principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to
national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of
Garcia vs. Hon. Executive Secretan;. (116 Phil. 348 [1962].) According
to the opinion of Justice Barrera: 'To adopt the theory of respondents
that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative
charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be
to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can,
in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due
hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution
and the Civil Service Law.' Further: 'In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in
Al( I , Ill , 1111 ,1, Pl l 1,t l t ,I 11
Hqunl P1·0Lc tlon of the L11wa
effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established
after due hecl-ri~g,. in violation of the Constitution."'
(3) Policy of law frowns at indefinite suspension. - "Clearly
then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitutibn frowns
at a suspension .of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the
mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law.
To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection
guarantee." (Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536 [19851,
through Chie!Justice Fernando.)
11. Law forbids compelling workers to work during Sundays and
legal holidays unless they are paid an additional 25%.
Facts: The law, Act No. 444, exempts public utilities performing
some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, powe1~ or
water or providing means of transportation or communication
from such prohibition.
Issue: The law was assailed as violative of equal protection of
law in that a public utility company may compel its employee or
laborers without being required to pay add itional compensation to
said employee or laborer.
Held: Law is not a class legislation. - "The classification made
between ordinary firms and public utilities is based on differences
which are apparent and reasonable. To require public utilities
performing public service to pay additional or extra compensation
to employees whom they have to compel to work during Sundays
and legal holidays would be tantamount to penalizing them for
performing public service during said days in compliance with the
requirements of the law and public interest." (Manila Electric Co.
vs. Public Utilities Employers' Association, 79 Phil. 49 [1947], through
Justice Feria.)
12. Law extinguishes all mortgages and other liens attaching to the
assets of a bankrupt company.
Facts: Presidential Decree No. 1717 ordered the rehabilitation
of the Agrix Group of Companies (which are privately owned)
to be administered by the National Development Company, a
government corporation, for the benefit of the "public, particularly
 .
l'llll ll'l 'I N l ! I IINl 1IIII J IIIIN/\ l , l ,/\W
l',fodplc11 nnd 'ntH!IJ
the small investors." Section 4 of the law provided, among others,
that "all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of
the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby .extinguished,"
that "all uasecured obligations shall not bea~ interest," ~n.d , that
11
all accrued interests, penalties or charges whether secured or
unsecured shall not be recognized." The respondent is a mortgage
creditor of one of the Agrix companies which went baruaupt.
Issue: Does the decree violate the equ,al protection guarantee?
Held: Yes. (1) Decree reduced secured creditors to the category of
unsecured creditors. - A mortgage lien is a property right derived
11
from contract. So do interests on loans, as well as penalties and
charges which are also vested rights once they occur. It is plain
arbitrariness to simply take by law private property from one
person and give it to another without compensation and any
known public purpose. (see Sec. 9.) There is discrimination as well.
In extinguishing the mortgage and other liens th!:! decree luinps the
secured creditors with the unsecured creditors and places them on
the same level in the prosecution of their respective claims. In this
respect, all of them are considered unsecured creditors. We cannot
see why all kinds of creditors, regardless of security, are treated
alike."
(2) Agrix singled out for government help. - "Agrix was singled
out for government help among other corporations where the
stockholders or investors were also swindled and surely, the
stockholders of the private respondent, whose mortgage lien had
been cancelled and legitimate claims to accrued interests rejected,
were no less deserving of protection, which they did not get. The
decree operated, to use the words of a celebrated case (Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 536.), 'with an evil eye and uneven hand."'
(National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192
SCRA 257 [1990], through Justice Cruz.)
13. Law suspends actions for ejectment of lessees of dwelling units
for two years from its effectivity.
Facts: The period provided in the law, R.A. N o. 6539, waH
made indefinite by Presidential Decree N o. 20 which Ht1Ap ('n d11 llw
provisions of Article 1673 (pa r. 1.) mnklng one of tlw ground11 (n,·
judicially ejecting the ICHRCC Lhc CXf')lrnllo n n( 1111' 1w tlml II ,,d (111•
l'lw chmitlnn or tlw 11· 11w.
A li( l , 111 1111 , 1. llll l~ lt ,l ll l
Llt1unl Jlmtccllon of the L,nwH
Issue: Is Act No. 6539 violative of the equal protection guarantee?
Held: No. Law is a valid exercise of police power. - "The Act
cannot :h e stigmatized as class legislation. There was a clear need
for such a.,_sJatute. It was enacted to promote public interest and the
general welfare. The Stat~ is not compelled to stand idly by while a
.considerable segment of its citizens [poor lessees of d welling units]
suffers from .economic distress." (Gutierrez vs. Cantada, 90 SCRA 1
. [19791, .tl;iraugh m,ting Chieflustice Fernando.)
14. Law limits right of political offenders to appeal.
· Facts: Under the People' s Court Act (C.A. No. 682.), political
offenders accused in said Court have limited right to appeal while
those who may be accused of the same crime in the Courts of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) have an absolute right to
appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Suprem e Court.
Issue: Is the act unconstitutional on the ground of denial of
equal protection?
Held: No. Rational basis exists for the distinction between the ~o
classes of offenders. - "The employment of two modes of appellate
procedure in the tw o classes of cases are suitably adopted to the
differences in the composition between the courts from which the
appeals are taken. The People's Court is a collegiate court, whereas
the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single judge.
Appeal is not a constitutional but a statutory right. The admitted
fact that there is no discrimination among app eals from the same
court or class of courts saves the provisions objected to from being
declared unconstitutional." (People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535 [1947],
through Justice Tuason.)
15. Law limits appeal to questions of law by certiorari from
Sandiganbayan to Supreme Court.
Facts: Presidential Decree No. 1480 (as amended by Pres.
Decree No. 1606.) creates the Sandiganbayan and prescribes its
own "unique rules of procedure." It is claimed, among others, that
the Sandiganbayan proceedings violate p etitioner's right to ~qua~
protection becau se appeal is limited to questions of Jaw, by certiorari
lo the Su preme Court, while all other estafa indictees are entitled to
np1wnl 111-1 o mnllcr o f ri ght covering both Jaw and facts and to two
J t/)
1'1111 ,ll ' l ' IN ll t llN 11111 / lltlt lA I I AW h 11 ,
l'dnclplcu nnd 'twc11
appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to
the Supreme Court. . .
Issue: Does the law violate petitioner's-right to equal protection?
Held: (1) Sandiganbayan is a special court. ·_ "The premise is
hardly convincing, considering thaf the classification -s atisfies
the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People
vs. Vera (65 Phil. 56 [1937].) requiting tftat i t rnust be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member
of the class. To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes mention
of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in
response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied,
namely, dishonesty in the. public.:: service."
(2) General guarantees must give way to specific constitutional
provisions. - "Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling
of this Court in Co Chiong vs. Cuaderno (83 Phil. 242 (1949].) that
the general guarantees of the Bin of Rights, included among which
are the due process of law and equal protection clauses, must 'give
way to [a] specific provision,' e.g.,·one reserving to 'Filipino citizens
of the operation of public services or utilities.' The scope of such
a principle is not to be constricted. It is eertainly broad enough to
cover the situation." (Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 [19821,
through Chief Justice Fernando; see Escai'io vs. Sandiganbayan, 160
SCRA 429 [1988]; Mejia vs. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457 [1988].)
16. Law exempts from closed shop agreement members of religious
sects which prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor
organization. · (4) Classification may rest on differences in religious beliefs. -
Facts: The law, R.A. No. 3350, is claimed to be a discriminatory
legislation, inasmuch as it grants to members of certain religious
sects undue advantages over other workers.
Issue: Does the Act satisfy the requirements of a valid
classification.
Held: Yes, (1) Simple inequalitt; does not render law invnlid. -
"The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other depmtmcntHof
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in spoculotlon Of'
practice because they agree with one rmothel' in CCl'luln pnr11(•11l111•11.
I fl I Ill JIi i I 1 11 I It 1111 j
Jlq111tl !11111111th111 11I 1h11I t1WN
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classifa:ation should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the ptlrpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class."
.1 (2) Classification may rest on narrow distinctions. - "In the exer-
cise of its power to make classification for the purpose of enacting
laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized
as enjoying a wide range of discretion. I~ is not necessary tha~ the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of thmgs
or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification
may, in many cases, properly rest on narrow dis tinctions, for the
equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degr~es of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to
evirs as they may appear."
(3) Law satisfies requirements. - "R.A. No. 3350 satisfies the
aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and
workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs
and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those
whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs,
feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe
in the same religions, faith and different religions differ in their
dogmas and canons."
"Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is
based on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not
mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry
with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain
rules of human conduct and the justification of certain acts.
Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events in
their relation to his God. Because of differences in religious beliefs
and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself better
than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life
may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries.
Due to their religious beliefs, people, like the martyrs, became

1'1111,ll 'l'I NH t 'P N 1 , 111 I J I IUN,1\ 1, J AW
Prlncl plo!l nnd t:mws
resigned to the inevitable c1nd ,iccepteq. chf!erfo.lly even the most
painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious
belief, the world has witness~d turmoil, civil strife, pei·secution,
hatred, bloodshed and war, generat~d to a large extent by members
of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs."
(5) Classification by law is germane to its purpose. - "The
classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose.
The purpose of the law is precisely to .avoid thQse who cannot,
because of their religious beliefs, join labor unions, from being
deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from
their work because of union shop security agreements." (Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974}, through Justice
Zaldivar; see Basa vs. FOITAP, 61 SCRA 93 [1974]; Anucension vs.
National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350 [1977].)
Note: A "closed shop agreement" is one by which an employer
binds himself to employ only members of the contracting union
and must remain members in good standing in order to retain their
jobs. (National Labor Union vs. Aguinaldo's Echague, Inc., 97 Phil. 184
[1955].)
17. Accused complains that law punishes drawer but not payee of
bouncing check.
Facts: The law, B.P. Blg. 22, punishes a person "who makes or
draws any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer w ithout any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment."
Issue: The law is assailed, among others, as denying equal
protection of the laws.
Held: Law applies only to the offendor. - "Neither do we find
substance in the claim that the statute in question denies egual
protection of the law~ or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the
drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the
payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of Lhc chec:k,
since without the indispensable participation of the pny1'(' by hlH
acceptance of the check there would be no crinw, T hl11111•1111 11 11•111 111
I I I I ll 11111 Ill I Ii , 111 1
'11 •1
11q11,d 11,111111 1111111111111' I 1I WN
taptamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the low should
punish both the,swindler and the swindled.
The petitioRers' posture ignores the well-accepted i:reaning
of the clause 'equal protection of the laws.' The clause does not
preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
not unreasonable or arbitrary." (Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
[1986], through Justice Yap.)
18. Department Order is in the character of "Guidelines" governing
the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and
household workers.
Facts: This Order of the Department of Labor and Employment
is assailed, among others, for "discrimination against males or
females" and that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but
onlylo domestic helpers and females with similar skills."
Issue: Should the measure be nullified on that ground?
Held: No. (1) Classification based on sex is justified. - "There
is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
'female contract workers,' but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect
identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided the requisites are present. (see People vs.
Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939].) The classification made - the preference
for female workers - rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that h as befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers,
even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government
action. As precisely the caretaker of constitutional rights, the Court
is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that
duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
x x x The Court, of course, is not impressing some male
chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the
Cou rt is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
 l'J lll,IJ 11'1 N I ('U N I, 111 lJ I ll , NA I , I.AW
Pdnclplcs nnd 'nf!CS
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in· massive
instances) and not upon some fanciful' or arbitrary' yardsfi1ck"that
the Government acted in this case. It is• evideiiice, capable indeed
of unquestionable demol_lstration and evi~ehce"this Court accepts. ·
The Court cannot, however, say the same•thihg far as men are as
concerned. There is simply no evidence1tojustify such an inference.
Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications.are concerned,
this Court is content that distinctions :are- borne·by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified;"
(2) Classification is germane to purpose behind measure. - "There
is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the
purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order No. 1 to 'enhance the protection
for Filipino female overseas workers.' This Court has no quarrel
that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have
suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare."
(3) Assailed order accords protection to certain women workers
differently circumstanced. - "The Court finds, finally, the impugned
guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers.
That it does not apply to ' all Filipina workers' is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability,
then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious
reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select
person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice
of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say
exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited
by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of
the Charter. It would be a classic case. of what is referred to as a
law that 'takes property from A and gives it to B.' It would be an
unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and
needless to state, an invalid act. 'Where the classification is based
on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and
stage of civilizati9n of minority groups, the bettel· rule, it would
seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, Md
the cultural minorities ore singled out fo1· fovornblc I r<•ul nwnl'."
(P/11/ipf1i111• Assoc/al/on of Servicl' ~xporler11, fo r. v11. l)r/fr111, /6,1 HC'IV \
.186 /'I 9HH /, I /11•m1p,/1 / ,wtIr·,, Smw/1°11/0,)
111 1 I A Ii I 111 1111 I I 11 I I H , I I I t 1
l!q11ul l'11,l1•1111111 ul tlu• I 11w11
Note: In Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 243 SCRA 666
[19~5]),_ !}le petitioner challenged Resolution No. 01 of t~e POEA
which mcreased the ,rates of compensation and other benefits in
the POEA Standard Employment Contracts'for Seafarers, claiming
that it di_scriminated against foreign shipowners and principals
employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employees
empJoying overseas Filipinos who are not seamen.
Held: "There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities
between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in
terms.of, amo~g other .things, work environment, safety, dangers,
and risks to life and lrmbs, and accessibility to social, civic, and
spiritual activities."
19. Department Order confers on the Board of Medical Ed11catio11
the authority to determine the cut off score for successful applicants based
on the scores of the National Medical Admission Test.
Facts: MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister
of Education, Culture and Sports pursuant to R.A. No. 2382, as
amended, established a uniform admission test called the National
~edical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for
issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
schools in the Philippines beginning with the school year 1986-
1987.
Petitioners contend inter alia that the Order is in conflict with
the equal protection clause. More specifically, they assert that the
portion of the order which provides that "the cut off score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after
~on~ultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges,"
infringes the requirements of equal protection.
Issue: Petitioners assert, in other words, that students seeking
admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when
subjected to a different cut off scores than that established for an
e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that thi~
renders the MECS (now DECS) Order "arbitrary and capricious."
Held: (1) Different cut off scores is dictated by different factors. -
"The foxcc of this argument is more apparent than real. Different
11t off HCOt't•s (or different school yea rs may be dictated by differing
 II
l 'l 111.IJ ' l'I NH t ' )NI, 111 LI I IUNAII. I.AW
Principles nnd Cases
conditions obtained during those years. Thus, the appropriate cut
off score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the
number of students who have reached the cut off score established
the preceding year; the number of places available in medical
schools during the current year; the average sGore attained during
the current year; the level of difficulty of the test·given during the
current year, and so forth."
(2) Measure offlexibility is needed to meet changes in circumstances.
- "To establish a permanent and immutable cut off score regardless
of changes in circumstances from year to year; may well result
in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order
No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of
Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet
circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores15 therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition." (Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 [1987], through
Justice Feliciano; see also Department of Education, Culture and
Sports vs. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 [1989], where the Supreme
Court sustained the validity of the '1 three flunk" rule allowing only
three [3] chances to take the NMAT, under Art. XIV, Sec. 5[3].)
20. Circular initially fixes the lifetime ceiling of six (6) years to taxis
in Metro Manila only.
Facts: Petitioners allege, among others, that the circular of the
Board of Transportation violates their right to equal protection of
the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only
and is directed solely towards the taxi industry.
Issue: Does the circular violate petitioner's right to equal
protection of the law?
Held: (1) Distinction is based on reasonable standards. - "The
Board's reason for enforcing the circular initially in Metro Manila
is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other ·places, are
subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This
15Effective 1993, the no "cut-off score," has been adopted as part of the liberalization
of policies of DECS, leaving it to medical schools to apply their own screening m echanis m
in the selection of standards.
A I,( I , 111 l I 11,1 , t 11' II( I l , I I I t
l!qunl Prolccllon of the Low1-1
is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions
are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so
that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed. As enunciated in the preambular tlauses of
the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the
safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by
old and dilapidated taxis."
(2) Circular satisfies criteria of equal protection. - "In so far as
the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal
protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be
accorded all and sundry. It permits of classification of the object or
subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on
substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class.
What is required under the equal protection clause is the
uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical
or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both
in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged
Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria." (Taxicab Operators of Metro
Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, 117 SCRA 597 [1982], through
Justice Melencio-Herrera.)
21. Act divides province into four (4) as a consequence of which
incumbent governor of a first-class province became governor of a sixth-
class province.
Facts: R.A. No. 4695 divides Mountain Province into four (4)
provinces to be known as Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
and Kalinga-Apayao. Petitioners are the Provincial Governor,
the elective members of the provincial board and some of the
important appointive officials of Mountain Province. They seek the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Act because, among
others, it denies equal protection.
It is contended that the old Mountain Province, which used
to be a first class province, is reduced to the category of a sixth-
class province, in view of the divisions effected by said Act. And
pursuant to the rule of succession prescribed therein, petitioner
Provincial Governor retains the position of Governor in the new
Mountain Province which has become a sixth-class province. Upon
t
300 L1.IHLll'PI N H ' N :Jl'II IJ II UN,\J , J,/\W i I 11', I
• Principles and Cases
the other hand, respondent Vice-Governor of the old Mountain
Province has become, in consequence ,of the contested legisla~ion,
the Governor of Benguet, a second-class province, and, hence,
higher, in this respect, in rank to his former superior officer, the
Provincial Governor.
Issue: Are the requirements of reasonable classification
sufficiently met in the Act?
Held: (1) Reduction in class not made by the law. - "The reduction
in class of Mountain Province is not material to the issue of equal
protection. Such reduction is not made by Republic Ac: No. 4695,
but is a mere effect of the limited revenues of the territory com-
prised in the new Mountain Province, as com~ared to th_at of
Benguet. The territory of each of the four (4) prov~~es estabh~~ed
by the Act in question merely follows the trad1t101:al pol~hcal
division of the region commonly known as the Mountam Provmce,
based upon the tribes or ethnic groups inhabiting the same."
(2) Requirements of reasonable classification are met by the _law.
- "The equal protection clause applies only to persons o~ _thi~gs
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification
of the subjects of legislation. x x x The requirements of reasonable
classification are sufficiently met in Republic Act No. 4695. The
offices of provincial governor and vice-governor, on the one hand,
are substantially different from those of plain members of the
provincial board, and those of appointive officers of the provincial
government, on the other. The former ~re essentially executiv_e in
nature, whereas plain members of the said board perform functions
partaking of a legislative character, since _th e ~uthority ves~ed by
law upon provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of
some legislative powers of Congress.
The equal protection clause does not require the identical
treatment of appointive and elective officers, insofar as the order of
succession is concerned, because they obviously belong to different
classes, both constitutionally and administratively." (Felina vs.
Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966], through Chief Justice Concepcion.)
22. Auditor General rejected a reimbursement claim but previously
allowed erroneously similar claim of another.
Facts: Petitioner complains that the Aud itor Gc1wl'lll (nt>w
Commission on Audit) rejected his reimbu1·Hcnwn1 r lnlm wlw11
A l{I', 111 , 1111 ,1. UP 1, l t: 1 I I: 1(11
JJquol lh·otccLlon of lhc L11w1-1
that official allowed redemption in the case of W and P involving
money orders purchased.
- ·•
Issue: Is the Auditor General' required to allow the reimburse-
ment claim?
Held: Guarantee is not violated. - "Assuming the facts to be as
stated by petitioner in connection with the Whalen and Palanca
claims, the most that can be said is that the Auditor General erred
in allowing those claims, and such error on the part of the Auditor
General is no reason for compelling him to make another error that
would cost the government a much higher sum. Obviously, the
equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require either
the courts, the executive and the legislative departments, after
having committed an error, to repeat the same error in subsequent
similar cases, specially when no principle of estoppel is involved."
(Tan Se Chiong vs. Director ofPosts [unrep.J, 97 Phil. 971 {1955).)
23. Ordinance imposes transfer fee for cadaver coming from outside
the city for burial within the city.
Facts: The transfer fee is payable whenever a cadaver, previously
interred in a burial place, is removed therefrom for transfer to a
private cemetery in Caloocan City. It is distinct from the burial
permit fee.
Issue: Does the transfer violate equal protection?
Held: Yes. Ordinance is discriminatory. - "The Ordinance collects
the prescribed fees solely in the case of cadavers corning from
places outside the territory of Caloocan City for burial in private
cemeteries within the city. Surely, whether the corpse comes from
without or within the city limits and whether interment is to be
made in private or public cemeteries, the city police must regulate
traffic and must use their city cars or motorcycles to maintain order;
and the city streets must suffer some degree of erosion. Clearly
then, the ordinance in question does unjustifiably discriminate
against private cemeteries in violation of the equ al process clause
of the Constitution." (Viray vs. City of Caloocan, 20 SCRA 791 [1967),
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes.)
24. Ordinance prohibits provincial buses to enter the City ofManila.
Facts: Ordinance No. 4986 of the City of Manila approved on
July 13, l964 provides for the rerouting of trnffic on roads and

302 J"i llLll11'1N H 'U NS'l'l'I U l'I )NJ\ I. J./\W
Principles 1H1.d Cases
streets in the city. It allows inter-urban buses to enter the City
which privilege is not given to provincial buses, although they are
allowed shuttle service into the city.
Issue: Is there violation of the equal pr()tecfion clause?
Held: No. (1) Substantial distinctions exist between inter-urban and
provincial buses. - "There is no point in pla~ingprovincial buses ~n
the same level as the inter-urban buses plymg to and from Manila
and its suburban towns and cities (Makati, l'a~ay, Mandaluyong,
Caloocan San Juan, Quezon City and N avotas). inter-urban ·buses
are used' for transporting passi=;ngers only. Provincial buses are
used for passengers and freight. Provincial buses, ~ecause of t~e
freight or baggage which the passengers usuaU~ bnng along with
them, take longer time to load or unload than mter-urban buses.
Provincial buses generally travel along national highways and
provincial roads, cover long distances, have fixe~ trip sche~ules.
Provincial buses are greater in size and weight than m~er-
urban buses. The routes of inter-urban buses are short, covering
contiguous municipalities and cities only. Inter-urban buses mainly
use city and municipal streets.
These distinctions generally hold true between provincial
passenger jeepneys and inter-urban passenger jeepneys."
(2) There is no unjustified discrimination under the ~aw. - "The
obvious inequality in treatment is but the result flowing from the
classification made by the ordinance and does not trench upon the
equal protection clause. (see Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA_ 606 [1960].)
The least that can be said is that persons engaged m the same
business 'are subjected to different restrictions or are held entitl~d
to different privileges under the same conditions.' (Suddreth v. City
of Charlotte, 27 S.E. 2d. 650.)"
(3) Substantial distinctions exist betweenprivateand public vehicles.
- "Neither is there merit to the charge that private vehicles are
being unjustifiably favored over public vehicles. P:iva~e vehicl~s
are not geared for profit; usually have b':1t one destm_ahon. Publ~c
vehicles are operated primarily for profit and for this reaso~ are
continually operated to make the most o~ time. Pub~ic and private_
vehicles belong to different classes. Differences m clns!:i beget
differences in privileges." (Lugue vs. Villegas, 30 SClV\ 408 /'196!) /,
through Justice Sanchez.)
I I 111 I 111 I I ll I~II , I I I I
l1q1111I 1'111h1d lw1ol 11111l,uwi1
25. Law withdraws the franking privilege from the judiciary while
relating the same privilege for other officials.
Facts: Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354, "An Act Craating the
Philippine Postal Corporation, defining its powers, functions and
responsibilities, providing for regulation of the industry and for
other purposes· connected therewith," withdraws the franking
privilege from the Judiciary.
It is alleged, among others, that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory
because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the
Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines;
the Vice-President of the Phiiippines; Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former
Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the
general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or
officers.
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination
because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance
with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has
been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also from other
government offices and agencies.
Issue: Is the law based on valid classification in accordance with
the equal protection guarantee?
Held: (1) Guarantee embraced in due process. - "The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every nnfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in
Article III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause."
(2) Concept of the guarantee. - "According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
fovor to some c1nd unjustly discriminate against others. The equal
protection clause docs no t require the uni versal application of the

l ' l lllll ' l 'ltl l l l lt J dlll l lllH l t l l AW l it I
l'il1H lph111 l11ld '11111•11
laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in
fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example,
a la:w prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age,
would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of
r, ; . • category to which it does not belong. If it recognized the need of the
adults.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as deter-
mined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars."
(3) Reason for grant offrankin_g privilege. - "What is the reason
for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the
franking privilege extended to the President of the Philippines
or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the
Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it
offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because
of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-
mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection? xx x
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the
franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for t~e
accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial
revenue by the Corporation in . the interest of providing for a
smoother flow of communication between the government and the
people."
(4) Withdrawal of privilege is without basis. - "Assuming that
basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the
government, it is the Judiciary that has been denied the franking
privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch
of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial
Department, as the respondents themselves point out.. Curio~sly,
the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely
of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking
privilege while extending it to others less deserving. x x x.
I£ the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from
the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw
it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those
who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may
not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The
problem is not solved by violating the Constitution."
I
I A l{ I , Ill , 1111 ,1.l)il l{ ll,11 U•
Hqunl 1.>rolt•cllon of the LowK
(5) Repealing clause is discriminatory. - "In lumping the
Judiciary with the· other offices from which the franking privilege
has been-withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of jqstice in a
President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize
a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege. While we may appreciate .fue withdrawal of the
£ranking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies
Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme
Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while
we may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics
Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if
not _greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice. x x x At
this tim~ when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the
administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking
privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume
.of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves,
should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal
service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the
judicial process. x x x
We .are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35
of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the
Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its
repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies
the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the
Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and power to correct." (Philippine Judges
Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 [1993], through Justice Cruz.)
26. The expanded VAT Law withdraws the exemption previously
granted to the press under the Tax Code.
Facts: The Philippine Press Institute (PP!), a non-profit organi-
zation of newspaper publishers established for the improvement of
journalism in the Philippines, questions the law (R.A. No. 7716.) in-
I I
IAI 111 ,ll'l 'I N ll l U Nf ; l 11 I J I IUNA I. I.A W I 1111 . I
·"'" l't'inclples u,,d 'rl!1ufJ
sofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the
press under Section 103(f) of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). ..
Section 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted
from VAT. Among the transactions previously granted exemption
were:
"(£) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and
any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears
at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and
sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of
advertisements."
R.A. No. 7716 amended Section 103 by deleting the above
provision with the result that print media became subject to the
VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however,
based on a memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, respondent
Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated
June 27, 1994, exempting the "circulation income of print media
pursuant to Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among
others." The exemption of "circulation income" has left income
from advertisements still subject to the VAT.
Held: It is PPI' s contention that even with the exemption of the
circulation revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional
abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT
on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on
their acquisition of paper, ink and services for publication.
Issue: Does the law violate press freedom for subjecting the
press to discriminatory taxation?
Held: No. (l) There is no differential treatment of the press by the
law. - "Even on the assumption that no exemption has effectively
been granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of
press freedom. To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute
that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The PPI' s
claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges
press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and
its importance in a democratic society, howeve1~ the press is not
immune from general regulation by the State. xx x
Other transactions, likewise previously granted t' Xt•rn (:)I l<:>11,
have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand l'hc bOIW 111d Ilw
A l ' I Ill 111 1 I l ll 11(1\ ,1 I l 'I
llq111d l'llllt1l l l1 111 ol 1lw l.11w11
scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the
charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn
had been that granted to the press. But that is not the cas,e."
(2) Law is not discriminatory in its purpose and operation. -
"The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those
cited by the PPI in support of its claim that Republic Act No. 7716
subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the
discriminatory purpose was clear either from the background of
the law or from its operation.
For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co. (297 U.S. 233, 80
L.Ed. 660 (1936].), the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2%of
the gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers
which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.
Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement
alone but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the
la"Z applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana,
leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less
than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were
in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question.
It was well known that the thirteen newspapers had been critical
of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of
Lousiana responded by taxing what Long described as the 'lying
newspapers' by imposing on them 'a tax on lying.' The effect of the
tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the
U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was 'a deliberate and calculated
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information
to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional
guaranties.'
The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power
to tax is the power to destroy.
In the other case (Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983].), invoked by the
PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because
everything was exempt from the 'use tax' on ink and paper, except
the press. Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that
state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on
the privilege of 'using, storing or consuming in that state tangible
personal property' by eliminating the residents' incentive to get
goods from outside states where the sales tax might be lower. The
Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967
 J ' l 111.ll'l'I N I! ( 1.- INI II 11 l J 11( INA I, LAW
J'1fo lplc11 nnd 'n11c!l
to 1971. In 1971, however, the ·state legislature amended the tax
scheme by imposing the 'use tax' on the cest of paper and ink used
for publication. · ,, ,
The law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there
was no reason for imposing the 'use tax1 since the press was exempt
from the sales tax and (2) the 'use tax' was laid ·on an 'intermediate
transaction rather than the ultimate retail. sale.' Minnesota had
heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed
to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to
be discriminatory because the legislature, by again amending
the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink used,
further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that 'only a handful
of publishers pay any tax at all and even fewer pay any significant
amount of tax.' The discriminatory purpose was thus very clear.
More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project-, Inc. v. Ragland (481
U.S. 221, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 [1987).), it was held that a law which taxed
general interest magazines but not newspapers and religious,
professional, trade and sports journals was discriminatory because
while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a
small group within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the
basis of contents (i.e., between general interest and special interests
such as religion or sports) the law became 'entirely incompatible
with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedo~ of the press?"'
(3) Law applies to a wide range of goods and services. - "These
cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential
treatment of the press creates risks of suppression of expression. In
contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies tD" a wide range of
goods and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only
on print media whose gross sales exceed P480,000 but not more
than P720,000, the law discriminates16 is without merit since it has
not been shown that as a result, the class subject to tax has been
unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation does not
apply to the press alone but to all sales."
(4) There is a reasonable basis for classification. - "Nor is
impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and
broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its
1
6section 108(z) of the NIRC exempts from the VAT "Sale or lease of goods or
properties or the performance of services other than the transactions mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs, the gross annual sales and/ or receipts [of which] do not exceed
the amount of Five hundred fifty thousand pesos (P550,000) xx x."
Ill I 111 1111 I I 11• I~ Il I I I I • I
lk11111l l 1rnl11t:llon ol rlw Luwn
transactions invoM.ng printing and publication, which are different
from the traf1$actions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable
basis for the classification."
I
(5) Newspapers are not immune from ordinary taxation. - "The
cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that
'owners bf new:spapers are immune from any forms of ordinary
a taxation.' The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid
because it was 'one single in kind, with a long history of hostile
misuse against the freedom of the press.' On the other hand,
Minneapolis Star acknowledged that the First Amendment does
I not prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and
the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally
applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional
problems." (Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 [:L 994/,
through Justice Mendoza.)
27. After enactment of R.A. No. 7653, exempting only officers of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas with salary grade of W and above from
the Salary Standardization Law, the rank-and-file of seven (7) other
government financial institutions were granted by subsequent enactments
without distinctions as to salary grade and position - the exemption from
the SSL that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP by
R.A. No. 7653.
Facts: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank
Act), which abolished the Old Central Bank of the Philippines and
created the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), was enacted.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Associa-
tion, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents
from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is u nconstitutional.
The proviso provides: "A compensation structure, based
on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component
of the Corporation's human resource development program:
Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed
by a compensation, position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive

1111 J'I IIUl ' l'I N ll l tl N!1 I 11 I J I It )NA I , l ,AW
iJl'lnd pl<•ti Md \ lflCH
job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plans of other government financial institutions and
shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every
two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases
based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall
therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as
possible with the principles under R.A. No. 6758."
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso
makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees
in the BSP, viz.: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the
coverage of the Salary Standardization Law {SSL) (exempt class);
and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SGJ 19 and below), or those
not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class).
It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class
legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's
position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes
of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the. most important of
which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in
the BSP.
Issue: Does the proviso in question initially valid, become
unconstitutional on the ground that its constitutional operation, in
view of the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charters
of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions, would
violate the equal protection guarantee?
Held: (1) Legislative leeway in providing for a valid classification.
- "It is settled in constitutional law that the 'equal protection'
clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate -
so long as the classification is not unreasonable.x x x
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those p ersons falling within a
specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from another. The classHicntion mw1t also
be germane to the purpose of the law and must npply to oll lhw,t1
belonging to the same class."
I f I
A I{ I I I~ ) I I I.I , ~ ll r I~ll ;I I 111 111
Hq1111 1'1 til<•l tlui1 ol IIH l.11w1 1
(2) Exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from SSL has rational
basis. - ·"In the.case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations
that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was
.intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of
attracting. competent officers and executives. It was not intended
to ,discriminate,·against the rank-and~file. If the end-result did in
fact -lead to at.disparity of treatment between the officers and the
rank-and-file-dn terms of salaries and benefits, th-e discrimination
or distinction has a .rat:ioaalbasis and is not palpably, purely, and
entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.''
(3) Concept'of relative constitutionality. - "The constitutionality
of a statute, cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as
applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.
. A statute valid-at one time may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical
operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even
though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation 'i n the light of changed conditions."
(4) Illustrative .cases. - ."Demonstrative of this doctrine is
Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon (307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d
517 [1954].), where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as
unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the
plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located
in the center of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance
then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and
storage of -automobiles, and service station within a parking area.
The Court found .the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property
rights which was contrary to constitutional due process.
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued
enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence of
significant changes in circumstances. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68
{1953].); ·u pheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its
enactment and operation b eing a valid exercise by the State of its
police power - but also ruled that the continued enforcement -Of
the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It
noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry
and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued
operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the
oppression of the creditors. x x x."
:.112
IJ
J'l 111 , Jl'I 'I N I! t 'U NI 1111 U I fU'.NI A I , I.AW
Pdnclplcs and 'ns~tl ,
(5) Applicability of the equal protectidn guarantee. ~ ·"fo the realm
of equal protection; the U.S. .case·of A·tltintic'Coast b.ine R. Co.✓ v. lve1J ·
(148 Fla. 680, 5 So. 2d 244, 139 A.LR. 9J3 fl9n].), is illuminating.
The Supreme Court of Florida··rul~'d ·,1al5a'inst · the: ·mntinued
application of statutes authorizing the 11ecovery·of double,damages
plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals ·killed
on unfenced railroad right of way with61!l;t' }>mo'f of negligence.
Competitive motor carriers, though· :Creating 'greater . hazards,
were rtot subjected to similar liability-because they wefe•hotyet in
existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruledLthat the
statutes became invalid as denying 'equ!3,l protection of the law,' in
view of changed conditions since their enactment..
In another U.S. case, Louisville ancf N.R. Co. v. Faulkner (307
S.W.2d 196 [Ky. 1957].), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
declared unconstitutional a provision of.a .statute which imposed
a duty upon a railroad company of proving-that it was free from
negligence in the killing or injury of_ ~a~tle by its engine or cars.
This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute,
enacted in 1893, had been previously s11stained. Ruled the Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because
it applied to all similar corporations and:had for its object the safety
of persons on a train and the protection ofproperty ... Of course, there
were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration
and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public
highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created
even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and
of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the
law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are
not ?ubject to the same extraordinary legal responsibiHty for killing
such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for
killing them on their private rights of way."
(6) Consequent unconstitutionality of challenged proviso. - "We
take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in
1993, Congress also undertook the ame~dment of the charters of
the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFis, from 1995 to
2004~viz.: xx x
It is noteworth¼ as petitioner points out, that the subsequent
charters of the seven other GFis share this common proviso: a
blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the
SSL, expressly or impliedly. x x x
t 11 H , I I Ill ' I A l I Ill tlll 1, llli l 11,111
' 11 I
quul P1'tJl(1,1IIUll ul llw Lt1w11
, ., The -p.rior vie:"( ,on, the constituti0nality of R.A. No. 7653 was
. ;... confined t°'an.e:v:a:l!:1'a;~.ionof.its dassifi..cation between the rank-and-
. , ; ., file an4_ the.officers of the BSP, found )1eas0nable because there were
",,,.sub,stantial cj,ist4tition1>.that made re~l) differences betw~n the two
· ' classes. '·· ·· · ·
,- , , . . • ' f , '·
L · The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, cons-
r
I
l'
'
t_ifute significant.changes in circumstance that considerably alter
the reasoi)~bility,-of the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15,k ), Artide II of.Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing
the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates
to the constitution!3-l~ty of the classification - aibeit made indirectly
as a consequence 9£ the passage of eight other laws - between the
rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFis. The classification
must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all
members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in
its operation, so as· practically to make unjust distinctions between
persons who are without differences."
(7) "Policy dete'r1_11ination" argument. - "[T]he inequality of
treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each
exemption (granted to the seven other GFis) rests 'on a policy
determination by the legislature.' All legislative enactments
necessarily rest on a policy determination - even those that have
.been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could
serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no
due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper.
There is nothipg inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination
made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and
overrun-the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.xx x.
At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised
precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by
Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the
field of equal protection, the guarantee that ' no person shall be ...
denied the equal protection of the laws' includes the prohibition
against enacting laws that allow invidiou s discrimination, directly
or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection
of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional."
(8) Disperate treatment of BSP rank-and-file from other GFis. -
"It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP
rank-and-file from the other GFis cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For
 111
I 'I JI I 11 ' I 'II II 1 1 11 I' .f I I I I I It 11 I 1\1 I , \ \V
1111111 111!1•11 ,11111 ( '"""'
as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, -there exist
no substantial distinctions so as to dHfere1\tiate~the BSP ·rai,i:k•and-
file from the other rank-and•file of the seven GFls. ·On the contrary,
our kgal history shows·that GFis hay~.l~u~g been recognized as
comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental
entities. ·
It is precisely this unpremeditated ,qis.crepancy in treahnent
of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made p_l~nifest arid glaring with
, each and ·every consequential grani\ :>fbla~~t exemp'tioli.'froin the
SSL to the other GFis - that cannot be rationalized or justified.
Even more so, when the SEC - which 'is not GFl :__ was given a to privileges conferrE;d and liabilities imposed, It is not infringed
leave to have a compensation plari that 'sil:all be comparable with
the prevailing compensation plan in the'-[BSP] and other [GFis],'
then granted a blanket exemption·from the SSL, fud its rank-and-
file endowed a more preferred treahnen, than the rank-and-file of
theBSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes evien more
pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if
Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the
eight GFis from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP
rank-and-file employees would have bee:J;l devoi<;i qf any substantial
or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful
discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. 'Nemo
potest facere per alium quad non potest facere per directum.' No one is
allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. xx x.
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the
exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar
only to the seven GFis or their rank-and-file so as to justify the
exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to
mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made
by the law is not only superficial,.but also arbitrary. It is not basecl
on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the
BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFls. xx x. Alikes are being
treated as unalikes without any rational basis. xx x.
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinction11 1h01
would justify the unequal treatment between the rnnk-nntl•fil<J of
BSP from the seven other GFls, it is clear that the ennclnw11l of llw
·seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued 11pplll'Hlill11
of the challenged proviso anathema to the equnl prol1•11llc111 11( 1111'
law, and the same should be declared as an oul'lnw." (I ·,111/1 r1/ 11111,A·
, .. I I ,., I I \ 1, I 111 II II I , , I' I I I, • J I I • , 11 'l
llqc1 ,il l1111li 11111111 nl 1'11• I 11w11
I:::mployee's Associations, Inc, vs. Bnngko Sentrnl ng Pilipinns, 446 SCRA
299 [2004], through Justice Puno; see dissenting opinion.)
. ·'
Similar treatmeht of' persons
similarly situated; ··
The equal protecti~n guarantee exists to prevent undue favor
or privilege as well as hostile discrimination, or inequality. It does
not demand absohlte equality; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957}.)
It follows that the existence of a valid and substantial dis-
tinction justifies divergent treatment. (Dimaporo vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 426 SCRA 226 [2004].) It suffices
that all persons falling within the same class or are similarly situated
are similarly treated,
(1) What the guarantee prohibits is class or discriminatory
legislation, which discriminates against some and favors others when
both are similarly situated or circumstanced. Thus, for example, a law
imposing professional tax of Pl00.00 on lawyers (or any profession)
residing in Manila and P75.00 on lawyers residing outside Manila is
within the prohibition as it is patently discdminatory.
(2) The benefits of a retirement law applicable to "all regular,
temporary, casual and emergency employees" should likewise
apply to "co-terminous or contractual en,ployecs" ns nil l:erminnl
employees with no fixed term, non-career nnd t:ompor,,ry. No
substantial differences, if any, exist between lhe lwn grn11pn of
employees. (Chua vs. Court Service Commimiion, 20() S('RA t,!1
[1992]; see Philippine Ports Authority Employees vs, < ·u11111d1111lo11
on Audit, 469 SCRA 397 [2005].)
(3) There are no substantial distinctions betwu,·n 11101t•l 11,
inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or ol'lwr ,,l11dl1111
establishments. By d efinition, all are commercinl cst·nbll11hn11•11(11
providing lodging and usually meals and other services fo1· l'lw I H ti, Ih•,
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but nol pl'nulnn
 II II I
.Ile. 1'1111 ,11',l 'INH 'UN S'JTl'U'Flll~{t\ l. LAW
• Principles and Cases . ,
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other ,sip;rilar •establishments.
The classificalion in the .instant case is. .imi~lid as similar subjeets
are not similarly treated, both as to rights-conf!;!rred and obligatioT'.s
imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not::reStiQn;;$~pstantiaJ-,distiµcti.~ns
bearing a just and fair relation to the purposel&6the·ordinanee~.,_(City
of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA308 [201)5],)
(4) If an employer accords employees ·the same p9~ition and
rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work.
Hence, the doctrine of "equal pay for equalwork." The doctrine does
not apply where valid factors exists to jus.tify,distinctive treatment of
employees even if they do the same. It is for the employer to-explain
why an employee receives less pay or why. .the others receive more.
(Philex Gold Phils., Inc. vs. Philex Bula.wan SupetvisorS'Union,-468
SCRA 111 [2005]; International School Alliance of Educators vs.
Quisumbing, 333 SCRA 13 [2000].)
(5) For the purpose of garbage collection there are no substantial
distinction between an occupant of a loti on one hand, and occupant
of a unit in a condominium socialized housing project, or apartment,
on the other hand. (Ferrer, Jr. vs. Bautista, 760 SCRA 652 [2015].)
(6) Executive Order No. 1 of the President which created the
I
Truth Commission with the mandate to investigate and find out
the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft corruption during
the previous [Arroyo] administration" only is violative of the
equal protection clause. The Arroyo "administration" is a member
of a class, that is the class of past administrations. It is not a class
of its own. Not to include in the Commission's mandate past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction." (Biraogo vs. The
Philippine Truth Commission, 637 SCRA 78 [2010]; see dissenting
opinions.)
(7) But the argument that denial from the military of the right
to bail (Sec. 13.) would violate the guarantee is not acceptable.
Members of the military are substantially different from civilionn.
The unique structure of the military whose members are nlloWl'd
the fiduciary use of firearms for the discharge of their d ulh•n n11d
responsibilities should be enough reason to exempt tlw111 fro111 1h11
constitutional coverage on the right to bail. (Aswa~ Vt~. ( :11llde1, }OIi
SCRA205 [1991].)
Al{T. Hl. lJlLL Ufl RIGl ITS 317
Equal Protection of the Laws
·· {8) The same is true of members of the Philippine National
·' ·Polite (PNP) who ·a.Te' f.reated differently from the other classes
of -p ersons ctharged •criminally or administratively inspfar as the
· application of the rule on preve·n tive suspension is concerned. The
imposition ef preventive suspension for over 90 days17 uncler the law
'(Sec. 47, R.A. No. '6975:) does not violate the suspended policeman's
cortstitutional right to equal protection of the laws. (Himagan vs.
People, 237 SCRA 53& [1994].)
(9) Since ~e · Office of the Ombudsman has been granted
virtually plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution nnd
by law, giving it wide latitude or discretion, its varying trealmcnl
of similarly ·s_ituated investigations cannot by itself be conttlckrNI
a yiolatio:r of any of the parties' rights to the equal pxotccllon of
the laws. (Dimayuga vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 495 SCRA 461
[2006].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Section 21(a, b) of the Tax Code (as amended by Sec. 1 of B.P. Big.
135) provides different rates of income tax on citizens or residents.
Facts: Petitioner, as taxpayer, alleges, among others, that by
virtue thereof "he would be unduly discriminated against by the
impos~tic;m of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from
· the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed
upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. The assailed
provision provides higher rates of tax on income derived from
business and the exercise of a profession than on compensation
~corii.e."
Issue: For petitioner, is there transgression of both the equal
protection and due process guarantees as well as the rule requiring
uniformity of taxation.
Held: (1) Presumption of validity. - "Where the due process and
equal protection clauses are invoked considering that they are not
fixed rules but either broad standards, there is a need for proof
of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion.
Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity prevails."
17
Under the Civil Service Law (Sec. 42, P.O. No, 807.), the maximum period of
suspension is 90 days.
 J I
1' 111111 '1'1 111 111111,1 111 11 11,r,t,\l , I t\W • ,, •
I 1!1111 lpll'tt ,111d < ',111r~ I I
(2) Similar trenl111e11t of persons under,nnalogous, if ~!ot idmticnl,
circumstances, - "The applicable standard,, to av.oid the charge
that there is a denial of this constitutJ.~nal jin:apdate whether the
assailed act is in, the exercise 9f, the poli~e, p,<iJw,~r pr the, .po_wer of
eminent domain, is to -demqns,t r;t~,)pi!;~ ,-j:l)e -g<;we,:&IUlr\ental _act
assailed, £~r from bejng ins,pireg by. .tb~ a~awP1,ept of the com1'lon
weal was prompted by t?e spirit, of !}p~ti_Ut)S,;\~r at. th_e v.7~y lr,ast,
discrimination that finds no support W,' ~~a~p_p..... ,? ,~: , : .• , ~,
It suffices then that the laws op~rate equally and uniformly on
all P,ersons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner,.the co;tditions not being dff.ferent, both
in the privileges conferred· and the liabilities imposed.' Fil,Voritism
and undue preference cannot be allowe~; For the frinciple is that
equal protection and security shall be gi~~n to every_persbn under
circumstances, which if not identical ate analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burdens or. charges, those that fall within
a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group equally binding on the•rest.' (J.M. Tuazon
and Co, vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA413 [1970].) That
same formulation applies as well to taxation measures."
(3) EqualittJ is not mere disembodied equality. - "The equal
protection clause is, of course, inspired by the 119ble 'concept of
approximating the ideal of the law's benefits being available to all
and the affairs of men being governed by that ser~ne and impartial
uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. There
is, however, wisdom, as well as realism, in these :w ords of Jus tice
Frankfurter: 'The equality at which tne equal protedion clause
aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteentli Ainendment
enjoins the equal protection of the laws, and laws are riot abstract
propositions. They do not relate to abstract units A, B ahd C, but are
expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, addl'essed to
the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The
Constitution does not require things or-persons which are different
in fact to be treated in law as though they were the same."' (TiAnor
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 [1940].)
(4) Inequalities by thei:nselves do not necessarily offc11d g11ara11/1U'.
- "Hence, the constant reiteration of the view thnt clo1111lflc111lo11 1r
rational in character is allowable. As a matter of foci, in Ilw lt•1111111H
case of Lutz vs. Araneta·(98 Phil. 148 [1955].), thiH Court, tltm11gli
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold: 'at any rnh•, 11111 l11lt,,11,11I
in the power to tax that a state be free to HCl<'t'I llu· 111111)1'11,1 111
I 1111 I / \ ,, I 111 I I II I I I I' I ,. • I I I I I 11 •,
Hq1111I !1101111111111111 llw l.11w11
faxation, and it ha.s b een repeatedly held that 'in equalities which
, , result from a sing.ling out 0£ one particular class for taxation or
1- exemp.t ion infringe no constitutional limitation.' Perfect equality is
hardly attainable.".
(5) Distinction between compensation and other incomes is justified.
- "Apparently, what misled petitioner is his failure to take into
consideration the distinction between a tax rate and a tax base.
There is no legal opjection to a broader tax base or taxable income
by eliminatiµg all deductible items and at the same time reducing
the appliq1ble tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different
categories. To repeat, it is enough that the classification must res!
upon substantial distinctions that make real differences."
(6) Basis of classification. - "In the case of the grosH Income
taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Big. 135, the d iscernibl~ baHIH
of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application
of generalized rules·removing all deductible items for all taxpayers
within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to
all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income
are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense,
these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income
tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less.
On the other hand, in. the case of professionals in the practice of
their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs
or expenses necessary fo produce their income. It would not be
just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero
deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax
rates on the basis of gross income.
There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to
adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income,
while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards
professional and business income." (Sison, Jr. vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA
654 [1984], through Chief Justice Fernando.)
2. Act requires candidates to Constitutional Convention to
relinquish their government positions.
Facts: PUisuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the 1935 Consti-
tution, Congress, in joint session assembled, passed a resolution
calling a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6132 which is the implementin g

I 1111 II I It II I t 11 I 11111 I It 11 I I I \\
1'1111111'h 1111,I' ,1 I II
1t,glul11tluu, ull11wH 1Jnv1•1•11111t:n t offld uln 11l\411,m1p l11y111•r1 lo Ul'~111111•
candidntes for the office of ¢\clcgate to thct ,cons~lh1tloon'l ci01w en-
tion the only condition being that when ,they .do so, they. should
relinquish their positions. • , , : 'fl,'
Issue: Does the provision ·ceinstihlte :dis~riininatory legislation
which offends against the equal protection guarantee· of 't he
Constitution? ' old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
Held: No. (l) Law affects· with.equ41jdrc¢'~ll persons of t~e s~me
class·: ~ "lt does not constitute tliscrirninattiry legisla:tforl sirtce'·the
classification is germane to the purpose of'the Act and is based on
substantial differences between the situatiori of said officials and
employees and' that of persons outside of the government service.
It is a well-settled rule in constitutional law, tl)at a legislation
which affects with equal force all pers.on.s 'Of the same qlass and
not those of another, is not class leg~slatton,and ,~Qe.s not Wringe
the constitutional guaranty of equal-protec~on of the laws, if the
division into classes is not arbitrary and is based on differences
. which are apparent and reasonable." · does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such
(2) Condition is imposed for reasons of public interest. - "The
condition is imposed for reasons of public interest, among the most
important of which are, first, that there are certain government
offices which afford their occupants many built-in advantages
- not available to others and which may be used o{ 'abused to
enhance their own candidacies, contrary- fo ·the very spirit of' the
equal protection clause invoked by th'e ·p~titi'oners; and second,
that to allow government officials and·limployees to campaign
for the Convention and, if elected, to 1sit as Delegates therein
without vacating their positions wo_u ld be clearly detrim~ntal to
the government and to the public at lar,gl:!, which would thereby
be deprived of their services for the unpredictable length of time
that the Convention may last, without such positions being filled
through new appointments, resulting in disrµption of public
service." (In re Subido, 35 SCRA 1 [19l0], per curiam.)
3. Election Code disqualifies retirees from .running for tire r.r,11w
elective post from which they retired.
Facts: The law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, is assailed as COJ1l l'11ry
to the equal protection guarantee secured by the Constit11t.io11.
Issue: Is the law valid?
I I
, fl I 111 1111 I I II I I• 1 I I I
I q11 ,1I 1'11111, 1111111111l11• I 11w11
f lt:lrl: (l) / JhJrJllr1/ljiurl n:tireelJ arc 110/ si111i/11rly situated wit/, other
retirees. - ''Retirement from government service may or may not
be a reasonable disqaalification for elective local officials. For one
thing, there can also be retirees from governme~t serv~(!e at ~ges,
say below 65. It may.neither be reasonable to disqualify _r~tir~es,
aged 65, for a 65-ye.;,.r-old retiree could be a good local official iust
·like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But in the case of a 65-year-
municipaloffice, there is reason to disq~alify him fr~rn ru~g for
the same office from which he had retired, as provided for m the
challenged provisi~n. The need for new blood assu_mes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work 1s present, and
what is emphatically significant is that the reHred employee has
already declared himself . tired and unavailable for th~ same
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mmd, he
wcmld like to assume again.
It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from
the ·application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision
denial. (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933].) Persons similarly
situated are similarly treated."
(2) Classification is in pursuance of purpose of the law. - "In fine,
it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid
all leg~J classification. What is proscribed is a classification which
is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is
not violated by a reasonable classification based u pon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose
of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
(Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30 [1978], citing Felwa vs. Salas,
18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; lchong vs. Hernandez,
101 Phil. 1155 [1957].)
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger
blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid." (Duml~o
vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980], through Justice
Melencio-Herrera.)
Teehankee, J., dissenting:
(1) D,isqualification is based on arbitrary distinction. -
"To
especially and peculiarly ban a 65-year-old previously retired
1111111 II II ll
111 1'1111 ll ' l ' II JI c c l/,J' ,IIII I IIC ll~l,\ I I AW
l'il11c lf'l1•11,111d ( ·,1111•11
elective local official from running for the same elective office (of
governor, in this case) previously held by him and from• which
he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive an.d u,nreasonable. Persons
similarly situated are not similarly 'trecit~9{ e.g., a retired vice-
governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor
(because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the
same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred
from doing so (although he may run for ;a ny other lesser office).
Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from ninning for the
office of governor. · In the fh:st place! while the said law grants retirement benefits
What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary
discrimination against petitioner who has cause to complain that
the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to
frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to rnake a political comeback
as governor of Nueva Vizcaya (since no other case of a former
governor similarly barred by virhte of_ said provision can ever be
cited). Is there not here, therefore, a gross denial of the cardinal
constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall
be given under the law to eyery person, under analogous if not
identical circumstances?"
(2) Disqualification is based on a presumption which is sheer
conjecture. - "The classification is patently arbitrary and
unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences that would justify the special
disqualification of petitioner; which, it is claimed, 'is based on a
presumption that elective local officials who have retired and are of
advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek
as those who are differently siruated.' Such presumption is sheer
conjecture.
The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has 'young or
new blood' does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective
and competent than a mature 65-year-old like petitioner who hnH
had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing lo
appear to be most physically fit. Suffice it to cite the outstandinr,
case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affnirn, <;l'n.
Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected at 80 as a member of tlw l111,·ri111
Batasang Pambansa and who has just this month complt•l1•d HI
years of age and has been hailed by the President, him1wlf 1111 ' 1111•
best foreign minister the Republic has ever had.'"
A l<,lf,flll , 1111 ,1, t 1)1 l<U. : I 11 1
Hqt111I Protection of the Laws
4. Law provides for retirement benefits only for members of
Congress.
Fads; The lay.,, · R.A. No., 3836, provides for the ~etirement
benefits for members of Congress.
Issue: Is the la,w discriminatory with respect to other elective
officials.
Held: Features of the law are discriminatory. - They, "therefore,
vioJate the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution,
to Senators and Congressmen, who are elective officials, it does not
include other elective officials such as the governors of provinces
and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective offi cialH
of the municipalities and chartered cities.
Secondly, all members of Congress under R.A. No. 3836 ure
given retirement benefi,ts after serving twelve years, not necessarily
continuous, whereas, mo~t government officers and employees are
given retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years.
In the third place, all government officers and employees
are ·given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length
of service in the government, whereas, under R.A. No. 3836,
because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to
two retirement benefits or equiv alent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to
an employee who had been retired and reappointed is suspended
during his new employment (under C.A. No. 186, as amended.),
this is not so under R.A. No. 3836,
Lastly, R.A. No. 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who
are not members ol the Government Service Insurance System.
Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement
laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of
their monthly salaries to the System." (Phil. Constitution Association,
Inc. vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965], through Justice Regala.)
5. Law bars the use of private vehicles with "H " and "EH" on
weekends and on holidays.
Facts: The law, Letter of Instruction No. 809 (May 31, 1979), is
assailed as violative of the equal protection clause. Six (6) and eight
(8) cylinder cars are classified as Heavy under the law.
Ill I II
I I 1·111111 · 1· 11111111 1•1 1111 1 ,1,lll"tl l l\\V
r''
1111111 lplt•N 111111 c ,v,1•,,
1!111,w: IH l'lwre 11 1.\1tkmnl bo~lfl fol' t·hc clnl:lslficallon provided in
the law'? · perpetua while others suffered only prision mayor.
I '
Held: Rational basis exists for the classification. - "The LOI is valid
as it is justified under the polic'e·'pt>wer ·of\the State to conserve ·
1 • multiple murder, rpbpery, arson and kidnapping. Subsequently, in
energy. There is rationql basis fo.r the_A ~~sJficatjon followed. To
assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of
law, a regulatory measure may qit tnt_qJ~i rights to liberty· and
property. Those adve~sely affected may, ooder i,uch cira:imstances,
mvoke .the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment
of the common ~e~l ':as _prompte~ by the Spirit of hostility, or at
the very least, d1scr1mmation that finds no support in reason.
It suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly- on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be ·
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different both
in ~e privileges conferred and the li~bilities, imposed." (Bauti;ta vs.
Junia, 127 SCRA 329 [1984], through·Chief Jus'tite Fernando.)
-: ~- ., Tax pro.vision is enforced only agp.inst manufacturers of filled
milk qut not against manufacturers of skimmed milk. .
:Facts: The provision in question is Section 169 [repealed] of
the National Internal Revenue Code. The only difference between
skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has
been removed while.in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed
but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or b,oth.
Issue: Does the enforcement of Section 169 against manufactur-
ers of filled milk only constitute denial of equal protection of the
law?
Held: Yes. Since both manufacturers, are similarly situated the
' not equally enforced would offend against the Constitution.
1aw if ' same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
(Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 '{~979 ], through Justice de Castro.)
Note: Se_ctioi:1 169 requires milk manufacturers to print on
labels of their milk products the words: "This milk is not suitnblu
fo~ nouri~hment. for infants less than one year of age" or word:;
with eqmvalent Import. As there was no dispute that filled milk
was suitable for feeding infants of all ages, it was held t'lrnl tho
declaration required by Section 169 would, in effect, cnn11lil111" 11
deprivation of property without due process of law.
.l I Ill !Ill I 1tl I 11 111 I I I
t•• I
I q11,1I 1'11111, 1111111•1 1li11I ,nv11
r '/, For ll11t tJt1111e crime, µctitio11crs 1verc swtenced to reclusion
, ~ ' FaGU,: Petitioners G, etc., after pleading guilty,
were sentenced
' ' to foffer recli{sion /peryetra for the complex crime of rebeilion with
• , ' • .. • • I
.i . People vs: 'Het'nandez (99 Phil. 515 [1950].), the Supreme Court ruled
that there is no such complex case. This ruling was reaffirmed in
People vs._~ap~,(~8 SCRA 72 [1969].)
,. , , Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional
right, namely, the denial of equal protection. According to their
petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted by Courts
of First Instance for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez,
GeroRimo; ,and others were convicted. The law undcl' which they
were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were
convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime,
committed und~r the same law, how can we, in conscience, allow
petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only
prision mayor?"
Issue: Is their continu ed incarceration contrary to the mandate
" of equal protection, i.e.; people similarly situated were not similarly
dealt with?
Held: Yes. Law qoes not operate u';.iformity. - "What is required
under this cons,ti,tutional guarante~ is the uniform operation of
legal nqrms so that all persons under similar circumstances would
be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred
and liabilities imposed. 'Favoritism and undue preference cannot
be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burdens
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
equally binding on the rest."' (Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37
SCRA 427 [!971], through Justice Teehankee.)
8. Central Bank Circular No. 185 (as amended by Central Bank
Circular No. 222.) prescribes the maximum .rates of interest which bank
may pay on deposits and on any other obligation.
Facts: By paying on savings deposits interest monthly instead
of quarterly, and advance interest on time deposits, respondent
 I I Ir f II I I, JI t t II I t II II II Ii 11 I :0. I
1 1111111
1
1 11, ,11111 I 11,1,.
1111 1111111 w111tld I'•I\ y,·11tly l1111•1c•t1l Jt1r,lit•11 lilliU\ thu mo«hll\1)11
lb111d 111 1111• , It, 111111, l lw lt,1-1111 lt1 lhc vnUdily of the ,oirculal'f',
d h'1•1 lli11\ 1111• 11•11111 111dc·111 1111'11mply s ldctly thc.r:ewith,. The alleged
1 are accorded P.A.E.A.E. members which are not similarly given
di8crhnluntlm11 a1•L,lt1·11J'lnc:J9 one! denial o( j'!qual pro,tection,!,'"ised
by the respondent bnnk ls predicated uppn the,fact.that the disp~ted
restrictions to b;;11lks ,as debtors are not .a'pplfod to banks as creditors.
Issue: Is the argument tenable?
Held: No. (1) Guarantee does not imply' same tredtmenf fo all. -
"This pretense is untenable, for settled is the :rule that,the equal
protection clause does not imply the same treatrnenHo all; that
it applies merely to persons, things or transactions, similarly or
identically situated; and thatit, consequently, permits a classification
of the object or subject of the law, provided that the cl~ssifi~,q.tion is
reasonable or based upon real 01; substantial distinctions,·germane
to the statutory object or purpos1:,"
(2) Circular is justified in view of its purpose. - "As above
indicated, the purpose of the resolutions and circulars fixing
maximum rates of interest payable by banks on savings deposits
and prohibiting the payment in advance of interest on time
deposits, is to protect the stability of banking institutions - as
vital factors in the national economy - from the danger that may
result from cut-throat competition among said institutions. No
such danger would result either from the interest that banks may
collect in advance from its borrowers or from high rates of interest
the former may charge from the latter." (Central Bank vs. Claribel, 44
SCRA 307 [1972], through Chief Justice Concepcion.)
9. Law requires that a representative from the private sector,
specifying the name of the private organization, shall sit as a member of
the board.
Facts: R.A. No. 3137 which creates an Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board, provides, among othel'S, thnt n
representative from the private sector coming from the Philipp.Inc
Association of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters, Inc., uhul I nc•I· OH
a member of the Board.
Issue: Petitioner claims that this particular provh1lun l!i d1111lgn11d
to favor one private organization to the excluHlu11 of 11th111•,1,
Held: Law does not confer special privilttg111i. "'1'1111 u1p,1111wnl
is without merit. "Respondent P.A.E.A.P.. w1111 11111 r1lngl1•d 11nl
lit I I 1\UI 111 , 11111. IJ III W,III:,
'"'' I
l!q111tl I111 il1•1•l.lrn 1Ill' Iho l.nwB
by the law, in order·to favor it over and above others, but rather
because it is the dm.ninant organization in the field. No privileges
to non-me~bers. 80th are within its coverage. Non-membership
in the P;A.E.A.E. does not mean that the benefits granted and the
restrictions .i mposed.by ~e Act shall not apply to those who choose
to venture into the business independently.
• It is a settled ·rule in constitutional law that legislation which
affects with equal force all· persons of the same class and not
those of another is not class legislation and does not infringe the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws." (Rafael
vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Bontd, 21 SCRA 536
[1967], ·through Justice Macalintal.)
10. Ordinance imposes tax on a named business establishmen/:.
Facts: A municipal ordinance imposes a tax on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc.
Issue: Is the ordinance violative of the equal protection clause?
Held: (1) Ordinance is not applicable to similar future conditions.
- "The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification
of the subject of legislation. The ordinance in question taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only
sugar central in the City of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as
well."
(2) Ordinance is singular and exclusive in coverage. - "The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as
plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company,
Inc. as the entity to be levied upon." (Ormoc Sugar Co., lnc. vs.
Treasurer of Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603 [19681, through Justice Bengzon.)
 II I
I 11 I' I 11J II I ' 11 11 1 1 tI I I II II I I I' II I •\ I I ,\ \ V
l 111!11 q 1ii It 111111 I 11~1•►1
n. Acc11:,,u/-r1ppt!l/1111l a:,ks t/111t lw ,be allowed to jl~lly ,discluir~e his
duties as Congressman despite his having been,co~victed ofa non~bailable
offense. · :' •· ·
Facts: The accused~appelJant, RGJ is!'~:jull-fledged II\ember
1
of Congress who is confined af the National Penitentiary _while
4
his conviction for s1:atutory ::rape on': ~cii 'c ounts aitd ·,kts of
lasciviousness on six (6) counts is peri~irig · appeal. He filed a
motion asking that h~ be allo~ed t0Ji1lli _:i;li~charg5J: tp.~,duties of
a Congressman, ~chfdjng _atten~aqc_e -~q~_gisl~t~;ei,se~sions ~nd
committee meeting!? despite his having bE!~n conv.i,cted m the first
instance of a non-bailable offense. .• , . .•,.,, . .
Issue: Does membership in Congress exempt arr accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in:
general? . (1) Cases involving aliens. - The Supreme Court has upheld
Held: In the ultimate analysis, the issue boils down to a question
of the constitutional equal protection. .
(1) Being a Congressman does not result in a substantial distinction.
- "The Constitution guarantees: 'x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws.' This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility t? any person.
Neither partiality nor prejudice shall b_e displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential du~ie~ by
public officers has never been ru:i- excuse to free a ,p erson va~1dly
in prison. The duties imposed by _the 'mandate of the peopl: are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of gc;>Vernrnen~. ~e ~ccu~ed-appellant
is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not
to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties
of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. 'x xx Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from
those others who are validly restrained by law.' "
.(2) Strict' scrutiny of classifications is essential. - A Blrkl
scrutiny of classifications is essential lest 'wittingly or otlwrwlt1\',
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or agaim1l groupn 111·
types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. Tlw 11m'1°1•il l11••1
imposed by public welfare may justify exerciHc of g11yc•11 11111 111t
ti, I I t\ I{ I , 111 , 1111 ,l , l I JI I<I( ,I I I ~
l!quol l.'roluc:Uon of Lhc Laws
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their .interests are disregarded." ·
' (3) Election to office is not reasonable classification in crirrzinal law
enforcemen't. - "We, therefore, find that election to the position
of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in lil::,erty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class."18 (People vs.
Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689 [2000], through Justice Ynares-Santiago.)
Other permissible discriminations.
statutes which excluded' aliens from -
{a) the enjoyment of certain economic privileges, such as
engaging in coastwise trade (Smith, Bell and Co. vs. N atividad,
40 Phil. 136 (1919].);
(b)" acquiring certain public lands (Li Seng Guap & Co. vs.
Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 689 [1934]; Mitsui Bussan Kaisha vs.
Manila E.R.R. & L. Co., 39 Phil. 624 (1919].);
(c) employment in control or non-control positions in retail
establishment or trade which is prohibited by the Anti-Dummy
Law (King vs. Hernande~, 4 SCRA 792 [1962].); and
(d) operation of public markets which are public services
or utilities. (Co Chiong vs. Cuaderno, 83 Phil. 242 [1949]; Co
Chiong vs. Mayor of Manila, 83 Phil. 257 [1949).)
(2) Tax cases. - There is no violation of the protection:
(a) Where compensation income is subject to a lower tax
rate than business and professional income because recipients
of the former are not entitled to make deductions for income tax
purposes as there are practically no overhead expenses (Sison,
11
Jr. vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654 [1984], supra.);
18 Allowing a detained member of Congress to attend Congressional sessions and
committees meetings for five (5) days or more than a week w ill virtually make him a free
man with all privileges appurten ant to a position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates his s tatus to that of a special claim, it also would be a mockery of the principles
o( the correction system. (Trillanes IV v s. Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471 [2008).)
 Ill
lnH , I
1111 .1'1111.ll'l ' lf..Jl'. 1 1 Ir-JI , 111111 I( ll ~A I. I 1\ W
1.'rlncipleH n11d C fl11<'fl , 1, '
(b) Where unpaid real property taxes are coHdoned to the
exclusion of taxes· already collected,: U:ut·a h Luna Subdivision,
Inc. vs. Sarmiento, 91.Phil. 371 .[1952].) Each set of taxp11yers is
a class by itself and all those belonging to <;>ne class are treated
alike; . . , ·,•·..
(c) Where stables for r~ce horses are"taxed while stables for
non-race horses are not (see Man'ita•Race· Fforse Own.~rs Ass~.
vs. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 62 [1951].); ancl' · ·
(d) Where a tax is imposed by · ordinance on persons
engaged in the business of operating tenement houses offered
for rent or lease, while owners of other classes of buildings in
the same taxing district (city) do not pay the same tax. Taxes
are (uniform and) equal when imposed upon all property of the
same class or character within the taxing authority. Tenement
houses constitute a distinct class of prbperty. Neither is the rule
violated by the fact that tenement taxes are not imposed in other
cities, for the same rule does not require that taxes for the same
purpose should be imposed in different territorial jurisdictions
at the same time. (Villanueva vs. City of Manila, 26 SCRA 578
[1968].)
But an ordinance which imposes a property tax on motor vehicles
using the streets of Manila, such tax being payable only by the
owners residing in Manila, was held violative of the constitutional
mandate because owners of vehicles re~iding outside of Manila who
also use the streets are not made to share the corresponding burden.
(see Ass'n. of Customs Brokers vs. Municipal Board of Manila, 95
Phil. 107 [1954].) In this case, those who use the streets of Manila,
regardless of whether they are residents or not, fall within the
same class. However, under the ordinance, the distinction rests on
residence.19
(3) Other cases. - Likewise upheld are:
(a) an ordinance requiring that receipts or in.voicc1:1 nH1Hl Iii;
issued in English and Spanish, because it applied to nil, whutlwr
Chinese or not (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 4'1 l'lill. 'I()'.\
[1920].);
19DE LEON and DE LEON, Jr., The Fundamentals of Tnxntlon, p, 'Ir, ( J1 ~11I)
ll IJ
t\ l<J. Il l. 1111.1 , I 11r 1, 1( ,111 !, ,1,II
H11unl l 'rol.cdlon of the l.rrw»
(b) a .law giving to the City of M,vtila the power to impose
occupation-tax whim power was not enjoyed by other municipal
corporations (Punzalan vs. Muni_c ipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil.
46 [1954].); · '
(c) .a resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the
demand of UNIDO,,. a political organization, for equal time and
number of TV and radio stations all over the country which were
utilized by President Ma;rcos in connection with the plebiscite
campaign on the proposed constitutional amendments (United
Democratic Opposition [UNIDO] vs. Commission on Elections,
104 SCRA 17 [1981].);
(d) a law (B.P. Blg. 51.) which uses the annual income of
a given city as the basis for classification of whether or not n
particular city i~ l~gally urbanized whose voters may not
participate in the election of provincial offices of the province
where the city is geographically located (Ceniza vs. Commission
on Elections, 95 SCRA 263 [1980].);
(~) a law (Pres. Decree No. 1290.) providing for optional
straight party voting system (Peralta vs. Commission on
Elections, 82 SCRA31 [1978].);
(f) a law exempting pauper litigants from the payment of
court fees (Cabangis vs. Almeda-Lopez, 70 Phil. 443 [1940] .);
(g) resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) denying the p etitioner's motion for technical
examination of the signatures and thumbnails appearing in the
Book of Votes and the List of Voters with Voting Records even
as it had previously granted respondents' similar motion where
the resolutions take into account the distinctions extant in
respondents' protest vis-a-vis petitioner's counter-protest which
validate the grant of respondent's motion and the denial of
petitioner's (Dimaporo vs. HRET, 426 SCRA 226 [2004].);
(h) A law (Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 9006) repealing Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, thereby allowing elective officials
to continue in office even as they campaign for re-election or
election for another elective office, as against the contention that
it gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive
ones who are deemed resigned upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacies on the ground that substantial distinctions
IIJ Vllll ll' l'llll 1 \ ll,.J/ ,11111111111 1\ I. I t\W
0
l'1'iildplt•1j 1111d ( il'IP!l
clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.20
(Farinas vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503 [2003].); and
(i) A law (R.A. Nb. 6758 cir The Salary Standardization Law
of 1989) which prescribes the July 1, 1989 as the qualifying
date to determine :whether an emplbyee was an incumbent
and receiving the non-integrated a11owances -or benefit-prior to
said law for purposes of entitling the employee to ,its,·cdntinued
grant, the different treatment accorded··to· the incumbents as
of July 1, 1989; on one handr and ,those ·employees hired on. or
after said date, on the otherhand, with respect to-the ·g rant of
the non-integrated benefits does not infringe the constitutional
guarantee as it is base9- on reasonab_le classification intended
to gradually phase out the said benefits with0ut, however,
upsetting the legislative policy of non-diminution of the pay
and benefits of the incumbents. (Ambros vs. Commission on
Audit, 462 SCRA 572 [2005].)
-oOo-
2°In Quinto vs. Commission on Elections (606 SCRA 258 [2009).), the Supreme Court
held that the differential treatment constitutes discriminatisin that is violative of equal
protection as such treatment is not germane to the purposes of the law. There is no vnlid
justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. (sec diaur•nlin1;
opinions.) The Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration and hold nH not
violative of equal protection guarantee of the Constitution the assailed provls lom1 Woe.
4[a], COMELEC Resolution No . 8678, the second proviso in the 3rd par. of i:il'C, 1:1 of
RA. No.. 9369 and Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.), as there oro tnntl'l'lnl 1111<1
distinctions between the two classes of officials." (613 SCRA 385 [2010].) U11d1n• :i(,, lion
2(4), Article IX-Band Section 5(3), Article XVI of th.e Constitution, civil imrvk,, 11nipl11y111•
cannot engage in any electioneering or partisan political activity except lo vol,•, Thn 11111111
of a certificate of candidacy for an elective position is, by the very 11111111\ ' 11! 1h11 m I, 1111
electioneering or partisan political activity. The only non-partlsnn pollllr ,11 111 llvlly 111111
can engage in as a citizen is voting . (Carpio, J., concurring opinion .)
UNR~~SONABUE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
.,p e.rsons, houses; papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any pur-
pose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant .or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be de-
termined personally by the judge after examination unde1·
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Meaning of search warrant
and W?rrant of arrest.
(1) A search wamtnt1 is an order in writing, issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed
to a peace officer, commanding him to search for certain personal
property and bring it before the court. (see Rules of Court, Rule 126,
Sec. 1.)
(2) If the command is to arrest a person designated, i.e., to take
him into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense, the written order is called warrant ofarrest.
(see Ibid., Rule 113, Sec. 1.)
1
lt is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. (Malaloan vs.
Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249 [1994].) A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal
action, much less a civil action. It is a sp ecial criminal process, the order of issuance of
which cannot and does not adjudicate the permanent status or charncter of the seized
property. It cannot, therefore, be resorted to as a means of settling a dispute over tlie same.
(Washington Distillers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 821 [1996).) A search wnrrnnl
is to be distinguished from a writ of search and seizure in a civil acl'ion for infringement
of intellectual property righ ts. (see Note 3.)
333
 1,1
• •
Iii 1,., ,11 11 •1·11 rn , , 11 i·, 1111 1111 ,1.J,\I I AW
1111111 1,,1..,, 111111( 'u,11•11
I
Scope of the protection.
(1) Applicable to both warrants of arrest and search warrants. -
Section 2 has been made to apply both to. warrants of arrest and to
search warrants. · ·
(a) Persons. - The protection ~ppUes to everybody, to
cil'izens as well as aliens in the Philippines, whether accused
of crime or not. Corporations are also entitled to the pn?tection
but they may be required by the State in the exercise of police
power (see Sec. 9.) or the power of taxation to open their books
of accounts and other records for inspection and examination.2
(MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 227
[1994].) . Drug Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 280
(b) Houses. - The protection is not limited to dwelling
houses but extends to a garage, warehouse, shop, store, office,
and even a safety deposit vault.3 It ~oes not extend, however, to
the open spaces and fields belonging to one. (Hester v. United
States, 205 U.S. 57.)
(c) Papers and effects. - They include sealed le.tters and
packages in the mail which may be opened and examined only
in pursuance of a valid search warrant. (Ex Parte Johnson, 96
U.S. 727; see Sec. 3[1].)
(2) Applicable only to unlawful intrusion by the government.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures in criminal cases is intended as a restraint directly against
the government and its agents tasked with law enforcement.4
2
The provision protects not only those who appear innocent but also those who
appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. (Ibid.)
3Sesbreno vs. Court of Appeals, 720 SCRA 57 (2014); see 56 CJ. 1166.
4
ln Resolution A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, the Supreme Court promulgated the Ruic on
Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of "Intellectual Property Rights
(effective Feb, 15, 2002) under R.A. N o. 8293, otherwise known ns the lntcllcctunl
Property Code of the Philippines," Article 50 of the Agreement on Trade Relntcd Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, otherwise known as TRIPS, and other relntcd low» nm!
international co nventions. Where any delay is likely to cause irreparable hnrlll to tho
intellectual p roperty holder or where there is d emonstrable risk of evidence bul1111
destroyed, said right h older or h is duly authorized representa tive inn pcnclln1\ clvii n~tl1111
for infringement or who intends to commence such an action may apply rx 1mrl1r wi th th u
proper regional trial court for the issuance of a writ of search and ao!zuro dhc•r th,K 1h11
alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party to admit Into hl,1 1n11111l"1•~ lho
■
l il't I J AIH Ill 1111 1, 111 1 1111 ,I 11' , 11'1
I J111t•11111111uhl11 H1•1111 h 1111d St•l:1.1111•
It can only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and exercise of power is imposed. Th115, where
~he eviden.ce sougl}t ,to be excluded was discov~red or obtained
by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without any
p~rtic~pation of govepunent authorities, the pr tection cannot be
41:'~ked as to bring . the
act within the ambit o alleged unlawful
ip'~rusion by the goveinment. In sum, the pr tection cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individ als. Unreasonable
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals give rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities. (People vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No.
143944, July 11, 2002; People vs. Marte, 193 SCRA57 [1991]; Waterous
SCRA 735 [1997}.)
Note that the rig!;,.t is against unreasonable searches and
seizures "of whatever nature and for any purposes." This means
that S~ction 3 covers all kinds of searches and seizures, including
administrative sea!ches done by administrative officers.
Importance and purpose of provision.
(1) Generally. - .The constitutional provision is "a safeguard
against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and
liberty of a citizen as to his person, houses, papers, and e.ffects" 5
{People vs. Burgos, 166 SCRA 1 [1986].) by officers of the law acting
under legislative or judicial sanction and gives a remedy against
such usurpation when attempted. (Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637
[194&]; Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, 203 SCRA 140 [1991]; Nala vs.
Barroso, Jr., 408 SCRA 529 [2003}.) It "seeks to forestall, not purely
abstract or imaginary evils but specific and concrete ones." (Central
Bank vs. Morfe, 20 SCRA507 [1967].)
persons named in the order and to allow the search, inspection, copying, photographing,
audio and audio-visual recording or seizure of any document and article specified in the
order. (see Secs. 1, 2 thereof.)
5
Inseparable and not merely rorollary or incidental to said right is the exdus lonnry
p rinciple in Section 3(2) w hich decrees that any evidence obtained in violnlion of the
injunction is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (People vs. Chun Ho Snn,
3~SCRA432[1999).) '
 II I.I Ii •
111, • I 'I 111 II ' I ' 11 II I I I I I' ,I I I I I I II I I'-/ 1\ I, I /\ W •I I
111li u lph"1 ,111d < 'm11•t1
(2) To vnlue the privacy of tire hv111e• ....., Aa hold·in ll.Q. vs. Arceo (3
Phil. 381 [1964].): ,.., ' 1• .. ,, • "wd ;. ::
"The invio_i~?Wty of tl:r pon\~ is 9pe:~l½~,ip9~t.w '~paI9e~tal
of all the in~ivi1ual right~ 9;eclar.~A.~1 ,recpgajz~P: },n, the .
political COdE;~ of cfvil,i:z~d l}~ti~ns:..,N~1iomt C:411,~I}~ft,ll3!0 ~e
home of another wi~out f:he ·co~s~~~ pfJt(?;-:1iri.9f
?,SSBP~ts.
The privai;:y Qf -the home ---: the,1plae~r9f. a,l>o~;e1.,.f:he ·.place
where .a, Ir\an with his family may,gwell ir!, ,p ea€e a!ld enj9y.the
~omp1mionship of his wife and childr~n. ¥nm.QJ~st!;!p. by anyone,
e;v en the king, except irJ. rare cases - ,has, always pe~,n regarded
by civilized natipns as one of the most sacre4 persopal rights to
which men are entitled.
. B?th the conuno~ anq the. ~iv4 l<;111i &ll~q:~nt~~d to man the
right?£ ab.solu.te protection to thf priv,acy of hi~ pome. 'JP,e king
1-¥"'~ p~werful; he was clothed with majesty; his will w~s the law,
but, with few exceptions, the humblest c_itlzen or subject might
shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch
and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded
as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives: The·poorest and most
humble citizen. or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how
frail or humble it, is, bid defiance to all,the .powers of the state;
.the wind, the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through
its weather-beaten parts, but the king may not enter against its
owner's will; none .of his forces dare ·to cross the threshold of
i- even the humblest tenement without its owner's rnnsent.
I A inan' s home is his castle,' has become a maxim among the
1, civilized p eople of the earth. His protection therein has become
a matter of constitutional protection in England, America, and
Spain, as well as in other countries."
(3) To value human dignity and protect the peace and personal security
of every individual. - The State cannot simply intrude indiscdminn-
tely into the house, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person
of an individual. 6 (People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998).)
6Why this right is so important is explained in. Villanueva vs. Qucrub/11 (48 SCl{A 3411
[1972].); thus: "It is in deference to one's personality that lies at the core of thin l'l)lhl, I,111 II
could be also looked upon as a recognition ofa con stitutionally protected ni-,•01 prl111orlly
or,ie's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf Hoffa v. United S1n11•1,1 J W, 1) •;, '.Ill I
[1966].) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choos1• wh11 I•• ~lk,wud
J \ I I 111 I 11 I I I ti II 11 , I I I 1 11 '
I h 11,1,111t11111ltli · :i1•r11 1h 111ul :u•i, 1111•
'. ,~ "The ~·ight t9 p,rivacy ii, an esse.ntialicondition to the dignity
I and happiness and to the peace,and:security of every individual,
whether it be <!t: ho.me or of persons and ~orrespondence. J'he
I . ·. ·constitutio:cyatihv-folability ·of,this great fundan,.e,n.tal •right must
I be deemed abs6h1.te })s :nothing, is ,dqser to a, mau' s soul than
l
I " the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal
(.•,, security. Any ·mt~rfoience allowable . can 9l}ly be for the best
of causes_ari~ reasons." '(People vs. Cour t of First Instance, 101
. ·" SCRA 86 [1980).)" : . · . ,
"The .right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn
is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the
same plane as,. the right to life, liberty and property, which h;
protected by the due process clause. This is as it sh otdd be fo1~
as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates, the right to
personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the
foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure
"includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life
while existing." (People vs. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142 [2003).)
Construction of guarantee.
(1) Liberal construction in favor ofindividual.~ In issuing a search
warrant or warrant of arrest, the judge must strictly comply with
the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions.
A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual
(or strict construction as against the State) to prevent stealth
en.~roachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by
entry to his residen ce. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only
in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants aroun d
him. Thus, is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon
to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 [1966); Brennan, J, and Boyd v, United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 [1886).)
In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and
the Supreme Cou rt [1966].), could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of the ·home nnd
perso1' and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of govcrnmonl Is
no less than to '-:'alue human dignity, and that his pr ivacy must not be disturbqd oxccpt
in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedurnl snfcguurds,"'
(see Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1986]; 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court o(
Appeals, 164 SCRA 655 l1988j; Guazon vs. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 [1990j,)
 • 111 • • Iii •
J'l lll ,ll'l'INH t 'l >N!, 111111 It >l-.11\1, I .t\W
JJri11dplcHnnd C.HwH ' "
the Constitution. No presumption of regulatity'in the performance
ofofficial duty is to be invoked in aid of the,process when an•officer
undertakes to justify it (see Mata vs. Bayona,, 128 SCRA 389 [1984);
People vs. Francisco, G.R N0. 129035;,Aug;.,2_2,:2002.) as against the
constitutionally protected rights of an_in.div.idual.7
(2) Strict con~tructfon of exceptions f(! :,eq'.,iiren:zents. - On the
other hand, a~y statqte, rule, or situation whi¢h allows _exceptions
to the constitutional and statutory requirements of warrants must be
strictly construed (People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1987].), without,
however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy.
(People vs. Francisco, supra.) Their application cannot be extended
beyond the cases specifically provided or allowed by law. (People
vs. Argawanon, 215 SCRA 652 [1992]; People vs. Solangga, 234
SCRA407 [1994]; People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 [1999].)
.· .··,,
Requisites for valid search warrant
or warrant of arrest. · same ma'hner that no such restriction is provided for warrant$ of arrest. (Malaloan vs.
They are:
(1) It must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) The probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;
(3) Such determination of the existence of probable cause
must be made after examination under oath by the judge of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce;
(4) The complainant and the witnesses must testify on facts
/1 .
personally known to them; and
if
I
7
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essentinl lo his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exempt-Ion
of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of ollwru.
While the power to seize and search is necessary to the public welfare, still it n1uot ht•
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional righlff of cillzt•11u
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifforcncc lo lho
basic principles of government. As the protection of the citizen and the mnl11tc11n11H• nr
his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the ,oml, 1lw110
constitutional guarantees should be given a liberal construction or a strict conr1lr1hlllv11 l11
favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or grnclunl d 1·111 1·1 l1,1lt111
of the rights secured by them." (Alvares vs. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 [19Si'J,)
• • • • ill ~ •
" ( I 111 I \I I I I ll .WU I I I t I 11\J
lla111•,111n111il1f., /11 1,111 Ii 1111d t,1'11,1111•
(5) The warrant" must particularly describe the place to be
$eai;eh~d, anq the per$9ns or things9 to be arrested or seized.
· '. r' The failure of · the judge to comply with the constitutional
. . I
and:·statutory..reqU:irements before issuance of search warrants or
warrants of arrest cori§tifutes grave.abuse of discretion. (Marcelo vs.
D~ GU:.Zmarir ,114 SCI½,,657 [1982]; Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC,
203 ~CRA 140 [J991].) , . . .
8
A warrant of arrest or a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the
Rules of Court to respond onjy to an incident in the main criminal case if one has nlrendy
been instituted or in -anticipation thereof. It is merely a process issued by a court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrant is inhcront in nil
courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. The requisites, procud11nJ
and purpose for its issuance are completely different from those for the institution of
a criminal action. No law or rule imposes a requirement that a search warrant may be
issued only by a court for the search of a place within its territorial jurisdiction in the
Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA249 [1994]; Kenneth Roy Savage/K; Angelin Export Trading
vs. Taypin, 331 SCRA 697 [2000J.) As long as the constitutional mandate is complied with,
there is nothing irregular if the warrant of arrest is issued on the same day the complaint
was filed. (Ribaya vs, Binamira-Parcia, 456 SCRA 107 [2005].) The constitutional
requirement for the issuance of a search warrant is reiterated under Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, (Phil. Long Distance Telephone
Company, 718 SCRA 54 [2014].)
9Under the Rules of Court, a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure
of personal property: (1) subject of the offense; (2) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds
o,r fruits of the offense; and (3) used or intended to be used as a means ofcommitting an
offense. (Rule 126, Sec. 3 thereof.)
Under Article 415(5) of the Civil Code, "machinery, recep tacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may
be car{ied on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs
of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co.
vs. Castillo (61 Phil. 709 [1931].), where this legal provision was invoked, it was ruled that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when p laced by the owner
of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having orµy a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner. Where petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/ or building
on which the machineries were placed, the machineries while in fact bolted to the ground,
remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. (Burgos, Jr. vs.
Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800 [1984],)
It must appear in the application that the items described therein fall under the list
of personal property which may be seized under Section 2 of Rule 126.
The proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant does not partake of nn ncllon
where a party complains of a violation of his right by another. It is thus not correct to say
that only the parties to the application for search warrant can question its issuance or
seek suppression of evidence seized under it. (Securities and Exchange Commission vN,
Mendoza, 670 SCRA 324 (2012] ,)
IJ
1111 1'1111 11• 1·11 It I I 111• , 111111 II,, j~\ I
l'1l111lph 111 111111 ( '11111••1
,\W
II ■
l tl I t
Effect of non-compliance. ·'- .·..
The absence of ariy of these requisites will cause the nullification
of the warrant. 10 (Republic vs. Sandiganl;lay~; 2,55. SCRA 438 ~1996];
Uy vs. Bureau ofintemal Revenue, '344 SGRA-36 .[2000];,Del Rosanio
vs. People, 358 SCRA '373 [z.001].), A,s ..againsf the, State, a sti::ict
interpretation of .the constitutiopal, st;1t\lt0ry; and-procedural rules
authorizing search and seizure is requirecj, and,stricf eomplia:nce,is
demanded. (see People vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81 [2003].)
(1) Any evidence obtained in violation ofthe above requirements
or without a warrant except in those cases _where a warrant is not
required, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in,any flJ:Ocee~mg
(see Sec. 3[2].) such as a subsequent trial even if ~uc~ evidence
clearly establishes his guilt. ,
(2) The rule is that search and seizure' must be carried out
through or with a validly issued judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure becomes unreasonable c,1nd unlawful (infra.)
within the meaning of Section 2, subject to certain exceptions. (infra.)
(3) A mere invitation to the police precinct may be covered by the
proscription on a warrantless arrest where it is actually in the r1ature
of an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an investigation
when construed in the light of the circumstances (i.e., none of the
exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest is present). By virtue of
Section 3(2), any evidence taken by the police from the place of the
illegal arrest is inadmissible. (People vs. Olivarez, Sr., 299 SCRA 635
[1998].) Under R.A. No. 743811 "cu.stodial investigation" covers the
practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed.
(4) A waiver of an illegal warrantless,arrest does not mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence sei~ed during an illegal
warrantless arrest. In spite of such waiver, things seized during
1~e motion to quash should be filed in the court that issued the wnrrnnl un1C88
a criminal case has already been instituted in another court, in which cnsc, tlm motlcin
should be filed with the latter. (Solid Triangle vs, Sheriff of RTC, Q.C., 370 SCl(I\ 119'1
[2001]; see Sec. 14, Rule 126, Rules of Criminal Procedure.)
11R.A. No. 7438 defines certain rights of persons arrested, dctnlncd, or 1111dn1·
custodial investigation (Sec. 12.) as well as the duties of the nrrcatlng dl'lalnl 1111,, 11ml
investigating officers and provides penalties for violations thereof.
I
•• Al~l Ill 1111 ,1, 1111 1•11,111 : , HJ
IJ111•,•auonul>lu Selll'l'h 1111d Sc,lz111·c:
a warrantless search which was not lawful cannot be admitted in
evidem:::e. {People vs.:Lapitaje, G.R. No. 132042, Feb. 19, 2003.)
·\: (5) Thlt absen~e dfprebabie cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arresf is not a groti:rtd •for the quashal of the Information but is
a: ground for the dismissal of the case. (People vs. Sandiganbayan,
439 SCRA390{2004].)After the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the
'
l judge is not preclude'd to subsequently quash the same if he finds,
i upon re-evalua:tion of the evidence that no probable causes exists.
(Manly Sportswear.. Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Dadotte Enterprises,
470 SCRA 384 [2005].)
Application of the principle of estoppal
or waiver.
' By estoppel, a person is precluded from denying or flSfJcrllnu
anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law,
been established as the truth or the facts by his act or omission.
(1) Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless
an:est _is not a jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto may be
waived. Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending or involving
a warrant of arrest12 on the procedure in the acquisition by the court
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before
arraignment or before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection
is deemed effectivety waived.13 (People vs. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682
12
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. (Rules of Court, Rule 113, Sec. 1.) It is made by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his submission to the custody .of the
person making the arrest. (Ibid., Sec. 2.) Application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough
that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent
on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. (Sanchez vs. Demetriou,, 227 SCRA 627 [1993); People vs. Millado, 417 SCRA
16 [2003].) The purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. (Verzosa vs. Contreras,
518 SCRA 94 [2007).)
The voluntarily going by a person with a policeman who believes thnt the former
is a suspect in a crim e, upon the latter 's invitation, is a submission to the policeman's
custody to answer for the commission of said offense. (People vs. Sequifio, 262 SCRA 79
[1996].)
13
Sec. 26, Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irrcg11/nr prcliminnry
investigation. - An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or
from assailing the regularity or questiorring the absence of a preliminary investigation o(
the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. TI1e court
 I I
I I 111 11
111111, lpl, I ,111,I I ,, I
I 1'11/0I;l'c•11pl11 VII, ( 'rnlll111, ~,,,,I !,<'HA IIM l,11JIJ:iji l'c·nph•, VII, l>c•
n ,1 ~l( 'IU\ 11'.I I 1111):lj; l'nnplc> I/ 1, ~;.ilill,•n, ~B~ !lil'I{/\ 19!.J
< :11•11111111,
I l'NHJ; l'Poplc• v11. N11vnrro, :NI SC'l{I\ :i~q ~~,!)8]; People Vfi, 'nllmllm,
3M SC'RA ~5 j200'1I; Poop.le vs. lllpul1 40~,SC:l<A l7.9 [2003].) The
pdnciplc of csloppcl nppl.ics. 14
(2) The right t:o be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures like any other right can be waived, and·Jhe1,waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly. An a<Zcused questioning the
legality of his arrest must move for the quashing of the information
before the trial court on this ground. If instead he voluntarily
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by applying for
bail, or entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial,
any irregularity attendant to his arrest will be deemed cured. Such
act amounts to a waiver of the right to question any defect in the
arrest.
(3) The rule is that if the accused ·objects to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, he may move to .quash the information
but only on that ground. If the accused instead raises other grounds
in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection
and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
(Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993].)
(4) Legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. 15
shnll resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of
the case. (n) , Codilla, supra; People vs. De Guzman, supra; People vs. De Guia, 227 SCRA 614 [1993];
The principle precludmg the accused after arraignment from qu~iioning the
legality of his arrest "applies only if he voluntarily~nters his plea and participates during
the trial without previously invoking his objection !hereto." (Leviste vs. Alameda, 626
SCRA 633 [20101,)
141n a case, the accused, six(6) days after the alleged shooting of the deceased, walked
into the police·station,accompanied by two (2).Jawyers,,placing himself at the disposnl of
the police authorities, He did not state that he was "surrendei:inghimself" or that he wns
otherwise guilty of a crime, Held: Since he was not arrested with or without a wnrrnnl, he
was entitled to a preliminary investigation and also to be released forthwith subject only
to his appearing at the preliminary investigation. Dissenting: When Ilic ,police outhodllc~
clamped the accused in jail after he was identified by an eyewitness as the pe1'Hon who
shot the deceased, he was actually and effectively arrested. His filing n pollllon In bo
released on bail was a waiver of any irregularity attending his auest 1111d 1•otopp11d hll11
from questioning its validity. (Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA lJ/J ['1\l92JJI'1 mpl!1 v~.
Lapura, 255 SCRA 85 [1996}.)
15The illegal arrest of an accused is not ·sufficient cau~o or n•11110 11 f11t' ,111lllh1111~hl11
an otherwise valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complnlnt "flt•r II lt,I, 11111• h11111
error. It cannot render aH the other proceedings, including hlr1r1111vJt'tl1111 v,,1,1 ,111,I 1h11 1,
,I I Ill IHI I I •I I lo ,II I 1 ,,c
111111 ,, 1111,1l1l11 '11·111, Ii oe11tl '•"l:11111
(/,) ijl111Jlurly, Lh Mlillll'C:h ox seizure cffccled w ithout a warrant
cannot be c:onsid;eted unreasonable where consent or waiver is
shown. (infra.)
' .
·(!5) In spite ·df the waiver, however, evidence seized during a
.
warrantless arrest ·which was not lawful' cannot be admitted in
evidence. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also
mean a waiver :q'f.,the inadmissibility of evid~nce seized during an
illegal warrantlessarrest. (People vs. Lapitaje, 397 SCRA 674 [2003);
Homer vs. People, 768 SCRA 584 [2015].)
When search and seizure unreasonable.
(1) In general. - The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously operates
only against searehes,and seizures that are "unreasonable." (People
vs. Balasa, 321 SCRA459 [1999]; People vs. Libano, G.R. No. 136860,
Jan. 20,.2003.) There are instances (infra. ) when they are not deemed
urueasonable even in the absence of a warrant. Whether a search is
reasonable or not-is not determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of the case. 16 (People vs. Susuki, 414
SCRA43 [2003]; People vs. Racho, 626 SCRA633 [2010].)
, (a) In a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court,
warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officers
d eprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his
culpability. (People vs. Rabang, supra; People vs. Briones, 202 SCRA 708 [1991); People vs,
People vs. Bustamante, 397SCRA 326 [20031; People vs. Pepino, 779 SCRA 170 (2016].)
16The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution, and
is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning. In general, all illegal searches
and seizures are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable, A search or seizure made
without a search warrant or warrant of arrest is not necessarily illegal, and one made
under a warrant is not necessarily legal. It may b e stated as a general rule that a search
and seizure is reasonable when reasonable cause has been established. When no judicial
warrant is issued, it is assumed that there is no probable cause. Normally, a search or
seizure is unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued warrant predicated upon
the existence of a probable cause, subject to certain exceptions found in Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court.
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that: "No search of a
house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lilwful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the lntter, in the presence
of lwo (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality," This
requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrnnt.
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code,
(People vs. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 (1993).)
 II II • ., II II
IH 1'1111 .ll 'l'tr-.JI( l l INI• 1111 1111 If J,\ I . I AW
JJi:l11d plc11 and CnHt>i:
conducting the search had every. opportunity to secure a
search warrant. The objects seized, being. products of iHegal
searches, were held inadmissible in evidence in the criminal
actions subsequently instituted against the·accused. 17 (Ver-oy vs.
Layague, 210 SCRA 97 [1992]; People vs. Aminnudin, supra; Alih
vs. Castro, 151 SCRA279 [1987].) . consideration of the circumstances involved, rncluding the purpose
(b) The fact that a thing is corpus deNc# of,a crime does not
justify its seizure without a warrant. (see 'Ljm' vs. Ponce de Leon,
66 SCRA 299 [1925].) Corpus delicti is -.the body. foundation or
substance of a crime. It refers to the fact of the commission of
the crime not to the physical body of the deceased. (People vs.
Penaflor, 766 SCRA427 [2015].) · Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 221 [2001]; Taifio vs. Court'
(c) Also, the fact that the offense (e.g., illegal possession of
firearm) is malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subject
thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Wliiie·' criminal intent or
motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, knowledge that the same
firearm existed is necessary. The subjects of this offense may not
be summarily seized without a search warrant simply because
they are prohibited. (Veroy vs. Layague, supra.) If the rule were
otherwise, then police officers could just enter the premises of
a person and look for the prohibited articles reportedly kept
by him without bothering to first secure a search warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search
is valid. (Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA687 [1986].)
(d) Searches pursuant to port and airport security measures
of x-ray scanning and inspection as part of routine security
procedures are not unreasonable per se. (Dela Cruz vs. People;
779 SCRA 34 [2016].)
The constitutional safeguard finds no application where
no search has been undertaken and, of course, no seizure on the
occasion thereof. (BASECO vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 1181 [1987].)
(2) A judicial question. -:- In cases were warrant is necessary,
the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules
17
Where a watrantless search and seizure is conducted despite the foc t lhnt then•
was sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant, persons who instignted or inlllntcd 1111'
same, or participated therein, take the risk .of a suit for damages in cnse tho Aunrch 1111<1
seizure would be proved to be unreasonable. (MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Colll'l of Ap1•c•i1l11,
236 SCRA U.7 [1994].)
• ■ ■ •
1\11 1 Ill 1111 ,1, llltl 11,111 ! ,
l 1i.11011Hot1ulil1• Sl•,11·1•h 11nd Sel:.,,u1'(•
of Court must be.._complied with. In the exceptional events where
warrant is not-necessary to effect a valid search and seizure, or
when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what
constitutes a reas.o nable or unreasonable search or seizure in any
pai::ticular case is a -purely judicial question, determinable from a
of _the. search or seizure,. the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in whkh the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, ai:id the character of the articles procured. (Alvarez
vs. CFI of Tayabal?, 64 .Phil. 33 [1937]; Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,
188 SCRA288 [1990]; People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA432 [1999];
of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; People vs. Nuevns,
516 SCRA 463 [2007]; Miclat, Jr. vs. People, 656 SCRA 539 (20U ].)
The burd.e n is upon the State to demonstrate the reasonablencsi,
of the search or seizure·. In case of doubt, the same should be resolved
against.the exercise ·of the power.
(3) Where there is consent or waiver. - Without a proper search
warrant (see requisites), no public official has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search
and seizure. It does not admit of doubt, therefore, that a search or
seizure cannot be considered as unreasonable and thus offensive
to the Constitution if consent be shown. For this immunity from
unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be waived,
either expressly or impliedly (Lopez vs. Comm. of Customs, 68
SCRA 320 [1976]; People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 452 [1992].), such
as by applying for or filing of a bail bond (Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120
SCRA 525 [1983]; Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377 [1977].),
or by failing to object during the trial to the legality of the search
warrant and to the admissibility of the evidence obtained there-
by.18 (see Sec. 3[2]; see People vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494 [1993].)
18
But as the constitutional guarantee is not dependent upon any affirmative act
of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting on
officer's authority by force, or waiving:his constitutional rights, but instead they hold that
a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or invitation thereto but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (People vs. Argnwanon,
215 SCRA 652 [1992].) While the right against unreasonable search and selzuwR iR n
personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, waiver by implicnllon
cannot be presumed. To constitute waiver, it must appear, firstly, that the right cxiNIO;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
 II
l'I IIUl'l 'IN I! ( l >I..JH I 111 JI ll Hi J,, h. I.AW
l'rlnd plcll and <..:rrnm:
(4) Where there is no copy ofsearch warrant. ---dn a case, the records
fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution
was able to present its return, and the judge who granted the search
warrant was the same judge who initially heard the case. It· was
held: "It can, therefore, be presumed that the ·search was made with
a search warrant and absent of any showing .that it was procured
maliciously, the items seized are admissible iri evidence." (People
vs. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 [1991]; People vs. -Hatani, 227 SCRA 897
[1993].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Petitionersubrnitted to the search and manifested his conformity
tn writing. · · with the consent of the owner. "Besides, it should be noted l'l,nt the
Facts: The Solicitor General argues th.c\t.,.y:~~tever defects there
was in_ the search warrant was thereby wai~ed by the petitioner.
Issue: Was there voluntary waiver by petitioners?
Held: Pressure or intimidation was exerted by militan; authorities.
- "We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the
military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign
to supposed waiver as a guaranty against possible challenge later
to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with
the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority
of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This
was not the manifestation merely of our traditional hospitability
and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the
Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the
petitioner could not resist." (Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1986],
through Justice Cruz.)
of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In other words, the waiver or consent must be voluntary, knowingly nnd intelligently
made. (People vs. Salangga, 234 SCRA 407 [1994]; Silahis International Hotel VA. 5olltn,
482 SCRA 660 [2006].) It is not to be lightly inferred but shown by clenr nnd convlnr h1f1
evidence.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of f,u'l to lw
determined from the totality of all the circumstances, particularly the rh11rnc1t•1•l11tln1 of
the person giving consent and the environment in which the consent 1•1 glvi,n, (I ,,iv, v,i,
People, 667 SCRA 421 (2012].) , - "The guarantee does not give freedom from testimoninl
■ • II
' A ,~ I , 111 , 1111 , I, I I fl N 11 , I I I ' , 11/
I lJ111•coHOl1nulu St•m·ch nnd SL•IZlll'l!
l:
2. PhilippJne Constabulary (PC) officers entered/without warrant
the apartment with-the consent of the owner.
Facts: The appellant claims that the firearm and explosive in
question cannot be used as evidence against him sin<!e the PC
officers had no warrant of arrest and search warrant when they
entered the apartment, in violation of his constitutional rights. PC
Sgt. C categorically declared - ';l,nd this is not disputed - that they
were allowed by the owner of the apartment to enter.
Issue: Was there a violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure?
Held: No violation of constitutional rights was committed. -
"There was no violation of constitutional rights as the entry was
unlicensed firearm and explosive were found when they an cHtccl
the accused and his companions for' carnapping' and not for JI lcgnl
possession of firearm and ammunition. In Magonica vs. Palacio (80
Phil, 771 [1948].), the Court ruled that an unlicensed firearm may be
seized without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant.
As Mr. Justice Perfecto explained it in his concurring opinion in
said case: 'x xx The illegality of the search is independent from the
illegal possession of prohibited arms. The illegality of the search did
not make legal an illegal possession of firearms. When, in pursuing
an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the
offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal
offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded
from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension
of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti."' (People vs.
Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988], through Justice Padilla.)
3. Law requires periodical submission of sworn statements of one's
financial condition.
Facts: The law, R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," requires periodical submittal of
sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities by
government officials and employees.
Issue: Does the law violate the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure?
Held: No. Obligation can be enforced only under judicial sanctions.
 l ' I IIJ ,ll'l 'INH l 1,. 11..J!, 11 I I JI fl 11'\Jr\ l , J ,AW
Principles and Cases
compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications, every•mari is under
obligation to give testimony. But ·that obliga;t~o:t;ti<:an. be exacted
only under judicial sanctions. Merely p~cailse -there. may be the
duty to make documents available for I:i-tig11,ti~1\does:not me,!n thttt
police officers may forcibly or fraudulently o~J<l-µ:t them.II (Morfe vs.
Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 [1968), through Ju~tice Fer11.1;1J1go.)
Meaning of probable cause.
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information,
has been defined as such facts and circumstances antecedent to
the issuance of a warrant sufficient in themselves to induce a
reasonably discreet and cautious man to rely upon them an9- act in
pursuance thereof (see Alvarez vs. CFI of Taya:bas, 64 Phil. 33 [1937];
U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566 [1914]; People vs. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667
[1937].), i.e., to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested (Agcaoili vs. Molina, 249 SCRA 482
[1995].), and that he is probably guilty thereof, or the objects sought
in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.
(Microsoft vs. Maxicorp, Inc., 438 SCRA 224 [2004].)
(1) As a protection against false arrest and prosecution, it is the
knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify
a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for
arresting the accused. (Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 [1994].) It
is concerned with probability; it does not import absolute certainty
or even moral certainty required for a judgment of conviction, nor
clear and convincing evidence of guilt. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief that more likely than not, a crime has been.
committed by the accused. (Ibid.; Fabia vs. Court of Appeals, 388
SCRA 574 [2002]; Tan vs. Sy Tiong Gue, 613 SCRA 98 [2010]; Ampil
vs. Ombudsman, 703 SCRA 1 [2013]; BIR vs. Court of Appeals, 741
SCRA 536 [2"014].)
(2) It presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom a warrant is sought to be issued has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws (La Chemise Lacoste vs. Femondoz,
129 SCRA 373 [1984]; Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [19671.),
or that the objects sought in connection with the offense nrc in llw
place sought to b e searched. (Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 2:-\ SC 'RA
800 [1984]; People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 [1999); S<:lc Cm1I 11111 VII,
People, 664 SCRA 430 [2012].)
1
1\ I< I'. 111 , I I I I.I . " " I-'. ll 1( I I ~t 111'1
Unrom11mflbla Scinch nncl Soii.uro
' (3) While this degree of proof demands more than "bare
suspicion," it is lower than prima facie. 19 (see Sec. 14[2]; Art. XVIII,
Sec. 26, par;·2. }Proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish gµilt is not
necessary. Probable cause merely implies probability not certainty
of guilt. (Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 653 [1996]; Kho vs. Lanzanas,
489 SCRA 444 [2006]; People vs. Choi, 497 SCRA 547 [2006].) It must
be shown by the best evidence that could be obtained under the
circumstances.20 (Nada vs. Barroso, Jr., 408 SCRA529 [2003].)
Determination of probable cause
by the judge.
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in
the issuance warrants of arrests or search warrants. The framers of
the Constitution confined the determination of probable cause as
basis for their issuance to judges to better secure the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 21 (Mantaring vs. Roman, Jr., 254
SCRA 158 [1996].)
19
The evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges and correl-
atively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. The previous
statutory and jurisprudential evidentiary standard was "prima Jacie evidence which had
been dubiously equated with probable cause." (People vs. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 [1998];
People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 443 [1999].) The probable cause requirement may be
said to be one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. (People
vs. Siton, 600 SCRA 476 [2009].)
20
Its existence must necessarily be determined by trial judges in the light of the con-
ditions obtaining in given situations or according to the facts of each case. Precisely, there
is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. (Pilapil
vs. Sandiganbayan, 221 SCRA 349 [1994]; People vs. Ayangao, 427 SCRA 428 [2004].)
21
The determination of probable cause is either judicial or executive in nature. The
first is m ade to ascertain if a search warrant or warrant of arrest should be issued only by
the judge and the judge alone, while the preliminary investigation proper to determine
the propriety of filing a criminal charge against a p erson in court is the function of the
public prosecutor and ultimately, the Secretary of Justice. The second is an executive
function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
The p reliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge; and when a
criminal complaint or information is filed with his court, the judge retains the authority
to determine whether there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The determination as to whether or not a warrant should be issued is an exercise
of judicial discretion, thus, judicial in nature. The judge m ay dismiss the case for lack of
probable cause only in clear-cut cases. (Dadula vs. Ginete, 453 SCRA 575 [2005]; Young
vs. People, 788 SCRA 286 [2016].) The judge's determination is paid great d eference by
the reviewing court as long as there was substantial basis for thiJt determination. (People
vs. Tee, G.R. No. 140546, Jan. 20, 2003.) Upon the filing of the application for a warrant,
the judge is duty-bound to determine whether probable cause exists or not (Ching vs.
Salinas, Sr., 462 SCRA 241 [2005].) to insulate from the very start those fa lsely charged
with crimes with the anxiety and expenses of a public trial. (Santos vs. Orela, Jr., 620
SCRA 375 [2010].)

I'1111 .ll'l'IN li l l >N:, 11111 I H >Nt>I , LAW
l'rindplcti 11nd Case\!
.. •_ -· (1} . Existence ·dependent upon.s.tq.teoffacts.pf part1cu~ar case.,.-;- The
question whether or not "probcible cause:':exists:is one whim must
be decided in the light-of conditions.obtainingfa:giv.en situations in
much the same way as "uru:eason?blertess'_,. fsupr.a.); in the narure of
things is a condition dependent upon the•citttu:nstances surrourtding
each case. (Central Bank vs. Mode, 2U SCR:A:S07 [-196'7].)
(a) No formula or standard, or ·hard and fast rule ' rii.ay be
laid down which may be applied to the facts of every situation.
(Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. Court of A,ppeal,1,, 261 SCR,.A 144
[1996]; People vs. Gonzales, ·364 SCRA [2001].)
(b) A hearing is not necessary. The accused cannot, as a
matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of
probable caus~. (Leviste vs. Alameda, 626 SCRA 575 [2010].). Its
· existence should be determined in a summary but scrupulous
manner to prevent material •damage to potential accused's
constitutional right to liberty and fair play. (Drilon vs. Court of
Appeals, 258 SCRA280 [1996].) The judge is not bound to apply
strictly the rules of evidence. (People vs. Delos Reyes, 441 SCRA
305 [2004].)
(c) It ought to be emphasized that in cletermining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the judicial rules of evidence
of which his knowledge is actually nil. Rather, he relies on
the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have
in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in
determining probable cause relative to search and seizure.
(People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998].)
(2) Personal examination of complainant and witnesses not always
essential. - Only the judge can validly determine the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search
warrant and he must so determine personally.
(a) The judge may, however, rely on the report or supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor (where the appropriate
preliminary investigation was conducted by him) regal'ding the
existence of probable cause and need not personally make the
examination of the complainant and his witnesses;22 othc,rwii;i:,
22
See, however, Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which rnq11ln"1 tlt11t lit,·
' ' -
Al 'I. Ill , 1111 ,1. 1111 1'11,111:,
Unn•,wo11nul1• ~ll•,1rcl111ml ~ll'lv,1111•
judges would ·be unduly laden with preliminary examination
'and the · investigation of criminal complaints instead of
·,conceti.trating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
:"<murts. (Soliveh vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 [198S,; Lim vs.
' 'Felix, 194· SGRA 292 [1991]; Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
254 SCRA 307 f1996]; Delos Santos-Reyes vs. Monteza, Jr., 247
SCRA 85- [1995]; AAA vs. Carbonell, 524 SCRA 496 [2007].)
(b) The prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence. (Lim vs. Felix, 187
SCRA 292 [1991].) However, this permissiveness should not be
• interpreted .as giving the judges arbitrary powers and letting
them loose in the determination of probable cause. The jud!JC
_cannot merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor or t·ho
report of the investigating officer that probable cause cxiHIH,
(Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994]; Abdula vs. Cuinni,
326 SCRA 1 [2000].)
(c) The examination or investigation of the complainant and
his witnesses which must be under oath may not be in public. It
may even be held in the secrecy of the judge's chambers. (Mata
vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 389 [1984].)
(d) The judge must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. Asking of leading questions
to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and
conducting of examination in a general manner would not
satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
(Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36 [2000].)
' '
i (3) Personal evaluation of the report and supporting documents
required. - It is not required that the complete or entire records
of the case during preliminary investigation be submitted to and
examined by the judge. Neither does the "personal determination"
of probable cause by the judge in Section 2 oblige hin1 to conduct
the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses
themselves.
judge, with respect to the issuance of search warrants, shall "personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses." (see Bache Co. [Phils.L Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
[1971), infra; Mendoza vs. People, 722 SCRA 647 [2014).) The requirement of personal
examination by the judge applies more appropriately to the issuance of a writ of search
and seizure.
IJIIIJ 111
I I 1· 1111 11·1 ·11 II I t
ll 5
11 I' , 1111 1 I h 11 ,.,1. I ,\W •~11
• I l 1111',Hl1tll1llil11 :,1°111, h 1111d t 1• !1 1111 •
(a) What is emphasized merely is the exclusiv.J a11d fJersonal
responsibility of the issuing judge to ,satis£y. himself of the
existence of probable cause; he is. never a1l0wed , to follow
blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the ·existence of ·
probable cause. (Talingdan vs. Eduarte, 360 SCRA 559 -(2001];
Kobe vs. Gutierrez, 429 SCRA 685 [2004];-Leviste vs. Alameda,
626 SCRA 575 [2010].) The determination of probable cause by
the judge may be done ex parte. (Mendoz<!. vs, People, 722 SCRA
647 (2014].) ' .
(b) It is the duty of the judge: 1) to p~rsonally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue the warrant; br 2) if on the basis thereof,
he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the report and
require the submission of supporting documents to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.23
(Supreme Court Cir. No. 12, June 30, 1987; Soliven vs. Makasiar,
supra; Delos Santos-Reyes vs. Monteza, Jr., supra; Abundo vs.
Manio, Jr., 312SCRA 1 [1999].)
(4) Evidence supporting finding of probable cause essential. - The
judge merely determines the probability, not the .certainty, of guilt of
the accused and, in so doing he need not conduct a de novo hearing.
(Ho vs. People, 280 SCRA 365 [1997]; see No. 1.)
(a) While the judge may rely on the findings of the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest or search ·warrantI
he is not bound thereby. The issuance of a warrant is not a
23
The extent of the judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes
depends on the circumstances of the case. He has to exercise sound discretion for, after
all, the personal determination is vested in him by the Constitution. He should call for
the c?mplainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when
the circumstances so require. (Lim vs. Felix, supra.) The personal examination must not be
merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forrna (see Sec. 5, Rule 126, Ruic~
?£ ~cu.rt; People vs. Choi, 497 SCRA 549 [2006].) He commits grave abuse of dlsc1\ •llo11
m ISsumg the warrant where he did not personally examine the evidence nor cnll fOI' ll w
complainants and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Goocl (nllh l•1 11i1l
enough. The probable cause test is an objective one. (Allado vs. Diokno, s111m1,) Bui lw IH
not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted by the proseculioJ\ 1t1 d11l111·111l11l1111
probable cause. (Cruz, Jr. vs. People, 233 SCRA 439 (1994].)
'J
.-. \I ll Ill 1111 I 111 I I• ,1 11 1 1
,. ,
mere ministerial ftmction; for the determination of whether a
probable cause. exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the
, ,accused.in order not to frustrate the ends of justice calls for the
·. I exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the jud~. (Placer
vs. .Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 [1983]; Cruz vs. Areola, A.M. No.
RTJ-01-1642, Marcil 6, 2002.)
· (b) nowevet, the finding or opinion of the judge as to
· · existence of probable cause must, toa certain degree, be sustained
or supported by the record. Where the application for a search
warrant and the joint deposition of the witnesses contained
pre-typed. questions and answers, none of which stated that
the affiants had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and
that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the
person against whom the warrant was sought to be issued, and
the records disclosed that the only part played by the applicant
(a police officer) was to subscribe to the application before the
jud"ge who did not ask any searching question, the issuance
of a search warrant was held in violation of the requirements
prescribed by the Constitution and the rules. (Pendon vs. Court
of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 [1990].)
(c) Hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable cause.
A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perception. (Agcaoili vs. Molina, 249 SCRA482 [1995].) Reliable
information is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough,
and the j,udge must depose in w,riting the complainant and his
witnesses. (Microsoft Corp. vs. Maxi.corp, Inc., 438 SCRA 224
[2004].)
(5) Need for naming respondent in application for a warrant. - The
issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the
showing of probabilities as to different facts.
In the case of the first, the determination is based on the finding
that 1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity
and 2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary
that a particular person be implicated. One could be proceeded
against although he was not included in the search warrant issued .
On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable
cause is based on a finding that a crime has been committed and
' that the person to be arrested has committed it.
I.! al II •
l'l lll ,ll'l'I NH I t >N t ,I 11111 It n~1\I , l .1\W
l'rl11cipltfl llllll L'llHUH
· (6) Issuance of warrant of arrest discretionary/mandatory,- Whether
or not to issue a warrant of arrest is discretionary ·on-the ~patt of
the trial court judge who conducts the preliminary ;investigation.
However, if he finds probable cause for .the-i ssuance of the warrant
of arrest of the accused then he is mandated by law to issue such
warrant (Sec. 6[a], Rule 112, Rules of Court; ·concerned Citizen of
Maddela vs. Dela Torre-Yadao, 393 SCRA 217. [2903]; ,Pangan v,s.
Garay, 445 SCRA 574 [2004].) but he is not precluded to subsequently
quash the same, if he finds upon reconsideratipn of ,t he ev:idence
that no probable cause exists.2i (Skechers U.S.A., Inc. vs. Inter Pacific
Industrial Trading Corp., 509 SCRA 395 [2006).)
When determination may be made.
The existence of probable cause may be determined by the
judge at the preliminary inquiry or examination which is an ex
parte proceeding, or after the filing of th~ information following a
preliminary investigation proper25 where no warrant has as yet been
issued.26 In the second case, the judge need not conduct•his own
24
Under Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, even if the judge finds probable
cause, the investigating judge's power to order the arrest of the accused is limited to
instances in which "there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." (Bersales vs. Arriesgado, 261 SCRA
320 [1996].)
25
Where a person is not lawfully arrested, he is entitled to a regular preliminary
investigation and not a mere inquest investigation. (Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, 281
SCRA 254 [1997); see Secs. 1, 7, Rule 112, Rules of Court.) But there is no rule that requires
that a preliminary investigation be first completed before a warrant of arrest may issue or
suggests that once a motion for preliminary investigation is granted, an existing warrant
of arrest is considered automatically lifted or recalled. (Bernaldez vs. De Castro, G.R. No.
104645, July 23, 1998.)
When a municipal judge conducts preliminary investigation, he performs a non-
judicial function as an exception to his usual duties. His findings are subject to review
by the prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice
in appropriate cases. (Castro vs. Bartolome, 457 SCRA 13 (2005).) Under the old rules,
the preliminary .investigation conducted by a municipal judge had two (2) stngcs: the
preliminary examination stage and the preliminary investigation proper. Under the now
rules of procedure, preliminary investigation has only one stage. (See Almonte v,q, Dien,
461 SCRA 218 [2005).)
26
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined in two (2) alngc11. Thu
first is at the executive level where determination is made by the prosecutor dmlng the
preliminary investigation, before the filing of the criminal information. 'I11c occ:ond 111 nl
the judicial level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance of the wnnnnt 1>f fllT1•11t.
(Haw vs. People, 735 SCRA 312 [2014].)
An inquest is a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the p111·p11r111 of
determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person was based on prohnhl11 , ,11 irlt'
•••• AN I. II I. I111 ,1. l II • H ll , I 11 ! 1
Um1•,wo11ablt• Sl!Mdl nnd Sc!1.urc
;,
,I petsonal-examinaticm. But the determination of whether there is a
probable cause /or filing the cnse is not a judicial function; it is part
qf,:the, prosecutor's job.2' (Salta vs. Court ,of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228
[1986].)
As to the first, a warrant can issue ORly if the judge (of a
Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court) conduct-
ing the preliminary investigation is sa,tisfied "after an examination
in writing and ,u nder oath of his complainant and the witnesses in
the·form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause
exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of Justice." 2'
(Rules of Court, Rule 112, Sec. 6[b]; Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,
254 SCRA307 [1996]; Bersales vs. Arriesgado, supra.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
J. Petitioners question the validity of their detention on mere
suspicion ofactivities which are not pun_ishable by Philippine law.
Facts: Petitioners, both American nationals, contend, among
others, that "mere confidential information made to the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents and / or suspicion of
the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with
their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid
Where a person has not been arrested, he should be subject to preliminary investigation,
not a mere inquest investigation. (Enriquez vs. Sarmiento, Jr., 498 SCRA 6 [2006].) The
proceedings a.re entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the other's
fin.d ing as regards the existence of a crime. (Solid Tdangle vs. Sheriff of RTC, Q.C., G.R.
No. 144309, Nov. 23, 2001.)
27
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rule 112, Sec. 6 thereof.) aside from
municipal trial judges, only provincial, city and state prosecutors can conduct preliminary
investigation. A police officer is not authorized to conduct such investigation; hence, a
judge cannot and must not rely on an inquiry made by a police investigator as the law
mandates him to conduct his own preliminary examination, (Ortiz vs. Palaypayon, 234
SCRA-391 [1994].)
28
aIn case, the petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest was issued barely one
hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent judge, which
according to him hardly gave the respondent sufficient time to personally go over the
voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. The Supreme Court ruled: "Merely
because said respondent had what some consider only a relatively brief period within
which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could
not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the lugnl
presumption that official duty had been regularly performed." (Emile vs. Snlowr, 186
SCRA 217 [1990].)
1'111 l'I Ill ll 'l'tr ti 1 1 11 l'ol 11 l I I II II J 1\I I 1\\ V
111l 11d plc" 1111 111 l '1110° 0i
II•
••
I ••
·grounds for their arrest and detention unless they, are,caught,in the
act. . _, ,, .., 1 ., 1,, • ,
Th~f ~rther allege _th~t be1:1g a p'ed'ophile is ndt pt\.nishab'le by
our Philippine law nor 1s 1t a cnme to be a pedophHe."
Issue: Was the arrest of petitioners based•ort ,p robable cause?
Held: (1) Probable .case was deter.mined after ~lose su~vihlan_ce liy
government agents:- "In this case; the ·arre:sfofpeti.tiop~ils¾as Based'
on probable cause determined aftei: close surveillante' for'thi~e (3)
months during which period their activities were moriitored.'The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of
the photo negatives, photographs and posters· without, •w arrant.
Those articles were seized as an Incident to a lawful arr.est and are,
therefore, admissible in evidence. (Sec. 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.)"
(2) Being "caught in the act" is ·not required to make arrest legal.
- "That petitioners were not 'caught ·in the act' does not make
the~ arrest ~legal: P~titioners were found _with young boys in
theu respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked.
Un.de~ those circu11;s:ances, the CID agents had reasonable ground
to believe that petitioners had committed 'pedophilia' defined as
'psycho-sexual perversion involving children.' (Kia.ft-Ebbing,
~sych?pati~ Sexualis, p. 555.) 'Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity)
m which children are the preferred sexual object.' (Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665.)"
(3) Activities in question are offensive to public morals. - "While
not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is a behavior offensive
to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-
being of our youth."
V
. (~) Irregularity'. any, was waived. - "At any rate, the filing by
petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered
as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops
them from questioning its validity." (Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago,
162 SCRA 840 [1988), through Justice Melencio-Herrera.)
2. Judge issued a warrant of arrest without personally exn111i11/11~
the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable ca,w,:. '
Facts: Section 2 adds the word "personally" aftc1: tho wm<.I
"determine" and deletes the grant of authority by thll I t)'/:1
\I I Ill 11111 ••I 11 • 111 1
l l1111·11111 11111ld11 ~11'11lc Ii , 111tl 'h•l11111•
I
Constih:ttion to issue warrants to "other responsible officers a9 may
be authorized by law," The judge did not personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the jssuance of warrants of arrest.
,1:,.. ,, • •
'
Issue: Did the.judge violate Section 2?
Held: No. (1) Personal responsibilitlj, not personal examination,
by the judge is required. - "What the Constitution underscores is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judges to
satisfy himself of 't he existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the ·existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine
the complaint and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report und
the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding t-hc:
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue n wn ua nt
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscal' s report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause."
(2) Reason. - "Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise,
judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts."
(3) Guidelines for issuance of warrants of arrest. - "On June 30,
1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12,
setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution." (Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988), per curiam;
see Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz, 71 SCRA 350 (1976].)
3. Deposition was taken by the Deputy Clerk of Court.
Facts: At the time of the application for a search warrant, the
respondent judge was hearing a case; so, by means of a note, he
instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the deposition of the
applicant and his witnesses. After the session, the stenographer,
upon request of the respondent judge, read to him the stenographic
notes; and thereafter, respondent asked the witness to take the oath
and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without basis, he would be charged with perjury.

J'llllll ' l ' l l l l t t ll/'1 l l l l l lt1111.,1 l t\\V •t
l 1d 111 ll'li''i 1111,I 1 ' 111ll'H
Issue: The question is: Was there sufficient c~mplinnce with
the requirement that the judge should persoM!ly ex>amine the
complainant and his witnesses? ,,
Held: No. (1) Examina,tion was not conducted by the respondent
judge. - "The participation of respondentJud,ge in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of Search Warran~ No. 2-M-70 was
limited to listening to the stenographer's ref!ding of h~r notes, to
a few words of warning against the 9omrnis~i<;m '~f perj;ury, and to
administering the oath to the personal examination. If .there was an
excl,ll1mation at all of the complainant and hi~ witness, it was the
one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But the Constitution
anc!. the rules required a personal examination by the judge. It
was precisely on account of the ipte,ntion of the de~ega:es ~o the
Constitutional Convention to make 1t a cl.uty of the 1ssumg Judge
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.that tl:-e
que.stion of how much time would be consumed by the Judge m
examining them came up before the convention."
(2) Reading of the stenographic notes to the respondent judge
was not sufficient compliance. - Such reading "did not constitute
sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule;
for by that manner respondent judge did not have opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witnesses, and to
propound initial and follow-up questions, which ~e judicial mi,nd,
on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive.
These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-
important question of whether or not there was probable caus~."
(Bache Co. [Phils.J, Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971], through Justice
Villamar.)
4. Search warrant issued suffers from many defects.
Facts: Petitioner EQ a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention (CON-CON for short), delivered a privileged speech
wherein he disclosed that on different occasions, certain persons
had distributed money to some delegates of the CON-CON,
apparently in an effort to influence the delegates in the discharge
of their functions. Later, he revealed the identities of th(! people
behind the "payola" scheme.
In the evening of the same day that President: Murcu I d1·•
nounced the expose, NBI agents, on the basis of n scnrch w r11'r1111l,
,- I
I t \J I Ill 11111 1 •I 1111 Ill 1 I I
l l1111•111,111111hle1 1 ,,.,11, I, ,111d 1 ..-11111,1
I'niclcd+ the Lu,w.;c of HQ, clniming t·hnt they have found btmdles of
money in EQ's residence. The following day, the NBI filed with the
City Fiscal a criminal complaint for direct bribery against EQ.
Issue: The issue was whether the search warrant 'issued by
the respondent judge was null and void for being violative of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Held: Yes. (1) Search warrant was based not on personal knowledge
but on mere suspicion or belief - "The statement of the applicant NBI
agent had no weight at all for lack of personal knowledge about
the offense that was allegedly committed by the petitioner. The
statement of the witness, Congressman M which was the sole basis
for the issuance of the search warrant, was characterized by several
natural omissions and replete with conclusions and in ferences,
drawn from what he allegedly witnessed when he visited EQ in t·lw
hospital. It lacks the directness and definiteness which would lrnvc
been present, had the statement dealt with facts about the alleged
bribery which Congressman M actually witnessed.
Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful
basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. The facts recited in an
affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant must be
stated with sufficient definiteness, so that, if they are false, perjury
may be assigned on the affidavit. Hence, affidavits which go no
further than to allege conclusions of law, or of fact, are insufficient."
(2) Questions of judge were not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause. - "Considering the generality of the statement of
Congressman Mate, a judicious and prudent man would have
attacked the statements made by the deponent, instead of asking
leading questions, and conducting the examination in a general
manner, like what the respondent judge did in the case at bar.
As held in Nolasco vs. Paiio (139 SCRA 163 [1985],), the questions
propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's
witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application
for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general
manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid
search warrant."
(3) Affiant had ulterior motive. - "Had the respondent judge
been cautious in issuing the questioned search warrant, he would
have wondered and, therefore, asked the affiant why said incJdcnt
was reported only on May 31, 1972, when the latter allegedly
llrll
11,11 J'llll ll ' l ' l l 11 1 I 111•, 11111111 HI ,1 I (\\V t ,, I I
1'11111 lpli"• 1111d l '11"1'11
witnessed it on May 29, 1972. Also, respondent juqge should have
questioned the statements of complainant;Congressman Mate?and
should have been alei:t.to,some ulterior:motives: on the -p art of the
latter, considering that c;ongr~ss.n;HtP: M.il,te'$ w#e. was op.e_pf those
implicated in ~~e '.e~pm,e' ma\f,e ~y ,Q!fll)tero._.A;l} ~l;t erior n;iotiy~ to
an application for search war.r ant should alert the Judg~ to possible
misrepresentations."
(4) There was,rto relation between c.rime supposedly committed and
evidence ordered to be seized. - Another circumstance which points
II
to the nullity of the questioned search warra!).t,,;fo; hqv:ing been
issued without probable caui,e, is the fact that the search .warrant
delivered to the occupant of the searched premtses,. _G eneroso
Quintero (nephew of the petitioner). was issued in connection with
the offense.of 'grave threats' and not direct 1:>ribery, which was the
criminal complaint filed against Qu~ntero with the respondent
fiscal.
The offense charged or labelled in the questioned search
warrant had, therefore, no relation at all to the evidence, i.e,, half
a million pesos, Philippine currency, ordered to be seized in said
search warrant."
(5) Impartiality ofjudge was doubtful. - "Besides, the explanation
given by the respondent judge as to the difference in the copy of
the warrant served on the petitioner's representative and those
retained by the respondents, cannot be given any weight, for no
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
can be invoked by a public officer, when he himself undertakes to
justify his acts. Furthermore, the Cour.t notes the admission of the
respondents that it was an NBI form which was used for the search
warrant, and that it was pre-filled by the applicant before it was
presented to the respondent judge, but that, he (the judge) allegedly
made the changes after he had conducted his examination. The
Court considers the act of the respondent judge in entertaining
a pre-filled search warrant as irregular; it casts doubt u pon his
impartiality."
(6) Search itselfwas highly irregular. - "The two (2) occupm1lfl of
the house who witnessed the search conducted, Generoso Quintc rn
and Pfc. Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room where o Hl',1rch
was being made by a member of the raiding party, whilt• tlw ol·h1•1·
NBI agents were.left to themselves in the other pnrb1 of llw hcu1m•,
where no members of the household were in a pm1lllm1 hi w11ll'h
them, and thus they conducted a search on thelr own.
\ 11 I 111 11 I I I I If I I 1 , II I ' I li,I
l J111 1•,111111111l•l1 1 ~ 111111 Ii 111111 :,, ,111111•
Such a proeedure, wherein members of a raiding party can
roam around .the rai(;led premises unaccm:npanied by any witness,
as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to
witness_a. search conducted by the,o,ther members of the raiding
party in another part of the house, is held to be violative of both
the spirit and the letter of the law, which provides that "no search
of a house, room, or any other ·premises shall be made, except in
.the presence of at ·least 0ne competent witness, resident of the
neighborhood, ,(Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sec; 7.)"29 .
(7) 'Requirement of Rules of Court was not complied with.
"Another irregularity committed by the agents of respondent NBI
was their failure to comply with the requirement of Section 10, Ruic
126 of the Rules of Court which provides that: 'The officer seizing
property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the
same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was fo und,
or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one
witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized
property,'
The requirement under the aforequoted Rule that a witness
should attest to the making of the receipt, was not complied with.
This requirement of the Rules was rendered nugatory, when the
one who attested to the receipt from the raiding party was himself
a member of the raiding party."
(8) Entire procedure appeared to be an orchestrated movement. -
"The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned
search warrant, and the actual manner in which the search was
conducted in the house of the petitioner, all but imperfectly, and yet,
strongly suggest that the entire procedure, from beginning to end,
was an orchestrated movement designed for just one purpose -
to destroy petitioner Quintero's public image with 'incriminating
evidence,' and, as a corollary to this, that the evidence allegedly
seized from his residence was ' planted' by the very raiding party
that was commanded to 'seize' such incriminating evidence."
(Quintero vs. National Bureau of Investigation, 162 SCRA 467 [1988],
through Justiee Padilla.)
29
Now Sec. 8 which reads "x xx presence of lawful occupant thereof or nny nwml.iur
of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient nge nnd doscrlpllon
residing in the same locality."
 VI 111.ll'l'll~ I~ t 1 1N:, 1111 1 I It >r..JA I , I ,\W
Prl11d ple1J ond <'mms
5. Respondent failed to pay oor,r.ect amount of customs q,uties.
Facts: Prior to the issuance of a search )warrant,' there was
a previous discovery of ·t he failure to pay the correct amount of
customs duties that led t6 the institution of a seizure and forfeitute
proceeding.
' (a) Thus, the statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Issue: Was said failure sufficient probable cause?
Held: Yes. (1) Search is authorized by law in case of illegal
importation. - "The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 thereof to enter, pass
through or searcl). any l~nd, ,inclosure, warehouse, ,store or building,
not being.a dwelling house and also to ~pect, search and examine
any vessel or aircraft and at:lY trunk, package, box or envelope or
any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or per.son suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable
or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law, without mentioning the need .o f a search w_arrant in said cases.
But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
'dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant
issued by a judge.'
Therefore, except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws."
(2) Seizure is authorized by law in case of illegal importation. -
"Merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law,
is subject to forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law
are subject to seizure and forfeiture. The evils associated with tax
evasion must be stamped out - without any disregard, it is to be
affirmed, of any constitutional right." (Viduya vs. Berdigo, 73 SCRA
553 (19761, through Justice Fernando.)
Personal knowledge of facts by complainant
and his witnesses.
In mandating that no warrant "shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge, after examinulion
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the wilnCHfWH
he may produce," the Constitution requires no less than. pt..' l'Hlllllll
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of th<,: farln 11p1111
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
/H(l ', 1111111 ,1', lll • l<lt ,lll : ,ltd
U11rca1-1un111Jlc Search und Sci;,:urn
(1) Purpose of oath. - The oath required must refer to the truth
of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
two witness~s "that the evidence gathered and collated by our
unit clearly shows that the premises above-mentioned and
. the articles and things above-described were used and are
continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy
with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such
as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines,
and April 6 Movement, was held insufficient as basis for
determining probable cause. (Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff AFl~
supra; 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 164
SCRA 655 [1988]; see Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344
SCRA 36 [2000]; Kho vs. Lanzares, 489 SCRA 444 [2006].)
(b) Where the '"aff:i.ants' declarations in their sworn state-
ments are generalities, mere conclusions of theirs, not positive
averments of particular facts within their personal knowledge,"
the issuance of a warrant cannot be justified. (Ponsica vs.
Ignalaga, 152 SCRA 647 [1987].) Thus, where the affidavits
state that "the said publication in fact foments distrust and
hatred against the government of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of
the Revised Penal Code, as embodied by Presidential Decree
No. 135" and words to the same effect, said statements are
mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. (Corro vs. Using, 137 SCRA541 (1985].)
(2) Test of sufficiency of affidavit. - The true test of sufficiency
of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether
it had been drawn in such manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused in case his
declarations are found to be false. Thus, where it was shown that
in the application sworn to, the affiant made his own personal
investigation, and testified that at his own knowledge, he knew that
the accused was lending money without a license, charging usurious
rates of interest, and was keeping and using books of accounts nnd
records relative to his activities as money lender, his affidavit was
 trll
1·1111 11 ' 1 II 11 1 1Ill 1111 11 11, ,, I \I \\V
' I'1111, 11 ,h ~ 1111d I ,1111 "
consklercd sufficient for he could be Hnble fo.u porjury ifdfo~ f,1CIH
turned out to b e not as stated under oath. (Yee Sue I<i.o y vs. Almeda,
70 Phil. 141 [1940].)
(3) When affidavit i:nsufficient. - The affidavit is, insufficiei:i.t if
it is based on mere information and beliet or on mere hearsay. The
probable cause must be shown to be within. the personal knowledge
of the complainant or the witnesses he m.ay prodtlce. (..(\,\va!ez vs.
CFI, supra; Roan vs. Gonzqles, 145 SCRA 694 [198,6]; Burg9s vs.. Chief
of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Quintero vs. Natipnal Bureaµ of
Investigation, 162 SCRA 467 [1988]; Prudente vs, Dayr.it, 180 SCRA
69 [1989].)
(a) Thus, in the Alvarez case, where the applicant for a
search warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a person
who I consider reliable that there are being kept in the premises
x x x," the Supreme Court held that this was. insufficient for the
purposes of issuing a search warrant.
(b) In People vs. Sy Juco (64 Phil. 667 [1937].), where the
affidavit contained an allegation that there had been a report to
the affiant by a person "whom he considers reliable x x x," this
was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a
search warrant.
(c) In the Prudente case (supra.), the applicant stated that he
has been informed that the petitioner "has in his control and
possession" the firearms and explosives described therein and
that "he verified the report and found it to be a fact," while
another police officer declared in his supporting deposition that
as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they
"gathered information from verified sources" that the holders
of the said firearms are not licensed to possess them, it was held
that the applicant and his witnesses had no personal knowledge
of the facts and drcurnstarices which became the basis for
issuing the questioned search warrant but acquired knowledge
only through information from other sources or p ersorn;.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Application for search warrant was based merely 011 i11fcw111r,//m1
provided by witnesses.
Facts: The respondent judge declared thnt lw 1111w Ill! 1111111 1 111
have applicant's deposition taken considcl'inr-; lfo1l h" w 1111 •'I I I' Iv1111•,
f I I I
111 Ill HIii t•I 11• 111
I 1111, , 1 11111l•lt ',, ,11, It ,111,I 1, , I 1111
for 111wHr1'l1 w11 1·1-.111 l rn1 llw lw ih, u ( tliu l111't1r11111tion provided by lhc
lwo witnesses ":hose depositions had already been taken by him.
Issue: Is the application sufficient to justify the issutrnce of the
search warrant?
Held: (l) Witness must havepersonal knowledge. - "In other words,
the applicant was•asking for the issuance of the search warrant on
the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known
to him, as required by settled jurisprudence. The rationale of the
requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for
perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance
of the warrant sought. It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses
themselves, oy their own personal information, to establish the
applicant's claim."
(2) Examination must be probing and exhaustive. - "Even
ass,uming then that it would have sufficed to hold the depositions
only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still
the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. It is axiomatic
that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro Jonna if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash
the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on
the intent and justification of the application. Ulterior motive of
the witnesses should put him on guard and alert him to possible
misrepresentation from them." (Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
[1986], through Justice Cruz.)
Taking of sworn written depositions
in answer to searching questions.
(1) Meaning, nature, and purpose of depositions. - The term
"depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any
written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and
appropriate sense, the meaning of the word is limited to written
testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in
advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. A deposition
is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in wr iting, under oath
or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial
officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and
usually subscribed by the witnesses. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA
388 [1984]; see Abuan vs. People, 505 SCRA 799 [2006].)
 ll I
1111 1◄ 1 Ill 11 ' 1'1111 1 I II l' ol 111 11 I• 11 I \I I \\V II I
1'11111 11'1, ,111111 ,11 1 11
'l'lw plll'pom• 111 l't'tJldtlng dep0Hillo1111 lo he lt1kt111 ii,1 lo Hnll1-lfy tlw
exa mini11g judge 111-1 lo lbc cxiHlcncc of probnblc en use.
(2) M<!r1• afjirlavils of /he co111plniwml· 1111d his witnesses are not
sufficie1tl. - The judge should only issue the search warrant or warrant
of arrest on condition that he shall examine -the complainant and
his witnesses thereby excluding the issuance of warrants merely on
the basis of affidavits. The examining judge has to take depositions
in writing of the complainant and the witnes·s es he may produce
and fo attach them to the record. Such writt'en deposition (searching
questioris and answers) is necessary in order that the judge may
be able to-properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if
it will be found later that his declarations are false.
The failure of the Judge to conform with those essential requisites
of taking the depositions in writing and.attaching them to the record
will render the search warrant invalid.30 (Ibid.; Paper Industries
Corp. of the Phils. vs. Asw1cion, 307 SCRA 253 [1999].)
(3) Nature of searching questions to applicants. - According to
the Rules of Court, "The judge must, b efore issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath the complaint and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements, together with any affidavits submitted."
(Rule 126, Sec. 5 thereof.) The same requirements are likewise to be
observed in the conduct of preliminary examination for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. (see Rule 112, Sec. 6 thereof.)
(a) The searching questions propounded to the applicant of
the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large
extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers
establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a
specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law,
30
It has been s.ubsequently held, however, that the Bill of Righls clm.'tl 1101 111ok11 II
an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of nn nppll1•,11h111 (or
a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fntnl for OM 101111 1111 1111•11, 111
evidence on the record showing what testimony was prescnlocl . (l',•oph• VH 'lh-, <; I(
No. 140546, Jan. 20, 2003.) It is sufficient that the judge pcrsonnlly 1,vnh111h"1 1111, 11,p111 I
and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution ln do1<•rn1'11l1111 pr,,b11ht,,, ,111111•
(Cruz, Jr. vs. People, 233 SCRA 439 [1994]; De Los Snnto9-Rcy,,., v" Mu11h•1111 11 , 'J'I'/
SCRA 85 [1995].) He can rely on the certification of the pro~1•c11lur
t I \ I I Ill 1111 I I IJ I I• 111 1
111111 ,11,1111111,111 '•• ,11," ,11111 '·• 1•1111
and Hnid nn1-1wcrs pnrlicularly describe with certainty the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Mata vs.
Bayona, supra; Balayon, Jr. vs. Dinopol, 490 SCRA 547I [2006].)
(b) The examination or investigation which must be under
oa~ may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy
of hts chambers. Far more important is that the examination or
~vestigation is not merely routinary or proforma but one that
ts thorough and elicits the required information. It must be
probing and exhaustive, if the claimed probable case is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not only rehash
the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on
the intent and justification of the application. To repea t, it: 1.n u11t·
be under oath- and must be in writing. (Mata vs. Bayona, Sll/ 1/'fl;
Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 694 [1986].)
(c) Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
~pplication for a search warrant and conducting of examination
m ~ general manner, would not satisfy the requirements of a
vahd search warrant. Thus, where a perusal of the deposition
shows that it was too brief and short and that the respondent
judge_did not examine the witness "in the form of searching
questions and answers," but on the contrary, the questions asked
:-7ere leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answers,
it was ~eld that th~ questions propounded were not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause.31 (Prudente vs. Dayrit, 180
SCRA 69 [1989].)
. ~ote: Searching examination of witnesses is not necessary before
1ssU1ng warrants of arrest, nor is the issuance of an order of arrest
required prior to issuance of a warrant of arrest. (Webb vs. De Leon,
247 SCRA 653 [1995].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Judge limited his inquiry to contents of complainant's affidavit.
~acts: By the judge's own account, all he did was question the
apphcant on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain, among
31
This is particularly true where the deposition did not only contnin lcndin!' nnd
roulinary ~uestions but it was also very broad, and was already mlmeogrnphocl m~d nil
that the witnesses had to do was fill their answers on the blanks provided. (sco Silva VH.
Presiding Judge, RTC, supra.)
lrl I I I r-
111111111,1, , 111 I I I 11 l!I I I
I t 111, ,, ,I, I''"' I ' ,, ' I 111111" ,,.11,1111,, 1 ,1•,11 1 Ii ,111d 1 ,1'1111111
111 11, r,1, 11 lw l-111•w 111111 11111l1•H1l11111I 1111' 11111111 •," 1111111111l y lw, ,Hi'II' "1111'
111111II, 11111111 w111, 11111 ynl 1,111,1111 llwd 1111d 1iw11111 to ," Th,,. 111111p,t•11t io11
l•1 tl ml Ill' w1111lcl 11t1I linw 11'1k1•d nny q111•1lll.01111 nl nll I( •·ht: 11ffidovit
lit1d ,1ll'l't1 d y lll'l'll 1:11111 p lclc d when il Wn!:i submi.Ltccl to him.
Jn nny cn!:iC, be did not ask his own searching questions. He
limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. I-le did not take the
applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record, ·
together with the affidavit presented to him.
Issue: Is the taking of written deposition necessary in the
determination of the existence of probable cause?
Held: (1) Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
not sufficient. - "The examining judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence
or non-existence of probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false. [citing Mata vs. Bayona.]"
(2) Application for search warrant was based on mere hearsay. -
"The respondent judge also declared that he saw no need to have
applicant's deposition taken considering that he was applying
for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by
the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned
had already been taken by the undersigned. In other words, the
applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the
basis of mere h earsay and not of information personally known to
him as required by settled jurisprudence." (Roan vs. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 687 [1986), through Justice Cruz.)
Sufficiency of description.
(1) Purpose of requirement. - The Constitution outlaws general
warrants. (infra.) It requires that a search warrant should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. 32
32A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently doM1'ilJt•d 11111y 1•11 <111l 11ff
without d estroying the whole warrant. A partially d efective wnrrnnt r,•111nh111 v11ll1I 1111 1, 1
the items specifically described in the warrant. (Microso{t Col"p, vtc, Mnxli 01 p, 1111•, 1l'ltl
SCRA 224 (2004).)
I,-
I I Ill 1111 I 1 •I I 11 , 111 •
Tiu· 1• vldc11l purpose und intent of this requirement is to
limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant and thus prevent pe<tce officers
from seizing the wrong items - to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
~easonal:>le sean;:h,es .a nd seizures may not be made - that.errors,
or worse, abuses may not be committed. (Bache & Co. [Phils.], Inc.
vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1973]; Hon Ne Chan vs. Honda Motors Co.,
Ltd., 541 SCRA 249 [2007].) It is also aimed at preventing violations
of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of
the sanctity of the home. (Tambasen vs. People, 246 SCRA 184
[1995].)
(2) Place. - A designation or description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with a warrant can, with reason-
able effort, ascettain and identify the place intended, attd distin-
guish,it from other places in the locality or community. (People vs.
Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, Aug. 11, 2010.)
(a) Thus, it has been held that the description of the building
to be searched as "Building No. 123 Rizal Avenue, Manila" is
a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched (People
vs. Veloso!~48 Phil. 169 [1925].) as it points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others.
(b) In Prudente vs. Dayrit (180 SCRA 69 [1989].), the
application for search warrant and the search warrant itself
described the place to be searched as the premises of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines located at Anonas St.,
Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, more particularly, the offices of
the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground
floor and the Office of the President at PUP second floor and
other rooms of the second floor. It was held that designation
of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the
constitutional injunction, notwithstanding that there were
several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
(c) Where the search warrant mistakenly identified the
residence of the petitioners as Barrio Patacsil instead of the
adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, it was held that "the deficiency
1 11 I I Ill II I" !I t t 11 I 1111111• If I I I \\
l'1l11,11ol1 ~ 11111l1 ,11 11
of Ilic writ IH 1101 of NtdJitfo11t gr·.ivlly lo cal I fol'.itt-1 l11valldullo11.'1~•
(Castro vs. Pabalen, 70 SCRA477 [1976),) '·
(d) Where the search warrant merely indicated the address
of the compound which is "516 San Jose ·de La Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City," this description of the place to be searched
was held as too general as it did not pinpo~nhe specific house
of the private respondent which inadequacy of the description
has characterized the search warrant as -a general warrant which
is violative of the constitutional requirements. (People vs.
Estrada, 296 SCRA 383 [1998).)
(e) The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant,
cannot be changed, enlarged, amplified or modified by the
police 0fficer's own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their ~pplication for the
warrant. To concede to police officers the pbwer of choosing the
place to be searched even if it not oe delimited in the warrant
would open wide the door to abuse of the search process.34
(People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 [1998]; Al-Ghoul vs.
Court ofAppeals, 364 SCRA363 [2001).)
(£) A mistake in the identification · of the owner of the
place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place· to be
searched is properly described. (People vs. Tru Won Chua, 405
SCRA 280 [2003].) . and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where
(3) Person. -As a rule, a warrant for the apprehension of an
unnamed party upon whom it is to be served is void except in those
cases where it contains a description of the person or such as will
enable the officer to identify the accused.
m another case, where the caption of the search warrant indicates the address ns
33
"Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City," while its. body states the address as "Hernan Cortes,
Mandaue City/'.. ~nd it was not shown that a street similarly named could be found In
Cebu City and that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the p remtuon of
petitioner corporation, the defect was held not sufficient to spell the involtclntlon of tho
warrant. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the pince
to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to II, onll~nou
the-constitutional requirement. (Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA. i)(j [2000].)
34
The particularization of the description of the place to be senrchod mny pm1wrly
be done only by the judge, and only in the warrant itself. (Paper lndus tri(•11 t.:11!'p, 11( 11111
Phils. vs. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999].) The controlling subject of ~cnrch wh1'1'11nt,1 111
the place indicated in the warrant itself and not the place identified by thu p(llit ,, (l 11•1111h•
vs. Francisco, 387 SCRA 569 [2002].)
l I Ill 1111 I I 1 1 I I• 111
1 1111, ,, 111111l,I, 1,1 ,11, 111111.J I,, I 111,1
(a) Acc1,1»cl l11uly, Jn n llflllt.! where the 1Jcm·t:h w in TAr\t stated
that John Doe (used· when the name of the person is unknown)
had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building
occupied by him at 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila and
as this John Doe was Jose M. Veloso, the manager of the club,
it was held that the police could identify John Doe as Jose M.
Veloso without difficulty. (People vs. Veloso, supra.)
(b) The. alleged ·defect of a search warrant in erroneously
designating · the accused's first name was held immaterial
where the accused's was arrested as a result of a "buy-bust"
operation and the issuing search of the premises was made as
an incident. to .a lawful arrest. The discrepancy cannot militate
against his positive identification by the poseur-buyer and
render the articles seized inadmissible as evidence in cour t.
The identification of a person is not established solely through
knowledge of the name of that person. (People vs. Martinez, 235
SCRA 171 [1994].)
(c) The Constitution does not require the warrant to name
the person who occupies the described premises. Where the
search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described
premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to
name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit
the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched
is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal
defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched
is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer
making the search as to the place to be searched. (Uy vs. Bureau
of Internal Revenue, supra.; People vs. Del Monte, 426 SCRA 383
[2004]; People vs. Tiu Won Chua! 405 SCRA280 [2003].)
(4) Property. - A search warrant may be said to particularly
describe the things to be seized when the description therein
is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when
the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which
bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. If the articles d esired to be seized have any direct relation
to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some
' J l'lllll l' l l l l l l l llll1 l(ll ff(l lll,\l l t\W
l '1h11 lplt•11 1111,I L hw11
evidence, other than those articles, to prov.e the. 1said.offense; and the
.articles subject of search and sei~ure ,shoul4 _c.ome:.in-handy merely
to strengthen such evidimce. (B.ache & .~ o, [Phils,J,, Jnc,•vs. RµJ,z, 37
SCRA823 [1973]; see PhiJ. Loag Distance Teleplwme Co. vs,Alvarez,
718 SCRA54 [2014].) .. . · ..,c;,, ",:.
(a) The Rules of Court (Secs. 3 and'~, Rule 126.) do not re'quire
that the search wa:rrant should i:deritffy -wifu particularity the
person against whom it is directed. 'lt suffices: that the place to
be searched and things to be seized are described. (People vs.
Lagman, 573 SCRA 224 [2008].)
(b) The Constitution does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute details as to
leave no room for doubt on the part.of the searching authorities.
(Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals, 364 SCRA 363 [2001]; Yao, Sr.
vs. People, 525 SCRA 108 [2007J.)·Rhas·been held.that where by
the nature of the property to be seized, the description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be
given as this would mean no warrant could issue. Thus, in a case,
the description "that there are being kept in said premises books,
receipts, lists, charts and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as money lender, charging a usurious rate
of interest, in violation of the law" was considered sufficient
because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was
thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles,
which he did.35 (Alvarez vs. CF!, supra; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil.
386 [1932].)
•(c) "Whe~ the search warrant applied for is directed
. against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and / or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published
or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
Thus, the broad statement in the application t·hnt pctillonl'I'
35But a warrant which described the cffcclR to be ncnrrlwd nH "fl m11u 111I 1,•11111I",
vouchers, x x x and /or typewriters showln11 i1II lrnnh1(•ij•1 11,,11~11t 11111111 1111 h1.lh1fj
disbursements, receipts, balnncc sheets nncl rclnt~d pro/1111111al lu•·• 11lttlt1111.,11t ,• w11~1\111!
invalid as it authorized the ael:r.urc of rccorcl11 p11rtnlnh111 to nll l111~/111 1 ,,.,,, ,It /11111• ,11 th
persons named regardless of whclht•r tht, trnivuu 1((11111 wm" lr11,1/ 111 /1/1 ,,1 11 ,~ ,1 ,,111111/
1oorrm1 t (/11/rn,) bocn1100 ii d0<_•~ not phrllt ulnrly d1•~rrll111 thu 1hh11,4 hi t ,, ~• I 1,I l1Hu111 hill
VN. l) lokM, 7.0 SCHA :lll:1 f1%'/ I,)
••• • • Alli. Ill llll .t. 111 l'lt,111: l ,1/.1
IJ111·1•111u11111l>lc Scurd 11111d Scl:t.u1c
is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
-- other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
which-were. used and are all continuously being used as a
means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended x x x is a mere
conclusion oi law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. .Bei:eft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the.existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot
.seFve as basis for the, issuance of ,a search warrant." (Burgos, Sr.
vs. Chief of Staff, AFE 133 SCRA800 [1984]; see Corro vs. Using,
., .
J 137 SCRA 541 [1985]; Nolasco vs. Pano, 139 SCRA 152 [1985}.)
(d) The requisite as to a particular description of the things
' ;
'' to l?e seized was held not complied with by a search warrant
issued for "narcotics and other contraband" as they may
comprehend any personal property. (see Castro vs. Pabalan, 70
SCRA 477 [1976].) Similarly, a warrant issued for "the seizure
of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended
to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment," it
having been verified that the petitioner has "no valid license
to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment" and
"committed / is committing acts prohibited by Article 34 of the
new Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same Code," was
held in the nature of a general warrant. (Salazar vs. Achacoso,
183 SCRA 145 [1990].)
(e) In Asian Surety & Insurance Co. vs. Herrera (54 SCRA
312 [1973].), the description of the things to be seized, i.e.,
"Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including
subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Book
of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and
general ledger, etc." was held to be "an omnibus description"
and, therefore, invalid.36
:16TI1e use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only
whun n more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure
lo l'rnploy the specificity available will invalidate a general description in a warrant.
'I'll!' use by tho issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers,
jnurnnl~, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional &
nfllrlnl receipts," "production record books/inventory lists, stock cards," "sales records,
lnh nrdo1," "co1·porate financial records," and "bank statements/ cancelled checks" was
ll'ld unncccptoble considering the circumstances of this case. (Uy vs. Bureau of Internal
H11v1•11110, 311 SCRA 36 (2000].)
I I 11 11 11 1 I lj ii I Ill/ I If J I 11111 I \I I \\
I ' 1 IIll I I,I, ,111,I I ,1 I
(t) /\ won-.11.11' rnusl ldenllt'y clearly Ilic lh l11111J l11 be 11ulzt:d;
otherwii;e, it is null and void. (Salazar vs. A chacoso, suprn,) Whnt
the Constitution seeks to avoid •are search warrants of broad or
general characterization or description. A search warrant is not
a sweeping authority empowering a raidimg party to undertake
a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to a crirne. The Constirution itself
and the Rules of Court (Rule 126, Sec. 4 thereof.) specifically
mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the
things to be seized.37
(h) The so-called warrant rule .,.._.. that only those listed in
the search warrant may be seized ~ enunciated in Vy Khetin
vs. Villareal (42 Phil. 886 [1920].), is subject to exceptions among
which is the plain view doctrine (infra.), which has been adopted
in our jurisdiction. (People vs. Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174 [1993].)
(i) It is not required that the property to be seized should
be owned by the person against whom the search warrant
is directed. It is sufficient that such person has control and
possession of the property. (Yao, Sr. vs. People, 525 SCRA
108 [2007].) There us not even a requirement that the warrant
must name the person who occupies the described premises.
(Quelman vs. People, 526 SCRA 653 [2007].)
(5) Dissolution of warrant. -A search warrant may be dissolved
where the subject thereof no longer exists having been converted
37Thus, where the search warrant authorized only the search and seizure of shabu
nnd its pnraphernalia, it is no authority for the police officers to seize a firearm which
is not mentioned much less described with particularity, in the warrant, Such firearm,
having been illegally seized, is not admissible in evidence, (People vs. Del Rosario, 234
SCRA 246 (1994],) However, it is not required that technical precision of description
be made, particularly, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description
must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that
no warrant could issue. Any description of the thing or place to be searched that will
enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate thing or place is
sufficient. Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in
particularity as to create a general warrant Nor is the description"any and nil nnrcolics"
and "all implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining lo" the URC,
possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs •SO broad as to be unconslilulinnn\.
A search warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a quantity of loose huroin" hnfJ
been held sufficiently particular. Tested against the foregoing precedents, lhu ciQ~Cl'iptlon
"an undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to satisfy the rrqulr·1•n11111I ft,r
particularity in a search warrant, (People vs. Tee, G.R. Nos, 140546-47, }01111111 y :,10, 200:J,)
I I 11 1 I I 11 I I ,, I II I I I
I 11111 tlltllll•ll il1 ',, ,Iii I, 11101 1 ,111 1111
to other url l ·le11 nol m111wcrl11g lo the 11pcdlic dc:,;criplion of the
pl'operties ordered to be seized under the same. (People vs. Court of
Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Search warrant for alleged violation of the Anti-Film Piracy law
merely listed articles used in renting out betamax tapes.
Facts: The,.migin11l or master copies of the copyrighted films
were not presented during the application for search warrant.
Issue: Are the search warrants valid?
Held: No. (1) Presentation of master tapes was necessan;. - "The
presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from
which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for
the validity of ·search warrants against those who have in their
pos~ession the-pirated films. x x x The court cannot presume that
duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master
tapes that it -owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video
tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale
and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 49." (Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Propern;.)
(2) Essence of copyright infringement. - "The essence of a
copyright infringement is the similarity or at least s ubstantial
similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighled work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted fi lnu;
to compare them with the purchased evidence of t·hc video lopes
allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unnul:hori;,;cd
reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted fi lms lo
the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requiremenlti
of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
.copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant."
(3) Specification of articles allegedly pirated was necessan;. -
"Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape
cleaners are articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged
in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax tapes.
In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with,
IJ II II a 11
~'111 1. ,ll'l'I N I! I l J('-J/ ,111 l J 111 l t"I I , I AW
)Jrindplc11 nnd l'M;c.4
or related to a legitimate bttsiness not necessarily involving piracy
of intellectual property or-infringement oh:opyright laws, Hence~
including these articles without specification and/ or particularity
that they were really instruments in violating an Ant>Piracy law
makes the search warrant too general which.-tould result in the
confiscation of all items foup.d in any vided.!'. ·,(20th Century Fox
Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA665 [1988], through Justice
Gutierrez, Jr.; see Columbia Pichtres, Inc. vs, F.lore~,38 223 SCRA 761
[1993]; Columbia Pictmes, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 367
j ,
[1994].)
Note: The ruling in 20th Century Fox .._;.a~ clarified in two (2)
cases.
"The supposed pronunciamento in said case [20th Century Fox]
regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of
the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at
most be understood to merely serve as a guideJ,)OSt in determining
the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases
where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the
printed copies.xx x Such auxiliary procedure, ho':ever, does no~ ~ule
out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, deposition,
admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum
probandum." (Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 261
SCRA 144 [1996].)
In Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc: vs. Court of Appeals
(261 SCRA 219 [1996].), the trial court ordered the seizure of the
properties enumerated in the warrant inclu~ing "acce_ssories,
equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or _ma:en~l used
or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distnbuhon, or
possession for purpose ·of sale, leas_e, distri~ution, circulat~on or
public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated tapes which he
is keeping and concealing in the premises above described." Held:
"In other words, it authorized only the seizure of articles used or
intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other nets in
violation of the said decree. x x x Clearly, the above items could
;sln this case the warrants ordering the seizure of "television sets, vid110 ca•i•,l'lh•
recorders rewind~rs and tape cleaners xx x" were found too broad since tlw 1h•l1•111l1111I
was a li~ensed distributor of video tapes. The mere presence of counh•rf,111 vld,·11
tapes in the defendants' store does not mean th~t the machines were used h1 l''"d11, •:
the counterfeit tapes. In Mal:icorp Corp. vs. Mal:1corp, Inc. (438 SCR/\ 2A4 l?OIM] ), tlu
respondent is not a licenr,ed distributor of petitioner.
I\ " I ' 111 "11 I I I I I I. II 'I I I l I 11/
I l111e•1111111111hlc• tl1•1111 h 11111I h t>l'1,11 11•
. not be .<J.ny more specific as the circumstances will allow since they
c.1re all u&·ed or it_}~~nded to be used in the unlawful sale or lease of
pirated-tapes.".,· ._.
Mec1ning of general .warrant/general
search warrant ·
(1) A generahvarrant is defined as "a search or arrest warrant
that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property
to be seized."
(2) A general search warrant is one that allows the "seizure of
one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer
executing the warrant the discretion over which item s to take.
(Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People, 713 SCRA 18 [2014).)
General search warrants constitutionally
obj~ctionable.
General search warrants are outlawed because they place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence (Sec. 3.) at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad
or general characterization or sweeping description, which will
authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize
and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an
offense. (People vs. Tee, 395 SCRA 419 [2003).)
(1) Description of the offense too general. - To satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, a specific offense must be alleged in
the application; abstract averments will not suffice.
(a) In Standford v. State of Texas (379 U.S. 476, 13 L.ed,,
2nd 431.), the search warrant which authorized the search for
''books, records and other written instruments concerning
the Communist Party of Texas, and the operations of the
Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions
to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC
13-3703 or otherwise," have been held too general, and that
portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Secs. 54-197 of
the Connecticut General Stahttes [the statute dealing with the
 If 5 I
I/II l,'l 111 11 ' 1' 11 JI l 111 J'ol 111 J I II II 11\1 1 1\\V J11-1
l'tl 111l1il1•11111111 ( IPll'H
crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a gc•~eral warrant, and,
therefore, invalid (see Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133
SCRA 800 [1984].) or void for lack of particularity. (Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438 [1996].)
(b) In the Burgos case, wher~i~ a ' search warrant . ~pplied
for was directed against a newspaper publisher or · editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials; nothing
specifici'llly subversive had been alleged; slated only was the
claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and
means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There was no mention of any
specific provision of the decree. In the words of Chief Justice
Concepcion: "It would be legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to
any determinate provision thereof.39
(c) In Stonehill vs. Diokno (supra.), the.Supreme Court struck
down the search warrants issued the.vein for being based on the
general allegations that the petitioners had committed violations
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, the National
Internal Revenue Code, and the R,evised Penal Code. There was
a bare reference to the laws in general, without any specification
of the particular sections thereof that were alleged to have been
violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such
codifications. (see Olaes vs. People, 155 SCRA486 [1987].)
(d) The Constitution, however, does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
39 Accordingto Justice Abad Santos in his concurring opinion:
"The [two] search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both authorize the
seizure, among other things, of the following: 'Subversive documents, pamphlets, lenflcts,
books and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subvcrnivo
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-A-Fire Movement nncl
April 6 Movement.'
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, book~, etc.,
subversive? What did they contain to make them subversive? There is nothing In lh1•
applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. The wnrrnnta nro r,c1wrnl
warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution. In point of fact, thol'O w1111 nothing
subversive published. xx x Conformably with existing jurispmdencc everything 11l'l111d
pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all of tho ll111n,1 11r1• 1111ltj!I! I
to the exclusionary rule of evidence." (Ibid.)
'l, I • \I I Ill 1111 I Ill I 'll .111 1 I f
I l 111, •,1111 11111lolt• 1 11•,11 1 Ii ,111d 1 ,11111111•
authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for
applicants to obtain a warrant. The use of the phrase "and the
like is -of no moment," it does not necessarily make, a search
warrant a general one. Thus, a warrant that described the
things to be seized as "books of accounts and allied papers," or
"unlicensed fireaxms of various calibers and ammunitions for the
said firearms," or "chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts,"
has been upheld. The description is required to be specific only
as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. Where from
the nature of the things to be seized, their description must be
rather general, to require that a technical description be given,
would mean that no warrant could issue. (Kho vs. Maka lintnl,
306 SCRA 70 [1999]; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932].)
(2) No particular offense mentioned. - A search warrant lhat is
too general, in effect, mentions no specific offense or covers more
than 01;,e specific offense.
Where the search warrant issued left the space in the caption
intended for the nature of the offense in blank and all that the body
of the warrant stated was that the articles in question were "stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the offense, the search warrant
was declared totally null and void. Since the particular offense was
not mentioned, the reason for the issuance of the search warrant
could be anything under the sun. (People vs. Court of Appeals, 216
SCRA 101 [1992].)
A search warrant which does not mention any specific offense is
not necessarily violativeof the rule against general warrants. 40
(3) More than one specific offense covered. - Corollary to the re-
quirement of probable cause, the law prohibits the issuance of a
40Jn a case, the search warrant issued b y the City Court did not mention any specific
offense deemed to have been violated by respondent, but the application filed by the
NBI agents stated that he "has in h is possession and control stocks of San Miguel Gin
which are adulterated and, therefore, violative of the provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of
the Revised Penal Code" entitled "Substituting and Altering Trademarks, Tradenames or
Servicemarks" and "Unfair Competition and Fraudulent Registration of Trademark and
Tradename," respectively. The Supreme Court sustained the contention of the Solicitor
General that "The specific acts defining said offenses and mentioned in said articles are
closely allied to each other that, in a sense, the punishable acts defined in one of them can
be considered as including, or necessarily included in the other." (People vs. Marcos, 117
SCRA 999 [1982).)
 II II a ~ II • 11
1:1111,11'1'1 1'"1 1 t t lf\ J!.J I J 1 1111 •UA l , I t\W
1'1fol'l ph H r,nd L'll!il'tl
0
II
?11111
search warrant for more than one specific offef\.<;e (Rules of Court,
Rule 126, Sec. 4.) such as for "illegal traffic of narcotics and c0ntra-
band" which is a generic term covering all goods exported from or
imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes. Neces-
sarily then, more than one offense could arise ~rom the activity des-
ignated. A search warrant based .on such ground is violative of the
rule against general warrants. It is a "scatter-shot warrant" and to-
tally null and void. (see Tambasen vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 [1995];
Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477 [1976]; People vs. Simbahon, 401
SCRA 94 [2003].)
A search warrant may not be assailed as a general search warrant
for having been issued for more than one offense simply because it
does not contain any reference to any particular provision of the law
violated.41
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
l. Search warrant based on a deposition that respondent organiza-
tion was illegally engaged in illegal banking activities does not mention
specific banking transactions with specific perso1:s.
Facts: The Governor of the Central Bank directed the
coordination of "the investigation and gatp.ering of evidence on
the activities of savings and loans associations which are operating
contrary to law." The municipal court issued a search warrant on the
basis of a verified application, alleging that" after close observation
41
Thus, in People vs. Dichoso (223 SCRA 174 [1993].}, the Supreme Court in rejecting
this contention of the appellant, said:
"While the [search warrant} is for 'violation of RA. No. 6425, known as the
'Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended,' the body thereof which is controlling,
particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and specifies the
offense involved, viz., illegal possession of marijuana, and shabu and paraphernalia in
connection therewith.xx x [Appellant] engages in semantic juggling by suggesting t-hnt
since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession
of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drug~
Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense, In 1;l10rl,
following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search wnrrnnl/1 x x x.
This argument is pedantic.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals s pcclncnlly with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into 'prohibited' and 'regulated' drugH nnd d(•lhw•1
and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which bolonfj lt11h111111111,
class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly INlllli'tl IPt' 1h11
said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act."
J
■ I ■ a a ti
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and versonal investigation," the respondent's premises "are being
used unlawfuHy," because said respondent was illegally engaged
in banking activities and enumerating alleged papers and articles
kept in the premises being used "in the commission of a'felony."
Issue: Respondent seeks to annul the search warrant because it
"is a roving commission, general in its character" and the use of the
words "and othets" in the search warrant permits the unreasonable
search and seizure of documents which have no relation whatsoever
to any specific criminal act. Respondent judge found the searches
and seizures reasonable.
Held: (1) Reasonableness is dependent on the circumstances. -
"The constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or imaginary
evils, but specific and concrete ones. In the very nature of things,
unreasonableness is a condition dependent upon the circumstances
surrounding each case, in much the same way as the question
whether or not 'probable cause' exists is one which must be decided
in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations."
(2) Personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions is sufficient
although names of individuals involved unknown. - "The deposition
of a member of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, that,
after close observation and investigation, the office of a savings and
loan association, illegally engaged in banking activities, is being
unlawfully used, is sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant.
The issuance of said warrant would not constitute a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.
The failure of the deponent to mention particular individuals does
not necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge of specific
illegal transactions of the savings and loans association, for the
witness might be acquainted with specific transactions even if the
names of the individuals concerned are unknown to him." (Central
Bank vs. Marje, 20 SCRA 507 [1967], through Chieflustice Concepcion.)
2. Search warrant issued was for four (4) violations of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Facts: The search warrant was issued for "violation of Section
46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208,
and 209. An examination of the provisions shows that they cover
 • IJ lj •
,IN} l~I III ,ll'l'I N I~ t l >N!i III l J I It l N/\ I , I ,/\ W
l'ri11ciplc~ nud CnBcH
at least four (4) distinct offenses involving viol;l.tion of Section 46(a)
(filing of income tax return); of Section 53 (withholding of income
tax at source); of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of .business or
occupation); and of Section 209 (failure, to make, a return of re.ceipts ·
of sales). , . .
, I
Issue: Was the search war;ant issued•in connection with one
specific offense?
Held: No. Warrants sanctioned seizure of all records, legal or
illegal. - "The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pe1'.taining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of a11 records of the petitioners and
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of the Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized
be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general wa.rrants." (Bache & Co. [Phils.],
Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971], through Justice Villamar.)
3. Search warrant fails to mention the particular provision of law
that was violated. . related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed
Facts: Petitioner attacks the validity of the questioned warrant,
on the ground that it was issued in violation of the rule that a
search warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific
offense. The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according
to petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular
provision of P.D. No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.O.
No. 1866 punishes several offenses.
Issue: Was the failure of such gravity as to call for invalidation
of the warrant?
Held: (1) Search warrant was issued for one specific offense. - "In
Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967].), where the warrnnts
involved were issued upon applications stating that the nalural
and juridical persons therein named had committed a 'violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, the National lntern11I
Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code,' the Court held thnt 110
specific offense had been alleged in the applications for n flC, ll'l 'h
warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay of the highcHt onh•1·
to convict anybody of a 'violation of Central Bank Lnws, ·1:,riff 11nd
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised l'lm11l ( 'ode•'
1\1~1 Ill I1II .L t II l>t lt, l l ll , 111I
U1.11:l•,u;un,1blc Scar h 1\1\d Sci1.ure
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws and
c0<;les.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant
was captioned: 'For Violation ot1P.D. No. 1866. (Illegal !>ossession
of Firearms, etc.) While the· said decree punishes several offenses,
t. the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase
'illegal po,ssession of firearms, etc.' As explained by respondent
Judge, the term 'etc.' referred to ammunitions and explosives. In
other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense
of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure
of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of P.D.
No. 1866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for il!:l
invalidation on this score."
(2) Decree is a codification of various laws 0 11 illcgn/ possessioJJ
of firearms, etc. - "Besides, while illegal possession of fircn rnw iH
penalized unde'r Section 1 of P.D. No. 1806 and illegnl possession
of .explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be
overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws
on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives;
such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are
within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D.
No. 1866."
(3) Departure from Circular on Search Warrant is not fatal. -
"Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the
failure of the applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for
the issuance of the search warrant [when applications are filed
after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays],
his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the
questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's
Circular No. 19, dated August 14, 1987, it would suffice to state
that the above section [No. 3] of the Circular merely provides for a
guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the
validity of an otherwise valid search warrant." (Prudente vs. Dayrit,
180 SCRA 69 [19891, through Justice Padilla.)
Warrant to search for evidence to be used
against the accused.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a
raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and con-
I IJ i-crT ,r ,-
II I I 111 11 I I t I I I I tr I I I I I • I I• 11 I I
1'1 111, 1,,1i 11111,I I ,1 I I 1111,
foicate uny and nil I i11d:,; of cvidcnc<.: or HrlidetJ..rdaliug In,, <:dtull.
(People vs. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246 [1994]; J'~opJe vs. Francisco,
G.R. No. 129035, Aug. 22, 2002.)
(1) Search for evidence of an intended crime......,.:A warrant is not
allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a:h intertded crime,
but only after lawful evidence of an offense actually committed.
Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's privacy for the sole
purpose of obtaining evidence against him, except in a few special
cases where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed to be
concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest in it or
in its destruction. (Rodriguez vs. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230 [1937].)
(2) Search for evidence in criminal cases. - The seizure of books
and documeJ,1ts by means of a search warrant for the purpose of
using them as evidence in criminal cases against the person in
whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it
makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation
of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
accused to testify against himself. (Alvarez vs. CF.I. of Tayabas, 64
Phil. 33 [1937].)
This fishing for evidence is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish probable cause.42 (Stonehill vs. Diokno, supra.)
(3) Search to prevent further use of papers to commit a crime. -
But the mere fact that the application for search warrant states that
the articles to be seized are going to be used in evidence - that
its purpose is "to take possession and control of the articles to be
used as evidence in the above case under investigation" - does
not make, the warrant otherwise lawful, as one issued to fish for
evidence. (People vs. Marcos, 117 SCRA 999 [1982].)
There is no violation of an individual's right against self-
incrimination (Sec. 17.) if the purpose of the search is to prevent the
further use of the records and papers to commit a crime. (People
vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]; Yee Sue Kuy vs. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141
[1940].)
-12But the accused's claim that the arresting officer was only fishing for t•vlcle11te• of
a crime was held without factual basis, it appearing that there WilS deflnllc lnfnr11111llo11
of the identity of the person the officer was looking for. (People vs. Vnldcz, 3M 8('l<A I-to
{1999].)
I I 111 111 I I •I I I• I I I
,1 ,111111,11 I I 11, It ,11,,1' I I 1111
Dlopooltlon or proporly uolzod.
The responsibilities of the judge do not end w ith the granting of
the search warrant but extends to the custody of the articles seized.
(Summerville Gen. Merchandising Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 525
SCRA603 [2007~ .), :,
· (1) Duty of officer who seized property. - The police officer must
forthwith deliver the proper ty seized by him to the judge who issued
the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory thereof
duly verified under oath. (Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sec. 12[a].) The
law also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to
issue a ,detailed receipt for the property seized. (Ibid., Sec. 11.) These
duties are mandatory and are intended to preclude substitution of
the intended property seized by interested parties. Approval by t·hc
court which issued the search warrant is necessary for the retcnUon
of the property seized by a police officer and only then will his
custody be considered custody of the court. Absent such approval,
he has no authority to retain possession of the property, more so, to
deliver it to another agency.43 (People vs. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743
[1993].)
(2) ½'hen property to be returned to the owner. - Where the
property has been wrongfully seized, either without a search
warrant or by virtue of an illegal warrant, or where the property
taken is not the same as that described in the warrant, upon showing
of the illegal seizure, the property should be returned to the owner
on his application therefor.44 It is not admissible as evidence (Sec.
3(2].) because it is "the fruit of the poisonous tree." No matter how
incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant45 (Pendon vs. Court of
Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 [1990].) nor may such act validate an illegal
seizure.
43
In like manner, only the court which issued the search watrant may order its
release or disposition, as it is the court which acqriired jurisdiction over the property
seized. (Tambasen vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 [1995]; Tenorio vs. Court of Appeals, 413
SCRA 234 [2003).)
44
47 AM. JUR, 529-530.
45rf no criminal case is instituted after the seizure made pursuant to a search warrant,
the property seized should be deliv·ered to its rightful owner or at least to the person from
whom it has been seized. (Washington Distillers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 821
[1996).)
 1T II ■ I ll I
l'111111 ' 1' 11 11( 1 1 111• ,11111111 111 .. \l , I AW
l1l'1 111•lplu11 1111d l '111ie11
. .-
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(3) Where property illegal or prohibited. - Where the articles seized
are illegal or the possession of which is prohibited, such as stolen or
smuggled goods, firearms, and the like, their :return to the owner
even if illegally seized may not be ordered by the court (Ibid.; Mc)ta ·
vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 389 [1984]; Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478
[1976].), although they remain inadmissible as evidence. Pending
resolution of the case, however, the said articles must remain in
custodia legis.
(4) Where property subject of litigation. - Such property will
remain in custodia legis until the case is terminated.46 (Alih vs. Castro,
151 SCRA 279 [1987]; Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1986].)
Replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. (Chua vs. Court of
Appeals, 222 SCRA 85 [1993].)
Right against unreasonable search
and seizure personal.
The legality of a search and seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights were involved and have been impaired thereby,
and objection thereto is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. (Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36
[2000]; People vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81 [2003]; People vs. Peralta, 426
SCRA 472 [2004).) Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee
or lawful occupant of premises searched cannot raise the question
whether there has been an unlawful search or seizure. (Lim vs.
Ponce de Leon, 60 SCRA299 [1975].)
The right can only be waived by the person whose right is
violated or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his behalf.
46
Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in c11stodin lcg/s. II m1rnt IJII
shown that the thing has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judic!nl cxoc11tlvl'
officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. Only when property is lnwf11lly tokt•11
by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and not ,1thnwl111•
The rule that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot bC! rcpli'v!,1(1 ,1pp!l1•••
only where the property is lawfully held. Thus, a thing unlawfully scl;,.od 111 vk,h1tl1111 1tl
the rule against warrantlcss searches and seizures or its acccepted oxcopt lo1111 t,, 111, t 111
c11stodia legis and a court has no authority to order it to be deposited with tho• , 1111~ 111
court. (Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 [1991]; Superlincs lrn11iop111•t,1ll1111 I " , 111,
vs. Phil. National Construction Co., 519 SCRA 432 [2007].)
.- .- . .- •• \ I I Ill 1111 I 111 11,.111 1
111111•,111111111!111, 1,,,,11, Ii 111 111 ' h,111111•
Invocation of right by officers
of corporation.
Officers of certain corporations, from which dQcuments,
papers and things were seized by means of search warrants, have
no cause of action to assail the legality of the seizure because said
corporations have personalities distinct and separate from those of
said officers. The objection to an unlawful search is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. They cannot validly object
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations since
the right to object to their admission in evidence belongs exclusively
to the corporations, to which the seized effects belong, and may not
be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967];
Iasiad vs. Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 238 [1974].) This is an instance
when ill~gally seized evidence may be admitted. (see Sec. 3[2].)
Justice Castro dissented from the above ruling in the Stonehill
case:
(1) Lack of standing cannot affect illegality of search and seizure.
- "That the petitioners have no _legal standing to ask for the
suppression of the papers, things, and effects seized from places
other than their residences, cannot in any manner affect, alter, or
otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and
the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder.
Whether or not petitioners possess legal standing, the said warrants
are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal
and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that 'legal standing,' or the lack of it, is a determinant
of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure."
(2) Doctrines on "standing." - "Our constitutional provision on
searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years
of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional
provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncements made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts,
cspecially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals.
II If I I ,.- I I
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1' 11111 lj1l1 •j 1111,I I lllll'H
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on 'stm'l.ding' to move for
the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects, which
are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized
as follows:
(a) ownership of documents, papers, and effects gives
'standing';
(b) ownership and/ or control or possession - actual or
constructive -of premises searched gives'standing'; and .
(c) the 'aggrieved' person doctrine where the search war-
rant and the sworn application for search warrant are primar-
ily directed solely and exclusively against the aggrieved person,
gives 'standing."'
(3) Control ofpremises or property_ suffident to give standing. - "An
examination of thesearchwarrantsin this casewill readily show that,
excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally.
In some of them, the petitioners _w ere na~ed personally, followed
by the designation 'The President and/ or General Manager' of the
particular corporation.
· The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants.
But the 'office/house/warehouse/premises' mentioned in the said
three warrants were also the same 'office/house/warehouse/
premises' declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the
petitioners and/ or 'the President and/ or General Manager' of the
particular corporation. The searches and seizures were to be made,
and were actually made, in the' office /house /warehbuse / premises'
owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
(a) Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the
petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives
them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure .regardless of their location at the time of seizure.
Under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches
and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or hi$ office, hiH
heitel room or. automobile.
(b) Control of premises searched gives stm1dlng. l11dl'•
pendent of ownership or other personal interest in l'lw 1•1•1•11rd11
and documents seized, the petitioners have stand Jn g Io 1110 v 1, f111·
I I
I I 11 I Ill 11111111 I h Ill
I li111,11,1,1111l•l1•' •••11111111111I •u 1,1111•
rel urn and impp1:c1;1!:li on by virtue of their proprietnry or leasehold
., inte,rest in m,any, ,o_~ the premises searched. These proprietary
and leclllehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their
motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here. It
has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to
have standing in a motion to return and suppress."•7
When search and seizure may be made
without judicial warrant.
For a search and seizure to be reasonable under the law, there
must, as a rule, be a warrant validly issued upon probable cause by
an appropriate judicial officer. The general rule is that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made. Yet the interdiction agninst
warrantless searches.and seizures is not absolute and inflexible for
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions as in the instances
enumerated subsequently.48 The required probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. Our
jurisprudence is replete with instances where tipped information
has become sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search
and seizure. (People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 [1999].)
(1) Where there is consent or waiver (People vs. Nalasugui, 63
Phil. 233 [1936].), and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly (People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462 [1992] .), such as by
posting a bail bond (Bagcal vs, Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525 [1985],), by
47In People vs. Dichoso (223 SCRA 174 [1993).), the appellant contends "that the search
made was illegal and the articles seized thereby cannot be used against him in evidence
since, he does not own the nipa house searched or the lot wherein it was built." It was
held: "It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by
the person against whom the. search warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is
under his control or.possession." (citing Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA .800 [1984].)
It was established that the appellant and h is wife have been using the nipa house as a
resting place even before the search.
48Th e right against unreasonable search and seizure is a most basic and fundamental
one. For this reason, the statute or rule which allows excep tions to the requirement of
a warrant is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. (People vs, Salan gga, 234 SCRA 407 [1994].) The essential
requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted. (People vs. Antta, supra.)
 lfl
II 1·1 11111 11 1 II 1 1111 1 1 I I 11 , 1 h 111 \I I \\V
1 1 hit 1,,1i
1
11111d I
1 , 1111,
filing a petitlon for bail (People vs. Abapo, 239 SCRA373 [1994].), or
by failing to object during the trial to the legality of the searcli. and
to the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby. (see Seo. 3(2].)
(a) Mere silence, passive c_onformity, or lack of objection
to the search being made1 especially where it was conducted
without a warrant, is not tantamount to consent or waiver. (see
People vs. Compacion, 361 SCRA 540 [2001]; People vs. Burgos,
144 SCRA 1 [1986].)
(b) Neither plea~~; p~rticipation,.i;~~~~ t;i~.;~~--cure ' th~
illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence
into ol;,jects of proof. (P~ople vs. Aruta, 2.88 SCRA 626 [1998].)
(c) An ~lleged consent t'o a warrantless search and seizure
cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty. (People vs. Baula, 344 SCRA 663 [2000].)
There must be a clear intention to relinquish the right.49
(d) The person who is the subject of the search must be
the one who should give consent to a search not anybody else
present. The right against unreasonable searches and seizure is
a personal one. (People vs. Asis, 391 SCRA 108 [2002].)
(2) Where search is an incident to a lawful arrest. (Alvaro vs. Dizon,
76 Phil. 837 [1946]; Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]; Nolasco vs.
Pano, 147SCRA.509 [1987]; People vs. Claudio, 160SCRA646 [1988].)
This exception includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest. (People vs. Chua
49The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the p erson giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he wns
in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or pnssivcly looked
on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive pollco
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the qucsllnnlnfl took
place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consc nlllll\, II 111 tho
State which h as the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, lhnt 1l1u 1wrc1n~~•'Y
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. ('llllf\o v~, 'rn11 I ,,r
Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, Jan. 15, 2002.)
To constitute a valid waiver,. it must be shown that just tho rlt5ht 1•1d11t•c) ,,,,. 11111I, llm
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive of lhc 1•xl,11c,11, 1• 111 t1111 h I l11ht,
and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish lho riKl,1. (l'1mpl11 v" A~IM, \\J I
SCRA 108 {2002].)
I 111
1 h I I A l I 111 1111 I 111 t 1 1• ,I 11 ',
,.,,
I !1111 111111111111,11• !,1•1111 Ii ,md :,1•111111 •
Ho San, 308 SCRA.432 [1999].) Thus, a person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
or constitute as prooF of the commission of- an offense, or connected
with the crime as its fruits, without a search warrant. (see'Rules of
Court, Rule· 126, Sec. 12.)
(a) The legal parameters of this rule, however, limit
its · application to instances when the search is made
contemporaneous to the arrest and within a permissible area of
search. (People vs. De Guzman, 351 SCRA 573 [2001].) A lawful
arrest rnust precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.
Where the search is first undertaken and an arrest effected based
on evidence produced by the search, both such search and a nest:
would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.!",() (People vs.
Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 [1996]; People vs. Aruta, suprn.)
(b) In Jlagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at
the _very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or
has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer. The arrest that follows the hot pursuit of a person caught
committing an offense in Jlagrante is valid. A contemporaneous
search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and
the immediate vicinity where the ar~est was made. (People vs.
De Lara, 236 SCRA 291 [1994]; People vs. Santos, 236 SCRA
l 689 [1994].) "Reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in Jlagrante delicto
arrests. (People vs. Chua, 396 SCRA 657 [2003] .)
(c) A lawful arrest may be effected without need of a
warrant. (infra.) In a buy-bust operation involving prohibited
drugs, a search warrant is not necessary in order to seize
evidence from the violator's person, the search being incident
to a lawful arrest. (People vs. De la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416 [1990).)
(d) Where the appellant was arrested in Jlagrante delicto in
the act of selling and delivering prohibited drugs to poseur-
buyers, the subsequent search of his house which immediately
50-fhe legality of the precedent arrest d etermines the validity of the subsequent
incidental search, However, a search substantially contem poraneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the <1trest at the outset of the
search. Given that the search was valid, the arrest based on that search is also valid.
(People vs. Ma riacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010.)
 I I 11 I 11 I 11 1 I I t II I I \\ I I
l 'il11,11 •li 1111,I I Ill
f11llu w1•d, yll'!d l1w, t1IIH•1· h1crlmln11l l1111 ,·v ld,•111 ,., 1111d wli ld1
Ii •rnnu• 1he batiiHfor hi:; conviction for possc1:1t1ion of a prohibited
a
drng, wa:; held search contempora~cous\f 1nad~ and_ a_s ~
incident to a valid wm·rantless arrest m the immediate vicinity
where the arrest was made. (People vs. Catan, 205 SCRA 235
[1992].)
(e) "Search made incident to a law:ful pirest" is limited,
however, to the body of the accused and to.that point within
the immediate reach or control .of the pefson ,arrested, or that
which may furnish him with the means of committing,violence
or of escaping. Thus, where a person was lawfully arrested
and searched outside his house, a warrantless search inside his
house was held unlawful. It can hardly be said that the inner
portion of his house was within his reach or control.51 (People
vs. Lua, 256.SCRA 539 [1996]; Espafto vs. <;ourt of Appeals, 288
SCRA 558 [1998]; People vs. Estrella, 395 -~CRA 553 [2003].)
(f) Immediate body search upon arrest is not always
necessary. For example, the arresting officer Jnay conclude that
the offender poses no danger and that it woul? be best.to defer
a
to later time a more thorough body search to be conducted
in the presence of witnesses thus obviating any later charge
of evidence-planting. ·That no immediate body search of a
suspected offender was done in any particular arrest may a_lso
be due to lack of proper training on the part of the arresting
officer or officers. (People vs. Esguerra, ~1 SCRA 261 [1993].)
(3) In the case of contraband or forfeited goods being transported
by ship, automobile, or other moving vehicle, where the officer making
it has reasonable cause for believing that the latter contains them,
in view of the difficulty attendant to securing a search wanant.
(Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770 [1948]; People vs. Court of First
Instance, 101 SCRA 86 [1980]; Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandignnbayan, 11-3
SCRA 267 [1986]; Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Cou.rt of Appcnls, 257
SCRA430 [1996].)
{a) Search and seizure without search worrn11l or v1•111a•l•1
and aircraft for violations of the cuslomA l11w11 h,1v,• lu•c•11 1l11· •
' ''!110 wnrrnntk•~s m•,u·ch mny <:Xlcnd lt11rwl11dc• 1h11 puu11l1111~ 111"'" 1111u11 ll1111- uwh 1
lhu linmudlnl!• control (1f tho 1wrno11 1111·11ull'tl 1111cl1,1• lhi; l'111 111 \ h•w , 11h !I', 11111" 1•
ll11l11111r, 7-lt/1 ti( HA (11{/ I1l/97J, /11[1 11.)
1
h I ' \II I Ill 11111 , 111 I' ll ,1 11 11 ,,,,
I l1111•1Hllll 1ilbli• n,•111111 and : l1•l✓ 11l'l'
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out
of the locality 0r furisdiction in which the search warront must
be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence, it is
not practicable to require a search warrant before such search
or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception
should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery
laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that
enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or
Coast Guard. (Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 33 [1975]; People vs.
Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]; Hizon vs. Court of Appea ls,
265 SCRA 517 [1996].)
(b) Warrantless searches and seizures of a moving vehicle
are justified on the same ground. (Asuncion vs. Cou rt of Appeals,
302 SCRA 490 [1999].) They are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances
as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers
in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When
a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made
it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out
of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile
or other vehicle contains an item, article or object which by
law is subject to seizure and destruction. The requirement is in
recognition of the possible abuse or arbitrariness on the part of
the police authorities. (People vs. Libnao, 395 SCRA 407 [2003);
People vs. Lapitaje, G.R. No. 132042, February 19, 2003; People
vs. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152 [2007); People vs. Mariacos, C.R. No.
188611, June 16, 2010.)
(4) Where, without a search, the possession of articles prohibited
by law is disclosed to plain view or is open to eye and hand (see
Mnnipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.) and the area of search is
wil'hin the immediate control of the arrested person. (People vs. De
C uz mnn, 351 SCRA 573 [2001].)
Under the seizure of evidence in plain view rule, an exception
odoplcd in our jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United
~;11pn•mc omt in Harris v. U.S. (390 U.S. 324.) and Coolidge vs. New
 1111•1J
l'l 111 11 ' 1'11 I I ( 1 1 I/,,., 111 l I ti JI Jr\l I t\W
• • • • • ••
l '1h 11 ll'lt••t 1111d l '11111°11
Hampshire (403 U.S. 443.), it is recognized .that·objects immediately
apparent and inadvertently falling in the plaitvview of an •officer
who has the right to be in the position to have :thaLview are subject
to seizure without a warrant and may ,be introduced in evidence.52
(People vs. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 431 [1992]; see:People vs. Tabar, 222
SCRA 144 [1993]; People vs. Sala:zar, 266 SCRA 607 [1997]; People
vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998]; People vs. J1olasa, 321 SCRA 459
[1999].) It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. (People vs. Compacion, 361
SCRA 540 [2001].)
(5) As an incident of inspection, supervision and regulation in the
exercise of police power (see Sec. 9.) such as inspection of restaurants
by health officers, of factories by labor inspectors, etc. The same
thing may be said of inspection of books of .accounts by revenue
examiners.
(6) Routinary and customs searches usually made at the border
or at ports of entry in the interest of national security and for the
proper enforcement of customs and immigration laws.53
(7) Stop and search and seizure conducted at military or police
checkpoints set up in the interest of public security. (Valmonte vs.
De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 [1989], infra.; Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,
188 SCRA288 [1990]; People vs. Ramos, 41 SCRA 734,222 SCRA 557
(1993].)
(a) Such warrantless search is not violative of the Cons-
titution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
I,
52Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. (l'aoplo
vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998]; Del Rosario vs. People, 358 SCRA 373 (2001); PcO/'llOVII,
Aspiras, G.R. Nos. 138382-84, Feb. 12, 2002; People vs. Macalaba, 395 SCRA 461 200!11:
People vs. Sarap, 399 SCRA503 (2005]; Abenes vs. Court of Appeals, 515 SCRA 690 120071/
Rivaldo vs. People, 585 SCRA 341 [2009].) Where the object seized wns innid11 11 l'lv11111I
package the object itself is not in plain view except where the packngc iH 1111~h lh11t 1111
experienced observer can infer from its appearance that it contains the pn>hihl1111I 111111 h•
(Taii\o vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.136292, Jan. 15, 2002.)
53
See 47 AM. JUR. 513-515.
lu I • \ IJI Il l 1111 I 111 I J1 ,Ill l ,,,
I li 11,·,1111,1111h l11 !,1°,11 1 11111111 ' 11'11 1111•
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search. Police officers, however, do
not have unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches
of moving vehicles in the absence of probable cause td believe
before the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.54
(Aniag, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424 [1994];
People vs. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63 (1992]; see People vs. Lo Ho
Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]; People vs. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277
(1995]; People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA 754 [2000].)
(b) Where a vehicle was flagged down but it did not stop,
forcing the police to chase it, there exists probable cause to justify
a reasonable belief on the part of law enforcers that the vehicle
contained objects which are instruments of some offense. (Epil,
Jr, vs. Ulat-Marredo, 518 SCRA 641 [2007],)
(8) ~top and frisk has already been adopted as another exception
to the general rule against a search without a warrant. It refers to
"the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat for weapon(s):55 Airport frisking is an authorized form
of search and seizure. (People vs. Cadidia, 707 SCRA494 [2013].)
54
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited
to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the rurtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3)
flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited
to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in
a fixed area. {Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 221 (2001]; Taii\o vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, Jan. 15, 2002.) Searches conducted at checkpoints are valid as
long as tl1ey are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists. (People vs. Vinecario, 420 SCRA 280 [2004].)
55
"x x x Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigatin g this behavior he identified himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encoun ter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weap ons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
wenpon seized may p roperly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom
they were taken." (Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 [1997], citing Terry v.
Ohio, 20 L. ed., 2d 889, 392 U.S. 1, 900, June 10, 1968; People vs. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 429
[2014].)
 I 111111111 ! 1 It Ill 1111 1111 l1J \ I I \\\
l '11111 1pl1 •,,111d< 11111· •1
While probable cause is not required to cm1duct a "stop and
frisk," mere suspicion or hunch will not validate a 'fstop and frisk."
A genuine reason must exist, in the light of the police. ,officer's
experience and surrounding conditions. t@; w.arrant the belief that
the person detained has weapon concealed about him. A "stO]D and
frisk" serves a two~fold interest; the general ·interest of effective
crime prevention and detection and the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation of the police officer making the "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons." 56 (Mala(>:at vs.
Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 [1997], citing Terry v. Ohio, supra.)
(9) Where the search and seizure were effected on the basis ofprobable
cause as when a person acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with
a bag, it is the right and duty of a police officer to inspect the same to
determine if he is concealing something illegal in it. A police officer
may, in appropriate cjrcumstances and .in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for the purpose of inve_stigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.
To require the police officer to search. the bag only after he shall have
obtained a search warrant for the purpose may prove to be useless,
futile and much too late.57 (Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)
56
The two (2) types of warrantless searches-"stop and frisk" and "search incidental
to a lawful arrest" - differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may
be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In the second as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is q uestioned in
n majority of cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
sea rch. In this instance, the Jaw requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made - the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the la tter
may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or p roperty
found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or thnl
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the mcnns o(
escaping or committing violence. (Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, s11pra; People vs. Chun,
396 SCRA 657 [2003].)
57
A warrantless search and arrest is valid where the police officer had n\Hlllnnhlt•
grounds to believe that the accused was in p ossession of shabu, having boun 110 h1f11rnll'II
by another person who was himself caught in possession of sh ab11 (l'uoplt• w1, l.l11l111',, i•;~
SCRAB04 [1997].); where the distinctive odor of marijuana cmnnn lcd fnu11 11 111pln~l\, llllt\
carried by the accused (People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 616 ll9Atll,): wll,•11• ,111 1111111111111•
positively identified the accused who was observed to hnv<i b,•1111 111 ll11t1 • 11•,l'l1 l1111• ly
(People vs. Tangliban, 184 SCRA 220 [1 990],); where low 1•11fon•11r11 hod 1111 h1~ ll11t•, l•us, ,I
on confidential information, of the personal circumotnn,·,.., ol Iii" I''''""""
th111 w, "'
looking for and the criminal act they will about to commil (l1<111plt• v1, t 111, 1•1111 1.1~, ' ,I 11 /\
247 [2009].); where the accused fled when arrcslccl by p11llll11111111 (l'11•11dl•~ vM 1 111111 ,,t
I I \ I I llt 11111 111 I II ,111 ' 1
l l 111 1•11111111, il , li• f.1•1111 Ii 1111d !11'1 11 111•
(10) ln view of the urgency and exigency of the moment, a search
warrant can lawfully be dispensed with, as where the raiding
military operatives, at the height of the December, 1989 coup d'etat
attempt, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
\.
committed, as the raid was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that the building raided was being used as headquarters by
the rebel forces after a surveillance was conducted thereon wherein
the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from
said building, and had no opportunity to apply and secure a search
warrant because the courts in the surrounding areas were closed,
in addit,ion to the general chaos and disorder at the time because
of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity. Under the
circumstances, there was more than sufficient probable cause lo
warrant their action. (People vs. Garcia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994]; see
People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998).)
(11) The Supreme Court h as ruled in several dangerous drug
cases that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search (see People vs. Breus, 767 SCRA 40 [2015].)
Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990].); and where the accused who were riding a jeepney were
stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that
said accused wou ld transport a large qu antity of marijua na. (People vs. Maspil, 188
SCRA 751 [1990]; People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991 ]; People vs. Lacerna, 278
SCRA561 [1997].) The appellant'a attempt to run away when a policeman approached is
susceptible of various explanations Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly
committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of gu ilt. (People vs. Edano, 729 SCRA
255 (2014].)
But a person merely " looking from side to side" and "holding h is abdomen" may
not be s lopped and frisked in broad daylight on a busy street on mere unexplained
suspicion without a search warrant. No offense could possibly have been suggested by
such nctions and in a place not exactly forsaken. (People vs. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174
[1992].) If n person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than
lho~c jlrntifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, merely on suspicion
lhnl he i9 cngnged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed
t'11n1111illcd n crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also the search on the
01•c1wi1111 lhcrcof. Consequently, every evidence which may have been obtained during
11u1 h 11c11rd1, even tending to confirm or actually confirming such initial suspicion, is
11l,•1ol111t•ly inadmissible, the sam e being "the fru it of the poisonous tree." (People vs.
l{11drlg111•1,, 232 SC'RA 498 [1994]; Guazon vs. De Vilfo, 181 SCRA 623 [1990]; People vs.
l 'llirnn, 256 SCRA 325 [1996}.)
 I I 111 I I I I I I I I
IJ I ,I I' d l{A IIVI I A'd•' ,
I. 'I/tr' lt-,1111/ /111•11•1Ji1r "1o11/111·11/hJ11 tlrir1111 " /1y //,r• 1111///11ry //IHI //,r•
1 nil police aclluns are governed by the limitations of the Bill of
1wlicc, a11rl tlw 1111111111'1' /1y w/1irlr //11•y nre ro11r/11clt'd art' nss(li/ed.
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to prohibit the military and police officers represented
by public respondents from conducting "aerial target zonings" or
"Saturation Drives" in areas pinpointed by the military and police
as places where subversives are supposed to behidihg. The arrests
ranged from 7 during one such drive and 1,5CJO during another.
The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a
common pattern of human rights abuses enumerated irt the petition.
The public respondents in their comment cite Article VII, Sections
17 and 1858 of the Constitution as the legal authority for saturation
drives and allege that accusations about deliberate disregard for
human rights are "total lies."
Issues: Are the "zonas" or "saturation drives" complained of,
a valid exercise of police power? Do they violate the Constitution,
particularly Article III, Section 2?
Held: "In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an
orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time.
Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look
by administration officials at the policy implications of the prayed
blanket prohibition are also warranted."
(1) Authority of the President to order police action. - "There can
be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action
of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and
blatantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constihttion which denies
the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor
General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminali ty, rising
lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constil11tion
grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subvcniivc•
movements which would bring down constituted authority .ind
substitute a regime where individual liberties arc ttuppretiHvd ,m
58"Sec.17. The President shall have control of all the cxccullw dt•p,11 l1111,11M1 t,1111•,11111
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfu lly cx1m1ll•cl "
"Sec. 18. The President shall be the Comma nclc1'-in-Chl1•( 11( t1II l\r 111,•,I I 1111, , 111 th,•
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he mny r,,11 nut KIi• h ,111111 ,I 11111, 1 '"
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion . xx x."
I I Ill 1111 I I •I I I• 111
I 11111 I n11,1l,l1 II• Ii 111111 1 I I 1111
11 111,1111•1· 111 polk y 111 1111' 11111m• ol scc11rlty of tlw St,1lt•. I lowevc1~
Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehrnsible
methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left,
the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying hard
to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but
they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations of the
c9nstitutional prote.ctions which are their distinguishing features."
(2) Police actions should not be characterized by methods that offend
sense ofjustice. - "The decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Rochin vs. California (342 US 165, 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952].) emphasizes
clearly that police actions should not be characterized by mel·hnds
that offend sense of justice.
The court ruled: 'Applying these general consiclcrnlions tn tl'lL'
circumstances of the present case, we are compelled to conclude
that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do
more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This
is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitione1~ the struggle to open his mouth and
remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents - this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.
They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of
constitutional differentation. 111
(3) Police action per se is not impermissible. - "It is significant
that it is not the police action per se which is impermissible and
which should be prohibited. Rather, it is th e procedure used or
in the words of the court, methods which 'offend even hardened
sensibilities."'
(4) Duty of courts where violation of human rights is involved.
- "The aerial target zonings in this petition were intended to
flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly because
of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials
by elements supposedly coddled by the communities where
the 'drives' were conducted. Where a violation of human rights
speci fically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the
duty of the court to stop the transgression and take remedial action
even in cases such as the present petition where the petitioners do
not complain that they were victims of the police actions, where
 fu •
no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims me given,
and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police 'saturation
drives' as long as the court is convinced that the event actually
happened."
(5) Show of force is sometimes. necessary. ·- "The Court believes
it highly probable that some·violations were actually committed.
This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for
the thousands of residents 'to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification.' We cannot imagine police
actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted
by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplin~d
soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses. However, the
remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and
legitimate ones.
We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly
felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent
demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show
of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated. Anarchy may reign if the military and
the police decide to sit in their offices because all concerted drives
where a show of force is present is totally prohibited."
(6) Problem is basically one for the executive department and fo r
trial courts. - "The remedy is not an original action for prohibition
brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim com-
plains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem
is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the
executive department and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens
with only second hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military,
and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of
all remedies for all evils." (Guaz.on vs. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 [1990.I,
through Justice Gutierrez, Jr.)
Cruz, J., dissenting:
(1) Saturation drives are not among accept:crl i11st:m1rrs rnllr'l'I' 11,•111'1'11
or arrest may be made without a warran/:. - " SA lt1rnt ln11 dl'i vt'll .i1't'
not among the accepted instances when a scnrrh 111· .111 11r11"1l 1n11y
be made without warrant. They cornc rmdt>1' llw c11111•1•pl 111 1l111
fishing expeditions stigmatized by law and d1H l11h11•, Al ,11,y 11111•,
1
if the majority is really introducing the 'zom1' 1111 1111111 lw 1 "'' 111•lh 111
to the rule, it m ust not eguivocatc. 11' mw1t 1,l,111• tli11l l11lt•11ll1111 111
• \I I 111 1111 I I ti I It , I I I 1 lttl
I li 111•111<111111l1h1' 111, 11 , 11 1111.t 111•111111•
forthright language and not in vague generalizations that concede
the wrong but deny the right."
(2) Mere waging of saturation drives is unconstitutional even
without proof of personal indignities. - "I urge my brethren to accept
the fact that those drives are per se unconstitutional. I urge them to
accept that even without proof of the hooded figure and the personal
indignities and the loss and destruction of properties and the other
excesses allegedly committed, the mere waging of the saturation
drives alone is enough to make this Court react with outraged
concern. x x x While they may be allowed in the actual theater of
military operations against the insurgents, the Court should also
make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground."
Padilla, J., separate opinion:
(l) A classic instance of state power colliding with individual rights.
- "This case is another classic instance of state power colliding with
individual rights. That the State, acting through the government
and its forces, has the authority to suppress lawless violence in all
its forms cannot be denied. The exercise of that authority is justified
when viewed from the standpoint of the general welfare, because
the State has the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a
peaceful life and existence for its citizens. A government that loses
its capability to insure peace and order for its citizens loses the very
right to remain in power.
But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of the
means and methods to suppress lawless violence, the right of the
individual citizen to the dignity of his person and the sanctity of
his home cannot and should not be violated, unless there is, in a
particular case, a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a compelling duty to suppress or abate."
(2) The stakes are too high for the Court to avoid judicial confron-
tation. - "Respondents must be given a chance to face their ac-
cusers and prove that they are indeed fabricating falsehoods. But
the stakes, I submit, are too high for this Court, as the guardian of
individual liberties, to avoid a judicial confrontation with the issue.
I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal venue
requirements) to the Executive Judge, RTC of Manila, for him to re-
ceive the evidences of all the parties, in support and in refutation of
the petitioners' allegation; to decide the case expeditiously on the
basis of the evidence, ~ubject to review by this Court; and to report
to this Court on action taken."
 ll ■ IIIJ IJ •
l'l 111.ll'l'I N l \ l UN!il 11 LI 111 >NA I. I.AW
l'rinciplcs nnd Casc1:1
Sarmiento, J., dissenting:
(1) "Show of force" has no place in a constitutional democracy. -
" As a general rule, a peace officer cannot act' unless he is possessed
of the proper arrest or search warrant. The·,exception is when a
criminal offense is unfolding before hi:tn1 in which case, action is
justified and necessary. The ~ajority &V.ould; ha.ve. the, exception to
be simply, the general rule. ,., ..
The fact of the matter is that we are ncit here confronted by
police officers on the beat or prowl cars on patrol. What we have
- and I suppose that everybody is agreeable to it - are lightning
raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects, and summary
arrests of persons, the very acts proscribed by the Constitution. If
this is a 'show of force,' it certainly has no place in a constitutional
democracy."
(2) Drives were conducted to fish for ·evidence. - "I find allusions
to the last aborted coup d'etat in[e]pt. In that case, our men in
uniform had all the rights to act amidst crimes being committed in
Jlagrante. The instant case is quite different'. There are no offenses
being committed, but rather, police officers fishing for evidences of
offenses that may have been committed. As I said, in that event, a
court warrant is indispensable."
(3) Controversy is purely one of law for the Supreme Court to decide.
- "That 'the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court' is to
me an abdication of judicial duty. As I indicated, the controversy is
purely one of law - the facts being undisputed. Law, needless to
say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not the Executive.
Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a
grievance to raise, arising from abuses ~ey pinpoint to the lower
offices of the Executive (which presumably has its imprimatur). To
make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to make the Executive
judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter."
2. Police confiscated, without judicial warrant, allegedly obscene
magazines.
Facts: The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "mcn'B
magazine," invokes, in particular, the constitutional gunrnnl..-c
against unreasonable searches and seizures as well UH 1\w
prohibition against deprivation of property without dtHl pml·~·1111
of law. He contends that the lower court and the Court of AppP11l11
1\l~ I Ill 11111. 1 11 l'l1 ,111 '1
U 111'l'lti1011,1hh· Set11·t•h 1111d Sl'l:,,.1111•
erred in holding that the police officers could, without any court
warrant or order, seize and confiscate his magazines on the basis
simply 0£ their determination that they are obscene.
Issue: Was.the,search and seizure lawful?
Held: (1) Absence of warrant made search and seizure unlawful. -
"It is bas1c that searches and seizures may be done only through
a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and
subject to challenge. Jn Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800
(1984), We countermanded the orders of the Regional Trial Court
authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan
Mail, two Metr<;> Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant.
We have greater reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in t·hc
complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact thnt the
instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from
Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech
is speech, whether 'political or 'obscene."'
(2) When warrantless search is allowed. - "The Court is not
ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court provide,
but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been
an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account
of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are
such charges being readied against any party under Article 201, as
amended, of the Revised Penal Code."
(3) Warrantless search is not justified by an anti-smut campaign. -
"We reject outright the argument that '[t]here is no constitutional
nor legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal
responsibility because there had been no warrant,' and that
'violation of penal law [must] be punished.' For starters, there is
no 'accused' here to speak of, who ought to be ' punished.' Second,
to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the
raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search
warrant because, in his opinion, 'violation of penal laws' has been
committed, is to make the respondent Mayor, judge, jury, and
executioner rolled into one. And precisely, this is the very complaint
of the petitioner."
(4) Police power is no license to seize property in disregard of
due process. - "The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act
was sanctioned by 'police power' is no license to seize property
in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc.
vs. Drilon (163 SCRA 386 [1988].), we defined 'police power' as
the state's authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
 1111111111 11 1 1 ,, / 1 11111111, IJJ,~I I A\V
I 11 /r11 11'11"1 ,111d \ 11111•11
personal liberty or properly in order to promote. the general
welfare. Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 ~re, a1:guably, police
power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities
for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in
carrying out the decree of the twin presideij.tial issuances (Mr.
Marcos'), from the commandments of the ·Constitution, the right
to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay
down procedures for implementation." ·
(5) Guidelines to be observed. - "We mak~ this resume:
1. The authoritietl must apply for the issuance of a search
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in
order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the
materials sought to be seized are 'obscene,' and pose a clear
and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant
State interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are
indeed 'obscene.' The question is to be resolved on a case-to-
case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion;
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it
shall issue the search warrant prayed for; .
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; and
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court
may assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed
'obscene.'
These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the
Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of
official power under the Civil Code (Art. 32 thereof.) or the Revised
Penal Code." (Pita vs. Court ofAppeals, 178 SCRA362 [19891, thro11gh
Justice Sarmiento.)
3. Petition seeks the declaration of checkpoints ns u11co11slil11/iu11"/
and the dismantling and banning of the same.
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with prcliminnry inj1111r •
tion and/ or temporary restraining order, seeking the clorl111·1 1l l1111 of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or clscwlwr<', 011 1111, •,11 1
stitutional and the dismantling and banning of lfa• Hll1111• 111•, 111 lh,,
,,1n , 1111111 1,1111• 11,111 ~, 411'1
U111'1•1wu1111bh· S1•t11·d1 nnd Seizure
alterna:tive, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the
implementation bf checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioners aver that because of the installation' of said
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious
and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to
regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and / or court order. They
further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents
a blanket authority to make searches and / or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and,
instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, hnd been
harassed.
Issue: Is the-setting of the questioned check points justified?
Held: (1) Right is personal, invocable only by those whose rights
have been violated. - "Petitioners' concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints
as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed
committed specific ·violations of petitioners' right against unlawful
search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of
Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP vs. Integrated
National Police, L-80432, Minute Resolution March 8, 1988.), it was
held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their
rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real
parties in interest. The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed."
(2) Reasonableness of search is a judicial question. - "What
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in
any particular case is purely judicial question, determinable
from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Petitioner
Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped
and searched without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, more so, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
 I I
t'l lll.ll'l'I N I ! t U N1 d 11 lJ I II l hl 1\I. I.AW
Principle!:! oml CnsCH
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful
search and seizure." · (1) Bill of Rights was intended to limit the authority of the State.
(3) Reasonableness of a search is to be determined according to
the facts of each case, not by any fixed formula. - "Not all searches
and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of
a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or
simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search."
(4) Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence,
and promote public welfare, and an individual's right against warrantless
search which was reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. -
"The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure
to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit
of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public
security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice
of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so dearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of
police and military men by NPA 'sparrow units,' not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which
are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions - which all sum up to what one can rightly
conside1; at the very least, as abnormal ti.mes.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search, which is, however, reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail."
(5) Checkpoints during abnormal times, if conducted witlti11
reasonable limits, are constitutional. - "True, the manning of check-
points by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susccptibl<' nf
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomf:orl 011<1
even irritation to the .citizen, the checkpoints during these nbno rn III I
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, arc pnrl of llw
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful co1111111111ily,"
(Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 [19891, through J1wll'l'1' flar/1//n )
/ \ )J I 111 I I 11 I I II I. II 'I I I I I
l J11n·n1101 111l1l1• ~l1111r,•li ,11111 Sl•l,.1111•
Cruz,],, dissenting:
- "The bland .declaration that individual rights must yi~d to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights
was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the .ground of national security."
(2) Searches were peremptorily pronounced as reasonable even
without proof - "What is worse is that the searches and seizures
are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without
proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The
improbable excuse is that they are aimed at' establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and ordet; nnd prnviding
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic nnd polilicnl
development of the National Capital Region.' For these p urpo!lcH, ·
evei;y individual may be stopped and searched at ra ndom ond n l
any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility
or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest
or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.''
Sarmiento, ]., dissenting:
(1) Existence of checkpoints alone, makes searches done therein
unreasonable. - "I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered
so strrughtforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the existence
alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and
hence, repugnant to the Constitution. x x x Checkpoints, I further
submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first
saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (authorizing
the Chief of Constabulary to establish checkpoints, update lists
of wanted persons and conduct dragnet operations and for
other purposes)r a martial law issuance, as amended by General
Order No. 67 (amending and amplifying paragraph 7 of General
Order No. 66 dated September 12, 1980.), yet another martial law
issuance. They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures, the
same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in
our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that
terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget."
(2) Stnte has burden of proving reasonableness of search. - "While
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethen
advanced, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners,
precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt,
aggrieved. I submit that in that eve:rit, the burden is the State's,

•11111 l'llll, ll'l'I N ll l lll'\J! olllllllllN A l I t\W 1
11 11
Prindplmi nnd Caseti
to demonstrate the reasonableness of the s~arch. The petitioners
need not, therefore, have illustrated the 'details of the incident' in
all their gore and gruesomeness. In any. ev,e11t; the absence alone
of a search warrant, as I have averred, maj<es.checkpoint searches
unreasonable, and by itself, subject to cor:istitutional challenge. As
it is, 'checkpoints' have become 'searcll warrants' unto themselves
- a roving one at that." · ·. · -
Motion for reconsideration denied. (f$5 °SCRA 665 [1990].)
(1) Checkpoints may be allowed under exceptional circumstances.
- "Nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize
all checkpoints, i.e., at all times and under all circumstances.
Checkpoints are not illegal per se. · Thus, under exceptional
circumstances, or where the survival of organized government
is on the balance, or where the lives and safecy of the people are
in grave peril, checkpoints may be allow~~ and installe~ by the
government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation
clears and such grave perils are removed~ 'checkpoints will have
absolutely no reason for being." ···
(2) Routine checks are not violative of constitutional right. - "It
cannot be denied that as a rule, the routine checkpoint involves
only a brief detention of travellers. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search. If vehicles are stopped and
extremely searched it is because of some probable cause."
(3) Similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless
nrres ts.- "Thesewarrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints
are quite similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless
arrests during the commission of crime, or immediately thereafter.
The Court's decision does not, in any way, validate nor condone
abuses committed by the milita1y manning the checkpoints."
Cruz, J., dissenting:
Warrantless search is not n matter of discl:'etion but of law. - "It is
not for the peace officer to decide when a warrantless search nnd
seizure may be made save in the exceptional instances allowed, nM
when a crime is being committed, or before, or after its commission.
It can hardly believe that the majority is seriously offering l'hiM
exception as a continuing situation to justifiJ the regular w,11.,.1111//1·•:(:
searches at the checkpoints."
r
,.' •u I 1
1\1 I Ill 1111I1 11' 11,,111 11 IIH
111111•11111111,11 , h• !w,111 Ii 1111d /11•l1ll11•
When arrest may, b.e made without
judicial warrar,1t:-..
While as a rule, an arrest is considered lawful if effected with a
valid warrant of ·a rrest,· the Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize
a warrantless arrest; otherwise called a citizen's arrest. (People vs.
Rayray, 241 SCRA 1 [19'95].)
A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(1) When, in hj.s· presence, the person to be arrested has com-
mitted (e.g., after ag ~ntrapment), is actually committing, or is
attempting (i.e., there inust be an overt act) to commit an offense;
(2) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of focts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;5~ and
(3) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
~scaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. (Rules of Cou!t, Rule 113, Sec. S[a, b, c].)
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under No. (1) has been denominated as one in Jlagrante delictow
while that under No. (2) h as been described as a hot pursuit arrest.
59Before amendment by the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.) effective Dec. 1,
2000: "x x x he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person xx x."
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested
without warrant in cases falling under Nos. 1 and 2. The person arrested shall be forth-
with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The initial duty of the inquest
officer is to determine if the warrantless arrest was properly made (DOJ Cir. No. 6, Sept.
21, 1993); otherwise, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of said Circular.
(Ladlad vs. Veloso, 523 SCRA 319 (2007].)
i.rro constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (a) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a cr ime; and (b) such overt act is don·e
in the presence or within the v.iew of the arresting officer. (Concurring Opinion of Justice
Panganiban in People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 568 [1999]; see People vs. Racho, 626 SCRA633
(2010]; People vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, Dec. 13, 2010.)
A previous arrest or existing criminal record even for the same offense will not suf-
fice to satisfy the existing requirements provided under Section 5 in order to justify a
lawful warrantless arrest. (People vs. Villareal, 693 St;:RA 549 [2013).)
 1111 1' 111111 I' ll II It ti I 11111111• •I I ~I I i\\V fh'
l'd111 !1'11 ••1 111111 ( 11111••1 '' I l li111•m1111111li l1 • 1,111111 It ,11111 !11•11111,,
(Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159' [1997].) The arrest of
an accused made in "hot pursuit" is an exception from the rule that
warrantless arrests are illegal. (People vs. Recepcion, 391 SCRA 558
[2002].)
Strict compliance with conditions required. ·
The power to arres~1 without warrant .is' without limitation
as long as the requirements of Section 5 above· are met. An arrest
made without a warrant issued by a judge should be deemed prima
facie unreasonable unless it is clearly shown that it was conducted
strictly in accordance with the conditions ·se't forth. This rule is
founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in
our communities. (Umil vs. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 [1991].)
(1) An illegal search cannot be undert~k~n and then an arr~st
made on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. (People
vs. Encinada, 280 SCRA 272 [1997].) . . - .
(2) The filing of charges and the issuance of the corresponding
warrant of warrest, however, against a person invalidly detained,
will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to
be released because of such defect. · Penal Code.)
(3) Also, the illegality of a warrantless arrest, does not deprive
the State of its right to convict the accused when all the facts on
record point to his culpability (People vs. Briones, 202 SCRA 708
[1991]; Sanchez vs. Demetriou, supra.), as where the conviction is
based on the testimonial evidence of the victim given in open court
positively identifying the accused as the author of its crime and
such identification is totally independent of the unlawful arrest.
(People vs. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239 [1995]; People vs. Salazar, 277
SCRA 67 [1997].) It affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person; his warrantless arrest cannot, in itself, be the basis of
acquittal. (Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611 [2007].)
61
Arrest is not a penalty but rather a mere means of "taking a person into custody In
order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense." (OJ'ilon
vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991].) It is in the nature of an nclminiillrnti v(•
measure for one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest law breakers in order to plrtt•,1
~ em~ the hands of exe';llti;e and judicial authorities upon whom dcvolvl'Atlw duty 111
mvestigate the.acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosucutc• 1111d 11111 111 1,
the punishment therefor,
• 'It t 1 \I I Ill 1111 J lll I 1• 11 11 1 111
(4) Even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest
is not a jurisdictional defect62 and any objection thereto is deemed
waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without
any objection. (People vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740 (1999].~
Commission of offense in the presence
of arresting office~.
Warrantless arrests. under Section 5(a) above (No. 1) are not
justified unless the accused was caught in Jl.agrante delicto such as
a result of an entrapmen~ (People vs. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644
[1991] .), or a buy-bust operation (People vs. Garcia, 198 SCRA 603
[1991].), or a crime was about to be committed, or had just been
committed. In any of such cases, a peace officer is not only authorized
but is under obligation to apprehend the suspect.
(1) An offense is committed in the presence or within the view
of an officer, within' the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a warrant, when the officer sees the commission of the offense
62The person arrested without a warrant must be charged in court within 12, 18, and
36 hours, as the case may be; otherwise, he must be released from custody. (Art. 125, Rev.
i:
63Entraprnent is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping
I or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. A buy-bust
operation involving prohibited dtugs is a method by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in Jlagrante delict<J. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer
neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. (People vs. De la Cruz, 186
SCRA 416 [1990].) The idea to commit the crime originates from the accused; nobody
induces or prods him into committing the offeru,e. (People vs. Yumang, 222 SCRA 119
[1993]; People vs. Aspiras, G.R. Nos. 138382-84, Feb. 12, 2002.) In inducement or instigation,
the instigation practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the
offense and himself becomes a co-principal. (People vs. Ramos, Jr., 203· SCRA 237 [1991);
see People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999).)
In our jurisdiction, a buy-bust operation is a recognized means of entrapping drug-
pushers. Entrapment is an operation allowed by the Revised Penal Code (People vs.
Caco, 222 SCRA 49 [1993].) and has received judicial sanction as long as it is carried out
with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. (People vs. Basilgo, 235 SCRA
191 (1994]; People vs. Padasin, 397 SCRA 417 [2003).) It is not available as a defense and
neither is it prohibited and contrary to law. (People vs. Clapano, 227 SCRA 598 [1993].)
Entrapment is not a bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. Unless there
is clear and convincing evidence that the members of a buy-bust team were inspired
by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony
on the operation deserves full faith and credit. (People vs. Garcia, 235 SCRA 371 [1994];
People vs. Bongalon, G.R. No. _125025, Jan. 23, 2002.) The defense of frame-up can easily
be fabricated and is commonly used by persons accused of drug-pushing. (People vs.
Bagares, 235 SCRA 30 [1995].)
 II 111 11 I l l Ii ti•"" •1111111• ,,, , I I \ \ I I
I 1111 II'"'' I 1111111 ,,,,.,,.
c1lthough nt a distance or hears the disturba11oes ewatecl thereby, and
pi:oceeds at once to the scene thereof; or the offe.nse-is continuing, -or has
been consummated at the time the arrest .is nuide. ,(U.S. vs. Fo~taleza,
12 Phil. 472 f1909J; U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 .PhH:·5i.l h· [1910h People vs.
Suero, 195 SCRA 388 [1991]; Padilla vs. Courl.of Appeals, 269 SCRA
402 [1997J.) ix,•~,-;;, ,:,. '
(2) Where the accused, when asked to sp'i~1d out'a pair' ot'pants
which she was then carrying at the titne-sh'e left her •shanty after
noticing the arrest of her nephew, voluntarily uhroHed it, 'thereby
exposing the package containing the package 6f marijuana sticks
under it in plain view of the arresting officers,•it was held tharthe
crime was committed in their presence. The voluntary submission to
the search and seizure was deemed a waiver ·o f her constitutional right
relative thereto. (People vs. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144 [199:3].)
(3) Where there was a prior arrangeme11;t 'between the accused and
government undercover agents whereby the former would deliver
shabu inside a room of a hotel, the immediate arrest of the accused
without warrant upon his entry in the designated hotel room
was held a valid search and arrest. The reception prepared by the
arresting officers for the accused who had with him the shabu
was in fact an entrapment operation. While the sale of the shabu
(understood as the meeting of the minds qf seller a;id buyer) did
not take place in the presence of the arresting offo::ers, the delivery
or attempted delivery of the subject matter did take place in their
presence. (People vs. Macasling, Jr., 222 SCRA 630(1993].)
(4) A warrantless arrest is justified where the arresting officer
has personal knowledge of the commission ofthe offense (infra.), although
he was not present when it was committed. "Reliable information"
alone or sole reliance on a report or tip of a ·concerned citizen is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. (People vs. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142 [2003].)
Warrantless search and seizure incident
to a lawful warrantless arrest.
(1) The accompanying search and seizure of the effects or iwitm111P11/·
of the crime shall also be lawful although done without Hl 11rd1 1 The frisk and search of a person upon his arrest is a permissible precautionary
warrant, being incidental to a lawful arrest (Rules of Com•!, R1d1•
126, Sec. 12.); hence, articles or money in accused's pmw1·1wh111 11r
h, I I 111 Ill I I 1 •I I I• I I I 111
11111, ,,, 1111,1lih11,,,,11, 11111111 1 ,1111111•
control scil(;edre1 as a res ult of such lawful search are admissible in
evidence. Thus, in a buy"bust operation conducted to entrap a drug
pusher, thelaw e.n forcement agents may seize t11e marke4 money
found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even
without arrest and search warrants. A number of reasons, however,
may exist why no !mmediate body search of a suspected offense is
d_i:ine_in any parti~ul~r arrest. (see People vs. Esguerra.)
(2) A search incident to a lawful arrest implies that the search
was conducted after the arrest although there are instances when
search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest if the police have probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search. (supra.)
(3) A search warrant cannot be considered an incident of a
lawful arrest if there is no warrant of arrest and the warrantless
arrest does not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of
Court; hence, the warrantless search is also illegal and the evidence
obtained thereby inadmissible. (People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA
402 [l988]; see Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA311 [1990].) '
(4) If an arrest without warrant is incipiently illegal or unlawful
at the moment it is made, generally, nothing that happens or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of the poisoned
tree is necessarily tainted. (People vs. Argawanon, 215 SCRA 652
[1992]; see People vs. Emile, 222 SCRA586 [1993], infra.)
(5) The subsequent search not being incidental to a lawful arrest,
is similarly illegal even if there was waiver. (People vs. Cuizon, 256
SCRA 325 [1996]; People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998]; People vs.
Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 [1999].) A waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest is not a waiver of an illegal search . (Villanueva vs. People, 740
SCRA 456 [2014].) It does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless search. (People
vs. Lapitaje, 397 SCRA 674 [2003].) The "fruit of a poisonous tree"
MWarrantl!?ss search and seizure incidental to a lawful arrest is expressly authorized
by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides: "Search incident to lawful
arrest. - A person lawiully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used or constitute as proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant."
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be
nrrested may be armed and might attack them and escape unless he is first disarmed.
(People vs. Geren te, 219 SCRA 756 [1992); see Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals, 598 SCRA
41 [2009J.)
ll I l'l 111 11'1'11 II I I If l' tl 111 I I II II I \I I \\V
1111111qil1•r11111d I 11,;1•,1
doctrine presupposes a violation of law. Without such violation
there would be no "poisonous tree" to begin ,with and thus, no
reason to apply th,e doctrine. (Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCAA
190[2006],) .,-,, . · ,:
(6) The inadmissibility ·of evidence of_t_aip.ed _in a warrantl_~ss
search incident to a _lawful arrest outsi4!;;9.'}e'.·icl,sp,e~t's' l?~rs~n ¥,(<;i
the premises under his immediate coritrol 'adm1fs ·of an· exception.
(People vs. Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213 [1996]'.) -·· · •; ·, ' ' The rule was amended requiring that the person making the
Under the plai~ view doctrine, the warranfIJss 9earch ·a nd ·sej!Zµ,re,
as an incident to a suspect' s lawful arrest may extend p(iyo~d the
person of the one arrested to include the premises (e.g.>car) or
surroundings under his immediate control and cover incriminating
objects inadvertently or accidentally falling in the "plain view" of
an officer who has a right to be in the p9siti011 to have that'view.
Such objects are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence (People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 fl993], infra.; see' Peop~e
vs. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 431 [1992].) and it 1s immaterial whether or
not the accused gave his consent to the search thereof. (People vs.
Ang Chun Kit, 251 SCRA 660 [1995].) Thus, the requisites for the
application of the doctrine are: lawful initial intrusion, inadvertent
discovery of object, and plain view of the object itself. (see People
vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]; see Note 52.)
(7) The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity
of the warrantless search under the· exception, the same must be
limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time artd place of the
arrest.
(a) As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only
with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may
be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or
"anything which may be used as proof of the ·commission of
the offense," or was the fruit of the crime or which provides the
prisoner worth the means of committing violence, or escaping,
or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.
(b) With respect to the time and place of the wm'l'nnl/usg
search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stn tcd
otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted nt
about_ the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter um! onl.y
at the place where the suspect was arrested, or fl10 prPrni tll'H
or surroundings under his immediate control. (Pcop.11• vu, c 'lu•
.. ,. 4 • "l~ I Ill 1111 It •I I It ,111 '1
I J 1111•1 11,1,1 1o1lol1 • 111•111 , h ,111d ! 11 '111 111 •
Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592 [2000]; see People vs. Estrada, G.R.
No. 138539, Jan: 21, 2003; People vs. Calantico, 727 SCRA 20
[2014].) The lawful arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. (Sanchez vs. People, 741 SCRA '194 [20141,)
Personal know.ledge by arresting officer
.of criminal act.
arrest "has personal knowledge of facts," in place of the former
phrase "reasonable , ground to believe." 65 It is essential that the
person making the arrest "has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating" that the arrestee is responsible for an offeru;e which hni-1
just been committed. (People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986].)
The Supreme Court subsequently clarified that it is not neces-
sary that the indubitable existence of the offense at the time of the
arrest be established. Not evidence of guilt but "probable cause"
is the reason that can validly compel peace of.iicers, in the perfor-
mance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct
an arrest without warrant. In the balancing of authority and free-
dom which obviously becomes difficult at times, the court may tilt
the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of arrest not con-
viction.66 (UrniI vs. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 [1991].)
65The arresting officer cannot be held liable for arbitrary detention where the arrest
was justified, even though the person arrested is later found to be innocent. (see U.S. vs.
Santos, 36 Phil. 853 [1917].) "11-te obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest
by reason of a crime does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfill~e~t
thereof the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, 1t 1s
sufficie~t that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteri~tics of a ~ri:°'1e and that_th~
same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be d etained par~1c1pated therein.
(People vs. Ancheta, 68 Phil. 415 [1939); see also U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 883 [1917); U.S.
vs. Battalones, 23 Phil. 46 [1912]; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 667 [1978]; see People vs.
Bautista, 227 SCRA 152 [1993}.)
66InPeoplevs. Mahusay (282 SCRA 80 [1997].), it ruled that "~ers?na( knowledgeo(fac_ts"
in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, or indicative or constitutive
of probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grow1ds of suspicion (see
People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998]; People vs. Mendez, 392 SCRA 443 [2002]; Peop~e
vs. Lozada 406 SCRA 496 [2003].) based on actual facts that the person to be arrested 1s
probably g~ilty of committing the offense. Besides reasonabl~ ground of su spicion, ~7tion
in good faith is another protective bulwark for ~e p eace officer._un~er su0 cond11ions,
even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the officer 1s not hable. (Cadua
vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 703 [1999]; People vs. _Molina, 352 SCRA 174 [2001];
Abelita III vs. Doria, 596 SCRA 220 [2009].)

l'~lll.ll'l'INH t 't >N!d'I J II J It >NA.•I. I.AW
Principles and Cases
(1) Where at the time the peace officers 'identified themselves
and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted: to flee, the:y did
not know that he had committed or was actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, but
just suspected that he was hiding something in the bag he was carrying,
without knowing what its contents were, it was held that the said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without warrant. (Posadas
vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990], supra.)
(2) Where the accused was arrested one day after the killing
of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained by police
officers from unnamed sources, these circumstances belie a lawful
warrantless arrest. (People vs. Cendana, 190 SCRA 538 [1990].)
(3) It has been held, however, that police officers have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of a crime when they had earlier
conducted surveillance activities of the accused. (People vs. Bati, 189
SCRA 97 [1990].) But mere suspicion of being a communist party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest
without a warrant of a suspect. (Umil vs.· Ramos, 202 SCRA 251
[1991], supra.) An arrest is not justified on the sole basis of unreliable
h~arsay infonnation (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402
[1997].), or raw intelligence information (People vs. Encinada, 280
SCRA 72 [1997].), or a witness' verbal report, (People vs. Mahusay,
282 SCRA 80 [1997].)
(4) The "requirement of immediacy" is obvious from the word
"just" which means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be made
almost immediately or soon after the act or acts not at any time after the
suspicion of the arresting officer begins, no matter how long.ago the
offense was committed. The brevity in the interval of time between
the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required, must
have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by
reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of
the arresting officer acquiring personal and / or reliable knowledge
of such fact and identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, i(
not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated a re the
chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. (Ibid., Cruz, ,Ir.
and Regalado, separate opinions.)
The wording of the former rule caused the confusion. Now, it it sufficient thnt rh,•
one making the arrest "has probable cause to believe based on personnl knowl1,d1111 ,,I
facts and circumstances xx x."
r
y\J.:' I. Ill. 1111.1. l >11 l<I< a I I: \ -II'/
Umcnsonul>le Scnrch nnd Seizure
A warrantless arrest effected three (3) months after the com-
mission of the crime' .is unconstitutional and illegal. (People vs.
Salvatierra, 276 SCRA 55 [1997].)
(5) Where the information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting - one stated that the petitioner was the gunman; another
was able to take down the alleged gunman's car plate number which
turned out to be registered in the petitioner's name, it was held that
the information did not constitute personal knowledge. An arrest
which took place six (6) days after the shooting of the deceased by
the accused cannot reasonably be considered as effected "when the
shooting had in fact just been committed." (Go vs. Court of Appenh;,
206 SCRA 138 [1992].)
Nor is a warrantless arrest justified where the apprehension
was made three days after the alleged ambush-killing (People vs.
Monda; Jr.,·228 SCRA 115 [1993].) or ten days after the commission
of the robbery with rape.67 (People vs. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239
[1995].) .
(6) Where the station commander got his information directly
from · his own men, and he saw for himself the presence of the
ptµchased prohibited drug and the culprit from whom it was
purchased, to say that he is still required to serve a warrant to arrest
the perpetrator of the crime is to unduly limit the power of the police
in enforcing the law. To require search warrants during the on-the-
spot apprehensions of drug pushers would make it extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to contain the crimes committed by these persons.
(People vs. Bautista, 227 SCRA 152 [1993].)
(7) A warrantless arrest is valid if b ased on personal knowledge
of the arresting officer culled from information supplied by the rape
victim herself who pointed to the suspect as the man who raped her
at the time of the arrest. (People vs. Alvario, 275 SCRA 529 [1997].)
67In Umil vs. Ramos. (supra.), the Supreme Court, by an eight to six vote, sustained
the legality of the warrantless arrest of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen (14)
days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the groW\d that such offenses
(i.e., subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army,
etc.) constituted "continuing crimes." In the Go case, the offense for which petitioner.w:as
arrested was murder which was admittedly commenced and completed at one definite
location in time and space.
 II ill
418 1-'lHLlPPlNI.i CONSTl'l'UTIONAL.. LAW Sec.2
Principles and Cases , ., .· ,.
Similarly, a warrantless arrest and the incidental seizure'. were ·held
valid where it was done by a police team wluch was' formed' am.d
dispatched to look for persons responsible for the crime base'd--on
information related by the victims that tl)ey i;iad just beeR robbed.
(People vs. Acol, 232 SCRA 406 [1994].} . . which the killers had used to bludgeon B to death. The eyewitness
(8) One who went without protest to police headquarters with
officers who had come to fetch him, by virtue Ma letter-invitation
issued by the PNP commander requesting him to appear at said
place for investigation or questioning, where was placed on rre
"arrest status" after he was pointed to by two witnesses~ has been
unlawfully arrested without warrant where the arresting officers were
not present when he allegedly committed the crime and' the basis of the
arrest were the sworn statements of the two witnesses. (Sanchez vs.
Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993].)
(9) In a case, M was arrested in fiagrante delicto 68 while in the
act of giving marijuana to a policeman, L~ the poseur-buyer. Asked
where he got the prohibited drug, he answered he got it from p
whom M later pointed to L and his two companions as the source
of the stuff. It was held that the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of the offense (sale to him of the marijuana) and also of
t~e facts ~dicatin~ that_ P was the source of the prohibited drugs by
vrrtue of information given to him by M to this effect.69 (People vs.
Madriaga, 211 SCRA 698 [1992].)
68
As applied to in jlagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information"
alon~, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within
the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute prol;,able cause that would
justify an in f/agranle delicto arrest. (People vs. Molina, 352 SCRA 174 (2001); see People vs.
Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988); People vs. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174 [1992); Malacat vs.
Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 [1997).)
69
. But in a case where two policemen testified that they saw P, a police informer, who
himself posed as the buyer, hand over to A the marked money representing p.ayment for
th~ mock ~ale of marijuana, that A left with the money and returned later with a wrapped
ob1ect which h e gave to P, that they then placed A under arrest, that A pointed to n 011
the source of the marijuana, that they went to the house of E, arrested and frisked h Im,
and fou~d in his pocket the marked money, it was held that the discovery of 1/w 11111rkcd
money dtd no~ n:ean that he was ~a~ght in the act of selling mnrijuanu. The marked money
was not prohibited per se. Even 1£ 1t were, that fact alone would not retroactively vnlldolo
the warrantless search an_~ seizure. The policemen had no personal knowlcd150 tlrnl ht•
was the source of the maniuana. What they should have done, according to rho S11pr't•n111
Court, was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information s upplied by /1, r111tl I(
the search was fruitful, arrest E. (People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 [1993),)
Sec. 2 AH,'!'. .LU. IJJl.,L 011 KLGl l'l'S 419
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
,(1-0) In ano.ther., case, the policemalil ,.arrested G only some three
·(3) hours after G .an:d his companions killed B. They saw B dead in
the ,h ospital and when they iRspected the scene of the crime they
found the instruments (a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block)
reported the h,a ppening to the policeman and pinpointed G as one
of the killers. It was held that under these circumstances, since the
policeman ~ad personal knowledge of the violent death of B and of facts
indicating two (2) others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
G without a warrant of arrest. If they had postponed his arrest
until they could obtain a warrant, he could have fled as his two
(2) companions did. (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; see
People vs. Jayson, 282 SCRA 166 [1997].)
Note that in this case, the policeman was not present when the
crime was committed nor was the arrest made by them at the scene
of the offense.
(11) The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officer, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. If there is no showing that the person who
effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own r ight, knowledge of
facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. (People vs. Doria, 301
SCRA 668 [1999].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES: .
1. Accused was arrested on the sole basis of another person's verbal
report.
Facts: At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be described as subversive. He
was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest. The location of
the firearm was given by the appellant's wife. The Solicitor General
submits that the information given by CM, his wife, was sufficient
to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and
that the accused.is probably guilty thereof.

L:I Jll.ll'l'INli 'UNS'l'ITUTll >Ni\l. I.AW Sec. 2
Principles and Cases
Issue: May the arrest be considered reaso~able·under Section 670
{a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court?
Held: No. (1) Arresting officers have no personal knowledge of the
case. - "Under Section S(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the
officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge71
of that fact. The offense must also be committed in µis pre~ence or
within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 [1948].) There
is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge
was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from
the information furnished by C.M." ·
(2) Any exception to rule requiring a warrant is strictly construed.
- "The right of person to be secure against any unreasonable
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic
and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions
to the requirement of warrants of arre~t is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided
by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without
warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty
and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full
protection."
(3) Fact of commission of crime must be undisputed. - "In arrests
without warrant under Section 5(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable grow1d to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an
essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may
have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to
the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of CM's
verbal report. CM led the authorities to suspect that the accused
had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of n
crime not yet ascertained."
(4) Unlawful arrest makes subsequent search and seizure 1111/awjitl.
- "The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the bnHiH of
'70Now Section 5.
71See Note 66.
1\1{1.1 11. 1111 .l,l>I' lrn,1111• ,IJ I
Unrensonublti Scorch and Seizure
information from tl;te lips of a frightened wife cannot make the ar~e~t
lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment 1t 1s
made,-generally nothing that happened or is disc~vered afte~ards
can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree 1s nec~sanly also
tainted. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field
is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure w~ch
transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as bemg
mere incidents to ·a valid arrest."
(5) Presumptfon is against waiver of fundamental constituti_onal
rights. - "Neither can it be presumed that there was a w:a1ver,
or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply
because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appcor
first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved hod
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right;
and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquit;h the
right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938].) The focl
that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
amount to a permission to make a search therein. (Magoncia vs.
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770 [1948].)
We apply the rule that; 'courts indulge ev~ry. reaso~able
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional nghts
and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.'" (People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1961), through Justice
Gutierrez, Jr.; see People vs. Jara, 146 SCRA 576 [1986].)
2. Warrantless arrest and seizure were effected after police officers
had conducted surveillance activities of the accused.
Facts: ES was charged with and convicted of violation of Sec-
tion 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The antecedent facts
of the case are as follows:
Patrolmen RF, was instructed by his Station Commander S
to monitor the activities of appellant ES because of information
gathered by VS that ES was selling marijuana. As planned, at
about 5:00 P.M. on the same date, RF positioned himself under
the house of one AB adjacent to which, two meters away was a
chapel. Thereafter, RF saw ES enter the chapel taking something
which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of
a cart found inside the chapel and then return to the street where
he handed the same to a buyer. After a while, ES went back to the
chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group
of persons. It was at this instance that RF radioed VS and reported
,IJ J ) 'l lll ll ' l ' I N l( I 1 1/~/ •lllllllt tl i,\1 , 1 t\ W
1'1'l11d plt 111111d V1,11u•u
0
the activity going on. VS in$tructed RF to ,continue monitoring
deyelopments. At about 6:30 RM., RF again called up VS to report
that a third buyer, later identified as RM, was transacting with
appellant. ,.
VS and his team caught up with RM. Upon seeing the police,
RM threw something to the .g.round which turned out to be a tea
bag of marijuana. When confronted, ~ readily admitted that
he bought the same f!om appellant in front ·the chapel The of
police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant. The police
recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside
the chapel and another teabag from RM.
Issue: The issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest
,without warrant·of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether
or not the ~vidence resulting froi:rt such arrest is admissi?le. ·
Held:: (1) The offense was committed indhe presence of the arresting
officer. - "The accused-appellant contE!nr,is. that his arrest was
illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under Section 2. He
stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply
for a search and arrest warrant considering that RF informed his
Station Commander of the activities of the acqtsed two days before
the date of his arrest. This contention is without merit.
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view
of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or h~ars the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof. (U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and
U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910].) ·
RF, within a distance of two m:eter~, saw ES conduct his
nefarious activity. He saw ES .talk to some perso~, go inside the
chapel and return to them and e,xchange some things. These, ES did
three times during the time that he was being monitored. RF would
then relay the on-going transaction to VS."
(2) Arresting officer had personal knowledge ofthe actual commission
of the crime. - "The fact that RM, when intercepted by the police,
was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted,
readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appcllnnt
clearly indicates that ES had just sold the marijuana stick lo RM,
and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the polico
officers had personal knowledge, being members of t:hc ten rn w Ii kh
monitored ES' s nefarious activity.
1\ 1~ I Ill 1111 I 1111 1' 11 , II I ' 1 •l' I
lJ 1111•,111111 111l,li, t l1•1111 It 4Hh l 1:1'111111 1
\ The Court earlier indicated in the case of People vs. Bati (189
SCRA 97 [1990].) that poHce officers have personal knowledge of
the actual commission of the. crime when it had earlier conducted
surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it stated: x xx."
(3) Arrest was effected on the basis of probable cause. - "The failure
of the police officers to Secure a warrant stems from the fact that
their.knowledge a;cquired from the surveillance was insufficient to
-fulfill the requfrements for the issuance of a search warrant. What
is paramount is that probable cause existed. Thus, it has been held
in the case of Feople vs. Lo Ho Wing (193 SCRA 122 [1991].): x x x"
As the Solicifor General has pointed out:
'There are several instances when a w arrantless ser1rch r1nd
sei~ure can be .effected without necessarily being preceded by
an c1rrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probnb.lc
cause (e.g., stop and search without warrant at checkpoints).
Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and
·in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that
unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable
cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions),
i
I
} ,
there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest
appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the
contraband."'
(4) Evidence obtained from a lawful warrantless arrest is admissible.
- "That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute rule. (Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
143 SCRA 267 [1986].) Among the exceptions granted by law is
a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person
lawfully an;ested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which, may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. (People vs. Castiller, 188 SCRA
376 [1990].) X X X
As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest
considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless
arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are
admissible in evidence." (People vs. Su ero, 195 SCRA 388 {1 991],
through Justice Gutierrez, Jr.)
3. A warrantless search was conducted in a bus on the accused's
person and his personal possession on the basis of information received.
I 'I l,'1111 11•1111 II 1 1 11 J' d 111 11 11 11 L\I , I ;\\V II I
I'd111 11'1'"' 11111 I l 11~1•11
Facts: The bus where the accused, a Swedish national, was
riding was stopped at a temporary iche·ckpoint set up by the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) somewhere in the Mountain
Province for the purpose of checking aU vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region in view of persistent reports. that vel;lkles
corning from a certain town were tran~porting prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the C.o.m man~ing Officer
of the NARCOM that a .Caucasian co~g.frcifu. said .tqwn,had in
his possession prohibited drugs. · · ·
' . , plastic bag owned J?y the accused, on where the accused was acting
During the inspection of the bus, a NARCOM officer noticed a
bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist
to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his
waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when
accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four
(4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects, The
wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
For his defense, the accused raised the issue of illegal search of
his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted
by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2)
travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted
to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada.
Issue: Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court
finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the
search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made
without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs
which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible
as evidence against him.
Held: (1) Sufficient probable cause was present. - Accused 11
was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited dmgH
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accuAcd nnd
he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon hiu
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of t:hc f:ort•goinr,
provisions of law (Sec. S[a], Rule 113, Rules of Court.) which a llow
a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officcrn w1• 1'11 11111 11r111111I
with search warrant when the search was mflcl~i 11V1'11 th,· 111•111111111!
effects of accused, however, under the circumntn111•1•r1 111 tlu, , i llil ',
J /\ I I 111 1111 I. t I I I' I1 , I I I ' ,
11111,•1111,111111tl11 n,,,11, h 1111d :11,1,1111•
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that
accused was then and there committing a crime. x x x The required
probable cause that' will justify a warrantless search and seizure is
not determined.by any fixed form1:da but is resolved according to
the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused
has b~en declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
suspiciously, and attempted to flee."
(2) There was no time to secure a search warrant. - "When
NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling
from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited
drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In People vs,
Tangliben (184 SCRA 220 [1990].), the police authorities conducted
a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San
Nicolas) San Fernando, Pampanga, against persons engaged in
the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by
some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously
and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by
. the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no
time to secure a search warrant."
(3) Information received and accused's attempt to hide his identity
justified the warrantless search, - "The receipt of information by
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to
produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM
officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances
arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that
was made on the personal effects of the accused.
In other words, the acts of the ·NARCOM officers in requir-
ing the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to ·
contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags contain-
ing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were
prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refus-
ing to present his passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from the Sagada had prohib-
ited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of
 II a 11 II a
~'I ,IILIJ'l'I N I•'. C UNS'l'l'J'LJ'J 'll,.JN A I. I.AW
Principles one! Coses
the ability and facility to act accordingly, induding, to search even
without warrant, in the light of such circ;umstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectiveness.in_l~w enforcement, to the
detriment of society." (People vs. Malmsted-t, J98 SCRA 401 [1991],
through Justice Padilla.)
Cruz,]., dissenting:
Fact of illegal possesion of firearms subsequently dis.covered cannot
retroactively validate an illegal search and seizure, - "On.the question
before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink
at an illegal search and seizure as long as the suspect has been
actually found in possession of a prohibited_article.. That fact will
retroactively validate the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all,
as they rationalize, the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them
is the fact of illegal possession, not !fte fact of illegal search and
seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of
Moncada vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1988].) which was discredited
in Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967].), even before it was
definitely rejected by an express provision in the 1973 Constitution.
That provision, which has been retained in the present Constitution,
again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally obtained 'shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.'
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison
our system of criminal justice. In the case at bar, the search was
made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that
the route was being used by marijuana dealers and on an individual
who had something bulging at his waist that excited the soldier's
suspicion. Was that probable cause? The ponencia notes that the
military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming
from the Sagada with prohibited drugs in his possession. This is
what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless
search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that
the majority should readily accept it.
The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been
influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused wnH
carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldi<.•1·'s
suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal poss1•1,slrn1
that retroactively established the probable cause that vnlldnh•d 1h1•
illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonmm ln•1• IIHll
washed clean the tree itself."
•• Al~ I ', Ill , 1111 ,1, 1 >I· IW ,11 I : , •IJI
IJ111°1•111101111hl1• Hc111'1°li 111111 !i1•l,,,u11•
0
Narvasa, J., concurring and dissenting:
(1) Similar cases adjudicated by the Court. - "(a) This case
is remarkably similar to People vs. Aminnudin (168 SCRA
402.), decided on fuly 6, 1988 also by the First Division. There,
Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was
disembarking from an inter-island vessel. The officers were waiting
for him because he was, according to an informer's report, then
transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin' s bag confirmed
the informer's report; the bag indeed contained marijuana.
The Court nevertheless held that since the PC officers had
failed to procure a search warrant although they had sufficient
time (two days) to do so and, therefore, the case presented no such
urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search of Amii:mudin's
person and bag, the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent
arrest were illegal; and the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence
in the criminal action subsequently instituted against Aminnudin
for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
(b) There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by
this Court in which apparently different conclusions were reached.
1) In People vs. Claudio (160 SCRA646 [1988).), the accused
boarded a 'Victory Liner' passenger bus going to Olongapo
from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was carrying
at the back of the seat then occupied by Obifia, an INP, now
PNP member. This avowedly aroused Obifta' s suspicion, and
at the first opportunity, and without Claudio's knowledge, he
surreptitiously looked into the plastic bag and noted that there
emanated from the package the smell of marijuana with which
he had become familiar on account of his work. So when the
bus stopped at Sta. Rita, and Claudio alighted, Obifia accosted
her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a policeman,
and announced his intention to search her bag which he said
contained marijuana because of the distinctive odor detected
by him. Ignoring her plea - "Please go with me, let us settle
this at home" - he brought her to the police headquarters,
where examination of the package in Claudio's bag confirmed
his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana.
The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circum-
stances to be lawful, the search justified, and the evidence thus
discovered admissible in evidence against the accused.
2) In People vs. Tangliben (184 SCRA 22 [1990).), two police
officers and a barangay tanod were conducting a 'surveillance
II II ■ IJ I I
J 'I II I .I I 'I 'IN I\ l 'l >N!, 111 lJ I L~ ~N 1\ I. l ,/\ W
l'rinciple,i 111,d l)nscs , •,
mission' at the Victory Liner •Terrninal·,at, San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, 'aimed not, only against. persons who
may commit :misdel!leanqrs X X.X (there) but a.l~o on persons
who may be. engaging in the traffi{of dangerous cl-rugs based
on information SUP,plfed ·by informers; x x ·x they noticed
a person carrying a red ;travelli.11g bag x x x who ·was acting
suspiciously'; they asked him to open tJ:te b~g;· the person did
so only after they identifted themselves as pec1c~.off\.cer$; found
in tpe bag were marijuana lea','.eS wrapped in pti;lstic w~ighing
one kilogram, more or less; tht; person ·was 'then .taken to
the police headquarters where he was investigated; and an
information was thereafter filed against that person; Tangliben,
charging him with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (R.A. No. 6425.), as amended.
Upon these facts it was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that
there was a valid warrantless arrest and cl P!oper warrantless
search incident thereto. · morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney npproached the
The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from
those in People vs. Aminnudin, supra-. In contrast to Aminnudin
where the Court perceived no _urgency. as to preclude the
application for and obtention of a search warrant, it was
declared that the Tangliben case x x x presented urgency. There
was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on hand to enable
the PC officers to secure a search warrant, had there been time.
But because there was actually no time to get the warrant, and
there were 'on-the-spot' indications that Tangliben was then
actually committing a crime, the search of his per.sop and his
effects was considered valid.
3) The two other decisions presented substantially similar
circumstances: Posadas vs. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 288
(1990].) and People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr. (188 SCRA 751 [1990],),
In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously
by two members of the INP (now PNP), and when he was
accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police
officers, he suddenly fled. He was pursued, overtaken nnd,
notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody. The lmri bag
Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a revolvt11~ for
which he could produce no license or authority to posses:-i, four
rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas grenade. I It• w11s
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and 111nm11111l lrn,
and convicted after trial.
1\l{I, IIL 1111 . 1.111, Ill~ ,(I I : ,
U11n•1111u.11nl,l1• ~:t•111·1•I, ,111d Sl'l:t,mt
This Court affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that
there was in the premises; probable cause for a search without
warr:ant, i,e:, the appellant was acting suspicioqsly and
attempted to flee with the buri bag he had with him at the time.
The Court cited with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal
Supreme Court in Jolin W. Terry v. State of Ohio (392 U.S. 1.), a
1968 case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify
the search.
In the case of Maspil, a checkpoint was set up by elements
of the Narcotics Command at Atok, Benguet, to monitor,
inspect and scrutinize vehicles on the highway going townrds
Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by
informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would
be transporting a large quantity of mal'ijwina to Baguio City.
In fact, the informers were with the policcnwn mnnning tlw
checkpoint. As expected, at about two (2) o'clock in the cnrly
checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The
officers stopped the vehicle and saw that on it were loaded two
(2) plastic sacks, a jute sack, and three (3) big round tin cans.
When opened, the sacks and cans were seen to contain what
appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon
placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the
leaves which, upon scientific examination, were verified to be
marijuana leaves.
The Court upheld the validity of the search thus con-
ducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, and
declared that, as in Tangliben, supra, Maspil and Bagking had
been caught in fiagran te delicto transporting prohibited drugs
at the time of their arrest. Again, _the Court took occasion to
distinguish the case from Aminnudin in which, as aforestated,
it appeared that the p olice officers were aware of Aminnudin's
identity, his projected criminal enterprise and the vessel on
which he would be arriving, and, equally as importantly, had
sufficient time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant.
In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the Court found that the
officers concerned had no exact description of the vehicle the
former would be using to transport marijuana, and no inkling
of the definite time of the suspects' arrival, and pointed out that
a jeepney on the road is not the same as a passenger boat on
the high seas whose route and time of arrival are more or less
lflll If
I •I 111 11 'I •11 I I I I If 'I' I I I I I I II If II\ I, I I\
1111111lpli"l 1111.I t ' 1"1C'II
certain, and which ordinarily cannot deviate fr0m or otherwise
alter its course, or select another destination.
. '
4) The most recent decision treaqn~ of wa'rrnntless search
and seizure appears to be People vs..LQ Ho Wing. (193 SCRA 122
[1991].) In that case, an undercover or 'deep penetration' agent,
Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into _a group of
suspected drug smugglers, which 'included Peter Lo 'a nd Lim
Chjing Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo to China, where he saw
him and another person empty the coµ~ents of six (6) tins of
tea and replace them with white powder. On their return to
Manila with the cans of substituted "tea," they were met at the
airport by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate
vehicles, they were intercepted by · officers and operatives
of the NARCOM, who had earlier been tipped off by Tia,
and placed under arrest. A search of the luggage brought in
by Tia and Peter Lo, loaded on. the group's vehicles, quickly
disclosed the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of
white .crystalline powder which, upon analysis, were identified
as metamphetamine. Lo and Lim were subsequently convicted
and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the questions raised
by them in this Court on appeal was whether the warrantless
search of their vehicles and personal effects was legal.
The Court citing Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan (143 SCRA
267 [1986].) held legal the search of the appellants' moving
vehicles and the seizure therefrom of the dangerous drug,
considering that there was intelligence information, including
clandestine reports by a planted spy actually participating in
the activity, that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs
into the country; that the requirement of obtaining a search
warrant 'borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity,' and 'it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.'
(c) In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, nnd I.I!
Ho Wing, facts existed which were found by the Court aH jw1li(ying
warrantless arrests.
In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly 0Ac1•1·1'11lnrnl th111 lh1•
woman h e was arresting was in fact in possc1-1Hirn1 of 111111•lj11111111;
he had personally seen that her bag contained nc>I only v11gl'l11lil1"1
I
w I\I~ 1• 111 1111 1 • 111 1 11 •1 1 1 r,
lh111•,11101111lilt• S1•111·d11111d 8clz111·c
•1 11
but also a packag~ emitting the odor of marijuana. In Tang!iben,
the person arrest~d · fl_n d searched was acting suspiciously, and
had been. positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in
both cases, the accused were about to board passenger' buses,
making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and
_decisive action. In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was
acting suspiciously) too, and when accosted had attempted to flee
ffom the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was
definite information of the precise identity of the persons engaged
in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and place."
. (2) Accused should be absolved on reasonable doubt. - "Now, as
regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the
case at bar make out a legitimate instance of a warrantless search
and seizure, there is a regrettable divergence of views among the
members of the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, 1 believe
that the appellant should be absolved on reasonable doubt. There
was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification
by an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting
tell-tale odors; no other reasonably persuasive indications that
Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the offense for
which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers
searched Malmstedt's pouch and the bags in his possession, they
were simply 'fishing' for evidence.
It matters not that the search d isclosed that the bags contained
prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and
suspicion. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as
an incident of a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e., under circumstances
sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was being
or about to be committed, or had just been committed. There was no
intelligent and intentional waiver of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The search was, therefore, illegal, since the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual
before a search of his body and his belongings may licitly be made.
The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken,
and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded .
by the search. An arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and
the search undertaken as an incident of such an unlawful arrest,
also unlawful."
(3) Accused was not accorded rights guaranteed to a person under
custodial investigation. - "The fact that when investigated at the
 I I 111 11 I It I I I I ' I 11 I I 1 1 I• II I I I \\
1' 1111, lj•lt 1,111,11 ,, '
• hu11d1111 111·ll!ni u( IIH• Nnn.:11lktt Crn111l u111d nl L'nrnp l)nngwn, La
Tdnidncl, MnJmstcclt had, it is said, willingly admitted thnt there
was hashish inside the 'teddy bears' in the luggage found in his
possession - an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory
examination:_ does not help the cause of the prosecution one bit.
Nothing in the record even remotely :mggests that Malmstedt was
accorded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all persons
under custodial investigation. He was not informed, prior to being
interrogated, that he had the 'right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice,'
and that if he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be
provided with one; not does it appear at all that he waived those
rights 'in writing and in the presence of counsel."'
(4) The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered are inadmissible
against him. - "The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered
in Malmstedt's bags, having been taken in violation of the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
are inadmissible against him 'for any purpose in any proceeding.'
Also pronounced as incompetent evidence against him are the
admissions supposedly made by him without his first being
accorded the constitutional rights of persons under custodial
investigation. Without such object evidence and admissions,
nothing remains of the case against Malmstedt."
Validity of administrative warrants.
May warrants of arrest or seizure be validly issued by
administrative agencies12 particularly the Bureau of Immigration
and the Bureau of Customs?
(1) First view. - The view that judicial warrant is not necessary
in deportation cases was first expressed in Tiu Chuan Hai vs. Commis-
sioner of Immigration (104 Phil. 969 [1958}.), wherein the Supreme
Court, through Justice Labrador, ruled:
72 Under the 1935 Constitution, "no warrant shall issue but upon probnblc 1:,1uuu, tu
be determined by the judge." (Art. III, Sec. 1[3) thereof.) The 1973 CoMlitul lon itw•rlod
after the word "juqge" the phrase: "or such other responsible officer 118 n,ny be• n11thnl'li~d
by law." (Art. III, Sec. 3 thereof.) The present Cons titution dolcll'd llw q1H1((,c l ph1'MO
and inserted the word "personally" after "determined." Uoth undl'I' llilJ 11)73 tind thu
1987 Constitutions, there is an express mention of "scnrrh wnrrnnl 11r WMl',1111 ,1( ,1rrc••1l"
instead of just "warrant" in the 1935 Charter.
Section 143 of the former Local Government Code• (II.I', lllg 11'/,) whli h ,.,,,11• ~ly
confers on mayors the power to issue orders of nrrc ll h 1111 b111111 11h1
0
"/I''"'"•
functus officio by the new Constitution. (M11flc1. VH, i\rlno, ?11I :it l~A 11'/tl 1011111 I
11111,l,,,.,.i
I t 111 111 I I I •I I (1 I I I I
I h 11, •,i,0 11 111ld, , 111•1111 It 111111 '11•1, 111 ,•
"There i:; no justification in law for the reasoning or
the conclusion of . the court below (that arrest was unlawful
because of the absence of judicial warrant). Proceedin~s for the
deportation of aliens are not criminal proceedings, and neither
do they follow the rules established in criminal proceedings.
Deportation pro<seedihgs are summary in nature and the
proceedings prescribed in criminal cases for the protection of an
'jr
accused are not present or followed in deportation proceedings.
XX X"
In a subsequent case (Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411
[1964].), in upholding the constitutionality of the pertinent
provision of C.A. No. 613, as amended, which gives authority to
I the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien
I
temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for foilme to put
up new bonds required for his stay, as against the con tention that
such p~wer is only vested in a judge, the Supreme Court explained
that the warrant clause does not apply because in ordering his
arrest, the Commissioner was merely enforcing "certain contractual
stipulations contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them,
in case of breach, the Commissioner may require the recommitment
of the person in whose favor the bond has been filed." 73
1 730 ther cases uphold the proposition that judicial warrant is not applicable:
I
I, "Section 1(3), Article III of the (1935) Constitution, we perceive, does not require
judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance
with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of
judicial power x x x as a step necessary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a
given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid
decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Com-
missioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation. (Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA
562 [1967].) In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1(3), Article
III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined
by a judge, does n ot extend to deportation proceedings. (Ibid., citing Tiu Chuan Hai vs.
Commissioner oflmmigration, supra .)
XXXXXX XXX
Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such pow-
er is planted on the 'accep ted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominion." (Ibid., citing an American case.)
"Section 11(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution x x x does not mean that only
judges can issue warrants. What it means is that it is the judge who sh ould issue the war-
rant where the proceeding is for the determination of a probable cause in a given case.
On the other hand, the Commissioner of Im.migration can issue a warrant of arrest for the
execution of a final deportation order. He cannot issue a warrant of arrest solely for the
purpose of investigation and before the final order of deportation is issued." (Po Siok Pin
 f t-t 1'1111 ll'l ' l i 11 ti I'll 11111 It 11 / ·\. I I t\W
1 t Ph I '
l'd rn lf'lc'tt 1u1d l ',1111•r1 , , ll
In Harvey vs. Defensor~Santiago (1'62: (SGRA -840"'L1988].), the
petitioners were apprehended by Clii> i:lgents.hy -vir.tl!le ,of-Mission
Orders issued by the CID C0m.missioner, .The· SU!prettre -Court
upheld the restraint of petitioners, ,aHens';dafui:ed to be,,p-ed0philes,
"In this case, the arrest 0f petitioners w-as·bas'M o:n ·probable 'Cause
determined after close surveillance £or ,.;tm;ee (3) months ·during
which period their activities were, monitored. '.The 1existence of
probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure •of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters withqut _w arrant [citing cases].
These articles were seized as an incide11t to a lawful arrest and are,
therefore, admissible in evidence." ;;; .
What is essential is that there should be,a specific charge against
the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair; hearing
be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and .t hat the
charge be substantiated by competent ·evidence. The :arrest of an
individual may not be ordered by an autltority other than a judge
if the purpose is merely to determine the. existence of a probable
cause, leading to an administrative inves~gation. (Lucien Tran Van
Nghia vs. Liwag, 175 SCRA 318 [1989], citing Harvey case.)
In other words, probable cause must first be shown to exist before
the warrant of arrest may be issued. Thus, a warrant of arrest issued
against a suspected undesirable alien solely for investigation and
before a prior determination, after proper hearing, of the existence
of the ground as charged against the alien, violates his right to due
process. Until a final deportation order has been issued, an alien
may not be indefinitely detained by the CID. A warrant of arrest
issued by the CID Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must
be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.74
(Board of Commissioners [CID] vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 854 [1991] .)
In the matter of search and seizure of imported goods, several cases
are to the effect that judicial warrant is not applicable.75
vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975]; Vivo vs.
Monteza, 24 SCRA 155 [1968],)
74
lt has been held that the "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) of the Immig rntlon
Act of 1940 refers to the arrest for the purpose and not the arrest prior to pwcccdlng~
to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. (Djumantan va, Domingo, 24()
SCRA 746 [1995].)
75-fhus: "As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the ['forlff nnd C.:111110111111 <'rn l,,,
seizure proceedings su ch as that those instituted in thiA cane, or,, p11 n•ly , lvll ,11111
J l\l,( I , 111 , 1111 ,1. l tfl H II ,111 It ,t \'l
UnrcmmHnblc Search and S~lzure
Under·the Natioiil.alintemaJ.Revenue Code, the Commissioner
of. Internal Reveno.e'. is· ·empowered fo. ·issue warrants of distraint
(of personal p_roperty):' and levy (of' real property) as remedies for the
c01lection of'delinquent.·iilternal reYenue taxes without need of judicial
authorization. (Sel1. 205, NIRC.) Indeed, no court (except the Court
of Tax Appeals) hal;l authority to grant an injunction to restrain the
coll~c-tion of any tax,- fee,or charge imposed by the Code. (Sec. 219,
Ibid.)
- (2) Second vitw. - ' ln Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (9
SCRA 27 [1963].), the Supreme Court, through Justice Barrera, in
declaring illegal Executive Order No. 398 (series of 1951) "insofar as
it empowers the Deportation Board to issue a warrant' of auest upon
the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens x x x, " ruled
that the arrest of an irtdividual may not be ordered by nny nut·hodt.y
other than a judge. The pertinent portion of the decision followfl:
"x xx As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring
opinion in the case of Rodriquez, et al. vs. Villamicl, et al. (65 Phil.
230 [1937].), the provision on personal security and privacy is
not the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this
guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our
Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people
and, of coursei indisputably, it equally applies to both citizens
and foreigners in this com1try.
Furthermore; a notable innovation in this guarantee is
fom1d in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that
the probable cause upon which a warrant may be issued,
I / must be determined by the judge after examination under oath,
etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
This requirement - 'to be determined by the judge' - is not
administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the adminis trative
fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession.
The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might
be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may _
be imposed.xx x.
Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house [for which a judicial warrant is
l'C(Juircd under 3cc. 2209], p ersons exercising police authority under [Sec. 2203.] of the
cw1tonw lnw may effect search and seizure without a search w arrant in the enforcement
of cus tom~ lnwH," (People vs. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 [1980]; see Papa vs. Mago, 22
Sl 'l{i\ 857 f'l968]; l'ncis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16 [1971]; Vlduyn vs, Berdiago, 73 SCRA
!i!i:l [ I 9761, nncl othcrA.)
If lllrll I
•llll 1'1111 11 ' 1' 11 II 1 1 ,11·, 11111 111 11 I \I I 1\\V
l'il 1u lp l1•11 ,111d l '11111•11
found in the Fourth Amendment of the. t_t.$. ConstitutiQn, in the
Philippine Bill or in the Jon~~. Law, .a.U of ':'J.',hich.d_o· :n.ot. sp~i:Jfy
who will determi:r).e .the . e«;is.ten~e ,Pf.J?,I'Pl~able •Caqse. Hen~e,
under their provisions1 any.p.qblic-offlc;~r. rµay be authqrj,ze,q;b,y
the Legislature to ma}se such c!.etermip,;1.vcm1 and thereafte;rJss:ue
the warrant of arrest.
Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore,
even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may ·be
ordered by any authority other than the judge if the. purpose
is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution
does not distinguish between-warrants in a criminal case .and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And
if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a
determination of the probable cause against him by a judge,
why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative
nature deserve less guarantee?
XXX XX X XXX
An implied grant of power, that would serve as a curtailment
or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his
security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we.are
to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution.
If this is so, then a delegation of that implied power, nebulous
as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberties of the people.
The guarantee of human rights and freedom can not be made to
rest precariously on such a shaky foundation," 76
(3) Considerations in support of second view. - The following
considerations support the second view: "The Constitution does
not make a distinction between criminal and administrative
proceedings; it has deleted the phrase 'or such other responsible
7
6The case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon (66 SCRA 299 [1975],) is also to the effect that the
issuance of warrants is a judicial function. In rejecting the argument that "inasmuch as the
motor launch in question was allegedly stolen,'' the Provincial Fiscal [now Prosecutor)
could order its seizure even without a search warrant, being the corpus delicti of the crime,
the Supreme Court said, through Justice Martin: "Under the old Constitution, the power
to issue a .search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other office nod 110
search and s~ure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the Act complnlned
of was.comrmtted, there was no law or rule that recognized the authority of Provlnclnl
Fiscals to issue a search warrant."
,,-,,,
\ I I Ill 1111 I 111 I 11 ,11 111 II
IJ1111•t1111111ulil1• !wu1, Ii 111111 !wl11111•
officer as may be authorized by law,' thereby emphasizing the
judicial nature of the 'power to issue warrants; and it now speaks
of unreasonable searches and seizures 'of whatever nature and for
whatever purpo~e,'·rneaning that the provision is made applicable
to all kinds of i:iroceedings, criminal or otherwise."
(4) First view is the better rule. -Nevertheless, it is believed that
the first view giv.es the cbrrect rule.
(a) Both the power to deport aliens and to collect taxes are
attrlbutes of sovereignty and essential to self-preservation of
every state.
(b) The first part of Section 2 which guarantees the invio-
lability of the right of the people against unreasonable searchcH
and seizures, should be deemed to apply to all search wan·antH
and warrants of arrest issued by a judge or an admin is trative
officer like the Commissioner of Immigration, and the second
part/ which prescribes the procedural requirements for deter-
mining probable cause, to warrants issued in criminal cases.
(c) Search warrants and warrants of arrest issued by
administrative agencies should be distinguished from warrants
issued by a "responsible officer as may be authorized by
law" which were allowed under the 1973 Constitution. The
Constitutional Commission that framed the present Constitution
was aware of the existing law and jurisprudence on the matter.
Indeed, the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
under our internal revenue laws to issue the so-called warrants
of levy or ~istraint has long been recognized.
(d) What Section 2 means is that "it is the judge who should
issue the warrant where the proceeding is for the determination
of a _probable cause in a given case." As held in Morano vs. Vivo
(20 SCRA 562 [1967}.):
"The constitutional prov1s1on against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not require judicial intervention
in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
accordance with law. It contemplates an order of arrest in the
exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental
I I
to prosecution or proceedings or for a given offense or
administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to
carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as
If If lfll ~
l'l 111 11'1'11 II I I II l'tl 111 I 111 II J L, I 1\\-V
I'ri11d ple11i111d l ·,,siJH
a legal order of deportation-issued by, the Commissioner of
Immigration in pursuance of a valid legislation."
(e) In the case of Salazar.vs. /4chacoso· (1:8-3SCRA 1!45 [1990].),
the Suprerne Court declared·~ection'38(c) of the Labor Code (as
amended by Pres. Decrees No. 1920 and 2018.), unconstitutional
insofar as it empowers the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants
of search and seizure (or arrest) on..the ground that "under
Article III, .Section 2 ·of the 1987; Constitution1 it is only judges
and no other, who may issue such warrants." The exception is
in cases of deportation of illegal and unc;iesirable aliens, whom
the President or the Commissioner of Imm_igration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose
of deportation." The arrest is valid because of the recognized
supremacy of the Executive in matters of foreign affairs.
In the case of Rodriguez vs. Bonifacio. (344 SCRA 519-(2000].), the
Supreme Court ruled that when an alien is detained by the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID) pursuant to an order of
deportation, as where a Summary _Deportation Order had already
been issued by the BID, the regional trial courts have no power to
release said alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because
there is no law authorizing it.
-oOo-
""It is undisputed that only judges have the power to issue search wnrr,1111°, I• ith111
Salazar}. This function is exclusively judicial." (Soiid Triangle Snlcs C'orpur,1!11111 v11 , ·1he•
Sheriff of RTC, Q.C., Br. 93, 370 SCRA 491 [2001].)
t,,., , J
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
,AND-CORRESPONDENCE
SEC. 3. (j) ·The privacy of communication and corre-
spondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
or
of the court, when public safety or order requires other-
wise as prescribed by law. .
(2) Any ·evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any pmposc
in any proc.e eding.
Meaning of right of privacy.
The right of privacy has been concisely defined as the right to
be left alone.1 It has also been defined as the right of a person to be
free from unwarranted publicity, and as the right to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters with which the
public is not necessarily concemed.2
1
If the right be thus conceived, their privacy is practically as broad a term as liberty
itself. A husband with full mental capacity (although about 86 years old) coupled with the
right of choice, may not be the subject of visitation rights b y his wife against his free choice,
otherwise, this will run agail1st his fundnmental constitutional right to privacy. This is not
a case involving the right of a parent to visit a minor child. (Ilusorio vs. Bildner, 332 SCRA
169 [2000].) It has been h eld that a local ordinance requiring exposure by residents of their
property via a see-through fence soiely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of
th e community was violative of their right to privacy and their right to property, which
necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. (Fernando vs.
St. Scholastica's College, 693 SCRA 141 [2013].) A business office is entitled to the same
privacy. (Hing vs. Choachay, Sr., 699 SCRA 667 [2013).) In as certaining whether there
is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reason able" expectation of privacy
test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and
whether this expectation has been v iolated. (Ibid., Opie vs. Torres, 293 SCRA141 [1998].)
2
41 AM. JUR. 925. The writ of habeas corpus (see Sec. 7.) provides a remedy to every
person whose right to privncy in life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened by the
unlawful gathering or storing of information or data about him or his communication
and correspondence.
439
1111 l'l 11111 ' 11 1 11 I 111 j I 1111lt11 11 I \i I t\\V ,111 I \ I' I 11 I 1111 I 1 •I • I I• , I I I I
l ' d111ll'li•r1 11111ll ,vlC'i1
Purpose and Importance of provision.
(1) By the above constitutional provision;'th:ere is a recognition
that persons may communicate and corresp·o nd with each other
without the State having a right to pry into such communication
and correspondence3 except only upon lawfulo~t:ler of the court and
subject to the ever pervading police power of the State. (see Sec. 9,
1.
infra.) Letters and messages are usually carried by the agencies of
the government and unless adequate safeguards are provided for,
their privacy may be eventually violated and great harm inflicted
upon the citizen as a result.4
The term "communication and correspondence" is used,
however, in the Constitution in a general' sense, so that the protection
is not limited only to written communication.
(2) The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not
likewise compel respect for one's personality as a unique individual
whose claim to privacy demands respect.5 (Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22
SCRA 424 [1968]; see City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308
[2005].)
In our jurisdiction, there is an express recognition of the right
to privacy, specifically of communication and correspondence. The
right, as such, is accorded constitutional protection independently
of its identification with liberty.
3TANADA & FERNANDO, op. cit., p. 260.
4
LAUREL, Political Social Problems, p. 59 (1938).
5As Laski so very aptly stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing
I ,
reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are
so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He
cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation which axe, broadly speaking, that his
experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he
surrenders his will to others, he surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer master of
himself is in any real sense free." (Liberty in the Modem State, p. 44 [1984], cited in Morfe
vs. Mutuc, supra.)
And as pointed out by Justice Dougla5: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy
as well if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the begin-
ning of all freedoms." (dissenting in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451
[1952], cited in Morfe vs. Mutuc, supra.)
To Justice Brandeis, this right to be left alone is "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." (dissenting in Olmstead v. United Stnlcs, 277
U.S. 438 [1928], cited in Morfe vs. Mutuc, supra.)
111
I 11 I \'Ill y 111 I 111111111111 h ,,I Ii II I 111 II I l ll.l ll'"P "l1d1 •111 ,.
Sections 2, 3, 6, (liberty of abode) and -17 (right against self-
incrimination) ai;e pro~i?iqµs of the Bill of Rights which protect a
pei:son's pri-vacy againpt _unnecessary governmeht interfer~nce.
Relationship witn r.ight against unreasonable
searches and s.eizures.
The constitutional provision on the right of privacy complements
or implements the security of the citizen against unreasonable
searches and seizures. .The right is but an aspect or a facet of the
right to be secure in one's person against unreasonable searches
and seizures. (see Material Distributors [Phils.], Inc. vs. Natividad,
84 Phil. 127 [1949]; Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237
[2014].)
It has specific refe~ence to forms of commw1ication (e.g.,
telephone, radio, etc.), .yhile the search and seizure guaran tee is
directed primarily against search of tangible, material objects, his
person, houses, papers, or effects. Thus, it is violative of the gua-
rantee given by the privacy provision to admit evidence obtained by
tapping of the telephone wires (see Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438.)
or through the use of a detectaphone,6 Here, there is no taking or
seizure of tangible and material objects. (see Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S.
29.) The evidence is taken only through the sense of hearing.7 But
the technique employed likewise constitutes "search and seizure"
under Section 2.8 ·
6
A device with a receiver so delicate that when placed against a partition wall it
could pick up sound waves originating in another room.
7
R.A. No. 4200 (June 19, 1965) penalizes wire-tapping and other related violations of
the privacy of communication, In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (145 SCRA 112
.. [1986).), the Supreme Court held that the mere act of listening to a telephone conversation
i in an extension line is not punishable under the law. The law refers to a "tap" of a wire
''
or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting; or recording communication. A telephone extension, not installed for the
purpose, is oot among such devices or arrangements enumerated in the law and the use
thereof cannot be considered as "t apping" of a wire or cable.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to a telephone conversation allowed a
recording of the same, the unauthorized tape recordings thereof are not admissible in
evidence. The inadmissibility is mandatory under R.A. No. 4200. (Sakedo-Ortai'iez vs.
Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 [1994); see Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590
[1995).)
8
1n Katz v. U.S. (389 U.S. 347 [1967).), the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Olmstead
ruling (supra.) that no violation of the search and seizure guarantee is committed where
there is no "physical entrance into an area occupied by the complainant. The guarantee
 I 'I 111 .11 ' I 'I N I i l l >N: , 1111 I I ll )N 1\1, I .AW
l'l'indpk H nnd C nHl!S ,
1
Limitations on the right.
Under Section 3(1), the right is not viol'ated when·the· Intrusion
is made: · ·, · ,-;• ·· ·· • · ''
(1) Upon lawful order of the court. ~ iTh'e·fi;st iimitation -~i~t
be interpreted in the light of the requirements for the issuance
of a search warrant. (supra.) Court ord~rsJor _th~ prod~ct~9_n or
inspection of documents or things ·au~Kbrized under _Rule 27 of
the Rules of Court should not be confused..with the unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constiht~ion. ·The constituti_o nal
guarantee of privacy of communication _8:Pd t;qr_respo1'.den~e will
not als:o be violated because a court has power and jurisdiction to
issue such orders in virtue of the express exception made in favor
of the disclosure upon lawful order of a court of justice (Material
Distributors, Inc. vs. Natividad, 84 Phil..2-~ _[:l9,9;4].); or
(2) When public safety or order requires otlJ,erwise as prescribed by law.
- This second limitation means that the right is subject to the police
power of the State (see Sec. 9.), and in this case, the intervention
of the courts is not essential. The judicial process is slow. Thus,
while the judge is contemplating his decision, the "objectionable"
materials may already be causing damage that could easily have
been averted otherwise. But the administrative authorities do not
have absolute discretion when the inteiference is without court
order in view of the phrase "as prescribed by law." However, the
exercise of the power by an executive officer without court order
is subject to judicial review.9 (see Lukban vs. Villavicencio, 39 Phil.
"protects people - not simply 'areas' against unreasonable searches and seizures." Its
"search cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of [the} protection ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in areas accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
9" American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees' non-
privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. Hence, when a detainee places his
letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to
possible inspection by jail officials. A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of
privacy for his incoming mail. However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys
limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband
but could not read the contents without violating the inmates' right to correspond with
his lawyer. The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physicol conll:abnnd nnd not lo
verbal contraband, xx x The right to privocy of those dclninud i~ nub)cct to fi1•ctio11 'I of
R.A. No. 7438, as well ns to the tlmltnllont1lnhoi:ent In lnwf11I ((Cll<1nllc11, M lmpd11011monl.
13y Ihc very fnct of tlwir dllll•ntlo11, pn•-11'1111 clC'lnl1111t•11 1111d <'11nvli•11,d p1'1,111111,r11 h11v1111
cll111i11I,1l111rl ''><l1Mli1tlu11 ..r pl'lv111 y tl11h111," (/\hllfll\11 v~ 1.'nluiny, il/-111 I l 1(/\ 11\11 17t111'1l )
t\l<.'f. Lil. MlLL U1 1 l{lC:lJT~ 443
Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
778- [1919].) Zones of privacy are recognized even in legislative
inquiries.-(see Art. VI, Sec. 21.) However, the right is not absolute or
unqualified where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
(Sabio vs. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 [2004); see Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary
ofJustice, 716 SCRA ~37 (2014].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1.✓ Law requires periodical submission of one's financial condition.
· Facts: R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," requires every public officer to submit
every year ·,,a true detailed and sworn statement of the amounts
and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and fomily
expenses, ·and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year."
Issue: Does the disclosure of the required information infringe
the right of a person to privacy?
Held: No. Law is a valid exercise of police power. - "It cannot be
said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of
information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It
cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement
possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to
say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting
him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and
liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of
income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year,
there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would
be a private sphere." (Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 [19681, through
Justice Fernando.)
2. Petitioners invoke their right, among others, to have access
to documents evidencing "clean" loans granted by the GSIS to former
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa through the intercession of
t/1eformer Fil'st Lncly beJ,ore the February 7, 1986 election.
Fuc/11: Rc•Apondc'nt C:SIS mnintninH !·hat n confidential
rnlut lo1111ltl1 11•xi11li1 lw tw,•1•11 tlw < :SIS 111ul 111; horrnwc•rn nnrl lhnl· n
111 11111111 I ' ll II 1 1 ti I olllllll! llj \I I i\\V It I I
I11 Ii II ii ol, " 1111d I 11~1•11
policy of' co111idL•nll11lily 1'eHLl'ic:l:-1 the lntlisrl'i1.ninnlc dissemination
of i11formnlion. ll contends that in view of ,the right to pri:vacy
which ifJ cqunlly protected by the Constitl,ltion an<:J. by existing
luws, the documents evidencing loan transci<;tions 9£ the GSIS must
be deemed outside the ambit of the right of information under
Section 7 of the Bill of Rights,
Issue: Are petitioners entitled to access to the questioned
documents? · and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
Held: Right protects dignity and integrity. of the individual. -
(1)
"There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally
protected. In the landmark case of Marje vs, Mutuc (22 SCRA 424
[1968].), this Court stated:
' ... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, if is
fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language
of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop _short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive
control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the p}lblic sector,
which the state can control.'
Protection of this private sector - protection, in other words,
of the dignity and integrity of the individual - has become
increasingly important as modem society has developed, All the
forces of technological age - industrialization, urbanization, and
organization - operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society."
(2) Right belongs to individual in his private capncittj. - "When
the information requested from the government intrudes into
the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict bclwccn t·he rlp;hlH t.o
information and to privacy mny nriHe, 1!owl'v1·r, 1111' rr1111pPth1H
interests of these righlH1wed not lw l'l"iolwll i11 thl•i r1111P, A p111111111t
from tlw nhow q11ol1•d 1111,11•11111111 of llw < '11111'! 111 M111/11 111 1l1111 11,11
It I \l'I 111,lllll , 111 1 1'1<,III :
111lvm y 111t111111111111k,1llrn1111HI l'rn•rt•11pnmlt nc1
1 1
right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity,
and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS."
(3)' Right cannot be invoked by juridical entities. - ,/Moreover,
the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSlS. As
held in the case of Vassar College vs. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. (97 F.
982 [1912].), a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since
the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings
ground for relief."
(4) Right is personal in nature. - "Neither can the GSlS, through
its General M~ager, invoke the right of privacy of its borrowers.
The right is purely personal in nature and hence, may be invoked
only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate as to the tin1e and
manner of inspection." (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256
[1989), through Justice Cortes.)
3. Surviving relatives of a deceased person invoke their right and
privilege to protect his memory.
Facts: The petitioner had purchased the rights to the book
entitled, "The Moises Padilla Story." In the book, Moises Padilla, a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party, w ho was murdered
during the November 1951 elections, is portrayed as "a martyr in
contemporary political history." The private respondent, mother
of Moises Padilla, objected to the filming of a movie based on the
book. Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of
the deceased, there were portions which dealt with his private and
family life.
The petitioner avers that the respondent did not have any
property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a
public figure.
Issue: Is the averment well-taken?
f felr/: No. (1) Privilege may be invoked by surviving relatives of a
rlrr,•nsNI 11crso11, - " The fact that he purchased the rights to the book
(I Id 'nol cl h;p1•nm• with the need for prior consent and authority
fro 11, 1111' d1·n•n1wd'H wife and in thnl of his mol'hcr and the members
lfTITT I .-.-111
l'Jlll.ll'l'I N l\11 >N 1t1111 / 1111 1Ni\ l.l I\W
IJt'incipfoi:; 11nd Cnsc!I , 1 ' i.
·of his family. A privilege may be, gi:vend:he-surviving relatives of a
deceased person to protect his memory; farii:th:e-pdvilegi:! exists for
the benefit of the living, to protect their feeljngs and to prevent a
violation of their own rights in .t he, char,~ct~r .anp memory of the ·
deceased." · that our law,. i;onstitutional and statutory, does include a right of
(2) Fictional representation of a public figure may be enjoined. -
"His averment that private resp0ndent did h0t have any property
right over the·:life of Moises Padilla:·s:in:cetthe-latter was a public
figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not
automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to
invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does
not extend to a fictional or novelized repr~sentation of a person,
no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar,
while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life
story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little
romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of
torture and brutality." (Lagunzad vs. Soto Vda. de Gonzales, 92 SCRA
476 [1979], through Justice Melencio-Herrera.)
4. Private respondent, a public figure, invokes his right to privacy
in seeking to enjoin the production over his objection of a movie on the
February 1986 EDSA peaceful revolution.
Facts: Petitioner, an Australian film ~aker, informed private
respondent Juan Ponce Emile, former Minfster of National Defense
and incumbent Senator of the Philippines; ab.out a projected
motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it, entitle,d "The Four Day
Revolution," the subject matter of which relates to the non-bloody
change of government that took place at EDSA in February 1986
and the train of events that led up to that denouement. The filming
of the movie is intended for commercial and for Philippine and
international release.
Juan Ponce Enrile is one of those who had played a major role
in the events proposed to be filmed. His complaint with application
for temporary restraining order cqi.d writ of preliminary injunction
alleges that petitioner's production of the mini-series without
private respondent's consent and over his objection constitutes
a violation of right to privacy. Respondent court issued the writ;
hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Does the production of the movie in question constitute
an unlawful intrusion upon private respondents' right of privacy?
I II II 11 ~ (j
I\U I Ill 1111 , . , 11 1 1-(11 ,111 , H'
l'dv,11·y of l 'o.1111111111lr,1l lu11 nod t 'nr11•i,po11d1•1w1•
. Held: .{1) ·Right . cannot be invoked to resist publication and
dissemination,of matters of public interest. - "The counter-balancing
, olaim ef :private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was
detnonstl\c!ted; som!ltime ago by the then Dean Irene 'R. Cortes
privacy. It is.left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope
and content of this right in differing types of particular situations.
. "
The right.of privacy or the 'right to be let alone,' like the right of
free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a
person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public
character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to
resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest.
The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the
right to be free from 'unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
pul;?lidzing of the private affairs and activities of an individual
which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.'"
(2) There is no intrusion upon private respondent's right of privacy.
"Whether the 'balancing of interests test' or the ' clear and
present danger test' be applied in respect of the instant Petitions,
the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached:
The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion
picture 'The Four Day Revolution' does not, in the circumstances
of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's right of privacy."
(3) Subject matter of proposed motion picture is one of public interest.
- "The subject matter of 'The Four Day Revolution' relates to the
non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifania de los
Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train of events which led
up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners argue, of international
interest. The subject thus relates to a h ighly critical state in the history
of this country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into
the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and
expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject
matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not
to the private life of private respondent Ponce Emile.
Unlike in Lagunzad (supra.) which concerned the life story of
Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family,

It 11 PIN ■ I 1 ,..., 1 11 1 1 1 I I
I 11111 ,, h t ,.. ,, I I •I
wlmt w11 l111v1• h1•11• 111""' 111/1111 li1t1111,11'liy, 1111111• 111 1, .. ,,, Ii, tlt11111ll z 1•d,
11! pdv11!1• ,·,•11pn11d, 111I 1'01111• Htll'llt-. 'Thu 11tiur I >ny Rovolulion' is
11111 prim ipfl lly ubout, nor i:-1 it focwJcd upcm, Lhc mnn Juan Ponce
Hnl'ilo; but ll l:-1 compelled, if it is to be htstb11kal, to refer to the role
plny1~cl by Junn Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and-thecbnstituent
t~vents of the change of government in February 1986;"
(4) Meaning of "public figure. 11
"At all relevant tim~si during
- in depicting· the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
which the momentous events, clearly of 'public· concern, that
petitioners propose to film, were taking place, private respondent
was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred· to a~ a 'public
figure': 'A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode ofliving, or by adopting a profession
or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his 'doings,
his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personqge.' He
is, in 9ther words, a celebrity. Obviously, to be includeq. in this
category are those who have achieved som,e degree of reputation by
appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional
baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer.
The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public
officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even
ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than
the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone
who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused
upon him as a person."
(5) Private respondent is a public figure. - "Private respondent
is a 'public figure' precisely because, inter alia, of his participation
as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of
government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was
major in character, a film re-enactment of the peaceful revolution
that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent
would be grossly unhistorical."
(6) Public figure's right of privacy is narrower. - "The right of
privacy of a 'public figure' is necessarily narrower than that of
an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the
seclusion of simple private citizenship. He continues to be a 'public
figure.' After a successful political campaign during which his
participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly
referred to in the press, radio and television, h<~ sHs in a v1•ry puhllc
place, the Senate of the Philippines."
.t I Ill 1111 I I l l I ll,1 1 1 1
l'1 I\'" V 111 I 1111111111111, ,1111111 1111,I \ 11111•11p1111dPIHI'
(7) /Jroposed,notion picture must be limited to the public facts
of the EDSA revolution. - "The line of equilibrium in the specific
.context.of the -instant case between the constitutional fi;eedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked
out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture
must be. truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There
l must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth
Revolution. There must, further, be no presentation of the private
life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation
of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion
picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera
in Lagunzad referred to as 'matters of essentially private concern.'
To the extent that 'The Four Day Revolution' limits itself in
portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into
private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable
and actionable. Such portrayal, may be carried out even without
a license from private respondent." (Ayer Productions Pty., Ltd. vs.
Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 [1988], through Justice Feliciano.)
5. Ordinance imposes registration requirements on guests or
customers ofhotels and motels.
Facts: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels,
motels and lodging houses, requires any guest or customer thereof
to fill up a prescribed form in a lobby open to public view, wherein
the full name, date of birth, address, occupation, sex, nationality,
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any,
with the name, relationship, age, and sex would be specified, data
from the guest's residence certificate and his passport number, if
any, coupled with a certification by the authorized hotel or motel
officer that the person signing the form filled it up formally and
affixed his signature in the presence of such officer.
Issue: This requirement is assailed by hotel and motel operators
as violative of the right of privacy and the guarantee against self-
incrimination. (Sec. 17.)
Held: Vnlid exercise of police power. - Only the guests or
cuslomers (who were not before the court) could complain of the
nllcgod invasion of the right to privacy and of the right against
 I I 111 II I I 1 • I I
lic•II hh I h11li111tl1111, 'I lie• 111di1111111 11 w li l, I, w11111•11111 ll'd 111 111l11li11l ~n
1•01·tolt1 p1·11dh-1•11 l111 rll11l lo 111ul'ollH w11u held lo bl• n volld cx1::rciAc of
pollco power. (I :r11,l/a•Ma/11/e Jlo/'t:/ r111cl Motel Opcmlurs Associ11tio11,
J11c. vs. City Mayor of Mn11i/11, 20 SCRA 869 [1967], through Justice
Fernando.)
6. Petitioner sent personal letters to four (4) Supreme Court Justices
making scurrilous accusations and dangling threat of investigation.
Facts: It appears that petitioner's lawyer, encouraged and
abetted his client in denigrating the members of the First Division
of the Supreme Court, by baselessly charging them, among others,
with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith."
The petitioner and WL, her lawyer, were required ,by the Supreme
Court to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt
for the disparaging statements which ."transcend the permissible
bounds of propriety" and made with the manifest-intent to bring
the Justices into disrepute and degrade the administration of
justice.
Issue: Petitioner prays that the contempt proceedings be dis-
missed, contending, among others, that the letters to the individual
Justices were private in character and were never meant for any-
body, much less the Supreme Court En Banc, "there being a con-
stitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of communica-
tions."
Held: Letters become part ofjudicial record and are a matter of Court's
concern. - "The reliance on the 'privacy of communications' is
misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices in connection
with the performance of their official functions become part of the
judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court.
"It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous
attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard
the morals and ethics of the legal profession." (In re Wenceslao
Laureta, 148 SCRA382 [1987], per curiam.)
7. Petitioner, a Senator of the Republic, seeks the invnlirlatin11
of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled, "Adoption of a Natio11r,/
Computerized Identification Reference System."
Facts:ThesubjectA.O. was issued by tho Pn•»ldnnt 011 I lot ,,111\11•1•
12, 1996. The petition is imchorccl on two 1•111111tlt111io1111I 1•,1111 11 111,1,
I I 111 111 I I 1 •I I I• ,I I I I 1 11
I', I\,,, \' 111 I 1111111111111! ,1111111 111,il l Ill 11·~p1111il1•111 ,,
vh.: 1.)11c, IL ill n wiul'pnliun uf the power of Congress to legislate,
and two, it impermissibly intrudes on the citizenry's protected
zone of.privacy.
Issue: Does the· Administrative Order threaten the citizens'
right to privacy?
Held: (1) Right to privacy enshrined in social provisions of the
Constitution. - "Assuming arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not
be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as
an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The ess~nce of privacy is the 'right to be let alone.' In
the 1965 case of Griswold vs. Connecticut, the United States Supreme
Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled
that the right has a constitutional foundation. x x x In the 1968 case
of Morfe vs. Mutuc; we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. x x x
• Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right
of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of
Rights. Other facets of the right are protected in various provisions
of the Bill of Rights. (Secs. 1, 2, 6, 8, 17 thereof.)"
(2) Zones of privacy likewise protected in our laws. - "Zones of
privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The
Civil Code provides that ' [e]very person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons' and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person
of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds
a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damage for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
' i! communications.
The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets
by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
tresp ass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special
laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on
privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
infor mation. (Sec. 24, Rule 130[c].)"
(3) No co111{Jelli11g State interest to justify A.O. - "The right to
prlvocy iH a fundnmcnt11I right gunronteed by the Constitution,
lw111·t•, ii. i•1 th" bmd"'n of govt•rn11wnl lo 11how thntA.O. No. 308 is
 1111111 l l l II I 1111 lllltllt1t I \I I \W
1' 1111111'1• " ,111,l 1 11111°11
jui:1Uncdby Homu cornpcl!Jng stale .Interest rnncl that it is nm;rowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two ronsiderations: ,(1') the
need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business ,wif:h.tl;i,e basic service and social
security providers and other government instru~entalities, and (2)
the need to reduce, if no~.tqt~µy eraqicate, fr,aud~lent transactions
and misrepresentations.by persons SE;f~ing ~asic services.
It is debatable whether these interests are oompelling,enough
to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable
is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308
which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear
and present danger."
(4) A.O. threatens right to privacy. - "The heart of A.O. No.
308 lies in its Section 4 which proviqes for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a 'common refere~ce number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies' through the use of 'Biometrics
Technology' and 'computer application design.' xx x.
It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific
biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology
shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage.
Cortsidering the banquet of options available to the implementors
of A.O. No. 308, the fe~r that it threatens the right to privacy of our
people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look
will show that it does not state whether encoding of.data is limited
to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact,
the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the 'generation of population
I
data for development planning.' This is an admission that the PRN
will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of
other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. ·
, No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and retrieve information
for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through
his Population Reference Number (PRN).
In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch
of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people
to surrender their privacy by giving information nbout themselves
on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of bmiic 1Jt•rvitl H, C ivPn
1 much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten
1, I I .,,1 I Ill 1111 I.I ,1 1 I'll ,111 ,
l'itv,11 y 1111 '111 111111111 h'n ll1111 nrnl l '1J1'll'Npumll'11C:c
the record-keeping power of .t he computer, only the indifferent will
fail to perceiv.e. the ,danger that A:O. No. 308 gives the government
the ·power to compile· a devastating dossier against uns'fspecting
citizens."
(5) Potential' for misuse of data to be gathered. - "Pursuant to
said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
... everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic
· s~rv~ces and se.cur~ty. His transactions with the government agency
wil( necessarily be recorded ~ whether it be in the computer or
in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may
include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns,
·· statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, th e
better the chance of building a huge and formidable information
base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be
gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of his vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a
covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for
some of our authorities to resist. x x x.
Said Order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how
these informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide
who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances
and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the
privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. Well to note,
the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to
the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage
of information. x x x.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring
that personal information which will be gathered about our people
will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.
The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308
may interfere with the individual' s liberty of abode and travel
by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information
and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave
the way for 'fishing expeditions' by government authorities and
evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,

I I 1111111111 111111 111111,11 I I
l't Ill• 1j1l1 I olll,I I 11 t 1
llil' v1•1•y 11l111111•11 1111111111' 11111 t1I Hlglilti 111•1•h•1 t,, pn•vt•nl." 111 (<111!,· im,
'/vrres, 2!:l.'.l SCH;\ 14'/ /'/998/, t/11·011811 j111Jliu'e P11.110.)
Evidence illegally obtained.
" (1) Non-admissibility rule. - Any ·evidence obtained by the
government in violation of the right against umeasonable search
and seizure and the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence is inadmissible for any purpqse in any proc~eding
(Sec. 4[2].), whether judicial, quasi-judicial, ·legislative, civit or
administrative. Verily, all items seized in violation of the right are the :
"fruits of the poisonou's tree." 11 Where, however, the evidence came
into the possession of the government through a private person,
acting in a private capacity, without the government transgressing
the rights of the accused,, the same may be ad11Utted against him in
the prosecution of the offense charged. _(see People vs. Marti, 193
SCRA 57 [1991], infra.)
(2) Reason. - The reason for the inadmissibility of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
its exclusion, as has been proved by historical experience, to be
1°1'he right to privacy does not bar the adaption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities. In Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director Genera/, NEDA (487 SCRA 635
[2006].), the Supreme Court ruled: "Exec. Order No. 420 does not establish a n ational ID
system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth, and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the
public. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Opie sought to establish a National
Computerized Identification System, a national 1D system that did not exist prior to the
assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation
becanse it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none
existed before."
11According to the libertarian exclusionan; rule known as the fruit ofthe poisonous tree,
doctrine a phrase by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Mardone vs.
United States (308 US 388, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.ed. 307 [1939).), once the primary source (the
" tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The doctrine is based on the principle
that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence
because the original illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently oblnincd.
(People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People vs. Ronclcro, 320 SCRA 383 ['19\191.)
The rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants thnt encourngc lnw 1Jl1f1m•11r11 lo f{ll ,11,
fishing expeditions. (People vs. Congaed, 731 SCRA 427 [20H].) Courl11 hflv1• 1~H•op,11 l111d,
however, that evidence derived from information obtnilwd 111,w,lly l11 11111 1,h~11l111d y
inadmissible under the doctrine where it i~ shown lhnl ttu~h 1•vld1•11n• w1111ld h11v,1l•11•11
inevitably gained or discovered anywny even wllhuul lhu ,111l11wf11l 111 I (t, '" 1111111,1111 / ,
dissenting, citing U.S. cnses .)
r
I I 111 I I I I I I •I I I I I I I
I I I ,,, \ "' I 111111111111h 1ll1111 1111,I I Ill II [ " ' " " II• I
lfo• 011ly p r1 1t•tlc,1l w,,y 111 1•11l{>1•1'ittg 1111• ~u111, II L11l loitt1l lnjmu.:ll(,11
ngoim,l umcnsunablc 8earch nnd sei:wrc nnd vioJalion of privacy
of communication and correspondence and thereby remov,ing the
incentive on the part of peace officers to disregard these basic rights.
Verily, they are the "fruits of a poisonous tree."12
The exclusionary rule is designed not so much as to vindicate
the constitutio!).al rights of lawbreakers but primarily to safeguard
the right of all citizens, especially the innocent. Without the rule, the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to
privacy would be a mere form of word and valueless.
(3) Presumption of regularity. - To prevent stealthy encroach-
ment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy, a
liberal construction in search and seizure cases is given in favor
of the individual. Consistent with this postulate, the presumption
of regularity is unavailing in aid of the search process when an
officer undertakes to justify it. For, the presumption juris tantum
of regularity cannot, by itself, prevail against the constitutionally
protected rights of an individual because zeal in the pursuit of
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself detests. (Sony Music Entertainment [Phils.], Inc.
vs. Espanol, 453 SCRA360 [2005].)
(4) Consented warrantless arrest. - This is an exception to the
exclusionary rule. Where there is a waiver or consent, the court
is bound to admit the evidence. Thus, where the accused never
objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the
same was obtained in a warrantless search which was not incident
to a lawful arrest, he is deemed to have waived his objection to the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence in the
course thereof. (People vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494 [1993].)
(5) Right of owner. - Since evidence obtained illegally is not
admissible, the owner has a right that the articles seized be returned,
i'
J.
12Thc nclion for damages against erring officers, their criminal punishment, and.
1111rh othe r reme dies ns may be provided by law, do not always afford sufficient protection
ll)lninRI their invnsion. The constitutional edict is of special public importance and serves
,1•1 11 nhi<•ld l!Hpccinlly in the remote province and rural areas to the people who have
110 11rr1•w1h> courts for prompt nnd immediate relief from violations of their rights. (see
tllo111•hill V8, Dioknu, 20 SCRA 383 [1919); Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 [1987); People
v,1. ili1ln11ggn, 234 SCRA 407 (19941; Pnpcr Industries Corp. of the Phils. vs . Asuncion, 307
t,l l{A 25'.l [199!/I,)
 1111111 1 11 II 1, 11/ 11111 11,, 111,1 I -\\\ I I
l'1 l11,l1•li " 11"'l1 ,1111 1~
unless they nre in thcmticlvctJ prohibited or forbidden by law, such us
illegal drugs, unlicensed firearm, etc. (see Uy Khey.tini vs. Villareal,
42 Phil. 812 [1922]; Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA477 [1976J; Mata vs.
Bayona, 128 SCRA 389 [1984].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Accused's letter to prosecution witness was admitted in evidence.
Facts: The accused contends that Mnetter to .th~--p i~s:1;cution
witness is inadmissible in evidence against h~m µnder the
exclusionary provision of Section 4, Article IV of the ·1973
Constitution. (substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III.)
Issue: Is the submission tenable?
Held: No. No invasion of privacy committed. - "The [said]
provision implements another constjtutional provision .o n Jhe
security of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The
production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of
an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted
intrusi'1n or invasion into Albofera's [acct!sed's] privacy. Albofera
admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo
Esma [witness] himself, who produced and identified the same in
the course of his testimony in court.
Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter.
Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his
Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor. Furthermore, nothing
that Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in
arriving at a determination of his culpability." (People vs. Albofera,
152 SCRA 123 [1987], through Justice Melencio-Herrera.)
2. Petitioners demand return of arms and ammunitions taken
without a search warrant.
Facts: A contingent of more 'than 200 soldiers raided the
compound occupied by the petitioners in search of loose fireflrms,
ammunitions, and explosives. The military confiscflted fi1•oarms,
etc. found in the premises. In a petition for prohibitlon nml
mandamus with preliminary injunction find restr11inlng ordl•1; lh1•
petitioners sought to recover the articles seized from tlwn,, 1111d 111
challenge their fingerprinting, photographing ond pnrnlll11 t, ..,1h1g
as violative of their right against self-incrlrnin11l11111.
I 1, t \ 1\111 Ill 1111 I 1 11 1 Ill • ,111' 1
111lvm y 111 t '111111111111lu1ll11111111d C 111•11•11pomlt.i11t.:c
Respondents sought to justify their act, alleging that they were
acting under superlor ·orders; the measure was necessary because
of the aggravation of the peace and order problem in Mpldanao
generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Clirnaco; the
petitioners were the suspects; the raid was urgent; and the search
and seizure was incidental to a legal arrest.
Is.sue: Is the search illegal?
Held; Yes. (1) Superior orders do not excuse violation. - "Superior
orders cannot countermand the Constitution. The fact that the
petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse
the constitutional short cuts the respondents took. As eloquently
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan (4 Wall
2.): 'The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving,more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the
wit of rnan than that any of its provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government."'
(2) Precarious state of lawlessness does not excuse violation. -
"The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the
time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizures: There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify,
assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the
petitioners."
(3) Suspects are presumed innocent. - "The record does not
disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives
from justice. At the time of the 'zona,' they were merely suspected
of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated
for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not
guilty as summarily pronounced by the military."
(4) Even the guilty are entitled to protection. - "Indeed, even if
it were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty,
they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the
Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. This
is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals.
What it does simply signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence,
the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not
from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every
person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the
 I I 111 II I I
' I
1'1111111'1, ,1 ,111,I I ,1,,1"
buHout cl'inihrnl, rnngud ngnlntjl the rcot o.f lhu p,wplc who would
condemn him outright, Is still, under the Dill of Rights, a majority
of one."
(5) Civilian authority is supreme over military. - "In acting as
they did, they also defied the precept that I civilian authority is at all
times supreme over the military' so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed
the civil courts, which had the authority.tc determine w,bether or
not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises.
Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant
on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt."
(6) Raid was not urgent. - "The respondents cannot even plead
the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew
where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a
search warrant before making the raid. If they-were worried that the
weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could
have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should
disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and
instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's
premises with all the menace of a military invasion."
(7) Search was not incidental to a legal arrest. - "Conceding that
the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure
be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal .
arrest? Surely not. If all the law-enforcement authorities have to do
is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they
see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then
we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
One cannot just force his way into any man's house on the illegal
orders of a superior, however lofty his rank.
Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official
intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes,
that a man's house is his castle. 'It may be frail; its roof may shake;
the wind may enter; the rain may enter. But the King of England
may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross t·hc
threshold of the ruined tenement."'
(8) Fruits of an illegal search are inaqmissible /11 11virlt•111·c1• • ;,II
follows that as the search of the petitioners' p:romlH('ll w1111 vlt 1h11 lv1•
of the Constitution, all the firearms and amnw nil.iow1lnl~1•11f11J1111111•
raided compound are inadmissible in ovidcnrt• In all JIIIH 1•e11ll111111
1, 1 I \Ill Ill 11111 I •I 1111 ,I II 1
1,,
1' 1 l v111 y 111, 1111111111111! ,1l h 111 ,111d I 11111•t1 p11111 l1111111
ngninst the pelilioners. These articles are ' fruits of the poisonous
tree.'
As Judge Learned Hand observed: 'Only in case the prosecu-
tion which itself controls with seizing officials; knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.' (Pugliese [1945]
135 F. 2nd ed. 497]. )"
(9) Seized-articles may be placed in legal custody. - "Pending
determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall
remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as
the corresponding courts may decide." (Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA
279 [19871, through Justice Cruz.)
3. · !llegal articles considered malum prohibitum were seized under
an illegal search warrant. ·
Facts: None of the articles listed in the search warrant was
found. However, a revolver and live bullets which were found in
the premises were confiscated and made the basis of the charge
' . against the petitioner.
I Issue: It is argued that possession of the articles was violative
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum
and, therefore, they could be taken without a warrant.
Held: (1) Valid search warrant is still necessary for seizure of
prohibited article. - "Prohibited articles may be seized but only as
long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not, because: (a) there
was no valid search warrant; and (b) absent such a warrant, the
right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the
military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right
to be there and, therefore, had no right either to seize the pistol and
bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum,
the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial
in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not
be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search ·
warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military
authorities could h ave just entered the premises and looked for
t·he guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to
first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so
indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a
 I 1111 II I I I II t Ill I' d II 1 1 11 1111 \I I \\V
l'd111 11'11 11 ,11 1il I ,1111•11
wnl't:nnl fol' the sclwrc of the w.cnpons the pelitioncr wos suspected
of possessing."
(2) Exceptions. - "It is true that there are certain instances
when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles
may be taken validly as a result 0£,that se~ch: For example,, •
(a) a warrantless search may be: made incidental- ,to a
lawful arrest, as when ,t he person being-atrested,is ifrisked for
weapons he m ay otherwise-be ab~e to ;Ui'/e' ag~inst the ~r~sting
officer. !
O
O
~ r i.
,:; T O ' •
(b) Motor' cars may be inspected at' ib6tders to -prevent
smuggling· of aliens and cot'llirabana·a:nd even in cth e interior
upon a showing of prob~ble cause.
(c) Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed
from the operation ot the rule because of their mobility and their
relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. the individual
may knowingly agree to be searched 'or waive objections to an
illegal search.
(d) And it has also been held that prohibited articles may
be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and
the peace officer comes upon them.inadvertently."
(3) Exclusionary rule is applicable in this case. - "Clearly,
though, the instant case does not come undet any of the accepted
exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled
upon th e pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were
deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were
taken. Hence, the rule h aving been violated anc,i no .e~ception
being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and
bullets were confiscated illegally and, therefore, are protected by
the exclusio.r:rnry prip.ciple."
(4) Articles must remain in custodia legis. - "This pistol and
bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner
in the criminal action against him for illegal possei;;sion 9£firearms.
Pending resolution of that case, however, the said ~rticles must
remain in custodia legis." (Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1986),
through Justice Cruz.)
4. Evidence sought to be excluded wns primarily di11rovr•rnd n1J1/
obtained by a private person, aclinK inn privafr rnJJ(trily ni11/ wltlw11t tlw
intervention a11d pnrtici/Jfltio11 0Jgovr·r1111w11 l11 1wt•11/11.
Ill I I /\ I 1· Ill 1111,l , l ll• 1-:H :I II:,
I 'tlv111 y 111 ( '011111111nk,1lion and Correspondence
Facts: The accused appellant was convicted of violation of RA.
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs
Act."
· The appellarit artd his common-law wife S went to the booth
of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pili-
pino Complex, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages.
R (the proprietress) attended to them.
Before d elivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs
' :, ' 11• and/ or Bureau of Posts, J (proprietor and husband of R),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
. fj,nal inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor
emitted therefrom. He made an opening on one of the cellophane
wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. J brought
out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in
the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flap, removed the
styrofoam and took out the celloph ane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained
inside the cellophane wrappers. The other packages were likewise
opened. He discovered that they contained bricks or cake-like
dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and
took charge of the packages and of the contents.
An information was filed against appellant for violation of
R.A. N o. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act."
Issue: Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the
imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreason able search and seizure and privacy of
communica.tion and, therefore, argues that the same should be held
inadmissible in evidence.
Held: (1) Evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and sei-
zure warrant inadmissible. - "Our present constitutional provision
on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter and was, in turn, derived almost verba-
tim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United
States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which
are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp vs.
Ohio by the US Pederal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6
I .. 1-:d. 'LOSJ [l96l].), this Court, in Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383
( 19671.), <h•dnn•d ns inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue
 I I
1:1 lll.ll'l ' INI. l I H-J: d 11111 II >I lr\1.1 AW
Pl'lnd plcll nnd C11se11
. of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process
the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1
(19481.), wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected
by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4(2],. Art. IV
thereof.), constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over
up to the present with the advent of the 1?87 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly ,adhered to the exclu-
sionary rule and has struck down th_e a4IBissibility of evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co. [Phils.J, Inc. vs. Ruiz,
37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim vs. Ponce de teon, 66 SCRA.299 [1975];
People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 [1987]; see also Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 185 (1990].)"
(2) Rule is not applicable where evide_nce was obtained by a private
person without any intervention or participation of the State. - '1t must
b.e noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence
so obtained were invariably procured· by the State acting through
~e medium of its law enforcers or other ·authorized government
agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character
since the evidence sought to be exduded was primarily discovered
and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused/ appellant validly claim
that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private
individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State.
1 '
As this Court held in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345
[1972].):
'This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen
or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions. x x x
x x x There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have the access except under the circumstances above noted,
for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble,
·"' ' Ill 11111 11 ( I 11,111 1
l1tl v111 ,v 111 I 1111111111111t ,111t,1111111I 1 1111t•'11•111 11 li 1111 ,,
is his castle. Thus is outlawed any 1mwarra11Jed i11trusion by
government, which is call.ed upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies ofhis life. xx x' (CF. Sr}i.ermerber
vs. California, 384 US 757 (1966] and Boyd vs. United.States, 116
US 616 [1886]; Italics supplied.) xx x'
Likewise apropos is the case of Bernas vs. US. (373 F.2d 517
(1967].) The Court there said:
.'The search_of which appellant complains, however, was
made by a private citizen - the owner of a motel in which
appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a
travel case containing the evidence [forgei:I checks] complained
of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative.
Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police,
informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to
the authorities.'
• The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do
not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search
by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action.'
The contra~and in the case at bar having come into possession
of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's
r~ghts against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no
cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in
the prosecution of the offense charged."
(3) No illegal search and seizure was made by NB] agents. - "It will
be recalled that after J opened the box containing the illicit cargo,
he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the
agents to his p lace of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels
containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and
custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made
no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused/ appellant.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by J into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look
at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed
that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified
without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not
the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
trd l.'1111 11 ' 1'11 II I I 11 J: ,111111111t J ,\ l , I 1\W
1111111 lplt-11,11111 l 11111'11
0
In Gandy vs. Watkins (237 F. Supp, 266 [1964].), it was likewise
held that where the property was taken into ·custody of the police
,.· .at the specific request of the manager and where the search was
initially made by the owner, there is no unreasonable search and
seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term."
(4) Constitutional proscription directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. - "That the
Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be
subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights·answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:
'First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamen-
tal liberties is the essence of constitutional democracy. Protec-
tion against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and
· the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the
Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the
private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship
Speech of Commissioner Bernas, Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674, July 1986.)'
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass th~ test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention
of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acln
committed by private individuals so as to bring It wil·hin the• nmlrlt
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government:."
111•1 ,I /\ NI , Il l, 1111 ,L t 11' l' l\, llt :1
l'dvtH:y of Cu 1n1111111lc,11io 11 und Con·ciipondcnce
(5) Constitution does not govern r,elationships between individuals.
- "AppellanH1rgues, however, that ,since the provision of the
1935 ,C onstitution has been modified by the present phraseology
found in the 1987 ,Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any
evidence obtained · in violation of. -the constitutional prohibition
against illegal search and seizure, it matters not ~hether the
evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals.
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the Constitution, in
laying down the principles of the govermnent and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications
introduced in the 1987 Constitution (Re Sec. 2, Art. III.) relate to
the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-rf-vis
the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof. (see Solivcn
vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988); Circular No. 13 [Oct. 1, l985J
and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987].) The modifications introduced
deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhib ition
against unreasonable search and seizu re is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not sh ift to anyone else."
(6) An act of a private individual violative of another's rights
cannot also be construed as an act of the State. - "Corollarily, alleged
violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be
invoke4 against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the
exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with the appellant that an
act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Ri,ghts should
also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the Constitution."
(7) Above principles are applicable to rights to privacy and commu-
nication. - "Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured
by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies,
in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of
appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication."
(Peaple vs. Marte, 193 SCRA 57 [1991], through Justice Bidin.)
5. Wife forcibly opened the drawers and the cabinets in her husband's
clinic and took, among others, tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity.
Pacls: Petitioner CZ, wife of private respondent AM, a doctor of
medicine, entered the d inic of the latter and in the presence of her
wmkc1~driver and J\M's Hecrctary, forcibly opened his drawers and
466 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTfONAL LAW Sec:3
• · Principles and Cases· •~ · ..
. cabinets and took documents consisting of ,pdvate correspondence
between AM and his alleged paramour,-gteeting cards,· cancelled
checks, diaries and photographs. The documents and papers
were seized for use in evidence·in a case fo~ legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of'ri)~dicine which CZ -filed
against AM.
' .' •'
AM brought action for recovery of the documents and papers
and for damages against CZ. . ., 1•
Issue: Are the documents and papers in question admissible in
evidence?
Held. No. (1) The constitutional protection is ever available to either
spouse. - "There is no question that the documents and papers in
question belong to private respondent and that they were taken by
his wife, without his knowledge and consent. x x x The intimacies
between husband and wife do not jus_tify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any tell-tale evidence 9f marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right
to privacy as an individual and the constitutional pwtection is ever
available to him or to her."
(2) Communication between the spouses is privileged. - "The
law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may one be examined
I .
without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication,
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to d9 with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other." (Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA
639 [1996], through Justice Mendoza.)
Writ of.Habeas Data.
The writ of habeas data is a judicial remedy available indepen-
dently from those provided under prevailing Rules, to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information regmding the
• A-1,t:J,'; UL L:HLL01 1 RlG ll'l'S ,J(\'l
Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
person, famil3/, home and/ or correspondence of the aggrieved party
through a complaintfile<i in court.13
(1) Like· the -wtit' of amparo (see Sec. 15.), habeas llata was
conceived as a respb~d, given the lack of objective and available
remedies, to address ffie extraordinary use in the number of killings
and enforced disappear~ces. It safeguards a person's right to life,
liberty and ·secur:ity·against abuse in the present·age of information
technology. (Mani1'a Electric Company vs. Lim, 632 SCRA 195 [2010];
see Gamboa vs. Chan, .677 SCRA 385 [2012]; Vivares vs. St. Theresa's
College, 737 SCRA 92 [2014]'.) It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right lo
informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as "the right to
.control the collection, maintainance, use, and dissimination of dnt-a
about oneself." (Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59 (2014).)
(2) The writ oper~te.s to protect a person's right to ccmtrol
information regarding himself particularly in the instances where
such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. An indispensable requirement
before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at
least by substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. (Roxas vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA211 [2010]; Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-
Arroyo, 600 SCRA 84 [2011].)
(3) This judicial remedy supplements the writ of habeas corpus
and the writ of amparo. 14 It is anchored on the constitutional right to
information and to privacy of a person, his family, his home, and
his communication and correspondence. The writ can be invoked
by an aggrieved party to find out the information or data gathered
about him particularly by the police or the military and other law
enforcement agencies and to compel these agencies to disclose the
use and purpose of such information. It gives victims access to
records otherwise closed to them. A general d enial of the allegations
in the petition is not allowed. In cases of extralegal killings and
13
Section 1, Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC.) which took effect
on February 2, 2008.
14Despite the lack of certain contents which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and
Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under exceptional circumstances
can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.
(Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 681 SCRA678 [2012) .) ·
468 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.3
Principles and Cases
enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by the spouse,
children and parents of the aggrieved party, or, in their default, by
any of his ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(4) The petition may bE: filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and also with the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the
Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of
.government offices. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of or
order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data
or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and
equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied. When
issued, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
(Secs. 2, 16.)
(5) This independent and summary remedy is available only
to natural, not juridical, persons. This is evident from the wordings
of the Rule and in view of the personal character of the rights
involved. Like also the writ of amparo, it will not issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petition therefor are vague or doubtful.
(Tapuz vs. Del Rosario, 554 SCRA 768 [2008]; Castillo vs. Cruz, 605
SCRA 628 [2009]; Manila Electric Company vs. Lim, supra.; Lee vs.
Ilagan, supra.)
-oOo-
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
SEC. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances.
Meaning of freedom of speech, of expression,
and of the press.
(1) The constitutionalfreedom of speech and expression, and of
/Jw press, otherwise known as the freedom of expression, implies the
right to freely utter or publish one's beliefs, ideas, or opinions
without prior restraint,1 and to be protected against any subsequent
responsibility for so doing as long as it does not violate the law, or
injure someone's character, reputation, or business.
(2) It h as been identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
ln1 thfully all matters of public interest without prior censorship or
nuhsequent punishment. (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, 27
'. ;cl\A 835 [1969].)
(3) It also includes the right to communicate and disseminate
01w's thoughts or beliefs, and to circulate what is published. Thus,
11 ~llntute imposing a tax upon the gross receipts of the business
, 11' advertising in newspapers having a circulation of more than
,1 11pccified number of copies per week was held violative of this
I 1, 'l'do1.n as a deliberate device in the guise of a tax to limit the
, i1'1·u Intlon of the newspapers affected. (Grossiean v. American Press
< ·o., 2()7 U.S. 233.) .
1Wlt1h• 1101 :ill prior restraints of expression are invalid, any system of prior restraint
llf'rtring a heavy burden against its constitutionality. (Newsounds Broad-
, o1111, .. , ' " w 111'I
' ,11,l l11g Nc•lwc>rk, Inc·. vs. Dy, 583 SCRA333 (2009].) Freedom from prior restraint is large-
h J1, ·1·d,1111 In 1111p,c1wr111mmt ccnHorship of publications whatever the form of censorship
,1111111•p,,mllc•s•1(1( whulhm· il' iRw ielded by the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of
1111• 1;11Vl'1tlllli'tll. (I U11ilt•d Tr,,nHporl Koalisyon v:,. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA
Ill l.'111',l,l
470 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4 Sec. 4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 471
Principles and Cases Freedom of Expression

Scope of freedom of expression. Purposes of the guarantee.

The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression embraces The following have been stated as the purposes of the protection:
the specific guarantees of free speech and free press, the rights of (1) To protect parties in the free publication ol matters of public
assembly and petition, the right to form associations or societies concern, to secure their right of free discussion of public events and
i1ot contrary to law, the freedom of religion, and the right to access public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the
to information on matters of public concern (Sec. 7.) which are all Government and p ersons in authority to the bar of public opinion
indispensable to the free and effective flow of ideas. The guarantee by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of their
implies the right to reach willing audience but not the right to authority which the people have conferred upon them;
compel others to listen, see, or read.2
(2) To guard against repressive measures by the several
The term "law" in Section 4 should not be limited to statutes and departments of the government, by means of which persons in
local ordinances; executive and judicial actions are to be deemed power might secure themselves and their favorites from just scrutiny
subject also to the constitutional restriction. and condemnation; and
(3) To prevent the censorship of the press by an action of the
Scope of terms "speech," "expression,"
government by m eans of which it might prevent such free and
and "press."
gt•neral discussion of public matters as seem absolutely essential
(1) "Speech" and "expression" include any form of oral or 1·, l prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as
written utterances. They cover peaceful picketing (for by it, one ,·itizens.3
silently expresses what he has in mind), street demonstrations,
display of a flag, and salute to the flag and other non-verbal condut:t Basis and significance of the guarantee.
intended to focus attention and communicate on an issue. They also
The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom
embrace expression by means of motion picture. nf expression including the right of free assembly and petition
Conduct is treated as a form of speech even inaction itself t1s .i 11; undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-
symbolic maimer of communication. (The Diocese of Bacolod wi. f11lfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation of the
Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 [2016].) l"'uple in social and political decision making, and of maintaining
1I 11 • balance between stability and change. (Gonzales vs. Commission
The word "expression" covers the mere expression of an opi nit >11
not made publicly. 1111 Elections, 27 SCRA 835 [1969]; ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs.
( 't ,1nmission on Elections, 323 SCRA 811 [2000].)
(2) Th e "press" covers every sort of publications: newspnp1•n:,
periodicals, magazines, books, handbills, leaflets, etc. Rad io c1111 I (I ) Promotes growth of the individual and the nation. - If man is not
television as instruments of mass communication are a bo indud1•, I l1'1'l' Ii i co mmunicate his ideas to others, not only is his ow n moral
, 11 HI in (·cl lectua l development stifled but his fellowmen are deprived
within this term.
11( 1111• l)('nd it and stimulation which he might impart to them. And
1111 11'~,11 individ ua ls are at liberty to discuss the various issues that
11111l ronl llw community, the government, and the whole w eb of
•,11t i,11 rd 1lionships, the search for truth and perfection is impeded.
2Co1111ne rdnl s p1·1'd1 is n .-,·p,1r,11t• ,-.11,•gory of ••JH'l'l'l11v hit h I'• 11111 ,11, 111d,·d th, •t1.11111 • F1,•1•d11111 o f 1·:-..prl•ssion is, the re fore, a n inalienable humanrightthat
J,·vd of pnill·dlnn '"' lh,11 glv, 11 lo ollwr, ,111•1111111 h111,,llv r,11111·,1111t-1·d lt11111•, t>I 1•,1111 ,,,,11111
0 1l11wh lr11111 1lw v1•ry 11,111.11•1· o f mnn. As s uch, it must be nurtured
1>111 l,11u•v,·1·1l11•J, ..,,, 1·11I II J.·tl 111 pi 111,·, lion 11111,,1)1, 11,·d ,,d v,·1 I1-il'1111·11l>1 ,111• lq ;llli1111h• 11111111
11l 1•\111,.,,,,lt111 (I lil,1111, II'\~ ~il•11l'l,1ry 1111111,l h ,, /)1, 'II IV\ 1I/ I 'lll•ll, •" ' ' 1111• I 1111,, ,, 111
ll,11111. ,d \ I .. 1111111•,•,11111 1111 I t, I 111111, '/ I" ',I ll I\ I I 'I I [',I )
i, 1 1! c H •I I '• Pf' 11/ , IIH'• 11111,
472 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 4
Principles and Cases ·
and protected by the State.4 Without the right, the full and proper
growth of the individual, nay, the nation, is invariably stunted.
(2) Essential to man's enjoyment of his life and to his happiness. -
These individual freedoms are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjqyment of his life, to his happiness,
and to his full and complete fulfillment. In the stirring language of
Laski,5 "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the
State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged; his
interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled
to exercise." 6 (Ibid.)
(3) Essential to the discovery and spread of truth. - As Justice
Holmes eloquently stated:
"To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you
think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he squared
the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result,
or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even'more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out xx x. That a l
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. We should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions tho.I
we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten interference with the lawful and pre::;s.ing
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to sov1 ·
the country." 7 (Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616.)
4
SCHMANDT and STEINBICKER, op. cit., pp. 163-164 (1954),
5 11,,11 1•xl11l tlll'ir· actK; if nothing relating to the conduct of the governing class can reach
The State of Theory and Practice, pp. 35-36 (1935).
c,I'hese freedoms and right to happiness should be rvco~ni7cd ,1nd l'l"•Jl•'l 'h•d n11I
o nly by the State but also by enterprise~ m1thorizeti hy the Stnl(' to op1•r,1l1•; for ,1•1 1,,1',l• I
(Liberty in the Modern Stnlc, p. 73 11941).) stressed: "Wi1h11111 fr<"l'do,11 of 1lw 111l11,i x, ~ ,1
man hnH no p.rolcclion in 011rHncin l on1('r, I It• rnny Hfll'nk wrongly m frn,11•,h lv, xx x, 'rnl ,1
dc•11i,1I of hi•• righl x X x iH ,1 d1'11hil of hiHh,1ppl111u1,1, Tlw11•l,y 111• 1>1•<'111111"• ,111 11 11111 11 11,..111 ..1
otlwr p1•01•h•'Nl'nd,1, not hi111•,1•lf ,111 ,•rul." (I :,1rri11 w, '1'l11• 11,1111lty Adn1 l,,•,l1111 l '11111111llh•1•
I ,11y11l11 H, 111111 ol 'I 111'111111:v, hil ~ll 'l{A '.1'/'/ I til'/' ,I l
Ii, '(111111' ,11•,,1h1 1111111 I ,1•,J..I •. , , ... l1P1, "'' I \VI' 111,1\' ''"l'I'"' ., l11d,1y llhl\' l•I' th,
111111111(11,h• 1 111 111111111111w Nt•w 1111th 111•11111,, ,111,,1\11 111 11 11111111111v 111 "111•, 11 11111111 J,,.
Sec.4 ART'.. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 473
Freedom of Expression
(4) Makes possible scrutiny of acts and conduct of public officials.
- A central value of the guarantee lies in checking the abuse of
governmental power. "No one can doubt the importance of the
right (a) to canvass the acts of public men and the tendency of
public measures, (b) to censure boldly the conduct of rulers, and (c)
to scrutinize the policies and plans of the government. If we would
preserve [this right], public opinion must be enlightened; political
vigilance must be encouraged." 8
(5) Insures a responsive and popular government. - It is only
through free debate and free exchange of ideas that a government
remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change
is effected. (De Jorge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353.) The people must
be able to voice out their sentiments and aspirations so that they
may become active participants in the political process (i.e., public
discussions, referenda, initiatives, recalls, plebiscites and elections)
as well as in national development.
Our Constitution provides that "sovereignty resides in the
people." (Art. II, Sec. 1.) To deny to the people the right to participate
in the shaping of public affairs through the discussion of matters
nfft~cting public interest would make a mockery of this democratic
principle.9
11111ncone's perception before it becomes a general perception. The world gains nothing
Ir111n a refusal to entertain the possibility that a new idea may be true, nor can we pick
1111d d1oo~e among our suppressions with any prospect of success. It would, indeed, be
hlll'dly beyond the mark to affirm that a list of the opinions condemned in the past as
w1•1111g or dangerous would be a test of the common places of our time." (Liberty in the
Mnd,·rn Stnte, p. 75 [1944).)
"TA N ADA and FERNANDO, p. 313, citing Story.
" It iH the particular duty of the people of the State to jealously m aintain the right
1111•~11n·11t1 freely, either verbally or by publication their honest convictions regarding the
,1, 1,, 11f public officials and the governing class. If the people of a free State should give
1111 1111• r·li:ht lo free• speech; if they are daunted by fear and threats and abdicate th eir
, 1111vkllrnw; if the governing body of the State could silence all the voices except those
tlu• I11•11pl1• ,,x,·,·pt those that which will uphold the men in power, then we may well say
' f;rn>dhyl'' lo 11111· liberlic•1, forever." (U.S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58 [1992].)
'''I 111·11111111 tlw righl1i of free expression, free assembly and petition, "the citizens can
1•111 ti, IJ mt" 11111 11w1'1'ly in llw periodic establishment of the government through their
,,11111 ,1111• h111 ,1!,111 in tlw ,11l111i11i•1t.rt1lio11 of public affn irs as well as in the discipline of
,1li1111t v1• p11l>li1· 11ttln•1'11, Tlw dti;,:1•11 i11 ,1c,·ordt'd tlw<:l' rights sc> that he can appeal for
11 ,h,., ,, ,111,I p111ti·,•tl1111 1111 w,·11 11•1 fur tlw imp11•1ili1111 11f th .. lawf11I imnclions on erring
1•11lol11 11flh 11111111111I 1•111l'l11yi•, ..," (l'l11lip)'l111· lll11111111ni; Mlll•1 l1111ploy,,,.., <)rg,111i~ntl1111 vH.
l'lllh('pl111• 11111111111111; Milli, I '11. l11, ' h lf/'111)
474 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
(6) Part of the sporting idea offair play. - "The closed mind has
no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play
to hear 'the other side' before an opinion is formed or a decision
is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only
one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation
of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides
complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to
the correct [judgment] after examination of the problem not from
one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance
or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence
of power." (Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659
[1987].)
(7) Serves as a safety valve for society. - "The freedoms of
expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are
inclt1ded among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people,
in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, 'to protect the ideas
that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish'; or as Socrates
insinuated, 'not only to protect the minority who wants to talk, but
also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.'10 And as Justice
Douglas cogently stresses, 'the liberties of one are the liberties of
all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all an•
protected."' 11 (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees' Organization
vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 189 [1973].)
Freedom of expression not absolute.
The right of freedom of speech and of the press is essential l'< > 1'111•
preservation and operation of a sound constitutional democr,11 ·y.
The trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is 111
10
See CHAFEE on Freedom of Speech and Press, pp. 13-14 (1955).
11
Justice DOUGLAS, A Living Bill of Rights, p. 64 (1961).
To Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, the freed oms of speech, pr, .. ,,,, pnlll11111
and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution "must be accorded tc, tlw ld1w1 w,• 111111•
or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we clwri~h." (C'om1111111i•,I I',11 IY , •I
the U.S. v. Subversive Activilics Control Donrcl, :167 ll .S. 'I.) S11p1m"l•1i1111 111 li,•1 1 1,p1•1•1 h
does not dittcour.ige ~1wPd1 hut only drivt"l ii 1111d1•1g1111111d ,111d 1h,•1,•l•y l'111l1111p.,•1,, ,H,11,h
govPrn1111•11t.
Sec. 4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 475
Freedom of Expression
recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude to this
constitutional guarantee. However, this right is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. It does not confer unbridled
license to speak or publish without responsibility for every possible
use of language. There are other societal values that press for
protection.
The right is always subject to some regulation by the State in
order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or
those of the community or society. This power may be exercised
under the police power (see Sec. 9.) of the State to promote or protect
the public welfare, which may, in turn, be delegated to political
subdivisions which may enact ordinances for the purpose. 12 (see
Gallego vs. People, 8 SCRA 813 (1963].)
Thus, any one who slanders or libels another may be penalized.
Furthermore, "lewd and obscene" speech is not entitled to
constitutional protection nor are "fighting words," insulting words
that by their very utterance injure and provoke others to whom they
are directed to attack. One has no right to stand up in a crowded
theater and yell "fire" merely to see the confusion and possible panic
that will result. Seditious speeches are also outside the protection of
the Constitution. It has been well-observed that "such utterances
are no essential parts of any exposition of ideas and are of slight
:,odal value as a step to truth that any benefit derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in morality and order."
(Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568; Philippine Journalists,
·1nc. vs. Thoenen, 477 SCRA482 [2005].)
12,\ i·o11te11t-neutml regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of
lhc• npccch, or one that merely controls the time, place, or manner, and under well-defined
1,t,1111lnrd8, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech. A
gov1•n1ml:ill regulation based on the captive-11udience doctrine which states that when a
rl'lll'llt'I' rn1111ol, ns a practical matter, escape intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted,
11111y 11111 lw juHlificcl if the supposed capture audience" may avoid exposure to the
11th,•rWIHe inlrnllivc speech." (I-United Transport Koalisyon vs. Commission on Elections,
, 1, 1l !l('IU\ 11 1 120'15'1,) A citizon who accepti. public eijployment "must accept certain
l1 111ll,cl ln111111 l,l11 or lwr fr,•1•do 111," 8Ul"h OM llw frc,•dom to Rpenk their mind. However, it is
11011,11 1l,1111111111t 111 llw 1•,•ll111p il'll1111,•nl of llwir ,•n111ilil11 li11nol right of expression otherwise
,.,,j11y1•d by 111111•1111 1111,t hy 1,w.,,11 o f lh,•I<' c•111ploynll'11t, (I lnv,H'l City Wate r District vR.
1\1,1111111•1, '/',fl ',I Iii\ '.' I', 1''11 1111,)
476 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
Abridgment of freedom of expression
and of the press.
The abridgment of the liberty, however, can be justified only
where there exists substantial danger that the speech will likely lead
to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This is known as
"the clear and present danger rule."
How substantial the danger must be and immediate the evil
results, depends upon the nature of the interest threatened. For
example, persons distributing handbills announcing a public
meeting may not be denied the right to do so merely because there
is a clear and present danger that the streets will become cluttered.
A town or city has the right to keep its streets clean, but the interest
in clean streets does not justify suppression of speech.
On the other hand, a conspirational group may be punished
for publicly advocating violent overthrow of the government,
even though the likelihood of such an overthrow is remote. The
interest in preserving our government against violent overthrow
is more substantial than that in keeping streets clean. The former
justifies restrictions on speech even when the danger is remote,
whereas the latter does not justify restriction even when the danger
is imrnediate.13 Where the seditious words do not pose a clear and
present danger to the State, the utterances may not be punishable.
"Clear and present danger" rule and
"dangerous tendency" rule.
At the very least, the liberty of speech and free press may be
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without censorship or punishment." There
13
See CORWIN and PELTASON, Understanding the Constitution, p. 121.
14
1n Chavez vs. Gonzales (511 SCRA 441 [2008].), the Supreme Court issued wrlt11
of certiorari and prohibition, nullifying the official statements made by rc~pmul1•nl11
Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission (on J11111• H nnd
11, 2005) warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped converHalion~ n•i;md<Jd 111
compact discs (CD) between the President nnd a high-ranking official of Il a• l \1111111i•,•,l1111
on Elections about fix ing votes in the 20fM nntional clccliorn,, 0111I lwlw,•1•11 1lll11·1
personalities, nncl Ihat Ihose brondcnHling or publiHhing ilH contcnl!J co uld l11• hc,ld lh1hl1·
und,•r tlw /\nli-Wir1· ·1:1ppi11g /\ eJ., Tlw i,isiw W, l'l wh1'1h,•r ll·1.. pr'1%1~1n11•rn1•11l11Ir, q11c•1lll1111
conHli111ll' ,1 rorm of 1111111•111 l•,1 sPd 11111•1111•1ll l11l i1111,1I 11rl11r 1•,..,trnl11l 1111 tlw ••~••1< 1111• uf
fr1•1•d11111 111 1,p.,,·,•lr ,111d 111 1111• J'II"•''• I Ir-Ir/: "111 ll",11lvl11p, 1lrl11 l•,•,111•, WI' h11ld lh,11 11111 11111
d1•, 1°,1111• 111,11 llr1• I'll"•'• ,,l,1li11111•11h 111,1111' liy 11"11'1111d1111l•1 w,·11• 11111 ll'd1u 1·d 111 ,11 l111l11w,·d
Ill' wllli 1111111,11111d1•1, 111, 11, 111,11 11 II 1,1 h11ll1i 11•111 tl111I Iii•• I'll'"'' 11l,1t.·111P11i-l 1V111,• 111,1.t,,
Sec.4 Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 477
Freedom of Expression
i~ to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views
or subsequent liability imposed (whether in libel suits, prosecution
for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings) unless
there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent. (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, 27
SCRA 835 [1969].)
(1) In Cabansag vs. Fernandez (102 Phil. 151 [1957].), the Supreme
Court spoke of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction. Thus:
"These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the
'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number
of cases, means that the evil consequences of the comment
or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought
to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according
to the above decision 'a definite rule in constitutional law. It
provides the criterion as to what words may be published."'
The Cabansag case likewise explained the other test, the
"dangerous tendency" rule, thus:
"If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which
the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.
It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such
acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts
1ir l'l'l•l'nnclcnlKwhile in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent
t ,, 111~llll"Hmnda hb statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement
1111 th,· f1•11,11lntory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on
l•..!11111 of tlw government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint.
11 11·, , 111l t I•l l•f rm "ncl" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or
pll 11 111I, Ir, 11l nr. O thcrwiRc, Iha non formalization of an act into an official order or circular
will ,, ..,1111 111 tlw cnsy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press
,11.r1 .. ,11 .. nl•1 ,11 l,,1 r 111•1• nclH lhnl sho uld be struck down as they constitute impermissible
li•r 111•, 111 1'1'1111' 11",l r,1inh1 011 tlw right lo free spl'ccl, and press. There is enough evidence
ol , h1lll11111•1111, l 111 tlw rn111pl,1i1wd nrtH on n•rord. Tlw wnrnings given to media came
1111111 1111 1, .. ,., tlu• NI'{·, ,1 1t•1•,11l11111r•y ,1g1•111 y lh,1t 1•,111 1·,11wl'I tlw Ccrl:ificate of /\uthorily
111 ih,• 1,11ll11 ,11111 br111uh ,1•ol 11,.,dl,1, 'l'lu•y 1111.11, .11111• lr11n1 tlw fi1•t n•1,11·y of J11t,lk,•, tin· 11/frr
i ~• • 11111 11· I,,, 111111,•, 1.vh11 wll'l, h 1111' ,1w1•,,1,r11,· 1'11w1•1· 111 1''"'·1•, 1111• tho•ll' pt•r1.-1v1·d to lw
1111h1IIIIJ\ 1111' 1111111, 1111hr, l,111d "
 478 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Sec.4
Principles and Cases
of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about
the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent."
(see Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, supra.)
(2) In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Commission on Elections ·
(323 SCRA 811 [2000].), after quoting the above discussion in
Cabansag of the two theoretical tests, in determining the validity 0£
the restrictions to the freedom of speech and the press, the Supreme
Court concluded: , causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising
"Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the 'clear and
present danger ' test. It implicitly did in its earlier decisions in
Primicias vs. Fugoso and American Bible Society vs. City of Martila;
as well as in later ones, Vera vs. Arca, Navarro vs. Villegas, Imbong
vs. Ferrer, Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Comelec and, more recently, in
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. MTRCB. In setting the standard or test £or
the 'clear and present danger' doctrine, the Court echoed the
words of Justice Holmes: 'The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.' "
The two doctrines distinguished.
The two doctrines were fashioned in the course of testing
legislation of a p articular type - legislation limiting speech expected
to have deleterious consequences on the security and public order of
the community. The essential difference between the two doctrinl.'s
relates to the degree or proximity of the apprehended danger w hich
justifies the restriction upon speech.
(1) The "dangerous tendency" doctrine permits the application
of restrictions once a rational connection between the spct-d1
restrained and the danger appreliended - the "tendency" of rnw It,
create the other (although it may be £ar or remote) - was s hown.Pi
1
5Thus, in a prosecution for sedition, it was ht>ld t·h,,t ii is s11ffidc·nt lo w,111,1111
conviction if the words used tended to incilo upri,inr, or prod11c ,, ,1 l1•l'l111g 111 1111' 1•c•11ph·
to take u p ~r111s .ir;.iin~t llw r,ov<'1'11111(•111 11r ilw duly , 1111,,li1111, ·d ,111lhc>r1l h"1 (l'c•ol'h• w,
Perez, 4 Ph1 L !iC/11 I l()(J',[: !'1•11ph· v,, N.11>,111g, 1,, 1'1111 ,1',, I l'l I II 1',•11plt· VN 1',·l,·11, ',/ l'htl
lf'i lll '/111)
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 479
Freedom of Expression
(2) The "clear and present d anger" rule, in contrast, requires
the Government to defer application of restrictions until the
apprehended danger is much more visible, unpl its realization is
imminent and high at hand. This rule is thus considerably more
permissive of speech than the first, in contexts for the testing of
which they were originally designed.
Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger must not
only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a
from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element.
It is used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger.
The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable. It
is a question of proximity and degree.16 (Gonzales vs. Commission
on Elections, supra; see The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on
Elections, 747 SCRA 1 [2015].)
Balancing of interests tests.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on the freedom of
speech and of the press is the "balancing of interests" test.
In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of
the conflicting social values and individual interests competing
for ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the U.S.
Supreme Court in American Communications Association v. Douds (339
U.S. 383, 94 L. Ed. 925.) laid the basis for what has been called this
test which has found application in more recent decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court (e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; Barenblatt v.
U.S., 360 U.S. 169, 3 L. Ed ., 2d 116; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 360 U.S.
:\h). Briefly stated, this test requires a court to take conscious and
dl.'l□ ilcd consideration of the interplay 0£ interests observable in a
11
·Why n•pn•ssinn is permissible only when the danger of substantive evil is present
l'I1·\pl,111wd, ll111•i: "x x x ihc evil npprehcnded is so imminent that it m ay befall before
lh1•11• 1•1 11pp111·t1111ily fm fu ll dim·us~ i1111. If lhere be li me to expose through discussion
th,· l,11,.,,hrn ul 1111d f,11lm 1, ..,, 111 ovc l'I ihe l'Vil by ihc procc~scs of education, the remedy
111 Ill• 11111•ll1•d 111 111u1,· H[>t'l'dl, 11,,1 ,·nforu•d •,ilc•nr,·,I. [The prohibition! of free speech
,1111111,,•u•111l<l v 1•111 111,·.1,,111 1• '•" ,,11 h11•,1•11 I 111111 II wo11ld Iii· 111.tppropri.ilc· ,1 ~ lhl' mcfln~ fo r
1111•111111: ,, 11•111111,•lv 1111l, 1111111111111 1♦rn IPly" (// 11d , 111111; 111•111, ,. llr,111d1•l4 in Whiliwy v,
I ,1ltl11111ln 1/ I I I', I',/ 11'1' 'I l
 480 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
given s_ituation or type of situation. 17 (Separate Opinion of Justice
Castro m Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, supra.)
(1) F?r _exa~ple in Lagunsad vs. Sotto Vda. de Gonzales (supra.),
the confhctmg mtere~ts are the right to privacy asserted by the
respondent and the nght of freedom of expression invoked by the
petitioner. The Supreme Court ruled that "the limits of freedom of
expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern."
(2) I~ A~iong ~s. Commission on Elections (207 SCRA ?12 [1992].),
the ~onstituhonality of the COMELEC's resolution prohibiting the
postn:g ~~ decals_ and sti~kers on "mobile" places, public or private,
and hm1tmg their location and publication to authorized posting
areas was challenged. Declaring the resolution null and void, the
Supreme Court said:
"When faced with border li~e situations where freedom
to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the
part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials
and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom. For in the
ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's
power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and
honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom
to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.x x x.
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places
on the Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and
the_State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
dehcate,_ is perhaps more so where the usual presumption
supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place
17
KAUPER, Civil Liberties and the Constitution, p. 113 (Ann Arbor, 1966.) provid1..1
a useful _summary statement: "The theory of balance of interests represent~ a who lly
pragmatic approa_ch :o the problem of First Amendment freedom, indeed, tu lhu wholt•
probl~rn _of constitutional ~nterpret~tion. It rests on the theory that it i,; tlw Com•I',,
function rn the c~se before 1t when 1t find s public interests served by Jei;i~lnlio n n11 llw
one h~d, and Frrst Amendment freedoms affected by it on the othe r; to bnl,mc,, tlll'
one ~g~mst t~e o!her_ and to arrive at a judgment. Where the public inte n"lt i,Prv,•d hy
restrictive leg1s!at'.on _is of such a character th at it outweigh~ 1he nbridgnwnt 11( (,•,•,•tlo, 11,
then the C~u:t ,":''II
fn~d th~ le?islnlion vrilid. In :.horl1 llw 'ha l,111c1• 11f•lnl,•r, ..,1,,· lill'ur y
rests..on the b,l$1S that con~hlt1l1nnril frt•Pdomn flrl' 1101· 11h,,nh1k, 11111 1,v,, 11 lho,,1, f<l,tlt'tl 111
the l:irHI Anw111ln11•11I, 1111d 111111 llwy lllay h,· 11lil'idt•,•·tl l11 u111111• ,,,1,,111 to""' vi• ''l'l''"I'' 1,1ft,
,111d 1mpnrl,111I pulill,• h1to•11.,,1,, ,"
Sec.4 ART. ITI. BILL OF RIGHTS 481
Freedom of Expression
given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the First Amendments. x x x That priority
gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions and it is the character of the rights, not of the
limitations, which determines what standard governs the choice
XXX.
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must
be justified by a clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection
between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which
in the other context might support legislation against attack
on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on
firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would
restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time
and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or
impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." (Citing
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [1945].)
(3) In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Commission on Elections
(323 SCRA 811 [2000].), the Supreme Court nullified the COMELEC
Resolution banning the holding of exit polls and the dissemination
1,f lheir results through mass media. It ruled:
"The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more
be upheld when what is soughtto be curtailed is the dissemination
o( information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right
of suffrage. We cannot support any ruling or order 'the effect
of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as
free speech.' When faced with borderline situations in which the
frcl!dom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the
•lcctorate to lrnow is invoked against actions allegedly made to
a:,,11-a1rc dean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of
fH•1•dorn. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen
,rnd lhc Stalc's power to regulate should not be antagonistic.
'l'lwn• L"an be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to
111aintnin llwm, 1·hc freedom to speak and the right to know are
1111d11ly 1·ml.till'd.
'1'11111•, 1li1• l',0V1'1'llllll'tll' h,11, .i i,1,il<l' in prol1•cli11g lhe
l11111l,111w11lal righl lo vuh• 1,y p1•nvidi11r, v11li11g pl,11°1", 111111
,111• 11,111• ,111d ,11 •111" l1 illil1•, II li,1' 1 1111' d11l y In 1,1•, 1111· 1111• •11•111•1 y
 482 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of
the electoral process. However, in order to justify a restriction
of the people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's
responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh
them."
(4) In GMA Network, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (764
SCRA 88 [2014].), the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
COMELEC resolution imposing the "aggregate-based" airline limits
in regard to political advertisements of candidates in the broadcast
media for being violative of the freedom of speech and expression of
candidates. The rule limits the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to
an aggregate total of 120 minutes and 180 minutes, respectively.
ILLUSTRATNE CASE:
Petition for prohibition seeks a reexamination of the validity of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646,18 the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
Commission on Elections.
Facts: Petitioners, both candidates for public office, contend
that events after the ruling in National Press Club vs. Commission 011
Elections "have called into question the validity of the very premises
of that [decision]."
NPC vs. COMELEC upheld the validity of Section ll(b) of R.A.
No. 6646 against claims that it abridged freedom of speech and
of the press. In urging a re-examination of that ruling, petitio1wn1
claim that experience in the last five years since the decision in tfo1 t
case has shown the "undesirable effects" of the law because "th•
ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing
field [but] actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the 1,>1101°
candidate[s ]" by depriving them of a medium which they can nff1 >1°1I
to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to otlll'r"
means ofreaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parnd1% ,11111
handbills.
R.A. No. 9006 (An A ct to <'llhnnn• th,• holdi1111 of fr,·,·, 01°,lo•rly, horw•,I, l"'•H1111111111,I
18
crcd ibl,- ,•lwlio1111 llm 111gh /1111' ,,J,•l'I 11111 prn, I I,, .., ) '"l 11•,il,•,I i,,., 111111 11 (I,) 111 H t\ No r,1,!1,
Sec. 4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 483
Freedom of Expression
No empirical data have been presented by petitioners to back
up their claim, however. They do not complain of any harm suffered
as a result of the operation of the law.
Issue: Does the provision in question abridge freedom of speech
and of the press?
Held: "What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case
but simply the holding of an academic exercise. And since a
majority of the present Court is unpersuaded that its decision in
NPC is founded in error, it will suffice for present purposes simply
to reaffirm the nding in that case. Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
This is what makes the present case different from the overruling
decisions invoked by petitioners.
Nevertheless, we have undertaken to revisit the decision in
NPC vs. COMELEC in order to clarify our own understanding of its
reach and set forth a theory of freedom of speech."
(1) No suppression ofpolitical ads. - "The term political'ad ban,'
when used to describe Sec. ll(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading,
for even as Sec. ll(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space
and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to
procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the
media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation
of the time and maimer of advertising.
SEC. 92. COMELEC Time. - The Commission shall procure
radio and television time to be known as "COMELEC Time"
which shall be allocated equally and impartially among
the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as
to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the
period of the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC.) xx x
There is a difference in kind and in severity between restrictions
Hlll'h ns those imposed by the election law provisions in question
in t·his case and those found to ·be unconstitutional in the case
l'il1.•d by both petitionern and the Solicitor General, who has taken
tlil' sidL' of petitione rs. In Adiong vs. COMELEC, the Court struck
d11w11 n n•gulation of the COMET.EC which prohibited the use
111' ,·i1 111 p11ig11 d1•1•,1 lr. n11d slid crs on 111obilc units, allowing their
l,11·,1lin11 1111ly i11 tlu• < 'OM Iii.lo:<' l'C-11111non postf'I' men or billboard,
,11 Iii,• ,•,111 1p,il)',t1 l11•,1dq11Ml1•n, 1111111• ,·,11111id,11<•or· hiti polilk,11 p,11•ty,
111' ,11 1111, r,•11l,l,•11, ,, 'I Ii,· ( '11111 11 111111111 th,, ,, .. ililt'lln11 '1111 li1na,I tlu1t It
484 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Sec.4
Principles and Cases
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case
is a privately-owned car.' Nor was there a substantial governmental
interest justifying the restriction.
Mutuc vs. COMELEC (36 SCRA 228 [1970).) is of a piece with
Adiong. An order of the COMELEC prohibiting the playing of taped
campaign jingles through sound systems mounted on mobile units
was held to be an invalid prior restraint without any apparent
governmental interest to promote, as the restriction did not simply
regulate time, place or manner but imposed an absolute ban on the
use of the jingles. The prohibition was actually content-based and
was for that reason bad as a prior restraint on speech, as inhibiting
as prohibiting the candidate himself to use the loudspeaker. So
is a ban against newspaper columnists expressing opinion on an
issue in a plebiscite, a content restriction which, unless justified by
compelling reason, is unconstitutional.
Here, on the other hand, there is no total ban on political ads,
much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact
that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by
rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a
substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise
of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, Sec. 4 of
the Constitution.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of political
ads. They only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air
time to candidates but require the COMELEC instead to procun•
space and time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to
the candidates. In effect, during the election period, the COMELnc
takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the cornmercinl
time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the candidates."
(2) Regulation applies only to election period. - "On the otlwr
hand, the validity of regulations of time, place and manne1~ undt•r
well-defined standards, is well-nigh beyond question. Whnt· is
involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of ll•aving
candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the law provid1••1
for allocation, by the COMELEC, of the print space and ai,· linw tn
give all candidates equal time and s pace for the purpose of Pn1-1 11rii1g
'free, orderly, hones t, peaceful, and cr0d iblc clectio111-1.' xx Wlrnl
is bad is if tht• law prohibili; mmpnig11i11g by ,·Prl,1i11 c,llldid,111•>1
brcnwm of llw vil•ws ,•xpn•s1wd i11 !lu· 11d , ( '011l1•11l n•g1ll,1lin111•,111111,1
Ill' dorw in tlw ,,1,.,,.,li'" of 1111y 1·011q11•lll11n 1, w,1111,
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 485
Freedom of Expression
The main purpose of Sec. ll(b): Any restriction on speech is
only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its
purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass
media for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed
out in NFC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.
What makes the regulation reasonable is precisely that it
applies only to the election period. Its enforcement outside the
period would make it unreasonable."
(3) Restriction of speech to enhance relative voice of others. -
"x x x Do those who endorse the view that government may not
restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of
others also think that the campaign expenditure limitation found
in our election laws is unconstitutional? How about the principle
of one person, one vote, is this not based on the political equality
of voters? Voting after all is speech. We speak of it as the voice of
the people - even of God. The notion that the government may
restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of
others may be foreign to the American Constitution. It is not to the
Philippine Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of that
document.
Indeed, Art. IX-C, Sec. 4 is not the only provision in the
Constitution mandating political equality. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 requires
Congress to give the 'highest priority' to the enactment of measures
designed to reduce political inequalities, while Art. II, Sec. 26
declares as a fundamental p rinciple of our government 'equal
access to opportunities for public service.' Access to public office
will be denied to poor candidates if they cannot even have access
to mass media in order to reach the electorate.xx x"
(4) Test ofContent-Neutral Restrictions/Regulations. - " In Adiong
'l'ti , COMELEC, this Court quoted the following from the decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City
ordinance which prohibited the posting of campaign signs on
public property:
'This test was actually formulated in United States v.
O'llri<'11. It is an appropriate test for restrictions on speech
whil'h, like Sec. ll(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-
bns1•d n•slridion:-;, 1-lu.:y nrc not imposed because of the content
of 1111• 11p1'l'l"h, For !his rcns011, ,·onb•nt-neulml restrictions ore
11°11 1 d1•111,11111i11g 1l,1111-l,1rd11. For 1•-<,1111plt•, ,1 nil,• m1d1 ,tfl llt,11
1
i11volvl'd l 11 :111111,l11d t'.'I, ! '()Ml;/ 1·1·, prnhlhill 11g l'llh111111l 11t11,
4136
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL !, AW
Principms and Cases
co~enta~ors, ~d anno~n~rs from campnigning either for or
agamst an issue m a pleb1sc1te must have a compelling reason
to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny.
These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore
they b~~r a heavy _presumption of constitutional invalidity.
In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and
vagueness.'
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to con-
tent-neutral regulations which, like Sec. ll(b), are not concerned
with the content of the speech. These regulations n eed only a
substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential
standard of review will suffice to test their validity."
. ~5) "Clear and_present danger rule" originally formulated for the
crzmmal law. - "Justice Panganiban's dissent invokes the clear-
and-present-danger test and argues that 'media ads do not partake
of th_e '~~l substantiv~ evil' that 1:he state has a right to prevent and
tha~ JUshfies the curtai~ment of the people's cardinal right to choosl'
their means of expression and of access to information.'
The dear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereii:11
remedy for all free speech problems. As has been pointed 0111
by a thoughtful student of constitutional law, it was origin,,ll v
formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for frc1,
speech cases. For the criminal law is necessarily concerned wilh tl11•
line at which innocent preparation ends and a guilty conspir,u·y
attempt begins. Oearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determini11i•,
the constimtional validity of laws which, like Sec. 11 (b) of R./\. N,,
6646, are not concemed with the content of political ads but onlv
with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-dangl'I' lt•t,I 1t1
su~, regu~atory measures would be like using a sledgdrnn11111•1' 111
dnve a nail when a regulai· hammer is all that is neednl.
The reason for this difference in the level of j11sli(h-,1li1111 1111
the restriction of speech is that content-based reslricti11111i di•,111 1r
public debate, have improper motivation, and are usuullv i111p11•,1•d
because of fear of how people will react to a parliculnr HJ11'l'd1, N11
sue~ reasons underlie content-neutral regulnt'io1111, lih.1• rq;11l11l l111 1,,
of hme, place and manner of holding public assPmhlil'-. 1111d1•1 II I'
Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985."
(6) Vnlid exercise ofpolici: powc1: - "A pply ing 1111• t !'Iii 11•11 1,.. ,1
in this case, we find !hat Sl'c. 11 (b) of l(i\. No. fir,,Jti I•, .i v, il1d 1•,1°1
cisc of !·lw pow1•r of rlw Sl,111' lo n•g1 do1l1· llll'd l,, nl 1'11111111111111 ,1111111
111· i111'11m1.ilion fur llil' 11111 p11•,1• 1111•11 ,11rl11)\ 1•q11,tl 1111p111t1111lt1 11111,•
1 111111111111, ,, 11,1 111I It, 1h,•,111·,1 nl , 1l111h1,1I t.,w, th,· 11111 , ,11111otl t.,~ ,. , h,1111 •"I ,111 In Iii,· ,11,•,1
I
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL O F RIGHTS 487
Freedom of Expression
and space for political campaigns; that the re~l~tion is unrelat-
ed to the suppression of speech; that any restnch~n on freedom
of expression is only incidental_ and no 1?10~; ,than 1~necessary ~o
achieve the purpose of promotmg equality. (Osmena vs. Commis-
sion on Elections, 288 SCRA 447 [1998], through Justice Mendoza; Note:
Justices Panganiban and Romero, dissented.)
Overbreadth and void for vagueness doctrines/
Application of facial challenges.
The "overbreadth doctrine" decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnec:ssar~ly
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms, w~Ile
the "void-for-vagueness doctrine" states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in ~erms so va~e
that men of common intelligence must necessanly guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential
of due process of law." (Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA
371 [2004], citing cases.) As distinguished from_ th~ _vaguene~s
doctrine the overbreadth doctrine assumes that md1v1du.als will
underst~nd what a stamte prohibits and will accordingly refrain
from that beheavior, even though some of it is protected. (Southe~n
I [emisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism ~ouncil,
178 SCRA 552, Oct. 5, 2010; see Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, 716
SCRA 237 [2014]; Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146 [2014].)
Both doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases.
They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.19
1••rhe reason is explained <1S follows: . .
"A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one w~1ch 1s
11v,•rhro,1d because of possible 'chilling effect' upon prote~ted speech. The theory 1s that
·Iw lhcn statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no r~adily_ apparent con~truct1on sug-
l',1"ll'l il~l'lf ns n vehicle for rehnbilitating the statutes m a smgl~ pr~secution, th~ tr~n-
,i, 1•11di·nl value to ;ill society of constitutionally protected expressmn 1 s deemed to JllS~ify
11ll11wing 11ll,1cks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making
tl11• ,1ll,1.-k d1•mo11qlrnte th.it his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
\\ ilh 1i.u-r1,w 1-1pcdficity.' The pos~ible harm to societ_y _i'.1 permitting some unprotected
11r11•1·, h 111 II" 1111p1111iqhcd is outweighed_ by the poss1b1hty tl~nt the _protccte~ sp~ec~ ~~
011111•111111.iy I11• dl'l,,1-r1·tl ,111d pl'r<"civcd grwvnnccs ldt lo fesk1because of possible mh1b1
'"•r !'1 11•<111 111' 11v,·rlv hrll,1d 1,l,1!1111'~. ., , . . .. .
1'1 11~ 1,1tion,1h• drn"I nnt ,1pply lo pP11,1I Sl,1l111tu1, l mrnn,,I sl,1(11lc•1 h~vc gc11~1,1l 111
t,, 1,,1, 111 ttlfi•i l 11"1t1llh11\ 1111111 tfu•ir VPI )' Pxh,h•11<1•, ,111d, I( l,11 Lil 1h,dl1•11g1• m ,1l111wc•d f11r
th h, 1ew11111 11 1,1111•, 1111· ',l,1lo• 111111• 1v1•II 1>1• 1•11•v1°11l1•d 1111111 1•11,11•tlng lt1w•1 ll)l,1h1•,I 11m l,1llv
"' flt I' ..,H•1·, h
 488 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec 4
Principles and Cases
"To this date, the Supreme Court has not declared any penal
law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity. While mentioned
in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet
to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad (271 U.S. 500 [1926].), the Bookkeeping Act was found
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not
because it was vague. Adiong vs. COMELEC (207 SCRA 106 [1997].),
decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally,
Santiago vs. Comelec (270 SCRA 106 [1997].) held that a portion of
R.A. No. 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of
legislative powers, not because of vagueness. (Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra.)
Indeed, an 'on-its-face' invalidation of criminal statutes would
result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure
from the usual requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no
factual concreteness. In determining the constitutionality of a statulP,
therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must bt•
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant hns
been charged."20 (Ibid.; see Romualdez vs. Commission on Electioni-;,
XXX XXX XXX
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness nre 111w lylli ,ii
tools developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech cases m; nH lht•y 111,•
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do servie,· wh,111
what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the establbh,•d 1'1111· 1•1
that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be henrd to nll r11•I• 11,,,
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other p1'l'H1,1 ,., , 11
other situatio ns in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As ]mq b1•c•11 I'"1111, .I
out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbrcadth d111ll1•11g, ,
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a ma llt'r 111' d111• 11111
cess typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular d efondrml."' (//,,,/ q11nl
ing separate opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Estradn vs. Snndigo111h,11 ,111, lt,11
SCRA394 [2001].)
20
"In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have bet>n 1•11l1•1·l.il11,·d 111111
where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected ~111•1•1 Ii 1111111!,•111 11111
be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possib]l' i11l11lillo1 \I 1%, I, 111
overly broadstah1tes)outweigh thepossible hnrm to society .in ollowl ni; 11u1111• 11111111 11, 1It ,I
speech or conduct to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth haA likt•wi•1,, 11111 li1•1•11 1111111, , I
w here a limiting construction could be placed on the challcn gt•cl 11!,111111•, 1111d 1\llw11• rlu 1,
are readily apparent constructions that would cure, o r nt h•.11,t :,uh•1l,111l1o1lly 11 ·,111,, II,,
alleged overbreadth of the s tatute.
In the CilSe ut bm; llw p1'ob11blr hnrm lo ~od,•i>' in p1•1•111itl liw, 111, 111111•11111 "l'I •11111111,
nfliri.il" lo r,•n1,1i11 in offk1•, 1•v1·11 iv, llll'Y ,11 llv1•ly 11111 1,111• 1•11•, tl1·,• p,11,111, l,11 11111, , 1111
489
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS
Freedom of Expression
553 SCRA 370 [2008]; Motion for Reconsiderations denied, 573 SCRA
639 [2008]; Disini, Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237 [2014].)
Freedom of expression, a preferred right.
All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important
but the Supreme Court has "adopted the concept that freedom of
expression is a 'preferred' right21 and, therefore, stands on a higher
the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible
inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes
-which are, at best, bold predictions- cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto
and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against con~uct that is, and ~as for more
than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and mterest _to pros~nbe. I~st~ad,
the more prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably _unp~rm1~s1ble
applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through a total mvahdation of
the statute itself." (Eleazar P. Quinto vs. Commission on Elections, 713 SCRA 385 [2010].)
"In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the United States
has been generally maintained, albeit with some modification. Whfle this Court h_as
withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, ~t has :xpan~e~ its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech but also those mvolvmg rehg1ous
freedom, and other fundamental rights.xx x For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expand ed jurisdiction is mandated by the Fundamental Law, xxx also to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction or the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (Imbong
vs. Ochoa, Jr., 421 SCRA 140 [2014],)
21The United States Supreme Court has been divided on the theory of "preferred
position" of specific constitutional guarantees such as t~e free_doms of expression,
assembly, and religion over the general guarantees of the bill of nghts such as the due
process and equal protection provisions. Un~er this theory, th~ t~st of validity of any law
or regulation affecting specific safeguards 1s made more definite when only the latter
provisions are involved. . ,. ,
For example, the right of a state to rq~ulate a public utility 1:11ay wel_l mclud~, so .far
ni; due process test is concerned, power to impose all the restnctions which a leg1sl~t~on
may hilve "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speec~, assembl~, ~nd rehg1on
mny not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of res1:1ctions only to
prevent grave and immediate danger. (West Virginia State Board of Educ~tion v. Barne!te,
;1'19 U.S. 624.) Thus, a law affecting a specific guarantee is infected with presumphve
invnlidity, contrary to the general rule that a statute is presumed constitutional and its
vnlidity will be st1stained unless it violates the Constitution clearly and palf'.ably and
111 m1ch n mai,ner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the court. The presumption of the
l'On~lilulionnlity nttaches only when the law is attacked for alleged violation of general
i;1111 rnnlccu s uch ns due process and equal protection. . .
Sine,, the mnjority opinion in Ullma11 v. U.S. (350 U.S. 422.) m 1956, which, through
J1111lkl' l/1•,111k(mtt•1; hns declared that "ns no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference so
11eo111• 11l1(111ld 1,11fft•1· m1hordi11nli01111r dc ldion," thl.l "preferred position" view appears to
l;n Iii,· 111111111 lly opl11ito11i111' 111111lil11l i1111ol adj11dk,1llo11. (~c•• Kovncs v. Copper, 336 U.S. ~7;
Mo 11 •v v, 1i1111d, :J'lil t l.'i ,11,'/; ll,1r,111loln111 v, I l 'i, :1w lJ,'i, 'lt~J; Mmdock v. !'cnnsylva111n,
ll'l I 11, lt)t,, l'l,1,1111111 v, I '11lll11w1, '\',1 '111 'l 'olh)
 490 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4 Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 491
Principles and Cases Freedom of Expression

level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but
the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due
postulate of our constitutional system"22 (Gonzales vs. Commission process clause." (Ermita-Malate Hotel and, Motel Operators
on Elections, 27 SCRA 835 [1969]; see "Primacy of Human Rights Ass'n. vs. City Mayor, 21 SCRA 449, 459 [1967]; Tolentino vs.
over Property Rights," under Sec. 1.) because of its value in the Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 [1994], quoting P.A. Freund,
search for truth in a free society. (supra.) It is difficult to imagine On Understanding the Supreme Court, 11 [1950); ABS-CBN
how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free Broadcasting Corp. vs. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 811
elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince [2000).)
or persuade is denied or taken away. (Adiong vs. Commission on
Elections, 207 SCRA 712 [1992); see The Diocese of Bacolod vs. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 [2015].); I-United Transport
1. Law prohibits early nomination of candidates and limits period of
Koalisyon vs. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 441 [2015) .) election campaign.
As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. Facts: R.A. No. 4880 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
319.): political party, political committee, or political group to nominate
"This must be so because the lessons of history, both political candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier
and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety
Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This days immediately preceding an election."
Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made Issue: The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Act,
that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of invoking the fundamental rights to free speech, free press, freedom
government and public officials. Political discussion is essential of association, and freedom of assembly.
to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of Held: (1) Law is a remedial measure. - "Congress was called
criminal indictments." (Salonga vs. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438 upon to seek remedial measures for the far-from-satisfactory
[1985].) condition arising from the too early nomination of candidates
nnd the necessarily prolonged political campaigns. The direful
The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated consequences and the harmful effects on the public interest with
by an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: the vital affairs of the country sacrificed many a time to purely
partisan pursuits were known to all. Moreover, it is no exaggeration
"[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is to state that violence and even death did frequently occur because
freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property of the heat engendered by such political activities. Then, too,
is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands the opportunity for dishonesty and corruption, with the right to
respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the 11uffrage being bartered, was further magnified."
(2) Law is a valid exercise of police power. - "Under the police
22
Even with due recognition of its high estate, and its importance inn d omor rnti,· power then, with its concern for the general welfare and with
society, the press is not immune from general regulation by the State. It hnR bmm lwld • lltP commendable aim of safeguarding the right of suffrage, the
"The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of ~jl'nl'rnl law11. l It·
has no special privilege to invade the rights and libe rties of othern. I le mu•,1. ,111•,w,·1· (01' h·1•,iHlnlive body must have felt impelled to impose the foregoing
libel. He may be punished for contempt of court ... Liko others, he mtP1l pay ,•r111lt,1hlt· n•ulridiorn; . It ls understandable fol' Congress to believe that
and non-discriminatory tnxes on his b11s ineH~ ..." (1i,lt•ntl11u v11. Sl'1' 1°N11ry ol' Fl11,111< ,,, wilho111· l'lw limit:alfons t:hus set forth in the challenged 1.egislation,
235 SCRA 630 [1 994], c iting AH~ndnhid l'n·•~•1 v, NI.Hit, 101 11.S. Ill;\, 1:1-! I 1'1:l'II.) 11111 th,• 1111' ln11d,,hl1• pmprn,l' of Republic A<;I No. 11880 would be frustrated
impo~illon of ,1 /ic,•111w /11.l:, whil'h, 1111111-.1• 1111 111·dlr1111•y 111 ~, 111 11111l11ly f11r "T,11!.11!1111, 1<11
1111d 11ullili1·d." (< ;11117,11/1·1: ·1 1.'I, < ·0111111i·,·d1111 t111 l:l1•1·/io111,, ?.7 .'i< '!ti\ .'i:!!'i
flu• pn",'' 111 11111•011•dll11tl111111l IH1c,1111,1• II luy,, 111•11111 11°,11,11111 1111 th,• •·~1•11 11,1• 111 It•, i111h1
( loli•11l l1111 v•• :11, 1<'1,11 y 111' 111111111, ,,. ;till/ f,( I{/\ r.JII I 1'1111,I J // 1 11, 1 l/1 l/11t111g/1 /1111//1•1• /'1•1111111tl11, )
 Sec. 4
492 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
Note: The necessary 2 / 3 vote to aimul the Act was not obtained.
2. Law declares it unlawful to print or publish any paid
advertisement, comment or article in furtherance of the candidacy of any
person outside of the COMELEC space.
Facts: The law, R.A. No. 6132 (Sec. 12[F].), is challenged as
uncons titutional on the ground that it unduly abridges the freedom
of expression of an individual, whether candidate or not.
Issue: Is the law violative of the freedom of expression of each
individual?
Held: Balancing of interests criterion is applied. - "Consistent
with the opinion expressed in the cases of Imbong vs. COMELEC,
35 SCRA 28 (1970), and Gonzales vs. COMELEC (supra.), this slight
limitation of the freedom of expression of the individual is only one
of the many devices employed by the law to prevent a clear and
present danger of the p erversion and prostitution of the electoral
apparatus and of the denial <;>f equal protectio~ of t~e l~ws. The
fears and apprehensions of p e titioner concerning his liber~ of
expression in these two cases, applyin~ the less stringent ~alancmg-
of-interests criterion, are far outweighed by the all-important
substantive interests of the State to preserve the purity of the ballot
and to render more meaningful and real the guarantees of the equal
protection of the laws." (Badoy, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 35
SCRA 285 [19701, through Justice Makasiar.)
Makalintal, J., concurring:
Law is within permissible limits. - ''Th e law that is here assailed
as unconstitutional is a departure from the system that h as been
tried so many times before and found wanting. It is an experiment,
to be sure; but it is one which Congress, by virtue of its powcrn
and its grasp of the problem involved, has con sidered necessary lo
initiate."
Fernando, J., concurring:
(1) Freedom ofexpression ranks high in the hierarchy ofvalues.· , ".".
quotation from the opinion of the author in Gonzales vs. COM/././.<
(supra.) may be permissible. Thus: '[t is undPninbh•, tlwrdon•,
that even though the govc•mmt.•nt.tl purpos1•s lw hT,ilimalt• 11m l
subslanlinl, tlwy <'nnnol lw 11111·mwd liy 11ll',11l'l lh,11 lirrn11lly hlllh·
f11nd,,m1•11l,1l p1•rnw1,1I IH ,,•rl h " I wlw11 IIll' 1•111 I , ,111 Iw 1111111• 11111111wly
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 493
Freedom of Expression
achieved. For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an area so
closely related to our most precious freedoms.'
Freedom of expression ranks high in the hierarchy of values.
While not illimitable, courts must be on the alert lest on a m ere
suspicion even if not without foundation, that there exists a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil, what it assures is, in effect,
nullified."
(2) When presumption ofconstitutionalit1J ofstatute is not applicable.
- "It would then that where legislation touches the sensitive area
of free speech and free press, a departure from the operation of the
presumption of validity that attaches to all enactments, especially
so where property rights alone are curtailed, does not call for
automatic condemnation. Where the constitutional infirmity of the
challenged statute may be discerned from a reading thereof, the
burden of disproving that there is no unconstitutional taint falls on
the shoulders of those disposed to uphold it. Where there exists a
reasonable apprehension of a trespass on the forbidden domain of
free speech and free press, the deference that is due the judgment
1>fa coordinate branch must yield to the supremacy that at all times
must be accorded to what the Constitution in plain and explicit
l.inguage ordains."
'/i't•/1n11kee, J., dissenting:
(1) Clear-and-present danger rule is not tenable under the
, inw11st1111ces. - "The trouble is, as Professor Freund well put
II, ' t·hat the dear-and-present-dan ger test is an oversimplified
j11dg111cnt unless it takes account also of a number of other factors:
tlw n·lativc seriou sness of the danger in comparison with the value
, ,1 t I H' occnsion for speech or political activity; the availability of
1111,n• niodcrate control than those which the state has imposed;
,11111 1wrhnps the specific intent w ith which the speech or activity
t,, l,11111dwd. No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and
1•11•w11I d,1ngl•1/ or how closely we hyphenate the words, they are
11,it t1 •,11hillil11l<• for the weighing of valu es. They tend to convey a
, lt•l1111lt 111111 <'Pl'I it udl! when what is most certain is the complexity of
1111' •olr,111d11 in llw web of freedoms that the judge must disentangle."
(.') :kl Ji1i/11 In 11nss ft•st ,![ rcasu11n/J/c11t•ss. - "The basic and
, 11111111 1< 11 1'1,11 !lw /\.l'I f,1ils lo pas:-; is !lw m n'ili!uliunnl tl'St of
0
11•,i,,1111,11•11•11, ...-; 1•,·q11in·d by tlw dw· pron",'• d,111•11• . Tlw 1111•,11,111·1•
"lilt Ii 11, 111111•,lil 111 111• j11°,lilit•d ,1•1 f,111111)'. will1111 1111' l'nlil" 1•11w,•r
1 (11,111.1 lw,11 ,t 11•,p1 1111,1lilt· 11'\,1tlo111111111' 1•1111 •1·11•,11v1 111111w11l,1l 11liJ111 I
494 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
and should not go so far beyond the necessity of the case as to be
unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary."
Barredo, J., dissenting:
Provision is an unreasonable restraint of the freedom of the press.
- "Touching as it does ·on the right of a candidate in an election
to campaign for his own victory, the provision is repugnant to
the Constitution. x x x If the freedoms of speech, press, peaceful
assembly and redress of grievances in regard to the right to vote
can be impinged, if not stifled, by standards and limitations fixed
by those who are temporarily in power, these freedoms are not
freedoms at all, but mere concessions of the establishment which
can be reduced or enlarged as its convenience may dictate."
3. Law outlaws the Communist Party.
Facts: The law, R.A. No. 1700, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Subversion Act," outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines
and "other subversive associations," and punishes any person
who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar
"subversive'' organization. 23
Issue: Is the Act violative of the constitutional freedom of speech
and association?
Held: No. (1) Purpose of legislative declaration. - "The legislative
declaration in Section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the
Philippines is an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government is intended not to provide the basis for a legislative
finding of guilt of the members of the Party but rather to justify
the proscription spelled out in Section 4. Freedom of expression
and freedom of association are so fundamental that they nrL'
thought by some to occupy a 'preferred position' in the hierarchy of
constitutional values. Accordingly, any limitation on their exerl'i s<·n
must be justified by the existence of a substantive evil."
(2) Result of legislative investigation warran/:ed law's e11,1d1111•11/ ,
- "This is the reason why before enacting the statute in q111•i.li1111
Congress conducted careful investigntions ,md Hwn Hl,1l1•d i h
findings in the preamble, thus:
Sec. 4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 495
Freedom of Expression
'. . . [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines although
purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracy
to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination
and control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the Com-
munist Party of the Philippines constitutes a cleat~ present and
grave danger to the security of the Philippines.
... [l]n the face of the organized, systematic and persistent
subversion, national in scope but international in direction,
posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope
with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country.'
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be open to
question if, instead of making these findings in enacting the statute,
Congress omitted to do so." (People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972],
through Justice Castro.)
4. Statements were made in judicial proceedings, where the object
arc private parties.
Facts: In his Reply and Answer to counterclaim, plaintiff,
a I legcs, among others, that the defendant "appears to belong to the
d ass uf individuals who have no compunction to resort to falsehood
x x x ns pnrt of their systematic campaign of falsehoods and slanders
di rccted against us, is an imposture that only ignorants, blockheads
,ind olhur me ntal pachyderms (like him) can swallow."
/.-;sue: ls the advocate who made them subject to criminal or
l'ivil liability?
I frlrl: No. (:I) Relevant statements made in I-he course of judicial
11ron·1·tli11s,'• rrrn irbsolu/:ely privileged. - "Statements made in the
1'rn11•i;p of jmlidn l proceedings are absolutely privileged, that is,
11l'lvil1•1•,1•d rc•gmdless of defomalory Lcnnr ,md of the presence of
1111ilit•1·, if tlw Hfl nw .in• rl'11•v.i11l, 1wrli 1w11l nr n1nh•rinl lo tlw Crt llSl!
111 l1,111d or hllhjt•c·l of tlw i11q11iry. /\ml, 111 vi1•w nl" thi1;, lfo• p1•r11011
wlin 111,1il1• 1lw111 hlll'i1 1•1 ,1 j11d1",1', l,1 wv1•1; nr wit1w11•1 d1H''i 11nt
1h,•11•l1v 1111111' tlll' 1l 1 il, nl li1•l111•, 111111111 li,11,1,· 1111•1'1•1111 111" , 11111i11,il
496 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. It is the rule
that what is relevant or pertinent should b e liberally considered
to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with
microscopic scrutiny."
(2) Relevant stateme1:ts contained in an appropriate pleading
are absolutely privileged. - "It will thus be seen that whether or
not the defendant is so deficient in knowledge ("ignorant") and
understanding (''blockhead") and possessed of an insensible,
unfeeling and hardened mind, as to indulge in a pretense of the kind
that he is alleged to have made in his Answer with Counterclaim, is
a question that reasonably pertains to the subject of inquiry in the
civil case, namely, whether his claim of good faith in mentioning
things defamatory to plaintiff is an imposture or a truth.
The privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the
administration of justice. Since it appears from the information
that the allegations complained of herein are contained in an
appropriate pleading, and since they pass the test of relevancy, it
was no error for the court a quo to su stain the privilege." (People vs.
Aquino, 18 SCRA 555 [19661, through Justice Bengzon.)
5. Picketers employed impolite language.
Facts: Plaintiff bank filed an action for libel against the
Philippine National Bank Employees Association as a result of
placards and signboards containing the following: "PCIB bad
accounts transferred to 'PNB-NIDC.'
Issue: Plaintiff considered the above "defamatory and libelous
per se" or "at the very least [it] amounts to an act tending to cause
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a juridical person."
Held: Strong emotional response is to be expected in labor disputes.
- "Peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech. That the
language employed by the picketers is far from being comteous
and polite does not give rise to a cause for libel and dnmagcs.
Labor disputes give rise to strong emotional response. It is a focl
of industrial life that in the continuing con fro nlnl'iun Lwtwcl'n
management and lab01~ it is far from likely lhat t·hc lnng11ag1·
employed would be bo1·h C"n11 rl1•011,; ,ind pnlill' . Tlw j11didnry, in
d~ciding su its for lihL•L 111u'II ,1•,1'c•11.1111 whdhc•r or 1101 llw ,1111•1•,l'd
ofh•mling word•l 111,1y h1• 1•111hr,11 c•d hv 1111' 1•,11t11,111l1•1•,; 111 fw1• 11p1•l'd1
1111d 111•1• pn .. ,•,." (l'/11I, < '111111111·1, 1,1/ l11,l11•d1111/ /111111.. 7,,, /'/11/1111/1,111A
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 497
Freedom of Expression
Employees Association, 105 SCRA 314 [1981], through Chief Justice
Fernando.)
6. Speech stirs public to anger nnd brings about a condition of
unrest or creates a disturbance.
Facts: The petitioner addressed a meeting in the City of Chicago
ill which he denounced various racial and political groups. His
address caused a public disturbance on the part of persons who
resented the speaker's views and statements. Petitioner was
convicted for violating a peace ordinance.
Issue: Does the ordinance permit an unwarranted infringement
on freedom of speech?
Held: No. Speech is often provocative and challenging. - "A
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. 2• It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It
111ny strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
<'!fects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship
111: punishment unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger
of n serious substantive evil that rises far above. There is no room under
011r Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would
ll'nrl to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts or dominant
1111/ificnl or community groups." (Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S.
I 1·1949 /, through Justice Douglas.)
7. f~egistrntion provision of the law is claimed to lay a prior restraint
111111n•s:1 .fi'cedom.
/ 'odH: U ndcr Section 107 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(N I I{( '), nny person s ubject to Value-Added Tax (VAT) shall register
with tlw appropriate Revenue District Officer and pay the annual
1c•gi•II r,11 io11 foe of Pl,000.
'J'lw l'hilippinc .Press lnstitute (PPI), a non-profit organization
nl 11e•w11p,1p1•r publishers established for the improvement of
1I fw 'd1•,11· ,mil 1'""•1•111 ,11111111•1 " 11"11 11111y 11pply wlu•u• th,· •1pc•11kc•1• ,t.•Hl1<•1,1ll'ly
1•1111 ,,I, 1•1, I111• 1111dh•1111• 111 ,111 1•,1,i 1111.I hl•1 ,11lvw ,11 I' ,,, 1111,·Iv 111 111.llo• 111 1•111,111," 11111 11r
\ hth Ill'
498
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
journalism in the Philippines and the Philippine Bible Society (PBS),
a non-profit organization engaged in the printing and distribution
of bibles and other religious articles, contend that the registration
provision, although of general applicability, nonetheless is invalid
when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its
essential freedom.
Issue: Is the contention meritorious?
Held: (1) No license fee is imposed. - "The case of American Bible
Society vs. City of Manila (101 Phil. 386 [1957].) is cited by both
the PBS and the PPI in support of their contention that the law
imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of the
City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in
the business of general merchandise, could not be applied to the
appellant's sale of bibles and other religious literature. This Court
relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania (319 U.S. 105 113, 87 L. ed. 1292
[1943].), in which it was held that, ·as a license fee is fixed in amount
and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee,
when applied to a religious sect, was actually being imposed as a
condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution.
For that reason, it was held, the license fee 'restrains in advance
those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably
tends to suppress their exercise. 111
For the same reason in People vs. Korins (385 N.Y.S. 2d 474
[1976].), a decision of the city court of Utica, Oneida County
held that to apply an ordinance requiring a business license to
be obtained before a person could sell newspapers in the streclti
would be to impose a prior restraint on press freedom becaw;I'
a newspaper is not in the same category as pineapple or a soap
powder or a pair of shoes whose sale may be conditioned on the
possession of a business license."
(2) Registration fee a mere administrative fee. - "But, in thil1
case, the fee in Section 107, although a fixed amount (Pl,Of)()), hi
not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the p11rpo111•
of defraying part of the cost of registration. The rcgiHlral i1111
requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is deHig1 ll'd 1, 1
provide a record of tax credits because any person who iH m1lii1•1I
to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he colh•1•111 1111
output tax on sales made or services rendered. The rcgitlll',1lirn1 11•1•
is thus a mere administrative fee, one notimposcd on tfo• t• l'l'1l,,1• 111
a privilege, much less n constitutionnl ri f{ht." ('/1J/1 111i1111 w,. !,,., 11'111111
1 d111• 1u·111·(•11!-l of lnw. 'In Raid ca::ie, police officers, without any court
of Finmlfl', 23S S< 'IU1 fi,10 /'l !J.94/, //11·n11:-:h /1111//1'1• M1'111/r1:•11,)
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 499
Sec.4
Freedom of Expression
Criminal threats and constitutionally
protected speech distinguished.
The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. ,United States (367
U.S. 290.) distinguished between the abstract teaching of the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence
and speech which would prepare a group for violent action and steel
it to such action. In Watts v. United States (394 U.S. 705.), the American
court distinguished between criminal threats and constitutionally
protected speech:
"We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole
indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term. For
we must interpret the language Congress chose against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.)
The language of the political arena, like the language used in
labor disputes, is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact. We
agree with petitioner that his only offense was a kind of very
crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the
President."
Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395
I J.S. 444.) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech
,ind free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
nf the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy
111 di rccted to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
l11 lilwly to incite or produce such action. (Salonga vs. Cmz Paf\.o,
••11/11'11, pe r Justice Gutierrez, Jr.)
ftroodom of the press and public morals.
111 /li/11 vs. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 362 [1989]; see Fernando
v 11. <'n111t of Appeals, 530 SCRA351 [2005].), the petitioner, publisher
nl l'itwy />/ay/l(}y, a "men's magazine," invoked, in particular, the
11111•,I It 11 Ii( 111nl guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
1 11•1 w1 II a11 tlw prohibition against deprivation of property without
1
w,11 r,1111 ur ordP1~ H1•i:,,;1•d nni.l t nnfiMl"fl l ('(J petitioner's magazines on
500 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
the basis simply of their determination that they were obscene. The
Supreme Court, through Justice Sarmiento, ruled:
(1) Test in determining the existence of obscenity. - "The Court
states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to
pronounce what 'obscene' means or what makes for an obscene or
pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger (45 Phil. 352
[1923].), the Court laid down the test, in determining the existence of
obscenity, as follows: 'whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open
to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or
other article charged as being obscene may fall.' Another test, so
Kottinger further declares, 'is that which shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency.'
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a 'conclusive' definition
succeeded merely in generalizing a problem that has grown
increasingly complex over the years. Precisely, the question is:
When does a prohibition have a corrupting tendency, or when can
it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is
to beg the question to say that a piece of literature has a corrupting
influence because it is obscene, and vice versa. Apparently, Kottinger
was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same breath, it
would leave the final say to a 'hypothetical community standard' -
whatever it is - and that the question must supposedly be judged
from case to case.
About three decades later, the Court promulgated People vs.
Go Pin (97 Phil. 418 [1955].), a prosecution under Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code. Go Pin was also even hazier. As the Court
declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have
neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to say,
indeed, that if 'the pictures here in question were used not exactly
for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes,' the pictures arc
not entitled to any constitutional protection.
It was People vs. Padan y Alova (101 Phil. 749 [1957].), howeve1~
that introduced to Philippine jurisprudence the "redeeming"
element that should accompany the work to save it from vfl lid
prosecution. But like Go Pin it also lcavei-; too much folil11dl' for
judicial arbitrament, which has pt•rmilh•d :111 t1tl fi/1 of id1•n1, n11d ' lwn
cents wcnth' ,11110111', j11dgt'H ni. l.11 wh,11 h 11h:11 1•111• ,11111 wh,11 i•i 111·1.'
1
Sec. 4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 501
Sec. 4
Freedom of Expression
In a much later decision, Gonzales vs. Katigbak (137 SCRA 717
[1985].), the Court following the trends in the United States, adopted
the test: 'Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.' (citing Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 [1957].) Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure
from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of
the 'dominant theme' of the work rather than isolated passages,
which were central to Kottinger. (Although both cases are agreed
that 'contemporary community standards' are the final arbiters of
what is 'obscene.') Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and, as a
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given into
1.-i w enforcers.
The lack of uniformity of American jurisprudence as to what
constitutes 'obscenity' has been attributed to the reluctance of the
1·ourts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem."
(2) Smut may be suppressed - provided it is smut. - "In the case
,1I hat~ there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate
1•-<t•rcise of police power, to suppress smut - provided it ~s ~mu~.
I ;1,r obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it
i,, nm u t. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt
11, w ide--ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance
nf 1·ivilizations. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago,
l' l 11ol necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce
,1111 I I >. I [. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their works are
1n11-:idl'rt'd important literature today. Goya's La Maja desnuda was
111u·,, l,nn ned from public exhibition but now adorns the world's
. . ,,
1111 ,,.i pn•s t·tgtous m.u seums.
(:1) ( )[,sc!'11i/'y is not a bare matter of opinion. - "But neither
iol 1111dd w1• s;1y that 'obscenity' is a bare (no pun intended) matter
1,I 11i•i11in11. t\s w e said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men
,uul wrn111•11 llmt have probably compounded the problem rather
1I 1,111 11",olwd ii. In thu final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts
111, i,1 ""•' • lll'roil' them rushing tun 'pC'rfcct' definition of 'obscenity,'
,1 1l1i1I 1•, pn~,nil>l1', ns 1•volvi11g i;l,1nd nrds for prop1•r police conduct:
l,11 ,·d wl tli tlu• pn,blP111."
l•I) /1111 r/1·11 /n 1,/11111• //1,· I'\ /•1/1•1111· 11/ ,\:1111•1• 1111r/ i 111111 i111•11/ rlt11rg,·1· 1/111/
,1•, 11r/,I //l',/f/11 ,rr/ n1·1 ,:,• 111 li1111 I/r", 1111 /Irr• 1111I/11 111 / Ir'',, '' I Ii 1du111 1 11 •d 1\I,

502 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 4
Principles and Cases
' immoral' lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases,
this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the
right, barring a 'clear and present danger' that would warrant State
interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes vs. Bagatsing
(125 SCRA 553 [1983].), 'the burden to show the existence of grave
and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on
the ... authorities. There must be objective and convincing, not
subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and
present danger. It is essential for the validity of .. . previous restraint
or censorship that the ... authority does not rely solely on his own
appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require.
To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
sufficiency to satisfy the dear and present danger test." '
(5) No sufficient proof to justifij a ban and to warrant confiscation of
the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought. - "The
Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below.
First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1)
finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing
them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant."
Freedom of television and radio broadcasting.
"All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled
to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression
clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues
to be the clear and present danger rule - that words are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear nml
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils th,11
the lawmaker has a right to prevent. The clear and present dnngt•r
test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all-embracing
interpre tation applicable to all utterances in all forums."
(1) Freedom lesser in scope than t'1nt accorded to 11ri11l 11wtfit1.
- "Broadcasting has to be liccnst>d. l\irw,1ys frcqut•ndt•:-, h,1v1•
to be allocated among qualific•d ll'it'l'l-1. I\ bro,1dr,1'il 1·or1111r,1lio11
canno t· simply nppro pri,tll' ,t n•rl,1i11 l11•q111•111 •y wi ll1n11l 1'1')' ,1nl l11r
1
)\IIV('t'IIIIH'JII 1'11r,til,11h,11 Ill' for 1111· t 1ghh 11111ll11°rs.
ART. Ill. BILL OF RIGHTS 503
Sec.4
Freedom of Expression
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protec-
tion of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, howeve1~ the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media."
(2) Reasons. - "The American Supreme Court in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726.),
confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio
program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms
of communications, receives the most limited protection from the
free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens. Material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizens, not only in public,
but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely
nccessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may
be prohibited from making certain materials available to children,
but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where
Ihe listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security."
(3) Pervasive influence of broadcast media. -"The broadcast
11wd ia have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
li ves of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found
only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities
,1cccssible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are
h1w income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and
111.1~azines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and
,d,eltcr perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere.
'l'lw television set is also becoming universal. The m essage may
h1• s imull·nncously received by a national or regional audience of
liiill'l1L'l'S including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to
1,,, wilhin rcnrh of a blaring radio or television set. The materials
I1rn,llk,1st ovC'r the airwaves reach every person of every age,
Iwn,, uu; of vnrying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of
dllt'1•n•11l IO's n11d ml'ntc1 l capnbilitics, persons whose reactions to
1111l,11111n,1lury or offt•nHiw spt•cch would ht' difficult to monitor or
1•11•dkl. 'l'lw imp,ll't o f 1l11· vibr,rnl HIW1•d1 i), forn·ful nnd imm(•diatc.
I l111il,1• r1•.id1•r1o nl llw pri11l1 •d work, llit• 1·,11lin ,1t1di1•111·1• 1111•; lt•11•;p1•
11 1 11111111111v lo 111r,1t.1l1•, ,111,ily1t•, ,111d 11•!1•1 I 1111' 11111•r,1111'1•,"
11
504
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
(4) Balancing of interests. - "The government has a right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a
rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same
time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television
would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to
bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they
are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating vary-
ing views on public issues, they also deserve special protection."
(Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628
[1985], per Justice Gutierrez, Jr.; see Telecommunications and Broad-
cast Attorneys of the Phils., Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289
SCRA 337 [1998]; and Soriano vs. Laguardia, 615 SCRA 619 [2010],
with dissenting opinions.)
Freedom to film, produce, and exh.ibit
motion pictures.
The freedom of speech and expression "includes the freedom
to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion
pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television."
( 1) Motion pictures utilized as a principal medium of mass communi-
cation. - "In our day and age, motion pictures are a universally uti-
lized vehicle of communication and medium of expression. Along
with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a
principal medium of mass communication for information, educa-
tion and entertainment. This freedom is available in our country
both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture compa-
nies."
(2) Commercial production of motion pictures not a disqunlificatio11
for exercise of freedom. - "Furthermore, the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected
to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom of speech and of expression. In our comm.unity ns in m,my
other countries, media facilities are owned either by the govcmnwnl
or the private sector but the private sector-owned mcdin f,wililh" ,
commonly require to be sustnincd hy bPing dPvot1•d in wltoh• or
in part to revenue- produl'ing al'livilh•s. l11d(•1•d, ('n'l1111H•n•l,tl 11H'd i.1
l'Ol1Hlil11(!• tlw bull- nr
~.11ch (,1dlifh .. , o1v,1il,1hlt• in 11111' l 'lllllllry ,111d
lw1u·1•, lo 1•,d11d,· 111111111Pl'l'i,1llv 11w1111d o1111 I 11p1•r,1l1•d 1111•dl.1 1111111
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 505
Freedom of Expression
the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and
of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such
constitutional liberties in our country." (Ayer Pr(!)ductions Pty. Ltd.
vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 [1988], per Justice Feliciano.)
Freedom of newspapers to report
on events and developments.
The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of
the general right of freedom of expression. Person engaged in the
newspaper business cannot claim any other or greater right than
that possessed by persons not in that business. The abuse of the
privilege consists principally in not telling the truth. (People vs.
Godoy, 243 SCRA 64 [1995].)
(1) Use of community standards in evaluating a publication
claimed to be libelous. - "The law against defamation protects one's
interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation 'as good
as one's character and conduct warrant' in the communih; and it is
to community standards - not personal or family standards -
that a court must refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be
d efamatory. The term 'community' may, of course, be drawn as
narrowly or as broadly as the user of the term and his purposes may
require."
(2) Reason. - "The reason why for purposes of the law on
libel the more general meaning of community must be adopted
in the ascertainment of relevant standards, is rooted deep in our
rnns titutional law. That reason relates to the fundamental public
inh-rcst in the protection and promotion of free speech and
,•xpn'Hsion, an interest shared by all members of the body politic and
ll•rTilorinl community. A newspaper especially one national in reach
,11HI cov<•rage, should be free to report on events and developments
111 whh'h the public has a legitimate interest, wherever they may
l.ik,• pince within the nation and as well in the outside world, with
111l11ii11111n f(•nr of being hauled to court by one group or another
(1111Wl'Vl'I' ddined in scope) on criminal or civil charges for libel, so
111111•, .r~ tlw rwwspaper respects and keep within the standards of
111111•,1ll!y 11nd civility prcvniling within the general community."
(:\) 1:J/1•1·/ ,f 1111y 0Nt1'1' rnle. - "/\ny ol'lwr rule on dl•f;unotion, in
,1 1111l lll11,,I nm11111111ity lik,· ourH with 111.111y div1·rn1' n1lt11r,il, sod,11,
1nlll',l111111,111d 111111•1' 1•,1•111111i11g/l, i11111,l'ly 111 p1'111l111·1• 11111111whol1•1111111•
506 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
chilling effect upon the constitutionally protected operations of
the press and other instruments of information and education."
(Bulletin Publishing Corp. vs. Noel, 167 SCRA255 [1988], per Justice
Feliciano.)
Freedom of the people to criticize
public officials.
(1) Full discussion of public affairs. - In a free government, the
people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of public officials in
whispers or with bated breath as in totalitarian governments. (U.S.
vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58 [1922].) Indeed, the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression carries the right to criticize the action and
conduct of a public official. (Jalandoni vs. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107
[2000].) The extent of the exercise of this right has been defined in
U.S. vs. Bustos. 25 (37 Phil. 731 [1918].)
(2) Doctrine of privileged communications. - On the aspect of the
question which as answered by him, would require that a criminal
suit for libel should not be utilized as a means for stifling press
freedom,2 6 Justice Malcolm categorically declared: "Public policy,
the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government
have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the
25
Justice Malcolm correctly stressed: "The interest of society and the mainten.incu , ,f
good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comm,•111
on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of lh
probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer unde r n 111,•!lll,1
and an unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of n clear consr iu11, ,,
A public officer must not to be too thin-sl<lnned with reference to comment upon hi·,
official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exnlti•d , < 11
course, criticism does not authorize defamation. N evertheless, as an individ 11nl h Ji,,,.,
than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common g(x>d."
26
"No inroads on press freedom should be allowed i.n the guise of pu nitiVI' 111111111
visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libe l whether in llw (<)l'nl o f 11111111 d
words or defamatory imputation. xx x This is merely to underscore 111" prim,1, V tli,,t
freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hiernrchy of ll');,11 v,11111••1, II 1111
cases mean anything at all, then, to e mphasize what h.is so clenrly 1•nw1r,1•,I, llwy , ,111
for the utmost care on the part of the judicinry lo M tilll'(' that in snfc•n11,1rdln11 ti,,, 11111·1, ,t
of the party allegedly offended, n rcnlis lic nr.m 11nl of tlw uhlitvi1io11 of ,1 1,.. w11 111,•d1,1 lu
disseminate infonnntion ofn p11blit: d1n 1•,11 11..r ,11111 111 1'011,1111°1,1 ,1,,.,,. ,v,
.,1, 11•1 w,•11 iii,
conrlilion•J nll(•111l,111I 1111 th,• htl',illl",'I ..r l'llhll•1hl11111 .1111111I 1,,, lg,1111,·d "{I "I'''' I,, l 11111 I
of App1•111", Nll/'l11; 111•1• l111li•1I Vii N,111011111 lttl1•lll)',1•11rn llrn11d, I I,'',< l{A Ill, I l'ltl II I
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 507
Freedom of Expression
doctrine of privilege." 27 (Ibid.; see Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 34
SCRA 116 [1970].)
(3) Exercise of freedom with responsibility. The doctrine of J_
privileged communications is based upon recognition of the fact that
the right of the individual to enjoy immunity from the publication
of untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not absolute
but must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to
investigation the conduct of pers'o ns charged with wrongdoing.
(United States vs. Canete, 38 Phil. 253 [1918].)
(a) Criticism against public officials in order to be privileged
must be directed against their policies or official acts and not
against their private affairs.28 (U.S. vs. Contreras, 23 Phil. 513
[1912].) But so long as it is done in good faith, newspapers have
the legal right to have and express opinions on legal questions.
To deny them that right would infringe upon the freedom of
the press. (EI Hogar Filipino vs. Prautch, 49 Phil. 171 [1920].)
To prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech
and free press, every libel prosecution should be tested on the
rigorous and exacting standard of whether or not it could be
violative of the fundamental guarantee. (Bocobo vs. Estanislao,
72 SCRA 520 [1976]; Mercado vs. CFI of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93
[1982].)
27Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to
he mnlicious, even if it b e true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
Hh(lwn, except in the following cases:
l. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance
of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
11( a ny judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
n,1luru, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
otlwr act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. (Revised Penal
l 'ode.)
1"Under Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made
,11111hrnl a public officinl with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions
,11111 tlw truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even
1h1111gh do,•1l nnt prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for
!111,tlll,1hl1• 1•1Hlt1, The recognition of the r ight and duty of every citizen in a democracy to
,,,,., l11 ii thnl l'llhlir duty is cli$chnrged fnithfully rind w ell by those on whom such duty
1,, 111, 11111l u•nl l•1 lt1,11110l-i1t•11I wi.lh nny rcq11in•111,•11t 11lacing on him the burden of proving
1l1111 h,• 11, l,·d with p,1111d 1n111iv1"i rmil for j11•,tifl11l>h· l'llllfl. Such a rnlo would not only be
, 111111,11 y 111 Arll, 1,, '\rd h111 wou ld ,,hov,· 1111, i11l111,g,• 1111 tlw ,·1111•11i111li11n,1lly g11arnnh•1•d
l11 ·1•d1111111I 1•,p11•,01l1111 (V,1•1q111•1 VH t 'rn11I of Ap1w,1l 11, 11 •1 1,1 l{A ,11,ti I 1111J'II,)
508 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4 Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 509
Principles and Cases
Freedom of Expression

(b) "Every citizen, of course, has the right to enjoy a good

claims, among others, that to allow the libel case to proceed would
name and reputation. x x x The newspapers should be given produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom.
such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously
and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. Issue: Should the Supreme Court decide tlie issue?
In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually Held: "There is no basis at this stage to rule on this point."
have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good (Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [19881, per curiam.)
faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account,
to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection Gutierrez, Jr.,]., separate concurring opinion:
in the choice of words."29 (Quisumbing vs. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510 (1) Case is not a simple prosecution for libel. - "I am fully in accord
[1955].) with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing
a newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness,
(c) The Civil Code in Article 1930 lays down the norm for
engages in unwarranted personal attacks, irresponsible t\.visting
the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise. of facts, malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause
The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this
availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths - this would not case is not a simple prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a
be "to observe honesty and goo~ faith;" it may not be used to powerful and popular President who heads the investigation and
insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them prosecution service, appoints members of appellate courts but who
into disrepute - this would not be "to act with justice" or "give feels so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step
everyone his due." (In Re Emil P. Jurado, 243 SCRA 299 [1995].) of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press
which would inevitably follow."
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES: (2) Supreme Court should draw demarcation line where criticism
Supreme Court did not rule on the "chilling" effect issue in libel
1. against men in public life. - "There is always bound to be harassment
case personally filed by the President. inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes
Facts: The incumbent President of the Philippines initiated beyond the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and
criminal proceedings for libel against petitioners, publishe1~ results in an unwillingness of media to freely criticize government
chairman of the editorial board, managing editor, and business or to question government handling of sensitive issues and public
manager, and a columnist of a newspaper. In his column, petitioner affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
B stated, among others, that President Aquino during the August demarcation line.
28, 1987 coup attempt, "hid under her bed while the firing was As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States vs.
going on - perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief of the Armed ll11stos (37 Phil. 731.) stated that '(c)omplete liberty to comment on
Forces to have done so." lhc conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
Offended by said publication, the President personally filed The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
her complaint against columnist B including publisher S, et al., B ML•n in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation;
llw wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.'
Tlw C 'ou rt pointed out that while defamation is not authorized,
29J3ut while it may be ad mitted that a somewhat broad license should be oHow,•d Ip 1'1'il ki.itu if> t.o be expected and should be borne for the common
criticism of the public acts of p ublic men, news media has the d uty to chuck llw !intll'<'<"I r,nod.
of their information to ensure the publiciltion of the truth. Freedom ol' tlw P"'"''', 111-..,•
all freedoms, should be exercised with rnHpo11Hibilily. (N<'WHW<'<'k, hw. v~. l111tu·11wd l111t· In 1'1•011/,• ·r1,,;. />,•1/ix/o (43 J>hil. 887 rI922].), the Court stated: 'x xx
Appellate Court, :142 SCRA l7 l'l\JH61.) Nn 10111;1•1· i•, lh1•1•, · n M ini!'ll(•r o f' !ht• ( 'rnwn or n 1wrson in authority
.'l<J,, Ari'. ·1•1. Ev,•ry 1u•n,011 ·,11111,I in thn , .... ,, I,... 111 hh11l11hl11 ,111d in tit,, 1•••1 11111 111111111• 111 111 1 ,1ll'li 1 1 ,rnlit·d p 111,llio11 1'1,11 1111' d li,r, •11 11111111 iip1•,1k of hint n11ly
hi•, d11lii"1, ,111 with j1111tii 1•, 1•,iv,• 1•v,•1 y11111• l11•, d11,•, 1111,I 11!>•11•1 v,• l1111w•,ty 1111d 111111d 1111th ·•
vvi llt li,11, ·il li11•i1lli, 111 1l11 • ,•ye• 111 11111 I '111 11.ti l11 tin11 ,11111 l11wn, l'Vl'l'Y
510 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with
every other man.'
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of
affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, would
actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It
would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at
~e _typical pers~n should be examined from various perspectives
if directed at a high government official. Again, the Supreme Court
should draw this fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals."
(3) Libel prosecution should be discontinued where there is likely to
II 11
be chilling effect, on press freedom. - "This Court has stressed as
authoritative doctrine in Elizalde vs. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977].)
that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending
words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guaranty.
In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to
continue, where after discounting· the possibility that the words
may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling effect,
a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen,
especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their
critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully
what a columnist writes in his daily column, the editors tell their
people to lay-off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a
free press would be highly injurious."
(4) Public discussion may well include vehement attacks on public
officials. - "Because many questions regarding press freedom are
left unanswered by our resolution, I must call attention to our
decisions which caution that 'no inroads on press freedom should
be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise
should be characterized as libel.' (Lopez vs. Court ofAppeals, 34 SCRA
117 [1970]; see also the citations in Elizalde vs. Gutierrez, supra.)"
(5) Liability of publishers and editors vis-a-vis columnists. -
"Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is
there a prim afacie showing that Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio
V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas
knowingly participated in a willful purveying of fahehood?
Considering the free speech aspects of these petitions, should not
a differentiated approach to their particula r liabilities be t,il 1•11
instead of lumping up everybody wHh l'lw off1•11Cling coli1rnnitil'? I
realize that the law includes publishc rn ,ind Pd it1,rHhut p1•rh11 pH1111'
'chilling effect' i.9Slll" npplies willt i,i11g11l.ir l'l f1•1 livily lo 1'11lil1!1h1•1•n
and t•d it·orH Pi s-tf -11 j,, 1ww11p,qwr , 11l1111111i1.I•,
1 lr,11111, ,11111 rlw 1111111' 111ul d, •f,•11•.,•I, .. ,,, 11111111 1111· ,,tlll'r, ,111d ,dh,w i111',,
Sec.4 ART. UL BILL OF RIGHTS 511
Freedom of Expression
There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not protected
by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some
provocative words, which if taken literally mcty appear to shame or
disparage a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate
on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality.
Will not a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us
dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There are
many other questions arising from this unusual case which have
not been considered."
(6) Supreme Court should have decided the "chilling effect" issue.
- "The Court has decided to defer the 'chilling effect' issue for a
later day. To this, I take exception. I know that most of our fiscals
and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any
considerations of possible consequences to their careers stand in
the way of public duty. But why should we subject them to this
problem? And why should we allow the possibility of the trial court
treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without
bothering to fully explore the more important areas of concern,
the extremely difficult issues involving government power and
freedom of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the 'chilling effect'
issue for a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting
words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v.
lllinois (343 U.S. 250.) when he said:
'If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history
on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws arc consistent
with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with
sofeg uards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of
1•xpression.'"
2. 'J'lw Stiecial Prosecutor charged the Supreme Court with
f,11,oriirs /Irr' rich a11d powe1ful, while discriminating against the poor and
,/, /r•1,l1( /l
1 1 1
11; 1lj,
/ '11d.•,: In n newspaper orticle, respondent Special Prosecutor
ll1111111·rly 'l',111ndhnynn) G was r~porled to have asserted, among
11lli1•1•1, th,11 till' S11pn' nH• ( ·ourl wos preventing him from
1•111111•111l l11g "ril'li 11 11d IH1w1•rf11l 1wr~h>llfl," that l'lw ( 'our!' wo~, in
Plli'd , d i•,1•1•1111 l11,1li111', lil'tw1·1•11 1111• l'l,•lt ,llld p11wl'r-f11I 011 llw 111w
512 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
"rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small
offenders.
Issue: The issue is whether the statements made by G may
reasonably be regarded by the Supreme Court as contumacious or
as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Court
over G as member of the Bar. The principal defense of G is that
he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech.
He also invokes the related doctrine of qualified privileged
communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Held: (1) Public has interest in the maintenance of the integrity of the
administration ofjustice. - "The freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interests. One
of these fundamental public intere·sts is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice."
(2) Freedom of the press presupposes an independent judiciary. -
"There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity
of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
'x xx A free press is not to be preferred to an independent
judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither
has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free
society.
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an
independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means fox
assuring judges their independence is a free press.' (Concmring
in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 [1946].)"
(3) An independent judiciary is as irnport1mt as an u1111111zzlt'd 1m·ss.
- "Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed I-he:! som<· though!
in the following terms:
''J'lw ( >rg,111k -Ad wi•Jt•ly g11,1ro111!1•1•11 fn•l'rlo111 of 1ip1•1•1·h
,111.I p1•, .. ,,,. 'l'hi•1 1•1111· 1111111 11111,il l'ighl 11111 11 It,• pmlt•,•li•d 111 il'I
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 513
Freedom of Expression
fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its
tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come
dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this
chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all
of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press
and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty in its
rrue sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for
the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn
a resolution of the court adopted fox good purposes, and if
such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to
diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the
embarrassment of the parties and the coUit.' (ln re Severino
Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 [1930].)"
(4) Lawyer's right of free expression is more limited than that of a
layman. - "On slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest
in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control
professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and
foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice
to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us,
that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited
than that of a layman."31 (Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 [1988],
per curiam.)
~11n the Matter of the Citation of Atty. CA Frerichs (238 N. W. 2d 764 (1976). ), respondent
11111,rncy chnrged the Supreme Court of Iowa with willfully avoid.ing constitutional questions
1,1l•11•d hy him thus violating the constitutional rights of his clients. In answering the citation
fur c·unl<m1p1·, reRpondent argued that he was merely fulfilling his duty to be critical and
"~••rd•ilng hi~ freedom of expression. The Supreme Court of Iowa said:
"/\ h1wyr•1; ncting in a professional capacity, may have some fewer rights of free
11111·1·, h lh1111 would n private citizen. As was well explained in In re Woodward (300 S.W.
'',I :111'i. :111:i.:W4 IMo. 1957].): 'x xx Neither the right of free speech nor the right to engage
111 'pnhl lr,11' nclivilicH con be so construed or extended as to permit any such liberties to
,1 111,·111b,•1· 11f llw bar; respondent's action was in express and exact contradiction of his
, 1111 h"t n11,t lnwyl'r. /\ loymnn may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech or political
,., ll vllh"1 1111lil 111• runH afoul of the penalties of libel or slande1; or into some infraction
111 11111• 1,lo1lulory l11w. /\ member of 1·hc bar cnn, nnd will, be stopped at the point where
ti,, l11lrl111:1"1 0111· ( '11111111•1 of r-:thic.:~; nnd if be wh,he8 to remain o member of the baL" he
will , 1111d111 I '1li11•1l'lf 111 111·,•onltm(t' therew ith. xx x.' llul ,is n citizen and officer of lhe
, out I, 1•v1•1 ~• l11wyp1• 11, ,·xp,•111,•d 11nl only ll• 1•l11•r, i•.1• llw rlghl l>ul nl~11 lo considl'I' lti.1 1
duly to 1•,1•111,1• 1'11• 11111,1•11011 il111•,•1 1111d i11di11,•l'l'll1111•, ol , 011rl•1 ,111,I judg, .. ,, (Hl,11<' llo.ml
..1 I -.11111111•1 •1 v• I 1111 I, 11 h N W ,>I'.' ) I low11v..,•. 111 "" , 1Ill< 1111111, 1111' l,11v y,•r 11111',I 111.,•
,, ,,,,,1t11'l,11111111ct1•· {llh1•1111111lllwl 1hll11 Vh 11111,•1 .111',l lli\•l •II IIIJh'/ ll"
514 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Sec.4
Principles and Cases
Meaning of right of assembly
and right of petition.
(1) The right of assembly means the right on the part of citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to
discuss public issues.32
(2) The right ofpetition means the right of any person or group of
persons to apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch
or office of the government for redress of grievances. (United States
vs. Bustos, 87 Phil. 731. [1918]; Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730
[1970].)
Relationship with freedom of speech
and of the press.
The right to assemble and the right to petition are necessary
consequences of our republican institution and the complement of
the right of free speech and, therefore, would exist even without
express provision in the Constitution. (United States vs. Bustos,
supra.) All these rights while not identical, are cognate and
inseparable. (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835
[1969].) They go hand in hand. "Public policy, the welfare of society,
and orderly administration of government [demand] protection for
public opinion" (United States vs. Bustos, supra.) of which these
rights are the most potent instruments. Without free speech and
assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation
would be stifled. As Justice Brandes' has said: "Public discussion
32
The Public Assembly Act (B.P. Blg. 880.) defines guidelines whereby local officials
may grant permits for rallies. A city or town mayor can approve or reject a petition to
hold a rally three days before it is scheduled. Every rejection must be accompanied by a
written explanation. Petitioners may appeal the matter to the courts, which have 24 hourn
to decide it. A mayor has 48 hours to make the decision.
To stage a public rally, the following guidelines are deemed necessary:
(1) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot, house, or edifice, tho
consent of the owner of the place is necessary. No permit from the government or 1111y
public officer is required;
(2) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful assembly has lo mnkc
use of public places like parks, plazas, and streets, the public authority chnrged with thu
duty of granting or denying the permit should also consider the convenience nnd thu
right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy these same facilities; and
(3) Conditions of peace ond order in tlw loc,1lity 11hn11ld hcJ C(ll'l•fully co11nid1•1·,·d
ond pn•rn11tionnry slt•p•1 lnke11 lo pn·v1·11l vnnclnlo,, h11oligt1m1, prnvn~'.11t•111'! 1, 1111d
nth,•r 1'1'i111 ln11l•1 frn111 ltll'lil11g i11l11 11 vl11l1•11I 1111" wlrnl 11llw1 wl1.1• 11h1111ld b,· ,1 1•1•,111'1111
d1•11111111,l1,1l l1111 (1{1111 VII ( ,01d1111, l'.11,1:1 l~A 1 1 II I'll! IJ)
ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 515
Sec.4
Freedom of Expression
is a political duty and the "greatest menance to freedom is an inert
people." (Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 460 [1999];
Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 375 [1927].) ,
In the absence of an imminent and grave danger, the granting
of a permit to stage a public rally is practically ministerial. If the
licensing authority is of the view that there is such danger, the
applicants must be heard on the matter and the burden to show its
existence lies on the licensing authority. In denying or modifying
the permit without .informing the applicants, it gravely abuses
its discretion. The presumption must be to incline the weight of
the scales of justice on the side of free speech and free assembly,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy in our scheme of
constitutional values.33 (Ruiz vs. Gordon, 120 SCRA 233 [1983]; see
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Atienza, 613 SCRA 518 [2010];
see The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA
l [2015].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Law requires all labor organizations to register and submit
the prescribed documents in order to acquire legal personality and be
entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
01~rsanizations.
Facts: The law, R.A. No. 875 (Sec. 23 thereof.), is assailed as
curtailing the freedom of assembly and association.
11 1\s in the case of freedom of speech and of the press, the rights of assembly and
pO'lilio11 i11d11de a t the very least immunity from previous restraint_ and ag_ainst any
,,111,1,t•qm•nt punishment for their exercise except that it may b~ restr~med or mterfered
wllli when there iR a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State or
)\llV1•1'1111wnl ha~ a right to prevent under its police power. The exer~se of the rights
11 1o1y 11111 ht• mndilio1wd upon the prior issuance of a permit or ~~thor12atlo~ f;om ~e
t',11 v 1•1 1111 11•nl. It hn:; bcon held that any statute or ordinance authonzmg an adrmmstratlve
111111 i,11 ,,I /,It, PIPII di~crt'lio11 to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other
1,111,ll1· i 11111'1"1 for prncc~8ions, pmades, or meetings, there being no stand~rd~ requ(red ~f said
11111, lal 111 ft1l1ow in deciding whether to grant or refuse such a permit, 1s a v10lation of
1lio1 ,1 111t1 of 1111~1•1nbly. Under o ur dcimocratic society, no such unlimited and un~gula~ed
1,.. w,·1• ""')' bl· vnlklly granted. (sec Primicias vs. Fugoso, SO.Phil. :1 [1948).)The hcens11:g
11111l111rl1 y pt1•1•.1·~•ll'M r,·ri~1111abll' dbcrclion to determine o~ specify the street or_ ~u~hc
1,1,11 t'11 111 b1• 111111d ft1r ,tt,oJ1•mbly in order lo Het:urc convement use thcreo~ to mm1m1ze
11 11 , , 1,,I, •1 111 ,li•,111•d1•r 1111,I 11rni11t,1i11 p11hlic H11f1•ly nnd order, (Navano VH. V11lcgas, s11prll.)
111 1111, It , ,,,,,., 11 tit,· ,1•,•11•1111>1~• !11 i111t·111lt·d l11 ht• llt'ld in r, publil: pli1cc, n permit· for the
11· ,, 11I ,,11, It pl,u 1,, ,111tl 11111 lt11· 1111' ,1•1•it•111lily li•,1•11, 111,1y 1u• v,illtlly n•q11ln•d. (IJ11vld v11.
M,11,ll'•'II•'' A1111y11, •Hl'J' I( HI\ lhlll.'tttH,J)
516
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
Issue: Is the requirement valid?
Held: (1) Requirement imposes no limitation on freedom of assembly
and association. - "The theory to the effect that Section 23 of
Repu?li~ Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and
assoaation guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual
basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section is
not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may
be exe~c~sed ~ith or without said registration. The latter is merely
a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by
labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession
of the 'rights and privileges granted by laws to legitimate labor
organizations.'"
(2) Requirement is imposed under the police power. - "The
Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much
less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the
possession and exercise of which registration is required to protect
both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors
who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of
the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid
exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor
organizations, associations and unions of workers are engaged
affect public interest, which should be protected." (Phil. Ass'n. of
Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 40 [1969], through
Chief Justice Concepcion.)
2. Ordinance of the City of Manila bans rallies within 500 feet of
foreign embassies.
Facts: The ordinance has not been judicially nullified or declared
ultra vires.
Issue: The issue is whether its invocation is decisive on t·lw
question of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free spc(•ch
and peaceable assembly.
Held: No, in view of the primacy accorded said rights:
(1) Sole justification for limitation of right. - "(I- was rwt by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of sp~p1•h ;111d
of the press were coupled in a s ingle guarantee wil-11 th· ri1•,lil 11 ol
the people peaceably to nsscmblc and l'o p1•1i!ion llw gnwn111w11I
for n:drusH of gt'il'VillWt•s. All lhl'lit' righlH, wltih• 11111 id1•11lk,1I, '""
i11h1'p,11·11lih•. In 11 v1•ry 1',1H1•, IIH'l'l'fnr1•, wlll't'c• llu•t'l' i11 11 li111ll.ill1111
pl,11 •1•d 1111 1111' c•,1•1d 11• of lhi•, rlglil, llu• j111lld ,11 y l•1 c•11ll1•d 1q11111 (11
1
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 517
Sec.4
Freedom of Expression
examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The
sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the
danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate
public interest."
(2) What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. - "There are,
of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable
assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest,
much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The
Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or
assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence are
to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed
out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United
States vs. Apurado (7 Phil. 422.): 'It is rather to be expected that
more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people
to protest against grievances, whether real or imaginary, because
on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of
the leaders over their irresponsible followers."
(3) Duty to protect premises of a diplomatic mission. - "The
Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations adopted in 1961. It was concurred in by the then Philippine
Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification was signed
by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter deposited
with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15.
As of the date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second
paragraph of its Article 22 reads: '2. The receiving State is under
a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises
of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent
any di::,turbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
d i~n i ty.' The Constitution 'adopts the generally accepted principles
of int~rnational law as part of the law of the land. * * *'
'lh the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the
genera lly accepted principles of international law, it should be a
p.irt of the lnw o( the land. That being the case, if there were a clear
1111d presPnl· danger of any intrusion or d amage, or disturbance of
the• p1•,1t ·11 of t·lw mission, or impninnent of its dig nity, there would
Iii• 11 jw1I ii it',11 io11 fnr Ille d1' ni 1l of t·lw pPr111il' insofnr ns the terminal
pol111 wn11ld l11• llu• H111hw111y."
518
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
(4) Freedom of access to public parks for staging a peaceful rally. -
"It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks
and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent
on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a
group. If.it.wer~, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory
access, g1vmg nse to an ~qual protection question. xx x
There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a
gathering were marked by turbulence that would deprive it of its
peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be
held accountable."
(5) Discretionary authority of City Mayor to issue license for
holding of public rally in the absence of clear and present danger. -
"It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is
not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit
would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While
prudence requires that there be -a realistic appraisal not of what
may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the
relevant circumstances, still the assumption - especially so where
the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place - is that the
permit must be for the assembly being held there.
The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts,
speaking for the American Supreme Court, 'is not to be abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.' (Schneider vs.
Irvingtong, 308 US 147 [1939].) The mere assertion that subversives
may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice."
(6) Duties of applicants for a permit to hold a public rally. - "By
way of a summary, the applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
(where) and the time (when) it will take place. If it were a private
place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead
in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whe the r
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit o r to its
grant but at another public place.
It is an indispensable condition to s uch refusal or modific.1lit111
that the clear and present danger teflt be the st·nndnrd for 1111'
decision reached. lf he is of the view l·hnt l·h1•rp is s 111'11 nn i111ini111 •11 I
and g rave dangF r of n s11hs l,111livt• t>v il, t·lw nppli1·,111l i,; 11111•,t lie•
heard on l·liL· m,1lll'1·._Tlwn•;1flt•1; hi 'l dc-d•.in11, w lil'llu•,· f.i vor•.ilil1• 111•
adY< 'l'lil', 11111'1 1 111• l1°.i111o111ill1•d 111 llu•111 o1I 1111' c•,11 lic",I 11111'1111111 ,l ty
Sec.4 Sec.4 519
ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS
Freedom of Expression
Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority." (Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 {19831, through Chief
Justice Fernando.)
Teehankee, J., concurring opinion:
(1) Burden of showing clear justification in denial of public rally
permit. - "The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent
danger that would justify adverse action on the application lies
on the mayor as licensing authority. There must be objective and
convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such
clear and present danger. As stated in our Resolution of October 25,
1983, which granted the mandatory injunction as prayed for, 'It is
essential for the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to
a previous restraint or censorship that the licensing authority does
not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare, peace
or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be
proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present
danger test. The possibility that subversives may infiltrate ranks of
the demonstrators is not enough."
(2) Duty of leaders of public rally to ensure a peaceful march. -
"Needless to say, the leaders of the peaceable assembly should take
all the necessary measures to ensure a peaceful march and assembly
.:md to avoid the possibility of infiltrators and troublemakers
cl isrupting the same, concomitantly with the duty of the police to
extend protection to the participants 'staying at a discreet distance,
but ever ready and alert to perform their duty.' But should any
disorderly conduct or incidents occur, whether provoked or
ol'l,erwise, it is well to recall former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras'
injunction in his concurring opinion in Fugoso (supra.), citing
Ilic '1907 case of l..l.S. vs. Apurado (supra.) that such instances of
'disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd [be not
ill •izPd] ns i.111 excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
l111n111luous rising against the authorities' and render illusory the
rigl 11. of peaceable assembly."' (Ibid.; see Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA
:•'u l19H~ I.)
:\. S/11,/,•11/ lmc/<'l'f; were s11s111·11dC'd .fbr 011c (1) academic year for
lt1 ,{,f1J1s 11•,•1,•111/1(11 1rll,•g,·rlly i11 11inlol iu11 of thi· f'l'l'lllit xmn tcrl /hem.
/'111 /o, • l'Plil i11111•1'11 w 1•n• lllli1•1•J't1 ll f lhc• S11pn 1 1111' S1itdt•11I'
c 'n11111 II 111 J1"•IH1111!1•11I l l111 v1•1 1 illy 1'111 1,tr.111I In ,1 111•r111il gr,111l1•cl l,y
520 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Sec. 4
Principles and Cases
school authorities, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the school's basketball court. At such gathering, they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition
to the proposed merger of two (2) Institutes of the University.
Continuing their rally outside the area covered by their permit,
they gave utterance to language severely critical of University
authorities using megaphones in the process. As a result, there was
disturbance of the classes being held and non-academic employees
stopped their work because of the noise created.
The petitioners were preventively suspended by the University
for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in
front of the Life Science Building. Respondent R, Director of DECS
National Capital Region, found them guilty of having violated
par. 146(c) of the Manual For Private Schools. The penalty was
suspension for one (1) academic year. Hence, the petition to review
the decision of respondent R.
Issue: Was there failure to accord respect to the constitutional
rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech to
petitioners?
Held: Yes. (1) Penalty imposed was unduly severe. - "Respect for
the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech
calls for the setting aside of the decision, the penalty being too
severe. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other
than that specified in the permit and continued it longer than the
time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and
caused the work of the non-academic personnel to be left undom:.
Nevertheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion l'o
their misdeed. A much lesser penalty is appropriate."
(2) There was infringement of rights to peaceable asseml1ly an,/ .fi',·,·
speech. - "Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable nsscmblv
and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like l'lw n•'.,I
of the citizens the freedom to express their views and com111unical1•
their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings. 'Tlwy dn
not,' to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in '/'i11k1•1' tJ. / J,,,,
Marines Community School District (393 U.S. 503 ['1969'].), 'slwd llu•li·
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or cxprem;i!l11 111 II w
schoolhouse gate."
(3) F:xtrr•1111•ly C'l'i/:i,-(1/ 11//1"/'rll/t'r'.•; iii rl1•11101111/r11/i111111 11/'r' 1/lll/1·
1111d,·1·11/r111d11t,/1•. - "( )hj1•1·lirn1i,1111,1d1• liy p1·iv,1lc• l'l'hpo11d1•11l>1 In 1111·
1l·1u11 1 111' 'll1C'l'd\1'1i lty llll' 1,l11d1•11I lc•.id1•1•11, IC X l\ II ill lh1• 111111•,1 1 111
ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 521
Freedom of Expression
such demonstration with an enthusiastic audience goading them
on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let
loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the
timid, diffident types. They would be ineffective if during a rally
they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe.
At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into
account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers
to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers
the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in
the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present
danger of public disorder is discernible."
(4) Petitioner, however, cannot be totally absolved for the events that
transpired. - "It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be
totally absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was
a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place
other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the
basketball court, of the VMAS building of the University. Moreover,
it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the
decision of respondent Ramento, the 'concerted activity [referring
to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.m.' Private respondents
could thus take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an
admonition, even a censure - certainly not a suspension - could
be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents could and did take
umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction - considering
lhc places where and the time when the demonstration took place
- there was disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of the
11tm-acndemic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if
they did take a much more serious view of the matter."
(5) One-week suspension would be punishment enough. - "Even
1111 •n, n one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While
llw discretion of both respondent University and respondent
l<,,111l'11 to is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness
,•,tilt, for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality
lwlwt•c•n lhe offonse committed and the sanction imposed is not
lollow1•d, nn dcnwnt of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise
lo ,1 d1u• prorc:,;s qL11' sHon. To avoid t·his constitutional objection,
II 111 till' holding of ll1iH ( ·ourt l'hnt none-week suspension would
111• 1•1111(11111111•111 l'IH>ll)\11." (Ma/11/111111111 vs. l\llt/11'1/ICI, '/2!) S('JV\ 7.r,a
/ 1•1H11 /1 11i,,,11sl1 < ·111,'{'/11t1lln· /',•,•1111111/0, l
522 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
Cruz, J., dissenting:
(1) Freedom of expression is not only for the intelligent. - "The
circumstance that the demonstrations were attended by some
disorder is not to my view sufficient justification for the curtailment
of their right much less for their punishment. And I do not agree
either that the sanctions may be sustained because some of the
students were academically deficient, for the truth is that they were
denied enrollment not because of such deficiency but because of
the demonstrations. Surely, freedom of expression is not only for
the intelligent."
(2) Student's enrollment is for particular course. - "I also have
misgivings about the ruling of the Court that a student's enrollment
is from semester to semester and may be terminated at will by the
school after each period. I submit that when a student is enrolled for
a particular course the implicit understanding is that he is entitled
to remain on the school until he graduates, subject only to the usual
academic, financial and other reasonable requirements."
Sarmiento, J., dissenting:
In his dissent, he alluded to two cases: Malabanan vs. Ramento
(supra.) and U.S. vs. Apurado. (7 Phil. 422 [1907].) Adverting to
Apurado:
Some disorder is to be expected in public assembly. - "It is rather
expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of
the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions, feeling is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more
intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary
control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse
to characterize the assembly as seditious and tumultuous rising
against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to pl~titio11
for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a sna r'l'
and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occnsion nnd
in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who look
part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishnwnt, if 1111'
purposPs which thC'y sought to attain did nothnppt'n t·o lw plc•,11li11g
lo tlw proHc•1·11li111:, r111lhndlh•s.
II i11nl1111,•1•11nf di•ionlc•l'ly 11ci11,l111'1111°11111· 011 i.111 1l'11w,·,l'iio1111, 1111•
1•,11llty i111 livld1111 l1111lin1ild Ii,• 1111111•,hl 11111111111 p1111i•1l'u,d 1h1•11•f111•, 1'111
Sec. 4 _ ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 523
Freedom bf Expression
the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between
disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.",
Cortes, J., concurring and dissenting:
(1) Relation between student and his school. - "I concur with the
majority insofar as it disposes of the motion for reconsideration
filed by the teachers, in view of the decision of the Court in Escudero
vs. Office of the President (172 SCRA 783 [1989].) which recognized
and applied the three-year probationary period for teachers as
provided in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
However, I find that the majority has failed to fully appreciate
the nature of the relation between the student and his school and
to rectify the doctrinal error in the decision. The public interest
attached to education, owing to the Constitution's express man-
, date for the State to protect and promote the right of all citizens
to quality education and to exercise reasonable supervision and
regulation over all educational institutions (Art. XIV, Secs. 1 and
4(1].), prevents one from viewing the relation between the student
and the school as a simple contract with a term of one semester. By
its nature, the "contract" cannot be terminated by the school on the
ground of expiration of the term, i.e., the end of the semester for
which the student is enrolled."
(2) Doctrinal error in the decision. - "The majority acknowledges
by way of obiter dictum, after the damage to the students has
been done, that 'We value the right of students to complete their
education in the school or university of their choice ...' However,
this expression of sentiment does not effect the necessary reversal
of the law of the case as far as the students are concerned. As stated
1'iH'lic1~ neither does it reverse the erroneous doctrine enunciated in
1lw dccbion."
(:1) Autl10rity of schools cannot go as far as to violate constitutional
1'i:,:l111J. • · "1 also find it necessary to bring to mind, as Mr. Justice
:-i11nui1•nto hrn; done, that we had already recognized, in the
la111lr1111rk cose of Malabanan vs. Ramento (129 SCRA 359 [1984].),
1111• right· of sludcnh, to peaceably assemble within the premises
11( llu•ir nd1ool nnd to air their grievances on matters that affect
llwlr 1•dw·,1tion, m1bjed h) reasonable limitations as to time and
pl,u·1•. A11d 1•v1•n thci n•cognilinn of l'lw right to assembly is nothing
ru•w, li,1vi1111 b,·1•11 hr 011r 1'l11il'h11t1k11 111111·1• lhl' turn of 1·111• n•11l11ry.
M,i/,1/ 1,111,111 1d1111 l11ld 1111 lh111 1111' 111'110111 (,1 11111 c•nlir'<'ly will11111I
524 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
power to discipline students for misconduct in the course of the
exercise of these rights. If there be any infractions of reasonable
rules established by the school or agreed upon by the school and
the students, the school may discipline the erring students, but
the penalty must be commensurate to the violation. Hence, in
Malabanan, the penalty of suspension of one year imposed on those
who led the rally that resulted in the disruption of classes because
of the noise was reduced to suspension for one week.
I am of the view that the majority's disposition of the present case,
as to the students, which sanctioned the school's stand of refusing
to allow re-enrollment of some of the students under the guise of
expiration of contract and, subsequently "academic deficiency/'
goes against the very grain of the rule that the Court, sitting en bane,
had established in Malabanan that while the authority of the schools
over the conduct of their students_ is recognized, it cannot go so far
as to be violative of constitutional safeguards."
Note: In Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Phils. (135 SCRA
706 [1985].), the Supreme Court reiterated that the exercise of the
freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring students
from enrolling. It enjoined the school and its officials from acts of
surveillance, blacklisting, suspension and refusal to re-enroll. But
the Court allowed the non-enrollment of students who clearly
incurred marked academic deficiency.
In Arreza vs. G. Araneta University (137 SCRA 94 [1985].), a case
arising from almost the same facts as those in Malabanan, the Court
ruled that while infractions of University Rules and Regulations by
petitioner-students justify the filing of appropriate charges, what
can not be justified is "the infliction of the highly-disproportionate
penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior
students to graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of
free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct cou Id Lw
attributed to them."
In Guzman vs. National University (142 SCRA 699 1'198(11.),
respondent school was directed to allow the p e titi.oning stud1•nl11
to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respccl'ivc courn1•1;,
without prejudice to any disciplinary proct•PdingH lh.11· 111ay Iii•
conductcrl in c1111111•1·l·i·d wil'lt tlll'il' p,1rlil'ipi1lion in 1h1 prnl<•tllN llu1I
1
.li•d 111 th1• ~,l11pp.ig1• of d,lHlil '!l.
Sec.4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 525
Freedom of Expression
In Alcuaz vs. PSBA, Quezon City Branch (178 SCRA 134 [1989].),
the Supreme Court sustained the disciplinary action taken against
students who took part in the demonstrations which were attended
by some disorder. Three justices dissented in Alcuaz.
In Non vs. Dames II (185 SCRA 523 [1990].), the Supreme Court
ruled that the academic freedom enjoyed by a school (see Art. Xiv,
Sec. 5[2].) is not a ground for denying students' rights. Excluding
students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them related to possible breaches of discipline not
only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the
basic tenets of fair play.
See further discussion of this topic under Section 1 (procedural
due process) and Article XIV, Section 5(3).
4. Petitioners assail some provisions of B.P. Blg. 880 as well as the
"Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it.
Facts: All petitioners assail B.P. Big. 880, the Public Assembly
Act, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a)
and 14(a) as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent
dispersal of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the
CPR Policy.
Issues: Are the questioned provisions of B.P. Big. 880 and the
CPR policy violative of the Constitution?
Held: (1) Right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
grievances. - "The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights
cons titute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
As stated in Jacinto v. CA (281 SCRA 657 [1997], 346 Phil. 665-666
1'1 ~)1)71.), the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v.
A1i11n11/o (7 Phil.. 422 (1907).), already upheld the right to assembly
t1nd pl'lilion, ns follows: xx x
Ag,1i11 111 /'l'i111/d1111 v. /.'r,goso (80 l'hil. 7'1 [ 1948).), the Court like-
wl111• 111Pll,ii1ll'd 1·111• print,H'Y of fr1•1•d11111 of 1,p1•1•1·h nurl lo ,wi,1•111bly
,111cl 1>c•lil l111111v1•r c ,11111111 11,111111 '1111vP11l1•111•1• 1111111• 11111• of 11ln•1•l 1i 1111d
526 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 4
Principles and Cases
parks. Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: xx x
Reyes v. Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553 [1983].) further expounded on
the right and its limits, as follows: x xx
8. By way of a -summary. The applicants for a permit
to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority
of the date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. 1£ it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable
the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be
valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that
there is such an imminent mi.d grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to
them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can
have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and
peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms,
are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It
cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, - even
more so than on the other departments - rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to
such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase
can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously
termed by Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incl i1w
the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rightH,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. xx x. 13.P. lllg.
880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Rt•yl'H.
XX X"
(2) No absolute ban of public asse1nblies. - "It is dent' thl'l'l•fol'1•,
that B.P. Blg. 880 is not an absolute ban of public nssemblil'i: l,111 "
restriction that simply regulates the time, place nnd 11wnn1·r of 1111'
assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmt'iin 1>. t 01111•!1•1', wlu•n· llw
Court referred to it ns a 'cont·1•111'-1wul'rn l' n•gtd,,tion of llw li1111·,
p lnct>, ond manner of holding p11hlk os:-;1•111hlit•~-
/\ f.1ir ,11111 i1111i.11·tial n•,1di11r, 11111,11• 1111•,. HH!l 11111>, 11•.idilv 11hmv11
I hat It ll'lt•1•1111 ,ill l, l11d11 111 p11lilit ,11, ,1•1111,111 1 lh.11_w111dd 11>,1• 11111 1111
1 00
Sec. 4 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 527
Freedom of Expression
places. The reference to 'lawful cause' does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be 'peaceable' and entitled to protection.
Neither are the words 'opinion,' 'protesting' and 'influencing' in
the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer
to any subject. The words 'petitioning the government for redress
of grievances' come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
can.not be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground
of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. xx x"
(3) Constitutionality of B.P. Big. 880. - "Contrary to petitioner's
claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions.
'Public' does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is we11-
known. Webster's Dictionary defines it, thus: public, n, xx x 2a: an
organized body of people xx x 3: a group of people distinguished
by common interests or characteristics x x x.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law
refers to 'rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
111'11er form of mass or concerted action held in a public place.' So it
docs not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the
rii~hl to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to
.,void a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress
h,1s the right to prevent.
Thcrl' is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the
hfl('t'd1is not: relevant to the regulation.
/1.s 111 l·he delegation of powers to the may01~ the law provides a
11n•('iH1• ,111d sufficient s tandard- the clear and present danger test
1,l.11t•d in SPt". 6(0). The reference to 'imminent and grave danger of
.i ,,11li1.t,1ntiv1• pv il' in Sec. (,(c) 1,ubstanlially meims the same thing
,11 1d i11 111,t 11 11 i11l'onHiBh•111· Hl'rmd,,1rd. xx x."'
(,I) ( ·1,·t1/io11 ,tf' (1,•,•i/1JJ1/ 1111rA•,', "lii11,1lly, !"11 1' thoM' who c,11111111
w,ilt, 1 :1•1111111 111 11' 1111· l,1w 11rnvid1"i 1111• ,111 ,1ll1•r11,1llv1• 1'111'11111
528 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.4
Principles and Cases
through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is
needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time:
'Sec. 15. Freedom parks. - Every city and municipality
in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of
this Act establish or 4esignate at least one suitable 'freedom
park' or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion
where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the
respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the
period of six months from the effectivity this Act."'
(5) CPR serves no valid purpose. - "In view of the maximum
tolerance mandated by B.P. Blg. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose
if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if
it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is
and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum
tolerance, which specifically means the following:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. - For purposes of this Act:
XXX
(c) 'Maximum tolerance' means the highest degree of
restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.'
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response
policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down
as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people
and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other
hand, B.P. Big. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it
does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the
use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
Far from being insidious, 'maximum tolerance' is for the bencfi.t
of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayorr.; of
the power to issue rally 'permits' is valid because it is subject to
the constitutionally-sound 'clear and present danger' standnrrl."
(Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Maglml;ukid ng Piliph111s {PM['/ P11.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 226 [20061, tlrrouglt /11sfice J\zrn110.)
o< >o
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
SEC. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
Meaning of religious freedom.
The constitutional guarantee of religious freedom is the right of
man to worship God, and to entertain such religious views as appeal
lo his individual conscience, without dictation or interference by
a ny person or power, civil or ecclesiastical.• It forbids restriction by
low or regulation of freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere
11, such religious organization or form of worship as the individual
may choose.2 (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296.)
Moaning of religion.
Religion, in its broadest sense, includes all forms of belief in the
••XiKtence of superior beings exercising power over human beings
,111d imposing rules of conduct with future state of rewards or
l'lllliKhments. (Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra.) It has reference to
11111 •' s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they
1111j10Kl' o f reverence to His being and character and of obedience to
I Ii:; will. (Aglipa.y vs. Ruiz, supra.)
< >1w's religion may doubt or even deny the existence of God.
1 111 /\M , JI II{. 1,,m.
' Wlml l•1 f',11,11°,11114'\'d hy liw Con~titul'icm is religious liberty, not mere religious
1111, 1 ,1111 ►11 (/\gllp,1y v,1. 1{111~,, 64 l'hil. WI I i<X17I.) The right includes the freedom to
, h "'J.1'' 11111•·,, 1,•IJ11lo11 1 ► I' rl'lif:h11l'1 h,•li,•f ,111d lo mnnlfi ..11 ii· in h•ar hing nnd prnclicc.
 J'l llldll'l'I N l •, l l >N:,J 111: I H•>Nr'\I. J ,/\W
0
l'ri11d plc•!1111ul !.. 11H1111
Purpose and Importance of the guarantee.
(1) Protects the broadest possible Ubel'ly fo 7frofess one's religion. -
The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the
support of any religious Jenets or the mo~~s of worship of any
sect, thus forestalling compulsion by la\..J·6£'fr~ 'acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship· but also assures the
free exercis~ of one's chosen form of re_li,gi,o n. within the: limits of
utmost ampli~~~: The_provision is·desigi}eq.: Jp protect the'broad~st
possible liberty .of conscience, to allow ead{ man to believe .a s his
consci¢nce -~irects, to profess his beliefs; anq _to live as _h e believes
he.ought to li,ve, consistent with the liberty bf o.thers and with the
common good.
Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of .one or all religions, or ;to qi~,Sfin:i-J11ate inv;iqiou$ly
between the religions, is invalid, even $ot1gh the burden may
be characterized as being only indirect: But·if the state regulates
conduct by en.acting, within its power,. a general law which has
for its purpose and effect to ·advance the State's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance,
unless the State can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. (Basa vs, Federacion Obrera de La lndustria Tabaquera, 61
SCRA 93 [1974]; Anucension vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 330
[1977].)
(2) Insures the widest possible toleration of conflicting religious
beliefs. - "Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious
belief, is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the 'right to
maintain the theories of life and of death and .of the hereafter. Men
may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the
proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. If one could be sent to
jail because a court in a hostile environment found these doctrines
or teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom . ..
The framers of the Constitution were aware of the varied and
extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement
among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all
men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government which
envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views, Man's
relation to his God is made no concern of the State. He is granted the
right to worship as he pleases, and to answer to no man for the verily
of his religious views." (United States v, Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,) That
' AR'fi IJJ. tHLL U l 1 IUGHTS &31
· l•teedom of Religion
is the essence of religious freedom. Bt;1t plain and simple insults to
another person C<U;ifJ.(?t.~~ elevated to the status of a religious speech
or discourse. (Soriil:C?· vs. Laguardia, 587 SCRA 79 [2009].)
Free exerc,ise of re.,IJgiQn superior
to contract ~igl)ts:
Freedom of worship alongside with freedom of expression and
peaceful assembly,•albng with the other inteU.ectual freedoms, are
highly ranked in dur ·scheme of constitutional va_lues. (G:r~an
vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA- 514 [1985D The free exercise of rehg1ous
profession or beHefs has, in fact, been held superior :o contract
rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the
former. (Ba1;,a vs. Fede.r adon Obrera, 61 SCRA 93 (1974].)
The Supreme· Court of the United States has also declared
on several occasions that the righ ts in the First Amendment,
which include freedon~ of religion, enjoy a preferred position
in the constitutional system.3 If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.4 (Islamic Da' wah Council vs, O~ ce
of the Executive Secretary, 405 SCRA 497 [2003].) The presumption
must be to incline the.weight of the scales of justice on the side of
lThe exercise of religion is a form of speech. In case of conflict ~etween the free
exercise clause and the State, the Supreme Court adheres to the doctrme of benevolent
neutrality. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, 74 SCRA 146 [2014),) as decided by the Court in Estrada vs.
Escretor (490 SCRA 1 [2006). see Illustrative Case No. 6, infra. ,
· Religious freedom,. although not unlimited, is a fundamental ~ersonal nght
and liberty, and has a preferred position in.the hierarchy .o f values. It 1s only_ where
unavoidably necessary to pr.e vent an immediate an~ grave danger to the _se~1ty and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be Justified, and
only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. (see Victoriano vs. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union, supra; Anucension vs, National Labor Union, supra.)
4"Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because
the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 4~ encroached ?~ ~e religi?us
freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to mterpret for F1hpmo Muslims .
wh~t food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arro~ating to itself ~e task
of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Mus11ms to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.~ xx In ~e case at_bar: we ~d
.no compelling justification for the government to deprive Mushm organizations, l~e
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as Jin/al, e~e~ on the prerfnse
that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
·exclusive power to issue h«lal certifications." (Ibid.)
IIJ 1'111111'1'11111 • 1 111 ,llllllll lllAI. I I\W
l'1li11lpl1••1 1111111 '11111•,:i
1;1uch rights enjoying n13 r·hcy do prcccd<mcc sili\cl p1·in1acy,n (Gcl'ntrrn
vs. 13arangan, suprn.) , ., '.
Aspects of freedom of religion.
As guaranteed by the Constitution, religious freedom has a dual
. ...- .\•· .
aspect: . ··
(1) The separation of Church and State secured in the first clause
of the first sentence of the provision referred to as "the establishment
clause"; and
(2) The freedom of religious profession and worship, in the
secon.d clause of the first sentence and th'e second sentence of the
provision referred to as "the free exercise clause;"
The first aspect is discussed {rnder Artlci'e Il, Section 6 (supra.)
which declares that "the separation of chui:cli. and· State shall _b e
inviolable." · ·
Meaning of '~establishment of religion"
clause.
The phrase "no law respecting an ·establislunent of religion"
has been referred to as the "establishment of religion clause." 6 In
the words of Thomas Jefferson, ·using a metaphor; this clause was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between the Church and the
State." (Everson .v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1.) ·1,\n.d it means
that:
5 the profoundest attention from the courts, not o~y- bec~use of their ~erent interest,
Under the Omnibus.Election Code (B.P. Big. 881,iSec..26[dJ.), "Anyhea_d,.supervisor
or administrator of any religious orgai)ization xx x who. coerces or intimidates or compels,
or in any manner influences,directly or indirectly, any of.its xx x members or parishioners
x x x to aid, campaign or vote for or against any candidate or any. aspirant for the
nomination or selection of candidates, xx x ot punishes or threatens to punish x xx such
member or parishioner for disobeying the former shall be guilty of an election offense.
A controversial House bill which would have allowed religious leader~ (partic;ularly the
Iglesia ni Cristo) to influence their followers to vote or not to vote for a .candidate or
set of candidates was objected to by other religioll$ groups, claiming that only the INC
would benefit from this so-called religious bloc voting measure. INC leaders reason that
influencing their followers to vote as one is part of their religious dogma stressing unity
and discipline. The INC is reportedly the only sect that dictates on its members lo vote or
not to vote for certain candidates. It is debatable whether o law legalizing unlly in voling
among members of a religious group is valid under the Constitution.
6The provision w,s contained in douse (7), Section 1 of Artlcl" Ill (11111 uf Rl11h111)
of the 1935 Constitution. It is now embodied In floctlr)n 5, Arlll'11 Ill 111 th,1 p11•01111t
Constitution.
A I·<;L', lit. IIJLI, l >F .Ld<..:ill'l'~l !l:13
Frncdom of Religion
(1) The State shall have no official religion;
(2) It cannot set up a Church, whether or not supported with
public funds;·nor aid one religion, aid all religions (see Art. VI, Sec.
29[2].), or prefer one religion over another or over non-religion;
(3) It cannot force or influence a person to go to or remain away
from ·church against his will. Every person is free to profess belief
or disbelief in any religion;
(4) It cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs; and
(5) Every priest or religious minister is free to practice his
calling. (see Art. III, Sec. 5.)
In short, the principle calls on the Church and the State to "render
:t-
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things
that are God's," or simply, "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and
r to God what is God's." 7 As noted previously, this is a formulation
which is easier to state than to practice.8 Incidental aid to a religion
is not forbidden by the Constitution. (see Art. VI, Sec. 29(2].)
Freedom of religious profession
and worship.
· The constitutional inhibition on the subject of religion, on the
one hand,. forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
7
"Cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received
f but because of the far reaching effects of the d ec1s1ons m human soaety. [However,]
I courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such m atters, it having
been found that, in a form of government where the complete separation of civil and
ec,clesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to
intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical n ature," (Taruc vs. Dela Cruz, 453 SCRA
123 1200s].)
8
Total separation between Church and State is not possible in an absolute sense.
In view of the complexities of modern life, some relationship between government
and religious organizations is inevitable. The line of separa~on, from being a wa~, is a
blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular ·
relationship. (see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602.) Government may ac<;ammodate
religion and religious institutions as long as it does not ex~essively entan~l~ goveri:ui:~nt
in the nffoirs of religion nor result to government surveillance over religious activities
nml churches, i\S much as secular bodies, and privote citizens have the right to take strong
poAitlon on public issues including vigorous odvocacy of legnl or consti:_':ltional positions.
(NC•c Mcc•k v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349; Woltz v, Tnx Commission of the City of New York,
:107 U.S. 661.)
 1 1 1 I
1 h
1 H•1•d " ' Ilic• I'"'' llw ol 1111y l111r1i1 11l won1hlp1 uml 011 'l'bc othe1~H
t1hlt•p,11111d11Ilic• (11 11' c•xc•r1 l11t• oC llio dwucn form nf 1· •Jigjpn. (Centeno
vu, Vl ll11 l1111 I'in I dll1J11, :•:1,d;c'!{A 191/ I lS>9'1 j.) 'fhu1:1, ii has t,wo aspects,
llllllH ly:
1
('I) Freedom to believe in n religion. - Eve1yone has absolute right
to ~elievc whatever he wishes. A state may npt COfl1pel a religious
belief nor deny any person any right or priyileg~ because of ihis.
belie~ _o r lack ?f them. It ~annot'in9.t1:ire.intci.-_the truth or_validity.
of rehg1ous beliefs or doctrines, though tl1E:y might seem incredible,
if not preposterous to many people. Religious beliefs or opinions
cannot be the issue but whether he honestly and in good faith
believes those things. The theory is that a religious belief by itself
cannot, in any degree, affect public interest; and
(2) Freedom to act in accordance with such belief - The right to
act in accordance with one's belief is ·not and cannot be absolute.
Conduct remains subject to regulation and even prohibition for the
protection of society. (see Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296.)
Religion may not be used to justify action or refusal to act
inconsistent with the public safety, health, morals, or general
welfare of society, or violative of the criminal law. Thus, no one
has a right to refuse to defend the country in time of war, to refuse
to pay taxes, or to invade the right of others even in the name of
religion. Persons may resort to prayers for the healing of the sick
but this religious right may not be fraudulently used as a cloak to
engage in healing for commercial purpose using prayer and such
religious rites as a curative agency. (see People vs. Diel, [CA] 44
O.G. 590 [1947].) The exercise of religious freedom or performance
of religious practices should not prejudice the public. It does not
exer11pt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of
the law (e.g., government office hours), including civil service laws,9
(Re: Request of Muslim Employees Re: Office Hours, 477 SCRA 648
[2005].)
9That solicitatio'l of contributions under the r,i1lsc of chnrltnblc or religious purposes
is gros~ly abused is a\mntter of common knowlcdf1<1. Public; 11ollcllntlon mny, therefore,
?e subiect to proper regulntlon by lhc 811111, l11 1ho <'ll<lrrl"11 o( polkc power (sec Sec. 9,
~nfra,) to protect public lntcrcRt, 11111, om· r,rnnol lw lrnlcl I rli11lnnlly llnhlc• (01' 1101lcl1n1lona
intended for n rcllglotrn puq,oflc• wllh11111 pm11111 II "11rh Nnlh 11!111111111 11111 not within tlw
covcrngo of lh<J lnw, (C'c•nt111111 VH Vlllnl1111 1•.,111111,,1, •11111,1)
1 1, A 1.<.:L',,U I. B 11.1. l.J l I Rl(..:l J'J'S 535
11recdom of Religion
Dissemination ·of r.ellgfew~ beli~fs.
(1) Right to disseminnte implied·. - The constitutional guarantee
of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with· it the right to disseminate religious beliefs
and information. The right to believe and to worship would be
incomplete without·the·constitution,al right to share one's views with
others and to seek to win them to one's faith, by giving analysis of
contrary views and by solicitation of financial assistance in <:arrying
the truth to others.10
(2) Restraint ·on the right. - Any restraint on the right to
disseminate religious ideas and information can only be justified
(like other restraints on freedom of expression, supra.) on the ground
that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil (e.g.,
disruption of public peace) which the State has the right to prevent.
(American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 [1957].) Tu
provide public officials, for instance, with discretionary power to
grant or withhold permits for distribution of religious publication
would be abridging freedom of religion (and of the press, and of
speech).
(3) License fee/tax on sale of religious articles. - The right of a
person fo believe is not subject to tax. Since the right to believe carries
with it the right to disseminate his beliefs, the imposition of license
or permit fees on the sale or peddling. of religious literature from
house to house, conducted not for purposes of profit, would impair
the constitutional guarantee of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession. and worship.. (see Ibid.) The right to peddle
religious information is similar to the right of a priest or minister to
preach a sermon in his church. (see Murdock v, Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105.)
In the case, however, of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance (235
SCRA 630 [1994].), the claim of the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), a
non-profit organization engaged in the printing and distribution of
bibles and other religious articles, that the removal by the Expanded
VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716.) of the exemption of printing, publication
10COOLEY, op. cit., p. 960.

l'I I IJ ,ll'l'll'-l l ( l l >N!, 11 J l JI It >NAI.: I ,AW
Prlnclples nnd C,11:WS '
or importation of books and religious -artioles~11 violates-religious
freedom was rejected by_the Supreme Court..12. • ;
Religious test prohibited.
The Constitution expressly provides'thaf"ri.6° religious test shall
be required for the exercise df civil ot ·political'_rights." (Sec. 5.)
, ., t I
(1) A religious test is one demanding ~e .av.owal or repudiation
of certain religious beliefs before the perfor11,1ance of any act.13 Thus,
under this injunction, laws prescribing the qt1;alification of public
officials or employees, whether appointive· or ·elective, or .o f voters,
may not contain requirements of religious b~liefs. It has been held,
however, that Section 2175 of the former Revised Administrative
Code (1917), which provides that ".In no case shall there be elected
or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics...." is not repealed
by the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions' provision that "No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights." Thus,
11 Section 105 of the National Internal Revenue Cod~ which imposes a value-added
tnx (VAT) on transactions "in the course of trade or business" defines the phrase to mean
"the reg ular conduct or pursuant of a commerci;il or an economic activity, including
lrnnancllons incidental thereto, by any person regardless of whether or not the person
cngngcd therein is a non-stock, non-profit private organization (irrespective of the
disposition of its net income and whether or not it sells exclusively to members or their
guests), or government entity."
/\ non-stock organization is one where no part of its income is distributable as
dividends or shares to its members, Under the Corporation Code, a non-stock corporation
is not prohibited to make profit as an incident to its operation (B.P. Blg. 68, Sec. 87, par. 1.),
to be used for the furtherance of the purpose or purposes for which it was organized. It is
in this sense that a non-stock corporation is considered a non-profit corporation.
12According to the High Tribunal, citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalizatio,i (493 U.S. 378 (1990).), ''the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit
imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a
religious organization." In Murdock (supra.), cited by the Supreme Court in American Bible
Society and Tolentino, it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount and unrelated to
the receipts of the taxpayer, the fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually being
imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution.
Although the imposition of license tax to transactions such as selling goods, is vnlid,
its application to religtus groups in connection with the latter's sale of religious book~
; I
~nd pamphlets is unconstitutional. As the US Supreme Court put it: "It is one thing to
impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite nnother thing to cxnct n tnx on
him for delivering a sermon." (Tolentino vs. Secretnry of Finnncc, ?.19 ~CRA 628 [19%].)
13
CORW1N, The Constitution and What It Mcnns Todny, p. 15 1.
Alff, Ill. IIJl.l,l)ll l{H ~l l'l '!i !Xl'l
Freedom of Religion
14
a priest cannot be elected·as municipal •mayor. (Pamil vs. Teleron,
86 SCRA 413 [1978]; see Art. II, Sec. 6.)
(2) The expression "civil· or political rights" (supra.) is to be
understood. as including. ~e individual rights safeguarded by the
Constitutioµ and s~~tut<;>ry laws such as the right to hold office or
to vote. The provisiq~ has no application to rights derived from
the lawful associat\on 'i:/11;1.di~iduals for the propagation of certain
forms of religious worship. Liberty of private association is complete
tinder the provision;. regardless of the test, religious or otherwise,
which the associated persons may see fit to adopt. (Verzosa vs.
Fernandez, 55 Phil. 307-[1930],)
(3.) The reason for•the provision is easy to understand, Without
such prohibiiion, religious freedom becomes meaningless, The State
without such a bar, notwithstanding the doctrine of its sepnrntlon
from the church, could· 'in fact accord preference to a religiouH
organiztl:Hon.15
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Law excludes from closed shop agreement employees belonging to
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization.
Facts: The law, R.A. No. 875 (as amended by R.A. No. 3350.),
otherwise known as the "Industrial Peace Act," excludes said
employees from the application and coverage of a closed-shop
agreement.
Issue: Is the law unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
provision prohibiting legislation for the support of any religious
sect?
Held: No, (1) Primary effects of exemption. - "The primary effects
of the exemption from closed shop agreemenl:s in favor of members
of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with
14In the cited case, the minority votes of five (5) members of the Supreme Court
prevailed over the insufficient votes of (7) members. The requirement to declare a law
unconstitutional was 2/3 of all the members of the Court (or 8 v otes out of 11 members)
under the 1935 Constitution, and at least 10 members under the 1973 Constitution. (see
Art. X, Sec. :Zj2) thereof.) The prohibition is not provided in the Administrative Code of
1987. (Exec. Order No. 292.)
15TANADA and FERNANDO, op. cit., p. 283 (1952),
 , 1
" 11111111 11tll, 11/'l.j~ IIII I IIIUN, J, J AW
l'1h11!11h.111,1111lt 1111111 1
11 1111 1111• utg1111l1t11llo11, 111 11111 p1t1h•1 llol1 nl P111ld l't11ploy1•1•t1 ,, 11 111 11 ,11
1111'. nggr< 1111 11 fon'<' ol IIH• rt1ll1•r llvv burg11l11lng n1_1rccmcnl, 1111d
rohovl11g c,•rloln dtiz,•1111 of n lrnrdcn v11 their religious bclicf8;
nnd by cllrnlnnlint, ton certain cxlcnt economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace to, the h ealthI moralsI
and welfare of the people of the State. The Act also promotes the
well-being of society. The exemption front the effects of closed shop
agreement does not directly advance; or'd1rriinish, the interests of
any particular religion." · , •·
(2) Benefit to a religious sect me~eiy iti~{d~ntal. - "Although
the exemption may benefit those who' are members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from joi.riirig labor unions, the
benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect.
The 'establishment clause' (of religion) does not ban regulation
on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise
clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that
religious exercise be preferentially aided," (Anucension vs. National
Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350 [1977], through Justice Makasinr.)
2. A group of people was prevented by the government to go to St.
Jude Chapel adjacent to the Malacaiiang Compound and there to pray and
hear mass.
Facts: Petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus
to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside
the Chapel and a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from
preventing them from getting into and praying in said church.
Respondents maintain that petitioners' intention w~s riot really
to perform an act of religious ,worship, but to conduct an anti-
government d emonstration at a place close to the very residence
and offices of the President of the Republic. · locomotion may be curtailed. - "In the case at bar, petitioners are not
Issue: Is the curtailment in the use of the restrict~d area viola-
tive of the free exercise of religion?
. . Held: (1) Exercise of right must be done in good faith. - "While
1t IS beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and
inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of
all fundamenta\_I'ights for that matter, must be d one in good foil'h.
As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishcH: 'EVl'ry pt•rson must, in
the exercise of his rights and in th<: per(ornrnm•p or lii:i d11lil'tJ xx x
observe honesty and good fnith ."'
I
I\ IH Ill 1111 I.I 11 • l~lt ,I I I t ,
F11•t•d11111 ol lMlglo11
(2) J<estricticms itt use of tltorot1ghfa1·es near the Malacaiiang Palace
are reasonable. - "E:ven assuming that petitioners' claim to the free
exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents' reaction
to the October .2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized
as violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972,
when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the Malacanang
gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P.
Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted.
While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been
absolutely prohibited, passersby have been subjected to courteous,
unobtrusive security checks.
The reasonableness of this restriction is readily pel'ceived and
appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect
the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government
officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacaflang. The need to secure the safety of heads of Hlntc nnct
oth~_r government officials cannot be overemphasized. The thrcnt
to their lives anq safety is constant, real and felt tlU'oughoul the
world. Vivid illustrations of this grave and serious problem nre the
gruesome assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of violence
and terrorism that have been perpetrated against heads of state and
other public officers of foreign nations.
Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several
executive offices within the Malacafiang grounds from possible
external attacks and disturbances. These offices include
communications facilities . that link the central government to
all places in the land. Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is
necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive
branch of the government, which petitioners' mass action would
certainly disrupt."
(3) Freedom to translate religious belief into action and freedom of
denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to
translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the
pronouncement of this Court in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (106
Phil. 2 [1959].) Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the
·use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of which
have already been discussed, is allowed under the fundamental
law, the same having been established in the interest of national
security." (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 {1985 ], through Justice
Esco/in.)
!Hll .l '.111 .1,11'1',INI.'.: C UNS'l'l'Jl.JTlU>NAli I.AW
Principles and Chses '
Teehankee, J., dissenting:
(1) Freedom ofreligion, speech, and (!SSembly are preferred righfs. -
"Freedom of worship, alo.n,,gside with ·rr~edom, of expr~s.sio~. and
speech and peaceable ~ssem~ly alon,g with the either in't:ellectual .
freedoms, are. htgNy ranked in our .s~~me · o{ .constitutional
values. It cannot be too strongly stress.~ct'-that .o~ the judiciary -
even more so than on the other deparn)ien;ts. _: ~rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of. assuring .re'i,pect for.and <;l.eference
to such preferred rights. No verbal fonnu1a, :no sqnctifying phrase
can, of course, dispense with what has b"een-so·felicitiously termed
by Justice Holmes as 'the sovereign prerogativ_e of ju?gment.'
Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of
the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do
precedence and primacy."
(2) Justification for restraint. - "In the free exercise of such
preferred rights, there is to be no prior restraint although there may
be subsequent punishment of any illegal acts committed during
the exercise of such basic rights. The sole justification for a prior
restrain~ or limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State
haH n right (and duty) to prevent."
(::l) Hrmlen to justify prior restraint lies on public officials. -
"The burden to show the existence of grave and,imminent danger
lhnl would justify prior restraint and bar a group of persons
fw111 entering the church of their choice for prayer and worship
lim1 on the military or police officials who would so physically
l'l'lilTain them. Indeed, there is no precedent in this 'time and age
whci·e churchgoers whose right of free exe_rcise of their religion
is recognized have been physically prevented from entering
their church on grounds of national security. On the other hand,
it does not lie within the competence nor authority of such
officials to demand of churchgoers that they show and establish
their 'sincerity and good faith ... in invoking the constitutional
guarantee of freedo~ of religious worship and of locomotion' as
a pre-condition, as seems to be thrust .of the rnajofity decision.
Nor is there any burden on the churchgoer to make 'a satisfactory
showing of a claim deeply rooted in religious conviction' before
he may worship at the church of his choice - as appears to be the
Ht?t.!. LJ ART. 11 l. IHI ,I. U l1 l{ll a rn-,
l~reedom of Religion
basis of Justice Gutierrez' concurring opinion for dismissal of the
petition." ,.
(4) Good faith is presu,rzed in the exercise of constitutional right,
- "Good faith on both .s ides is and must be preswned! Thus,
petitioners' manifestations of their sincere intention as Christians
to gather togetherJn prayer at St. Jude Church who is known as the
Patron of the Impossjble should be taken in good faith. It would
seem that no court_petition should be necessary to enable a group
of persons such as petitioners to freely proceed and ent er a churc~
of their religion and choice and therein hear mass and say their
prayers. We are basically a people of peace who believe in the power
of prayer and pray silently for God's guidance and compassion and
that peace and justice may reign in the land."
Makasiar, J., dissenting:
Wearing of yellow T-shirts and bearing yellow em/Jlcms nre for11111
of expressions. - "Their wearing yellow T-shirts and clothing und
beari~g yellow emblems or banners, are forms of expression which
are also protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression in general, and religious freedom in particular. The
fact that most, if not all, of them are not residents of Sampaloc or
the neighborhood around St. Jude' s Church, should not impair
their credibility as to their true intentions because St. Jude's
Church, to the believers or devotees, is the only church in Metro
Manila especially dedicated to supplications for the realization of
impossible hopes and dreams."
Abad Santos, J., dissenting:
It was highly presumptuous to attribute unstated and unadmitted
motives to petitioners, - "It may be assumed that they intended to
pray for the full restoration of the civil rights of the Filipino people.
But they were prevented by the respondents who .contended that
their real purpose was to demonstrate against the President .of the
Republic. In my opinion, it is highly presumptuous for both the
respondents and this Court to attribute unstated and unadmitted
motives to the petitioners. The petitioners said that they wanted
to pray and hear mass. Why can' t good faith be accorded to them
in 'the light of the constitutional provision that the free exercise
and enjoyment of reJigious profession and worship shall forever
be allowed? It is unthinkable that they would conduct an anti-
government demonstration in the hallowed, premises of St. Jude
 1'1111 ,ll'l'INH l ( JN!il ITU'J'l.<.>N.(\I , LAW
Principles nnd Ct1ses
Chapel and thereby defile it., If they taised their fists in protest
and shouted invectives it was only after .th~,y tiad peen.arbitrarily
barred from going to the chapel." · · official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents m
Melencio-Hetrera, J., dissenting: : r • · .', .
There was no· clear and present danget: t/p11qlfc place and order. -
'The location of the _St. Jude Qtapel wifum 'Jpe perµnet~r of the
Malacanang security area is_not, to ~y ,_ ptifid, s~fficient. reason
for a prior restraint on pet~tione;s: rigl)t, f~ freedom of ~eligious
worship. Proper security measures c<1r.t:;~J;w~xs be taken: It is. only
when petitioners, in the exercise of their religious beliefsJ exceed
those bounds and translate their freed.Om~ ~to a_cts detrimental or
inimical to the superior rights of pub)ic;: peac;e and order, that the
test of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil is met and
.the acts having a religious significance O'll!Y ~e infringed upon in
the .ex_ercise of the police power of the $tat~. Freedom of worship
is susceptible of restriction only to p;-eyent grave and immediate
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect. (West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Bqrnette, $19 U.S. 624 [1943).)"
3. fudge, in his decision, made disparaging remarks against a
religious sect.
Facts: Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious sect, took umbrage at
Ilic• porlion of the opinion of the respondent judge in the course
of 1H\jt1ltting the clefcndnnts accused of rape, to wit: "It cannot,
lhrrcfow, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to
011 n gimmick of showing to the community xx x that the Iglesia ni
Cristo unhesitatingly helps its members of his/her problem."
issue: Does the offending portion warrant disciplinary action?
Held: Yes. (1) Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. -
"The use of the word 'gimmick' could offend the sensibilities of
the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not ina~curate to state that as
understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary.
It may indicate lack' of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade
others to take a course of action, which without it may not be
acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert that intentional
.,
deceit is employed, it could have. that effect. The Latin maxim,
'.
I
Suggestio falsi est suppresio veri, comes to mintl. It is to be expected
that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a 'gimmick' to
gain converts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of
Scc.5 ART. III. BlLL OP RIGHTS 543
Freedom of Religion
religion implies,'respect for every creed. No one, mu~h less a publ_ic
a derogatory sense." ,
(2) Judge should be more careful in the use of language. - "!he
Court, however, takes into consideration the fact that the_ nght
of a court ·t o give expression to its views is equal~y de~e~mg of
protection. At any rate, it is not an affron t to rahonahty 1£ note
be taken that not all members of the bench are possessed of _such
an extensive vocabulary in the English language that the nususe
of a word is to be followed automatically by reprisal of a severe
character. .While .under the circumstances, some me_m~ers of _the
Court are of the opinion that censure is warranted, it is the view
of the majority that an admonition would suffice. The respondent
is admonished to be much more careful in the use_ of _langunfl<'
likeiy to offend an individual or religiot~s sect.." (l?lesw III Cr/Glo v:,.
Girone/la, 106 SCRA 1 [1981), through Cl11efl11st1ce 1-enumdo.)
4. Law prescribes compulson; daily flag ceremonies in all public
schools.
Facts: The children of members of a religious sect, the Jehovah's
Witnesses, had refused to salute the Philippine flag, s~g the
national anthem, or recite the patriotic pledge as reqwred by
Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 issued by the Secretary
of Education implementing R.A. No. 1265 of July ~1, 19~5. They
"were willing to remain silent and stand at attention with their
arms and hands down straight at the sides."
Issue: The members alleged that their participation would be
offensive to their religious beliefs.
Held: (1) Religious freedom is subject to reas?,nable and .non-
discriminatory laws and regulations of the State. - If a man hved,
say on an island, alone and all by himself without neighbors, he
would normally have complete and absolute righ:s as ~o th~ ~ay
he lives, his religion, including the manner he practices his rehg~ous
beliefs. There would be no law to obey, no rules and regulations
to follow. He would be subject only to nature's physical laws. But
man is gregarious by nature and instinct and h_e gravita_tes toward
community life, to receive and enjoy the benefits of socie~ and of
social and political organization. The moment he does this ~nd he
becomes a member of a community or nation, he has to give up
some of his rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the
 ) 'I HLU'P .IJN .Ll CON!:i'I'l'J/E.J'lll©~/,~m.. LAW Sec,5
Principles am!. Cases,
· general welfare, just as his fellowmen and dem:paniorts also,a'&ree to
a limitation of their rights in his favor:!So,,v.iitld:\is;re;ligibrt: He,may
retain his freedom of religious belief, but as-to,practish:tgJthe same,
he would have go give up some of thqs~:p\~ctices repugnant to the
general welfare and subordinate them to the laws anq. sovereignty
of the State. . , , (4) Patriotism and love of country is vital to national existence.
In other words, the practice of religion or religious, belief is
subject to reasonable and non-discriminatory la:ws and regulations
by the State." :, •
(2) Requirement does not impose religion, religious · belief, or
religious test. - "In requiring school pupils lb participate in the flag
salute, the State through the Secretary _of Education is not imposing
a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is
merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable
to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, l'ro'testant or Jehovah's
Witness. The State is merely carrying·:out the duty imposed upon
it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and
regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain
a complete and adequate system of public education, and see
to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things, civic
consciousness and teach the duties of citizenship. (Art. XIY, Sec.
5, 1935 Constitution, now Art. xrv, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution.) It
does nothing more than try to inculcate in the minds of the school
population dming the formative period o£their life, love of country
und love of the flag, all of which make for united and patriotic
clt!zenr7' so that ~ later. years .they may be ready and willing to
serve, fight, even die for 1t. .. , . ..
, It i~ well-known that whatever is taught to the y outh during
tlus pen od, such as love of God, of parents, respect for elders, love
of the truth, loyalty, honoring one's word and respecting the rights
of others, becomes a habit or secon.d nature that will remain with
them always. School children of kingdoms and empires are taught
early to respect and love the king or the emperor for these rulers
~~ sover:J8n~ sym~olize the nation, and the children as future
citizens or subiects will come to love their country."
(3) Flag salute is not compulsory. - "In enforcing the flag salute
on the petitioners, there was absolutely n o compulsion involved,
and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations abou t
th~ flag ~al~te, they were not being prosecuted. Neithe r were they
being cnmmally prosecuted under threat of penal 1;1nnction, If
they chose not to obey the flag salute regulntion, they nwrL?ly lost
Sec. 5 A,Ii:P, .IU. BILL O F RIGHTS
Freedom of Religion
the l;>enef}..ts. of public education being maintained at the expense
of their fellow _1;_iti,zens, nothing r:nore. According to a popular
expression, they take it or leave it.. Hc;1.ving elected not to comply
with the r~gulations,about the flag salute, they forfeited their right
to attend public schools." .
.,.,.. "Me11 ~ay differ and do differ on religious beliefs and creeds,
gov,ernment. policies, the w isdom and legality of laws, even the
correctness of judicial decisions and decrees; but in the field of love
of country, reverence for the flag, n ational unity and patrioti~m,
they can hardly afford to differ, for these are matters in which they
are mutually and vitally interested, for to them, they mean national
existence and survival as a nation or national extinction."
(5) Philippine flag is not an image but n sy111/Jol of 1111tiv11,1I
sovereignty and devoid of religious significance. - "The flap, iB 11111
an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Phili.ppiI1c~, 1111
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and colu,!Hio11
and of freedom and liberty w hich the Constitution gmmmtecu
and protects. Considering the complete separation of church and
state in our system of government, the flag is utterly d evoid of
any religious significance. Saluting the flag, consequently, does not
involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the
recital of the pledge of loyalty, is no more a religious ceremony than
the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate
for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while his right hand
is raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
promises to defend the Constitution and even invokes the help
of God; and it is to be doubted whether a member of Jehovah' s
Witnesses who is a candidate for admission to the Philippine Bar
would object to taking the oath on the ground that it is a religious
ceremony."
(6) Established constitutions of society and law prevail over exercise
of religious belief. - "The realm of belief and creed is infinite and
limitless bounded only on one's imagina tion and thou ght. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without
b ounds. One may believe in mostly anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scale of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of
said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise
of said religious belief clashes w ith the established constitutions

J'J Ill .ll'PINH \)N:J'l'lTUTlU>N~I'. I.AW
Principles nnd Coses :
of society and with the law, then the formermust:'y ield:•,a rid, give
way to the latter. The Government stepsin·al'ld,eithet•resttains said
exercise or even prosecutes the one exercisi.ng1it."
(7) Determination of whether ritual is reltgfoiis 'ceremony r~s'ts with
courts, - "The determination of whether a ·certain ritualis or is not
a religious ceremony must·rest With the-courts. It cannot be left to
a religious group or sect, much less· to a follower.:o f said group or
sect; other';Vise, there would be confusipr:i ~d misunderstanding
for there might be as many interpretations ·and' meanings to be
given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups
or se,cts ?r follo,wers'. all depending ~pon the meaning which they,
~ough m all smcenty and good faith, may want to give to such
ritual or ceremony." (Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2
[1959], through Justice Montemayor.)
Note: In the above case, it was likewise held as not abhorrent
to :eligious freedom the payment of taxes, the singing of the
na~o.nal anthem, the reciting of the patriotic pledge, and military
training. Polygamy even when permitted by religion may be
validly prohibited. Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna vs. Secretan;
of Education (110 Phil. 150 [1960].) R.A. No. 1125 and the ruling in
Gerona h~v~ bee~ incorporated in Section 28, Title VI, Chapter 9 of
the Admm1strat1ve Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292.) which took
effect on September 21, 1988, one year after its publication in the
Official Gazette, Vol. 83, No. 38 of September 21, 1987.
S. Same issue raised in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education.
Pacts: All the petitioners are school children who are members
of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses. They were
expelle~ by school au~horities in Cebu from school (both public
and pnva,te), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to
take part m the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band)
or singing)he Philippine National Anthem, saluting the Philippine
flag, and reciting the patriotic pledge.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge for they believe that those are"acts of worship" or "religious
devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give xx x to anyone
or anything except God." They feel bound by the Bible'B commnnd
to "_guard ourselv:s from idols." They conside r the flng nu nn lmnw:
or idol representing the State. They think thnt t·he m:lio11 of llw
!,4'./
1
/\~.<.11', JU.. IJll.1. U l 1 l{!G l.1'1'::i
Freedom of Religion
I
school a.u.tlrorities irncoll'l.pelling flag salute and pledge transcends
constimtionar·'lirriitatiohs OR the State's power and invades the
sphere of the in\el1eet·and spirit which the Constitution protects ·
against official ¢PI'\trol. '
Iss~e: The petitioners raised essentially the same issue raised in
1959 in Cerona vs.
Secretqry of 'Education and Balbuna vs. Secretary of
Education.
· : · Held: (1) Time: ha~ come to re-examine Gerona ruling. - "Our
task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year-old decisic;m of this
. Court in Gerona upholding the flag salute law and approving the
· expulsion of students who refused to obey it is not lightly to be
trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic, however, that after the Gerona ruling hnd
received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the Administrn tlvo
Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time hnfl comr:
to re-examine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute
the· flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge,
during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job
or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the
present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of
Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech16 and the free
exercise of religious profession and worship." (Sec. 5, Art. lll, 1987
Constitution; Art. IV, Sec. 8, 1973 Constitution; Art. Ill, Sec. 1[7),
1935 Constitution.)
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled
to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. (Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando' s separate opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531.)
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined w ithin the realm
of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. O. Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., pp. 176~177.)"
(2) Sole justification for prior restraint on exercise of religious
freedom. - "Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not
The flag salute, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge are
16
all forms of utterances.

l'.1.11,Lll'l'JNI•: 'UN~,'l'l'J'I I J IUNAI, I ,AW
• Principles and Cases
tc!,ke part in the compulsory flag .cere,w.9:i,.~, thev: do qot.engage in
'external acts' or behavior that :wo.u.ld:.offen(:JJ):i§lir;,CPuntrym,.en who
believe in expressing thei11 lov:e..of cow1t!,3/;Jht;9}1gh th,e oqservance
of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand ~t,~tt.e~ntJorrd:uring the flag .
ceremony to show their respect for the right ofthosf'! who choose to
participate in the, solemn ptoc~~aings. S~te'~eidd ndf ep.gage in
disruptive behavior~ there is rlo \vartan:t'Jc3r' llieli expulsi_o n: ..
'The sole justification for a prior res_triint o.rJimitatto~ •~~ the
exercise of religious freedom (according)o the late Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting op_inidn ili'eJermar, vs:'Barangan,
135 SCRA 514, 517.) is the existence ol a grave lmd-:present danger
of a: serious evil to public safe~ publk moral~, public health or any
other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty}
to prevent. Absent su~ a .t hreat -to public safety, ,the expulsion of
the peijtioners fx:om ti)e schools is .not ju!:l~£i.ed.11
(3) Coerced loyalty is not conducive to love ofcountry and respect for
duly constituted authorities. - "The situation that the Court directly
predicted in Gerona that: · a mere shadow of freedom, The test of its substance is the l'igh t
'[T]h~ flag ceremony will beco~e. a· thing of the past
or perhaps conducted with very few p~ticipants, and the
time will come when we would have citizens untaught and
uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the fl.ag and
love of country, admiration for national heroes, and p9 triotism
- a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all Sec;'luse a small
pol'lion of the school population imposed its will, demanded
nnd wns grnnted an exemption.' (Gerona, p. 24.)
hew not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the
Jehovn,h's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem, and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which
admittedly comprises a 'small portion of the school population'
will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
'untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for
the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national
heroes' (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24.) After all,
what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony,
not exclusion .from the public schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government,
and learn not only the arts, scienc;es, Philippine history and culture
but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught
the virtues of 'patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation
for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral
• /\1:<J ', 111.1111 ,l , l >ti IW :I 111 1
Frt!cdom uf Religion
and spiritual values (Sec, 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution,) as part
of the curricula.
· Exp@lling or 'banning the petitioners from Philippine schoo~s
will bring about the very situation that this court h~d feared m
Gerona, Forcing a small religious group, thro_ugh the ir?n h~~ of
th~ law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for
duly constituted authorities.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319
0.S. 624 (1943): ,
· 'x x x To believ.e that patriotism will not flourish if
patriotic. ceremonies are voluntary and spont~eous, instead
of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estunatc of
the appeal of our institutions to free minds. x xx When they
[diversity] are so harmless to others or to the Stntc as thuH1'. ':'."''
deal with h~re, the price is not too great. But freedom to dtffcr
,is not limited to things that do not matter much. Thal would lie
to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even
to the country, x x x - assuming that such unity and loyalty can
be attained through coercion - is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot
be promoted by prohibited means.' (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.)"'
(4) Expulsion of petitioners will violate right to free education.
- "Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah 's Witnesses
from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right
as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the State to 'protect and promote
the right of al~ citizens to quality education x x x and to make such
education accessible to all.' (Sec. 1, Art. XIV.)"
(5) Exemption may be accorded to petitioners out of respect to their
religious beliefs. - "In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59
SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo, from the coverage of a dosed shop agreement betw~en
their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching
of their church not to join any labor group:
'x x x It is certain that not every conscience can be
accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general
J - I l1 ll 11 II
,l'I IIJ.ll'l'INI\ l ~UN!,'l'l ll.JJ'l'lti >N\1\1. I.AW
l 'rlndplcs und Cuscs
laws conflict with scruples .o f consciencer e.xemptions ought to
be granted unless some 'compelling state-in:tetests' intervene.'
(Sherbert v. Bemer, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed·. 2d 965, 970 83 S. Ct.
1790.) . _ ·
We hold that a similar exemption 11'1.ay be accorded to the
Jehovah's Witnesses with reg_a rd to the observance of the flag
cererpony out of respect for their religious l;>eliefs, however 'bizarre'
those beliefs may seem to others." ·
(~) Exemption does not give them right t~ disrup,t the patriotic
e~ercises. - "Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the
flag e_eremony does i:iot give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited ·by this Court in Non
VS; Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must
be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, 'this
should not be taken to mean that sch9ol_authorities are powerless
to discipline them.' If they should commit breaches of the peace
by actions that offend the serisi~ilities, both religious'and patriotic,
of other pers~ns. If ~hey quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremo;1y while the1r classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we, do not see
how Ruch conduct may possibly dishlrb·the peace, or pose 'a grave
nnd present danger of a serious evil to public·safety,public morals,
publlt: hcnlth or nny othet' legitimate public interest that the State
hur, n right (nnd duly) to prevent.' (German vs. Barangan:, 135 SCRA
!ii ,1, fi'l 7.)"
(7) D11ty of every Filipino to appreciate and cherish the Philippine
fl11g. - "Defore we close this decision, i,t is approp.ri~te to recall
t~~ J~pfmese .occupation ?f. our .country -in.1_942-i 9'~, whert e_very
F1hpmo, regardless of rehg1ous persuasion; in fear of.the inv.ader,
sal_uted ~e Jap~i:iese flag and bowed bef()re .~v~_ryjapaq~se soldier.
P~rhaps, 1f petitioners had lived through ~~t q,_ark ped9µ of our
history, they wo~d no\ quibble n?w about saluting ihe Philippine
flag._For "".hen hberatim~ c~me m 194.4 and our own flag was
proudly hoisted aloft agam, 1t was a beautiful sight to behold .that
made our hearts po~nd with pride and joy over the newly-regained
freedom and sovereignty of our nation. · ·
. Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners'
right under our C~nstit:u~on to refuse to salute the Philippine flag
or:i acc0unt of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that
another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in
AltH UL BlLL O F RIGHTS 551
Freedom of Religion
order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine
flag." (Ebralinag vs. -The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,
219 SCRA-256 (199.1], through Justice Gr/no-Aquino.)
Cruz, J., concurring:
(1) Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. - "In my
humble view, Ger.on.a was based on an erroneous assumption.
The Court that promulgated it was apparently laboring under
the conviction that the State had the right to determine what was
religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what he
could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not
a religious image but a symbol of the nation, it was implying that
no one had the right to worship it or - as the petitioners inslHtccl
- not to worship it. This was no different from snying thnt the r11ll
that reveres Rizal as a divinity should not and cannot do no bl'1'11w11•
he is only a civic figure deserving honor but not vcncrntion.
It. seems to me that every individual is entitled to choom• for
himself whom or what to worship or whether to wornhip nt nil.
This is a personal decision he alone can make. The individual may
worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag) and the
-State cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can
it compel him to, do so. As long as his beliefs are not externalized
in acts that offend the public interest, he cannot be prohibited from
harb~ring them or punished for doing so."
(2) State cannot interpret the Bible for petitioners. - "In requiring
the herein petitioners t_o participate in the flag ceremony, the State
has declared ex cathedra that they are not violating the Bible by
saluting the fla_g: Thi~ is to me an unwarranted intrusion into their
religious beliefs, which tell them the opposite. The State cannot
interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit.
Right or wrong, the meaning they derive from it cannot be revised
or reversed except perhaps by their own acknowledged superiors.
But certainly not the State. It has no competence in this matter.
Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and
authority, cannot invade."
(3) Petitioners' refusal does not disturb peaceful atmosphere of the
school. - 11
1 am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition
that 'the constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new p rivileges. It gave religious
equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity
 If I[
• I'1I11,ll 'l'IN H l 'l >N! J1.'1 J'lJ l'I:( >rN,NI, I ,AW
t>rlncipb1 nnd Cmics
',
· to,religious dogma, not.foeedon]. from.conformity toJaw, because of
, religious dogma/. , ..,. .. : ., . .,. . ,, /'.' :.. ,, ·_f •.•i:· - _.·'. .
, But in the case·at bar, the'la.w to whiclfTh:er'etitioners a~e made
to conform clashes with their own wjde~st~ndi~g of their religious
oblfgations. Significantly,; as the_: poneµi;iq ).1i;1tt}s, _t):ie_ir intransigence
does not d-lstµrbthe peaceful atm.oi;phere·:ofthe scl),ootot·otherwise
prejudice.the public order. Their-tefusal tifsalute ·the fla:g:ani:i recite
the patriotic pledge does not disrup.t theflag:cere:moriy. They neither
mock nor disdain it..The petitioners simflly stand :at attention and
keep quiet I to show their respect for ;the ,right of those who ehoose
to participate in the solemn proceedings.' It -is· for this· inhoctious
conduct that, pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the
teachers have been dismissed and the· students expelled."
(4) Right to remain silent is protected by· the Constitution. -
"Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it
been said that the Bill of Rights that-guarantees to the individual
the liberty to utter what is in his mini± also guarantees to him the
liberty not to utter what is not in his mind, The salute is a symbolic
manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as
the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot
be compelled any more than it can be prohibUed in the face of valid
religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it
on thl~ petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their
r •ligion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no
pine<.) in the free society."
(5) Co11scientious objections of petitf;ners are protected by the
Co11s/.i/11tfrm. - "The democratic system provides for the accommo-
clntion of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the
biznrre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot
regiment thought by prescribing the ~e'citation· by rote of its opin-
ions or proscribing the assertion ,of un:orthodox or unpop~ar views
as in this case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no
· less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are pro-
tected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual
speak when the soul within rebels."
Padilla, J., separate opinion:
(1) Rultng/i may create more problems than we have solved. - " At
the same time, I am really concerned with what could be the far-
reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be
sanctioning a privileged or eJite class of teachers and students who
' j
II II IJ IJ ltl D
Alff; UJ. HILL UJ• l{JL~l.l'l'S 55ll
Freedom of Religion
wiH·here~fter,be-exem;pt from patticipatiag, even_when they are in the
school premises,,in the flag ceremony in defE;lrence to their religious
scruples:·;Wh<}th~pens, for insta_nce, if some citizens, based also on
their religious hi:?H!'*3, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees
.t ?. ~eJ??.:.'e:i:nm,~!'~? perhaps problems of this nature should not be
a~H¢ipatr~r~~Y..\fi.lt'bE;r_esolved wh¢rt and if th~y ever arise. But
yv~t'h. today s"q.;~c~~ton, we may have created more problems than
we have solved; :
' • ' .' . . "
It cannot b~ ct~nied that the State has the right and even the
duty to promote .among its c_itizens, especially the youth, love
of country, respect for the flag and reverence for its national
heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the State has the right to
adopt reasonable means by which these laudable objectives can
be effectively ·pursued and achieved. The flng ceremony ii, one
such device intended to inspire patriotism and evoke the f1111•11t
sentiments of love of country and people.
In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitbn nlc means to nchicvc
legitimate (and noble) ends. For a select few to be exempt from the
flag ceremony and all that it represents even if the exemption is
predicated on respect for religious scruples, could be divisive in its
impact on the school population or community."
(2) Arrangement is suggested to achieve an accommodation. - "I
would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who
because of religious scruples or beliefs cannot actively p articipate
in the flag ceremony conducted in the school premises should be
excluded beforehand from such ceremony. Instead of allowing the
religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display therein
his inability to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the pledge of lqyalty to the Republic, he or she should remain in the
_classroom while honors to the flag are conducted and mani.fested
· in the 'quadrangle' or equivalent place within school premises; or
if the flag cere,:no!}y must be held in a hall, the religious objector
__ must take his or her place at the rear of (or outside) the hall while
_ those who a_ctively participate in the ceremony must take the front
· places. ·
This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation
and, to a certain extent, harmonization of a citizen's constitutional
right. to fre_e dom of religion and a valid exercise of the State's
fundamental and legitimate authority to require homage and honor
to the flag as the symbol of the Nation."
 J ,I
l 1'1 lll ,ll'P INE C<JNS'l'lTU'flti>.NU1.L LAW Sec.5
Principles and Gases '.
6. Respondent, a married female empl0,yee who'.'Was cohabiting with
a· married man, claims exemption•from the prohlbition ,on com:ubinage,
justifying the cohabitation on the ground ofifreedom of religion •as it- is i~
uniformity with the tenets of the church t0 which she belongs. · 1·:
Fa,cts: Ee~pon<;ient SE, ~ c~1_.1r~ int!:~(~\% ~fs.<tem~r,Jf~~v~ly
charged with disgraceful and unmora~ c·~n:~t.1,ct~9~ cf ha~:~~.~.w1th
a married man when her husband was. still alive and continued
to do so for over 20 years and begot_a ·Son· 20 years. of age. In her
defense, she presented a document entitled "treclarationof Pledging
Faithfulness" she executed whert he:r ' husl5~nd ' Wa's still lfving,
allegedly that said docu91ent was .with ·saMt{g~ of the Jehovah' s
Witnesses to which she belortgs. Her live-in parfuer also ~ecuted a
similar document. A foi:mer minister of tjle c6ngregatiort affirmed
the_exeqition of the document as pledged as in accordance with
the doctrines of the said:church. His J~stimo:rw was affirmed by a
District Minister of the congreg~tion. · . · ·
SE invokes her right of freedo:0 of religion. Flnding the
defens~ of religious freedom unavail~g, the .C ourt Administrator
recommended the suspension of SE for six (6) months and one
(1) day without pay with a warning that a repetition of .t he same
offense will be dealth with more severely in accordance with Civil
Sci:vlrc Rules.
l ii!JIIC: May SE invoke the religious belief and practices and
morn! 111'r111clurds of her religion, Jehovah's Witnesses, in asserting
lhnt her· conjuBal arrangement with a man not her legal husband
docfJ not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she
:;hould be held administratively liable?
Held: (1) Two main standards in deciding religion clause cases. -
"x x x Rather, the cases discussed above suffice to show that, as
legal scholars observe, this area of jurisprudence has demonstrated
two main standards used by the Court in deciding religion clause
cases: separation (in the form of strict separation or the tamer
version of strict neutrality or separation) and benevolent neutrality
or accommodation. The weight of current authority, judicial and in
terms of sheer volume, appears to lie with the separationists, strict
or tame. But the accommodationists have also attracted a number
of influential scholars and jurists. The two standards pro.ducing two
streams of jurisprudence branch out respectively from the history
of the First Amendment in England and the American colonies
and climaxing in Virginia as narrated in this opinion and officially
Sec.5 AR'lf: III. BILL OF RIGHTS 555
Freedom of Religion
acknowledged by the Court in Everson, and from American
societal life .which.reveres religion and pFactices age-old religious
traditions. Stated otherwise, separation - strict or tame - protects
the principle ·o f chu~oh-state separation with a rigid readfog of the
principle while benevolent neutrality protect.s religious realities,
tradition · and established, practice with a flexible reading of the
principle. x x x.
x x. x While the strict neutrality approach is not hostile to
religion, it is strict in hqlding that religion may not be used as a basis
for classifica.tion for purposes of governmental action, whether the
action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations.
Only secular criteria may be the basis.of government action. It does
not permit, much less require, accommodation of secular programs
l
! ' to religious belief. xx x.
Accommodation is distinguished from strict neulrnllty in that
the latter holds that government should base public policy solely
on secular considerations, without regard to the religious conut!·
quences of its actions. x x x An accommodationist holds that it is
good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for
the state to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid interfer-
ence with religious freedom~ On the other hand, the strict neutral-
ity adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also consti-
tutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific
policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise. xx x."
(2) History of religious clauses in the Philippines. - "Before
our country fell under American rule, the blanket of Catholicism
cover~d the archipelago. There was a union of church and state and
Catholicism was the state religion under the Spanish Constitution
of 1876. Civil authorities exercised religious functions and the
friars exercised civil powers. Catholics alone enjoyed the right of
engaging in public ceremonies of worship. Although the Spanish
Constitution itself was not extended to the Philippines, Catholicism
was also the established church in our country under the Spanish
rule. Catholicism was in fact protected by the Spanish Penal Code
of 1884 which was in effect in the Philippines. Some of the offenses
in chapter six of the Penal Code entitled "Crimes against Religion
and Worship" referred to crimes against the state religion. The
coming of the Americans to our country, however, changed this
state-church scheme for with the advent of this regime, the unique
I: American experiment of "separation of church and state" was
l transported to Philippme soil. x x x.
i '
i
 PHILIPPINE CONSTf f:(;.l,':0G)N~A LAW
Principles and .C::~~~s ,
, . , With the Philippin~s ,.un<;\ei; ,Uw A~~:ri~~n~'.V~g'i.ro.e,, 1ijr~§}dent
McKinley issued In$.t,r.11ctions.tq.•t4~$eg9J\.diPl,llilippin.~1Cqpm].1,ission,
~e body created to take over the dvilgo;Ver~~ntiµthe Philippines
m 1900. The InstructiQns. gu~ranteecl religious freedqm. x,x x.
Thereafter, ev~ry · organic act of the Philippines· conta'ined a
provision on freedom ofreligion. xx x: · ·. • of Aglipay v. Ruiz involving the Establishment Clause, defined
In accordance with the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the 1935
~onstitution. provided in the Bill of Rights, Article rv, Section 7,
VIZ.: XX X ••
' . '
This provision, borrowed from the Jones Law, was readily
approved by the Convention. In his speech .a s Chajrman of the
Committee on Bill of Rights, Delegate Lawel said that modifications
in phraseology of the Bill of Rights in the ·Jones Law wer~ av~ided
whenever.possible because the principles must remai~ couched in
a language expressive of their historica,l background, nature; extent
and_H:mita~ons as construed and'interpreted by'the great statesmen
arid jurists that vitalized them. ..
The 1973 Constitution which supersede\'.,i the 1935 <;:onstitution
contained an almost identical provision on religious fr~edom in the
Bill of Rights. ii:t Article-IV, Section 8, viz.: x. xx
This time, however, the General Provisions 'in Article XV added
In S<!ctlc>h l!hhat '(t)he separation ·of church and state shall be
lnvlolrime."' · 1
WHhout discussion by the 1986. Constitution·a1 Commission
Lho t973 religious clauses were reproduced iii'tHe
1987 ConstHutio~
under the Bill of Rights in Article III, ·sectioit' ·:5, ;Likewise, the
provision on separation of church and state «.a:S ihcluded verbatim
in t~e 1987 ~o.n s,titution, but this time as fprinciple in Section 6,
Article II entitled Decla'r ation of Principles and State Policies. ·
,. ~onsidering the American origin . of th~ Philipphle reiigion
clauses and the. intent to adopt the historical background,
nature, extent ~nd liI,n~tations of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution when it was included in the 1935 Bill of Rights, it is
not surpr_ising that nearly all the major Philippine cases involving
the religion clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in explaining
the nature, extent and limitations of these clauses. However,
a close scrutiny of these cases would also reveal that while U.S.
jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two main streams of
interpretation - separation and benevolent neutrality - the well-
Sec.5 A!iR.tr. nr. BILL OF RIGHTS 657
Freedmn 0£ Religion
,'
spring of Philippine· jitrisprudenc.e on this sul;,ject is for the most
patt, ben:_volent·neutrality which gives room for accommodation."
· (3) Jurisprudence: Free Exercise Clause. - 1 "In Philippine
jurisprudence, religion, for purposes of the religion dauses, has
thus far been interpreted as theistic. In 1937, the Philippine case
"religion" as a "ptofession of faith to an active power that binds
and elevates man tohis Creator." Twenty years later, the Court cited
the Aglipay definition in American Bible Society vs. City of Manila,
a case involving the Free Exercise clause. The latter also cited the
American case of Davis in defining religion, viz.: "(i)t has reference
to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations
they impose of reverence to His being and character and obedience
to His Will." The Beason definition, howeve1~has been expanded i11
U.S. jurisprudence to include non-theistic beliefs.
Freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden,
whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. The
Free Exercise Clause principally guarantees voluntarism, although
the Establishment Clause also assures voluntarism by placrng the
burden of the advancement of religious groups on their intrinsic
merits and not·on the support of the state.
In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief
poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona vs. Secretary of Education
is instnictive on the matter. x x x The difficulty in interpretation
sets in when belief is externalized into speech and action. Religious
speech comes within the pale of the Free Exercise Clause as
illustrated in the American Bible Society case. x x x.
This was the Court's maiden unequivocal affirmation of the
"dear and present danger" rule in the religious freedom area, and
in Philippine jurisprudence, for that matter. The case did not clearly
.·show, however, whether the Court proceeded to apply the test to the
facts and issues of the case, i.e., it did not identify the secular value
the government regulation sought to protect, whether the religious·
speech posed a clear and present danger to this or other secular
value protected by government, or whether there was danger but
it could not be characterized as clear and present. It is one thing to
apply the test and find that there is no clear and present danger,
I; and quite another not to apply the test altogether.

• I 'I I11,I1 'I 'lNI\ ( 'ON!::i'l'l'fU'L![ONJ\.L LAW
Prindples and Case's
Instead, the Court categoricaUy held .that ··the questioned
ordinances were notapplica:bleto,'Plairitlff'as:ifwas not,engaged in
the business or occupai;ion of sel1ing said·1'.fri~rchandise" for profit.
• • • ''· ~ ' "f , • • • , ~ ' • .. ., ,;
In the rnµch later0oase of,Tolcntino.vs;,iS.ecr;efary of Finffn.ce, also
involving the sale of religious bo(:)ks1· th,~•;~c;iµrt distinguished the
American Bible Society case from . the fac;t;~ and issues in Tolentino
and did.n ot apply the American Bible ~ocie_ty·~ling. xx x .
ln the Court's resolutio~ of the -~qtib~·for·reconsiderafion of
the Tolentino decision, the Court no~ed t;hftfh'e burden o~ religious
freedom c:aused by the tax was just similaf ·t(). any other economic
impositio·n' that might make ,the right to dissemina,te religious
doctrines costly.
fuo years afte~ American· Bible S~cie,ty., came the ·_1959. case
of Gerom.i vs. _Secretary of Education, !fil.s _tii:11,~ invotvin$ conduct
expressive of religious belief colliding w'itn a rnle prescribed in
accordance with law. x x x It was held that the flag was not an
image, the flag salute was not a religious ceremony, and there was
nothing objectionable about the singing of the national anthem as it
speaks.orly of love of country, patriotism, liberty and the glory of
suffering and dying for it. xx x The Gerona ruling was reiterated in
Bnlbuna, et al. v. Secretary of Education, et al.
'(lifteen years after Gerona came the 1974 case of Victoriano
v9, Elizalde Rope Workers Union. In this unanimously decided en
lmnc case, Victoriano was a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo which
pr9hibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization.
I-Je worked in the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. and was a member of
the Elizalde Rope Workers Union. x x x
Quoting Aglipay vs. Ruiz, the Court held that "government is
not ,p recluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character
even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or
sect." It a.ls~ dted Board of Education vs. Allen, which held that .in
, 9rder .tp withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, a
statute ttrust have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion. x x x
. A close look at Victori??no would show that the Court mentioned
sev:~ral tests in determining when religJous freedom m<}y be validly
limited; Ftrst, the Court mentioned th~ test of "i1Itffiediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of ,the community" and
"infringement of religious freedom only_ to the smallest cxlPnl
necessary" to justify limitation of religious freedom. 8r•t'/)//(/,
II W
Sec. 5
' , A-l9°• )IL l31LL OP RIGHTS 559
Freedom of Religion
re~igious exercis~ l?i).ay be indirectly burdened by a general law
w.hich has f9r it~·P,1:-r,I?pse and effec_t the,advancement of the.state's
s¢c,u1~r -goals, pr,o,v;~de,d .t hat th.ere 1s no other means by which the
sta·te can accomplish this purpose without imposing suck burden.
:-f • 1·, · ~ · · .
·' Third, the:,Coul't' ·refot.:red to the "compelling state interest'' test
. , whichgranfa exemJltions ~hengeneral.Jaws conflict with religious
.exercise, _unless ,a co~pelling state interest intervenes,
Victoriano was reiterated in several cases involving the Iglesia
· ni Cristo, namely 'Brisa, et al. vs. Federadon Obrera de la Jndustria
Tabaquera y Otros 'Trabbjadores de Filipinas, Anucension vs. National
Labor Union, et al., and Gonzales, et al, vs. Central Azucarera de Tarlac
Labor Union.
Then came GermtJn vs, Barangan in 1985 at the height of tJ,e nnti-
administration ralHes. x x x The majority found 1Ju1t the rcntl'icllon
imposed upon petitioners was "necessary to maintain the tnnoot'h
funs;tioning of the exe_cutive branch of the government, whid1
petitioners' mass action would certainly disrupt" and denied
the petition. Thus, without considering the tests mentioned in
Victoriano, German went back to the Gerona rule that religious freedom
will not be upheld if it clashes with the established institutions of society
and the law.
Then Associate Justice Teehankee registered a dissent which
in subsequent jurisprudence would be cited as a test in religious
freedom cases. x x x
In 1993, the issue on the Jehovah's Witnesses' participation in
the flag ceremony again came before the Court in Ebralinag vs. The
Division Superintendent of Schools. A unanimous Court overturned
the Gerona ruling after three decades. Similar to Gerona, this case
involved several Jehovah's Witnesses who were expelled from
school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge, in violation of the Administrative Code
. of 1987. In resolving the same religious freedom issue as in Gerona,
· the Court this time transported the 'grave and imminent danger'
test laid down in Justice Teehank.ee's dissent in German, xx x.
Three years after Ebralinag, the Court decided the 1996 case
of Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Although there was a
dissent with respect to the applicability of the 'dear and present
danger' test in this case, the majority opinion in unequivocal tenns
applied the 'clear and present danger' test to religious speech. xx x
 J' I I LJ ,11 'l 'I N n L 'l >N n 'l'I I.IU 1J',l'. ) NAJ•. I .AW
• Prlndples nnd Q';.ises :
In Iglesia, therefore, ,t he Court went back to Gerona insofar as
:holding that religious freedom cannot be invoked.to seekexemption
from compliance w.1th a law that,hur.dens·ol'le's religious exercise. It
also reiterated the 'dear :and pres.ent;danger' test in American Bible
Society and the., grave a,nd imminent darrger' in •Victoriano, but this
time clearly justifying its applicability and showing how the test
was applied to the case. , · ·
In sum, the Philippine Supreme Courthas;adopted a, posture of not
invalidating a law offensive to religious freedom, .but carvi-ng. out an
exception or upholdfng an exception to· accommodate religious exercise
where it is jus.tified.
(4) Jurisprudence: Establishment Clause. - "In Philippine juris-
prud_ence, th.ere , is substantial aweement on the values sought to be
protected by the Establishment Clause, namely, voluntarism and insulation
ofthe political process from interfaith dissension. The first, voluntarism,
. hc1s 09th a p!,!rsonal and c1 social dimension. As a personal .value,
it refer-s to the inviolability of the human conscience which, as
, ~lSCll.SSE\d, above, is also protected by th~ free exerci.se clause. From
the, religio\l,s perspective, religion requires vol:untarism because
compulsoi;y faith lacks religious efficacy. Compelled religion is a
contradiction in terms. As a social value, it means that the "growth
of a religious sect as a social force must come from the voluntary
1111pport of itfl membern because of the belief that both spiritual
nml Hcculor society will benefit if religions are allowed to compete
rn, Llwir uwn intrinsic merit without benefit of official patronage.
Such voluntarism cmmot be achieved unless the political process
ii, l11A11lntcd from religion and unless religion is insulated from
politics." Non-establishment thus calls for government neutrality in
religious matters to uphold voluntarism and avoid breeding interfaith
dissension.
The neutrality principle was applied in the first significant non-
establishment case under the 1935 Constitution. In the 1937 case of
Aglipay v. Ruiz, x x x The Court, citing U.S. jurisprudence, laid down
the doctrine that a law or government action with a legitimate secular
purpose does not offend the Establishment Clause even if it incidentally
aids a particular religion.
Almost forty-five years after Aglipay came Garces vs. Estenzo.
Although the Court found that the separation of church and state
was not at issue as the controversy was over who should have
custody of a saint's image, it nevertheless made pronouncements on
' /Ii 1-:.'I'. 111. 111 I. I. l l II Rl ;1 I' I•~
Freedom of Religion
the separation Cif ohurch and state along the same line as the Aglipay
!ruling. The• C:} (jUtt· held that there was nothing unconstitutional or
,.illegal iEt.holdmg·a fies.ta and having a patron saint for the barrio.
..
X·,XX '
, ,. ,'. ·•- ;,. .,
' · .
Then dme Ute1978case of Pamil vs. Teleron, et al. which presented
a' novel issue ihvolving the religion dauses. In this case, Section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 disqualifying
ecclesiastics from atilpointrnent or election asmunicipa'l officer was
chailenged. After .protracted deliberation, the Court was sharply
,: divided on theJissue ..Seven members of the Court, one short of the
number nec~ssary to declare a law unconstitutional, approached
the problem front a free exercise perspective and considered the law
a religious test offensive of the constitution. On the other hand, the
pr,evailing _five 9ther .members of the Court - Chief Jwitice Cnfllro,
. )u.sti~es. Barredp, ~\,fa~~siar, Antonio and Aquino - npp.ronched Ilw
, , .sase.from .~ Jfqn-establis);µnent perspective and uphold the lnw 111111
s_afeward against the constant threat of union of church nnd Hl.f110
. Jha~ _h as ~arl&.ed Philippine history. x x x.
;( Anothet: type of cases interpreting the establishment clause
-. ·deals -w ith·mtramural religious disputes~Fonacier v. Court ofAppeals
· . is the leading case. The issue therein was the right of control over
certain properties of the Philippine Independent Church, the
resolution of which necessitated the determination of who was the
Jegitimate bishop of the .church. x .x x The Court then ruled that
p~titioner Fonacier was legitimately .o usted and respondent de
los Reyes was the duly elected head of the Church, based on their
internal laws, x x x While the Court exercised jurisdiction over the
case, it nevertheless refused to touch doctrinal and disciplinary
differences raised. xx x"
(5) Free Exercise Clause vis-ti-vis Establishment Clause. - "In
both Philippine and U.S. jurisdiction, it is recognized that there is a
tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause in
their application. There is a natural antagonism between a command
not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice;
this tension between the religion clauses often leaves the courts
with a choice between competing values in religion cases.
One set of facts, for instance, can be differently viewed from
the Establishment Clause perspective and the Free Exercise Clause
point of view, and decided in opposite directions. In Pamil, the
l
I
\
I
majority gave more weight to the religious liberty of the priest
I
 I f
11111111 It II I I II l'd l l l l fl llll l.-'ll , 1 1\\'V
l' d1111,,1, II 1111.i t f\lll'tl I
ht holding lli,tl lliq pl't>hlbltl()II of ui:olcalnHUk!J to llfl911ll1C ol<.Jclivo
or uppolnllvc govornm.enl posillons wns • violative of the Free
ExcrclHc Clnu11c. On tJ1c other h tmd, the prevailing f.ive Justices gave
importance to the Establishment Clause in stating that the principle
of scparntion of church and state justifie,d ,the prohibition.
Tension is also apparent when a ca~e is dE\cided to uphold the
Pree Exercise Clause and consequently·,e xemptions from a law
of ge'.1eral a~~licability ~re afforded P,Y ~~ J:~urt to,:the person
1
claimmg religious freedom; . the question - ar,1ses._wfleth!;)r the
exemption qoes not amount to support ·o f the. reJigion in violation
of the Establishment Clause. This was fhe .c~s·e in the .Free Exercise
Clause case of Sherbert where the U.S. Supr~me Ceurt _ruled, viz.:
XXX
Tension· also exists when a law of general applicatj_o n provides
exempti<iln in order to uphold ~e -~~e;r~ii as in_ th~ Wa!,t case
where the appellant argued that the exempti,on granted to religious
organizations; in effect,· required him to contribute to religious
bodies in violation of the Establishment Oause. But the Court
held .that the.exemption was not a case of esta!:;>lisl'l,ing religion but
mer~ly upholding the Fr_e e.Exerdse Clause.by '.sparing the e;xercise
of religion ftom the burden of property taxation levied on private
p,rofit instih,ttions.' x xx
Similarly, the Philippine Supreme Court in the Victer-iano case
held that the exemption afforded by law to. religious ·sects -who
prohibit their · members from joining unions did not offend the
Establishment Clause. We ruled, viz.: 'We-believe that in enacting
Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit
of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise
of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union
security agreeme~ts.' (emphasis supplied)
· Finally, in' some ·cases, a practice is obviously violative of the
Establishment Clause but the Court nevertheless upholds it. In
Schempp, Justice Brennan stated: ' (t)here are certain practices,
conceivably violative of the Establishment Clause, the striking
down of which might seriously interfere with certain religious
liberties also protected by the First Amendment.'
How the tension between the Estnblishment Clouse nnd the
Free Exercise Clause will be 1·0Rolvod iii n qtwfJllon for dclcnninnlion
in the actual cases lhnl conw lo th,. <. '011rt. In rn:1e11 involvh,fl' holli
the Estnblishmc11t ('11111111 • 1111d Iii,• !In•,. lix1•11•l,1" l'l111111<•, lhl' lwo
• 1 ,'\JU ,•lll 11111 ,1, 1 ,1 , l(lt ,111 l
Jlrl'Udom ~,( HoHulon
. clauses should ,be•:balanced against each other. The courts must
review all the J'ele¼ant facts- and ietennme .whether there is a
sufficiently s:trong-fre.e; exercise right tha.t should prevail over the
Establishment GlcJ.uSe problem.. In the .United- Sta:tes, it l:l'as been
proposed that 'in balancing, the fl:ee exereise claim must be given
an edge not only because of abundant -historical evidence in the
colonial and early national period of the United States that the
free exercis.e princtpie long antedated any b,road-based supp0rt of
disestablishment, P,Ut.a lso because c;ln Establishment Clause concern
raised by merely a,e::.commodating a citizen's free exercise o_f religion
seems far less dangerous to the republic than pure establishment
cases. Each time the e9urts side with the Establishment Clause in
cases involving tension between the two religion clauses, the courts
convey a message of hostility to the religion th at in thnt cnse cnnnot
be freely exercised. American professor of conslilulinnnl lnw,
Laurence Tribe, similarly suggests that the free cxerclllo prl11dpl1•
"should be dominant in any conflict with the nnli-c1anbllHhm1 nl
principle." This dominance would be the result of commi lnwnl
to religious tolerance instead of "thwarting nt all costs even the
faintest appearance of establishment." In our jurisdiction, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. asserts that a literal interpretation of the
religion clauses d0es not suffice. Modern society is characterized
by the expanding regulatory arm of government that reaches a
variety of areas of. human conduct and an expanding concept of
religion. To adequately meet the demands of this modem society,
the societal values the relig_ion dause_s are intended to protect must
be considered in their interpretation and resolution of the tension.
This, in fact, has been the approach followed by the Philippine
~ourt."
_(6) Intent to ·adopt a benevolent neutrality approach. - "The
history of the religion clauses in the 1987 Constitution shows that
these clause~ were largely adopted from the First Amendment of
the U.S. ConsJitution. xx x
,.. - Alongside this change in the landscape of U.S. religion
clause jurisprudence, the Philippines continued to adopt the 1935
Constitution religion clauses in the 1973 Constitution and later,
the 1987 Constitution. Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries
01:1 the religious clauses also continued to borrow authorities from U.S.
jurisprudence without articulating the stark distinction between the
two streams of U.S. jurisprudence. One might simply conclude that
the Philippine Constitutions and jurisprudence also inherited
 r IJ
1• I 111 II' I' II II • I ,, I' , I I I I t I /I fl ( ~ 1 h I AW
• J11111t lf'll N 1111cJ (
1
11111"1
tlw cll!mrmy uf U.S. religion qlu1rnC' jul)Jspmdbncu and .• the , Lwo
ldcnlifiablc streams; ,thus, when> m:,religionr.dause . case comes
before the Court,. a separatio1;1,ist,o.pproa_ch1 ,dr''il,brmevolent•·neu·t,:1,1/ihJ
approach might .beiadopJi:!d1and:iealbbtt_:o/i1H.'lia~e-·U S.•,al!Lth~:rities to
support it. <Dr, on:e·might t:@rtcldde,1thatta:s~the·hist0ry of.ihe·•First
Amendment .as na1.1rated 1by.1fuet,.Coµ:rt:14'v.~t,erson( sup.p0I.cts, the
separation,ist approach:; ·Philippine,jNTi!:lp;t'l!l<!le:tjc:e:sh0.uldia1lso follow
this appr©aclt.ik vlight_;0f the;Philtppy;,~'tel!imo.n~q~s~s{.Justozy. As
aresult,in,a casewher-e-the-p~t:y,dl~~l}gid),µsrlil:?ert:w~t,!c1e,£ace
of a general law that.inad:verteatlyibut~en.~·h±s 11el-i,gtotis,exer.qise, he
faces an almost insurmour,i.table·wa:lLiroaen.<V,incingl the'.€-0mt. that
the wall of separation would not _b e .b~eacbe_d · if ,the.-Co~t grants
him an exemption. These-conclusions, howp;?r, a_r,e,·not-~l'!d_~~e never
warranted by,the 1987, 1973 and 1935 Constitutio_ns as shown by.other
pro.visions, on religion in all thriee co;nstitutions, .,It.is.a c~:rdin:al rule in
constitutional construction that-~~co~~tit1irti.onmust be·intl:!rpteted
as a whole and apparently conflktirt'g provisions : should be
reconciled and harmonized in·a manne11:that will:give t0 all of them
full force and effect. From this construction, .f t will be ascertained-that
the intent of ·the framers was to adopt a-benewlent neutriality approach in
interpreting the religious clauses in the 'Philippine consUtutions, and the
enforcement of this intent is the goal ofconstruing the constitution.
XX X
Although our constitutional history and interpretation
mnndntc benevolent neutrality, be:i;,.evolent ii.eutrality .does· not
mean that the Court ought to .grant ex~tnptio.~s-~very; ,time.a free
exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean that the Court will
not look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious be,liefs
and practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it
can within flexible constitutional limits; il does'mean: .that'the Court
will not simply dismiss a claim unqer the Free Exercise Ciause
because the conduct in question offends a law or the orthodox view
for this precisely is the protection afforded by the religion d~uses
of the Constitution, i;e., that in the absertce of legislation granting
exetnption from a law of general applicability, the Court can.carve
out an exception when the religion clauses justify 'i t. While the
Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate
the difficult questions of judgment in 1 determining the degree of
burden on religious practice or importrmcc of the state intcreRt
or the sufficiency of the monns udoptc ct L>y 1'110 11l'!l.tC to purm1c ilt-1
interest, the Court cnn set n doC'lrliw on tlw idt•nl lownrcl» whkh
1 /\ 1{ I'. Ill. 1111 ,l , l >fl l<lt,111 ! ,
Freedom of Rdiglon
religious clause: •j urisprudence sh0"1ld be directed. We here lay
do.wn the dochine ..that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the
benevolentneutr.ality•approach not only because of its merits as
- discussed abo°½e,-.b ut in0re importantly, because our constitu.tional
' ' history andt inter.pretation· indubitably .show that benevolent
neutrality is the launching pad from which the Court should take
,.
; off, in: interprep.pg religion clause cases. The ideal towards which
this approa~J~ 1dirE:,¢teq is the protection of religious liberty "not
only for. a mino_rity,· however small - not only for a majority,
however large ~ but for each of us" to the greatest extent possible
within flexible constitutional limits.
Benevolent neutrality is manifest not only in the Constitution
but has also been recognized in Philippine jurispmdence, nlbeit
not expressly called 'benevolent neutrality' or 'accommodnlion.'
x xx While the U.S. and Philippine religion clnuses nre Rimilnr i11 Ji1r111
and origin, Philippine constitutional law has departed .fmm tlii: 11.8.
jurisprudence of employing a separationist or strict 1w11tmlity f/f)/lro11ch.
The Philippine religion clauses have taken a lifo of their own,
breathing the air of benevolent neutralih; and acco111111odatio11. Tl111s,
the wall of separation in Philippine jurisdiction is not as high
and impregnable as the wall created by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Everson. While the religion clauses are a unique American
experiment which understandably came about· as a result of
America's. Ei:i.gllsh background and colonization, the life that these
clauses have taken in this jurisdiction is the Philippines' own
experiment, reflective of the Filipinos' own national soul, history
and tradition. After all, 'the life of the law . .. has been experience."'
{7) Interest of the State should also be afforded utmost protection.
''But while history, constitutional construction, and earlier
• jurisprudence unmistakably show that benevolent neutrality is the
lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases,
it must be stressed that the interest of the state should also be afforded
i utmost protection. To do this, a test must be applied to draw the line
tI between permissible and forbidden religious exercise. It is quite
I paradoxical that in order for the members of a society to exercise
, i
l their freedoms, including their religious liberty, the law must set a .
limit when their exercise offends the higher interest of the state. To
do otherwise is self-defeating for unlimited freedom would erode
order in the state and foment anarchy, eventually destroying the
very state its members established to protect their freedoms. The
very purpose of the social contract by which people establish the
,.I
 See. b
l'l llLll.'l'lN .l:.i CUN S'H'l'U'.l'J;WN~L LAW
Principles and Cases
state is for the state to protecttheirJibertiesy{or,,this pt,mpose1 they
give up a portion of these freedoms - including the natural right
to free exercise - to the state. It was certainly not the intention of
the authors of the constitution that free exercise coukt be used to
countenance actions that wouid:'undo-.the:constitunonal order that
guarantees free exercise."
(8) Test to be used. - "The all 'in,i.poftant qUestion then is the
ol
test that should be used in ascertaintng t).le ihnifs the exercise of
religious freedom. Philippine Jurisprild'e ncel rticulates sliveral tests
to determine these limits. Beginning with •the firsniase on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court m"entfoned the
'clear and present danger' test but did not-employ it. Nevertheless,
this testcontinued to becited insubseqt!ent cases on religiol:ts liberty.
The Gerona case,then pronounced that :the test of permissibility of
religious freedom is whether it vioiat'es the established institutions
of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate
and grave danger" test as well as the·d.oatrine that a l:aw of general
applicability may burden religious exereise.provided,the 1aw is the
least restrictive means to accomplish'the-goal :of the law. The case
also used, albeit inapproprlately, the 'tom:-pelling-state interest' test.
After Victoriano, German went back to theGerona itrle., Ebralinag then
employed the 'grave and immediate-danger' testand overruled the
Gc/'01111 test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to
t·ho 'clear and present clanger' test inthe maiden case of American
lli/1/e Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the 'clear
011rl prcoc11t danger' or 'grave and immediate danger' test involved, in
1111c for111 or mwtlwr, religious speech as this test is often used in cases
u11 frei:t/0 111 of expression, On the other hand, the Gerona and German
cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
cstnblished institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which
was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag
which employed the' grave and immediate-danger' test. Victoriano
was the only case that employed the' compelling state interest' test,
but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to
the facts of the case."
(9) Case at bar. - "The case a.t bar does not involve speech as
in American Bible Society, Ebralinag and I~esia ni Cristo where the
'clear and present danger' and'grave· and immediate.ctanger' tests
were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate
effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach,
•" AK,L', 111. UlLL, 0 11 Kl(.ill'L'~ tl<i'I
F1:eedom of Religion
thus not ~ppr.o priat~ in this jm:is¢ic~ion. Similar to Victoriano, the
present case invohits .p,urely conduct ari$ing from religious belief,
The 'co111pelling state. interest' test is proper where conduct is involved
for the whole gi:imu.t.QJ human conduct has different effects on fhe state's
in_terests: son;e, •effects may be immediate and short-term while others
delayed .amt far-.reac(ling. A test that would protect the interests of
the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
~el!3-yed, is therefore n~cessary. However, not any interest of the
. state would s:ti:ffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom
a
as this is fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in
the hierarchy of rights - 'the 'most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights,' in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for
an·invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited govcmmm1t·
is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher flOV('r1•ig11ly,
thus the Filipinos implore the 'aid of Almighty c;od in 1inlc-1· lo
1
build a just and humane society and estnblifih n gov1•rnnwnt. Au
helq in Sherbert, only the gravest abuse11, cndoni~cring p111·1111101111 I
interests can limit this fundamentnl right. A mere bnlnncing of
·interests whic}:i balances a right with just a colorable 8tate Interest
is therefore not:appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of
the state can ptevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty.
The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling
orie, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion,
especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed.
In determining which shall prevail between the state' s interest
and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
' compelling state interest' serves the purpose of revering religious
liberty while at,the.same time affotding protection to the paramollll\l
interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which
involved conduct, i.e., refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end,
the 'compelling state interest' test, by upholding the paramount
interests of the state, seeks to protect the very st ate, without which,
religious liberty will not be preserved."
(10) The religion clauses and morality, - "In a catena of cases,
the Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit
relations are guilty of' d isgraceful and immoral conduct' for which
he/ she may be held administratively liable. In these cases, there
was not one dissent to the majority's ruling that their conduct was
immoral. x x x Respondent Escritor does not claim that there is
error in the settled jurisprudence that an illicit relation constitutes
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which a government employee
 I 'I llLll 'I 'IN H 1..;uNn U ll 11 1/H,J>NAI. I.A,W
Principles nnd Case8 ,
is held liable. Nor is there an aUegati:c::m-:tlii1~ th:e,nonns--of•morality
.· with respect to illicitrelation:s·have 13hi-£tecrt0wards-lenten:ay,-from
the time these precedent.casesw,rere,d'edded., The <C'ourHirt'ciis that
there is no such err0r,or shift1 thus·we-fim;l no teasontodevrate.from
these rulings that such iHidt .relationship::t0'lil:Stitutes 'disgraceful
and immoral conduct' punishable undei:'theCivilService Law.
Respondent having ad~itted the --~J1'.eg,~_d )i:nmoral conduct,
she, like the respondents in the abd\i~:citeg cM~s/ :courd be held
administratively liable. However, there is a·distinguish'ing factor
that sets the case at bar apart from the cited precedents, i.e., as a
defense, respondent invokes religious freedom since her' religion,
the Jehovah's Witnesses, has, after thorough~wesHgation, lli1owed
h~r conjugal arrangement with Quilapio based on tqe church's
religious beliefs and practices. This distin~ishing fact_~r compels
IJ:le Court to apply the religious dauses, ~Q .th':.c<1,se at bar. x xx
The public morality expressed. in the. law is necessarily
secular for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit
the state from establishing a religion; including the morality it
sanctions. Religious morality proceeds from a person's 'views of
his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of
reverence to His being and -character and obedience to His Will,'
in nccordnnce with this Court's definition of religion in American
/Ji/Jlc Society citing Davis. Religion also dictates 'how we ought to
live' for the nnture of religion is not just to know, but often, to act in
accordance with man's 'views of pis relati,pps.Jo His Creator.' But
!he Ustnblishment Clause puts a negative bar.against establishment
of thiH morality arising from one religion c;,r :the other, and implies
the nffirmative 'establishment' of a civil otdedor the res,olution of
public moral disputes. This agreement, on a.s~c.ul~r mechanism is
the price of ending the 'war of all sects aga,inst ali'.; the establishment
of a secular public moral order is the soGial_.contract produced by
religious truce.xx x
Thus, when the law speaks of 'immorality' in the Civil Servic~
Law or 'immoral' in the Code of Professional Responsibility for
lawyers, or 'public morals' in the Revised Penal Code, or 'morals'
in the New Civil Code, or 'moral character' in the Constitution, the
distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand,
and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The
morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily seculm~
not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. 'Rcligi.ous
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence l'he civil
I I
1
A,~· t'. l1J. I 11LL UL1 J,{l(JI ITS
Freedom of Religion
public 0tder;1bu:tr·p ub1ic:moral disputes· ma)l-be resolved only on
,grounds ,avticulable·,m!,secular terms. Q~emise, ·.if go~e.mment
relies uppn religious .beliefs in formulating public pohe1es and
morals; the +~sultingpolicies and morals wo!-!ld require conformity
to wh~t s9~e· _might,r~gard :as religiq~s programs or agenda.
The non-qe!ie;vers. -woµld therefore be . com,P,eµed t? co~oqn to
a standard of conduct buttressed by a r~~igioui;; belief, .i.e., to a
'compelled religion/ anathema to religious· fr~edom. Likewise,
if government base4 .its actions upon religious -.beliefs, it wo~ld
tacitly approve or ·endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious vie"."s that wo~ld
not support the pqlicy. As a result, goverrunent will not provide
full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it ~ppear
that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second~clnss c1ttzcns,
Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that governnwnt lw
neutral in matters ofreligion; governmental rclinncc upon 1·r liglo11H
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neulTnlity. x x x"
(ll) Distinctio.n between public and secrilar 111or11/ily. - "The
distinction between public and secular morality as expressed -
albeit not ex,clusiveiy - in the law, on the one hand, and n:ligious
morality, on the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement
·the Court rriakes in the case at bar should be understood only
in this ·realm where it has authority. More concretely, should the
Court declare respondent's conduct as immoral and hold her
administratively liable, the Court will be holding that in the realm
of public morality, her conduct is reprehensible or there are state
irtterests overriding her religious freedom. For as long as her
· conduct is being judged within this realm, she will be accountable
, to the state. But in so ruling, the Court does not and cannot say
. that her conduct should be made reprehensible in the realm of her
· church where iHs presently sanctioned and that she is answerable
for her immorality to her Jehovah God nor that other religions
prohibiting her cond~ct are correct.
__.' · On the other hand, should the Court declare her conduct
permissible, the Court will be holding that under her unique
circumstances, public morality is not offended or that upholdtng
her religious freedom is an interest higher than upholding public
morality thus her conduct should not be penalized. But the Court
is not ruling that the tenets and practice of her religion are correct
nor that other churches which do not allow respondent's conjugal
arrangement should likewise allow such conjugal arrangement or
 l 1(Li1• 1•11111,,,,., 1111 111,,ii .111 LAW
I 11 I Ill I ,,11,~ Ill td ( ,11.c•tt
11ho11ld 1101 ll11d un.vlhlng lnrn,iot·nl :1bot1l ll·nvtd therefore mcmbcrn
of Lhcsc churches Ol'C nob tmswcrable• for. in11n0rnliby to their
Supreme Being. xx x ,, ,.
• ' I ., ' '
Only one cq~~uct)~ µl _qu~_s tion befo_.r~. th,i_s _Co,utt, i.e., the
conjugal ai'ral').g~~e'nt d(a goverhm'~/it ~¢ploye~. tvliqse parq,.er is
legally married to.~l)other ~hie? ~hilippirie~aw·ahd ju'r i,~ prudence
consider b9th"j.nimoral,anq ilf~g~t: *:X
~'! ·:.:. :,, :. ·.. · I '• 1 , .· ,
. . .. . -· ' . ' .. ,,,.;
{12) Application of Ben~volent NeaUtt;µJity )nit
;Comp~lli~g Jnterest
tes~ to case at Bar. - "The case at bar b1eing)5ne,6£· fifqt iµi.pression,
we now subject the respondent's daim;ot.i~figio.us freeciom, t0 the
'compellin$ .state interest' testfrc;m a./Jenevo1ent neutra1ity ,stance·- i.e.,
~ntertaining the possibility that •respori'd~ht'!Vdaim' 'to·-religious
freedom would warrant carving ·_out an· excepti_~n £tom·
the Civil
Service Law; necessarily; her de'fense ofreligiotis .freedom will be
unavailing' should the ·g ovenunent' suc~eed iri· demdrtstrating a
more compelling state interest. · • .. .
' .'
◄
In applying the test, the first inquiry is 7.11hi;tbf!r-respondent's right to
religious freedom has been burdened. There .i~ .no doubt that choosing
between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious
belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her
employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the
other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion.xx x
Tltc second step is to ascertain respondent's sincerity in her religious
/icl/ef Respondent appears to be sincere· in her religious belief
nnd practice and is not merely using the 'Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness' to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not
secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where
the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after
· ah administrative case for immorality was filed against her. The
Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of
living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she
entered the judiciary. x x x
Respondent's request for exemption from the flag ceremony
shows her sincerity in practicing the Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs
and not using them merely to escape punishment. She is a practicing
member of the Jehovah'·s Witnesses and the Jehovah ministers
I. testified that she is a member in good standing. Nevertheless,
should the government, through the Solicitor General, w,mt to
further question the respondent's sincerity and the centrality of her
practice in her faith, it should be given the opportunity ll) do BO.
AJ{'l", Ill. IHLL (.)JI KlCI ITS 571
Preedom of Religion
The government ·has not been represented in the case at bar from
its incipie~ce.until"this point. xx x"
. (13) Butden ofevidence on the compelling interest of the State. - "In
qny event;-.even if;the.Court deems sufficient respcmdent's evidence on the
·sincerity of1her.. ref.igious belief and its centr.ality in her faith, the case at
•. ·bar ctin11.9tstill•be;decided ,using the 'campelJing state interest' test. The
. case at bar is one ,of first impression, thus the parties were not aware
of the burdens o(proof they should discharge in the Court's use ·
of the 'compelling state interest' test. We note that the OCA found
'respondent's defense of r~ligious freedom unavailing in the face of
the Court's rulin'g in Dicdican v. Fernan, et al,, viz.: XX X
·'.' It is .appa;el).t from the OCA's reliance upon this ruling th.a t
the stat~ intere~t it uphqlds is the preservation of the integrity of
the j4diciary by maintaining among·its ranks a high stnndnrd oi
. , morality and.' de!=ency. However, there is nothing in the OCA't1
m.emor'a ndurn to'the 'court that demonstl'ates h ow thiH lnt<~n•Hl
is so compelling that it should override rcspondcnl' H plcn of
religious freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by
!' the governrneht 111 pursuing its interest is the least rcslrictivc to
respondent's religious exercise. ·
1·
I Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private
\: person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state.
The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency
of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To
properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be
given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest
it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent's stance that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes
within the scope of free exercise protection. x x x The government
must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity
to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state's compelling
interest which . can override respondent's religious belief and
practice.'' 11 (Estrada vs. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 [20031, through Justice
Puna.)
11
The disp0sitive portion of Decision: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED
\ I to the Office•of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in
the case where it will be given the opportunity: (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality
of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's
"compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c} to
show that the means the s.t atc adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from
the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
 l_'llll 11 ' 1'11 111 1 111~• ,1111 1 11, •1·1.\1 I ,\W
I11l11t 1pl1 1M1111d ( ' mu•11
Ballosillo, J., Separate Opi11ion: · ,, , .,, ,'"t :- ,. , ·"' ., ·,
,, ~espon~ent should be absoiJ'ed ''of't~1'e ~4,i:h!nistra:iive 1'diarge. -
x x x Bu.t m the proper context in. whicih, µ~e ~vents complained
of transpired, .we cannot avoi~i being dra,wri to the conclusion
that respondent Soledad S. Eseiritor.""s}r6ul9'. be ·absolved of the
administrative ~harge against-her fer llii~~e,i~\i'0solutely ·no'thing
from her actuations-that would cori'§'tittite l'.Hsgracefill dr immoral
conduct. • . · . ·. . .> 'i , ;(· •·, L,,r,, . .., .
Contrary ~o 'some impre,s~i~rs;'. #}~'. ·: :A~rf 9.f; ~81PB}~~n.ant'.s
~ac~~l al!e~ations: occurred lo~g µ~4)~e JE:SJ??nder_t jo_ined the
Judiciary m 1999. ShE: was a widow _capacifa£.4d to: marzy when she
was appointed court interpreter: Her stat'us 'a.1 ir's:epar,adh'
who had
. bee~ ~?ithfu~ly, d.evotedly :and. p~a~eruµy ' t~l<'¥g
g?od /~r~·
9.t her
£a,rnilY -:--:- her partner and thE!ir tw~~fy:~p (f2)"yE!'a dili:l :~on --:--
was s~nctified as ~arly a~ 1~91 by"theJ~h6vah's'::tiVifue's'ses· the
religious group ~o which she and her £~63Ly
,~eJ.p~g~~/ a'pe~l~d
of
almqst ten (10) years b~fore she was em:p~oyea a,s c.qu~t interp:reter
.and );,efore th~ in~tant complaint against li~t~~~~-filed ·in:the,year
2000. Indeed, m hght of these facts, what_):;E{tter.jnstituti.on is there
to judge her morality than her own ch~rch; ¼rhat b~~iness does
the government have to judge her conduct tha(is not'criminal in
nnlurc nor destructive of her efficiency in the.-seriice? this is the
wilderness."
to
pith and soul of what may be referred as ra l~nely' voice in the
· · :. ··
Vit11g, J., Separate Opinion:
(1) Mo~ality of Mar7:iage. - "Marriage is ,~Re ~rea ~here law
and morality closely intersect. The act of -respondent Bscritor
?,~ cohabi~g with Quilapio, a married man, -can. only be ,called
unmoral m the sense that it defies and transgresses the institution
of marriage. Society having a deep interest in the preservation
of marriage, adultery is a matter of public, not merely private,
concern, that cannot readily be ignored. x x x
. Wi~ the separation of the Church and State, marriage has re-
ta~ed its sta~ as a legally protected vinculum because it is per-
ceived to be unbued with societal interest as ·a foundation of the
family an~ the ~asic unit of society. x x x Societal interest in monog-
amous uruons 1s grounded on the belief that the cohesiveness of
the family is better protected, and children, prized for their role in
the perpetuation of the future of the con11minity1 nn• bol.l'cr n•nrcd
i\10', Ill 11111 , 1111 Hit ,1 1 I I •
F1\•t•d11111 ol R1•1lglon
.,, , when spouses remain together. These societal interests are embod-
ied in mori;i'l ltl:~~ g~ared towards protecting the monogamous
natu,re. pf ,r:h,ili:m~.in~ marriages. But I do not endeavor to examine
whether PhiHppfne ~ociety is correct in viewing monogamy as the
better mean~_for the.protection of societal interest on the family but
I do woula f.6cus'tnysel£ on, given the facts of the case, whether or
not s_o_ci~t~f};1ter¢s'fls rightly served."
: (2) Blanket application of moral laws affecting marriage to be avoided.
- . "Ate we not sacrificing the substance of marriage - that is a
uni9n o(' ~c;lfl a:r:i.d woman in a genuine, loving and respectful
relationship and, in effect, the substance of a family, for a mere shell
of intriqate·legality? Lest I be misunderstood, I am not advocating
for a departure from the elevated concept marriage ns being n
legaUy ptotec'ted union. I merely express concern thot 11 blnnkul
applicatiohof moral laws affecting marriage, without i·cgnr<I to llw
peroliarities ofevhy'case, might defeat the very puq>OA(' for wl,lrh
those laws are put into place.
. .Thus, ~ v.qte. for the remand of the case to all(}W a thorough
examina,tton on whether a strict application of the provision in the
administrative code prohibiting immorality, under the facts and
circumstanc_e/I of the case, would defeat the very purpose which
it seeks to serve; A remand would allow the parties to assess the
fa1ctual issues, to adduce further evidence, if necessary, and to make
out their case towards this direction."
Ynares-Santiago, J., Dissenting Opinion:
. (1) Applicable provisions of law and jurisprudence take center stage,
- "When a case involving the concept of immorality comes to
court, the applicable provisions of law and jurisprudence take
center stage. ··
Those who choose to tolerate the situation where a man and
a woman separated from their legitimate spouses decide to live
together · in an 'ideal' and yet unlawful union state - or more
specifically, those who argue that respondent' s cohabiting with a
man married to another woman is not something which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless - show a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community in a manner
prejudicial to the public service."
(2) Issue is legal. - "The issue in this case is legal and not
philosophical. It is a limited one. Is respondent Soledad S. Escritor
l 1'1!11,ll'l'll-lHI I lN/illJIIIJPl)'l'>l ; l AW
l'rli1dplt•11 nnd C:11u1•11
~ •gµilty __of c;l.isgraceful and immoral' f.Qnq,-149t i.n fu~,,c;on_te~t:of the
I
, · €ivil.$ervice Law? Are there.any,sancti9P!? ~~;t:~~~tbe_j,µlpp~ed?
We cannot overlook the ·fact-that res~bmde'nt ·Escritor would
have been convicted for a criminai:, O'f{,efiSe•JKitne.offerided party
had been inclined and justified to pro~clte :4er prior to his death
in 1998.. Even now, she is a co-pri.ncip<!litiipi~r4ri1e1of'foilc_uollJage.
a
A married woman who has sexual intercours.e with. man not ·h er
husband, and ~e,man who has carnal;~m;,wte,dgli! ofher knowing
her to be married, commit the crm;ie oVad~ltery. •Aband.o nment
by the legal husband without justificatfon does not exculpate the
offender; it merely mitigates the penalty." , ,
(3) Respondent is charged as a court employee. - "hi this· case,
respondent is charged no_t as a Jehovah's Witn~ssbut in her ~apacity
as a court employee. It 1s contende4 that re~pected elders ·of the
Jehovah's Witne.sses sanction 'an inform.al' conjugal relationship'
between respondent and her marita!. partner £6:r more than two
decades, provided it is characterized by faithfulness and devotion
to one another. However, the 'informal conjugal'relatiorlship' is not
between two single and otherwise eligible persons where all that is
mi~sing is a valid wedding ceremony. The two persons who started
lo hvc tol}clher in an ostensible marital relationsnip 'are married to
ul·lwr p<'l'ROnll." ·
( '11r1ilo, J,, Dlsse11tl11g Opinion:
(1) Si11ccrity or insincerit-i; in religious beliefs is ~ot a test. - ''The
ostensible purpose of the remand is to allow respondent Soledad
S: Escritor 'to b~~tress the sincerity of her cla,imed religioµs belief'
~~d for, the Sob~1tor General 'to m~e.t th!? test, of compelling state
interest to override respondent's religious belief.xx x
A remand of_ th~s case for further prpc~~dings is clearly
.unne.c~s_sary. Escntor s unlawful cohabHati_on _with Quilapio is
an admitted fact regardless of the outcome "q f the remand of this
case. Escritor's cohabitation wit-h Quilapio constitutes concubinage
which is a crime under our laws. .
~~ issue then would inevitably turn on whether Escritor, or
any citizen for that matter, may invoke religious freedom to justify
~onduct that patently violates our criminal statutes. Such conduct
m the present case is concubinage. However, under the same claim
of religious freedom, such conduct may be bigamy, sacrifice of
/\1<1. 111.1111 ,l.< II' l<J< ,11 t :, /1/'I
Freedom of l<cli!jlun
' infants or irlfanticide, sacrifice of virgins or murder, or use and
possession of prohibited drugs as part of religious rituals. This is
the issue that Laddress in this dissent, after showing that Escritor's
conduct is neither disgraceful nor immoral."
(2) Respondtnt's cohabitation with live-in partner constitutes
l conduct· prejudicial to the best interest of the service. - "However,
I "t
while Escritoi: is hot guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct,
her cohabitation with the legally married Quilapio, a fact Escritor
readily admits, constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. Quilapio, whose marriage to another woman still
subsists, is liable for concubinage under Article 334 of the-Revised
Penal Code for cohabiting with Escritor. There is no showing that
Quilapio's wife has consented to Quilapio's cohabitation with
Escritor. In coricubinage, the concubine is a necessnry C<Hircw;ed
of the off~nqing spouse. The concubine iHpunh-1hed with rlr.!Jl/r, ro,
While no one can criminally prosecute Quilnpio nnd Hticrllor
without·, the: complaint of Quilapio's legal wife, still 1'11ifl Court
cannot countenance such unlawful conduct by a court employee. I.n
conduct prejµdicial to the best interest of the service, the immorality
of the ce.nduct is· not in issue. What is in issue is the adverse effect
of the conduct c.m the efficiency, integrity and credibility of the
civil service, and in the case of the judiciary, its impact on the
administration of justice."
(3) Wall ofseparation between Church and State is no defense against
exercise of State's police power. - "The power of the legislature
to declare concubinage a crime against the State is certainly
beyond dispute. In . effect, the legislature pronounces a socially
reprehensible act, which may or may not constitute an immoral act
by certain religious standards, a crime that the State has a right
to suppress to protect public order and the general welfare. The
wall of separation between Church and State is no defense against
the State's police power over conduct constituting concubinage,
bigamy or polygamy.
While Escritor's cQhabitation with Quilapio conforms to the
religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the cohabitation violates
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. The State cannot interfere
with the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, in the same
way that the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot interfere with the State's
prohibition on concubinage. The free exercise of religion protects
practices based on religious grounds provided such practices do

!J76 Pl-ULIPl-'IN E CONS'l'lTUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases '
not violate existing laws enact~d in the reAs0nable exercise, of the
State's police power." .· . ·., •1,.... , . _:
·• . ~.; ~ -~ .
• .-,,.; " /.:~:' !
·P:, t i'
7.. Social S.ecur~ty, Corrimis~ion,.4~1:1ie~ r~qfe.~U>f Roman: Catholic
Arc~bisho~ of_Ma_?:ula thf!;t .all pa.t~oJf.<; ~ftat;({ie,1? -,qnd alt r~l{g{O.JfP and
charitable institutions _and(~r °:rga_rJ,~za.tio~~ p13~rqf:e4. .8Vii[,~e· ~3~1l)pted
frof!Z the.coverage of the Soq~[ Seeur_tty;L5w_. :-;, 1;1,-. . (:" ,:· · , .. : ,;, .
. F~~ts'. Th~ r1quest'is based .Ort the,~lafrh;;'·'~roohg oth.~t.s;:'that
~eir mc~usion mipairs ,appellant's right ti5 1:4tssernhia'tE~,~r~Ii!gious
information. ···, · • · · · · · •.·. '. .' .,, ·
Issue: Is the argument fenable?
Held: Law in question is in line with co~stitu:tionaf mandate to
promote social justice. ~ "Neither may it be·valicl.ly argued '.$ .at the
e~orce_ment of.~e So_cUil Security Law impairs·appellant's·r1ght to
d1sserrunate rehgiou~ lli.f?,rmation. All that i~ r~q_uired of appellant is
~o pay mortthly contr1b~~o~s to the System for Cdvered emplbyees in
its employ. These contnbut10ns, contrary to ap·pellant's contention,
are n?t '~ the_ nature of taxes on employment' _Tdgetner with the
contributions unposed upon the employees and the Government
they are inte~de~ _for t~e protection of said employees against th~
hazards of d1sabihty, sickness, old age and death in line wfth the
constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-
being and economic secu.l'ily of all the people." (Roman Catholic
Archbishop o/M1~11il.n vs. Socin{ Security Commission, 1 SC.RA 11 [1961],
through /118/11•,1C,11il('rn:z Dnvid.)
- oOo-
II II II IJ
LIBERTY OF ABODE ·
...'_",;·•- ~ .-.
,. •
... :,4-ND TO TRAVEi,.
.."
,.S~C. 6..the liberty of abode and .of changh:i,g \h~ same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impc1id:r,e d
except upon lawful .order of the court. Neither shall the
. . riglit ~o travel: h-e impai~ed except in the interest of na-
. ·· Hon~l secu#ty, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. .
,., '.
Meaning of liberty pf abode
a'nd:travel
,. 'fhe•li,berty of11bode·(lnd to travel is the right of a person to hnve hb
horp.e or r~sidence in whatever place chosen by him and thereafter
to change it a~ will, and to go where he pleases, without interference
from any source.1 This is qualified, however, by the clauses "except
upon lawful order of the court" and "except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be p r(!vided
by law."
Limitations on the right.
This private right ·which may also be referred to as "freedom
of movement," is subject to the demands of public welfare. The
phrases "except upon lawful order of the cour t" and "except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health" means,
in other words, that the liberty of abode and travel is subject to the
dominant police power (see Sec. 9, infra.) of the State.
(1) Upon lawful order of a court. - Holding an accused in a
criminal case within the reach of the courts b y preventing his
1
The 1935 Constitution confined the right to liberty of abode. The liberty now
includes the right to travel. (see Salonga vs. Hermosa, 97 SCRA 121 [1980].) It may be
deemed embraced in the "liberty" protected by the due process provision. (Rubi vs.
Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919].)
577

1' 1. 111 ,ll'l'I N l l JN:i tll U II C Nt\ 1, LAW
l'dnclpJcs ond Coses
departure from the Philippines is a valid restriction on his right
to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.2
Section 6 is not to be cons}:r;icted ,~s:delim'.~t~g:1:th~ inherent power of
the courts to use all mea1;1s neces~arY. t9 Cp.,r ri their orders into effect.
a
When by law jurisdict-ioniis conferr~d on court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other means. necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer.3 (Silverio vs.
Court of Appe'als',' 195 SCRA 760 (1991]; ShlttiHgifvs:·Vasqi'.iez, 217
SCRA 63~:[199~}.) . ·· =· ., · • 11. i, · , ·
(2) in /h~
intgr~st ~! ~ati~nal security, puqli~i dJ~~!_Qr: k~alth.
:-- U~der fl:,.e second hm1ta~10n, a court O!de:r 1~ not l}~c;es:~an' b~t the
tmpamn:ent must be done "as may be provided by l~:w.'r4 'f\i.u,s; the
lawmaking body may, by law, provide for the observance curfew
hours in time of war or national eme~gepcy, th~. co:mm,it:rJ!.~1;1t.0£
mentally deranged persons to a mental institution~ the confin~:ritent
of :hose,-~i.th c,ommunicable diseases to a ho~pitaI; etc. A p~rson
facmg trrnuna:I charges may be arrested and detained or restrained
from leaving the cbunt:ry. 1t is· an accep.fe'd maxim •of intE!mational
law 1that a ·Sfate· has the 'power · as rnherent -in 'sovereignly, ·and
' t . • ,. 4'
2 ' ·' , .
Sec. 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. - x x x An accused released on bail may, be re-
ar~ested wi_thout th~ n~cessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines
without prior pernuss1on of the court where the case is pending. (Rules of Court, Rule
114.) -• , ,
311le constitutional right of a person to travel may be restricted ~ot ·only because
he may be facing criminal charges but also as being the consequence of the nature and
functjon of-a bail. (Ccijuangco, Jr. vs, Sandiganbayan,. 300 ·s cRA.367 [1998];) Whether
an accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction of the court for humanitarian
reasons is a matter of the court's sound discretion. (Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, 247
SCRA 127 (1995].) A lessee may be judicially ejected for non-payment of rent or other
violations of his contractual obligations without violating his liberty of abode. In a case,
the_ Supreme Court ruled that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requiring all foreign travels
of Judges and court personnel must be with prior permission from the Court and after
submitting certain requirements, does not restrict but merely regulates by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave
to abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; travels
to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule. (Office of Court Administrator vs.
Macarine, 677 SCRA 1 (2012].)
4The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. It does not
mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing like a toll way. The mode pertaining
t? ~e u se of a toll way, by which one may wish to travel is a subject that can be validly
hm1ted by government regulation in the exercise of police power. Thus, as a special kind
of road, it_is but reasonable that not all forms of transport (e.g., motorcycles) could use toll
ways. (Mirasol vs. Dept. of Public Works and Highways, 498 SCRA 318 (2006].)
/\ 1~ 1'. 111,. llll.1. 11 1, 1 illt : bN
Libel'ty of Abode and to 'l\-ovcl
I
I
I '
essential to seH•preservation, to forbid the entry of foreigners
I
I:
within its ter-rit0ry1 or.-to admit them only in such cases and upon
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. (Nishimura v; United
States, 142 U.S. 659.) ·
The determination·of the proper executive officer (e.g., President)
is subject t9 judi~ial review.5
A person ".Yhose liberty of abode is violated may petition for
a writ of habe,~s .corpus against another holding him in detention
or in _a ny manner depriving him of the freedom of locomotion or
~lf,b1/A movement. (see Sec. 15; Villavicencio vs. Luk.ban, supra; Caunca vs.
Salazar, 82 Phil. 851 [1949].)
of ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
. 1. DeprJrtment,Order, in the character of Guidelines, governs the
temporanJ suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household
workers.
Facts: This measure of the Department of Labor and
Employment is assailed, among others, as violative of the right to
~
travel.
Issue: Does the Order impair the right to travel?
-
Held: (1) Order is authorized by law. - "The consequence
'. the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair
the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to
• ·. ,
I the requirements of public safety, 'as may be provided by law.'
Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor
Code, in particular, its basic policy to 'afford protection to labor,'
pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making
authority vested in it by the Labor Code.''
(2) Order is a valid qualification to right. - "The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the
5The appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed :'ith
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of
"national security, public safety, or public health," a limitive phrase which did no_t ~ppear
in the 1973 Constitution. (Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 760 [1991], ating the
Constitution by Bernas, J.G., Vol. 1, 1987 ed., p . 263; see, however, Leave Division, etc. vs.
H eusdens, 662 SCRA 126 (2012].) Apparently, the phraseology in the ~9B7 Co~stitution
was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under a previous regime when
there was a Travel Processing Center which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon
application of an interested party. (Ibid., citing Salonga vs. Hermosa, 97 SCRA 121 (1980).)
 (\11~.,l, rill 'l. 1111 ,1, t lil I 1~ 1I 11 1
l 'J III ll 'l 'l t ll l l (lN1 IIII J llUN 11, f ,A W
UbcH·Ly,of Ab~do 1111d to 'l'rflvcl
11J'lt1l'i pk11111Hl l'IHI 'II

Indeed, •if the·c;lcoused were allowed to leave the Philippines

:1right,to travel, but as we have,stated;,the,:dght,it~elf js n0t absolute.
, , The ~isruted Or~er is .a val~d- qu<!lific":tiop., -th~,1:et9.''. •ltRltilippine
Association of Service.E~gr.t¢rs, :lt1-a,:·vs,, f,)r,;i(rm; i .6.J, SCK/\ ;3.~6fl0{J8}1
through Justice Sarmiento.) . . : . · , · . ·. i ,. . .
:w:tthout s.ufficiemt,reas.on,.-he may b.e place.d beyond the reach of the
.courts. Tbe constitutiortaLrlght to travel 1s not an absolute right."
· .
(Manotoc, Jr. vs ..Court ofAppeal~, 142 SCRA,.169 [1986], throu~h Justice
Fernan; see Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 [1993}.)

2.. , A~cused was admitted to bail but he 'was

jNohibited from leaving
thePh1l1pptnes: ·. ·. : . ,::i,.,'L. '.'.; .._.~., ,., ..
Facts: Petitioner contends·that havirig;bel?rfactmiHedtobail~ the
court which granted him bail can.hot .prevent;him from exercising
his constitutional right to travel. · Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against the petitioner
Issue: Does the production operate as a valid ·restriction on the
petitioner's right to travel?
Held: (1) Nature and function of a bail ·bond. - "His co~tention is
untenable. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to
baiLfrom leaving the Philippines. This· is a necessary consequence
of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court ,in which
his appear~ce may be required as stipulated .in the bainond or
recognizance.
' .
Jts obj.ect ~s to relieve the accused _o f img}.'.isonm~nt an,d the
?~~t~ .of tl}e bur~e1:1-ot_keeping hinl,,_pendin,.g;.the tl'.ial, ilnd at the
same time, t<? put the accused as much wider the power of the
cow:t.,a s if he were in, custody of the proper 9£ficer,
to•secure
the.app.earance.of.the accused; so·:as .to·answefthecall of the court
: .;'1,fid qp wha_t th~ law may require of_h.im."
(2) Condition operates as a valid restriction. - "The condition
Wl;P9~e4 'upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
w.~e~~v,er the co11rt requires· his pres~nce o.pel'.ates a~ a .valid
restrict,i?n on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. ·
Uy Tutsmg (61 Phil. 404 [1935].): 'x xx the result of. the obligation
ass1:1med by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all
.~~es,fo ~e orders_and processes of the lower cou~t, was to prohibit
said accused fr_om l~aving the jurisdiction of · the .Philippines,
becau~e, otherwise,. said, orders and proces~es wilJ be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued
does_ no~ extend beyond that of the Philippines, they would have
no bmdmg force outside of said jurisdiction.'
3. Validity of hold-orders against petitioners has already-expired.
Facts: It appears that the validity of the hold-orders which have
a maximum period of six (6) months issued by the Presidential
has already expired pursuant to its Rules and Regulations and the
PCGG has not extended the life-span of the hold-orders in question
nor has it advanced "good reasons" for doing so. Furthermore, the
grounds for the issuance of the hold-orders have become stale.
The "issues" spelled out against petitioners have remained
unresolved for a period of nine (9) months. But the PCGG has not
given them any opportunity to contest the hold-orders.
Issue: Did PCGG act with gross abuse of discretion in
maintaining hold-order against petitioners for an indefinite length
of time?
.
Held: (1) Requirements of due process were disregarded. - "The
PCGG must, thus, be faulted for a disregard of the requirements of
'fairness and due process.' ·
Under the environmental circumstances of the case, the hold-
and
orders against. petitioners preventing them from leaving the
country cannot be prolonged indefinitely. The right to travel and
· to freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
to which the Philippines is a signatory. The right extends to all
residents regardless of nationality. And 'every one has the right to
an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution
and the law.' (Art. 8, UDHR.) While such right is not absolute but
must yield to the State's inherent police power upon which the
hold-orders were premised, no 'good reasons' have been advanced
which could justify their continued enforcement."
(2) Gross abuse of discretion was committed. - "The PCGG
acted with gross abuse of discretion in maintaining the hold-

J 111 1 11 ' 1' 11 11 I l itl 1 1l l ll l lll ll l t 1, 1 AW I I
Jlll111lpl1•1 1111d t 11111 1
1 11
o,·durHngul111H l'hc pclilloncrs for oia indefinite lcngH1 of lime. By
so doing lt has orbitrnrily exdudecl'petiU6ners from the enjoyment
of a fundamental right ~ the right1t0· freedom of movement- to
all they are entitled. Mandamus lies." (Kant Kwong vs. Presidential
Commission on Good 'Government, 156 SCRA 222 [1987), through
Justice Melencio-I-Ierrera.)
4. M(lrcoses ask the Suprei:ne Cr;,!frt to or4t;~ respondents to issue
travel documents to them so that they. ca~.'iefur~
,.
. . fhi1iP,pi'ngs.
tq)he' . . . may-be restricted by such laws as 'are necessary to protect national
. Facts: The petition for mandamus; and prohibition asks the
$upreme Court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, etc, to issue .travel documents to former President Marcos
and, the immediate members of his family and · to enjoin the
implementation of the Presiden_t'-s dedsion to bar their return to
the Philippines.
The case. for the petitioners is founded on the asse;rtion that
the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contend
that the President is without power to impair the-liberty of abode
of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 13[1, 2] thereof.) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 12(1-
4) thereof.), which had been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Is the right to return to one's country among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights?
Hel-d: (1) Right involved is right to return to one's country. - "I.t
must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to travel from the Philippines t.o..other countries or within
the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to
one's country, a totally distinct right. under international law,
independent from although related t~ the right to travel. Thus,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom
of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to
A I<' I', 111 , 11111 , I , (.) ti I{ I : I I' I :--1 5U3
11 : I I( , ( I
Llbct·Ly of Abode ond lo 'frnvcl
leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights.
ThitDeclaratioh speaks of the 'right to freedom of mpvement
and residence within the borders of each state' (Art. 13[1).)
separately,from·the 'right to leave any cou,.ntry, including his own,
and to retum to his country.' (Art. 13(2],) On the other hand, the
Covenant gµarantees the 'rig1'lt to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose hi§_residence' (Art.,.12[1].) and the right to 'be free to
leave any.,cou1;1.try, including his own,' (Art. 12[2].) which rights
security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights
and freedoms of others' (Art. 12[3].), as distinguished from the
'right to enter his own country' of w).lich one cannot be 'arbitrarily
deprived.' (Art . 12[4].) It would, therefore, be inappropriate to
construe ~e limitations to the right to return to one's country in
the same ·context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the
right to travel."
(2) Right to return is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights. - "The right to ·r eturn to one's country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel,
but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law
and, under our Constitution, as part of the law of the land. (Art. II,
Sec. 2.) However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel
and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being' arbitrarily deprived'
thereof. (Art. 12[4] thereof.)"
(3) Limitations on the right to travel should be resolved in an
appropriate case. - "Thus, the rulings in the case of Kent and
Haig, which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of
effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of
'I this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to
·' · a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in
Philippine, and even in American, jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue
of whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in
the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An
appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited." (Marcos
vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA-668 [1989), through Justice Cortes.)

1: 111 1,111 1' 11 11 11 tlNl lJ l \11 1,1 ll ~ 1. /\W I I i;, (1
11r!11clplu11111,4l Ch111 111, ,, ,
Gutierrez, Jr., dissenting: ,, ., . ,
(1) Issue is one of right and not. of >ptit/J'ef;\ -'- "The Gdv~m'rhent
has the power -to arrest ·.and pun:i:sh) ~M~. M~ri:os)' But dde~ it have
the power to deny him his dght t&.,coriti!f hotne and· die among
familiar surroundings? The Court !thd>tild 'View ,the return of Mr.
Marcos and his faml.ly solely in the tlfgheof the·,constitutional
guarantee of liberty of a:bode rurrd the dtiz~:it's riih:Mo travel as
against the 1 respondents' con'te-nti'oh -that'1·'tfational 1,ec:tirity ' and
public safety would· be endatigeted by'ia. ~g'rant
of t):i:e ·p~Htion.
Apart from the absence of any texfih the Constitt:iti0n 'c bmmitting
the issue exclusively to the President, there is likewise· nb -dearth
of decisional data, ·no urunartageable stanciards which stand in the
way of a judicial determination."
. (2) Impairment is allow~d only "upon Jabjit(order of (h~ pourti, and
"as may be provided by law." - ~ection .6 of ~e Bill of Rights states
11
categorically that the liberty of abode and of _c panging ·the same
within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a
lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the
President. Section 6 further provides that the •frght to travel, and
this obviously includes the right t9 travel oul:' of .o r back into the
Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the· interest of national
security, public safety, or public. health, as may be provided by law.
. ~
There is no law setting the _limits on a citizen's r:ight to move
from one part of the country to another or from the Philippines
to a foreign country or from a foreign country to the Philippines.
The laws cited by the Solicitor. General - immigration, health,
quarantine, passports, motor vehicle, destierro, probation, and
parole - are all inapplicable insofar as the return of Mr. Marcos
and family is concerned. There is absolutely no showing how any
of these statutes and regulations could serve as a basis to bar their
coming home. -
There is also no disrespect for a Presidential determination
if we grant the petition. We would simply be applying the
Constitution, in the preservation and defense of which all of us in
the Government, the President and Congress included, are sworn
to participate. Significantly, the President herself has stated that the
Court has the last word when it comes to constitutional-liberties
and that she would abide by our decision."
(3) Right to come home must be more preferred than any other
aspect of the right to travel. - "With all due respect for the majority
I
.t\-1;(/ ', ~ IJL. Ji ll1;l. JI Hl '11'1'8 585
Liberty of Abode and to Travel
opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the rig1i.t to travel. I do not
think we should. differentiate the right to return home from the
right to::go abroad,:o r to move around in the Philippines. If at all,
th~ right to come home must be more .prefe:i::red than any
other
a~p~ct of .the right, to. travel. It was pi:ecisely the banning by Mr.
,~~~.cos of tl:ie ;r~ghtM>. trav~l by Senators t}~rogno Aquino, Jr., Jovito
5fl.Jong~1 af!.d sc;pres of .otper 'undesirabl~~'. !'Ind 'threats to national
securj~' p.~~µ,ig W,at u.nfortuna~e ,perio.d which led the framers of
o~r,pre~ent, ½RPSti.~tjon not qnly to re-e~('}ct but to strengthen the
, .declaration c?f !:):tli,.;right. Media often asks, ' what else is new?'
• , . • I
I submit that .we now have a freedom-loving and humane
regime. I regret that-the Court's decision in this case sets back the
gains that our country has achieved in terms of human rights,
especially human rights for those whom we do not like or those
who.are agams,\ 11:~/' .
. Cruz, J., dissenting:
(1) Marcos, .as a Filipino, is entitled to return. - "It is my belief
that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to return
·. to and live - and die -,- in his own country. I say this with a heavy
heart but say it nonetheless. That conviction is not diminished one
whit simply.because many believe Marcos to be beneath contempt
and undeserving of the very liberties he flouted when he was the
absolute ruler of this land."
(2) There . was no showing of threat to national security. - "In
about two.hours' of briefing, the government failed dismally to
show that ~e return. of Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat
~o the national_ security as it had alleged. The fears expressed by
its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political
and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete
evidence to back up their apprehensions. Amazingly, however, the
majority has come to the conclusion that there exist factual bases
for the President's decision to bar Marcos's return. That is not my
recollection of the impressions of the Court after that hearing."
(3) Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and the liberty of
abode Ninoy Aquino invoked. - "Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino
who also wanted to come back to the Philippines against the
prohibitions of the government then, Marcos is entitled to the same
right to travel and the liberty of abode that his adversary invoked.
These rights are guaranteed by the Constitution to all individuals,
including the patriot and the homesick and the prodigal son

IUI I ' I 11 I ,11 ' l'I NH 'UNI l 'l'Ji' IQll'tON J;\Wd ,I\W
Pdnclplcu uncl 'tlSCtt' oJ .•.1• .
returning, and tyrants and1· char1atans rand,, so0undrels,iof- ,every
· stripe." . .-... . ,_: ·. . r:,v\•)-':: ... ;(.-i .~.
Paras, J., dissenting:• :
Marcos is. entitled to return. _..:. 1'1h~ie' ts' no dispute •fh~f· the
former PresidenHs·still 'aFilipinb ci~ef(186thunder the U'niv~rsal
Declaration 'o f Hi.unan·Rights and ·the·'1'987"Constitutiort of the
Philippines;·he' '4as the righffo ' teti:irtf tc/ his o'wri country except
only if prevented by the demands' 6£ nat{onaL$afety andma:tional
security. Our Armed Forces have failed to .prove this danger.
They are bereft of hard evidence, and ~11 they. can rely on.is. sheer
speculation. True, there is~some danger but there is no showing as
to the extent. It is incredible that one man alone together with his
family who had been ousted from this country by popular will,.can
arouse an entire country to rise in morbi:q sympathy for the cause
he once espoused."
Padilla, J., dissenting:
(1) Right may be restricted under the police power with or without
restricting legislation. - "With or without restricting legislation, the
interest of national security, public safety,orpublic health can justify
and even require restrictions onthe right to travely and that the clause
'as may be provided by law' merely declares a constitutional leave
or permission for Congress to enact laws that may restrict the right
to travel in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health. I do not, therefore, accept the petitioners' submission that,
in the absence of enabling legislation, the Philippine Government is
powerless to restrict travel even when such restrict,ion is demanded
by national security, public safety or pu~lic 'he,alth. . . territory. It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, the right
The power of the State, hl particular .cases, to restrict travel of
its citizens finds abundant support in the police power of the State,
which may be exercised to preserve and maintain government
as well as. promote the general welfare of the greatest number
of people. And yet, the power of the State, acting through a
gC>vernment in authority at any giv~n time, to restrict travel, even if
founded on police power, cannot be absolute and unlimited under
all circumstances, much less, can it be arbitrary and irrational."
(2) Dangers to national security are more speculative than real. -
"The apprehensions entertained and expressed by the respondents,
including those conveyed through the military, do not, with all due
respect, escalate to proportions of national security or public safety.
J
So·. G i\Hll'.11U.• lJ lLL
F RlG I rrs
' 587
Liberty of Abode and to Travel
· 'Jlhey appear to be more speculative than real, obsessive rather
L, \. ·l . . ~! , ••
than factual. Moreover, such apprehensions even if translated
into realities, would be. 'under control,' as admitted to the Court
by said military authorities, given the resources and facilities at
ti),~ command ,o f government. But, above all, the Filipino people
themselves, ll1 ,r.tlY,PpWo,n, will know how to handle any situation
brought about by a political recognition of Mr. Marcos' right to
return, and his. a~tual return, to this country.
, The Court, in short, should not accept respondents' general
apprehensions; cone.ems and perceptions at face value, in the light
of a countervaiUng and even irresistible, specific, clear, demandable,
and enforceab1e right asserted by a Filipino."
Sarmiento, J., dissenting:
(1) Only one right is involved. - "The majority would have
as the 'red issues' facing the Court: The right to return to one's
country; pitted against ' the right of travel and freedom of abode,'
and their supposed distinctions under international law, as if such
distinctions under international law, in truth and in fact exist.
There is only one right involved here, whether under municipal
or international law: the right of travel, whether within one's
own country, or to another, and the right to return thereto. The
Constitution itself makes no distinctions; let, then, no one make a
distinction. Ubi .lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus."
(2) Right to travel may be impaired only within the limits provided
by law. - "There is no law banning the Marcoses from the country;
neither is iliere any court decree banishing him from Philippine
to travel is worded as follows: 'Sec. 5. The liberty of abode and of
travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court,
or whert necessary in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health. Under this provision, the right may be abated: (1)
upon a lawful court order, or (2) 'when necessary in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health.' Arguably, the
provision enabled the Chief Executive (Marcoses) to moderate .
movement of citizens, which, Bernas says, justified such practices
as 'hamletting,' forced relocations, or the establishment of free-fire
zones. The, new Constitution, however, so it clearly appears, has
divested the Executive's implied power. And, as it so appears, the
right may be impaired only 'within the limits provided by law.' The
President is out of the picture."
 J J

J' l 111 11 '1' 11 JI I l 11 /' 11111 l 11 /t IA I, I AW Iii ti

1
l1thll 1,,1t•111111d l 1tll('tl

Motion for reconsideration d.enied, (PB SCRA 760 [1989].) The

Supreme Court ruled:
{1) No compelling reasons have ..been established "to warrant a
a'
reconsideration of the·~ecisioti. _.:. 11After 1 thorough consideration of
the matters raised jn the ·m otion _fdr rlic:'¢:qSl:'deration, the Co4rt is
of the yiew thM.:n_o c;orrip~ll~$ reaso#,fp~~~ tfoe~ ~$~ap,li~h,e~ :by
petitioners to· w~rant a t~dm~i~e.r"ti~.n ·;9.f~ttt~,R~Vft'~ 'deci~(<;>p/'
(2) Death .of Mr, Maiws has not c_hqng(}d the fqct.t1-a.l scev.qr,io' under
which the CoJirtfdecfsiori ~as .re1J-4er~a: :...- of
'•~:rl{e' ciiath X0r, Mar.cos,
althou&h}t_m ~,be view:e d as ~ supe~~nin_si i~~( ~~$ ~apged np~
the factual-scenario under wltj.cll ~e C.o¼r{ s ~id~JP,+1- ;w.a~ ,rendl;!red.
The threats to .the government, to which i:lie return of the Mari::qses
a
has been viewed to provide catalytic effect> h,we not been .shown
to have ceased. On the contrary, instead ·of erasing foars as to the
destabilization 14at will be cause'd by ~e r'¢ntrn of the Marcoses,
Mrs. Marcos reipfonced the bases for the d~cision to bar their r.eturn
when she called President Aquino, 'illegal/ claiming that it is
Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the 'legal,' President of the
Philippines, and declared that the matter -should be brought to all
the courts of the world." (En Banc.)
Note: This case is also given under Sectjon 1 of Article VII
(Executive Deparqnent) and Section 1 of Article VIII Qudicial
Department).
-oOo-
RIGHt.,JQ INFORMATION
• SEC. 7. The right;of the people to· i<nformation on mat,
ters. ·o f public co.n cern shall be recognized. Access to of-
fioial.records,.and to documents, and ·paper!:l pertaining!to
official acts,-transactions, or 'decisions, as well as to govern-
ment research:da\a, us·ed as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded .t he citizen, subject to such limitations as ·
µ,.~y be provlded by law.
Right to information on matters
of public concern.
The right of access in the above provision implements the right
to informqtion on matters of public concern which is reinforced by
the State policy of full disclosure and transparency in all transactions
involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article 11.1
Incidentally, the right to information regarding matters of public
concern should not be deemed merely an adjunct of freedom of
expression guaranteed by the Constitution (see Sec. 4.) as it is now
constitutionally r~cognized independently of freedom of expression.
The right goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
public disclosure by the State of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art. II, Sec, 28.) and honesty and integrity in the public
service. (Art. II, Sec. 27; Valmonte vs, Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256
[1989].) They all seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
i~ the operations of the government as well as to provide the people
sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their
constitutional rights. (Sabio vs. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 [2006].)

Right, a public right.

The right to be inf~rmed on matters of public concern, recog-
nized by no less than the fundamental law, is a public right. When
the issue concerns a public right an d its enforcement, the people

1
Found in Section 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Section 7 inserts the phrase, "as well as
government research data used as basis for policy development."

589

• l ' l lll , ll ' l ' I N I( l U N/ 11111 1 I 1t)N A I , 1,AW
Jltl11tlph•111111d 'I\Ut'tl
are regarded as the real parties in interest; hence, it is sufficient to
sustain legal standing before the court thr1t the petitioner is a citi-
zen and, as such, is interested in the faithful execution of the laws;
he need not show that he has any legal ·or special interest in the
result of the action. (Chavez vs. Presidential ·Commission on Good
Government, 299 SCRA 744 [1998]; Akbayan Citizens Action Party
vs. Aquino, 558 SCRA 468 [2008]; Guingona, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, 620 SCRA 448 [2010]..) This is particularly true when the
case involves matters of transcendental importance. (Chavez vs.
Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 [2002].)
In view of Section 7, there can be no doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of any law making the refusal to give such information or
denial of access thereto a punishable offense.
Categories of information covered.
The cons'titutional right covers three (3) categories of information
which are "matters of public concern," n~ely:
(1) Official records. - These refers to my document that is part
of the public records in the custody of government agencies or
officials;
{2)- Docl:'menis and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions
and decisions. - These refers to documents and papers recording,
eyidencing establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or
explaining officials acts, transactions or decisions of government
agencies or officials; and
(3) Government research data used in forn;iulating policies. -These
refer to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned
by the government and used in formulating government policies.2
(Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, supra.)
2
The right includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contrac~. A consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right;
othe_rw1se, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if
one 1s consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. The information,
however, must constitute definite proposition by the government. Information on on-
go~g evalua~on o_r revi~w of ~ids or prop~sals being undertaken by the bidding or
review comnuttee 1s not unmed1ately accessible under the right to infotmation. While
the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts transactions or
decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee ~akes its official
recomm~ndation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.
From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access
all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. (Ibid.)
A l-l ,1', II/ , 1111 ,1. Utl 1,(, 1 !I 11'1 !!VJ
l~lghl to ln(onnnllon
Scope of the rigl'ilt.
The right involves not just the right to information or to
disseminate information but the right of access to information within
the control of the government. Like all constitutional guatanties,
this right is not absolute.
(1) The right embraces all official records, etc.;
(2) It is limited to citizens only but is without prE!judice to the
right of aliens to have access to records of cases where they are
litigants;
(3) It does not grant citizens the right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. The
right is limited to access to official records, etc. (Ibid. ); and
(4) Its exercise is subject to su~ limitations as may be prnvided
bylaw.3 • '
lmpo.rtance of the right.
(1) Right vital to democratic government. - "An informed
citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and
artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange
of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic
government envisioned under our Constitution.
The cornerstone of this republican system of government
is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information
on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power h ad
been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,
3Relevant documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent
jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the
presumption of public access applies. The policy reasons for granting public access to
judicial proceedings include the public's right to monitor the functioning of our courts,
thereby ensuring quality, honesty and respect for our legal system. (Hilado vs. Reyes, 456
SCRA 146 [2005].) Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings filed by parties
in a case (for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an
order or judgment) need not be matters of public concern or interest. (Hilado vs. Reyes,
496 SCRA 282 {2006}.)
 llfJA ,11u11 ,11 1J 1J N H ·c. N:,u-1 U)l~Uf:;1/\ J, 1.A w
Princlplca nntl< <!:hdcs
institutionalized in the Constit:ution (ip, .1\\.rt_. Xl,'S~~- '[·, po p;rote'Ct
· the people from abuse of gove.r,nme,m,t~ ,p.owelj .would ·certainly };le
mere empty words.if access to sqch in.£or.mation.pf.public ,conce.,l'n
is denied, except under limitations p~es.crjb.~d by.: irnpleiµ~{ltii)g
legislation adopted pursuant to the Consti~on.' 1
(2) Right, an essential 'premise.of right to speech and ,exp,ressiom -
"The rig~t.to Jnformation is. an ess~n;ti~l.me.11;U~.e, of c'\ me~ingful
right to speech an,d expression x x x. ,I t.is -me.a nt-to ~nhance the
widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as
well as.checking abuse in government. Practi~~ners in media have
both ~e rig}H to gather a~d the obligation to check ·the accurac;y
of information they disseminate. For the·m, the freedom of the
press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of
their professions. The right of access t0 information ensures that
these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's
monopolizing pertinent information." ·
(3) Right essential to free and intelligent political discussion. - "An
essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government
and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels
for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently.
Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues
and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
(Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., supra, per Justice Cortes.)
(4) Right aids people in democratic decis'ion-making. - The
incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality
of the free flow of ideas in a democracy. In the same way that free
discussion enables members of society to .cope with the exigencies of
their time, access to information of general interest aids the people
in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective
of the vital issues confronting the nation. There can be no realistic
perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information
of general interest. (Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 297 SCRA
NR'fJ11J..L 131LL Or1 RIGHTS 593
Right to Information
-754· .[199'8VBa{dbza vs-::Dimaano,.71SCRA·1411976]; Gonzales vs.
Narv:asa, '337. SCRA '7.7(31(2000];)
Limitations oq the right
. ••t. • "" ' . .,;c.·
Like all the:eonsfitutional.guarantees, the right to information is
not ·absolute,
tll The people's· Figltt to information is limited to '~matters of
puBlic concern," or- to trahs·actions involving public interest, and is
furt:he:f"subject to sudi•limi'tations as may be provided by law."4
(2) Shnilarly, the _State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reason-
able conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may
issue, it must be made clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.5 (Legaspi vs. Civil Service
Com.mission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]; Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr.,
supra.)
(3) The right only affords access to records, documents and
papers, which means. the opportunity to inspect and copy them.
One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and .
papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to
r.easonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records
•◄some of this laws are Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards), Section 3(k) ofR.A. No. 31:H 9 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), Section
229 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 24(e), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These
~e in addition to what jurisprudence classifies as confidential and what our Constitution
tonsiders as belonging to the large concept of executive privilege. (Neri vs. Senate
Committees, etc., 549 SCRA 77 (2008].)
5The Supreme Court has ruled that the delib~rate non-disclosure of information by
the Bureau of Corrections about the date of exec;ution of a death convict to the Secretary
of Justice and the public violates Section 7, Article III and Section 8, Article II. Such non•
disclosu re deprives the Secretary of Jus tice of vital information necessary for the exercise
of his· power of supervision and control over the Bureau pursuant to the Administrative
Code of 1987, insofar as the enforcement of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and
the rules and regulations implementing said law is concerned and for the discharge of
the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are
faithfully executed. It also limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency
powers pursuant to Section 19, Article 7 and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which provides that "the death sentence shall be carried out without prejudice
to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency power at all times." (Echegaray
vs. Secretary of Justice, supra; see Gonzales vs. Narvasa, supra.)

1' 1111 ,ll'lti N I~ l HNl1 f'IJ l J Ill NV-\ 1. I. AW
i>rin lplco tmd '11SQ!l
and to minimize disruption to, goVe.l;'n.;rnent ·ope.rattc.ms,iH.ke: rules
specifying when and· how to· condu<it •fhe;i.ij.s~ection ahd: copying.
(Chavez vs. Public Estate Authority,384'SCRA 152 [2002].)
(4) It does not extend _to ni.~t~er~ ~~~6ii~e\ci'as 'priViieged' li,.~
formation under the separation of.powers, ·')llhus, the _,i nformation
does not cover Presidential cohversatiQhS,.cq-rtespondertces, dr dis~
cussions dtlfipg.q~o-~e.d-doot C~b~~t mei~~-~:t-µ4i,.-~~~ ·h;lternal
delibe~ation~.~f #'1e .Sup~eme Couttrru,1,~,\91W.~fs~I}e.giat~( cq~ts, Of
executt".e _se.ss10ns of ,e1:ther,Hou~.e : of fi:li;!:gf~$S, ,are ~ec9gt1ized -as
confidential. This ~1 of information :c.~pf'~e pried o,pen by a
co-equal 'branch ofgqvernment. A fr?hR_ 'el¢h.'Wlg~ of.'¢xpl~iatory
ideas and as·s~ssments, free _from the glai:ejff·publkity and-pres-
sure by int~rested parties, is essen_tial tp prbt~tfthe i.rideP,ertdence of
decision-making of those tasked to exer~.i~¢ Presid'ential, ·Legisla'tive
and Judicial power. (Ibid,) . ' . ' . ,, · '· .
• .. .... ;:- =~. ."'1
(5) The privileged character of- dipfo~~tic ·negotiation is
recognized in our jurisdiction. !nformatio_n on inter~goverrunent
exchanges prior to· the conclusion -,0£ .tre<).ties- ,u;i.d_, ,exemtive
agreements may be subject to reasonable saf~gµards for, the s~l.<Ei!,of
national interest. (Akbayan Citizens Ac_tion Party vs. _Aquino, 558
SCRA468 [2008].) ·.· .·.·
(6) The Constitution does not open every door to any and all
information.
(a) It is recognized that information a~ecting the security
of the State, information on investigation of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution ·o f the accused, and
records, which are confidential in c}:ugf-~ter should be excepted.
Presently, certain public records are declared confidential either
by law or by administrative regulations. Instances of these are
income tax returns under the National lnternal Revenue Code;
the condition or business of h~nks u,nder the Central Bank.Act;
accounts pertaining to military intelligence funds; certain army
records; and disbarment proceedµ1g~: (se~ Art. VI, Secs. 16[4],
20.) ' .
(b)At common law, a governmental privilege.against dis-
closure is recognized with respect to -State secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is-based
J J
1i ' , '/ IHU~(.)ll l'{L(;l l'r$
,4.1r 1•, JU!).. 595
Right to Information
(
.Il upon public1interes.t of such paramount importance as in and of
.
·itself transcend~g,the il').dividual interest& of a private citizen,
ey~R,.j:l\\ougl;;t flS, 'A' ..conseque119~ th~:i:,eof, the plaintiff cannot
enforce his lega~ rights. _(Almonte ys, Vasquez, 244 9CRA 286
.[1995];) . ..
!' , • •
'1:
: • ,- . (c). Pr~_sid,~~tft.~ communications _are presumed privileged
· ·· whet}:ter or not J~y involve matters of niitional security. The
;--E',{¢cu~ye; _: hc;rw~y,er, cannot . -invoke . general confidentiality
· privilege to shie_l~ its officials ajnd empl0yees from investigations
by proper govex:nmental institutions for possible criminal
_';Vro~g~oing._{~~~yan Citizei:;isAction Party vs. Aquino, supra.)
· -·Any la,w -which prohibits disclosure of information by
government agencies -.must, however, strike a healthy balance
be-tw~e.n -the .n~~d. ..t-o. <J,fford protection .to vital secrets affecting
. national interest or security and the imperative of safeguarding
the basic right of the pe_o ple to know about the activities of their
government. In line with the constitutional policy to enhance free
fl.qw. of information an'd to promot¢ transparency and accountability
in c!dministration, the disclosure of information must be the general
r,ule, not the exception.
Constitutional provision self-executing.
· Section 7 is. self-executing. It supplies the rules by means of
which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may
be a,sserted by the people without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature. ·
What may be .provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to b~ afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full
p\lblic c:lisclosure of, all transactions involving public .interest. (Art.
II, Sec. 28.) However, whatever limitation may be prescribed by the
Legislature, the right and the duty under Section 7 have become
operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the new
charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus
proceeding. (Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530
[198-7]; see Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, supra; Sereno vs.
Committee OR Trade, etc.,. 782 SCRA 486 [2016}.)
I J J I J l J J 1
I 1111 11 ' 1'11 J I I lrl/1 11 1 I l l111Jlf I I AW I II ,
• t't·hwl plr1111ml Vttl 1•11 I
Meaning of "private," "public" and , ,A• . -. • • ,
"public concern." , ,.
(1) Private. - The ·-term has ·been defined as• ~'belonging to
or concerning, an individual> ·person,· t_ o~p@y, or infetesf/' On
the other hand, "public" me&ns ')e~ta~g 't_o; or bel~hgfn$ to,
or affecting a na.tioJ.1, stat~,,.9-l ,co:n:i.mµmW.i?,!.!)l?llg~,:'. Th~ right to
privacy belongs to tl)e 4J.divid.1,1;al c!-Ofil"\g.i,nN~,pt:i\_[a~e,CcJeP,~.c}ty and
not to a governmeriJal agen"Y•or officer/, t.a;,~ei:;t_;with ~d.!~GMg in
the discharge of public duties.' (Aquino.:Sarn,iento w,. Mo'r.a:to, 203
SCRA 515 {19.9:L].) . , ,
(2) Public. - When a mandamus proieeding· invol:v~s the
assertion of a public right, such as ,the ,xight ,gn~ted. by Section 7,
the requirement of personal intei;.est is satis#ecl,. by the mere £act-that
the petitioner is a citizen/ and, therefore; par;t ofi 1:J\e,general ."·p11blic"
which possesses the righ±.-6 . . · .,. ;. .. • •. . .
(3J Public concern. ...,_ The informafi:on/ tp:-:t-vhich the pµblic is
entitled tb. are those :com':~:di.ittg )/mattets;of p:J.blic: concerrt:~' In
determfufug whether or·mof'cip~rtirular .n;ifociia:~ort is· of ·public
concern there.is no -rigidt~st whim 'cart:be'appliei;t"Publk coiicerri"
like "public interest" is a term that eludes•-°e',tifotdetiriifio~~' Bdth
terms embrace a broad sp~ct~m 9£ subjests' which .tp.e,-,p~blic
may want to know, eithet' b1tcau::se'lhese·.c3.ired:ly ·affecfl:heii'•lives,
or simply because· such matte11s naturally arouse. the inte~est.df an
ordinary citizen. In the·final analysis, i Us for..th-e·courts to 'detetmine
in a case by case basis whether _the _.~ ~tt~,r·at:1ssue:•is'_ofirtterest qr
importance','.as it relates ·to .or,affects·ibt~ip1:1blici7·'(Legaspi vs. 'Civil
Setvice Commission, :supra;-•see Elmegatay ·ys'.,:Secretary '. of.J~stice;
supra; Gonzales vs. N arvasa, supra; Guingona~Jr. vs, Commission on
Elections, supra.)
6The Supreme Court had opportunity to define the word "public"· in Subido vs.
Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 (1948),), when it held that even those who have no director tangible
interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "publi~'i to whom "(a)ll records
relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register 'o. f Deeds shall be open." In the
words of the Court: "'Public', is a comprehe{lSive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed,
it embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest
of a pecuniary ·character in the particular information sought are given the right of
inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction."
7
lt has been held that the negotiation and subsequent sale of a foreclosed property
by the GSIS to a private individual was a purely private transaction. (Vda. de Urbano vs.
Government Service Insurance System, 367 SCRA 672 [2001).) ·
I I 1 J
'f 1 ,w, 'I Alie.I', Ill , 1111.1 , Ul'J.<l ll.ll'!J 097
Right to Jr.i formntlon
ILLUSTRATrnE CASES:
l. Civil Service Commission denied petitioner's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons. ,
. ' Facts:•Claiming 'that his right to be informed of the eligibilities
is guaranteed by ~eConstitution and that he has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner
prays f9r the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent Civil Service Commission to disclose said
information.
Issue: May the Commission be compelled by mandamus to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of certain persons
occupying government positions?
Held: (1) Petitioner has personality to bri~g the suit. - "It is asserted
that the instant petition is bereft of any allegation of petitioner's
achtal interest in the civil service eligibilities of JS and MA. At most,
there is a vague reference to an µnnamed client in whose behalf he
had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject. But
what is clear upon the face of the petition is that the petitioner has
firmly anchored his,case upon the right of the people to information
on matters of publkc;oncern, which, by its very nature, is a public
right. It has been_held that: '* * * when the question is one of public
right and the ol,ject of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement
of a public duty, _the people a're regarded as the real party in interest
and the relater at y;rhose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show ~~at he has any legal or special interest in the result,
it being sufficient to :show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws.* **' (Tafiada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27
[1985].)" .. .
(2) Authority to,regulate is not authority to prohibit examination. -
"The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records
does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of
or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate
the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a
limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought,
which only the Legislature may impose. The second pertains to the
government agency charged with the custody of public records.
Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end
that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue
interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and
IJ\111 J'l llLll'l'JNH 'UN8 '1'J'l'UTl()N t,.111 LA W
Principles and Ca.s~s
more importantly, that the exer..aise::of tne:,sa.ri1:~pon~tib.l;tiQJital.right
p
by other persons ~hall ~_.assw~:~ i-i:l~•~bJd~, f ~_.pzae,~a180 ,Phil. 383
[1948].) ;·_.·.'· ._. : _... ·\-,. ~:1,\:--_,, J.\";\•·2 ;, , .. ,,·,,r :. .:•,.
Thus, while the.ci:ann.er 0£ -e~-ffli:t$J}4blic recqrd~ may be .
subject to reasonab1W:'t_~gµfa;fpf }i}l~it§!v~~e~tj \g~_r.t9' in
custody thereof, ·l:):i.~1,q~ty.·) o, '¥~ii ~f 1~t; ~pi:mf!ti0n.'o ( .pHblic
concern, and ,to affo~~-~Vi~~s t9.p~~J1,f.i~9,~~ S~~-()t ~~ c~11~1.d ered
dis~reti9.nary 9~ ~~-!l~f-?~~fJ~~{L~~-~f,t!1~1f*i
cannot be made contingent upon"llie d~~crt?hot.\ uf.s~~t{ ag~ncies.
:i}~_p eJ:\i f;Wt1:1ce
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of -agency discretion.
The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a ptoper case:"·
(3) Citizens have legitimate concern in the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligibles. - "Public
office being a public trust (Art. XI, $et. 1.), it is the- legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring
civil service eligibility are occupied ·only ·by persons who· are
eligibles. Public officers are at a-U times accountable to the people
even as fo their eligibilities for their respective positions. But then,
it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest.
For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not
be among the species exempted by law from 'the operation of the
constitutional guaral}tee. In the instant case~ while refusing to
confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed
to cite any provision in the CivilService Law: w.h ich would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles."
(4) There is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility. -
"We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and
licensure examinations for various professions, are released to
the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service
eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in_thi,s case, the
governm.ent employees concerned daim to,be civil service eligibles,
the public, through any citizen, has a right to-verify.their _professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Comntipsicm. The. civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public-e:oncern, and in the absence
of express limitations under the law upop. access to the register of
.l\,lll..' l '. 111.. IHl ,I , ) 11.l<l : 1 Il l
Right to.In.formation
• civ.il· serv.iie eligibles for· said. position, µle duty of the respondent
€ommlsSior.i;-to ,e.orifion or deny-1he::dvil'tSetvice eligibility of any
p~rson bot:upy•i.t\g 'the ·position beeomes imperative. Mandamus,
thetefor.e;:l'tes.f'-..Cteg-aspi vs, Civil Ser-vice Com-mission, supra, through
Justi~e Goffe~,). . , . · ·. . '
2, • GS[S.i.denied.petitioners' request for information on certain loans
granted ,by,thef.erm~r.
Facts: The .information sought by the petitioners is the truth of
reports that-·certain members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa
belonging to,,th.e·opposition were able t0 secure "clean" loans from
the GSIS itnmedia:tely before the February 7, 1986 election through
the intercession of the formerFirst Lady. They ask the GSIS to furnish
them the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members and
certified true copies -of the documents evidencing their respecti ve
ot.
loans, ana / t0 allow petitioners access to the public records fol'
the subject information.
Issue: The GSIS claims that it would not be proper to breach the
conftpential relationship th.at exists between it and its borrowers
unless so Olldered by the court.
Held: (1) J.:aanabl~ funds of GSIS are of a public nature. - "In
Taiiada vs. Tuve,a (136 SCRA 27 [1985].). and Legaspi vs. Civil Service
Commission (supra.), the Supreme Court upheld the people's
constitutional .r ight to be informed of matters of public interest and
ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for
by the petitioners. In the Taiiada case, the public concern deemed
covered by llie ·constitutioi'lal right to information was the need
for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to
regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In the Legaspi case, it
wa~ the ' l~gitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persol).s who are eligibles.'
. The GSIS is a trustee of contribations from the government and
its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs
for the benefit of the latter. Considering the nature of its funds, the
GSIS is expected to manage-its resources with utmost prudence
and strict:compliance with pertinent laws or rules and regulations.
I As respondent himself admits, the GSIS is' not supposed to grant
'dean loans.' It is, therefore, the legitimate concern of the public to

t,IJII l'l Ill ,l l'l 'I N I\t tJN/; I I I ~J I IU N/'I ! , J, AW
l'dn lpJc11 nnd 'n11m1
J.
ensure that these funds are managed properly ,w ith·the end in view
of maximizing the benefits ;tlila,t accr.ue to the insured~government
employees. Moreover, .the suppos.e d borrowers :-,yere Members of
the defunct Batasang Pa.rnbansa who th~p:1~elves apprn;p.riated
funds for the GSIS and were, therefore, expected t.o l;J.~ th~ fj.r$t to
see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree
of fidelity and that all its tran:sactions were ,iqoye board. In sum,
the public .nature of .t he .\oana:i,le funds.-of;the.,:GSIS and ~e public
office held by the alleged borrower~ make _ th~,information S0';1ght
c{early,a matter of pubH~ inte.rest_and cpnc~~n/' . , , ·
• ~ • , , I •' , : • '• • . ; ·I '
(2) Official records c9ver'loan tran~actifJtl$·.+ :"Resp.onden.t next
ass,ei:ts. that the. documen;ts,. e:vid.,er:i.cing , th~,.Joan, .transactions of
the G~IS are private in na;ture and-hence, are !UQt .co'(ered ,by the
· -c.onstiw.tional · right to. iruqn;natfqn on, rna'M.;,e:rs .of pu9lic.;coI1-Cern
w hid.,. guarantees' (a)cc;ess to official req:,rds;·~rid to (ii9c~gi,1ts, ·and
. p~pers perta.inmg to; bffict?1i'acts, transadio'n.s;· decisi.oµ.s' only. or.
First .of all, the 'c.onstih.1¢1.)Hninistrant' dicihotomy chii.:racterizing
government .function has long been repti,diateq.. In ,AC.CFA vs.
Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations .and Offices (30
1
. scRA·644' [1969].), the 'Court said that ffi~ ;go~ernmen:t; whether
carrying out its sovereign attributes or tunning some business,
discharges the samefonction of service tti the.people. "
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exer-
cising a proprietary function would not jt.isHfy the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of th~.-right to information.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which,
though not binding upon the Court, are nevcfrtheless persuasive,
and considering further that government-'Owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprie't ary or governmental
functions are accountable to the people, the Cohrt is·convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled
corporation created by special legislation, are within the ambit of
the people's right to be informed pursual').t to the constitutional
policy of transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulg~!e .relating to the manner
and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss ·of the
records may be avoided, that undue interfe;rence with the duties of
the custodian of the records may be prevented and that tbc rlght of
other persons en.ti tled to .inspect the 1·ccocds,may be irn;urccl."
f 1 I
AR'L'. 111. 1111.. L 0 11 me.a l'l'B 601
Right to Information
(3) Custodians.ofofficial records cannot be compelled to prepare lists,
etc. - "However; the same, eannot be said with regard to the first
act sought by petitioners, i.e.,.' to furnish petitioners the ijst -of the
names o,f the ,B,atasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP~Laban who were able to se'cure·clean loans immediately
1:?efo:re the -I<ebrua.ry 7 election through the· intercession/marginal
note of the then 'First Lady Imelda Ma~cos/
_·: ·_..Al~~\lgh ~it~e!-1~ ?r~, afforded. th~ rigt'lt to information and
pti!suant t}le.t;eto,. ,~re :entitled to 'a~cess tq official records,' the
Consti'b,;l:t!91'\ ;does.not 11cc;:ord them a right to compel custodians of
offi.cial r,ecords to prepa~e lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
~eir desire,to acquire information on matters of pubHc concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to
iss;u e thi;it tl.ie, app,ltcaxit has a well-defined, clear and certain. legal
. rig~t t9 thi) Npg:,ct~i:nanded and ,that lt is the imperative duty of
. g~fendant,to pe~form the act required. The corresponding duty
· of the resp~md_e~t to perform the required act must be clear and
specific. (Lemi vs. __Valel').cia, 126 SCRA 203 [1968]; Ocampo vs.
Subido, 72 SCRA ·443 [1987].) The request of the petitioners fails to
me,et thi~-St¥1dard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
prepare the list requested." (Valmonte vs. Belmonte; Jr., supra, through
Justice Cortez.) ·
3. Access to judicial records was refused by respondent judge.
, .
Facts: The respondent Municipal Judge is charged with abuse
of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor
to e~amine the crim4n.al docket records of the Municipal Court to
secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the
peace and order conditions of the municipality.
Issue: Respondent asserts that such inspection is always subject
to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how the
records may be inspected.
Held: (1) Access to judicial records may be regulated, but may not be
prohibited. - "As found by the-Investigating Judge, the respondent
allovyed the complainant to open and view the docket books of
respondent under certain conditions and under his control and ·
supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to
public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire
602 1'1 ULU'J'J N J•: (.;()N!:J'.L'l'.J/U'l'l N n J:i LAW Soc. 7 Sec. 7 ARTi III. BILL 11 KlGI l'l'S 603
• Principles and Cases ·' . Right to Information

•information on matters , 0f public -conc:em1~ )Jndc;1ubtedly in a The complainants were understandably interested in securing
• democracy,·the public.has a-legitimat~inte:r~s-t.in-.m:atfers of-social a copy of the· decision as they were the compl.aining ~itnes~es
and political significance. · .. ; - •· in these four criminal cases. The request was made during office
1
In a~ earlier case (Subido vs. OzaetJ, ' S6 ;Phil. 383 [1948].), hours. It was r~lj'ly~q personally to the respondent. The _decision in
question was alre~dY. promulgated. Copies were already furnished
this Court held that wa_ndamus would ~ie· t}?_\~-~ pel. the ~e,cre;tary
the counsel for th~ p,r,osecution and the defense. It was already part
of Justice and the R~g1~ter of [?~eds _to, ~x-~mn:e tht1. resprcls of
of the public rec;o~d which the citizen has a right to scrutinize. And
the latter office. Predicating the right to examine the re~~rd~ on
if 'there was 'no· more copy,' the complainants were amenable to
statutory provisions/ and to a certa~n deg.re"'e'by ~eneral principles of
have·a xerox copy· of the original on file, copies of which, as part
den:wcratic institutions, this Court stateltnat 'wJSil~ th:fRegister of
of court records, ?re allowed to be given to interested parties upon
Deeds has discretion t~ exercise as to the iriatµ1~r'in 'whi~'persons
request, duly certified as a true copy of the original on file.
desiring to inspect, examine or copy the·_re~ords in his ~ffice.inay
exercise their rights, such power does not carry with.it authority to What aggrav,ates the situation, as seen from the sequence of
prohibit." events narrated by the complainants which were never denied
o.r rebutted by the respondent, is that respondent, without just
{2;) Re$trictions on acc~ss to certain r.~doY;dS- tnay ~~ imP;osed by cause, denied complainants' access to public records and gave the
law, .::..... "The new Constitution now exp~essJy _re.cogrtizes i:ha,f the complainants the run-around, which is oppressive as it is arbitrnry.
peopJe are entitled to information on m~tters of .P.~blic concern
and thus are expressly granted access _to; official records, as ;"ell
In"Baldoza vs. '·dimaano (supra.), We emphasized the importance
of access to public records, predicated as it is on the right of the
as documents of .official acts, or transai:tio_n s/ p{tie_cisions, subject
people to ac;quire information on matters of public con~ern ~ whi~h
to such .limitations imposed by law: 1$(i:nc¢irporati~~· 6£ this
the public has a _legitimate interest. While th~ pu~hc officers m
right 'in the G5nsti.~tjon is ~: rec?gnlti~~-.~~:~e,~~~~~~~l'role custody or control of public records have the discretion to r~gulate
of free exchange· of information m a demo~raty. Th.ere Cal). b~ no
the manner in whith'such records may be inspected, exarmned or
realistic perception by the public of the na~io_n's pipblel!1s, nor a
copied by intereste~ persons, such discretion does not car17 ""'.ith
meaningful democratic decision-making i( tliey ar~ denied access
to infor,matio~ of gel;l.eral interest.. Informatio.n. jsneeo.ed to enable
it the authority to prohibit such access, inspection, examination
or copying." (Lantaco, Sr. vs. Llamas, 108 SCRA 502 [1981], through
the me~bers of society to cope with the e·x.igencies of the times.
Justice Makasiar.) .
x x x However, restrictions on access to certain records may be
itnposed by law. Thus, access restrictions impose? to'confrol civil
insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate -oOo-
and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control
inadequate to maintain order." (Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14
09.70], through Justice Antonio.)
(3) Right to secure copy of judicial records may not be denied.
- "In another case where the Judge gave complainants a run-
around in furnishing them a copy of the judge's decision even
if the fiscal aµd the counsel of the accused were already given a
copy each of the court's decision, the Supreme Court held: "After
a careful examination of the records before this Court, We found
that respondent committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to
give the complainants a copy of his decision in Criminal Cases Nos.
95647-95650.
 11 J ll
! ..
The
SE<;:. 8.. right of the peopl~, )~cJii4ing Jhos:~.~~~­
ployeq in the public ,and private secto,~s, ,to. fo.,:µt P4iqµ~,
associations, or societies for piu;poses not ~p,J,'it(ary .to law
shall not be abridged. · ··
Meaning of right to form associations.
The right to form associations is the freedom to organize or to be a
member of any group or association, uni_on or _s.ociety, and to adopt
the rules which the members judge most approprfate to idueve their
purpose. With or without the above provision, it may be assumed
thiit this right exists. · which singly they would be unable to accomplish, such associatio~s
· It i~ clear that the right to join an associ~tion includes .the right
to leave and cancel his membership with s_a id organizati_o n or to
abstain from joining one. (see Anucension vs: National Labor Union,
80 SCRA 350 (1977].) It also includes the freedom no.t to associate.
(see Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association vs. Gaston, 374 SCRA 396
[2002).)
Right expressly granted to government
employees.
The right to unionize or to form org~tl.tions is now explicitly
recognized and granted to employees in both the government and
private sectors. This guarantee is reiterated in Section 3 (par. 2,) of
Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), which mandates that
the State "shall guarantee the right of all WOfkets to self-organization
xxx."
Specifically, with respect to govenmi~~temployees, the right to
form labor.unions.is al~o recognized in Sectj.on 2(5)' of Article IX-B
(Constitutional Commissions) which provides that "the right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees." (Trade
604
81.!i.!, I.I /\.J:<.' l'. Jll. IJJl.l. 11 HI :u:n
Freedom of Association
Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services vs. National Housing
Corp., 173 SCRA 33 [1989].)
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees, in the
public service may not ~ngage in strikes, mass leaves, walk out and
other forms -6 f mass action,that will lead in the temporary stoppage
or disruption of public servic.e. The right of government employees
to organize islimite.(;i to the formation of unions or associations only,
without' including ,the ijght tci strike. (Gesite VS,. Court of Appeals,
444 SCRA 51 12004):> . . .
!· ' ; • •
Purpos~ and importance of the guarantee.
(1) Undoubtedly, the purpose of the constitutional guarantee
is to encourage the formation of voluntary associations so that
through the cooperative activities of individuals, the welfare of the
nation may be advanced and the govenunent may thereby receive
assistance in its ever-increasing public service activities.1
(2) By enabling individuals to unite in the performance of tasks
relieve the government of a vast burden. The needs of the social
body seek satisfaction in one form or the other, and if they are n?t
secured by voluntary means, the assistance of the government will
inevitably be invoked.2
(3) Since man lives in society it would be a barren existence if
he could not freely associate with others of kindred persuasion or
of congenial frame of mind. As a matter of fact, the more co~mon
form-of association may be likely to be fraternal, cultural, social or
religious. Thereby, for almost everybody, save for the exceptional
few who glory in aloofness and isolation, life is emiched and
becomes more meaningful. (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections,
27 SCRA 835 [1969].)
(4) Freedom of a~sociation has much political significance.
If such right were non-existent then the likelihood of a one-party
government is more than a possibility. Authoritarianism ~ay
become unavoidable. Political opposition will simply.cease to exist;
minority groups may b_e outlawed, constitutional democracy as
1V,G, SINCO,op, cit., p. 669,
SCHMANDT and STEINB!CKER, op. cit., pp. 184-185.
2
 l
I'1JLl ,ll't 1 l('\J J! 'L).N 'l'l'L'U'J'llD.t>il·~ L L AW
• Principles and Cases
intended by the Constitution-may well beCClJ.Wl't)Hhittg,of the,past;
(Ibid.) · :• ._,-.- _
.,_
,·" · -,·,-,,: . . , ; .
Limitation on the right.
The right to form associatiqrrs or.:sJpi_ ~ti~S: may be regulated
or abridged or interfered with .b y· the ,8t~J¢';fu.: the exe:r-dse of its
dominant artd,pervasive -police pow.er, (s,~e.-~~~··:9<i·infra) This .i~ the·
meaning of 'the_phrase "for ~~rp~se~ ~pti5Q~~,t~t? !.~~tr;:,.; ....
Even without.such qualification, hqyrere11,~t 1~.d~eg1eq;,to exist
by virtue.of the inherent p_ower of th~p.t~Jr-Jq.p~~~~ct ;m,}~-~::f~fef,y~
its existence. But unless an assodatjon or_ so·i:;i¢ty cou.J,d be"snown
to qeate an irrunine1't c;langer to ptt~li:C>Ofd.~r~'public peace, public
morals, or public safety, there is ;Ji1o. ju~~ti.7a:tj.on for abridgin
th,e right to form unions, associatio:r;is ot -~qcieties (9onzales vs. 9 association, and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his
Commission on Elections, supra_.),an4 "iH,sJ~aterial whethe~ th~
beliefs sought to be advanced by ar;i ~ss9ci~:&~n pertain to political,
economic, religious, or cultural matters;" {~AACP v. Alab_ama rel
Patterson/ 357 U.S. 449.)
Whether . a restriction imposed on , ~i!? dght to associate-'is
constitutionally permissible or not depends ~pon. the_circumstances
of each case. (Occefia vs. Commission on Elections, 127 SCRA 404
[1984].) . , . .
3
The phrase should not be interpreted as for purposes contrary to "any statute
whic;h might be passed by the Congress of the Philippines." To do so would render futile
the constitutional guarantee. The constitutional provision ~ that case would cease to
be a limi\ation on. legislative ~power for which it is primarily intended. (Y.G. SINCO,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 1994 ed., p. 193.) , industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, °;ledical, or
There is in the Revised Penal Code the crime of i!Jegal association penalized in
Article 147 thereof. As defined in that article, illegal assb{:iatiims are those "totally or
partially organized for the purpose of committing any ·of .the crimes punishable under
this Code or for some purpose contrary to public morals,'.' Jloth the officers and members
of_said associations are subject to the penalties _prescribed therein. Presidential Decree
No. 885 defines and outlaws subversive organizations ani;l associations and penalizes
membership therein.
4 forms of union security and strength. They do not constitute unfair la~or ~ra~ce nor are
As was so aptly stated: .. .
"There is no -other course consistent with the Free Society envisioned by the First
Amendment. For the views a citizen entertains, ·the b,eii~fs he harbors, the utterances he
makes, the ideology he embraces, and the people he associates with are no·concern to
government - until and unless he moves into action, T.\la,t article of faith marks indeed
the main difference between the Free Society whic4 w,e ,espo\lse and the dictatorships
both on the left and on the right." Citing DOUGLAS, The Right of Association, 63 Col.
Law Rev. 1362, 1376 [1963]).
Sec. 8 ART; lII. HlLL OF RIGHTS 607
Freedom cJf Association
Rig_lilt to,join; ,to l~ave, Qr·not tp Join,
or to disaffiliate from a labor union.
(1) Righi to-join •and to leave. - Both the Constitution and the
Labor Code5 (P.O. No, -442, as amended.) recognize freedom of
J: ass,Qciation. What the ConstitutiQn anq. the Labor Code recognize
and guarantee is .the "tight" to form or join associations.
The right · compr~hends at least _two broad noti~ns, namely;
first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restramt, whereby
an.-employee Irlay <1:d for himself withdut being prevented by l~~;
an.dhsecona,·-powet, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, Jorn
or refrain from joining ari association. It is, therefore, the employee
who sli.bul<l decide for himself whether he should join or not an
mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has
joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel
his membership with said organization at any time.
(2) Right not to join. - It is clear, therefore, that the right to
join a. union includes the right to a_bstain from joining ~y .u~on.
This right recognized by Section 243 of the Labor ~ode 1s l~~1t~d.
The legal protection granted to such right to refrain f~om Jommg
is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor uruon and an
employer have agreed on a closed shop,6 by vir~e of the collective
bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members
,.
·J
!'I
i: 5
Section 243 of the Labor Code provides that: "All p ersons employed in commercial,
educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the nght ~o self-
org<U\i.Zation and to form, join or assist labor o~ganiz~tions of ~~ir own choosing for
the purpose of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form
labor organizations for their mutual aid or protection." .
6
"The closed _shop, the union shop, the maintenance of member_sJ:up shop, ~e
preferential shop, the maintenance of treasury sh op, and check-off prov1s1ons are valid
they violations of the freedom of association ~arantee of ~~ Constitution. (Tanduay
Distillery Labor Union vs. National Labor Relations Comm1ss1on, 149 SC~ 470 [198:l,
citing Pascual; Labor Relations Law, 1980 ed., pp. 221-225 and cases cited the~m.
It is the policy of the State to promote unionism to enable _the workers _to negotiate
with management on the same level and with more persuasiveness than if they w~re
to individually and i.ndep imderttly bargain for the improvement of then respective
conditions. (Liberty Flour Mills Employees vs. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., 180 SCRA 668
[1989]; see Bank of Phil Islands vs. BPI Employees Union, 627 SCRA 590 [2010].)
 I
''
60!1 .PHILIPPINE CONSTITI:JT~IDR.f:Jx.t LAW
Principles and @ase~ :,-:-;
of the union for the duration ·of ltl'ie toiHf£otfilf&ctJr Wiee\j~Hefr .
jobs.7 . , ··•.• . ' •!:--:~"'; ,,.i . . :· ·:· ·'" ... •
(3) Right to disaffiliate. - ,T he r,ight 'is-w~ll-settled that a local
union, being a separate and voluntary -ass.oc;iation, •is free to serve
the interest of all its membe11sinc;:liiding, th.e freedom to·disaf.filiate
when circumstances '1-\'.arrant. -Th1.s rig:lti\, ~s. ,consfstent, with the
constitutional guarantee of free,don.:t qf ~~s9¢.!'lti,9_n_. (Vo,llq;cJ:ut~ J-:abor
Union vs. _Bureal,l of Labor Rel,;tqpns, 1~7: ~c;;MA? [,19~~);,.,1,ib~rty
Cotton Mills Workers Uniqn v.s. _Lipe.1;ty .C9.ttql),MH~~1 .6,'5;~~M ,~,l i
[1975]; People's Indus.l!ial & Commercial,:Employ.e.1rs .an_,d;Wo.rkers
Org~ation vs. People's 1n9'ustri~l &.. <;::o:rrµn~r.cia.l.C9rp,o.Ji'ation,
112 SCRA 440 [1982]; Philippine S)<ylanders, Inc..vs, Na~c;n;1:91 L.a~or
Relations Commission,_375 SCRA 369 [2000],)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.
1. Political party adopted a.complete set of candidates af another
poliHcal party.
f.
Facts: Petitioner :Lakas .ng Bayan · filed a.,petitionuagainst. the
COMELEC and the N acionalista Par.ty to enjo~-: the. GPMELEC
from "according. to respondent N acionalis_ta ;Par.fy .the,·r~_gl.t,t~ :<11).c;i
privileges of a separate politiccil p~rty, yvl~P,ut.preiudice.,-t~ said
party from exercising such rights and p.rivit7ges .throµgh, the
7
Section 4(a, 4) of the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No, .875; superseded by the Labor
Code.), before its amendment by R.A. No. 3.350, provi,d E:s ,t,hat although ·it·woula be
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dis•criminate. IA regard (d hit~ oi:''·tenure
of employment or any term or condition oI employment, to: efil:0\11:age ·o r· discourage
membership in any labor organization," the employer is;·,however;not_pr~duded "from
making an agreement with a labor'drganizati9n to require af a 'con_dffion l:i'f employment
membership therein, if such ·labor organization is the· represeritative of the'employees."
By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before· the enactment of R.A. No. ·3350,
if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or·to keep his
employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the
right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed arid withdrawn. ·
To the all-embracing coverage of the closed-shop arrangement, R.A. No. 3350
introduces an exception when it addeq to Section 4(a, 4) the following proviso: "But
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization." The Act does not prohibit members
of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members
the liberty and the power to affiliate or not to affiliate with labor unions. (Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1954]; Anucension vs. National Labor
Union, 80 SCRA 350 [1977]; De La Salle University vs. De La Salle University Employees
Association, 330 SCRA 363 [2000].)
Sec. 8 ART. U'I. BILL OF RIGHTS 609
Freedom 0£ Association
Kilusan ng· Bagqng Lipunan (KBL) in the forthcoming elections
for th~Inter~,Batasang Pambansa-on April 7, 1978," and alleging
that the. adoption by the NP of all the 21 KBL candidates places
not only 0Re but tweRty~one candidates•in the ticket of more than
one political party, group or aggrupation which is in violation of
Section-140 of the'19'l6 Election Code.
Petitioner contends that under such circumstances, to avoid
advantages that would accrue to each of the two gr~ups, KBL
and NP, as ·a result of their separate listing and for fairness, they
-should be cortsidered as just one and the same party, group or
aggrupation. The Solicitor General explained that this provision is
intended merely to·avoid confusion in the preparation of the ballot
among voters who would wish to utilize the block-voting and that
the Ba-ta.sang Bayan could not have in mind prohibiting the same
set of candidates from being nominated by more than one polilicnl
party.
•Issue: May coalition of parties be prohibited without abridging
freedom of association?
Held: Coalition of parties is not strange in politics. - "We are
c.o nvinced there is no point in reading Section 140 of the Election
Code •of 197& ,in the sense that it is illegal for a political party to
adopt •the complete _set of candidates of another political party,
group ,o r aggrupation. To do so can even result in an abridgement
of the freedom of association and of political beliefs conse.crated
in the Constitution. Coalition of parties is not strange in politics,
particularly in ·countries with parliamentary governments." (Lakas
ng Bayan vs. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 196 [19781, through
Justice Barredo.) •·
Note: See dissenting opinions.
2. Law requires registration and submission offinancial statements
of labor unions.
Facts: Petitioners claim that the law, RA. No. 875 (Sec. 23.),
unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights.
Issue: Is the requirement a limitation to the right of assembly or
association?
Held: The theory of petitioners is devoid of factual basis.
nlO l 'IIIJ ,l l'l'I NI\ ' N ! 'l'lTU'JJ N.JA:IML A W
Principles and Cases•1
. .. .(1) Purpose of registration.' "m,/'!ljhe,:,regfstra~pn!i,pxescribed
·-in paragraph (b) ofsaid Seeti0rds· 11ot1a.,limifaticin4odhe1right of
assembly or association~ which may ·,be exercised ..withr,0r.;without
- said registration. 'I'he.lattettls merely:a•:~onq.iti<i>nsine,quamott1for the
acquisition of legal -pe-rsonaliity, J,,y lab,o t,organizations,;d:tssod,atibns
or unions and the possession·o£(th:e,JHgllts.ian-d.iprivileges g11anted
by law to legitima!e la.boi; or~an}z~t~9Il$,,,;;>,.,. ; · .·..·:- , . ,..-
The Constitution doesnot gua,ra:mtee! thesk·rignts Md prl:v.ileges,
much less said personali~ which are;mere' statutory.creati0ns, for
the.;possession and exercise of wl)icl:t regist11ation ,js tequired to
prot,ecf bo.t h labor and.the public against abµse, fraud,, or impostors
whp pose as orga.:rµ.zers,_although not truly accredited a.gents of
the. union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid
exercise of the police power, because the activities in.which labor
organizations, associations and unions of. workers are engaged
affect pubJic interest, which should be protected."
(2) Purpose ofs11bmission offinancials.tatements. - "Furthermore
the obligation to submit financial statem~ntfi, as a condition for
the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable
regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization,
considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership,
as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge
amounts of money due to them or to the cirganiz-ation." (Phil. Ass'n.
of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretan; ofLabor, 27 SCRA 41 (1969 ], through
Chief Justice Concepcion.)
3. Law outlaws the Communist Party-o fthe Philippines (CCP) and
other "subversive associations."
Facts: The law, R.A. No. 1700,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-
Subversion Act," punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts affiHates himself with, becomes or remains a
member of the Party or of any similar 'subversive' organization.
Issue: One of the issues is whether the statute unconstitutionally
infringes freedom of speech and association.
"The Act. has been repealed by R.A. No. 7636, dated September 4, 1992. It was
previously superseded by P.D. No. 885 (September 3, 1970) known as the Revised Anti-
Subversion Law. (see Buscayno vs. Military Commission, 109 SCRA 273 [1981].) R.A.
No. 7636, being favorable to the accused charged with subversion, has retroactive effect.
(People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 [1998].)
Sec.,8 •ART. HI. l31LL Ol~RIGHTS 611
Freedom of Association
, ·. field: ,.Bal·an.cing·•of interest. - "The Act is aimed against
· conspiraciestgoverthrow the Governmentby force, violence or other
illeg~! flJ~~~·iWl:tr,tey:r ~te~e~t in ffE;~do~~o_f spee~ and freed?m
of' associa:tto'rl: •-ts >.infrlliged ·by· the· prohibition against knowing
· . membership in.the CCP, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be
clearly and heav.ilyioutweighed by the overriding consideration of
natlonal :sedttHy-'ahcl. the preservation dfrdemocratic institutions in
their country." (People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972], ~hrough Justice
Castro.)
On a reconsideration of the case, the Supreme Court said:
· (1) Acts, a conspiracy statute. - "The Act is a conspiracy statute.
Obviously to require proof of dire.ct participation of the defendant
in the substantive offenses constituting the obj.ect of the c0nspfracy
in addition to proof of agreement would render ineffectual the
conspiracy'device in penal law. Moreover, it would_run co~nter t,o
another established principle in the law that where conspiracy 1s
proved, the act of one is deemed the act of all.
(2) Proof of membership by overt acts. - "The requirement that
membership in the CCP or any other subversive organization be
shown by overt acts was intended no more than to preclude the
possibility that conviction may be obtained solely on the basis of
incriminating evidence rather than positive acts of the defendant.
. Th~s, where'on(ds 's hown to have taken an oath of membership or
signed affiliation papers in a subversive organization knowing its
illegal purposes, the requirement of the law is satisfied. But overt
act requirement may also be satisfied by proof of non-criminal and
relatively minor acts such as the signing of membership papers,
paying dues, attending meetings, and the like." (Ibid., 56 SCRA 793
[1974], through Justice Castro.)
- oOo-
 I J' I tI
Sec.9 ART. •III. BILL OF RIGHTS 613
Inherent Powers of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain

Meaning of eminent domain.

Eminent domtiin is the right, authority or power of the State,
as soverefgn~ or of those to whom the power has beel\ lawfully
delegated, to take private property for public use upon observance
-· . ,.. ·~ ..~: ::.-1 ~·,.,. ·:t.:r2 1) ~·t... ~J.; L .~ , ~-~ ,. . . of due process of law and paying to the owner a just compensation
SEC. 9. Private ,ttrQpe~•J!haH,ndt ,}i,.e:;takep. for •pubiic to be· ascertained according to law.! (see Art. XU, Sec. 18 and Art.
use without ju,st,con1;p,erts~tio;;~i · : ,. · .:,,..~:~1/:"": :;;:·.,:"' ~. :::;,;:,;
, , • .. , , ·- 4 -~ - ~ , ·' . .• , ,1 ·. • • • ..,. . 0 ;. ,
XIII, Secs. 1,. 4, 9; Rule 67, Rules-of Court.)
" '. -;J' •:a.) It is often referred to as expropriation, and sometimes as
• 'I • A, _FQ.lXJ?_E.PFJifyflNBN:J;,PfJ~AH'i, fl :,(:,· . condemnation; ··Stri!ctly sp·eakmg~ expropriation is the procedure
~-; )"' \··:~· ·.... ,"_.:.~:. (t';• prescribed for enforcing the power of eminent domain. 2 (see Rule
E·ssentlal o'r- lnher-ent: powers•1. . '· . ·· _; ,, . ..._:_, t ,dz: 67, Rules of Court.)
ofgovefoment; ' ,,, ...... ,,_, ...,,. ..
T}le ;~~~r~ise'o{goverrun~ri.t~l power will .f~ll ~d'~r -~~~ of three
(~) ~eat p9i;vex~t:na~r1f;power of'e~~4f\l9it\~in j.,_poµ~~_1p .~wer, -1It is. the governm~rt's inherent right to expropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
and ower of taxatio . · · · _,. " ·- .... ·· · · ' " · ·· · · sare-st~tl:\.e,$fate, · pr-iiv'-!rte'1~peI<ty"':ftjrpublfc 'U's'e or ptmpose. (Modny vs. Court of
· p . ..J:h -; .; _ _, ..., _,_..;;,,,...~;:;,.:: :,r,-.1•1?·::,;,, ·.."·· ., .: r·•:; . Appeals/'268 SCRA 586 [1997]; City of Cebu vs. Dedamo, G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002.)
:: ,.:Aln.~~4?9.?,¥~r§,~fe ~iJ:Uij~t ip.;ti;\e,:!0UP~WtdJWR1efttfr . , ) , . Section 9 merely imposes limitations or conditions on the government's exercise of the
power as a measure of protection to a person's right to property. When land has been
•(1)· :rlhey all rest u p6n necessity becahse there ~ru;; be effectiv~ ~o· acq4ired forpublic use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent
government without themt · ·_ .. ·· · ' · ·' > • . -,_.. -• ,· , . !=lomain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
use· inay be a:baridoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
b
(2)_· They ar~ fuhe~enf a Stat~, i~separable fr~m ~ts Sovereignty; impair-rne.nt of the estate·or title acquired, or any reversion to the former. If, however,
hence, they c~n ~e ~xerc,ised ev_e n witho~~-,Reirlg ,~x,prg~s_ly ,gRanted Ian~ i$ expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose
is ended or abandoned tbe property shall return to its former owner, then, of course,
in the Constitution or by law although .,the conditions for their when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property
exercise may be regulated and limited by the Constitution .Md by so expropriated. (Ferry vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan, 42 Phil. 28 [1921]; Reyes vs.
law; · · · National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494 [2003].)
. . The t~g,<0~pniv.ate,J:and·~-i:mdeffthe,agrm,ian.teji,,',m,progmm partakes of the nature
(3) vhey are ways by which the State interferes with private of ~>ipmpm~tien--p,11otee~-ing, (Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Heirs of Salvador Encinas, 670
rights and property; · · _·' · ·· · · · SCRA 52 [2012].) .
2
Expropriation proceedings are ~e.~.the,e:onventtenabrense; for the
(4) They are all legislative in nature and ~haracter; condemning authority is i:rot>-require-d to -assert any conflicting in\erest.in the ,pioperty.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking
(5) They all have the common good for their object; and title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the
(6) They all presuppose an equivalent compensation received, property, mat,t0,,poo~ea-,,r-ight-,to•possessio~~~ to,p.r,0,ve,a.righMe.-clilmpensation,-for the
t~,Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 611 (2002]; Air Transportation Office vs.
directly or indirectly, by the person affected by the exercise of these Gopuco, Jr., 462 SCRA 544 [2005].) An ~oprla~tdoes not-in"olve the reoovery of
powers by the government. ·~'S'tffii''df·money. It deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to
take property for public use. As such, mis~<!apable-.,o£prima:r;y. estimation,.and-should-be
Strictly speaking, both eminent domain and taxation are em- rftJtci'With.the,.regional.triakoUt>ts,(Bardellon vs. Barangay Masili, 402 SCRA 440 (2003].)
braced in the very broad concept of police power being founded In a <1'.l.!lgt'l/,if¾tqq..~ale, the goverrunent offers to acquire for public purpose a private
on common necessity and interest "extending as [they doJto all the property and the'<tl,~l;l1i,I!it<if«-R<1<iap,t.orsej~t.it. A rejection of the offer, however, would
great public needs." · most likely rttlrliel,.y .i;~ul.tiit:1,the,commertcement,0£ e«pi:0pr,iation proceedings.that..w.Q.u!d
e.v.entua)ly., .t;t;amsfen-.full;!'•tG--the~ovetntrrent Hence, the g@11eFF1ment's. _cffel,,te,-asEprire
il'<pPi•Yl\\te;,pn0pe,rty"iOl"'pttblk•pmpese,,may,be.,0Qnsidered .as,-an• act,• preparatory•·to--,an
612 e,opr0pi;iati.o.i,.p;.0_eeeGiing., (Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, 717
SCRA 601. (2014).)
 614 J?HILIPPINE CONSTITUTIC)NAL LAW' Sec;9
Principles and Gase:s·/"'.·,. ~,
Property subject to the power.
The power of eminent domain reaches to every form of private
property the State needs for public use, .and all separate interests of
individuals in property are held unde-11 a-tacit agree.fnent or implied·
reservation vesting upon the sov.ereign .the right to assume the
possession_ of the property whenever the p-ubUc interest so requires
1t. (Republic vs. Court of Ap.peals, 383:SCRA 611 [2002].)
Practically all kinds of property,. real or personal, tangible or
intangible (e.g., franchise of a corporation), except money and rights
in action which can only be available when made to produce money,
are subject to the power of eminent domain.3
Conditions for or limitations
upon its exercise.
The exercise of the power is not unlimited. There are three (3)
conditions.4 . Sv /><.\ Wc., ·
(1) Existence ofpublic use. -The term "public use" is not defined
in the Constihttion. Public use may be identified with "public
benefit," "public utility," "public advantage" (see Guido vs: Rural
Progress Administration, 84 Phil. 877 [1947].), "public interest,"
"public welfare," or "public convenience" which tends to contribute
t? the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community,
hke a resort complex for tourists or housing project. (Province of
Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals; 222 SCRA 173 [1993]; Ma:fiosca
vs: Court of A~peals, 252 SCRA 412. (1996].} It is ~s·s~ntf~i ~~t the
element_of pubhc use of the property be maintained throughout the
proceedmgs for expropriation. (Republic vs. Heirs, of S.,Q. Borbon,
745 SCRA.40 [2016].)
(a) "Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a
broa<:fer interpretation of 'public purpo~e' or 'pu'.bl}'<: use'.' The
old concept was that the condemned property must ~ctually be
3
18 AM. JUR. 640-641.
4 does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once
The con~tutl?'Fi'at provision is not a,,grantd!>t1~<adi.t1:lita !i01'),.0 f pewer"ilnd should,
therefore; bestnctly interpreted against the expropriator;·the,,g m,ernment,- and liberally, in
f.tvor,of the.-pr0perty owner. (Republic vs. Lim, 462 SCRA265 (2005].) It is about ensuring
that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. It is also
about lo~s spreading. If the go~ernment t<lkes away a person's property to benefit society,
then society should pay. ,Justice and fairness require that the economic loss should be
borne by the public as whole. (City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308 (2005).)
Sec.9 '. A'R'iLIH. BILL OF RIGHTS 615
Inherent ·Powers of Government
1
A. Power of Eminent Domain
used by the ,general public (e.g., roads; btidges, public plazas,
etc.). befote ·the .t~k.ing thereof could satisfy the constitutional
requirement of ' public .use.u' (Province of .Camarines Sur vs.
C0urt of App~,al~, -?f-'pra.) Through the years, .~t.i:re~Wc U$,t ·
t rl, ' h ,I, ~ ' t 'bl~
,,,·..,.••,, ,:·
.• ·•· ,it.. ' " '
~~~t :-.,rn.9~~~-,· ·.~1, ~lri.81¥~11 };1;1,~?, -A,nf:X.l :.p::
'1
Ct:1l
·-~ ,r 1~-
'1 t> ' .':~~-W'kem~ed hv-,~ ;1n.o:m
~n'ff<i-?'Hl't'tt.f#>7
1 -:.."'i"r":O., . ~
-~-i
g .£ Qftcl;i;fit-i1!1<~
• , , ........ . , ' pµ h,hc ne~d$.
~ n-v,--~
5
Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage, mcluding in particular urban land
reform and housing. This concept is specifically recognized in
the present Const~tution.6 (see Art. XIII, Sec. 9.)
(b) Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private
land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private
homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concern.
Moreover, the Constirution itself allows the State to under-
take for the common good and in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing
which will. make at affordable cost decent housing and basic
ser vices t~ underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
centers and resettlement areas. (Art. III, Sec. 9 thereof.) The
expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized
housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the
social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the
Constitution. (Reyes vs. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA
494 [2003]; Antonio vs. Geronimo, 476 SCRA 341 [2005]; City of
Manila vs. Te, 658 SCRA 88 [2011].)
5The restrictive view that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the
public'' has been abandoned. The term m ay be identified with "whatever is beneficially
emplbyect for 'the community'' (Sef\a vs. Manila Railroad Co., 42 Phil. 102 (1921).) or
for the general welfare. (Heirs of J. Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Barangay
Sind alan vs. Court of Appeals, 518 SCRA 649 (2007].)
6
"1"hat only a few can actually benefit from the exp ropriation of private property
land and shelter for all who need them. Corollary to the expanded notion of public use,
expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is
of no moment that the land sough t to be expropriated is less than half a hectare only."
(Philippine Columbian Ass'n. vs. Panis, 229 SCRA 668 [1993].) What ultimately emerged
is a conc_ept of public use which is jl!lst as broc1d as " public welfare." (Manosca vs. Court
of Appeals, supra.) 0fGourse, the-government cannot expropiiate private property for the
benefit of a private individual.
 • J
616 PHJLIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ·Sec 9
Principles and Cases ·.. ; .
(c) Private lands rank last in the order of priority for
purposes of socialized housing, (Esta.te,..o:f Heirs.of JfB.L. Reyes
vs. City of Manila, 422 SCRA 551 [2Q04];}-, . . . .·
· '(d) The privilege (20% discount) erijoyed by senior citizens
t1rtderthe law -(RA. No: 7432.) do·es rto'f'ifotrte dfr~~tly t¥6'ih the
State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.
Accordingli the tax credit (now tax deduction) given to these
establishment can be deemed as their just compensation for
private property taken by the State for ptib'lid use. (Cd:ttn'n. of
Internal Revenue vs. Central Luzon Ji>i;ti!f€orp,,.'.4!56 B'CRA 414
[2005].) . ·· . ·,{;@:e~en~ refers to all those who have lawful interest in
(e) If the property is taken by a private corporation (e.g.,
Meralco, a public utility given the power of eminent domain) to
enable itto furnish the public with some necessity or convenience
(e.g,1 electricity), the use is public. . ·
(f) The exercise of the power of eminent domain is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to specific
public purpose for which it was taken. If this'particular purpose
is not initiated or not all pursued, then the former owner, if he
so desires, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation. The expropriator
may file another petition for a new purpose. (Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority vs. Lozada, 613 SCRA 618
[2010]; Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic, 642 SCRA.384 [2011].)
(2) Payment of just compensation. - The government may take
private property but it must pay "just compensation." (infra.) The
term is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of
the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller
in open market in usual and ordinary course of legal action or
competition or the fair value of the property· as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of actual
taking by the government. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
146587, July t ·2002.) .. . . , . . administrator or such value as determined by the assessor, whichever value is lower. (see
(a). The owner could still contest in court the value
~etermined by the assessor. In fact, this method of determining
Just compensation in · expropriation cases has , been declared
unconstitutional in the landmark case of Export Processing
Authority vs. Dulay (149 SCRA 305 [198,7), · infra.) as "it renders
4I CI I 11
Sec.. 9 Ai!.<Ti'UI:BILL OF RIGHTS 617
InherentPo.wers of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
the Supreme Courtl inutile in the matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination." Hence,
commissioners are still necessary to assist the courts in
determining just compensation for •properties sought to' be
·, expropriated as: provided in Rule 67 of-the- Rules of Court.
. - While it is true .t hat, strictly spe~king, it is the court that shall
appoint the said commissioners, there is nothing to prevent it
:·•. frQm.$,eek,ing.,tn~Jeg~~~.n.datio).'L.o f the parties on the matter.7
.(M,uni,cipa\ity of J;al.;i&~y VS; Ramirez, 183 :SCRA 528 [1990].)
0,) ·'The t~rm·"owner"•when employed in1~~mtirrg
the pn;perty to be
condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee,
and a vendee in possession under an executory contract and
are entitled to share in the compensation. (De Knecht vs. Court
of Appeals, 290 SCRA 223· [1998].) An ejectment suit ordinarily
should not prevail over the State's power of eminent domain.
(Republic vs. Tagle, 299 SCRA 549 [1998].)
--J \,JG,.(c)
In exercising the right of eminent domain, the State
hercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary
rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, where private
property has been taken without just compensation being
paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by
the State against an action for payment by the owner.8 (Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212 [1991); De Los Santos vs.
Intep:nediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 11 [1993).)
7
Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160.), the amount to be paid by the
expropriating local government uniHor expropriated, property sh all be determined by
the prope!rcourt, based on the·fait market value at-the-time of the-taking of the· pr.operty..
(Sec. 19 thereof; see Frances, Jr. vs. Municipality of Meycauayan, 549 SCRA 53 [2008].)
Under the former Real Property Tax C(?de (P.D. No. 464, as amended.), the compensation
tobe paid ·in expropriation proceedings shall not exceed the value declared (in the sworn
statement required to be filed with the provincial or city assessor) by the owner or
Sec. 92, RPTC, as amended.) Such value is presumed to be the fair market value which,
under the Code, is understood to mean the "prke at which a willing seller would sell
and a. willing-b uyer would buy neither-b eing under,abnormal pressure." (Sec. 3[n], ibid,)
8
H has been held·that the·failtt:re•of'the··expropriator to reconvey to the owner the
subjectprQperty despite return, of the pur<!hase•price therefor p ursuant to a commercial
agreement, amG>unts.to expropriation without compensati0n. (Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority vs. Urgello, 520 SCRA 515 [2007].)
 11 I J f I
618
'
J:'HILIPPINE CONSTITll!J'.FlO'.l'l.:J!'..<&L LAW Se.<l:'. -9
Principles.and ,cases" -, Li .
, ,iJ: ., '
(3) Observance of due process of law in the taking. - 1In expro-
priation, the private owner is deprived of his property against his
will. Withal, the mandatory requiremeJ.1i:t 0£ du.e pt0.cess,.0 ught to be
strictly followed. (Vda. deQuano vs ..Repuplic, 642 S.CRA384rao11].)
Procedural due process requires that the owner be notified of,, and
be heard in, the expropriation proceedings on the issues of public
use and just compensation. (Supra,.) .. . ··:·;• _,,
(a) The ,ex,'pntQfU;-ia:ti©~-p:r0®etd~ ·, .may . be J~i:ir,t~n
by..:,the-; g0vei:iu:iJt~t not · only·· by - ~ :imij;g~'l;!~~Hwifibi
;~j;r~~49W1~r but also by ,tj;lJ.9i,Jllgm~ii¥§.IFt4~t~;ju;d,i:oi<:ll ·F1-€ti®
,ft>(i/P,¥ 1.Je~slaticn::i.1, (J:M. Tuazon &. .c;o,, J,nc;._vs. Lan_d Tenure
Adm,inistration,·33 SCRA 882 [l97Q];,Reptibli~ ys"D.e Kriech;t, 182
SCRA 142 [1990].) It is jrtcumbent, how:ever, upon.the conp.ernnor
to ~~aµsf~Jl ;efi$ep~q.l~.:e#.<;n;ts:.-t~,,9~~~fAA.Wl~EC?:F~~Jt;desil1es
,WX;}\8J'll;~~E.rqtf.9 (Jesus is Lord Christian Sd!i.oplFound,~tion, Inc.
vs. Municipality of Pasig, 466 SCRA·235 [2005].) _
(b) The ·exercise., of , llie'. p~etf>lt~¢9jij\);¢s·· aet~Ersaey.d,f :the
_pJ/qp,ei:.tx 9~r-~r. is_~:wlllw,$J~~e1JJµ$:,· . 1t1·or/~e, !fo~s pqt
?JITTee to' the pricEt offered-1'.y-. the gev '" ~·-·-
't ·fot'itf pirchil:s~..
Being ~ · d~rogatl~n \:i(p~iV~t~- right;; the ~1/
i~-'ih~{ th~
authority must be strictly construed against the e~propriating
agency ancrtiperally in f~vor of th~ property_~:n,v-i:_ie.r,;partic9larly
where it is exercised by local governments or other entities upon
which the authority is conferred. The expropric\1-ti,ng agency
must, of course, have the legal authority to exercise the power.
Jhd-icial revi_ew~- ,· _- involve ih"quiry·mto, t1l~d'e€J:ix'afy of the
compensation, · ublic-use charaete:r··:aflhe.,takittg, and the
@aecessity of the ta g., (Infra.)
(c). E?(p~opriati~n proc;:eeding,, are to be resorted to only
a-ftet the other modes of acquisition ,have ·been exhauste.cl. 10
Compliance with the<conditi:ons for expropriation is mandatory
because these are the only ·safeguards· of private ptopei;t,y
. . ~ere the ll1mfo>:wner-·agrees··velimwirio/, he thereby Waives his 'right to the
institution ,of.a formal exprnpriation. proceeding covering.,streb•,property.- (Republic vs.
Mendoza, G.R. No. 185091, Aug. 8, 2010.) · of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of
1 the property in a lawful manner, -lessening or destroying its value. (National Power
°Section 12, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, the current effective
la~ on delegated authority to exercise the power· of-eminent domain, does,,not-·requii'e
pnor·unsuccessfu-1 negotiation a-condition-precedent,fo~·the-exercise of the·'powei (SMI
Development Corp. vs. Republic, 323 SCRA 682 [2000).)
lJ IJ
·. ,ART'. .HJ. B'ILL OF RIGHTS 619
InherentPowers of Government
A. Power' of Eminent Domain
,<;l~(lr,s ·<.!-gtij),it:;y,J~la.tio}l. .o f ,aliae,:p roeess;mhen their property is
fo'rdl;>ly,,t aken,fr0rt<t them for public use. (Estate of Heirs of J.B.L.
Reyes, vs. City of. Manila, supraJLagc:ao vs. Ta.bra, 4-90 SCRA 279
[2004].) · •. . ·, .
Concept of "taking."
(1) Actual ·physical seizure not essential. - The exercise of the
power does not alway~ -r~sult in the taking of property "Taking,"
under the concept of eminent domain, has been defined as entering
upon private property for more than a momentary period, and,
under the warrant, or color of legal authority, devoting it to public
use, ·or- otherwise informally appropriating or infuriously affecting
it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. (Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi,
58 SCRA 336 [197-4,]i:) The term refers not simply to actual physical
seizure or appropriation of the property, or to actual deprivation or
dispossession of the owner of his property but also to its practical
destruction or material impairment of its value, or to a restriction
or limitation of its usual and necessary employment or use by its
owner, not as a consequence of police power.
. (a) Where the ·owner is deprived of the ordinary a.nd i'
bJ¼rtefifialt,;t~f o'f. 'h5.{priJpe~liy or .o'.f its·valu, by being div~rted to !
.l
p.u~M~t-ffs'i'(Municipality of La Carlota vs. NAWASA, 12 SCRA 164 i
\
[1964].), there is taking within the constitutional sense, although
there is no acquisition of pmperty with a corresponding transfer
of title or possession. 11 For example, where airplanes take off
over lcµad! adj-aaenHo airport at such low levels that the 1and is
no.lomgex;s.uitahle for other uses, it has.been held that there is a
'ihi:\oigr',ior'.whidl the government mu.st corripensa,tp (Stearns v.
Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223.) although it does not involve transfer
of title.
(b) Similarly, where due to the const ruction of a dam across
a river to improve navigation, water overflows into plaintiff's
11Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption
Corporation vs. He_irs of M. Sangkay, 656 SCRA .60 [2011); see Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 454 SCRA516 [2005]; Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Jr., 188 SCRA 300 [1990); Republic vs.
Andaya, 524 SCRA 671 [2007); National row er Corp. vs. Ibrahim, 526 SCRA 149 (2007).)
6!W
I I
1:t-llLI!-'P lNH CON S1'l'.l1B,'I'J:.c;DJ~:!,li.~:~ LAW
Principles;and Cases, ·, ,.: \(
J g
. r· ·, • .,• :· f,.
,Jand(f(Pumpelfy '~i,,,G:reen,§t .Clo.,·. 20. L,'::¢~:'.: P~~)i1~~J.:~\e;e.,: as a
result of the cons:truction:ahtt qperatiori of a cbmiiter12ialtailroad
along the p0:rfion ,Of.t..the :Street in .front ·o f plain:tiff(.s{house,
smoke, dust, and cinders darken and pollute the au-1:up.on the ·
lot, such that the .pla,htti£f lias.,l:Jien: deipriiv.~ d,0f-the ordit1;ary u~~-
to which the ·p ron_r erty,· has-heen,.·o,r-io:i;
. ~ T_·.::,I.~\aFN,,~:e~©:fellli'
'Jl'lt•· ·• ···j◄ · -'F''l~;'i . .·"1.,.,
taking of the land in the consti,tutionc).l sense ~µd th1~_plainHff is,
there~ore,I~~\tti~g m1 f9.,E.iR~-~fi.9~:-;_(A~m.i11istraf?i: v.·C~ic~g9,
39 Minn. 286.) In such case, -'ef,ie cf~age caused 1s not merely
consequential; it is the character of the invasion of the proper,t y
that determines whether there is taking'. (U.S. vs. Causb}{ supra.)
· (c)• While the government play not cotnp~l the :PLOT to
celebrate a contract with it, it may in the exercise of the so~ereign
power of eminent clomaiil.,· requi.re th~, telephone comparty to
permit interconnection of the governrrienti~Jtetephone system
·and that of the-PLDT, as the needs Qf tht? government service
may req~ire, ~ubjgctto,the,.paJn:tent.@£1j1Jst,¢~ro.,pe~saY,on. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation,
be subjected to an easement of right ·of way.. The use iOf the
PLDT's lines and services to allow :inter""s.ervice. connection
between both telephone systems is not much different. In either
case, priv~te property is subjecteq, to .a hurd~n ·£qr Po\l~Fc .use
and benefit. (Republic vs. Phil. Long bistance Tel~pho:i;te:Co., 26
SCRA 620 [1969].) . .. ·1 . . · •.
(d) A law which authorizes the Matip]):ahr.Water::Wopks
ana: ·Sewerage·-·Alilthority · (NAWASA} .t o:.. .r:ha;y,ei'.ljwfisdictiem,
su:Reryision .: ::a nd control" ov_er ,. (a)lJi,·i;<.goi\tl:!:rtinwte\.m:t"'o wned
~~~~r·a!:}~~-~,::~?r,ks ev~nwithout trail~fe!ll:0£:a~~FShi:Rr was
held ~e~sti~l;ion~l as 1t was in thet~~~~;.'o!~~f,p;f:~p'.1$.atign
·of :pnvate .prnperty without just- corn'Jien*afi©n; There was
practically an assumption of ow,nership itself and not of mere
adminieytration. (Municipality of La Carlota .vs. NAWASA, 12
SCRA 164 [1964].)
(e) To compel print media companies to donate "COMELEC
:~pace" of the dimensions (not less than 1 / 2 page) specified in
Section 2 of Resolution 2772 of the Commission on Elections,
amounts to "tam,-ig" of private persona_! property £or public
us~ or p.u_rpose. the taking is authorized by the Constitution
but tjPt without payment -o f just compensation. (Philippine
Se<!!,1i9
1
I
,;
.' 1
Sec.9
J J
'
1
; Al~'r; III. BILL OF RIGHTS
I
62'1
l Inherent ·Powers· of Government
A Power of Eminent Domain
Press Instifafe, Inc~ vs. Commission on Elections, 244 SCRA 272
[1995])
(f) The mere physical entry and occupation of the real
property being expropriated falls short of the taking of title,
· f.l;,'ere Jc:: a
. which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner
. over the· smbJ.eat property. Although eminent domain usually
involves.a.takiing: of titl~Am~te1m1:ay,also •~ ;~pe;m,_s.able taking
.},<i>f: only,,,sJJ>fn.(,i,m.e.t,a£k,o!ithe,i].;ttl@,:t?,ellty Wl;terests•--in.,theJiuncl1e of
r,igntttnaffoils-ti'.ftit";;; ~w;,:~rship.-£Republic VS•. Tagle, 299.SCRA
549 [199&],)
(g) The <;t9,;J,µJsHJ..on:o.f an eas~ment of rfeght,~£.way r«;!sulting
,jJ;), i:l, :i;,e~trifµ~P.,•.9.; J,imita~ion,_op ptop.~rty rig\:lts falls, w}U1in the
.J?W.Vi~w gfs-~~ :PJi>Vf~r 0£~i;ninent domain, The mere passage
of transmission lines conveying high-tension current aside
from the danger to the occupants' life and limbs and the actual
. dc:i.inage done to the property traversed by the lines, falls
within the ambit of the term "expropriation."12 (National Power
, ~orporation vs. Agµirre Paderanga, 464 SCRA 481 [2005].)
(h) A resolution of the Commission on Elections compelling
publishers to provide free print space for COMELEC purposes
was held as amounting to "taking" of private personal property
for public use or purpose but ,since the necessity for the takir}g
im.d tlJ,e leg~l authority to effect the taking had not been showp,
and the t~g ~ as: wfllioufµ~yineia{t o{ju~t.compensaHor{, s~id
·--~~sohi~~n· d~rs n <?,t .constitute a valid exercise of the powei:: of
eirii.ile):'if!'.[9main or of the police power of the Stat~. (Phillppine
Press Institute, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 244 SCRA
272 [1995]; see, however, Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Phils. vs. Commission on Elections, Illustrative
Case No. 8, infra.)
12
An\ easement of right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself.
Nonetheless, where-the-Hmita·tien-s-ef•l>Re-,\,lse--0t the..pr-0peity,.takenlor.an.indefu:tite-pefiG.d
would depriv.e.the..owner·of-the·normal,.use--thereof,,the-latter is entitled to payment-foe a
just compensatie n-which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of
the land taken. (National Power Corp. vs. Tiangco, 514 SCRA 674 [2007]; see Camarines
Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 85 [2000]; Didipio Earth
Saver's Multi-purpose Assoc.,ys. Gozun, 485 SCRA 586 [2006].) There-itH-aking U-the
owrier is depriv!!~0ftheF1or.mal.use..0£.h.iS,p>r.opei:ty.,(Republic vs. Libunao, 594 SCRA 363
[2009]; National Power Corporation vs. Tuazon, 653 SCRA 84 [2011].)
:I

622 PHILIPPINE CONSTIT;UTrON:AI,.; LAW
Principles and Cases· . '.
(2) The "taking" must be direct . .-;-;- Ther~ iJ:\,;iSt pe .~lfer;:t t,aking of
the property as defined above. The Constitution does not require
that property losses incidental to the exercise of governmental
power be compensated for. · · : :' ·· · · ·· ·
(a) For instance, the ,:e,a,$~as-~rl~:~E~f~~,}f~.i)t;,Ghim~~SJ.'1;~, in
the exercise,of police power:cduld;jg~W,~jp.$-spmsi-Q£1~1E:J!~fghtl
to ch~g~i;~it.}tlte,tnaif~ffi.l,:~i\lt,1; · ,:an:&is<i'de'crease','l!he value
of their-prdp.e rty·but tlie _.;,._· . ., ,:~~j~tf.l~i~tlit\l1'\d~.w®'
eol'llt~t;?1il'Sf'l.tib:JI,13 . • • . ,. . ,,: . ",. L;. -, .. ,,
(b) Similarly, the government, by pmviding ''ship4o-shore
and snore~to~s'hip public corresponding, fr~e·of'charge" is not
guilty of an uncompensated takipg of the_;business of operators
of llshore-to-ship and ship-to-shore·pub_lic marine coastal radio
stations." "Rather; the Government merely built a bridge that
made the boat obsolete, although not ~ntirely useless. Certainly,
the owner of the boat cannot charge·the 'ba:i!fde'r of1:he bridge for
Its;tfiiieonl}'e, And certainly,i'the·_.G.9Yerfyhient ·I1:as'a1Pille 'r ight t9
b'uilddhe bridge/' (Marine Radio Communicafions Ass'n. of the
Phils., Inc;. vs. Reyes, 191 SCRA 205 [1990], cited in Art. II, Sec.
20.)
(3) Mere notice of intention to expropriate not sufficient. - Mere
notice of the intention of the government to expr_o priate lands in the
future does not and cannot bind the landowner ari.dpreventhim from
dealing with his property. To bind the land to be expropriated and
the owner thereof, the expropriation must be commenced in court.
(see Familara vs. J.M. Tuason Co., Inc., 49 SCRA 338 [1973].)
Authority that may exercise power
-o f eminent domain.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly
by th~ State_ or by its authorized agents is necessarily a derogation
of private nghts. Consequently, the authority to condemn is to be
strictly c;onstrued in favor.of the owner .ind ~gain.st the condemnor.
13
CORWIN and PELTASON, Understanding the Constitution, p. 134.
,, A ~d~mental distinction exists between an exercise of the eminen.t domain power
to. take private p~opercy_and an exercise of the police _p ower to "regulate'' the use of
private proper()'. The first 1s compensable; the second is not. (infra.)
I I J
Sec.9 ' ART. HI. BILL O F RIGHTS 623
Sec. 9 Inherent Powets of Government
A Power of Eminent Domain
(Jesus is Lor~ C~j~tiaJ't Schqol Foundation, Inc. vs. Municipality of
Pasig, 466 SCRA 2$!;5 [7P05J.) .
·,'(1} A legis]a_ti,vep~wer. -As an inherent power of sovereignty, the
power of eminent domain is lodged in Congress. Being legislative in
character, its scope is as broad as the scope oflegislative power itself,
and 'it can only be exercised under the authority of some statute.
· :~ (2f Exerci~~-by, e~~cutive authorities. - By tradition, the power is
~x~:r;cjsed by ~e ;e~er.;utivr a~ 0£ the govemmertt subject to such
' i ·,.,. . :: . . ., limits as Congress may prescribe. Once the authority is given by the
legislature, the m~tter ceases to be wholly legislative and it is up to
tn~ .1~ecutive authorities (national government) to decide whether
it shall invoke the power and to what extent. 14 (Visayan Refining Co.
vs. Camus, 40 Phil: 550 [1919].)
to
(3) Delegation government agencies. - The power of eminent
domain may be conferred upon local government units (LGUs)
and ofl:er government entities. The scope of such delegated power
must be sought in the terms of_the delegation. 15 The grant of the
pm,yer of eminent,domain to local governments under Section 19,16
14Sec. 12. Power of Eminent Domain. - The President shall determine when it
is necessary or .advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of
the National Government, -and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the
action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court. (Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.)
15In delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain control or
impose certain restriction. But while such delegated power may 15e a limited authoricy, it
is complete in itself. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit
that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall
be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy, the courts defer to such
legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no
real or substantial relation to the public use. There is no provision in the Constitution or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6557.) which expressly subjects the
expropriation of agricultural lands by government units to the control of the Department
of Agrarian Reform.
16Sec.19. Eminent Domain. - A local goverrunerit unit may, through its chief executive
arid acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of ju~t compensation, pu~suant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent la\Vs:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
p~opercy upon the filing of the e~propriation proceedings and upon making a deposit
with the_proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value. of the
prop~rty based o~ the current tibc declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That the amount to be paid £or the expropriated property shall be determined by
 I 'I 111 ,l I 'J 11NJJ 'UNS'l'l'fU'J.'lON,A:L.LAW Scc.9
Principles and Cases.
RA No. 7160 cannot be understood as be4:tg th~ ,p,e rvasive ~d all-
encompassing power vested in the legislative 9ran.ch govenu:ri.ent. of
The delegated power partakes only of a share in eminent domain. 17
f
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. lt~?8~, ~ly 2:- 2QO?; B~l~so
vs. Municipality of Panay, 498 SCRA 113 [2003J.} , more than three (3) commissioners. 18 (Municipality of Bin.an vs.
(4) Deleg9.tfon, to public senµce ,co111P,c,.11;ie~: :_ The power may
also be delegat~d to public service comp~e~ or pr~vate. entities
operating publi~ utilities to enable them to serve p~blic needs.
When the power !s granted, the extent to ~hich it may be ~xercised,
is also limited to ~e express term or clear implication of ~e statute
in whid-\. the grant is contained. 1n· other words; the delegated
authority inust 'be sti:ictly construea..(Tenorio vf M~l~ ·Railroa'd
Co:~22:Pliil: 411 [1912].) . . ' · . , ·. . .
.. ' ~, t •
S:tag.es involved In expropri°ation proce·e'ding$.
·There ·are two (2) stages or phases in every action for expropria-
tion. : '. • . · · · ·
,::-(i).·~e~~-r~i~ation, of q_utboriiy pf P.laiJi,if} l .--;-;- The .~rsJ J?ha~e 'i;.
concerned with 'the determination .of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
e~erdse in the context of the facts invo'lved in the suit. It ends, with
on order·of. expropriation (where the rigl::tt ot the ,plaintiff to take the
land and the public purpose to which they are devoted are upheld)
or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it
finally disposes of the case.
the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the proper_ty..
(LocalGo.vetrunent Code [RA. No. 7160].}
Section 19 does not make determination of public purpose a condition precedent
to the issuance of a writ of possession. (Francia, Jr. vs. Municipality of Meycauayan, 549
SCRA53 (2008].)
17
An LGU m(l.y, therefore, exercise the power only when authorized by Congress
and•subject to the latter's control and restraint imposed through the law conferring the
power or in other legislations. In this case, Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 which delegates the
power of eminent domain also lays down the parameters for its exercise. (Municipality
of Paranaque vs. W.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678 [1998].} Despite the existence of
this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to
determine whether the power of eminent domain is b!!ing exe,rcised in strict compliance
with the terms of the d elegating law. Aside from the other requisites, .an ordinance not
a resolution, is requi.red for the exercise of the power, and a valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner of the. property sought to be expropriated but said
offer was rejected. (Heirs of A. Suguitan vs. City of Mandal1,1yong, 328 SCRA 137 [2000}.)
Sec. 9 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 625
Inherent Powers of Government
A. Powef of Eminent Domain
(2) Determination ofjust compensation for property taken. - The
second· is concerned with the determination by the court of the
just compensation for the property to be taken which relates to the
valuation thereof. It is done .by the court with the assistance of not
Garcia, '180·.scRA 55'6 ·[1989}; Republic vs. Legaspi, Jr., 670 SCRA
333 ,[2012].) It ends with an order fixing the amount t0 be paid to
the,tlefendant. lnasmuch as it leaves nothing more to-½Je done, this
order finally disposes of ·the seccmcl stage. · ·
('3,) Comptetion of the two stages. - It is only upon completion of
the two (2) stages that expropriation is said to have been completed.
The .Process, however, is ·not complete until payment of just
compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession
does hot writefinis to the expropriation proceedings. (Abad vs. Fil-
Homes Realty and Development Corporation, 636 SCRA 247 [2010].)
· (4} Remedyojpropertyowner. -To both orders-an expropriation
(oi:' c6ndemination) order and an order fixing just compensation -
the remedy therefrom as an appeal. 19 ·once the first order becomes
.fi:rYai and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate
and its public use. cannot any more be questioned. (Estate of Salud
Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 349 SCRA 240
'j· [ZO0l];' National Housing Authority vs. Heirs of I. Guivelendo, 404
SCRA389 [2003]; Ma:lonzo vs. Principe, 447 SCRA 1 [2004].)
Concept of just compensation.
(1) Market value. - "Just compensation" means the equivalent
for value of the property sought to be appropriated. Anything beyond
that is more and anything short of that is less than just compensation.
It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained by the owner
(not the gain to the taker) which is the measure of the indemnity, not
whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. Of course,
to be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but
18See Sections 5-8, Rule 67, Rules of Court.
19Jurisprudence recognizes the existence of separate appeals in a complaint for
expropriation because of said two stages in every action for expropriation. (Marinduq~e
Mini,ng and Industrial, Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 567 SCRA 483 (2009].) Once the tnal
court's order of expropriation and the order fixing just compensation have become final
and executory, tb.e expropriating authority can no longer withdraw from the expropriation
proceedings. (Ciriaco vs. City of Cebu, 602 SCRA 601 [2010].)

626 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIQNklS'LAW Sec. '9
Principles an:dCases ·::~··_'· ' "
, .. • ,I •
also to the taker. The "just" ness of the
corn~ertsation tbtiicf only be
attained by using reliable and actual date (e.~.';' s;~dtii' dedafation of
rea'ltors, in the area, tax dedarations .and :z;on.?-tyalua:tion) as basis
for fixing the value .of ithe condemned propei,;fy; (Expor.t Proaessing
Zone. Authority vs.. Dulay, 149 SCRA 30~ [i,98.7.];.,Land -Bank of the
Phils. vs. Imperial,·51.5 SCRA449 {2004]; Ap9 F;ruits Corporation .vs.
Land Bank of the .Phils., 632 SCRA 727 [2,;1io];,Repub.lic vs. R,ural
Bank of Kabacan, Inc., 664 SCRA 233 [2012]; National-Power.Corp.
vs. Zabala, 689 SCRA 554 [2012).).
(a) The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning-of the
word "compensation" and to convey ·th'~reoy th~ idea·.'tbat- the
equivalent to be rendered for the property· to be ta.ken shall
be real, substantial, full and ample. The just compensation is
generally the market value20 (Nationa\ Power- Corporation vs.
Manubay, 437 SCRA 960 [2004]; Republic.vs, Mupas,. 769. SCRA
384 [2015].) or !'the fair value of the property as between one
wl~o receives and one who desires to sell x x x." (Republic vs.
Co'":t of Appeals, 454 SCRA 516 [2005]-?
(b) All the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and _,capabilities should
be considered (Sumulong vs. Guerrero,· 154 SCRA 461 [1987];
Ignacio vs. Guerrero, 150 SCRA 369 [l-987],), including .t he cost
of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape,
location as well as the tax declaration thereon. (Land Bank of the
Phils. vs. Wycoco, 419 SCRA 67 [20q4].).The zonal value may be
one but not necessarily the sole, index of the value of a realty.
(Leca Realty Cprp. vs. Republic, 503 SCRA.563 [2006].)
(c) The nature and character of the la11d af the time of its·
taking·is the principal criterion to determine just compensation
to the landowner. (National Power Corporation vs. Henson, 300
SCRA 751 [1~98]; Camarines Norte Elect~ic Cooperative, Inc. vs.
:ZOWith respect also to compens ation, m arket value has ~een equated with "that sum
of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be giyen and received therefor. (Noble
vs. City of MaJ)ila, 67 Phil. 1 [1938]; Eslaban, Jr. vs. Vda .. d.e Onorio, 360 SCRA 230 [2001).)
This rule is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In ·s uch case,
the owner is not restricted for the portion actually taken. He is also entitled to recover
for the consequential damage if any, to the remaining part of the property. (National
Power Corporation vs. Chiong, 404 SCRA 527 [2003]; Bank of the Phil. Island vs. Court of
Appeals, 441 SCRA 637 [2004].)
Sec.9 " ART, lll.,BILL OF RIGHTS 627
Inh~r'e'nt Power,s.of .G0vernment
A. Power o~ Eminent Domain
., <l:ourt pf Appe~l~J:.34~SCRA85 .[2000]; National Power Corp. vs.
SanPedto; 5193-S~RA 333 [2006].) ·
·. '(d) The c:oricept"of just compensa'tjon, however,,does not
··iuii.ply fa.i~ness 't 6 thitproperty owner •afone. Compensation must
·be .just not'~:mly :td'the property owner but also to the public
\~hi}h ultinjate~y :bears the cost of expr9priati0n. (Republic vs.
'Court of Appectls;-454 SCRA 516 [2005]i Secretary of DPWH vs.
Tecson, 700 SCRA ·243 [2013].) The State is not obliged to pay
premium to the property owner; it is only bound to make good
the'loss sustained, by the landowner with due consideration of
the circumstances· availing at the time the property was taken.
(National Power Corporation vs. MFll<alastas, 782 SCRA 363
[2016],)
(2) Damages and-benefi-ts. - •Expressed in another way, just
compensation is compensation equivalent to the fair market value
(supra.)_of the property. taken.
(a) To the market value must be added the "consequential
damages," if any, minus the "consequential benefits" accruing to
the owner as a result of the new use to which his former property
will be put or improvements of the same by the expropriating
authority. (City of Manila vs. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208 [1913]; Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 280 [1915]; Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Rodriguez, 13 Phil. 347 [1909]; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 596. SCRA 57 [2009].) Consequential damages are
awarded, if as a. result of the expropriation of only a part of a
certain property, .the remaining property of the owner suffers
from an impairment or decrease in value. (Republk vs. Bank of
the Phil. Islands, 705 SCRA 650 [2013].)
The sentimental value of a home t9 the owner is not a proper
element of damage. (Amigable vs. Cuenca, 43 SCRA360 [1972).)
(b) The benefits must be actual and appreciable and not
merely conjectural; they must be the direct and proximate result
of the .improvements done on the land.21 (Republic vs. Valera,
L-57.76,. April 14, 1954.) Damages caused by use and occupation
of the property expropriated before the actual filing of the suit
may be recovered. (Philippine Oil De,yelopment Co., Inc. vs. Go,
L-4007, Jan. 23, 1952.)
21
29 c.J.5. 1069.
r J r I J l I
628
P l HLil!PINLl 'ON S'flTLIJITXO N .tl.L LAW
Principles and,Gases;, .· :_-" ,;
• ~ ,, ,' ,.,,".r ,
· (e) It would be M.(iAj;~Stic_eJlliJ. tm:ff;par.t rof,\~(Le¾pll.@1p,riator
w~~re the owner would be gj.ivett~t.µ'.):!ilt:le:-iticr~rf\~t\l-t.ahwJJvaq,t~ges
arising £ropt the . ~i,.t t?,-_wh~0r -~edz°:~~~f~hC;i~r-otes the
property, ,e7p,~opr1't~~~;, ,Je.~~~!; ·. ~7;1 ·,tJ:"~~~~l ,c~9f. ~><;~~ple; .
that the suBJect .Pr<?per~Y, shquld ,~!rP:~f#,Jr.9,m, f¥,e: sµJ#epµent
1
. 1 ·~6f
classifie;c1-tion· :• it$. adjdiitli\b-.t:>:,.:....ptb,.1?1
t '• -~
·''erWJs'
"{ y,
. ~sd.hd. ~'it'riJtt
_·~,~-:;..-,t,1·
untenab (:!: (fgiio;,J~. ys..Nltiqrial J?o:Wk'.rJ.iobh6iatfo~,. .640,
287 [20111.) .. · · · ··· : · · . •· ·' ·· ~ ·: 1· -:ry;····r : · ,. -1 ,.·
• : \ ~,.i : · ? t~r:--.:• ;-_ :,;_, -:, ,,··, ·
• 1
(3). Interest . ..;-,-- Damages'.inay~
be aw;tcle,d}h~d't,V,rter1irithe;form
of legal interest.on,the price of.the 1arid. -t dbi'ir~~kon:~di.£ro11µ_fueitime
of the taking; (Amigable .VS:.G:uenca; 43 BG1.iJr3.60·{19i21, Oe los
Santos.vs; Intermediate. Appellate·()::mrt;.~23 .SERA 11 {'W-93:}.)'.·
(a) If the property is takeri'pefore C<?rn:pensation 1~-~¥.f~'):ted,
legal interest·on the amount of -the fit,.at 1c0mpehsatien s'l\ould
be •given to - the owner, of the property from ·the 'time· when
possession thereof was taken until the con1p·ensatioh acfn.J:ally:
paid or deposited with the court. (Phil.ippine Railway Co. vs.
Solon, 13 Phil. 34 [1909]; Philippine Railway Co. vs.Duran, 33
Phil. 156 [1916]; Land Bank oLtpe Phils. vs:. .E. Rivera, G.R. No.
182431, Nov. 7, 2010; Apo Fru\t$ Corporation vs.. Land B~ of
the Phils., 692 SCM 72'.i',[2010}.) . . . , ·. ,-., · _
(b) The interest recoverable isnot contractual nor based on
delict or quasi-delict, btit one that runs a 1natter of law and as
fo11ows as a matter of course from the·r1ghts of the landowner
to be placed in as good a position as inoriey can accomI51ish, as
of the date of the taking. It must be claimed, however; ·or it is
deemed waived. (Urtula vs. Republic, !2tSCRA 417 [196_8].)
(c) The compensation must be in the form of rentals1 but
by way of interest, and·the amoUJ1tS 'graht~d fy,the ~ourts shall
cease to earn in interest only from 'the rp.oment they' are paid
to the owners or deposited in court. The· indemnity' for rental
~s inconsistent with a property owner"'.s ·dght to be paid legal
interest on the value of the property, for if the i;ondemnor js
to pay- ,t he compensation from the time of the actual taking of
the property, the payment of such compensation is deemed to
retroact to the actual taking of ~e property, and hence, there
is no basis for claiming rentals £ro111·-t he.time of actual :taking.
(Manila International Airport Authority vs. Rodriguez, 483
SCRA 619 [2006].) . credits, and Land Bank bonds. (Sec. 18 thereof.)
Sec, ,9 Scc. 9 •ART., 111. 1:HLL O F RI GHTS 629
Inherent-P.0wers of Government
\ , A. Power of/Eminent Domain
(d) In a case ·'~pplying Article 220,9P of the Civil Code, the
· •, Supi:ern:e,C:ou:rt ,dedared that the computation of legal intetest
·. ;0£6% is ,t he. cotrectr<.md valid legal interest allowed in payment
1
. ,0£just compens.atiomfor lands expropriated by the government.
, _(National Pow;eit Corporation vs. Angas, ~08 SCRA 542 [1992].)
:~ds is
)1-~_1' . -J~ij\.." .
\7 ' '4,,· ' ,•·
In ,Republie, :v.s . Cau,::kof Appeals (38$-.SCRA 611 [2002].), the
stRA Suprem.e Co.urt).fnpos.e.d-interest at 12% per annum in order to
heJp .elhninate _fue issu~ of. the constant filuctuation and -inflation
.• \;~
q~ '.t he .. ~rl'\?.~cy , py~r ,_tip:1e . .(see Reye.~ vs; National Housing
.A..uthodty; ~95 $(;:.1.tA ~4 [2003]; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
454 SCRA516 [200$].) ..
(4) Fprm, --:-N9te thattre Constitution.does not specify the form
of coinp.ensatiOr.!,, Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speaks of
"arty ·sum _o r_sun:i,s ~~ru;~ed as compensation," while Section 10 of
the same Rule speaks :pf ;'the amount so fixed."
is Section 8, Article XIII of the Constitution says "financial
instruments" used as payments for lands covered by the agrarian
reform program "shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their
[landowners'} choice." This means that payment need not be in
cash.23
(5) Standard, - The appropriate standard of just compensation
is a substantive method. It is well within the province of the
legislature to fix the stanc;lard. Specifically, RA. No, 8974 prescribes
new standard in determining the amount of just compensation in
expropriation cases relating to national government projects, as well
as J:he payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the writ
of possession. (Republic vs, Gingoyon, 478 SCRA 474 [2005].)
Judicial inquiry into the adequacy
of compensation.
(1) Determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases,
essentially a judicial function. - The executive department or the
22 Art. 2209. H the obligation consists in the payme~t of a sum of money, and the debtor
incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages there being no stipulation to the contrary,
shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the
legal interest,' which is six per cent per annum. (1108)
23Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657.), landowners
may be paid partially in government financial instruments or they may be paid shares
of stock of government corporations, physical assets or other qualified investments, tax
\
I,
 11111111 1 1 11 I 11r,•1 lll ll lll lt lA I . I AW
l 111i11 lplt•~ 1111d <'tVn•u
gl11l11t111·1• ,11 oy 11111k • lh ' Jnltlnl determination but when a party
·lnln111 n vlolnlion o( LJ,e guarantee in the Bill of rughts that private
I ro1:iel'LY may nol' be token f:or pttbllc use without just compensation,
uo Hlolutc, decree, or executive order can mandate· that its own
dclerminnl'ion shall prevail over the coutt's findings. Much less
con the courts be precluded from looking· into .t he "justness" of
t·he decreed compensation. (Export PrG)cessing Zone Authority vs.
Dulay, 149 SCRA305 [1987]; National Powe:r-Corporat,i on vs. Jocson,
206 SCRA 520 [1992]; see M~dpality. of 'falisay vs. Ramirez, 183
SCRA528 [1990]; Panes vs. Visayas-State College of Agriculture, 264
SCRA 708 [1996].)
The matter of just compensation befog•a question of fact, is
always subject to review by the courts. The valuation of property
in eminent domain is essentially a judic;:ial •function and may not
be usurped by any other branch or offici.al of the government.
The reports of -the· commissioners are merely advisory and
recommendatory.24
(2) Provisions of Decree on just comp~nsdtion unconstitutional. -
In the Dulay case, the Supreme Court declared the provisions on
just compensation found in Pres. Decrees No. 76, 464, 794, and 1533
unconstitutional encroachments on.jud,icial prerogatives because,
following the decrees, the task of the court "would be relegated to
simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either
by the owner or the assessor; it has only to choose between the two
valuations, and its choice is limited to the lower of the two. It cannot,
therefore, exercise its discretion or independence in determining
what is just or fair on· a matter which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for final determination.
(3) Property owners have right to question assessors' valuation. -
The market value stated by the local assessor alone or as fixed by
2
'The statements made in tax documents by the assessor or the statutory determina-
tion of just compensation may only serve as a guiding principle or as one of the factors to
be considered but they cannot exclude or prevail over a court determination made after
expert commissioners have examined the property and all pertinen't circumstances are
taken into account and after the parties have had the opportunity to fully plead their cos-
es before a competent and m1biascd tribunal. To enjoin the courts by decree or loglalotlon
from looking Into alleged violations of the due process, cqunl p1·otccllon, ond 11mhwnt
domoln clnuscs o f the Constitu tion is lmpormlsalblo oncronchmont on 118 lnd<1pMtll nm
nnd prcrogotlvo6, (Mnnolok v,1 . Nn1i.o nnl I louRln(l Authority, 'ISO8(.' l{A fltl I11/ll'll; lh1IM1111
S1•otllln11 All~tl, Inc. v,1 l{ll1rnbllr, C.H. No. I~ 1()()1/, July 'J, ?00?.)
Ill\ I
11 A lit'il . Jll. Ull.L 11 RIGH TS 631
Inherent Po½{ers of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
law cannot·. sttbstitute-''for the .·co1;t1:t's judgment in expropriation
0
pr0cee.dings. It is violative of the due process and the eminent
domain pr-ovisions,oUhe ConstitutiOIJ. to deny to a property owner
the:,opportunity .,to . prnve· that 'th'.e ¥aLuatfon made is wrong or
pnejudiced.25. ·
(4) Prompt payment, an element of just compensation. - Just
compensation -meru:1.s not only the correct dete11mination of the
amOllliltto be paid to-the owner of the land but also the payment of
a
the tand within r.easona:b'le time from its taking. Simply put, the
concept implies 'jtist and timely payment.
. (a) Without · pi:ompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence ~f being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for an µnreasonable length of time before
actµally receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.u
25 According to the Supreme Court in the D11/~y (s11prn. ) cnsc:
"Various factors tan come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled
otit for expropriation..:fhe values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for
very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the
pobladon:-Individu'al'differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based
on such gerleralities as its possible cultivation for rice, com, coconuts, or other crops.
Very often, land described as ' cogonal' has been cultivated for generations. Buildings
are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of
areas are more often··inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be
absolute substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the. owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors
since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land-
ow,ne.r s accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax d eclarations prepared by local
assessors or murucipal· clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the
statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a
case (is) filed by an agency authorized to do so.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that
the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and
con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and
just determination have been judiciously evaluated ." (see also Ignacio vs. Guerrero, 150
SCRA 369 [1987]; Lagunsad vs, Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 199 [1987]; see Republic vs.
Sps. Tan Son g Bok, G.R. No. 191448, Nov. 16, 2011.)
Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate. By
ilsolf, thJs index cannot be the sole basis of 'just compensation' in expropriation cases.
(Republic vs. Asia Pacific Interpolid Steel Corp., 719 SCRA S0 [2014].)
16Th11~, in lhc cnsc or Provincial Government of Sorsogo11 vs, Villaroya (153 SCRA 291
I 1'1B7 I,), tho Supremo Court rnlcd: "Tho pclil loncrs hove been wailing for more thnn
r f r r J r f r I r 1 r
6321 l 1·llL1.li'J."lNlli <:.:ON S'l11'Uf1'.,IIOMY;ll.To.LAW Sc.c:.. S>1
Principles and Gaseshc1i~:""<'1.l '
.. . '
; ~ '. )· , ,:,i;• •
, . (CosouHuela vs. Court .of.Ap,JDeals/?::l6~rS§}~_39~,;[l198811,·Land:
Bank of the Phils. vs.,Court .of Appealsfx~:53.SCRA 404 {i996J;;
Republic vs. Court of App~eals;:4A4:::SQR¼.:5l6J2005];,,Rep.:ublk
vs. Lim, 462 SCRA.265 .[200S],;::Ap9iF~i,ts. <;o.;rpoL'c):tion vs. -1,,andi.
Bank of the Philippines, 632 SCRA 7'P :[201_0J; Dept. of Agni.r~ani
Reform vs. Gal.la, 732;$CRA 4~;)-[401t-fo) .
(b) Paym~nt of just compe:nsation sh;uld follow as a .
matter of right immediately after :the;,oro.er of exproF>riation is
issued. Any delay in payment must b.e ,Gounted from said order.
However, the delay, to constitute •.a -v,iolatj.on of due. process,
must be unreasonable and inexcusab.le;..it.must .h e deliberately
done by a party in order to defeat the, ends of justice.28 (Estate of
Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 34_ 9SCRA
240 [2001].)
thirty years to be paid for their land which was taken for use as a public high school. As
a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will to supply all reqµire\i documentation. and
facilitate payment of just compensation, The imposition of unreasonable requirements
and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary.but a rich
90ttrce of discontent with government. There should be some kind of swift a_n d effective
recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower lev.el bureaucrats. ·
Under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid .
is
property is the obvious remedy. In cases where land taken for :pubUc.,µse, ,public.
interest, however, must, be considered. The children cif Gu.bat, Sorsqgon hal,\'e b.een using·
the-disputed land as their high school athletic grounds for.thirty years." .
27
In the Coscu!luela case (supra.),.the Supreme Court said;
"In the present case, the irrigation project was completed ·a nd has been in opera-
tion since 1976. The project is :benefiting the farmers specifically, and the ,community in
general. Obviously, the petitioner's land cannot be returµed to him. Howev:er,, it is. high
time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It.is arbitrary and ca-
pricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize.a person'.s .
property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executoiy and then refus~
to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for.the property earlier .taken and
profitably used. We condemn in the strongest possible.terms the cavalier attitude of gov-
ernment officials who adopt such a .d espotic ard irresponsible stance."
28
Payment of just compensation is not, however, a condition sine qua non to the
issuance of the order of expropriation. It is the transfer of title to the land expropriated
that must wait until the indemnity is actually paid, (Republic vs. Phil. Ville Dev. &
Housing Corp,, 525 SCRA 776 (2007].) The process is not complete until payment of
just compensation. (Lintag vs. National Power Corporation, 528 SCRA 287 [2007].) An
order merely fixing the fair m~rket value of the subject property is not an acljudlcallon
on the merits and does not declare the rights and obligations of the parties. (Phil. Porto
Authority vs. Rosales-Bondoc, 531 SCRA 198 [2007].)
Soc. Y AHJl',. JLL BlLL 11 RIG I-lTS 633
lnherent.Po'\Ve:rs.of .Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
~1:1,<ifj~,i~!, ioq,4Jcy iiJtcrJh.e-p,ub,lic,~u!iie.
__ c~c!ra~~e.r. c;,f t'1~t~~tng.
· ' ~1-) Where- statukspetiftes the pa-rticular publio use. - Whether or
not-a statute authorizmg·the exercise of-the general power of eminent
domain specifies the-pa:iticular "public use" to which the property
will be put, the courts wo.uld still have jur4sdiction to review the
judgment 0f the legi~lature.
For if the use be not public or no necessity for taking exists, the
legislature cannot au.,t horize, the taking of private. property against
the will.of ,the owner,-notwithst~ding that compensation may be
requirep.. Even,if the proposed use is.public (to open a street through
a cemetery),. a municipal corporation is without valid authority
to expropriate a portion of a prop erty c).lready in public u se (as a
cemetery) under a mere general authority to expropriate. (City of
Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349 [1919].)
(2) Where specific purpose stated in the Constitution. - Where
the authorizing statute declares that the expropriation of a particular
land is for a spetiftc purpose. stated.in the Constitution, it is not for the
judiciary to inquire as to whether or not the taking of such land, in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion (see Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2.)
is for public use.
The C01.1stin:ition itself which is supposed to be the supreme
la'::"' on private property rights de~lares it to be so (under its social
justice and agrarian reform provisions), and leaves it to Congress,
not to the judiciary, to.make the choice of the lands (including the
area or size) to be taken to attain the constitutional objective. The
s~J?P~ and lim,i~ of. th,e, p_o-w~r cif the judiciary in this regard is only
todeterrnine-the existence. of legislation to see to it that the facts are
as·contemplated in-such enabling act, and to provide the vehicle for
compliance with procedural due process in the implementation of
the Act. (se_e ·concurring opinion of Justice Barredo in J.M. Tuason &
Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970] .)
Judicjal inquiry into tile genuine
necessity of the taking.
(1) Genu_ine necessity_of a public character. - As early as City of
Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349 [1919].), the
Supreme Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the
power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity
 J J 11 J J
PH:ILlPPlN:E C NS'ffl'Ll'I'IO NAL. LAW Sec. 9
Principles anq Cases . · .· ·,
must be of a public character. Condemrta:tion of private ·property
is justified only if it is for the public g-ood ·and·'.there ts a gein:uine
necessity of a public character., Consequently, _the courts have; the
power to inquire into the legaJify of ~e._exercise of. the right of
eminent domain an.d to determine -whether. there. is •a genuine
necessity therefor.29 (Republic vs . .La Or<len--_d e PP. Benedictos .de
Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646 [1961]; J.M. Tuason .& ,Cp., IJ;ic. vs. Land.Tenure
Administration( supra.) .
(2) Necessityfor the -taking directly Weiermlired by·law. ~ :iln'"fihe,<
where the expropriation is directed tby.-,Jegislation, iSStie -0'fthe
nec!essity assumes the nature of-a pdlifit'al qt.testidn:t11r·(Manap·a t vs.
Court of Appeals, 536 SCRA 32 [2007].') · '·· · • ·, · · · ·
(3) Particular property to qe Jaf;cen. _- In. t}).~case, qf De !(n~cht '9S.
Bautista (100 SCRA 660 [1980]'.), the _S upreme· Court further ruled
that the government may not capriciously choose what private
property should be takeri. Citing the case of J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration (supra.), 'the Court held: "x x· x
With due recognition then of the po-~ er··of Congress to designate
the particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be
condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still
a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the
party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice in
violation of the equal protection clause." (Mun. of Meycauayan vs.
29
Genuine necessity "does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with· the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the proper.ty owner conslstenf
with such benefit." (City of Manila vs. Arellano, 85 Phil. 663 [1950); Masikap vs. City of
Pasig, 479 SCRA391 [2006).)
30J.n Estate ofSalud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone (349 SCRA 240 [2001) .),
the Supreme Court quoted with approval its ruling in the City ofManila (supra.), to wit:
"... [T]he Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating
private· property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the
exact location of the improvement. In such a l;ase, it is w¢11-settled that the utility of
the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its construction,
the expediency of constructing it, and the suitabi.eness ·of the location selected, are
all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no
power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives
of the people.
In the absence of some constitutional or-statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character."
J J J J
Sec.9 ' · Al\\".P.•IH. BlLL O F RIG H TS 635
Inherent Powe-rs of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
Intermediate Appeilate :Court, 157 SCRA 640 [1988); see Moday vs.
Court of Appeals, 268.SC:RA 568 ~1997].)
to
(4) Ma~imum area be expropriated. - The taking of property
must always be limited to the necessity of the case and, consequently,
no more can be expropriated in any instance than what is needed for
the particular use for which the expropriation is made31 or necessary
for the legitimate purpose of the expropriation. "Necessity," within
the rule, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or
practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the
public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning
authority and property owner consistent with such benefit.32 (see
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Mitchel, 50 Phil. 832 [1927).)
Right of property owner in case of non-payment.
Taking of private _property without compensation or just
cornpen_sation is a violation of a person's property right (Sec. 1.) It
does not, however, entitle the property owner to recover possession
of the expropriated property. Neither will the non-filing of the case
for expropriation necessarily lead to the return of the property to
the landowner. The right of the property owner is far from that of
an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission
might perhaps apply.
An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.
The property owner is merely given the right of recovering
compensation for his property, which right does not prescribe. Public
policy imposes upon the expropriating authority the obligation to
continue its services to the public. 33 (see Eusebio vs. Luis, 603 SCRA
576 [2010).) The trial court should continue to proceed with the case
31
COOLEY, op. cit., p , 1147.
r 32Ibid., p. 1110.
33
It is a recognized rule that although the right to enter upon and appropriate the
land to public use is completed prior to payment, title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
(Reyes vs. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, Jan. 20, 2003; Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002; National Power Corporation vs. Bongbong, 520
SCRA290 [2007]; Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Heirs of A.T. Domingo, 543 SCRA627 (2008];
Forform Development Corp. vs. Phil. National Railways, 573 SCRA 350 [2008].)
In a case,. the Supreme Court treated the dismissal of the expropriation proceeding
during the appeal, as producing the effect of converting the case into an original action
for damages. (Republic vs. Heirs ofS.Q. Borbon, 745 SCRA 404 [2015].)
 J 1
636 P.HlLIPPINE C0NSTITl,HJ::I<i)NIA1,,l,z,,LAW Secr.9·
Principles. and Gases;; t:! --l~,. ·
'•';\> .'
to ,determine just compensation in accordance. wi~ Jaw, .(Republic
vs. 0rtigas and Company Limtted ·P arthe~p, :•7a7;, ,SCRA :601
[2014].) - ..
Time at which value of prop~rty
should be reckoned, .
(1) Time of commencement . of pmceeding, judicial or otherwise.
- The decision of the government to :acqttue a property through
eminent domain should be made kntJwtt:·to .the property; owner
through. a formal notice wher~in a hearing' or,a judicial ptoceeding.
is contemplated as provided .for in Rulei'67' -·of'the .Rt'.tles ·0£ Court.
This shall be the time of reckorting the value of the property for the
purpose of just compensation. . is that the owner of the property should be compensated only for what he nctunlly loses;
A television or news · a:nnouti:cemert't : bi' tn:e· trlei:e°'Jl:tct; df ·'tnli
property's indusipn in the governm.en( hou:sin~ progr~/ f~r
example,·cannot .suffice because for the compensation t0 ,b e:iust, ·1t
ot,
must approximate the value the prppertr;:~t;the time ot, its .ta_k i~g
and the government can, be said to have, deqded to. acquu:e or, take
the property only after it has, at the least; co:mmenced •a,proceeding,
judicial or otherwise, for this purpose; (Manotok vs; · Nlational
Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987].) . .
(2) Time offiling of complaint. - The general rule in determining
just compensation is the value of the property as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. Normally, the time of the taking coincides
with the filing of the complaint for exprppdation. Hence, many
rulings of the Supreme Court have equ~ted just compensation with
the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint
consistent with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
So too where the institution of the action precedes entry with
the property, or the taking coincides with the commencement of the
proceedings, or the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the
time of the filing of the complaint. 34 (National Power Corporation
34In National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of M. Sangkay (656 SCRA 60 .[2011].), the
Suprellle Court ruled "that the reckoning value of just compensation is that prevailing
at the time of filing of the inverse condemnation proceedings; for ,the following reasons
xx x" (see National Power Corporation vs. Saludares, .671 SCRA 266:[2012].)
Where the acj:ual taking is made without the ben efit of expropriation proceedings,
it is the value of the property at the time of the taking that is controlling for purposes of
compensation. (Nepomuceno vs. Suriagao, 560 SCRA 41 [2008].) The reason for the rule
II
Sec.9 ~ ,f.\R'I'<-IIL BILL OF RIGHTS 637
Inherent Power.~ of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
vs. ,Court of: :Ap.pea-ls,- 254 SCRA 577 (1996]; National Power
O>:i:poration vs.fficµigco, 514 SCRA674 [2007]; Republic vs. Co.u rt.of
Appeals, 596·SCRA 57 {2009).) It has been held that where the initial
taking was by virtue of a law which was subsequently'declared
unqonstitutional, ju.s t compensation is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, not the earlier taking. (Tiongson
v~. _National Housi~g Authority, 558 SCRA 56 [2008].)
,(3) Time oj taking/filin,g of complaint. - The above general rule
ad1:tiits of an exception where th~ value of the property is fixed as
of th,e date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement
oHhe expropriation proceedings.35 This exception finds application
it is.not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury, nnd whnl
he l9ses is only the actual value of his property at the time it Is tnken. This le the only wny
that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the ownor whose
prop'etty•i!3 taken but to the public which is to pay for it. (Republic vs. Lnra, 96 Phil. 170
[1954); Ansaldo vs. Tantuico,Jr., 188 SCRA 300 [1990); Eslaban, Jr. vs. Vda. de Onorlo, 360
SCRA 230 (2001); Manila International Airport Al.\thority vs. Rodriguez, 483 SCRA 616
[2006).) n 1e "time.of tal<ing" ,is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of -h is property, suchas·when title is transferred to the Government. (Land Bank
of.the Phils. vs. Livioco, 631 SCRA 86 [2012]; see Land Bank of the Phils. vs. American
Rubber Corp., 702 SCRA 166 [2013).)
In a case, it was held: "When the parties signed by compromise agreement and
the same was approved, they had in fact settled between themselves the question of
what is just compensation and that both of them had intended that defendant would be
compensated on the basis of prevailing values at the time of the agreement [in 1993],"
and not those at the time when the expropriation complaint was filed in 1981. (Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. Pulido, 656 SCRA 315 [2011 ].) In Hacienda Luisila, Inc.
vs. Presfdential Agrarian Reform Council (G.R. No. 171101, Nov. 22, 2011), maintained its
earlier ruling that the date of the "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when the PARC
approved HLI's Slide Distribution Plan (SD) "in view of the fact that this is the time that
the farm worker beneficiaries (FWBs) were considered to have owned and possessed the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita xx x. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage
ordinarily issued under compulsory [land] acquisition."
For the rationale of the rule reckoning the value of the land on the date of its actual
taking, see Republic vs. Laros (96 Phil. 170 [1954] cited in Republic vs. Tetro Enterprises, Inc.,
(713 SCRA 524 [2014].)
35
Sec. 4. Order of expropriation. - If the objections to and the defenses against the
right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears
to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated,
for the public use or purpose d escribed in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of
the complaint, whichever came first. x xx (Rule 67, Rules of Court.) Just compensation is
to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint
whichever comes first. (Ramonade Corp. vs. National Power Corp., 513 SCRA 424 [2007].)
There are exceptions: grave injustice to the property owner, the taking did not have color
 I I I I I II I r
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTJOJ::s.A!l.-LAW
638
• Principles artd Cases-.-·.'·.' :/._
,' ·~ I r J, t
.• .;: · .
where the owner would be given undue·inc~enta:l -a dvantages
arising from the use to which the governn\~~#~'.~~otes.'tl;le'ptbperty·
expropriated - as for iristance, the extensi0n:iii:h maii:t thofoughf~e'.
(Ibid.) "-!
The owner of prop~rty·expropriatecf 'by
the _S tate is entHied' t'b
how much it was ·worth at the time of l:ne:_ f<lldhg.26 · · .·· ' '
~ 'l , .. : ~ ;:.(. .. : - .f' ',, . f
It has been held that Article 1250j7 of:the Civil Code_applies only
to cases where a contract or agreerperf ~i· in~C?lved. The hiking of
private property by the government ih'the ·exercise of the power
of eminent domain does not give rise .t9_~ contractual but to a l~g~l
of authority, the-takin$ of property was not initially for expropriation, and the own~r will
be given undue incremental advantages because of the expropriation. (National Power
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 578 SCRA 234 [2009].)
The applicable law as to the point of ;-ec~onit}g for ~e determination of just
compensation under R.A: No. 7160 (Local Govehunent Code) is Section 19 thereof
which expressly provides that just compensation shall ~e !ie.termined as of the· time of
actual taking. Section 4, Rule 67 above cannot prevail, Qve.r .R.A, No. 7160 which is a
substantive law. (City of Cebu vs. Dedamo, 381 SC-RA 75412002].). Under R.A. No. 6557
(Comprehensive Land R~form Law of 1988), just <;omp.el)Sation must be valued at the
time of taking of the properly expropriated, or at the \ilne wl\en the owner was <;l.eprived
of the use and benefit of his property. (Mercado vs. Lanq :Bank of the Philippines, 759
SCRA 193 (2015].)
TI1e rule Is that the just compensation or the value of the property -i s determined as
of the date of the toking of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes jirSt.
(Dnnk of the Phil. Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA657 (2004]; see Gabatin vs. Land
Bank of the Phils., 444 SCRA 176 (2004]; see Repu9Jic v~. Cour-t of Appeals, 454 SCRA516
{2005);Manansan vs. Republic, 498 SCRA348 [2006]; Leca Realty Corp. vs. Republic, 503
SCRA 563 (2006]; Tan vs. Reyes, 523 SCRA 203 (2007]; H'.adeii.da Luisita Incorporated v~.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 670 SCRA 392.(2012]; ~ational Power Corporation
vs. YCLA Sugar Development Corporation, 712 SCRA 550·(2013]; Department of Public.
Worl<s and Highways vs. Tecson, 756 SCRA 389 [2015] .) • the judgment of the court, whichever comes first." 39 (citing Manotok
36This has been clarified in Republic vs. PNB. (i SCRA 957 (1960].) Thus: "When
plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the ·condemnation proceedings, the
value should be fixed as of the time of the taltjng of sai_d p~ssession, not of filing of the
complaint, and that the latter should be the basis for the determination of the value, when
the taking of the property involved coincides with oris subsequent to, the commencement
of the p~edings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision pf Rule" 69; Section 3, directing. that
compensation 'be determine'd as of the date of the filing of the complaint' would never
be operative." Said provision contemplates "normal circumstances" under which the
complaint coincides or even precedes the taking of the property by the plaintiff. (Ibid.;
see Foroform Development Corp. vs. Phil. National Railways, 573 SCRA 350 [2008];
Municipality of Carlota vs. The Spouses Baltazar, 45 SCRA 235 [1972]; Mercado vs. Land
Bank of the Phils., 759 SCRA 193 (2015].)
37
Art. 1250. In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated
should supervene, the value of the curren cy at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to .the contrary.
JJ , J I
Sec.9
Sec.9 .Airf'. ':ru. BI-LL OF RIGHTS 639
Inherent PowerS of Government
A. Power of Emfuent Domain
obligation. Accordingl$;th.e value·of the property at the time of the
taking, not the 'increa'sed·value restilting from the passage ef time
represents the. true .value to be_paid as just compensatio:n for the
,' -. ·
property t_aken. (Commissioner. of Public Highways vs. Burgos, 96
SCRA:831 [1~80],)
• (4) Time of judgment. -The value should be fixed at the time of
the j'O:dgrherit and not at the tix:ne of filing of the complaint where the
govJmment had not actually taken possession of the property sought
to be expropriated for it cannot be said that the taking coincides
with or is subsequent to the filing of the complaint.38 (Municipality
of Daet vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503 [1979].) There is no
"taking" where the entrance to the property is without intent to
expropriate. (National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
supra.) The Supreme Court has defined the element of " taking" as
the main ingredient in the exercise of the power of eminent domain
in Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi. (58 SCRA 336 [1974), infra.)
(5) Time of taking/judgment. - The Supreme Court, in Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay (149 SCRA 305 [1987).), declared
as unconstitutional the mode of fixing just compensation of
condemned private property under Presidential Decree No. 464
(Real Property Tax Code), as amended by Presidential Decrees No.
794 and No. 1533. (supra.) In Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(185 SCRA572 [1990].), the Supreme Court said: "This Court having
declared as unconstitutional the mode of fixing just compensation
under P.O. No. 794, just compensation should be determined either
at the time of the actual taking by the government or at the time of
vs. National Housing Authority, supra.)
38It has been held that when the government takes property not for the purpose of
eminent domain, and .t he government does not initiate condemnation proceedings or other
attempts to. acquire said property, just compensation should be reckoned not at the time
of taking but at the time the trial court made its order of expropriation. (Garcia vs. Court
of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597 [1981]; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 454 SCRA 516 [2005].)
39Justice and fairness, howe ver, may dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for
the valuation of the property is when the trial court made the order of expropriation. This
is particularly true in a case where to peg (in 2001) the value of the property at the time
of the taking (in 1948), despite the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse
of over half. a century would be iniquitous. (Heirs of M. Pidacan vs. Air Transportation
Office, 524 SCRA 679 [2006].)
I II I 11 !I JI i J I I I
640 PHILIPPINE CONSTIIDU'DION¼:L LAW
Principles and Cases',''.'';,;·:
Pr:otection of due process,from atbltraey·. •: : •• ..,,
·'exercise of power. . ;•_: . . .
Decisions .upholdii:zg 1pr~sidenti1al decree's·;gi:rvertdng'expfbfrfa1:ioh
(1)
no longer controlling.'~ ''In sbme'•dedsitiris"p'ifo:nulgate'd 'berdrEFtne
February 1986 political upheaval, 1:he Sttpreine C6ci-fpresU:inMfili~
validity of the b'e,:tutiful'wherea:s' mpte'sideij:'tj~!,:4e.~i:ee.s,,g ovetning
~xpropriation~ and legitiJ:r\~te'd taking~.of: pr.iv~i~.:}?tOP.¢tfy.._·wWd\
m norm.al tim!;ls, would ~cl.Ve been const~~ti-9J:l.aHy susPi~~te'J t :.Ph~Jte
were the~ the avo:weq. twin purposes qfmartial ~c!.W.tq.first,quellth,e
conunu:ru,st rebellion and$.econd, to refo1;m so~iety. . , _ ,1. •
Thus, in Haguisan vs. Emilia (131 SCRA 517 · [1973}.);- ;the
Supreme Court sustained-the cohtentidn that pribr he~g.was,rio
longer necessary under P,D. No. 42 in ,ascerfaining the value of the
property to be expropri-ated and.;before·the government may take
possess10n. There was a disregard in the decree·for Section,? of Rule
· 67 which requires the court having jurisdiction ov~r the proceedings
to promptly asc_e rtain and fix the provisional ~al\le of the property
for purposes of the initial taking or entry by the Government into
the premises.
In National Housing Authority vs. Reyes (123 SCRA 245 [1985].),
the Suprem~ Court upheld the decrees which state that the basis
for just compensation shall be the market value declared by the
owner for tax purposes of such market value as determined by the
government assessor whichever is lower.
Vt:e re-examine the decisions validating expropriations under
martial law and apply established principles of justice and fairness
which have been with us since the advent of constitutional
government. We return to older and more sound precedents."
(Manotok vs. National Housing Authority,40 150 SCRA 89 [1987], per
Justice Gutierrez, Jr.)
40
In this case, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional Pres. Decree
No, 1670 (together with P.O. No. 1669), which attempted to expropriate by legislative fiat
a property. It found that both decrees being "violative of the petitioner's (o·w ners') right
to due frocess of law," f~il~d "_the test of constitutionality," and that, additio'nally, they
were tainted by another infirmity· as regards "the determination of just compensation."
It fu~ther observed that contrary to Rule 67 and established precedents, the decrees
provided ~or the determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that "of the
actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment of the court, whichever
came first." Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left to the City
Assessor. (Belen vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 59 [1991).)
I J
Sec.9 AR'.:IYIH. BILL OF RIGHTS 641
Inherent Power's of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
(2J: Duty ,o fcourt to,fnquire into,alleged v:iolation ofdue process oflaw.
- ''The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory every-time
1
a ,s_pecifj.c decree or. law orders the expropriation of somebody's
pliopertt rU1d provides.its own peculiar manner of taking the same.
Neither should, ,t he• comts adopt a hands-off policy just because
the public u·se:Jit'as·:oeen ordained as existing by the decree or the
jµit comp~rtsation has ,been fixed and determined beforehand by a
statute. . . . ..
Although due process does not a:Iways necessarily demand that
a:proceeding.be had beforea court.of law, it still mandates some form
of proce~ding·wh~rein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard
are -given to the-.©:wner to •prott!ct his property rights. We agree with
the.public respondents that there are exceptional situations when,
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the requirements of
due process may not necessarily entail judicial process. But where it
is alleged that in the taking of a perso11's property, his right to due
process of law has been violated, the courts will l1ave to step in and
probe into such an alleged violation." (Ibid.)
(3) Right of the government to choose what private property should
be taken. - Thus, certain portions of the decision in De Knecht vs.
Bautista (100 SCRA660 [1980].) state:
"There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the
Philippines to take private property for public use upon the
payment of just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the [1973]
Constitution of the Philippines provides: 'Private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation.'
It is recognized, however, that the government may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should
be taken. In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc, vs. Land Tenure Administration
(;31 SCRA 413 [1970].), the Supreme Court said: xxx xxx xxx
'It is obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle
of protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It
frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental
act that smack$ of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act
in an oppressive manner. x x x"41
41In the same case, the Supreme Court concluded; 'With due recognition then of
the power of Congress to designate the particular property lo be taken and how much
 I I I r J
6<12 J:'J.ULHJJ:11N.Ll C.:UNS'l 1l'l'U'l'£O:MA.-1L LAW Sec. 9
Principles,and Cases .
(4) Final judicial decision npt an obstaclet0 subsequent,expropriation
by legislation. - In Republic vs; .Knecht 'El82!•SGRA 142 {1~90].)
involving the very properties subject ,.of ·ilie pr0ceedings -in. De
Knecht vs. Bautista, the issue pose.d is whether·an expropriati0n
proceeding that was determined by a final judgment (in favor <:if
the property owner) of the Supreme Court may still be the subject
of a subsequent legislation for expr0priation.Jbased on supevv.enmg
events that occurred after the rendition-of.the decision. The Supreme
Court up}:leld the expropriation.•2 •. • • . . . . ,
1
, •
In short, the principle of res judicata which .finds application
in generally all proceedings cannot bar the right •of the State to
expropriate private property. The State or its ·agencies cannot be
barred forever from exercising the right of eminent domain by reason
alone . of ,previous non-compliance with any .legal requirement. It
thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of- expropril!tion, iHs still a
judicial question whether in the exercise of such.competence, .t heparty adYersely affected
is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection.d ause wHl not ·a11ow.'
42
In upholding the expropriation, the Supreme Cou.r t explained thus: ·
"While it is true that•the said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the
law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take
privnte properties for public use upon the payment of just compensation is so provided in
thc·Constltulion nnd our laws. xx x When on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pani.bansa
passed B.P, 131g. 340 expropriating the very properties subject of the presenf proceedings
and for the same purpose, it appears that it was. based on supervening ev~rits that oc-
curred after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980, justifying the
expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets. The social impact Jact~r which
persuaded the Court to consider this extension arbitrary had disappeared. All residents
of the area have been relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of the EDSA out-
fall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed, Only private respondent (De
Knecht whose holding is hardly 5% of the whole route area] remains as the solitary ob-
stacle ~o .thi~ project th~t will solve not only the drainage and flood control problems but
also ml!UII\1ze the traffic bottleneck in the area.
. , B.P, B~g. 340, therefore, effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory de-
0s1on of this .court. Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the
government m thereafter (over two years later in this case) making its own independent
assessm~n! of the circtunsta.nc~s then ~revailing as to the propriety of undertaking the
ex~rop~1ation_of ~e_Pro~erties m question and thereafter, by enacting the corresponding
~egislation as 1t did m this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enact-
mg B.P. Blg, 340. Thus, the anterior decision of this court must yield to this subsequent
legislative fiat." . (Republic vs. Tagle, 299 SCRA 549 (1998],)
"B.P. Big, 340 is not a legislative reversal of our finding in De Knecht vs, Bautista,
~at ~e expropriation of the petitioner's property was arbitrary, xx x Under the changed
s~tuation, the p~e~ent expropriation is no longer arbitrary. This decision is not a reversal
either of the ongmal De Knecht case which was decided under a different set of facts."
Oustice Cruz, concurring.)
Sec. 9 " 1 f,\/R'l". III. BILL OF RIGHTS 64@
Inherent Powers of G0vernment
A. Power of Eminent Domain
may-still exercise·the;right once the legal requirements are comphl.e,d
with. :Jh rule•.,otherwise will not only improperly diminish th~
power of eminent domain but also clearly defeat social justic.e.
(Municipality ,0£ Parafiaque vs.. V.M. Real:ty Corporation, 292 SCRA
678 [1998].)
Requisites for issuance of writ of possession
in expropriation p(ooeeding.s.
The follow'ing are the requisites for authorizing immediate entry
in expropriation, proceedings:
(1) There must be a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and·insubstance;
(2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court
on the b_asis of judicial (ndt legislative or executiv<;)43 discretion; and
(3) The deposit requirement must be complied with. 44 (Sumu-
long vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]; Export Processing Zone
Atithodty vs1 Pui~y, 199 SC~ 305 [1987]; see City of Iloilo vs.
Leg~spi, 4;{4'SCR.A 2!59 [2004].) . .
Upon cornpliancewith the requirements, the issuance of the writ
of possession over the expropriated property becomes ministerial.45
. 431he provis.io:r;tal character .o f the payment means that it is not final, albeit sufficient
under the law to entitle the government to the writ. While the provisional value is based
on 'the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing
market \1alue of the property. (Capitol Steel Corp. vs. PHINSEC Industrial Authority, 510
SCRA 590 [2006],)
44Under Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the provisional deposit should
be in ru;i amount equivalent to the full assessed value of the property to be condemned.
(Robem Development Corporation vs, Quitain, 315 SCRA 150 [1999],) On the part of
the local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local
Government Code. (RA. No. 7160; see Note 8.) The deposit constitutes advance payment
in the event expropriation proceeds, and stands as indemnity for damages should the
proceedings fail of consummation. (Biglang-awa vs. Bacalla, 345 SCRA 56 [2000).)
45The writ is both necessary and practical, because mere physical possession that
is gained by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim
of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess, the expropriated property.
Under RA No. 8974, an Act to facilitate the acquisition of right of way, site or
location for national government infrastrucrure projects, the government is required to
make immediate payment to the property owner of the value of the property upon the
filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession. (Republic vs. Holy Trinity
Realty Dev. Corp., 551 SCRA 303 [2008]; Republic vs. Far East Enterprises, Inc., 597
 11 I J I l
644 m -IILXPPINE CO.NSTI'l:rU'fllr<DNi!AiL LAW
Principles and Gasesr·,-,.~i'.i.;•:
. ,r: '>-
(rb:tdf; City of Manila:ivs.:Seniartb,.i35~8C:R!A:'~3l~[Q(i)0.1!]:~},;'JJJ.i~:t'i:tle.to
the property, however; shaILp.ass frti5ri:t!the·owrt\er:t©lh:eie~p-rdp.i:iation
only upon full payme:rnti,of ryust::cornpensation.:·,~Repablicr.vs-;,,•Litn, .
462 SCRA 265.f2005JPF.e'd:etate'd Re:ailty C6i:}.imratfon_-vS'.,"Court. 6£
Appeals, 477 SCRA 707 (2005].)· " ·- .,.., . ,.~,
I (3 j Discretion is given to NHA _regard_ins choice and site of project.
ILLUSTRATIVE1t 'A:SES: ·< " ·, "· -V · ,r •' ,.,,;,, ·
,;1 . ; • :c:~;_., ;,;i; ~" ,,._._ _•..t , ·· • ~.
1. Land was expropriated for s·ocialzzea!fousing purposes.
Facts: The National Housing Autho~i!y (NHA)_filed a a:~wplaint
for expropriation of 25 hectares of land j,ui:suant to Presidential
Decree No. 1224 which defines, the policy -on the ·exproprfation
of private property for sociaUzed housing upon'payment of just
comp,,ensation.
Issue:. Petitioners contend that "sodalized housing" as defined
in.the decree, for_the. purpose of condemnation proceedirlgs is not
"public use" since it will benefit oniy "a handful of people bei;eft of
public character;''
_Held: (l) Public use requirement is a flexible concept influenced by
changing conditions. - "The 'public use' re.q.uireme~t for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving
concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction,
the statutory and judicial trend ,has been summar.ized as follows:
'The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time
when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to
such a ·requirement. Whatever project is unq.ertakeri. mµst· be for
the public to enjoy, as in_the case of streets _Of: .parks., O,t:herwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As lc:>ng. as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comesfoto plci.y. Itis accu~ate to state then that 1:lt·prese1:1-t, whatever
. ni.ay be beneficially employed for the_general welfare sa'tisff~s the
requirement of public use."' · ·
(2) Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern. - "Housing
is a basic need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern
since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
SCRA 75 [200].) The paym ent of the provisional value as a condition fo; the issuance of
a writ of possession is different from the payment of just compensation required by the
Constitution in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, The provisional value is
based on the current zonal valuation while. ju,st compensation is prevailing fair market
value of the property. (Republic vs. Cancio, 577 SCRA346 [2009]; Republic v.s. Heirs G.Q,
Fernandez, 754 SCRA 298 [2015].)
I II J
Sec. 9 I.Ailt:r. ltl'I, BILL O F RIGHTS 645
Inherefl,t·Po0-ers of-Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
environment a'.Fl:d in sum, the 'general welfare. The public character
of housing measures does not .mange because units in housing
. projects Cil.ru10t be,-occupied J:?y all but only by those ~ho satisfy
_presqibed ·q~_µ.µ~aJions..A.,b eginning_has to be made, f,o r it is not
possible to provide.housing for all w ho.need, all at once."'
- "The State acting through. the NHA is veste4 with ,broad
,;,,
discretion _to design!3-te ,the particular propercy /properties to be
taken for socialized housing purposes aiicfli.ow much thereof may
be expropr~ated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or
gross abuse of discretion, the Court will give due we-ight to and
leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the site for the
project. The property owner may not interpose objections merely
because in their judgment some other property would have been
more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose. The right to the
use, enjoyment and,disposal of private property is tempered by and
has to yield to the demands of the common good. The constitutional
provisions (see Art. II, Sec. 10; Art. XIII, Sec. 1.) on the subject are
clear." (Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1 987), through Justice
Cortes.)
2. Occupants filed suit to prevent their ejectment from land which
the government intends to expropriate,
facts: An original action was filed by "bona fide" occupants
of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City to enjoin respondents "from
bulldozing and fencing any portion" of the Estate "and / or from
selling" any of the lots therein, "and / or from filing ejectment
cases" against them. The action is predicated on the averment that
the Land Tenure Administration was directed by the Executive
Secretary to initiate proceedings for the expropriation of the Estate.
Reliance is placed by petitioners upon the provisions of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 2616 which reads:
"SEC. 4. After the expropriation proceedings mentioned in
Section Two of this Act shall have been initiated and during
the pendency of the same, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present occupant of any lot
in said Tatalon Estate; and no ejectment proceedings already
commenced shall be continued, and such lot or any portion
thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any
 11 I I J J
646 PI-]lLIPP lNE CON STITU11i£~J[i\J'~ h LAW 'Sec.. -9 Se c. 9 AR'fi. Ii l. BILL OF RIGH TS
1
647
Principles and eases. , •,,,-: • · Inherent Powers li>f Government
A.PowerofEminentDomain
person other than ,the,p1;.~setJ.t;Qecu.p.,imhwilibol:lt,.the:c~msent of for the expropriation ef the pro.perty known as the "Tambunting
the latter given in a publicJn~tr.unient./f .'-", , . _,.,,,_ ·• , · Estate" in Rizal Avenue Extension and the property along Estero de
Sunog-Apog in Tonda.
The7e is no <;1'_'.e~mentr, . !i~~~te~; .ID.. petftion ili~t any thf
expropriated ptocee~~s.}1a$; mf'~'ct, bean a:~~ally:iristftuteH before . Issue: Petitioners qiaint?,in that the two decrees are unconstitu-
the courts.. · ·'1, tional because, among others, the properties are not proper subjects
Issue: Is there avajj-4,gro~1 'to·re~J:ri&freip'6nd'ents',exercise of for expropriation consfdering their location and other relevant cir-
their ·aominical rights aver'theffp¥opJrty'?-' ·':,,. · . · · cumstances.
j • .. ... ' ~ : ' ' ' '' : , • • , ~t ' ~'; b-' . ' I l •

. H~ld:. (}) ,Op51:fP~TTt~ -h~ve no .ca.~.~~. pf,~ot~~~::~ '"In th.~ ,.~bsence Held: (1) Basis of the p.ower of eminent domain. - "The basis for
of al;f . ~~~f~~dm~s ..~or expr_op~iatiop, ,:1rtt!;i~~e1 . ~~for~ the the exercise of -the power of eminent domain is necessity. This
courts, petitioners nave clearly no cause .of action. It-1s true that Court stated in City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila (40
R~p?plfo A~. ~o/ ;2~f6,i?S.ofar' 'as lt_' ~~iopriaJ~ir'
s~~Jarly a Phil. 349 [1919]'.) that ,.(t)he very fouhdation of the ri:ght to exercise
partit\,\lar prrvate property, had survived' the ·l:ha11enge· of being eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be
dis.~i{minatary; and was declared free £tofu 'cqnsti~fional infiqnity. of a public character."'·
Secµon 4, whioorplaces a restramt upon the exercise 'a nd enjoyment
~i ·~~io:vner of:c,~rtain dghts '°-Ver -~;~ rt&perty, is j_u~tifiable only (2) Absolu.te necessity for the taking is not required. - "In City of
Manila vs. Arellano Law College (85 Phil. 663 [1950].), we reiterated
iftlie ·goverrunen'Makes possess10n of th'E! fand anti 1s m a position
to rt,take a coetanebtis payment of just·compensation to'its owner. that a· necessity must exist for the taking of private property for
There could not be any .other way by wnich the validity of the the proposed uses and purposes but accepted the fact that modern
provision may be sustained." decisions do not call for absolute necessity. It is enough if the
(2) Before institution of expropriation proceeding, proprietary rights condemnor can show a reasonable or practical necessity, which,
of owner cannot be restricted. - "Definitely, -to hold that the mere of .course, varies with the time and peculiar circumstances of each
declaration of an intention to expropriate, without instituting case."
the corresponding proceeding therefor before the courts, with (3) No reasons were shown for the choice of property. - "In the
assurance of just compensation,. would already preclude the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as to why the
exercise by the owner of his rights -of ownership over the land, or properties involved were singled out for expropriation through
bar the enforcement of any final ejectment order that the owner decrees or what necessity impelled the particular choices or
may have obtained against any intruder into the land, is to sanction
selections. In expropriations through legislation, there are, at least,
an act which is indeed confiscatory and, therefore, offensive to
debates in Congress open to the public, scrutiny by individual
the Constitution. For it must be realized that in a condemnation
case, it is from the condemner's taking possession of the property members of the legislature, and very often, public hearings before
·that the owner is deprived of the benefits .of ownership, such as the statute is enacted. Congressional records can be examined.
possession, management and disposition thereof. Before that In these petitions, the decrees show no reasons whatsoever for
time, the proprietary right of the owner over his property must be the choice of the properties as housing projects. The anonymous
recognized." (Familara vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., 49 SCRA 338 [1973], adviser who drafted the decrees for the President's signature
through Justice Antonio.) [during martial law] cannot be questioned as to any possible error
or partiality, act of vengeance, or other personal motivations which .
may have led him to propose the direct expropriation with its
3. Commerciql property was singled out for expropriation for both onerous provisions."
housing projects and commercial itse. · · (4) Property is a commercial area. - "The Tambunting estate or
Facts: Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Pres. Decree at least the western half of the subdivision fronting Rizal Avenue
No. 1669 and Pres. Decree No. 1670; which respectively provide Extension is a valuable commer~ial property. x x x It is a foregone
, I
 J t I , r J
PI·HLlPl-'l NLl CONSTI'il.1U'J.)ll©NA:L LAW Sec. 9
1
• Principles and Cases,.'.. , 1, , ·
conclusion that the favored -squatters allowed to buy-these;choice
lots would lose no time,. once it is: possU,le .to do so, to either lease
out or sell their lots to wealthy 111erchants -even as•t:J::ley ~eek_other
places where they can se,t :upx\ew'. ~qu_~tter ~9lonies. The public use
and social justice enq.s stated in,tn.e::wriere<Js dau~es of P.D. No.
1669 and P.D. No. 1670 would notbe ~~/'.Y.f:ld thereby."
(5) Lease of portions of expropriqted property for · commercial
purpose is not pubJic use. - "The prov;isjon of P.D. No .. 1669 which
allows NHA., at its sole option, to put port:f9ns o°f the expi:opriated
area to commercial use in order to defray .th.e development costs
of its. housing projects cannot st~nd consti~tional scrutiny. The
Government, for instance, cannot expropriate the. £1.ourishing
Makati commercial area in order to earn mone.y that wo.uld finance
housing projects all over the country;
The leading case of. Guido -vs: Ifu_r~l, frqgress Adminis.tration
(84 Phil. 847 [1949],.) may have been modified .i n some :ways by
the provisions of the new Constitution on agrarian _and urban
land reform and on housing. The principle of non-appropriation
of private property for private purpose_~,. however, ·rei:pains. The
legislature, according _to the Gui4o case;.may not take the pr.operty of
one citizen and transfer it 'to another, even foi: a .full compensation,
when the public interest is not thereby promoted. The Government
still has to prove that expropriation of commercial properties, in
order to lease them out also for commercial purposes; would be
'public use' under the Constitution.I'
(6) Area is not a blighted community nor occupied by ·squatters. -
"P.D. No. 1670 suffers from a similar infirmity. T9ere is no showing
how the President arrived at the conclusion that the Sunog~Apog
area is a blighted community. The many pictures submitted as
exhibits by the petitioners show a well-developed area subdivided
into residential lots with either middle-income orupper class homes.
There are no squatters. The area is well-developed with roads,
drainage and sewer facilities, and wafer, electric and telephone
connections. There are many squatter colonies in Metro Manila
in need of upgrading. The Government should have attended to
them first. There is no showing for a need to demolish the existing
valuable improvements in order to upgrade Sunog-Apog:
After a careful examination of the questioned decrees, we
find PD. Nos. 1669 and 1670 to be violative of
the petitioners'
right to due process of law ·and, therefore, they must fail the test
1 I I l
·sec. 9 AI{'.f\ -H!J. B'ILL OP. RIGHTS 649
Inherent Bower~· of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
· of Cohstitutionality;" (Manotok vs: National Housing Authority, 150
SCRA 89 £1'987],·through Justiee Gutierrez, Jr.)
.l 4... "j,~;sidentfalproclamation converts ricelands into industrial site.
Factsi The President •issued a proclamation reserving certain
parcels of .land .of the private domai.R for the Cavite Export
Processing Zone. Thereafter, a complaint for the expropriation of
the property occ;tipied by the petitioners who refused to give his
. Iandho@ing was flied.. ·
Issue: May the co.urt,inquire into the wisdom of the proclama-
tion?
·Held: (1) Wisdom of the taking is not justiciable. - "The wisdom
of converting their ricelartds into an industrial site is within tho
prpper exer~is.e.,of eresidential prerogatives and the Court may
not inquire into it. The necessity and expediency of exercising the
right_of eminent d,oma.i n are questions essentially political and not
justiciable in their character.
At any rate, since an application to condemn or expropriate had
· already been made directly to the court, the question of necessity
of such condemnation should be raised before, and decided by, the
court having jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings."
(2) Property right must give way to public benefit. - "It is unfor-
tunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings,
but his interest and that of his family should not stand in the way
of progress and the benefit of the greater majority of the inhabitants
of the country." (Pulido vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 65 [1983],
-through Justice Concepcion, Jr. )
5. Land was expropriated for tourism purposes.
Facts: In their motions to dismiss the complaint for expropria-
tion, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the requirement of pub-
lic use, that there is no.specific constitutional provision authorizing
the taking of private property for tourism purposes.
Issue: Is the expropriation of land for tourism purposes for
public use?
Held: (1) PoliC1J objectives of the Constitution are expressed only in
general terms. - "The petitioners look for the word 'tourism' in the
Constitution. Understandably, the search would be in vain. The
 PHILIPPINE CONST.I11U'DL'<DW\li\lL LAW
Principles -and,;easeM·•,,.r!i·: l
.. •. ~ ~ ,, ~--;~'-ljl ·"'
policy objectives.of the ,f ramers:. ¢an-,be.:.exF,1ie'ssed;·10nly 1irt1general
terms such as social justke,,Jqeal\'\:a,1!Ilt.1j>i-i0.fuy;, conseJ!V,ati:on· and
development of the national pa~imony1 .p~blk interest, "nd general
welfare, among others. The -program.S.:.to achiev,e ·th~se objectives·
·t6
vary from time Hine ai.icl ac:co~i:fu'.ft,/:vi~~e. ·ro' t~eez~_specific
programslike tourisminto expres~ constitu#onal pr.ovisfoms would
make the Constitutionmore pro}ix.tqm,;li.I~.u1~y·c.o de and:requi,re of
the framers a p:rescience b.eyoncLDel!pW,<q~foportion$, : •·
The particular mention in the·Cons~itutio:n of-agtaifap. reform
and the transfer of utilities and other privat~·enter-p dses 1tci.'public
ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the . problems
sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not preclude
nor limit the exercise of the power of .e~ent, ~OI~ain for such
p.urppses ijke tourism artd otp.~r develop:µ1ent program_s.".
(2) Power is inherent in sovereignty:_;_ "In tli.e leading case of
Visayan Refining Co. vs. Camus (40 Phil. 550 [1919].), this Court
-emphasized that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from
sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent
in government even in its most primitive forms. The only purpose
of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to pxo:vide so:r;ne form of
restraint on the sovereign power. It is not a grant-of authority.
'The power of etninent domain does not depend for its
existence on a specific grant in the Constitution. It is inherent
in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any
recognition of it in the Constitution. The provisions found in
.,most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property
for the public use do not by implication grant the power to
the government of the state, but limit a power which would
otherwise be without limit. 111
(3) Meaning of public use. - "The constitutional restraints are
public use .and just compensation.
The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare
that 'public use' means literaily use by the pti.blic "°d that 'public
use' is not synonymous with 'public interest,' ;public benefit,' or
'public welfare' and much less 'pubHc convenience.'
The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention
which is rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public
welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and outmoded. Second, no
less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that the
Sec.9 Ail~T: JU. BILL OF RI l lTS 651
Inhei;eli\t Row.ets of G0verrunent
A. Power of Eminent Domain
power1of-.eminenrt·domam<may ·b e exercised in the promotion and
developmen:t·0fi Fhilip.pine ,t ourism. ;
· . . TH/resft1ttl.:ilf vi~\.i or public \!Se may be appropriate for a
· nation Which: ·cff&i:tiZscribes the scope of government activities
... arid' pubI)c toricerWs 1an_d 'whlch possesses big and correctly located
ooviate
· JSub1ic·1ati.ds iliat ·ffi.e need to take private property for public
. '" purpMes: Nl'~ith?r'Hictifusfan:ce applies to the'Pnilippines. We have
never been a· laissezfhire State. And the necessities which impel
the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of
scarce public land oi:·limited government resources."
(4) Promotion of tourism is "public use." - "The petitioners'
contention that the promotion of tourism is not public use because
private concessioners would be allowed to mau1tain various
facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist
complex is impressed with even less merit.
Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and
oth;r private businesses using public streets and highways do not
diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for
roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets
built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private
purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines
and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation
of private land for slum clearance and urban development is
for a . public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to
private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns."
(5) Judicial deference is to be accorded to legislative formulations of
policy. - "The rule in Bernan v. Parker (368 U.S. 25.) of deference to
legislative policy even if such policy might mean taking from one
private person and conferring on another private person applies as
well in the Philippines.
'x x x Once the object is within the authority of Congress,
the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to
determine. Here, one of the means chosen is the use of private
enterprises for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue
that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for
the benefit of another businessman. But the means of executing
the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine,
once the public purpose has been established. The public end
may b~ as well or better served through an agency of private
652 1".LHL1J>1Jl N.l.: O N S'l'l'llU'!\LON ~ L LAW
Principles and,<G:a:sest ,..,.;_..i
enterprise tha:m. through ·a departm:edt1of ;go;v.enunen1:.--::,- or
so the Congress might conelu.de._.We:~.ca·rm.o.t;;say.)tiiat · public
owri.e fship Js th~ s0l~,r:net4qfi :0t_ptQB}9-ti:n~ithr1 p4bitct: purposes
of: soqµn~ty r~d.e1(.e19p~wnt;,Br,~j<,~~~J}',hpt. we:hf'tn'P.'11.~'f; also
disJ?O_s es. of -aiiy _cont~tion, s::o_gc,' 1~gr J~e . faq~ r.;~ 'tt-:~~~tain
property
, , owz:i.ers ·in
, ,, the -
.
" te;i p:v~;v.,:-
l;>e1•Re;1-;mi~e.
T, ~91 .,. fo➔ J , .b· .L JJ I
d .,to
, \,
•t~P.-1-ff,c;hase
~I
, . J ...
.fu~ir prop_erti~s for 1;edey,el,~m~Hf,_1AfV\1'JJlP!J:Yl ~i;!}\,1f~-?ver-
.aq .plap.- ~ .at, tqo, is a;l~gi~t.e .IJW,_c\n~,.~ m,cq .<;:.9_n g,~e~~~d its
.. ag_e11-c~es may ad,qp~, if they ~hoose~;t~tt ,y , , .. , . :- ,,_,, .· -·, ,,:-·
An examination of the lang:µage·:m .t he!.1.9.19,;tease_s,-0£..Gity of
Ma11ila_ 'l/S,,: Chinese Community of ManiJq)(49 J?hil_..349:·[1~19],) and
V;isayan .Refining Co. vs. Canius (.40 Phily,oi5Q .{1.919,].) .e?4"lier, c;ited,
_ shows that £~om the very.-start of cons~fu.ti~nal&over~entin our
_ cC>~tr-y,-jup}c~al d~ference_to legislative_.policy,has, been cleat and
manifest in eminent d:o~ai.n,.prp_ceedings.t;(Heir_s of.Juancho,.,Ardona
vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983!, throug~ Justic7'Gutierrez, Jr.) .
' ~I '
6. Government wants the · prz'te 'o f _l~1t p~dperty · expropriated
reckoned as of the time it occupied t~e property ~y virtu/~ of a contract of
lease and not at the ~ime of the subsequent filing of. tlie complaint.
Facts: In its appeal, the Government contends, among others,
that the lower court erred in finding the price of Pl0.00 per square
meter of the lands subject of the expropriation proceeclings,as just
con;:tpensation and in holding that the "taking" of the properties
commenced with the filing of the complaint on J~e 26, 1959, and
not from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special agreement
bet-Ween the Government and the appellee property owner, the
former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property
should the lessor wish to terminate the lease.
Issue: Is the -contention tenable?
Held:· (1) Elements of taking of property. -
"A nuµ1ber of
circumstances must be present in the 'taking' of property for
purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circum-
stance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease
agreement, the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the
property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be far more than a
momentary period. 'Momentary' means, 'lasting btJ.t a moment; of
Sec.:. 9 S e c.9 ' ART. Ill. BILL OF RIGHTS
Inherent Powers of Government
A. Power of E~inent Domain
but-a moment's duration' (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume
' VI, page 596.); 'lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very
·brief life;_operative or-recurrmg at every moment.' (Webster's Third
,faterrtanonal Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word 'momentary'
when :applied' :tcJ possession or occupancy of (real) property
L'!
shOl!t-ld be construed to mean 'a limited period' - not indefinite
-or permanent. ·The aforecited le:ase contract was for a period of
· ·one -year, renewable ·from year to year. The entry on the property,
under the lease, is tempo rary, and considered trartsitory. The fact
that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations
of'a. permanent.nature does no.t alter the fact that the entry into the
land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable
from year to year-by consent of the owner of the land. By express
provision of the lease agreement, the Republic, as lessee, undertook
to return the premises in substantially the same condition as nt the
time the property was first occupied by the APP.
·Third, the entry into the property should be under warrnnt or color of
legal authority. This circumstance in the 'taking' may be considered
as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the
Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise,
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that
the circumstance of the property being devoted to public u se is
present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
of the properhJ, In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into
the property and its utili4ation of the same for public use did not
oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of
the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease
contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property
to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because
the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the
agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint
for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
. I
It is clear, therefore, that the 'taking' of Castellvi's property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
 I 1 , r ,
' J
Sec. 9
I ••
654 PHILIPPINE CONS'PI1'UTilON~L, LAW Sec. 9
.Principles and Cases, .- :
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to OCCl:tPY :the property
as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Cast~llvi that
two essential elements in the 'taking' of property under the power
of eminent domain, namely.: (1) that the entrance and occupation
by the condemnor must be fo~ a permanent,_or indefinite period,
to
and (2) that in devoting the property public use the owner was
ousted from the prop.erty and deprived of its beneficial use, were
not present when the Republic enter.ed and occupied the Castellvi
property in 1947." •· ' .·
(2) Lease does not give rise to a pe'.f.ma'nent right to occupancy. -
"x xx Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may
be exercised by simply leasing the premises· to be expropriated
(Sec. 1, Rule 67, Rute·s of Court.), nor can it be accepted that the
Republic would enter into a contract 6£ lease where its real
intention was to buy, or why the Republic should enter into a
simulated contract of lease ("under the ·gi1ise of lease," as expressed
by counsel for the Republic) when all the ~
7the Republ~; had th_e
right of eqrinent domain, and coutd ,expro.p~iate .Castellv1 ~ land if
it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever xx x.
To sustain the contention of .the Republic is :to -sanction a
practice ~hereby in order to secure a low price for a land which
the government intends to expropriate (or W0),1-ld ev~ntually
expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the .land to
lease the land (for say, ten or twenty'yecµ-s) then e~propnate the
same when the lease is about to terminate, theri claim that the
'taking' of the property for the purposes of the ·expropriation be
· reckoned as of the dc1;te when the Gov~rrunent started to occupy
the property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the
property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease,
in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many good
reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of the
lease."
(3) Taking commenced with the filing of the _complaint. - "Under
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court (similar to Sec. 5, Rule 69
of the old Rules of Court, the rule in force when the complaint in
this case was filed.), the 'just compensation' is to be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain,
the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
ART. 111. BILL 0 11 RIGHTS 666
Inherent Powers of Government
A. Power of E'minent Domain
filing of tli\e complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, 1
SCRA957 [1961].}
In ·the ihst;mt ~ase, it is undisputed that the Rep:,iblic was
placed in posse~sfo,n .of the Castellvi property, by authority of the
court, .o n August 10, 1959. The 'taking' of the Castellvi property for
the purposes of det~rmining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for
· eminent domain was filed."
(4) Basis of market value. - "In expropriation proceedings,
the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for
which it would bring th~ most in the market. The owner may thus
show every advantage that his property possesses, present and
prospective, in order _that the price it could be sold for in the market
may be satisfactorily determined. The owner may also show l·hat
the property is suitable for division into village or town lots. The
amount fixed as the provisional value of the lands that are being
expropriated does not necessarily represent the ll'Ue and conect
value of the land. The value is only 'provisional' or ' tentative' to
· serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property
being expropriated by the condemnor. The valuation fixed for the
purposes of the assessment of the land for taxation purposes cannot
bind the landowner where the latter did not intervene in fixing it."
(5) Report of commissioners was not binding. - "The report of
the commissioners of appraisal in comdemnation proceedings are
not binding, bµt merely advisory in character, as far as the court is
concerned. A Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] or,
ort appeal, the Supreme Court, may change or modify the report
of the commissioners by increasing or reducing the amount of the
award if the facts of the case so justify. While great weight is attached
to the report of the commissioners, yet a court may substitute
therefor its estimate of the value of the property as gathered from
the record in certain cases, as where the commissioners have applied
illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, or where they
have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where
the amount allowed is either palpably inadequate or excessive."
(Republic vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 [1974], through Justice Zaldivar.)
7. Constitutionality of agrarian reform laws is challenged.
· Facts: Squarely raised in the petitions is the constitutionality
of Pres. Decree No. 27 (which was promulgated on October 21,
 f I 1
t,"111 1'1111 , ll'l ' I N I ~ 'UN/1 l l l l Jtl'I. N/(\(J.J.AW
Frlnclplcs ond Onses,·1•, ..,1 . ,.
1972,'. one month after the dedaratfon -o f madial 1-aw) providing
for .the compulsory acquisition of private r.ice. a11td ;c'o rn lands for
distribution amop.g ; ~en.apt,. "tfnn;iets: a}}d· •specJfyiq_g ·ni:aximum
retention luni~s f9i; Jwi:~p~!={~; -·~'-.<~fr 1¢tq~r,.{:-J.9_, }213.(~~~He4 by .
Pres"identAqµw.o qnJuW~7, 19~7.) qed,aP,Ilgjfull l~nd q:v,m~t;$hip in
favor of the b~nt:1~ciil!'~es_9.ffQ. ro.
2l~;·~i~c:,or~er No.
ii!tds~ued
on July 22, ~9.87.) providing-tl;i,e,me,¢lian:i.c sJo.r ·the implementa:tion
of a comprehensive agrarian reform prqg:r~p:,._(<;:AR:1') ~stitute.d by
Proclamation No. 131; and R.A. No. -6557, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform ·ta-w of''1988 (CARL), which the
President signed ort June 10, 1988. '
The. petjtioners are questionJ.ng the. aforementioned laws for
violati1,1.g, among others, the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use witt,.out just compensation.
They argue that just compensation may l;>e made only by a court
of justice and not by the President of the Philippines; that it is
payable only in money or in cash; that taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation;. that title to the land taken is
arbitrarily transferred before it is fully paid for; and_ that there was
failure to establish by clear and convincing evi<Jence the necessity
fQr, the exercise of the power of eminent domain, .
Issue: Should the laws in question be sustained against all the
constitutional objections raised in the petitions.
(1) Traditional distinctions between police power and power of
eminent domain. - "There are traditional distinctions between
the police power and the power o·f eminent domain that logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the
same subject.
1n th~ c9-se of City pf Baguio vs. NAWASA (106.P~. !44 [1959].),
for example, where a law required the. transfer of all
rriunicipal
waterworks' systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of
equivalent value, the Court held that the power bei11g exerdse_d was
eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome
and intended for a public use. Prop~rty condemned under the
police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as
a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for
the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed
in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is
not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to
the owner."
" ,Aln:.- rn. BILL O F RIGHTS 657
Inherent--Bowel'.{! of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
. (2) Requirements-'for .n.-pr.oper. exercise of police power. - "A
. &tatute mc1,y. ;b e,.s;14:s~ain~d,under-the police. power only if there is
. a, conc:::uxrnn<?e, of,,.th¢.,1aw£u:l subject aml .t he lawful me~od. Put
.,, oth~cl\WiS:ei ,t)Je,intere~#r of! the .publit·,generally as clistinguished
.. fi.'.©?'l ;tl,.pse;.of a :p11rti.i:cula-r class require the interference of the
,:S:tc:1.t~and,, noies,s imp,ortant, the means ~mployed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the purpose .~ought to be achieved
· and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. (U.S. vs. Toribio, 15
°:f'hit85 [i910J; _Fal:>ie 'vs. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486 [1912]; Case vs.
. Board ·of I-leaith., '.44'Pli:il. 256 [1913].)
As the ~ubject aµd purpose of agrarian reform have been
laid down hy the Constitution itself, we may say that the first
requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is
the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional
·goal."
(3) Lawful ends do not justifiJ unlawful means. - "One of the
basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights
· of the _individual are CO!).~erned, the end does not justify the
means. IUs not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary tpat the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with
the ·Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. Therejs no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions,· will excuse the bypassing of an individual's
,pg]1ts. It is no ex,~~~~ration to say that a person invoking a right
gua,ran'teed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
e\i'~h as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that
"right. ., ' ,
The right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property
under'-Sectfon 1 of Article II'I of the Constitution. With regard to his
· :property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9; which
:reaffitrils the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation."
. (4) Cape involves an exercise ofpolicepower and the power ofeminent
domain. 46 - "The cases before us present no knotty complication
insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To
the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
4
· 6See also Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 367
SCRA 175 (2001).
658 1"'1-.tlLll:' J:' l NLl O N S'flT f..UfH©NA!Tl.,LAW Seo.9
Principles and·Casl!St,',: · . ti
., '
retention limits for landowners, ·there·:is·al1' ·e~er.cise of ,the police
power for the regulation of priv.ate propitrt}M:i>\ accordance •with the
Constitution. But where, to ca:ny:0ut1sticn'-te'gulan6n,:it:,becomes
necessary to deprive such'0Wnettr16fwh111:everlands they1n.ayown
in excess of the maximum area allowed1·sfuere is definit~ly :a •t aking
under the power·;bf eminent domain·•fbr' which payment' of just
compensation :is·imperative. · - · -' •- ., .
The,fa~g·co~templated is ·n9(i¾i\ j~)m1if~ti~~~1 th~ m~e of of
the land. What is required is the .sU;t-ieAde~,;otthe title to.and the
physiqi.l possession cif the said eXCE)$S: and·
all b~neficiaf'rights
accruing to the owner:- in favor of the-farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an_exercise not of th~ police power but of the power of
·eminent domain." · · · · · ·. :. ' ·, · · The word 'jl¾St' is used to intensify the meaning 0f the word
. . ., ' ·,
.
(5) Requirements for a proper exerdi$e ·o f po.we~ of eminer-it domain.
- "Eminent domain is .an inherent power•of the.State th.,it enables
it 'to fordbly acquire private l~ds _int~~ded · for public use upon
pay~ent of just i::ompensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no
' need to e,{propriate 'wher'7 the OWll:ei. is willing to sell under terms
also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of
sale may be agreed upon by the parti~s. '(f':Tdble vs. City of Macila,
67 Phil. 1 [1939].) It is only where the own~r is uriwjlling to sell, or
cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee,
that ·t he power of eminent domain wiU come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over_the interests of the p~operty
owner. Private rights must then yield _to th~ irresistible deman4s of
the public interests on the time-hqnored justification, as in the case
of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
But for}l,U it~ primacy and urge.ncy, th~ power of ex.propriation is
by no m.eans absolute (as indeed no power~sabsolute). The limitation
is found in the constitutional injunctio~ iliat,'pr,i vat\i.j:m~p.erty shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation' and in the
abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of
this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of
the power are public use and just compensation."
(a). Public use. - "The requirement for. public use has
already been settled for us by the Constitution itself. No less
than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the
reason why private agricultural lands are to betaken.from their
owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits.
Sec. 9 Al~T,:,m. BILL Ofl RIGHTS 659
Inherent Power~ of G0vernment
A. Power of Eminent Domain
The -p1,1Fp0ses spedfied in P.O. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A.
- No.,6'657 are only an elaborationoHhe constitutional injunction
-that_th~ •State• ~dop>t the necess~ry measures 'to encourage
and undertake. th!:l, just distribution of all iigricultural lands to
enal?l~ .f,wm~l'.S,JVh.o are landles$·to own o.irectly .pr collectively
the,,lands, th~y, .tiJl,' ,Jllat public use, as pronounced by the
fundaqtental law itself, mqst be }?inding on us."
,(b) Ju-SJ-compensation.~ '.'The requirement needs a longer
ard_more thoµgl:itM .Er1'amination.
. 'Just compertsation'. is defined as the full and fair equivalent
of the ptopercty fakeit from its owner by the expropriator.
'compensation' to convey the idea .that the equivalent to be
. rendered forthe 'property to·be taken shall be real, substantlnl,
•full, ample." (City..of Manila vs. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208 [1913].)
(6) Requisites for c~nip'ensable taking. - As held in Republic of the
11
Philippines vs. Castell.vi (58 .?.CRA 336 [1974].), there is compensable
taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator
m)l~t enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than
· a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color
of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5)
the utilization of the? property for public use must be in such a way
I
as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property. All these,requisites are envisioned in the measures before
us."
(7) Deposit by the State is not required. - "Where the State itself is
the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its
taking possession of the condemned property, as the compensation
is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its
payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in
raising the amourtt.
Nev.ertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARL provides that:
'Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
i'
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper

I!(!() l'J.JJ,LlJ: l 'l N.Ll 'ON::i.n ·r u n QN~li-.LAW
Principles and Cases·:.·:'Hi . ,
..
. ,· '' '
Register of Deeds to isgi,e a '.frim&f~r .<;;;:,e~tiJi~~ter~f Titl!=! (TCT)
in the name of:th~ Re;publh'; ,otth~ .PJ:uM,1?,Pin~~.-,Th~·PARshall
thereafter proceed with ;the redis.t-,:,ik>liltiOll tPf J;he fand to the
qualified beneficiaries."'
(B) Determination of "just cohipensat:fori. ' by the· l)epdftment pf
Agrarian Reform is•not final.:....... i'sped.fic' ref~r~rtce fs"rriade.to Section
16(d), which provides that in
cl:lse -of the rejection or ·d isregard by
tlw owner of. the offer of the government ,to b.,uy·his land -
'x X X the DAR shall conduct' "sun;unary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensati,on °'.for the land by
requiring the landowner, the LBP and other'in.terested parties
to. submit evidence as to the just cdm,pensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the .notice. After the
expiration ofthe above period, the m::ttter is deemed submitted
for decision. The DAR shall decid,e the ·case within thirty (30)
days after it is ~ubmitted for decision< x x x
A reading of the aforecited S~ction 16(d) will r~adif y show
that it does npt suffer from the afhitrarµ-iess . that-rendered the
challenged -decrees constitutionally. pbjectionab~e. Although the
1
proceedings are described as ·summary,_the..landowner and·other
interested parties are nevertheless allowe~:an ?.PPOrtunity lo sub-
mit evidence on the real value of the propetty. Bu:tmo~ impor-
tantly, the determination of the just COJ?perisation:by the.DAR is
not by any means final and conclusive upon thelandowner or any
other interested.party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:'Any.party
who disagrees with the decision may bring.the inatter to the.court
of prpper jurisdiction for final deternun,ation ofJust compe~sation.'
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless
accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination
in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function."
(9) Traditional medium for payment of j1,1st c~mpensation. - "It
cannot be denied from the cases (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Velasquez,
32 Phil. 286 (1915]; Province of Tayabas vs. Perez, 66 Phil. 467
(1938]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31
SCRA 413 [1970]; and several American cases.) cited by petitioners
that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation
is money and no other. And so, conforl!'lably, has just compensation
been paid in the past solely in that medit.Un."
4I
Sec.9 .NRT:-1H:·BILL OF RIGHTS
Inher.ent,Powers oLCoverrunent
A. Power of Eminent Domain
(lQ) Agrarian t,ejorm. 4s ·a revolutionary kind of expropriation. -
"However; ·we do not-"deal here with the traditional exercise of the
power of eminent donii.ain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific pro,perty of relatively limited area is sQught
to be taken by .the _Sta,,t,e from its owner for a specific and perhaps
local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation.
(a) The expropriation before us affects all private
agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as
long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits
allowed their owners.
(b) This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit
not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the
population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of
our society, from_the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted
owner.
(c) Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of
this country but goes qeyond in time to the foreseeable future,
which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice 0£ the ,p resent generation of Filipinos. Generations
){et to come are as involved in this program as we are today,
although hopefully _o nly as beneficiaries of a richer and more
fulfilling life ,w e w:j.11 guarantee to them tomorrow through our
thoughtfulness today.
(d) And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than
the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the
farms, calling for 'a just distribution' among the farmers of
lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but
can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos.
The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land
subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that
hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than
the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already
staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact
not even fully availabie at this time."
(11) Intention of framers as to form and manner of payment. -
"We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this
· difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority
project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that
662 FI-IlLIP l-'lNl:l CON S'l'l'J.,'lJ'I:~~ N f.\J., LAW Sec.9
Sec.9
Principles antl•Gases_.
when they envisione"d th¢ expropria~on'\that· would be needed;
they also intended 'that :the just ·torifp~traa:tiior\,would,,-have .fo be
paid not in thetorth0dox way but,-:a:1 Ie~s ·eotiventicma'l, ·if more
practical, method'. 'Fhere can be ho·d~'filbt:that fhey were aware of
the financial limitati0ns of the· govetn:n\'eht_" and had rio -nlusions
that there would be enough money"to::pay. m:cash arid'irl full for the
lands they wanted to-be.'d istributed among the farmers. · ·
We may, therefore, assume that :tb.eir-·interition was to allow
such maimer of payment as is riow pr:bvided:forqy th~CARP Law,
particularly the payment of the balanC:e :(if the owner cannot be
paid fully with money), or indeed of.-the entire amount of the just
compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose
that what they had in mind. was a similar scheme of payment as
that prescribed in P.O. No. 2-7, which was the law in force at the
time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
presumably agreed in principle."
(12) No special definition of just ·compensation was agreed upon
by framers. - "The Court has not found in the records of the
Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the
members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program being contemplated. There was ·the suggestion to 'fine
tune' the requirement to suit the demand of the project even as it
was also felt that they should 'leave it to Congress' to determine
how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement
required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as
'progressive compensation' and 'State-subsidized compensation'
were also proposed. In the end, however, no s.pecial definition of
the just compensation for the lands-to be expropriated was reached
by the Com.mission."
(13) Proportion of cash payment is not unduly oppressive and other
modes of payment are not unreasonable. - "Accepting the theory that
payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, we find further that-the proportion of cash payment
to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not
unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is no.ted that the smaller
the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the
small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners,
who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value.
AR'f'. III. Bii,L OF RIGHTS 663
Inherent Powers of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
No less'iil:rpottitntly,:the government financial instruments making
upiliebalance.- 0£:tl,,e payment are !negotiable at any time.'
...,.
' ~
The other·modes, which are likewise available to the tandowner
at his '6ption, are:a.fS'O not unreasonable because payment is made
in shar~s of stock, U~P borids, other properties or assets, tax
credits, and othet•thmgs of value equivalent' to the amount of just
compensation." .
(14) Inco.nvenience :to landowners cannot be avoided. - "Admit-
tedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the
landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already
remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly
hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they
are of .the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not
begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the idcnl
of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will
be like the quest for the Holy Grail."
(15) There is no arbitrary transfer of title before lnnd covered is fully
paid for. - "The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner
is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full
of just compensation, in contr avention of a well-accepted principle
of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only
upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this
settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdiction. Thus:
'Title to property which is the subject of condemnation
proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment
fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition
under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report
under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. (Chicago Park Dist.
v. Downey Coal Co., 1 Ill. 2d 54.)
x x x although the right to appropriate and use land taken
for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property
taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made.
(Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 U.S. 599, 26 L. ed. 550.)"'
(16) ProperhJ may be taken before full payment. - "In Kennedy
vs. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding
 I IJ
664 FHILIPPINE CONSTITU'I>IONAL LAW
Principles and-Cases.,,•, -·
that title to ptoper,ty ,does· nokpass:to(the: ccmd~OJ;•·until just
compensation had ·a ctually been.made; I11da:cti-.the de'cisiQ:µs appear
to be uniform to this effect. As ec:1.rly as 1838, in Rubotfow v. McLure
(4 Blkf. 508.), it was held tha.t 'a_ctu?l payment to .the owner of the·
condem_n ed property was a conditioniprec~rl:~t to the inv:estment
of the title.to the property.in the $f.a t(t~lb.eit~pot tQ the apprqp;riation
of it to public use,'
In Rexford V, Knight (11 NY 314,), the C6urt 0~ A.ppeal~ of New
York .said that the constmction upon the .statutes was,that the fee
did not vestin the State until ·the payrneht of. the C.Oll'lp·ensation
althpugh the authority toenterupon ,and•appropriate theland was
complete prior, to thee payment.-T~e Kennedy·case farther said that
'both on principle·and authority, the rule is x x x that the right to .
enter on and use the property.is:complete;-aS'·sobrt•as the property
js actually appropriated under the au-thor-1ty 6£, law for·a public use,
but that the title· does not pass from the owner-without his consent,
until just compensation has been made .to him."'
(17) Transfer of title under.assailed measures is conditioned on full
payment of just compensation. - "When KO: No. 228, categorically
stated in its Section 1 that: 'All qualified· farmer-beneficiaries are
now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they
acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27,' it was obviously
referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the.farmers' cooperatives
and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly
proper for the Order tq also provide in its Section 2 that the 'lease
rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after
October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment
of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for
the land.'
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank Until then, title also remains with the landowner. (Sec. 16(d].)
No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. .
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due
process by arpitrarily transferring title befo.re ~e land is fully paid
for must also be rejected.ii (Association of Small Landowners in the
1
Sec. 9 · AR.'r; lIL BLLL OF RIGHTS 665
Inherent Po~ers of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
Philippines, ·lrio.;Vff. Sec:retary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989 J,
throug_~ Justice er~ztsee Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 218 [1990].)
· · 8. ·. The '. cc3nsfif11Nonality of Section 92 of the Omnibus Election
·-c;orle iiilii'Cli' corizp'ltls all' broadcast stations in the country "to provide
radio.and television time, free ofcharge, during the period of the [election)
ca111paigns,'! U?hiP:h, t!ze (:ommission .on Elections shall allocate "equally
and (nJparfially:'i.m.~1!:8 .t~e candidates" is challenged.
· .· / d'cts; Se.dtion; _ll,(1;>)
of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale or
.qon~tj.pp _9[ p~i,n.t,_s.pace or ~ir time for political ads, except to the
C0mmission .Ql1'.Ele11ti9,ns under Sectiqp 90, of B.P. Big. 881, the
Omnibus,Electio,n,Code, with respect to print media, and Section
.92, .with re~pe~t.tci broadcast medi~.
It wm be- h'qfecr:that while Section 90, of B.P. Blg. 881" requires
·th~ C:OMELEC.to:prbcure print space which, the Supreme Court
has held sho~~d be.paid for, ,Section 92 states that air time shall be
_proc.u~e,9-.' bythe C,:OJ0:ELEC free of charge.
Issue: P.etitiQners challenge the. validity of Section 92 on the
gr.o und, amoli).g pthers, that it takes ·property without due process
of law _a nd without-just compensation.
Held: (1) Airwaves and frequencies are not owned by broadcasting
companies. - ''The idea that broadcast stations may be required to
provide COMELECTime free of charge is not new. It goes back
to the Election Code of 1971. (R.A. No. 6388.) This provision was
carried over with ·slight modification by the 1978 Election Code.
(P.D, No. 1296.) Substantially, the same provision is now embodied
in Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. xx x.
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the
requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in
the United States, .~ere are responsible scholars who believe that
government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be
instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs
to further the system of free expression, For this purpose, broadcast
stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an
election.
In truth, radio and .television broadcasting companies, which
are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They
are merely given the temporary privilege of using them, Since
 I lJ IJ
666 PMILIPPINE CONSTITt1,T ION*b' LAW Sec.-9
Principles and·Gases,.,,. •'-'f :·1•.
a franchise is a mere privilege/ the .exercise .of,the p.rivilege-'m ay
reasonably be burdened with the performan.ce by the grantee of
1
some form of public service. Thus, in De .Viliata vs. Stanley (32 Phil.
541 [1915].), a regulation requiring inter-island vessels licensed to
engage in the i!1ter-island trade to ca.i;;y,rpa,il,ap.,q., for this purpose,
to give advance notice to postal aut:{19~itiet, .qf.date ·,anp. .l:iour of
sailings of ves11els and of changes.of, ,sailing -pgurs to enable them
to tender mail for transportation at t4e la,st.pqi~ti,cable_h.oµr prior
to the vessel's departure, was held to be a r~a~c:>r-$le c.on9'ition for
the state grant of license. Although the tj_uestiort of compensation
for the carriage of mail was not in issue, ~e C_o'~rt s~ronr;ly implied
that such s\,!rvice could be without co~pensati:ort, as in fact under
Spanish sovereignty the mail was carried free. ·' . . . . .. '
. In Philippine Long Distance Tel~h.one Co~wJ}1yvs:.NTC (241 SCRA
486 [1995]. ), the Court ordered the PI.PT t9 ,aUow tl:te interconnection
of·its·domesti~ teJephone system :..Vith _the' irit~rnational gateway
facility of Eastern Telecom. The Court cited: (1) 't he provisions of the
legislative franchise allowing such interconnection; (2) the absence
of any physical, technical,· or econohi.ic basis fot restricting the
linking up of two separate telephone systems; and (3) the possibility
of increase in the volume of international traffic and·mcire•e:fficient
service, at more moderate cost, as a result of intercortnectio'h. ·
Similarly, in the earlier case of PLDT vs. NTC, it was H.eld:
'Such regulation of the use and ownership of telecommu-
nications systems is in the exercise ofthe ple~ary police power
of the State for the promotion of the gene_ral welfare. Jhe 1987
Constitution recognizes the existence of. that power in Sec. 6,
Art. XII.' "
(2) No private property is taken. - "The claim that petitioner
would be losing P52,380,000 in unrealized revenue from advertising
is based on the assumption that air time is 'finished product' which,
it is said, become the property of the company, like oil produced
from refining or simila,r natural resources after undergoing a
process for their production. But air time is not owned by broadcast
companies. x x x
'There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with
others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations
to present those views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred
J
Sec.9 AR'fo.. ·,III. BILL OF RIGHTS
Inherent Powers of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
from the p.ll)W.a'\1,e s-.: A,q radio and television broadcast stations
do not own ,the. 'Air.waves, no private property is taken by the
requireri:YeF1t that:.t hey·provide air tim.e to the COMELEC.~ .
(3) Law alfows·)1exible · time for programming by stations, not
'·' confiscation of air ·time by COMELEC. - "It is claimed that there is
no standard in theJaw to guide the COMELEC in procuring free air
time and that 'theoretically the COMELEC can demand all of the
air time of such stations.' x x x
The conten!i,on has no basis. For one, the COMELEC is required
to procure free air tiine for candidates 'within the area of coverage'
of a particular raqio or television broadcast so that it cannot, for
example, procure such time for candidates outside that area. At what
time of the day and how much time the· COMELEC may procure
will have·to be deterpined by it in relation to the overall objective of
informing the public about the candidates, their qualifications and
theit:, progr~ms ?I.government. As stated in Osmefla vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No: 132231,, March 31, 1998.), the COMELEC time provided
for in Section 92, _a s well as the COMELEC space provided for in
Section 90, is in lieu of paid ads which candidates are prohibited
to have under Section ll(b) of R.A. No. 6646. Accordingly, this
objective must be kept in mind in determining the details of the
COMELEC time as well as those of the COMELEC space.
The~e _woufd indeed be objection to the grant of power
to the COMELEC if Section 92 were so detailed as to leave no
room for accommodation of the demands of radio and television
programming. For were that the case, there could be an intrusion
into the editorial prerogatives of radio and television stations."
(Telecommunication and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils., Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998, through
Justice Mendoza.}
Romero, J., dissenting:
(1) Section 9 of Article III is violated. - "x xx There is of course
no question that the taking of the property in the case ;t bar is fo;
public use, i.e., to ensure that air time is allocated equally among
the candidates; however, there is no justification for the taking
without payment of jusfcompensation.
Apparently, Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 justifies such taking
under the guise of police power regulation which cannot be validly
done. Police power must be distinguished from the power of
 I J
668 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION'~L LAW
Principles an'd Cases ·'·'"f:'in ,-
• ~ V .\,;,I.;/ ,"; -::,; I .--11 ••
eminent domain. In the exercise of'pdlice·powe'tftlit!teistfresttiction
of property interest to }_1):t0m0te 'publib:vie:lfars 1or·inter.e"§'t:which
involves no compe11sablet1faking.:fWhe~t tl\e'.Ap&:wet:,ef:,emment
domain, however, .is exerd~ed,. prop~-1-:l:yii int~tes:t -\S/ qpproptiated
and applied_ tq ..~Qpte public p~,:pp_se,;: 1:w_c~.~~it<1!:J,ng .1,pm,pet.1sation
therefor.. Traditj.o_i;tal !=lis~cti9;t1~;,b,~~e~~f!BR}iq<t:?,-PQ"IY~tJ\1;1.;c;l the
power of eminent dom.,au,,.,.p.re!=lti,qedpHP,li¢~tjqn pf bq$ipQ:o/,€!tS at
the same time on the same subjec;t.. . :: ;· . ,"--.::: , :-.. !: _-·. · -: ..,
Hence, in the-case of City of Baguio,vs.:N/1..Wf\SA (W6 Phit.144.),
the Court held that a law requiring the trartsfer-,9f all municipal
waterworks systems to NAWAS,A in exchang~ for its assets of
equivalent value involved the exercise of.~il:l~ent domain because
the property involved was wholesome anq intended for p,ublic
use. Property condemned under -t he exercise of police power, on
the other hand, is intended for noxious purp·Q:se and, consequently,
is not compensabl~. Police pcn.ver proceeqs .from the principle.that
every holder of property, how~ver ab_sotute. and unqualified may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability 't hat hi$ use of it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of•others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights
of the community. · While there is no taking or appropriation of title to, and
Rights of property, like all other SC;>cial and conventional
rights, are subject to reasonable limitations ·in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them· by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. . .
In the case of Small Landowners of the Philippines> J~c .. vs: Secretary
of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343 (1989].), we found occasion to
note that recent trends show a mingling ofthe poUce power and
the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an
implement of the former like the power of taxation: Citingthe cases
of Berman vs. Parker and Penn Centml Tr_ansportation Co. ~s. New York
City (438 U.S. 104.) where owners of the Grand Central Terminal
who were not allowed to construct multi-storey building to a compensation. We find no cogent reason why radio and television
preserve a his~oric landmark were allowed certain compensatory
rights to mitigate the loss caused by the regulation,· this C~urt in
Small Landowners ·of the Philippines, Inc. ·case held that measures
prescribing retention limits for power for the regulationof private
property in accordance with the Constitution. And, · where to
carry out the regulation, it became necessary to deprive owners
Sec. 9 A&. 1]1. BILL OF RIGHTS ,669
Inherent ·powers of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
of whatever lands they may own ,in excess of the maximum area
. allowed,-the Court held that there was definitely a taking under the
, . power ofeminenr d.oma;in for which payment of just compensation
•
was.unpera fl·Ne,,II _. •
,, · · (2) Therds compensable taking. - "While the power of eminent
domain ofteinesults in·the appropriation of tifle to or possession
of property, it nee-cl not always be the case. It is a settled rule that
neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential
to taking and ,it is usually in cases where title remains with the
private owner that· inquiry should be made to determine whether
the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to
a compensable taking. A regulation which deprives any person of
the profitable use .of his property constitutes a taking and entitles
him to compensation unless the invasion of rights is so slight as
to permit the reg1:1lation to be justified under tl1e police power.
Similarly, a poli~e . regulation which unreasonabley restricts the
right to use business property for business purposes, amounts to
taking of private property and the owner may recover therefor. It is
also settled jurisprudence that acquisition of right of way easement
falls within the purview of eminent domain. ·
possession of the expropriated property in the case at bar, there
is compensable taking inasmuch as there is a loss of the earnings
for the airtime which the petitioner-intervenors are compelled to
donate. It is a loss which, to paraphrase Philippine Press Institute vs.
COMELEC (244 SCRA 272 [1995).) could hardly be considered 'de
minimis' if we are to take into account the monetary value of the
compulsory donation measured by the current advertising rates of
the radio and television stations.
In the case of Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC, we had
occasion to state that newspapers and other print media are not
compelled to donate free space to respondent COMELEC inasmuch
as this would be in violation of the constitutional provision that
no private property shall be taken for public use without just
stations should be treated any differently considering that their ·
operating expenses as compared to those of the newspaper and
other print media publishers involve considerably greater amount
of financial resources."
(3) Franchises are as much entitled todue process and equal protection
of the laws. - "The fact that one needs a franchise from government

6'10 PI-IILIPPlNl:i CONSTlTU'.CU:<DN¼.L LAW Sec. 9
Principles and Cases
to establish a radio and television station while no license is needed
to start a newspaper should not be made a basis . for treating
broadcast media any differently front thlil print ~e-cHa,in compelling
the former to 'donate' airtime to resp0ndent ·coMELEC. While no
franchises and rights are grante.4 exc.ep..t.un<;ler the condition that it
shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or.re;peal by the Congress
when the common good so reqit\res,. tjus· p.~ovides ~o license for
government to disregard the car~Imil rule .t hat corporations with
franchlses are as much entWed to due ,prd¢e.1fs and equal·protection
of laws.guaranteed under the ·Constitutjon/ 0 Technically, therefore, the wholesale alteration by Section 92 of
Panganiban, J., dissenting:
(1) Franchisee1sproperty cannot be taken without just compensation.
- "x xx Orice g.ranted, a franchise (notthe·air lanes~together·with
concomi~ant private rights, becomes property ~f the grantee. It
is regarded by l_a w precisely as other property and, as any ·other
property, · it is safeguarded by the Constitution from arbitrary
revocation ·or impairment. The right under ·a franchise can be
neither taken: nor curtailed for public ast! or purpose, even by the
government as the grantor, without pay.tnent•of just compensation
as guaranteed under our fundamental law. The fact that the
franchise relates to public use or purpose does not entitle the state
,t o abrogate or impair its u se without just cpmpensation.
The majority further claims that, constitutionally, franchises are
always subject to alteration by Congress, 'when the common good
so requires.' The question then boils down to this: Does Section 92
of the Omnibus Election Code constitute a franchise modification
for the 'common go~d,' or an' unlawful taking of private property'?
(2) Broadcast companies already pay renta.l for air lanes. - "x x x
Since the use of the air frequencies is already paid for annually by
the broadcast entities, there is no basis for the government, through
the COMELEC, to compel unbridled donation of the air time of
said companies without due process and without payment of just
compensation.
In fact, even in the case of state-owned resources referred to
earlier- like oil, minerals and coal - once the license to exploit and
develop them is granted to a private corporation, the government
can no longer arbitrarily confiscate or appropriate them gratis under
the guise ofserving the common good. Crude oil, for instance, once
explored, drilled, and refined is thereafter considered the property
Sec. 9 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 671
Inherent Powers of Government
A. Power of Eminent Domain
of the authorized explorer (or refiner) which can sell it to the public
and even to the government itself. The State simply cannot demand
free gasoline for the operation of public facilities even if they benefit
the people i,n general. It still has to pay compensation th~refor."
(3) Air time is the finished product. - "Note should be made,
too, of the fact µtat what Section 92 take away is air time. Air time
·is the 'finis!led product' aftE:r a station uses its own broadcast
facilities. The frequency is j~st the spe~ific 'route' or 'channel'
by which this medium reaches the TV sets of the general public.
all broadcas.t franchises would appear unrelated to the compelled
donations. While the express modification is in the franchise, what
Section 92 really does is that it takes away the end product of the
facilities which w~re set up through the use of the entrepreneu rs'
investments and the broadcasters' work."
9. Ordinance gives owners and operators of "prohibited"
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to "wind
up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
Malate ai-ea or convert said business to other kinds of business allowable
within the area."
Facts: See Illustrative Case No. 12 under "B. Police Power,"
infra.
Issue: D oes the ordinance go beyond regulation as to be
equivalent to taking of property without just compensation?
Held: (1) Two types of taking. - "There are two different types
of taking that can be identified. A 'possessory' taking occurs when
the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A
'regulatory' taking occurs when the government's regulation
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property."
.j
(2) Ordinances is practically confiscatory. - "The Ordinance gives
the owners and operators of the ' prohibited' establishments three
(3) months from its approval within which to 'wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable
within the area.' The directive to 'wind up business operations'
l amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation
i
of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner
I·

672 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUlfI<DN'Aff!.,LAW Sec, 9
Principles and Casi!s · ·.-~ ·:'.. ·
,. , •i _.,
converts his establishment to,accommodate·an .'allowed' bt!tsiness,
.' .
the structure which housed the previous' ;o usiness will- 'be left
empty and gathering dust. Suppose he tran~for~ it to ano~l;ter area,
he will likewise leave the.entire establisru;nent idle, Consiql.e;i:ation
must be given to the substantial amount of mqney invested to build
the edifices which the owner reasonably ,expec,t s to be returned
within a period of time. It is apparent that tl}e_-O:rdinance le~ves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use. .
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside
of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businesses are
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a 'taking' of private property.
n,.e second option instructs the owners to abandon. their
property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area.
In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation
with an additional burdevi imposed on the owner to build another
establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does
not put an end to the 'problem,' it merely relocates it. Not only is
this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The
conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How
may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee
shop, art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its
property? This is a taking of private property without due process
of law, nay, even without compensation.
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking
. that should be compensated by the government. The·burden on
the owner to .convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be
closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne
by the public as this end benefits them as a whole."
(3) Police power not involved in the case. - "Petitioners cannot
take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A
zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which
limits a 'wholesome' property to a use which can not reasonably
be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended
for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of
justice as we know them. The police powers of local government
]
Sec. 9 ·-~~I,,I:p:. BILL QF RIGHTS
lnherentJ?,qwers ~f Government
A. Pow:er of Eminent Domain
I
. ,lµ}jc~s ;whichp~v~ ,™W?Y:S r:.eqeiV:ed,,, broad and liberal interpretation
cpnnqt,b~,stretc;b~d-,to. q>Ver this particular taking .
(4') OrdinanfsdsHiot;a regul~tory measure. - "The case of Ermita
Ma/ate· Hotel' and Mbtel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor
of Manila 47 (20 SCRA 549 [1967].), it needs pointing out, is also
different from this case in that what was involved therein was a
measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct
business in ord'e r•to put an end to practices which could encourage
vice and immora'lity. Necessarily, there was no valid objection
on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did
not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not
a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit.
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is on
unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personnl
rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restrnint of
trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police powe1~ be
upheld as valid." (City ofManila vs. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308 [2005],
through Justice Tinga,)
Other rulings on eminent domain.
(1) Pre~trial is not necessary in fixing the amount of provisional
payment it being made only as condition precedent in taking
possession of the expropriated property and not a final adjudication
of question of just compensation. (Zaballero vs. National Housing
Authority, 155 SCRA 224 [1987].)
(2) Different tax declarations pegging the value per square
meter of the affected lands are not considered reliable. Tax values
can serve only as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for
just compensation. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 128
[1987].)
(3) Even if a land is predominantly agricultural and cogonal,
the presence of commercial establishments within the vicinity improves
the actual classification of the property. It is of common knowledge
that if there are several commercial establishments in a certain
area, there is no doubt that there will be more persons interested to
purchase property adjacent to said establishments. (Ibid.)
47See Illustrative case No. 3-C (Substantive Due Process) under Section 1.
 1 I
{j1/lj 1'Ull~IJ'.l:'1N.Ll 'ONS'!'l'l'UTl N A L LAW S l!C,
Principles and Cases ' · · ·
(4) Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Cdurt,·g'overns even in a
provisional basis the procedure for ascertaftiirig')u~f compensation in
eminent domain proceedings. (Ignacio vs, Gtier'tero, 150 SCRA 369
[1987].) · i: · ' ,
(5) When a landed estate has been ~~b4i~ided into rea;g_nable
areas, either throug\1 voluntary sales' b'y:-J:J.ji,owner o( f!u;ough
expropriation proceedings, the re~aining . p,~i;c;e~s . a.r~. n,o. lpnger
subject to expropd.ation or further· expropiii~in.. The
theory. :that
there ar.e tenancy problems in the lands being expropri~teµ and the
only solution to such problem is to expropri~te the same is a theory
which finds no constitutional or statutory suppoi:t. Rather, such a
concept is promotive of evil results for then all that a tenant has
to do is to stir up trouble and unrest and the land becomes subject
to condemnation proceedings. (Republic :vs. Baylosis, 109 Phil. 580
"[1960).)
(6) Eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed against
the expropriator. (San Roque Realty & Dev. Corp. vs. Republic, 532
SCRA 493 [2007].) The Constitution protects a landowner against
indiscriminate and unwarranted expropriation. To simply enable the
tenants of a piece of land of reasonable area to own portions of
it, even if they and their ancestors had cleared the land for their
landlord for many years, is no valid reason under the Constitution
to deprive the owner of his property by means of expropriation.
(Province of Rizal vs, San Diego, L-10802, Jan. 11, 1959.)
(7) The value of the property sought to be expropriated should be
determined by, among other factors, its character at the time of the
taking. The nature of the property at the time of its possession by the
expropriating power is the determinative yardstick of its value. The
future convertibility of the property into some other classification
does not affect the nature of the property; it may be considered only
as a circumstance to determine the value to be paid. (Municipal
Government of Sagay vs. Jison, 104 PhiL 102 [1958].) The property's
character refers to its actual use (e.g., residential) not its potential
uses (e.g., commercial or industrial). (Land Bank of the Phils. vs.
Livioco, 631 SCRA 86 [2010].)
(8) Where a land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the
condition that when the purpose is ended or in case it is abandoned,
the property shall be returned to its former owner, the former owner
9 Sec. 9 AR.11'. W. 131LL OF RIGHTS 675
htherent Powrrs of Gbvernment
A. Power of Eminent Domain
may. reacquire the property so expropriated when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned. But where the decree of expropriation
gives the•.expropriatol;' title to the land, then the land bfcomes the
absolute property of the expropriator in which case the non-user of
the same, or the abandonment of the public use, or its devotion to a
n~t
different i:is~, doe; have the effect of defeating the title already
a~quire·d ,in'. the exprgpriation proceedings or any reversion to the
former oW;ner,, (R~rry,, ¥,s. MunicJpahcy of Cabanatuan, 42 Phil. 28
[1921]; Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority · vs. Court
of. Appeals,' · 346- s¢RA 126 [2000]; Reyes vs. National Housing
Authorityi 395 SCRA 494 [2003].)
(9) In an expropriation case where, the principal issue is the
determination of just compensation, a trial before the commissioner
is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the
issue of just compensation. Trial with the aid of commissioners is
a sub§tantial right that may not be done away with capriciously
or for no reason at all. The court, howeve1~ is not bound by the
commissioners' report regarding just compensation. It may even
substitute its own estimate of the value but it may only do so for
valid reasons, from competent evidence that may be gathered
from the record. But while the court may accept the report and
render judgment in accordance therewith, it may not do so without
considering whether the report is supported by evidence. (Manila
Electric Company vs. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 [1992]; Republic vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA572 [1990]; Municipality of
Daet vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA503 [1979].) ·
(10) If property is taken by the government without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings, the aggrieved landowner may seek the
restoration of the property by bringing an action for its recovery,
but if the remedy is no longer convenient or feasible as the lot
involved had already been devoted to public use such as a road,
the landowner may simply demand payment of just compensation.
(Militante vs. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 318 [2000].) The failure
for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings covering the property the government had taken,
constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. (Republic
vs. Mendoza, 627 SCRA 443 [2010].)
(11) Where private property is taken by the government for public
use without first acquiring title thereto, either through expropriation
 676
P J lll ,ll ' l 'I NII ( 'ONST l'f'U'f'IONA I . 1,/\W 1 II 11 I) /\ I{' I', 111 , 1111 .1 . t HI I< I{: I l'l'f) 677
Pri n iplc:; nnd 'ascs
lnh<:1'(•111l'ow111 11 111t:ov1 rn111 •nl
1

11. l'o lh-1• l'ow1•1·

or negotiated sale th , .
value thereof d , e owner_s action to recover the fond 01• 11111 l 11 tr l f I ii Lo the com fort, safely, and welfare of society." (Rubi vs.
454 SCRA 516 ~es not prescribe. (Republic vs. Court of App(• II t l 1111vl11 iol Uoard, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]; Sto. Tomas vs. Salac, 685 SCRA
[1967]· S [ 005]; B. Lopez vs. Auditor General, 20 S 'f<A ,,,,,; 1•1'i 120 121.)
, ecretary of DPWH vs. Tecson, 700 SCRA 243 f20'IJ J,)
(12) Taxation power can z b d • (3) ll has also been defined as the "power vested in the
of the po if . a so e use asan1mple111entfor t/11•1•,,·,r1 ,, l1 •1•1l11lolure2 by the Constitution to make, ordain, and establish
contribut~:;soe::;~nent domatn. Tax measures are but "1.•nh1n 1•1I 1111 1n,1nner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
imposed for a ubli ed on pa~ of penal san ctions" ond "d1• n ly 111'1II 11 Hl cs either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
beco p c purpose. In recent years, the power lo 111 1111n t 'i11111lllution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
and :ea ~~~!a:~:c!~et t?;l ~o realize social justice, public w1•1l1111• 111 lltl' commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." (U.S. vs.
Re is n ut10n of wealth. (Comm. o f lnt1•11 tu l I'11n1 p ya, 31 Phil. 245 [1915], quoting definition in Commonwealth
ac;:i:: ~; ~:ns~:!eL~z:: Drug Corp., ~5~ SCRA 414 I200''1,) 'I I h•• v. I\ lgct~ 7 Cush. 53 [Mass. 1851]; see also People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil.
of whate . fly y of exp ropnat1on are clcen-1(•<.I d(•11111111d 1~11 I 192'1:J and Churchill vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 [1915].)
Realty, 1:cerJsr~ {~u; alwtysDmay h ave attended these Lill ' H, (M111111l11I
' . . ea ev. Corp., 582 SCRA 583 l2009I.) (4) The term has been simply described as "the power to govern
1111 111 ind things." (Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet.
,,. 0,)
B. POLICE POWER
Ii , Is, function, and scope
of pollce power.
Meaning of police power.
( I) 13nsis. - Police power is founded largely on two Latin
Police power has been char t .· d ,, I 111 1 l m H, snl11s populi suprema est lex (the welfare of the people is the
insistent and th . . ac euze as tic ll'lOHI 1•11111•111 1111
aU the reat u~ !east hm~~able of powers, extending 0 14 II d111 ••1 111 1111111 l •m ' low) and sic utere tuo ut alien um non laedas (so use your own
[1957]· E
P_ he 1:eeds. (Ichong vs. Hern.and1.-•;,., 101 1'11II I 11ir,
, egasp1 vs. City of Cebu, 711 SCRA 77'1 l20 lJ I.)
111 1101 lo injure another's property) which call for the subordination
111 l11dividuol interests to the greater good of the greater number.
flo,· livi ng in a civilized society demands that an individual must
ena~;!u~h~:::en referre~ to ~s the P!enar:y power of 11 11• ::1111,, 111
11111I wilh Horne rights and privileges for the common good. Every
as may promote o~~~?~ ahi°~s m r~lahon to pcrli<>nH ind p111111111 1• 1 ll l/ 1·11 of CVC l'Y community must bear certain burdens imposed for
general welf pd ic ea t_ , public mornl11, public.-' 1iOl1 •ly, i111d 1111
are an convemen ce of the p oplt.• (u1,.. lJ " vi I 1 1111 · 1•,nod of all. (see Barbier v. Connally, 115 U.S. 28.) No right is
Gome 31 Ph'! 1 · 218 [1918];
• · ,., ' ·"· • ♦•11 1 1tl11111h il<.•.
z, Ferrer vs. Uauliala, 760 S( 'HA,,,,' l'J(J 1,, l
1 (n) Police power cannot be abdicated nor bargained away
1 (2) Negativ~ly, it has been put fo rth o1-1 llw "li1h4•11•111 1 ,111il
p enary powel' m the State w hich 'nnbl ' H iL lo pl'Ohlhll ,111 111 l111, (A nglo-Fi l Trading Corp. vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 495 [1983].) for

il'olicl' powl•1· l•1l11lwrt•n1 In tl u• !ihtll' hul n11 • I 1111111 ' l'ollu• p11w1•r 111 lodg d primarily in the legislature but it may delegate the power
r nn bl' l'Xt•r·d~otl 1111 l(111, llit• "t• , 1ill<1',, 1 ," h lpul 1111111 11,11/1111~1111111111, 1, 11 111 ll1t• p,,..1ld,•111 nncl ncl1ninlsti:ollvc agencies as well as the lawmaking bodies of local
/W lll'l'rl W(•I 11'11" I1
polln • p1~w111; 1111•,,, 11111111 bl' 11n 111• ,11,,tiw
''
' ' 111N1•, II111· I I1,, 11,11, , 1,,, , ',, , 11•,11,11 1111111111 11111111 l11dud1t11\ th , borongoy. (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
111111,1
1
<•1wrdH1•, Vo111;11••,•1l111111111111 ln l :1i.. I 11111 r't'"' wit ii h 111111•••~111 lly 111-.11 •ml111111 1111111 f,., II
,t,v<1, 111111 '"1poll, 1' pnw,•1li y !111,tl II"\', 11111 11 1
v• 111•1Ah• Vlll1w· A11~urhll lun, Inc,, 328 S RA 836 [2000); MMDA vs. Garin, 456 SCRA
I '" IJIH J11I, 11l!111 111lvr• B1• 1·11t,11•y VII, Houthwing lluavy Industries, Inc., 482 SCRA 673
A vulld tl11l11g,1ll1111 1,1 1,11111 " JIII W PI 11111 ,. 11, , 1 IJIHl/11) 11111 111111 I ii, I{/\ Nu. i' ltlO (l.ocnl (iuvornmont Code), known ns the "general
''""' 1111• n1111p f,11 I " ' 11111 I ll',1111111 "' 1h11111; 1,11,1 l''r('lt ~i111l1111,1ll1111 '" I,, hlh II I
111I' '1'I1111 w, 11 111,• 1 h 111>0 1•1111w ~11l111tu1 11t1 1h11t111111t1tl pullcu pnwor to locnl government units
1, "
111 1 14 l<A 11 11/1 I l'l•l f I ) "'1 11 ' 11111 1111 ( ''' fll11ny \N 1,,,,111 11 wltl1 Ii 1•~1•11 l,111 pulh 1, p11w111'lliH11111h 1l111lr 11•~p1 < tlvt l, HIHlnllv, bndioN, (Rubl • Art:ostre,
lw 11• Vllh11l111, 11 1111 •It l(A 1l'l'/ I.J1101,II "1111 11111111r, Jr, VII, IJ1111tlNl11, i'(,0 Hl'l< A 652 12015).)
 678 PHILIPPINE CONSTJTUTIONAL LAW Sec.9
; Principles and Cases
the power to protect public interest is beyond abnegation.3 (Del
Mar vs. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485 [2000].)
(b) "Police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague
and f~r from 1:'r~cisely defined. It is rooted in the conception that
men m orgamzmg the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." (Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 [1979].)
(2) Function. - The protection of the general welfare is the
particular function of police power which both restrains and is
restrained by due process. (Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
148 SCRA 659 [1987].) Thus, police power is simply defined as the
power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare.4 (People vs. Vera, 67 Phil. 190
[1939].)
(3) Scope. - The police power of the State is co-extensive with
self-pr?te~tion a~d it is not inapHy_termed "the law of overruling
necessity. (Collms vs. Wolfe, 5 Phil. 285 [1905].) By reason of itH
function, police power extends to all the great public needs and ii-I
3
!n ~ American case, where the Legislature of Mississippi, pursuant to the S11111,
Cons!1hlt1on, passed a law prohibiting all kinds of lottery within the State, th rec y1',1t'M
after ~t h~s gr~ted a 25-year franchise to a corporation to operate a lottery businCRH, 1lu1
~onstirutionahty of th~ law was upheld as against the claim of impairment of conl1:tll'I,
The po~er of the leg1slarure to pass laws for the preservation of public mornli; c111111nl
be bar~a~ed away. The supervision of public health or public morals by the 81.fllt• l11
a coi:itmumg one and_is to be_dealt :"'ith a~ the speci?I exigencies of the momt-nl 11111y
reqmre. Government 1s orgamzed with a view to the1r preservation nnd cannot dlv1•~l
itself of the power to provide for them." (Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 81'1; U,8, vu
Gomez, 31 Phil. 218 [1915].)
4 l'Xlttlt'ncc of the Stoic itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being
"The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of pub.lie Jn il'l't'~I 11111 1,
co~versely, with~u~ a well ordered state there could be no enforcement of prlvnh• 1•lnhl>i
Private ~nd pubhc interests a,~e, both in the substantive and procedurnl scnAe, 1111p111•1,1 111
the totality of the legal order. (Bmroughs, Limited vs. Morfe, 69 SCRA 40'I I 19761,)
As the power of self-protection on the pm:t of the community, police pow<•••brn111111\,,
some relotion to the community th/II' llw prlnclpl1• of Holf-dofonsc boom 10 tlw l11dlvldl1ul
(PCGC vR. Nepomucnnu, 184 SC 'I{/\ 1149 I 11/fl() j,) fl 1,1 tlw founcln llo11 of 1•rl 111lr111I h1w
in nil guvornn1un111 of t'llvlll.-.rn l 11111111111•11, 1111d 1111 nll uw l11w11 c:011~l11r lvp ,., 111111111•, 111111
l"on11nq11nn11y, 10 Lhr lrnpplrw..,1 111 11 11 1 pt 11ph 1 (\ '11lllr111 v11, Wolf!•, 11111,11,, ) 11 111 i •1<111r 1 , ,1
wllh11111 prt1vl11l1111tu,· 111111 p1 "" 1111111 1111 II 11111 ,111111111111111111ld111·nlh111 111 111 ,ltlh w,111,111
(A11r111, It' VII Phil h11t111111lh11111I Ail I\ 1111liu1b1 ! 11 , 1111 , ll'J U'll 1(/\ '1i''t l~lKl~ I )
Sec.9 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 679
Inherent Powers of Government
B. Police Power
described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. (Ynot vs. Intermeqiate Appellate
Court, supra.) Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. (Binay vs.
Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 [1991].)
(a) The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by
the police power, which affects him even before he is born and
follows him still after he is dead - from the womb to beyond
the tomb - in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach
is virtually limitless. It is an ubiquitous and often unwelcome
intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the
police power is not only proper but necessary. (Ibid.)
(b) Police power embraces the whole system of public
regulation.5 (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 Phil. ·104 [1908].) In the
interplay between a fundamental right (e.g., to due process)
and police power, as where the assailed governmental action
deals with the exercise of one's liberty or use of one's property,
especially where the latter is involved, police power is accorded
much leeway. (Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 [1984].) If the
liberty involved is the freedom of the mind of the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting but where the liberty curtailed affects at
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider. (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators
5Tho Supreme Court has sa id that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it
Iurn nlniost become im possible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very
co•cxl ' n.ilv,· wllh RClf-prescrvo lion nnd survival itself, it is the most positive and active of
11il Aovc•rnml'nl,il proCCHHC~, lhc most CStiential, insistent and illimitable. Especially it is so
111Hkr 1lw 1i111d1•1·n d1•11111ern lic: framework w here the demands of society and nation have
m11l1 lpll1•d In 1iltno•1l 11nl1111gl1111bl1• proporl.ionq. The field and scope of police power have
b1•m 11111 11111111,11 h1111mlh••~, jw,1 11,1 1lw flv ld11 of public inlercqt nnd public welfare have
bt ll\11111• 11111111~1 ,ill 11111lw,\\ 11111 ,111d h11 v1• l1',111H1°1•11d1•d '111111,111 foroqight. Since the courts
1,11111111 l1111•M11p 1h1• 11PPd11 ,i11LI dp111,111d11 111 p11h lk 111l1•1•p~l ,111d w1·lf.11·t', iht•y con not delimit
lwli,1,11!11111 I 1111'1•'< 111111111 Nt ,1111 1 11111!11 I11>lh I' 1ww,•r hv whh h 1111111hrn11gh w hich the State
Hlltil 11 111 111111l11111 ,11 li J,.v11 111 1l 1111 l1111•11 ,1 ,111.I w,,ll ,111 • (11h111lf\ vM I l11111,1111h·1, 111 1 l'hil.
I 1'111 I I 11 1f l )
680 PHILU'PINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.9
Principles and Cases
· Ass'n. vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967].) While the
Constitution protects property rights, the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operation of a business which
may result in impairment of property rights in the process.
(Carlos vs. Superdrug Corp. vs. DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 [2007].)
(c) The State, in the exercise of its police power, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment
of the obligation of contract from altering, modifying or
revoking the same. (see Miners Ass'n. of the Phils., Inc. vs.
Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA 100 [1995].) Thus, as long as a contract
affects the public welfare one way or another so as to require the
interference of the State, the police power must prevail over the
right against impairment of the obligation of contract secured in
Section 10. (Juarez vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 475 [1992].)
Illustrations of police power laws.
Below are illustrations of police power statutes or ordinances.
(1) Public health. - Those providing for the segregation of
lepers (Lorenzo vs. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 [1927].); limiting
1·he working hours to eight (Phil. Air Lines Employees Ass'n. vs.
Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 11 SCRA 387 [1964].); requiring every building
or premises to be connected with a sanitary sewer system (Case vs.
Boord of Health, 24 Phil. 250 [1913).); prohibiting the sale of freflh
meat, except in refrigerated establishments, outside the publk
nrnrkets (Co & Kiam vs. City of Manila, 96 Phil 649 [1955]; PeoplL·
vH. Sabarre, 65 Phil 684 [1938].); regulating cattle imports (Cruz VH.
YOL1ngberg, 56 Phil. 234 [1931].); requiring license for the praclicv
of medicine (U.S. vs. Jesus Gomez, 31 Phil. 218 [1915]; Peopl VII,
Venluro, 4 SCRA 208 [1962].); providing for periodic insp 'Clio,,
o f t1L11·1:1ing schools and barring from admission to the nL11·,;1:11'
l' fl ni inati.on graduates of schools found to be sub-s tandard (Sond v11.
Abud Sa ntos Educational Ins titution, 58 S RA 33 r1974].); li111 l1i11n
1lw numb •r of ti.ckets that rnay be sold in lheutN H to avoid l1u 1
m11ch crowding W<-'Opk• v~. ' hon, 65 Phil. 611 1'19381,); pron101h111
111d 1\ •qtlidng l'lw 11H1 nf l'i"'wl'iv d r11g prod11 l'H undt•r l'lw C:l·1w1 IP1
1 1
t\1I (1)1•1 l<o1-1111•lo v11, llc 1111',/ t11 11 IH() !K'l{t\ 52'i I 19H9I,); dl111 dl11wl 111•,
11t1d1•11I w hn Ii 111 111 11111 1 f,d lnd Iii• • N1tlln1111I Mrn lh' ,I t\d111l111llr111 '1\••il
(NMt\'1') lu 1111 t• II 1111 1111 1 11 11 1111 1 llnw (1)11p 11•11111 111I 11f l\d111111i1111
t 1!1111 11 11111d Hp11it11 VII 111111I J111111, llltl NC'l<A I ·1:1I IIIH' II,); 11 11•,1tl11ti111•,
Sec.9 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 681
Inherent Powers of Government
B. Police Power
advertising materials on use of breastmilk substitutes, suppplements
and related products. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. vs.
Duque III, 535 SCRA 265 [2007].);
(2) Public morals. - Those punishing vagrancy and prostitution6
(U.S. vs. Gener Cruz, 38 Phil. 677 [1918].); regulating, taxing, or
otherwise dealing with gambling (Basco vs. Phil. Amusements &
Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 [1991].); prohibiting gambling
(People vs. Chan Hong, 65 Phil. 625 [1938]; U.S. vs. Pads, 31 Phil.
524 [1915); U.S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil. 1 [1913); U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo,
23 Phil. 610 [1912].); even games which are not technically gambling
where indulgence in such games is conducive to laziness and neglect
of daily duties (U.S. vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102 [1918).); providing a
license tax for maintenance or operation of public dance halls (U.S.
vs. Rodriguez, 138 Phil. 759 [1918); Lapera vs. Vicente, 5 SCRA 549
[1962); Sarmiento vs. Belderal, 2 SCRA 477 [1961].); punishing usury
(U.S. vs. Constantino, 39 Phil. 553 [1919].); regulating the operation
of motels and hotels (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Ass'n.
vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967].); licensing cockpits
(U.S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1 [1912]. ); prohibiting the operation of pinball
machines (Uy Ha vs. The City°Mayor, 108 Phil. 400 [1960]; Miranda
vs. City of Manila, 2 SCRA 613 [1961).); prohibiting barbershop
operators from rendering massage service to their customers
(Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 [1983].); punishing graft and
corruption (Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 [1968].); phasing out of
commercial blood banks (Beltran vs. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA
168 [2005].),
(3) Public safety. - Those providing for the closure of certain
streets to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles (calesas) (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726 [1940).); requiring compulsory military service
(People vs. Lagman, 66 Phil. 13 [1938].); prohibiting the carrying of
oncca led deadly weapons (U.S. vs. Villareal, 28 Phil. 390 [1914].);
outhod zing the demolition of buildings or improvements which
c:onHli tutc a public nuisance (see Iloilo vs. Ice and Cold Storage vs.
Municipa l 'ouncil, 24 Phil. 471 [1913]; Salao vs. Santos, 67 Phil. 549
I 19J9 1; I' Ioli Ii vr;. Lacson, 98 Phil. 772 [1950].); regulating building
0111-111•11r l it) n 1-1 ( ·u-Unjicng vs. Pats tone, 42 Phil. 818 [1922]; Fabie
0
(
v 1. C'lly or M 1111111, 21 l'hil. '186 1'19'121; Aastida vs. City Council of
- ,, ,, ,, 111,w,,v,11 I( A Nn 111 1',14 ,1;,1n11dlo111 A1 lh h1 II' 111 Iii,, l(1 •vl111•d 1'1111,11 ( '11\11•
682 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.9
Principles and Cases
Baguio, 53 Phil. 553 [1929].); requiring cars to be equipped with
early warning devices (EWD) (Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 894
[1979].); regulating distance between gasoline stations (Javier vs.
Earnshaw, 64 Phil. 626 [1937].); prohibiting the use of motorcycles,
bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles in toll
ways. (Mirasol vs. Dept. of Public Works and Highways, 490 SCRA
318 [2006].)
(4) General welfare and convenience. - Those requiring
coff1pulsory registration of lands under the torrens system (Director
of Lands vs. Abella, 54 Phil. 455 [1930].); authorizing the removal
of billboards offensive to sight (Churchill vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580
I !1)'15].); penalizing the turning loose of large cattle or permitting
I hem to run loose in streets and plazas of municipalities (U.S. vs.
Alex.1 nde1~ 8 Phil. 29 [1907].); regulating the slaughter for human
corn.;umption of large cattle still fit for agricultural work (U.S.
VH. To ribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910].); excluding foreign ships from the
l'Ot 1ntry's coastwise shipping trade (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad,
ti() l'hil. 136 [1919].); prescribing rules for the deportation of aliens
(( 'huo o Tiaco vs. Forbes, 40 Phil. 1122 [1913]; U.S. vs. Delos Santos,
:,:1 Phil. 397 [1916].); providing for zoning regulations (Seng Kee
t'<i. ( 'o. vs. Earnshaw, 56 Phil. 204 [1931]; People vs. Fajardo, 104
Phil 11/J.J 11958].); limiting the net profits realized by certain public
11tll ilil'H (Ala layan vs. National Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 172
I 1%8 1; M.i nila Electric Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 18 SCRA
(1 1-i l I 19661.); regula ting public m arke ts (Javellana vs. Kintana1~ 115
St 'l<A 627 !'1 982].); imposing price controls (People vs. Chu Chi, 92
l'hlI. 977 I'1953].); prohibiting certain forms of election propaganda
(ll11 dny, Jr. vs. Ferre t~ 35 SCRA 285 [1970].); providing for the
1'l'i'\IV1•1· of ill-gotten assets and stolen government propertle8
( l'( 'C:C: VH. N •porn uceno, 184 SCRA 449 [1990].); g ivin g b uria l
11111 IHl1llWl' lo qu alified bereaved fam ily .in the form of PS00.00 cash
11•ll1•f upon fulfillmen t o f certa in requirem ents (Binay v s. Dorn ingo,
' 0 I ~i( 'l<A SOH 1·199·1].); d ecla ring EH1 .11\!.t as on,mcrcia l :z<.m1}
(l't1l 1dl11hug VH. ·ourt of Appea l!'!, 229 S 'Rt\. Sr::4 1''1994,1.); l'cgulollng
p11hllc 11o lld l,Hlu11 of Cp11lrib ulion:-1 ( \ ' 11l(•no V H, Vl llnlon-Po r•nlllrl/4,
'J It, HC ' I{ /\ IW I l <J1M I.); lmpo11i1111, trp(m priv 11 ~, ('HLohli1,hml•n lH Hw
l111n l1 •11 ol p 11•11 111 1h11lt ll:tlng 111',o v1•1•1111ic•111 p 1•og1•,1111 (20% dll'l t'ot1111
1•,l v1•11 111 11111 1 l111H1"I 111 •1t•11 hll' l'l ll:t.111111) lo p1•1111101t• llw lw 11111 n1d
w,,111111• 11111 1111111 l1 tl r1111111 11111lll:,111111 (111•11101• l'l tl:1.1•1111 111111111• IV\ Nil,
11 11,,1) ((',11 l,111 :111p1 •1 rl111 n 1'1111, v, I ,~:wI >, 1t'1 , H<'H/\ 1,101· 00•11;
Sec. 9 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 683
Inherent Powers of Government
B. Police Power
Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of DSWD, 711 SCRA 302
[2013].),
\
The State, however, would be acting beyond the bounds of police
power in totally prohibiting mall owners/ operators from collecting
parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities.
Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of private
property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity
to do so for the purpose of protecting peace and order or promoting
the general welfare. (Office of the Solicitor General vs. Ayala Land,
Inc., 600 SCRA 617 [2009].) Neither may the State, under the guise
of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance
of the community. (Fernando vs. St. Scholastica College, 693 SCRA
14 [2013].)
Observance of constitutional guarantees.
(1) Exercise involves restriction or constitutional rights. - The
exercise of police power involves restriction, restriction being
implicit in the power itself.. Thus, the test of constitutionality of
a police power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the
restriction imposed on constitutional rights is reasonable and not
whe ther it imposes a restriction on those rights. The means by
which the government chooses to act is reasonable - reason, not
scientific exactitude is the measure of the validity of the government
regulation. The use of reason in this sense is simply to guard against
orbitrary and capricious government action. (Mirasol vs. Dept. of
Public Works and Highways, 490 SCRA 318 [2006].)
(2) Police power co-exists with constitutional guarantees. - There is
no conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process
und equal protection of the laws. Any conflict is more apparent than
1·tn l. l'roped y rela ted, the power and the guarantees are supposed
to co-c.:xiHt. The balancing is the essence or the indispensible means
fo r lb , ultoinn1ent o f legitima te aspirations of any democratic
111H'h'ty. 'l'hc.•rc• con be no absolute powe1~ whoever exercises it, for
ti, 11 would lw ty rnnny. Y, t thC'l'c can neither be absolute liberty, for
11 1111 w1>1tld nw:111 ll r ('111il ' und a norchy. (rcho ng vs. Hernandez, 101
1'1111, I l'i'i I 11m,1.)
(,I) :;1,111t/111 r/ /01 11,1/1rl 1· 11•11 /•It' 1111011w1•, Sn I IHI SI111( • n111y d t•privc
IH 'I Ill I I I' I 11 I 111 I ., III H. I Iy, 111' I' II I III ' " y 111 0 VId 11d I III I II I IH d I II ' 11 l'(}('V ltl
684 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 9 Sec.9 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 685
Principles and Cases Inherent Powers of Government
B. Police Power

of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test 1. Law prohibits slaughter of carabaos for human consumption
or standard as always is reason. Police power legislation must be without a permit. ,
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable Facts: The law, Act No. 1147, an act regulating the registration,
relation must exist between purposes of the police power measure branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a
and the means employed for their accomplishment, for even, under deprivation of property without due process. It was shown that
the guise of protecting the public interest, private rights will not plaintiff slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human
be permitted to be invaded. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, supra; Ermita- consumption his carabao without the required permit from the
Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Ass'n. vs. City Mayor of Manila, municipal treasurer.
supra; City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308 [200].) Issue: The issue is whether the questioned law is a valid exercise
(4) Concurrence of a lawful object and a lawful method. - Police of police power.
power is validly exercised if the interests of the public generally, Held: (1) Purpose of the law. - "The law is a valid police measure
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then
interference of the State and the means employed are reasonably badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in
an acute decline in agriculture output, which, in turn, had caused
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the
an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the
proper exercise of police power requires the concurrence of a lawful animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling
subject or object and a lawful method of accomplishing the goal.7 had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for
(Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego, 180 the registration and branding of these animals."
SCRA 533 [1989]; National Development Company vs. Philippine (2) Law is required by the interest of the public generally. - "To
Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA257 [1990]; see Chavez vs. Commission on justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
Elections, 437 SCRA 415 [2004].) public, it must appear, first, that the interest of the public generally,
The test merely reiterates the presence of the constitutional as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
g uarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non- interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary
impairment of property rights. (Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534 for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals x x x.
[2004].)
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment
(5) Exercise subject to judicial review. - In view of the requirements of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required
of due process, equal protection, and other constitutional guarantees, by 'the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the Ji fe, liberty, of o porticular class' and that the prohibition of the slaughter of
o r property of any person is always subject to judicial inquiry. The ('OrnbnoH for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit
legisla tive d e termination of what is a proper exercise of its polic' for ogri LI I l LI rnl work or draft purposes was a' reasonably necessary'
power is not final or conclusive but is subject to review by the courtH. llrnilntion on private ownership, to protect the community from
(U.S. vR. Teodoro, 15 Phil. 85 1'1.910).) Th e prcHumption, how •vc,~ I:, I hl' lo11tt of th • services of such animals by their slaughter by
in favor of ilH vn lidil y. lni pnwldl'nt own ' l'fl, tempted either by greed of momentary gain,
or hy I dl•t-111'1,' Lo <.'n joy tlw luxury o f animal food, even when by so
d11l11H thl' prc1d111•tlw powt•r 1)f l'lw ommunity may be measurably
1111d d 11innr•11111ily 11ff1•1'hKI." (tl11it, 1rl S/n/1•11 vs. '/bri/Jio, :£5 Phil. 85
1
M111 1ll11M11111111h1ll',ul 11 11 VII '1111111,11 y 11f l lh Wll, ('/ ll '1l l<A IOJ IJOll l, 11111111 / I 11/ () /, l /111111,~/1 j 1111 / /1 •1• <',11 1w 11 .)
Iii' I •~•ti 1111,I / Ir I 11!11 /1 Piiil l111•l111 I 11111!11111111111111 I t1W1 l'1 1rn lt•h ·1 111111 l 1111•~, 1/111 I, !ii
I' ll% l 111' 1
 I I
1'1 IIJ ll ' l ' I N I( l I IN/ 11I I ll 111 )N~ I , 1,/\W i\,lt !'. lU. tHLL 0 11 lUGHfS 687
• Vdnclplc11 nnd 1
0!ll 19 Inherent Powers of Government
B. Police Power

2. Issue:.The provisi~ns of the statute are impugned as an invalid

;;a,r,mmlirrm.1
UiJ!,!&biLJ . . .. •. .! .~, . .'
,'t . exercise 'l_f police power.
Facts: The law, Exec. Order No. 620-A., imposes .an,,absolute
ban, not on the.sl,aH,SD~er 9fth~p1r~b.~P:f1,.,l:>1.1\?n !heirir}ovement.
The origina! ~e~s~reJ~.q: ~9- ,?2~.), ba-J}~,tpe,sl~\lg?te;.of_ \:a~a9~os
except un~er 'c;:er~alll C(?nd1hc:m~, to pre~e11n~e md1~s;~a~t}.<lll-
ing.of cat:<).Paqi\ i~ view_of the increase~ d_eperidence of om: farms
on these traditional be.asts of burden. . . . ' .. ,., .
Issue:!~ Exec: ii~.
620-A, a ,v,~ id exe;d;~·ofp,oJi~ip,Q~e~?
f!eld: N,q. ,( l } ~ & i -
- · - "While ?cM&a£fcifafttte
?n:tenahfrirneas~r,e,has tl:\e
~awful s.ubject as the original executive order, .we c,annot say
with equal certainty that it complies ·with the second .r~q~}rement,
· viz., that 'there be a lawful method. We nofo that to sti~_ng_then
the original measur,e, Exec. Order No. 62_6-A imposes ·an·absolute
ban not on the slaug~ter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that 'no cara:bao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall d question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalhng that the
from one province to another. ·
rfhe ·
(2)
"Even if a reasonable relation etween e means and the ep.d were
to be assumed, we wouid still have to reckon with the sanction that
the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef, hein& trans.ported,
to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police
only. In U.S. vs. Toribio (supra.), the statu~e was sustaineq because
the penalty was fine only. The challenged ml:!asure is an invalid
exercise of P?lice po_w er because the
ermediate _Appellate
, t rough Justice Cruz.)
Law re uires t h e ~ ~ l ' l
. a::a:w:l~ c e of a
certificate o e igibility for admission into medical schools.
Facts: The requirement (among others) is presc1%ed by R.A.
No. 2382 (as amended by R.A. Nos. 4224 and 5946.), otherwise
known os the "Medlen! Act of 1959."
Held: (1) ... ...
.•·.n·.- •. . ~ "T ·e ppf~ce power, it is ~ommo:hp~ace learning, is . e
mt•·-
pervasive.a nd n0n-~a1vable power and authority of the sovere.1gn
· tp secure and:pro_mote all the important interests and ne~ds - m a
word, the ,public order - of the general eommunity. An unportant
c.omponeIJ,t of thatpublic order is the health and physical safety and
wellbeing of the population, the securing of which no one can deny
is a legitimate objectlve of governmental effort and regulation."
(2) .
"The only issue that needs s e
consr eratiotr1S w ef er t ere is some reasonable relation between
the prescribing 0£ passing the NMAT as a condition for admission
to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health
and ·safety of the general community, on the other ~and. This
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long
been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public.
That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,
legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises
·of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements - i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical school, for admission
to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state."
(3) . , - "What we have before
us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access
to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement
of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity
in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the requir~d
r Ill VII II ,JI 'J 'I N II I N U'!'U'l l N1AI.. LAW
Soc.. 9 Sec. 9
P1foclples and Cases.
degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice.
The need to maintain,. and the difficulties'bfmaintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in ·general, c\nd medical
schools in pai:ticular, in the currentstage ofotirsocial and economic
development, ar~ widely known. We believe ·th:a.t the government
is entitled to prescribe an admission test .like .the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of 'upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical· schools;. and· of 'irriprov[ing] the
quality of medical education in the cdrmhy.' (Tabiarin-vs: Gutierrez,
152 SCRA 7$0 [1987}, through Justice Feliciano; se~ also'Qepartment of
Education, Culture and Sports ys. San Diego/ 180 St:J.t<\' 5·3~ [1989],
wherethe · · · ... · ·
·.,-. , but th'eyshoiild e
Facts: The law, Pres. Decree No. 1808, alsq· directs the
reconveyance of the same to the government_.up_on payment of
just compensation and the disposal of the lots to qualified bona fide
occupants and other sqiAatter families.
Issue: ls the law a valid exercise by the State ofits police power?
Held:Yes. (~
objective of.thedeci:ih:n,~ resove;;l: .-"The.stated
~tenure problem
in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the
comprehensive development plans for this depressed community,
provides the justification for the exercise of the police power of the
State. The police power of the State has been described as 'the most
essential, insistent and illimitable of powers.' (Smith, Bell & Co: vs.
National, 40 Phil. 136; Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660
[1919}.) It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, 'suitably vague
and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the·government limitations
to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measureto ensure communal peace,
safety, good order and welfare." (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481
[1979).)
'
A'.R'f! 'Q:1. BILL OF RIGHTS 689
Inherent Powers of Government
B. Police Power
~
::;:;-
'(2) ~ jedion-
raised- --
by petitioners that- -
Presidential
,15Tcree.N.'o. 180~\~pairs the ebligations -of contract [see S~c. 101 is
-wtth9µt m~rit..~tl;te,co!lstitutioaal guaranty of noa-impakment of
.. 0,hligations· oLcqnfr~ct is, Hmit~d by and subject to the exercise of
·the police·power pJthe. State in the interest of public health, safety;
!_tl.or~Jsan.ci gen~fa,t\velfare. (Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
Yi:uo~i59_SCI\A.$~ [i974].) ·
, F~~ the sa111~ re~son, petitioners ,can not complain that they
.are 1,->eing depr}v;ec\.,9! their property without. d;ue process of law.I'
,.([fa_biliJtg v~. !'l_affon,_al, Jfousing Au*~rity, 156 SCRA 6?3 [19871,
th'.,ougli
.... ' , .
Justice' ,Ypp,) .. , •; . ·.
·· •,.. . ...
·
· · 5. Ordinance liif1'3 any pe';son, gr~u~ of persons, entihJ ~r
·corpdration engageJJ#dsmess of selling admission tickets to ant movie
orother public"l!Xhibitions, · ames, or contes
s nded for adults
·. Fqcts: Th·e petitioners assail the ordinance as unreasonable and
not justifiM 'PY any necessity for the' public interest.
. . .. .' r, ·• . . .
. Issue: Is th,e oi:dinance a valid exercise of police power?
_Held: N~. (11 M a i M W W . ,
· - "Inthisjurisdiction, it i~ already settled
at 1 of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
public exhibitiomtre subject to regulation by the municipal council
in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government.
Thus, in People vs, Chan (65 Phil. 611 (1938].), an orciinance of the
City of Manila prohibiting first run cinernatog-r.apns from selling
tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional
for being a valid.exercise of police power.
Still irt another case (Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City,
.60 SCRA 267 (1974].), the validity of an ordinance of the City
of Bacolod prohibiting admission of tw<? or m0re persons in
moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only one
ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police measure not only
in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are
concerned but also in accordance with public h ealth, public safety,
-and the.general welfare."
1
invo~l- ~that i~
 ~!HLll'l-'lNU CON SlYL',Ujq~l,\)'.().~ LAW
Principl~s and Cases t'· ., ,-. , Inherent Powers of Government
. i;nt.~ rest of the public ge1:e:r_aUy.r~g;u~es aajflt~x~~'~en1ce with private
rights, but the ll)eans adopted. mus.t be. tEl~;l.Qt\a\;ly nec;1es$a.ry for
the accomplishme.nt of the purpose .and·:m:Otd:roduly oppr.essive
upon individuals. The legislature may Ro.t,. ;under the· guise of
protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private
business, or •impose·unusual and unnecessary restrictio.lils upon
lawful occupations, In other words, the determination as to what is
a proper exercise of its police power is notJinal or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the courts.''.
(3) Ordinance is not justified by any necessftyfor the public interest.
--:- "The police power legislation must be firrrily grounde4 on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to
help ease the burden of cost on the pa.rt of P.arents who have to shell
out the same amount of money for tne ~dmission of their children,
as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission
would mean corresponding savings for the :parents; however, the
petitioners .are the ones made to bear the cost of. these savings. The
ordinance does not only make petitioners suffer the loss of earnings
but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it.
Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in
its implementation because as already e~perienced by petitioners
since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of
age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to a~ail
qf the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide
a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the
respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be
exhibited by moviehouse patrons to prove the age of children. This
is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is
clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners. Moreover,
(4) , , I ,. " , . . ,, , : ;t, -
"There are a number· of cases decided by the Supreme ourt and
the various state courts of the United States which upheld the right
of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket
as against the right of the state to interfere in this regard and which
we consider applicable to the case at bar.
Sec..9, Sec. 9 ART: III. BILL OF RIGHTS 691
13. Police Power
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license,
-rev.0ca0le at the •wi:11:of the, proprietor of the theater or it may be
'· ew:id1?p.ce 'of a cont11act,w,l,1ereby. for a valuable consideration, the
purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe
,th1r :performatiee',on conditit;>n that he behaves properly. Such
ticket, therefore, represents a right, positive or conditional, as the
, . case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale.
/.
This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents
that right is also, necessarily. a species of property. As such, the
owner thereof, in tl).e absence of any condition to the contrary in the
contract by which h~ obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it,
to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain, So
that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places
of amusement at more tha:n the regular price was held invalid as
conflicting with the constitutional right of property."
, t at is,
e regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions
cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with
' the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or
calling may not1 under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and
operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate
and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be
sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as
such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the
· proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in
their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for
their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve
could stay away."
(6)
n 1 o
argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
the ordinance. This may be the rule but it has already been held
that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity
or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must
nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness
 I I J J
(Jl/2 J.'lJlLJ l't 1lN .Li '(JN S'ffl'U:l'IQN'AL LAW Sec. 9
Principles and Cases ·...·:· .
appears on the face of the ordinance-itself.o.r.isestabli'shed by proper
evidence. .
Ordittante No. ·640 clearly imta:de§•:frte' p~r's onal aridJ>tb~erty
rights·of petitioriets for even-if we -c6tita. ~sMm:fu' tll.at; ·6n its 'face,
the interference was reasonable; from'.the,fo:regoing consfdera'tions,
it has been fully showrt that it is an· UJ1.War:l'ant_e d ·and. unlawful
curtailment of the property and personal l'.ight_s of d~ens. For
being unreasonable and· an undue restr'a,i,rit of trade~ it cannot,
under the guise of exercising police power, be··upheld ·as v~lid."
(Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte; 163 $CR/2 182 [1988], through
Justice Gancayco.) ·
Gutierrez, J., 'con~urring:
. - "There 1s
a so u e y no pretense t at the munidpal .or mance is intended
to protect children, enhance their morals; promote their health,
safeguard their safety, improve their education, or otherwise
promote the general welfare. In fact, the effes:t of the ordinance may
be the opposite. With the price of movie tickets suddenly within
the reach of many children, they may neglect their studies or use
money intended for food or school supplies tb enter moviehouses.
~ovie owners who are compelled to accept'half prices for anewly
mcreased group of young patrons will be tempted to'. allow them to
enter moviehouses indiscriminately, including those where scenes
of violence, crime, or even sex are portrayed. Addiction of the
young to movie going is definitely injurious to their health.
The avowed purpose of the ordinan~e -,-t~ ~ase the.burden of
costs for parents who have to shell out _the same amount of money
for the admission of their children as they would for themselves-is
not covered by police power. If the city Cfil1llOt compel refreshment
parlors to charge half-prices for hamburgers, soft drinks, 'pizzas, or
cak~s c.01:sum~d by children by what authority can it impose the
obligation of similarly easing parents' burdens upon the owners of
rnoviehouses?" ·
I l l
Sec. 9 ART, III. BILL OF RIGHTS 693
Inherent._Powers of Government
B. Police Power
6. W i i i l l l i W -·
Facts;]he law/ B·."P. Blg. 22, punishes a person "who makes or
draws·and issues· -~ny check on account or for value, kno"vving at
the tint~ of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
. drawee bank for.. _insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored!for the same reason had not the drawer without
any valid reason,. ordered.the bank to stop payment."
Issue: Is the law a valid exercise of police power?
Held: Yes. (1) ~~- "The
enactment of B.P. mg!lfsTct~laTation by the legislature that, as
a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of <\,.worthless
check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition
of penal sanctions.
Ifi
It is su c1ent at a reasonable nexus exists between means and
end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the
adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public
concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that
the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200
million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the
Central Bank, it averaged be.t ween 50 million to 80 million pesos a
day.''
(2) t. - "The effects
of the issuance o a wo e private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As
aptly stated:
 I I
Sec.9
139'.I . PllILH'fiNLl CONSTn'tTTIONAL LAW See2. 9
Principles and Cases
C.J., con.curring in State<vs.'. Yarboro; MO :S'.E,-i16i{1927J.)
(3) Courts should consider existing cond{tions and the lauf involved.
- "This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence
obtaining in the various states . of the United States on the
constitutionality of the 'worthless check' acts. It is needless to warn
that foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant caution. A
caveat to be observed is that substantial differences exist between
our statute and the worthless checkacts of those states where the
jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to remember is that B.P.
Blg. 22 was not lifted bodily from any exis~ing statute. Furthermore,
we have to consider. tha · · e
11!.Jite. - "It
Facts: T_h e objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be
abl~ to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the
business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659, as amended
by Ordinance No. 4767, an entirely different measure than the
ordinance regulating the business of barbershops, and (2) in order
to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of ,c ustomers."
t
Issue: Is the ordinance a valid exercise of police power?
Held: Yes.
"This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on
the general welfare clause.. As far back as U.S. vs. Salav.eria (39 Phil.
102.), a 1918 decision, this Cpurt, thxough Justice Malc~lm, made
clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which'delegates
in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above
stated, this clause has been -given wide application by municipal
authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances
1
• AR.IT: LII. BILL OF RIGHTS 695
Inherent Powers of Government
B. P6Jice Power
of the case,been.fiberally constiued'.by.the courts. Such, it is well
--,it
to recall, is ~e pr.o_gres~ive view ofPhiJrin-.nce.
has-continued-to.bP 3..4,, . · "-'54]&
As. it
.. , · , - -(Velasco vs. Villegas,
120 SCRA 568 '[19831, through· Chief justice Fernando.)
8.
Facts: The law, Pres. Decree No. 20, amends certain provisions
of R.A. No. 6359 entitled, "An Act to regulate rentals for two years
of dwelling units or of land on which another's dwelling is located
and penalizing violations thereof and for other urposes." The
law suspends -paragraph 1 of Article 1673
Held:
~-Jlii-
Issue: Is the law, Pres. Decree No. 20, amending R.A. No. 6359,
a valid police power measure?
c-i:
Yes ...
stigmatized as class legislation. There w~s
a clear need for such a statute. It was enacted to promote the pubhc
interest and the-general welfare.
s. Oi:iJy recently, in Agustin vs. Edu (88 SCRA 195
. , erence w:as made to the 'broad and expansive scope of
police power' citing Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme
Court in an 1847 decision as 'nothing more or less than the powers
of government inherent in every sovereignty.' Correctly, it was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as 'that most essential, insistent,
. and illimitable of powers." (Melchor, Jr; vs. Moya, 121 SCRA 1 [19831,
through Chief Justice Fernando.)
Facts: Petitioners argue that the taking of respondent's property
is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land
is taken for public use as it is intended for the burial of paupers. On
the other hand, respondent, in effect, contends that th_e questioned
ordinance confiscat~s its property without just compensation.
Issue: Is the ordinance a valid exercise of police power?
Held: ~ ~ A s a rule, the courts
resol"'.e e v - ; ; . ~ ~ ~ ~ v a l i d i t y and, more so, where
t 1 1 I J 1 I
AJ~'Jl" l,11, 131L.L O F RIGHTS 6!)'7.
p 1111.11,1 J;11NH •oN~'11l~lllJJ11J, .N!f\L LAW Inherent Powers of Government
Principles and Cases :.· · · : B. Police Power
_., _ , Jss~~:,_ )~. ,r~lip.p,qe on pG,ijce pow~r .sufficient to justify the
the municipal corporation,asserts thc,lt',th¢:,@rdin~ce was enacted
;, ,,ena9t,m~11t19,f,~ ~''!&~m~li\~~t ,' . . ' .· .
to promote the comm:o n :good and gene!!al'. welfare. (see Ermita-
Malate Hotel & Motel Op.e rators Ass'-n., Jnc.;. vs ..-City ,Mayor ,o f (1) ' · , -. ,. . . - "Police power is
Manila, 2.0 scRA:8.4~); [19.67);-.Case ¥s.;_'.B9.ar4:;oHiea1th,,24sBhil. 250 gtahfed't6 · - dpal' corpor~tions' m·general terms as follows:
' ' . ... /:? •. ~
[1913].) · • , ·t' '' ·
. _,, , ... e m_µ nicipal counc1 s a · enact
(1) No reasonable relation exi~ts betwei1J. m_ef~oq and -~nd. - "There or manc~s ~a·~ake such regulations, not repugnant to law,
is no reasonabfe relatiori between the setting ·asi:a:e·of at least 6% of
the total area of all private cemeteries £cir· charity burial grounds
as m~y ?e
i\e'c~s~ary' to c_a rry info _effect and discharge the
_powefs and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall
1
of deceased paupers and the promotion· o_f health, morals, good · seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people, The ordinance promote the··prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
is actually, · order, comfor_t; ·and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants th~reof, and for the protection of property therein.'
. . U l
c1 ~s ~-e burden to private It is practicall a re roduction of the former Section 39 of the
· · · virtue thereof, according
. The t ~in . '
questione mance· is diffei:ent from laws and re~lations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set a.side certainareas for streets,
parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities-from the land they
, ·. ; ·.•
sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The nec!;lssities- of public safety, ( . '

health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the developmef!t.of communities with
salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by .the subdivision developer
when individual lots are sold to homeowners.''
(2) - "As a matter of
fact, the pe _ .. . o e y on e ·ge11-:era ,-welfare clause or on
implied power~ of th~ municipal corpoi;atip~(_ not on any express
provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The
c;l~n1se has a,lways receive.cl brqad ~~? ¼l?~~~l ,.ipterpretatiqn but we
. carin6t stretch it to cover this pa:rticulcµ-,takii:i,g." (City Govermnen_
t of
;s.
Quezon City Ericia, 122 SCRA 759 [1983]/ t~roughJustice Gutier~ez,
Jr.)
Facts: It is contended that the ordinance is tainted with nullity,
the municipality being devoid of powe,r to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling.
the power· 't o legislate
u its exercise and ·the detail of
such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant
thereto must -be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
.pronmmced invalid.
s
"1£ night dubs were mere y · · en re
a e an not
pro ibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. 1ri the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had
stressed rea~onableness,. consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as 'well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping
exercise of a iawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
and desirable end c;an be attained by a measure that1. does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly, the ordinance qp its face is
characterized b overb
 1'1111 ,lfll'I NI\ ' N !l l 111 W I'll N\f'I), LAW
Prlnclplcs nncl G:tiscs'' I I l ' I II
It is clear that in the ga-ise·of a'; o'lice·i:egu.Iat_it:h1.; tli.ere\wasin this
instance .· . S)l)'e-~ ·0 nal in
the case o ose ip. \L _.11 tta s,.~·_e~g0l.\S :g£w~~(j)ni,~iQg~th:-q_~e ni~ht
clubs and proper.t y in ~e,r~~; o£*~~v.;~_s1:p.1.~pJ~-11:\~8-~.flf\~l~~l,~pes .
to be earned by those therein employed./l(De !a Cruz v.s. ~aras,123
SCRA 569 [1983},,fhrougb. Chief,J,µstice Ferrwndq.) · -. . ··
·..,. .... ,. ·>< ~- . :· . 1t _., r, :,...:
a~t. a_an... . . . .. . . . . . of, the Coni,tif;ution. The requirement that the enactment must
Facts!. Th_e city ,ord.inanc~ in.que.sti9~--pioyj9-"~~ ~iit:.no.jperson,
· p_artri.ers};u,p, cqrpor1:1tion or entity shall,· w :ffif.Er,,ro:iJ_a:M~lafe area
,boµpded b,y Teodoro,M. ,Kala~-S!,'., ~tree\:in~U}~ NorJ;l;l:,. -J~ft Avem!e
in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard m
the West, pursuant- to P.D. No. 1:99 ..be a.11"<?~ ~ --or a~thorized !o
· contract and engage in,,any business pr.o.v:iding ·.certairi-.fotms of
,--- . D8
sta . ".as· ,u not limited -to: 1.
1 broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional
c}~a Parlors; 2. Massag~ Parlors; 3. K~;ao~e ,Bars; 4.. B~e;hoµ~es;
5. Night Clµbs; 6. Day .Clut,s; 7. Super 9ub,s; 08. D~scotheques; 9.
Cabarets; 10, Dance Halls; 11. Mo,te)s; 12. ~nnfi.".. ·
Owners and/ or operations of establishments engaged in, or
devoted to, the business enumerated are "given three (3,} months
from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind
up business operations or to transfer to a1'.y place ou,tsiqe of the
•famit.a -Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area. x x x:11' ~ · · '· ·· ·
Piivate respondent MTDC, a J oipqrat).~11 .~ng~g~d it:1 the
busines~ of operating 4otels, hostels_~4 lodging .~ouses, p _r,ayed
that the ordinance insofar as it includes m_otels and inns among its
prohibited establishments be declared invalid.a nd unconstitutional.
Issue: Is the ordinance invalid and unconstitutional?
"[They] are well established. A
long eld that for ah 'otdinance to be valid,
Sec.- 9 " '.AR"il 1<11. BILL 0 1~ !UGI-ITS 699
Inherent Powers of Government
B. Police Power
.. tt .mµst not cml-y;,be, within -the corporate powers of the local
, 'r"government :uni~·'.to.renact and must be passed according to the
•. j
•proeedw:e pi;esml;>~d by law, it must also conform to the following
-,~--
·, •·su~stantive,i:e:qu-:iliiemehts; ,(1,
('.2) .'. - "That ordinances
should be constitµtj:onal uphold the principle of the supremacy
rtot vi~late :exJ~tkg ·law glves stress ·to the precept that local
gov,et:l;llllerit units. are able to legislate only by virtue of their
derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from
the national legis1afure. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter." x x x
, The Ordiruu:ree was assed by th
. x x x The police power of the City Council, owever
' limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise
"'
I
j
; must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the
enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated
power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws."
(3)
"The police power granted to local government units must always
be exercised with
. Such power cannot
be ·e 1 un,,,,,"•"u:), espotically as its exercise
'is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by
the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. Due process requires _the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his
life, liberty and property."
(4) - '~he
problen:t, it needs to be pointed oit,lsnofeesfr1sment, which
by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the health or comfort

' '/()() ] 1 1JLLJJ ' JII NH 'U N S'J'L'J'U' l.'l NV\,) , l.,A W
Pri11Ciples and Cases . .. ,. ,
of the community and whicil in.itself is.amoral,, butth~ deplorable
human activity that may occur :withinit~;,p~~P:1:i~e~.While. a ;motel
may be used as a venue for immQr:al-sE::xua~.•activity, it cannot for
that reason alonebe punished. It.c ~otbedassµied as,a.hp.u se of
ill-repute or as a nuisance p.e11 s~- ort.at i;ne.r-e, .1ik~lil;lo&d;·.0r1:~ ••:naked
f the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses, An
assumption. If that W:l:!te so· and _if th4-t,:W.~/:'E;?,,ci,llowed,' ;then the
Ermita-Malate.:area.would hat,01;1ly P.El·Pl:1,if,8,~.9:~o~ i.tsts11ppos~4.s0'cial
ills, it would be extinguished of its ~oJ\l:l;<:1,~•,.~ e~t:.a.t?~:J~~~ry:;h~an
activity, reprehensibJe; or not, in its· e.v:efy41gpk~ru;td (cr~n:il>; would
be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities,"
-.. , . ·. : '
(5) ~While
petitioners earnestn.~ss at curbing c ear y o J~ctiqna e. abC"iaHlls is
commendable; they unwittingly punish even·the proprietots ·and
operators of "wholesome," "innocent"es~~~l\s~ents:Jn'theinstant
case, there is aclear invasion of personal or prppe:r:ty rights,. personal
in the case of those individuals desirouS' of o~nirtg, operating and
.... p~tron,izip.g tlwse ~otels and prqper;ty,.i,n;te.q,1-w, p(:th~ investments
, .. ..~a.d e and,the .salad.es-to be p ,qip to :th,q~~ thrrf_iII: ;~:tnBlQ.y~~<;t,Jf the
1<:;ity of Man,ila sq d.esii:e.s-to .p.u t aq ~ri.4:lo-,p ro.sf,j.tutlqg~ tP!t,i:i.c;l;l-tiqn
.;mc,i other social ills, it can instead impose. ,:reaspnal11~.:regulations
. such as daily inspections of th.e establis~en.,ts for al;'i.y_ yiplation
of the conditions of.their licenses or p~pp.its;jtro,ay e)J;erdse its
authority to suspenc:I. pr revoke their lice:r;l.Ses for these violations;
ar1d it ma .e ose increased lie fees. In oth r words,
~ ,,
l;l}it..5\f,
· "TheOrdinance
• q..i~\11lows.: . e qperatjon of sauna parlors, p:ia,s sage -pado:r:s;:karaoke
bars, beerhouses, nightclubs, day .clubs, super,<i=h~bs,..di~9ofueques,
cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Errnita-Malate a_rea.
In Section 3 thereof, owners and/ or operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval
of the Ordin(l.nce within which 'to wind up business operations or
to transfer to any place outside the Erm.ita~Malate area or convert
said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area.' Further, it states in Section 4 that 'i n cases of subsequent
violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the ' premises of the
erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permailently."'
·. - "In addition, the
I U l
S0c. S> ART. Ill. BILL 0
'
11 R1Gl
lTS 701
Inherent Powers of Government
B. Police Power
Section 1 thereoffotbids the running of the enumerated businesses
in the Ermit~Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/
op~rators to wind up business operations or to trans{er outside
ordinance which .permanently restricts the use of property that it
can not'be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation
~-k--
and must be retognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation: It is intrusive and violativ.e of the private property
rights of individuals."
(8) "Further, the
Otdinan::iriio \ ; up any standard to guide or limit the
' ' petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion
\rested ih thetn;' It provides no definition of the establishments
covered by it· and it fails to set forth the conditions when the
establishments·come w· · · s ambit of rohibition.
0
rdinances such as this, which make
poss1. e abuses in .its execution, depending upon no conditions
or qu<!lificatlons 'whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary
will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is
to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be
secured. · ·-
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property
must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and
conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit
of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled
discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions."
(9) , ·. - "The
Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as e a er merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit,
the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. x x x Clearly,
with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments,
. the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto
is to regulate them to romote the eneral welfare,
ity of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308 [2005},
through Justice Tinga.)
'lOZ LJl IJ L.ll't'JN I! '(JNt 'l'l'l 'U'11 Ni\1L I ,AW
Principles nnd Cas,es· · ~.
Other rulings .on police ·p_
ower. ·.
(1) Franchise being merely a privilege _e:rp.'anating fro.m the
State's sovereign power is subject to regulation by the State itself
by virtue of its police power, (Radio Conununi~ations of the Phils.,
Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission~ 1so· SCR.A 450
[1987],) .. · •. '·
, • :1
(2) Police power · cannot be surrendered· or bargained away
through the medium of a contract. In fact every :contract affecting
the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an
implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing
legal order, The impairment clause is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power. (Villanueva ys. Castaneda, Jr., 154 SCRA
142 [1987]; see Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v~. Lazaso, 124 SCRA
494 _[1983]; Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [19~3])
(3) The Social SecurihJ Law was ena~~eci·purf,µant to the "policy
of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually,
and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the
needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide
protection to employees against the hazards of disability, sickness,
old age and death." (Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1161, as amended.) Such
enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords
protection to labor; especially to working women and minors, and is
in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the "promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people."
Being in fact a social legislation, comp~tible with . the_policy
of the Church to ameliorate the living ~onditioil.s of the working
class, the extent of its provisions cannot be arbitrarily delimited to
relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture. It
includes within its coverage the charitable and religious institutions .
and organizations. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social
Security Commission, 1 SCRA 10' [1961].) · ·
(4) The implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (R.A. No. 6657.) is an exercise of the State's police power
and the power of eminent domain - to the· extent that the law
prescribes retention limits to the landowners there is an exercise
of police power for the regulation of private \,roperty, but where,
to carry out such regulation the owners are deprived of the lands
/t, JU', Ill, llll.l , U JI H I ;111 !
Inherent Powers of Government
· B. Police Power
they own in excess of ·t he maximum are.a allowed, there is also ~
ta,king under -the p_o wer of eminent domain. Hence, compensation
should be given t\) U,.e land-owner prior to the taking. RA. No. 6657
(Sec. 16 [e] the~~o!,)_requit:es the Department of Agrarian Reform to
take immediate possession only after full payment. The exercise of
this power r~quires that due process be observed in the taking of
private property. (Rox.as & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA
106 [1999]; Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corp. vs. Dela Cruz,
739 SCRA 229 (2014].)
(5) While as. a measure of_self-protection if in the interest of
the general welfare, police power may be exercised to protect
citizens and their business in financial and economic matters, it
may similarly be exercised to protect the government itself against
potential financial loss and the possible disruption of governmental
functions. "That the public interest and the general welfare are
suqserved by sequestrating purported ill-gotten assets and taking
,.
1 over stolen properties of the government channeled (by the past
regime) to dummy or front companies (or individuals) is stating the
obvious. The recovery of these ill-gotten assets would greatly aid our
financially crippled government filld hasten the country's economic
recovery, not to mention the fact that they rightfully belong to the
people." (PCGG vs. Nepomuceno, 184 SCRA 449 [1990].)
(6) When th~re is a reasortable relation to an object within the
governmental authority, the exercise of the legislative discretion is
not subject to judicial review. The scope of judicial inquiry in deciding
the question of power is not to be confused with the scope of legislative
c1;msiderations in dealing with the matter of policy. Whether the action
is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best rrteans to achieve the desired result, whether,
in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should
be exercised in a particular manner, are matters for the judgment
of the legislature and the earnest conflict of serious opinion does
not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance."
(Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549.)
(7) Where the property was not taken and devoted for public
use but was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e., the access fence, in
order to secure the general safety. and welfare of the motorists using
the North-Luzon Expressway (NLEX), the limited access imposed
 704 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.9 Sec.9 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 705
Principles and Cases Inherent Powers of Government
C. Power of Taxation

on the petitioner's property did not partake of a compensable Meaning of taxes.

taking due to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, there Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from persons
being a clear and valid exercise of police power. (Hermano Oil and property levied by the lawmaking body of the,State by virt11:e
Manufacturing & Sugar Corp. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, 742 SCRA of its sovereignty for the support of the government and all pubhc
:195 [2014].) needs. They are financial burdens or charges imposed by the
government upon persons or property to raise revenue for public
C. POWER OF TAXATION purpose or purposes.

Meaning of taxation. Distinctions among the three powers.

As a power, taxation is the power of the State to impose charge They are, among others, the following:
Pl' bllrden upon persons, property, or property rights, for the use (1) As to authority which exercises the power. - Taxation and police
1111<.I support of the government and to enable it to discharge its power are exercised only by the government, while the ex~r~ise
11ppropriate functions. 1 of the power of eminent domain may be granted to mumc1pal
corporations and public service companies;4
Theory and basis of taxation.
·(2) As to purpose. - In taxation, the property (generally in
(1) The power of taxation proceeds upon the theory that the the form of money) is taken for the support of the government; in
t•xh'ltence of government is a necessity, that it cannot continue eminent domain, for public use; and in police power, the property
wil'bout means to pay its expenses, and that for these means it has (usually noxious or is intended for a noxious purpose) is taken or
,1 right to compel all its citizens and property within its limits to destroyed for the purpose of promoting the general welfare;
conlribute.2
(3) As to effect. - In taxation, the money contributed becomes
·fr1xa tion is also necessary to enable the State to exercise its police part of public funds; in eminent domain, there is a transfer of the right
power in order to promote the general welfare.3 to property whether it be ownership or a lesser right; hence, there is
(2) The basis of taxation is found in the reciprocal duties of compensable taking; and in police power, there is no such transfer;
protc tion rind support between the State and its inhabitants. In at most there is a restraint in the injurious private use of property
l'l'llll'll for the citi zen's contribution for the support of the_govern- (see U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910]; People vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil.
nwn l, th ' State is supposed to make adequate and full compensa- 443 [1958]; Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 26
1ion in th ' fo rm of benefits and protection which it gives to his life, SCRA 620 [1969].); hence, there is no compensable taking;
lilwrty, ond properly.
(4) As to persons affected. -Taxation and (usually) police power
operate upon a community or a class of individuals, while e~inent
domain operates on an individual as the owner of a particular
111m dl,-;rn,-;~fon o( 1hc lcgi~lotivc power to tnx, ~cc A 1:liclc VI, Socllo n 28. (Vol. 2.) property;
1s l'l' 111 AM. JUR. :i7-:19.
1l-iiiw,• t \ ,nw<'~~ h,111 tlw pow,,,. to t'Xt•rC'l.,t· tlw StnlO'ti lnlwr\•111 pnwc1'H of pollt't' (5) As lo rights affected. - Both taxation and eminent domain
111,wi,1•, 11111i1111nt do11111ln 11111-f t,1J111tlon1 ilit• dl111lnellu11 h<•iwl•t•11 pollr<• pow(•!' nnd lht• offc t only property, while police power may affect also the life and
p11w1•1 111 111 , w h il h, 111ild lw 1tlf111llit ,1111 II th1 • 1•1wr< l1ii11r, 11111111,rlty w,•1'1• 1111111, pnliilt ,1I lib •rl y of o pcnmn;
~11hdlv1>1h111~ (1,l,111, d1•l11►111 t ln11 hy 11 i,1 11111 Ii p11lltlt ,11 1111b11lvl1il11111i uf 11111, pnwnr d ttl'~ 110I
11111 ..,. ,11 lly h11 l11tl1• 1'111 11111111), w1111ld 11111 111• ul 11 ,,y 1111111111111 wl 11,11, ,111 Ill th,11,11i11n11d1w
1,11,~h l1•1.ith111, I "''H'•' 1 It , It 1 11, I I tlw 1111w111•, All thnl J11 111 Im 1-1111111 Wt•11ld u,, lti
11111ilv 1111.J ,,111t,111• 11111 I 1w 1vl11 11 111111h It 11II ~ 1h ll11lllv1, 1111d 11111111t1t1llt u ll111111lly J11llt111 ~M u11h 111~1 1111 p111 ,1th11111 l1r1 v,, 111111111111,,111 ilnht ' " l111pnH1' t,1x1•~ nlthn up;h the power
( l111h11111l I) I, 1111111111111h 1lh11111 11111111I 11111 1111 l 1H11 I 111 l\ppr 11l,1, It I t l{I\ 'lt111 I 111tNI ) li11M ht 1111111111,11 1,•,I 1,y th,• I .. 11~11111111111 (1..-1 1 Ai l , 11111 11)

706 J~l llLU-'l''lNl.i 'ON S'fITl:JTlOW!A:L LAW 'Sec. 9
Principles and Cases-· •1: ' • ,.
(6) As to benefits received. - In taxation, it is· assumed that ·the
individual receives the equivalent of the ,tax m tht=; form of btpefits
and protection he receives from the gover:rµnent;,·in.eroinen~g:om.ain,
he receives just compensation fo.r the_property e~propriated; and_in
police power, the compens.ation of the indi;vidual is not immediate
and usually annoyance and financial loss are caused to him, leaving
the reward to be reaped through his altruistic.iecognition. that the
restraint is for the public good5 (see U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85
[19101; Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Rhll. 580 [1915.].);
(7) As to amount of imposition. -
(&) In taxation, there is generally no limit on the amount of
tax that may be imposed;
(b) In eminent domain, there is n~ amount imposed but
rather the owner is paid the market value of the property taken;
and
(c) In police powe:u, the amountimposedshould notbel:nore
than sufficient .to cover the cost of th~ license and the necessary
expenses of police surveillance and inspection, examination, or
regulation as nearly as the same can be estimated (Cu-Unjieng
vs. Patstone, 44 Phil. 881 [1922]; American Mail Line vs. City of
Butuan, 2 SCRA309 [1961].); and
(8) As to relationship to the Constitution. -
(a) The taxing power is subject to certain constitutional
limitations including the prescription against the impairment of
the obligation of contracts (Sec. 10.);
5
In police power, the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted; to
promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking; hence, payment of
just compensation is not required. For example, a law prohibiting the manufacture and
sale of ~toxicating liquors except for medical, scientific, -and mechanical purposes was
held vahd under the police power as against the plaintiff's contention that it, in effect,
constituted a taking of his property without compensation inasmuch as before, he could
lawfully engage in the manufacture of beer for every purpose. (Mugler v. Kansas, 128
U.S. 623.) But where, as a result of the construction of a dam across a river for the purpose
of improving the navigation of the same, a person's land was damaged due to the
overflowing of the river into his property, the owner was held entitled to compensation
as his property was, in effect, required to be devoted to the use of the public. (Pumpelly
vs. Green Bay Co., 20 L. ed. 557.)
Police power has limits. Its exercise does not necessarily preclude a finding that a
compensable taking has occurred.
A.Kf. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 707
Sec. 9
Inherent Powers of Government
C. Power of Taxation
(b) Eminent domain is also inferior to the impairment
prohibition so that the government cannot expropriate property
which unfll:ei: a contract it had previously botlf.).d itself tqpurchase
from the other contracting party6 (see Noble vs. City of Manila,
67 Phil. 1 [1933]:); and
(c) Police power is relatively free from constitutional
limitations and i~ . :supel'ior to the impairm.ent provisions.
In appropriate cases, the constitutional injunction against
impairment of the obligation of contracts cannot be invoked as
against the right of the state to exercise its police power.
-oOo..:._
6The government or an expropriating authority cannot enter into a contract whereby
it binds itself not to expropriate. But where it has bound itself under a contract to buy,
it cannot expropriate without violating its contract. The government must respect and
o)serve individual rights. Expropriation lies only when the owner opposes the sale _or
there.is disagreement as to the price. In the absence of a contract of sale of the property
between the property owner and the expropriator, the non-impairment guarantee cannot
be invoked to defeat the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Thus, it has been held
that the franchise of a corporation may be taken in whole or in part with other properties.
,. (Eastern Railroad Co. vs. Boston Railroad Co., 111 Mass. 125.)
; It has been held, however, that the exercise of the power prevails over the non-
impairment clause. (Manapat vs. Court of Appeals, 536 SCRA 32 [2007].) Thls should be
so only if the purpose is the protection of the public interest or the genernl welfare.
 ! II II 11
~
'"'
. l .
) -~..... ' •' ~ '
NON-IMPAIRMENT OF 0:~:t;IGA.rION
OF CONTRACTS . • : •·: • II •
SEC. 10. No Jaw impairing the obligati6rt of:corittacts
shall be pass·ed. : :·
Meaning of obligation of~, contract. ~·
!he obligation of a _contract is the law or duty which binds the
parties to perform their agreement according to its terms or intent
(Sturgess v. Crownshields, 4 Wheat 122.) if it (agreement) is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
(see Art. 1306, Civil Code.)
Scope of terms "law" and "contract."
(1)_ The law, t~~ enachnent of which is prohibited, includes
execuh~e and admrmstrative orders1 of the President, administrative
orders issued by heads of deparhnents, and ordinances enacted by
local governments. The guarantee is not violated by court decisions
a
or by _acts o! boards or officers acting in judicial or quasi-judicial
capac~ty which have the effect of altering the obligation of a contract.
(see Lim vs. Secretary of Agriculture, 34 SCRA 751 [1970];)
.. (~) The contract, the obligation of which is secured against
rmparrment under the Constitution, includes contracts entered into
by the government.2 An example of impairment by law is when a
1 533 [1979]; Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 [1993).)
ch Exec_uti~e Orders are ~cts of the Pre~ident providing for rules of general or permanent
aracter m nnplementation or execution of constitutio~al or statutory powers. (Adm.
Code of 1987, B~ok III, Sec. 2.) Before the effectivity of tne new Constitution the then
1
incumbe~t ~r7s1de~t exercised legislative powers through :the issuance of executiv~
orders. Administrative ~rder~ are acts of the President 1Yhich relate to particular aspects
of governmental operations m pursuance of his duties as administrative head (lb1'd s
3; See Art. vn,
Sec. 17.) · • ., ec.
2
1h~ State when contracting does so upon the same terms as a private individual or
corpor~tion ~d ~ay not plead its sovereignty as justification in impairing a contractual
obhg~tion "'.hich it has assumed. (WILLOUGHBY, op. cit., p. 1224.) In a contract, a ar
acqu1Ies a right and the other assumes an obligation arising from the same. (Art.
708
j j J
Sec. 10 ART. III..BILL OF RIGHTS 709
Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
tax exemption·based 0ff a contract entered into by the government
is revoked by a later taxing statute. (see Cassanova vs. Hord, 8
Phil. 1is [1907).) J\,;~~rfta.~:t which is entitled. to.protection against
impairment'mi.u~t be a..Y.~lid one. . •
(a), Under the· Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly
subject to the police power of the State because they are not
ordinary contract~ but are impressed with public interest.3 (The
Conference of Matitime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, 243 SCRA 666 (1995].)
(b) LBP (Land Bank of the Philippines) bonds p,aid to
land-owners for lands acquired under the agrarian reform
program (see Art. XIII, Sec. 4.) are deemed contracts and the
obligations resulting therefrom fall within the purview of the
non-impairment protection. Thus, the value of these bonds
cannot be diminished by any direct or indirect act, particulady
since said bonds are fully guaranteed by the government of the
Philippines. They are not ordinary commercial papers subject to
discounting by the government. (Maddumba vs. Government
Service Insurance System, 182 SCRA 281 [1990).)
(c) Marriage, sometimes referred to as a contract, is more
than a mere contract; it is a status. Hence, it is outside of the
contemplation of the constitutional provision. (see Art. XV, Sec.
2.)
(d) A license is not a contract, property or property right
in the constitutional sense, as to which the prohibition against
impairment may extend. It may be validly revoked or rescinded
_b y executive action whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare. (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 84 SCRA
ibid.) A contract is the law between the contracting parties and is enforceable upon the
parties, their assigns, and their heirs. (Arts. 1159, 1311, par. 1, Civil Code.) Where a
contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or
amendment of said law will not affect the terms of the contract nor impair the rights of
the parties thereunder. (Recafia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 24 (2001].)
3
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
)30! good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, dosed-shop, wages, working condition~, hours of labor
and similar subjects,
 l J J 1J
?10 lJl ULlPIJINB CONST1TUT!O NAL LAW Sec. 10
• Principles and Cases·t. !, ·
(e) The nature of.public office js, inconsistent withreither a·
property or contrac.t right. (see-rut. ,Xlr:Sec. L) .
(£) Membership in the Social Se<frµ:ity 9yst~m is not the
result of a bilateral~ con~eris,uahjgf:eeii\.eht wli~relfhEh:ighfs;and
obligations of the pa.rti.e s. axe··deffu:ed:i:by. .and· subject to their
will. The la:w re,quj,res,,cornpws0ry:,~ov.e.rage, of employers .and
emplpyees un.det the, systel.1,'l.. Jt ~§; a<;:tJ4*llyJ;ct •leg~I: µnpo$ition
on,,said employer~ :an.e;Lemployees✓ ,df:liigme.d ~o •pro\\icte:social
security to the workingman. Membership fu, t}J.e Social Security
System is .in c~mpH~ce w};t;h .a law~l ,9?fft;cis@ .-o f the police
power of the State, ±q.which, the principle. of noil-i!llp&irn;i.ent
Qf the ~bligij~on, of,c~ritr~ct is not a p.r,ope11 qefense. (Ehilip,pine
Bloqmrn,g Mills \'.o. v~. Socia,J. S~~ify System, 17 SCRA 107
.[1977].) . ,. . matters which are within the government's power to regulate
. (;g). It has 'b een held that the Gen~rics:Act, .(R.A. No~ 6675.)
impairs.no obligation of contract between a physician and his
patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between
a patient and a physician. A doctor ·may take rn or •r efuse a
patient, just as the patient may take or refuse.the doctor's advice
or pres_cription. In any event, no priva.te ~onfyact between doctor
and patient may be allowed to override the police power of the
State to promote and secure the public health. All contractual
and property rights are subject to its fair exercise. (Del Rosario
vs. Bengzon, 180 SCRA521 [1989].)
(h) Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that the public
w~lfare is pr~~oted. (see Art. XII, Secs. 2, 3, 4.) They merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do ~ot vest in the latter a permanent or irreyocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein:
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded
by the President when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process
of law guarantee. (F. Ysmael, Jr. & co·., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary, 150 SCRA 673 [1990J; Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., supra; C
& M Timber Corporation vs. Alcala, 273 SCRA 402 [1997]; Picop
Resources, Inc. vs. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corp., 510
SCRA 400 [2006].)
J
Sec. 10 •ART. 1_11. BI LL OF RIGHTS 711
Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
(i) As used in .: the Constitution, the word "contracts"
includes other a.r rangem~nts n0t normally considered to be
~o;n.tracts.~u,cn:,as,ale;gislative grant of a,public land to pafticular
i?,dividuals, s1u~;h: ,fua~. ~- subsequent. a_ttempt by the State to
. ;~ul. the tWe,p f f?ur,chasers ~ good faith from the grantees
w-o:uld 9e·UJ,1.Cq,Qst.itution~.14 (:eletcher v. P~ck, 10 U.S. 87.); so
are corporate charters.5 (Darmouth College v, Woodward, 17
U.S. 518.) But charters of municipal corporations which are
political subdivis16ns of the State are· regarded as grants of
pub~i~,authori/;y, ap.~ n_o t as contr,acts withµi the meaning of the
Constitution. (Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U.S. 189.)
- (j) A fra.f!.chise is not in the strict sense a simple contract
but rather it is, more i.Ihpor tantly, a mere privilege specially in
and even prohil;>it through the exercise of police power. Thus,
a ga1.1J.blingJrancpise is always subject to the exer cise of police -
power for the public welfare. (Lim vs. Pacquing, 240 SCRA
649 [1995].) The constitutional guarantee does n ot extend to
privileges, franchises and grants given by a local government
unit in excess of its powers or ultra vires. (Batangas CATY, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 439 SCRA 326 [2004].)
Purpose of non-impairment prohibition.
The prohibition is intended to protect creditors, to assure
the fulfillment of lawful promises, and to guard the integrity of
contractual obligations6 against unwarranted interference by the
State in the form of laws. Business problems would arise if contracts
were not stable and binding and if the legislature can pass a law
impairing an obligation entered into legally.
The provision implements the constitutional right to freedom of
contract. ·
4
Under the Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 11.), any franchise or right granted for the
operation of a public utility is "subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress
when the common good so requires."
5
Congress is empowered by Section 145 of the Corporation Code (B.P. Big. 68.) to
amend or alter the corporate charter subject to the limitation therein provided and the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of obligation of contracts. ·
6
V.G, SINCO, op. cit., p . 640.
712 PHILIPPIN E CONS'l'ITUTtON .AJ.,. LAW Sec. 10
• Principles and Cases . ,. ·:
When obligation of contract impaired.
(1) Change or modification of terms or condif!ons. -The op_ligation
of an existing contract is iinpairec,i ·when it_s. ~erms c;,r conditions,
either on the time.or mode of performartce, are changed modi'fied or
by law, ordinance, or any issuance having the force of law thereby
· ''
weakening the position or diminishing the.rights or obligations of a
party to the contract/ · · ·'
(2) Cases. - More specifically, a law which:
(a) takes from a party a·right to which he is entitled under
the contract;
(b) deprives him of the means of enforcing such right;
(c) imposes conditions not expressed in the contract, or
dispenses with those.~hich are exprt?S,s ~d contr:act; w.th~
(d) diminishes the considera~on agre~d upon by the parties,
as to diminish the vahte of the. contract; or ·
(e) authorizes for its satisfaction different from that
provided in its terms; or enlarges, abridg~s or in any manner
changes, directly or indirectly, the intention'of the parties, is void
as impairing the obligation of t;he contract within the meaning
of the Constitution. (see Gaspar vs. Maling, 5 Phil. 197 [19Q5];
U.S. vs. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]; Clemons vs. Nolting,
42 Phil. 702 [1922]; Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 346
SCRA 748 [2000].)
(3) By way of illustration. -
(a) A law increasing or decreasing the rate of interest for
the loan of money cannot apply retroactively to loans contracted
before its enactment, otherwise impairment will result.
7
Impairment of obligations of contracts should not be confused with breach of
contract. For example, if a person agrees to construct a public building for a city for an
agreed price but after the contract has been executed, the city council passes an ordinance
to abandon the project, the ordinance does not constitute an impairment of the obligation
of contract. It is a mere breach of contract, and the remedy available is an action for
damages. On the other hand, if the council, pending performance of the contract or
after performance thereof, should pass an ordinance materially altering the scope of the
contract or diminishing the consideration agreed upon by the parties, the obligation of
the contract is undoubtedly impaired. (Ibid., pp. 649-650.)
Sec. 10 ART. J!I. BILL OF RIGHTS 713
Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
(b) Where the terms of a statute have been made a part
of a p~blic contract, a subsequent amendment of the statute
will have the effect of amending (indirectly) the terms of the
·!
contract. (Government of the Philippine 1slands vs. Frank, 13
i Phil. 236. [1909].)
(c) If a tiontract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered
· illegal by any-subsequent legislation. (U.S. vs. Diaz Conde, 42
Phil. 766-[1922].)
(d) Lawsi,mpairing the obligation of.contracts are necessarily
retroactive or retrospective. There will be no impairment if the
law is given prospective effect, i.e., it is already in effect at the
time of the execution of the contract.
lmp.airment depends upon the circumstances.
In 0,.rder to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally
imp~irs obligations of contracts, no unchanging yardstick, applicable
a,t all ~es and under all circumstances, 1;,y which the validity of
eac;h statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned,
but every case must be ~etermined upon its pwn circumstances.
(1) End sought and means adopted legitimate. - Legislation
impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is
enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and
when the means adopted to secure that end be reasonable. Both the
end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within
the;scope of the reserved power of the State construed in harmony
f
with the constitutional limitation of that power. (Anucension vs.
National Labor Union, supra.)
(2) Interference free from unreasonableness. - While it is true that
police power cannot be resorted to just any time the legislature
,,I
wishes, it is not correct to say that it is indispensable that exceptional
circumstances must exist b efore police power can be exercised.
Gone are the days when courts could "be found adhering to the
doctrine that interference with contracts can only be justified by
exceptional circumstances," for the "test of validity today under
the due process clause, even in the case of legislation interfering
with existing contracts, is reasonableness. In other words, freedom
from arbitrariness, capriciousness and whimsicality is the test of
constitutionality." (People vs. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 [1955]; Associacion
 J J J J
, I
714 .PH ILIPPlNE CONS'tlT,tJ'f!PNA1L LAW Seo. ,1 0
Principles and Cas,es. , · 1 Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
, de, Agricultores de Talisay,-,Silay,, •Inc. vs.:.]al,is.ay7Silay Mi1ling Co.,
Inc., 88 SCRA 294 [1979.J.) , , ,
Limits on freedom ·to..contract. ,'; · , ., ,, ·
The freedom to contract, under our system:of goverrirnent, ls not
meant to be a.bsolute..,Equally-hi:t:tdatne~taJ·with tn_e private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the con;imon interest. (PhilJppine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditdr General; 22 SCRA 135
[1968]; Beltran vs. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168 [2005];Province
of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary, 477 SCRA436 [2005].) ·
(1) Police power. - Individual rights tp contract and·to property
are necessarily limited by the exercise of t~epolice power .of the State
in the interest of the general welfare, and by the explicit provisions
in the Constitution especially with referenc~ _to th~ promo.tion of
social justice. Hence, pre-existing (and.future) contracts yield to a
reasonable exercise of police power. '.fhE! abolition of share tenancy
as well as the introduction by compulsion of the leasehold system
(after a contract of share tenancy has been adopted between the
landlord and the tenant) has been sustained· as a valid exercise of
police power, share tenancy being recognized as the root cause
of the land problems and agrarian unrest .in the country8 (see Del
Rosario vs. De Los Santos, 22 SCRA 1196 [1968]; Genuino vs. Court
of Agrarian Relations, 22 SCRA 792 [1968]; De Ramas vs. Court of
Agrarian Relations, 11 SCRA 171 [1964].) and in view of the social
justice precepts of the Constitution. (see Art. XIII.) .
(2) Power of taxation. - The guarantee <!,gainst impairment
has never been thought of as a limitation oi{the exercise of the
State's power of taxation save only where a tax ·exemption has been
granted for a valid consideration.9 For not only are existing laws
8
There is no impairment as such enactments under the_police power are remedial
in nature. The non-applicability of police power legislations otherwise valid, to existing
conditions or contracts already in existence. would be self-defeating in charact~l\. (see
Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950]; Alalayan vs,_National Power Cgrporation, 24
SCRA 172 [1968]; see Social Weather Stations vs. Commission on Elecijons, 755 SCRA
124 [2015],) ' .
9While tax exemptions contained in special franchises have been referred to as being
in the n~ture of contracts and a part of the ":duce~entfor carrying on th~fr/inchise, these
exemptions, nevertheless, are far from bemg strictly contractual" in nature. Contractual
tax exemrilions, in the real sense of the term where the non-impairment' guarantee can
rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as these
j J
Sec. 10 .A'.RT, III. BILL OF RIGHTS 715
read into contracts,.i-•1t,6rder to fix obligations as between parti~s,
but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is
also read info contracts as a basic postulate of the legal o!der. The
policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to
sepure the peace ap.d good order of society. (Tolentino vs. Secretary
ofFinance, 235 SCR'.A 630 [1994].)
(3) Power of eminent domain. - It may also validly limit the
impairment prohibition but social justice cannot be invoked
to trample on the rights of property owners who, under our
Constitution and laws, are also entitled to protection. The social
justice consecrated· in our Constitution was not intended to take
away rights from a person and give them to another who is not
entitled thereto. Evid~ntly, the plea for social justice cmmot nulHfy
the law on obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the
power Qf the court~ to grant. (Salonga vs. Farrales, 105 SCRA 359
[1981].)
(4) Freedom of religion. -The Supreme Court has ruled that the
free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract
rights. (see Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA
54 [1978); and Anucension vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 550
[1914], :under Sec. 5.)
(5) Reservation clause in the Constitution. - This clause with
respect to the operat}on of public utilities gives the government
the right to amend, alter or repeal franchises granted by it. (see Art.
XII; Sec. 11.) But even without the clause, franchises are subject to
am~ndment, alteration, or repeal by Congress in the exercise of police
power when the common good so requires. Thus, police power
statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities are applicable
not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its.
passage but likewise to those already established and in operation.
(Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs: Public Service Commission, 70
Phil. 221 [1940]; Alalayan vs. National Power Corporation, supra.)
contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under
enabling Jaws in which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak
-o f authority and waives its government immunity. These contractual tax exemptions,
however, are not to be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises which
may be revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts. (Manila Electric Co. vs.
Laguna, 306 SCRA 750 [1999].)
71/J .l'Jlll ,ll'l'I NIJ ' N!i'l'!'!'U'l.'J. N.Y¥J.LAW
I
I I
Principles nnd Cases
P-rob._ibitlon against impairment not ap~_o.h,i~e.
· In view of the above, the prohibition ,agliinst impa'irinenl' of
obligation of contracts cannot ·be abst:>lute ~~ii.cl unquaiified. E,ven
where an impairn;tent is fotfn'd, ·the impairment might nevertheless
be constitutional. ' regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,
' . • , ' ' • • .' r ' ~I J • I ,
(1) Prohibition signifies unreasopq.ble_ ,frrz.paiprzent qnly.,,-;::-:- -The
prohibition_ is general, affording 'a ·broad :o,~tline and · reqpiring
consfnictiot'l.' to · fill in the details. It is nof fo' be read with literal
exactness like a J+lathematical formula,-forjt pt~hibits unreasonable
impairment only. (see Abella vs. · National · Labor · Refatioris
·Commission~·152 SCRA 140 fl.987].) In a'Case; 'ah1addendurn t~ the
original· contract of employment of petitioner, 'approv~d by th'e
of
Department· Labor and Einploymeilt,·_'"a'cfu.a_lly" !secured' ·a ·1%
salaryincrease for petitioner;'! It was held'"lliat the addendum could
nothave impaired_ the obligation of his employment contract since it
has ·beer). enhanced instead. (Fausto vs. Leogardo, Jr., 184 SCRA~32
[1990].)
(2) Prohibition supject to exercise of police power. - Police power
legislation is applicable ·not only to future coritracts but equally to
those already in existence. (Ortigas Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appe~ls,
346 SCRA 748 [2000].) All private contracts must yield to the superior
and legitimate measures taken by the State tc,l promote the general
welfare.10
(a) Regulation of matters involving public rights and public
welfare. - The prohibition contained in the constitutional
provision is restricted to contracts with ~espect to property, or
some object of value, and confers rights which may be asserted
10
1n spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess autho:ity
to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation -appropriate to safeguard said
interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing
laws read into contracts in order ~o fix the obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. Thus, as already discussed, all contracts rnnde with reference
to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood ns
madeinrefetenae to.the possible exercise of that power. (Anucenslon vs, Nntionnl Lnbot·
Union, 80 SC:RA 350 [1977].) Such regulntions arc subject to chnngc from limo to tlnw,
as the general well-being of the community mny require, Ol' nu tho clrcum,1t1111r1••1 1rn1y
change, or os experience mny domonRtrntc tho noceeolty. (Tho C.'Mf11111111•11 uf M11dtl11111
Manning Agencies, Tnc. Vil, Phlllppl110 Ov<11'R(W1 Hmploynwnl Ad111l11lli11o1llc111, :/11I !lt It/\
66<, (19951; RCli ·n omlct1 v~ . C'o11r1 of Ap111mlR, :IO>t fl RA ,~o I 111w1)
S~c. 10 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 71?
Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
in a court of justice, -and has no application to statutes relating
to public .subjects within the domain of the general legislative
power of"the State and involving the public rights and public
welfare . of the ~ntire community affected by it. By enacting
morals, comfort or general welfare of the community, even
contracts may thereby be affected; for such matters cannot be
..pl~ced by contrad beyond the power of the State to regulate and
control them. (];J:usorio vs. Court of ~grarian Relations, 17 SCRA
25 [1966]; Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. SO [1950].)
(b) Pr,o.tection of public interests. - The impairment
. gua~antee is no longer inviolate; in fact,. there are many who
· nqw believe that it is an anachronism in the present-day society.
It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private ,
agreeme~ts from government meddling, but that was when
such agreements did not affect the community in general. But
things are different now. More and more, the interests of the
public have become involved in what are supposed to be still
private agreements which have as a result been removed from
the protection of the guarantee. As long as a private contract
affects the public welfare one way or another as to require the
interference of the State, then must the police power be asserted
and prevail, over the right against impairment of the obligation
of contracts. (Juarez vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 475 [1992];
see Philippine National Bank vs. Office of the President, 252
SCRAS [1996].)
(c) Balancing of conflicting interests. - Where the legislation
complained of is shown to be an exercise of police power, it does
not necessarily mean that the invocation of the protection of the
non-impairment guarantee would be unavailing; otherwise,
the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment, and for that
matter both of the equal protection and due process clauses
which protect property rights would be rendered nugatory. The
process of balancing, and adjustment or harmonization is called
for where governmental authority may trench upon property
rights. (Alalayan vs. National Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 173
[1963).)
(::I) Proltlultio11. 1101· npplfcnble to pnrtlc11lm· remerlies or modes of
Jlltlt'N/111·1·. Stnlt1tP11 th1,t 1n ·(1 t.'t'munlnl, or do not 1'('nt' JWW 01· tnko
 11
718 • PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIG>M~t., LAW Sec.. iLO
Principles and ·Cases-1·:,· .:·, ,.
away vested rights do not fall under the~general rule, agaim.st the
retroactive operation of statutes, (Comm, oCI,ntemal Revenue vs.
Reyes, 480 SCRA 382 [2006].)
A statute may not be given retroactive effect if vested rights
born of contracts are impaired thereby. (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1982]; Development
Bank of the Phils. vs. Court of Ap·peals, 116:scRA 636 [1982).) But
parties to a contract have no vested right .i n particular re.m edies or
modes of procedure. The legislature m~y change existi,rlg remedies
or modes of procedure or prescribe ne'\N' ones without impairing
the obligation of existing contracts provided the change does not
diminish substantial rights or increase substantiv:e oblig<!.tions and
an efficacious remedy remains for enforcement of the rights under
the contract.11 (Manila Trading Co. vs. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461 [1935].)
· (4) Prohibition not applicable to · judicial decisions. - The
Constitution forbids the.passage of "law:" However erroneous and
whatever their impact on existing contract rights, judicial decisions
would not constitute impairments.. under the constitutional
guarantee. (Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444.) .B ut judicial
decisions having retroactive effect may violate due process of law.
(see McNair v. Knott, 302 U.S. 369.)Judicial decisions are, of course,
subject to review by a higher court.
(S) Prohibition not applicable where there is waiver. .:..__ The guarantee
is subject to waiver before or after the enactment of the impairing
law. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.
The rule, however, is that every reasonable presumption must be
indulged against waiver of any constitutional right.
11There can be no vested right in a judicial relief for this is a mere statutory privilege
and not a property right. (United Paracale Mining Co., Inc; vs. Dela Rosa, 221 SCRA
108 [1993].) Thus, a law may shorten the time for the bringing of actions, with respect
to existing causes of action, if a reasonable time has been_left within whi~h to institute
proceedings. (McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662.) A vested right is some right or interest
in property that has become fixed or established, and is no longer open· to doubt or
controversy. Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, h as
become the property of some person ·as present interests. (Balboa vs. Parrales, 51 Phil.
498 [1928].)
Sec. 10 AR'l':,UI. BILL OF RIGHTS 719
Non-Impairment 0£ Obligation of Contracts
ILtUSTRATIVE CA:SBS:
1. 1=_aw ex'cludes from closed-shop agreement employees belonging
to religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members at tmy labor
org(lnization.
Facts: The l~w, R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial
PE1,1ce Act, excludes said employees from the application and
coverage of a clos.ed-shop agreement.
Issue: Is the law unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of
contracts?
~
Held: No. (1) Impairment prohibition is subordinate to police
power. - "The·policy of protecting contracts against impairment
' presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains
adequa~e authority to secure the peace and good order of society.
The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not
only jn harmony ~ith, but also in subordination to, in appropriate
instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital
interests of the people."
(2) Labor contracts are impressed with public interest. - "It
follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing
.a contract are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to
impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of
police power; although it incidentally destroys existing contract
rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special application
to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which
are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being
impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good."
(A11ucension vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 550 [1977), through
Justice Makasiar.)
2. Requirements of subsequent law are more stringent on the
borrower on date offoreclosure than those provided by former law.
Facts: Pres. Decree No. 694, otherwise known as the Philippine
National Bank Charter, requires that redemption of PNB foreclosed
properties should be made by payment in full of all PNB claims on
the loan. Its requirements are more stringent on the borrower than
the former law.
Issue: May the Decree be applied retroactively to loans
contracted prior to its taking effect?
 Sec. 10
_I 'J Lll , U 'I '!NH 'ON!J'l'l'i 'U'HfONAL LAW
Principles and Oases.', 1 •• ,
Held: No. (1) PNB had already forecl(,se.d .u:nder Act,N.'o•.31'35. -
"By virtue of the mortgage contract, rNB, had th~ contractually
acquired option to resort either to its former charter, ·;R.A,.No.1300
or to Act No. 3135 (extra-judicial foreclosure of m9r~gage)". :when
it foreclosed the mortgage at issue, it chose Act No. 31.SS·: That
was an option it freely exercised wiffiotit-fue leastfat't:!r-v~ntion of
app~llee., And it was exercisecl:before'•P.D:::NoI 694' came futo ·being.
In fact, the foreclosure sales to·0k place,, in-1974'. And·.s0/ .to make
the redemption supject to c\· ~ubsequel}Uaw, w,9µ1(\1. .be.o.bviously
prejudicial to the party exercising the right. to redeem.,''. .
(2) Law cannot be given retroactive effect. - ''Without cqnsidering
the date the loan was secured and the date of- the mortgage
contract, and taking into account only the dates of the foreclosures
and auction sales, it is quite obvious that any change in the law
governing redemption that would make it more -~ifficult than
. under the law at the time of the sale cann,ot be given retroactive
effect. Under the terms of the mortgage contract, the terms and
conditions under which redemption may be exercised are deemed
part and parcel thereof whether the same be merely conventional or
imposed by law. To alter those terms in a manner prejudicial to the
mortgagor or the person redeeming the property as his successor-
in-interest after the foreclosures and sales, would definitely come
within the constitutional proscription against impairment of the
obligations of contracts." (Co vs. Philippine National Bank, 114 SCRA
842 {1982], through Justice Barredo.)
3. Interpretation of Rent Control Law..
Facts: The plaintiff (lessor) threatened the defendants (lessees)
with ejectment unless the latter increase their tent's. The def~ndants
contended that the suit is barred by the decree.
Issue: The issue raised in this case is purely legal - whf:!ther
considering the provision of the· contract'oOease, under whidi.
either party may, on a 30-day notice terminate the lease__:, the lease
may be considered one for. an .hi.definite period for the .purpose
of applying Pres. Decree No. 20 which prohibits the ejectment of
tenants. To exempt a lease from the application of the decree it must
be one with a. definite period.
Held: (1) Decree was not enacted to ignore impairment prohibition.
- "At all events, the fact remains that the parties agreed, under
the stipulation of the lease contract as quoted above, that either
' AR':J;', \LIL BILL OF RIGHTS 721
Non-Impairmemtof Obligation of Contracts
one of._them,:may,,X)J.1,1a thirty,:-:cday notiae, terminate the lease.. This
agi;eement,:i&p.at. ,$e; ~e .i t .was el,\tered into, a perfectly valid
undertaking. Nqt bein_g against the law, public policy or,oustom,
iP~ tl:}e.l_(l.~-~f,~.e~.l;'\•Jhe partges{A,rt. 1).59, Ciyil Code.) as all valid
contracts are, ani:l. O,.e qbligations thereof may not be impaired by
law, as so ordained by the Constitution.
: :'i .. 'rt seems 'a):l 't6o .'clf:!ar
th~t t6 hold, UJ1der ·the authority of
·rtesiden~al IJ.ect'.~e· Nq.. 2'0;· that the lessot may not anymore
.ixerdse thiS'. r~gh! ·under the agreement ·and·
:subject the lessee to
the correspondi.rig obligation( or the other 'IA.'.'ay around, as the right
to terminate ·m.~y be exercise,d also oy the lessee, would be to lend
: tQ the de~ree a legal infirmity arising from · the provision of the
·Constitution that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall
be passed. The decree, with all its manifest social justice intent,
could Flot have meant to ignore any constitutional injunction. lt
means only to regulate, or p erhaps even restrict, the exorcise of
proprJetary right for a higher purpose than just protecting private
interest, which is that of advancing general welfare by giving
direly needed benefits to the poor and the underprivileged under
conditions of economic crisis, but not at the cost of the sanctity of
contracts, the obligations arising from which being shielded by the
Constitution from impairment."
(2) Decr,ee to be construed as applicable prospectively. - "The
decree, therefore, · in order that it would not be tainted with
constitutional repugnancy, must be construed as only restricting
the freedom of the parties to contract,. bu_t only in a prospective
manner. Thus, to raise the rent in specified specie of leases after the
decree has been promulgated would constitutionally come within
the regulatory provision of the decree. In the instant case, this is
not w,hat is sought to be done by the petitioner. He seeks to enforce
an obligation validly imposed on, and voluntarily assumed b y, the
private re_spondent, already existing with complete validity and
full enforceability at the time Presidential Decree No. 20 tookeffect.
The contract could not be made to lose these qualities or attributes
by a law or decree w ithout doing violence to the Constitution."
(C:uz vs. Puna, Jr., 120 SCRA 497 [1983], through Justice De Castro.)
4. Court orders substitution by a surety bond of a mortgage lien.
Facts: The court orders that a mortgage on real property be
substituted by a surety b ond and directs the Register of Deeds to
 II ii l J
722 Pl l!L.LPPlNB CON S'l'l'fW(fIO NY\:L' LAW Sec. 10
Principles and Cases .:. . :-
cancel the mortgage Hen ann0tated on the,<torrens title since the
surety bond already secures the obligation earlier -secured by the
cancelled mortgage. ··
Issue: Is: the order of tl\e court violativ(;? of the constitutional ·
guarantee? · · ·· · ' · ·
Held: Terms and_ conditions of rn,or~gage_·.c,qrtract qre changed. -
"The order viol(ltes the non-impa'ir;ment.,gii~r~ritee. Substitu,tion of
the mortg_a~e with~ S~E;ty ~orid_WO):µd;:~~~i~l~ f~-~ge
_th:~ ~frms
and conditions of the mortgage cQµtract,J~ven:.bE~fore tnal on, the
very issµes affecting the contract, the respondent c.o uit has dire'Gted
a deviation froJ.?:l its terms, d~shed its:Eiffi.ciency, and di~pensed
with ~.primary condition." (Gan.zon vs. Inserto,'1'23 SCRA 713 [1983],
t1iro11gh Nstice Gutierrez, Jr.) · ··
Note:. The changE? here :was ma.d e by a j~dicial decision which
is not supposed t0 ~b e covered by the term. "law," as used in the
constitutiomal-sense.
5. Circular prohibits payment of salaries· of teachers · to persons
other than the employees concerned.
Facts: Z had extended loans to public sch<;)Ol teachers who
executed promissory notes and special powers of attorney in favor
of Z to take and collect their salary checks from the ·division office
of the Bureau of Public Schools. T, the Superintendent of Schools,
forbade the collection of the checks on the basis of the circular in
question.
Issue: The issue is whether or not Circular 21 of the Director of
Public Schools is valid and enforceable.
Held: (1) Salary checks belong to the government before delivery. -
"The salary check of a government officer qr erl).ployee does not
belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that
time the check belongs to the government. Accordingly, before
there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over
it, cannot assign it without the consent of _the government. The
circular is authorized by relevant statutes."
(2) Creditor can still collect from debtor payee. - "The claim that it
impairs the obligations of contracts with the employees is baseless.
The circular does n ot prevent the creditor from collecting a loan
from the payee. It merely makes the government a non-participant
j IJ
Sec. 10 . ART. III. BILL CF RIGHTS 723
Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
-···in its collection :whiclt is within its competence to do." (Turo vs.
- Hontanosas; 125 SCRA 697 [1983], through Justice Abad Santos.)
6. Law integrates operations of arrastre and stevedoring services.
Facts: Petition,ers ~.ssailed the policy integrating the operation
gf arrastre. and stevedoring services and , the authority of the
P,pilippifl,e Poi:ts ·Authority (PPA) to collect (pursuant to Pres.
Decree No. 857.) ib%' of the gross arrastre and stevedoring charges
I (
paid to contracto,;s" ·
Issue:'The I.llain.throughst of the issues raised is whether or not
the respondent 1:PA's take-over of arrastre operations in the Port
of Tacloban, Leyte is a valid exercise of police power and does not
violate the petitioners' right to non-impairment of obligation of
contracts.
Held: (1) Take over is a valid exercise ofpolice power. - "The State In
the exercise of its police power through its agency, the PPA, has the
power to revoke the temporary permits of petitioners, assuming the
exj_stence of valid temporary permits, and take over the operations
of the port of Tacloban whenever the need to promote the public
interest and welfa.re both of the stevedoring industry and the
workers therein justifies such take over. The statute which gives
PPA the authority to implement the take over cannot be assailed on
the constitutional grounds raised by the petitioners.
1:
}
Thus, whatever right, if any, that the p etitioners may have
acquired on the basis of the temporary permits earlier given them
must yield to the State's valid exercise of police power."
(2) Exercise of police power is paramount over right against non-
impairment of contracts. - "Neither can petitioners argue that their
right to non-impairment of contract had been violated. In the
same case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro (124 SCRA
494 [1983].), we held that the subservience of the contract clause
to the police power enacting public regulations intended for the
general welfare of the community has been settled by this Court.
Furthermore, the records will bear out the fact that only petitioners
were either merely allowed or tolerated to operate in the port of
Tacloban. However, even on the assumption that all of them were
able to secure temporary permits from PPA, still, this does not vest
any property right on them and hence, petitioners cannot allege
a violation of their right to non-deprivation of property without
 J iJ J IU
I 'I 111 ,l I 't'l,N J\ ' M 'l'l'l'l+,!if.J., f:':Jfo.,/r: LAW
Principles at:lcJ Ca:;~s.. ·.., ,, ,.
due process of law." (Pern#o 11-rrastre; $~f}!.i~es,. In_c. ,vs. M.,end9za,
146 SCRA 432 [1986], through Justic~ Gut(ew:z,Ir,; see HilWling vs.
National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]; Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 168 SCRA, t,34 [1989]; see Central
Bank vs. Claribel, 44 SCRA 307 [1972].) - hereby extinguished"; (ii) "all wlSecured obligations shatl not bear
7. Department order is .in the character oJ"Guidelines governing the
temporan; suspension of deployment of f:ilipfriq dQm'estic and·household
workers." · ·
Facts: The measure of the Department of Labor and Employment
is assailed, among others, as violative of the noi1Arnpairment clause,
by the petitioner, a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement."
Issue: May the non~impairment gu"arantee be invok~d to
invalidate the Order? _- · · _·. · The contracts of loan and mortgage executed by AGRlX nre purely
Held: Order is a valid exercise of police power. -- "The-non-
impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner,
must yield to the loftier purposes targetted -by .the Government.
Freedom of contract and enterprise, like.-a ll o.t her freedoms, is not
free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdictfon; w here laisstz faire
has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of
life. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned
Order has on the business of recruitment':_ The concern ·of the
Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of !\!Y~nts, it is prpfits that
suffer as a result of Government regulation1 The.interest of the State
is to provide a decent living to its citize,ns. The Governrrtent has
convinced the Court in this case-that this is-its intent." (Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, 16~ SCRA 386 [19881,
through Justice Sarmiento.)
8. Law extinguishes all mortgages and other liens attaching to the
assets ofa bankrupt company.
Facts: Pres. Decree No. 1717 ordered the rehabilitation of
the AGRJX Group of Companies and mandated that it will. be
administered mainly by the National Development Company.
The law outlined the procedure for filing claims against the Agrix
Companies (which are privately owned) and created a Claims
J J
Sec. 10 AR't. III. BILL OF RJGHTS 725
Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
Committee to process these claims. Section 4(1) of the law, among
others, provided that: (i) "all mortgages and other liens presently
attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are
interest or charges"; and (iii) "all accrued interests, penalties or
charges pertaining to its obligations shall not be recognized."
Issue: Does the Decree impair the obligation of contracts?
Held: Yes. Contracts in question are not affected with public
interest. - "A legislative act based on police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. While it is "
true that the police power is superior to the impairment guarantee,
the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the
public welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible
to change by the legislature in the interest of the greater number.
private transactions and have not been shown to be affected with
public interest. Insofar as the Decree interferes ~ith ~urely privn~e
agreements without any demonstrated connection with the public
interest, there is an impairment of the obligation of contracts."
(National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192
SCRA 257 {1990], through Justice Cruz.)
9. Validity of Bouncing Check Law is challenged.
Facts: The law, B.P. Blg. 22, punishes a person who makes or
draws and issues· any check on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full
upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment.
Issue: The law is assailed, among others, for impairing the
obligation of contracts.
Held: (1) Checks are not mere contracts. - "The freedom of
contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter
into 'lawful' contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy
are not lawful. (Art. 1409, Civil Code.) Besides, we must bear in
m ind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has
 l I
Sec. 10
726 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTI<DN~L LAW Sec. IO
Principles and Cases .., , ..
become a convenient substitute for money;- if forms· part of the
banking•system and, therefore; not-entirely fre'e from the regulatory
power of the state."
(2) Gravamen of the offense. ~ "The gravamen of fu,e offense
punished bY'.B._P.: Blg. 22 is the act of making and"issuin:g a worthless
check ot a check that is -dishonbfed tipon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-:paymentof. 1111 obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. X X X Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the
act not as offense against property, but an offense against public
order." (Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 [1986], through Justice
Yap.)
10. Validity of extension of moratorium law is challenged.
Facts: R.A. No. 342, enacted in 1948, continued Execu-tive
Order No. 32 (which-amended E.O. No. 25.), issued in 1945 by the
then President Osmefia, suspending the enforcement of payment
of all debts and other monetary obligations incurred or contracted
before December 8, 1941 and payable by war sufferers, for a period
of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim
of the debtor.
By virtue of R.A. No. 361, a creditor should have to wait for at
least twelve (12) ye.a rs instead of eight {8) years before they could
collect their investment.
Issue: Does the continued operation and enforcement of
:Executive Order No. 32 infringe the constitutional provision against
the impairment of contractual obligations?
11
Held: Yes. "Altered circumstances have rendered extension un-
reasonable. - "ExecuHve Order No. 32 is a valid exercise of police
power as that power was called into exercise by thepubiic econoII).ic
emergency which the legislature had found to exist. However, due
to altered circumstances, the extension of the p eriod-'at the present
time [1953 or eight (8) years after liberation] is unreas0nable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer.' In .the
case at bar, the credits were unsecured and the·de"l::itor was not
required to p ay interest during the operation of the moratorium
law." (Rutter vs. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 [1953], through Justice Bautista
Angelo.)
' Al~f. HI. 'BILL 0 11 RIGHTS 727
Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
• Citing the Rutter case, the Supreme Court held in Agbayani vs.
Philippine National Bank (38 SCRA 429 (1971).):
-,,At the ..fime of the issuance of Executive Order,No. 32 in
1945 and of-the passage of Republic Act No. 342 in 1948, there
was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines
was ·c onfronted with-an emergency of impressive magnitude at
the time .of her liberation from the Japanese military forces in
1945. Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate.
Measures, radical measures, were then devised to tide her over
until some semblance of normalcy could be restored and an
improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then that'
the suspension of enforcement of payment of the obligations
then existing was declared first by executive order and then
by legislation. The Supreme Court was right, therefore, In
rejecting the contention that on its face, the Moratorium Lnw
was unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the Impairment
-of the obligation of contracts. Time passed, howevei~ and
conditions did change.
When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question
before it was its satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the
time of its enactment, but as of such date. Clearly, if then it were
found unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual
obligations must prevail over the assertion of community power
to remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court was convinced
that such indeed was the case. As of the time of adjudication, it
was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test
of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified.
That before the d ecision, they we11e not constitutionally infirm was
admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then to yield assent
to the now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative
fact to which legal consequences are attached." (through Justice
Fernando.)
- oOo-

FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS
AND QUASI-JUDIClf\~ »~PIES
SEC. 11. Free access to the .courts an:q. quasj-judicial
bodies and adequat~ legal assistance s~flll:~ot b.e denied
to any person by reason of pqverty. ··
~ight to free access to the courts
and quasi-judicial bodies.
Access to justice by all, ,espe_cially ~y ·tpe poor, is· deemed
essentiai in a democracy and in the rule ..of law. ,Un
re: Request on
National Committee on Legal Aid,. x x ·x, 597 S~RA 350 [2009].)
"The Constitution," as aptly stated in one case, "is a law for rulers
and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with . the
shield of its protection all classes·of men at all' times and:under all
circumstances," (Ex-parte Milligan 4 ·waL 2, 132, 18 L. ed. 281, 295,
cited in Cayaga vs. Tengonan, 66 SCRA 216 {19?5].)
(1) Poor Ii tigan ts intended beneficiaries.·- The:guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws assure.all persons like access
to the courts as well as quasi-judicial bodies _of the country for the
protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress
of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts. (Barbier v. Connally,
113 U.S. 27.) But such guarantees .are futile if persons are prevented
from going to courts and quasi-judicial bodies particularly labor
agencies on account of their poverty. Within this category may be
mentioned the low-paid employees, domestic.servants and laborers
who, to collect their small salaries and wages, might have to go to
court and yet are without means to pay filing oi' sheriff's fees and
attorney's fees. (Cabangis vs. Almeda, 70 Phil. 443 [1940].) To give
constitutional stature to the right of free access by the poor, our
Constitution has expressly included the above provision. 1
1
See Section 21, Rule 3, and Section 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court.
728
Sec. 11 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 729
Free Access to the Courts and Quasi-Judicial Bodies
(2) Where litigant's right has been finally adjudicated, - While
access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies is constitutionally
guaranteed; then,? mus~ be limit to it. Every li,tigation must come to
an .end. .
Once a .litigant's ·right has been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment or decision of a competent court or body, he should not be
granted ~ tmbridledrlicense to return :for. 8;1-o~er try. Thus, ':here
the issue on the right to the property m litigation has been finally
adjudicated, it cannot be reopened on the pretext that the de!enses,
of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered
by the lower court where the defeated party could have appeal~d
the case but he did not. He can no longer be heard to complam
in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment
which has becbme final and executory.2 (Alvarez vs. Intermediate
Appellate Coutt; t85-SCRA8 [1990]; Pacquing vs. Court of Appeals,
115 SCRA 117[1982]; Ngo'Bun vs. Sayo, 163 SCRA 237 (1988],)
· (3)" Wh~r,: court 9r body has no juri$diction. - It is obvious that
the constitl!ltional guarantee of access to courts or agencies refers
only to courts with appropriate jurisdiction as defined by law or
the Constitution. It does µot mean that a person can go to any court
for redress of his grievances regardless of the value or nature of
his claim. A person is barred from filing a complaint before a court
which is not vested with the appropriate jurisdiction over the issues
raised by him. (Santos III vs. NorthWest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA
250"[1992].) .
Right to adequate legal assistance.
. If may not be sufficient to just grant the rights of a pauper (i. e.,
exemption from payment of court fees) to poor litigants. (see Rules
of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 21.) The State has also the constitutional duty
to provide free and adequate legal assistance to citizens when by
If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property re,qu"7
ments, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically ~ranted, The nght 1s
a matter of right. (Frias, Jr. vs, Sorongon, 750 SCRA 345 [2015].) While ~e acc~ss to the
courts is guaranteed under Section 11, it does not give anyone the unbndled license to
file .any case against another, whatever his motives may be. (Lucas vs. Royo, 349 SCRA
181 [2000].)
2
The prevailing party s hould not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless
lltlgntlons were to be allowed, unscrupulou~ litigations will multiply in number to the
clcldmont of the nclmlnistrntlon of jus tlce. (/11111.)
 u J
l~HILIPPINE C ON STITU'Tl<DN.AfL:..LAW Sec ..1-il
Principles an1 Cases, '.· •. '. . 1·, . ·
reason of indigence or lack of financial means,\tl,rey are unable to
engage the services ofa lawyer to defe:p.d thetttor,to eruorte,.t heir
tights in civil, criminal, or administrative cases.-, · · . ·
to
An accused in a criminal case may be allo0ed defend himself
in person only "when it sufficiently appearS. to -the court that he can
properly protect his right without the a~sistanc~_of counsel" (I}Jid.,
Rule 115, Sec. l[c].); otherwise, he must havea-e0unsel de oficio if he
does not get a counsel of his own choice.- . · ·
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Court denied motion asking that petitioners be authorized to litigatf
as pauper. ·
Facts: Plaintiffs-petitioners filed a s,\l,it tq recover l:):ieir alleged
participation or shares amounting to more than Pl 4 million i}1 sugar,
molasses, and other derivation based on µ,.e provis.ions of R.A. No.
809. (The Sugar Act of 1942.) In a separ~te motion, they asked that
they be authorized to sue as pauper litigants under Section 22, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, invoking Section 1(21),Article :m df the 1935
Constitution which provides: "Free access to the courts·shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty."
The lower court denied the motion upon the ground that
petitioners have regular employment and ~c;,urces of income and·
thus, cannot be classi~ed as poor or pauper. · 3, Sec. 22 ther.eof.), a 'pauper litigant' is not what the nomenclature
Issue: The sole issu~ is whether. the p~tj.tione~s were d~priveq. qf
free access to the courts by reason of poverty.
_Held: (1) Constitution is to be interpreted sp as to make it a livir(g
reality. - "The Constitution should be interpreted with a view to
realizing it~ ~damental objective of protecting and enhancing
the people s interest, as a nation collectively and as persons
individually. : legislations: in Republic Act No. 6033, 'An Act Requiring Courts
The rule, that free access to the courts should not be denied
to our person by reason of poverty, applies to a class suit filed by
ten (10) laborers in their own behalf and in behalf of 9,000 other
laborers because, although each laborer would share only Pl .60 out
of the total filing fee of P14,500, still such amount would diminish
the subsistence income of seasonal workers. Moreover, there are
other litigation expenses to be shouldered. A contrary interpretation
would not make the constitutional provision the living reality that
it is designed to be."
IJ
Sec: 11 '1 ,'· ,A'.RT: IJi}. BILLOF RIGHTS 731
Free Access to ~e Courts and Quasi-Judicial Bodies
{2) It .suffices thatlitigant is indigent though not a pauper. - 'As
• applied t0 sta~tes Q;rprovisions on the right to sue informa pauperis,
the term has .a broaqe,r meaning. It has thus been recogi;i.ized that:
'An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be a pauper;
the fact that he is,,able-bodied and may earn the necessary money
is no answer to his statement that he has no sufficient means to
· '; ,prosecute. the ~~ti~n or to secure the costs.' (14 Am. Jur. 31.)
It suffices that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), though not a public
charge. And the difference between ' paupers' and' indigent' persons
is that the latter are 'persons who have no property or source of
income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor,"
though self-supporting when able to work and in employment.'
(Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913, 'Indigent' citing People v. Scholnrie
County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830.) It is, therefore, in the sense of belng
indigent that ' P,aupe"r ' is taken when referring to suits in fon11n
pauperis. Black's Law Dictionary in fact defines pnuper, thus: 'A
person so poor that he must be supported at public expenses; nlso
a suitor who, on apcount of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend without
. being chargeqble with costs."' (Acar vs. Rizal, 19 SCRA 625 [1967),
- through Justice J.P. Bengzon.)
The same issue was raised in another case, where the Supreme
Court ruled that "under the Constitution and the Rules of Court (Rule
literally means - that the p etitioner must be so destitute as to have
no means at all of even supporting himself." After quoting Acar vs.
Rizal (supra.), it said:
(1) Term "indigent litigant" is given expansive meaning by
legislations. - "Not that the foregoing view stands alone. This
concept of pauper litigant has been incorporated in recent (1969)
to Give Preference to Criminal Cases Where the Party or Parties
Involved are Indigents,' and Republic Act No. 6034, 'An Act
Providing Transportation and Other Allowances for Indigent
Litigants,' both approved on August 16, 1969. Congress has defined
the term 'indigent' to refer to a person 'who has no visible means
of income or whose income is insufficient for the subsistence of his
family.' Of particular interest is a third statute: Republic Act No.
6035, also approved on August 16, 1969, entitled'An Act Requiring
Stenographers to Give Free Transcript of Notes to Indigent and Low
 l I
732 :eI-IILIPPINE CONSTITUlfION~L LAW Sec. 1.1
Principles and Oases · ·, · · , · . ·
Income Litigants and Providinga Penaltyforthe:V19fatioriThereof.'
This refers to the transcript· of: stenogr-aphk notes of, ':a· hearing
before an investigating,ffsca'l qftrial jtt.dg-e 'Or.h~at:irtg•G9mm,issfoner
of any quasi-judicial bodyot' admirustraJ5)1~.ti:ibun~l/ifo,r,.indeed,·
the term 'indigent~litigant' fo:i: i:he·ptttpos1Pbf<tl;tls statute (iZ.A No.
6035.) was given a more expansive meaningtb'f~dude 'anyorte\ivho
has no visible means·of support ot whose in:~opt~ ~de~ rt6fexcieed
P300 per month or whose inco:¢-e even -i n excess:'of P3@0;per p:ionth
is insufficient for thesubsisteFtce ,ofhis family'.'" ··· -,t ·: · :;-, - "·
(2) Constitutional policy is to be liber;qlly. ·cqneftrued. ~ : "In the
resolution; Qf the issue involved, we ~hould risffos~ sightj>f, the
liberal views expressed in said decision <Hl9-. li:i.:0{s.: Fcir the}e ,views
are but expressions of the constitutional policy that proscribes .denial
of free access to the cou,rts by reason of poverty which ·policy should
be liberally applied, the better to approximate·· the constitutional
intent." · any othedneans which vitiate the free will shall be used
(3) Income of Htigant is the determinative factor. - "There is in the
record the affidavit of petitioner stating that he has neither property
nor income. And yet, the municipal judge misconceived the impact
of this affidavit by relying merely on a certificate of the municipal
treasurer stating that a man by the name of Jtian' Enaje appears to
own property. Such certificate was mistakenly given importance by
the municipal judge. His Honor should have taken stock ofpetition-
er's vehement assertion that he is not the Juan Enaje mentioned in
those tax declarations; and that, in truth and in fact, he '(petitioner)
had no source of income at all.
Even on the assumption that petitioner QWI).S property, he may
still be an indigent (Alameda County vs. Janssen, 130 A.LR. 1041,
1147.) considering his sworn statement that he had no income.
Under the standard set forth in Acar vs. Rosal as well as the recent
legislations heretofore adverted to, it is the income of a litigant 'that
is the determinative factor. For, really, pi:operty may have no.ineome.
It may even be a financial burden." (Enaje Vs; Ramos, 31 SCRA 141
[1970]) ·through Justice Sanchez.) · which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the
-oOo-
', •• Jf
RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER •
, INVESTIGATION
SEC. _12..;(1) ~~y pers011. 11-nder i:p.vestigation for the
commission of an
offen·s e shall have the right to he in-
formed of'hi; r~ght -t~ remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cartnot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provide'd With orie. These rights cannot be waived ex-
cept in writing ·and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommuni-
cado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evi-
dence against hiin.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violations of this section as well as compensation to
and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practic•
es, and their families.
Rights of person u,nder arrest
or Investigation.
(1) Miranda rights. - Under Section 12, 1 any person under
1
Implemented by R.A. N o. 7438 (May 15, 1992). The rights originated from Miranda
t•. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 (1966],) which gave birth to the so-called "Miranda doctrine"
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. (People vs. Tulin, 364 SCRA 10 [2001],) The
Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the
statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the
733
 Pl 111 ,ll ' l ' I NH CON:-JIJ l'lJ 11( NJ\ l , I.AW
' Pl'ln lpl.cii nnd Crrnel'.l
criminal investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right:
(a) to remain silent;
(b) to have comp!:!l:ent and in.?~:pen\fep.t c_ounsel preferably
of his own choice or to be provided with ·orie; · ·
(c) to be informed of such rights;
(d) not to be subjected to the use 'of't~r~rei. fore~, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means w,hi'cil vitiates the free
will; and · · ·' ·
(e) not to be_ held in secret d~t¢.n:t\o;l;\-.,;PlicE:s, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms ofdetention.2
(2) Waiver. - Any of the above rights may ·t;,e, waived, but to
insure that the waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the Constitution
•i?
adds.the stringent r~quirement that i_t mu~_t be writing and in the
presence of the counsel of the person tµ1d,er investigation.
(3) When right .can be invoked. - These rights are .available the
moment an arrest, with or without a warrant, is made or from the
time he is taken into custody for possib1¢· investigation, or he is
singled out as a suspect although not yet'in ctisfody. They may not
be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in
court because he is no longer under custodial iri.v:estigation3 (People
presence of counsel." (People vs. Chavez, 735 SCRA 728 [2014],) The infractions of the
Miranda rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made
during the custodial investigation. The conviction of the accused may be based not on the
alleged uncounselled confession or admission but on the testimony of the prosecution
witness. (People vs. Bio, 750 SCRA 572 [2013].)
2
These forms of detention of persons arrested by the military for alleged subversive
activities or for being critical of the government were found to be prevalent under the
Marcos.regime especially during the period of martial law, from September 21, 1972 to
Jan11ary 17, 1981. Different forms of torture were also practiced.
31he guarantees contained in Section 12(1 ), or the so-called "Miranda rights",
may be invoked only by a person who is under custodial investigation or in-custody
interrogation. (People vs. Almanzor, 384 SCRA [2002]; Esoleo vs. Dorado, 385 SCRA
554 [2002]; Ladiana vs. People, 393 SCRA 419 [2002].) R.A. No. 7438 (see Note 13) has
extended these guarantees to situations in which an individual has not been_formally
arrested but has merely been "invited for questioning." (Aquino vs. Paiste, 555 SCRA
255 [2008}.) The police authorities concerned have the duty to see to it that the accused is
apprised of his rights and that they are availed of by him. The burden of proof is upon the
prosecution that the accused was accorded said rights before he extrajudicially admitted
his guilt to the authorities.
A l,{'1', JJL IJIIJ ,t)Jl l{l ·1.rn; i':JO
Rights of Persons Under Investigation
vs. Loveria, 187 SCAA 47 [1990].) nor by a person undergoing
preliminary investigation before a public prosecutor. (Ladiana vs.
People, 393 SCRA419 [2002).) ,
When person under investigation..
The words "under investigation" include custodial or in-
custody interr6gation or investigation but not where the proceeding
is 'a mere generc'\1 inquiry intp art alleged crime.4
· Custodial inte~rogation or investigation refers to the critical pre-
trial stage when the police investigation is no longer a g~neral
inquiry into ariunsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
person as a suspect who had been taken into custody by the police
who carry out a pro.cess of interrogation and propounds questions
to' the person to elicit incriminating statements.
(1,) It is when q~estions are initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person (even if he is not yet a suspect) has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.5 (People vs. De Jesus, 213 SCRA 345 (1992] and
People vs. Elvis, 154 SCRA 513 [1987], citing Miranda vs. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966],) A barangay chairman is not deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3).
(People vs. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374 [2004].)
(2) A person on board a police vehicle on the way to the police
station is already under custodial investigation. (People vs. Bolanos,
211 SCRA 262 [1992].) Roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest. (Luz vs.
People, 667 SCRA 421 [2012].)
(3) The person need not even be in custody because the
Constitution does not mention the word "custodial." (Galman
4It is qujte common and in most cases, necessary for law enforcers to ask questions to
he_lp them ascertain whether or not there exists probable cause to arrest perso~ suspec~ed
of committing a crime. Such inquiry is nothing more than a part of the mvestigahve
p rocess. (Argoncillo vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 313 [1998].)
5The subjection of the accused's body to paraffin test or to ultraviolet ray examination
in order to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder without the presence of counsel
does not violate the right against self-incrimination (see Sec. 17.) nor the right to counsel,
for it cannot be considered a custodial investigation. (People vs. Canceran, 229 SCRA 581
[1994]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994].)

l"l-lll:..11-'l.,IN~ ONSTITV11Ii<Z>NA.L LAW
Sec. 1,2
Principles and Case's. , ·· ,,..
vs. ~amaran, 138 SCRA ~94 '[1985]:)'in other' words, the rights are
available to a person who 1s not yet incustody; whentheinvestigittion
has begun to focus on him as a suspecti(infra,),•i.i?.,'frotn the time the
police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession or
an admission, or any information from-him,iR.Connection with;an
alleged crime, even if the sa~e pe initiate~_1;,y m~re "invit~tion"
~o a person who is investigated in cqnnection with .i:Ul off~nse he
1s suspected to have committed. (Gamboa vs. Crttz 162 SC:RA 652
[1988]; People vs. Valdez, 341 SCRA25 '[2000]; P~opi~ vs. Delm; 390
SCRA 395 [2002].) . _ . . '
(~) A person_ undergoing preliminary ihve~t~gfitio11, crum9t be
cons1dered_as being ~der custodial ~vestigaHoi: ..The p~rpose of
the former 1s to determine whether a cnme has been committed and
~e respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be· held f~r
tnal. (People vs. Pefiaf101~ 766 SCRA 427 [2015}.) ' · ·
Guarantee remedies imbalance between
investigator and Investigated.
S~ction 12 sets forth stringent procedural safeguar~s to secure
~he .n~hts .of the accused, particularly the-. P:ivileg~ against self-
mcnmmation (Sec. 17.) of persons under arrest or itJcustody of iaw
enforcement officers.6 ·
~e 1973,C~ns,titu~ion expressly and clearly states that ·a ,c o~essi~n obtained by
!orce,,violence, mtim1dation or any other means which vitiates the free w ill is inadmissible
111 evidence. It does not distinguish whether or not the confession ~btafued d.. ··
t d'al . t . . th . . urmg
cus o , 1 .m errogation 1s• at of the accused or of a witness. On..the other hand, the 1987
c.onstitution appears. to limit ~ admissible ~onfession~ t9..those e~ecuted by the accu~ed
hrmself whe~ it provides that any confession or a.~m1ss1on obtained in violation of this
or the precedmg section shall be ~nad7:1issible in evidence against him.'' (People vs. Bombesa,
162 SCRA_ 402 [1988).) A ~onfess10'.11s not required to be i;n a r..articular form. It may be
oral or wntten, forrr:al or informal m ch aracter. (People vs, Satorre, 408 SCRA 642 [2003].)
U~der rules laid down by the Constitution and existing la\v and jurisprudence a'
confession ~o be admissible rr:ust satisfy a_ll of f~ur fimd~mental requirements. It must be: (a) .
volunt.u:r, 1.e., ma~e freely, without coerc10n, v10lence, mducement, or false promises; (b)
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) express (see Rules
of Court, Rule 130, Sec, 35.); and (d) in writing. (RA. No. ?438; People vs: Denie a 251
SCRA 626 [1995); 1'.'eople vs. Ca~iles, 284 SCRA 199 [1998).) The confession must ~iven
i:ot o'.'1y voluntarily but also mtelligently where the accused comprehended the legal
b!
51.g nifican~ of his ac~. The :vriting must be in the language krtown to and under~tood by
~ and signed by him, or 1f he does not know how to read and write thumbmarked by
m. It must be sipited by him in the presence of counsel. ' and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up (infra,) is considered a
1:he confession_ must also be credible, i.e., consistent with the normal exp erience of
mankind. A confession that meets these constitution al standards constitutes evidence of
IJ
Sec. 12 : ,Af{'f :.llll. BlLL OF RIGHTS '7.37
Rights of.Persons Under Investigation
After a person:i:s arrested .and his custodial investigation begins,
a .confrontatiomflXi~~.which; at best, may be termed unequal. The
detainee is--brought to an army camp or police headquarters and
there questioned ancj, cross-examined not ·only by one but' as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds
hiµ:is{;!lf 41. a s~ange cmd unfamiliar surrounding, and runs through
~~nc!Cing police µ;iterrogat~o;n procedures where the potentiality
f_o,;-compulsi9n, physical and•psychological; is foi;cefully apparent.
Every pers.o n he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators
are well-trained and se.a soned in their work. They employ them to
extract the truth, or what may.pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainee$ are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
dghts. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence
of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them
into silence. The incommunicado character of custodial invesllgalion
or interrogation also obscures a later judicial determination of what
really_ transpired.
Section 12 seeks to remedy this imbalance. During the period
of his detention, the detainee shall have the right to confer with his
counsel at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone
and privately, ·in the jail or any other place of custody.7 (Morales, Jr.
a high order,.because no perspn of normal .m ind will knowingly and deliberately confess
tp be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. (People vs.
Santos, 283 SCRA443 [1997); People vs. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640 [1999].) With the presence
;;if these requirem~nts, the confessant has effectively }Vaived his right to remain silent.
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that: "An extra-judicial confession
made .by an accused shall not b e su fficient ground for conviction unless corroborated
by evidence of corpus delicti.'' The rule merely requires that there should be some other
evjdence •:.tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession."
(People vs. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640 [1999}.) . .
7Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel
at the trial, inasmuch .as the accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the
law and the advocacy .of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of the changes
in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries
and the judicial system well before the trial begins. It is, therefore, appropriate to extend
the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law
enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate
"critical" stage of the proceedings. (People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 [1994]; People vs.
Labtan, 320 SCRA 140 [1999].)
73U l"IllLU"l"l Nli N ST1TUT£<DW:Al'L LAW
Principles and Cases · . -·· ...., ' ·
. .
vs. Entile, 121 SCRAS38 [1983];.se'.e:Reopie.iV:sr.;AlJ.:tdan; '-269·,SGRA 95
1
'(1997]; see People vs. Ordofioi 364'SCR:A.;617.3-[20©0};~.· u.,.:, .r:·r,, ;- . ·:,
. ·'' ··
' record. (P-eople vs. Gonzales, 189 SCRA 343 [1990].)
Effect of failure to comply with .-,
the guarantee. .
(1) Confession or ·admission ifutdmissib1e,, >,; ;To' give forc:e:'•ai\'d
meaning to th.e guarantee; the Co1itsti~tib!i:hi.a1Jk~sJW~l~a1Hifa.f 'any
confession or· adntlsslon,8 even.if i'f,h:ad' ;bee~•voluhM._
:rily;g<ivefi: ans.
speaks the truth, obtained in vibla:tion of a'.ny,of::the above rights,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in·• whole or-· in part!, shall ·be
inadmissible in evidence against the·-person . under investigation.
(Sec. 12[3); see Sec. 3[2].) In the absence of'a valid waivet;~it does
not matter that the accused ·failed to object ,dutfug the trial to ·the
introduction of the constitutionally proscribed ev~dence. (People vs.
Obrero1, 332 SCRA 190 [2000]; People vs. Samontanez, 346:SCRA 83
[2000].)
It is not difficult to understand why unlawfulty obtained
evidence has to be excluded.9 To hold otherwise is to grant the· right
8The R~les ~f Court defines confession as a "declaration of the accused e_xpressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged." (Rule 130, Sec. 129.) The extra-judicial
confession of the accused is binding only upon himself and is not admissible against
his co-accused as to whom it is merely hearsay evidence. This rule is not, however,
without exceptions. (People vs. Liwag, 225 SCRA 46 (1993).) In confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt.
Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused
which does not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. (see Rules of Court, Rule
30, Secs. 26 and 33.) It is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, ·of facts pertinent'to
the issue and tending, in connection with proof other facts, to Jltove his guilt. (People vs.
Zuela, 323 SCRA 589 [2000]; AstudiUo vs. People, 509 SCRA 302 (2006].) It is something
Jess than a confession.
Not~ tha~ the infra1;tions of th7s?•called Miranda _rights render inadmissibh( only
the ~x~a _J~d\c1al confess.10n or adm1~s1on made during the ·custodial investigation: The
adnuss1bility of other evidence proVIded such evidence is relevant to the issue and it is
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even .jf·obtained or taken in th~
course of custodial investigation. (Aquino vs: Paiste, 555 SCRA 255 [2008]; Ho Wai Pong
vs. People, 654 SCRA 624 (2011].) . other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evid~nce
Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of the admissibility in evidence
under Section 12 of Article IlI of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because
paragx;aph (3) thereof expressly .refers to both confession and admission. (People vs.
Agustin, 240 SCRA 541 [1995].) Section 12 treats of both in the same light. (People vs. De
la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 [1997).)
9
Paragraph 3 of Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the ·poisonous tree
doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of
Sec. 12 A.R-T . lTI. BILL OF RIGHTS 709
Rights of Persons. Under Investigation
but in realit y to,.withh0ld its privilege and enjoyment. The judgment
of conviction mus.t.i:s tand or fail on the basis df other evidence of
(a) Section 12 treats of two (2) kinds of involuntary or
coerced confessions: 1) those which are the product of third
degree· methods such as torture, force, violence, threat or
intimidation which are dealt in parag11aph 2 of Section 12, and
-· · 2) those whieh-are given withoutth.ebenefit of Miranda warnings
(infra.), which are the subject of paragraph 1 thereof. (Peopfe vs.
Obrero, 332. SCRA 190 [2000]; People vs. Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA
666 [2004].) Manhandling of any sort will vitiate an extra-judicial
confession. (People vs. Opida, 142 SCRA 296 [1986]; People vs.
Yutuc, 188 SCRA i [1990] .)
(b) Any documentary evidence signed by the accused in
the nature of a declaration against interest or tacit admission
of the crime charged (e.g., mere unexplained possession of
prohibited drugs) is punishable by law, is in th e same category
as an extra-judicial confession outlawed by the Constitution.
(People vs. Yutuc, supra. ) But affidavits and testimonies of other
persons (e.g., police officers) are not to be expunged from the
records where they are not affected by the inadmissibility of the
accused's own extra-judicial confession. (People vs. Lorenzo,
200 SCRA207 [1991].)
(c) The exclusionary rule10 applies, notwithstanding that
the confession is in the handwriting of the accused and exhibits
all the earmarks of truth, containing minute details that could
only have come from him, and jibe with other p ieces of evidence
uncovered by the investigations. (People vs. Or tilla, 129 SCRA
Nardone v. United States. (308 U.S. 388 [1939).) According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit" } derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based
on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain
subsequently obtained. (People vs. Tulin, 364 SCRA 10 [2001); People vs. Alivando, 251
SCRA 293 [1995].}
1°It applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made
in an administrative investigation. (Manuel vs. N.C. Construction Supply, 282 SCRA 256
(1997). ) Perforce, the admissions made by the respondent during such investigation
without the assistance of counsel may be used as evidence to justify disciplinary action
ngoinsthim. (Remolana vs. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304 [2001).}

740 1Jll1L1YI: !NU 'ONST!TUT~ l'N4\.if., LAW Sec. 12
Principles and Cases i ,, i:-.
250. [1984]; People . vs. Compil, 244;- ·SGR:A'-135. [19,95.J,) And
1 i
where the extra-judicial- confession . is· ip.adimissU:>le} pictures
1 of release ot better treatment cannot be considered admissible
taken during the re-enactment of the -crime,based upon such
confession, are themselves inadmissible. (Pe.o ple vs. J:ungco, 186
SCRA 714 [1990].) - Constitution, uncounseled statement such as it is called in the
(d) The exclusionary rule was n<;>t: intijnc;led..as a deterrent
for the accused fi;0n:i. ..confessJng guil:t,,.i{:.lhe :yqluntarily and
intelligently so.desires but to protect the .~ccµs,ed,fa:o~ admitting
what he is coerced to admit incriminating fact-s although untrue.
It presumes that the alleged admission w.as_..cq~rced; the very
evil the rule stands to avoid. When .applying th:e :l'!llle, courts
are .not allowed to distinguish between pre_liminaey questioning
and custodial investigation-proper. (People·v~; Bravo, 318 SCRA
81f [1999}; People vs.. Penaflor, 766 S.C¥ ~27. '[2015].)
.(e) Involuntary or . coerced .confessions .are inadmissible
.not only because of their unreliability but more fundamentally,
on the ground of humanitarian principles which abhor all
forms -of torture or unfairness .toward the accused in criminal
proceedings. (People vs. Inguito, 117 SCRA 641 [1982].) Crime
must be punished and the guilty must not be.allowed to escape.
A desirable end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional
means. There would be less than full respect for the law and
a decent regard for the dignity that attaches to every human
being if, in the process of enforcing the law, lawless methods are
employed. (People vs. Magbanua, 115 SCRA 641 [1982].)
(f) "Coercion can be physical, mental or emotional. The
blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconsti-
tutional confession." (People vs. Navoa, 143 SCRA 513 [1986];
People vs. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383 [1999).) Thus, a confession
bears the earmark of involuntariness where it was taken in,com-
municado, as where the interrogations were conducted inside a
small room with only the accused and five police investigators
were present.11 (People vs. Jara, l44 SCRA516 [1986].)
11
1n a case, the trial judge regarded as tell-tale signs of the accused's guilt his
submissiveness when he was arrested and the fact that he signed without objection the
Receipt of Seized Property (marijuana dried leaves) which was later offered as evidence.
It was held: "One can.easily be cowed into silence by men with drawn guns and ostensible
authority and may even be intimidated rnto involuntary -admissions as the [accused)
claims he was when he signed the receipt. That receipt was, in reality, an admission which
AR!T. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 741
Sec. 12
Rights of Persons Under Investigation
(g) Confessions or admissions of guilt extracted on promises
evidence. (People vs. Campos, 202 SCRA 387 [1991);, People vs.
Eglipa, 174 SCRA 1 [1989).)-They are not voluntary. Under the
United States from which Section 12 was derived, is presumed
to be psychofog!cally coerced. 12 (People vs. Obrero, 332 SCRA
190 [2000).)
(h) Where, for example, the statements of the accused were
taken without,.the assistance of counsel, such lack of counsel
makes those statements, in contemplation of law, involuntary,
even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically (People vs.
Ampo-an, 187 SCRA 173 [1990).) or although it was a product of
the accused's own free will and volition. (People vs. Nicolas, 20~
SCRA 191 [1991].)'It cannot be considered and given any weight
in ascertaining the guilt of the accused (People vs. Gonzaga,
212 SCRA 730 [1992].), and even if it speaks the truth (People
vs. Malmis, 167 SCRA 10 [1988]; People vs. Parel, 261 SCRA 720
[1996].), and although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel, they are still flawed under the Constitution.
(People vs. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 [1994]; People vs. Ordona,
334 SCRA 673 [2000].)
(i) An uncounselled confession cannot convict. Any sug-
gestion that an uncounselled confession and waiver were sub-
sequently validated by the later signature of counsel for the
accused, must be taken with extreme care. (People vs. Cabintoy,
247 SCRA 442 [1995).) Where there is doubt as to their voluntari-
ness, the same must be rejected in toto. (Ibid.; People vs. Galit,
135 SCRA465 [1985].)
·, I
l
t
the accused-appellant was forced to make withou~ the assist~ce of COU1;15e~ and "."'i~out
first being informed of the constitutional rights of a person facing custodial 1~vesttga~on.
That evidence was totally inadmissible under the Bill of Rights and the consistent ruh.ngs
of this Court." (People vs. De Guzman, 194 SCRA 601 (1991].)
12Note, however, that what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an ~clusion of his body
in evidence, when it may be material.. In fact, an accused may vahdly be compe~ed to
be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced without
running afoul of the prescription against testimonial compulsion, (Gu tang vs. People, 335
SCRA 479 [2000]; see Sec, 17.)
I I
742 pl-HLl.f>li>JNhl 'ON S'fl'l'UlU:<DN~ •T.i. LAW Sec. 12
Principles and Gase·s
, (j) An uncounse11ed-s tafement is:pre$umed·by the Consti-
tution to be psychologically coerced.·Surr0unded by ihtimidal-
ing figures typical of the. atmosphere of Wf'i©lice interrogation,
the suspect needs the guiding handiof t1. counsel. {People vs. Ca~
simiro, G.RNo. 14627'7, June,20,-2002.)
(k) An officer making an arrest m°'y tcJ.:\<.e from the person
arrested any money or property found upon his perr,.on which
was used in the commission of the crime, or was the fruit of
the crfrne, or which might furnish the prisoner with the means
of committing violence or escaping1 or which may be used in
evidence in the trial of the cause. But where it is shown that the
fatal weapon used in the commission of the crime was found
as a consequence of an uncounselled extra-judicial confessio,1,
the same, together with the confession, may not be admitted in
evidence because it is but a fruit of .a constitutionally infirmed
interrogation. (Aballe vs. People, 183 SCRA 196 [1990].) · relative,. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means -
(2) Penal and civil sanctions. - Under subsection (4), violators
shall be subject to penal and civil sanctions to be provided by law.
For humanitarian reasons, such law to be enacted by Congress shall
provide compensation for, and rehabilitation of, victims of tortures
or similar practices and their families. The provision is thus not self-
executing.
Responsibility of arresting officer.
.The issue of failure by the arresting officers to inform the
accused of his constitutional rights and to afford him the benefit
of counsel during the custodial investigation requires strong and •
convincing evidence because of the presumption that the faw
enforcers acted in the regular performance of their official duties.
(People vs. Moreno, 374 SCRA 667 [2000].) · he desires to exercise them, and only when such person definitely,
(1} To inform person arrested of his rights. -At the time a person
is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights
to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. (Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA
538 [1983).) But the fact that the initial interrogation of the accused
Sec. 12 k R:r.,J)J,I: 'B ILL OF RIGHTS 743
~ghts of Persons,Under Investigation
by the arresting officerS:iWa:s made without his first being told of
his constitutional 'rights is inconsequential where the prosecution
ne;ver attempted Jo;'p_r,ove w hat he might have said on that 9ccasion.
(People vs. Sinoc, ·27BSCRA 357 [1997].)
(2) To expl!l:in their effects in practical terms. - It is not enough
that the per~on <!rrested be told that he has those rights. The
arresting officer is not on,ly duty-bound to tell the person the rights
to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in
practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or
may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (see
People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312 [1983]; People vs. Caguioa, 95
SCRA2 [1980].)
(3) To allow him to communicate with his lawyer, etc. - The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawye1; a
by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It sh all be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. (Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, supra; People vs. Galit, 135
SCRA 465 [1985]; People vs. Camalog, 169 SCRA 816 [1989]; People
vs. Albior, 163 SCRA 332 [1988].)
(4) To be familiar with the constitutional rights of persons arrested
or under investigation. - It behooves every police investigator who
conducts a custodial investigation to possess definite knowledge of
the constitutional rights of all persons being subjected by him to
any inquiry relative to the commission of any offense and, what is
more, he must see to it that the person being interrogated by him
is not only informed of such rights but that he is specifically asked
in the language the latter adequately understands whether or not
categorically and freely answers affirmatively may the investigator
proceed to conduct his inquiry and take the statement of the person
detained, with the implicit understanding yet that even such initial
waiver is not definitely final, for the person under investigation
may still invoke, at his option, the same rights at any further stage
of the interrogation. (Barredo, ]., concurring in People vs. Caguioa,
supra.)
I·,
I I I 1
'r44 .PHILIPPINE CONSTI1flU11J(!).N'.f.\.L LAW Sec. :t2
Principles and Case·s • •
:Right·of .detained p~rson. to•·be'4nfor.med;,r, ,.
,, ·.of his rights. . ,. ..,:.u ., .,
In the case of People vs. Mahimty (302· SCRA 455 [1999).), 'the
0
Supreme Court lays down the pr~·{ced1fi.:~;·''~iti.elines and duties
which the arresting, detqinirtg;. inviting' ot 4ivestig~)ii:1g officer or
his companions'must do an\i observe aftn~ t_im~.of making ar\..arres.t
and again at, an~ during th~ ?me of th~ cµsf9dfa1 intertogat1oidn
accordance with the Constitution; juri~i;:fruaenc~ and R.A. No.
7438, 13 as follows:
(1) The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial
investigation must be informed in a :language kn0wn to and
understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must b~ shown
the warrant of arrest, if any; every other warnings,• information or
communication must be in a language known to and understood by
said person;
(2) He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and
that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;
· (3) He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at
all times and have the presence of an independent and competent
lawyer preferably of his own choice;
(4) He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot
afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and
that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested
or one acting in his behalf;
(5) That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he
must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall
be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or valid waiver
has been made; · ·
(6) The person arrested must be inforrned that, at any time; he
has the right to communicate or confer by the
most expe_dient means
13
An Act defining certain rights of persons arrested, det11ined pr un.der custodial
investigation a~ .well as the ~utie~ of the arresting, d~\aining, and investigating officers
and providing penalties for violations thereof. It broadens the concept of custodial
investigation to include "the practice ofissuing an invitation to a person who has not
been formally arrested ii\lld is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed."
l J
Sec. 12 , , J Ail~ ,1 Dll!t Bll.L OP R.IGI~ffS
Rights of P,erso'tis.Mncledm1.estigation
. '
- :telephone,1tad.dt::1;)letter·on messemg~r ;.--. with his lawyer .(either
:I
I
retained or app:0inted,,. any, member of· his.·immediate family, .0r
~ -Rt~~ic~ll:c\w·:t?5'JFP.es~ ~'::WV!l~-~~r ,ci)9~~~ PY hixµ or by, any one
f,so,TT\~~ !IBm~ft.¾~}~.:f~~lypr RX Jj~~ <;:P1HJ-~eJt pr !;le,visited by/ confer
),Xm.\ .._~\JlY, . ~cs;~~~~d n~qon~l _or, .i:nte¢~tipn,al . no,n-goverrunent
0rg~z.a ti9n..:It.~9~ \~'e, the re$ponst~JU}y.,9f.U,i.e officer to ensure
that .this, is ~q:o~R~rhedi . .
,, · (7') ·He rnust;l;;~: ihfoi:'riled•that;lie l:i.as-the righno waive any
of said · rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and
i.nt~llige:o.tly.,a.n~,ensure th~t he understood the same;
· (8) ln additidn; i( the person arrested waives his right to a
lawyer, he must be informed that it must be dohe in writing AND
in the presence of counsel; otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver'is vbid:even if he insists on his waiver and chooses to speak;
'
(9) That .t he person _arrested must be informed that he may
indicate in aJ.lY manner at any time or stage of the process that he
does not wish to be questioneq with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not i,nterrogate him if the same had
not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already
begun;
(10) The person arrested must be informed that his initial
waiver of his rights to remain silent, the right to counsel or any
of his rights does not bar him from invoking it any time during
the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements; and
(11) He must also be informed that any statement or evidence,
as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Meaning of "right to be informed."
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation
"to l;,'e informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must
b~'.·P,xesumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful infor-
_mat:ion r_a ther,:th:~ just the cerelllonial and perfunctory recitation
of an abstract co.nstitutional principle, with the purpose of making
suspected individual understand his rights. Understanding would
I I I I I I I I Jl r I l
7.46 .PHILIPPINE CONS'J;l7J.l l:ff'E]©J:';\!.AiL. LAW Sec. 12
Principles !Andr:G::ases. <,. -:--' . · • ·
mean_that the information- tr.aro1smitted,was 1effetui;v.ely.:r~ceiveti, and
c0mprehended. 14 (People.vs, MdletayB©9,SORNM8,[11999}.)l., · ·., ,..
(1) The right of a J'iersdn uh~:let·ipte:rr9'¢.~&drt ·,,·to ·ld1h.rtf?:1:n1ed ' 1 who is·•addres~ed, fu,a) anguage or dialect he does not su#icientJ.y
implies ~ correlatiye ~',~~J~~
o]?l'!S.~~f P*~f.~I\~~'.jf~!i_c~fn,ves~~'~f?r
to exp lam (supra.),'attd'ciin:t~fhiplates afl_-Jffettt_vtcoH((!fu.tncat~ort.~~t~e~~
him and the suspederl Vndiviilua1' W-fal r'es'izlts itr:WnaerstaRaiWg :·what'is
conveyed, i.e., the latter's rights. Short of thiii, ·t1rJf~Ts\i''lienial'6£ the
right, as it cannot_trulyibe said!tha:t-±heJ).ersoit ha!s be.en '!J1,..fotmed"
of his rights. · . · · ., · , · ~ ·
Now, since the right "to be inforfued;, 1m:pli~s· cernpreheri.sion,
the degree of ex..pla11,~ti0n xequired wU~ nff~S$ai;iJy ;vary-, q.epe11ding
upon , the . educatipn, J:ntelligence aii..d -,9,~~F ; releyant -perso~a)
c~c~stances of .th~ ,P.ersort µnder investigatioI).. S:uffige. ;it to S?;Y
th.at.1a simpler and. .more;:h:1,<.~~- exp\anat~on _i,s!.iwe,d~f;l.1,~.here:.t pe
subject is unlettered. (People vs. _Nicandro, 141 SCRt\ 2~9 [1986];
People'vs. Decierdo, 169 SCRA 816 f:l:989]; Pe'6ple vs.1.Cafu'alogj 167
SCRA496 [1987]; People vs. Dunarl; 142 SCRA'.'100 [1986]; People· vs.
Albofei'a, 152 SCRA 123 [1987]; Peopfo',is;'Qlapani, 179 S~RA 495
[1989WPeople vs. Santos~ 283 SCRA 443 [1'~97ff People vs. Tiz6n/ Jr.,
385 SCRA 364 [2002]; People Vs:'Guillermo, 420 'sCRA:'326 [2004].)' '
(2) It is thus clear that merely informing a person under
custody of his constitutional rights and'. thei:eaftet.:ltaking down his
statement does not ·and meet the standard ·pro:V,i:a:ed··by law- and
sufficiently safeguard those rights. lruormmg·him ·bfhis rights is
but the first step. It is netessary, in addition,tha.t1he.be-convinc~d that
notwithstanding the fact that he•is in "enemt' ,tetiitory, he is not a
doomed man. (People vs. Decierdo, supra.) The Constitution does
not merely require the investigating officer to ~nfqrm the , person
under investigation, ratl).er, it requires that the ,latter be infqrmed.
(People vs. Muleta, 309 SCRA 148 [1999]; People v_s. Tizon, Jr,, supra.)
(3) To give meaning and substance to the manifest spirit
and intent of the constitutional mandate, he must p~rforce be ask~d
14
As.a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat
or enumerate to the person under investigation the provisions of -Section 12 ,(P~ople
vs. Ramos, supra.); nor 'it is enol.\gh to make the accused read lµ~;constitutipnal right$,
The prosecution must show that the accused understodd what he read" and that he
understood the consequences ofhis waiver. (People vs. Canala, '208 SCRA M2 [1992]; see
People vs. Parel, 261 SCRA720 [1996]; People vs. Canoy, 328 SCRA 3&5,(2000]; People vs.
Continente, 339 SCRA 1 [2000].)
l I I
Sec. 12 AR<T: JI.I. BILL OF RIGHTS l'ij'7
Riihts of Persons Under-Investigation
7,miutedly and -unequivocatly whether ·or not he wants to exer:oise them.
Nert every · orditla,ry: pe:r,son~ pa11ticularly the unschooled or one
~0:mmand, would r.eadi~y comprehend·the exact import of the ba£e
information-that be O"{ns a right.15 (Barredo, J.; concurring in People
vs;;IG:aguioa, 95 SCRA 2 [1980)'. ) ·
Warnings required for admissibili~
of statements made.
(1) At th_e o.u~s~t, if a ,person in custody is to be subjected to
iµtex:rogaµon, he ,111ust first be informed in clear and unequivocal
terms that he has the right to remain silent.
(/l) The ,wa.m.ing of the right to remain silent must be
accompanied.by:-1th~explanation that anything said can and will
· he used againsfthe individual in court. This warning is needed
in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of
the consequences, of foregoing it.
(b) If an ind'fvidual indicates that he wishes the assistance
of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities
cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the
individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney.
In order to fully apprise a person interrogated of the extent of
his rights under this system, then it is necessary to warn him
not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also
that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him. In a case, the warning aside from being merely perfunctory
and ceremonial, and inadequate from transmitting meaningful
information to the suspect, was held incomplete because it
did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant could
not afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. (People vs.
Casimiro, C.R. No. 146277, June 20, 2002.)
15
To dispel any doubt, and to best serve the ends of justice as it is understood by
the common man, it is imperative that the investigator should go one step further as just
indicated. One may have a right and may be r.emind ed thereof, but if in his inadequate
circumstances of education and means of intelligent communication, and because of
the obvious anxiety and apprehension usually felt by one under questioning about his
possible participation in a criminal offense, he is not mad e clearly aware when and how
he can avail of such right, such right reminder would not be of use to him. (Ibid,)
I I I
l'lJJL.JL'l'I N Jl ' N 'fl'fl.J'l \L N l,\.li,, LAW 1i<.:.
• Principles and Cases • • , ·"
. ,. ,(2:) Once warnings.have been..given,.:$eii$t\Q.~equent pr,,ocedure
is clear.· If the individual•indieates ir\,i<Ul)!'J manner, .at -any time
prior to or during questioru.rtg, ili,at·he :w ishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. Jf·the inq.iv-idual (;artnot oJ.Jtain an attorney
and he indica.tes that he wants -o ne··before .spe~g .t0 the police,
they must respect his decision to remc;tin,silent. (Peop>le.vs. Dµero,
104 SCRA 379 [1981]; People vs. Decierdo, supra.)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. One-sentence "advices" of one's constitutional rights.
Facts: In a, case, the accused's supposed voluntary statements
simply declare: "x x x x x x x x x 1
The affiant and accused in Criminal Case No. 699 for murder
was apprised of his constitutional rights under ·the Republic of
the Philippine~ and the nature of 't heir lnvestfgation regarding
self-incrimination taken in QUESTION AND ANSWER IN THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE translated into the CEBUANO DIALECT
of which he understands and testified as follows:
Question: Did you now understand your constitutipnal -rights
and the natw;e of the investigation, which, has been explained to
you?
Answer: Yes, sir.
XXX XXX xxx."·
Issue: Does the above advice satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution:? ·
Held: No. (People vs. Decierdo, supra, through Justice .Sarmiento.)
. 2. Mere pro forma effort to· inform accused of his constitutional
rights.
Facts; The following exchange preceded the investigation:
"Prelimi-nary: Mr. Roger B. Fernando, you are hereby informed
that you are under investigation for commission of an offense.
Under our New Constitution, you have. the iright .to remain silent
and to counsel of your own choice and if you cannot afford to retain
a lawyer to assist you in this investigation, the Government shall
provide you one. Is this clearly understood? ·
Answer: Yes, sir.
J
J.Z Sec. 1:2 AltT. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 749
Rights of Persons Under Investigation
Question: Aftet having appraised of your legal right under the
New Cor.1-_stitution; do you understand your right?
. Ans-µJer: Yes, $ir,
Question: Do you wish to sign a waiver stating among others
that you wish to.be investigated even without the presence of your
counsel?
Answer: Yes, sir."
Issue: Is there compliance with the procedure prescribed in
.Section 12?
Held: "The above perfunctory and almost mechanical
'compliance' certainly did not follow the prescribed procedure in
the investigation of persons suspected of criminal offenses. The
r~ghts guarante(i!d by the Constitution were merely co1111111111icnterl 1ml
not explained to 'the suspect notwithstanding the apparent need to
do so; considering his circumstances. Mere recitation of these rights
is not enough where it is not shown that the person entitled thereto
can knowingly and intelligently waive them, as we held in People
vs. Caguioa. (95 SCRA 2 [1980].)
Moreover, the waiver must now be made with the assistance
of counsel in _accordance with the rules laid down in People vs. Galit
(135 SCRA 465 (1985].), as affirmed, and even strengthened, in the
new Constitution." (People vs. Fernando, 156 SCRA 35 [1987], through
Justice Cruz.)
3. Usual mechanical advise of the suspect's rights.
Facts: The exchange between the investigator and the accused
ran as follows:
"Tanong: Ngayon, m atapos mong malaman at maintindihan
ang iyong mga karapatan na binanggit sa itaas, ikaw ba ay
nakahanda pa ring magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang
loob na salaysay at sagutin ng pawang katotohanan ang lahat
ng itatanong sa iyo na hindi ka naman pinipilit, tinatakot o
pinangangakuan ng anumang pabuya?
Sagot: Matapos akong mapagsabihan ng aking mga kara-
patan at naintindihan ko ang mga ito ako ngayon ay nagsasabi
na hindi ko na kailangan ang abogado at ako ay nakahandang
sumagot sa anumang itatanong sa akin at lubusang magbibigay
I I I I
750 •PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTtONf•.AL LAW Sec. 12
Principles and Case's ··
sa inyo ng isang malaya at kusangfoob,rta·salaysayna hindi ako
tinatakot, pinipilit o·pinangangakuan ng anumang pabuya."
. . ;.. ~
Issue: The.issue is whether the accused, y.4s p'tope'rly advised of
her constitutio;nal rights. ···
Held; Np. A reading of the supposed cdnfessioh shows there
11
was the usual .mechanical advise of the suspecf's, rights, inclucling the
right to assistance of counsel, followed by th~ sacr~~ental query
as to whether or not she was. waiving her righHo such assistance,
followed by the stereo.typed answer so ,.familicll' in statements of this
nature. As unacceptable as the question.was, the answer thereto
was no less so cind could not .have been possibly composed by the
accused-appellant in .her state of,mind at the tiµte and .g iven her
limited knowledge of Tagalog. Although she had lived all her life
in Camarines Sur and had come to Manila only sb( months earlier,
in June of that year, there was. this remarkably fluent f?Xchange
between the investigator and Leticia (accus~dJ.
It is not believable that the organized and ready ar:tswer, with
all its legal overtones, to boot, could have come from this 22-year-
old housemaid, who, on top of her deficiencies in the language (and
the law), was presumably not thinking clearly then (even assuming
she was sane) because she had just killed her child and was under
strong emotional stress." (People vs. Capitin, 165 SCRA 11 [19881,
through Justice Cruz.)
4. Stereotyped advice of the suspect's rights.
Facts; The accused's statement reveals the following:
Pasubali: Ikaw Ginoong Ernesto Flores ay nasa ilalim
11
ng pagsisiyasat sa kasalanang paglabag sa pinagbabawal na
gamot gaya ng marijuana, ngunit bago kita tanungin ay nais
kung ipaliwanag sa iyo ang iyong mga. kilrapatan alm,sunod
sa ating Bagong Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, ng gaya n:g mga
sumusunod:
Na ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag sumagot
sa mga itatanong sa iyo.
Na sa anumang sasabihin mo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay
maaring gamiting ebidensiya laban o pa.bor sa iyo Sa alinmang
hukuman dito sa ating Bansa.
Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng manananggol
upang sumubaybay sa iyo at kung hindi mo kaya ang humirang
I J
Sec. 12 A.RT. lU. BILL OF RIGHTS 751
Rig~ts of P~rsons Under Jnvestigation
.. ng isa ang tanggapang ito ang bahalang humirang ng isa para
sa iyo.
Tagasfyas~t: Naunawaan at naintindihan mo bang lahatang
mga ipinaliwanag ko sa iyo?
Sinisiyasat: Opo.
... Tanong: Matapos mong maunawaan ang iyong mga kara-
pata.n nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng malaya at kusang
loob na salaysay, na ikaw ay hindi pinipilit, tinakot, sinaktan o
pinangakuan ng anumang bagay?
Sagot: Opo sir."
Issue: Does the kind of advice" given to the accused satisfy the
II
constitutional guarantees accorded a person W1der investigation
for the commission of an offense?
Held: No. "This protection given W1der the 1973 Constil'utlon
is further expanded by the 1987 Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 12.) In
People vs. Jara (144 SCRA516 [1986].), this Court had the opportunity
to assail the kind of recitation of rights similar to the one in the
present case:
'This stereotyped' advice' appearing in practically all extra-
judicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed
the nature of a 'legal form' or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with 'Opo' as the answer or ask
the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its
tired, punctilious; fixed and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding
on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free
and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.'
This Court has observed that the long question of the investiga-
tor informing appellant of his right to remain silent and to counsel
followed by a monosyllabic answer, does not satisfy the requirements
of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Con-
stitution. (People vs. Taruc, 157 SCRA 178 [1988], citing People vs.
Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985].) The questioned confession shows that ·
while the accused was informed of his right to counsel, he was not
definitely asked whether he wanted to avail of such right, contrary to our
ruling in the case of People vs. Velasco. (110 SCRA 319 [1981].)
Furthermore, he was not made to understand that, if at any
time during the interrogation he would wish to have the assistance
 1' 1111 ll ' l ' l t ll 11 !l/ 1 1IIII J IIIIHI\ I I AW I ii '
I 1'1 1111lplt"I 1111d ( '11111•t1
of counsel, the interrogation would cease until an attorney is
present. (People vs. Lasac, 148 SCRA 624 [1987], citing Miranda vs.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [1966].) With the manifest failure to comply
with this constitutional sine qua non, the confeeysion must be held
inadmissible.
In People vs. Nicandro (141 SCRA 289 · (1986].), this Court
explained the essence of the right of the ?,ccused to be apprised
of his-constitutional rights." (People vs. Flore~~;165 SCRA 71 [1988},
through Justice Cortes; see People vs. Muleta, 309 SCRA i48 [1999].)
5. Superficial and mechariical act of "ii:zforming" suspects of their
rights.
· Facts: The accused's (Punzalan's) extra.;jt,tdicial statement is
prefaced by the following:
"PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATA.N SA !LALIM NG
SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS
Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pag_tatanong sa:himpilang
ito ng pulisya hinggil sa isang usaping kinasas;mg~utan. mo
sa salang pagnanakaw na may kasaman~ pagpatay. Bago ka
tanungin ng anuman, ipinauunawa ko mµna sa iyo at pinagpa-
paalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan Sa Halim ng Saligang
Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:
1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik <J,t huwag
magsalita o magbigay ng salaysay kung hindi mo nais.
2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod
ng isang abogado na iyong mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang
kumuha ng abogado, at nais mong magkai:oon ng paglilingkod
nito maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na
kailangang bayaran ang p aglilingkod nito.
3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ,ng
anumang pahayag na maaaring g amiting katibayan laban.sa
iyo.
4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin, o gamitan ng anumang uri
ng karahasan o pamimilit para ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.
Tanong: Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa lyo
at mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga kan:ipatan RO llnllrn ng
Saligang Bat11s ng PilipinaR, nokohonda kn bnn~ m11gbt1111y 111\
isnng mnlnyn nl· k1111nng loob nn 111ilfly11ny'?
I I 1\1{ 1', Il l. Ull.l. ( 1 lli(.;ll'l'S 753
Rigl:ts of Persons Under Investigation
I Sagot;.Opo. --
Tanong: Nakahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay \<ahit na
walang abogado na surnusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay
sinisiyasat?
Sagot: Opo.
Tanong: Lubos mo bang na~_awaan na ikaw ay hindi
maaaring pilitin · o gamitan ng anumang uri ng karahasan
upang maging saksi laban sa iyong sarili?
Sagot: Opo.
Tanong: Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa
sa iyo, magbibigay ka pa rin l;,a salaysay?
Sagot: Opo."
Issue: Has the accused been fully and properly informed of his
righf to counsel?
Held: N9, "Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additi.onal
·- question in Escober's extra-judicial statement, the latter carried the
,same quoted prefatO!Y statement. This, to our mind, indicates the
~ack of zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to
fully and truly inform Punzalan of his rights to remain silent and
to counsel during the custodial investigation. The identical manner
by which the police sought to ipform Escober and Punzalan of
their constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard for individual
comprehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence level,
educational background and personal experiences. No effort was
exerted to see to it that Punzalan really understood what was
being told, considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2
Elementary level.
The so-called 'informing' done by the police in the case at bar
was nothing more than a superficial and mechanical act, performed
not so much to attain the objectives of the fundamental law as to
give a semblance of compliance thereto, Besides, the phraseology
used by the police respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for
Punzalan was misleading. It gives the impression that the services·
of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by Punzalan only during the
court proceedings, not during the custodial investigation.
Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel,
the waiver appearing in Punzalon's extra-judicinl statement connot
b conRlclcrccl lntclligcntly rnnclo. !lor l'l, In rcwmn, n11ldc from
754 P.HILlPPlN.IJ C.:ONST1·1~Uff!tDN.A:(; LAW Soc. 12
frinciples and Cases'. ~.
the fact that it was done· without the assis.tan:ae,·oh:ounsel, said
waiver is not valid. Need.~ess to ,say, the ~?(g-a::i4dj9iaJ .confession is
inadmissible in evidence.'' (Reople 'QS. Escob.er/ ~57·,scRA 541 [1988],
through Justice Fernan.) · ·
6. Statements of three accused.are identitql •in all confessions.
Facts: The appellants (accused) repudiate/ their confessions.
They denied having freely executed the same. · The trial court
nevertheless convicted them on the strength of their confessions.
In_t:1:teir appeal, appellants question their convict!,on on the basis
of the confessions given by them under C1J.Stodial interrogation.
They contend that the same are inadmissible in evidence because
the confessions were obtained in violation of their constitutional
rights.
Their statem~nts are as follows:
"Preliminan1: Mr. Domingo Taren Y. Tresmanio, I am
informing you that I am Pfc. Gilbert T. Oasan who is assigned
to investigate you in connection with y.our involvement in a
case of robbery with homicide and robbery with intimidation.
Before giving any statement in this investigation, I would like
to inform you that under the New Cons_tjtution, you have the
right to remain silent, and the right to tie assisted.by a lawyer
at your own choice; if you cannot afford·-to get a lawyer, we
can refer you to the Integrated Bar of tli.e Philippines, Baguio
Chapter, Baguio City; should you wish to give your statement
in this investigation, it will be under oath and can be used as
evidence for .or against you in any co'u:rt •proceedings in the
Philippines.
Q: ·Have you fully understood all -your rights mentioned
above?
A:Yes.
Q: I will investigate you in Tagalog language and I will
translate all my questions and your answers in English. Do you
fully understand and speak Tagalog very well?
A:Yes.
Q: You have the right to remain silent which mcnns you mny
not give your statement If you Ao clc!lii:C, do yo11 und(•t'A lnnd?
A: Y<'II,
Sec. 12 /Ii.tq~1r1 tDL Blt.L OF lUGH'fS 765
Rights of Pe~sons.Under Investigation
Q:,:D0:y.0u·neea the serv.ices of a lawyer who will assist you
in this investigation so we refer you to.the Integrated Ba( of the
.. l'ltjlippm~~' B~guio Chapter if yo4 c~ot afford to s~cure a
. lawy~r? \· ·. ,;, , .
A: I doJlQt need a lawyer to assist me in this investigation.
Q: Are you wil'lirig t<? give your free and voluntary
statement even without the assistance of a lawyer and even
if it will be used as evidence for or against you in any court
proceeding~?
I,
;
A: Yes.
1
Issue: The issue is whether appellants were effectively informed
of their rights to silence and to counsel.
Held: "The record supports the appellants' submissions of
infringement of their rights. To begin with, it is doubtful whether
appeUants were indeed effectively informed of their rights to silence
and counsel. A glance at their individual confessions at once shows
that the statements therein purporting to demonstrate compliance
with the constitutional requisites in custodial investigations - said
statements being identical in all three confessions - fall short of the
acceptable norms.
Now, about such a lengthy opening question, this Court has
~ad occasion to remark in People vs. Galit (135 SCRA 465 (1985).):
'Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer
does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused
.be informed df his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Instead, there should be several short and clear questions and
every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
_ known to the person under interrogation.'
. The police interrogators knew, since the statements themselves
so disclose, that none of the appellants had gone beyond the
elementary level of education, and their limited education was,
therefore, a handicap to a ready and effective understanding of
the meaning and purpose of their constitutional rights. It was the
duty of the investigating officers under these circumstances to have
exerted a little more effort to ensure that information of their rights
would be adequately transmitted to the appellants and understood
by them." (People vs. O/apani, 179 SCRA 495 [19891, through Justice
Nnrvnsn.)
756 J' HlLif'PINE CON S'fI'lfCJ'fl NNI!:. LAW Sec. 12
Principles and-Cases: . -, .
I
7. Questions substantially:transmit meaningfoll ihformation-·to the
accused of his constitutional rights. ., . , ? . -~· • . •• .::
Facts: The pt~limiifar;.• qul:!sti'Sns .. ,t;!Filie p6H_c e;irtv~stigator
informing the accused of his rights and his·aiiswers·ffieret'o, read as
follows: _., ,. :',f ·'.·,r.. • · ·'
i,,..
"Tanc:ing; Ito b~ ~y:iyo~g l}~!,laj,~\Jl'a11?-. ..· :. (>
Sagot: Opo,.nalalam.an·kt:J.po,;,, ,, ; ,: ,.<,,;: ~,~:::r·,··,~; .;
T: Bago·ka magbfgay ·ng1·iSafar,s·~y;·.sE( .pagsisfyisat ·na ito
ay nalalaman mo ba na ika:w ay may :kar.i'patang mahahimik
at huwag sumagct sa IU\O µ1-ang tal}o'ng .s~ iye,attang lahat ng
iyong sa.sa~.iJ:,.~ _sa prgs._is~yast~ '.md~9~.~ ~:r:na!lariij._g gamitin
laban o p<UUg sa 1yo sa aij.n.TT'\ang B\tk~J . . . . .
S: Nalalatllan ko po, n.~nit;ha~da p9.~o~g 1\l_;g~ig~y ng
saiarsay _sa pagsi~iyasat,:t\a Jt~- ·. , ·_;; ·.. ' '. . .. ..
T; NalaJaman mo rin ba na 'il<a\v ay may layang .magkai:odn
ng manananggol sa pagsisiyasat ha ito? : ·· · investigation," without more.
S: Nalalaman ko po, ngurut hiridi.ko na·po''kai1angan sa
ngaycm ang manananggol at sa Hukuman na lamang kung
kailangan pa.
T: Kung ikaw ay bigyan ko ng man~~nggol sa ngayon?
S: Sa Hukuman na po."
Issue: Has the accused been appraised of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to counsel?
J-Ield: "The foregoing questions by ~e poiice investigator and
the answers given thereto by the accused, satisfy, in our mind, th~
requirement under the 1973 Constitution t;hen enforced, that the
accused b'e apprised of his constitutional ~ight to remain silent and
to counsel. Such questions substantiaily transmitted meaningful
information to the accused regarding his aforesaid constitutional
rights, as distinguished from a mere cefemonial arid perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." (People . vs.
Marquez, 153 -SCRA 700 [1987], th-rou,gh Ju5,_tice·Padilla; see People vs.
Pinlec, 165 SCRA 674 [1988].)
8. Constitutional s-afeguards were read.perfu~ctori~y to the accused.
Facts: The advice given.to the accused by the police investigation
was in the form of a mere repetition of the constitutional safeguo rds
read to the accused in a perfunctory manner.
At( l'. ·111. UlLI . 11 1{1(..:1 l'l'8 'IS'l
Rights of P~rsons Under Investigation
Issue: Is ther~ full ·compliance with the constitutional man-
date?
Held:""The 1;tdyice is less than full compliance with the mandate
: of meaningful reci,tptipn of.constitutional rights. The requirement finds
greater relevance..where the accused finished only Grade VI .and
is, in all probabill.ty,, ri,ot adequately educated to understand fairly
and fully the significance of pis constitutional rights to silence
and to counsel." (People vs. Nicandro,)41 SCRA 289 [1986], through
Justice Plana; see People vs. Rama, 122 SCRA 312 [1983]; People vs.
Almario, 171 SCRA'291 [1989].)
9. Confession was prefaced with statement that affinnt was informed
of his rights, · ·
Facts: The confession was merely prefaced with the perfunctory
statement that "the one making a sworn statement wns informed
of his right under the Constitution and the reason for this
Issue: Is the confession admissible as evidence?
Held: The confession is inadmissible in evidence as the accused
was not clearly and unequivocally informed of his constitutional
rights. (People vs. Dino,_160 SCRA 197 [1988], through Justice Melencio-
Herrera.)
10. Prosecution Jailed to rebut allegation of coercion of accused when
they signed extra-jucJicial confession.
Facts: The prosecution failed to rebut the testimony of
appellants that they were coerced to sign extra-judicial confessions
by force and that they were not informed of their constitutional
rights during custodial investigation.
Issue: Are the sworn statements admissible in evidence?
Held: Such failure is tantamount to an admission of appellants'
allegation. Thus, their sworn statements are inadmiisible in evi-
dence. (People vs. Enciso, 160 SCRA 728 [1988], through Justice Paras,)
11. A statement was prepared by the police in the Booking and
Information Sheets that after accused was informed of his constitutional
rights, he admitted his guilt.
Facts: The sheets contained the following paragraphs: "Ac-
cused, after being informed of his constitutional right to remain
758 ' PHILIP PINE CON S'flTU'l'lONAL L/\.W
• Principles and Cases
silent and to counsel, readily admitted his guilt but refused to give
any written statement."
At the trial, the testimony of the police investigator who
prepared the sheets wc\s dispensed with by the Trial Fiscal after
he had obtained from the Defense a stipulation to the effect that,
had said witness testified, he would have identified and testified
on the existence and due execution of--said'Sheets. The accused,
however, subsequently denied in effect having made any such
verbal admissions ofguilt.
Issue: Is the verbal admission acceptable as evidence?
I
Held: "Even if the accused ha~ indeed made the verbal
confessions imputed to them as alleged in the Booking and
Information Sheets, the same would not be acceptable as evidence
against them because the constitutional preconditions for their
admission had not been complied with. The· mere ·assertion by a
police officer that after an accused was informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, he readily admitted his
guilt, does not make the supposed confession admissible against
the purported confessant." (People vs. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100 [1986],
through Justice Narvasa.)
12. Long question was followed by a monosyllabic answer.
Facts: There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from
the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the
accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the
accused is his alleged confession. The statement begins as follows:
"Tanong: lpinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang i.nyong
.j
mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na
kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng
isang salaysay, na hindi rin kayo rnaaaring pilitin o saktan_at
pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na anuman
ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring laban
sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang
hukuman o tribunal dito sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito
ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang man ananggol at kung
sakaltng hindi mo l<ayang bayaran ang isang manananggol
maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon al nlnrn 1110 M nng
mga ito nnkahnndn kn bonp; mngblp;ny ng ltrnng k111111ng•lo11II 1\lt
11oh1y1111y 11n p ng111 11111011g no lln'?
Sec.:. 12 l,\.lt l'. 111. Bl LL O F RIG! l'fS 759
Rights of Persons Under Investigation
Sagot: Opo."
Issue; Is the confession admissible in evidence?
Held: No. _"Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic
answer does not S<!-tisfy the requirements of the law that the accused
be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Instead, there should be several short and clear questions and every
right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to
the person under'-investigation. Accused is from Samar and there
is no showing that he understands Tagalog, Moreover, at the time
of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives
did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation
and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the snlnysny
that his relatives were allowed to visit him.
·His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to
counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by
one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted
by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his
rights." (People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 {1 985], through Justice
Concepcion, Jr.)
13, It appears from the extrajudicial confession that the appellants
were informed of their rights and that thei; understood such rights but the
records show otherwise.
Facts: The extrajudicial confession of appellant AD starts in this
manner:
cl
"Pasubali: Ginoong Alfredo Dagumboy, ipinagbibigay alam
namin sa inyo n a kayo'y inuusig tungkol sa isang kasalanan,
Pinaaalala namin sa inyo ang magsawalang kibo at magkaroon
ng patnubay ng manananggol na sarili ninyong pili. Ito ba ay
nauunawaan ninyo?
Sagot: Opo.
Tanong: Pagkatapos na maipabatid sa inyo ang inyong
karapatan sa ilalim ng ating bagong Saligang Batas na magsa-
walang kibo, nais ba ninyong ipagpatuloy ang imbestigasyong
il:o?
Snsot: Opo, h incli ko po ka ilnngan ang manananggol sa
l11 tb( 111lj\1111yoi 1g I10 .
1
 I l 1 1 1 II
760 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTI®NAlt LAW Sec. ,1:2
Principles and Cases: :, . -·.'
'fanong: Ipinaaalala rin narnin sa inyQ:na anumang.salaysay
ang inyong sasabihin sa imbestigasy.ong ito, ay . maaaring
gamiting ebidensya laban o panig sa inyo sa alinmang
Hukuman dito sa Pili'pinas, Ito ba Ay ~aµtfnaWaan ninyo?
Sagot: Opo.
Tanong: Matapos na .maipaalam s_a 'fp.yo ai;ig inyong -~ara-
patan sa ilalir.rt ng ating Bel.gong ·$.~Hgaqg_Batas, Artik_\;llo 4,
at
Seksyon 20, na magsawalang kil:>o: m~g~aroon ng sariling
manananggol, handa ka na bang ·m1J.gbigay ng isang kusang
loob na salaysay? · ·
Sagot: Opo.''
The extrajudicial confessions of the other appellants ·are in the
same tenor. · The right of a person under interrogation to be informed of
Issue: Are the extrajudicia1 confessions· admissible in evidence?
Held: (1) Re.quirements for investigating ·officer to follow. - "The
court in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile (supra.) laid down the
correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an
arrest and in conducting a custodial invesfigation. The rule is that,
when an investigation conducted upon an accused did.not conform
to the requirements set forth in People vs. Galit (supra.), the extra-
judicial confession taken therein is inadmissible,"
('.?,) Advise was pro forma and perfuncton;. - "Moreover, it is
clear from the records of this case that the way the investigating
officer apprised the appellants of their constitutional rights, was
proforma and perfuncto1y. The three (3) extrajudicial statements in
issue appear to have contained the same afore-quoted prefatory
statements, which indicate that the 'appraisal' made was a purely
mechanical act.
In People vs. Newman and Tolentino (163 SCRA 496 [1988].), this
Courtheld-
'It can be gleaned from the record of the case that' the
advice as to constitutional rights of the accused, given by the
investigating officer, was perfunctory and proforma, intended
obviously to pay lip service to the prescribed norms, through a
recitation by route of the sacramental advice. This stereotyped
'advice' appearing in practically all extra-judicial confessions
which are later repudiated, has assumed the nature of a 'legal
form' or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially
stately style doe~ not create an impression of voluntariness or
J (I
Sec. 12 ,AR'T:III. BILL OF RIGHTS 761
Rights of }?.er-sons Under Investigation
e:ven,unders.tanding-.on.thepart of the accused. 'the showing of
a spontaneous,, free &nd unconstrained giving up of a right is
miss.m g.
In the case at bar, the two (2) extrajudicial statements and
waivers carry the same quoted pr.efatory statement. This, to. the
mind of the c;qurt, indicates _the lack of zeal an,d initiative on the
pai:t pf the inv~~t}gating officers to fµlly and truly inform the
accused of ~!=:ir rights to remain silei;it and to counsel during
:he custodial investigation:. The 'informing' done by the police
m the case at bar was nothing more than a superficial and
mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the objectives
of the fundamental law, as, to give a semblance of compliance
there>:Vith.
his rights to remain silent and to counsel, implies n correlative
.obligation on the part of the police investigator to exploin and
contemplates an effective communication that results in an
understanding ~f what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a
denial of the rig~t, as it cannot truly be said that the accused
has been informed ?f his rights."'
(3,) Confession was inadmissible even if true. - "While it is
true that the trial court observed that appellants' extra-judicial
confess~ons are interlocking and replete with many minor details
. ~a~ could haye _bee~ known only . to the appellants and, hence,
md1cate that they .were voluntarily given, still, one cannot be
_unmindful of ·t he equally-settled rule that even if the confession of
the accused is 'go~pel-truth,' if it was made without counsel, it is
, 'inadmissible in evidence regardless of_the absence of coercions or
even if it had been voluntarily given." (People vs. Repe, 175 SCRA
422 [1989], through Justice Padilla.)
· . 14, Inadmis~ible confession was replete with details that bespeak the
guilt of the accused.
· Facts: Examination of the extrajudicial confession shows it
is indeed. replete with details that, according to the trial court,
bespeak the guilt of the accused-appellant as no one but the
actual perpetrator of the offense could have described it with such
particularity.
/1n his testimony, the accused declared he was subjected to
manhandling by as many as six policemen during the time he
 l1
762 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUlfICDNA!L· LAW
Principles and Gases' :,,, -.i.:•
was under investigation. He cla'ims ·he,was. hit ,in the head with
handcuffs, his private organ was e1e'(ltrifi:e.d,- and he was forced to
sign the confession which he had not eyeµJ?~~n allowed to read.
There is no physical evidence ••of-1th'.E!" accused-appellant's
charges, and there is ·rto !'lhm.ymg ·ei'fher: tlia't he coihplairted later
of the violence arid in:timidatibn imp'6se'd-up0n'.him, Mdreover, the
allegation of thifd~degree methods wasid~iµe~ under oath by the
investigator who ·coriducted1li.e irifer'iog~non'.·' -- 1' ' - -
• 1 ' '. • 1 :: • • ·: ·• • · . · ' -· l
Issu.e: Should sud:\ a con£essiq)1 still be- t¢jected notw\thstanding
that it bespeaks the guilt of the accused.? · · -. ··.. ·
·-tteld:·"As convincing as •i t appeatsto be, however; the'supposed
confession must still be rejected for violation of the Constitutio'fi:.It must
fai;l under our ruling in the.Gali_t ca_s~ a.n d thi.provisions of the new·
Bill, of Ri,ghts. · ··
· In People vs. Galit, we held that a confession m~st be made with
the assistance of counsel unless the right to counsel is waived with
the assistance of counsel. Under Article III, Section 12 of the new
Constitution, it is not only provided that U1,e right to the assistance
of counsel, to be validly waived, must be made in writing but that
it must 'also be done in the presence of counsel. These requirements
have not been met.
Apart from this, it is clear from the said sworn statement
that the accused-appellant was rn;)t properly· informed of his
constitutional rights. Typically, the interrogation, began with the
standard sacramental recital of such rights, but without any effort to
explain them, and ended with the mechanical question of whether
he understood the notification, followed°by the usual docile 'Opo'
from the suspect. There is now a long list of cases that have outla:wed
this unfeeling procedure as not sufficient to satisfy the imperative
requisites laid down by the Bill of Rights for the. protection of the
person under custodial investigation. The confession having been
obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights, it is not admissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant." (Peop{e vs. Tunday, 157
SCRA 529 [1988], through justice Cruz.)
Where statements not made under
custodial interrogation.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in
some crim e is within the scope of the cons titutional protecllon . lf n.ot
I I
Sec. 12 Sec. 12 4RT:III. BILL OF RIGHTS 763
Rights of Persons Under Investigation
made ·"under ·eustodial interrogation," or "under investigation for
the commi~sion of an b.ffense," elicited through questioni.Q.g by the
au*oritie~, th,e statemenUs notprotec;ted. The rights under Section
12 q:re,gt!aran,t~ed to.preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
Sta~e ~s wswlr;l Je<,\d the ~cc~sed to admit something false, not to
prevent him from fr~ely and voluntarily te!ting the truth. (People vs.
An~an, 269 S~RA 95 [1997]; People vs. Suela, 373 SCRA 163 [2001];
People vs. Balo~<?Y, G.R:No. 140740, April 12, 2002.)
. ·-..: , ~ ,
. .,(1) The legal (()rma1ities required by the c ·o nstitution apply
.. . . onJ.y to those extrajudicial confessions obtained during custodial
inyestigation. (People . vs. Tawat, 129 SCRA 431 [1984]; People
YP, ,$p:).pnga, 359 SCRA 310 [2001].)' Thus, compliance with the
ci;ms.tip;i.tiqnql procedure o:n custodial investigation is not applicable
· t~ a spontaneo~s statement, not elicited through ques tioning but
given ~ an ordmary manner, whereby the accused really admitted
the crime. (People vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 [1988]; Aballe vs. People,
183 SCRA 196 [1990]; People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589 [2000]; People
vs. Hermosa, 343 SCRA 567 [2000]; Alvarez vs. Court of Appeals,
359 SCRA 544 [2001]; People vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229 [2003]; Bon
vs. People, 419 SCRA 101 [2004].)
(a) In People vs. Taylarani6 (108 SCRA 373 [1981].), where a
person went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation
could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the
killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by
barang, or witchcraft, the Supreme Court ruled that such a
statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional
16
In this connection, the Solicitor General opines in his comment that the so-called
:: on-the-scene ques~o~( of citiz~n.s ~y P?lice officers in the fact-finding process are
1
undoubtedly ~dm'.ss1ble, for, as d1stingu1shed from the questioning of a suspect, in
~ x x (sue~ a) ~1tuation the c?mp elling ~,tmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
mter~gation JS ~ot n~essarily present. According to him, "when investigating crimes,
an offi_cer may mqmre of persons not under restraint (Constitutional Law, Klotter/
Kanov1tz, 4th ed., 1984,) x x x and 'such general on-the-scene questions are not thought.
~o be accus~tory beca~se ther !a~ the compelling atmosp here inherent in the process of
l.Il=-CUstody mterrogahon. 1 (Civil Rights and Liberties, A.L. Bonnicksen, 1982 ed,)"
. The comment ~so states t:1at according to Escobedo v, Illinois (378 U.S. 478 [1964],)
which preceded Mrrnnda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966}.), " the right to counsel attaches
when .'the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
bcgui1 to focus on n particular suspect, the s uspect has been taken into police custody,
the pol!cc cnrry out n process of interrogations thnt lends itself to eliciting incriminating
ntntomcnls,"
 J J
764 P.1:-ULH-'nN.l:i 'ONS'ffl'LJTJ: N~.L LAW $ec. 12
Principles and Cases ,,
procedure on custodial interroga;tion not(beitlg, exigible· under
the circumstances. (see People vs. Ay;sonf l75 SCRA-216:1;1989P
(b) In People vs. Andan (269 _S CRA95'[l997].), the appellant's
confession to the Mayor was held correctly·adinitted bys the trial
court, it appearing that the appella!tt freely.sought the mayor, as
a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer. ··
(c) Similarly, statements spont,aneot.i~Jy 111ad~ by a suspect
to news reporters on a television interview are deeme~ volun-
tary. (People vs. Vizcarra, 115 SCRA743tfl982].)The appeHant's
confession to a private individual, ori-to a. radio reporter /an-
nouncer or during· interviews with the rii.€dia without-the as-
sistance of counsel was held adrnissible·where ·t here is'rtothing
in the record to show that the ra:dio intet\iiewer-c0Huded' with
the:police authorities to elicit' inculpafbty· evidence-against the
accused. The prohibitions in ' the Bi!ll of·•rughts- are ,ptimarily
addressed to the State and its agents~ (People vs. Domantdy, 307
SCRA 1 [1999]; People vs. Ordofio, 334 SCRA 673 [2000]; People
vs. Tabaga, 376 SCRA 500 [2002].) The tights enu~erated are
not ·available before governtnent'investiga.tors enter the picture.
(People vs. Tiog Lan Uy, Jr., 475 SCRA,2~8._[2005].) .
(d) There was no-investigation that already focused on the
petitioner as the culprit where what was conducted was an
administrative inquiring into the missing city funds. Beside_s
he was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law
enforcement office. (Mesina vs. People, 758 SCRA 639 [2015].)
(e) A barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement
officer for purposes of applying Section12(1) and (3). (People vs.
Ulit, 423 SCRA 374 [2004].) But the accused's alleged confession
made to a barangay chairman was ruled as not admissible it
appearing that the conversation with the said official was .part
of an ongoing police investigation. (People vs. Morada, 307
SCRA 362 [1999]; People vs. Ochate, 385 SCRA 353 [2002].) . Appellant initially denied any participation in the killing, but when confronted with the
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Accused made an oral declaration to the police acknowledging his
guilt.
Facts: Appellant voluntarily placed himself under police
custody and orally admitted to a policeman his authorship of the
crime.
Sec. 12 /2..R'r. .m. BILL OF RIGHTS
' 765
Rights of Persons Under Investigation
Issue:- ·Is the oral •confession competent evidence against the
·, •·accused?
I
Held: Ye~. (1) Ora(confession is competent evidence against accused.
- "The oral confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that
'he had shot a tourist' and that the gun he had used in shooting the
victim was in his bar which he wanted surrendered to the Chief
-of Police is competent evidence against him. The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be
given in evidence against him. (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court.)
ii It may in a sense, be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The ru!e
is that, any person, otherwise competent as a wih1ess, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what
he heard -if he heard and understood all of it. An ornl confession
need not be repeated verbatim, but in sucl1 a case it must be glvcn In
substance."
(2) Custodial interrogation procedure is not applicable. - "What
was told by the accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement
not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner.
No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a
result of formal custodial investigation. (People vs. Taylaran, 108
SCRA 373 [1981].) The trial court, therefore, cannot be held to have
erred in holding tha.t compliance with the constitutional procedure
on custodial intenogation is not applicable in the instant case." 17
(People vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 [1988], through Justice Melencio-Herrera.)
(2) The booking sheet and arrest report which are signed by a
suspect are part and parcel of a mandatory and normal procedure
17
Note: In another case, a security guard pointed to policemen the appellant, another
security guard, as the one involved in a shooting incident Informed by the appellant
that his gun was at his residence, they all went to appellant's residence to get the same.
I '
fact that somebody saw him do it, he admitted the act although he alleged that it was in
. '· ~~ .
It was held that he was not under custodial investigation when he made the
/ admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement.
Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the very s tart when the policemen
requested that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level
wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They were just probing into a
number of possibilities, having been merely informed that the suspect was wearing what
could be a security guard's uniform. His admission may be considered as part of the res
gestae, (People vs. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 [1994].)
 lJ l 1
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTJC)N.l'A,L, LAW Sec. 12
766
. Principles and Cases) :'.. ·'
I
followed by .apprehending and seizingj,!!)!ic.e :offic(:!r_s_. :ihe mere
signing of these documents does not ~6\:i.tit to ·the•..susp.ed s •
subjection to cu.stodial interrogation whifrei;it anj'accused is.required
an~
' .~.... • ., :,:i,J·•·.( "·'.· f . ~
;f ' • ·:" ~ .
to gi~e stateni.~nts abo\lt his ~~olr:me~tWttr~ff~~~r wh7rein
the right to be informed: of Ns rights o,f srl~n~~-1:\11.P. to counsel w;bulp.
otherwise be invoked. 18 (l?eopie v:s. Oliva~es~·tij5 SCI½ '536 [f990].)
(3) A polic~ blotter19 is not a conf.essio;;i,f a suspec;£'·;ei,ther
does it purport to be a c0mplete andirre~table:,r ecord of what had
happened at the scene of the crime. It fa -no·mo,re than a summary
report of the occurrence of a crime. Hl0tter' entries and other entries
in official records, though regularly done in the course ,o f the
performance of official duty are only primllfaci~ evidence of the.facts
statedtherein, and inaccuracies as well as.omissions thereinmay be
explained during a witness' testimony. (People vs. Ap0linario, 223
SCRA [1993]; People vs. Sorongon, 397 SCRA 264 [2003]; Lev i vs.
Matillano, 429 SCRA 449 [2004); Macalinao vs. Ong, 477 SCRA 740
[2005]; People vs. Dulanas, 489 SCRA58 [2006}.)
Right of arrestee to remain silent
and to counsel.
The right to counsel given to per~ons accused of an offense
during criminal investigation does not apply to any proceeding
conducted by a administrative body.
18When an arrested person signs a 13ooking Sheet and Arre!lt Report at a police
station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor cc,mfess to any incriminatory
circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement o'f the accused!s being booked
and of the date which accompanied the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be
useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-
judicial s tatement and cannot be the basis of a judgmE,?nt of conviction. But the signature
of the accused on the Receipt ofProperty Seized (e.g., shalni) ~ a declaration against hi,s own
interest, and a tacit admission of the crime charged, f~r mere unexplained possession' of
prohibited drugs is punishable by law. The signature fa taptamount to an uncounselled
extra-judicial confession outlawed by Section 12. (People vs. Bandin, 226 SCRA 299
[1993]; see People vs. Ang Chun Kit, 251 SCRA 660 [1995]; People vs. De Guzman, 194
SCRA 601 [1991]; Gutang.vs. People, 335 SCRA 479 [2000].)
The practice of inducing suspects to s ign receipts for property allegedly confiscated
from their possession is unusual and violative of the ci,stodial right to remain s ilent. It is
the po1ice officer who confiscated the same who should sign such receipt. (People vs. Go,
411 SCRA 81 [2003].)
19A police blotter is a book in which entries. of occurrences of crimes are made
pending their transfer to permanent record books. It is admissible in evidence if the
requisite for its admissibility under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court are met.
1 J
s~e. 12 4 1,r l{J.. l:HLL 0 1' 1uc:.a l'fS 'I(//
Rigl,ts of Persons Under Investigation
(1) Warnings .to be.-:given ~ suspect. - U!'lder paragraph 1 ef
Sec,tion 12,,it; is;reei,~h:~4. th.at the suspect in custodial interrogation
ntUst' be giv.~rt.•t he 1 f9llowir\.g warnings: (a) He must be informed
qf ~iS"right 'to remain, s.iient; (b) He must be warned tha\ anything
> •
hg·says can and w{ll 1;>~ used against him; artd {e) He must be ,told
that%! has right to·(::Ounsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will
be appointed to represent him.20 (People vs. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190
[20QQ].) •
(2) Silente not to be .taken as evidence against accused. - While
an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence
against him; otherwise, his right of silence would be an illusion. 1'he
failure of an accused under police custody to deny statements by
another implicating him in a crime, especially when such Accused
was neither asked to comment nor reply to such implication or
accusation, cannot be considered a tacit admission of the crime. The
settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, i.e., his
refusal to testify, may not be used against him as implied admission
of guilt. (People vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 [1979]; People vs. Guillen,
710 SCRA533 [2013).)
(3) Burden of proving waiver of right. - The prosecution has the
burden of proving that the accused w aived his rights to remain
silent and to counsel; the failure to object to the introduction of
constitutionally proscribed evidence does not satisfy this heavy
burden on the part of the prosecution. (People vs. Alicando, 251
SCRA 293 [1995].)
(4) Receipt for property seized. - It is the police officers who
confiscated illegal articles who should sign the receipt. Indeed, it
is unusual for a person to be made to sign said receipt for what
2°Failure to inform the susp ect of his right to counsel attains significance only if such
person makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel and which is then sought
to be admitted against the accused during the trial. Such confession is inadmissible. (Eu-
genio vs. People, 549 SCRA 433 [2008].) Where a person under custodial investigation
was informed that whatever he says may be used against him and that he cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself, it is as if he was also informed that he has the
right to remain silent. (Oracular vs. Donato, 85 SCRA 266 [1978).)
The right to silence is accorded to the accused or persons under suspension for a
committing a crime. It is, of course, the duty of the complainant or victim of the crime to
help in the police investigation.
 I ' I 111 ,ll ' l 'I N H Vt ) Ni 1111 lJ I U.PNAJ1 , I.AW
Pdnclplcs nnd Cnl:les . .,
were allegedly taken from hiin. To make ,him.sign ,t he receipt for
property seized which, in effect, is M '.t~x,tta-judicial confession
of the commission of an offense, wi.thgµ~ . iQfqr.ming ~ of his
constitutional rights is a violation ofhi~ i;i~~tM, ~~main s~lent and
is inadmissible in evidence, 21 (People. vs.·Qei:l?fMarinas,)96 S<:;RA
504 [1991]; People -vs. .Policarpio, 158,SP~:B~Jl ~~B:]; ;Pepple ,v~.
Lacbanes, 270 SCRA 195 [1997].) ·,.· ..,
(5) When right to remain silent and to counsel not to be considered
violated. - Instam::es are: where the. uncoupselled q:mf.!}ssi9n or
admission was never offered in evidenceJ'.!y the prosecution (Ptlople
vs. Briones, 202 SCRA 708 [1991].), or wher~ there was no showing
that the accused was ever investigated by tj:le police., and all that the
police investigators did was to show him a witness' sworn.st~tement
identifying him as the killer (People vs. Buntan, Sr., 221 SCRA 421
fl993].), · or where the accused did ·not ·obje'Ct· to the admissibility
of the unlawfully obtained evidence at the. trial. Furthermore, the
objection that a confession was taken in violation of Section 12 can be
raised only by the confessant whose right has,been violated, as such
right is personal in nature. An extra-judicial confession repeated in
court is converted into a judicial confession which, if allowed by the
trial court, eliminates the need for assistance of counsel. (People vs.
Balisteros, 237 SCRA 499 [1994].) · an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (People
(6) When right to counsel can be invoked. - A person's right to
counsel while under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until
such time that the police investigators start questioning, interrogating
or exacting a confession from the person under investigation.
(People vs. Buntan, Sr., 221 SCRA 421 [1993].) It is settled that at
the moment the accused or suspect voluntarily surrenders to, or is
arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed
to have started. So, he would not. thenceforth be asked about his
complicity in the offense or made to give even plain informatic;>n
21
• Since merely Wlexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by Jnw, the
signature of the accused on the receipt or list of Items confiscated from him Is !nndmlsslblc
in evidence in the nbsence of any showing thnt he was then assisted by counsel. (Pooplo
vs. Mauyno, 207 SCRA 732 [1992); People va. Ang Chun Kit, 251 SC~A 660 (19951.) 11
cannot bo enld thnt In Blf:1nlng the ,·ocolpt wlthout n lawyer, th nccuHod IICI0d wllllnKIY,
lntclllgcntly, nnd freely, (I'uoplu vft, CMln,lro, C:.lt No. 146277, Juno 20, 2002,)
Al-tl'. UL UlLL 0 11 RI I rrs 769
Rights of Persons Under hwestigation
without the assistam::e·af counsel.22 (People vs. Lim, 196 SCRA 809
(1991];; Sumanogvs.-People, 63.0 SCRA42 [2010].)
· · · (7) ·Right rib't to ~peak' or to be interrogated. - If the person under
de~en:ti6h'indica:tes W,.'any manner and.at .µ1y stage of the process
tli:~t'};le ·wishes_to consult with an attorney before speaking, there
cah be ·no- questioning'. 'Likewise; if the indi_v idual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated,
the. police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does n0.t deprive him of the right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consented to be questioned. (Miranda v..Al'izona, 384 U.S.
436; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 [1980]; People vs. Decierdo, 149
Sc;RA 496. [1987] .)
(8) Accused free to mqke admission or to confess. - Th e presence of
a lawyer is not intended .t o stop an accused from saying anything
which might incriminate him but rather to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false (People
vs. Layuco, 175 SCRA 47 [1989].), not to provide him with the best
defense. (People vs. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364 [1991]; People vs.
Remollo, 227 SCRA375 [1993].) The counsel, should never prevent
vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851 [1990]; People vs. Enanoria, 209 SCRA
577 [1992]; People vs. Gallardo, 323 SCRA 218 (2000]; see People
vs. Ordofio, 334 SCRA 873 [2000]; People vs. Reyes, 581 SCRA 691
[2009].) It is, however, his bounden duty to properly and fully advise
his client on the nature and consequences of his confession. (People
vs. Suela, 373 SCRA 163 [2002].)
22
The person being interrogated must continuously have a coW1sel from the very
start of the custodial interrogation (People vs. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997); People
vs. Rodriguez., 341 SCRA 645 [2000]; People vs. Moria), 353 SCRA 95 (2001).), until its
termination, to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of persons W1dergoing investigation for the commission of ~n
offerise. (Gamboa vs, Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 [1988]; People vs. Rayos, 351 SCRA 336 [2001).)
Thus, there is no compliance with the requirement for the assistance of counsel where the
lawyer was called only on the fourth day of detention, when the accused was about to put
his confession in writing (People vs. Rodriguez., supra; People vs. Delmo, 390 SCRA 395
(2002].), or where the accused stayed overnight at the police station and was presented
to the lnwyer !or the tnklng of his formnl statement only the following day. (Lumanog vs.
People, s1111rn.)
 I l I 1
l'J JlUl 'l'LN l.l '(..)N ~'l'l'l'U'l'l.ONJ,,:'.L LAW
Principles and Cases ,r · •: •
(9) Choice or appointment ofcounsel. ........,Appearance of afawyer as
a public attorney is not enough. Under the ruie; it,isnecessa:li'y that
the person under custodiat investigation be _a$sisted ·by. ¥\,attorney
engaged by him or by any persop. on his 'b ehalf or appoint~q PrY tjle
court upon petition by him or.such person;. (P\~pple v~. Sfl~Ud~r,)88
SCRA 181 [1990]; People vs. Vasquez, W6 sq.~.As,6i [1991]; feople
vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 [1987).) .
(a) The absence of counsel at,.,the ' time·. 0£ . custodial
investigation when the extra-judicial confE:!ssion was tctl<en,
rendered it inadmissible. It is'·not enough that ;the suspect is
asked if he needs a lawyer; he must be in.formed that if he is an
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed ·to represent him during
custodial interrogation. . rangay captain, a municipal attorney, or a legal officer of a local
Where there is only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda
rights of the accused without any effort i:o find out from him
whether he wanted to have counsel and,. if so, whether. he had
his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him,
it is merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful
information to the suspect. (People vs. Obrero, 362 SCRA 190
[2000].) · constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from
(b) It is clear from Section 12(1) ·that a: person under
investigation for the commission of an offe~se i;nay cl:ioose his
own counsel, but if he cannot afford the s·e rvices ofa counsel, he
must be provided with one. While the initial choice in the latter
case is naturally lodged in the police investigator, the accused
has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one.23 (People vs. Parohin.o g, 203 SCRA
673 [1991); People vs. Jimenez, 204 SCRA 719 [1991); People vs.
Baello, 224 SCRA 218 [1993].)
(c) A lawyer provided by police investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused where he never raised any objecti9h
against the former' s appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused, rather than rejecting the counsel
'-'But the right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his
own counsel. (People vs. Espiritu, 302 SCRA533 (1999].) The option to secure the services
of a private counsel is not absolute such as when the insistence of the accused in acquiring
the services of counsel de parte was merely a strategy to prolong the proceedings of the
case, (People vs. Caralipio, 393 SCRA 59 (2002].)
u J
Sec. 12 .AlvH lH. BlLL 01:1 RIGHTS 771
Rights of Persons Under Investigation
chosen (for hinnrithereafter subseribed to the veracity 0£ his
statement before.the.swearing officier.24 (People vs. Suarez, 2€>7
: SCRA.-119 ,[1997:k People vs. Continente, 339 SCRA 1 [2000];
Belonghilot VS; RU'8,,402SCRA 221 [2003] .) '
. ·,•, (d) T~e phrases '" competent and independent" and "pref-
,.. · ~rably of his own choice" were a.dded'upon the persistence of
· human rights lawyers in the 1.286 Constitutional Commissions
who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period,
the lawyers made available to the detainees would be those ap-
pointed by the military and, therefore, beholden to the military.
He cannot be a. special counsel, public or private prosecutor, a
lawyer who is part of the police force, a municipal mayor, ba-
government unit whose interest is adverse to the accused, or an
associate of-the private prosecutor in the same case. It is very
doubtful whether .a ny of them can effectively w1dertake the de-
fense of the accused without running into conflict of interest.
(e) It is in:lportant that the lawyers should be competent
and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless .recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
If the lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a mere witness
to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating
therein compliance with the accused's constitutional rights, the
standard guaranteed by Section 12(1) is not met. 25 (People vs.
Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995]; see People vs. Santos, 283 SCRA
. 443 [1997]; People vs. Muleta, 309 SCRA 148 (1999); People vs.
Porio, 376 SCRA 596 [2002); People vs, Janson, 400 SCRA 584
(2003].)
(f) The right to counsel is a fundamental right and con-
templates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside the accused.
24
In People vs. Olvis (154 SCRA 513 (1987]; People vs. Gallardo, supra.), however, the
confession of the accused was rejected, there being no showing that the lawyer of the
Citizens' Legal Assistance Office (now Public Attorneys' Office), called by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NB!) to assist the accused was its counsel of choice. (People vs.
Jimenez, 204 SCRA 719 [1991]; People vs. Binamira, 277 SCRA 232 [1997].)
25
A counsel assisting an accused is presumed, however, to be providing all the
necessary legal defense which are reasonable under the circumstances. (People vs.
Liwanag, 363 SCRA 62 (2001].)
 l 1
ii , 1111 11 •1•ir 11 , 1 H111 1111 1111r1~• 11, 1.AW
11rl11clpl '!J 111td '111,c's 1,, .-Ir,, '
I
, "·. fPeople vs. Labtan, 320 SGRA 1.4©t![iL99.9J;).(l1he .c:otnpe.tent. and
. :,,· independent lawy~r so :ert:gaged,sh0~ld11b.er,pr¢senh11atcal1~,stages
of the interview, counseUng or advis.irig<:'Ctiu.Mon t.ea;5onabi2fat every
turn of the investigation~ ;,atfd 1stoppiti~i tljfii.i'rlterro8ati0nn0.1ft·0el in a
ac9~~td J~«f:h~ may ~i.ther,continue,
while either to g(Qe a41;1ipe to tpe _
choose to remain sjlent, O:~-ter,n;Jna;e tl;J?,i,nte_rp,_i:grp,; The;desired_role
of counsel in tl{e ;prosiiss_of cu?todiaJ Ml"~~tigclltion i~ rendered
meaningless_µ tl]~J1wy~r m~i~ly.gi'yii Br/ftW9~9ry. ~9yi~e as
opposed to a meaningful advp.cacy,of .thEf,rights.of the. person
undergoing questioning, If the advice given is so cursory as to
be us~less, voluntarines~ is i~.paired.~6 (:r~pple vs, D~ega, 251
SCRA 626 [1995]; People v~. Vilarde; G.R: No. 1~9333,: July 18,
2002.) . . . .
.(g) When the Constitution requires the right .to counsel,
it did not mean any kind -of counsel :but ~ffective and vigilant
counsel for the pµrpose of protectingit:l.\eaccused: against the use
of duress and other undue influence -i n extracting "confessions
from the suspect in a cdme, .The Constih,I.tion vouchsafes to tµe
ac_cused the right to an effective and vigilap.t counsel, 01.w who
can be .made to act in protei:tion·of his ,;igl}ts,_from the time the
confessant answers the firs.t quest\ons as,ked by the investigating
officer until the signing of t{le extrajudidaL confession, and not
m!,!rely going through the motions of providing with anyone
who possesses a law cj.egree.27 {People vs. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA
245 [1997]; Peop~e vs. Lq.btan, 320 SCRA 140 [1999]; )?eop~e vs.
Bacamante, 47 SCRA 47 [.1995]; People vs. E.ayqs, 351 SCRA 336
[2901]; People vs. Morial, 363 SCRA 96,[:2001].)
(h) The extrajudidal confession must be struck ,down
as inadmissible in evidence. if the prosecution fails to show
that the accused was, at that time, assisted by competent and
independ~nt counsel. preferably of his own choice. (People vs.
Santos, supra; People vs. Tomaquin, supra,) . ·.·
2 R.A. No. 7438 requires that "any person arrested, detained or under custodial
%e-assistance extended.by a lawyer "for the pmpose [only) of the writtenwaiver"
-is not the assistance contemplated by the fundamental law. (People vs. Silongan, 401
SCRA 459 [2003].) nor where the p attidpation 9f a lawyer was -the-notarization of the
suspcct's confession. (People vs, Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596 [2007].)
1JA lawyer who already suspected the accused as having the crime h e is accused
is not an effective and vigilant counsel. (People vs. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23,
2004.) The requirement is not for counsel to be "intelligent" but to be effective. (People vs.
Liwanag, 363 SCRA 62 (2001].)
1 j}, I{ I , I I, . 11 I I.I . II I{ I :1 l'J''-' '1"/ J
Rights of Pel'sons Under Investigation
~ · (i) >The · w,orct,·•,?preferably" is not to be construed as
;· 'fex:alusiv,e1y".,;as··-tcL1p reclude. other equally competent and
independent att0rneys from handling fue defense of the person
under investigatiom If the rule were otherwise, then the accused
can impede; nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting:a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not
available tQ protect his interest.28 (People vs. Barasina, 229 SCRA
450 [1994); Peopl~ vs. Band\lla, 2S2 SCRA 566 [1994]; People vs.
Agustin, 240 SCRA 541 [1995]; People vs. Espafiola, 271 SCRA
689 [1997).)
(j) The fact that there are no lawyers in a locality will not
excuse the violation of the right to be assisted by one; and even
if the confession of the accused speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible
in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it
had been voluntarily given.29 (People vs. Malmis, 167 SCRA 10
[1988]; People vs. Esteban, 186 SCRA 34 [1990].)
(10) Investigation conducted after filing of information. - Once a
criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused
is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, it would
be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to
investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense
for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such
investigation, then Section 12(1) and the jurisprudence therein must
be faithfully complied with. An uncounselled confession is wh olly
inadmissible pursuant to Section 12(3). Police authorities would
have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused
persons after they have been arrested but before they are arraigned
28
The "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and sp ecifically to
a person under custodial investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal
prosecution. (Amion vs. Chiongson, 301 SCRA 614 [1999]; People vs. Larranaga, 421
SCRA 530 (2004]; Gia vs. People, 504 SCRA 507 (2006].)
29
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." (Sec. 2[a] thereof.) It mandates that
"in the absence of any lawyer, no cus todial investigation shall be conducted. (Sec. 3, last
par. Thereof.) Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit
of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are
still flawed under the Constitution. (People vs. De Jesus, 213 SCRA 345 [1992]; People vs.
Moria!, 363 SCRA 96 (2001].) The lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with
the constitutional rights of the accused. (People vs. Peralta, 426 SCRA 472 [2004].)
 I 11111.l I ' l ' I N I ! t UN:J 11 J U 11 JC\LA I', I , AW
Vrlnclplcs nnd Cases
if at such stage the accused persons are sµpp:osedly not entitled to
the enjoyment of the rights to :remain silent andito counsel.30 {People
vs. Macqueda, 242 SCRA565 [1995].}
Waiver of the right.
The right of silence and_,to co_~nsel t~ptrot be waived except
in writing and in the pr~sence of counsel. Thfs·requiremerit which
is not expressly found ifi the 1973 Constifution, is directed against
abuses in the past whereby written waivers by the accused or
detained persons without assistance of 1l lawyer were employed
to circum,vent constitutional protection .on human rights. An
invalid waiver by the suspect of his rights make~- the uncounselled
confession, inadmissible. A denial of due process can be successfully
invoked where no valid waiver of rights has been made. In order to
be vaHd, the waiver should have been in a language that clearly
manifested the individual's desire to do so, with understanding of
his rights and the implication of his waiver.
(1) Requirements for a valid waiver. -The right to be silent and to
counsel may be waived, provided thatthe waiver is made intelligently
and voluntarily, with understanding of its consequences31 (People
vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 [1980].), but, in any case, it must be made in
writing and in the presence and with assistance of counsel ~s now
clearly and explicitly required by the Constitution. 32 If the records
30Precisely, the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investi-
gation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false, in view of the inherently
coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation. (People vs.
Olivares, Jr., 299 SCRA 635 [1998].)
31
R.A. No. 7438 (see Note 11.) mandates that in case of a valid waiver (made in
writing and in presence of counsel), the person making the ext~a-judicial confession
must be accompanied by any of the following persons: parents, elder brothers· and
sisters, spouse, municipal mayor, municipal judge, .district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel chosen by the person arrested. The law, h owever, does not propose
that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any condition or
clause. It does not unconditionally and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel
but underscores its importance by requiring that a substitution of counsel with the above-
mentioned persons be made with caution and with the ·essential safeguards. (People vs.
Ordoi'lo, 334,SCRA 673 .[2000].)
32
Even before the effectivity of the 1987 Charter, the need for assistance of n counsel
as a prerequisite for according validity and effect to a waiver of righ ts in custocllnl
investigations laid down by the 1973 Constitution was already existent. The Supremo
Court has construed Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution no nllowlna
J\_1),t'J,'. IIJ . IJ I.U~ 11 LH(.;11'1'8 77!3
I' Rights o~ Persons Under Investigation
do not show: that the aaeused was assisted by counsel in making
his waiver, this 'defect nullifies and renders his confession, whether
verbal or non-verbal,. inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Olapani,
179 SCRA 495 [1989]; see People vs. Yap, 185 SCRA 222 [1990]:),
even if freely and voluntarily given. The fact that the accused was
<)Ssis:t,ed by a cqµns~l is !l very strong indication that the waiver was
ma\J.h:freely an(,l knowingly.
(2)· No request made for a lawyer. - An individual need not
make a pre-interrogation request fo;r a lawyer. While such request
affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a
lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right
to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically
made after the warnings delineated (supra.) have been .given. The
accused who does not know his rights and, therefore, does not make
a request may be the person who needs counsel most.
(3) Interrogation conducted without presence of a lawyer. - If the
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and
a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to retained or appointed counsel. (People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA
379 [1981].)
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was subsequently
signed in the presence of counsel would not cure the constitutional
I
defect. (People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 [1995]; People vs. Moria!,
363 SCRA 96 [2001].)
(4) Defect in waiver cured. -The defect in the waiver of the right
to remain silent and to assistance by counsel may be cured, as where
the accused's lawyer arrived at the closing stage of the investigation,
read the statement, and talked to the accused before the latter signed
it. (Estacio vs. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 12 [1990).) Nor is the right
to counsel violated where the suspect was given the opportunity
n waiver by a suspect of his rights while under custodial investigation. While initially,
the Court's holding was that such a waiver was valid and could properly be given
effect merely upon some ad equate showing that it had been voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently given, its subsequent rulings imposed the requirement, as just pointed out,
I thnt th e w aiver of those rights b e made In the presence uncl will, the assistance of the
uuspect's counsel. (People vs. Dncoycoy, 208 SCRA 583 (1992].)
lI I
 '110 111HLJJ'1 1J N U 'UNU'l'l'l'U'l'iJ.OffiAL. LAW Se c. 12
Prlnciples and Case~ . , .
to confer ·with his counsel before his· .extra,-judicia1 confession was
ta:ken. (People vs. Masongsong, 174-SCRA.39 ·[1989]-.) Where the
. accused expressly acknowledges during the',trial that he voluntarily
signed his sworn statement, the sta!ement .is. admissible.33 (People
vs. Marcos, 147 SCRA 204 (1987.}.)
(5) Waiver not knowingly and intelligently made. - What the
Constitution requires is the presence of competent and independent
counsel, one who will effectively undertake · his clierit'-s defense
without any intervening conflict of interest.·AJiscal or prosecutor
cannot, therefore, exercise the function ,of,.defense counsel even
during custodial investigation. To allow,such happenstance would
render illusory· the protection given to the g.Ccused during custodial
investigation.- In ·a case,. the answer of the accused - "nandiyan
namanpo si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na kailangan.ang abogado" - was ruled
as a "palpable indication that she did not fully understand her in-
custody rights; hence, it cannot be said t;hat she knowingly and
intelligent1y__waive~ those rights." (People vs. Matos-Viduya,. 189
SCRA403 [1990].) .
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Accused allegedly waived his right to counsel.·
Facts: The waiver was supposed to have been made as follows:
"For'eword: Mr. Florencio Poyos, you are informed that as
of now, you are w1der investigation in connection with the
unusual incident wherein you are implicated: You are reminded
that a~cording to Section 20, Article IV of our Constitution, you
have the right to remain silent and to. hire a lawyer of your
own choice that could help y0u when you are propounded
with questions. You are also reminded that every word you say
will be used against you or in favor of you in Court. D9 you
understand this? · Question: After having been informed of your right under
Answer: Yes, sir, I understand.
33A confession given under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel
is inadmissible in evidence under Section 12. If the accused fails to timely object during
the trial to the presentation of his confession, he is deemed to have waived objection to
its admissibility. (People vs. Mendoza, 364 SCRA 289 [2001]; People vs. Samus, 389 SCRA
93 (2002].)
Sec.,12 .Ai.R,T, lfil. BILL OF RIGHTS
1
Rights of Pei:sons Under Investigation
~uestiom .After. you ,are informed of your rights, do you
agree to continue this investigation even if for the moment you
have--no.lawyer to help you?
Ans:wer: I do ag~ee, sir."
Issue: The primary question is whether or not there was a valid
waiver of the right to the assistance of a lawyer who could have
advised the accused-appellant dµring his interrogation or even
invoked for'·}ilih his constitutional rights to be silent and to refuse
to submit to at:iy questioning whatsoever.
Heid: "It ~~: do¥btful, given the tenor of the question, whether
there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his right to counsel.
His answer was categorical enough, to be sure, but the question
itself was not a.s it spoke of a waiver only 'for the moment.' All
worded, the _question suggested a tentativeness that belled the
suspect's suppo·sed permanent foregoing of his right to countlcl, If
indeed there was any waiver at all. Moreover, he wns told that he
c_ou.ld 'hire a lawyer' but not that one could be provided for him for
free." (People vs. Poyos, 143 SCRA 542 [1988], through Justice Cruz.)
2. Waiver of counsel 'is sufficient in form and substance.
Facts: 'r~e appellants' extra.judicial confession contains, inter
alia, the following: ·
PreliminanJ: Mr. Fernando Quebral, I would like to inform
you .that you are under investigation in connection with your
involvement 'i n the commission of an offense. Under Article
tv, Section 20 of the New Constitution, you have the right to
remain silent and be assisted by a lawyer of your own choice
and if you cannot afford to hire one, we will provide you with
a free counsel, is this clearly understood by you?
Answer: Yes, sir.
the New Constitution, are you willing to give a free and
voluntary statement?
Answer: Yes, sir.
Question: Do you still need the assistance of a lawyer?
Answer: No more, sir.
Question: I would like to inform you further that whatever
you may state may be used against you or in your favor in any

1''111Lll"P1NB CON S] /l'l~ll:!l',J;;i<l).'.t'9WJ.. LAW
Principles;ana 6 ase°S'.i<,, ,:,· ',, 1
Court of Justice in.our, countty;is ;~is,.al~o:deal'J.y.uade~stood
by you? . · . - ·.:;· ,;,..;: '/' , , ,,, ;~ : . • .
Answer: Yes, sir. .·:, ,,: -,_. · . ,:,.
Question: Are you willmg'·to'a:ffi.x:your si:gnliture to affirm
to .the truthfulness•0£.what you-,state_d ·iat,;0ve?. ··, , ,.
Answer:Yes,sit;" - · ·: , , .· ·.·~--
. Issue: Tl;ie aJ?pe~i~nt_di~Im~::ih~t;~,il _s9J~~W#qppljfgl:t!t ;v.rere
v10l~ted ~nd, consequently, ,his coaj,1,~~Wr,~119H:}<;I, ;ll,9t,P.,~;yeJ:>een
admitted m evidence since he was not assiste.d by counsel, or if he
had waived assistance of counsei'the· Jdi"~fshoitld ita;e been in
the format approved by the Deparhnerits'0&dfrstice and ·1'!'ational
Defense. · : ···L • .:, • , '
. Held: The appellant's constitution~! righ/s pa;e . not been
violated. The waiver of counsel made by tf\e,app'ell~nt was.~ufficient
in form and .substartce to meet the c;on§tih.ttiona1 .requirement.34
(People vs, Quebral, 134 SCRA 425 [1985], tliroijgh Justice Abad Santos.)
When right to counsel attaches.
The right to counsel is available ev~i:i if the suspect is not yet
in custody because the Constitution doe~ not mention the term
"custodial." It continues 1:o be available even after a criminal
complaint is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by
virtue of a warrant of arrest.35 · · • · right to counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test without
(1) Upon the start of police investigation. - The right to
counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation; i.e., when the
inyestigating offi.cer36 starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/ or confessions or admjssions from the.· respondent/ accused
who was arrested or voluntarily surren.d-ered, unless he ~aives his·
right in writing .and in the presence of counsel. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must ~e assisted by counsel ~o
34Toe requirements and restrictions under the rule in. People vs. Galit (135 SCRA 465
[1985).) that the waiver of the right to counsel can be·ri'lade' only with the assistance of
counsel have no retroactive effect and ·d o not apply t,o.confessions taken before the date
of its pronouncement.
35
R.A. No. 7438 provides, inter alia, that any person arrested, detained, or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assis.ted by counsel.
36
Hence, if the admission was not made before such officer, it should not be rejected.
(Arroyo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 750 [1991].) ' [1991).)
1
.A!R.-T.,Ill. BILL OF RIGHTS
'Rights ofI-lers0ns Under Investigation
., .
avoid;fhe!pertti:ci.ous:?r.idfil.ce of extorting-false or coerced admissions
or confessions from the lips of.the person :undergoing interrogation
for the commission ofan offense. ·,
•
(a) . :Any perspi:t,,under investigation must, among other
things, qe_assisted),y .counsel. the provisi'Ons of the Constitution
are ·c1ear. They leave no room for equivqc~tion. Accordingly, no
C½stodial invesp.gation shall be @ndu'.cted unless it be in the
presence of co~sel, engaged by the persdti: a'.rl:est~d, or by any
person in his behalf, or appointed by lhe court upon petition
either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and
that; while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be
valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 [1988].)
(b) The belated arrival of a lawyer prior to the actual
signing . of his uncounselled confession does not cure the
inherent. defect ,9£ such confession previously taken without
being assisted by counsel, as the operative act is when the police
investigation has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
has been taken without being assisted by counsel and not when
the suspect signs his supposed extra-judicial confession. (People
vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 [1995].)
(c) An accused was held not deprived of his constitutional
the assistance of counsel, for he was not then under custodial
investigation.37 (People vs. De Guzman, 223 SCRA [1993].)
(2) .From the moment there is a move to elicit admission or any
information. - The clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is to extend to those under police investigation the
right to counsel. While there is no real need to afford a suspect the
37
1n a case, the .accused claimed that when the policemen required him to initial
the Pl0 bills, they violated his constitutional rights to counsel, to remain silent, and not
to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation, The Supreme Court said:
"Although he was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the PlO bills that the police
found fucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his
possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime. The subject of the prosecution
was his act of selling marijuana. His conviction was not based on the presence of his
initials in the Pl0 bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the
policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in selling marijuana
cigarettes to a member of the arresting party." (People vs. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 782
 1' 111111 ' 1 l f l ll l IIN' II I I I J II \JNA lwl AW
1'1 luclplcl:l nnd '01;~1:J
ser:vices of counsel during a police line.-up{i!S--he isortot auhat·moment
umder custodial investigation), the1Supr.enre;Court gave the .caveat
that the moment there is a move or even an urge by i.vt.v estigators
to elicit admission~ or confessi9,ns or. ;v~:p. pl~jn informat}on which
may appear i.ruw~~I).t.Q( -~oc;1;1,.ops a~ i)1r Hm:e}'~tOq.\l sa~cl suspect, he
should then and there ~e as~is!ed.~~ so,tp;i.~~l,,.~nJ~r.s: h~, ~ aiv.~s the
right, but the ;J:V~ver _sh~ll.p~ ll}~qt ip W+¾~g aJ.1-d)n M\e pr~s.ence
o_f coun~et ,(G~h~~~~s, ~ru_z,._-~.uP,ra;.s~e,)?~SR\~ .xs:-_-.0,qp'1lll_'\O, 209
SCRA,~19 [1Q9n ~eoP.le :vs,-~e Je~~~-:2P SqtA,3~~\ [1992,].).
(3) During the .preliminary- invei(ig(I.Ji911;.!1;,:r•:'Jhe.- fa,ctd:hat the
Constitu,tion p.oes not _m oose to u&e the,te1;m,,1"cu,5todial" by having
it inserted between the wq.1:ds "under" an~ . '!i.nvestiggti0n" as,
in fact, the first sentence o( .Section 2 opens o/,itr\ the phra~e "any
person" shows an intent to expand tpe coverage of the rigµt beyond
tp~re ~~ic! ~stodi~l h!~e_stig~tio~ _to·.~ ~}i:~~iin!f\aIY,,~v~~~gation
(see G'alman vs: P~maran, 138.SCRA 2?'4' {1~~5).J;._Q!h~rwis~, there
,,v'o:uld.arise the awl<w.a rd situatio? of a' pe~SO!l eriJ,~yip!i 1the right
while under custodial investigation and
then losing ;t{· during
the prelb:ninary investigation; and· then;·enj'oying h: ;again
upon
arraignment. (see Sec. 14[2}.) Thus, in Pedple vs, Albano . (145
38
SCRA 555' [1986],), the .Supr!;lme Courf ·coI).sld~rea .th~ absence of
the accused's counsel when· she appeared as witness during the
preliminary ·investigation conducted by the municipal judge "as
an irreparable damage" which rendered inadmissible her ·alleged
confession.39
(4)'. During certain pre-trialproceedings considered critical stages.fl fl
-The right to counsel applies in certain pre-trial proceedings that
can be considered "critical stages" in the criminal process. Custodial
i.ntenogation before or after charges have been ·filed and non-
38
"The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed
"critical stages" in the criminal process. The preliminary in.v,estigation can be no
different fl:'om the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect -who takes part
in, .a pi:.eliminary .investigation. will be subj!!cted to n o. less than the State'.s processes,
ofte,ntimes.intimidating and .relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal
proS!!cution, fu the case at bar, Sunga, was thrust .into the preliminary investigation and
while he did have a i:ounsel, for •the latter's lack of vigilance and con;unihnent.to Sunga's
righ_ts,. he was virtually denied his right to counsel." .(People vs. Sui\ga, 399 ·SCRA 624
[2003].) _: • • ·
39At the ·prelintina.ry ·examination, insof!l.r'as it'refers to-the requisite proceedings for
theis~uance of a,wai:ranf of arrest or search warrant by a judge,(Sec. '2:), ca person is not
entitled to be present or to be heard by counsel.
l\)U'. w. UJl, L l1 m<.arrs 781
Rights of PeJ·sons Under Investigation
custodial inter;rogation after the accused has been formally charged,
are considereq. to be ci:ihcal pre-trial stages. (People vs. Espanola,
271 SCRA689-.[:199'.7];) ·
Right ~o.cour:isel befpre,lndictment.
(1) Right expressly mqde available by both 1973 and .1987 Consti-
tutions. _,.. Section 20',40' Article IV of, the 1973 Constitution, now
Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, was inspired by
the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of the Uni{ed States
in the cases of Escobedo v.·Illinois (378 U.S. 478 [1964].) and Miranda
v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 {1966].) for the protection of persons facing
custodial investigation.
These persons were often the victims of police brutality and
other forms of coerciqn that were inflicted upon them to extrncl
from them what crone later to be notoriously branded as "sumisc
confession." They were so-called because it was often during the
early hours of the morning, after grueling interrogation throughout
the night, that the suspect' s resistance would begin to crumble.
Driven to the point of exhaustion, he would finally agree to sign
any confession just to relieve himself of the physical and mental
pressure being exerted on him by the investigating officers.
(2) Procedural safeguards. - To prevent such treatment, Chief
Justice Earl Warren laid down the following rules in Miranda:
'.'Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the
pages which follow but briefly, it is this: the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stem-
ming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
40
"Incorporating Miranda v. Arizona in the Constitution was by no means an effort
to copycat American procedure. It was to fill a constitutional hiatus under the 1935
Charter , , . If Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Ch arter carried quite an exacting standard
compared to its 1935 predecessor, the 1987 Constitution provides for an even more
demanding procedure." (People vs. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496 [1987),)
The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given
effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on April 26, 1983 in Morales
vs. Enrile (121 SCRA 538.) and reiterated in March 20, 1985 in People vs. Gali!. (135 SCRA
465.) While the Morales-Ga/it doctrine eventually became par t of Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution, the requirements and restrictions outlined in said cases have no retroactive
effect and do not reach waivers m ad e prior to April 26, 1983, for the reason that at that
time, there was no rule or doctrine or guideline that waiver of the right to counsel
should itself be made .only in the presence and with the assistance of counsel. (People vs,
Luventino, 211 SCRA36 (1992]; People vs. Gamer, 326 SCRA 600 [2000],)

782 PHlLlPl-'lNli CONSTlTUTtG>NAL LAW Sec, 12
• Principles and Cas~s. .
demonstrates the use of procedural safog:uards effective to se-
cure the privilege against self-incrimination. By 'custodial in-
terrogation,' we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in cl;\Y significant way. "
As for the procedural safeguards to· be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused
persons of their right of silence and -to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following. measures are required:
Prior to questioning, the person must·be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of _an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is _m ade voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any mp.llller and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult an attorney
before spea)<lng, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the
individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does
not 'wish to pe interrogated, the police may not question him.
The mere ·fact that he may have answered some ques,tions or
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him
of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned." 41
Out-of-court Identification in the, absence
of counsel.
(1) Identification by victim at a police line-up. - There is no
law or police regulation requiring a police line-up as a con~ition
41
Significantly, the above rules are based on the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution guaranteeing to the accused the right, inter alia, to the assistance of
counsel for his defense "in criminal prosecutions." The right was extended to custodial
investigations only by judicial interpretation in the aforestated cases. In our country,
however, the right to counsel is expressly made available to any person eve·n before he
is formally indicted and actually tried, i.e., while he is still only facing investigation for
the commission of an offense. A separate guarantee is made for the trial itself in Section
19 of Article IV which states that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel." (People vs. Poyos, 143 SCRA 542 (1986].)
j J
Sec, 12 I ART. HI. BILL OF RIGHTS 783
Rights of P'.ersons Under Investigation
sine qua non for a prqper identification of an accused. (People vs.
Magdamit, 279 SCRA 423 [1997].) A police line-up is merely a part
of the invesiigation process by police investigators to ascertain the
identity of offenders· dr confirm their identification by a witness to a
crime. (Tapdasan, Jr. vs. People, 393 SCRA 335 [2002]; see People vs.
Tolentino, 423 SCRA 448 ,[2004].) Proper and reliable identification
could still be made ·other than through police line-up as long as
such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness
by the police. What is crucial is the positive identification made by
the witness during the trial. (People vs. Martin, 567 SCRA 42 [2008];
People vs. Palma, 614 SCRA 784 [2010]; People vs. Macapanas, 620
SCRA 54 [2010).)
(a) Process purely investigatory, not yet accusatory. - A person
taken or brought to the police station only to be identified Is
not yet entitled at such stage to counsel, as the confrontation
between him and the State has not yet begun. Technically, he is
.not yet under custodial investigation 42 (People vs. Hatton, 210
SCRA 1 [1992]; People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47 [1990).) where
in the course of the identification there is no move to extract any
admission or confession from the suspect. (People vs. Frago, 232
SCRA 653 [1994].)
(b) Process not part of custodial investigation. - As has been
stated (by the Solicitor General) in Gamboa vs. Cruz (162 SCRA
642 [1988].):
42
That stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police-
line up is outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel bec;mse it involves
a mere general inquiry into an unsolved crime; at that point, the process is purely
investigatory in nature, and has not yet shifted to the accusatory. (People vs. Lamsing,
248 SCRA 471 [1995]; People vs. Salvatierra, 276 SCRA 55 (1997]; see De la Torre vs. Court
of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196 [1998]; People vs. Pavillare, 329 SCRA 684 [2000].) Even if
it has, the inadmissibility of a police line-up identification of an uncounseled accused
will not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of a subsequent independent in-court
identification again made. (People vs. Lapura, 255 SCRA 85 (1996]; People vs. Timon, 281
SCRA 577 (1997); People vs. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002.)
f
I ~
I I
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways, i.e., showups,
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, mug-
shots, where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect, and line ups,
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider a number of
factors. (People vs. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995]; People vs. Sabangan, 712 SCRA 522
(2013]; People vs. Dandanan, 771 SCRA483 (2015].)
II ( 1' 1111 11 ' 1' 11 Ill t I IN/ 11111 11 ll !'lll\•I. J, AW
tJd11clplcu 1111d Ct11le~ ,•
"When petitioner was identifietl By.the complaihlant. at the
police line-up, he had not been heh:i'yet., tb'artswer for"a,triinin.al
offense. The police line-up is not a •par,t,.o fthe custoti:ia,l inquest;
hence, he was not yet entitled. tcftoili1SeLThus1Wwas held that
when the process had not yet ·shi!te·a. from •the iinvestigatory. to
the accusatory as when police· mvestigatibn does \110t elidt •a
confession, the accused may not yet aivail of the sEfrvke of his
lawyer. (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [1964].)
Since petitioner in the cours~ of his ,identificatic:>n in the
police line-up had not yet been held. tci answer for a :crim~al
offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be
assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet
set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to
counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State
and him had not begun. In fact, wh€n'he was identified in the
police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to
the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was
not yet facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes,
the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used
against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was·
being investigated at that time. He was ordered to sit down in
front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated.
Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued."
(c) Process not involve testimonial compulsion. - Neither is a
police line-up encompassed in the constitutional right against
testimonial compulsion in Section 17. (People vs. Casinillo,
213 SCRA 777 [1992].) The customary practice is that it is the
witness who is investigated or interrogated in the course of a
police line-up and who gives a statement to the police, rather
than the accused who is not questioned at all at that stage. Wh.at
·the Supreme Court warned against is an identification proce~s
in the police line-up that is "pointedly suggestive" or .tainted
with "improper suggestiveness, e.g., the accused is pointed out
by the police as one of the suspects; the accused is presented as
a single witness to a witness for purposes of identifications/'
(People vs. Santos, 221 SCRA 715 [1993]; People vs. Acosta, 187
SCRA 3? [1990]; People vs. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 [1994]; People
vs. Amestuzo, 361 SCRA 184 [2001); People vs. Escote, Jr., 400
SCRA 603 [2003].)
.A',J.~'tll11U1l: ·B;lLL Q l1 RIGHTS 7,85
Rights of P.~rs.ons .Under ;Investigation
, , 1 1. . (cl) Wlu:r~pro{;~ss.lon.e(1.jter: start ofQU$tQ4ial investigation. - But
, •, ,fl.fter;the starJ, 0£ ,th~ cuatoclial investigati0n, any identificati0n of
; . • . •i m :\ll1€.0lUi'lSeled,acousecl madl:)jp•a po,lice,Hnesup is inadmisslble.
,., i· This is .particularly-,.ttue, wli.ere the rpofaie officers first talked
-·, t0 the victim. before the c0nfrontati0n :was held under such
.circumstances· as to:impart improper- s'l!lggestion on the mind of
, ,,~ ,e._victim ~9-t may. lead to a mist&ken iqentification. (People vs.
J:0:.acam, 238 SCRA 306 [1994],)Du~ process demands that the
. idel)tification proce<;lu:i;e of crirnil:,.al suspects must be free from
impermissible suggestions. 43 (People vs. Alcantara, 240 SCRA
122 [1995].)
(2) Identification by .victim at a police station. - Even under the
constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States, a suspect
would have no cause for claiming a violation of his rights to counsel
and due process. In Kfrby v, Illinois (406 U.S. 682.), the facts of the
case aie summarized as follows:
"After arresting t:he petitioner and a companion and bringing
them to a polic~ station, police officers learned that certain
items found in their possession had been stolen in a recent
robbery. The robbery victim was brought to the police station
43
For procedure for out-of-court identification and the factors to be considered,
following the "totality of circumstances test," to determine the admissibility of such
identification, see People,vs..Verzosa, 294 SCRA 466 (1998); People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 249
SCRA54 (1995) and People vs. Timon, 281 SCRA577 (1997); .People vs, Gamer, 326 SCRA
660 (2000); People vs. Almanzor, G.R. No, 124916, July 11, 2002; People vs. Pineda, 429
SCRA 478 (2004); People vs. Rodrigo, 564 SCRA 584 (2008); and Mercado vs. People, 599
SCRA 367 (2009). The subsequent positive identification of the accused in court will cure
any flaw or irregularity that may have attended the out-of-court identification. (Lumanog
vs. People, 630 SCRA42 [2010]; People vs. Manigo, 714 SCRA 551 [2014].)
An out-of-,ourt identification of .an accused can be made in various ways. In a
show~~p, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification,
while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a .group of persons
gathered for that purpose, During custodial investigation, these typ.es of identification
h ave ),een recognized as "critical confr<:m tations of the accused by the prosecution"
which ,necessitate the..presence of counsel for the accused. This is becaus.e the results ·
of these pre-trial proceedjngs "might w ell settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality." We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police·line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the .start of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. But the inadmissibility
of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of the
,1ccused inadmissible on the ground of being the "fruits of the poisonous tree.'' (People
vs. Escordial, 373 SCRA 585 (2002I; see People vs, Rodrigo, 564 SCRA 584 [2008],)
 I j
786 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUI'IGNii\L' LAW Sec. 12
Principles and Cases'- · "'
· and •immediately identified the petitioner and his companion
a!;rthe robbers. No attorney was ptesent:wh:en the·,identification
was made, and neither the·petitioner•nora:):tis: companion,had
asked for legal assistance or had '.b een advised of any right-to the
presence of counsel.. Several weeks. fat-er, ·,the petitioner ,and his
companion were indicted for the robbery. ·· .
Af trial in ardllinois state co~t, tjf~'r'@b~ery victinf testified
that he had seen the petitioner ru;fdN.i?compAnion at ffi.e:pblice
\ stati(?n, and he pointed them ourm.ithe' cqu'rttoom and ic!.en:tified
them 'as the"robbers. The p"ettti61j'e'r' iiifc:f:'lus
C6mpanion :were
convicted, and the IllinoisAppell~teCour.t /FirstDisttict;•affirmed
the petitioner's conviction, holding :that the -constitutionaLrule
re.quiring the exclusion or evid¢noe deri1/ed:. from out-of~court
identification proceduri;:?s, •.conducted; in the .absence ,o f i;:ounsel
·•did.~Qt apply to pre~inclictmeI'\t idenp,fications. (121 I1L App.·2d
323,257 NEE 2d 589.)
On certiorari, th~ United States Supreme ~ourt, although not
.agreeing on an opinion., affirmed. In an opinion by Stewart, J.,
announcing the judgment of the court rui,d expressing the view
of four members of the court, it wa_s held.that the constitutional ·
right-to counsel did not attach until judici~i criminal proceedings
were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating to out~
of-court identifications in the absence of counsel did not apply
to identification testimony based_upon a police station show:..
up which took place before the accused had been indicted ,or
otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.
XXX XXX • ,
Mr. Justice Steward, expressing his view and°that of three other
members of the Court, said:
"In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming
back to the Court's landmark opinion in Powell v. Alabama (287
.0.S. 45, 77 L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84 ALR 527.), it has been firmly
established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment.
right to counsel attaches only afor after the time that adversary
juqi~ial _proceedingr, have been initi~teq ag1;t~st ni.1?1, ·
This_is not to say that a defendant·in_a criminal case has a
consµtutionaJ right to counsel only at the· trial i~sel(: The Powell
case makes clear that the right attaches at the.time of arraignment
Sec. 12 ART, '!fII; BILL OF RIGHTS 78'7
Rights of Pers11ms Under Investigation
and the Court nas:tecently held that it exists also at the time of
a preliminary hearing; (Coleman V; .Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, L. Ed.
2d ~87.).But the ,pc;>int is that, .w hile members of the court have
differed as ~o ,existence of the right to counsel in the contexts of
,some of the ahove.cases, all of those cases have involved points
of time at or after the initiation of ac:iversary judicial criminal
; ;· ,Rr9~eedings .....--:: "\yhet_b_~r by way of formal charge, preliminary
_,,, 1?--earii;tg, indicb11E:I!J,._infor~,a tion, or arraignment."«_
Exfra-Judiciai confess:ion o,btain~d before
. f effectivity cf 19?,3 Constitution.
/ '
. (1) Admissible.in.,ev,id~nce. ~ Although the requisites in Section
20, Article IV of the 1973-Constitution (now·sec. 12, A.rt. III.) which
declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person under
iii:vestigatiori for ru:i.offerise who has not been informed of his right
to remain· silenfand to counsel were not observed, an extra-judicial
cbnfession obtained and offered before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitutio'n is admissible in evidence, since that portion of the
1973 constitutional mandate should be given prospective and not
retrospective ·effect and no law gave the acwsed the right to be so
informed before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January
17, 1973. (Magtoto vs. Manguera,'5 63 SCRA 4 [1975]; People vs. De
44
As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and
beypndthe guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. For vrhile, under the latter, the right to counsel "attaches only at
or after the time that ad versary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him (the
accused)," under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches
at the start of investigation against a respondent and, therefore, even before adversary
juqicial proceedings against the accused have begun. (Gamboa vs. Cruz, supra, per Justice
Padilla.) The right to counsel was extended to custodial investigations only by judicial
interpretation in Escobedo and Miranda cases. (supra.)
45
· "The Constitution now expressly protects 'a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense' from the overwhelming power of the State and from official
abuse and lawlessness and gu_a rantees that he 'shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel and to be informed of such right. In order to give force and meaning to the .
constitutional guarantee, it flatly outlaws the admission of any confession obtained from a
person under investigation who has not been afforded his right to silence and to counsel
and to be informed of such rigj,t.
The outlawing of all such confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction
whether the invalid .confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the
C9rs.titutio_n . The Coµr t is called up on to enforce the plain mandate of the Con$titution
outlawing the admission of such invalid confessions. Ubi lex non distinguit neo dos
d{siittguere debemus.'1 (Teehankee, J., dissenting.)
 I I I J
11111 t.:lJN/1 I L.lrt.Jlll ~ll.~N/Ml1,, L/\W
J' l lll , ll ' l'l l 11 !
Pdnclples -o'rld1Glases\ \ ) "',,,i•"
los Santos, 150 SCRA 311 ,[1981);,!P.eople,.,v,:s;1L:aclier.a,-.]50·6CRA 113
[1987}; People vs. Veloso, iL48,SCIM.,6.01J9.~;1hk ·:· > 1, _, -- ;i-1-, i · ,
(2) Admissibility - detettnined ·~by }urisprcide'rit1a1 :-isfandards''-then
existing. - The admi~sibility of an·extfaiju'didal'coruessiorr executed
prior to Janua:11' 17,· 1973 shall bf det~ftt!med by-_ llie juiisi5rud~htial
standards existing' prior to tHe eff~ctivi'fy-~8£ .ffi'e '197-3 C:!ottsntution.
(Belvis III vs. Court of Appeals, 167SG:RA324[1:988].) Itj!anf tase, an
extra-judicial confession, to be adrilissl.bl~/ fs·~iibj~ctitb'thitcfo,:dfoon
sine qua non that the same had been given voluntarily ~d freely:
(People vs. Flores, 186 SCRA 303 [1M01:} ,._r; , · .:- ~:,:- : :•;1: · - , , :· -,
• > {" ) • ~--- . • "' •• '
Uncounselled waiver of right to·couns·efbefore
effectivity of 1987 Ct>nstitation. : .,,.
(1) Admissible under 1973 Constitution ..-cc-;-·Th~ 1973 ·constitution
did po_t contajn ~~:·right aga~st .anu~i~~sifI~ct ~¢~~f::~f
righ~ t9.·,c ounsel ,o/,hiclJ. is proyid~4 i.t\tlle,sep.o,ncl. ~~nterwe __of.$.~~~t~m1
12(1) ofthe 1987 ConstihJ,tion.. By; pru;ity :ii~fr~~~Rajt).g, ,tl;i}s .s p,~,c_½c,
provjsi!,m 11J,ay nqt be ~ppli!;!~ ;e~R~cqv_~lY.;_,_Acp;>{<i~gh,;,,:w.~iye;s
of the .i:4ght to .c~mnseLdtirµ,.g cqst~dial,ir]:v;~~tigatj,Q!'l ~vy,~fuo-\:lt th¢.
bene,fit of coun~er dui:ing the eff~ctivity;_qf~e l973 t:an~titution
sµ9uld be admi~sible. .
_ . ·~ ,,. . ·: ,
(2) Inadmissible from April 26, 1983 under Morales-Galit rulings.
-Bo,,.vev~r, the S1,1.preme Cou,r t, .througl:\,Morqle,s, ft: _El)'fil~,;(121
SCRA 538.) first anno.unced on April 26,,198~,artQ.reiter~a.ted h;r,People
vs. Galit (135 SC;RA 465.) on March 20, 1985 the-j~qicially .made
doctrine that eventually petame part of~'i~cfion '.12(lTofthe 1987
Constitution, that an uncounselled waiverp.f--the -right to counsel is
not to be given legal effect. According -to the High Court, pursuant
to Articles 4 and 8 of the Civil Code; th~ Morales-~alit rulings have
no retroactive effect and do not reach. waivers _made prior April
26, 1983. (People vs. Luvendino, 211 SCRA36 [1992]; Filoteo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 222 [1996].) . vs. Atutubo, 161 SCRA 463 [1983].)
Inadmissibility of extra-judicial confessions.
Any confession obtained in violation of Sec_tion 12 or 'Section
17 is inadmissible in evidence against the a1;:cused.- Thus, even if
the disputed confession of the accused speaks t;he truth, if it was
made without assistance of counsel, or nothing appears ·from the
S I , 12 AlU': UL UlLL OF RIGHTS 7,89
Rights of Pe_~son~ Under Investigation
record,.that he"was assisted .bf counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of.the absence:of coercion or even if it had.beea
voluntarily given. (People vs. Pineda, 157 SCRA 71 [1988]; PeQple vs.
Guarnes, 160· SCRA 522 ~1988]; People vs.-Newman and Tolentino,
163 SC::RA 496 _[1988]; ?~oJ:?le vs. Estevan, 186 SCRA 34 [1990].)
. A judgme~t- of conviction; therefore, cannot be based purely
on these confessions, It must stand or fail on the basis of the other
e:vidence of record.
Conviction notwithstanding inadmissibUlty.
) •
The alleged violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
•' . . ' .' while·under custodial investigation becomes relevant and material
only to cases in which extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted fre>m him is the basis of his conviction. (People vs. Ttdula,
the 292 SCRA 596 [1998]; People vs. Amestuzo, 361 SCRA 184 [2001].]
(1) Guilt of ace.used established by other evidence. - Even if the
accused's confes~ion should be disregarded, the prosecution
evidence may be sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(People vs. Folo, 147 SCRA 551 [1987].) The inadmissibility of the
findings based on an extra-judicial confession notwithstanding, the
accused cannot be acquitted of the crime charged. His guilt can be
established by the other evidence (People vs. Nolasco, 163 SCRA
v~: 623 [1988]; People vs. Malmis, 167 SCRA 10 [1988}.) apart from the
inadmissible confession (People vs. Como, 202 SCRA 200 [1991].),
e.g., eyewitness testimony positively identifying the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime.46
(2) Uncounseled extrajudicial confession affirmed by accused in open
court. - The sworn statement taken from the accused without the
assistance of counsel is, of course, inadmissible under Section 12. But
to that becomes inconsequential where the accused gave testimony in
open court affirming his admissions in the said statement. (People
46The admissibility of other pieces of evidence (e.g.;·stolen goods found in the
possession of.the accused), provided they are relevant to the issue and legally obtained
or are not otherw ise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in
the course of custodial investigation. (People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167 [1996); People
vs. Tidula, 292 SCRA596 (1998].)
 1'11 11 ,ll'l 'I N I\ ' )N ! IJI U II N A Li.A W
• i'J"lnciplcs nnGI Cascis, ·
.(3~- Doctrine of interlocking confessipntl,;...:..\'.Rhis•1doctrine.has,be.e n
accepted and recognizec;l as•a n exaeption:..t0Jfli~r£s·i'n~er ·alios.,aeta r.ule
and the hearsay rule: Where lhe ..exllt'.aj~el.i<iial•¢oh,£essiQ;t){is·use4,as1
circumstantial evidence to show:,~e::prop.abiliity: of·pa~oip:a~oli1}by
an accused co,cd:nspirator, that cionfessi<l,n is''feceivaToJe·as-evci.d~Me
against him.. (P,epple V'.S. Su.are~, f-,67 ~c~ J,\ ?,[1992'].)
'
Presumption of regularity not applicable
. · .1 •. ·' .. • • .
to in-custody confessions. ,
(1) Presumption always-against- waiver"of-a eonstitutionat right. -
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is, waived by the
person entitled to that protection, the presumpti9n is alw~y'.s against
the waiyer. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to satisfactorily
prove compliance with the constitutional requirements; otherwise,
the confession of the accused shall be inadmi,ssible in evidence.
With the exclusion of the confession, there is no necessity for the
court to deliberate on allegations of intimidation or maltreatment
which attended ·its execution. (see People vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA
597 [1986].)
(2) B°urden upon prosecution to prove compliance with constitutional
requirements. - In other words, in view of the peremptory
character of the constitutional admoniJion about giving these pre-
interrogation advisories, there must be clear proof that they were
given. No presumption of regular performance of official duty
that might otherwise arise from the making of an extrajudicial
confession to a police officer may be accorded thereto until the
prosecution convincingly establishes the regularity of its taking
and its compliance with the Constitlftion.47 (People vs. Vda. de
Cabangahan, 175 SCRA 160 [1989]; People vs. Santos, 283 SCRA 443
[1997].)
In People vs. Trinidad (162 SCRA 714 [1988].), accused-appellants'
allegations of torture and maltreatment.were refuted by a doctor's
47
The presumption tlt~t official duty has been regularly performed cannot by itself
prevail over positive avernmerits concerning violations of the constitutional rights of
tlte accused (People vs. Dario, 339 SCRA 515 [2000].), or overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Tan, 348 SCRA 116
[2000]; People vs. Canete, G.R. No. 138400, July 11, 2002.) Neither wiH it apply where the
death penalty is at stake. (People vs. Molina, 372 SCRA 378 [2001].) · People vs. Montiniero, 246 SCRA 786 [1995].)
!:it!C, '1 2 Altf: H!. l31LL OP RIGHTS 791
Rights of l~.ersons Under Investigation
testimony and medical-certificate. However, since there was no
proof that V{_hentli.eyinade their confessions they were informed of
their ·r ights to reni.airi·s ilent and to .counsel and that they krtowingly
and intelligently waived these rights, stich confessions were held
inadmissible .in evidence. (see People vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379
[1-982],)
(3) Where no in-custody 'confession taken from accused. - In
the Trinidad case,_it is not only the oral confessions made to the
apprehending officers that were tainted, but also the written
confessions made and signed a few days after their arrest. Thus,
the testimonies of the police officers on the matters allegedly
confessed to them by accused-appellants and the written extrn-
judicial confessions were held inadmissible in evidence. Dul whcrr
it appears that no extrajudicial statement was taken from the ncc11setl
-during the custodial inv~stigation that could have been presented
against nim, the claim that he was not informed of his constitutional
rights does not merit consideration. His mere denial that he was
just picked-up for no reason at all and framed-up, in the absence of
any proof to show any motive on the part of ~rosecution witnesses,
particularly the police officers in testifying in the manner that they
did against him, cannot overturn the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their official functions. (People vs. Hernandez,
179 SCRA 502 [1989].)
Presumption of voluntariness
of cohfessions·.
· (1) vVhen presumption arises. -Once the prosecution has shown
that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement
i
on pre-interrogation advisories, an extrajudicial confession is
presumed to be voluntary48 and consequently, the declarant bears
48A confession constitutes evidence of high order because it is supported by the .
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime, especially a heinous crime, unless he is prompted by truth and his
conscience. (People vs. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574 [1988]; People vs. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364
[1991]; People vs. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 [1992]; People vs. Fabro, 277 SCRA 19 [1997];
Frontreras vs. People, 776 SCRA 152 [2015].) It is admissible until the accused successfully
proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward
or leniency. (People vs. Dasig, 221 SCRA 549 [1993]; People vs. Nimo, 227 SCRA 69 [1993];

l ' llll ll ' l ' I NH 1 U Nlt llll J II IN/\l , 1.AW
JJt'11wlpJ011 nncl 'll!lcH '
the burden of proving that his confession is invo'luntary and untrue.
(see People vs. Canunay, 130 SCRA 30i [19~4]-{P.e ople vs. 'Solis, 182
SCRA 182 [1990J; People vs. Estevan, 186 BCRA; 34· [1990]~ People
vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA 199 [1997]; Reyes :vs,. Tacfrio, C.R. Nos.100940-
41, November 27, 2002; Belonghilot vs. RTC,'4~2 SCRA 221 [20~3].)
Repudiations of confessions are looked i..ip6n.·.with disfavor as
unreliable. If the accused fails to successfully assail the voluntariness
of his confession, the court canm;>t set i~ asiae.49 ·.
(2) Indicia ofvoluntariness. - \roluntarine~s i~ l~~ely determined
by external manifestations.
(a) The Supreme Cour.t h~s lard :.!;lo.Wt\ several factors
indicative thereof as whe~e the accuse.d diq. not present evidence
of compulsion, or q.uress nor violence on ~~ .p erson, or where
they appeared to be no mar~ of violence on his body and he did
not have himself examined by a repu_t~J:,,l e.physician to buttress
his claim. (People vs. Enanoria, 209 SC:RA577 [1992]; People vs.
Taboga, 376 SCRA500 [2002].)
(b) It has been held that a confession i$ ~eem~d to have been
made volUt1tarily where the accused ·d~d 11ot complain to the
proper authorities regarding the alleged ,maltreatment despite
the opportunity to do so (People vs. De,los Santos, 150 SCRA
311 [1987]; People vs. Solis, supra.) or institute any criminal
or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment. (People vs. Mada, 93 SCRA 317 [1979].)
(c) Still another indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure
of details in the confession which could have been known only
· to or supplied by the declarant (Peopl~ vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465
[1979); Estacio vs. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 12 [1990); People
vs. Villanueva, 266 SCRA 356 [1997]; People vs. Obrero, .33_2
However, under Section 3 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial
confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti. (People vs. Macqueda, 242 SCRA 565 [1995J.)
49Sec. 29. The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his ,guilt of the
offense charged, may be given in evidence against him (Rule 130, Rules of Court.) by any
person who heard the confession.
The doctrine that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on the confessant and
is not admissible against his co-accused admits of exceptions, one of which is when the
confession is to be used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation
of said co-accused in the crime committed. (People vs. Alvarez, 226 SCRA683 [1993J.)
A l{l', Ill. UIU . 11 HIU ll'J'S 793
Rights of Persons Under Investigation
SCRA 190 [2000,].), reflecting spontaneity and coherence which,
psychologically, cannot be -associated with a mind to which
. violence· and torJiire have been applied (People vs.• Taboga,
. .supra.) or could c;,i;tly eome from a participant in the commission
of the crii:ne, especially where.every aspect thereof jibes with the
s:worn•statements. given by his co-accused. '(People vs. Ladao,
G.R, Nos. 100940-41, November 27, 2001.) It is corroborated
be evidence ·aliuride · which details with the essential effects
contained in said cortfession. (People vs. Alvarez, Jr., 409 SCRA
·562 [2003].)
(d) In a case, a reading of the accused-appellants' confession
d;isclosed that he tried to limit his·liability by implying that he
had no irttention to kill the victim as he was not aware that the
estero where they threw the victim was filled with wl-\ter. Thill
exculpatory tor\.e·bf his confession was held demonstrative of its
voluntariness rather·than compulsion. (People vs. Fonseca, G.R.
Nos. 100940-41, November 27, 2001.)
(e) There is no law requiring the existing counsel to affix ,
his signature to the extra-judicial statement. His presence and
advice are considered sufficient safeguards against involuntary
,. confession. (People.vs. Rosales, 223 SCRA 222 [1993).)
1
(3) Evidence to rebut/substantiate claim of involuntariness. -
Where, however, an accused testifies that he signed his confession
,1
because he was maltreated, the prosecution must present evidence
,i1:- to rebut this claim; otherwise, the confession will be considered
illegally procured. (People vs. Inguito, 117 SCRA 641 [1982].) It must
prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the
court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted
his confession. (People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 [1986]; People vs.
Decierdo, 149 SCRA505 [1987].)
. I' (a) The fact that a suspect did not sign his sworn statement
may cast serious doubt as to the voluntariness of its execution.
(People vs. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 [1997).)
(b) The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from
its language. Where key details in the alleged confession were
provided by the police officers themselves, this fact shows that
the confession was not voluntarily given. (People vs. Rapeza,
520 SCRA 596 [2007].)
 l t I I
794 PI·lILll-'PINl:.1. 'ONSTffUTION/\L LAW Sec. 12 JI

Principles and Cases

(c) But the bare assertiqn :by the ··acdused : that he -was
threatened and forced ,t o exe0\:1te· an exh:ajudicial confession is
not sufficient to justify the rejection, 0£ -tl:J.~fonfession. He must ,.RIGHT TO BAIL
substantiate his claim because the .rule is .that a confession is
presumed voluntary until the contrary· is proved. (People vs,
Estevan, supra; People vs. Lumandon&,,·~27 :SCRA 650 [-2000].) SEC. 13; A:11 <persons, except those charged with of-
Neither is a confession rendered invo}:untar,y;:merely be-cause fenses punishable ·by reclusion perpetua when evidence
the accused was told by his counsel that h.e s,,riould tell- the truth ·of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
or it would be better for him to tell..the;truth.. (Pe.o.ple vs.,Calvo, · sufficient surefies; or·be released on recognizance as may
Jr., 269 SCRA 676 [1997].) be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended;.Excessive bail shall not be required.
-oOo-
Meaning of bail.
Bail is the security required by a court and given for the
provisional or temporary release of a person who is in the custody
of the law,1 for the commission of an offense, furnished by him or
a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance2 before any court as
required under the conditions specified, (see Rules of Court, Rule
114, Sec. 1.)
It is a "mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable
certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the subsequent
trial." (De la Camara vs. Inage, 41 SCRA 1 [1971].)

Purpose/rationale of ball.
(1) The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet assure appearance at

1By the very definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, the person applying for bail

must be in the custody of the Jaw. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law
(a) when he is arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 5, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, or even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation
to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court b y surrendering to the proper authorities. (People
vs. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334 (2000].)
2A bail bond may be forefeited only in instances where the presence of the accused

i~ specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court and, despite due notice to the
bondsmen to produce h im b efore the court on a given date, the accused fails to appear in
person ns so required. (Crisostomo vs. Sandiganbayan, 456 SCRA 45 [2005].)

795
 1 1 11111 1 l r! I 1 1 1t l' 1l ll f f l ll lll l\ l , I AW
11it,11lpl1•11111 1tl C 11111•1J
' ',
·'
the trial (Almeda vs. Vilialuz, 66 SCRA 38 ,[19,75].), .\ll1d at the same
time enable him to prepare his defense witl}9~t beµ1g subject to
punishrr;;nt p~ior ~o C0f;t:{~9\i~n,1 / C?1'!r~·1y;~) G~~r~l,. ;?79 SCRA 1 .
[1997].) Its ob1ect 1s to· reheve .the actuseitof unpnsonrnent .a nd
the State, of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, arid 8tt
the same time, to put the acquseg._.aey m48h .i md~r. the'.power of the
of
court as. if he. were in. cµst~clo{ ,t he ,propei:\:~fffo~r,. ,~d to secure
the appearance of th~ ~~cuse~ so as, ~o an.sy,er.:tlw ,call,:of. th~ court
and do what the law may require of hi)}lt.-C~vH:mqto.ls:t Jr. vs:- qour.t of
Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 [1980], citing 6Am. Jur. [Rev. Ed.], Bailment,
Sec. 6.)
(2) In practice1 bail has also been used to prevent the release of
an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom
judges might not want to release. (Basco vs. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220
[1997); Gaea} vs. Infante, 658 SCRA 835 [2011].)
(3) It acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both
the accused' s interest in liberty before trial and society's interest
''
in assuring accused's presence at the trial. (Leviste vs. Court of
Appeals, 615 SCRA 619 [2010].)
(4) The right to bail is granted because in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused is presumed innocent. (see Sec. 14[2.].) But
without bail, an accused under detention cannotbe released.
Form of bail.
It may be in the form of cash deposit, property bond, or a bond
secured from a surety company, or reco~zance.3 (see Rules of
Court, Rule 114, Sec. 1.) The question as to the form of the bond is
left to the discretion of the court.
(1) After the accused shall have been admitted to bail, the
court may; upon good cause shown, either increase or decrease the
amount of the same. (Ibid., Sec. 20.) · that he is unable to post the required cash or bail bond. The accused in this case is a CPA
3 all too clear for the law explicitly provides that the accused can be released on his own
Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion or the accused seeks to be released
on re~ognizance, the application may be filed only in the court where the case is pending
on trial or appeal. (Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 17[b}.) The judge should require the
presentation of the originals of the supp.o rting documents before approving a bail
bond, (Tuliao vs. Ramos, 284 SCRA 378 [1998];_Yap, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA
564 [2001}.) He C<\MOt approve a bail and order the relea~~ of an accused without the
submission of a valid bail bond. (Bantuas vs. Pangadapun, 292 SCRA 6i2 [1998).) A bail
bond is required to be in a public document, i.e., a duly notarized document. (Far Eastern
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. People, 710 SCRA 358 [2013}.)
8cc. 13 ART:1II. BILL OF RIGHTS 797
• Right to Bail
· (2) The accused" or any person acting in his behalf may deposit
in cash with.Jhe neafesfcollector of ll1,temal revenue, or provincial,
City, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the- court or
recommended by the ·prosecutor who investigated or filed the case.
(Ibid;, Sec. 14.)
. (3) A recognizance is a simple personal ·obligation or undertak-
ing entered into before a court and having no money penalty at-
tached.' Thus, an .accuse<;l may be temporarily released on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person.5 (Ibid., Sec. 15.)
Effect of bail.
(1) The effect , of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully
executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereundc1~
is to transfer the custo,d y of the accused from the public offlclals
w ho have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such
custody'has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original
imprisonment.
4
WEBSTER' S Third Int. Diet., p. 1896.
5
Section 1 of RA. No. 6036 provides that in "any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a person charged with violation of a criminal
offense the prescribed penalty for which is not higher than six months imprisonment and /
or a fine of two thousand pesos, or both." Ins tead of bail, Section 2 states that the person
charged "shall be required to sign in the presence of two witnesses of good standing in
the community a sworn.statement binding himself, pending final decision of his case, to
report to the Clerk of Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks, The Court
may, in its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further that he
be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a responsible citizen in the
community who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In such a case the affidavit
herein mentioned shall include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself
to accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the court." R.A. No. 6036 allows
the release of the accused on his own recognizance only where it has been established
who is engaged in the transport business. We reject the contention of respondent judge
that the law does not distinguish w hether the accused is rich or poor. The distinction is
recognizance only if he is able to clearly establish that he is unable to post cash or bail .
bond. (Tabao vs. Barataman, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1384, April 11, 2002.)
R.A. No. 10381 (Recognizance Act of 2012, May 14, 2013.) institutionalizes
recognizance as a mode of granting the release of a indigent person in custody as an
accused in a criminal case . Recognizance is defined as "a mode of securing the release of
any person in custody or d etention for the commission of an offense who is unable to post
bail due to abject poverty. The court where the case of such person has been filed shall
allow the release of the accused on recognizance to the custody of a qualified member of
the barangay, city or municipality where the accused resides."
I I I 1
'l!/8 l'J:lLLll'l' JNH 't)N.'f .J,'J'J'U'l'l NA I. I.AW
Principles and Cases
(2) The sureties become invested with fuJl authority over the
person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal
from leaving the state. (Manotok, Jr. vs,. Court of Appeals, supra,
citing 6 Arn. Jur. [Rev. Ed.], Bailment, Sec. 100.)--'l.Jpon assumption of
the obligation of bail, the sureties becom:e)n·law. the jailers of their
principal. (U.S. vs. Addison, 27 Phil. Sp3 [19.H]i U.S. vs. Suni~o, 40
Phil. 820 [1920].)
(3) When a cash bail is allowed, the two parties to.the transaction
are the State and the accused. Unlike other bail bonds, the· money
may then be used in the payment of that in which the State is
concerned - the fine and costs. The right of the government is in
the nature of a lien on the money depositeq.. (:Esteban vs. Alhambra,
437 SCRA 560 .[2004]; Ester vs. Ledesma, 52 :phil. 114 [1928].)
(4) The giving or posting of bail by the acc:t,ised is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. (Cofuangco;
Jr. vs; Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA367 [1998).)
Who may invoke the right to ball.
Where bail is a matter of right, the prosecution does not have the
right to present evidence for the denial of bail or to oppose the grant
of bail. But it must be given notice of the hearing or at least asked for
its recommendation as to the amount of bail.
(1) The right to bail is available to any person arrested,6 detained,
or otherwise, deprived of his liberty, whether or not an information
(criminal complaint) has been filed against him. A person is allowed
to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of
his arrest or voluntary surrender.7 (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, 396
SCRA 443 [2003].)
6
Section 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court provides that a judge.could grant bail to a person
lawfully arrested but without a warrant, upon waiver 0£ his right under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
7
1£ there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged with
a criminal offense, a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of one not yet
so charged although already arrested or detained. To place the former in a more favored
position than the latter would be anomalous and absurd. (Teehankee vs, Rovira, 75 Phil.
635 [1945}; Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 [1946]; Beltran vs. Diaz, 77 Phil. 484 [1946];
Ruiz vs. Beldin, Jr., 451 SCRA402 [2005].)
/\ I'(,' I ', J11 , U 11. I , U I I I,( I :J l'I :J '/W
. !Ught to 13all
The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
conduct of hearings 'o n a petition for bail.8
. Note that the Con,.s.t itution explicitly grants the right to bail to
,;all persons/' not merely to "all civilians."9
(2) When.the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended,
the right to bail, even for the commission of national security
crimes (s~e Sec. 15.), is still available to the person detained except as
provided in Section 13.
A petition.for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for
asserting a right to hail or vindicating its denial. (Galvez vs. Court
of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685 [1994].)
(3) Bail is a matter of right to an accused where the offense cl1nrged
is. not punishable by death,10 or reclusion perpetua or life impriso11.111c11t11
even if the evidence of guilt is strong, or where the offense cl,nrged Is so
punishable but the evidence ofguilt is not strong.
8There is no inconsistency between an application of an accused for bail and his
filing a motion to quash an information, these two reliefs are not necessarily antithetical to
each other. An accused may file a motion to quash, as a general rule, before arraignment.
(Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.)
9.In Comendador vs. De Villa (200 SCRA 80 [1991].), the majority opinion sustained the
argument of the Solicitor General, justifying exemption of military personnel suspected
of having taken part in the failed coup d'etat in December 1989 from the right to bail.
"The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail could violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. x x x the accused officers x x x cannot say that they
have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is
extended to civilians."
1oUnder the Rules of Court, a capital offense is defined as an offense which, under
the law existing at the time of its commission, and of the application for bail, may be
punished with death. (Rule 114, Sec. 6 thereof.) Note that the crime involved must be
punishable by death, during two points of time: the time of its commission and the time
of the application for bail.
Congress through RA. No. 7659 (Dec. 13, 1993) has restored the death penalty on
certain heinous crimes. (see Sec. 19[1].) RA. No. 9346 Uune 26, 2006) abolished the death
penalty.
nReclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment. (see Note 2 under Sec, 19.)
It would seem that the penalty of "life imprisonment'' does not fall under the exception
to the right to bail. In other words, a person charged with an offense punishable by life
imprisonment shall be entitled to bail before conviction even when evidence of guilt is
strong. Under the Rules of Court, however, he shall not be admitted to bail. (Rule 114,
Sec. 7, infra.)
See Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94.

1' 1111 , 11 ' 1' 11 uPrlnclplcm
, nual Cnt1cn
t t IN I 1111 1 l ,li ~,(\JI l,A W
(4) So, before or after conviction by·Jh~, lt!efropol~tan· tr.ia.l court,
municipal trial court, and municipal C!irc4it trjaJ,1court, and befoie
cpnviction by the Regional Tri~~ Court of. -~ qff~_nse.not pµnishable
by death, reclusion perpetua,·or.lt(e impris~~~;tt, bail is~ _m at_ter of
right. (Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 4,)
(5) Individual freedom is too basic, too'transaendental and vital
in a republican state to be denied on n:i~re· g¢neral principles and
abstract considerations of public policy. (P~6j51e ys.
Hern~<;l.ez, 99
Phil. 515 [1-956).) The right to bail as guaranteed by the Constifutiori.
may not be denied even where the accused ha.$ p,reviously escaped his
detention, or by reason of his prior absconding. (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66
SCRA38 [1975].)
(6) Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a
clear and convincing showing (a) that he will not be a flight risk
as a danger to .the community; and (b)- that •.there exists special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. (Government of the
USA vs. Purganan, 389 SCRA 62 [2004); Rodriguez vs. Presiding
Judge, 483 SCRA 290 [2006].)
When right not available.
Although the right to bail applies to "all," the guarantee is not
without exception. (Aswat vs. Galido, 204 SCRA 205 [1991].)
(1) The right cannot be invoked where the applicant is not in
custody of the Iaw 12 or otherwise deprived of Ns liberty (arrested or
detained) because he went into hiding and is at large, and hence,
a free man even when he has already been criminally charged in
court. The purpose of bail is to secure one's -release and it would
12
A person is considered to be in the custody of the law- (a) when he is arrested
either by virtue of a warrant of arrest pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court, or even without a warrant, under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section
7, Rule 112, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities. Only those persons who have been either
arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty can petition for bail. (Dinapol
vs. Baldado, 225 SCRA 110 [1993].) Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
of the accused. (Alva vs. Court of Appeals, 487 SCRA 146 [2006).) But one confined ln
a hospital, who filed his motion for admission to bail w~th the trial court before being
actually and physically placed under arrest, furnishing true i.nformnlion of hie nctunl
whereabouts and equlvocably recognizing the jurlsdlctlon of tho anld co11rt, moy bu
considered as being co11str11ctlvcly under lognl custody. (Pndornngo vo, Courl o! A1~p1111l,11
247 SCRA 741 [1995).)
l l I t I I
A<lt l": 111. IJILL OI' RIG! l'l'S 80'.l
· Right to Bail
be ·in~ongruous dJ.:'_pier.rt-atureJ:0 grant bail to one who is free or
whose heed.om h.as·yet to be curtailed.13 (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2
SCRA 888 [1-961]; Me'n'doza: vs; CFI of Que:zon, 51 SCRA 369 [1973);
.Agµirre vs. Beltnonte,;237 SCRA 778 [1994]; Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr.,
240 SCRA 1-54 [1995]: Comia vs. Antona, 337 SCRA 656 [2000]; Alva
vs. Court of Appeals; 487 SCRA 146 [2006].)
(2) It is also not a'tjailable t~ one charged with an offense punishable
by death a or reclusion· p'erpefua, when evidence of his guilt is strong (Sec.
13.) regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution . Under the
Rules of Court, -the same rule applies where the offense charged
is lif~ imprisonment15 (Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 7.) which,
for purposes of Section 13, is considered of the same category as
reclusion perpetua. The obvious reason for the non-availability of the
Fight is that the accused has a particularly strong temptation to flee
if he ha~ the opportunity rather .than face the verdict of the cou rt. 16
i .
Note that a per~on charged with a capital offense is not abso-
lutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on ba!l
pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person bail
is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the court. (People
vs. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA.334 [2000]; Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, 396
SCRA 443 [2003].)
(3) Under the Rules of Court, "no bail shall be allowed after
the judgment of conviction has become final, or after the accused has
commenced to serve sentence."17 (Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 24.)
13Toe rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the
former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to
post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appeara~ce-
(Aguirre vs. Belmonte, supra.) By gaining custody over the accused, the court acquires
jurisdiction over him. It is, therefore, highly irregular for a court not to order the arrest of
the accused, and yet requiring him to a bail bond.
14See Note 10.
15See Note 11.
16The test to determine the penalty affixed to the offense charged is not the penalty
to be actually imposed on the accused in view of attendant circumstances, but the penalty·
prescribed by law for the offense charged as described in the recitals of the informatioi:i,
ln relnl'ion to the penal provision supposedly violated. The designation of the offense 1s
not binding upon the court. (see Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja, 134 SCRA 466 [1985). )
17Thc exception is when the counsel has applied for probation before he commences
to ijCrvo sonlcncc, provided the pcnnlty nnd tl,o offense ore within the purview of the
l'l'Oht1llon Lnw. (soc Vicente vs. Mojnch1con, 461 SCRA 12 [2005); Adnlln vs. Bugtas, 475
flC' l{I\ '17!1 [2005],)
 l"l H LW~ lNJJ C..:ON S'l'l'l'U'lllt.l>N ll\.L LAW Scc. '13
· Principles and Cases
{4) It is available only in ·criminal proceedings; ·1hence,- aliens
in deportation proceedings, which are administrative .jn,_ n:a:tur~i •. do
not enjoy the right. (Republic vs. Clorib~l, 9· SCRA 453 [1963};·Ohg
Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of I-Irlmigrit'i.ont:4,:,scRi\ 442 t,19@],)
The granting of bail -is d-isctetibnary with. tne ·Commissioner of
Immigration. (Harvey vs. Defensor Santiago, 162 SC.RA 840-fi988].)
Of course, an alien suspected of or chru::g~~-~t$ }:tavip.g com!llifted
a bailable offense is entitled, to baj.l as an.y; ?~~-. . . ... , .,., ,. ._
(5) The right to bail cannot he invoked where ·there -.i's waiver.
It is a right ,which is personal to, the accused--and whose waiver
would not be "contrary to law, public order, public policy; morals,
or goods customs, or prejudicial to a third · person with a right
recognized by law." (Art. 6, Civil Code:) It is competen\.for a-person
to waive expressly or impliedly a personal ri,ght guaranteed by the
Constitution and to consent to action which would be invalid if
taken against his will. 18 (People vs: Donato, 198.SCRA 130 [1991].)
(6) The right to bail has traditionally not been recognized and
is' not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. The release from confinement of a
person subject to military law facing charges before a general court-
martial is a matter that lies largely in the discretion of the military
authorities who are in a better position to appreciate the gravity of
said charges and the advisability of releasing him pending trial and
disposition of the case filed against him. 19 ( Comendador vs. De Villa,
200 SCRA 80 [1991]; Domingo vs. Minister of National Defense, 124
SCRA529 [1983]; Aswat vs. Galido, supra.)
18
0nce an accused escapes from confinement or jumps 12ail or flees to a foreign
country, he lossess his standing in court and unless 'he siµrenders or submits to the
jurisdictiOn of the court, he. is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court. (Alva vs. Court of Appeals, 487 SCRA 146 [2006).)
Posting of a bail b ond constitutes a waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of
a person. (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377 (1977]; B'ermejo vs. Barrios, ·31 SCRA 704
[1970].) Where the accused did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved
application for bail at the earliest opportune time, having ·raised the issue only in the
appeal, for ~uch failure they w~re deemed to have waived their right to bail. (People vs.
Manes, 303 SCRA231 [1999].) . hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. x x x While this
1
911:ie right to speedy trial and the need to instill disciplirte within the command
and thereby achieve command efficiency are glven more emphasis in the military. The
unique structure of the military sh ould b e en ough reason to exempt military men from
the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. (Ibid.)
Sec. 13 ~ R''r. 111. BILL OF RIGH TS 803
Right to Bail
Note1 howeveF, that Section J.3 makes use of the phrase "All
persons, x x x."
.Bight to .ba!.i qf pot~nti,al extraditee.
,
. In Gover.nmen{ of the USA vs. Purgancm (389 SCRA623 [2002].), the
Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision on bail does
not apply·to extradition proteedings. It is a'lailable only in criminal
proceedings. In ext:radition proceedings, prospective extraditees are
generally not.entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their
arrest can be issued; neither are they entitled to the right to bail and
provisional liberty while t1,e extraditions proceedings are pending.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained
to avoid his flight fr0m justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of
eyhowing that he wHl not flee once bail is granted.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is no t a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused
as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extradition court is not called
upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought
to be extradited. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings
in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies w ith the extradition treaty and whether the person sought
is extraditable. (see Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160
[2000] and 343 SCRA 374 [2000]; Rodriguez vs. Presiding Judge, 483
SCRA 290 [2006].)
4 i
The above ruling was abandoned in Government of Hongkong
Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr. (521 SCRA470 [2007].), thus:
"[T]his Court cannot ignore the following trends in international
law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
, rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of
countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and,(4) the duty of this Court to balance
the rights of the · individual under our fundamental law, on one
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
 l I
1 t
804 ' ' \ t
PH ILIPPINE CON STITUTIONA'.L LAW
Principles and Cases
Sec. 13
right to life and liberty, a :re-exarttinatiort of th~ court's ruling in
Purganan is in order. x x x.
An extradition proceeding . q._eing .sui gener!s, .th~ _stardard of
proof required in granting or·dehying bail carnieither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases .n or _th~ s.tandard of proof
of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, thestandardofsubstantial evidenceu:sedinadministi:ative
cases cannot likewise apply given. fue .obje<;t. of extr;adition law
which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from' ·fleeing · 01:11'
jurisdiction xx Xi [The] standard.should be lower than pioofbeyond
reasonable doubt but higher than:prepond.efance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by 'dear and convincing evidence'
that he is not a flight -risk and will abide ·wilh' all the: orders and
processes of the extradition court. In this case; there is no· showing
that private respondent presented evidence fo sh~y._h e is not a flight
risk .Consequently, the case should be remand:e d.to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent mi;l.y be granted .b ail on the
basis of 'cle~r and convincing evidence.' "
' ~ '
Duties of a fudge 'in a petition for bafl
In a capital offense.
The Supreme Court enunciated the following duties of the trial
judge in such a petition:
(1) In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to, submit his recommendation (Sec. 18, Rule 114, Rules
of.Court.);
(2) Where bail is a matter of discretion conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Secs. 7 and 8, ibid.);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and
(4) If the evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong, disch arge
the accused upon the approval of the bailboncl (Sec. 19, ibid.);
otherwise, the petition should be d enied. (Nal'ciso vs. Sta. Ron1onu-
l I\
Sec. 13
\
ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS
· . Right to Bail
805
Cruz, 328SCRA.505J2P0O]; Basco vs. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA220 [1997);
Managuelod vs. Paclibon, Jr., 426 SCRA 377 [2004); Mabutas vs.
Perella, 459_$CRA 368 [2005].)
Discretion of judge•to grant or deny ball,
A person under'detention by legal process shall not be released
dr transferred except upon o.rder of the court or when he is admitted
to bail. (Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 3.) An offended party, the
private complainant in a criminal case, has been held' to have
sufficient person~ity to question in the appellate court an order by
a lower court granting bail to· the accused. (People vs. Calo, Jr., 186
SCRA 620 [1990]:} .
(l) Grant or denial, a judicial function; - The approval of bail
.of an accused person and the authority to order the release of a
detained person is ·purely a judicial function. (Vallada vs. Vdn. de
Batoorr, 353 SCRA 1~ [2.001].) The judge is called upon to balance
the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of
innocenc:e until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt and to
prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to
conviction, against the right of the State to protect the people and
the peace of the community from dangerous elements. (Floresta vs.
Ubiades, 429 SCRA 270 [2004].)
Baii hearing is necessary even if the prosecution does not
interpose any objection or leaves the application for bail to the sound
discretion of the court. A hearing is required in order for the court
to ascertain the adequacy of the amount of bail under the guidelines
set forth in the Rules of Court. (Sec. 9, Rule 114 thereof.)
(2) Determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. - The
grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinged on the issue on
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. If the
evidence establishes a strong prima facie case, bail shall be denied.
It is the Regional Trial Court which is tasked to determine whether
or not the evidence of guilt in a capital offense (punishable by
death reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment), is strong. Such
determination, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with
the judge.
(a) In the absence of manifest abuse of discretion, the
Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
tlOO !'llll..,ll'l'I N I '. 'UN! ll'I IJ' lt( l~/\1. 1./\W
Principles nncl Cnses
trial court. (see Bolafios vs. De la Cxi,rz,::116. SCRA 78 -fl982].)
The judge is allowed a reason.abie latitude for tke op.e ration
of his own individual view of the case, his appreciation of the
facts, and ms understanding of the applica,b le law on the matter. ·
Judicial discretion is, of course, not unlimited; it must be guided
and controlled by well-known rules-fIDd p.t:inciples. (Re Judge
S. Tayao, RTC, Br. 143, Makati, 229 SCRA 723 [1994]; Baylon vs.
Sison, 43 SCRA 284 [1995].)
(b) If the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion
before conviction. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether
or not the evidence is strong. In such case, where the gra,n~ of
bail is discretionary, due process reqµires that the prosecution
must be given reasonable opp ortunity to oppose·the motion for
bail.
-(c) Once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail becomes a matter of right. (People vs. Donato, 198
SCRA 130 [1991).) When the evidence of guilt is strong, an
accused shall not be admitted to bail regardless of .the stage of
the criminal prosecution. (Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr., supra.) In
other offenses, bail is a matter of right although the evidence of
guilt is strong, and even after conviction. (infra.)
(d) Mere affidavits of the accused and/ or his witness or
witnesses or recitals of other contents are not sufficient voice.
They are mere hearsay evidence; hence, they cannot legally
form the basis of an order granting bail. The prosecution must
be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. ·(Ocampo vs.
Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 [1946]; Baylon vs. Sison, supra.)
(e) A judge should not grant bail based simply on the
failure of the prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong; he should endeavor to determine the
existence of su ch evidence. (Tolentino vs. Camano, Jr., 322 SCRA
.559 [2000]. )
(£) An accused charged with a capital offense is still
entitled to bail but no longer "OA o molte r of ri3bt." ln11l<1 nd It 111
cliscr llonnry on tlw pA1't of thr tl'inl co111·1nrid rn ll11 fo1· 11 l11dlc 111I
I 1'l ', I ~I A L{'J '. J11 , Ul 1,1. JI l{I !t J'J U
. Right to Dail
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong in order to
grant b ail.20 (Andres· vs. Beltran, 363 SCRA 371 [2001}.)
j' ; I
;' Recommendation for bail. - Where the charge is bailable, it
(3)
is a grave error for a judge to issue a warrant of arrest without a
recommendation for bail. The right to bail is a constitutional right.
Its d~mial to an accused is allowed only in rare cases. (Bernardo vs.
Mendoza, 90 SCRA214 [1979).) It is consistent with equity and justice
that the accused should be released on bail pending determination
of the criminal case against him on the merits. (People vs. Padilla, 92
SCRA 621 [1979).)
But it is incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has
been recommended or fixed, to claim. the right. to a bail hearing
and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence
against him. (Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 [1990].)
(4) Summary hearing on right to bail. - By sum111nry '1enri11g is
meant such brief an d speedy method of receiving evidence of guilt as
is practicable and consistent w ith the purpose of the hearing, which
is to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. In
such a hearing, the ,c ourt does not sit to try the merits or to enter
into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor is it called to speculate on
the outcome of the 'trial. The court may confine itself to substantial
matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses. The evidence for purposes of
granting bail is merely preliminary and is not conclusive. (People
vs. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334 [2000]; Basco vs. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220
[1997); see Docena~Caspe vs. Bugtas, supra; People vs. Dulanas, 489
SCRA58 [2006).)
(5) Notice and bail hearing. - Whether bail is a matter of
right or discretion, reasonable notice of hecp-ing is required to be
given to the prosecutor or, at least he must be asked to submit his
recommendation. (Bangayan vs. Batacan, 345 SCRA 301 [2000];
Cabrera vs. Zeina, 388 SCRA 249 [2002]; Young vs. Batuigas, 403 .
,oA grnnl of I.mil docs not prevent the trial court, as the trier of facts, from making
n nnnl ni1•11•~•1m~n1 of lhc evidence nflcr full lrinl on the merits. It is not an uncommon
1•'(11111h•nrt• tlmt nn nccu eel grnnlccl bnll ls convicted in due course. (People vs. Brita, 741
l1t liA 11()11120 111} )

1•1111 11 •1•1~ Ill l t IN/ I 1111 J I J UI ✓ I , I AW Ill'. I,\
I '1fod (Jlc11 t1 t1d 'IIJJt!ll
SCRA 123 [2003].) The judge has no au-~ho1·1ty, to de1w , or grant
bail irrespective of his opinicm. as to 'the culpabUity'-o,Mhe aq:.µsed,
without hearing on the,.application for b~il and taking into account
't he evidence presented; a~ t,o th1: guilt of iJ:ie;a:ccused.'
(a) A bail application. doe~ not: 9nly
invol~~ the rig!'lt of
the ·accused _to temporary Jjbe1;.ty, qut'JiReVfis_e th~ right 9£ the
State to prot.~_c t the people am;l ,fuej:iea_ce,o f t4e community fr9m
dangerous ele::m;ents,;These two ..tjghts:mu~t l~e ib ~an~~d 1;,y the
judge.in ~~- SC<),lE~. 0~ ~usµce~hence,, the P.~<;:essity of.a hearing to
guide_his exercise' of discretion. (Go vs. Bqngol~, s~pra; ~afteda
vs: Alaan, 374 SCRA 225 [2002]; Docena-Caspe vs. Bugtas, 400
SCRA37 (2003].) . ' .
(b) Bail .may be grante~ only after a hearing thereon
conducted by the judge.to determine whether the prosecution's
evidence of guilt is strong before the motion is resolved. The
discretion lies not in determining whether or not there will be a
hearing, as it is mandatory, but in apprec~ating and evaluating
the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused. (Baylon
vs. Sison, supra; Gimeno vs. Arcueno, Sr:, ·250 SCRA 376 [1995];
Aguirre vs. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778 ' [1994]; Bantuas vs.
Pangadapun, 292 SCRA 622 [1998].)
(c) A bail hearing is necessary to give the prosecution
reasonable opportunity to oppose the application by showing
that evidence of guilt is strong. (Go vs. Bongolan, 311 SCRA 99
[1999].) Granting bail without such hearing would constitute
grave abuse of discretion. (People vs. Antona, 375 SCRA 464
[200f].) Even in cases where there is no petip.on for bail, a h earing
should still be needed to determine whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. The hearing on the petition for bail is separate
and distinct from the initial hearing to determine prob_able
cause. (Directo vs. Bautista, 346 SCRA223 [2000].) ,
(d) Without a hearing, a judge cannot aptly be said to be in a
position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution
is weak or strong. (Alrneron vs. Sardido, 281 SCRA 415 [199:?"];
Docena-Caspe vs. Bugtas, 400 SCRA 37 [2003].) "Strong"
evidence, of course, does not mean proof beyond 1·ctumnnbk
doubt. The hearing need only be summary (Ocmnpc~ v11,
Bernabe, suprn.), olthour;h J.t noocl not be AoptH'lllO trnd dl111h1II
I 1
A l'(' l', lll.1111.I , J1 1{l i ll lf) HOV
Wght to lJall
·from the trial.i:ts~H: (Gerardo vs. Judge 0£ CFI of Ilocos Norte, 86
Phil. 504 [l950:] .)
(e) Tlie · prosecution-must prove the non-existence of the
right to bail (i.e., evidence of guilt is str~ng) ~d, in the ca~e ~f
the defense, the ex.istence of the right (i.e., evidence of guilt is
not It ihe
·stron'g). is mini~terial duty· 0'£· the .judge to ~onsider
. the' ev~dence .so presented. The reason for the rule 1s stated
.· , by . the Sup,reme ·couq in the following man_ner. "A_s far as
· the, principles involved are concerned, th:r~ 1s no. difference
between refusing to admit a defendant to bail ma capital o~ense
without considering or deciding whether the proof be evident
or the presumption of guilt strong,. and convicting a defendant
of the crime charged without considering or deciding whether
r he is guilty or not. The only difference is the degr_ee of freedom
of which he is deprived." (Montalbo vs. Santaman a, 54 Phil. 955
[1930],)
(f) The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall
be considered automatically reproduced at the trial. (Rules of
Court, Rule 114, Sec. 8.) The assessment of the evidence presented
during a bail hearing, however, is intended only for the purpose
of granting or denying an application for the provisional release
of the accused. Such assessment is at best preliminary and not
a final one; It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused
person granted bail is convicted in due course (People vs.
Baldoz, 369 SCRA690 [2001].), or denied bail is acquitted.
(g) Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused, if on an examination_ of ~e entire rec~rd
the presumption is great that an accused 1s guilty of a capital
offense, bail should be refused. (People vs. Cabral, 303 SCRA
361 [1999].)
(h) In the judicial determination of the availability of the
right to bail, the prosecution should be afforded procedural due
process. Thus, in a summar y proceeding on a motion praying ·
for admission to bail, whether it is a matter of right or discretion,
the prosecution should be given notice and ample opportunity
to present evidence and, thereafter, the court should spell out
nt least a resume or S\.tmmary of the evidence on which its
01·<'.kr g1.·onlh113 Ol' denying boll iAbn11 cl; ol·hcrwise, the order is

I I Il l ii I I 11 I 1111 11 1 11 11 1 If A l I w :11 I
111hll tpl1 11111d t 11111'~
defective and voidable cm ground of,viola:tion.o f procedural due
process.21 (Carpio.vs. Maglalang, 196 SCI3:A,41 [19.91]; People vs.
San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 [1968]; Cortes vs. CatraJ, 2?9 SCRA 1
[1997].) .,
(i) Failure to c0nd\lc:t a hearing whef\-.requi,red;; ,befo;.eJixing
bail, will violate d.ue process .and dfsre~aid' :o f !;he, estc1.blished
rule of law.by depriviRg the ptosecuti©n.·of th..e ,6.p porruility to
prove that the evidence of :guilt agains~) h!:l ·"ep!l'.sed is strong,
will constitute gro'ss ignorance ot the:·_1aw ~or~iina0rp.petence,
which wiU subject the judge to discip~ary action, ._,Libarios
vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Estoya,v,s . Abraha~Srngson,
237 SCRA J [1994],) Ignorance of this .~ pe:,Cclllllot, lie excused
by a·claim of good faith -o r excusable.negligence .. (Almeron vs.
Sardido, supra; Bantuas vs. Pangadapun;.292 SCRA 622: [1998].)
' (j) It is st,ill mandatory for the':'co~e"tci conclttc~ ~ :~earing
and ask searching and darificatory questions for the·ptrrpose of
detehii.u;ung the existence of strong evidence against the accused
although the prosecution interposed,no objectio~.to the grant of
bail .(Tucay vs. Domagas, ·242 SCRA -no [1995].}or refused to
adduce evidence that the ,g uilt of the /lCCUsed was strong (Meris
vs. Ofilada, 293 SCRA 606 .[1998); Mao:za;U-:Gelacio vs.:Flores, 334
SCRA 1 [2000); Domingo vs. Pagayatan; 403 SCRA 381 [2003).);
in fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail. (Directo
vs. Bautista, 346 SCRA 223 [2000); Te vs. Perez, AM. No. MTJ-
00-1286, Jan. 21, 2002.)
(k) The determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion . which by the
very nature of things, may rightfully be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. {Serapio vs.
Sandiganbayan, 396 SCRA 443 [2003) .) A hearing is required for
the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines for
fixing the amount of bail. (Go vs. Bongolan, 311 SCRA99 [1999).)
21
In a later case, the order of the judge granting bail contained no recital of the
evidence presented by the prosecution nor a pronouncement that the evidence of guilt
of the accused was not strong. It was held that the "order was defective in form and
substance," and "should not be sustained nor given any semblance of validity." (People
vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37 [1995].) . the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
811
I\ A l I', Ill , 1111 ,1, U P l{l '111.~,
· Right to Bail
(1) ·It is pate·n t·error for a judge to base his order granting bail
merely on the supporting affidavits attached to the information
since these are merely intended to establish probable ~ause as
basis for issuance of a warrant of arrest, and not to control his
discretion to deny or grant bail in all situations, i.e., with or
without tnotion from the accused and even without conducting
a hearing on the matter (,c}urillo, J~. vs. Francisco, 235 SCRA 283
[1994); Buzon, Jr. vs. Velasco, 253 SCRA 601 [1996].), or solely
on account of the voluntary s:urrender of .t he accused. (Sule
vs. Biteng, 243 .S~RA 524, [1995}.) There would be violation
of procedural due · process, a right to which the pros~cution
is equally entitle_d as the defense, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered. void on that ground.
(Borinaga vs. Tamin, 226 SCRA 206 [1993].)
(m) Where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the cou.rt
may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain
the strength of the state's evidence or judge the adequacy of
the amount of bail. (Ibid.; Libarios vs. Dabalos, supra; Basco vs.
Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220 [1997].) The error committed by the
judge in granting bail cannot be corrected by the mere failure
of the prosecution to file a motion for cancellation thereof or a
clarification of his order. (Baylon vs. Sison, supra.)
(n) It must be borne in mind that a hearing is also necessary
for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth
in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount
of bail. Only after it has satisfied itself that these requirements
have been met can it then proceed to rule on whether or not
to grant bail. (Baylon vs. Sison, supra.) The prosecutor must
be heard even in cases where bail is a matter of right (Chin vs.
Gustilo, 247 SCRA 175 [1995].), or at least he must be asked for
his recommendation. (Comia vs. Antona, 337 SCRA 656 [2000].)
(o) The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing
of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or
to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against
another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with

ll"t\ L 1,AW
l ' l ll l, 11 ' 1'111 1, I I )Nl1 J 11 1 1 l ~l
• t'r.lti 1,, 1t•11un~l \1u 81
1 '!-''i l-'ll may be unders.core\dftba1t•in~t,he.-e~~rqise; oH ts •ddscretion,
·: , 1Jihe . Sandiganbay:an, .musk ita~e ~ } riJo·i •~{co1:ti1:t '•f<l:ot ' :t}nly the
convenience of tlr(e:state; .mdu.dii;tgd:ri~~prciisec.Jition,r'but:also that
· of the accused,and1the,w.itnesses·of botkth:e prosecufiom and the
accused and ;the right of aocili.sed·t;o a speedy trial. •~Serapio vs.
Sandigai,,:b.ayan, G.R.:Nt>. H8'i16:8i Januar:}i.2-8;. 20.03. ~,. . ··
. {pf Tl)~'to.uri~·ord~r.igtAntihg;o{tgfdslh~ baii'tiuls:t co,ntain
a sumni_ary of t~e eviden~~:,for thl pros~~~tip~ ~oilowed \ iy its
. c~r.,cI~~i?:~ ·'f:'heth~r,.or. 1;)9~ the evide~1~e_·of ,guqt} s:-~fro~g. Its
a~~~1'\~e.7;-~ll mvahdate tH.~ grant or d~ru!3:\ of,tp.~•apphcahon for
bai.l ,because the .summary of the evidence· for the prosecution
wN,cl:t ,conta4ls the judge's , evaluatioit of
the 'e;idence is
considered an aspect _of: farViedural · d_u e process °for ooth the
prosecution and the defense. A "suinmaty" is
de.fined as a
. comprehensive and usually brief abstract' br drgest of a text or
·' ·· , Btatement. {People vs. Gako,''Jr., 34!3' SCRA 334 {2000];· Cortes
vs: Cattal, 279 SCRA 1 [1997); Baylon vs. Sison,· supra; Bantuas
¥Si',PaFrgadapun, 292 SCRA 622 [1998); Aleria, Jr. vs. C6urt of
Appeals, ·268 SCRA 611 [1998']; Narciso vs; Sta. Rornana•Cruz,
328,SCRA 505 '[2000); Comia vs. Antona, 337·SCRA 656 (2000);
Mar.zan-Gelacio vs. Flores, 334 SCRA · ±,f2000]1 Domingo vs.
Pa,gayatru:i~403 SCRA381 [2003]; Zamora vs: Bersale.s, 4'147SCRA
20 [2001); Mabutas vs. Pera.Ho, 459 SCRA394·[2005J:) ·
· ·{q) ~ the cancellation of · bail proceedings, the judge is
c0ttfr~nted with the·same issu.e as in application for bai1, i.e.,
whether the evidence ·of guilt is sb strong 'a's ;to convince the
.to
.'CO:llrt·th:~t the accused is not entitled bail; hence·, the ·s imilarity
. ·,of'the nature and·proeedure of tlfe he'a):'ings for b·o'th. (Go vs.
' <Co~t:of-Appeals, 221 SCRA 394 [1993};•0campo vs/;Bernabe,
·supra; Concerned Citizens vs.-Elma, 241'SCRA 84 [19-95].) The
failure ·of COU!1,sel for the accused to appear at
the scheduled·
hearing'isnot a valid ground for cancellation of bail since u.ndei:
~ection 2, Rul~ 114 of the Rules of Co~rt,.th,1; presence of counsel
1s ,not a :condition of the bail. (Andres v~. Beltran, 363 SCRA 371
[2001].)
(r) A judge has no authority to set for hearing a petition
for bail where he has not acquired jurisdiction over the criminal
case in view of the fact tha t the information therefor hns 1101· yN
been filed. (Borlnagn vs. Tamin, s11prn.)
l
I 111 , I I /\J 1, IU, II IJ,1, ~HI H ll ,1 11
•Hight lo Ut1II
·(s) The fact that-the judge of the municipal trial eourt
granted bail .to ,the:accused during the preliminary investigation
n ~annot.be. the..b,wis,£9r the grant of bail by the regional trial
,cpµrt after ar).: .inf<i>rmation was already filed and where the
. .. .public prosec~tor r~.c ommends no bail for the indictee. It could
very well -h~ppen,,¢,at after bail was granted by the judge of
the lower court on the bash~of the evidence then at hand at that
stage, thl:? pr.o~ecution may have secured further evidence and
all the evidence taken together are sufficiently strong to prove
the guilt of frte _accused of a capital offense. (Santos vs. Ofilada,
245 SCRA 56 l1995].)
(6) Granting of bail even when evidence of guilt is strong. - Even
when evidence of guilt is strong, bail may be granted where there
is .n o probability that the defendant would £lee rather than face
the verdict of the court. (see Montano vs. Ocampo, 49 O.G. 1855,
Jan. 29, 1953.) It has been held that to d eny bail, it is no t enough
that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear that in
i' '
case of conviction, the accused's criminal liability would p robably
be for a capital punishment of death, or reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. (see Montano vs. Ocampo, supra; Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja,
134 SCRA 466 [1985); People vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167
SCRA219 [1987]; People vs, Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 [1987].)
(7) Denial of bail even if capital offense charged is bailable. - Even if
the capital offense charge is bailable owing to the weakness of the
evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably be denied if the
probability of escape is great. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 529 SCRA
7?4 [2007) .)
(8) Granting of bail after conviction by the Regional Trial Court.
- Conviction destroys the presumption of innocence and,
conseq1,1.ently, terminates the constitutional right to bail.22 The right,
22An accused convicted of a capital offense (or reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment)
and sentenced to suffer the capital penalty is no longer entitled to bail even if he appeals
since his conviction clearly imports that the evid ence of his guilt of the offense charged is
strong, (Supreme Court' s Adm inistrative Circu lar No. 2-92; People vs. Divina, 221 SCRA
209 [1993].} In su ch a situation, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused
nor of discretion on the part of the court, for the court would not have only determined
thnt the evidence of guilt is strong - which would have been sufficient to deny bail
!,afore conviction - it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt h as been p roven
l1oyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 [1993]; see People vs, Manes,
303 SCRA 231 [1999],)
 Pl 111 , ll ' l'I N H 'lJN~1I I l'UTI CJNAL I.AW
Principles nnd Cases
however, is not completely lost. Bail is a matter of right even after
conviction by the metropolitan or rnunieipa~ ·trial court. •- . .
to
Section 13 speaks of person entitled bail "before conviction,"
implying that after conviction, it is not demartaable as a matter of
right unless given by law. Under the Rules t>l"·Coutt, ilie RegfonaJ,
Trial Court is now given the discretion to'deter~fue whether bail is
proper or prudent, considering the preva'ilinifcircumstances 'after
an accused is found guilty.23 The discte~ort' to'·~·xl:end baih~uring
the course of the appeal should· be exetd'sed with grav·e caution
and for strong reasons, considering that tne a'cc'used had been, in
fact, convicted beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court. (Yap, Jr.
vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 564 [2001]; see Leviste vs. Court of
Appeals, 615 SCRA 619 [2010].)
Since an accused convicted by the Regional Trial Court may
be in prison while his appeal is pending, he would actively seek
the immediate resolution of his case instead of resorting to dilatory
tactics. It has been held that after conviction, bail may be granted on
humanitarian grounds, where the life or health of the convict may
23
Sec. 5. Bail, U:hen discretionary. - Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
nn offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life Imprisonment, admission
to bail Is d!scretio~~ry. The apJ:lication for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial
court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not .transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
~~ould _the court ~rant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
prov1s1onal liberty durmg the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused sh'.111 be ~enied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
\a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the cnme aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; · (a) He has to take into account in deciding the matter,
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; . law attaches to it, the probability of guilt, and the financial
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
\d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
00~~ ' 24The condition imposed upon the accused to make himself available at all times
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The a?pellate court may, mot11 proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution
of the Regional '!rial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (Sa)
1sec. 13 ART. III. BILL OF RIGHTS 815
.. Right to Bail
be endangered by :q:~ntin:µed. confinement pending appeal. (De la
Rama vs. Peq_ple's C(?urt, 77 Phil. 46 [1946].)
(9) Granting .'!?ail .with conditions imposed. - While the court
may not rejec_t otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the
EJ.!=Cuseq .Ql:>tain his p:rqvisional release only through a ,cash bond, it
may impose conditions in granting bail where the likelihood of the
accused-jumping hail or committing other harm to the citizenry is
£~axed such as increasing the amount of the bond to an appropriate
level, requiring the accused to report in person periodically to the
~ourt ;md make an accounting of his movements, and warning him
that "_trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."21
(Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 [1975].)
· (10) Necessity of hearing in granting or reducing amount of /Jail.
- Under ,the present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail,
whether it is a matter of right or discretion. (Rules of Court, Rule
114, Sec. 18.)Amotion to reduce the amount of bail likewise requires
a hearing before it is granted in order to afford the prosecution the
chance to oppose it. (Bangayan vs. Butacan, 345 SCRA301 [2000].)
Prohibition against excessive bail.
(1) A restriction on both courts and congress. - The Constitution
ordains that excessive bail shall not be required. (Sec. 13.) This is
a restriction on both courts and Congress. Without the explicit
injunction, the right to bail would be rendered nugatory or a
meaningless farce by requiring a sum that is excessive.
(2) Discretion of judge to fix reasonable amount of bail. - What
amount is a reasonable bail rests mainly upon the discretion of the
judge.
among others, the nature of the offense, the penalty which the
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. Thus, an accused admitted to bail may be prohibited by the court from leaving
the Philippines. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of our courts. (People vs. Uy
Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935]; see Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 (1980].)

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.AL LAW Sec. 13
816
Principles and Cases
condition of the accused. (see Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 10.)
·of
That which is reasonable bail to a man -wealth is equivalent
to a denial of right if exacted of a poor man charged with a like
offense.
The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when required1 but it should n0t be so higher than
is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Tlitus, bail acts
as a reconciling mechanism to accommoclate-both th~ accused's
interest in his provisional liability before or during -t he trial,
and the society's interest in assuring the accused1s presence.
(Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, 767 SCRA 282 [2015].) As a -general
principle, a bail set at a higher figure than an anrourtt reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive. (Sunga vs. Salud,
109 SCRA253 [1981]; Yap, Jr. vs .. Court~fAppeals, 358SCRA564
(2001]; Magsucang vs. Balgos, 397 SCRA 158 [2003].)
(b) Also, the amount of bail may be i:e.a sonable if considered
in terms of surety or property bond, but excessive if required in
the form of cash. A security or property bond does not require
an actual financial outlay and in the case of _the bondsman, the
bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of a
relatively small premium. Upon the other hand; the posting of
cash bond would entail a transfer pf assets into the possession of
the court, and its procurement coµld work untold hardship on
the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying
him the constitutional right to bail. The optton to post a cash
bond primarily belongs to the accused. (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66
SCRA 38 [1975].) . 104 Phil. 949 [1958].} As deportation proceedings do not partake of
(3) Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail. - The guidelines for
the ~ g of the amount of bail provided for in Section 9, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the discretion of
the court.25 They call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
25
S1;c, ~- Amount of bail; guidelines. -The judge who issued the warrant or granted
the apphcabon shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited
to, the following guidelines: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature
and c~mstance of the offense; (c) Penalty for the offense charged; (d) Character and
rep1;1tation of the accused; (e) Age and health of the accused; (f) Weight of the ev idence
against the accused; (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trinl; (h) Porfcituro
of other baU; (I) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested· nnd
(j) Pcndcncy of other cnscH In which the nccuscd Is on bnll. tlxccsslvc bnll Rhnll n~I bo
ro~ d~.~~ ,
Al~.'l'. 111. 131LL 0 1~RIGHTS 817
~cc. 13
Right to Bail
opportunity for the prosecution of refute. (People vs. Donato, 198
SCRA130 [1991}; People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA489 [1989).)
.. '
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Right to ~ail was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration
,t1n.d, Deportatjon. ,
.. Facts: The p.Eltiti.o,nei:s, both American nationals, suspected of
.being pedophiles, challenged the denial by respondent Commission
of Immigration. ?nd_Deportation their rel~ase on bail.
Issue: Is right to bail a matter of right in deportation proceed-
ings?
Held: (1) Grant of bail by Commissioner is a matter of discretion. -
0
"The aerual was in 'order because in deportation proceedings, the
right to b,ail is not a :matter of right but a matter of discretion on the
part of.tl\e-Co~ssioper of Immigration and Deportation. Thus,
_Sect.ion 37(e)-of .the .Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides
· that 'any alien un~er arrest in a depor~ation proceeding may be
released under bond or under such other conditions as may be
imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration.' The use _of.the word
'may' in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is_ t1;erely
permissive and not mandatory on -the part of the Comnuss1oner.
•The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary. (Ong Hee Sang
vs:-Commissioner of Immigration, 4 SCRA442 [1962].)"
(2) Deportation proceedings are not in the nature of criminal action.
- "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Admin-
istrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to
provisional liberty on bail. (Tiu Chun Hai vs. Deportation Board,
the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail
m~y not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings. (Ong Hee Sang
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra.)"
(3) Deportation of aliens is an act of State. - "Every sovereign •
power has the inherent power to exclude alie~s from its territ?ry
upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation
or public interest. (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 (1948].) The
power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
authority of the sovereign power. (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41
[1918].)"
(4) Deportation is a police power measure. - "It is a police
measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in
Hitt l'l,,111 .11 '1 'J N n 'CJN!l'l'l'fUl-l'l N.1tl, LAW S 'C. 13
PrJndpJes nnd Cases
•the country is found to be injurious· .t o, the'Public-good and the
do.mestic tranquility ofthe pe.ople. (F6rbes,,vs-:.Chu0.c b Tiaco,--16·Pliil.
534 [1910].) Particularly so in this case where fhe State has expressly
committed itself to defend the right of .children to assistance
and special protection from all fortt:ts of neglect, ab_u se, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicia'l fo their development.
(Art. XV, Sec. 3[2].) Respondent Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against
petitioners, acted in the interest of the Sta'te."· (Harvey vs. Defensor-
Santiago, 162 SCRA 840 [1988], through Justice Melencio-Herrera.)
2. Bail bond of P18,000 was imposed for·an offense punishable with
prision mayor or a fine ranging from PS,000 to Pl 0,000 or both.
Facts: The imposition of the bail bon:c;I· for alleged violation
of Presidential De9ree No. 583 led to a ve-r'ified l etter-complaint
from petitioner (who was accused in a criminal case for unlawful
ejectment) aga4tst respondent municipal judge.
Issue: Is the amount of the bail so excessi~e as to amount to
denial of bail? · · ·
Held: Respondent judge was found guilty of grave .abuse of
authority for which he was fined equivalent to two (2) months'
salary, not chargeable to his leave credits with a warning that a
repetition of the failure to apply constitutional provisions would
result in a more severe penalty.
(1) Guidelines in the fixing _of bail. - "The members of the
Judiciary were reminded in Circular No. 1 (Feb. 9, 1981) dealing
with the fixing of the bail bond in criminal cases, of the authoritative
doctrine in Villasefi.or vs. Abaiio. (21 SCRA312 [1967].) The guidelines
in ~e fixing of bail were there summarized, in the opinion of
Justice Sanchez, as follows: '(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense· charged; (4)
character and reputation of the accu~ed; (5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the
accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether
the accused was a fugitive from ju stice w hen arrested; and (10) if
the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other coses.'"l6
Sec. 'l3 ART. llI. BlLL 011 RIGHTS 819
-~ght to Bail
(2) Excessive h11il is equivalent to denial of right to bail. - "This
Court in the later case of De la Camara vs. Enage (41 SCRA 1 [19?1].)
was equallie~pltc;:it on the Il}a;tter, thu~: 'There is grim irony in an
accused being told•:that, he has a right to bail but at the same time
being required to ,post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates
the situation: is that the lower court jud ge would apparently
yield to the command of the 'fundamental •law. In reality, such a
sanctimoniou s avq½'.~l of respect for a mandate of the Constitution
was on a purely verI?.a l level.
There is rea~~m to believe that any person in the position of
pe,t itioner wou1d, . under the circumstances, be unable to resist
thot1ghts pf escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have
been to a state. of desperation. In the same breath that he w as told
hi.e could be bailed .o.u t, the. excessive amount required could only
Il}~a~ that pr:oyis~9n~~ lib_e rty would be p eyond his reach , ll would
h~"'.g bren rnor~Jo,r .t hright if he were informed categorically that
l.
.J
such a right coµld, npt be availed of. There would have been no
j disappointmen'i of expectations then."
1'I (3) Permissible fe.nction of money bail. - "It is not to be lost sigh t
of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition
against excessive bail. The sole permissible function of money bail
is to assure the accused's presence at trial. A bail set at a higher
figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill the purpose
is excessive." (Sunga vs. Salud, 109 SCRA 253 [1981], through Chief
Justice Fernando.)
i.
' . -oOo-

11
• ' ' i '
m
• , • •' •• - ' ' • ,
SEC. 14. . NQ, pe.rso,n.,sh:all ·J.,~-hil4r/Q_,ap.s~eJJ~rj l
criminal of{en~e with.out dµ~-pr9c_~ss,_c,U11w, .
. :• ' .. , ~. : l ~ ,.~ ;•1.
(2) In all criminal prosecu:ticirts1 't he 1a'icised ~hall be:
presumed irtnocertt'ttntil the• contrary i'Sp:rcive'd; :an:d; shall
enjoy the righHo:be'heatd PY himse1(- a.nA·:¢o"iutsel, ·,to be .
infortned·otthe na:ture and_cause of ~he a~cll~ation against
him; to have a speecly, impartial, and pfrb_Hc trial, to~·mee_t
the wifu.esses 'fac•e' tb- face; arid fo-hav_e·~6inpulsofy process
.to secure the atte!1,d~nce o_f witnesse.s ;a,;t;id.the production ,
of evidence in 4is beh~lf; However, aftetarri!.ignment, trfal
may proceed notwithstanding the ab~~nce'bf lli~ accus~d
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable. · (16) The right against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment;
A. INTRODUCTION ' .
Constitutiona1 rights of the accused
in criminal cases.
A person accused of a crime can claim an assortment of rights
which are his safeguards against injustice, to wit:
(1) The right to adequate legal assistance ·(Sec. 11.);
(2) The right, when under investigati0n for the commission of
an offense, to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
counsel; ·
(3) The right against the use of torture, force, violence, thi:eat;
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will;
(4) The right against being held in secret, incommunicado, or
similar forms of solitary detention (Sec. 12.);
(5) The right to bail and against excessive bail (Sec. 13.);
820
J
If
J\ l:{'J'. JH, LllL.l , JI K l :ll'l'!-J 821
Rights of the Accused
A. Introduction
,,
• • .~
(6) The right to due process oflaw;
(7) The right to p~esumption of innoce1,1-ce;
(8) The right t~ b~ heard by himself and counsel;
(9) The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
{ , ;: ~• .' • • ' ' Y-.
accusation against him;
.. > .~ . , (10) The right to.have a speedy, impartial, and public trial;
(11) The right to :i;neet the witnesses face to face;
(12) The right to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf;
(J3) The right agai;nst self-incrimination (Sec. 17.);
(14) The right- against detention by reason of political beliefs
and aspirations (Sec. -1'8.);
(15) The right against excessive fines;
(17) The right against infliction of the death penalty except for
heinous crimes (Sec. 19.); and
(18) The right against double jeopardy. (Sec. 21.)
The first five (5) rights have already been discussed while
the others (Nos. 13-18) are discussed subsequently under the
corresponding sections indicated. Only the rights to criminal due
process and in criminal prosecutions (Nos. 6-12) will be specifically
discussed here. ·
Reasons for constitutional safeguards.
There are several reasons underlying the tenderness of our
Constitution on the subject of the rights of an accused.
(1) A criminal case, an unequal contest. - For one thing,
every criminal case is a contest between an individual and the
government. It is of necessity an unequal contest because the parties
are of unequal strength. The government is very powerful. It is the
repository of the enormous power of organized society. In order to
reduce the possibilities of injustice, the Constitution seeks to redress
the imbalance between these parties by guaranteeing the accused
 I I II I 11 I It II I t trJ I I I II I I I I It I w h I II
l1d1 11 fpJ1•~ 1111d l 11111•~
the right to an impartial trial, the privilege of.cross-examination,
and other procedural safeguards. 1
(2) Criminal accusation, a very serious matter. - Moreover,
experience teaches that it is a very serious·'m attetfor the government
formally to accuse a man of having committed a crime . . The
defendant, by being merely accused, may find hin;tself in immediate
troub!e, whether ;guilty or not. He may lose his job, or be suspended
from 1t pending trial. He may lose his liberty or even his life (where
death penalty is allowed) upon conviction. His reputation is under
an immediate cloud.
The a~cus.ed, therefore, needs every possible opportu,nity to
establish his innocence, as soon, as publicly, and as decisively, as
possible. 2 The constitutional rights granted him are intended to
assure a. ;ull and unimpeded opportunity .£or him to meet what
in the end could be_a baseless accusation. 3 (People vs. Montejo, 63
SCRA488 [1975].)
(3) Protection vf the innocent against wrongful conviction. - The
underlying purpose then is not to coddle wrongdoers or to protect
the _guil.ty but to assure that truth will be discovered and that justice,
which 1s the very end of government, will be· done. Under the
Constitution, the acquittal of the innocent is given more importance
or preference than conviction of the criminal. Indeed, in a criminal
prosecution, the interest of the government is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall prevail.4 (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556
(1940); Tan, Jr. vs. Gallardo, 73 SCRA306 (1976].)
(4) Protection of the guilty against arbitrary punishment. - The
protection of the Constitution covers both the innocent and the
guilty. It is meant to be a safeguard against putting an innocent man
to prison and, at the same time, a guarantee that the guilty obtains
1
FELLMAN, op. cit., pp. 1-3.
2
Tbid.
3
ln the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the
State to prosecute and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards
the former. (Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 [1994]; Uy vs. Office of the Ombudsman
~~~~J , (2) Of the accuser (State/offended party). - The State, like ·me
4
"lt is the lesser evil to set a hundred guilty men free than to have one innocent
perso~ languish in jai~." ?nly with the assurance that even the guilty shall be given the
benefit of every constitutional guarantee can the innocent be secure in the same rights,
(People vs. Sevilleno, 305 SCRA 519 [1999].) · the charge. (Silvestre vs. Military Commission, No. 21, 82 SCRA 19
A l I , 11,1, II11 ,I , U I I l~l t ,I I I I /Il l
lHghlfl of 1-\10 Aecw1cd
A. Tntrod uction
his just dues. (People::~s.·b1yot,. 1&7'.SCIRA 637 [1990].) "Lacking the
shield 'of inno~enize,- the guilty need, the armor of the Constitution
to protect them, n0,t :from a· deserved sentence, but from arbitrary
punishment.. Every person is entitled· to due process. It is not
exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the
p~<;>ple. who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of
Right~, a majority.of one." (Alih.vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 [1987].)
R~ght to due proc~ss of law
,in criminal case.s.
Section 14 catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal
prosecution:- (People vs. Larranaga, 421 SCRA 530 [2004).)
{1)' Of the accused. - A person cannot be held to answer for
a criminal offense -without due process of law. The importance of
criminal due process is stressed in the above provision, although it
is already covered by S.e.ction 1. But this constitutional right pertains
more to the procedural aspect. It requires that:
(a) The accused must be -
1) informed as to why he is proceeded against and
what charge he has to meet;
2) given a fair and impartial trial before a competent
court; and
3) allowed to use all legal means and opportunity to
defend himself;
(b) Jurisdictioh must be lawfully acquired by the court over
his person; and
(c) The judgment against him must be rendered upon
lawful hearing under the authority of a valid law.
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process has been
equated with "the failure to observe that fundame.ntal fairness
essential to the very c::ortcept of justice." (Lisenba v. California, '814
U.S. 219.)
accused, is also entitled to du.e process in criminal cases, that is, it
must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of
 PLlll ,l l/ l 1 l N l1 ' MJl'J'l'U 11~ NV\.f.'LlAW
P rlnclpJcs ond Case~ I Rigl1ts of the Accused
trial has commenced, and, therefore, ~as)iot·h~atd tne tesHmoriy .
of previous witnesses..In.' fact; Wer~'. fs :;o p'r<:ivision qf"fawlw.h,i¢h
could preclude a judge froin :aecidihg· a ·cr-iitdh~i--6ass,ofr;t1{~-hJsis' c,f .
the oral and documentary evidence ptesertted Hefofif tlte•ffrstjudge·• -
who left the service for a:?1:¥ rea,s on wimoµ,\A,~i_<lingtj;le S~,se, "{hich
oral evidence was taken .1;,y th~ st~fl.O.g!Jtph,:~,r p.l)g',;~a..s;pr;0d..:µc;i.d Ir¥:
thesecondjudge. 9 • -: • _ •• , . --:'. :'._ _;, 't,rtr-· ,_, .:! ,, , ,..
• .; i ~ • , ~· :.
1 .• ·/·.!J:f·:.1.· :'t~L. /.~h . ! n/r;• .. ,,.
B. RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF INNO@EN©Ei- -. ;:,. t ·· •
lmpor:tance of the right.
• <! . -, f._., t ,:f J" > :•·\ ,:
The .d ght to presumption1 of innocence2. is .f~U11de~ ~pon the
first_p rihdple of justice; and is,nof a n:jere fotri:i.)u,.~~'$tibs't ~ti~l part
of the law; (People vs. Godoy, 250-SCRA.676 [199"5r} The rfgnt fo bail
(Sec. pJ emanates from this right of the accusi~ 'fo _b e j,fesumed,'
innocent.
(1) A safeguard to balance unequal contest b~.f~?~ti the State. and
accused. _:_ In a criminal prosecution, the accused'. is .pitt~d ·against
91.'he rule is rooted in practical considerations. Sometimes· it is an impossibility
for a judge who tried the case to be the same judicial officer to decide it. 'rhe judge
who tried the case may die, resign, or retire from the bench before he could render
judgment thereon. There is no legal impediment to his successors continuing with the
trial or rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted· if the trial has been
terminated. It is sufficient that in such circumstances the judge, in deciding the case, must
base it completely on the cold record before him, in the same m'a nner as appellate courts
when they review the evidence of the case raised to them on-appeal, (People vs: Narajos,
149 SCRA 99 [1987], citing Villanueva vs. Estenza, 64 SCRA 407_ [1975].)
1
Apresumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires tobe made from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise·established in an action. It is an "inference as to
the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another ·
which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course of human ,
affairs ordinarily taken." It has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who
would be disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact. (Mabunga vs. People, 429
SCRA 510 [2004].)
2
"Presumption of innocen ce" is a rule of s ubstantive law, and is a legal infcrcncc
growing out of the fact that persons generally are not criminals. (Stnte v. Reily, 116 Pnc.
481.) "Reasonable doubt," on the oth er hand, h as reference to acgrec of proof rcqul rocl
for conviction. (Dutta v. State, 79 S.Il. 87.) It Is thot ongondorod by nn invcAllf!OtIon of tho
whole proof and Jnnblllty, n(tor s uch lnvcatlgnllon, to lat tho mind rcnl on11y 11p1111 llw
ccrtnlnly 0£ guilt. (U.S. VA, LM,nd n, rn Phil. 90 (1 910]; P<1oplo v11. 0J'lf'z~, !l?ll 1-lC 'RA 'llltl
[2007),)
AH'l'. lJL U!l ,L 0 11 HlGl-l'l'S 827
B. Right to Presumption of Innocence
the .full might of State•authority itself with all the resources at its
command. -To lighten--the ·heavy odds against him or to balance
the scales'ili!what would otherwise 'be an uneven contest between
himdmdr--the State;,he,'.is·aecorded, among others, the presumption
of ilitrt<:kence (People Vs. CFI of Rizal, 161 SCRA 269 (1988].) which
continues untii overthrown by proof of guilfbeyond reasonable doubt. 3
(l?orrS!}ll~O vs, C::~mrt of Appeals, 13} $CRA 318 [1984]; People vs.
Bacus, 20).SCRA81 [1991].)
, T,he convktioni' or·. a.cq_uittal of the accused is simply the
consequence of the presumption of the innocence of the accused,
being either overcome or not being overcome by the evidence
'.,I ; / • i_. ... ~ pre,s ented by the prosecution. (People vs. Go, 237 SCRA 73 (1994].)
(2) A guarantee against false conviction of accused. - This pre-
suq1.pt,ion _o f inn9c_e:ri~~ is a .guarantee that no person accused shall be
convictectexceptupQ_~ confeS$iOn or µnless his guilt is established by
the stringent quantum' of evidence beyond reasonable doubt which
is more than just a preponderance of evidenc& sufficient to win in a
civil case. I£ an accused is ·entitled to the presumption of innocence,
with more reason, mere suspects of a crime are presumed innocent.
(Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 [1987].)
The presumption takes an even more paramount significance in
offenses involving the capital punishment. (People vs. Lagmay, 306
SCRA 157 [1999).)"
Duty Imposed upon the court.
The constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence of
the accused and his right to due process of law impose upon the
court the duty to ascertain in every case that no person is made to
answer for a crime without proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
3To meet the standards of "proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt," it is required
I. that "every circumstance favoring the accused's innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason, the strongest suspicion must not be
't, I permitted· to sway judgment." (People vs. Dramayo, supra; People vs. Aus tria, 195 SCRA
700 [1991),) Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for correction if the combination of all
tho cl rcumstnnces is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
4
lt monns thnt tho cvidenco ns n whole ndduced by one side (in civil cases) is
11111, orlor to thnt of the othcl'. It means tho grontor weigh t of the evidence, or evidence that
m11w11lttl111tho ovldonco of tho ndvorso pn1'ly. (l)opt. of Jid11cntlon, Culture nnd Sports vs.
t lt1I Ho~n,•lu, ~~9 SClV\ 299 [2005).)

/1)/J l'I I1I ,ll 'l'I N JI. ' N!J'!'l~l1l,J1'1'lC.~Nl\l.LAW
• Pdnclplcs ol'lcl Cos¢s
T ' , I
fact. or element necessary .to a~m.~ ti~te Ulfr:5:PJ,BW with-;&hi~)ae_is
charged.5 To overcome this constitutipµ~\ ;pre~4!J).}?.tiop_h~.has ,jn
his favor and to justify a criminal COr).Viqtion/;thex,.~_,.mu~~--,~;Xist ,in
the record "that degree .o( p1;09_f ~hi~:~PJ<i>@."iPe~,ponyid!'i<R0.:;¥.1Jll1
unprejudiced mind" (}i.guiqe ;V,s. J.!e0pJer.)5S SCRA 337,Jl_ijS?J;-) of
the accused's culpability. ·
The presump'tion cannot ·he overcoiite· J:>yrmere $USJiidorr or
conjecture, i.e., a probability that the acq.1sect.coinmitt~d -!tl\e crime
or that he had the opportunity to do so,6 (PeCi>ple vs. ,Isla, -278' SCRA
47 [1997].) !,
Evidence required fQr filing criminal
case in court.
A ~c;iing of ptobable: cause ·by ··the-Jfll.tP}ic: piose~tor ·'Yill
~arrant.the filing of a·particu-l-ar critninalin,fe,fmatfon,·(Ag:uirre vs.-
Secretary; Department ofJustfce, 527 SCRA431 t2008].): · .an] agent" in the abse~ce of proof that he was d uly notified
Under the Rules -of Court, {Rq1~ 11~{ ?-~c.,{~p,cit~qn~-th~,q4e~tio~
for the prosecution in filing a crim4lal c.ase,iµ c9,.u rt i~ not.wh~ther.~e
accused is guilty beyond reasonable· dou~tbut Qnly.whether·"there
is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and th~ accused is probably guilty thereof'~ ·Henc~; -~ -•· accusation
which is based on "probable guilt" not is an
urijusf ac~satjon and
a conviction based on such a degree of proof is-nbt necessarily an
unjust judgment but only an erroneous Qn,e!J;hEl remedy for such
. ! . • ' ~ I ·•• : ~ •-
5
Upder our criminal justice system, the overridint co_nsideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether-it'entert~lns a reasonable'•dotibt as
to his guilt. (People vs. Vasquez, 280 SCRA 160 (1997].) It.would be far more acceptable to
acquit a person upon the ground of reasonable doubt though he may, in reality, be guilty
than to inflict imprisonment on one who may be innocent. (People vs. Manoji, 68 Phil. 471
(1939].) Of course, the ideal would be for every one to get his or her just desserts. (People
v~. Pe la Cruz, 200 SCRA 379 [1991].)
6
1n other words, the conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid
the responsibility for the offense charged, that not only did he perpetrate the act but that
it amounted to a crime. What the Constihltion requires then is only moral certainty of
culpability or that degree of proof which produces conviction in nn unprejudiced mind.
(People vs. Drarnayo, 42 SCRA 59 (1971]; People vs. Berroya, 283 SCRA lll 11997],) A
court foced with n flfly-fi{Ly proposition of guilt or Innocence nlwnys docldca In fnvot· o(
innocence. (Cabnhug vs. People, 376 SCRA. 113 [2002].) Jn <:MO of do11b1, 1hn bnln11c11 111111
In fnvor of lnnoconcc 01·nt lonlll In fnvor of lho 1\llldor (orm of crlrnlnnl llnhlllly, (fiy11, rt v~
Pooplo, 740 ACHA. :um (?01 111,l
I J
Sec. ·u 'ART. III. l31LL OF RIGHTS 829
Rights of the Accused
B. Right to Presumption of Innocence
error-1is appeal1(Ba:sbaci~, vs, Office of the S.ecretary, Department of
Justice, 238 §CRA5 [1994].)
.• I .
BtJl'd,en of proofupo1:1 the prosecution.
, ,· '"
.(i) To overca~e presumption of innocence. --: Aceusation is not
S¥110111.ymous.with.guilt; neither is presumpti0n of innocence proof
nt5t:inte:r.tded as evtdence .of innocence but 0nly to shift th.e burden of
proof-Jn a,crirrtinal·proceeding upon the prosecution to demonstrate
that culpability;lie-s. It is-incumbent upon the prosecutor (a) to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti,- more specifically, that
the crime charged had been committed and (b) to establish with
same quantum of proof that the accused precisely committed the
same. 7
(a) A suspended PC-CIS agent was acquitted of the charge
that he "knowingly and falsely represented himself to be [such
of his distp.isSq.]_ b~fore the commission of the alleged crime
'fo overcome 'the constitutional presumption of innocence.
{(;igantoni vs:People, 162 SCRA 158 [1988].)
. (b) Whe~e·. the ev.idence on the alleged forged voucher is
. : extremely 9:oubtful, the accused is entitled to presumption of
innocence. ~Afonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA
552 [1987],)
(c) In the absence of the positive identification of the accused
•
as the perpetrator of the crime, he shall have the right to be
acquitted. To m eet the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, motive is essential for conviction, when there is doubt as
to the identity of the perpetrator.
(d) Where the identification of the accused is a derivative,
not positive, identification, the same is doubtful and the victim's
testimony, standing alone, d oes not satisfy that quantum of
7Al~1ough the appellate court ordinarily relies on the factual findings of the lower
comt recogni.zing its superior competence to assess the credibility of the witnesses
1hrounlt direct obscrvntion of their m anner on the stand, this policy or doctrine is not
11ppllcnbl.c whore the prosecution hna not sufficiently estnblished the guilt of the accused
111 tlw point of ovorcomlng tho constllutlonnl prc1111111pllon o.f innocence in his favor.
(I 'N1ph1 vH, l'cmfm·ncln, 220 HCHA 46 (199'11,)

I I 111 , , I II II I , ' I, I 11 11 1 , , ,, I I I /\ W
l'd111 It'll•~ rold 'itillt't' ,
t,
· d • . ,; '1•· , ' 1\ 1 . ...,,·•r . • . ,
pro.of requrre to support a 1udgn:t~nt @n.~oi;i,Y,1~ti_g nJ:(if.f!RP.le.nr.s:J ·
FragoI 232 SCRA 653.
[19-94])
. , • .
· <:' r:·it~ , •-V•_--,:;; ·•:-'H:"··' •.·)1-'_·· ··,_: ,:ft:••
, ·.· ..• , . ., _ / -• l l . •
(2) To establish guilt bi;y~ni ,:easofzableflp~:kt,:; ' S~:v; m_,;~er·t~hl-
circumstances, ' as where the ,:accas!?<;Y ii~Y.Jr~}.ft'hl
·:c•oriimissr'<s\.rll>f
the imputed criminal ac:it but .interp:@SE)S;:}usti.(y~g:''circum~tru.l~~;
(see Note 6.), thatbur,den•of.proofis n~ver:shi(l:~-'to. the accmsedt:or.
diminished by the weakne'ss·.ohhe defer\~eJi:{:Pe6pie \!S; Gateiaf,2il5"
SCRA 369 [1992] .) Stated otherwise, it is:for .the: prosecution to,proye.
beyond reasonable doabt the-commission ~Hh:e cdme·&a:rged and
that the accused is guilty thereof. It is ,not{~l' .tl'ie~accused to prove
that he ·i s innocent. In case there is-a reasonaMe doubt ·of l;tis;guilt',
the accused is not only entitled to acquittal (see Rules of..Cpq.rt,
Rule 133,: Sec. 2.); it is, even more, the court's constitutional duty
to acqui! hu_n. The theory is that it is prefe_r~b~e.to acquit the guilty
erroneously than to c_onvict the innocent w:rori'gly~ ' ...
Evidence required of the prosecution.
(1) Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. .:....c The accused is
entitled to be presumed innocent bi:;,_t 6nJy_ Ufttil the co;,fr~ is
proved. (People vs. Alcantara, 151 SCRA 326 [1987].)' The evidence
of the prosecution must be strong per se t_o pierce that shield of
presumptive innocence and establish the'.g\Jqt of the accused beyond
rec'!sona~le doubt on the strength of its ·own.· .evidence (People vs.
CFI o~Rizal, 161 S~RA269 [1988].), without see]w1g to rely upon, or
even mvol<e, what.it may claim is a w,eakrtess oft that of the defense.
(People vs. Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA 215 [l994]i) .it is not sufficient
th~t the_preponderance or the weight of the,evidence points to the
gµ1lt of the accused.8 (People vs. Berroy;:t, :?~9 ,~<;:]M. 11J [199~):) _ . ,
The accused is not even called upon .t,o:bff~r evidence ,on
behalf. l:Iis freedom or life is forfeited only ifthe requisite quantum
iri.
of proof necessary for conviction be ~xist~n~~t (?~opl~ vs. Nf~rtos, ·
211 S~RA 805 [1991]. ), no matter how despic~blE! crime for which , tlw
he may have been charged. · ·· ' · · · ·· · ·
8 lying in his testimony. (People vs. Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279 (1992],)
Note that the quanhlm evidence required for conv,icti\)n il\ merely proof. beyond
rea~n~?le doubt, not absolute proof beyond any doubt or absolute certa4:tty excluding
poss1?iht:Y of error, but only a moral certainty as to the. presence of the ,elements
co.nstituting the ~ffense, as well as ~e id_entity of the offen~er.. When guilt is not. proven
";1th ~oral ce~tarnty, the accused 1s entitled to .exoneration or acquittal as a matter of
right, urespective of the reputation of the accused,
J
tyl~ I'. Hl. Ull ,I , U J.1 iUUl .L'l'!:l 831
Rights of the Accused
B. m&ht to Pr~sumption of Innocence
, ....(2.) !!,bse1JC~:'.Pf !f1'Jr·circim;starice consistent with innocence. --r
, J·
:·-.,· ·;-::
' • ·- .~
-..,. .
: :•. •.
The ,p'roof againshfue.accused must survive the test of reason; .the
sb:.origest suspidon ·should not be :pertnitted to sway the court's
jtidgmeht. ·tP~hp1e ·vs-. -Canete, ·425 SCRA 353 [2004]; People vs.
\.
ji ·Qufda:to/Q97: SGRA 1 [1998].) The circumstances of the case must
exclude all ' .µ1d · each and every hypothesis consistent with his
;µ{h@cence jn order to-convict. (People vs. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA
24:6'[1994]; Dizon vs·. People: 490'SCRA593 [2006]..)
(3) Weaknessinon-presentation of accused's defense. -The accused
should be acquitt,ed although his defense is weak, regardless of
.:whether' his mpr,al character is good or bad, or even if he presents
.naught a shre4 o~ evidence as long. as the prosecution's evidence
-i s not strong enough to convict him. 9 (People vs. Aminnudin, 163
S;CRA4021[1988];J?eople vs. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760 [1980]; Poople vs.
Caccam, 174 SCRA 135 [1989]; -People vs. Valencia, 184 SCRA 287
[1990];- People vs. Sulit, 233 SCRA 117 [1994]; People vs. Berroya,
283 SCRA 111 [1997].) Thus, even if the evidence submil-ted by
the accused is weak as where, for instance, it consists merely of
bare denials or alibi, the judgment of acquittal must follow if the
prosecution fails ,for any reason to discharge its onus probandi. 10
(Pepple vs. Fider1 223 SCRA 117 [1993]; People vs. Pija, 247 SCRA
" j .
1
628 [1995].)
. i
(4) Uncorroborated testimony of lone prosecution witness. - The
settled rule, however, is that the uncorroborated testimony of a lone
' · 9-Exceplion: By invoking self-defense as a justifying circumstance, an accused, in
effect, admits that·he has indee!i committed the crime. In order that an accused may be
his reliev,!;?d of criminal liability, he is obliged to estaplish the presence of the.se requisites:
unlawful aggression; teasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
.it; and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In so
doing, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution for even if the prosecution's evidence were weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after accused has admitted the killing. If the evidence on his claim of self-
defense consists solely of his own testimony, the trial court may reject that testimony If
not supported by convincing corroborative evidence and if the accused is perceived to be
10Mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is not sufficient to sustain
conviction (People vs. Ochate, G.R. No. 127154, July 30, 2002,), nor even if the defense
engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime, (People vs. Ong, 544 SCRA
123 ·[2008].) But once the presumption of innocence is overcome it is the duty of the
defense to bear burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt.
111 1' 1111 , ll ' l'l f'II ( lhJ/ 11111 I llll lN I, LAW
l 1'1n ·lplc.q nnd 'M CH
1 lUghts of the Accused
prosecutioR eyewitness, as long ,as it ,is•,cre~,ibl~( ~d, po~iti:y.e,. c~
prove beyond reasonable ·doubt the . gui1hof,,the/t1,qQt:1scid,~£,eop.le
vs. Francisco, 213 SCRA 7'4-6 l1992}.), espeqiaJlYf.~fi~r.e .t he· ~itne.ss
is a police officer who enjoys the prestlmptio~·-~.t;r~g:t.rlariiy.·,q(;ilie
performance of his duties:I1. Na,riile ~iis~ -f.{~i~-,req.tlires~that.~
testimony has to be·co~r0h'orated to·~e1 aaj1114g~~:f#(11.i]'-l~.,Witn~s~s
are to be weighed~
. .. 'not numl!iered.·The-
' . 1,~ oii.kf1
. ·p,.1A..-.F }";, , t \ . iliing
r· .is,thait~
. . - ,LI.1.E
_1-.::.
testimony has clearly and' 'UnmfsMkabl'y.:,eqt<;1blishe1i;{·.thetqmzinu:~s1&n
of the crime ch~g_ed. (Pe~ple ;vs. Q1.1;e~a;_271',..S"C.l¼. )~7-JI993];
Peo Ievs Ra
p .,'. ' , y . Y.,
• "I. • · •
i:a
·2usCAA f'[1995]'.•)•'h'' •'':'•t-•,r'. \-!i1'" .--I~~\, • ,•·. ;
,, ' ' ' ... /.,t•.:' •.J• 1·.
, , •
' ,' - ' : r._,·:" ( ~ ,.:'... • :, .'·, '·~.,H; ~ \ ~·-' !.:t·,
•l 1::-
• • ,• . ~ •
(5)-1Invpcation of the ,equip'ois~~.ru1e-. ,i-t+.' lJnd~ruthe,~le;·, 1:fo;fu.~
incuJpatoryi f a€ts and· circumstances are· capaqbt 4,f., .t wo :ori;P,rore
expl~ations; one-of which·is·consistentwith~e;innocenee 0t the
aCCl:lS_!;!d 'of.the Grime charged and.the·other donsi'st~t,.t,wiHt::his·gililf,
then the evidence does not hurd:le or.MfiH the te§t-of-rhoral 12ertainty
required to support a conviction. {Jileopfe vs..Pal'ayno, 24 SCRA 3
(1968l,.>•'Fhe scales of justice ·must hang equat -at).d, in fact~ shoitld
be tipped in favor of the accused because o.f the constitutional
presumption of innocence which must prevail. <(People-:v.s..Opida,
142 SCRA 295 (1986]; People vs. Coderes, 414 SCRA 134 [2003l}
1herefore, the constitutional presumption i~-nbf avaifabil¼l\ere
the prosecution is strong enough to overcome the presumptio~ but
the defense is not strong enough to overcome the prosecution. (People
vs. De Guzman, 162 SCRA 145 [1988].) In such case, the-equipoise
rule (supra.) that where the evidence of the parties is in equipoise
or evenly balanced, or there is doubt on which side the evidence
~reponderates, the constitutional presumption of.4u!-9c~rj.~~-:should
tilt the scales in favor of the accused, cannot be invoked. (Corpuz
vs. People; 194 SCRA 73 [1991]; People vs. Ramelfo, 227 SCRA 583
[1993].) If the.rule applies, the prosecutio'n which is the party having
the burden of proof, loses. ·
11
• But if the uncorr~borated testimony coming from n police officer is insufficient
to induce· moral certainty, the presumption of regularity cnnnot prcvnll ovov tho
constitution~ presumptio~ of inn~ence of the nccused. In such cnsc, corroborntlnll
evidence Is mdlspensable in estabhshlng the guilt of the nccuaed beyond i't1i'i~t11\nblu
doubt, (Pt'!oplo ve, Tadepn, 244 SCRA 339 (1995).)
A l{ I'. Ill. H1ll ,1, )ti 1,( 1 ~11'1'! II.ID
B. Right to Presumption of hu1ocence
•.
i
Presumption- of.re~ftilarlty' of performance
·of•official-d111ty:.•. ·
:_ (i)' Pr~su'riiptio'n Jnjerior to constitutional presumption of in~ocence.
- The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused 1s not a
mere·procei:lural toot or.the law; it is not overcome ·b y the presump-
., . ti@h of regoomty in the perfmtmp.nce .of official-duty. (People vs. Na-
:v.aet1,,3'Ji1t5CRA. 5i9'[2Ci0'lr,} Sitnply,put, the latter is inferior to and
can never"be'Sh'drfger th~:tbte-former:
'The presumMioh .that official duty had been re~larly pe~-
formed.which is only a ma~~r of pro~edµre, cannot by itself prevail
over ·the constitutional presumption of innocer,.ce enjoyed by an ac-
cused person_whith ·n:1ay be overcome only with proof beyond rea-
sonable goubt.12~(PMple vs. ·Mendoza, 203 SCRA 148 [1991); People
vs. tbaria', 233 SCRA427 [1994]; People vs. Rigodon, 238 SCRA 27
[19941~ People vs. -Vi'llaviray, 262 SCRA 13 [1997).) This is particu-
larly true when t:he prosec1J,tion' s evidence is weak (People vs. Estil-
lero, 174 SCRA 5 [1989];:People vs. Yutuc, 188 SCRA 1 [1990].), or
where the testimony of the law officer concerned is ambiguous and
unpersuasive (People :vs. Alvarado, 242 SCRA 464 [1995].), or where
the performance ,of duty is tainted with irregularities (People vs. Sa-
lqnga, 602 SCRA 783 [2010].), or where the death penalty is at stake.
(People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 141129, Dec. 4, 2001.)
(2) Where presumption not rebutted by defense's evidence. - This
presumption must be applied with caution. It should not by it-
self constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt or support
a judgment of conviction, or prevail over the presumption of in-
nocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual.
(see.People vs. Sapal, 328 SCRA 417 [2000]; People vs. So, G.R. No.
1338'61, Nov. 22, 2001; People vs. De Guzman, 431 SCRA516 [2004].)
But when police officers had no motive in testifying falsely against
12,'The necessity for proof-beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that in a criminal
prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest ~ith a prior ·
inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of. co~and; with counsel
usunlly of authority and capacity, who are ~egarded as pu~llc o~cers, and,_ ther~fore,
ns npcnklng seml-judlcinlly, and with an attitude of tran.quil maiesty often 111 ~tril<ln~
co1\lrnst to thnt of defcndnnt engngcd inn perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if
not for llfo, ·n,csc lnoqunlltlos of position, the lnw stdvcs to meet by tl1e rule that there Is
lo btm, convlollon when lhorc Ip n ronsonnblo doubt of guilt." (Pooplc vs, Gnpnsnn, 243
llC l{A !i:l I 1?951; l'<•oplo vft, ll('rroyn, 283 8 H/\ 11 119971,)

r
11M 1' 1111.ll 'l' I N H l 'O M1 J 11 lll J') UNAI~ 1,/\W
Pdnclplcs and Cast!s.
the accused or when no physical violen~e· or harm was, applied· to
the accused, courts should uphold the presun'lpti0rr.of-re~larity of
performance of duty by police qfficers.13 (PeGpl~ v~. I:Iorµ-ada, 204
SCRA 858 [1991].) .
In other words, where the presumption ·of regularity of
performance of official functions has not been rebutted by the
defense's evidence and it is not the sole basis' for conviction; it
prevails over the cortstitutional presµmption·· of irutocence of the
accused. 14 (People vs. Acurame, 209 SCRA281 [1992].)
Where accused fails or refuses to take
the witness stand.
An accused has the right to remain silent and no adverse
inference should be drawn from that silence., Besides, the rule is
that, in order to gain conviction, the p;osecuti,onmust.;r~iy on th~
sµ:ength of its evidence rather tha,n on the. we~kness of the defense.
(People vs.-De Dios, 187 SCRA 228 [1990].)
But while the accused is not required to testify or offer evidence
in his own behalf, nor required to produce'w.itnessesi yet he runs
the risk of an inference from non-production ,of evidence. (US. vs;
Sarikala, 37 Phi1. 486 [1918]; People vs. Solis, 128 SCRA 217 [1984].)
Where the prosecution has already established a prima facie case
against the accused, his failure or refusal to take the witness stand
may prejudice him. 15 (People vs. Resano, 132 SCRA 711 [1984].)
13
The defense of "frame-up" requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
presumption, as it can be easily fabricated, In drugs cases, the accused commonly take
refuge in such a standard line of defense often self-serving and uncorroborated. (People
vs, Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174 (1993]; Espano vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998].)
14
In any case, the presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
of irregularity or failure to properly perform a duty, or that the police officers were
prompted with ill motive. (Sevilla vs. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 428 [2006]; People vs. Roa, 920
SCRA359 [2010]; People vs, Mamaril, G.R. No. 171980, Oct. 6, 2010.) In case of doubt as to
an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
(Bustillo vs. People, 620 SCRA 483 [2010].)
1
5The burden of proof, designed merely as a rule of procedure, confers only a
temporary benefit upon the accused. Th e prosecution is required in the first instance to
make out a prima facie case proving the essential facts embraced in the criminal transaction
alleged. If this is done, and the accused offers no evidence, the case, as made out by the
State, is submitted to the court which must consider it, but only in connection with the
presumption of innocence to which the accused is always entitled, though he may have
introduced no evidence whatever. (Underhill, Criminal Evidence, pp. 62-63.)
,I
~ ll<.:. '.J,4 I A.ltf, w. l:HLL 0 11 RIGHTS
Righ~s-of the Accused
. B. Right-to Presumption of Innocence
\
ILLU$TRA'.IJ\';E ~ASE:
Constitutionality of the law creating the Sandiganbayan is assailed
for diluting the right to appeal.
Facts: Under the law (P.O. No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No.
1606;) .creating ,the Sandiganbayan1 it,s decisions can be reviewed
only by the Supreme Court through certiorari on questions of law.
Befor~, the right to appea~ to the Court of Appeals and, thereafter,
t9 th~. Sµpr~11,1e Court, on q'lJ.estions covering both law and facts
was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of R.A. No. 296,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Act of 1948."
Issues: (1) Does the omission of the Court of Appeals as an
intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the
protection of his liberty?
(2) Does the decree dilute his right to appeal amounting to
denial of due process?
• Held: The answer must be in the negative.
· (1) . Sandiganbayan passes upon innocence or guilt of accused. -
"In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the
three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a
unanimous vote is required, failing which 'the Presiding Justice
shall designate two other justices from among the members of
the Court to sif temporarily with them, forming a division of five
justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be
necessary for rendering judgment. 111
(2) On review, Supreme Court determines whether presumption
of innocence has been overcome. - "If convicted, this Court has the
duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was
committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes
much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact
that there is no review of the facts. What cannot be too sufficiently
stressed is that this Court, in determining whether or not to give
due course to the petition for review, must be convinced that the
constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. In
that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no
Only by "proof beyond reasonable doubt," which requires moral certainty, "a
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act
upon it," may the presumption of innocence be overcome. (People vs. Lavarias, 23 SCRA
1301 [1968].)

I 1•111111 •1•1t l1 I 11N t lllfl f lH t,q ,\I.J.AW
• l1tl n !pl •IJ nl\d ~ttbvif J , •
, • ,, 1 • ~, ·, , •l 1
way of scrutinizing whether the ~uan~9'f-11~(d~n,t~··\ti~uf,~~1:i for
,a, finding of guilt has been.satisfied/' · •. . _:_·.- _:;:,:•, >'· ,.,::, .-· · . ·
· (3) There is_. no loss of-vital ~ight. - "'tt·. a<i'.~~;'.~~~fu'.t~P~teiclled .
and highly unrealistic:t& ~ondutteithat.the··o~sf9n:ofir.t he t4i:ih
of Appeals as
a,1'eyiewingc,fil!thQricy ·.r esults/~ the loS'$.-•6ftv:ital
protection' of liberty/' · : · '. . ·· · • · •·. f • , ,· : :: : · .,, ·
. , ,• ► . ., ' • • ', ~ , ,,, t . ,. -;,-:, I ,:-~.. ' ~ ..:~I ' : \ ,
(4) _When criminaJ. d~~ :,~~~f~~~ , -~s- j;~~~§t,~dj ~:- ;- .1;,¾\}!¥inal
proceedJ?gs,·due pr~c;~~~ _1s1~~~~{i~d.~ ~e1~~1~~-r-clj}:~,~1~,:-~~}~eard·
m a court of comp~~ent Jtirt~~~Cti~~ ;an~;t>foc~}!~f~ ~~~~~.•F-der
the orderly process of law, and only pttrushecf ¥.ter ~qu1ry and
investigation, upon notice to hi.in ·wil:h .an opporfunity ,to be heard,
and a .judgqi.ent awarded within-the authority of a constitutional
law. There is no denial of due proces~.'.~ (Nuiiez,-qs. Sandiganbayan,
n1 SCRA 433
' . . . through Chief Justice Fe-,;nan,
[19821, ' .. do.), , .; . ...
Statutory presumptions of guilt.
There is np constitutional objection to the p~ssage of a law
providing'; even in criminal prosecutions, that ti).e presumption of
innocence ·m~y be overcome by a contrary .pre~umption,
fo~ded
upon the experience of human conq:ud - tha,qylje? ~ettaµi facts
have been proved, they s_ha~l ~e primafacie (i.e;, st1ffll=i.en't)pr_proof
if uncontradicted) evidence of the existenc.e of ~e Jll~in ·fact in
question, 16
(1) Establishment of prima facie ca$e, - The State is .only,-required
to e~t"blish a prima far;:ie ca~e after which the-acc;:used is given an
opj,or.t,wp.ty to P!es.ent evid~nee- to :i:~b~t it - f:4at.h,i.s iiCPs innocent
and with·o ut cri..tn¥l°'.l intent... This contrar,y ,pr~S~'.11'.\-P,tion,of.guilt is
n9~ arbitrary ·sinc_e the act re~ied upon _by; the a_<;91,s~d a,sj4s_t;i.£,i;c~tipn
relat_e s to him per.scmally or otherwise U~s -:p.e~~arly _ witl\in his
knowledge, and a few words from .him.. w.oul~Lbe sufficient. to
destroy ~e ptima.facie case. (US. vs. Tria, 17 PhiL3~3 [1910]_.}·
· (a) Under.the Revised Penal :code,.-for instance~ the failure .
·of ~ . accourttable officer -to prodtic~ p1blic funds or p~opeity
1
61;heremustbe a rational connection between the facts proved and the ulttm'ate facts
presumed i;o. that.the inference of the latter from proof of. ·th~ former is not Uill;'eason<!ble
and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in•'common experience.
(People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856 [1953]; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 [1916); Vallarta vs.
Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 336 [1987).)
, ,f\ilq ', ,11 l. U1LL Ul1 m<.,a l'l'8
' · !Ughts df the Accused
B. Right t9 Pre_
s\lmption of Innocence
with -which h1:1~is.cl;iar,geaple, upon demand, will be conside-reai
• .· ,pri~a jacie :e vidence that.he. has put:-ihem to his persona:l,use.
· (Ait..2J..'Z,thereof.}.Jn, a .c ase where the shortage was fully restored
.. ',l 6ruy,thiee1(8:}Imohths after its discoyerw~t has,bee~ h~ltl that;th.e
.. ,..,interregn\l~-c:fe~ted-a presumption of nu.sappropr-iatiort. (Offite
. ·o f the Courf Administrator vs. Soriano,\136 SCRA 461 (1985].)
{b) Under our Rules of Court, it is presumed "that a person
:
found in poss_~ssion _of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
_ ;wrong~l a~t'_{i'.;e:, th~ft) is .the tpker and the doer of ~e :'hole
act.".(Ruie·131, Sec. 5(1].} The ground for the presumption 1s that
men who c6me·honestly into the possession of property have
....~o diffi~lf)t'i~ e~plaining the method of which they come into
·such. (see U,$. vs. Ungol, 37 Phil. 835 [1918]; U.S. vs. Espia, 16
Phil. 506, [19fQ].) .I f upon such presumption taken in connection
~ith the other evidence, it may fairly be concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of theft, a judgment
0 { conviction may properly be entered. (U.S. vs. Catimbag, 35
Phil. 367 [1916].)
(c) , Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law.). expr~ssly
provides that "mere possession of any _good, article,_ item,
object, or anything of value ':"hich ~as ?een the subJ~Ct ,?
robbery or thievery shall be prima facte evidence of fen cing.
1
!
Thus, the possessor is presumed to have knowledge of the fact
I :
that the items found in his possession were the proceeds of a
robbery or _theft. This constitutional pre~um~tion of innoce~ce
is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can anse
· from the established fact of his possession of the proceeds of the
crime of -r obbery or theft.
(2) Proof of gl,/ilt beyond reasonable doubt stil~ req~ire1, -:: It mu.st
be stressed that the existence of a presumption md1catmg guilt
does not in itself de.stroy _the presumption of innocence. (People
vs. Go_doy, 250 SCRA 676 '[1995).) The cour_t caru:o~ depend al~ne
on -the contrary pr~sumption because, precisely, 1! 1s n:erely prima
facie. It must still satisfy itself that the accused 1s guilty beyon_d
17fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.O. No. 1612, !s the act of :iny person who, wi~
intent to gain.for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, sell, or many manner deal in
any article or anything of value which'he knows or should be ~own to .him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (D1zon-Pammtuan vs. People,
234 SCRA 63 [1994),)
 1 ll l l II l lf ll 1 1 lfl , 11111111 11 I I I
l'il111lph•111111d l'11H•IJ
•rea,i,ona,ble doubt of the. ~ffense ·char.E$ed;· (B~oida vs. 'Beople, 178
SCRA:-204 [1989].) The presumption of irtnoeence, 'is'. no.t overeome
by mere suspicion or c0njecture; ,a ·,pos'sibili;ty,ior•·ev:en ,probability
that the accused had ~onµrutte<11'theicrime n01rby.th<'i fa.ct that he had
the opportunity to do.,so)$_(Beople ·vs. ~_ogoyl'~s~pra;1 see·Weople vs.
Berroya, 283SCR)\: 11!:li [l997:}:). ' · , .·'.· " · ·
lLLUSTRA'IlIVE CASES:+,;'. ·
L Ac'cusef:l was;~on71ict~d oJmqiveWatib; 9~:-:tfie /estiMpn,.y.ofa lone
witness, . . '· . . . ' . ' .. ' . ·, _. ' ''., ,..= '.,
Facts; )he, C:ity. AµcJlt,o r ,testi.fied:-th~:th~,: 9p~clu~t§~ .:an audit
of ~e ac~sedi Seni?r c_ie:tk i1;Ild Acfui~'C?i~ruei of:)1:e' ~ity_Post
Office, that he _fotJnd her sh~rt of; J,'69/Z2-11~
demand,_sh1daile'd'to·rehi.m:the money. R~lyurg or\. 'thl{ te~timony,
the Sandigi1J:}bayan-returned a guilty vefd~ct. · . .
js
ij~fore the·Supreme Court a petj.tion_,#led ~d~r Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court in the nature of a challenge aga,inst the decision
of the Sandiganbayan. ,· ' · charge of disloyalty to the State is filed _against him.
Issue: Should the petition be granted?
Held: The petition is deni!;!d.
(1) Prima facie evidence of accountability has been established. -
"The prosecution has established by the City Au_d itor' s account the
accused's prima facie liabili_ty for m alversation under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code and that being the
case, reb,uttal e_vidence
(to rebut the presumption of culpability) devQlved, on the accused.
In the case of People vs. Mingoa (supr(l:), it was held that a
finding of prima facie evidence of acc0tintabili~ does not shatter
the presumptive innocence the accused ~njoys l;>ecause before
primaJacie evidenc;:e arises, certain facts [have still to be) proved. Yet
the trt~ court cannot depend alone on such an evide_nce, because
pr~ciseJy, it is rarely prima facie. lt mus~ still satisfy ,i tself that the
accus~~ is guilty b eyond reas~:mable doubt of
the offense charged.
N ~ither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce."
'"In 9µter words,. the presumption of innocence. may ..be overthrown only by
evidence ofguilt in the patt!;e of prop{ ''beyond reason/Ible doubt,'.' Thus, while the rule
of long standing is ~at alibi is a weak defe,nse, H is, equally an enduring rule that the
prosecution must rely on the &trength of its evidence rather than on the weakness of that
of the defense, (People vs. Hora, 153 SCRA 21 [1987].)
W 10 I I f •f l l 1 l ', .f/ 1 AR'l'. 111. UJ.LL 0 1~ RlGH'fS 839
Rights of the Accused
B. Right to Presumption of Innocence
(2). Accused· is guilty beyond r.easonable doubt of the offense of
malversation by. conversion. - "As acting cashier, the accused·held
,-. and han,dled, money a$ a matter of official duty. When she, therefore,
, .··• fail~d to retur.n the money up.on demand .therefor, the btlrden was
·,: : ~ers t9proy1~Jpss {by means other thal'). negltgence). Now, the fact
. o.( lo~s is-.nQt tp.e cpntr9versy h~rein, The parties are agreed that
•~ e .mo11ey ,is -~SS!I}g, Sut if any pa(l1ty rpay be .h eld accountable
therefor, it is t}ie ,;tccµ~~d, a:nd she alone. Res ipsa loquitor.
.,
It is not :the ~act ·that the aQcused's defense (that she lost the
money fr(:)m' :rqbbecy). is inftrm. The fac.t remains that she has
fail~d to (a) .pwve her allegations and (b) rebut the prosecution's
ev.ipence. Anent her claims, suffice it to say, that first, the questions
to
hav'e do with witness' credibility which is the realm of the trial
:ap,d, that ·µpon court, and ~econd, they defy logic." (Babida vs. People, supra, through
Justice Sarmiento.)
·..
·2. Pro'l!ision of law disqualifies a person to nm as a candidate if a
Facts: Under Section 7 of B.P. Blg. 152, the filing of charges for
the commission of any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrectiqn, rebellion or other similar
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact and, therefore,
shall justify the -disqualification of a person to be a candidate for
any of the offices covered by the Act.
Issue: The validity of this provision is assailed as violative of
the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Held: (1) Law condemns before one is fully heard. - "An accusation
is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged provision contravenes
the constitutional presumption of innocence as a candidate is
disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone
that charges h ave been filed against h im. It condemns before one is
fully heard. In u ltimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a p erson convicted of acts of disloyalty
and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as
both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same
category as a person .alrea dy con victed of a crime with the p enalty
of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension

IIIIJ l ' III J. ll ' l ' I N I , U NIJIII U LI N /\L l ,AW
hfo.ciples and Cases
of the right to hold office during the ter:r1' of .the sentence. (Art. 44,
· Revised Penal Code.)"
(2) Time constrai1J,ts prevent refutation·ojcharg~·· ~ A#cfa:lthough
11
the filing of charges is cortsid~r,ed ;~~.?~t.p(iin'a,'.fa_citevH:lerl~e;, and,
therefore, may be' rebttttetl, yet 'there 1s· a>.cleaf, arrd present, da:nger
that because of the proximity of the·electiO'ns", 'time constraints will
prevent one charged with acts of dislbyalty ftdm'. offering contrary
proof to overcome prima fdcie evidend( a·gainst him. ...
Being infected with constitutional infirmity,•:a partial declaration
of nullity of only the objectionable porti'bh:-is''n'1.andafed.1' (Duml~o
vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA '392 Il980], through Justice
Melencz'o-Herrera.) ··
C. RIGHT TO BE HEARD .
Right of accused to be heard
by himselfand counsel.
(1) Effectiveness of counsel. - It .is the .constitutional dght of
the accused in all criminal prosecutions to be heard in his defense
by himself a:nd/ or- by counsel beginning from the cµstodial
investigation (Sec. 12[1].) ?Jld at every stage of ·the· .trial;·· from
arraignment well into the pronouncement of sentence or jtid$ffient
on him, and even on appeal. This right is t;J;,.e··most fundamental
tenet of due process. It basical~y means that a person must be heard .
before being condemned or subject to li~bility.1
(a) The right to counsel ~ust be more than just the presence
of a lawyer in the courtroom or the me.~e _propound_ing of
sta:ndard questions a:nd objections. It me.ans an efficient and .
_truly decisive legal assistance, particularly at the -trial of the
case, a:nd not a simple perfunctory representation. (People vs.
1
Implementing this right to be heard, the Rules of Court provides:
(a) "In all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled x x x to be presrnt
and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from the arraignment
to the promulgation of the judgment. (Rule 115, Sec. 1.)
(b) "The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his
plea." (Rule 116, Sec. l[b].)
(c) "Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to cotmsel
and shall as!.< him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend him-
self in person, or has employed counsel ·of his choice, the co~rt must assign a counsel de
oficio to defend him." (Ibid., Sec. 6.)
(d) "After a plea of not guilty, the accused shall have at least ftfteen (15) dnys to
prepare for trial:'' (Rule 119, Sec. 1.)
j J
Sec. 14 AR1'. III. B!LL OF RIGHTS 841
Rights of the Accused
C. Right to be Heard
Durango, 329 -sc'RA 758 [2000]; People vs. Murillo, 434 SCRA
342 [2004].) .
(b) In·es~en.ce;..the right to be hea~d by counsel simply refers
to ·~e right tc{b_e a~~isted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring
that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due process.
' hl. order ·to be heard, a:nd therefore, accorded due process, the
.. a~s1stance _giv~n hy, c'?unset must be "effective." (People v~.
.Liwanag, 363 S.CRA 62 [2001] ..) An accused without counsel 1s
a
··e$.s entially ,d~p;ived of fair hearing ':hi0 is ta:ntamoun~ to_ a
g;.:ave de~al of due _p rocess since it strips him of a:n equality m
'arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field. (Ibanez vs.
People, 782 SCRA 291 [2016]; see note 6.)
(c) The presence of a:n adversarial testing process ensures
·· that the. trial is fair by according to the accused due process
through the "~ffectiye" assistance of counsel. Section 14(2) refers
simply to "couhsel" not specifying particular requirements
• of effective assista:nce. The proper measure of attorney
peiformance'i'~:rnains simply reasonableness under prev~iling
prdfessional norrhs;2 • The only insta:nce when the quality of
·· cotinsel'.s a~srstanc:e can be questioned is when the accused is
· deprived ·of his dghfto due process. (Ibid.)
· Tlie right, h9wever, does not mean that the accused must
personally hire his own counsel. (People vs. Ma:neng, 343 SCRA 88
[2000].)
(2) Right to remain silent. - The accused has the right to remain
silent, i.e:, not to testify, and to waive his right to be present during
the trial. (see J, infra:, He cannot be compelled to present evidence
in his behalf or to be a witness against himself. (Sec. 17.) His right
to present evidence on his behalf, although guaranteed by the
Constitution, may be waived, expressly or impliedly.3
2
The assistance afforded b y counsel to an accused in the light of the constitutive
requirement need only be in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court (see Rule 138, Sec. 20.), Code of Professional Responsibility (see Canons 2,. 12, 17,
18, and 19), and the Canons of Professional Ethics. (see Nos. 4, 5, and 15.) A counsel
assisting an accused is presumed to b e providing all the necessary legal defenses
which are reasonable under the circumstances in accordance with said norms. (People
vs. Liw~ag, supra.) The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative proceedings.
(Lastimoso vs. Asayo, 517 SCRA 522 [2007].)
3
In a case, the accused-appellant was. held, in effect, denied due process when
the successive non-appearance of his counsel who was fairly notified of the scheduled

l'lJlLU'llJ,NJJ ' N LJ'l'll'lrfl+ 'f'rf}-J., LAW
· Principl~s. ?,p.q, C~s~~ ~1
"" :,.{3).~~e.asonable .opporturifY ,,t~rfef~~~3«i:mfe}fi:1~•~;~~es(bif ti~peld
·that- the absence of a qua~if,ied interpreter m.1~1grt)¥'ij.µ,flg~nWld of
. any other means who ~p],l_ld,~av~ co~~ey~_cj;J~-*'e -~;c~s~?r a q~af-
mute, the full fa_tts'.dfme'·lliafges:a_ga'm'sf:l\ihr'a'.tldw~cf cdu.lq.. also
hav~ communicited 'lli~ a'c~tige(Fro¼\~e:i~f6ti or tii.Jcir~HmU~ces
which led to l}i,s im~k~tibli uf~(cr~r;~i£t\~~~'·$ ~J1su~~d of
a full ~dfaiJ: lr!cµ an1.a r_eEi:s.op.~ol~ 9J??:9.~aj~~~Sp.,d~f~tj\t~tpself .
in violation of his fundamental rig~~ :tl:f Jp~
;.p_roc~~s·.<>(law. '.The
accus~d co'itld not be' said to be_ he.~4"kf~~#~~}f':~~i #mti ~i,.~d
to be informed of the nature and cause of.fu~ aft\!-~a(19{J _9g~l.J;ls\,him
by reason of which he deserved a re-a,rrai~ent anci.a re-t,:iat (see
People vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 6.53 [1\f87]; P,eople vs·. Par~~o; 310
SCRA 146 [1999].)
(4) Waiver of right to presen't evide'nce. ~ The .right ,to present
evidence in his behalf may, however, be waiv~d PY the a;c cus~dwho
cannot complain that he was denied his .r ight to due process.}'Vhere
he was afforded the opportunity to present evidence.4 B;µt a sirµple
warning to the accused that the next time that he should not be ready
with his defense evidence, he would be deemed tq, hav.e -waived
his right to present it, does-rtot satisfy the ~ccused'.:S con~tihttional
right to due process. The trial court should just.cl:ppi;ise the .acc;used
or explain to him in clear terms the exact nature and consec;i,\lences
of a waiver. (People vs. Macarang, 424 SCRA 1_8.[2004].)
Waiver of the right to counsel.
The right to counser'is guaranteed by the. Constiru:tion, laws,
and the Rules of Court to minimize the imbalance.µ, the adversarial
hearings was construed as a waiver of his right to present. evidence. (People vs. Diaz,
311 SCRA 585 (1999].) In another case, the accused conte~~ed that after the fiscal (pros-
ecutor) had presented the prosecution's evidence-and when counsel de oficio called upon
him to testify, the trial court should have·advised him of his constitutional right to-remain
silent. The Supreme Court ruled that the "contention is not well-tal<,ef) considering that
[the accused] pleaded guilty and had executed an extra-judicial confession. The court
during the trial is not duty bound to apprise the accused that he h<1s the dght to remain
silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right.fo~ him. If he does not claim it and he
calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that _right." (People vs. Tnmpus, 96
SCRA 624 [1980].)
"To protect the constitutional right to· due process of every accused, the Supreme
Court in People vs. Bodoso (398 SCRA 642 (2003).) laid down the procedure or requirements
the trial court must observe when the accused waives his right to present evidence and be
heard. Courts must proceed with more care in criminal cases involving capital offenses.
V
, ART. m. BILL OF RIGHTS
Rights of the Accused
C. Right to be Heard
S}{St~-m wher~·the ace\JS~d is pitted ·again~.t the awesome pi;osecutor.y
ma~ery-of th(eiState. ~Pieqple vs. Serzo, Jr., 274 SCRA 553 [19(97).)
It,ilJ,1{1.!}'•be invoke<l::at all-,tim.es, not only in the trial cour\S but also
- ~uring eust-odhilf.mve~tigation and in the. pursuit of appeal. (Telan
v~.!Court of Appeals~202 SCRA 534 [1991].)
· : (1) Reijuireinen'ts for waiver. -The right to counsel de parte, like
~y 'o ther: personal right, may be waived. The accused must be
inform'ed·~a\ ~fh.as the right to the assistance of counsel and that
if fle cannot •afford one, he will be provided with free counsel. If he
chooses to wai:v,e the right to counsel (as when he changes his plea
i ' of not guilty to that of guilty to lesser offense), such waiver must be
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
(a) If the person arrested is under custodial investigation,
the waiver mu,st be made in the presence of the accused's
lawyer; and in ·writing; otherwise, the waiver is null and vold.
The confession of the accused becomes inadmissible in evidence,
even if the accused fails to prove he was coerced to execute the
same. All law enforcement officers are enjoined to observe the
guarantee because its disregard may ·result in the conviction
of innocent persons deprived of the assistance of counsel, or
in the escape ·of the guilty. Constitutional short-cuts are not
allowed to diminish the liberties of the person facing custodial
investigation. (People vs. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623 [1988]; People
vs. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760 [1988].)
(b) The right to counsel de parte is waivable as long as 1) the
waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly,
and intelligently made. (Tumanlaw vs. Peralta, Jr., 482 SCRA
396 [2006].) It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding, and with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. (Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532 [2008].)
A number qf cases, however, have held that the right to
counsel is not subject to waiver by the accused its purpose being
to ensure that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due
process, a fundamental right which cannot be waived by the
accused. (People vs. Liwanag, 363 SCRA 62 [2001], infra.)
(2) Effect where right was invoked but denied by court. - If the
accused does not waive his right to be heard by counsel but on the
844 PJ-ItLIPPI'NE.CONSTI'IUTid>N)\&' LAW Sec.14 A~T. LU. BILL OF RIGHTS 845
Principles and'Ctt§e·~I, l Ri13hts ,of the Accused
' ,, C. Right to be Heard

eontrary·imvokes that right1°an<;Irtli.e,c:ouitt)d-e:rties1d!t t:dhimJffiat•co'u,rt · · hearc:l before being. <;:ondemnea,;6 (People vs. Bernas, 306 SCRA 135
no it>nger has jurisdictio'l;l.tb pi:oceedr,,It:,H~s:.W@''Pl:)Wei:>f~t'Seitt'e:Me · , [2004],;,Callanganvv~., People, 493 SCRA2.69 [2006).)
the· accused without,H~arfo:g"lii.:im,1iri-'hi!r dl.ett?rtseJ,,an:!ll,. tli.e".:S'ei'.i,:tenc~ . (2) Safeguard against wrong/i{l conviction of the innocent. - The
~hus pronoµn_c ed istv.Oid1ahtll) may b~ t011at~r~Hy /attacke<\!,j ;n•a\#iibeds .· prese!).<;:e cll).d participation of counsel in c;r~minal proceedings
corpus proceedir).g. (AbripFV.si ffdhietes';i 8(1f Phiik·•&25· ['1949M -!The · shotjld nevir be taken l~htly. E:ve.i;i the most intelligent or educated.
accused -;m,1.s;t he,:gi.y,E¢ -~!V#fY,:fl.1-anc~Jp,,,p;te;ijrJ,lt,.-Jl¥si'f!~~p~e if ·the :man may have np ._s15ill .in the_!').cienQe of the law, particularly in the
reques,t-.
'"',i t
t, he:tef~r.is
' •'. '. · ' .>.;,_
,1
·r.ea.sbnahle,
i
maq:e,iftgo&d_,
,"': f.~. J. ,✓ n,..•
!. l..,._ ,.. _n ,.~ rr ..,-_
• ,·.- ) . · .
_·,t\@d>npt
,f::i.i:tJ1_ ::11; .1fnn.g.
.> •• J , ,;;,ti ..,_
ela:tf
~ -1.J;.~ iul~s of legal pr9ce4µre, and '}'ithout, the ajd of counsel, he may be
The f~Bf~ mi\Y. ·9-~Yiflte1h:RP.1;$t~reqfup;,J,t~~kq~~!Wt~~ ,of,;p,Ji~it:&9'~ ·: conv\cfed no~ becqU$EI he is guilty but because he Joes not know
rather, µ,.an .run,:th~ risk, _pf; 4~pri:y~_g •:.~ ;-J.'1.CC,l,l;§~9-·;.<?,f,=t; hte-1t,~8}li,si~~, · how to establish his innocence. He may be put on trial without a
oppq;rwnJ.q, to: :prese~t .,N~- stge.pt th.~ ,i9ritrqv\e;~J,:--(ArP,alllt:Y~• proper charge and, -lacking the skill and knowledge adequately
Pecson, 87,.P,hil. 4i8Il.9.5.QJ)c, ," . • •,, ,. ·\,,.::":;ff;, • ,1; , >_: •, . • r to prepare his defense,. even though he may have a perfect one,
he -may be found guilty upon evidence irrelevant to the issue
(3) Effect w~ere reco.rd fails td )disclose tftdf 'acdtMeti.f-wds ddvl~eJ :aJ or otherwise inadmissible. And this can happen more easily to
his.:t;!gfl~,.~,,, Xh¢JJ:1.ilu!e q_tfu~ i;ec9:1;q, to ,ii~.qlqs,e,affl.rmatjxely that persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that
the ;ti;i~!-J'19,,g e :ii:d½!§~c:\-,1;\l.~ a_c9U~_g d, o,f, his,ilg~t )o hc1ve :<;ipu1j1~el is . 0

· the right to be assisted by counsel (except as provided in Sec. 12(1))

not suffl~ie11£gfpµnd ·to reiVerse the J11.d,gmerit '.of ,cpnyie,tjon,. (U.S. in criminal proceedings is deemed so importan t that it has become
vs. E:s qaj.~te/ 36thfi.. .74p, (1917]; People vs. Nang, Kay, 88.PhtL 315 a constitutional right which has been held not subject to waiver by
[195l];Anur vs.
Mosceso~ :98 Phil.115 [1955].)h,l such case, th!:! court the accused.7 (see People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752 [1950}; Flores vs.
must pe, pre~umed in m~tters of ,the kiµd to:_litave complied with Ruiz, 90 SCRA 427 [1979); see People vs. Malunsing, 63 SCRA 493
the pr-09.e dure pr~scrtbe_d )?,Y law ,for the hfa!i.J:ig arid trial of cases [1975]; Botja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 420 [1977); Aguilar vs. Enerio,
and such presumption catl only be overco!l)e by .an affirmative 37 SCRA 140 [1971); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 [1932); People
showing to the c9ntrary.5 (U.S. vs, Lab:ral, 27 _P hil. 82 [1914]; People vs. Liwanag, 363 SCRA 62 [2001).)
vs. Agbayani, 284 SCRA 315 [1998].) .
Counsel de oficio/de parte.
Importance of the right to counsel.
(1) The practice has always been for the trial court to provide
(1) Imbalance in the adversarial system. - The righ~ of an accused the accused with a counsel de oficio, if he has no counsel of his own
to be heard would be qf little avail if it dogs npt include the right choice or cannot afford·one. It is not enough to ask him whether he
to be heard by counsel considering that a layman is not_versed on desires the assistance of a lawyer; the court should assign one de oficio
the technicalities of a trial. This right is guaranteed to miniini;?:e the for him if he so desires or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
imqalance in the adversarial system_where the accu~ed is pitted attorney of his own. Nevertheless, upon motion, the accused may
against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. (People be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears
vs. Santocildes, Jr., 321 SCRA 320 [1999).) . to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the
Indeed, the right to counsel springs from the fundamental assistance of counsel.8 (Rules of Court, Rule 115, Sec. l [c].)
principle of due process which basically means a person must be
6The Rules of Court allows a non-lawyer to conduct litigation personally and appear
for oneself only when he is a party to a litigation, (see Rule 138, Sec. 34; see Ciocon-Reer
5
It is, however, the duty of the courts anc! their officers to see to it that ·the record vs. Lubao, 783 SCRA 15 [2016].)
sets forth a full and COI,1.plete report of all ,the incid.ents of criminal trials·so far as that is 7But see U.S. vs. Go Leng, 21 Phil. 426 (1912), U.S. vs, Kilayko, 31 Ph il. 371 (1915), U.S.
humanly possible and in such form as to leave no room for doubt or question as to what vs, Escalante, 36 Phil. 743 (1917), _and People vs. Sim Ben, 98 Phil, 138 (1955), where the
actually occurred, (U.S. vs. Custan, 28 Phil 19 [1914].) I£.the.records do no.t show that the accused was deemed to hav~ waived the right to counsel.
8
accused was assisted by counsel during the Ci{s~odial investiga'tion, this defe.ct renders his "By analogy, but without p rejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal
confession inadmissible in evidence. (People vs.
Olaparti,'179 SCRA495 [1989];) practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently
 J 1
1-'I-IILIJ?l:>!NE 'O N S1'B1()1';t10 W4t LAW Sec. 14
Principles: and Ca~!!s ··
, In .case the accused cannot iloq~$•I£te:r.hi~:Anter~shwttho~t· tl;r.e
assistance of counsel, the fo:urt shouid apj?.oii\t:a·oow1sef qe offoipI9 .•
(2) While the right' of the· a:ccused to be. r~presen~ec;Mt,y COUrn'$el
is immutable, his option tb se'cure the· s~,:yk~s · of courtsel de parte,
however, is riqfa:bso1tite; The cou'r f i:naylestt;\tl,the ac'cused"s option
to retain a counsel de parte if 'f hf:~~cuse1d.fasls:ts on'an at~o_rney he
cannot afford or the retained counsel' is not a.' memb.er of ·the bar, or
the attorney declines to represenfth~-acct.isJcffcit p. valid r~ason; e.g.,
conflict of il'lterest and the lif<'e. ·' . . .. . . . .
The court is obliged to balance ,the privi-lege . of the accused to
retain. a counsel of his choice against,.fhe ·S tate's and the offended
party's equally important right to speedy and ·adequate justice.
(Pe?ple vs. Serzo, Jr., 274 SCRA 553 [199?].) . .: .
Ri'ght geF1efally.not indispensable ·
- to·due process.
~j) 111 crimivr:il cases. - The right tp the a~sistcince of.counsel'is
I;!)tJn_d ispensable to due process ~ess:requi;redby the Cqnsti,tution
,9.r a law. E~ception is made in th~ <:;:hc1.rter only ~l!,ringthe custodtal
investigation of a person suspected ofa,m:ime, who._rnay n<:>t waive
his right to counsel except in writing and in.the presence of counsel,
and during the trial of the accused, wh0.hc).~:Jl;t,e ,r ight ~t_o b~ heard
by hi.m self and counsel,' either retained by.hitn or pr9vided for him
by the governn:tent at its expense. . . _. · . ·
These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with
the other rights of the person facing criminal •prosecution, because
of the odds he must contend with to· defend his liberty, if not his
and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination ofthe
record will show that he knew the technical rules of pr-0cedure. Hence, we rule that,there
was a valid w&iver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering
that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistan ce
of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made. (People vs. Tulin,
364 SCRA 70 [2001]; People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 160 SCRA
680 [1988),)
9In a case, it was held that the right to counsel was not denied where a counsel de
oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused'.s counsel de parte pursuant to the
court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system.
(People vs. Macagitling, 237 SCRA 299 [1994].)
' AR'T. 'IU. :BILL OF RIGHTS
Rig~ts of the Accused
C. Right to be Heard
life, 'against the awesome-authority of the State. (Nera vs. Audit0r
Gen'eral,. 164 SCRA Hf988,].)
·(a) Consistent with due process, the court should appoint
· counsel for the_accused whether requested or not, and thi:mgh
he pleads guiify; he is nevertheless ·entitled to the benefit of
counsel. (Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 876.) Even if the guilt of the
defendant is very apparent, a he!3rlng is still indispensable. He
cannot be punished upon a doubtful assumption. Lack of notice
of hearing violates procedural due process.
(b) Doubts ori the part of a lawyer as to the ultimate
f innocence of a -client accused do not, in themselves, constitute
bases for claiming miscarriage of justice or failure of due process.
Of course, complete confidence in the innocence of one's client
may lend added sincerity and even passim~ to the lawyer's
pleading and argumentation. It is, howeve1~ precisely one of
the demanding requirements of the legal profession that the
lawyer must present all the defenses allowed by law to a person
accused of crime without regard to the lawyer's private beliefs
or suspicions as to.his client's guilt. (People vs. Luvendino, 211
SCRA 36 [1992).)
(c) The '-'·preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more
aptly and-specifically to a person under investigation rather than
one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. Hence, the
appointment by the court of a counsel de oficio for the accused
cannot constitute,a violation of his right to due process and a
deprivation ofqis ~ight to be defended by counsel of his own
choice. Even if the.application of the concept of "preference in
the choice of counsel" is extended to an accused in a criminal
prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a
discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice
of counsel refer extensively to the predilection of the accused.
(Amion vs. Chiongson, 301 SCRA 614 [1999].)
(2) In non-criminal cases. -There is nothing in the Constitution
that sars a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be
represented by counsel and that without such representation he will
not be bound by such proceedings.
The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause

848 • PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTI©NJr.AiE. LAW
Principles artd~t::a~~k .
·: ,_ ··1; ',i i
·suclfthM without the participation',of.:its·mentbets; tht is.afe:gµards;
are deemed ignored or viblated: The tlfdi!fiacy'.cl~&n:'i'.$PrfoW~at)
h~lp~ess that he cannot Y,~idgr ~Wtr?t:,all,e)5-se;ptJ:!ajYrWJ~aJ~wyer at
~s side. (Nera vs.,Aud1,J9[ G$n;ep~l,1~1tpr:q40~1~:;fe~~-e~ ~t~W.~ltj~11a,l
1 (J?~ople vs.. Nu~la.p, :366 &qM, ('.9~i.t~OQ1};,l'~gl.c;ly. vs . .p.~ray,; 678
Line Ptd., Ltd. ~~· ~94!}.f~f f\:P,P~f1§,. ._1~7 ,§ P~:ey~J~99Alh1 ,., ' •
i••:·• ; .. -~ ,
' '
.'. ' 0.:im:~HTT:Q·BEINFeRNIBB \ ,, i,::r t;1 .<,
• ·• ' •• r ,.._ ;. ~. ,... ! ' .,,. ,.
Right of accused to be informed
.of.the accusation.against him. .
· (1) r Arraignment.:...:.. Basic is the precept Th~f the accused has the
right.to be informed of the nature and cause ofthe accU:sat'ion against
him. This constihttional right is implemented by the arraignment of
the accused. . · • protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
' · · Arrill~ent is not a mere formality but a vital stage in criminal
proceed~gs. It is at the stage of arraignment that the accused,
for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. (Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 420 [1977].)
The arraignment is made in open court by the_ judge or clerk, and
consists in furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
informatit>rt1 reading the same in the language or dialect known to
him artd asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.2 (Rules
1The information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense
subscribed by the prosecutor (formerly fiscal) and filed with the court. (Ibid., Rule 110,
Sec. 4.) It is filed in court usually by the prosecutor after due.investigation.
If no. inf!)rmation can be filed against a prisoner be~ause the records have. been lost
oj ·the~ _custodia?, it is not the prisoner who should be made to suffer. In the eyes of the
law, he 1s not. guilty or does not appear to be guilty of any crime for which he may be
legally held. Hence, he is entitled to be set free. It is illogical and absurd to suggest that
becau~e. the S,Ovemment cannot prosecute him, the prisoner's detention must continue.
(Ordofiez vs. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 [1994)'.) • · • , . •
2 3The general principles of criminal law provide that aggravating circumstances,
Aplea of guilty·made by the accused freely, v.oluntarily, and with full knowledge
?f ~ e c~1:15equence~ and me~g of his ~ct,. besides being a mitigating circumsta~ce,
'.s a 1udi<;1al c~nfess1~n of guilt - an adnuss1on of all the,material facts alleged in the
inforl]l_ation, mcludmg the _aggravating circumstances. . Where •the accused . pleads
~ty to ;a. capital offense,. it is now mandatory for the .court, to forestall the entry of
an unprov1dent plea of guilt, (a) to conduct a searching inquiry i,lto the voluntariness
and full .comprehension of ~e cons.e quences of the a_ccused's plea, (b) to require the
pr_osecution to prov~ the_ gml~ of th~ ac~sed and hi~ precise degree of culpability, (c)
with the accused bemg likewise entitled, if he so desires to present evidence to prove
inter a!ia, mitigating circumstances. (People vs, Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611 [1991); People vs'.
Mangila, 325 SCRA 586 [2000]; People vs. Pastor, 379 SCRA 151 [2002); People vs. Murillo,
434 SCRA 342 [2004); People vs. Espidol, 442 SCRA 360 [2004); see Rules of Court-, Ruic
IJ j
, .' ,r "hRT1:JH,i1BlLL, OF .RIGHTS
_R:i,gµt~ ~ttl:ie Accused
D,RighJ.-to be Informed
,,,.qf~,~€)u,t;t; ·~t:t:\~h;~~n~~~:~-,~;),,~ti~.~a.formaJ procedure in a ,G ~~al
; -EFP~~£4ti.i;>:p. .' 1tR,a~m:4vu:i c;1c_e:used_.}c;lue.process" and it is -als~.Jhe
L,'.ffl,Jt~.~,,:,qf!JmpJ~m9~~g ;t\1~:<;0~µ-tq:p.!.i>~al r,igl;lt of an ac,aus~gj•,t0,
.;' :l?,~wtqr.µ:tEld.•p,£..~~ J.;).j:l~~:Af).4 Cq:µ:~e. p{ -th~ :c;l,<3€µS~tion against hi;m..
1',SN,,-;§~04t,9f7}) _1}.e acqis,ef1J s. PfJ!~~ed to !)_ave no independent
,
½?~~r~9e 1ot,fl,\~ .fac~~ c~n ~ptil~&'. th~..off~l}~e he h&s purportedly
{c?!l}fl{~t:?:{rep-l?~e_y~.13~xhl,os,_ (50'SCJ0 677 [2015].)
t ,; l ~ .. c·f ~•
(2) Objects of the written ae.cusation. - As stated in U.S. vs.
K~_rel~~n (3 ~hil. ??3 [i9Q4].), ~ey are:
"First~ to-furnish the accused with such a description of the
· · ·charge against hirtr as will enable him to make his defense;
Second, to. avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
,. Third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so th at it m ay
decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction,
.• if one should.be had."
(3) Sped.fie allegations of crime charged. - Every crime is made up
of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint
wi'tn' reasonable· p~ticularity of time, p lace, names (plaintiff
I ,
' ( and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint or
_information must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.3 (Ibid.)
. It should be sufficiently clear to a person of ordinary intelligence
as to what the charge is so as to enable him to properly prepare his
~efonse.4 It is impeta!ive that he is thus made fully aware of possible
116, Sec,. 3; see People. vs. Aguilar, 548 SCRA 663 (2008).) An improvident plea of guilt
should be set aside if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
even if not' alleged in the information may b e proven during the trial over the objection
of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence. Such evidence merely
fortns part of the proof of the actual commission of t;he offense and its consideration by
the .courts, does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be infonned of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. (People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA559 [1998].)
4
Due process requires that the acts or omission s or the elements constitutive of the
o~ense be stated,in the information to fully apprise the accused of the charge against
hi)ll and enable him to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of-the facts that constitute the offense. The nature and the cause
of the accusation must be reasonably stated therein with clarity and sufficient detail.
 1.' l lli.11 ' 1'1 NH ' NS'l'l'l'U'l'ltbNA'u,{JAW Seo. 11!4
Principles and Cases,A .
,, ·• · .l
loss of freedom, even of his life, depen&mg~on-tl:'t~.ffl~1alrce ~of the=eritrle . ·
imputed to him. (Borja vs, Mendoia, ;supra;--Ma'til,e►,Jf~ vsHahsort;l68. · ·
SCRA 456 (1975].) The use.=0fderrvative-s,~r sy,nony-m s,or:aJ.tegali:ons -
of basic facts constituting the·o:ffertse1charged is•sq.fficieRb(Sefapi'd ,
vs. Sandiganbayan.,' 396 SCRA 443 l2'6l03F) , .. ·, · : · ,· · · ..
(4) Characterization of!h~'crime F,h~~¥!f_; Tl)e·~~-~~eq ·~ee_dJ\P~ ·,
be informed of th~.chq.taderi~a#dn 'pf. )'il}e'-~~efhKtg.~'?, 'J.W.~ft !J .
1
·is
·a
conclusion of la~.' Hence, aniilco:rrect-'c:aption-i.s;i}.bt fatal defect.5
(U.S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273{1,910]:) · ·, . ;· :' · ·.
(5) Conviction not for offens·e c'harged, ·..:_ It has oeeri held 'that an
accused charged:with rape,through one rrt<;>cl;e,of: !;l!>rr:uni~sion (while
the victim was urtconsci0us-_0r otherwise deprife'd~of:!e@_on:):may ·
still be convicted of the crime if evidence shows another ·x:node of
co~ssion (through force ~d iritimidatio~) !i.ithQ,ti(vigJa.t;i:ng his
constitutional right. to be informed· of rl1e natuie {Uld cause ·of the
accusation against him, provided that the ac_cused did not bbj~ct to
such evidence-. (People vs. Abiera, 222 SCR.A p7.8 ",[1993]; PE!opie vs.
Pailano, 169 SCRA 649 [1989].) It would be a ·dertial of the riglit•of the .
accused to be informed of the charge agaim.st hill}, apd c.onsequently,
a denial of ~ue_process, if he is charged w_i~-~0:ip,J~ rape o~ ~~cp
he was arraigned, and be convicted of qu~f=.d: .~ape punishabk 9y
death, 6 (People vs. De la Cuesta, 304SCRA83 [1999].) .
Remedy of accused whose right
is violated.
This requirement of notice is indispensable: Thus, there is a
violation of the right where an accused has be'e n charged with an
offense and convicted of another (People vs. Abad Santos, 78 Phil.
I ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
774 [1947].); or of a higher offense (U.S. vs. Ocampo, 23 Phil. ~68
[1912]; People vs. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740 [1989].); or where no
.
(People vs. Puertollano, 308 SCRA 356 [199!)); Andaya vs. People, 495 SCRA 539 [2006);
,
Enrile vs. People, 766 SCRA 1 [2015).)
5
What i:ietermines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is
the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not its caption or
preamble, nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law. (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1997].)
6
Pursuant, however, to the variance doctrine (see Rules of Court, Rule 120, Secs. 4, 5.),
a person may be convicted of an offense proved even if not charged in the Information
provided it is included in what is chargei:i. (Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309
[2004).)
Sec. 't':t AltT. ·III. BiLL OF RIGHTS
.. 851
1 Rignts of 'tH.e Accused
D. Right to'be Informed
~fraj~eitt pf'~~-~~rused has ta.ken J;Jiace. (U.S. vs. Sobrevifias, 35
Phj;t'.<3.2 ·(i9l6].tTh~·:cl:1::l~_ertce of -~rra\gnn.;;ent results in the nullity of
fhe proteedings be-foi;e •the trial ~ourt. (T~gl~y vs. Daray, 67S SCRA
640 [~01?-],). lndeed,·-the accused cru:mot be convicted of a crime,
evei:i'lf du.iy .Rto'9en, unless if is alleged or necessarily included in
P1e itVqtfu,gtj~n·fil~flri g,.ux:tst ~- (I;'eople
~,~!" -f~· f1~, TJ'f•:-,. >·•'LV •• ".. ·· t· ··· .· . , ·
vs. Manalili, 294 SCRA
~r2Jl~ffSJJ ,. ·.':-;,:,.;,,• . · . ~
(1) The •proceedings in . such case may be challenged and
ami!tUlled_,i n the.proper ,co.urt, at the instance of the accused; on the
g-r:.ou.ia.c;l:of denial qf~(>,constituticmal and legal right to be informed
of' tl!te.-hatur.e ~d:.ct~t,tse of the· accusation against him and to due
protzeSs)@f :ia:\oV,'But an.accu-s ed may be convicted of a lesser offense
(e.g.;tl;\eft).jnclul!led in-that (e.g., robbery) which he is charged.
.·· (t)..An ac~ed rii.a:y, at or before judgment, rrf'ove for a bi!l of
p~,rtiRilars to. en~ble· hiPl properly to plead and prepare for trial.
The -n,ipJ:fon shalf sp~cify the alleged defects of the complaint
or information ~d.-the details desired.,(Rules of Court, Rule 116,
See; 9:)
llie accused will be estopped to question whatever procedural
er,r9{lli~re Jas ,in tlie'_~ raignment by actively participating in the
triaf-of his case witl:i9µf bringing up the a}Jeged invalidity or defect
thereof. (People vs. Dy, 375 SCRA 15 [2002],)
1. In a prosecution for robbery with rape, the information did not
mention Article 335 but Articles 293, 294, and 296 of the Revised Penal
Code..
Facts: Appellant claims that even assuming, without admit-
ting, that he is guilty of the offense charged, he cannot be meted
the death penalty because Articles 293, 294, and 296 which are
mentioned in the information prescribe only the penalty of reclu-
sion temporal to reclusion perpetua. Under Article 335, the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death and this is the provision mentioned in
the dispositive portion of the lower court's decision imposing the
death sentence.
Issue: Is the defect merely of form or one of substance?
Held: (1) Defect is merely of form. - "If the above requirement
(Rules of Court, Rule ·110, Sec. 8.) is not complied with and no name

h,as be~n given to_th,e g~iI.?~ty \\~~~~ tRitlf\~Si·~~/t 1W\WTil~:r·~t- tne.
~~~~: ~~ ;:~:
1
l:1~!!~t¾.ift~s;(i.~1l~R~\~·;§j1t~tf t1r~a~rJ
'.J.,., ':g~r:!i-~., :., , .
are clearly constihltive(of ·h-s'pid'fi'c 'b~ert~t1' h
• •. • •· '. 1 •l .- · , f .• ,, • -'·•' ,;. , ·•· )~ ,·, ,
(2) NaJure if.c,;im~fs}~t~hwi~f(p.·.¥~iff,7-,iato£.:ta,_c.t§, {ri,,teflorir;q!-iOIJ,,
flie,
0,
- "In suc~ cas~s, th~ rear .P?Wr.e 9f criw~·¢),rged?~ d~!~J.\nJ.!fie,<,i_
not by the titl'e of ·fue ·c'olhplain'.f,'.'n6P:1:>_r tn~'.,spe:cl:ficand.n:'..Qf ,U;l~
provision of the law alleged to have-beenviolat~d, but by the £acts
recited in th~ compl?tint o,r infqri;n<!.ti~p.." ',ri• •. :· ... )' •-
. ,, . ' .
(3) Designation ofcrime -is,;nbt ess¢Miiz1. ·~·{'!fh.is :is so-because
from a legal point of 'V'iew;and,inia•v:eo/teaJ§ei$e; iti&.of,i(o,donte-tn
t0 the accused what -is ,the)technical;natne·.o Ltbe ·,crlme' 0£ which he
sta1,1ds charged. It;.in np"Wc;l)'l ~ds.nifl):lrl)1l~'idef~~~
QP, ~ .e,merits
x x ~. The realcquespon i!, I).Ot did h,e <;Gm.m]t. f!.J!t4n~ :giY~n. in the
law some technical and specific nan:i.e~-hl.i/:<;fi~t:.h~p~rtp:r;Il} A,eacts
alleged in the body of th'e :iti.fdrmatiord.ri: ~ tllf.p.'iaimer We.r~i~ set
forth. If he 'aid, it is -of no conseq'µeric~}o' pi;ni~ ·a~.:~ !fuatt~f
of procedure or of stibstarttive,Hght, hch.JJlf lA'w -,d~IJ.6J.T1ii:itit~s the
crime which those acts eonstj.tute x,.,(x; Ih Jhe;:d~sigftati6rr',of the
crime, the accused never has a real interest until the trial,has ended:.
For ~s full and c~mplet~Ldefen,.~e!-;~~: ~~-e.~, kn?,_::V}{i.e of
the cnme at.all. It 1s of. ~o ~bnsE:~'lH~~~~)':71:\ateyer·,' f~ttlie,P,fote~ti~m
of his substantial righfs xx x. n ~s th~·1?.r~v¥1~eof_tli~ cqurt'alon,J ~~
say what the crime is and wha:t it.is n~ea/ ' o,' . · -· ..
(4) Effect of contrary rule. - "Acc~rdb:,.gli the ~ccused not
be permitted 'to stand by and watch the fiscal [now prosecutor]
while he guesses as to the name which ought to be-applied to the
crime with.'.\-Vhich he charges the.aCCU$~i;i~@.d-~:t~i;i ,tak..e..aq.v:antage
of the guess if it happens to be wrongt w1'Ue the acts and oll).is11ions
upon which that guess was ~ade and which are th¢ orily r~al
foundation of the charges against him are·dearly and fqlly stated
in the information. Otherwise, it wotild change· the battleground
in criminal cases from issues to guesses and from facts .to fancy."
(People vs. Labado, 98 SCRA 730 {1980], thtciugh.Justice Abad Santos,
citing IV Moran, Rules of Court, .22°23,'.1970 ed.) pp.
· ·· ·
2, Judgment of the lower court imposes ·upon the accused for the
crime of simple theft the penalty prescribed in Pres. Decree No. 133
instead of that imposed by Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts: Presidential Decree No. 133 imposes a penalty of
imprisonment ranging from prision correccional to prision mayo1~
l
i.tVR.''t JU. l3J1L,LOF RIGHTS 853
~ghts of!tl:te Accused
D. Right to be Informed
,;,,i,:t.i(-hile·.A11ticle 309 of the Revised Penal Code imposes a penalty of
·prision c~rred~ioval in its maxunum and medium periods. The three
(3) infor:ij:lations uruformly lBtated that .the accused were ,charged
· _ -~ '. ' •. ~ . • • . ' ' . ' . • f ' ' .with ,the crime of qualified theft_ in i;elation to Pres. Decree No.
:-133. Peti;t~op:er_..;C.~~ten_c!,s µ:tat ip the absence of any allegation in
; the b,~dy:Qf th~ frifwmc1tion alleging specifically all the elements of
th~ offep.~e cj:efi~e\:i. ~nd p1m~H.z.e d under the Decree, he cannot be
:penalized ':Ulder .the:same.
· . Issue; The issue is whether on the basis of the averments of
the informc1tions, the respondent court can validly impose upon
i petitioner the penalty pre~cFibed under the decwe.
Held: NCl,'(l) Right of accused to be informed is discussed, - "The
Constitution guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
~gainst him. · T6,,give ·substc1nce to this constit:utional guarantee,
"eithe·r Section 8 of Rule .110 of the Rules of Court requll'es that the acts or
9mis.sio~s compla'i ned ofas constituting the offense must be sta ted
· 'iifan ordinary" and concise language so as (a) to enable a person
· o{dommon ui:{derstanding to know what offense is intended to be
' · · charged; ancf(h)-fo ~nable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
A1t n.1f~ · -The rule itate~ that the statement need not necessarily be in
:of
the .l?I1guage the statute. What is important is that the crime is
described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise
will the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. In
other words, the crime is stated in such a way that a person of
ordinary intellig~nce may immediately know what is meant, and
the court can decide the matter according to law. (U.S. vs. Go
Chanco, 23 Phil.,641 [1916]; U.S. vs. Gatmaitan, 4 Phil. 265 [1905].)
. . Inasmuch as 'not only the liberty but even the life of the
accused may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the
accused should .be fully apprised of the true charges against
them, and thus av_o id all and any possible surprises which may be
detrimental ta. their rights and interests.' (People vs. Abad Santos,
76 Phil. 744 [1946].) The main purpose of this requirement is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed
to be innocent and has, therefore, no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense with which he is charged. 7
7
As aptly explained in People vs. Mencias (46 SCRA 88 [1971]. ):
'2. Nor was the lower court any more justified in quashing the fi ve informa-
tions on the ostensible ground that private respondents had been denied the consti-
tutional right 'to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against h im

854 PHlLl'fP lN B CON 6'fJJ'ftlµt l~N"A®,L AW Sec. il:>1'
Principles arl.:cO:b:asJ~.t!}
' ·11; . ' ·< .~:,: .....
: ' -·:iz:i)' Accused, 'even ift~~l{ity, '2a.¥ihb't:?i,¢on'v.iote'd.;djf~:J6fs~~n-iiff~11~~
than that charged. - ",CQrtc9µu-ro.:ta~t•~ tl'i-1flie1ftiie:g9~ i£~i~sllieti"l;tlJ .
laid down in U.S. vs. ·©clift!po'(23,_~tf~~~'fd19,1£M ~Uv~1fft1!'iM&used.: .
person cannot b'e c~rivit~~4~htlu~i~ft8fiet1·se'than: tha f,W.ftrt'whit::h
he is chargecj. ii\::tf\e'~oiripfaffit'tir;lfirurti\~tYoWBn·whi:c:h 'hl i~~ed:
It matters 'hofh9w·•c~;rclusi'f~'. bnd'c&~~fh?µY!:±4¢' ~vfdef\te\of~iiiii
may be, an iccu~~d'pe#oh ca~&~r-~:~.'.~~y';~~~fh~ ~~t~~r-~_,>I
these Islands of any offense~ uriless 1t 'r/3' §{;i~1d'iWtl\'e"c('jH$1aiht or
information on ·wh.kh he'is: ti'iedr o·frtecessafily iticlutled :therein.
He has a rigl:\t to be informed M'tothe nafure· ofthe•off-ensewith
is
which he is cha!ged before he ptit cii').·tfial/ aiid to convicfliitn-of a
higher offense than that charged in.the-complaint or information on
which he is tried would be an unauthorized -denial of that right."'
(3) Informations filed are insufficient't/1 properly inform 'accused. -
It is true that in the preamble of the infqrmations, the petitioner is
charged with the crime of simple theft in relation to Presidential
Decree No. 133. This is, however, insufficient for the purpose
envisioned by the constitutional guarantee considering that it is
well-settled that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information. (Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456
[1975], through Justice Antonio.)
Waiver of the right.
In U.S. vs. Sarabina (4 Phil. 876 .[1905]..), the 'Supreme Court
';
ruled that the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
j .
•••:Here again, 'its process of r atiocination.is'diffi~t. to follow. Certainly, it.ough~
to have.been aware that aU tharthis constittitiohalright signifies is that an accµsed
should ·be- given the necessary data as ·to. why he is .being proceeded against. H e
should not be left in the unenv iable state of speeulating why he is trlade the object
of a prosecution.
As was so aptly pointed out in the same sponsorship speech o'f Delegate·I:.aurel: 'It is
the right of a person accused of crime to.demahcl'tht! naN'.i:e.and,cat.tse of-tlie·accusation
against him. He should know for what cause and of what crime h e is being: charged. The
Petition of Rights denounced the former practice in England_.of impr-isoning a freeman
by the King's special command, without any charge.' Th'e act or conduct imputed to him
must be described with sufficient particularity' so that he woutd be in a position to defend
himself properly. lf.'it were not so, then ·there is an ·-element'of unfairness ..Due process is,
in fact, denied him.*• *.'"
~ . JA A!~t..'('~ U.U IJ b,L 11 HlU ll'l'!:l
1~h.h.1 ot the Accused
E. R!g~t to Ii~':-~~ SJ?eedy Trial
aecusation .a :~st:h\m may,be waiveq. (s.ee.People vs. Gutierrez, .9,1
t..!1 [ , )'
ttlli,\\( $7.6' i.9,541(·; '
' ',
, . ' : . •'
'1 . }ifi
~eopi'e vs: Os9,Mandil!fja·(f;3 Phil: 271-{1936].) and Tubb ps. People
(JQ'~-PHi:L 114-Il~S-o/r:J; tl:ie St:ipreme'Court ·s·ald that the right cannot
~~ ~~ a~ved forvre~SOtc\S.q£ p1(ibHc-p"olicy,:If is a fundamental right of
Af.~1.?,c.cu~e~Wot-t~fi}i.,;:·c;Jeptived dflife-or'libetty without due process
of -.ind tKe:prbYis}ort~rega:rciJ~gthe suff;id~ncy of the complaint
tt#,.
Qi '111{drm1:1tiolij-tliu,pliclfy of offetrsds; preliminary investigation and
tne~reading-'of-t}:'uHti.for:inatlon at the arraighmenf 'and the furnishing
of a. copy thereof to the accused are all intended to give effect to
the,f,undamental ·right. Hence, it is, imperative that the information
must fu,t.lly state .~ e elements of ·the specific offense alleged to have
been.committed.{People vs. Pangilinan, 660 SCRA 16 [2014], citing
cases) Similarly, in People vs. Dy (375 SCRA 15 [2002].), it was ruled
thi,at the. right "may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive
their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of 'not guilty'
in ,thei,r 'behalf._However, it becomes altogether a different matter
if the accused th~zpselves refuse to be informed of the nature and
ca~e of the acc❖sation against them. The defense can not hold
11,9~tage the court,1:,y their refusal to the reading of the complaint or
i.nformation."8
..t ,
E. RIGHT TO HAVE A SPEEDY TRIAL
Concept of the right.
~i) f-igh.t dependent upon the c(rcu,:ns(a,r,zces. - Although our
stara,-tes do not outlin,e wit];\ precision-what qmstitutes tirrw for
speedy trial in criminal cases, yet it has been pronounced with
8~ People vs.Moreno (294 SCRA 728 {1998].), in a separate opinion, Justice Davide,
Jr., opmed that: "An accused may be validly convicted of rape under either the second
or third ciJ.;CUII\St"}_lC~ provided for in Artide 335 of the Revised Penal Code even if the
\nfoti:nation bas charged bun <;>~y w,ith ~apl! un.d er the ,first circumstance if he did. not
object to the presentation and off~r by the prose~tion ~f the evid~nce ·that the victim was
an imbecile, with the mental age of a s'ix-year old child, His failure to object was thus a
w~iver. of his constitutiomil right to be informed of the i:tature and cause of the accus~tion.
It 1s· competent for a persot;i to waive a right _g uaranteed by the Constitution and conse,;it
to a:ction whi.ch wouldbe inval_id lf taken aga~t his will." · "~ · ·
:fh e.J,tules of Court is very clear that "the accused must be present at the arraignment
and must personally enter-his plea." (Rule 116, Sec. l[b],) He may not be represented by
his lawyer only even for lig'\tt offenses.
 111111 1 1 1 • , 1 .. , 1111 1 11 , ,r •• I I I
l11h11 l11h I HIid l I I IIN
good uulhod.ly lhnt n "speedy L~·i~l" i_neans o_ne ·~a~ 1can be l!~d as
noon n.e p oAsible, after a person 1s md1ctec;l ~I).:d .w1t)un s.u ch.ti~e,as
t III] p cosecutlon, with reasonabl~, c!.il~gElnS~~--.c9µW:ptE:Pa.ttJC?r f
It
11ho11ld be n trial "cond),lcteµ ~cc9.r~;,.p.~ ;tq .~~~cJ. .ru~e~,. 1;1,~~~9:i,ey,,
111d proceedings of law, fre~ 1.fEOffie-·~~xat.i9M~, ca:grici9u~,, anp,
opp 1'(1/IOlvo clelnys.'' It do~s not me~_Mi~~ ~~_st~),ut ,9 ~.e.s._9q.d.upt~9.-i
w JI I I r •noonnble prompµiess ._cg~l~f~lit~--~ -~ .?Hj i;:p~~_e, Hf•j~~t;~~~,1,
(( '111 1d11 v11. Wvcra, 4p Phil. 650 [19?~];_~~lt}f .:Y,~'. /1B?,.St?t!::~~ l'p~. ;
II'•1 I111:171; Nepomuceno vs .. Se.cr:.e~ary,,9,f -~~~:9 nal. J;)efe_ns~~)9~1
1
1l l{/\ (1 1 11!'1'181].) ....•.. ,. • · ._'._, ,, '
(:.t) l{/~/i.t 11ot susceptible to preci'se, quan.tificat,i_cm..--;-;-•Whether ~ti
111,t 011 ti'no been denied-speedy-ti'ial.-is.·not:.suseeptible t~precise,
1pmnllflcallon. At best, the constitutionct-1.right· of- speedy_tr-i~i<is'
11 •ccAsndly relative,. consisten~ with-·reaso~~blf·.,d~layg,. takin&~t0
oc oun t the circumstarices of:each.case; (~~t_in vs._V~r,_l23'8CRA 7!46. ·
ll983]..) As expressed in Bark~r V$, Wingo:(~?.L:_ed. 2d 101.): ,.. . . · · .
"'me right to ·a speedy trial i~ a va~e· ~~re an~
ge1:eri~~l,l y
dlff rent concept than other · const~tufional rights guat~teed
lt> {\CCused persons and cannot be quantified into a _specified
,111mbcr of days or months, and 'it is· impossible to p~poirit'
11 p1·c1 lsc time in the judicial process when the right tnusf ~e
111awrt·cd or considered waived."2 ·
1 1'ht l'lghl
necessarily depends upon the facts and ci):curn_stances peculiar in each
1 l
1,,,.,,, l 'onacqucntly, reasonable postponements are allowed. :It 1s not enoµgh that .there
ho 110n10 procrnstination in the proceedings. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
l11 volvod, therefore, would not be sufficient. (Tai Lim vs,·C ourt of Appeals, 3l7•SCRA 521
1'1999I; J\y-Dnzon vs. Sandiganbayan, 374 SCRA 200 (2002]; Lumanlaw vs. Peralta, Jr.,
•1112 SCIU 396 (2006]; Uy vs. Adriano, 505 SCRA 625 (2006]; Imperial vs. Joson, -C.R. No.
I (1()()(,7, Nov. 17, 2010.)
2It hns been held .that in determining whether there has been a denial of the right
lo 11pccdy trial, the test is to begin counting the delay from the time of the filing of the
l11formntlon. (People vs. Orsa!, supra.) Courts apply- the 'balancing test in which t!le
l Oncluct of both prosecution and the accused is weighed, ,and such -factors as length of
1he delay, reasons for the delay, the accused's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice or damage to the accused resulting from the delay, are considered_. (Alvizo
YR. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55 [1993]; Martin vs. Ver, 123 SCRA 745 [1983]; Gonzales
vs. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 [1991]; Hipolito vs. Court.of Appeals, 230 SCRA 191
11994]; Yulo vs. People, 452 SCRA 705 (2005].) A balancing test necessarily compels courts
lo approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis using the factors mentioned in assessing
whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. (Perez vs. Tagle, 544 SCRA
532 [200B]; Lumanlaw vs. Peralta, Jr., supra; Olbes vs. Buemo, 607 SCRA 336 (2010].)
Any delay should be considered in relation to the entirety of the proceedings. (Jacob vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 102206, Nov. 17, 2010.)
I Ill' , 1,,1 A l<tf. lll. UlLL O F lUGI·l'fS 857
Rlghts of the Accused
E. Right to Have a Speedy Trial
(3) Right not pr-ecluiie rights of public justice. - Speed in the
administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts
and judges. M9re ·than 'this is the esse1:1tiality of justice and fam1ess
wh~ch is the prirrio,rd~al.objective of the_courts. (People vs. Escober,
~57,'. SCRA 541 [19.88).)' The right of at:, accused to a speedy trial
i~ gµatanteed 't o him by 'the Constitution but the same cannot be
u~~(fe'.d to dep~1ve _the: Stat.e of a. rea~~mabJe· opportunity of fairly
iD1i,c ~~ or pr~secu_tip9 criminals. (Acusta vs, People~$Upra; Co vs.
New Prosperity Piastic Productsf 721 SCRA 503 [2014].) It secures
rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public
jtistic.e. (Bermisa·vs: Court of .Appeals, 92 SCRA 136 [1979]; People
vs.- Gmesi ·197 SCRA.481 [1991]; Guiani vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
146'897~Aug: 6, 2002.) ·
. ~~ ~-~6~ the State and th~:~ccused are entitled to due ~rocess. The
right canno.t_be ~uc<;es~fµJly be invoked where to sustain the sarnc
wot1ld tesult in adear denial of due process to the prosecution .
· (4) · Swift trial is what the Bill of Rights outlaws. - "The argument
of procedural delays in the civil courts and need of prompt and
ce.r_tain punishment has been long cut down by the late Justice Frank
Murphy in his concurring_opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku (327
US. 304 [1946].) when he stressed that 'civil liberties and military
expediency are often irreconcilable' and that ' the swift trial and
punishment which the ,military desires is precisely what the Bill of
Rights outlaws. We would be false to our trust if we allowed the time
it takes to give effect to constitutional rights to be used as the very
reason for taking away those constitutional rights."' (Teehankee, J.,
dissenting opinion in Gumaµa vs. Espino, 96 SCRA 402 [1980].)
(5) Period of trial. - The right to a speedy trial does not extend
to· the pronouncement of sentence. Trial and judgment are two
diffe.r_ent stages of a judicial proceeding. (Acosta vs. People, 5 SCRA
774 [1962]; Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 Phil. 599 [1947J.)
The period 0£ trial ends when the judgment begins. (Felismino vs.
Glor;ia, 47 Phil. 967 [1925].) A delay in refiling a case that has been
In o~der fot the government to s ustain its right to try the accused despite a delay,
it must show nvo (2), thll)gs: first, the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that
which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, there was no more
delay that .is reasonably c1ttributable to the ordin ary processes of justice. (Roallos vs.
People, 712 SCRA593 (2013].)
I I l I
PHILIPPINE CON STITtJTitl>NJ.A~ LAW
Principles and Cases,·:
1
., • · ) '1° 1 .,.,•. 1 ;-1
provisionally dismissed is,not a delay in trial\ :(se·e ~ermisa-vs. Court
of Appeals, 92 SCRA 136 {1979]1 infra.) ·;,
(6) Separate trial. - A separate trial_ i~ }n ~~nsoriap~e w:i!h
the right of an accused to a .speedy trial. 'It 'ne~essarily requires a When the right deemed violated.
repetition of the presentation of the same evidence. But the resulting
inconvenience and expense on the part 6£ the government cannot be
given preferenc.e over the rightto aspeedy·triathhd tp.e protectjon to
a person's life, liberty, or property guarantee·d by the Constitution.3
(Dacanay vs. People, 240 SCRA 490 [1995].) · · tation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
(7) Availability of right. - The right of the: accµsed to.a speedy
trial and the right to a speedy disposition .of cases (Sec. 16.) are
distinct, albeit kindred guaranties the most obvious difference peing
that the secured obtains regardless of the nature of the case. In fine,
the first,is available only to an accused and;!s a_peculi':1'1Y criminal
law concept, while the broader right to a ·speedy disposition of cases
may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies.
(Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. vs. Republic, G.R.
No. 177837, Jan. 24, 2012.)
Importance of the right.
· That the accused is free from vexatious, capr1c10us, and
oppressive delays is important. Its salutary objective is to assure
that an innocent person may be free from -anx'iety and expense of
a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatever legitimate defeI).se he may interpose.
(People vs. Jardin, 124 SCRA 167(1983]; see Andres vs. Cacdac, 113
SCRA216 [1982]; Tan vs.People, 586 SCRA 139 [2009}.) Along delay
in the judicial process serves as a refuge of the accused if he is guilty
and a continuing injustice for him ifhe is innocent. (People vs. Orsal,
112 SCRA 226 [1982].)
The Government should be the last to set an example of delay
and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral
and legal obligation of the courts to see that the criminal proceedings
3
Section 16, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court states: "When two or more accused
are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the cou rt in its
discretion and upon motion of the prosecutor or any accused orders separate trinls for
one or more accused."
11 J J
Sec. '14 JI I AR'\l'! 'III. BILL OF RIGH TS :859
Rights of the Accused
E. Right to Have a Speedy Trial
against an accused come-to an end. (People vs. Castaneda, 60 Phil.
480 [1934].)
The Spe~dy Trial 'Act of 1998 (R.A. No. 8493.) provides that
the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be one hundred
e.ighty (180) days.• However, in determining the right of an accused
to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical compu-
the case.
The right to speedy trial is deemed violated only wh en:
(1) the proceedings are attended by vexations, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured;
or
(3) when without cause or justifiaple motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.5
•sec. 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime,
excep t those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed
by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(Pl,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penaities, the jus tice or judge shall,
after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case
for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term calendar at the earliest possible time
so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first d ay of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court pursuan t to Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.
5
In a case, the -complaining witness and the prosecutor failed to appear only in the
first hearing. The lower court dismissed the case. It was held: "Even if the court a quo did
not dismiss the case but merely postponed the hearing to another date, there would not
have been a d enial of the right of the accused to a speedy trial. The right of the accused
to have a speedy trial is violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
for and secured, or when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without his case being tried. The more p rudent step that the court
a quo should have taken was to postpone the hearing to give the p rosecution another
oppor tunity to present its case. The court a quo had in fact reconsidered its order of
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N and reset it for trial. The dismissal of the case by
the trial court on the ground that the accused is entitled to a speedy trial is unwarranted
under the circumstances obtaining in this case." (People vs. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142
(1989),)
But when, through the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers, the
accused is forced to wait two (2) years and eight (8) months for the trial, he is denied the
basic constitutional right. (People vs. CFI of Rizal, 161 SCRA 269 (1988); see Conde vs.
Judge of the CFI of Tayabas, 45 Phil. 173 (1923); Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 [1924); see
Rodriguez vs. Sandiganbayan, 424 SCRA 236 [2004).)
I I l 1 I 1 J I
860 ,.PHILIP PINE COI'NSTJTUTIONAL LAW Sec. 14
Principles and,Casefl'.;< .::
•, :·
(:People vs. Tee, G.R..Nos.. .140546-47> Jantta);;}<zo.,.20.03; Riopl¢:V:S.,
Billaber, 421 SCRA 27 [2004].) · ··. . . . . · ~- ·· ·; :.. ·
Remedy of the accused whose:.,1"', ,;;,,.·";, ~. -,, :: : . ~;-. · : .,_; , .'.l }:
right i~ v_
iolaJed. · .
(1) Wh~re ·a prosecuting. officer- .;,ithgu.t:1.g~~d ~au~e;, ;~~a.u-~s
postpon~:ments,of the trial of·a.·def~nqmJ.bagwnHlJis·p,i:,or~sfl:iey~J.'.\d
a reasonabl~ peri<:?d ,of time (e.g., for ·m:o)i~.th.~l-~ :yeai~? the-raGcused
is entitled to relief by a proceeding in-.mtJ7:tdamusi:to ,compel a .dis-'
missal of the information, or if be resfrairtecl. :of his liberJy, 11?:habea~
corpus to obtain freedom. (Conde vs. Rive~~AlSP,W,.:650 {192.4]; Baesa
vs. Prov: Fiscal of Camarines Sur, 37 $CRA··437 [i9'7.1J; ·Peopfe vs.
~aladjay, 113 SCRA 284 [1982].) What offends·tli~'right o:f the a·c cused
to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which profonged trfa.i
for an unreasonable length of time. The courts-shoald b·alance the
right of the accused and the right of the State to punish people who
violate its penal laws. . 54 .[1989]; Sec. 21.)
As earlier noted, both the State and the accused are entitled to
due process. (People vs. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202 [1995].)
(2) A dismissal premised on violation of the right to speedy trial
is equivalent to acquittal and is thereby a ba.r to a prosecution for
the same offense. (see Sec. 21.) A motion to quash the ·information
is not strictly the proper remedy because a .denial of the right to
speedy trial is not one of the grounds upon which a motion to quash
a complaint or information may be grounded, (see Rulefi 0£ Court,.
Rule 117, Sec. 3.) The denial 9f the right will give rise to a motion to
dismiss. (Calderon-Bargas vs. RTC of Pasig, 22.'i'"SCRA s·6 [1993].)
Waiver of the·right.
The right to a speedy trial as any other right conferred ,by the
C~mstitu.tion or statute, except when otherwise expressly so pro-
vided by law, may be waived by the accused._',It must, therefore,
be asserted ..(Nepomuceno vs. Secretary of _Na:tional -Defonse, 108
SCRA 658 [1981]; Sumbang; Jr. vs. General Court Mar.tial, 337 SCRA
227 [2000].)
(1) Delay acquiesced in or caused by accused .himself, ::_ Where the
delay is acquiesced in by the accused, or is ,attributable to him, he
cannot claim to have been denied speedy trlal. (Esguerra VA. 'our't
1 l
11 lU G J 1'1'~
A-,l<.'.l'. Hl. l.HLL fl(;(
· ' Rights of the Accused
E. Right to }iave a Speedy Trial
of Fil:stl:n~tance, 95 .Phil-i-609 [1954]; Gunabe vs. Director of Prisons,
77 Phil. .993 [1947).) This,· where the delays in the prosecution were
caused by the accused himself through requests for postpGnements
ar1:d·reinvestigation and tactical maneuvers, he is deemed to have
waived or- abando~ed·his right to speedy trial.6 (People vs. Jardin,
12~SCRA 167"[1983].)
l f .,.. ' ·! •
.i -J?..) .];?.ight;i:1pt,_\a,s~ert~fl. pr clttim.ed._by. aCC!f~ed_• ....,.. The r~ght mµst be
a~~~rt~sf..(I')l'ep4mor:;e119ys•.Se~retary of N atic;mal Defe~se, 1OS SCRA
@IUlQSl].) i;;\-1,~ a<;cused must claim the right. Silence on his part
c~Qt be consideted a demand for trial. (see People vs. Jabojab, 100
Phil. 307 .[1956J.) He-should ask not for the dismissal of the case, but
for its trial, whereupon, if the prosecution, for lack of reasonable
ground for postponement, is ordered to proceed and fails to do so,
he becomes entitled to an absolute and de.finite dismissal which will
bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense on the ground of
double'jeopardy. (Ca.es vs, Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
l. The corresponding informations were filed by the Tanodbayan
with the Sandiganbayan after more than a decade from the alleged
commission of the offense and five (5) years after receiving the complaint.
Facts: Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated
his constitutional right to due process and the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. The respondent Sandigc;l.nbayan
dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that the mere allegations
of "undue delay" do not suffice .to justify acceptance thereof in
the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse"
committed by the Tqnodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation; and that such facts and circumstances as would
establish petitio_ner's claim of denial of due process and other
constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more
fully thresh~d out at the trial.
6
The primordial purpose of the constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of
the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. (Dacanay
vs. People, 240 SCRA 490 [1995]; Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 [1996].)
Deloy of his own making cannot be oppressive to him. (Medina vs. Orosco, Jr., 18 SCRA
168 [1966]; Do lo Roso vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA499 [1 996].)
1162 1'1111 .ll'l'I N I! 'U N:, 1111 1 11 >NA l , 1,AW
Principles 1111d <.:nsct-r .
.: i
~ The records show that the ·co.qipl~inant, :A.R., originally filed
what he termed "a report" :with .th~ Legal Pa\l'el ;0fthe Pt~sid,ential
Security Command (PSC) ·Oµ Octobf!J>Wl:'4{ coQta~g, charges .of
alleged violations of ~-A· N,q,. 3019 ~g,~4,~t'i}J~titione;.-The 'report'
was made to 'sleep' in -the office 0Hh13 PSG' until the end of 1979
when it became widely known that Secret~ry (then Ministe1t) Tatad
had a falling 9µt with President Mar~os ~~q had r~signed· frol!l the
Cabinet. On December 12, 1979;·the1;97.~cotj\plaint'Was'1'esurrected
in theifoti.n of a forrnal complaint file~t~itn~the·'Tarib~bayai: who
acted oh ,the· ·complaint ·o n Rpril 1,.·1:~8@)'4 which was~ttr-0und
two months after petitioner Tataq's re~i~~t\it!i!l"w~s -a.cc~pted 'b y
Pres. ·Marcios - by referring the cornpl~jµ:tiro,'tli:e CIS/ P-resideti.tial
Secui:i.ty Command, for investigatiq~ ~Fi:q,.reP..O.r..t. On·Jun_e.16, 1980,
·: .. the :CIS report was submitted to th~ Tarip4.l?~Y.a;.¼:recon;tmending
•· ; th.e.filjng .o f charges for graft and cor.ruP,(practjGes;agaJi;i~t-former
, ,Mj.µ.ister Tatad. · · ·
By October 25,· 1982, all affidavits and counter~affidavits'were
submitted and the case was ready for disposition by the Tanodbayan.
· However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a res0lution was approved
by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ftling of the correspo:nding
criminal informations against th~ ac¢used Francisco Tatad. Five (5)
criminal informations were filed with the SaJ1diganb.ayan on June
12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his co1wtitutional rig~t to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the case.s aga~st him?
H?ld: Yes. (1) Political motivations played role in filing of
11
information. - A painstaking review of the facts cannot b~t leave
. the impression that political motivations played a 'Vital role in
· activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case.
Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner
Tatad had a falling out with President Mar~os. Secondly, departing
from established procedures prescribed ~y law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and
counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and
their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for fact-finding investigation and
report."
(2) There was a blatant departure from the established procedure.
- "We find such blatant clcpnrlure from the established procedme
Ml I\ duhlow1, but rovPnllnP, ntlrmpt to Involve an office dirccl'ly
•~'. ,ltl AH.I', Ill , n11 ,1. u 11l( ll-.111 1 Ill•!
),U15hto of lh(J Accu l •d
E. Right to I Iuvc n Spcc~y 'l'rlnl
: under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence
.. to the ,suspiciQn that the prosecution was politically motivated.
i :~. We cannot. emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not
1 .. allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble
· office is·. being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for
. .p,olitical ends or other ·purposes alien to, or subversive of, the
.·_ ba:,ic and .ft.u\daJ:I,\ental objective of serving the interest of justice
. eve{lhandedly, without fear pr favor to any and all litigants alike,
whether nc:h or p9or, weak oi: strong, powerless or mighty. Only
.by stri~.t adherence to the esta,blished procedure may the public's
pei:ceptio1;1 of!he impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced."
(3) 'Ehe long delay violated constitutional right of accused to due
process and speedy trial. ...,_ "We find the long delay in the termination
of the· preliminary, investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant
cas.e to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the condµct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance" with the time limitation prescribed by
the law for .the resolution of .t he case by the prosecutor, is part of
· the proceduraf due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights."
(4) Delay was not justified by the circumstances. - 11 A delay of
close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable
in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are
not impressed by the attempt o·f the Sandiganbayan to sanitize
the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that
'the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by
the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution.of a former high-
ranking government official.'"
In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard
'. of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three
'
out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged
failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required
by R.A. No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated
legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny'; as would justify a delay of almost three years in
 • .L1R'l's [!!. LHLL OP RIGHTS
' • •. .UL
llrt l 1°1111.11°1 11N 1! ~uN: 1TJ 'lJ 1l <ON0..LLAW Soc. 11
Pdnclples and.-Cose_ii, , ,.,1
terminating the preliminary investiga~oh: i TJie.oilier· tw..o!.charges
,relating to alleged bribery and: alle.gecl:· giving·.-ol ' unwarranted
benefits to a relative, while presenting more·.substantial legal and.
factual issues, certainly do not warranbor'jttstifycthe;period·oHhree
years, whim it took.the Tanodbayan to 1'esolve the c-ase."
(5) Accused .was entitled_ to ~e~edx . p're!~ff!i~ary_~ i~ve~tl!iiltion.
- "It has been suggested· that the lorlg 4¢Tay in_te_rminating the
preliminary mve•stigl:i.tiod snould 'not 'IJe 'deerrtecr ·fatii1;·fdf even
the complete absence of a preliminary investik~tidn does not
warrant dismfssal' of the informatio.n. "Tnie ""'.""" but the absence
of a preliminary investigation can be ' cotre~f~d 'by givhlg the
accused. such .investigation. But an undue d:elay · in the. conduct
of a preliminary investigation canrtot be :eorrected, -for until now,
man has not yet invented a device for setting b·ack,time-." (Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan,7 159 SCRA70 [1988]~ through fustice Yap; see Alvizo
vs. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA55 [1993].)
2. Delay was caused by assigning case successively to several f{scals
with previous commttments.
Facts: After Fiscal C inhibited himself f~orn ·t he, case of coercion
because he could not in conscience prpsecute' t):;.e·case considering
that he had recommended its dismissal as.i~~ initial inve·s tigator and
after prosecuting, Fiscal P asked that he be relieved from the case
'i
1Note: In Defensor-Santiago vs. Garchitorena (228 ,SCRA. 2f4 . [1993).), .petitioner
complained that her constitutional rights to due process were vfoiated by reason of the
delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. Acc6tdin~ to her, while the
offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988," .\he .information was
filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations.on De~embe( ?, l9Q2. Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan was held inapplicable to petitioner's case. "In Tatad, tht?re indeed was.an
unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors Inspite of the simplicity of
the legal and factual issues involved therein. In the case at bench, there was.a continuum
of the investigatory process but ·it got snarled because of the cornplexi~ of the .issues
involved. The act complained of in the original infoanation came to the attention of
the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the
Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory, process was set in motion.
The investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Liana but on
request of petitoner herself, the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who
submitted II draft resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft
resolution had to undergo the hiEltarchy (Jf teview, rtormal 'fo_r a draft resolution with a
dleserttlng vote, unlll It reached tht! 01nbudsm11fl In March 1991."
i
,I
806
i
Rights of the Accused
E. Right to Have a Speedy Trial
because cif his tight·sch~dule, the lower court specifically ordered
that the case be assigned to another fiscal furnishing a copy of said
order to the Provincial Fiscal himself.
The Provincial Fiscal assigned Fiscal A but it turned out that
the latter, like Fiscal P, was not also avi=!ilable during the scheduled
hearing on March 25, 1980 because of previous commitments on
.·the very same day'. Ip the March 14, 1980 order, after the motion for
pos.tpqnel1\e.nt of $e,sched1J}ed h.eani,ng was approved, the lower
c0urt categorically stated that the March 25, 1980 schedule must
be maip.tained. Yet, the pi:ovincial fiscal's office despite notice of
such order kept on changing the fiscals and as.signed the case to
prosecutors who, at .t he time of their assignment to the case, already
had previous c~mmitrnents. The lower court dismissed the case.
Issue: Was the delay unjustified and prejudicial to the accused?
Held: "The cavalier attitude of the Provincial Fiscal' s Office, not
only towards a more efficient management of its work but, more
important, a greater respect for the rights of the accused, greatly
prejudiced the constitutional right to speedy trial of the private
respondents."
(1) Delay was unjustified. - "The case was a simple one. It did
not need lengthy and' tedious preparation for trial. This familiar
ground for postponement - previous and tight schedules of the
pro.secutipg fiscal-is so hackneyed and over-used that it is time the
Prosecution Services takes remedial measures. The excuse should
b~ used sp~ringly and proof must be adduced that every honest
effort to avoid botching the court's schedule has been taken. The
provincial fiscal was aware of the court's order denying the motion
· to postporte the March 25, 1980 hearing. The trial court stated in its
March 14, 1980 order - 'x xx if Fiscal cannot really make it and
considering that there are many assistants in the provincial fiscal's
office, then any- of the assistant provincial fiscals must appear on
the said date and hour."'
(2) Delay was prejudicial to the accused. - "The two-month
delay of the trial from March 25, 1980 to May 1980, if requested
for sound reasons may not be unreasonable. However, owing to
the nature of the case, the reasons for the postponements, and the
fact that one of the accused is a municipal mayor, who had to leave
his work everytime he was haled to court only to be told to return
another day, the delay became vexatious because the lower court
stated - x x x. "The delay is not only prejudicial to him but also
 1 1 1 J I 1 I 1 I
' (M() '
J.11 Jll~ll'Ji'l NlJi '' N~'.L'.l'l'U'J,'1,(J)Ni\.11 I ,AW
Principles nnd CasM•H
t jd;, , ,J ,
J J
~ ·· •, !MU
·to the ,pe0ple of Santander, Cebu:'.1·(Jledpl'e ;1/s/.Laya, '161, Si,CRA 327
,.,• .[1.98B], through Justice Gutierrez; Jr;) "· •· ·· •:" ·, + .
3. Circumstanees j~stify postpone~~n:t ,pf case ·but ~ptiQn was
denied.
Facts: The first hearing for ·the.def~~s:ei_:w,~s•. s~t,by·respo~tlent
judge for Jam,iary 23; ·put.the notitte >W.i:ls•,;~t~iye_d 1by;·th~:-~~unsel
for the. petitloner only 6n janti.ary:21: oue· to short noti1Ze, and the
art
fact that counsel had intransferable:orimfnaf case scheduled on
bf
January 23 at the ·Municipal C~utf Pillilan, Bul'acan,· compelled
petitioner's counsel to seekpostponement. ,
Another reason for postponement in the present case was the
fact that petitioner resides some 65 kilometers from Quezon City
where counsel of petitioner resides, and due to such short notice,
counsel could not contact petitioner in due time to be in court ready
for the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge. Counsel for
petitioner filed a motion for postponement.
Issue: Does the denial of the motion constitute a denial of
petitioner's right to due process and to his right to his day in court?
Held: Yes. (1) Speed is not the chiefobjective of'a trial. - "Although
a speedy determination of an action implies 'a speedy trial, speed
is not the objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate ·consideration
for the administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of
all parties, and the requirements of procedural due process and an
adherence to the Court's standing admonition that the discretion
given judges in the granting or denial of motions for postponement
and the setting aside or denial of orders previously issued 'should
always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
tonvenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends
of justice and fairness would be served thereby:' These are more
important than a race to end the trial.8 • ·
8
. 1~ Sosa vs. Yu Chu (33 SCRA 601 (1970).), it is. stated that 'where the notice setting
the case for trial in the Court of First Instance of Marinduque was received }?y counsel
with law office in Manila only one day before that date for trial, there is enough reason
for the court lo postpone the trial and re-set it for another- date 'instead of dismissing the
case,' In the case of PLDT vs, Genovea (116 SCRA 395 (1982).), the Court stated that 'Even
if PLOT hnd sou ght several postponements due to absence of its witnesses, substantial
juetlcc d?mnnde thnt It be given Its day In court."
1
V 1.(\li.(.';l,\J I) I L.1l)JJ ,J,
Right$ of the Accused
E. Right to Have a Speedy Trial
II H I :1.1 l f
(Z) Cour,fs ,dfocietion must be e~ercised wisely in considering
motions for po_stpanement. - "While it is true that motions for
postponement are addressed to the sound discretion of the courts,
discretion must" bi{ exercised wisely. Thus, in considering motions
. ·for postgo1:eme~t two things must be consid~red, namely: (1) the
·· reason for l:he postpohement, and (2) the ments of the case of the
movant. THusJrt ·the case of Pebeauco vs. Dir. of Lands (119 SCRA
' '.1bf [1.982].)/ the 'ttiai"judge rather adhered to the technical and
rigid enforcement of the rule thereby de!eating the ~ur?os~ th;reof
whim is to help and secure to the parties substantial iustice. (De
Guzman vs: Elbifias, 172 SCRA 260 [1989), through Justice Paras.)
4. Criminal case was·refiled four (4) years after provisional dismissal
with the consent of the accused.
Facts: On motion of the prosecuting fiscal on the ground that
the witnesses for the prosecution had failed to appear despite
notice, the lower court, with the consent of the accused and his
counsel, provisionally dismissed the criminal case. It was refiled
approximately four (4) years thereafter before another branch of
the same court.
Issue: Hc;l.s the accused's constitutional right to speedy trial been
violated as to warrant the final dismissal of the criminal charges
against him?
Held: No. (1) Delay in refiling is not a delay in trial. - "It has
been held that the right to speedy trial cannot be violated by delay
between offense and indictment, though it can be violated by an
inordinate delay in the return of the indictment after the arrest has
been made. (21 Am: Jur. 2d 283.)
. Where a statute requiring indictment or information within
a certain period after defendant is held to answer is treated as a
legislative definition of the constitutional right, the right arises
when defendant is held to answer by a magistrate, and the right
has been held not violated by unwarranted delay in bringing him
before a magistrate following arrest."
· (2) Refiling of case is a prerogative of the prosecution. - "The
criminal case at bar was provisionally dismissed with the consent
of the accused and his counsel on June 2, 1965. Considering its
nature, it was entered with a possibility of the filing of a subsequent
suit. The case was refiled approximately four years thereafter, or on
 (!I Jl,l ,ll'l 'l Nll t 'UMI 11 l'U I I~ NA I , 1,/\W
l' dnclplcs nnd 'M~•
,f • I
September 10, 1969, before another Bra1,rnh .0.fu•.fue same Court. That
refiling we.s an act within the prerogative of the prosecution.
. In the absence of an}'. sta~tory ?~oy~~(ofl}~ -~ ~:..~9.~t;~r~.¢~~e
1s no reason why the,cC?ur,t may pot, /•!\~e_mJe,r.~~'~.of J}.lS~ce, ct1sm1ss
a criminal case provis~onall~ i.e., .Y-;'i~~v.t pi,~judic~.to ~einstating
it be.fore the ord~r become_s fipal .-~ r tg_ fu~;~VJ?s:eq1;1f.mt flUn9:of· a
new inform<J.tion for.the. .same offense.'~-.0-ac?,vS.( BJan9p;, ~~,Ph~L 452
[1950],) · ·_. _:.t ·::.::· .~~ -~-::.. . 1
;.- .
(3) ·Consent of accused to the provisional·'disfrfissa( ~pn_
stiiuted a
waiver. - "The right of an accused 't o· a speedy:&faMs guaranteed·
to hi~ by the Constitution but the same.shall not ~e u tilized to
deprive the State of a reasonable opporfunlty of fairly indicting
criminals ..lt'secures tights to a,defonc\ant b.ut it~does_.not preclude
the rights of public justice. (Me!cado::v.s : CFI, 66' PhiL· 215 [1938];
Gupabe vs. Director.of Prisons, '77 ·~hµ-,'~93· [19~?Lt , , •· ·
In fact, the consent of petitioner to· the dismissal -constituted a
waiver of his constituti_on~l riglit not tq 'bE;_pros~cute'd '£or the'same
offense: .
'x xx where a defendant expresslyconsen.tsto 9r-mo;ve for
the dismissal of the case against him, even if the court or judge
states in the order that the d ismissal is definite or does not say
that the dismissal is•wifhout 'prejudi~e to the filing of another
information, the dismissal will not be a bctr to a subsequent
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. (Gandicela
vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299 [1951].)
The ef.(ec_t of a discharge (of ' aj::,er,s ?n cortunit,~ed on a
criminal charge in case of a failure _to find a_n i!tdictment or
file an information within a certain. nm..e) dep,e nds upon the
particular statute. Under some statutes, the discharge does
not prevent ano.t her indictment for ,the 'same offense, -s ince it is
considered that the effect of the discharge is merely to relieve
the accused from imprisonment .or from being held to bail, .and
not to acquit him of the crime.' (27'A.tn. Jur., 597-598.)
If petitioner believed that the provisional dismissal deprived
him of the right to a speedy trial, then he should have objected
to the same instead of having given his consent thereto." (Ber111is11
vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 136 (1979], thro11gh J11sl.ice Md1•11cio-
Ncrrem.)
I 11 I 1,1 A l 11 Il l 11111 111 lll l d 11'
l<lf~ht;i ul th11At, u1111d
JI. W15lil lo 1fav n11 h11p1111l1d J Int
F. RIGHT TO HAVE AN IMFAiRTIALTRIAL
~~ncept of the rlg'n t'.
. (1) A basic reqi7-t.it~ment of .due priec~ss. - An impartial trial is
ce,rta~~ a l,asic require,nen;~ o~ due p~,ocess in criminal proceedings.
-P\\e Frocess ,..of :law . .req~ir~s -cl: ·~earing b.e.( ore an impartial and
, · ' . • ' di~4lterested ~ibunal, and tl,.at every:li,t:i.gant is entitled to nothing
Je!',S t:I;i,1µ1 "the c9ld neup::ality of an impartial judge." (Gutierrez vs.
S~tos, 2 SCRA 249 [1961].)
All the other .e lements-of due- process, like notice and hearing,
would be meaning1ess, if the ultimate decision were to come from
a biased judge. (Webb vs. People, 276 SCRA 243 [1997]; Gochan vs.
Gochan, 398 SCRA 323 -[2003]; Busilac Builders, Inc. vs. Aguilar, 504
SCRA:585 [2006].)
. . (2) Qu~lities _expected of presiding judge. - The true intention of
the 'Constitution: is that no J!,1,dge: ~h~ll preside in a case in which
he is nqt'w holly free; disintere·sted, impartial, and independent be-
cause, however upright the judge and however free from the slight-
est inclination to do other than justice, there is a peril of his uncon-
scious bias or prejudice, or of a former opinion ex parte that may still
linger to .affe~t ·unconsciously his present judgment, or of his be-
ing moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts
which may not or cannot, under the rules of evidence, be revealed
.
! :
or stated at the tria[ (Gutierrez vs. Santos, supra.)
(3) Absence of interest by judge in outcome of case. - Impartiality
implies an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases which shall
be decided solely on the basis of the evidence and in accordance
with law without any improper influence, inducement, pressure, or
interference, direct or indirect, from any source. To this end, no man
can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases
where he h as an interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the outcome.1
(In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133.)
1Thus, n conviction under nn ordinance whereby a portion of the fine imposed went
lo tho judgo ond lhc l'emnlnder to the municipal treosury is a violation of due process of
lnw, llvciry prococlur11 which woulcl off11r oven only n posslbln tomptntlon to tho Judge to
fuqJdl tho b111·don ol proof roqulrud h;, co1wlot tho d11fondnnt, donlue 1hu fnttcr du<! prucos~
ot lnw, ('.lu1n11y v, Ohio, 273 IJ,l-l, /l1().)
 1' 1111 ,ll ' l ' I N H~JN!1 Jll l1.lll N 1. 1,AW
Pdnalpltlti ,11t\cl1G.'ttde~>l
1 , • ·:• l ·' ··.t ·1,{,·,;U'. ,' I
Cori'fldence in judgeJs·im'piidi~Uty.. ·, :.,; •·('., r rt•::s ~1. ._-:
A judge has both the dufy of ri~-d~~ing f~~f:de!'~isrol;l 'a nd tnet
7
~ obJ~¢tiv.ity•(?,h the-part of ~juclir;~-stif:nderttto reassure litigants of his
duty of doing it in a mannef con;tple_f¢ly fre;ij$W.-:~w~~}~9.D-~~,to
its fairness and as to N .s,'integr.ity; Wpifo jµ9'.ge.~~;ht¥14'{p9.~~ess
proficiency it:i' law u1· orirer'"i:1t~P''•t},.e.y ~ijf lt'6~ p~foh\tl)t 1't pri~true
and apply the law; .ifi~'ittc\~eHtnfoh~p:Wfat'~ ~y'-sFii:i:~1f4<~t:i:· att_ 9 to ~e pi:ejl!:dk~ ·o f a just decision. Where this is probable or even
behave in such mannera iliartl'l'e
parti~stf>e£ore10fu~mteyrtoula hav~
confidence in' tnej.r iinpru:ti~iity (T~; jr. \is/: Galla1:~o, 73·s.c~ ·30"6
[1976])fo give·added as~urahde;tb the pai-tie•stti(athis 'de~i'sf6k\ will
be just.2 : · ·. ' · ··
{1) Judgment of conviction-:e,;p.resses fudge',s ·•indignation ofcrime.
- The fact that the judgment of .c onviction ·i &,;interspersed. with
statem:erits and· phrases · which prqperly should not, h~ve been
made.as·they may be wrongly·inteq:,ieted as indicative of bias and
prejudice, such statements and phrases do not' per se ·cbnstifute
evide1;1,ge of bias and partiality as to vioh~te the accused'.s right to an
impartial ~ial as where they clre merely an expression oft}iejtidg~'. s
"fully jµstified indignation and revulsion ~t the co~ssion of such
a monstrous crime." (People vs. ·Reg~.1a.,·1-13 $CR.A 613 [19.~2].)
(2) Judge interven_e,s -in .th~ cr;$§;~~~ni,i~ation CJj wittt(!sSe$. ,,,,...... Nor
does the· trial judge~s.· interv.e.ntiP~r- in ,.t htf ·'CT<;?J,s-,exi;I.-Fl)in~ti_o n- of
witnesses be construed as COljlStj.;t,uQng . Ja~f ~f J l):lp,rrt,ialJty .:~d
objectivity. It is n9t only the right l;wt,often,times tpe du!:}' of a trial
j_udg~ to examit}e .y.r,it:ri,esse,s . vy.:~~n,it aHpea.rs tq he,, p.ece~sary , to
develop the truth <1-Ild,t9:g~t,at;t,he r~al f.a:cts.The extept t'i> -wlJuch such
examination may be conducted rests in the discr~tion of the judge,
the exercise of which will -ifot be· co:nt'i-3Hecf ttlU~ss .his discretion
llas arre~ciy be~rt abused td·ffie pr~~di~e'.o'ferth~r p.&rty:
io:·ihe·¢'a1se·,
(Peopie vs. Manalo,'148 SCRA 98.[19.87]1 People vs:·tarritifa:ga, 421
SCRA53_0 (2004].) . . . ' .
Duty Qf judge to inhibit himself.
The rule on disqualifid 1.tion· of judges · is a mechati;srri £or
enforcing the requirements of due process.3 It is beyond dispute
2
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although requ ired primarily for the
benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of th~ judiciary. (Go vs.
Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA. 397(1993].) · ..
3
Disqualifications. Rule 3.12 - "A judge should· ti:ike no part in a proceeding where
l
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among
others, proceedings where:
Mt•1JH. lJ'ff_;L 01~ltiGilTS 871
~il~ts of -the Accused.
F. Right to Ha.ve an Impartial Trial
.tha't.due proceS's cannot hesatisfied in the absence of that degree of
being fair and just. (Go v·s . Comt of Appeals, 221 SCRA 39'7 [1993].)
(1) Relationship wiJh one of the parties. -The relationship of the
judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law
only possible, clue process demands that the judge inhibit himself,
if only out ·of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's w ife, he must be
~bove suspicio1i (see Javier v s. Commission on Elections, 144 SCRA
194 [1986).)
(2) Ciear and convincing evidence to prove partiality. - While
it is true that partiality and prejudgment may constitute a just or
valid re?,son for the trial judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from
hearing the case, it is not enough that the same b e merely alleged.
It is now settled that mere suspicion that a judge is p artial to one
of the parties to the case is not enough; there should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and prejudice.
(a) . the judge.has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
p ro~eedlngs; , . •
· '(b) the judge·served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the
case·or matters in controversy; or a former associate of the judge and served as counsel
durjng.,their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the ju_ctge' s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth'degree or the counsel within the fourth degree;
_ _(E!). the judge knows that the judge's spouse or child h as a financial interest, as
h eir, fogatee, .1:redifor, fia.u ciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
p<l!ty tb the proceecting, cit any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the p roceecling."
In every instance, the judge should indicate the legal reasons for inhibition.
Remittal of disqualification. Rule 3.13 - "A judge disqualified by the terms of Ru le
3.12 may, instead of withdrawing from the p roceeding, disclose on the record the basis of
disqualification. If, based on such d isclosure, the parties and lawyers are, independently
of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is
immaterial or insubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceedings. The
agreem~nt, signed by all parties and lawyers, sh all be incorporated in the record of the
proceeding."
The rule on inhibition and. d isqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. It contemplates two kinds of inhibition: (1) compulsory
disqualification which conclusively assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially
sit in a case for the reasons therein stated; and (2) voluntary inhibition which leaves to the
judge's discretion whether he should desist from setting in a case for other just and valid
reasons with only his conscience to guide him. (Amarillo, Jr. vs. People, 500 SCRA. 487
(2006).)

117'.l .lllJll ,11/J'INH 'UNS'J'l'J:LJ'I ¢.)N'.'}. l , l,AW
Pdnclples oncl Cllfl\'18 ·1
(Beltran vs. Garcia, 41 SCRA,158:1 [197-J:Jf!G~rtoblazo,;vs;{Giourt ,of
Appeals, 174 SCRA 124 {1~8~,J;,.Qp) •{~I.~P?:ulif9£;,Appe~l~,:!S,Uf?Jia;
Gochan vs. Gochan, 3981SCR.A,32:3,~400$J;}, . ::·, ;,,, ·: ,, . -1f,.: -,. +.
ILLUSTRATIVECASES: · ,- ,: . _.,: ., ·,._,_, ___ ., .
1. ]U.d9e, tryi~g:
c~~e,Jo~'
arson for which he convicted him,.tP
0~ipi.~~qtirhiiltr{~~t,;4i¢~it1i.~~;;$,4~t,at
/qtfer:'s,d~_ s fre'tn des'trq11iv.i4ence
malversation. , . 1·•• .. ' , , \ ' '( ·::: 1'. ' t· l; , ·' . / :? 1r,·,,•·.t l '• · ,- ~
- . ,. . ' .. ·. :-{' ,.·., .: ·~i,~. :-,~·.- f• .,.; . _;-..-' •..i'~i'' · . ~:;•: _/ '
-.F~cts: Respondent Judg~ ~o.nYi<.te,cln;i~tjj:j..9.p.e,i;,qf:1~~~9A· :.~ zys
dec1s10n,_ h~ state~ that Re~tioner conceived-of ilie ide~·pf~.tp.:ning
.~ e :provincial capitol buildmg_.to prey:ep:t discpyery_of llie$h6i:fage
m his accounts and escape criminal liability:therefor. - . -·
. On the basis of the stateritent'.'p~tit1dn~r : inove·d. for the
~bition of the Judge from trying tlie ·m.alvets·a non case against
hun. Respondent denied the petition for'irihioition,''
Issue: Should respondent judge,have granted ·the petition to
inhibit . .
Held: (1) Close causa,1 connection between the cases. - "In view of
the close causal connection between Criminal Cases N 0s. 569 to 594
against petitioner for malversation and Criminal Case No. 559 also
agai~st_the lat~~r for arson, and wherein the respondent judge, in
convicting petitioner of said crime of arson, found that the motive
of pe!itioner a_nd his co-accused in burning the provincial capitol
building of Rizal was precisely to destroy all evidences thereat
that could be used against said petitioner in the rhalversation cases
against him.
We are constrained to agree with petitioner that sufficient
reasons exist for him to _ent_er_tain serious d.o.ubts ~isgiy.ings
as to the ~egree of ob1ectiv1ty and neutrality with which the
respondent Judge can continue to try, and ·eventually dec,ide, said
malversation cases against him." · ·
~2) Peril of ju1ge's unc_onscious bias ~;-pre}.~q(c~. ·:::-: "Cori~idering
~at_ ho;1ever upr~ght_the Judge, and however free from the slightest
inclination to do Justice, there is peril-of his unconscious bias or
prejudice' (Del Castillo vs. Javelona, 6 SCRA 14,6 (1962].), so that to
insure c~mpli?nce with ~he demands _of dtt{:! process( to which every
?ccused 1s entitled, and m ord_er that 1t may be said that every effort
1s always exerted to attain the 1denl of an impartial administration of
juaticc, tho bett~t· nlto:rm\tlvo 1.mdOl' tho cira~1mat11nc01J woitld bu £or
tho ro11pomfont )ud1,n to b1hlhlt 01· cll11qunllfy hltt11101£ fron, fmtht11•
A,t~ t', 111 , 1111 ,1, l !II 14. I .I I 11 1171
Hl1jh 1•1 of the Al'1;wwd
l1. Right to I Ii\vc on Im1nHllnl T1:IL1l
. ) qontirtui:ng..witll the 1tdal o'f1said •malversafion cases, thus assuring
i:' :· petitioner 'tl:\.e-cqld neat:~ality of ?tn impartial judge.' (Gutierrez vs.
Santos, 2SCR!A-249 t1961].)"' * *," · · · "
(3) Inhibition by the judge. - "It is difficult to understand the
.-,,\ .,_, .. , reludtanceof resptml;J:ertt Judge,tb inhibit'hi'linself. lI'l a case where
he was named··rt?spor1deµt (Mate0;· Jr:·vs. Villa'ltiz, 50 SCRA 18
of' t ,r,~1~?3rJ.)~,:1 ,eFi<;lrfU~-f~7,~{ this,,Gf:iurt)~W d.o ~n the principle: 'It is
.. ,, p.Q~•( ~ei9,,\f1<U~pt,1\~. if:Ija,t 8U.e: P,lC>Cf:iSS _cannot pe s<_1;tii;fiecJ, in the
. , l,l.bser,i.ce,of fhatd~grne pf obj~ctivity qn the part of .a judge s.ufficient
·. : 't9, r~i~sute)¥~1l;nt~-,.qf- r'is beµy~ faµ: and..ju.s.t. It is trm;:eable to
· Gutierrez vs. SantOs (112 Phil. 184 [1961].), a 1961 decision, cited in
'''t he petition. As. a-matter of fad, iri Umale vs. Villaluz (29 SCRA 668
·[1969].), fiv·e eases were relied upon in support of the conclusion
reached,. starting from Del Castillo vs. Javelona (116 Phil. 451 [1962].)
likewise invoked by_petitioner and referred to in the Comment of
the Solicitor General. Such a doctrine has been consistently adhered
to, the latest case in point being Bautista vs. Rebueno (81 SCRA 535
[1978].)." (Ignacio -vs. Villa/us, 90 SCRA 16 [1979], through Acting
Chief Justice Fernando.)
2. Judge refused to disqualify himself in a case where the prosecution
witness against the petitioners impugned his extra-judicial statement
which was subscribed before said judge. ·
Facts: Petitioners are among those being tried by respondent
judge for the offense of robbery in band with homicide. Thereafter,
an extrajudicial statement by one RR, who was later on likewise
indicted for the same offense, implicating petitioners, was
subscribed before respondent Judge. That was the background of a
motion for his disqualification, as RR, when called upon to testify
and as an additional witness for the prosecution, impugned his written
declaration stating that it was executed as a result of a threat by a
government agent.
It is _now contended that such a repudiation would not sit
well with respondent Judge, who had thus placed himself in a
position of being unable to pass on such question with that degree
of objectivity required by due process, although admittedly, such
a move did not fall squarely within one of the specific grounds to
inhibit jU:dges.4
·•According to Rulo 137, SocUon 1 of tho RuIce of Court: "No judge or judlclnl officer
,11'1111 ,,11 It, nuy r111111 In which ho, (ti' hl11 wlf11 ,w r hllrl, 111 poc1111lfldly lnl<Jrcatocl na hclr,

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• Pl'lnclplcs nncl Ca.e◊,~1 , 1
fl I ti' .!j • '
Respondent Judge turned :9-0WJ.:l.: th~ ipl~~ J9r. dis,q~alification.
Hence, the petition, bas~d on,. fue ass~r:,t~d, v.{0,~<;1tj.q,n p~ 1a;,c;pt).~titu-
tional right not to be convicted of ~n offens.e,w.Jthpµt _ta\lEM_;).;r~~~ss of
law.
Issue: Did--r espondent judge c0mmit-g1:a;v.e·abuse of.-.djscrretion
in turning down the plea for his.·disqualification?
Held: "This Court, ~fter a careful coh~idel:atibn the:,rtfatt~riand of
in the light of past decisions to Be here~ft~(!10,f~, 1P,~~•ttp9~rsuch
failure of respondent Judge'fo 'dis,qua~i'.fy'hlmself'.}1; grave a:buse
of discretjon correctibl~ PY .
pfo~ipitlcfo:.lf4e;petitibrds meritorious.
' ' ' '" ., . ' ,., \"' ·; '
· ~l) V,olu11tan; disqualifi,qCJti.on ofaju<Jg~;/9.lf,(}tlYius,(qr,p,qly:l rea.son.
- "Conformab}y: to ';Vh~tw~s:so ~ropJ\ati_cqlly .~sserte_d .i n•Gut1~rrez
vs. Santos.(2 SCRA 269 [1961},.) as th~ pm~~rt;t.et\tal teqµi~\te of
imp,p:ti~lity for due. prb<iess to · b~. $aµ~.fied, .the Ru1~s qf t .o urt
provision on disqualification when revised ·}me.e y~~rs ~atej ui 1964
contains.this additio11al_paragraph: '1\judg~:may,_ ,ip.the exer~jse of
his sound discretion, disqualify himself fi;om s~t#r\g in a,...case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned_ abov~.' (Rule,137,
Sec. 1.)
Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of ,th~ b~nch that
outside of pecuniary interest, relations~ip or previou's participation
in the matter that calls for adjudication, there i:nay be other causes
that could conceivably erode the trait -of objectivity, thus, calling
for inhibition. That is to betray a sense -of realism, for the factors
that lead to preferences or predilections are many, and varied. It
is well, therefore, that if any such should make its appearance
and prove difficult to resist, the better 'course for a judge is to
disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His
reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even
more important, the ideal of an impartial .administration of justice
is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated.''
(2) Duty of judge to voluntarily desist from a case where his motives
orfairness might be seriously impugned. - "There is relevance to what
was said by Justice Sanchez in Pimentel vs. Salanga (21 SCRA 160
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is rela.ted to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, :computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
gunrdlnn, trustee or counsel, or in which he hos presided in nny inferior court when his
ruling or doclalon la tho subject of review, without tho wrlllcn consent of nil pnrtlctt In
Interest, olgncd by them nnd ontorod upon tho rncorcl."
l 1
: 1 I', Ill ~ I~ I', 1111, I 111. I. l) II I{ Il : I I 1: IIYH
wghts ~f Lhc Accuucd
F. Rlght to Have an Impartial Tdnl
f
r · [·1967].), drawing 'attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines
in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly
and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one
of the parties. A judge may not be legally pi:ohibited from sitting in
, a litigation. 8uLwh!:?t\.sugg~stion is mclde of record that he might
be induced to <;1Ft. ~ -f.av9r of one party or with bias or prejudice
~gains~ A .li.t;g€l:r;,,t -a,.~iefzjg out of circumstance reasonably capable
of irtcitit1g st:1-~h a state of mind, he should conduct a c11reful self-
_e x~minatibn. -B~ ,s4ould exercise his dis.cretion in a way that the
·a people's~aith ¥1,t;ne,~qurts of justice is not impaired.xx x
' . " On the re_sulii of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend
tq a great ex~ent the all ,important confidence in the impartiality
of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily
desist from si~ting in a case where his motives or fairness might
be seriously impugned; his action is to be interpreted as giving
, .meaning and sµ,l:>s!ance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
1$7. He serves the cause of th·e law who forestalls miscarriage of
justice."'
(3) Exercise of discretion in favor of disqualification is looked upon
with favor. ~ "The imperfections of human institutions being such,
what is fit and proper is not always achieved. The invitation to
judges -to disqualify themselves is not always heeded. For that
matter, it is not always desirable that they should do so. It could
. amount in certain cases to their being recreant to their trust. Justice
Perfecto' s warning is not to be ignored; 'to shirk the responsibility'
entails 'the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction.'
(People vs. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286 [1949].) It could be an instrument
whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another
more amenable to his persuasive skill.
With all such considerations in mind, there is still cogency in
the approach that would look with favor on the exercise of discre-
tion in favor of disqualification, given the likelihood that bias or
prejudice is unavoidable. Even before the amendment of Section 1
of Rule 137, this Court, in at least two decisions, Gutierrez vs. Santos
(supra.) and Del Castillo vs. Javelona (6 SCRA 146 [1962].), gave its
approval to such a move."
(4) Exercise of discretion is subject to Supreme Court corrective
authoritt;. - "Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that w e
have the power to set aside the order denying the motion for
disqualification. While the d iscretion Jn the first instance belongs to

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IJ'lo
•l'J 111 ,ll'~'I N f>tinclplca oncl Ca~m1 11
lh •, U
.I ' ,._, '.
. ''
· resp9ndent Judge, its exercise is subjec:::Ho-bu~-i€oi:rectiye _at1thority.
. Ceit;iinly; there canb.e no:qu~stion,as to,its beirfKconsidered.:a hused
if it.can be shown that-to refoseinhibiticm:is,tme:;asbvalid.qoubts as
to·a court's.impartialtty.'( · ·. · . : · . ' , .,
(5) Impar'tiality ofrespondent juage·:i[Jas :placed under suspicion.
- "The specific issue then that m:ust b~ resolved i$, whether the
circumstance of a party having subscri~elibefcfr~·re·spo~4ent Jµdge
an extra-judicial statement purporting ;H:i, \:!.e'scrioe .the 'inaiuler in
which art offense Wa'S committed, later' 01't';i:~p*diated by him as
the product of intimidation in the course of his havmg been asked
to testify against petitioners, would suf;fil.ce, t.o .negate that degree
of ,objectivity the Constitution req~il;es. Tlle answer must he m the
,affirmative. Petitioners are thus entitled-to-the relief sought.
Respondent Judge could . not be., _totally· immune to what
-apparently was asserted before him in such exbia: judicicll statement.
0
Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the·slightest bit offended
by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there was
intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was
hardly flattering to respondent Judge. Not only that,. his sense
of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blW)ted. The
absence of the requisite due process element is thus n9tjceable."
(6) Respondent judge was called upon to review·a-matter on which
he had previously given his opinion. - "There is this circumstance
even more telling. It was he who attested to its due execution
on October.1, 1971 wherein RR admitted Ms -participation in the
crime and in addition implicated ·petitioners. At :that time, their
motion for -dismissal of the charges against them was pending;
its· resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until after the
prosecution had presented and rested its evidence.a gairtst affiant,
who was himself indicted and tried for the same·offense, but in a
s~parate proceeding. . Held: (1) Impartiality ofcourt is essential to due process oflaw. - "No
It cannot be doubted then that respondent JudgeArt effect ruled
.that such extra-:judicial statement was executed freely. ,x x· x there
is apparent the situation of a judge having to pass ,6n a question
that by implication had already been answered by him. x x x For
respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter'on which he
had previ~usly given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity
that is sought to be avoid ed by the law on disqualificatioi1."
t,
(7) Lower co11rt· j 11rlgas sho11/d desist fro111 1:/rn role nf 110Mrlz/118
rloclnmtlcmn. •· "'l'o Hvold 11ny (u 1'l'bcr on 11·ovtir11lw1 <1f 1h l11 n111111'1'1
r ll
Al{' I', 111. I I II ,I , () II J( IU.1I I :
:Rlght11 of 1h0Accue1Jd
ff. Right to I-lave an lrnpartlal 'Jl'lnl
lower court judges are well-advised to limit themselves to the
·task of c1ajudication and to lea:ve to others the role of nptarizing
declarations. The less an occupant of the bench fritters away his time
and energy in tasks more incumbent on officials of the executive
br?,nch1 the less the danger of his being a participant in any event
that. might lend itself to the interpretation that ).us impartiality
has be,en compromised," (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18 [19731,
.through Justic,e Fernanda.)
3. Presiding Justice received "orders or suggestions" from the
President in a secret Mala~aiiang conference.
Facts: "Thi! report and findings of a three-member Commission
show that from beginning to end, the then President Marcos
stag_ed-managed the Aquino-Ga/man murder cases before the
Sandiganbayan. The fact of the secret Malacafiang Conference of
JcU1uary 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed
with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire
prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal
. char$es against all the 26 accused is not denied.
As the Commission noted: 'The very acts of being summoned
to Mal~cafiang and their ready acquiescence thereto un~er
the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure
dramatized and exemplified. X X X Verily, it can be said tha.t any
~vowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacafiang Palace on January 10, 1985."'
Issue: What is the effect of the Presidential pressure on the
Sandiganbayan's verdict?
court whose Presiding Justice has received 'orders or suggestions'
frQm the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed
only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a
petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder·
cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court
martial, as mandatorily required by the known P.D. No. 1850 at
the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over
criminal offenses com mitted by military men) made it possible to
refer t·he cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court,
whlch ls the vcty essence of due process of lnw.

878 1"1 llLJl'l'l N.Ll 'OM:l'ffl'l!.J 'l'J, ~AL LAW
Principles -and Cases, '.
As the writer then w..rote, .(jurisdictio:n ,over. cases sho4ld,
be determined by law, and not ·by preselecti0n of the Executive,
-which could be mueh too easily ..transfo~~a, intq·,a ·me~s ,of .
predetermiriir).g the outcome,of individual;ca~_es.W
(2) Cri1Jiinal collusion riullifies court'l:Verilidt; - "this ci:imw~I
collusion as to the ·handling :and· ftecitq;{ert( ofth~ casei:i 1?f ppbik
respondents 'at the .secret Malacafia:nfCotjrerih~e ·(a'na 5reiealed
only after fift~en months ,by Justice ¥~½e1Jten:~ta) 'co,mplet~}Y
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan ·P-:P.9- voided .db initia its
verdict." (Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 146 -SCRA 43 [1986], through
ChiefJustice Teehankee.) . ·
G. RIGHT TO HAVE A PUBLIC TRIAL
Concept of the right.
(1) When trial public. - A "public trial" is meant one which is
not limited or restricted to any particular dass of the co1?1ffiunity
but is open to the free observation of all. (People vs. Gr~eso, 230
Mich. 124; State vs. Keeler, 52 Mont. 705.) The_trial is public when
everyone .interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There·is no b'an on such
attendance. His being a stranger to t~e litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. (Gar~ia vs. Domingo, 52
SCRA 143 [i975].) . . .
(2) Not necessarily one to which whole public admitted. ........ The
requirement that the trial be public is not meant, however, that every
person who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted to attend criminal
trials. A public trial is not of necessity one to which the whole public
is admitted; Rather, it is one so far open to all, as that of the accused's
friends and relatives and others who may be inclin.e d.to_watch the
proceedings in order to see if justice is intelligently .al).d impartially
administerec:l, so that they may have an opportunity to do s.0.1
. (3) Attend,ance of particular_persons may be ba~ne~.' ~ Th~;e may
be and often is justifiable occasion to exclude from a trial those
who are inclined to attend from idle or morbid curiosity only and
1
Sec COOLEY, O/J, cit., pp. 320-321.
l
A Ii I , II I , I I 11 , I , I II I I'( II , I I II It/II
! I I I •I
Hlgl\LHof thoA 111-1od
G. Right to Have a Public 'I\'lal
especially in cases (e.g., prosecution for rape) where public morals
I -
artd publk decency require iU (see Rules of Court, Rule 119, Sec. 13.)
Purpose of the right. · ·
The right to a public trial is manifestly intended to protect the
rights of a person accused of a crime, so that the public may see that
he'.is fairly _dealt with and not unjustly tried and that the presence
~t;p~t~a,.tors ~ay:k¢~l( ~is _triers keenly ~ive t~ a sense of their
respopsibility and to the ~inportance of their functions.3
•' Thethought. that lies behind the safeguard is the belief that
thereby, the accused is afforded further protection, that his. trial is
likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. (Garcia vs. Domingo, supra.)
Waiver of the right.
The right to a public trial is also waivable. (Gunabe vs. Director
of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993 [1946].) Thus:
(1) The defendant was held to have waived his right to a public
trial, by his acquiescence where for the convenience of the witnesses,
the criminal case was tried in Bilibid Prison, without any objection
on his part as to the place of trial or that it was not public at the time.
(U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304 [1903].)
(2) Where the accused refused, for security reasons, to be
brought to court for which reason the court directed the holding
of the arraignment and trial in the national penitentiary, and the
accused did not object during the trial, the public was not actually
excluded, and the accused was not prejudiced, it was held that his
right to a public trial was deemed waived. (People vs. Tampus, 96
SCRA 624 [1980].)
Trial by publicity.
Trial by publicity may amount to a denial of one's right to a
fair trial. The publicity attending the ventilation of the accusations
against a person and the ·conduct of the investigation and trial
2
Ibid.
3 14 AM. JUR. 865.
 I l
l'I 111 ,11 ' 1' 11'-t l( I. ( JN: , 111 I J I I~ N/\ 1,, J,/\W l 1w, 1,1
Pdnelplell 011d (.'(Ul(,)fl
•a¢G®ropanied by insinuations or innuendoes agains.t the accused
in.variably has a telling effect on .the ptiblic'.s, perc:eptio:n of his guilt
and thus may influence the judgment of the judge hearing the case.4
ILLUSTRATNE CASE:
Hearings were held insideJudge 1s chambers;
Fact~: The judge held the trial of :eight (8), c;:rjminal . ac.tions
a
inside his chambers. '1t appears . that stlch'. proce'du):'e had. been
agreed to beforehand by the other respondents or defendants, the
hearings were e0ndt1.cted without objection on their-p art, no person
so minded was ever excluded from the premises, and what took
place in the chambers was devoid of haste and intentional secrecy.
The issue in the petition for certiorari and.prohibition ls wheth-
er the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
holding the trial inside his chamber.
Hel.d: There was no transgression bf :the right to a publ'ic trial.
• , - 1'
(l), What public trial means. - "The trial must be public. It pos-
sesses that character when anyone·interested in observing the man-
. 'ner·~ judge conducts the proceedmgs iii: hii(courtiobrr\ may do so.
There' is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to
thEditigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be
shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that
thereby the accused is accorded further p,rQtection, that his trial is
likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any im-
propriety.xx x There is the well-recognized exception, though, that
4
ln a case, the threshold question is whether the publicity given to the cas.e was
such as to prejudice the right of the petitioner to a fair trial. It appeared, however, that
the publicity was focused on the responsibility of the Government instead of the guilt of
the accused.
The.Supreme Court said: "In contrast, the spate of publicity in the case before us did
not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government
for what was claimed to be a 'massacre' of Muslim trainees. If there was a 'trial by news-
paper' at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing
of failure of the court martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged
by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of
information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of
prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the peti-
tioner was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those
imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process."
(Martelino vs. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106 [1970); see Cruz vs. Snlva, 106 Phil. 1'151 (1959].)
J
I\ I'<!', 111. 1111 ,l , U t l l•U t:I I I ! 11111
! Ill', Ii i
mghts of tho Accused
G. Right to Have a Public Trial
warrants the' e~clusiort of the public where the evidence may be
char.acterized as '9ffensive to decency or public morals."'
(2) No person should be excluded._ !'What did occasion difficulty
in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the
city court Judge, it was in the latter's ai~-~onditioned ch~mbers
that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as
viol~tive of this right? The answer ~~s:t be in the negativ7. There
is"no' showihg that :the' public ·was tlfo'reby excluded. It 1s to be
·· · admitted that the sfz'e of the room alloted the Judge would redu~e
the ·n umber of those who could be present. Such a fact, though, 1s
Mt indicative'of any transgression of this right Courtrooms are not
of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover,
as admitted by Justice Black in his mc1ster~y In re Oliver. opin~on
.(333 U.S. 257.), it suffices to satisfy the requll'ement of a tnal being
public-if the. accased. could 'have his friends, relatives an~ counsel
present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed
,
, .
fact that at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of
the city ·court Judge, without objection on the part of responde~t
policemen." (Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 [1973], through Justice
Fernando.)
Radio-TV coverage of jud.icial proceedings.
;. . Relying on Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and. the case of Estes v. Texas (381 US 532 (1965].), the Supreme Court
issued on October 27, 1991 En Banc Resolution Re: Live TV and
Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aq~ino's
Libel Case, totally prohibiting said coverage of court proceedmgs.
In Perez vs. Estrada (360 SCRA 248 [2001].), the Supreme Court
denied the petition filed by the Secretary of Justice to allow live
media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrad~ bef?re
the Sandiganbayan. The petition sought, in effect, a re-exarrunation
of the October 23, 1991 Resolution of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled:
(1) Balancing of interests. - "The propriety of granting or
denying the instant petition involves the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the ri~ht to
public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental nghts
 [J
l!HQ l'J J11 ,111vi N B • ND·rrruTHJ>NJAr,. LAW
• PrinclpJes and Cast:$• 1
1
·A "' r~!
• •
,0fthe accused, on the other -hand, along witfothe constitutitmal
power of ·a court to co~trot $ts 'p r0ceedbigs·-in. ens~ring .a fair
and impartial tri.al. When thes~. t:ights,·:r.ac;~ ~gainst.9ne another, ·
jurisprudence tells us.;that the
r1ght, oLthe-:accused.· must be
preferred to win." . ... · h{ action; ri~vertheless,' Withln the courthouse, the overriding
(2) Violation of dlfe,·process. .-'- "Dtie',proces,s guar_fu'tt~es the
~ccus:d a pre~ump~on;of innoce~ce ~tll_tl{e'~pnt¥~rf
i,s 'pr,qved
ma trial that 1s not hf!ed abpve· its ind1vidtial$etting~ nor made
an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached
are induced not by any outside for~e or influence ' but only
by evidence and argument given in -open court, whe:re fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. x x x Even while it
may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media
can bring to bear on them [witnesses and judges] directly and
through the shaping of public opinion, it is·a fact, nonetheless,
that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees.
The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may
have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges
cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all
unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it."
(3) Right to a public trial. - "An accused has a right to
a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
and would not be unjustly condemned and that his ~ights are
~ot compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial
1s nofsynoliymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors rrJ.USt be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
. .•available seats, cond1:1,ct themselves with de~~rum and observe
the trial process. ' rights to free speech, free press and of access to information on
. ~~ the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough
facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible
and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their
proper functions, who shall then be tot~lly free to report what
they have observed during the proceedings."
(4) Freedom of the press and the right to public information. -
"The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom
I
Hh:.•l'I ' AJ:(.'tl'.'111 .'I HLl ,UJI NI lll l'!l
ltights of the Accused
G. '.Righf to Have a Public 1\-ial
·' :·_ofthe·pre~s .ind'fhe right toipublic in.formation. It also approves
· d( media's exa:lte'd·,'power J o provide the most accurate ·and
1
coinpreh'.ensive. means' of' 'con.veyn:ifthe proceedings •to the
·pµblic and' in acquainting tJ1e phli>Iic with the judicial process
S!)nstderati9n is st_ill ~~ paramount right of the accµsed to due
·.: '.p·roc~ss whiGh mµst never be allowed fo suffer diminution in its
· c·onsHh1tlonal proportions."
(5) Possible extraordinary case of mass action. - "The sad
reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great
dimensions so involving as they do a former President of the
Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become
the nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of
EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has
left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew
and tisk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved?
The transcendental eve!lts in our midst do not allow us to turn
a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass
action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the
courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law."
(6) Abser,.ce of ample safety nets. - "The Court is not all that
unmindful ofrecent technological and scientific advances but to
chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to
use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided
and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a
price too high to pay." (through Justice Vitug.)
Kapunan, J., Concurring Opinion:
(1) Right of accused to fair trial. - "In a clash between the
matters of public concern, and the right to a fair trial, the right of
the accused should be the utmost concern of the Court. The instant
petitions, if granted, would throw overboard a well-established
policy that considers such live radio and television coverage not •
orily as prejudicial to the defendant's right to due process, but
also as inimical to the fair and orderly administration of justice.
In its Resolution, dated October 22, 1991, this Court laid down
the guidelines for broadcast media coverage of courtroom trials, to
Wit: XX X
ttttil !'1111 , ll ' l ' I N li l lJN! d 11 I I l)f J~l) I , I. A W 111', 1,1
Pl'lnclples nntl C(llHf l1:,
. Considering the prejud;i\'.:~,it, poset ;tO. '.~ e 1q.e£end,~rfim ight to
~ue. process as ':"ell_ as t9..,t:p;" J.air -M~.;:pi-;ct~rw, ~qmqµsq.?,tio,n of
JUSti~e, and cons1derm~ wiµJrE:/?% tl,i,n.,~t~~Ji.~i;n,9f ;1W1-l?:!. ~-~~. and
the right_ of _th~ pe?pJ7 t?,. ½1f.~r.IN.~~g'i}.ffl:6¥.)':~~~Yi~,~n;ti~a~_~fied
by le~s. d1strac~& _ d~g5~d\!W ?.?:~iRteJ~2.t,~}il!ff~~r~, .li,°Wl:i~.a:i?. and
9,f
televIS1on coverage ~.~tf!,J?.r9itr1?.!f1:q'~fli;;i}i, ~9()?.eaiJ.o_}V'~_d.. y'ideo
footages of court hearings'for )'.lews 'p ~o~essh'a.il'b'rr.esttfti~d: and
limited to shots' of ffi~ cotifhJorii} tll~ Ja&!di!i\ WMi:bfi;~J'.·;·-~rties
and their counsel taken prior to .!lli~11tb'illiff&t~·e fuliffh6f1-~fficial
proceedings. No video shots, or phofographs.-shcu,l1'1\,ei·permitted
during the.trial pro,per. The rest_riction5:,i,et foifu ,w ;P~r ~esolution
of October 22, 1991, have remained so-und-and valid/'···. ·. ; •··
(2) Right to free, press ·and1..pubUc •injorm~tion. :_ .:;~t ro'~st be
made clear: that there is no cur,tailmertt·not $Ub>'stahtia:l, ditnmtition
of the rightS' to free .press and·to infotmil.tfon·on !matters :of public
concern brought .about .by the, pr,ohlbiH6n~,on."live; ·radio. and
television coyerage-:,of, court p i;m::eedj.ngs, · These• rights •remain
amply protected ev~n with the .existen9e 0hmch prohibi.fion. 'In the
criminal cases against Mr. Estrada-.be£6re the Sandiganpayan, the
press can still repoFt OR .t he proceedings being. conducted therein.
Media outfits can send their representatives to;the ttia1s and make
their reports and comments th~reon to their viewers or listeners.
What is not allowed is for them to ·bringi:riside thecourtroom their
broadcasting equipment that would tertd to ·hamper the orderly
administration of justice."
(9) Right of aqcused to a public . tri_al due process. -:- "It bears
emphasizing that the right to a public trial belongs first and
foremost to the ~ccused. Said right requires that proceedings be
open to the_ pubhc to ensure that the accused is fairly dealt with
and_ not un1ustly condemned. The openness of a trial' safeguards
a?am~t a_ttempts to employ the courts as instruments of persecution
s~ce tt induces all the· participants therein, .e.g., judge, lawyers,
witnesses, to perform their duties conscientiously, and provides
the public with an opportunity to observe the events· therein.
However, a public trial is not to be equated w_ith a 'publicized.trial,'
one characterized by _perv;asiv.e adverse publicity. that violates the
accused's constitutional right to dueproces·s."
(4). Negative effects of live television coverage. - "The negative
effects that live· television coverage of criminaI: proceedings may
have thereon may even . exceed those resulting from the biases
created in the mind of the viewers from watching the Jmogcs
Ill I I l /\ I \ , Ill 111 1.1, 1 11 1 1rn,_,I I I ' 1111'1
ll lgblll of tho Acc1111cd
G. Right to I-lnvc n Public 'Mn!
appearing onscre~n. It: -i s not unlikely that the television stations
tl1~Y-Gl.ecide tha_t the trial itself does not contain sufficient drama
to ·sustaip an audience and thus provide 'expert cornrqentary'
_on the proceed;ing~ by hiring persons with legal backgrounds to
_anticip~te possible trial.strategy, in the same manner as a basketball
e'xpert ant_icipates plays for his audience. Arguably, this may be
. ;. h,.~l"\e/i~ia,l.~ ,U).~ ,s e~e tJ:wt the viewing public is offered guidance
L: ..,i?,.,':1-~der'stanqm~ th~ €y~nts that trap.spire at a court proceeding.
. Bp~ev~r, it ca~ot _.b e, dei:µe~ tpat such live commentaries r;nay
iptensify the blases .shaped by the images of the trial on television,
. or worse; creii.te wrong impressions in the viewers' minds. The
~~?1e migh( als~ ·s;i:1bv~rt our 1;ub judice rule that media should
ref~ain from .eublishing or airing comments regarding a pending
case.
The transmission of edited images on television or the
accompanying commentaries are not the only possible sources
of bias which may unduly influence the outcome of a trial. The
mere presence of the television camera inside the courtroom also
inevitably affe~ts the proceedings beiRg covered for television can
work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on.
x x x Even the behavior of lawyers may be influenced by
the fact that their case is being covered by live television: 'In
addition, cameras pose a risk that lawyers will modify their
roles. In a televised trial, the public becomes an extrajudicial
audience that they must persuade. Lawyers may become
preoccupied with the cameras which interferes with their
devoting full attention to the fact-finder at trial. As a result,
some lawyers direct at least part of their case to the television
viewers instead of fully representing their clients to the pre-
siding judge and the jury. Lawyers are motivated to present
themselves well in the eyes of the public. In a highly televised
trial, the marketing consciousness of lawyers may be affected.
There is a danger that the media's production of the trial may
transform into an excellent opportunity for the lawyers to gain
free personal advertisement.'
· The presence of television cameras inside the courtroom also
places additional responsibilities on the trial judge. In addition to
.his duties of listening to the testimonies of the witnesses, receiving
documentary and object evidence, ruling on motions and objections
and ensuring that the accused receives a fair trial, he must also
supervise the television crew present in his courtroom to make
lltHl J'llll ,ll'l'I N I ( 'I.JN!1 JIJIJII )N l\ 1, 1,AW I 1,
Principles ond Cnscs
~~ tl;1at they do not d!sn.tpt Qt~ .p.r<?,c.~edlng&: fV.~ theJieJ;la:vior
of the judges themselves may be.unduky-in.ilu~n.ced by s_1:1clp~~dia
presence, for although they ai;e.supposed:to be more impervious to
external pressures with respect tp the: castis p·e nding .b,efor.e ithem,
they still experience-the same psy:chologicaLreactions as,·laymen.
XXX
It is not merely
. the ,..
. obtrusive .locatibn. in the courtr'ooiri
'·' '
of- the
cameras or their effects on the decorum!. .$o1e~ty"and .d~gi:u,'!;)7 of
the court that impinges on the accused's right to a fair .fria('It is
the beaming or transmission of all events, t~stimonies and··faces
inside the courtroom directly ' to the vie':"ing , public, including
the milling crowd outside the court's premises, coup1ed with the
running accounts of the proceedings by the radio and televi§ion
networks, which .may.: be slanted or, distorted by bias, self-interests
and hate, thus w.h ipp~g up passion ·and' rage among the Viewers,
that offends the right of the .accused·to a fair trial." · ·
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Concurring Opinion: ··
(1) Right of accused to ·equal proteciion ·of the 'la~. · - · ' Equal
1
protection is afforded in a criminal proceeding where the trial is
conducted fairly and impartially in ·the sam~ manner and under
the same procedure as all other people are tried within the state. In
the myriad of criminal cases that passed our trial courts, this is only
the second time that the issue of the propriety of a televised trial is
directly raised. In the first instance, this Court prohibited the live
radio and television coverage of a criminal proceeding in .order to
protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent tlie distraction
of the proceedings and to avoid a miscarriage of justice: I see no
reason why the case of Mr. Estrada sho,uld be· ~eated ·differently."
(2) Right of accused to a fair trial/due process. - "The fact that
the accused held the highest posi~on in the land is significant.
As a m~tter of fact, hif? stature str~mgly, j_:µstifies the denia.l of the
request for a televised trial. To ~e sure, even before the camera
staxts moving, the case would have already achieved a sensational
status. When a case is sensationalized, there is a greater difficulty
in safeguarding the rights of the acc1,1 sed, particularly, his right to
due process, which basically requires that the court try,ing the cnsc
should be impartial, free from outside pressure nnd interference.
'The presence o( n ' WH 1nuclin cnn tlcny n de( •ndnnl Jhnt 'j11rllcinl
11<'ro11ll!J 111/fl rn /111 1 whlrh <ht(• pwn•m1 of lnw g11n1·n11l('l''I,
Id
/\, II{ I , 111 , 111 I.I , t Jti t( It ,I I I
Hl1\ht,1 ur 1h11/\ c.w1ml
(.;, Rtgl\t to Ilnvc n l'ul>llc 'l'l'lnl
X XX XXX X XX
· Mor~ importantly, the general public is una.lvare of
procedural rules·. If the Sandiganbayan's rulings are adverse to
·their e)5pectations, this may start· another massive action which
may cu1minate t6 ·a n 1 EDSA IV:' Needless to state, the effects are
disastrous to the naticm."
XXX XXX X .XX
Thu;, u.i:tti\ -a nd unless the medii.l can secure the rights of the
accused and ei•iminate all the adverse effects, specifically on the
general public! tl\etelevisionshould remain outside the courtroom."
Puna, J., Disse!1t-ing Opinion:
(1) Re-examin_ ation of Resolution banning live coverage of criminal
proceedings. - ;, After' <the)apse of ten (10) years, I respectfully
·s ubmit that .the ·1991 resolution of this Court absolutely banning
live radio and television coverage of criminal proceedings should
be re-examined to re-adjust the bala1'ce between a free press and
a fair trial in ligh.t of the continuing progress in communications
,technology and;to expand the right of. acce$s of the press and the
-public to information without, however, impairing the right of an
accused to due :process.'
XXX XXX
With the· qµantum leap in communications technology in
the last twenty (20) years, TV cameras are now less intrusive and
disruptive. Indeed, various states have imposed rules successfully
,' .
regulating ';"'hateyer 4lterferenc~ carner!3,i; Jl\~Y have on the dignity
and decorum or judicial proceedings. Maryland, for example, has
clear rules setting down the technical requirements for television
artd still cameras and photographers, types of microphones to be
used, noise limitations, placement in courtroom and restrictions on
movement of personnel and equipment. More progress in audio-
visual technology can be expected in the immediate future and this
objection that TV cameras in the comt-room will create chaos in
judicial proceedings will just be a part of the museum of history.
The absolute ban against radio-TV coverage of criminal trial
hos now been lifted in majority of the states in the United States."
(2) Pri11ci11nl nrgu111cnls. - "The principal arguments favoring
l<il1•vl11ou 1d11l n,·c wall h1id out nnd cnn hardly be refuted. Firstly,
1111 npM ll'lul 11111111 grnnl v11 h1P. xx x .~11rrmrl. )I 111 n Jr11lsm thot an

111\11 th<./n.i'A I , l,AW
. 111 JI J.11 ' I 'I N I ~ 'U.NI d 'J J'IJ
Principles Mcl CM' .:,, .'
.,,.. ·
,g
educated, enlight_eried a~d _v:.igil_cin.L fi\~.~½.:.,n:1akes· 7~oc~acy
works. X X X Third. In .~ y~ry ~~r!lw\\Y+~,;f,rti~le, ~,f~,s~ter has
revealed that empir~c~~.s»:i#iW,$;$&~~ :9tn
~j!m.~m~,~l:\ #i5·:S.PA:1~J_room
_d o not have any neg~,t w~ ,~H7.~t,~n,1~q19~\,p,rP:c~~q~~&1,~,~1 ~ ,Eq~rth.
9f.
Televised trial helps_the pressfylfillJt$•rCJ1~ ~xposp:lis_m1s~~!nage
of justice." · · ··· · : · ·· ... ,
(3) Discretion of trial judg~. .:__, '"1iy_e,,·i,~dio,."I'V cove_rage (?f
a criminal trial cannot he demand~~: ~(~ r,i.?tt~r of right bu~ its
absolute denial is also constitµticinally st.($pec~. His•therefore resp~ct-
fully submitted that the matte~ ~[ ~~e~er ?;~ 1:ot .u:ie :pr~c;~~dings
in a criminal trial should be t_elevrs!:!d, totaliy.or partially, should be
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge on.a case ~o case
basis. The exercise of this discretion w_ilh:i~pen:d on the facts of each
case and will involve the delicat~ b!}~~nc,ing.of the,·c_o nstitutional
right of the accused to fair trial and,·il:':yf v,rpcess of law,,the p~ess
and the public. right of access to tri!}ls. in_criminal' ,cases; the nght
of the state to prosecute crimes effectiv:ely and 'the duty of courts
to ensure the fair and orderly admiruskation of justice: To be able
to reasonably exercise· his discretion, the trial jud_g ech~s to hea_r a
party's motion seeking to televise the proceedings·or any portion
thereof to determine, ·among others,· the· standing .o f the· mo:vant,
the factual and legal bases of his asserted.righJ and the.opposition
thereto. No witness, especially a witness for the accused, upon
his written objection, should be corripe,l l~d to, have his testimony
televised. lrt ·balancing the above •right's;:the judge _s\10uld deny
the ·motion to televise trial 'upon speclfi.c_--proof of_ prefuaice a_~d of
reasonable likelihood that the right to fair triatof ~e accused will be
endangered. · _ __:: ::~.:' · . · ,.· ·" ·, . . · .
. ' Additionally, itshall be ·the d~W ,O(~eJri~ljµ<;lg~}O.Pi?vide
·and impose the necessary :rul~s and xegi.tl~~~.~ s t_q aSS'1,r~ that the
televised trial will not deqact from: tli~ ~q}enm.ity,, 9,!:JC~rµ.~ a_n d
_d igttlty of the court." · · . . ,, . ,
(4). Right of th~ people. -.., '':It ·is ,the ·p~ople!.:who govern; in
a democracy and they can only govet:n- well if they- a,re fully
informed. A people kept in the ~lark by.t~e blindfold ofignorance
will only govern with mistakes. Let _it 9e str,essed th~~ the r~g~t
of the people to know is strongest in times of turbulence for 1t 1s
when the stakes to the State are high that they cannot afford to
err due to ignoran ce. x x x By outlawinf$ tel(') vision in tlle ITinl of
former Prcflldont l1fltrndo, the rnojorily hflfl dimlcd om pcnpl<' lho
oppo1·t11111l y 10 l(11ow on1ph111•ly 1md nrruml<'l y wlw 1lw1· rw nnl hlH
I )
Ill Id A I( I 111 I I II l I l I I I a ii I I
' )dKl\lll uft tht Ac1111md
(;. H.lght to Hnvc II Public 'l'rlnl
. tr,i~l ..wtJ! b~ fair an,_d , ,i.tnpf!rJ;ial. .c\11 tl)ese because the majority has
t1w
.·' P.~F.S,l~,t ed(in wifyi}tiy¢..b~lief that,the courtro~m is limited to ~e
. p~4. a9-.d pencil . repqrter_i The majority will bnng about new Rip
: ' .' Van Winkles in t):Jj,s'eyge of electronic media."
«. • ' ,.
I , , ·, 1 • ~ , \ .,~ •
Pdnganfba7'1, J., niss·enti'ng Opinion:
·. (1) Righf .to public information. - "Today in 2001, I respectfully
submit that it- is teclm~logically possible to uphold the right of
the people to public ~ormation without violating the right of
the accused to due ·p rocess and without impeding the orderly
administration. of justice. It is now feasible to satisfy the people's
right to information 'by less distracting, degrading and preju~icial
means:' X X X By proscribing live coverage of trials and hearings,
the Court haidost ah indispensible teammate in discovering,
processing and repoi:tln.g the raw, unadulterated and unvarnished
truth. Why is the majority afraid of the truth? More pointedly, why
is it.fearful of the whole truth and nothing but the unedited truth."
· (2)- Free, ·open and public hearing. - "[A]s a general rule,
every~one .has a right to attend and witness a trial or hearing,
. especially if criminal in nature, under the constitutional principles
of tran~parency; and of free, open and public hearings of cases.
However, given the limitations of time and space in a courtroom,
it is not always possible to physically accommodate all persons
~terested . in .w itnessing a court hearing. That is why court
salas have been enlarged. Moreover, microphones equipped
with electronic an;ipHfi~rs, and sometimes with closed circuit
television, have in the past been used to project the proceedings
to the immediate vicinity of the courtroom via, radio speakers, TV
monitors and prqjec~on screens. .In this manner, people outside
·· ~ha❖~: beei\'able to listen to and watch the ·proceedings, as if they
·w<ir~ ·msidg the tourttoc:iri:i.. As the 21st century dawns, it is now
possible to use eyen- more advanced ·technology .to enable more
people to watch ju<;licial proceedings in the privacy of their homes
. , ,·and offices withoufcausing pr.e judice to the tights of the accused or
t6 th~ integi;ify of orderly justice,"
- ·(3) Proper balancing of conflicting interests. - ·1' A trial must be
publi~ ~a transparent, because op.enness is vital to the effectiv.e
administration of criminal justice in a democracy. Not only does 1t
safeguard 'the rights of the accused; it likewise ensures pu~lic trust
in the conduct of the tdal. Therefore, affer balancing the interests
t>f l·hc p11rtics concerned - the constitutional rights of the accused
 J \
1190 P ll!Lll'f lNJJ 'ON S 11'1'l'WH'1€:/INRL LAW
Principles and1€a'S'es
and the requirements of·ord.elily,prt>ced:ures,vis-tt:-vis the people's
fundamental freedom ·of exp"i:essioh .and_;t ight ·t6· information on
matters of public concern·~ 1fespectn;illy_ Si:11::>mit tha.tl,iV'e•coverage
via a single fixed ca:,:nef~ ins~de-tbe, c(,i1,1rtroom,.·tl:p:bi;tg}:r which
the media can access and the~et?li~_.pfo~4~1:1st th~ prqc~ed~_is to
the entire nation and to the world, lS'.-·llie ;best techn:olbgical 'and
legal solution to the -concerns raise'd•;\;iy '.~he Comt.in 1991 _and to
the objections now. aired by the: .aecµ~~'d-~former -Pres-rdertt Jbseph
EjercitoEstrada).andthe'lBP.,· -~.... . •. ::i , ..: ,·, . ·.· • - -:)
X.X X l:O( ~ : -
-; . - Indeeq, ina free society •~here transparency and accountability
-are Qle dl:)sirable standards 0j public;-:offic~;-'.tlµs Coui:t can rtQ; longer
.totally prohibit live .i;nedifl coverage of4r.ial_s anq hearings, given
the reality that the techm>logy of -moder.a communications has
adequately overcome the-obsolete reasons f9i: the ban.
These advances in communication·facilities have now made it
possible to satisfy the people'.s constitutional right to information
without violating the constitutional right· of the accused to,a fair
trial and without subverting the orderly administration of,justice.
Indeed, it is now technologically feasible to give people in' their
homes and offices the same access to .trials as spectators inside the
courthouse."
H. RIGHT TO,CONFRONTATIONDF WITNESSES
Reasons for the right.
The accused person has the right to rueet the witnis~es _face to
at
face his trial.' There are two important reasons behind'thls t:igJ,.t.
i'
(1) The first and primary reason is to. give the accused an
opportunity {a) to confront and (b) to cr6-ss,-examine witnesses
against him, particularly to test their .recollection and ·veracity.
He may not, therefore, be convicted upon the ll1ere depositibns,
certificates, reports, or ex parte (of or from one party) affidavits1 of
1
An affidavit, l:,eing taken ex parte, is almo~t always incomplete arid often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial sugg11stion and sometm\es fromwant of suggestion c,nd.inquiries.
(People vs. Molina, 213 SCRA 52 [1992].) But they do not really detract from the credibility
of witnesses. (People vs. Padilla, 213 SCRA 631 [1992].)
Soc. M AR'l'. ,llf. l31LL 0 11 RIC:il-l'l'S 891
Rights of the Accused
H. Right.to Cqnfrontation of Witnesses
his, accusers. Thus, a: doctor who executes a medical certificate must
he,presented for examination.
'(Z) Tne secondary reason is to give the judge, as the tr\er of facts,
ah opportunity:to see and observe the demeanor and appearance of
witnes_ses whil~ testifying.2 (U.S. vs. Javier, 37 Phil. 449 [19181; U.S.
v's:rtanjuan:c6, 1 PNL '3'74 [1902]; U.S. vs. Bello, 11 Phil. 526 [19081;
P~ople vs.' Estenzo, 72 SCRA 428 [1976].)
Nature o~ right c;>f cross-examination.
(1) The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in;a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature or
in proceedirtgs before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.3 (Savory
Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, 62 SCRA 288
[1973].) Note that. mere . opportunity and not necessarily actual
cross-~xamination is the essence of the right.
Cross-examination is an indispensable instrument of criminal
justice to give substance and meaning to the constitutional right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him, and to show his
innocence. (People vs. Pido, 200 SCRA 45 (1991].) The right does
not necessarily require an actual cross-examination but merely an
opportunity to exercise the right if desired. (People vs. Escote, Jr.,
400 SCRA 603 (2003].) The failure of the court to afford the accused
his right of cross-examination constitutes reversible error. (People
vs. Montes, 118 SCRA 124 [1982].)
2Stated otherwise, it insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus
deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross•
examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and b ringing out the truth;
and it enables the court to-observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.
(California v. Green, 339 U.S. 157 (1970]; People vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 (1980].) But it
does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot
render a valid and just decision, since he can rely on the transcribed stenographic notes
taken during the trial as the basis of his decision. (People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56
(1992].)
It is-rather unfair, if not irregular for the trial court to make a unilateral observation
or conclusion that the demeanor -of an accused shows a guilty conscience. "This is not
only non sequitur but also trenches on a denial of procedural due process under the guise
of a judicial finding which, however, stands unexplained and is purely conjectural."
(People vs. Aniscal, 228 SCRA 101 [1993).)
3
Under ·the system of our legal procedure where the trial court is judge of both the
law and the facts, the presiding judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion may re•
examine a witness by putting such questions as may be essential to elicit relevant facts
and to make the record speak the truth. (People vs. Manalo, 148 SCRA 98 [1987).)
 1 1
l'lHl.ll'J ' I N I~ • M 'nJ 'UTJ~~N.f\td ,AW l i ', J~I
• Prlnclplcs and Coses ,,
(2) . The right of a party to cross-exam~~-the. witness , of his:
adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in. civil:.rases;~no.. lJ:ls&:_tham.
th~ right of the accuseq ilt f::J.'i,rr.\iil!'ll c~se~: :Ch~rf?SFHl~~c~~f.P&9tPon
of such right of the p.CCUsed in the ConsJ;itµti?~ ·~R~~ -~<;>MrP-sl~r,-th.~,
right thereto of parties"in civil cases less CPf'\SPtu.gonallrbc1:f?,e<!',.for
it is an indispensable part of the due :r,rpces_~ S1:1,a_ran~~e<;! by the
fundamental law. (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Luft;hansa ,qe;,m:an -'}irlJri~~f 64
SCRA 610 [1975].)
(3) The right is not an absolute one ~hfolf a"party •efui ·a.e~aid
at all times, The right is a personal .one'. w~~ch ma3/ be watv~d,
expressly or impliedly, by conduct amotUwting t0 a ,renunciation
of the right of cross-examination (Savor:y.. Luncheonette vs. Lakas
ng Manggagawang Pilipino, supra.), such as· by admission by the
accused that a -witness, if present, would :testify to certain _facts
stated iil the affidavit of the prosecution.~ (People vs. -Hernandez,
260 SCRA 25 [1996].),
Excep~ions to th_e ·hearsay rul_e.
· The ·hearsay rule excludes evidence that canno~ be ·_ tested
by cross:examination. While· the ·lack 0f objection to a hearsay
testimony results in its being admitted·.a:s evidence, such-testimony
has no probative value. Hearsay· evidence; whether 0bjE:!cted _to or .
not, cannot be given credence. Adm:issibilitfof eviuence ·s hould not
be equated with weight of evidence. (People'·vs. Vaiero, 112 SCRA
675 [1982]; People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA547 [1992].) · · · ·
As the accused in a criminal case has the.right to confrontation,
the witnesses against him must be produced to testify, subject to
cross-examination. This right, however, is not absolute.5 Thus:
(1) Testimony given by a witness at aform er trial. - It is generally
recognized that it is sometimes impossible to produce again a
witness who has already testified in a previous-proceeding, as when
the witness has died or is otherwise unavailable, in which event, his:
4The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution.is not for the court to
decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right
to choose whom it wishes to present as witness. (People vs. Zeng i-Iua Dien, 432 SCRA
25 [2004).)
5 United Stoles, nncl it is clear thnt these provisions were not intended to render _m-
0ther exceptions to the hearsay rule are provided ln the Rules of Court. (aco Rul
130, Secs, 37-47 thereof,)
A i<'t J'l I. 11111. 1, 11 l{ I a l'l'U
lUghla of.tho Accused
H . Right toConfrontation of Witnesses
previous testimony in its entirety is made admissible as a ~istinct
piece· of evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule, p~ticularly
where the ·•party against whom the evidence is offered had the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness who gave the testimony.6
· · (2) P~riod of preliminary investigation or examination. - The term
criminal prosecu.tions, !'\S used in the Constitution, means proceed-
ings before the trial court from arrai~e~t to ren~ition of ~e
judgment. Hence, the right of confrontation 1s not ~va1lable during
the period of prelimi,nary investigation. (see Deqmto vs. Arellano,
81 Phil. 128 [1948]; Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640 [1948].) Neither
is it constitutionally guaranteed during investigation referred to in
Section 12(1). ·
But the right is . statutorily recognized d uring preliminary
investigation although not during preliminary exam_ination, the
purpose of said examination being merely to determme whether
or not there is sufficient reason to issue a warrant of arrest. The
constitutional provision commanding the determination of probable
cause prior to issuance of a warrant of arrest requires no no~ce to
an accused. A prelimihary examination is generally a proceedmg ex
parte ll1 which the person charged has no right to participate or be
present. (Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA423 [1981].)
(3) Dying declarations. - An exception to the provision
securing to accused persons the right of .confrontation is a "dying
declaration." 7
6
The reason for-the ex~eption has been aptly expressed:
"Because such testimony has been delivered under the sanction of an oath and
subject to the right of the adverse party to cross-examine the witnes~ givin~ it, it is not
open to the objections ordinarily urged against hearsay evidence. It_ is adxrutted ~n 0e
principle that it is the best of which the case admits. x x x The real bas'.s for :he ad~ ss1~n
of testimony given by a witness at a former trial is to prevent the miscarriage of JUStice
where the circumstances of the case have made it unreasonable and unfair to exclude
the testimony." (People vs. Villaluz, 125 SCRA 116 (1983], citing 29 Am. Jur. 2d, 807-809.)
7
The Supreme Court justified such an exception in U.S. vs, Gil (13 Phil, 530 [1909).),
thus:
"The American authors of the Philipp ine Bill and of General Order No. 58,
must be presumed to have borrowed the provisions of the Constitution of the ~nit-
ed States securing .to accused persons the right of confrontation and cross-examma-
tion of the witnesses against them, subject to the well-established exceptions which
hnvc nlwnys been recognized under the rule as laid down by the Constitution of ~ e
ndmisslblc dying doclnrntions in crlmlnnl coses touching Lhc circumstances lcadmg
up to the donth for which tho prosecution I~ lnatllu tocl, for such clccln.rntlons have

VlllLIL'PJNH ' N 8'1'.l'fU'J'lU~i\.l, I ,A W
Principles 11nd Cas~s!•'
~ ~,,., ~,~.r,,·
The rule is the same as the rule.of theltol¥ian"CJiMit:biw:..~1Mott,i
proximum, sive moribundum, non praesum~ndum·~st,men(fti;ine~ ess·e
i711memmorem salutis, aetern:ae;·,licet _non _prti~swnatu~:ie'nJp'er. .dicere
verum." · · · . , ' l
{ 4) Waiver ofthe right. - As pi:evieµsly, .ri.i~~tion,ed1·the .dght ·i; a
personal one which may be waived, expressly odropliedly.•(supra.)
(a) An accused who escapes affit li.e has·beetCdul~ tried
11
in absentia impliedly waives hiS rfght to1;l::orufor\.t arid cross-
examine witnesses who testified againsfhl,m'. (infra:)
(b) Where a party ; has had the. ~ppprtunity to cr9ss-
examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, necessarily he
forfeits the right to cross-examine cUld !:{le t.~ stimony given on
direct examination of the witness will be received ·or allowed
to remain in the record.8 (Savory Luhchecinette vs. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, supra.) · · . the cau~e for the non-completion of the cross-examination was a
(c) The right, being personal and waivable, the intention
to utilize it must be express. The task of recalling a witness for
cross-examination is, in law, imposed ·o n the party who wishes
to exercise said right. After a party has presented his witness, the
burden shifts to his oppone~t who musfmake the appropriate
move. (Fulgado vs. Court of Appea,1s, 182 SCRA81 [1990].)
E_ffects of absence of or incomplete
cross-examination. · Appeals, supra. )
Until the cross-examination of a witness has been Jinishep, his
testimony cannot be considered as complete and may,not, therefore,
always been regarded as an exception to th~ gen.erai tuje rejecting hearsay eviden~,
on the general principle, as laid down by Lor<i Baron Eyre, 'That they are declara-
tioI1s m·a de in extremity, when the party is. c1t_µ_t!! p6htt of death,. and when ev!!ry
hope of this world is gone; when every ·motive tts lal$¢hood is silenced and the mind
is _induced by the most powerful consiq.etatit;m s t~ spe$1k the truth. A situation 'so
solemn and so awful as to be considered by th~ faw as creating an·obligation equal
to that which is imposed by a positive oath in a-court of justice.'"
8
The conduct of a party which may be construed .a s an
implied waiver of the right
to cross-examine may take various forms. But the coihmon basic principle underlying
the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was gh,en the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness·buHailed to take ;1dvantage.of it for
r~a_s~ns attributable to himself alone. (Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang
Pilipmo, supra; De la Paz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 65 [1987).)
The opportunity of cross-examination having been secured, the function and test of
confrontation has also been accomplished. (People vs. Catcedo, 198 SCRA 503 (1991).)
IJ
A tn •. Il l, JIil II, U II l<H ,111 I U!J/1
Ht-ghlll of tho A cu11ocl
H. Right to Confronfatlon of Wih1cs8es
be allowed toJorm pa.rt ot .the evidenae to be considered by the court
m 'd'mg th!= .case,..· ·..
. . -_d.eq.·
.· '(1) . Thro'ugh fault ofcross-examiner/il.irect examin.er. - Where the
right to cross-examme is lost wholly or in part through the fault of
th.e dross-examiner, !Jl.en .the testimony on ~.ii:ect testimony may be
taken into account; but when cross-exa:m:ination is not or cannot be
q.one or· completed due to causes attributable to the party offering
the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent. In such a case, it is proper to present a motion to
strike out from the records the testimony already given on direct
examination by the opposing party. (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa
German Airlines, supra; De la Paz, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra; People vs. Digno, 250 SCRA 237 [1995).)
(2) By reason of a fortu itous event. - On the other hand, wh ere
fortuitous event under such circumstances that no responsibility
can be attributed to either party, it i~ a harsh measure to strike
out all that has been obtained in the direct examination. To avoid
any inflexible rule, the prudent alternative to wholesale exclusion
should be to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-
examination can be shown to be not in that instance a material
loss. More compellingly so where the adverse party was afforded
a reasonable chance for cross-examination. (Fulgado vs. Court of
(3) On admissibility in evidence of testimony on direct examination.
- The effects of absence of or incomplete cross-examination of
witness on the admissibility in evidence of his testimony on direct
examination were discussed in People vs. Seneris (99 SCRA 92 [1980).),
thus:
(a) Stricken out only insofar as not covered by cross-examination.
- "As a general rule, the testimony of a witness, given on direct
examination, should be stricken where there is not an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination, as where the witness by
· reason of his death, illness, or absence cannot be subjected to
cross-examination. x x x. The direct testimony of a witness wh o
dies before conclusion of the cross~examination can be stricken
only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination. (Curtice v.
West, 2 NYS 507, 50 H u n 47, affirmed 24 N.E. 1099, 121 N.Y. 696.)

896 J:'~HLUJ.PlN J1 'UN~'l'f l'U'l!'J Nl'\Jl... L,AW
Principles and Ca,ses;1
I£ one is deprived of theopp(iH:tuni~.ota,; <1:ross.se~amination-
without fault upon his part, as in the case-J1ftlile>illn;e~s19r ,death
-of a ~itness after dirt;?c;t_e,x ~~~~-<?!},_i~is,_p~n~r,af?f •~~Jq,-th~~ he
is ~ntitled ~oha~~ tb~
4!r~~t -~~~WP9fX:r~P.%~~r--tt,?:tnJl~~
This doctrine r~eytis,ign_µr.y, <:PlllJ~OAi~}Y-.~ ~-,t,h~\,IJ,9 _ey~~en;~e
should be ~d-P¥Hi,~, :p,}lf..:\YJ:!~j
.~~~39.t: AJje
'exami11atiO;l,O.f bp~ ~,~~~fltl:U}:,,: ~\~.t-~~
p\~rt,e.\~t/~t,m~nir~f't:tpo
uncertaip ~d -~£:u~ehc\B,le_tg be co11s~_qerm! ;~ :th~}fVeStit/ilt:i91J.,p(
controverte · acts." ' ·
. . ' '
(b)· Striking out i:iot warranted. - "Abs~~ce ofa witness _is.not.
enough to wa:rr.a nt :striking his testim(?I}Y, fqi; faih.u:e to,.appear
for ,further, crctss~·e xamination, where . the ,w,itness'. 'has ab:e~dy
been sufficiently- tross.,.-examined (Lew ChO}\V. ,IJi:i;n _;~ll'lg;12l6
P. 8$8, 125 Wash 631.), or the matter on which further cross-
. exanilitati6n is sought is r:iot in contr6ve~sy:''9• ·. . • . •
• , " • • * • ~ • l . . ,.. > • • ·, • , ~ ,
I. RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROPUCTiON
OF WITNESSES AND ,EVID~NC:E .
Need to secure order from court.
The accused has the right to have compulsory process issued to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, in his behalf.1 (Sec. 14[2].) The right must
be exercised during the trial; otherwise, it is deemed waived and
can no longer be invoked on appeal. (U.S. vs. Garcia, 10 Phil. 384
[1908].)
9What is proscribed by statutory norm (Rules of Court, Rule 115, Sec. l[f].) and
jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness, and
certainly does not cover the situation where the witness-had been extensively examined
on material points and thereafter failed to appear, more so, when the failure to complete
the cross-examination was not brought about by the prosecution. (People vs·. Barasina,
229 SCRA450 (1994].)
It has beenheld that the trial court did not abuse its discretion·in refusing to discharge
the "jury where the state witness collapsed before ·cross-ex-ami.nation was completed, it
being shown that no motion to strike the testimony was made, that it was not indicated
what furtl,lei: information was sought to be produced by further cross-examination, and
that the witness' testimony was largely cumulative. (Bariks v. Commonwealth; .312 Ky
297, 227 SW 2d 426, 81 Am. Jur. 2d 474.)
1 secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf," The ruling is not clear whether it should
The 1935 Constitution gunrnnteed only the l'ight "to have compulsory process to
secure tl1c attendance of w itnesses In his bchnlf."
1 l
!;o . .l{L AJ.~t'. 'Ill. JIU ,I. Ul1 l<l :J l 18 llDY
~ights of tl~c Accused
I. Right to Compulsory Production of Witnesses and Evidence
. (1) Under i:he Ru,les·of (:ourti ·an accused person is entitled to
have subpoerias ·(ordet to a person to appear and testify in court)
iss:ued to compel the attendax:ice of witnesses in his favor, 'including
;~cp~~\ ~ 1~a~raJit,6f:~fp;e,s!i}/ ~ -~ded. 2 ,(see l,\µl~s of Court, Rule 23, Secs. 1,
~i'Y.!i.~~~.st,. 1:ip~~vN,•m.~e ~ea~ona;ble ;and ~ligent effort to have
~~~t)?:~im?.r!r tl\~ni:,¢it~~-t9~pp~~r~dJ¢sµfy:;_0Jherw1s,e, the court rx:ay ~roperly
:i:eft;w~-~~F9§t:Ji?;@ri¢\f?~·:gialj.n·$p!~e of, fh,e 'absence o~ his w1~esses.
(tl:;S.• vs .. P.ellt;?j~ta, ;1,7 ·'fhil, 587 [19.10]; U.S. vs. Garcia, 10 Phil. 384
. [1908].)
·' -
-. ·. He m.ay alio as,k-ilie .cowt to order a person to produce in court
certain documents; ·artiqes, or other evidence and testify with
·fi~p~~t to ~er~J.:• This _o rder is called subpoena duces tecum.3 (see Rules
i:if Court, R~E;!\ 16; Sec. 10.) ·.
· (2) Likewise, the .court, upon proper application of the defen-
dant, may order the prosecution to produce or permit the inspection
of evidence (e:g.; written statements given by the complainant and
other witnesses in any investigation of the offense) material to any
matter involved1fu the-action, in the possession or under the control
of the prosecution, the police, or other law investigating agencies.
(see ibid.) Thus, ariother mode is assured the accused of meeting the
evidence that might be presented to prove his guilt.
Failure to comply with the order of the court is punishable as
contempt of court. The witness, if necessary, may even be arrested.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
'',
Motion to send written interrogatories on witness living abroad was
denied.
Facts.: It is the contention of the petitioners that the medical
testimony from a doctor who could testify on the wounds inflicted
. 2In People vs. Bardaje (99 SCRA 388 (1980].), the accused wanted a witness to testify
on his behalf and a-subpoena had b een issued to the witness. But instead of taking effective
steps to have the witness brought to coui:t, the judge gave responsibility for the witness'
attendance to the defense expressly stating, that if the defense .was not able to bring said
w itness to court, her -t estirn_o ny will be dispensed with, The Supreme Court ruled that
"considering that .this case involved a prosecution for a capital offense, the lower court
acted precipitously in not having [the witness] brought to court by ordering her arrest if
necessary. [The accused] was deprived of his right to have compulsory process issued to
also apply where· the case does not involve a capital offense.
3A subpoena ad testificandum is used to compel a person to testify.
 I 1 r
898 Pl·HLlPPlNJJ NS'l'l'l'U'l'l(D:t{)'.Aill 'LAW
Principles and Cases I1
on them during the incident in question wot:1.ld He crucial to their
-defense. Unfortunately for them, the:dootor,foltbleft-the,.P,Ftllippirtes
and was then residing in the Unitecl. S.tates; ·. ·.;•_' • ·,,. ,1 . •
• . I '"' ,. ,·,· l' ' ,_ ~ .'
Since under the circumstances, cor.npulsory attendance wotJ.ld
not be feasible, their counsel relying _on 'the ~ofisffrunon~l ptofisi'o.n
(compulsory productiotj. of 'evidenc~f ·sougli"tlf<;i 'sefi'd ·written
interrogatories on the dbctor in hifresid~rice'irt the Unit~a. :States.
A motion to that effect was filed; but it vvas deniedb:y'respqndent
judge.
Issue: Does the constitutional guarante'e :include the right to
serve interrogatories on a witness living abro~d? ·
Held: (1) Other evide~ce was available..- ;,The fact that the
petitioners were treated in the hospital by'~ doct.6r in question
could be testified to by other witnesses, induding the nurses who
must have been present. It cannot be assumed that µtere w_ouJd
be an insuperable objection to the_presenta~on .of th~. r.nedical
certificate -as to the wounds alleged to have been inflic~ed, as they
could very well show traces of such maltrea,tment. faren the leng,th
of their stay in the hospital could be verified }?y. ~ts recqrds_. :On:trus
point, an excerpt from People vs: Montejo (63 SCRA 488 (1975],) may
furnish guidance:
'Respondent Judge certainly has not been shown to be remiss
in the fulfillment of his judicial duties. On the contrary, the petition
would impute not only abuse of discretion, but grave abuse thereof,
when precisely he was manifesting fealty to the well-settled doctrine
that a trial judge should display receptivity to offers of evidence as
wE?ll as to searching questions with the end in viE?:w of having the
tru~ come out. It would appear then that the provincial fiscal who
filed this petition was motivated more by the apprehension and
misgiving that with further information and data furnished the
Court, an acquittal would be likely. That of itself is no argument for
a petition of this character.
Precisely, the constitutional rights granted on accused are
intended to assure a full and unimpeded· opportunity for him to
meet what in the end could be a baseless accusation. Moreover, at
the stage of the trial reached, there was an element of prematurity
to this proceeding. At any rate, the presumption to be indulged
is that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence
submitted by the respective parties. Petitions of this character
certainly deserve no encouragement from this Tribunal."'
Al~!Y.,.1,J,\L HlLL 0 11 l{lGl rrs 89-9
Rights of the Accused
J. Right Not to Appear at Trial
(2) ,Standa.rd .re,qµired for grant of certiorari has not been met. ~
"In tl}e light of ,what has b,een stated, it becomes obvious why as
of now, there is no.nee4 to make a definite pronouncement lln the
. ' ~ scope of the expanded.concept of the constitutional right to secur.e
not only the attendance of witnesses but the production of evidence,
Ali that the ·decision starids for is that the standard required for the
gr?,nt of certiorari has not been met." (Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514
[1980], through(;hiefJi{sfice Fernando.)
J. RIGfl:T NOT TO APPEAR AT TRIAL
Right of the accused to remain silent.
"An accused has the right to remain silent and not to present
evidence on his behalf.
(1) The right of the accused to be exempted from testifying
applies equaliy _to any compulsory disclosure of the guilt of the
offender himself, whether sought directly as the object of the inquiry
or iri.dii"e~tly and, incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts
involving an is~ue between other parties. (U.S. vs. Navarro, 3 Phil.
143 [1902].) ,,
(2) An accused, as a prosecution witness, occupies a different
tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege as each . question requiring an incriminating answer is
propounded at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the
witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in
reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People
would be to incriminate him. This may apply even to a co-defendant
in a joint trial. (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 [1968].)
When trial in the absence of the accused
allowed.
The constitutional right of the accused to be personally present
and to be heard in his defense by himself may be waived by him,
expressly or by implication, such as by his repeated failure to be
present at the hearings without justifiable reason. 4 (People vs.
4
The former rule did not allow waiver of the right. (see U.S. vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil.
223 [1904].) But it was relaxed 20 years later by making the presence of the accused
indispensable only at the following stages: (1) at the arraignment; (2) at the time of
 l
:I l !, ,\11 A l~1L', Ill , 1-I Ul , L t ltl l~ll ,11 11 \ltl l
\/00 •P!lll..ln'JNH 'ON8'n.'1't/fi.( ·N L L,AW l-J<.H.:. 14 ' H1$htB of tho Accused
Principles and C:ns1 ds I
J. Right Not to Appear at Tl'inl
·'. ·~. '

Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957.(1980}:) Th,e·:r'ig~/~

view of the rule a~Iow'ing tti'aNn Fabs,~fftli{~us~ltfriiai:~4yspfoceed
ijt~y- also• ·~.rWaiv~~.
hotwithstandingtheab.s'e nceoftne 1acctt§ej•pt16Vide'c:lfno¢~ver;'that
·three (3) conditions coh'cur) b'am·er f'' •~:·:'.: "J: .. · '· 1'·>· '.''':·..
. : . . . ., . -:· , .,_:J . ....-. Y,:.~; ~.~---~·--~;r~- ··:;·,··.,. ·;2 .-1~· ; :·' .'~.: t.:•-:. J
'(1) He has been ~ .rl)ignedHs~~.l~qrji;i fll• M~ndo,;z;a,;?7,,$ (.:~ 420
[1977].); . . , , ·., ; ,, . , ·; ,.. . .
(2) He has been duly notified df thitrfa!;>ruta··,i:• ·
(3) He fails to appear .and failure to ,app~~~is,unjµstifiable : (Sec.
14[2].) · . · .
The rule is in the interest of a speedy admihi.sti:lftioa of justice
which shoul~ be afforded not pnly to the {1.Ccµsed but to the offended
party as well. An accused cannot, by simply escaping £r9m prison .
or confinement, or by_jumping bail, or. fleeir),g to another country,
thwart his prosecution and possibly, ev~nfu'.al conviction provided
only that the three (3) co~ditions mentionec;i ~re pres¢nt. 6 (People vs.
S'.~las, 143 SCRA 163 [1986].) Tl;le prisoner.or accused i_s co.p,sidered to
at
hav~ waived his right to b~ pr,esenf th.e,tti?i an.cf to ,have recetved
n'6tice of the subsequent hearing/ (Estrada vi. People, 468 ,SCRA 233
[2005].) . (1) The right not to appear does not give the accused the right
Where presence of accused essential
for purposes of identification.
(1). Pr~sence may be compelled. - The provision. .of the Consti-
tµtiop.: a'!;tth~r~ing trial .in absentiq of ~e,a~cu~~4 ~ ~a$e of his nqn-
app_earance
. .
after arraignment
.
d~sp{te.nqtice
. , . .. sjmplY. ,riiean~·th~t he
' .
the defendartfs ·answerJ;,g the (:Ompl',tlnt, if he ,p}~.ad~ guilty; an_d (3) at :the ,time of the
pronouncement of the judgment. (see People vs. Francisco, 46 Phil. 403 [1924].)
5
Tohave. a valid trial in a~se~titi, there m~s~ first be. a prior artaigrune~tbecause it
is during the arraigrunent that the accused is Wormed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Actual arraigrunent .is an element of due process,'(N~lasco' VS.
Enrile, 139SCRA502 [1985].) . accused the right to ignore the terms of .the bond posted .by him in accordance with his
_ ~Wl_ie~ tile ~ccusedfails to appear duri~g the promulgation o/jud;e?J·! co!'v.iction) iq~
desp1~e notice, his_ arrest and .the: cartce.llatiott ofhis baff is proper. (People vs. Court ·of
J\ppeals, 503 SCRA 417 [2006]; see SE?c. 6, Rule 120,R\.tles C:oui:t.) . .of
7
• , ~e non-appearance of an accused at.the trial .o n ~,particuhu-_ datids,merely .a waiver
of ~s n ghtto.be pres:nt for trial at such date only and.not for the succee~ing trial dates.
(Cnsostomo vs. Sand1ganbayan, 456 SCRA 45. [2005].) In a cas·e, the petitioner failed to
inform his-counsel (who was,served with notices of the hearing) of his. whereabouts. The
validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment.in absentia was upheld for not
being in violation of his right to due process. (Senit vs. People, 778 SCRA 425 [2016].)
in
thereby,waives his right, :amongrothers, to meet the witnesses face to
face. (Carre~o vs. Peq'i?le! 183SCR,A273 [1990].) However, he cannot
'r-~!ye to~ci,ltr h~~ F;ifS.~t~?-~:e p.re,s!'lnt wh~11-Ns presence i.s ne~essary
fqr, purposElS ofid~ntification by prosecution witness which is vital
for his conviction.8 ' .
·(2) Exception. - An exception (i.e., his. p11esence may not be
..
compelled) is wh~n the_accusec;l m;i,q1.,talijied:ly admits in open court
~fte~ his arraigninent th,a t ~e is the p~rson named iJ.S defendant
in the case on trial. But a writte~ waiver stating that the accused
"admits that he can be identified by the prosecution witnesses in his
absence," is vagy.e and far from unqualified and the accused cannot,
therefore, seek the benefit of the exception. He may be ordered
arrested for failure to appear. (People vs. Presidfng Judge, 141 SCRA
37 [1986]; Carredo vs. People, supra.)
Where accused jumps :bail.
Except at the arraignment and at the trial when his presence is
necessary £pr .purpos.es·of identification, the accused may waive his
presence and he should not be ordered arrested for non-appearance.
He has a right not to appear.
to jump bail.9 Thus, where the accused continuously failed to appear
in court everytime the cas'e was called for trial the usual procedure
provided by the Rules of Court to determine the liability of the
bondsmen should be followed. 10
~In s.uch case,. he; m ay be compelled by the court t o be present despite his waiver
(Aquino, Jr. vs. Millta,ry Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA546 [1974); People vs. The Presiding
Judge, 125SCRA269 [1983); People vs. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA37 [1986).); otherwise, he may,
· iri liis defense say i:ha_t ·he ·w as·never 'identified as the person charged in the information
. and,..therefore, is en~tled to an ~cquittal. F~rthermore, it is possible that a witness may
not know the name of the culprit but can identify him if he sees him again, in which case
the latter's presence in court is necessary. (People vs,. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 [1978).)
.· .9'fhe,innova,ti0n· (ti;ial'inabsen,tia) irt~odu~edby the Constitution does not give the
constitutional right to bail. He may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the
court. (see Pei;,ple vs·. Prieto, Sr., supra; Carred_o vs. People, supra.) It is the duty of the ·
accused to inform the courtbefore~and if he is waiving his right to be p ersonally present
at the trial; otherwise, the court would be justified in presuming that he has jumped
bail. An accused who escapes after he has already been arraigned waives his right to be
present on .all subsequent trial dates until his custody is regained. (People vs. Daduyo,
414 SCRA 146 (2003].)
10A bail may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is
specifically required ·by the court or the rules of court and despite due notice to the
 f J
l'I Ill ,I l'l 'I N I((.' N!/1'1 l'U'l'J N.l\il , I. AW
· Principles ond Casas •'
,(2} He can also be tried in. absenti(-1., anq. a wapl'ant of&rrestissued
forhis·.apprehension w9uld be :p1'6per: . . :' , . :-,'. '. . time until the accused who escaped.from custody finally decides
(3) H the accused remafus at large, ·l jf sJ;:rgbld not"b~•hlforded
the right to appeal froni:a Juugftl:ent of conyicHdn
proipulgafod after
the trial in ab.sen,tia unless he voluntarily submits to'•.the jtirisdiction
of the court or is otlrerw1se arrested:· ·. · .·, , : ··
(4) While at'large, te ~dcti~~d\'.ciu-iitot s~~~ relief frozri ·court
as he is deemed fo1~a-&~--ivarve_ c{tff~.-sa:me··~4 -~a~ ·mSi s't~ding iri.
court. (People vs. Mapalao, 1Q7 S'~RA 79· [1$l9J]; :Phil. ~~bBit Bus.
Lin~s,In:c. vs. Peqple, ~7 · $CR.A ~56 t~boM:f the cotif has the
discr~tj.on to postpone the resol:utioi'i'of his" c~'e or
to· dismiss his
~~
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
An escapee was tried in absentia.
Facts: Two basic i~sues are raised in.the petition for certiorari
and mandamus. The first is whether or not a court loses jurisdiction
over an accused who after beiRg aFra,igned escapes from the custody
of the law. The other issue is whether an accused who has -been
duly tried in absentia retains his right. to present evidence on his
behalf and to confront and cross-examine w _ itnesses who testified
against him,
Issue: Above.
Held: (1) Jurisdiction continues once acquired. - "Jurisdiction
over a person once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties
but continues until the case istermmated. Thus, where the accused
appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, jurisdiction· is acquired by the court over his -p erson and
this continues until the termination 0£ the case, notwithstanding
his escape from the custody of the law."
(2) Court has duty to decide upon termination of trial in absentia.
- "If the absence i~ unjustified, the trfal court should proceed
with the reception of the evidence for the prosecution.. Upon the
te~mination of a trial in absentia, the coµrt has the duty to rule upon
bondsman to produce the accused before the court on a given dnte, the accused foils to
appear ns so required without satisfactory explanation for his non-production or non-
appearance. (sec Rules of Co\1rl', Rule 114, Sec. 21; Mnrcos vs. Ruiz, 213 SCR/\ '117 [1902).)
I 1
A lol l', )11 , 1111.1 , ~lll l~I .lll t 1 IJ\1 1
or
Hlghls the ACCLtfJCd
J. Right Not -to Appear at Tdal
the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the
to appear in court _to present his evidence and cross-~xa~e ~e
witnesses. against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this
purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial
_in'abs·entia. As it has been aptly explained:
'x x x The Constitutional Convention felt the need for
tne such -a PI?Vision as there were quite a number of reported
instances where the proceedings against a defendant had to
·be stayed :indefinitely because of his non-appearance. What
the ConsHtution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued
enj.oyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved.
. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his
absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse
could be remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society
and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it
that crime should not go unpunished.' 11
. (3) Accused is still presumed innocent. - "The contention of
the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is
untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction
must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such
evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also,
there can be no violation of due process since the accused was
given the opportunity to be heard."
(4) Accused is deemed to have waived right to confrontation and
examination. - "Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been
tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present
evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of
which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court
has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be
waived. (U.S. vs. Anastacio, 6 Phil. 413 [1906); U.S. vs. Rota, 9 Phil.
426 [1907]; U.S. vs. Binayon, 35 Phil. 23 [1916]; U.S. vs. Golanco, 11
Phil. 575 [1908].) In the same vein, his right to present evidence on
his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection,
may be waived by him.
· 11Citing E.M. FERNANDO, The Constitution ofthe Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 701.
904 PIHLll l~lNH 'ON ~'l'l'rU'fl N4U, l..AW
• Principles nnd Castis,i "' ,
:Finally, at this point, We note :that our prqn:o,unc~m~nt in: ·this
,· case is buttressed by the pi:qvisions,of.t h·eJ985.,R~les ·b):i •t;:.viminal
Procedure, particularly ·section' l(c). :o( Rule·r-115 wlticl,i;-dearly
reflects the intention of the framers of10ur C.onsi:itutiort,-to ,wU: ·
~ • ·_, ·, --~ · -,- . _: ~:-~. ·...}::.:.·,,: · r ~ . ·
7 · _. · ~ 1 ,- • , ; •
'x X X The absence o.f the acc1,1s~d wtJ;hout any" ju_$tif:iable
cause at the trial b"n a particular date o{ which he_l),ad ncitice
shall be considered a waiver of his;tr~ghf~o ~e-pr¢~ent during
that trial. When ~n fl~_cus~d urrder _7~t~~thqd•~eJ~ 1;19tified
of the date of the trial and es-cap~s, ·he::~1),.all. be deer,ned to
have waived his right to be. present 'on ·sa:i,d_ ~ate and on all
subsequent trial dates until rustody;is i:~ga~ed.' ' --,
Accordingly, it is Our consid~~~d,.opmi6:l1:· and We· so hold,
that an e~capee who. ];,.as been. duly tii_e d in qbsentia :w~ives .his
right to present evidence on his OWI?. J!>.ep~H-,~~.
t~ -~~ri-TTJ?nt and
cros,s -examine witnesses who testified, -a~~4,:-.~t,hi11;.':. _
((;imenez vs.
Na:+areno; 160 SCRAJ [1~88], through Justice gan9ayco.)
, (5) P~rpose of rule. --,-.11ThepU:rpose.6f$Js ~le i_s,t0 speedup
the di~position of criminal cases_;- tiia1 of.whic~ ·could in. the past
be indefinitely deferred, and many' tim,~s cc:nhplet~ly abandoned, .
because of th,e defendant's escape .. The'·•dH:rcas.~ oLPeople
Avancena (32 0.G. 713.) requfred''his ptegeftce it ·cei::tairt'§tages of
the trial" which, as a result; had 'to p~ '.disi;:6nth:ttiM·afi the idng'as·
cl.efendant had not reappeared or tema.fu.M aflarge. As· his :right to .
be 'present at these stages :w as thei-i. held not waivabie_even by his
escape; such escape thus ope:i:ated to the :f ugitive's 'a dvantige, and
in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the· trial could riot proceed
as long as he had not been recaptured. .
The doctrine laid down in tha.t case has peen modified by
Section 19 which now allows tria.1 in_absen,tia. Now, . the prisoner ·
cannot, by simply escaping, thwart his continued proseeu.tion and
possibly, eventual conviction provided only that: a} he has been
arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure ·
to appear is unjustified."
(6) Escape can never be a legal justification for the discontinuation
of trial. - "Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past,
his escape 'rewarded' him by postponing .a ll further proceedings
against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he
was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally speak-
ing, operate to his disadvantage by preventing him from attendlug
his trial, which will continue even in hls nbsencc nn.d 1no11t ll kvly
' A1'\t ~ MI. l ~l) ; I, t II 1( 1 :111 !
Hlghts of tho M ou11od
J, Rlght N o t to Appcol' at. 'li'lnl
result1in his ccmvktion. He wi'll be,i:leemed to have received due
notice. Th.E!r same fad-of ti.is escape; will make his failur~ to ap.pear
unjustified because he has,,by estaping, placed himself beyoncl. the
.':,. ~ -- _ •
pale, ano p.rotettiom,_ofthe law." : -
Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja vs, Mendoza (77 SCRA
42~ (1977,].): because it w~.s held n0n,v,ithstanding that the accused
had not 1?.Et¢n :p reviously ar,raigned. :WJs. subsequent conviction was
properly .s~t a.sWE:, ;But in ~e)nstant c;se, since all the req~isites
c;1.re p,:esept, .l;here is absolutely no reasqn why the respondent Judge
should refuse,tq·try the acC1,1.sed, w.ho hi;ld \l.lready been arraigned
at the time he was released on the illegal, bail bond." (People vs.
Salas, 143 SCRA. 163"[1"9$6], through Justice Cruz. )
Promulgation. of judgment
in_criminal cases.
. · (1) Section 612 of Rule 120 C?f the Rules of Courts, a new provi-
sion, provides_for tlie p romulgation of jud~ents in criminal cases:
vs. • 12Promu/gatir;m of judgment,: - The,judgment is promulgated by reading it in the
p_r.~sence qtthe aq:used,_~d any judge of the qourt .in whicl). it was ren~ered. However; if
the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced m the presence of
his counsel 'or representative. When the.judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment ·m ay be promulgated by the clerk of court.
. If the a_ccused is confil)ed or de.tained in another province or city, the judgment may
be p romulgated by the execµtive judge of the Regional Trial Court having "jurisdiction
over the place of confinement or detention upon tequest of the court which rendered the
judgment, The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice
of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the dccisi_on of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of
the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from
prison, the notice to him shall be served at his las t known address. .
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in
the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his las t known address or through
his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation
of judgment, however, the! nccusC!d mrty surrender and file a motion for leave of court
to ovnll o( these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
pro1n11lf!nllon nnd If he proves thnt hln nbsonco wns for n juslifinblc cause, he shall b e
llll!lW(ld ltl nvnll of nnlcl HllllOcllrt1within flfl11(111 ( l!l) doy11 from nollcc."
 IJ
!>06 PHILlPl?INE ONS'l'll'UTION ¥t\,L LAW Sec. 14
Principles nnd Cnses ,
. . (a) The. first paragrapb; c;,£ Secti,_o_n .(S i4¢1)1s.:w-l$h:th~iPersonal
. ;pr.esence of the accused,at the-,promt'tlgati~m_.-,0£ juclgtnerit ru:td its
exception, i.e., in the ~J.ls:e;;ota, ljghtcpft~~~ fuW,.f¢r~·~s--personal
presence is dispensed with. He ,mayriippea~~ throqg'h ·counsel or
representation, . 1 . •. . - • :,, ~ ·_
<;)</J .Jf , . O-F HABEAS-CORBUS
(b) The third paragraph;· a new· provision, !pr0¥ides for
the promulgation .of-juci1gmeht' in 'absentia:J!111e:··¾J:n\en:q.fu~nt is
intenc~ed to obviate the'sifu.a:'ficfri 'in: th(fp~~r~Jfote•.the11udicial
process could :be subverted by the -accµse~''Jum.ptng o~il t9.
frustrate the promulgatiort 'of judgment~Wh~re'tne'dvilli~bility
ex delicto was institut~<:l with the cr~q1in~l ~~.tip~;.
·µ_{e of.fended
party could not enforce, without the atn~hdatory pr6vision,
either the primary liability of the accused· or any subsidiary
civil liability, where proper and involv..e d in the ease; ,a s"no
judgment could be promulgated. Since the promu'lgation of the
judgment is merely the procedural cul~ination pf.,the trial, the
pro111ulgation thereof can justifiably. be made in abser_itia in th~
manner set out in Section 6.
(2) All the accused, regardless of the -gravity of the offense
charged against them or the penalty imposed on them, must be given
notice of the promulgation of judgmentand the requirement of their
pres~nce, in person or, in the case of those facing a conviction for a
light offense, through counsel or representative.. If the judgment is
for conviction, the failure of the accused to appear witho:ut valid
justification will notonly cause the issuance of an order for his arrest
but alsofor the confiscation of his bail bond ifhe is on bail. 13
-ooo~
13
It has been h eld that the absence of co~sel during p~omulgation o f the judgment
will not violate any subs tantial right of the accused, and does not affect the validity of
the promulgation. (see Bernardo vs. Abete, C.A. No. 6076, Jan. 31, 1940; Gonzales vs.
Presiding Judge, 186 SCRA 101 [1990).)
'.t~{.(~Jt~<fEi)F/rU}fWRfr,
-.
.SEC. 15. The p~vilege of lhe .writ 'of habeas corpus
slia~l not be su,sp!!nded _exc;~pU1,1 c~s~s on invasion or re-
b~llion when th~ l?,\1.blic sa~ety r~qu_ires it.
Meaning
. .. corpus..
of writ of habeas
A writ is a court order; the term habeas corpus means "(that) you
have the body."
Fund'!:ffielitally, the writ of habeas corpus is an order issued by
a court of competent jt,irisdiction, directed to the person detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, and to show sufficient cause for holding
in custody the individual so detained.
Purpose and importance of the writ.
(1) Habeas corpus is a highly prerogative writ. It has for its
purpose to inquire info all manners of involuntary restraint, 1 as
1
lt is necessary that there should exist true or actual and effective restraint or
deprivation of liberty. A nominal or moral restraint is not sufficient. (see Zagala vs.
lliustre, 48 Phil. 282 [1925]; Sombong v s. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 663 [1996]; Manalo
vs. Calderon, 536 SCRA 290 [2007].) The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus
is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. (Sangca vs. City Prosecutor,
524 SCRA 610 [2007].) Restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabqut
of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form .of illegal detention
or restraint of liberty. (Ampatuan vs. Macaraig, 622 SCRA 266 [2010].) But if the actual
effect of the external moral compulsion is to place a person at the mercy of another, the
victim is entitled to the writ as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of his
liberty by duress or physical coercion. (Caunca vs..Salazar, 82 Phil. 851 [1949), infra.)
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense as to entitle
a person to the remedy. The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on
the petition for the issuance of the writ. (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Datuhang Malang Salubo vs. Warden, Quezon City Jail, 756 SCRA 296 [2015].) Under the
Rules of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 102. thereof), the writ is also available in cases involving the
rightful custody over a minor.
907

908 . PHILlPl'lNE 'ONS'f1TU1'1ONAL LAW 5cc. 15
Principles and Cases
distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a :p erson therefrom if
such restraint is found illegal or when the accased's ..constitutional
3r at
rights_ ar~ disres,arde~~<~P..~Y~\~fC~O.V:thu~!"~P' rni~. 778 [1?19}.)
Its prmc1pal, purp·ose' tli~h1iJ td set·tli'.e md1vtciual hberty, 1.e,; to
order his release il:-111.ilftit~mH'c)lnJs'. £~~d it~ b:e1 iHegal. It may issue
ev'en if another remeqy (e.g.,. appeal)~which is less effective, may be
availed of by the pe.~sc;m.. (Chavez vs. Court ofAppeals, 24 SCRA 663
(1968]; Santiagoiv-s.½likp,ala; 26:S_C ~356:[19~S).) · /' · · . liberty of a person:· ·
(2) Wiilibuti the ' \~li'aran'f~e •\jf · ha/J.eas \ c0rpits, _iritpri_sprurient
is possible ~ithout eX:plahafion. or·:·r edrtis; 'fbr Iaw '-enforcement
authofi:ties :could d~tain a per,so~J o~-,~~.-,\ e~9~ . ?f ti~mr, ~!~
11,0 basis for detention. But the granttrtg· of the relief cannot be
predJcated , on the mere disappearance. o.f a - person. It must be
established by e-0mpetent and convincing _e vidence tha-t the mi~sing
p~r~.~f\·,m who_se -~el_lalf ,the p.etitt~m'. .is filed, i_s .~d~r the !=UStody
of -the r~~.pon¢ent. (Ng~y.a-an vs, Balw_~g,. ZOO $CRA, 14J (199~].)
Th~ ;writ~ay~not be used _as a means-of ohta~g evid_e nc~ on !h~
wh.e.r~abouts o,€ a per-son. (Subayno vs. Ponce Enrile., 145 SCRA, 289
{1986].) .
Consistently, with the .purpose and importance of the writ, the
rules on habeas corpus should be lib.et.ally applied. Thus, in a case the
decision in which has b ecome final,_the Supreme Comt treated a
motion for reconsideration as a substantial compliance with the
~les· and ordered the release of the accused appellant it appearing
she has already served more than maximum of the imposable
pen~lty.2 _(People vs. Labriaga, supra.) A motion for execution of a
hapeafro,:pus decision is not required .
2"Case law has expanded the writ's application to circumstances where there is
deprivation of a p erson's constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person
continµes ,to be·unlawfully denied of one or· more of his constitutional freedoms, wliere
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has ·later become
arbitrary, · · ·
However,-a mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not sufficient.
11:ie courts will extend the scope of the writ only if arty '?f the following cir~stances is
a
presenfr(a)there·is·a deprivation of constitutional right res~ting in the ~awful restraint
of a person;'(b):the court had no furisdiction to impose the sen:tence;_or· (c) an excessive
penalty is ·imposed and such sentence Is void as to the excess. Whatever 'situation the
petitioner invokes,. the-threshold remains high. TI1e violation of constitutional right must
be sufficient to void the entire proceedings." (Alejano vs. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188 [2005].)
AR:J', HL 1311,1 , 11 1<.l 'll'l'S
Privilege ofthe W_rit of Habeas Corpus
. How wFJt ,9per.ates.
• The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective - to inquire
into the cause of the detention of a person. If found illegal, the
court orders his release; 'if proven lawful; then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminates. (Petition for Habeas Corpus of A. Kunting,
487 SCRA 602 (4006] ;)
' 'This is hdw the writ of. habeas corpus operates to safeguard the
The prisoner or any person in his behalf petitions the proper
court, which immediately issues the writ. It is sent to the person
having another in his custody. Such person is ordered to produce
the prisoner in court at a specified time together with an explanatio~
q
of 'the cause of the detention, called the return.3 After the order 1s
obeyed, the judge scrutini~es the return and then decides whether it s/Jows
l thilf the irtJprisonment is authorized by law. If so, the pris?ner is remanded
- sent back to custody. If not, he is set free at once by the7udge. 4 (see Rules
of Court, Rule 102.)
The return ofthe writ must be taken on its face value. Unless it
is in some way traversed or denied, the facts stated therein must be
taken as true. (Lorenzo vs. McCoy, 15 Phil. 559 [1910].)
Availability of the writ.
The writ is the proper remedy in each and every case of
confinement or detention by which any person deprived of his
liberty without legal cause or authority. (Villavicencio vs. Lukban,
supra; People vs. Padilla, 92 SCRA591 [1979].) may obtain immediate
relief. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral. (Illusorio vs. Bildner, 332 SCRA 169
[2000].)
3The order to present the detained individual before the court is a preliminary step
in the hearing of the petition. (Alejano vs. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188 [2005].) Every person .
who unlawfully disobeys the court's commands or unlawfully resists its execution is ~
contempt of court and may be summarily punished therefor. Disobedience to the wr_1t
may take the form of neglecting or refusing to produce the person whose presence 1s
sought by the writ, of failing to make a return, of making a false or evasive return, or of
refusing to obey the final order or judgment entered in the proceedings. (Contado vs. Tan,
160 SCRA 404 [19-88).)
4See CHAFFE, The Most Important Right in the Constitution, 32 Boston Univ. Law
Rev.143.

9HJ J:l) LL.1Pl'l NH ' NS'fl'l't)'!'.t l'i41Al.l'. LAW
Principles and Cas'err ,11· 1
(l) It can be invoked by a prisoner, who "has · •t,mdergone
imprisonment for a period more thaF),,the:~~~um ,itJ;l.prisoµrnent
which could have been properly . iri1PP~,e.d · ·bn h,im. ..(Lamen vs.
Director, Bureau of C0n:ectio:µs, 24} SQR.J\ .573 [19Q.~];. R~ople vs.
Labriaga, 250 SCRA 163 [1995].) .. ; _
(2) It will lie not only when someone is deprived 0f ,liberty, but
also when he is wrongfully pr~venJed ft:<i>m.:•e?(etfjsing .th~ il\?gal or
rightful custody, to which he is entitled, over; anothe,r..per~on. (Ortiz
vs. Del Villar, 57 Phil. 19 (1932]; Veluz vs_. Villanueva, 543 SCRA 63
[2008].) ,· . . •,'
(3) It is an appropriate i:emedy t,o obt<}.i.o: t:l).e f~~edqm of an
accused who is denied his right to speedy trfal. (<;:onde vs. Rivera,
45 Phil. 650 [1923].) It may be availed of wl)~r.~, as a c9nseqµ~nce of a
judicial proceeding, there has:been a dep_riv~t,j.<;>ri of a constij;utional
right (the court th!1t rendered the judgmetj.t ~s. deeme_cl ousted of
jurisdiction) resuHll)g in the restraint of a pe_rson, or the coµrt had
no jurisdiction · to impose the sentence, or· an exc~ssive sentence
has been imposed as such sentence is votd as to such excess. CFeria
vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCR,A 525 0[2000]'; Orfhilla vs; .Director of
Bureau of Corrections, Si2 SCRA 177 [2007].} · · · · · · vs. Macalino, 416 SCRA 390 (2003).) The function of the special
Non-availability of the writ.
(1) Where privilege ofthe writ has been suspendeq.5 -The privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus (not the writ itself)m?y be s.u ~pended by
the President (Art. VII, Sec. 18.) in case only ofinv~s.i on or rebellion,
when public safety requires it.6 Consequent!~ the _person under
detention by the 'g overrunent may pot obtain his liberty by the use
of the privilege. · detention through the writ as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. (Abarca vs. Ver,
(a) While the person detained must still be produced in
court, the official or person detaining him may ask the court
not to continue the proceeding any further as the privilege of
the writ as to that particular person seeking release has been
suspended. Unlike in cases where the privilege of the writ is
5This topic is.further discussed under Article VII (Executive Department), Section 18
in Volume 2 of this work.
"The phrase "or Imminent clnnger thereof" hns been d eleted bccnuAc of Its nmblflulty.
Insurrection which la the 8n mc no rebellion lo no longer n ground for tho u1111po1111lo11 uf
rho prlvllogo.
l
1\ 1{~'. Ill. 1111.1 , tJI I l{ lt ,I 11 1 Ill I
l' tlvllcgc ol t:hc \Yl'lt o( Ilnbuas C.:01·p11s
available and in full •fore~ and effect, the judge thus may be
prevented in the,event of suspension from determining whether
or not the detention is authorized by law.7 •
(b) The suspension of the privilege of the writ enables the
State "to holg in preventive imprisorunent pending investj.gation
anq. trial of persons who plot against it or commit acts that
~rtdanger its very ~xistence."8 (see Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, 121
SCAA 472 [1983].)It does not, however, destroy a person's right
and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention
and other violation of his constitutional rights. Neither does it
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention, nor suspend
the right to bail. (Sec. 13.)
(2) Where confinement,9 illegal at beginning, has become legal at tfre
time offiling of the application. - In such case, the rule is that a writ of
habeas iorpus will not be granted. 10
. ·(3) Wh~re war.rant of commitment has been issued after filing of
information. - Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening
events . may bar his release or discharge from custody. (Jackson
proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
7See TAl'lADA and FERNANDO, op. cit., p. 530.
TheSupreme Court is empowered by the Constitution to inquire, in an appropriate
proceedings filed by any citizen, whether or not there was factual basis to justify the
suspension by the President of the privilege. (see Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.)
8
What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
160 SCRA 590 [1988],)
9
Habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. (Aqui•
no vs. Esperon, 531 SCRA 788 [2007].)
11>fhus, it has been held:
"But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its incep-
tion, the records show that formal d eportation charges have been filed against them, as
undesirable aliens, on March 4, 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on
March 7, 1988 'for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section
69 of the Administrative Code.' A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of
Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The writ
has served its purpose. The purpose of the law is being followed." (Cruz vs. Montoya, 62
SCRA 543 (1975}; see Lucien Tran Van Nghin vs. Liwag, 175 SCRA 318 (1989).)
" lt Is n [unclnmentnl rule that n writ of /1nbens corpus will not be granted when the
conrlnomcnt ls or hns become lcgol, although such confinement was illegal at the begin-
ning.'' (1lnrvoy vu. Dofonsor-Snntingo, 162 SCRA 840 [1988),)

.J'I 111 ,11 'l ' I N l l 't >Nii t l' l l J ,l' L N J\ 1, LAW
l'd nclplcs and CdMs ' 'f •1
detention.U · Where the detained persbri';s·' detenti.orl·.r was later
made1'by virtue of a judicial order,:4rt,~ire:latioridt-o' ·at cmmina:1:case
subsequently filed against him~.•liref'e:>@t the~:aour:tjithEt i r~:rnedy of
11r~P~q~ corpus no lo~ger ij~s;,-1 2
tii,s ::P.folt\~q~lf?f;':MP-)1S£~o/.urJ:>ecomes
m?_ot .and acaderm,c. •(~~.!,~~ Y~·. _qf1q~-~1c]?.:~~-~ ~.?!7-J}9?:,l)
The
wnt should not be, allo,~~~ aftrLllif1e,,ar~;r,;~~~1\~ .t?:.P.~ r~\~a~ed
~ad b~~~ charged 11_~,tqre _a ny coµrt 'or ~tt,,?};j¾,~iFiai'.P?-~Y,.'.1$1/erm
court mcludes.theGeneral Court-:-Maro,ai,,,Nav~\~s vs:·Abaya, 441
SCRA 393 [2004]; Aquino vs. Esperon, 53t SC;RA 78'8 [2007].)
, ., . I ; . . . .
Detention under a valid informatiqn is ,~me thu:i.g; arbitrary
detention anterior thereto is another.13 '.fhey;,are separate q:mcepts.
The second is illegal; but the first is not. (Medina, Jr. vs. 01.iozco, Jr.,
18 SCRA 1168 [1966].)
(4) Where detained person has been released. -The writ should not
issue where it is not necessary to afford the pe.titioner relief or where
it would be ineffective. 14 (Ybanez vs. Ponce Enrile, 145 SCRA 282
[1986).) There are exceptions. (see Manalo vs. Calderon, 536 SCRA
290 [2005].)
11The S~preme Court's original jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus (see Art.
Vlll, Sec. 5.) 1s shared by the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts.
12
"SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - I£ it appears that the person
alleged to be _restrained of ~s libert):' is in the custody ~f an officer under process issued
by a court or Judge or by v1rt1.1e of a Jt1dgment or order of a court of record, and the court
or jud~e had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; .or if the j1.1risdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any i,n.formality or defect in the process,
Judgment or orde~. Nor shall_ anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
pers~n charged with or conv'.cted of an offense in the PMippines, or .o f a personsuffering
unpnsonrnent under lawful Judgment." (Rule 102, Rules of Court.) ·
By filing a motion for bail, the accused admits that he is under the custody ·o f the
court and_ voluntarily_ submits his_ person to its jurisdiction. The denial of the motion by
the co1.1rt 1s .an uneqmvocal assertion of its authority to keep him in custody. (Velasco vs.
Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677 [1995).) ·
13Release of the detainee will be a futile act, as it will be followed by immec;liate
~e-arrest pursuant to a new and valid warrant of arrest. His remedy is the quashal of the
information ano/ or the ~arrant of arrest duly issued. (Bemarte vs. Co1.1rt of Appeals,263
SCRA 323 [1996).) If no mformation can be filed against a prisoner because the records
of the_case have bee~ los~ in the eyes of the law, he is not guilty or does not appear to
be guilty; hence, he 1s entitled to be set free. (Ordonez vs. Director of Prisons 235 SCRA
152 [1994].) · ' the. judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded i ts jurisdiction.in imposing the pen-
14
, The dismissa~ ?f a petition for a writ of habeas cor(lllS is without prejuoice to the
filmg of another petihon should new factual circumstnnces wnrrnnt it. (Ybaf\ci: vs. Ponce
Em ile, supra.)
llu '. I , A li •~. (lll\,1 ll) l li,J,, t1 l~l !i.:J 11 I
l1 rivllcgc of the W1,lb.0£i.l,fobeos1Corpus
i "' (a) .A, petition. f9rt-its .issue'.·becomes moot and academic
., ,where the. de.tanry.ed;p,ersol.11: has, been-released' (Alejandro vs.
. Minister ·0£ Justjce~ .142.. SCRA'2'i.16S[~986]t.1) 1rwhether per~~ent
,.. ;,9[ _te~p9r?!,}7 J9lfi-se 9l ;i;h~ S9.¼~itg{,q~n~~al, vs, De Ca,i,tro, 529
,. _': f~RA: 15?_ l?~O?l}--~~of~ _a/ .it_q,\te~~9!W the l~.p~l~ty. of the
, .. -~Nest ap.d: 9-~tenhe>,A of pet~t101,1er .(!q~o :7s. Court ~f Appeals,
. Jg o.r
S:CMZ~9_;[1~~2JJ, is not ~dya:Uy',~e~tpiip.~d o.f. ~~ lib_erty.
. tt ts tpe. ~vol~tary ,and ill~g~l resq;(llll~) h~t hq~·eas corpus as a
swift and e1ficaci911s remedY. is intended' t:6 reach'. (Cayaga vs.
' T~gonari, 66 SCRA
. 216 [1975].)
. . .
, . . .; .
(b) An accused in -a criminal case who is at liberty on bail
may no longer avail himself of that :vemedy £or the purp0se of
nullifying th_e order of arrest issued against him in the criminal
case. (Zacarias vs. Cruz, 30 SCRA 728 [1969).)
(5) Where the object is .to correct alleged errors offact 01· law committed
by a lower court. - Habtas corpus cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error.
(a) The Supreme Court cannot, in habeas corpus proceedings,
review the record in·a criminal case after judgment of conviction
has been rendered, and the defendants have entered on the
execution of the sentence imposed, to ascertain whether the
facts found by the trial court were in accordance with the
evidence discl~sed by the record, or to pass upon the correctness
of conclusions. of law by the trial court based on the facts thus
found. 15 (In the matter of the Petition for the Privilege of Habeas
Corpus, In Re Azucena,L. Garcia, 339 SCRA 292 [2000].)
· (b) Habeas·corpus~ is a high prerogative writ which furnishes
an extraordinary remedy and may not thus be invoked under
normal circumstances. The determination of legality of an
order and warrant , of arrest cannot be resolved in a petition
for habeas corpus but not where an illegal order and warrant of
15Under the statute, a commitment in due form based on a final judgment convicting
and sentencing a defendant ina criminai case is·conclusiv.e evidence9£ the legality of-his
detention under su<;h commitment, unless it appears that the -court which pronounced
alty. Mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depr-iving the trial court of
its jurisdiction over the cau se and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be
corrected on appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law. (Ibid.)

J' IILl , ll ' l'I N I( 1
UN/j l l l LJ ll1 lNA I.L AW
Pdnclplcs one! Cnsas , ,
, ar11est subsists and the ,arrestee, has no spe~dy, adequate remedy
or,;appeal in the ordinary· course. oL:law, 16;·€Calvan.vs; Court of
Appeals, 341 SCRA806,[2000].) .... ,.,·
(c) When a coutl'has 'jt'.i tisdic~.6~.·:d(fu~ . o'ffei:~e ch~rged
;J, .
and the party wno 1s ·cBarged,)J!'rj'i4d'ginent, 'order, or decree
is not subject to collateral attack by' h,ab~as ·corpus. The writ of
habeas corpus can no:t b~ ~ade to perform the functi0n·of writ of
error;, and'tm\~&J<f~ ti:u,e'~v~ff:ift!}~ j_~d~¢1:t; ?t~er,_ or .decree
were erroneous, provided, 1t, .1s. w1tffi.n• the Junsd;ction of the
court which rendered such· judgment ot"issued such an order or
decrE1e, (Slade Perkins vs. Director of 'P-fisbn:s, 58 Phil. 271 (1938];
.see Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, 45iSeRA 312 [2005].) ·
l service employees. (Manalo vs. Calderon, 536 SCRA 290 [2007];
. , ,.. (d) the wdt qf habeas corpus cannot l;i_e used to ~i.rectly assail
• •l ' ' ' ' -~ ' • .. - • I • / ,
a judgment rendered by a competerit'court' or tribunal which,
·· having duly acquired jurisdiction~·was not deprived or ousted
of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the
proceedings. Review·of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very
specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c} an excessive penalty
has been imposed, -as such sentence is void as to such excess. (In
re The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa, 442 SCRA
706 [2004].)
(6) Where an alien is detained by the Bweau of Immigration and
Deportation. - Where the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) has not yet completed its hearing and investigation with
respect to.an and there is no showing that itis unduly delaying its
decision, the writ is not available. Alo,ng the same vein, when an
16
writ o_f _h~beas corpus, , although. not designed to interrupt the orderly
• '.'The.
a~nurustration of JUStice, can be invoked, in fine, by the attendance of a special
arcu_mst:ince that requires immediate action. Such a special circumstance is here present
considering that respondent cannot resort to the remedy of a motion to quash, the case no
longer being with petitioner judge, and neither could he ask for a reinvestigation because
the preliminary investigation for p urposes of filing the information has .nlrendy been
taken over by the Provincial Prosecutor. The latter, upon the other hnnd, docs not hnvo
the authority to lilt the warrant of arrest issued ·by the disqunlifiecl judgo.'' (Ibid.)
l
1\,1'(. I , Ill , 1111 , 1, ~II I l{ lld 11 Ill ~
!i i ', I!
Pl'ivllug, of 1ho Wdt of llnbollll 'orpus
alien is detained hy·.t he.,BID pu:rsuMt to an order of deportation! as
where a Summary· Deportation: Order had already been issued i'by
the BID, the regional trial courts have no power to relea~e the said
~lj~n on bail even, Jn ha/Jeas corpus proceedings b~cause there is tl<D
l~~ aµthqrizing _i~:.p.~od,rigur;z vs. Bol).ifa~io, 344 SCRA 519 [20001.)
. (7:) Where polie.e . officers-. facing grave administrative case under
restrictive eustotiy.. -;-:- Suclt : custody is a disciplinary measure
, aµthorized uhde,r -Mie -P NP law to assure that said police officers
a:re ,always ~ccou:nte_<;l ' for. It is at. best . nominal restraint which
is-beyond the ambit .or habeas c;orpus. It cannot be considered as a
form of curtailment of ·their freedom guaranteed under the Consti-
tution. Police officers are not similarly situated with ordinary civil
'
Ampatuan vs. Ma:~raig, 622 SCRA 266 [2010]; Note 1.)
(8) Other cases. .~
(a) The writ may not be used as a means of obtaining
evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding
out who has specifically abducted or cause the disappearance
of a certain person. The proper remedy is not a habeas corpus
proceedings, but a criminal investigation and proceedings.
(Martinez vs. Mendoza, 499 SCRA234 [2006].)
(b) A husband cannot be compelled to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority. (Ilusorio vs. Bildner,
332 SCRA 169 [2000]; 361 SCRA 427 [2001].)
Remedy where warrant of commitment
has been issued.
·If a detained person questions his detention because of improper
arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the
remedy is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a motion before
the trial court to quash the warrant of arrest, and / or the information
on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation/
reinvestigation of the case. (Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310 [1968].)
Habeas corpus wouid not lie after the warrant of commitment has
been issued by the court on the basis ofthe information filed against
 J,1111,1 ,ll'L'J NH ' O NII 111 IJ I 10 1\1 1,\Jr'} •I\ W
• Pl'inclplca on(l.~o~es 1• , , :
the aq:used,11 This is explicitlyprqy;i~~f 'f~H:,;~ ];,~e,9µ81\H,r!~~lE; 1,0_~
9£:the Rajei, of Cow;t. (Ilagan -y:s ...E.~~l~;,_;J3Q.$C:::M9191:U~~5,l.) .., •
t, •. - ., • .
In exceptional circumsta'.lices, habeas 'cdrpui way be granfed by
the courts even when the person concerned is,.d!c!t~ined pursuartt to .
a vaJid-atrest or after his voJunfary-'shfrenliet·:o:r -rn:-'t he custody of
an.officer under proc;es_sjssuedJ:,y a :cqurt·which-·l\l:ad; j~isdkq'on to
issue the same. Thusi the writ may -b e iss.ue'.<;l W:hElpg; the-depriv.ation
of liberty, while ipitia11y valiq und~r; the, ·lawz,,)'.l~9- later: bec;<Qrne.
invalid, and even throl:lgh the person.pr-aying..fo.T.its. issuanc;e was.
not completely depriV,ed,of his liberty. -(SEma.piq,vs..,Sandiganbayan,
396 SCRA 443 [2003]; Parede.s v;s. S.andtgclllb~yan; ..193 .SCRA 464,
[1991].)
Remedy to secure provisional liberty.
The writ is not the appropriate vehicle·for asserting one's right
to bail. .It cannot be-availed of where the accused is ~r;ttitled to bail
----;-- . , , . . . . . :·I
1
71n Umil. vs. Ram~s
(187 SCR!,. 311 [1?90].), ~e petitior;i~rs, m\\de 11 p lea thaJ the
Supreme Coui:t abandon its pronouncement in Il11gan vs. E11'ri(e (139 SCRA 349 [1985],
infrn.) that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an informationis filed against
a person detained and a warrant of arrestis fasuecl by the.courtwhere•s.iid informa1!6h has
been filed, claiming that said ruling which was handed down during the past dictatorial
regime, makes possible.the arrest and detention of innocent.persons despite the)ai:k of .
evidenc~ aga,i nst them, for after a petition for hqbeas. co_rpU$ 1s ,fi]eq, the: auth.Ofities .can
simply file the criminal information-to be. able tci' h\de b~d.'the pt6fecfive mantle of •
said .doctrine -' · ·· · ' ·. ·. '- : :·- · · · · ' : "· · ·:
The Su;reme .Courbaid that a t~apprni~al '-Of the,,~o~ine ~hltfu,
is based-upori
an express provision of the Rules of Coµrt. is no.t the_.answer. '.'.T,he .fears expressed by
the petitioners are not really irremediable. The• answer and 'the better practice would
be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to -a mere inquiry as to whether ·or not the
court which issu ed the process, judgment or otden:,f commitment or:before whom the
detained person is charged had jurisdiction or not to issue the proce~s,jm;Igment or order
or to take cognizance of the case but rather, as. the court itself st~ted in''Morales, Jr. vs.
Enrile (121 SCRA538 [1983].), 'in all petitions for habeas corpus, the coµrt mustinquire into
custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of th~ petition' and '?nlY after
such a scrutiny can the court satisfy 'itself that the due process clause of our· Constitution
has, in fact, been satisfied.' In short, all cases involving deprivatiort of individual liberty
should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate sci:utiny and disposition."
18
SEC. 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, nnd wizen let to bml. - If it
appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, nnd is plnin'ly nnd spcciilcally chnrgcd
in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable 1,,y dcnth ho shnll not be
released, discharged, or bailed. Tf he in lnwh.1lly lmprlsonod or r<:ati:nlnod on II chnr110 of
having committed nn offense not HO p1111l11hnbk', lw niny bu r11c,,111nilllt1d 10 l111pd11tl111l11ml
or ndmlllod to bnll In lho dl11rm1ln11 or1hu rn111•1 01· j11d11<•. xx x"
I I,.. I A l I', Ill , Jlll ,l , i ,i1 I l ld 11 ' 111 ,
l1dvllcgc df tht W:cll of ( fobon11 l'orpllll
not as a matter of right 'but on the discretion of the court and the
latter has not abuse·d,~Jch discretion in refusing to grant bail.
The correct cou·r se is for the accused to file a petition to be
admitted to bail with'the court where the criminal case is pending and
to allow hea:rings thereon to proceed. (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148468, Jan. 28, 2003.) In the absence of exceptional
circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will not grant
the writ and discharge the prisoner in adv.ance of a determination
of his case in court. (Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685
[1994].) But the writ may still be invoked if the process, judgment
or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of
which may be assailed. (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391 [1970],)
Release of detained person, a matter
· of proof by those holding him.
· · The general rule is that the release of a detained person renders
the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. In a case, "the
respondents make·such a plea in line with their return that they had
released the desaparecidos after nine (9) days but their return begs
the question. The cited general rule postulates that the release of the
detaine.es is an established fact and not in dispute, and that they do
not continue to be missing persons or desaparecidos.
Where, however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the
alleged release of the detainees, where the standard and prescribed
procedure iri effecting the release has not been followed, then the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the alleged
release is shifted to the respondents, Release is an affirmative defense
and 'each party must prove his own affirmative allegations,' just as
the burden of proof of self-defense in a killing rests on the accused."
(Dizon vs. Eduardo,19 158 SCRA470 [1980].)
· 19In the above case, the Supreme Court found that the respondents did not follow
the prescribed standard procedure for releasing political detainees imprisoned during the
Marcos regime. They failed to prove by clear and convincing eviden~~ the alleged rel~ase.
The Court, however, could not grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It explamed
why: "The Court regrets that it cannot grant the relief sou ght by petitioners. It is not th~
ropoHitory of all remedies for every grievance. But the Court does state that ~d~r the
fnclo nnd circumstances above se t forth, it is far from satisfied and as already md1cated
11hnH•11 tho wnvo doubla nbout public resp ondent's nllegaHon that they had released the
1/1•~111H1rnclrlo~ on Soplombcr 2~, 1981, nlno dnyn n(lcr 1·hcy wore token Into custody.

IJ 111 l'IIIJ ,ll'l 'I NI! '(. N il'l\llJII l),jNJ-. J,AW 11111', I
Pdnolj'.)lt!fl trncl 0 H8UII '
'.ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Mayor of the Ci'tJ/'of Manila forcibly depottU' ioom~h ·of ill-
repute from Manila to Davao;, . . . . . : ·\·.,.,. . ,
Facts: "!'lie Mayci of 'tl'le 'City !·cif Manila, to' elterthmate vice,
ordered· the · segregated' .disttid for' women of ill-·re'ptlte· ·ctosed.
Between October i6 ·anc:I:' October isi 1,1nv; .{Jte·'. worit~n were
kept :confined in their louses frt-'the dfatt1d:by the potfrt'About
,midnight- of October· 25, the ·p olice destei;ided u.po:&,tne houses,
hustled some 170 women into · patroLw.agons· ,and placed them
aboard two steamers that awaited their aurival. T'he woment.were
given no opportunity to collect their.belongings and; apparently
were under the impression that they, were.being-taken t,o a p9lke
station for investigation. The steamers sailed with their unwilling
. passengers for Davao where they were lan.de.d and receipted for as
laborers. · anties as are other citizens - to change their domicile from Manila
Issue: The question was: By authority of what law did the
Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act ,i n deporting against
their will these persons from Manila to another distant locality?
Held: (1) Deportation was without authority of any law, order, or
regulation. - "One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled- these
one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and
then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled
on board ~teamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite
the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and
gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the
pi:esence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary
. ~etitioners' charges of falsification of the detaineest alleged signatures on the
certificates·of release, compounded by the .irregularities and failure of respondents to
follow the pFescribed procedure in effecting the rel~ase,for purposes of authentication and
to. produce :u'd furnish the parents upon req1.1est copies of the release certifica.tes (taking
one month m the case of Isabel Ramos and three months in the case of Eduardo Dizon)
n~ed .thorough investigation. If duly determined, they would involve, as indicated by
~10~0, prose~tion for criminal contempt, falsification of public documents, petjury and
violati?n ~£.Article 12.5 of ~ e ~evised P~nal Code requiring delivery of detained persons
to the')UdlClal authority within the periods therein fixed, and worse. This. com,otes thnt
the respondents with their subordinates who executed the supporting nffidnvits, Mnjor
Cabauatan and Lt. Maranon, were involved in a grand conspiracy for Lhc purpo~n.
The Comt cannot make this determination. It Is not n tdor of Cncta, nor dor,i ll hnvu
the means nnd facl\ltles to conduct such investlgntlon of tho grnvo ch111·g(•~ nl hru· Mil w11II
ns of the whorcobouts and fntc of the dcsnpnracidoo," (l/1/d,)
1 J
I HI 11 Al I, Ill. 1111.1. t 111 1( 11 .t 11 \Il l/
11,•hll logt or the Wl'll or I1111>( illl 'Ul'IJIIII
and that these offdcets of the law chose the shades of night to cloak
. their secret and,'.s~ealthy act. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to
refote'and pradticaUy admitted by the respondents. •
v\l'i~h .thi's·.s'ihiatj.9n, a coµrt would next expect to resolve the
. ,qu~stion - By a1:1,'.t:hqrity of what law did the Mayor and the Chief
. of I'.olic~ 'pr~s1,1111e to actin dtporting by duress these persons from
:Manila to anoth~j- 'di s,t~nt lbcality within the Philippine Islands? * *
* Ever :wh~n fh.~ l:ieal_~ --authorities compel vaccination, or estal:>lish
.~ ~uarantine, 9~ pl~ce a leprous person in the Culion leper colony,
.1t 1s done p~i:smmt to some.law or order. But one can search in vain
for any law, 9rder, or regulation, which even hints at the right of
the Mayor of the City of Manila or the Chief of Police of that city
to force citizens of the Philippine Islands - these women despite
their being, in a sense, lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels
but Philippine c~tizens pr~tected by the same constitutional guar-
to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifical-
ly punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized
by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence."
(2) Law, not mere will, defines power. - "Law defines power.
Centuries ago, Magna Carta decreed that - 'No freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized bf his freehold, or liberties,
or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will he pass upon him nor condemn him, but by
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell
to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or
right.' (Magna Carta, 9 Hen., Ill., 1225, Cap. 29; 1 Eng. Stat. at Large,
7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts
are the forum which [function] to safeguard individual liberty and
to punish official transgressors. * * * 'The very idea,' said Justice
Matthews of the same high tribunal * * * 'that one man may be
c?mpelled t.o hold his l~fe, or the means of living, or any material
right essential to the enJoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
se:ms to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as
bemg the essence of slavery itself.' (Yick Wo v, Hopkins [1886], 118
U.S. 356, 370.)
All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus,
and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the prima-
ry questi.on was whether the courts should permit a government
of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine
lslonds,"
 1 J
1'1111,ll'l'I N I I 'UN : III U II,( Nt\ l.J ,/1,.W f I l ',
• Pdnclples and Caeca · · l'rivJl(ilg o! thoWl'll of l lt1bCM C..:orp111J
(3) Writ of habeas corpus is theproper rein~dy for unlawful restraint
of liberty. - A prime specification of .art· application for a writ of
11
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. Any restr,aintwhich will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient. The forciple taking of ~ese women
from Manila by officials who de_ported th~J;l)_;to a distant region,
deprived them of freedom of locomotk>n ju~~ -a$ -~ffed~vely as if
they had been imprtsoned. Placed- in Dav~'Q-.without either tp.pney
or personal b~longJngs, they _:were·. 'p.f,§Y.en_t~d fr9m . e~~rcising
the _liberty of _going wh~rt an~ :'he;re::~e:i,,;P1¢,as~d.,The res~ai:nt
of hl?erty whi_ch began•rn Marola contmu~¢.-until $e •aggrieved
parties were returned· to Manila a11d r~leased, -or until they freely
and truly waived their right." (Villapicencio vs. J.,ukban, 33 Phil. 778
[1919], through Justice Malc9lm.)
2. Temporary release of detainee: ·{t· ·i~~'c:t~~med, does not render
petition moot and academic.
. Facts: Attached to the _pe*foner's .te:g1porary release are
restrictions imposed on him. These ar_e: (1)-H\s .f,reedom of move-
ment is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval
of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila; (2) His liberty
· of abode is restricted because prior apprbval ofrespondents is also
required in case petitioner wants to change.his place ·of residence;
(3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibitibn that he
should not participate in any interview conducted by any local
or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release
or information that is inimical to the interest of national security;
and (4) He is required to report regularly to. respondents or their
representatives.
The petitioner argues that, although admittedly his temporary
release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions
imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal
restraint on his freedom. He stresses that his temporary release
did not render the instant petition moot and academic but that '.'it
merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention
to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents."
Issue: The issue to be resolved is whether or not the petition
for habeas corpus has become moot and academic in view of the
petitioner's temporary release.
Held: No. (1) Restrictions constitute restraint on liberty. - "The
reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to
11 h I I IJ /\ I 1, 111, l l ll ,1, llll lW rl ll tl
. i : -thf;l: .~emp,0_
11,?cy-, Jt:1lease of the petitioner constitute restraints on
.,. _,;.-~ e libercy; :o.£..M,11, •MmJcupa. Such restrictions limit the fre.ed~m of
: . , , 11m0vei;nent .of th~ ,petitioner. It is not physical restraint al ope which
•,,, is inquit'ed, intq 1>y th~writ of habeas corpus.
In -Villavicencio•vs, Lukban· (supra.), the women who had been
· ..., illega-lly·,seized·arid transported against 'their will to Davao were
·. , . no. longer under•any 0ffieial restraint. Ui;,like petitioner Moncupa,
r•· ·, · they were·free to·dian.ge their domicile without askin•g for official
permission,,,Ind:eed;·,some of them managed to return to Manila.
Yet,. the_.~o\u't condemned the involuntary restraints cause by the
9~d~l ,lC~pp,_~ed -the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope
~at its .,dec\sion · may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
o.rder!y gpxernment of laws and to protect individual liberty from
l~legal encroachment.'
In the UgJlt o~ the.above i;uling, the present petition for l,11be11s
corpus ·has µ.ot become moot and academic. Other p recedents for
such a conclusion are not wanting.
In Tibo vs. Th~ l?rovincial Commander (85 SCRA 564 [1978).), this
Court ruied:
'Although the releas~ in the custody of the Deputy Minister
· did not signify that petitioners could once again enjoy their
· full freedom,·the application could have been dismissed, as it
·could be withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a purely
voluntary act: When the hearing was held on September 7,
1978, it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz
could have acted in a hasty manner when he set forth the above
allegations in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney
Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for petitioners, while conceding
that there was such a release from confinement, also alleged
that it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as
labor wtlon leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied Services, presumably in Manila, as well
as the Ministry of Labor. As the voting was to take place in the
business firm in Bataan, the limits set wou ld nullify whatever
efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the
prohibition against their going to Bataan, the restraint o~
liberty was undeniable. If so, the m oot and academic character
of the petition was far from clear."'
(2) Where release is temporary. - "More recently, we had
occasion to rule squarely on whe ther or not a temporary release
I I I I
1'l·llL11 1lP1NH 'UNti'l'Jtl'IJJ'J'M.))'.NJ".l l , I ,AW
Principles at~et OaMs •·'...J. ,:· ' : 1
from detention renders the:petitionl fot~·wdt10£,habeii5t~6.t-pus:·•moot
and academic. As in this case of:~.fonfu,1:D'aJ'..fue1pe'titioriets<-i n'Toyoto
vs. Ramos (139 SCRA 316 (1985].)~ ·we'te lte'ttipora.rily 'ieleased,from
detention. The respondents fired·a ·moticin Y6 tlismiss the petition
for habeas corpus on the gronnd,,tha;t th!i!'..petiti0ners -had been
temporarily released and,, theiJ.,,case:had; ,,therefore,,b~c0JJ;1e.moot
and academic. The petitioners i:rlsis·te.d,. however) th~t their case
may be considered mo0t and academic only ·:if,their release would
be permanent.' In ruling for the petitioners, w_e.said,, ·
'Ordinarily, a petition for Ji'abNs sq-fput_becomes moot and
academic when the restraint Oh the liberty of the . petitioners is
lifted either temporarily or pemianently. We
have. so· ~eld in a
number of cases. But the instant'case pres_e.n:\s_a qiff~te~t sit'.uation.
The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the
power to re-arrest a person for an offense ~fte( a rnurt,of competent
jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense ..An affirmative answer
is the one suggested by the respondents b'~cause 'the release of the
petitioners being merely 'temporary,' it foll:ows that they .can be re-
arrested at anytime despite their acquittal'by a court of competent
jurisdiction. We hold that su~1 a r~s,ery~tion is repugnant to
the government of laws and not of i:n~Ii.'1(p#ndple. Under this
principle, the moment a person is acq1.1.itte~ on a· crirt1inal charge he
can no longer be detained or re-arreste~ for the same off.ense. This
concept is so basic and elementary that 'it needs no elaJ:i9ration."'
(3) Release must be free from invol~ntary restraints. - ':In effect,
the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person c:ontinues to be unlawfully
denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, 'where there is
present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
· involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation
of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent develop-
ments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in
his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ."20
20Jhe general rule is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a
detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and acactemic, unless there
are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which cnsc the
court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint under tho Villnvicc11c/o
case. Where the only condition in the bail bond is that ordinarily found in nny othor
analogous undertaking, which Is "to nppenr nncl answer the complnint x x x will nt nil
j J I
I) l 'i I .1\114 , 111 , IHl ,I , WH1t: 111 : U2 I
Pt'ivllcgc -of the Writ of Habcns Coqms
(Moncupa vs. Enrile,. Hl SCRA 233 [19861, through Justice Gutier-
, rez, Jr.)
3: Petitioner}s prevented from leaving an employer due to external
. •.· . moral com,pulsion without exertion of any physical force.
Facts: E, 1 an. ·o rphan, was brought from the province to the
'" · house of resporideit't S in Manila where the latter was running
an employment ·agency. E was prevented by S to leave unless the
amount advanced for her fare and other transportation expenses
first be paid. There. was no evidence that physical force was being
employed to prevent h er departure.
Issue: Should Ebe released on habeas corpus?
Held: Yes. (1) When there is restraint of liberty even wit/,0111 use
of force. - "Estelita is restrained of her p ersonal liberty And not
forced to go with her cousin at her will. The fact that no physical
force has been exe.rted to keep her in the house of Julia Salazai; at
1343 Felix Huerta$ Street, or to stay· in Silang Cavite, in the house
of Julia Salazar.'s, ~ousin, a place that Estelita could not identify
better than just q.escribing it as a place far from Manila, does not
nwke less real the deprivation of Estelita's personal freedom which
includes the freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
place to another, freedom to choose one's residence.
Freedom may be lost due to· external moral compulsion, to
founded or unfounded fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of
an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly
,, ol:?eyed, to any .other psychological element that may curtail the
mental faculty of chqice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
' If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person
at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of
courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived
of liberty by duress or physical coercion."
(2) Personal liberty cannot be restrained lnJ failure to pay indebted-
ness. - "On the hypothesis that Estelita is really indebted in the
amount of P83.85, such is not a valid reason for the respondents
times hold himself x x x amenable to the orders and processes of the Court, and after
conviction, he will s urrender himself x x x in execution of the judgment x x x," there is
no unlawful limitation of his freedom of movement. (Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag,
175 SCRA 318 (1989].)

1' 1111 ll ' l ' IN I I lJlll llil' l, 1111~1'1-J(\ l , I AW
J>l'J n lpl 111 Ut1d 'tlllCU ,., , 1,
to obstruct, impeqe qr ,i.Ja.terfer.e with,iE;stelitais ,:per:spn.al,,.Uber.ty
to leave the house of Julia Salazar and ~o :lh'~ in the.r~$idence of
her cousin Bartolome. Said indebtedn,ess 1:p.ay be multiplied l?y
thousands or millions; put would n-ot ·fu anyway subtract an iota
from Estelita's, fundamental rightto,):iav~ i:dree,tjloice of:abode/'
(3) Employment .agency has no authority -to: restrain-'individual
persona{ frefdQn;t ~o .pr<?tec( its business. ~ :'.;'!}}1 ~-~ploY;.~eI}t agency,
regardless of the amount 1t may adv1:u1ce to·a prospective e01pl!)yee,
has absolutely no power to curtail the freedqh\ of mov:ement of
said employee. The fact that. the power Jo
contr.otsa.i d f)::eedom
may be said to be an effective!):leans of avoiding._i;:nonetary losses
. to the agency is no reason f~r Je<?p:ardizing a fu~dap:i~ntal human
right. The fortunes of business cannot be co:i;i.tr9lled ~y controlling a
fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not a merchandise
appropriate for commercial barters or bus,iness bargains.
Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or
any business enterprise."
(4) Human freedom is not measured by scale of monetary values. -
"In the scale of values, there is no acceptable equivalence between
matters involving human dignity and those belonging to the
domain of the business. The latter are characterized by transience
and precariousness, while the former are the nearest things to what
are everlasting, if ever there are any, irt humc:mify." (Cuenca vs,
Salazar, 82 Phil. 851 [1949], through Justice Perfecto.)
Writ of Amparo.
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that
provides rapid judicial relief to protect the people's right to life,
liberty and security in cases involving extrajudicial killings and
· enforced disappearance, or threats thereof.
(1) Aggrieved party entitled to writ. - Before, an aggrieved party
can only invoke the writ of habeas corptls''to compel the respondent
detaining a person to produce the body or to challenge the legality
of the person's detention. Under the writ of Amparo, victims of actual
or threatened violation of their civil liberties, specifically the right
to life, liberty, and security,21 are provided with an equitable and
21
"While the r.i ght to life under Article III, Section 1 gunrnntecs <isscnllnlly lha df1ht
to be alive upon which the enjoyment of nil other !'ights is prcconclltlonod -- lh<1 l'.lghl lO
security of person is a guarantee of the secure qunlity of thill ll(o, viz.: "'rh" ]1(11111 whl1 h
J
I 1 1 , I 11 A 1-4 1, 111 , 1111 1. ~ n, 1m , 1 11,
J'dvll ~l of lllu Will tif l l11b 111 (.'u rp1111
extraordinary lega}i,remedy to which the aggrieved pairty or any
qualified person-01.1 entity can seek judicial relief for the vinpkation
of their rights again~~ 0£:ficial and private abuses.
. (2) Nature of pr.oceedin.g. - The writ22 is a protective remedy
or remedial .m easure designed to provide rapid judicial relief in
cJ. sum111ary proceed;i.ng whose principal objective is to address
or
speaific violations tlitr.e ats 0f violation of the constitutional rights
to life; liberty, or security.23 The proceeding is not criminal in nature.
It does not ascertain the criminal culpability of the respondents.
It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable· doubt or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence, The totality of evidence is a standard
for the grant of the writ as applied in Razon vs. Tngitis, infra. Thus,
even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that
the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of
person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs,
his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the r-ight to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but
also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of
the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." x xx Second, the right
to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. x x
x Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. x x x." (Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, 56 SCRA 1 [2008); see
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 606 SCRA 580 (2009].)
22
The privilege of the writ should be d istinguished from the actual order called the
writ of amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. (De Lima vs. Gatdula, 691 SCRA 226
[2012].)
23
The- order of priority with respect to the petitioner mandated by Section 2 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo must be followed "to prevent the indiscriminate and
g roundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty
o r sccu l'ily of the aggrieved party," (BOAC vs. Cadopan, 649 SCRA 618 [2011].) The rules
on lhc writs of Hnbcns Co,pus (Sec. 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court) nnd Amparo (Sec. 1 thereof)
ni·o cloor thnl the net or omission complnlnccl of - confinement nnd custody for hnbens
rr11111w nnd vlolnllona of, or th rent 10 vlolntc, n pornon'o ll fo, llbcrly, nncl security for nmpnro
r 11N<•tt - • 11ho11ld be lllognl or 1111lnwf11l. (So v11. 'Jhcln, Jr., li:);I SCl~A 563 [2010J.)
I I
l'I IIJ ,1l'l'I NI! l'PN/1 11 J'I I IJUN(d , l ,A.W I lt11•,
• Pdndplct-.1 ond C.:ascs •
minimum test. (In the Matter of the Petition for .the Writ of Amparo
and Habeas Data in Favor of N. Rodriguez, 696..SCRA.390 f2013],)
(3) Defense ofsimple denial. -The rtewjudfdal remedy prohibits
respondents from using the defense pf Jl. ·.simple denial. They have
to produce documents or evidence to ·s:u pport,daims &at they did
not violate the right to life, liberty au1d Ja,mtly of. the. aggri~v.e q
party. Neither can a respondent public offici¢ .er .empl0yee imv~ke
the presumption that official duty bas bee.1;:t:regularly performed to
evade responsibility or liability. ·
(4) Interim reliefs. - Section 5 ofthEb\.mp'a'ro Rule·en.urtierates
what the petition should contain. The peititto'ii, pay be filed with tJ:le
Regional Trial Court, the Sandiganbayam, the,<;:ourt of. Apeeals; the
Supreme Court, or any justice of such co'Urts .. tj.ie special writ allows
a court to. issue interim reliefs even hef!'.?fe·p~fi.p.on is res~lved, such
as a temporary pr9tection order, inspection ordej:, production order
for the presentation of documents, pap.ers, or other evidence, and
witness protection order: It is broader in scope tha,n the wtit of
habeas corpus.
These provisional reliefs are intendedto assist the court before
it arrives at a judicious determination ?f fue petition. (Yano vs.
Sanchez, 612 SCRA 347 [2010]; Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroy.o,
660 SCRA 84 [2011].) ·
(5) Issuance of writ. - The Court shall grant the privilege of
the writ if the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence.24 The writ may be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines
(see Secs. 2, 3, 9, 14, 15, 18, Rule on the Writ.) without need to file
a motion for execution. The writ should not issue when applied
for as substitute for the appeal or certioritri process, or when it will
inordinately interfere with these processes. If one wishes to seek
24
Evidence is not to be rejected outright because it ls inadmissible under the rules for
as long as it is relevant to the issue at hand. (Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 [2009].)
The petitioner in an amparo case, has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation. Thus, proof of disappearance alone
is not enough. It is likewise essential, to establish that .such disappearance wns carried
out with the direct or indirect authorization, support, or <1cquiescence of the government,
even if the person sought to be held accow1table.o r responsible in the pclit!on Is n privnto
individual or entity. 111is hnlhnnrk of State pnrticipntlon dl(fcrontlnlC1•1 nn 1•nforcocl
clisnppcnrnnce cnsc, from on ordlnnry cnsc of o missing person. (Nnvln vo. 11nrdlcn, Iii'~
SCRA 618 [2012].)
1
IL
.I\ l{°J.'. 111. llll ,l , tlcl' l{I :11 I ~J 1)2'1
Privilege of the Writ of I-Inbcns Corpus
redress and hold the alleged perpetrator criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in· the realm of ordinary criminal persecution
rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
Amparo.
(6) Coverage ofwrit. -The coverage of the writ (including writ of
habeas corpus) is limited to the protection of rights to life, lib~rty, and
security. The writ of Amparo was originally conceived as a response
to the extraordinary rise in the number of extralegal killings and
'enforeed disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available
and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns.25 It
is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty, or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond .those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. It is not one to issue on amorphous
or uncettain grounds but only upon reasonable certainly. (Tapuz
vs. Del Rosario, 554 . SCRA 768 [2008]; see Canlas vs. Napico
BomebuildersAssn., 554 SCRA208 [2008]; Ladaga vs. Mapage1~685
SCRA 322 [2012].) The writ cannot be invoked for the protection of
the right to travel (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 606 SCRA 580 [2009] .)
and concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature.
(Salcedo vs. Bollozos, 623 SCRA 27 [2010]; Pador vs. Arcayan, 693
SCRA 192 [2013].)
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of "extralegal killings" (extra.judicial killings) and "en-
forced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined
to these two (2) instances or to threats thereof. The fundamental
functions of the writ is to cause the disclosure of details concern-
ing the same. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceed-
ings." On the other hand; "enforced disappearances" are "attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of
a person by a government official or organized groups or private in-
dividuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the gov-
2!111us, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights
violations. It ls prcve11tive in that It breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission
of these offenses, and ii is c11rntive ln thnt it fncllltntcs tJ1c subsequent punishment of
pol'polrntot· by lnovltnbly lending to oubsoquont lnvcstlgntlon nnd nction. (Secretary of
Nnllmrnl Dofonso vo, Mnnnlo, GIIJJro; l.01.111.n, Jr, vu, Mncnpn11nl•An·oyo, 670 SCRA 545
17.012]; IJ,11·3011 Vil, llspOl'Oll, Jr., 715 SC.HA 200 1201 4),)
1.ttl
4 .1'1111,ll'l ' IN H 'U N !,l 'IJ 'U IJ >NtA J, LA W
Pdnclplcs and C!l9CS
ernment; the refusal of the State to disclose•the 'fate or whereabouts
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the d~privation
of liberty which places such persons .outs~de tfte,protection of law,'.'
(Sec, of National Defense vs. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 {2008]; see Navia
vs. Pardico, 693 SCRA 618 [2012); Mison vs. G~llego~, 760 SCRA 360
[2015]; Santrago vs. Tulfo, 773 SCRA 558 [2015].) ,
(7)- Command responsibility in the context. oj.amparo pr0ceeding. -
Command responsibility pertains to "responsi~ility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces
or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict."
The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive
law that establishes liability where1=!y the superior is made
::!
responsible for crimes or wrongs committed ~y his subordinates.
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary
Amparo proceeding. The reason lies in the nature of the writ itself.
(Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211 [2010]; Rubrico vs.
Arroyo, 613 SCRA233 [2010]; see BOAC vs. Cadapan, 649 SCRA 618
[2011]; Balao vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 662 SCRA312 [2012].) ·
The President, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be h eld
responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.26
26"To hold sQmeone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the fol-
lowing elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship be-
tween the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the
superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or h ad been commit-
ted; and (c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The president, being the commander-
in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies
him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. On the
issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a
strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may n onetheless be established
through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and
superiors may be charged with constmctive knowled ge. Knowledge of the commission
of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within
the government official' s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regu-
larly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immedintc s tn ff 01·
office personnel are involved. As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is lmporlnnt
to note that as the commander-in -chief of the armed forces, the President hns tho pow◄>r to
effectively command, control and d iscipline lhe militmy, 111e Supremo Court hold, liuw11v1,r,
u. ·. u, /\J ('J,'. .IJJ.. IHLI, 11 Kl an~, 91\!
l'dvllcge 0£.thc ~dt of Habcos Corpus
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Pe,titioners qu_est'ion the sufficienciJ in form and substunce the
reqpandent's Writ .of Amparo petition in the Court of Appeals and the
· sufficiency of the ~idetice that police operatives were the perpetrators of
the abduction and enforced disappearance of respondent's husband,
Facts: Tagj.tis, a Muslim consultant for the World Bank and
Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank
(IDB) Scholarship Programme, arrived in Jolo from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. According to the receptionist of the pension house
where he was staying, Tagilis went out to buy food at around 12:30
in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. He did
not return. Tagitis' disappearance was reported to the Jolo Police
Station four (4) days later.
More than a month later (Dec. 28, 2007), respondent wife filed o
petititm for the Writof Amparo with the Court of Appeals, against
among others, the Commanding General, Philippine Army (PA)
and the chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). On the same,
the Court of Appeals (CA) immediately issued the Writ, set the case
for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file
their verified petition within 72 hours from service of the writ. The
Court of Appeals directed the officer in command of the area to
form a task force to handle the disappearance of Tagitis.
On March 7, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued its decision
confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. It ruled
that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm
of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing
person case qualified as an enforced disappearance.
The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and
substance of the Amparo petition filed before the Court of Appeals;
the sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent look before
that aside from Rodriguez's general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could
establish President Arroyo's respon sibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither
wns there even n clear attempt to show that she should hnve known about the violation of
his right to life, liberty or security, or l1int she hnd fnilcd lo lnvestigate, punish or prevent
It," (/11 /1,c Mn tier of //,c Petil/011 for //,e Writ of AmJJnro nm/ Hnbens Dntn i11 Favor of Nor/cl H.
l<orfrlg11,·z vs. Glorln MncnJJngnl Arroyo, GGO SCI< /\ 811{2011 /.)
J l I I I I r r
!>30 •tllJ ll ,I.I 'PJ Nn 'U N !J'l'I l'U'J'.1 )NAJI. J.I\W
Prloclples nnd,Co1:1bs ·,
petitioning for the writ, the finding .that. the·rights to ;Ufe,diberty
and security of . Tagitis had been yfolated; the ·Sl!-ffici~ncy 0£
evidence supporting the conclusion_that-Tagitis was abd49tec,l; the
conclµsion the p~titioner needs otily-.,t,o p'toperlY;,.COmp~y wI*'the
substance and form requiremeµt~ <;>£ :a wri!;014,mparo.peHti,ort; and
prove the allegations by substantial'evfdence; · · ··
Issue: Is the petition questioning tlt:e·toi:£i:tb£!4f,pe~ls1 \March 7,
2008 decision meritorious? • · ·' \ ', ·. .' . :· . ._. ', 'I ' •.
Held: No. (1) The ,iatur~ of. i'7e w~it.'9f A~pk%,,: . i:ffiifi
.!J~cision
reflect~ the nature of the writ 0£ !ilrfRf.'O 7 -~
_protec,tjye· r~medy
aga4;tst violations or threats of violation ag~µis,t .the·~igl).~s. tq ,ife,
liber,ty and security. It embodies, as a' rem,ed~·f1:ie cou_rt's -~~ective
to police agencies to undertake specified c\:i_uises · of a~t~9n to
address the disappearance if an individual: h ci~e·s riot determine
guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability-for the .disappearance, rather
it determines responsibility or at least accountability. •
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever 'way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure 0£
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts.
AccountabilihJ, on the other hand, refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden ofextraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all
these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life 0£ the
victim is preserved and his liberty and secudty are restored." ·
(2) Sufficiency in form and substance 'of respondents' petition.
- "In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the
respondent's Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the
petition violated Section 5(c), (d), an~ (e)' of the Amparo Rule.
Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent £ailed to: xx x
The framers of the Amparo Rule never inten ded Sccllol'I !3(t:)
to be complete in every detail. in staling the thrcatcmod w· 11 111111
I I I I 1 J J
A,1~•1•,, 111, UIJ ,I,
11 I-t i 111 l l i y l
Privilege 01 the W11ll of l lnbuno 'orpus
, viiolation of a -vicUrn' s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading,
,. the ,pleader1•mus~ i.0£,course state the ultimate facts coqstituting
,,: ·.the-.cause:Ofacition,;omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo
nr petitkm,-·h0w:ever1 ,th;i.s requirement must be read in light of the
nature ~nd purpose of the;proceeding,.whichaddresses a situation
of u11~ertaµlty; ~e ,P.e.p.ti?f!-er may not be able to describe with
.,..s~rt~ty ,h.ow, tl,1~ ,Y-~ctiw. e~acHy ,d_~s~ppeared, or who actually
_acted to ki_g,nap( ?tbdu'ct or ~1rrst ~tm or h~r, or ,where the victim is
_ cj.e~all1~q, bepause ~ese .mforw~tion n:ay purposely be ~idden or
. .. s9x_ered l!-P by.those who i:a.vse.d,_the disappearance. In this type .of
situation; ·t o require the'level of specificity, detail and precision that
. , .the peti_tiqµ~;!l ~ppar_ently .w ant to read into the Amparo Rule is to
make this Rule .a, token gesture of judicial concern for violations of
fue constitutio:r;tal rights to life, liberty a~d security."
(3) Test in rer:iding petition. - "To read the Rules of Court
requirem~;nt on pleadings while addressing the unique Ampnro
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contai:r;ts the details available to the petitioner under
the c~cumstances, whjle presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the v_ictim's rights to life, liberty and security through
State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read
in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements - namely, of the d isappearance,
the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations
of the rights to life, liberty or security - are present. x x x x x x
[The] allegations [in the petition] in our view, properly
pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader's knowledge about
Tagitis' disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in
this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to
provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as
the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot
be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action."
(4) i ack of supporting affidavit. - "If a defect can at all be
attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting
affidavit, as required by Section S(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to
the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate
the resolution of the petition; the Amparo Rule incorporated the
requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that
these can be used as the affiont's direct testimony. This requirement,
howevc1~ should not be rc11d 111-1 nn ob1Jol11lc one that necessarily
 I~1111 ,ll'l'I NH 'U N: 111 U 1'1 NAL l ,A W u ', JS
Pri nciples nnd 'ascs• ,',
leads .to the dismissal of the petition df not strictly followed. Where,
as in this case, the petitioner has substanti:ally, com'})lied with the
requirement by submitting a verified ·pe,titiql). suffi.ciently..detailing
the facts relied upon, the sti;ict;meed :for th~ sworn.statement .t hat an.
·affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.". .
(5) Historical context of the writ an{ ~nforced disappearance. -
"The phenomenon of enforced· disap,IJ~_ara!,\ce' a!isirig from State
action first attracted notice in Adolf ffitler' s Nact und Nebel E.rlass
or Night and Fog Decree of Decemb-~~ ~' 1941. The '1'hi,rd Reich's
Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was'.~direct~d at persons
in occupied territories 'endangering Gerinan·secud:ty'; they ·were
transported secretly to Germcfuy where·!:hey' dlsapp_e ared· wifhout
a trace. In order to maximize the desi_i:ed intimiqapng."_effect, the
policy_prohibited government officials'from p1:oviding i.nforrnation
·.about the fate of these targeted person1i: _., .,..,_ , , . -
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenori_.of,enforced disa'.ppearances
resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when individuals,
-numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have
'disappeared' during the military regime in' Argentina:.· Enforced
disappearances spread in Latin America, and the' ·issue became
an international concern when ·the world noted its widespread
and systematic use by State security forces in ·that continent urider
Operation Condor and during the Dirty War in the 1970s arid 1980s.
The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested,
tortured, and killed as part of governments'· 2ounter-insurgency
campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine
elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized
the term 'disappearance' to describe the phenomenon. The victims
of enforced disappearances were called the. 'desapareci~os,' which
literally means the 'disappeared ones.' In general, there are three
different kinds of 'disappearance' cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses·or without
positive identification of the arresting agents and are never
found again; ·
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an
appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation fQr weeks
or months while their families are unable to discover their
whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in
custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center
or another; and
Alff. 111. LHLL 0!1 lU 'l ITS 933
Pl'ivilege'of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
3) · those of victims of 'salvaging' who have disappeared
until their lifeless bodies are later discovered."
(6') Enforced disappearance under Philippine law. .L "In the
Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first
two categories. x x x The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the
'writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof.' We note that although the writ specifically
covers 'enfori:ed disappearances,' this concept is neither defined
nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The rec<;>rds of the Supreme
Court Committee on the Revision of R_ules (Committee) reveal that
the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an
elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance. xx x
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed
in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudidnl
killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do awny with
a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee
instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its
power to address and provided the· appropriate remedy therefor,
mindful that an·elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing
legislative efforts.
As the law now Stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to
carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are
now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the
corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters
of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact
under the countris constitutional scheme and power structure.
(7) Procedural rules governing writ. - "Even without the
benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court
is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate 'rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts,' since extrajudicialkillings and enforced disappearances, by
their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation
of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and
security. Although the Court's power is strictly procedural and as
 IJ
IHI l' llll ll ' l ' II..J ll l llN:1 tll lllll CJI\J I.I AW
.l 'dnt'lpl •u 1111tl '111H•11
such does not diminish, increas13 or. modify substantive rights, the
legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful
through the procedures it sets iq. ,~ddr~ssing extrajl./-,d idal killings
and enforced disappearance1s. The _Court, through its procedural
rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby dire<;tly compel
the public authorities to act on actual pr threatened v~olations of
constitutional rights. To state ¢e obviot1.s, judicial iµtervention can
make a difference - even if only procedurally - 1:r;t a situation
when the very same investigating p1;1bliq authorities may have
had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional
rights." -- '
(8) Issue of criminal culpability. - "Lest this Court intervention
be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on a1;ty
issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced
~isappearance. This is an issue that requ_ires criminal action
before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our
intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance
has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this
disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies
to address it."
(9) Two-fold duty of law enforcement authorities. - "The burden
for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is two-fold. The first is to ensure that all
efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of
indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are
less than what the individual situations require. The second is to
address the disappearance, so that thelife of the victim is pres~rved
and his or her liberty and security restored. In ·t hese senses, our
orders and directives relative to the writ are cor1tinui11g efforts that
are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of
the fate and the whereabouts of, the victim, by the production of
the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and
security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal
action against the guilty parties."
(10) Enforced disappearance under International Law, - "From
the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced
disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.
It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of
the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial
j'
I I , 111 Al' I Ill JIil I l 11 1 1111 d 11'
l'rl vll1•g1 uf I111 W1II ol l h1b111111t \ 11 p1111
of their right t0 information regarding the circumstances of the
disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have
been said to be 'a double form of torture,' with 'doubly paralyzing
impact for the victims,' as they 'are kept ignorant of their own fates,
while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of
their detained loved ones' and suffer as well the serious economic
hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance
of the household breadwinner.
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of
enforce·d disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration). xx x
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General
Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). xx x
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument
to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced
disappearance and that this right is non-derogable. x x x"
(11) Binding effect of UN action in the Philippines. - "To date,
the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so
that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing
enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal
law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court,
as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance
is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security
that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect
through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still ptlrsuant to its
terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality
that the Philippines is a member of. the UN, bound by its Charter
and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly
the conventions touching on humans rights.
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as
a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced
disappearance cannot but have its effects on the countri given our
own adherence to 'generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land."'
(12) Evidentiary difficulties posed by the unique nature ofan enforced
disappearance. - "These difficulties largely arise because the State
,, n )'I IIJ ,ll ' l ' l hJI l l )N:1I I I IJ I IU NA: J. J, AW
P1fo lpleo l llld 'osc»
its elf.- the party whose involvement is-:<llleged .- investigates
enforced disappearances. Past experiimces, -\!}·.other jur,i~.dktions
show that the evidentiarytdifficulties are:.geJ;ie;ally three~fold.-
First, there may be a deliberat~ c6n d~ahn~nt ofthe identities
of the direct perpetrators. Experts· n6te that· ~bductors are ·well
organized, ~rmed and usually members of the military qr police
forces. x x x · · ·· · ·· 1 : :· • · •
• ·
, . - .. \ '.-
~ . '. .
Second, deliberate ~once.ahnent of per,fulertt eviqence of. the
disappearance is a distinct pos.sibility;°'.tne centr_a l piece of evi~ence
in an enforced disappearance--:- i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim's
body - is usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any
investigation or the progress of one that may have begun.
Third is the element of denial; in m~ cases, the State authorities
deliberately deny that the enforced disappeax:ance ever occurred.
"Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as
the absence ·of any proven disappearahce makes it easier to escape
the application of legal standards ensuring the victim's human
rights."
(13) Evidence and burden of proof in enforced disappearance cases.
- "Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an
Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of proof the parties
to the case carry, as follows: x x x
These characteristics - namely, of being summary and the use
of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to
the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable
doubt in court proceedings)- reveal the clear intent of the framers
of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative
proceedirlg, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo
situations. The standard of diligence required - the duty of public
officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence -
point; too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection
of constitutional rights and in the _consequent handling and.
investigation of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance
cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only
to properly comply with the substance arid form re·quirements
of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has
b een proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their
defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The i:ebuttable
/\ I{ f, 111. I II I.I , )II I'{ I : I I I ! VJ?
PJ'lvllcgc of tho Wdt of I fobons Corpus
case, of c0urse, mo.st s:hbw that an enforced disappearance took
·place under citcumstarti:es sh-owing a· violation of the _victim's
c0nstifutiorta.l r.i'ghts .to 'life, lib'erty or secmrity, aud the &ilure on
,_ the parst of the investigating authotittes ~o -~ppropriately respond.
...., ,. XXX XXX
~ ' ,;. 'In Secr!'t'ary' ofDefe'risi v. Manalo (56°8 $'CRA 1 {2008]), which was
the ·coi:ut'f first petiti:o~ for a W,:it of Amparo,' we recognized that
. . tn~'fuii .~~ ~*~ustiv~ 'pi'b~eedings 'tha_t tn~ substantial evidence
. · standard ' r~gatatly requires d o not need to apply due to the
summary n ature of Amparo p roceedings. x x x
~ I l ,I~ ' "' •
The rem~qy [of the writ of Amparo] provides rapid judicial
relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding th~t requires only
~ubst,mtial evidence to mal,<e the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is no.t an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyo~d reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evid,cnce that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of
Amparo ·petitions are the unique difficulties presented by the
n ature of enforced disappearan ces, heretofore discussed, which
difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is
to -be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary
difficulties. compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and
· responsive to ·the circumstances, withou t transgressing the due
process requirements that underlie every proceeding."
(14) Assessment of the evidence. - "The threshold question for
bur resolution is: was there an enforced d isappearance within the
· meaning_of this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as ' the arrest,
detention, a~,duction or any other f9rm of deprivation of _liberty by
ag~nts of ~e State or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquies~ern:;~ of the State, followed
by a reft,isal to acknowledge _the depr~vation of liberty or by
.~oncealment of the fate. or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
_w~~ch place ~uch a per~on ou tsi~e the p ~otectio11 of the law.' xx x
' • We·find no-direct evidence indicating how the victim actually
I•
disappeared. x x x We likewise find no· 'direct evidence showing
that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested
-Tagitis. XX X '
V tt l'l lll.ll'l ' I Ntl t 'UN:1 111 ll 11 N:A,1., 1,AW
J>dnclplcll ond t:11uc1J , l1dvllo(IO of tho Wdl or 1Ioboau 'tll'puo
Strictly speaking,. we are faced illler'euwith; a classic case of
hearsay evidence ....... i.e., e:Vidence who~e ,p.ro.b.ativ¢-iyaJue; is not
based on the personal knowledge of the ;witnesses (the.·res;p.ondent,
Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim:himself}bµJ,o,n•the,knowle.dge:of some
other person not on the witness stan,d (the:infonnant).
To say that this piec~..of ev~dence i.s_ip.com_pet~n.t and inadmis-
sible eviden~~ . of wh~t..it ~ul;,sta~tiy~ly.·~!a~es" is;,;o~~c~o"".!.ydge
- as _the pe~tioners. effectively ~ugg~st:,.:, ; ili~t
!ll -fl.i~
f~.sen~e of
any direct ev1d,ence, we should sunp1XdistniS~ ·tlJ,e .B~\1,tion. To our
mind, an immediate dismi~sal for this ~ .~$on, i.s nq:,d~fferent from a
statement tha~ the Amparo Rule - despite its terms ~ is ineffective,
as it can:rtot allow for the special evidentiary,-liiffiro~ties that are
unavoidc1bly -pi:esent in Amparo ~ituati!C>rts, :patticulariyfo exti'aju-
dicia1 killings and enforced disappe~r.anees.- Tli~ A11J,f)a'r'9 :Ifole' was
not promulgated with this intentor·with the·'inteht fomal<e·ita to-
ken gesture of concern for constitutional ~ights. Itwas·promulgated
to provide··effective and timely remedies,·usi'ng and'·proff~g'from
local and intemational'experiences in extrajudicial killings and en-
forced disappearances, a~ the situation may requi;:~,. Conpequently,
we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary ;difficulties ir)herent
in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that_tl\lese d!fficul-
ties demand. x x x" , . :1 ••
(15) Conclusions. - "x xx In sum, none of the reports on ·record
contains any meaningful results or details ort the depth and·extent
of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top poliee officials
indicating the p ersonnel and units they ·direei:ted to investigate
can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or
equal detailed investigative reports of the ac~ivities undertaken to
search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police au~orities from the very
beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the
Amparo Rule requires.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col Kasim's
disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to
some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent
but unfounded denials and the haphazard· investigations cannot
but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its
officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not
been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would
not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government's
cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this
AH. I', I I. Ull ,t.Utl l( ll ,11 l l
perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the
Kasim evidence, :already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance-that-the Amparo .R~le covers. From the ptism of the
UN Declaration; Heretofore cited and quoted, the evidence at hand
and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a background
of consistent and unfounded government denials· and haphazard
han,dl,i,ng.. The disappearance as well effectively pla€~d Tagitis
outside the prot,e ction of_the law ....,.. a situation that w..ill subsist
unless this Court acts."
(16) Remand of case for appropriate proceedings. - "To fully
enforce the Ampar.o remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for
appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation
of their results ·through hearings the CA may deem approprlntc
to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP /PNP-
CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its
investigation tq the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf
of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and
the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as
indicated in this Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate;
the petitioners' submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative
efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its
actions and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and
the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision: The PNP and the PNP-
CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigation.
The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this
Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision." (Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 [2009).)
-oOo-
I
I
 : 11 .' i .HA
RIGHT TO,S:CiIE}))C.ti1$e'p.Stt:t<;t['t ..i ' · ,~ .
OF CASES . ·
SEC. 16. All persons shall ·have the right t'o a ·speedy!
disposition of their cases before aU judich\l~·quasi-j'udi-
cial, or administrative bodies. ·' :
lmportanc~ of right.
. . . disposition of their cases" enhances the people's respect for the law
Under the Constitution, the Supreme Coil!tJ all lower collegiate
courts, ai;td all other lower courts are requi~ed .to decidt::! or resolve
cases within a certain period of.time. (see A.rt.
VIII, Sec. 15[1].) The
Commissi9n onElections shall expedite disppsition of election cases
including pre-proclamation controversies.. (Art IX-C, Sec. 3.)· With
the setting of an absolute time limit in the disposition. of cases, a
court litigant will not have to wait indefinitely anymore for his case
to be decided.
(1) Section 16 upholds the time-hono~ed tradition of sp~edy
justice· for as stated in the old dictum---:- "Justic;~ del~yed is- justice
denied,." Its expr.ess inclusion was in respon~e to.th,e common charge
against the pe_rennial ,d elays in the administration pf justic~ yVµich
in .t he past have.plagued our_jµdicial system. The right finds greater
s~gniµcance .i n criminal prosecutions where not only the fortune,
but the Hf~ .and liberty, are at stake, and where any rea~onable delayi
ir\ th~:dis,position of the case ~ay result in a denial of justiae for .the
accuse4 altogether. . · . .
(2) A long delay in the disposition of cases often results in the
loss of evidence, abandonment of cases, and frequent defeat of
justice: It lowers the standard of the courts and brings them into
disrepute. (Escabillas vs. Martinez, 78 SCRA 367 [1977]; Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Bustamante, 720 SCRA 619 [2014].) The
unjustified delay in a criminal case cuts both ways - on the part
of the accused, since his liberty is at stake, his suffering is unduly
prolonged on account of the judge's failure to promptly render the
940
Sec. 16 A.RT. .III. BILL OF RIGHTS 941
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
judgn;1ent of acquittal, and, on the 'part of the. offended party, the
pain of waiting for the sentencing of the accused gives the former
the impression of imp,ropriety that could diminish :bis trust in the
judicial system. (Galanza vs. Trocino, 529 SCRA 200 [2007].)
(3) Not ·only does it increase the· cost of seeking j~stice, it
likewise undermines the people's faith and confidence in the
judiciary. Worse, it .invites suspicion of ulterior motives on the part
of the judge. It may create mistrust of the government itself and this
may pave the way to one's taking the law in his own hands to the
great detriment of society.
(4) On the other hand, the observance of "the right to a speedy
and faith in their government. Any party to a case has the right to
demand its expeditions disposition by all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.
Scope of the right.
(1) Covers all phases of any case. - Section 16 recognizes the
broader right to speedy judgment after trial or hearing1 distinctly
from the right to speedy trial available to an accused in criminal
cases guaranteed in Section 14(2). It covers all phases of any case,
be it criminal, civil, or administrative in nature, before judicial
(i.e., courts), quasi-judicial (i.e., executive agencies performing
adjudicatory functions similar to those of court, like the three
Constitutional Commissions [Art. IX.], the National Labor Relations
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, etc.), or
administrative bodies (i.e., executive agencies performing limited
adjudicatory functions, such as the bureaus under the different
departments) from its filing to its disposition.2 (see Art. VIII, Sec. 15.)
1There is a basic difference between the terms "hear" and "try," or "hearing" and
"trial." As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., pp. 1348, 649, the term "trial" means
a "judicial examination and determination of issues between p arties to an action." On
the .o ther hand, the term "hearing" is "frequently used in a broader and more popular
significance to describe whatever takes place before magistrates clothed with judicial
functions, "at any stage of the proceedings subsequent to its inception." (Gohu vs. Gohu,
343 SCRA 124 {2000].)
2The inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation will infringe
upon the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to a speedy disposition of his
case. (Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 [1998].) And where a court does not act
promptly on the adjudication of a case before it and within the period prescribed by law,

V42 l✓ IIIJ,ll'l 1 I N I! 'UN! ,l,III J II{ Nl\1, 1,/1.W
h lnclplc:.; and Casc!J
(2) Extends to all parties and covers the pdrio'ds before judgment.
- This constitutionally guaranteed right extends its protection to
all citizens, including those .in the .military and covers the periods
before, during, and after the trial, affording br6'ader cir 'expanded
protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to
a speedy trial in criminal cases (Abadia vs. Coµrt of Appeals, 236
SCRA 676 [1994]; Marcos vs. Sandiganbaya.,n, 297 .$CRA 952 [1998];
Dansal vs. Fernandez, Jr., 327 SCRA 145 [20091; People vs, F9rtuna,
G.R. No. 182555; Sept. 7, 2010.), the violation .o r·-tvhich entitles the
accused to an acquittal.
(3) Obtains in any proceeding regardless of the nature of the case.
- It is not limited to the accuse.cl in crimir1aJ proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings inc~uding judicial _a nd quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitutiort, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with
the administration of justice. (Lopez, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, 364 SCRA
824 [2001]; Ombudsman vs. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 [2008].)
(4) Right necessarily relative and flexible. - The right to a speedy
disposition. of cases, or prompt rendition of judgment, however,
like the right to speedy trial accorded to the accused in all criminal
proceedings, is necessarily relative or flexible. While the speedy
disposition of cases may be the policy of the Constitution, speed
alone is not the chief objective of a trial or hearing. More than speed
and efficiency or the mere convenience of the courts or agencies and
of the parties in the case, the disposition of cases should always be
predicated on the consideration that the ends of justice and fairness
would be serveq. thereby.3 (Habana vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 314 SCRA 187 [1999]; Simon vs. Canlas, 487 SCRA433
[2006}.)
the accused's right to a speedy disposition of the case is just as much prejudicial as when
the prosecution is prolonged or deferred indefinitely. (Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan, 370
SCRA 394 [2001].)
3
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time, involved, therefore, wo~ld not be
S\lfficient Thus, it has been held ·that the ·bare allegation that it took the Ombudsman
more than three (3) years to terminate the preliminary investigation and file the necessary
information would not suffice. ('Iy-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan, 374 SCRA 200 [2002]; see
Dimayacyac vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 121 [2004].)
11 j J
tI I , 1(1 t\ lH , 11I , llll ,1, lH 1 l'{lt .J I 1:1
l<lghl lo'Spu dy l)l1:1po1111lon of 'o QII
(5) Right dependent upon circumstances of each case. - The right
is also consistent with reasonable delays and usually depends on
the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prCi>hibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights
nugatory. The same f?,ctors laid down in determining whether or not
the right to a speedy trial has been violated may also be considered
artµ balanced against each other in answering judicial inquiry,
whether or not a person officially charged with the administration
of justice has violated the right to a speedy disposition of a case.•
(see Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 [1991]; Dela
Rosa vs. Court. of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499 [1996]; see Castillo vs.
Sandjganbayan, 328 SCRA 69 [2000].)
(6) Factors that may be considered. -A balancing test of applying
societal interest and the rights of the accused necessarily compe!A
the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. 5 (Corpuz
4It is not enough that there be some procrastination in the proceedings. TI1e conduct
of both the prosecution/ plaintiff and the accused/ defendant must be weighed. It has
been held that in order to justify the dismissal of a criminal case, it must be established
that the proceedings have been unquestionably been marred by vexatious, capricious and
qppressive delays. But even though the failure or inaction may not have been deliberately
intended by the court, the unjustified delay may have nonetheless caused just as much
vexation and oppression, in violation of the right of a person to a speedy disposition of
his case. (Licaros vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.)
5
In Ta/ad vs. Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70 [1988] ,), which petition invoked, there
was a delay of almost three (3) years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan. In ruling the such delay constituted a violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases, this Court
took into account the following circumstances: (a) the complaint was resurrected only
after Tatad had a falling out with the former President Marcos, and hence, political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process;
(b) the Tanodbayan blatantly departed from the established procedure prescribed by law
for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (c) the simple factual and legal issues
involved did not justify the delay. (see People vs. Sandiganbayan, 712 SCRA 359 [2013].)
In Angchangco vs. Ombudsman (268 SCRA 301 (1997),) and Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman (307 SCRA 106 (1999).), the Supreme Court held that the delay of almost or
more than six (6) years in resolving the criminal charges against the petitioners therein
amounted to a violation of their constitutional rights to due· process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against them, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional
duty to act promptly on 1:omplaints filed before him. ·
However, in Santiago vs, Garchitorena (228 SCRA 214 (1995].) and Cada/in vs. POEA's
Administrator (238 SCRA 721 [1994).), the complexity of the issues, coupled with the
accused's failure to invoke the right to a speedy disposition of cases (in Santiago) and
the ".squabble" between the lawyers of the claimants (in Cadalin), prevented this Court
from yielding to the claims of violation of the constitutionally-guaranteed right to a
speedy disposition of cases. Similarly, in Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan (supra.), and Castillo vs.
Sandiganbayan (supra.), this Court hold as valid reasons for the delay in the disposition
 J
1/•M l 'l ll l. ll 'l' I N l l ~ UN/ , I Il l / 11( INAJ. ) ,/\W
Pl'ind plcs nncl tnscs
vs. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294 [2004].) The doctrinal rule is that
in the determination of whether the right has •been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (a) the
length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused;.and (d) the prejudice
caused by the delay. (Alvizo vs .. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55
[1993]; Dela Pena vs. Sandiganbayan, 360 SCRA 478 [200.1]; Republic
vs. Desierto, 436 SCRA 543 [2004]; Yu.lo vs. People, 452 SCRA 705
[2005].)
Indeed, what is beneficial speed or delay for one side could
be harmful speed or delay on the other, and -vice versa. (Avilla vs.
Reyes, Jr., 479 SCRA 334 [2006].) The right should not work against
and preclude the people's equally important.right to public justice.
(Republic vs. Desierto, 468 SCRA458 [2005].~· - ·
(7) Subject to waiver. - The right m<!-y be waived ·by failure to
assert it seasonably despite the finding that there was condemnable
delay (Republic vs. Desierto, supra.) especially where the delay is
not attributable to any of the parties involved. (Guerrero vs. Court
of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703 [1996].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Trial court deferred request of defense counsel to confer· with the
accused till after the prosecution htis rested its case and judgment was
promulgated the following day.
Facts: The accused is charged with robbery committed· agains,t
a tourist or transient which, under General Order No. 32 (issued
during martial law), has to be resolved within 24 hours. In
of .the cases "the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the
structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new
ones ?Y executive fiat, resulting in change of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, [~d]
functions and powers of prosecuting agencies." Also considered in Castillo was the
Sandiganbayan's he_a"}'. caseload; and in Alvizo, the accused's failure to assert such right
and the lack of pre1ud1ce caused by the delay to the accused. (cited in Dela Pefia vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra.) But a judge will not be exonerated b)' the fact that she had to
wait for the stenographic notes to be transcribed, proofread and finalized or that she had
multiple assignments in three different courts. (Tan vs. Regencia, 493 SCRA 26 [2006].)
In Dela Peiia, the petitioners failed to show that the delay of.four (4) years in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation was unreasonable or arbitrary; neither did
I
!.
they take any step to accelerate the disposition of the case. Their silence was interpreted
as a waiver of their right. (see Dirnayacyac vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 121 [2004);
Lumanog vs. People, G.R. No. 182555, Sept. 7, 2010.)
/\ l'i, I , Il l, 1111 , J, JI! l( lt .111 1/11'1
l{l!5IH tu s ,,oudy l) l11pofllt1on of 1
1lllCll
deferring the 'request, the court clarified that it would allow counsel
to consult his .cli~nt from time to time during cross-examination.
Trial comme,r,cE;p. tfte~e_after an,d,contj.nµe~,until 7:30 µ1 ~e ev~ning
with the pro'secution resting it's case.
The following day, trial was resumed for the presentation
of evidence for the defense, at 8:30 A.M., and judgment was
promulgated at U.:3$,that same:mo.rning.
Issue: Petitioner-accused claims lack of due process be~ause of
the unusual speed with which the trial court disposed of the case.
Held: (1) Trial time covered a brief span. - "Considering the
. .explicit requirement pf GeneraLOrder No. 32, the Trial Court had
np other alternatiive but to speed up trial. That defense cow1sel was
aware of the pr~scdbed time element is shown by the fact that he
had asked for only one hour within which to confer with his client
although norm.ally he would have been entitled to at least lw o
(2) days to prepare for trial. (Sec. 7, Rule 118, Rules of Court.) In
point of fact, the Trial Court did not deny defense counsel's request
for conference with petitioner-accused. The Trial Court merely
deferred such conference till after ·the prosecution had presented
its witnesses.
It is to be noted furt:4er that defense counsel was not totally
unprepared for trial for he was ready with two witnesses when
asked by the Cdurt. Moreover, after the prosecution had rested its
case, trial was -resumed the next day, thereby giving the defense
enough time to prepare for the presentation of its dire~t evidence.
Besides, notwithstanding the brief span of trial time, rebuttal and
sur-rebuttal were presented by the prosecution and the defense,
respectively."
(2) Judgment was rendered imme.diqtely after trial. - "The
rendition of the judgment not long after the trial was terminated is
not necessarily indicative of inordinate haste. On the contrary, Judge
Regino T. Veridiano II, the Trial Fiscal, and the defense counsel are
to be commended for their punctilious compliance with the explicit
mandate of the law. A reading of the transcript and of the judgment
rendered will also reveal that petitioner-accused was duly a11d
amply heard in his defense. He was not denied procedural due
process." (Magat vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 283 [1982], through
l
Justice Melencio-Herrera.)
-oOo-
 h I I l '/ /\ 1( 1, Ill J\ 11 , 1, 111 1 1( 1\,1 l 1'1
Wi,ht A151,li111t ffol(-J11edmh111tlm1

•I ,;(; ,; t t. t•.,j '·i" '

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or passive, that·would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is
covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. (People vs. Olvis, 154
SCRJ,\ 513 (198?),) _•. ..
ttIGHT AGAINST :SELF71NC~IMINAtION , . . !. of: ,, I. /·:, :

. ,:., .,J . ' •

' ,_; Importance of th~ right.
(1) Respect for the inviolability of the human personality, - The
SEC. 17. No person shall be compelled,to be a wiJness right against self-in:crlm:ination expressed in the.Constitution is not,
aga~nst himself. . .'. indeed, an idle right. It strikes at the very foundations of modem
civilization.
Meaning of the right.
As set forth by the Supreme Court in People vs. Alegre y Cerdon-
The right against self-incrimination is· t4e right ·of a person to cillo (94 SCRA 109 [1979}.):
refuse to give any evidence that may l_e ad to his conviction unless
he willingly decides otherwise; or simply, tne right of a person not "The right . _Qr privilege of a person accused of a crime
to be compelled to be a witness against himself: · ' against self-incrimination is a fundamental right. It is fl
personal right of grea·t importance and is given absolutely and
Th,e prohibitio~ is a protect~()n against'seJf~kcrimination· which
·un~quivocibiy:·rhe privilege against self-incrimination is an
trtay expose a person to criminal liabi~ty. · important development in man's struggle for liberty. It reflects
man;s fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations;
Basis and purpose of the right.
the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those suspected
(1) The constitutional prescription is founded on grounds of: of ·crime to the· cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
(a) Public policy, because if the party ·1~ thus required to contempt; tjle fea.r that self-incriminating statements may be
testify, he would be placed uncle! th~ st~o~gest terri.ptati<:m to obtained by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect
commit the crime of perjury for his own i;fr~tection; and · for the inviolabi!ity of the human personality and of the right
of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a
(b) Humanity or humanifarian reaso,ns b~cause it prevents ·· 'pri'vate life;' "
the extortion of confession by duress·m order to convince the
accused. (U.S. vs. Navarro, 3 Phil. 63 [1903]; Chavez vs. Court (2) Prevention of a greater evil. - No doubt the constitutional
of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 (1968].) Thus; the right is also· based provision may, on occ_asion, save a guilty man from his just deserts,
on the principles of liberty and justice which impose the on ~'-1~ Jt ts aiµ1~d, !l-gai.nsta more far-reaching evil/recurrence of the
government the duty to accord respect to· the dignity of its mquisition and the Star <:;:hamber, even if not in their stark brutality.
citizens. ·· · · PreveRtion of the greater evil was deemed of more importance than
occurrence of the lesser evil.
· (2) Essentia.Uy, the right is, m~ant •to · ;~a,:void and pr~hibit
positively the repetition and recutrenae of the ce11fo.inly inhuman . Pean Griswold of Harvard Law School (later, Solicitor General
procedure of.compelling a person,in a\cviminalor any other case, to of_$e'united ~tates)_eloquentJy puts it:
futnish·the·missing evidence necessary foihis 'Conviction." 'This was "The privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great
the•lesson learned from the ancient days of the inquisitiqn in which landmarks in man's struggles to make himself civilized ... We do
accusation was equivalent to guilt. Thus, anact,·whether testimonial ·· rtO't make' even 'the most hardened criminal sign his own death
warrant, or dig his own grave ... We have, through the course
946 of history, developed a considerable feeling of the dignity and
\1111 1' 1111,ll'l ' l l"lh l U " J 11 I I I JI ILIN I , I AW I IH ,
0
Pdn~lplcu und U11c11 , :, ·,
.. intrinsic importance of the indi;v.idual mandw.t;?n,the ev,il B,'1¥\iS
a human being.111
The Government must thus establish ~ ·guilt ·By ev:iderii::e
independently and freely secured; it c~o,t/bff ~(!eJ~iol'.l, ,Pr,oyf
a charge against an accused out of his; owi(:m6\it:l\: (s~~-)~lep'ai1ale
1
opinion ot:}ustice Castro in-Chaves vs. Co'Ur't1bf'Appeals:,. 24 SCRA
663 [1968].)' · · · • r',;. "~·'· ·
History of the right.
Mr. Justice, Malcolm, in.his, expressive. lwigu~ge,· tells µs, that
this fundamental right was recognized iti ~ngi~d in.the:early days
"in revolt against the thumbscrew and the sack." (Bermudez vs.
Castillo, 64 Phil. 483 [1937].) ·'
An early Philippine case (U.S. vs. Navai:ro; 3. Phil. 143 [1904).)
speaks ofthis constitutional injunction as.!'oldef than the Government
of the United States;" as having "its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person," and as
having been adopted in the Philippines _"to wipe out such prstctices
as formerly prevailed in these Islands of r_equirii:ig accused persons
to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimonies regarding
the offenses with which they were charged." (Chaves vs. Cqurt of
Appeals, supra.)
In People vs. Jimenez (71 SCRA 184 [1970].), _the Supreme c;::ourt
recounts the historical background of this constitutior:tal inhiqition.2
1
The Fifth Amendment Today, 1955.
2
"The history of this constitutional right against co~pulsory self-incrimination
stems from the revulsion of mankind against the abuses committed by the ecclesiastical
inquisitions and by the Star Chamber several centuries ago. Involuntary confessions -h ad
been rejected by all courts not only on the ground of its unre_liability but also mor.e impor-
tant; on humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness tow1U"ds
the accused in criminal proceedings. . compulsory self-incrimination, the Court held that 'the prosecution may not use state-
Although the constitutional language in which tl}e p~ivilege is cast mig~~ be con-
strued to apply only to situations in which the prosf;!cution ~eeks, to qill a defendant to
testify against himself at the criminal trial, its application has been ·held.to apply to civil
proceedings, to congress\onal investigations, to juvenile proce~4ing~, and other statutory
inquiries. In the application of this right, the natural concern rs the obvious realization
that an inability to .protect the right at one stage of <)- proceeding may make-.i_ts invocation
useless at a later stage. Thus, testimony 'ob~ained in civ.il suits, -or -befor~ ad.ministrative
·o r legislative committees, could also prove so_ incrimina!o.i:y that a peFson compelled to
give such testimony might readily be convicted on the basis of those disclosures in a
subsequent criminal proceeding.'
17 ! I l:, I '/ A l<.' I'. II (. Ull ,I , JP 1{ 1 :1 11 !
Right Ag,1lnst Sclf-lncdmlnation
Scope of the.right: . ..
(1) Right of an accused to silence. - An accused "occupies a
different tier of protec::t.i<;ms from an ordinary witness." The right to
outright refusal to ,tak~· the witness stand does not generally apply
to parties in civil clrld administrative cases or proceedings uruess
they are criminal in nature. (People vs. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216, 226
[19.89]; Rosete vs. Lim, 490, SCRA 125 [2006].) An accused has a right
to testify but he cannot be compelled to testify against himself or as
witness in his own behalf.3
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right of the
accused to silence, artd his silence, meaning, his failure or refusal
to testify, may not be u sed as a presumption of guilt or taken as
evidence against him (U.S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343 [1905]; Chaves vs.
Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 663 [1968].) or even imply a desire to
conceal guilt. (People vs. Rael, 204 SCRA 704 [1991].)
It gives the accused immunity from any attempt by the
prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him
to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but
only if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only if
he freely chooses to. Or he could remain silent, and the prosecution
is powerless to compel him to talk. 4 (Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424
[1968].)
(2) Any case where fact asked for is a criminal one. - The right
is available in criminal cases as well as in civil, administrative,
and legislative proceedings or investigations, whether ex parte
In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the precedent-setting case of
I r,
Miranda v. Arizon11 established rules to protect a criminal defendant' s privilege against
self-incrimination from the pressures arising during custodial investigation by the police.
Thus, to provide practical safeguards for the practical reinforcement for the right against
ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination."'
3According to the 1935 Bill of Rights: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." (Art. Ill, Sec. 1[18) thereof.)
4lncorporating Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966].) in the present Constitution
was intended to fill a constituJional hiatus under the 1935 Charter. Section 20 of Article
IV of the 1973 Charter (now Sec. 17 and Sec. 12(1, 2, 3]; Art. Ill.) carried quite an exacting
standard compared to its 1935 predecessor, but the 1987 Constitution provides for an
even more demanding procedure in Section 12. (People vs. Decierdo, supra.)
 1' 1111 ll ' l ' l f JI H \ H li d 111 l Ill II IA I I AW
1
1'1111 lplt !1 IH\d 1\ll('II
1
or otherwise, including forfeiture cases where fact asked. for is
a criminal one. It protects one whether he is a party or a, witness5
(Bermudez vs. Castillo, 94 Phil. 483 [1937]; Mc.Carthy y. Arnsdtein,
266 U.S. 40; Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059 [1964); (;alzytan v.s.
Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 [1985]; Pascuali Jr. vs. Board of Medical
Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 [1969].), a citizen or an .aliet).. It does not
extent to private investigations done qy private individuals.6
(3) Compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. -'the right may
not be invoked to protect a person against being compelled to testify
to facts which may expose him only to public ri~icule, or impair his
reputation for probity, or even tend to disgrace him.-It may .n ot be
invoked simply because the testimony might subject one to some
liability not arising from any criminal action.7 (Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22
SCRA424 [1968].)
(4) Present, not a past criminality. - It is applicable only to a
present, not a past, criminality which involves no present danger of
prosecution. Hence, a witness cannot refuse to testify as to a crime
which, for example, has already prescribed (Ibid.) or as to whic;h he
has been granted pardon or guaranteed immunity under a valid
5What is controlling is not the character of the suit involved but the natur~ of the
proceedings. The privilege extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases
in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a w itness. (Galman vs. Pamaran, supra.)
But a respondent in an administrative proceeding cannot claim the right to be informed
of .his right against self-incrimination under Section 12(1) because this provision is not
applicable where a person is not "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
(Escleo vs. Dorado, 385 SCRA 554 [2002].)
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpuena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceedings. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
question incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed
at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. (Rosete vs.
Lim, 490 SCRA 125 [2006].)
6Under Sections 12 and 17, "the Bill of Rights does n ot concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and other individuals, It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State," (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Casa Montessori
Internationale, 430 SCRA 261 [2004].)
'What the above guarantee seeks to prevent is compulsory dlsclosure of
incriminating facts. Necessarily then, the protection it affords will have to await the
existence of actual cases, be they criminal, civil, or administrative. Prior to such stage,
there is no pressing need to pass upon the question of wheth er there is an infringement
of the non-incrimination guarantee. (Ibid. )
1I , I? A IH, Il l. 1111 I l 111 l{ l t .111
1.<lghl J\g11lnt1UffolJ •lill't'lmln 111011
s tatute 8 because once the reason for privilege ceases, the priv-iilege
itself ceases. An immunity statute must grant complete and •not·
par-tial immunity against criminal pr.osecutions, because no statute
can deprive a witness of his constitutional privilege unless it affords
him absolute immunity.
(5) Testimonial cqmpulsion. - It can be availed of only against
testimonial compulsion, and must be invoked (by a witness other
than the accused) at the proper time and that time is when the ques-
tion which fends to elicit an incriminating answer is propounded
since a witness has no way of knowing in advance the incriminat-
ing e~ect of the question to be put to him, but an accused, unlike an
ordinary witness, can refuse altogether to testify as a witness for the
prosecution on the very reasonable assumption that the purpose of
the ~nterrogation can only be to incriminate him.
(6) No application to juridical persons. - The guarantee bas no
applic~tion to juridical persons. While an individual may lawfully
refuse to answer incriminating questions w1less protected by an
irrµnunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with
special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when
charged with an abuse of such privileges. 9 (BASECO vs. PCGG, 150
SCRA 181 [1987].)
Nature of the right.
(1) A personal right subject to waiver. - A confession taken in
violation of Section 1710 (and also of Sec. 12) shall be inadmissible
8
For example, Section 8 of RA. No. 1379 (re forfeiture of illegally obtained wealth),
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 749 (re bribery and graft cases), Sections 4 and
5 of Executive Order No. 14, dated May 7, 1986 (re testimony before the Presidential
Commission on Good Government), and Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886. (infra.)
'I-There is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation. The latter,
being a creature of .the state, does not have the constitutional right to refuse to submit
its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the state even if this will result
in disclosure of criminal acts of the corporation, and an officer of a corporation who
is charged with criminal violation of a statute for refusal to produce its books may be
required to do so. (Hale v. Hankel, 201 U.S. 43; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361.)
This principle applies also to_an unincorporated association such as a labor union or a
partnership.
10Section 17 and Section 2 are closely interconnected. Since the very personal nature
of an individual's private effects testifies about that individual, an unreasonable search
and seizure, by its very purpose, is, in essence, forcing someone to testify against himself.
 t'1JLLJ 1'1'1NU ' N!?ffJ,\l.)' l l U>N A J.1./\W :Jt (', 11/
Principles nntl Cnses ', , , • -:
against-the confessant. The guarantee; howe.\f:er, is pu!iely,p~rsonal · .
and.-:may be waived invario~s ways;•Itrtt?y::bednv.oked.only by,the1
person to whom it belongs. It was ne¥.e r intehd.eq to,p ermit a.person .
to plead the fact that scimethird peri;_bn-might-be:mcriminated PY his. ·
testimony, even though he were the agent of st.ich person: ·(People
vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 [1979]; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; People
vs. Merabueno, 239 SCRA 198 [1994].) Th~ p~~vile_g~ i~ an. o:ption of
refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry. (Beltran' vs. S'a!l1son, '53 Phil.
573 [1929].) . . . .
While a person cannot be compell~d to b~ a witness against
himself, he may waive this right by voluntarily taking the witness
stand. (People vs. Ventura, 433 SCRA389 {2904].)
(2) A right not self-executing or automatically.operational. - In other
words, it must be claimed; otherwise, the pmtection does not come
into play. Moreover, the right must be claimed at the appropriate
time, or else, it may be deemed waived. Thus, in a case where the
petitioner did not invoke his right against self-incrimination at the
time she was asked to provide samples ~f her signature, she was
deemed to have waived her right against self-incrimination. (Nacu
vs. Civil Service Commission, 635 SCRA 766 [2010].)
(3) A substantive right enforcement of which is mandatory. - The
right is not merely a formal technical rule; the enforcement of whicll
is left to the discretion of the court. It is mandatory; it secures to a
defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundame.n tal to our
scheme of justice. Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "the constitutional
privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well
as the innocent and farsighted." (Marchetti v. United States, U.S.
Supreme Court, No. 2-0ctober Term, ,1967, Jan. 29, 1968, cited in
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663 [.1968].)
Nevertheless, it is the court, rather than the witness, that has
the final say as t~ whether or not the answer to a question will be
incriminatory.
Form of testimony prohibited.
(1) In general. - The constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination has been defined as a protection against testimonial
compulsion, but this has since been extended to any evidence
1
/ 0 ( ll, Ill , 111).1 , II Jtl, :1l' l/1
Hight ◊goln~t Sclf-Inctlrnlnnllon
"co1~wm~cati•V!:!. •in, .nature, . acquired under circumstances ,.,w.£
duress." (People vs, Ol~s; 154 SCRA 513 [1987].) If such ev,i<:J.emc:.e.is
necess~ the sarneshoukl be secured from other sources; tmd if jt js
desire,d thatit should·b~tal<en from the p?,rty concerned, he must.at
least be assured ofabsolute immunity by those legally empowei:ed
to do so. .: :.· •
As the common .s:ai¼lg goes, "No sane man will burn his own
shirt nor will he get a stone to hit his own head."
(2) Testimonial seif-il'!c.rimination. - The constitutional guarantee
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is
a prohibition against cqmpulsory testimonial self-incrimination 11 -
extricating from d'efendant' s own lips, against his will, an admission
of his guilt. The guarantee includes the "right to refuse to testify to a
fact which would be a neeessary link on a chain of evidence to p rove
the co~mission of a crime by a witness." 12 (Fernando vs. Maglanoc,
95 Phil. 431 [1954].)
(3) Production of incriminating documents and other objects. -
Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may be documentary.
The protection then exte~ds to the production by the accused of
documents, cllattels, ·or other objects, demanded from him, which
may constitute evidence of his guilt or innocence, for then he is
compelled to make a statement, express or implied, as to the identity
of the articles produced.
The constitutional privilege cannot be maintained with respect
to private papers or records required by law in the exercise of police
11
The right cannot be invoked where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incriminating statement but an object evidence such as stolen goods. (People vs. Malimit,
264 SCRA 167 [199~].) The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of
counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of the righ t. (People vs, Gallarde,
325 SCRA875 [2000].)
Neither can it be claimed where the voluntary confession (given in the preliminary
investigation) of the accused is admitted at the trial. What the Constitution prohibits is
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. The conviction of an accused on a volun-
tary extra-judicial confession in no way violates the constitutional guarantee. (People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 [1946].)
12
_ Why it spould be thus is not difficult to discern. "A crime or a criminal net may
contam two or more elements and a question would have a tendency to incriminate, even
if it tends to elicit only one of said elements." (Isabela Sugar Co. vs. Macadaeg, 98 Phil.
995 [1955].)

. 11 111J , ll ' l 1I N I'.t 'U N! II 11 I J 1\1 INt'\ I , 1, AW
1'rh1clplc11 11nd '119 • ,, ,'
power to be kept (e.g., books of accounts~,inorder that there may be
suitable information of'transactions which ate appr6priate subjects
of governmental regulations -and the enforcement of res'trictions
validly established.13 (Shapiro v. United:States1 335 U.S. 1; Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S,. 582.) ·
(4) Production ofhandwriting specimen;·-,-.The refusal of a person
to produce a specimen of his handwrttmgds· p.lso include_d within
the privilege. The reason is that writing-is•,n ot a purely.mechanical
act "of moving the body, or the hand, or the·fingers." It requires
the application of intelligence and attention and is equivalent to
testimonial compulsion. Thus, in a prosecution for falsification,
writing means, in effect, requiring the acctised "to furnish a meahs
to determine whether or not he is a falsifier." (B'e ltran vs. Samson, 53
Phil. 570 [1929].) ..
(5) Forced re-enactments; executing · mechanical acts.. - Like
uncounselled and coerced confessions, forced re-enactments come
within the ban against self-incrimination. ·
In a forced re-enactment, the accused is not merely required to
exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made ~o
admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police procedu'r e
just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession. Accordingly, all
evidence (e.g., pictures) based on such a_ re-enactment conducted
without any lawyer assisting the accused is held to be in violation
of the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence. 14 (People vs.
Olvis, 154 SCRA 513 [1987]; People vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119 [1997].)
(6) Identification in police line-ups. -An act, whether testimonial
or passive, that would amount to a disclosure of incriminatory facts
is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. In .People vs. Olvis
-($upra.), the Supreme Court ruled, in effect, that a police line-up
13
Asearch or seizure of a person's house, papers or effects for the purpose of locating
incriminating matters infringes the guarantee. (Morfe vs: Mutuc, supra.)
14
Forced re-enactments should be distinguished from mechanical acts wherein
the -a·ccused is made to execute, not meant to unearth:undisdosed facts but to ascertain
physical attributes determinable by simple observation. (infra.) This includes requiring
the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body, or compelling him to
expectorate morphine from his mouth, or making her submit to a pregnancy test or n
footprinting test, or requiring hlm to take part in a police line-up in certaln cnsos. In oach
case, the accused does not s peak his guilt. It is not a pre-requisite, therc(oro, thnl ho bo
provided wltl, lhc guiding hond of counsel.
J
II 1•, 17 AN,11, Il l , I111.,1, ntf l( ll d 11 (
Hight Agnlnot 8l'lf-h1rrli,1ln11tkm
is not encompassed in, the constitutional right against testimonial
compulsion and the right to counsel. (People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA
777 [1992].) . - - •
(7) Identification in ·2ourt. ~ The constitutional prohibition is
not also violated by compelling the accused to stand up for the
purpos~ of ide,ntification, for every court has the power to require
every person who is pre.sent as a party or who is a witness under
e).(ami.nation, to disdbse,his or her face to the court. For the purpose,
an accused can be. compelled to disclose only those parts of his
person which are not µsually covered. The admission as to marks
and scars found upon the person of the accused with a view of
ascertaining his identity is not prohibited.15
(8) Signing of Booking Sheet/Arrest Report/Receipt of Property
S~ized. - When an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest
Re.port a.ta police station,.he does not admit the commission of an
offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking
Sheet is merely a statement of the accused being booked and of
the date which accompanies the fact of arrest. It is not an extra-
judicial statement and cannot be the basis of conviction. However,
the signature of the suspect on the Receipt of Property Seized
given with.out the assistance of counsel (Sec. 12.) is inadmissible
in evidence for such signature is a declar ation against his interest
and a tacit admission of the crime charged. (People vs. Morice, 246
SCRA 214 [1995].)
Use of body or parts of one's person
as evidence.
The prohibition of compelling a man to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body or
parts of his person as evidence when it may be material. (Alih vs.
Castro, 151 SCRA279 [1987].)
Thus, there is no violation where:
(1) The accused is finger-printed, photographed, or paraffin-
tested (Alih vs. Castro, supra; People vs. Gamboa, 194 SCRA 372
[1991].) or made to undergo ultra-violet ray examination in order to
1011 AM JUR. 875.
 • I ' I 111 ,11 'I ' I N l~t U N/1 I I I l J ,PIU M/'/\1, I .AW
JJd nclplOij and CllllOH
determine the presence of ultra,vio.let p0wder16 (People ,vs .. Tranca,
235 SCRA 455 [1994).);
(2) The accused is examined for gortorthea to determine if it
had been transmitted to his victim of rap·e (U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23
Phil. 145 [1912].);
(3) Blood sample is taken from the acc~_sed (charged with
homicide through reckless imprudence.arisih°g froin'an au~omobile
collision involving an automobile driven ~y' fom while allegedly
intoxicated) while unconscious for purposes of blood test to
determine the presence of alcohol (Breithaupt v. Abraham, 342 U.S.
165.); . .
(4) Hair samples are taken froni. the accused (cl:targed with
homicide) and submitted to the Natiom.a:l B-ureaµ of Iiwestigation
(NBI) for forensic examination for comparison with the hair sfr~ds
found on the right hand of the victim. The hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him for what is proscribed is the use
of testimonial compulsion or any evidence coi:rununicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress (Peqple vs. Rondero, 320
SCRA 383 (1999].); and
(5) Aside from blood sample taken :from the accused, DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) was conducted ·on hitn.17 (People vs. Yatar,
428 SCRA 504 (2004].)
Performance of mechanical acts.
Mechanical acts the accused is made to execute which are
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts, but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation are not within the
16
Paraffin tests and ultra-violet ray examination may be conducted on the accused
in the absence of counsel since the subjection of the accused thereto cannot be considered
a custodial investigation. (People vs. Canceran, 229 SCRA 581 [1994]; People vs. Franca,
supra.) Paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered inconclusive by the Su preme Court.
Scientific experts concur in.the view that they have proved extremely unreliable in use.
(People vs. Cajumocan, 430 SCRA 311 [2004],)
17
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organism, and
a person's DNAis the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person's life
time - the DNA in a person's blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat,
bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal
cells, Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA with the notable exception of iden tical twins.
! IW, I'/ A l~" JI~, 1111 ,1.lHI 1{1\ :1 I 11
Hl!Jhl Ag1dn1JI•!:loJf.111 dmlnollon
privilege. By such acts, the ,accused does not thereby speak his guilt;
hence, the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.
(People vs. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104 [1993]; Gutang vs. People, 335
SCRA 479 [2000); Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals, 431 SCRA 194
[2004].)
There is also rto violation where:
. (1) ,The ac~us~d is for~ed to discharge morphine from his mouth
(U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36. Phil. 735 [1917J.);
(2) The accused is compelled to place his foot on a piece of
paper to secure his footprint (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S.
vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 (1921).);
(3) The accused is c0mpelled to be photographed or measured,
to remove his garments and his shoes, or required to put on a pair of
pants, and a hat to determine whether they fitted him, or to move his
body to enable the foregoing .things to be done (People vs. Otadora,
86 Phil. 244·[1932]; People vs. Codilla, supra; People vs. Payno1~ 260
SCRA 615 [1996].); .
(4) A woman accused of adultery is compelled to permit her
body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant
(Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920r); and
(5) Samples ' of urine were given by the accused who were
requested to undergo drug test (Gutang vs. People, 18 supra.);
Constitutional provision to be lib~rally
construed.
In order that the constitutional provision under consideration
may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be
given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the persons
invoking it. 19 (Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483 [1937}.)
18
1n this case, Gutang who was arrested in relation to a drug case, volunteered to
gi:e urine and there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the
crime charged. In Dela Cruz vs. People (730 SCRA 655 [2014]), petitioner was arrested
for extortion. He .resisted to having his urine sample taken, and his urine, was the only
evidence available evidence to prove his guilt for the use of illegal drugs. The drug test
done against his will was held a violation of his right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.
19
1n the United States, the generally accepted approach in Fifth Amendment cases
(involving the constitutional guarantee und er consideration) was stated as fo llows ln
\11111 l ' llll ll ' l ' l l ll( t (JU 1111111(~11',/ A l,I AW
l'.l/lncl1le» t111tl <.:111w11 , ,
But simply invoking .the privilege is nost sl-l,fficiel;lt. Th~ witness
is'rtot the sole judge of the ,inCJJiminat_ing :U~!iUtl:l ofathe. questicm. It
is .t he province of the cour~ to determin!i? w~t:l:te'r ,any direct. artswer
to a question will furnish evidence against,hi;m; andJwh~ther•or not
the question is incriminating, the ruJe firmly establislied is j:hat a
witness cannot be compelled to giv:e atF~Jq ~ chaiJ:1 .of evidence
which may furnish matter for hi~ convictjo~.ot _a c;riminal offense. In
doubtful cases, however, the witn~ss sl):9,JJ4 be permJtted to make
the determination.
Law granting to witnesses immunity
from prosecution.
(1) Statutory immunity granted to witnesses, -· Aside from the
Constitution (see Art. VI, Sec. 11; Art. XVI, Sec. 3.), there are laws
(e.g., P.O. No. 749 and No. 1886, E.O. No. 14 [PCGG); R.A. No. 602
[Minimum Wage Lawl) giving immunity to witnesses from criminal
prosecution to facilitate the solution of crimes with high political,
social, and economic impact against the people.
Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
an accused may be discharged to be utilized as a State witness.
(2) Types of statutory immunity. - Our immunity statutes are
of American origin. In the United States, there are two (2) types of
statutory immunity granted to a witness, namely:
(a) Transactional immunity. - By its grant, a witn-ess can no
longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of
the act or transaction; and
Johnson v. Zerbst (304 U.S. 458.): "It has been pointed out tha~ 'courts. indulge in every
reasonable presumption against a waiver of the fund amen.tarrights' and that we 'do not
presume acquiescence in the Joss of such fundamental tjghts.' A waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a kno\fn right or privilege."
In .this jurisdiction, almost six decades ago, Justice Laurel voted to sustain a claim
of the constitutional guarantee in Bermudez vs. Castillo. (supra.) In his concurrence, he
said inter alia: "As between two possible and equally rational constructions, that should
prevail which is more in consonance with th!! purpose i;ltended -t o be carried out by the
Constitution.xx x Unless the evidence is voluntarily given, the policy of the Constitution
is one of protection on humanitarian considerations and .grounds of public policy x x x.
The privilege should not be disregarded merely because it often affords a shelter to the
guilty and may prevent the disclosure of wrongdoing. Courts cannot, under the guise of
protecting the public interes t nnd ftuthering the ends of justice, treat a sacred privilege as
if it were mere excresence in the Constitution.'' (see concurring opinion of Justice De In
Fuente in Galman vs. Pamnrnn, 138 SCRA 294 [1985],)
Ii', 17 AI I , 111 , II II ~1, l ll I I{ It ,I I I
W15hl At111IMI !-l(1l(. J11cd 1tlh111 tlo11
(b) Use-and~derivative case immunit1J, - By its grant, a witness
"is only assurecl . tnat his particular testimony and evidence
derived.'from it•,wm: not be used against him in a su~sequent
prosecution.
{3) justification for grant of immunity. - The decision of
the prosecution to grant immunity to a witness is a deliberate
renunciation of the right ·of the State to prosecute all who appear
to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the
particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more
guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm
of the law.
To accommodate, the need to assist government in its task of
containing crime, the right against self-incrimination was stripped
of its absoluteness.
(4) Condition for grant of immunity. - Immunity statutes in
varying shapes wer~ enacted which would allow government
to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right against
self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionality, a witness is given either kind of immunity.
Those given the privilege of immunity pay a high price for it~ the
surrender of their precious.right to remain silent. Laws that tend to
erode the right against self-incrimination and the right to remain
silent must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of
the individual. (Mapa, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783 [1994].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Accused was never informed of his constitutional rights at time
of his arrest.
Facts: In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and
alleged subversive documents, the prosecution presented the two
arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted
ownership of the gun after his wife pointed to the place where
it was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused himself
who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive
documents were hidden.
It appears, however, that the accused was never informed of
his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest.
Issue: May the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the
admission made by the accused be used against him?
IIM) l ' llll 1I 11'1N lt i ~JNl 11I1U ll l f1NJ\ l.1 .A.W
JJrlnclplco nnd 'nsco
Held: Testimonies of arresting officer ·as to ·acca'sed's ·admissions
inadmissible. - "So that when the. acQl:1.~e'd-· allegedly admitted
ownership of the gun and pointe~ t0 ;tl;i.eil0oation pf the -Subversive
documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right- agaJnst self-incrimination.
The Constitution itself man9:ates' that' :~ny
-e~ld'ence__obta~ed in
violation of this right i's' inadmfssib)e hf evidence."Consfquently,
the testimonies of the arresting officers, ~s,to
the c1.dmis'sions·'rriade
by ~e appellant cannot be used agamst him/ (People vs, Burgo$, 144
SCRA 1 [1986], through Justice Gutierrez; Jr.)"
• '
. 2. Petitioner~appell.ee who is a r;~spond~nt_in an admin_i.~trative
~nvestigati~11: against him for im_moralit_y,and mf!lpractire is ·r_eqµ.ir~~ to
take the witness stand at the instance of t~e complai,:za~t. · ·
Facts: Petitioner-appellee alleges that the ruling of the
respondent Board of Medical Examiners violates his right against
self-incrimination because the administrative proceeding against
him could result in forfeiture or l_oss of a privilege, being quasi-
criminal in character.
Issue: May the Board compel the petitioner-appellee to testify
as a witness for the complainant against his will?
Held: No. (1) PenalhJ involves revocation of license. - ''In the
case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (16 SCRA 1259 [1962].), while ,the matter
referred to an administrative charge of unexplained wealth,
with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever
property a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out
of proportion to his salary and his other lawful income, there is
clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture,
while administrative in character, thus possesses a criminal or
penal aspect.
The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be simi-
larly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of propt;?rty
but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some
an even greater deprivation. The privilege extends its protection
to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not
be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and
the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. We re-
iterate that such a principle is equally applicable to ·a proceeding
that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the
medical profession." · and Government Operations, an agency created by executive order
A l~ I , Ill 111 1,1, \ 11 1 1{ 11..t 11 (1
Wgltt A1511li11it Set(. (11 rl111lnollon
(2) Guarantee protects as well the right to silence. - "The accused
has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as
a presumption of his guilt. (U.S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 363 [19f)5].) It is
his right 'to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to
take the witness stand - with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his
own free genuine will.' (Chaves vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663
[1968].)"
(3) Reason for the rule. - "The constitutional guarantee, along
with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while
cr~e sho~lcl not go unpunished and that the truth must be re-
J
vealed,. such desir?ble objectives should not be accomplished ac-
cording t9 means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
acco.rded the .human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote
from Chief Justice Warren, 'the constitutional foundation underly-
ing the privilege is the respect a government x x x must accord to
the dignity and integrity of its citizens.' (Miranda v. Arizona, 284
U.S. 436 [1966].)" .
(4) Guarantee is identified with the right to privacy. - "While ear-
lier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right
is predicate<;!., precluding as it does all resort to force or compul-
sion, whether _physical or mental, current judicial opinion places
equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus,
according to Justice Douglas (in Criswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 [1965].): 'The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force to surrender to his detriment.' (Criswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 [1965) .) So also with the observation of the late
Judge Frank (in United States v. Grune~old, 235 F 2d 536, quoted
in Miranda vs. Arizona.) who spoke of a right to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy." (Pascual, Jr. vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344
[1969], through Justice Fernando.)
3. Respondent who is not facing any administrative charge is cited
as a witness in connection with a fact-finding investigation of anomalies
and irregularities.
Facts: The issue is whether the Presidential Agency on Reforms
 l ' llll 11 ' 1' 11 11111~ 11 , llll l1lt l!II JA I 1 1\W I II ,
l'l'!nclpl1111 11t1~1 '1111c11
of the President pursuant to his powel!s' and•duties to investigate
cases of graft and corruption, enjoys· thei authority to issue
subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigation;
Under the executive order, the agency is veste~ with.subpoena
power. ··
Issue: Above.
Held: Yes. (1) Administrative agencies inay be authorized to make
investigations. - "The life blood of the· administrative process is
the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of
evidence. Investigations are useful for
all administrative·functions,
not only for rule-making, adjudication, and'licep:sing, buf also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, fordeterininirtg general
policy, for recommending legislation, · and for purposes rio more
specific than illuminating_obscure ar~a~ to find out if anything
should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to
make investigations not only in proceedings of a legislative or
judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to
obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or
ju,dicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature."
(2) Administrative agencies have power to issue: subpoenas. -
"Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce· subp6ena.s issued
in the course of investigations, whether' or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable· cause is shown and even
before the issuance of a complaint. It is enough that the investigation
be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena
is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon
which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Because
judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until
it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it does not follow
that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws ar,e
enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry."
(3) Administrative agencies have power of inquisition. - "The
administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not
dependent upon a case of controversy in order to get evidence, but
can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated
or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."
(4) Requisites for validity of administrative subpoena. - "In
sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for
11/ f I ti 1(11, 1111 III I I , t II I I( I l d I l •
l{l11h~P.!Jlihllll t;olf-111cl'ltttl1'1tllun
. · enforcement if the:inqu.iry is: (1) within the authority 0£ the agency;
(2) the del;lland is. not too indefinite; and (3) the information is
reasonably relevant-.'.'
(5) . Only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis for
future action. - "The privilege against self-incrimination extends
in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to
adversary proceedings. x x x Nevertheless, in the present case, the
respondent is not facing any administrative charge. He is merely
cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation
of anomalies and irregulflrities in the City of Manila with the object
of submitting the asser:nbled facts to the President of the Philippines
,or to file the corresponding charges. Since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any
unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be . unwise.
.Anyway, by all means, respondent may contest any attempt in
the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination." (Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99 [1975], through
Justice Martin.)
j
!' 4. Petitioner is being directed to take the stand not in a criminal
case where he is an accused, but in a civil action.
i. Facts: A case was filed by respondent provincial board for the
annulment of a resolution approving the provincial budget on the
ground that the said resolution was never approved by the board.
Issue: The issue is whether in the civil case, the petitioner
(Provincial Treasurer) can be called to testify as a witness for the
respondent despite his claim of violating his right against self-
incrimination.
Held: Yes. (1) There is no legal impediment for a party to call any
of the adverse parties to be his witness. - "This is dearly provided in
Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 20 It is in a criminal case
20
"Sec. ·6. Direct examination ofunwi!Iing or hostile witnesses, -A party may in terrogate
any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse
party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of
a par~ership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading
questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicled and impeached by or on
behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only
upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief."
 II I t ., I , 1111 1 1 [ I I I I
l'tlnt t11h , 1111d I 11 , l(IPihl A1111h11Ht 1ill. l11u lt11h111\h111
wh •n ~h, A 111wd m11y not be ··ompullod•to t'oHtlfy, 011Lo llO 1nuch l\8
utter a word, even for hls own defonse, But wfaile thci conelitutional
guaranty against self-incthnination protec_ta· a. pe1•son in aU types
of ca$es, be. theiY criµ1h:al, civil op ~~rrµni~tF,~~;yef ,~aid,pdvil~ge, in
p·roceedings other than a crii,ninal case aga;!n,st )mn :wh0 mvok~s it,
is considered an option to refuse to.answer:incli,imin~ting,q~e~tions,
and nqt,a prohibition of inquiry.''
(2) Privilege must be invoked af the proper.'time. -2."lt is esfablished
that the privilege against self-:mcrimina'tibn'mustbeinvoked at the
proper time, and·the proper time to mvoke it' is when ··a question
calling for an incriminating answer is-propounded. This has to be
so, because before a question is asked~ there would be no way of
telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is
self-incriminating or not. In the instant case, petitioner invoked
the priviiege even prior to any questi~ ,b_e ing propourtded, and
simply declineq to take the witness stand. (Gonzales vs. Secretary
of Labor, 94 Phil. 325 [1954}.)"
(3) Civil action is governed by different set of rules. - "Moreover,
the herein petitioner was being directed to take the stand, not in a
criminal case where he is an accused but in a civil action. This is
expressly permitted by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which authorizes a party to call any adverse party as his witness.
In the case of Suarez vs. Tengco (2 SCRA71 [1961].), the following
was stated:
'Here, petitioner invoked the privilege even prior to any
question, and simply declined to take the wiJness _stand. Note
that in the Gonzales case, above-dted, the· adverse party was
directed. to take the witness stand in proceedings to investigate
an alleged failure to pay overtime compensation, which, under
corresponding special laws, carries a pena'l sanction. Here,
petitioner was being directed to take the stand, not in a ,crriminal ·
case where he is an accused, but in an independent civil action
which, although arising from the .same facts involved in a
criminal case pending before the same court, is still regarded by
law (Art. 2177, Civil Code.) as an entirely .separate and distinct
action, governed by a corresponding different set o{ rules."'
(Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906 [1 979), thro11gh ]11/ltlcc I
Castro,)
I~ /\ I I I ll JIii I , l JI I i l H ,I 11
5. Testlm0nies ofrespondents who.did not invoke tl1eir right ag.ainst
1
self-incrimination.were not admitted in evidence by the SandJganbayan.
Facts: To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding
the killing of Senator Benigrto S. Aquino, Jr. inside the premises of
the Manila Ir\t.e rtiatiortal Airport on August 21, 1983, Presidential
Decree· No. 1886' wa:s issued by President Marcos creating an
ad hoc Fact-Finding Board which later became more popularly
known as the "Agrava Board." On the basis of the two (2) reports
submitted by the Board, private respondents were charged before
the Sandiganbayijn as accessories for the killing of Senator Aquino
. and Rolando Galman.
Petitioners assail the resolution of the Sandiganbayan admitting
all the evidence by the prosecution except the testimonies and/ or
other evidences produced by the private respondents in view of
the immunity granted by Section 5 of Pres. Decree No. 1886. 5Aid
Section 5 reads:
"SEC. 5. No ·person shall be excused from attending and
testifying or from producing books, records, corresp ondence,
documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued
by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by
him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after
having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination to testify
or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying
shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed in so testifying nor shall he be exempt from
demotion or removal from office." (italics supplied)
Under Section 4, the Hoard "may hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and impose appropriate penalties therefor."
. Issue:The crux of the controversy is the admissibility in evidence
of the testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who
did not invoke their right against self-incrimination before the
Agrava Board.
Held: (1) Board was charged not only with thefunction ofdetermining
r,
thefacts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly,
the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor
so that /:hey 111ny /.Je bro11ght before the bar of justice. - "This purpose is
!166 _1Jl llLLL'l 'JN IJ 'UN! 'f'l ' l'U J'l N A.I. 1,/\W
Principles and Cnses
implicit from Section 12 of the said Presidential Decree, the pertinent
portion of which provides - 'Section 12. The findings of the Board
shall be made public. Should the findings,warrant the prosecution
of any person, the Board may initiate the filing of.proper complaint
with the appropriate gove~nment age!J.cy.' And as a safegµard, the
Decree guarantees 'any person call~dJo te~tify before the. Board
the right to counsel at any stage of the proceidings.' It cannot be
denied that in the coqrse of receiving eyidence,.persons s~oned
to testify .will include not merely plain w,itriesses b\lt also those
suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing."
(2) Decree compelled private respanderits to testify_ against
themselves under pain of being declared in contempt. - "Presidential
Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were
compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5
of the Decree leaves them no choice. Tuey have to take the \Vitness
stand, testify or produce evidence, under pairi of contempt if they
failed or refused to do so. The jeopavdy of being placed behind
prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes.
Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against
themselves, both of which are sacrosanctly enshrined and protected
by our fundamental law.
Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally
foreclosed by Pres. Decree No. 1886. And yet when they so testified
and produce evidence as ordered, they were not immune from
prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them."
(3) Right to remain silent is available to any person under
investigation. - "The fact that the framers of our Constitution did
not choose to use the term 'custodial' by having it inserted between
the words 'under' and 'investigation,' as in fact the sentence
opens with the phrase 'any person' goes to prove that they did not
adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. (Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 343.) The use of the word 'confession' in the last
sentence of said Section 20, Article 4 (now Sec. 12(1], Art. IV.) does
not connote the idea that it applies only to police investigation, for
although the word 'confession' is used, the protection covers not
only 'confessions' but also 'admissions' made in violation of this
section. They are inadmissible against the source of the confession
or admission and against third persons.''.
(4) Private respondents, G~nerals Ver and Olivas, labor under
suspicion of being involved in the assassination. - "The papers,
A loi. I , I l l , 1111 ,1.lll' H I ,I I I t,
Hight A gnlrnll Sclf-lncrlmlnntlon
especially the foreign media, and rumors from ugly-wagging
tongues, all poirtt to them as having, in one way or another,
·participated or have something to do, in the alleged t:onspiracy
that brought about the assassination. Could there still be any doubt
then that their being asked to testify, was to determine whether they
were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation
in the said conspiracy?
It is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe that private
respondents' being called to the witness stand was merely to elicit
from them facts and circumstances surrounding the tragedy, which
was already so abundantly supplied by other ordinary witnesses
who had testified earlier. In fact, the subject matter dealt with and
the line of questioning as shown by the transcript of their testimonies
before the Agrava Board, indubitably evinced purposes other thnn
merely eliciting and determining the so-callecl surrounding focl1-1
and. circumstances of the assassination."
(5) As suspects, they were not forewarned of their rig/rt to remain
silent and to counsel. - "Yet they have not been informed or at the
very least even warned while so testifying. Did they lose their
aforesaid constitutional rights simply because the investigation
was by the Agrava Board and not by any police investigator, officer
or agency? True, they continued testifying. May that be construed
as a waiver of their rights to remain silent and not to be compelled
to be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes, if they have
the option to do so. But in the light of the first portion of Section
5 of P.D. No. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of the Board
to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, We are not
persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their
constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a witness against
themselves, much less their right to remain silent."
(6) Right against self-incrimination may be invoked not only in
criminal proceedings but also in other types of suits. - "It is not the
character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all.
proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment
is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in
a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved,
'the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself' is
secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot
be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact-Finding

IJl\tl l' llll II l ' ltf l 111r l1 I I II J lh1f 1 I 1 1\W 11 I~
1111111 l1ilt1H11 u~l l 'tt11t•11
Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be
given by him, hang on the balance..The .deletion .of the phrase 'in
a criminal case' in Section 20 connotes no other import except to
make said provision also applicable to ,ases other ;t han criminal.
Decidedly then, the right 'not to be COI\1,pelled to testify •against
himself' applies, notwithstanding that the proceedings before the
Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense! a ~riminal case."
(7) Decree grants only. "use immunity" but not '.'.transactional
immunity." - "ImmunihJ statutes may·be generally classified into
two: one, which grants known as 'use immunity'; and the other,
which grants what is known as 'transacti.onal immunity..' The
distinctl.on between the two is as follows: 'Use immunity' prohibits
use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner
in connection with the criminal prosewtion of the witness. On
the other hand, 'transactional ·Immunity' ~ants immunity to the
witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates.21
It is beyond dispute that Pres. Decree N.'o. 1886 belongs to the
first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely i.nununity from use
of any statement given before the Board,. but_not immunity from
prosecution by reason or on the .b.asis thereof. Merely testifying
and/or producing evidence do not render th~ witness immuned
from prosecution notwithstanding his inYQcati~n of the right
against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against
him of such statement and nothing more._Stated otherwise . . . he
still runs the risk of being prosecuted even :if he sets up his right
against self-incrimination. The dictates. Qf fair play, which is the
hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should
have been informed of their rights to remaii;,. silent and-warned that
any and all statem ents to be given by thE!m may be used against
21
"Transadional immunity derives from common-law tradition, which gives greater
deference to the weight of judicial precedents since the codification of laws by the
legislature is atypical in practice. In our jurisdiction though, the definition of crimes and
provision of criminal penalties are ineluctably within the sole province of the legislative
branch of government. It thus follows that this prerogative necessarily empowers the
legislative to enact conditions under which a class of persons may be immune from
criminal or civil prosecution. Since the legislature possesses sole discretion 10 cnoct
statutes to such effect, it is not obliged to conform with judge•mnclc stnndnrdn, or <won
tmdltional modnlltlcs concerning the grnnt of crimJnnl immunlty. Tho noHtm·y ll111l1111lon
on lcglslntlvo grnnt of Jnimunlty, nu with nil other loglslnllvc new, 111 n,llwrnnrn 111 1h1
Conallt111lon," (Tnn<'hnnco v11, Anndlgnnbnynn, 170 SCRA 202 [2005],)
J
!I I I Ill 1111 l I II I' ll ,I I I I
1<111111 A1111'111l1 !hill l1H d111h111ll1111
them. This, they were denied, under the· pretense that they are
not entitled to it and that the Board has n0 <i>bligation to sp inform
them." ·
(8) Right to ·remain silent ·nee'd not· be invoked before the Agrava
Board. - ."For the above reason; the view tha't the right against
self-incrimination must be invoked befdre the Board in order to
prevent use of arty given statement against the testifying witness
in a subsequent criminal prosecution is wrong. The· exclusionary
rule applies·notonly:.t trconfessions•but also t0 admissions, whether
made by a: witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal
proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense. Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a
meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be avoided. To
save the statutl;! from a declaration of unconstitutionality, it must
be given a r!Zasonable construction that will bring it within the
fundamental_law.".
(9) Witnesses before the Board cannot be compelled to answer
unless. immunity from suit .is offered him, - "The strong testimonial
compulsioI). imposed!by Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886
viewed in the·light oUhe sanctions provided in Section 4, infringes
upon the Witness'·r.ight against self~incrimination. As a rule, such
infringement .of the constitutional right renders inoperative the
testimonial c?mpulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled
to answer unless .a. co-extensive protection in the form of immunity
is offered, H~nce, under .t he oppressive compulsion of Presidential
Decree No. ~886, immunity must, in fact be offered to the witness
be~ore he can be required to answer, so.as to safeguard his sacred
C?nstitutibnal right. :But in this case, the compulsion has already
· pr9duced its desired results - the private respondents had all
testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights
are, therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its
unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if immunity
had in fact been offered.
In view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to
testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of Pres. Decree No. .
1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized
under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity
granted by Pres. Decree No. 1886 cannot be made to depend on
o clnim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same
low practically stl'ips away from the witness." (Galman vs. Pamaran,
'1.38 SCTUI. 291 (1 9851, ti,ro11gh /11slicc C11avns.)
11111 1'1111 ,ll 'l ' I N li !lNl lll j~l l~(lll/}l,A l , I AW
l' l'lndp)Cfl nntl (;1111QH
Teehankee, Jr., dissenting: .. , ·•:H• ·•'.•· .
· (1) Right again~t,. setfincrimination-";::iA:1-ptilceedings·: other_ -~h.an
criminal is considered an option of refusal ·to ·~nswer, not a prohtb1t10~
of. inquin;, ,_ /'11W $c\ndigat1.b11yf1tl ··i:;w(orj:gly_·' .~les .<\S to.tally
and absolu;tely ,;in{lqx:nissiblEi-,. the testim:orues given by. •pnvate
respondents.,Gep.~rals Ver ~e;i-QJi:vas; ~c;Uhei,!' s~-fp~i;espo~dents
(all charged as as:~e.ssories) as weJ,tas cJ~l,tl}.~ qp,cuq,.ents,.record~ and
other evide11ce p1:oduced·by thei;n.l;,efo~e,1~~ Fact;Finding Board,
notwithstancl.iI}g that all w~r~ representE;S',l, ~y,;counsel -~!;ld none of
them invoked the privilege or right agaipst self,incrirr1ination or
made any claim or objection at the tiµ1e. pfJ:lis testimc,m,y before the
Board that any ques.tion propounded to him and which he wiUingly
answered called for an inariminating answer (;).gains.t himself.
No legal impediment exists against a l~tigant calling any of the
adverse parties to be his witness.xx x True, an accused in a criminal
case may not be compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word,
even for his own defense. But while the constitutional guaranty
against self-incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be
they criminal, civil, or administrative, said privilege, in proceedings
other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered
an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions, and not a
prohibition of inquiry."
(2) Right must be invoked at the time the question is propounded. -
"It is established that the privilege against self-incrimination must
be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is
when a question calling for a criminating answer is propounded.
This has to be so, because before a qaestion. is as~ed there would
be no way of telling whether the informati~~-to be elicited from the
witness is self-incriminating or not. A.s st~.ted h:t Jones o~ Evidence
(Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927.), a person who h as been summoned to
testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he 1decline; to be sworn as
a witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question
calling for an incriminating answer is asked; at that time, and,
generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may
properly be interposed."'
(3) Respondents were in the category oford;inan; witnesses. - "The
respondents were not accused in any criminal case nor Were they
persons under custodial interrogation who, ).11:lder .the second part
of Section 20 (now Sec. 12[1].) of the Bill of Rights (consisting of
three additional sentences) were given additional rights to silence
I l t, I '1 A I I , 111 , 1111 ,I , l HI I{ I , I I I I 1 1,11
H115hl Aguln1Jl !rlol(-ln rlmlnntlon
and counsel and to be informed of such rights and to the outlawing
of any confession pbtained in ·viola'fi:on of the rights ~araliteed
in the dted secti;on,. by virtue of the incorporation into \:he Bill of
Rights of the rights. granted in the •rulings of the U.S. ·Supreme
Courfin the Mimnda-Escobedo cases.
As noted by former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 'It
amounts to an acceptance of the applicability in this jurisdiction
of the ·epochal American Supreme Court decision in Miranda v.
Arizona, the · opinion being rendered by Chief Justice Warren. It
is, thus, now a part of our fundameRtal law. Such doctrine was
promulgated in rE!sponse to the question of the admissibility of
statements obtained from an individual interrogated under police
custody, considering that such a time and under the stress of such
conditions, his right against self-incrimination could be rendered
futile.'
As ordinary witnesses before the Fact-Finding Board and
under the settled jurisprudence above-cited, they could not invoke
the right to silence and refuse to take.the wih1ess stand. Their right
and privilege (which is not self-executory or automatic ipso jure)
was, while testifying whether voluntarily or by subpoena, to invoke
the privilege and refuse to answer as and when a question calling
for an incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke the
privilege which is personal does automatically result in its loss ipso
facto."
(4) Court or board has to rule on the application of privilege upon
invocation. - The law, usage and settled jurisprudence uniformly
require that the privilege must be asserted or else is lost. The court
or board upon its invocation still has to pass upon and rule upon
the proper application of the privilege. As restated by Francisco,
the rule and exceptions are: 'Certainly, where the witnesses on oath
declares his belief that the answer to the question would criminate
or tend to criminate him, the court cannot compel him to answer,
unless it is dear perfectly, from a careful consideration of all the
circumstances of the case, that the witness is mistaken, or is acting
in bad faith, and that the answer cannot possibly have any such
tendency.'
(5) Respondents need not be forewarned, - "The view that withal,
it is best, although not required, that ,a warning to the witness of
his option to refuse an answer to Incriminating questions - as
advanced even by the Tanodbayan at the hearing - clol'cs back to a
 f /
\!fJ_ l'I IIJ 11 ' 1' 11 I ll l ~ ll~/i 11111 11 11 IN I AW i I I\ • I '/
Jl1'1 11clph•1) 111,~l '1111\'ll ·'
century ago and has been long discarded,IIS 'wjtnesses al·e usually
-w.~11 enough advised b,efo,rehand. by. co_µnse) ,<'J.& ·to _theii; rights when
such issues impend',<!11d 'as ,general know.ledge spread among the
masses and the prepfirqtj,o:n for .tes,timorw,o.eq:'f'i:ne:I'l;l.Or,e thorough.{
Thus, Wigmore, the bible on-.t hela-w .of'..eyid,ep:ce .so· remarks and
adds ~at 'ther~ i~. ffO -r~as,911 ,f 9r . let9,1;g, a whol_esorp.e custom
degenerat;~ )~,t o-,~, ~e.$ 1f~~l rul~:' : . . _.,,1 .._;. , , _ . . : • •,
. _ ,Pl'P@ ~lil;~n¥ir(,/w;nent~U!!li:j~§-·p11q•,Q!TCU:i;t).Stan~e~:Pf ctl;te. -Fact-
Fisndm.g,Btrarcd·l.:i:~arings; to-re:q~i~e sµplva warn.i.ng t(;) the wim.ess of ·
his-option-of refusal to answer incriminatory questions woul_d· have
b.eeq.,aJt:ex~rdse in absurqJty al}d futility. As is a matter of public
· krtoWledgw,,re$pond~nts :had concluded tr): their investigation that
JJ,alman was, the_a~sassj.n,of the.-late, Senfltor Aquino. As observed
. , , J::,y_:fprn:rer S_ei;iator Ambrosic;,;Padilla) as.mniqu~:cuniae aHhe.hearing
on ~e.merits of August 15, 1985, they were all 'too eager to testify
and lllake a strong· effort to gain s_uppo.rt from the Fact-Finding
Board ·and the public for the _.military version and report that the
assassin was Galman who was forthwith gunned down by the
military escorts and· guards at the Tarmac. It would have been
ridiculous, if not bordening on officiousness and impropriety, to
warn them as the highest ranking military·offi!cers of their option of
refusal to answer incriminatory questions and also as the majority
holds, of their right to remain silent. When respondents generals
appeared before the Board, respondent Ver precisely made the
opening statement that 'I welcome this opportunity, Madame
Justice, members of this Honorable Board, Dean, gentlemen - this
opportunity to assist ... this Honorable Board in the quest for truth
and justice."'
(6) Section 5 was given a distorted reading. - "The majority
decision holds that the clause 'concerning which he is compelled to
testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination'
is a surplusage for being in conflict with the first clause which gives
immunity to the witness except in case' of perjury. 'The truncated
and distorted reading of the cited Section 5 which consists of a single
integrated paragraph and splitting it into two isolated parts so as to
allow. the privilege against self-incrimination (which was already
lost for failure to claim it in the Board hearings) to be resurrected
and. raised in a much later time frame and 'subsequent criminal
proceeding' is against all usage and rules of statutory constrnctlon.'
· The text is plain and simple, i.e., it requires ilwocati0n of tho
privilege.'"
l I
A l(!', Ill , 111) ,1.ln' l~I ,I ll (
Rlijh~J\gr1 h111t Sclf-l11crlmln11llon
(7) None of respondents has indicated incriminating portion of
testimony. - "Nori.e of the respondents, public and private, has ·
indicated the specific portions of their testimony that• they have
been 'oppressively compelled' to give, in alleged violation of their
privilege against self-incrimination. The reason for this is that
they all testified voluntarily and eagerly to support the military
report and version that Galman killed Senator Aquino. The Board
un~mously ~ejected the military report and found that the killings
were the product of criminal conspiracy. Only the former lawyers
of the. Fact-Finding Board created under Presidential Decree No.
1886, have given us the answer that there is nothing incriminatory
per se in the testimonies of the respondents, in the Memorandum
submitted by them. In short, the testimonies of respondents could
only be deemed incriminating if it be found that they sought thereby
to hide or cover up the crime and thus incriminate themselves, os
accessories to the murder of Senator Aquino."
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissenting:
(1) Board's inquiry was a general one. - "The inquiry before the
Board was a general one. It was not directed against any particular
individual or individuals. Private respondents did not testify
therein as suspects or as accused persons. There should, therefore,
be no hindrance to a criminal prosecution."
(2) Immunity extends only to such evidence as is not privileged. -
"The right against self-incrimination is not a prohibition of inquiry
but an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions. (Cabal
vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059 [1962).) The kernel of the privilege is
testimonial compulsion. Whether or not any specific portion of
the testimonies of private respondents is incriminating should be
determined by the Sandiganbayan itself. The claim against self-
incrimination should be invoked when a specific question, which
is incriminating in character, is put to a witness in the subsequent
proceeding. There should be no automatic ' immunity bath' of the
entire testimony before the Board for immunity does not extend to
such of the evidence as is not privileged."
(3) Interests of the people are also entitled to consideration.
"There are additional considerations. While the right against
self-incrimination is indubitably one of the most fundamental of
human rights, Section 5 o'f Presidential Decree No. 1886 should be
construed so as to effect a practical and beneficent purpose and
no t in such a mmu1er as to hinder or obstruct the administration of
I I I I I J I I
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criminal justice. In the interest of elicitlrtg the: truth, the
excluded
testimonies should be admitted, leaving it· to 'the Sahdiganbayan
to determine which specific questions and answers are to be
excluded because they are incriminatory: and which should be
given credibility, if found to be competent and admissible."
Relova, J., dissenting:
(1) Privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked when
question is propounded. - "Pursuant to the above Presidential
Decree, no one can refuse to testify or furnish evidence before
the Fact-Finding Board. However, his testimony or any evidence
produced shall not be used against him after he invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination. Stated differently, the privilege
against self-incrimination must be invoked when the qu~stion at
the hearing before the Board, calling for an incriminating answer
is propounded;. otherwise, before any question is asked of the
witness, he wop.Id not know whether the .i nformation to be elicited
from him is incriminatory or not."
(2) · When privilege is waived. - "Since it is a personal right
to be ·exercised only by the witness; this privilege against self-
incrimination cannot thereafter be asserted. The privilege is waived
by his voluntary offer to testify by answering questions without
objecting and/ or claiming the privilege."
(3) Respondents 'testified as witnesses without claiming privilege.
"When, private respondents gave testimonies before the
Board; they were not defendants but witnesses invited and/ or
subpoenaed to ventilate the tntth through free, independent and
dispassionate investigation. They could not refuse or withhold
answers to questions propounded to them unless the inquiry calls
for an incriminating answer and a timely objection is raised. In the
case at bar, since they answered questions from the board without
claiming the privilege, they cannot now be allowed to invoke the
immunity clause provided in Section 5."
6. Accused in a criminal case was made to testifiJ as a prosecution
witness.
Facts: Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was cnllcd
by the prosecution as the first witness to testify for the People
during the first day of trial thereof. He objected and invoked lh<'
I 111'. I'/ A II{ f, 111 , JI I J. I, ( J II I~1l ; I I I I
Wght J\:gnlnst SoH-lncdmlnnllon
privilege against self~incrimination. This he broadened by the
.clear-cut statement.that he will not testify,
His protestations were met with the judge's 'emphatic
l statement that it "is ,t he right of the prosecution to ask anybody to
act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that
defense counsel "could not' object to have the accused called on the
witness stand."
Issue:' Was the petitioner forced to testify in violation of his right
against self-incrimination?
Held: Yes. "The cumulative impact of all of the above is that
accused-petitioner had to take the stand, He was thus peremptorily
asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation
molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the
law, and jurisprudence."
(1) Accused as "prosecution witness" distinguisher/ from nn
"ordinary witness." - "Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different
tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
. privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is
sh0t at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness
stand and re.fuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would
be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and
prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person
to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.
(Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483 [1937].) This rule may apply
even to a co-defendant in a joint trial."
(2) Guide in the interpretation of constitutional precept. - "And
the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the
accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself
is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of
abuse. (Allen v. State, 171 ALR 138, citing Emery's Case, 107 Mass.
17.) Thus, it is that it was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge
to placate petitioner with these words:
'What he will testify to does not n ecessarily incriminate
him, counsel.
And there is th e right of the prosecution to ask anybody to
act as witness on the witness stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then
that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection and the
 l ' l lll ,11 ' 1' 11111 I 111J:1 11 I l 111111~ J,. l AW
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court will sustain him if and when th~ <,pulit feels -that the
answer of this witness tp the question -woul<i rnc11iminate him.
Com1sel has all the assurance that the C{:)urt .will not-require
the witness to answer questiornfwhich would incriminate-him.
But surely, com1sel ~ould not o~ject to. h~ve ·t he accused
called on the witness stand.' · · ' ·•. ·
The judge's words above quoted ----: 'B:ut _sµrely, .counsel
could not object to have the accused caller:l. on the wiqu~s~ stand'
- wielded authority. By those words, petitioner was enveloped
by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to x:esist; tp.ey
foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us ·that ~s he
took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth, no genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness
stand. Constitutionally, sound consent ~as absent."
(3) Concept of compulsion. - "Compulsion, as it is understood
here, does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be
the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates
to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational
choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would be
sufficient. So is moral coercion tending to force testimony from the
unwilling lips of the defendant. (State v. Wolfe, 266 N.W. 116.)"
(4) Waiver of the privilege. - "'To be effective, a waiver must
be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and
willingly made; such waiver follows only where liberty of choice
has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly
be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence.' (98 C.J.S. 314.) The teaching in Johnson v. Zerbst (304
U.S. 458.) is this: It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights.' A waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
Renuntiatio non praesumitur."
(5) Petitioner did not waive his right. - "It cannot be said that
he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand
and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a wih'less; on
the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to tesllfy. Tf
petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of hlH frnt·
of being accused of perjury or being put under contompl, thl11
h I I'/
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circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony·is not ·
of his own choiee'.· Jo him it was a case of compelled sabmission.
pie was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who
. .possessed the power: t© put,him under ·e@ntempt had he -chosen
to remain silent. Nor could h~ escape ,testifying. The court made it
. abundantly clear that his teStllJl_Ony at least on ~zyect exa~ination
would be taken r~ght then and the;e on the first day of the ~ial.
It matters notthat, after all efforts to sta:ve off petitioner~s taking
the stand ·became fruitless no objections. to questions propounded
to him were made. Here involved is not a mere questjon of self-
incrimination. It is a defendant's constitutional immunity from
being called to testify against himself. And the objection made nt
the beginning is a continuing one.
If by his own admission defendant proved his guilt, still, his
original claim remains valid. For the privilege is a rampart thnt
gives protection - even to the guilty. (Marchetti v. United States,
No. 2, Oct. term, 1967, Jan. 29 1968.)"
(6) Remedy of accused who is illegally confined. - "Under the
Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused whose case
presents a clear picture' of disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ of habeas
corpus, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto."
(7) Effect of violation of constitutional right on court's jurisdiction.
- "A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost
in the course of the proceedings due to [violation of any of the
constitutional rights of the accused]. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court wi:thout jurisdiction is void and a void
judgment is, in effect, no judgment. One imprisoned thereunder
may obtain release by habeas corpus." (Chaves vs. Court of Appeals, 24
SCRA 663 {1968), through fustice·Sanchez.)
7. PAL employee admitted his guilt without assistance of a counsel
. during an administrative investigation.
Facts: In the investigation conducted by Branch Manager EC
of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), In the presence of three (3) other
PAL employees, Lhe occuscd Pl{, n llcket freight clerk, who was
J I I I I r I r
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Principles and Cases . . ·...,
allegedly involved in the irregularities in the sales· of plane tickets,
signed his statement containing· his answers in response :to ques-
tions by EC, wherein, inter alia, he admitted misappropriating the
proceeds of the tickets issued to him. The day before the investiga-
tion, he gav:e his superiors a handwritten admission of the offense.
Both signed statements and handwri'tten admissions, marked
as Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "K/' respectively, were declared
inadmissible by the respcrrrderttjudge !'since it does rtot appear that
the accused was reminded tDf. his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have counsel; ·and that when· he waived the same
and gave his statement, it was without.the .a ssistance actually of
counsel.''
Issue: The issue is whether or not.it was grave abuse of discretion
for the respondent judge to have exclud~d Exhibitii' A" and "K.
11 11
Hdd:'The writ of certiorari is granted ai;i'.nu.iling and setting aside
the orders of respondent judge.rejecting Exhibits "A" and "K."
(1). Right against self-incrimination and rights in custodial
interrogation are disparate rights. ~ At the·core of the controversy
11
is Section 20, Article IV, of the 1973 ConsJitution. There are two (2)
rights, . or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely: 1) the
right against self-!-r1-crirnination, i.e., the right of a person not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself - set out in the first
sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Se_c tion i's, Article III
of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, and 2) the rights of a
person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect
'under investigation for the commission ofan offense.'
Parer,.thetically, the 1987 .Constitution indicates ml).ch more
clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. It
has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self-
incrimination, 'No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself,' is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation,
which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section
12 of the same Article III."
(2) Right against self-incrimination.·- "This right is atcorded
to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civi), criminal, or adi:ninistrntive
proceeding. The right is NOT to be compelled to be a witness
l f I I J
Sec. 17 AJ.l{'l~ lll. U1LL 0 11 lUGI lTS 979
Right Against Self!Incrimination
against himself. Toe precept set out in that first sentence has a settled
·meaning. It prescribes an option of refusal to answer incrupinating
questions and not a. prohibition of inquiry. It simply secures· to a
witness, whether.he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer
any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which
has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime."
(a) Subpoena.. -=- "However, the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory in .character, is
actually put to the w itness. It cannot be claimed at any other
time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena,
to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or
to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena
must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn
and answer questipns. It is o~y when a particular question is
addressed to him, the .answer to which may incriminate him
for some 9fferise, that he may refuse to answer on the strength
of the constitutional guaranty."
(b) Right may be waived. - "The right against self-incri-
mination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It
must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness,
the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, .expressly or impliedly, as by a failure to claim
it at the appropriate time."
(3) Rights in custodial investigation. - "These rights apply to
persons 'under investigation for the commission of an offense,'
i.e., 'suspects' under investigation by police authorities; and this
is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the
first sentence, that the right against self-incrimination which, as
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any
proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under
investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is
,;1.vowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436.), a decision described as an ·
'earthquake in the world of law enforcement.'
Section 20 states that whenever any person is under
investigation for the commission of an offense -
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of'such right;
J I I I ul I I I
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2) no force, violence, threat; i,rltµll~da.tio~,, or any other
means which vitiates the. free. will ·shall ,be :used against him;
and
3) any confession obtained in vi6lation of x x x these
rights shall be inadmissible in eviderice.
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warreh.summ~rized 't he procedural
safeguards laid down for a person in police custody; 'in custody
interrogation' being regarded as the:.. commencement of an
adversary proceeding against the suspect.~'. .
(4) Defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not
under custodial investigation. - "His:foterrogation by the police~ if
any there had been, would already have been' ended at the time of
the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutor's
office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already
pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there ,i s no
occasion to speak of his rights while uhdel'.'tqstodial interrogation'
laid down by the second and subseqµen~ sentences of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is
no longer under 'custodial interrogation."'
l
'' preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his liherty in some significant
way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continumg right
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be· informed thereof, not
to be subjected to force, violence, threat, i,ntimidation or any other
means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained
in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) after the case is filed in
court - a) to refuse to be a witness; b) not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c) to testify in his own
behalf, subject to cross-examination by the p rosecution; d) while
testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
"FR was not in any sense under custodial interrogation flS
this term should be properly understood, prior to or during the
administrative inquiry· into the discovered inequalities in ticket
sales l.n which he appeared to have a hand." (People vs. Ayson, 175
·SCRA 246 [1989], through Justice Narvasa.)

(5) Accused cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidenc~ in a -oOo-

criminal case against him. - ''The right of the defendantin a criminal
case 'to be exempt from being a witness against. himself' signifies
that he cannot be compelled to testify or prodqce evidence in the
criminal case.in which he is the accused, or one of the.accused. He
cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena o~ oµier process or
order of the court. He cannot be required to be a wjtness either for
the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or_even for ¥in~elf.
In other words - unlike . an ordinary witness (or a party
in a civil action) who may be ~ompelled .to testify by subpoena,
having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incri,minatory
question at the time it is put to him - the defendant in a criminal
action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the
witness stand, be sworn, answer any ·question. And, as the law
categorically states, 'his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not
in any manner prejudice or be used against him,"'
(6) Rights before anl after criminal case i~filed in court. - "In fine,
a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in cotirt, has· the following rights
in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1)
before the case is filed in court (or with the public prosecuto1~ for

RIGHT aGAI,N~T DpTE'.~tTION F.OR
POLilllCAL BELIEF'S/INVOLUNTARY
. SERVlt:(.JOE" . press guaranteed in Section 4. It is nothing more than a reaction to
SEC. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by rea-
son of his political beliefs and aspirations.
• (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted.
Right against detention solely by reason
of political beliefs and aspirations.
Upon the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972
under Proclamation No. 1081 of the then incumbent President, the
military establishment carried out a nationwide arrest and detention
of known political opponents and critics of the administration.
Thousands of people were arrested during the whole period of
martial rule. Many remained in incarceration for years without
charges filed against them. They came to be known as "political
prisoners" or "political detainees." Some were forced into exile.
Even after the lifting of martial law by Proclamation No. 2054
on January 17, 1981 up to the February 22-25, 1986 so-called "people
power revolution," the privilege of the writ.of habeas corpus remained
suspended "for the crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes and for all other
crimes and offenses committed x x x in connection therewith/'
Many more were arrested and detained after the lifting of martial
law, for denouncing, among others, the authoritarian rule of the
President, human rights violations by the government, graft and
corruption, etc., for espousing allegedly subversive doctrines, or
for participating in protest movements and demonstrnU.ons, ox on
mere suspicion of being subversives or comrnunist flym.pothl:t.t'r11,
W12
II I 111 , I I Ill 1111 I I ti I II 11 11 I
IH1•,hl A1111h111I I h lt 11111111 1111 l'11llllt ,11
llt11lt1f11/ l11vwl1111l 11ty Ht l'Vll11 d t1
and then charged with having committed crimes against national
security and public order.1
The inclusion in the Constitution of the right against detention
solely by .reason of one's political beliefs and aspirations adds
nothing substantive to the freedom of speech, expression, and
these recent events in our history and merely manifests the great
importance the frainers·attach to its protection.
Meaning of involuntary servitude.
Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforcetj., compulsory
service of one to another. It has been applied to any service or labor,
public or private, which is not free, no matter under what form such
service may have been rendered.2 (Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39
Phil. 660 [1919).) It includes:
(1) Slavery or the state of entire subjection of one person to the
will of another; and
(2) Peonage or the voluntary submission of a person (peon) to the
will of another because of his debt.
1During the period of martial law, the military could arrest and detain indefinitely
persons suspected of violation of Jaws against national security or any Proclamation No,
1081 offenses unless otherwise ordered released by the President. The Supreme Court
uphel<i the authority of the President to issue Presidential Commitment Orders (PCO's),
which replaced Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders (ASSO's) notwithstanding the lifting
of martial law. The PCO's validated the arrest or .detention of a person for any of the
offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continued in force the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
P.O. No. 1877 Ouly. 21, 1983) abolished the PCO, but authorized the President to
take "preventive detention action" (PDA) in certain cases. While the PCO has indefinite
effectivity, has no appeal machinery, and authorizes the continued detention of a person
even after having served his sentence or having been acquitted in the absence of any order
for his release by the President, POA has a maximum one-year term and an automatic
review by a review committee created to evaluate evidence against those covered by the
PDA.
P.O. No. 1876 (same date) repealed P.O. No. 1498 (the National Security Code.)
while P.O. No. 1875 (same date) repealed P.O. No. 1757. (The Public Order Act.)
2No compulsion, force or threat is made upon reproductive healthcare service
providers under the Reproductive Health (RH) Law to render pro bono service against
tlwlr wlll. Where the rendering of such service wns made a prerequisite to accreditation
to Phlll lenllh, lhe snmc cnnnot be considered nn unrensonnblc burden, but rafher, a
1wm1~nry lnconllvc lmpoRed by Congress In Iha furlhornnr.c of perceived legitimate State
111111111111, (lmlJnol) vn, Ochon, Jr., 72'1 SCR/\ 111612011].)
 I 1 I I
• I' I 111 , 11 1I •IN I! 'U N II I I I I J I I\ 111'! A I , J. AW
Princi ples 1mcl 'Mc:a·_. . ,
The term "slavery" is not employed irrthe Constitution ·because
slavery, as it existed in Europe and America, has.never beer). practised
in the Philippines . .
Purpose an~ basis of the prohibiti.on ...
(1) The purpose is .to maintc\ina system.of completely. free and
voluntary labor by prohibiting the controJ by which the personal
service of one. is disposed pf or coerced .for ·anG>ther' s .benefit which
is the essence of involuntary servitude. (~ee '!3.ailey v. Alabama, 269
U.S. 26~; Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.,S. 4.). - :,,, ..
(2) Hum<;Ul dignity -is not a m~rchandise appropriate for
commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are
beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.
(Cuenca vs. Salazar,' 82 Phil. 851 [1949].) ·
Exceptions to the prohibition.
Not every form of forced labor is within the scope of the
constitutional provision. Thus, the prohibition does not apply:
(1) when the involuntary servitude is imposed as a pu~ishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted (Sec.
18[2].);
(2) when personal, military, or civil ser_vice is required of
citizens for the defense of the State (Art. II, Sec. 4.);
(3) when there is a proper exercise of the poHce power of the
State. (supra.) Thus, persons may be requiredto assist in the protection
of the peace and order of the community{U.S. vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil.
245 [1915].);
(4) to injunctions requiring striking laborers in industries
affected with public interest to return to work pending settlement
of an industrial dispute (Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy
vs. Gotamco Sawmill, 80 Phil. 521 [1948].);
(5) to exceptional services, such as military and naval
enlistment. Thus, a statute punishing sailors who desert their ship
do not contravene the constitutional provision. From immemorial
usage, sailors may not leave their ships <luting.a voyage (Robertson
v. Ba}dwin, 165 U.S. 715.); and
(6) to exercise by parents of their a-iithority to require their
children to perform reasonable amount of work.
I J
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l<lghl .t\W,1~1111l IJ •t 1111(:,111 !tir l'ollllcal
Uellcfs/Involuntnry Servitude
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
A former court-s'tenographer is compelled to transcribe his steno-
graphic notes. '
Facts: After petitioner had ceased to be a court stenographer,
the Court of Appeals required him to transcribe his stenographic
· notes in two cases·decid:ed by the lower court where he functioned
· as temporary sten:oghipher. In a petition for habeas corpus after his
arrest, he <l.dvan_ced. J:he novel contention that to compel him to
transcribe his stenogdiphic notes after he ceased to be a stenographer
would be a transgression of the rule against involuntary servitude.
He was averse to being subjected "to involuntary servitude
sans compensation."
Issue: Sh_o uld ,his request to be relieved from transcribing his
notes be granted?
· Held: No. (1) Court has authority to compel the transcription /Jy n
former stenographer, - "An Appellate Court may compel a former
court stenograp~er . to transcribe his stenographic notes. That
prerogative is an_cillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction
and is a pai:t of its inherent powers which are necessary to the
ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the
due administration of justice."
(2) Such compulsion does not constitute involuntary servitude. -
"The contention that tb compel him to transcribe his stenographic
notes would constitute involuntary servitude · is not tenable.
Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory
service of one to another (Hodges v. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 [1919].) or the condition
of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and
against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 961.) That situation does not
obtain in this case."
(3) Incarceration of contemning stenographer is lawful. - "Also
untenable is [petitioner's] argument that the imprisonment
of a stenographer who had defied the court's resolution for
the transcription of the notes constitutes illegal detention. The
incarceration of the contemning stenographer is lawful because
it is the direct consequence of his disobedience of a court order."
I , (Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131 [1975}, through Justice Aquino.)
Vtl6 .J'llll ,ll'l ' IN JI, 'l N l , 11ll11J' llt N /\ 1, l ,A W
Pdnclplcs nnd Cnscs
Fernando, C.J., concurring:
(1) On principle, contempt citation 'is not subject td valid objection.
- "On principle, there ,appears to be· P.<1 :".alid objection to an
appellate court, as stressed by _Justi~r. 1'~11ha~ee,in his separate
opinion, 'compelling a former cc;,urt s,t~n!;)gr~pher, under pain
of contempt, to transcribe_his stenogrjpN~,- ;notes ·.µ19 thereby
complet~ .t he records of the_case 9n fRP.~?l,)p ~!\~._ex~,;;ise ?f its
inherent powers for the effective <W,fl. · ~ffl~i.~nt . e1er9ise of its
appellate jurisdiction and the due admiitisJJ;ation of j_u s.tice.' It does
not to my mind, however, solve.difficultie's that its appli~ation may
give rise to."
(2) Danger that a prolonged contempt citation may assume a
punitive character. - "There may be caSE;!S wlien an appellate court
will be confronted with the obstinacy of a ,former stenographer
holding fast to the conviction, even if nbt . altogether justified,
that he is the victim of an oppressive court 'order anq that there
is a disregard of his constitutional right' hot to be subjected to
involuntary servitude. So it did happen in this case, marked by
petitioner's stubborn insistence of what he considered his sad and
undeserved fate, one, moreover, in his opinion, frowned upon by
the Constitution. For a recognition that the exercise of the contempt
power is warranted may still be attended_with problems·that defy
easy and pat solutions. Its coercive aspect may be conceded, but
given an individual, like petitioner, not averse to suffering a species
of martyrdom rather than give up .a principle, and thus unable to
yield obedience to an order requiring that,he -transcribe his notes,
the detention. consequent upon a cqntempt citation may be so
prolonged that it assumes a punjtiv~ .ahai:acter..Then it appears
to me the question is reached of wh.e ther ,there is involuntary
servitude."
-oOo -
Urn•, I Ii 1 II
...,
PROHIBlTED PUNISHMENTS
•,
SEC. 19. (1) Exces_sive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or ·inhuman punishment inflicted. Nei-
ther shall death penalty be imposed, unless, £or compel-
ling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress here•
after provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or de-
grading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities un-
der subhuman cqnditions shall be dealt with by law.
Right against excessive floes.
· The question as to the amount of the fines that shall be imposed is
. )
I one addressed to the sound discretion of the court. If it keeps within
! the.limits of a statute, the fine cannot usually be held unreasonable.
(U.S. vs. Valera, 26 Phil. 898 [1914]; U.S. vs. Sing, 37 Phil. 211 [1917).)
Courts will be justified in declaring a fine prescribed by a statute
excessive only when it is clearly so, considering the nature of the
offense and the ability of the person punished to pay the fine. The
pr0hibition against the. imposition of excessive -fines applies only to
criminal prosecutions.
Right against cruel, degrading,
· or inhuman punishment. .
This right, as contra-distinguished from the right against the use
of torture (Sec. 12[2].), can only be invoked after conviction for a
crime.
To be prohibited by the Constitution, the punishment need only
be cruel, degrading, or inhuman. The Constitution refers primarily
l' to physical punishment.
987
 r r
988 Pllll.,11.'l>INH ' N! 'l'l'l1U'HIP I\I.A l , J,AW
Principles and Cases
(1) Forms of punishment. - It can be ·saJd, that punishments are
cruel and/or inhuman when they involye_.tqrtµ,re.or lingering death,
such as burn4J.~. alive,( ,?;lY:tg~~io?,~ s,t'f'.Y,~o~';',2:wy~g1 and· other
barbarous pun1shnients.· They 1mply•- someUhng ,\t,~:re than the
extinguishment of )ife. 1 Punishment is. dc.grftding when .it brings
shame apd humiliation to the victim, or. exRo~_es hini to r;:on,,tempt or
ridicule, or l(,wers his digrt~ty antl self~t~~p~:d~ as ·~h4ro~1N~~ing.
• " . :.. 7 ,· · ) • , ,. ~ -~ ~ J,! 1 • , 1 ,.. · . th,~.~ i '
(a) The punisrun:ent of peahl11 b_y;h~g~g,,~lt;i¢b:PGUtion, or
mli!.sketry is not considered .c ruel. withi1J tb.e Jl\t;?.aming,:ot that
word as,used in the.Constitution (L,egard&-vs. Valdez,J:Rhil.146
[1902]; Weens v. United States, 217. U$.,3·49,.,) nor is,i,t inhuman.
Lethal injection is a constitutional form of execution. (Echegaray
v:s. Secretary of Justice, 297 SCRA 7.54;[-i.99.8].).
(b) Destierro or banishment from a ' ce:rta}n , lt>i::ality as a
punishment is neither cruel nor "inhuman and is so valid.. It is,
in fact, less than imprisonment or confinement. (Legarda vs.
Valdez, supra; see Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil. 473 {1949].)
(c) The penalty of suspension or cancellation of a physician's
license (for violation of the Generics Act [R.A. No. 6675].) is
neither cruel, inhuman, nor degrading. .It is not different from
the penalty of suspension or disbarment that the Supreme Court
inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or violate the
laws and the Codes of Professional and-Judicial Conduct. (Del
Rosario vs. Bengzon, 180 SCRA521 [19891.)
(d) The imposition of indefinite suspension from the practice
of law on a lawyer "for contumacious acts or statements
constituting a frontal assault upon the Supreme Court and
through the Court, the entire judicial system, was held not crµel,
degrading, or inhuman punishment." The indefiniteness ofthe
suspension far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman"
has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restqration
of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That
1
In Ecl1egaray vs. Executive Secretnn; (297 SCRA 754 [1998],), the S4preme Court,
citing cases, adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not foslcnod to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humn11u
justice nnd must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency thnt mnrk th(
progress of n maturing society. (sec Pere:,. vs. Tagle, 544 SCRA 532 [2008),)
I I I
I 111.. 111 Ill ' Pl }.1(11 rtll 1111 I l ll l lCll.11 1 1 1
J1ruhlhll1 d I1111\I ih11 u111111
sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge
.himself in his own ·good time of his contempt and misconduct
by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate
)repentance and _de!I}:onstrating his willingness and capacity to
live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded
from every member of the bar and officer of the courts. (Zaldivar
vs. Sandiganbayan, 170SCRA 1 [1989].)
• . t ,A., ; _,,
·(2) Duration or ·amount of punishment. - The prohibition is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather
than its severity or harshness in respect of duration or amount.
(People vs. Tongko, 290 SCRA 595 (1998]; People vs. De la Cruz, 92
Phil_. 906 [1953]; People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 [1954].) It has been
held that the disproportion between the penalty and the crime is
an insufficient basis to declare the penalty unconstitutional on the
ground. that it is cruel and unusual.2
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of propor•
tion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. (Lim
vs. ,People, 390 SCRA 194 [2002].) It does not, by that circumstance
alone, make it cruel and inhuman. But punishments that are
"fragrantly and plainly oppressive" or wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community" (People vs. Alejandro, 225 SCRA 247 [1993].) may
be both cruel and inhuman or at least violative of the due process
guarantee which requires a reasonable correspondence between
the degree of the offense and the degree of the penalty. Thus, the
penalty of life imprisonment or even death is not cruel nor inhuman
when imposed for treason, parricide, murder and other heinous
2The prohibition of "unusual" punishments in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions has
been removed and changed to "degrading or inhuman." A punishment may not be cruel
or it may be less severe but unusual. A penalty may be said to be "unusual" when it is
previously unknown for a given offense. It should not be proh ibited just because it is
unusual.
In People vs. Dacuycuy (173 SCRA 90 [1989].), the Supreme Court ruled: "That the
penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In addition, what
degree of disproportion the court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has
s llil to await appropriate determination in due lime since, to the credit of our legislative
bod ies, no decision hns us yet struck down n pcnnlty for being 'cruel and u nusual' or
'1•xccsulvo.'"
 I r
• 1'1111 11 ' 1' 1111 I I l~Htl 11 I l 11\I • ~~ I I AW I I I '
.P d 111lpli11 11111d t '111w11
offenses especially when aggrav.a ting circumstances atten.d ed their
commission; but it is cruel and inhuman if imp0sed for.petty crimes.
(3) Unreasonable application of valid'pU:ttishmen'ts. ·- ·The Consti:-
tution mandates that the employmenl-of' pl:i.ysi~al,
psycltological or
degrading punishment against any p:risorter·ot detainee 6r the use
of substandard or inadequate penaHadlifi~s tihuer subhuman con-
ditions should be dealt with by law:··fS~c:19[2J;?''fhis'cbiit~inplates
the improper, unreasonable or inhi,up.im a,pplkation pf p.~nalties or
punishments (Sec. 19[1].) on p_ersons p,etajll~p.-unq.E:r Yc;J.lid laws.
Purpo,se and.basis of the guarante~...
(1) The·purpose of the guaran.tee/ it'has,:h eetfsaid, is'to ;eliminate
many of the barbarous and uncivilizced'put:rishinehts formerly known
the infliction :6£ which would batbariz.;e· preseii.t.dvilizatiorti (see
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155.) Exmn,P.les ;Qf such purtishrnents
are those inflicted at the w,hi:pping post. ~~-.in !h,e pillpry,, J,~g at
the stake, breaking on the wheel, di~eni:l;l,ow.,!ii!l,ng, q.:ucifixion, and
the like. (see People vs. De la Cruz, '92'phj:t·906 [19$,3]; feople vs.
Dacuycuy, supra.) · , . . · ' (3) Validity of penalty disproportionate to the crime. - A ?enalty
(2) The constitutional proscription was established Ql}.,grouncl.s
of humanity which precludes the imposition .of harsh penalties that
public sentiments have regarded as an affront to r~.c,1:~on or,~ho<::kwg
to the conscience of m.en. It is consistent .w,i;th the Gonstitutional
1 t, • ; • . , a more effective deterrent, like the stealing of motor vehicles or
policy which states that "that the State vahi~s the dignity of every
human person." (Art. II, Sec. 10.)
Prohibition aimed at form or char~cter
of punishment.
(1) Remedy where the penalty imposed severe or excessive. - The
constitutional prohibition is generally aimeq at the form or characte:r;
of the punishment rather than at its sever~ty. In other words, the
prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not
to the proportion between the penalty and the crime.3
3This conclusion may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs. Estoestn (93
Phil. 647 [1953).) where an "excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional nnd wna
imposed but with a recommendation for executive clemency, thus: "x xx H) mprl~or:11n11nl
from 5-to 10 years is out of proportion to the present c11se.in view of certain ch·o11111111t111r1"1,
the low ls not to be declared unconstitutionnl for this reason. The conatltut lonollty p( 1111
r r J
'II I pj I I tll JIil I I 11 I II , 1 11
11lt1ltll1l1111 I l '1111h•l11tH 11h1
(2) Need for imposing severe penalty. - In view of the need ~o
1
provide•a more deterrent to crime, a penalty m ay, theref?re, ?e vahd
alth0 ugh-it is out @f.pr.Qportion to the offense. Thus, m People vs.
Dionisio :(22,SCRA 1299 [1968].), the Supreme Court, in affirming the
penalty of one (1) month imprisonment imposed on the appellant
for .collecting, without legal authority, bets for a daily double race,
an offense pen~ized by R.A. No. 6063, declared:
"Whatever should be corrected as ,pernicious to the body
politic, and how correction should be done, is a matter primarily
addressed-to the discretion of the legislative department, not of
,t he coutts;-and the view thatnnsupervised gambling is definitely
-detrimental to,the·nation and its citizens counts with respectable
suppor,t. 'The, hope of lcirge or easy gain, obt~ined without
. special ,effort nuns the head of the_ wor~1an_ ~d habitual
. gambling is.a .cause of laziness. 1 (Plamol; Dro1t ClVll, Vol. 2, No.
211 0.) The social scowge of gambling must be stamped out. The
laws against gambling must be enf~rced to the limit.' " (People
vs. Gorostiza, 77 Phil. 88 [1946])
not normally propor tionate to the offense may be imposed m some
instances without violating the Constitution as, for example, where
the offense has 'become so rampant as to require the adoption of
coconuts ~ hich is punished by the Revised Penal Code as qualified
theft or such crimes as assassinations, bombings, and robberies
whi01 are committed with frightening frequency and seeming
impunity with the use of high-powered weapons, explosives or
similar devices.4 (Baylosis vs. Chaves, Jr., 202 SCRA405 [1991).)
act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgres-
sors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caugh~, and
it is to meet such a situation.as this that courts are ad vised to make a recommendation to
the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction.of the penalty.xx x" ·
4Jt has been held that the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from P20,000 to P30,000 imposed by the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425, Art. II,
Sec. 4.) regardless of the amount involved in the sale of prohibited drugs is not cruel
punishment. It is settled that "It takes more thnn merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for n penalty to be obnoxious to tl,e Consti~tion" as it may be _that
It wnu proscribed to prevent 0 1· dlscourngo the prollfornl'lon of cnmes thnt are especially
h111•1ru1 to tho public. (People va, Alo)ond1·0, 225 SCRI\ 3~7 [1993].)
 l J
Vt.I.A , I 'I J11 ,11 ' I 'I NH 'UN:1 l'l 'f l.J'Jlll N II\), J ,AW H '. HI
Principles nnd Cn·ses1
But, as elsewhere stated, where the d~gree 0£ disproportion of
the penalty to the offense committed is sucih,as. '~to shock the moral
sense of all reasonable men as to what is· right'arrd proper. under the
circumstances," the penalty would be violative of the prohibition:
(see People vs. De la Cruz, 92 PhiL 906 ,[1953].) However, a ·fine
is excessive and, therefore, prohibited when it is clearly out of
proportion to the offense. (supra.)
Imposition of the death penalty.
Section 19 does not expressly declare the abolition of the death
penalty. 5 It merely says that the death penalty-shall not be imposed
unless Congress decides to reinstate it "for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes" in which case .it shall apply only to such
crimes subsequently committed. Death penalties already imposed
upon the effectivity of the new Consti~tion were automatically
commuted to reclusion perpetua.6 (Sec. 19.)
5 heinous crimes .a mending for the purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special laws.
Section 19(1) did not abolish the death penalty but merely suspended its imposition.
(People vs. Quiboyen, 310 SCRA326 (1999].) The intent of the framers .o f the Constitution
W(lS merely to consider the death penalty automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(People vs. Gulpe, 426 SCRA 456 [2004].)
6 homicide or with any specified attendant circumstances, crime of plunder, importation,
"Upon the ratification of the new Constitution, the death 1;enalty may p.o longer .be
imposed and unless Congress provides otherwise, there is no longer an automatic review
of a judgment of conviction. The·review must be afthe initiative of the accused." (People
vs. Almenario, 172 SCRA 268 (1989).) The intent of the framers of the Corporation was
merely to counter the death penalty automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua. (People
vs. Gulpe, 426 SCRA456 [2004].) ·
Reclusion perpetun is not synonymous or interchangeable with "life imprisonment"
While the latter may appear to be the English translation of:the former, in •reality, it goes
deeper than that The former "entails impi;isonment for a_t least 3.0 years.afte,r which the
convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no
case exceed 40 years; it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely, perpetual special
disqualification, etc. provided in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code. It is not the same
as life imprisonment which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty
and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration." The former
is prescribed under the Revised Penal ·c ode, while the latter is invariably impos·e d for
serious offenses which are not penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by speciallaws.
(People vs. Baquio, 196 SCRA459 [1991); People vs. Gerona, 227 SCRA 547 (1993]; People
vs. Retuta, 234 SCRA 645 (1994]; see SC Adm. Cir, No. 6-A-92, dated June 21, 1993.)
Therefore, the latter should not be used in lieu of or as a·substitute for the former. (People
vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA546 [1992]; People vs. Alvero, Jr.,.224SCRA 16 (1993].)
Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the Act (i.e., its benefits)
shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment. The· term "life imprisonment" has been interpreted to include reclusion
perpetua. (People vs. Saberola, 297 SCRA 733 (1998].) .
l
A1{'l'. JI](. IJll.L U l l Hl.l,ll'l'~
Prohibited Punishments
The ,Constitution does not define what "heinous crimes" are but
they can be said to cover offenses that are exceedingly or flagrantly
bad or evil or those committed with extreme cruelty as to shock
the general. moral sense, such as treason, parricide, drug-trafficking,
murder, robbery with homicide, rape with homicide, killing a
person in stages, etc., especially if the crime is committed against
children or defenseless people.7
Before, the death sentence was carried out by putting the person
tinder sentence by electrocution. This method was changed to
lethal injection. R.A. No. 9346 (effective June·24, 2006) prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty.8 Before -
The Constitution speaks of the penalty of reclusion perpet11n at lea~t thl'OC (3)
times: Section 13 (Bail) and Section 19 of Article III, and Section 5(2, d) of Article VIII
in connection with cases over which the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction. The
duration ofreclusion perpetua has been increased from 20 years and one (1) dny to 40 yearn
by R.A. No. 7659. .
7
R.A. No. 7659 (effective Dec. 31, 1993.) restored the death penalty on certain
The 13 crimes classified as heinous and punishable by death under the Act are treason,
qualified piracy, qualified bribery, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, robbery with violence or intimidation of pers.ons, destructive arson, rape with
manufacture, possession, sale, etc., of prohibited or regulated drugs, and camapping
with homicide or rape.
The "whereas" claitses of the Act state: "x x x Whereas, the crimes punishable by
death under this Act .are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and
which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity; are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
de(:ency and morality in a.just, civilized·and orderly socie.ty;
Whereas, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only
in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but has also affected the
nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while at the
same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's ability
to maintain peace and order in the country;
Whereas, the Congress in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of law,
and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."
The mandatory character of the death penalty for heinous crimes prescribed and
defined in R.A. No. 7659 notwithstanding, the courts are not precluded, given mitigating
factors or conditions duly established in evidence, from declaring the crime charged to
be, in fact, non-heinous in character, or from concluding that no compelling reasons exist
to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. (Vi tug, J., Separate Concurring Opinion;
People vs. Purazo, 402 SCRA 541 [2003).)
8
In view of R.A. No. 9346, prescribing the imposition of death penalty, the penalty,
I,
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed. (People
r vs. Mangitngit, 502 SCRA560 (2006).) The law unequivocally bars the application of the
 IJ
994 . PI-l!Lll'l lN.l:.i 'ON S'l'l'l'UJi!O.NAL LAW
Principles and Cases
:(1) Arguments against the· penalty; i+:-:-i"The· proponents of the
abolition of the death penalty are of the:epinior:rthab; •. . -1 . ·
(a) It is cruel and inhurnari ·· l;,ecause ''its imposition
traumatizes not only the convict but ~lso · fhe members of his'
family; · '
(b) It has never been shown ·to hc).~e a special .det~i:;;,~nt:
effect on criminality; · Treatment of detention prisoners.
(c) · It deprives the convict of a chance fo~ rehabilitation an_
d Section 19(2) prohibits confinement of any prisoner which may
reformation, death being irreversible; ,
(d) There is always a possibility of error in condemning a
person to death; and · law to deal with the matter.'3 Such law may impose the necessary
(e) The State has no right to deprive a person of his life;
God is the giver of life and only He can take it.
(2) Arguments in favor of the penalty. - Those who advocate the
retention of death penalty say:
(a) It is not cruel and inhull}an because the manner by
which it is executed (e.g., by electrocution, gas chamber, or
lethal injection) does not involve physical or mental pain nor
unnecessary physical or mental suffering, and it is imposed
only for heinous crimes;
(b) It discourages others from committing heinous crimes,9
and its abolition will result to the increase of the crime rate;
(c) A convict, by his own acts, has forfeited his right to
life and shown his moral incapability to be rehabilitated and
reformed;10
death penalty, as well as repeals all such statutory proyisions requiring the applicatio~ of
the death penalty. (People vs, Bon, 506 SCRA 168 (2006],) It only prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty but did not affect the corresponding pecuniary or civil liabilities.
(People vs. Antonio, 549 SCRA 569 [2008).)
9Practically, all h~an ? eings fear the loss of their lives so that the death penalty
cannot but have a deterring influence on human conduct. This argument has, of course,
n~ application where the certain imposition of the death penalty was not present in the
mind of the c:riminal at the time of the commission of the crime or, with knowledge of the
death .penalty, and the probability of being caught, he deliberately took the risk,
'°There is ho statistical evidence to prove that punishment by impris.o nment alone
has been effective for purposes of rehabilitation of criminals, particularly with the
subhuman conditions in our penalinstitutions.
II
~ •c. l~ l\ l{'1L'. Jll , 1111.1 ,\.W l'( l t d 11 1 W/1
Prohibited Pwushments
{d) Its imposition is filled with numerous legal safegua,rds,
manifesting society<s reluctance to take human life;11 and
(e) The State has the absolute right to take the 'life of a
person who has proved himself a great menace to society by
way of self-defense and as an example and warning to others.12
amount to cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment prohibited
under Section 19(1) and commands Congress to pass the necessary
sanction upon those violating the constitutional prohibition. (see
Sec. 12[4].)
Thi? Commission on Human Rights is vested by the Constitution
with visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities to
insure its observance. (Art. XIII, Sec. 18(4).)
ii
;l 11 Although the death penalty has always been part of the statute books, specifically
I'
I
the Revised Penal Code, and many sentences have been imposed, very few executions
have been carried out. The first execution by lethal injection was carried out on February
5, 1999. It was during martial law when a military tribunal imposed the death penalty by
firing squad on the head of a drug syndicate. He was shot in public in 1973 a year after
the declaration of martial law.
12The State derives its authority ultimately from God,
13In a case, " all the .appellants have been under detention for more than twenty
years. More than that, they have been living under the shadow of a sentence of death
since September 8, 1960, almost nineteen years ago. In the light of these facts, while,
unquestionably, appellants deserved the death penalty at the time they were sentenced
by the trial court, the passage of so many years of mental torture under the deplorable
conditions obtaining in the national penitentiary during all those years has transformed
that penalty into a cruel one within the contemplation of th human proscriptio~ of the
7
Constitution against the inflicting of cruel and unusual punishment. It was certainly no
fault of appellants that proceed_ings leading to their final conviction by this Court now
have been prolonged beyond the reasonable period for the purpose. And it is hardly
of any materiality at this juncture to inquire where the fault for such a happenstance
actually lies, for it cannot lessen the extreme agony they have already undergone. It
cannot be denied that living under the shadow of a sentence of death for more than
ten years, what with the deplorable conditions in the death row and other parts of
our national penitentiary, is a life that can be worse than death itself. Indeed, such an
unusually long waiting amounts to cruelty, which should never be added - and the
law does not contemplate that it may be added - to the penalty of death." (Barredo, J.,
separate opinion, in People vs, Botja, 91 SCRA 360 (1979].)
 l I
99(1 ·l I llLll'l'lNH 'ON, "1'1'1'W'l'l N/\L I ,AW
Prlndples and C:nsc-s 1
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Law provides an alternative penal sanction of impriso,nment but
without a specification as to the term or duration t~eteof
Facts: Private respondents, public school officials, were
charged with violations of R.A. No. 4670,. €ltherwise known as the
"Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." They allege that the
facts charged do not constitute an offeJ:1Se sin1ce. the penal;provi~ion,
which is Section 32, is unconstitutionai, one of the two grounds
being that it imposes a cruel and unusual'punishment, for the term
of imprisonment is not fixed and may run to reclusion perpetua.
The disputed provision reads:
. "Sec. 32. Penal Provision: - A
.person . who shall wilfully
interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise
of his rights guaranteed by this ~ct or who shall in any other
m~er commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this
Act shall, ·upon conviction, be .punished by a fine of not less
than one hundred pesos nor m:ore than one thousand pesos, or
by imprisonment, in the discretion of ~e court."
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently
imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from Pl00.00 to Pl,000.00; or (b)
imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or
term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While c1. minimum
and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is
no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although
both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the
court."
Issue: The issue is whether or not the contention that RA. No.
4670 is unconstitutional on the ground that the imposable but
indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes a
cruel and unusual punishment.
Held: (1) Prohibition is generally aimed at form or character. of
punishment rather than its severity. - "The rule is that a punishment
authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to
the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to
the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community. The prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form
or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect
of duration or amount,- and apply to punishments which never
Ill , PJ I\ 11 1, Ill 1111 I I II I II ,1 11
11l\Jhlhltlld l'w1lttlin11111tt1
existed in America, or which public sentiment h as regarded as
cruel ,o r obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172.), for instance, those inflicted at
the "".hipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the staka, breaking
on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like."
(2) Severity of punishment does not ofitself violate the constitutional
prohibition. - "The prohibition looks only to the form or nature
of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and
the crime. That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime
is an insufficient basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the
ground that it is cruel and unusual." (People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA
90 [19891, through Justice Regalado.)
Note: The entire penal provision in question was invalidated as
an "undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of penalty
of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if
the latter were the legislative department of the government." (sec
case under Art. VI, Sec. 1.)
.. '
~', ! 2. Mechanical defect in the electric chair prevented the carrying out
' of a death sentence by electrocution.
C
Facts: The petitioner was convicted for murder and sentenced
to death by electrocution. When the executioner threw the electric
ir i •switch, death did not result because of some mechanical defect.
!'9'
.'.i '.
He was thereupon returned to prison. Another execution was
scheduled.
:r
-;·
Issue: The petitioner in his petition for a writ of certiorari to
review the denial by the Louisiana Supreme Court of his application
for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus,
claimed that the execution would deny him the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy and against cruel and unusual
punishment.
Held: (1) Prohibition directed against cruelty inherent in the method
ofpunishment. - "After stating that no case for double jeopardy was
presented, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: Petitioner's suggestion
is that because he once underwent the p sychological strain of
preparation for electrocution, now to require him to undergo this
preparation again subjects him to a lingering or cruel and unusual
punishment. Even the fact th at the petitioner h as already been
subjected to a current of electricity does not make his subsequent
execution any morn cruel in the constitutional sense than any other
 ) J IJ
998 •PllILU1l'lNJJ 'UN!:l'l'l'l'U'!'l NAJ, Jj \.W f 1 , I,1 I I
...
Principles and Cases

execution, The cruelty. against which the Consti:tution protects a

convicted man is cruelty inherept -in ~e ·method· of punishment,
not the necessary suffotirtg involved. in any ~ethod,e!llployed to
extinguish life humaneJy;'1 ' : J. · RIGHT AGAINST IMPRIS:ONMENT FOR
d-i4 nqt nd4.an elemen-t'.of cruelty to
(2) Unenforce.able accident, _ DEBT/NON~PAYMENT OF POLL TAX
subsequent e:\';~cution. - "The f[!ct th~t ,q,n µ,nforseeable, aq,ident
prevented the prompt consWJW1,~tion. of:the seDtence ~annpt, it
seems to us, add an ,element of c11+elty to a subsequeni; -!;!xecution. SEC. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or
Thei;e i& n9 :purpose to inflict unpecess.ary pai,n nor any unneeessary non-payment of a poll tax.
pain m.volved in the ,proposed .execution. The- situation of the
unfortunate victim of the accident is just as though he had suffered Meaning of debt.
the identical amount of mental anguish and physical pain in any
Debt, as intended to be covered by the constitutional guarantee,
other occurrence, such as, for example, a fire in the cell block."
(Louisiana v. R'esweber, 329 U.S. 459 [1947}, through Justice Reed.) means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or
implied. (Tan Cong vs. Stewart, 42 Phil. 809 [1922].)
In qther words, debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil
-oOo-
debt or one not arising from a criminal offense.

Purpose of prohibition against

imprisonment for debt.
(1) The prohibition was brought about by the force of public
opinion which looked with abhorrence on statutes permitting the
cruel imprisonment of debtors. The Constitution seeks to prevent
the use of the power of the State to coerce the payment of debts.
(2) The control of the creditor over the person of his debtor has
been abolished on humanitarian considerations. One should not
be punished on account of his poverty. Moreover, the government
is not a proper party to private disputes. It is not called upon to
render its aid to one who deems himself aggrieved by imprisoning
the other for failure to pay his debts. (see Ganaway vs. Quillen, 42
Phil. 802 [1922].)

Prohibition limited to contractual

obligations only.
The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in
action ex delicto (criminal actions), for the reason that the damages
recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into

999

Il)tl(I • l ' llll ll'l 'lf JIS t till 11111 1~ 1\l~IA l. l AW 11 I fl)
1Jl'Jnclpl •u nruJ 't111t 1r1
between the parties, but are, imposed upon the defendant for the
wrong he has done and .are consi~ered as a punishm,e;nt, therefor;
nor fines and pel}.alti~~ W~!t:d ._9µt .,.bYr -~ ~- co:urts .-!l1 C,l:iminal
proceedings as pun:ishments for ~rime (Ibitf.);'ifor sanctions imposed
in administrative
.
artd civil cases?fhfis:
. '.
, · ·: · ,. . .
'
(1) Subsidiary imprisonment as a penalty for failure to pay a
criminal debt or fine does not aqpffi.lt ~P-Pf()_hib.ited imprisonment
for debt. (Freeman vs. U.S., 40 Phil. 1039 t1910]; Ajeno 'vs. Judge
Inserto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976].)
(2) A person may be imprisoned for failure to pay tax (as Jt is
not a debt).
(~) An employer cannot successfully·ch~llenge a!J _;iQlative of
the constitutional prohibition a law pr9yiding that failure of em-
ployers to pay the salaries of their employees shall be considered
as prima facie evidence of fraud committed through false pretenses
since what is being punished is fraud of
the employer who, being
able to make payment, refuses to do so without justification. (People
vs. Merillo, L-3401, June 28, 1951; People vs. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 187
[1939].)
(4) Neither would suspension of a public officer for failure to
pay a just and admitted debt violate the constitutional prohibition.
(Flores vs. Tatad, 96 SCRA 676 [1980].)
(5) If the debtor has property, the creditor has the right in a civil
case to have such property attached (i.e., taken into legal custody) as
a means of enforcing payment of the debt.
But an order for the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant,
who was declared in contempt of court for failure to satisfv a
judgment (ordering him to pay plaintiff past and future supp~rt),
owing to his insolvency, would, in effect, authorize his imprisonment
for debt in violation of the Constitution. (Sura vs. Martin, Sr., 26
SCRA286 [1%8].)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Constitutionality of Bouncing Check Law is challenged.
Facts: The law, B.P. Blg. 22, punishes a person "who m 11l<cR 0 1·
draws and issues nny chock on accou nt or for val11c, knowlr1n t\l
the time of iR11uc 1'1.,nt h ' cl(;)CH not hnvo 1mfflclont f1111d11 111 011 , 111tll t
I ll
IIMII
' I I " ll
A I( I 111 l111 l I II II II ,I l l 1
l<lt1hl Ag11h11tl J1 upal1111111111111 Im J)ulll /
Non-11uyn111nl of Jl(Jll 'H.1x
,. with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in (ull upon
. .. presentment, which oheck is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee:bank x x ·x t ($ec. 1, pat. nhere?f .) •
Before the enactment of 'if P. Blg. 22, provisions already existed
in qµr ~.tatute books- ;,,y,hich. penalize the issuance of bouncing or
rul;il:>er checks,·Criminf\l·l~y, :};,.?,s dealt with,the ;problem within the
c~ntext of crimes agah:tst,pr,operty puni~hed .as "estafa" or crimes
. ;,i,rtvol~h:1-gJ Jiau~t and· d~ceit. -The focus of these penal prpvisions
1
is on the dam.:\ge c<l,used to the property rights of the victim. It
. is claj.~ed, p:rnopg·o.thers,. that the law offends the constitutional
provisiop. forbidding imprisonment for .debt.
Petitioners insistthat' since the offense under the law is con-
summated only upon the dishonor or ·non-payment of the check
when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad
debt law" rather than a II a bad check law." What it punishes is the
non'-payment of the chec~, not the ~ct of is~uing it. The statute, it is
claimed, is. nothing more than.a veiled device to coerce payment of
a debt under the threat of a penal sanction.
Issue: Is B.P. Blg. 22 a valid law?
, Held: Yes. (1) Histon; of the constitutional inhibition. - "First of
all, it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional
inhibition invoked by petitioners. Viewed in its historical context,
the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is
a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the
nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a
result of the people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice,
sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditors to cause the
incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts.
At common law, money judgments arising from actions for
the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract
could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ
of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could
be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he
,,
,I makes the satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the popular
'I
' I ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provis~ons
forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined
in the constitutions of various states of the Union."
(2) Scope of the constit11tio11nl snfegunrd. - "The reach and scope
of thh1 conslltullonnl aofcguot·d hove been the subject of judicial
 1 I
1002 . PI-IlLlfll"lNB t:ONS'n'l'U'JJ'l(.)N<.I\L J .AW
Principles and .Cases,•, ·,
definition, both by our Supre):Ue Court,('I'a•n.:C:ong-vs::N .L:: Stewart,
42 Phil. 809 [1907]; Ganaway vs. Qu·il:le.n, i,l4,Phil. 81j.[1922}.} and
by American state coµrts. Mr. Jus,tice M.<;lkolm, speaking £or the
Supreme Court in the Ganaway. .
caqe, ,st~te.d:
. ,,, .
.
'The 'debt' intended to be· c0ve'red by the c0nstitutional
guaranty has :a well-defined rrteanirtg; , Organic-· provisions
relieving from imprisonment ifor d¢bt were intended to
prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabHities,arising
from actions ex coritractu. The inhibition -was never meant to
include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that
damages recoverable therein do not ,arise from any' contract
entered intq between the parties, but, are .impose,d: µpon the
defendant for .the.-wrong he h~s ,di:me apd are considei:e;d as
punishment, ngr to fines ancj. p_enalti,es 4nposeq by the .courts
in criminal proceedings as ptJJ;1.isl'itnents for crime.':' .
(3) Analogous case: Refusal of employer to pay salaries of employee.
- "Closer to the case at bar is People vs. Vera Reyes (67 Phil. 187
[1939].), wherein a statutory provision which. made illegal and
punishable the refusal of an employer to pay; when he can do so, the
salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of
every month or on Saturday every week, was challenged for .being
violative of the constitutional prohibHion again~t imprison,rnent for
debt. The constitutionality of the law in question was.upl:wld by the
Court, it being within the authority of the Jegislature to enact such
a law in the exercise of the police power. It W;<lS held that 'one of
the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part
of the employers who hire laborers or empl9yees without paying
them the sal~ies agreed upon for their services, thus causing them
financial difficulties.'
The law was v iewed not as a measm:e to coerce payment of
an obligation, although obviously such could be its effect, but to
banish a practice considered harmful to public welfare."
(4) Gravamen of offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22. -
"The
gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of
an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay );tis debt. The thrust of the law is
to prollibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
/\ I I , Ill , 11111 , 1111 I ll 1I II 'I I IJI
W15hl Agoln 11 J11\1.Jl'J11111111u111l !111• 1)111J1 /
Non-Payn1onl of Poll 'l'ox
checks and putting·them in circulation., Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is p:roscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
an offense against public order."
(5) Acts may be criminally punished as malutn prohibitum. - "It·
may be constitutionally impermissible-for the·legislature to penalize
a person for non~pay ment of a·debt ex contractu. But certainly it is
within the prerogative of the lawmaki,ng body-to proscribe certain
acts deemed per:nicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in
se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se,
but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The Stntc
can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The enactment of B.P, Blg. 22 is a declaration by the legislature
that; as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of n
worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions. In sum, the enactment of B.P, Blg.
22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt." (Lozano
vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324 [1986], through Justice Yap.)
Meaning of poll tax.
A poll tax (or personal or capitation tax) is a tax of a fixed amount
imposed on individuals residing within a specified territory, whether
citizens or not, without regard to their property or the occupation in
which they may be engaged. 1
The residence tax is in the nature of a poll tax.
Purpose of prohibition against imprisonment
for non-payment of poll tax.
The constitutional right is intended for the protection of the
poor. It is a measure dictated b y a sense of humanity and sympathy
for the plight of the poorer elements of the population who cannot
even afford to pay their cedula or poll t axes/ now community tax
1
See 51 AM. JUR. 660.
2
V.G. SINCO, op. cit., p. 682.
 • PHILIPPINE·CONSTJff'UTIO'Ni\'.L LAW 5cc. 20
· Prindples:and ;Cas·es ,.

(formerly x:esidence tax): Toete. isi however;1n0. p,r0hibi<tion against

the imposition of po11 tax.3 -;

A person is subject to impx;is·onm.ent" ,for ·v-iolation-qf- the com-

RIGHT AGAINST POUBLE JEOPARDY
munity tax law (iri the Local Gbvernmeri:t -Tax CodeJ other than
for non-payment of the conununi:tY. t,p~.._(~.g., f~lsification of the
community tax certifica,t~).and for .npn-payme_nt of other taxes if so
SEC. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
expressly provided b y p ertinent !aws.
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by
The payment of a poll.tax cann0t be made,a pre-11equisite-to the a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under ei-
exercise of the right of-suffrage. (see Art. V, Sec,. 1.) ther shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
-oOo-
Right against double Jeopardy.
The right against double jeopardy means that when a person is
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquitted
or conviction or in any other manner without the express consent of
the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense. (Melo vs. People of the Phils., 85 Phil. 766 [1950];
see Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 7.)

Purpose and basis of the right.

I
i'. (1 ) The guarantee has a strict application to criminal prosecution
'I
l only. It protects the accused against the peril of a second trial as well
.I as a second punishment for the same offense. 1
As the Supreme Court put it:
(a) "Fittingly described as res judicata in prison grey, the
purpose of the right is to set the effects of the first prosecution
forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter,
., 'f be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against
r
t.
him for the same offense." (Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate
•' Ii
• I Court, 179 SCRA54 [1989].)

1Double jeopardy provides three (3) related protections: (1) against a second prose-
3 cution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) against a second prosecution for the same
The provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt was transported to our shores
by the Americans at the turn of the century and embodied in our organic laws. Later, offense after conviction; and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense. (Peo-
the 1935 Constitution outlawed not only imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous ple vs. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 137953, April 11, 2002.)
practice native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-payment of the cedula or
poll tax. (Lozano vs. Martinez, supra.) 1005

, l ' llll ll ' l ' l l'-lf I lll /l 1llll Jl 1hll" IA l , I AW 111 I
1'1 l11('1 pl1•111111d l 't11H•11
(b) "It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to
treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either
~o ~xult in his fre~dom 9r to -b e re?igned ~o ;wh,atever penalty
1s imposed, and 1s a bar to unnecessary litigation, in its~If
time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well."
(Republic vs. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA $79 [1971]; Bustamante vs.
Maceren, 4_8 .SCRA. 155 [1972].)
.
· • · •· l "'
(2) This principle is founded upon th<:1law of rea,son, justice and
conscience.2 (Melo vs. People, supra,)
To permit the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second
judgment for the same offense would arm the government with
a potent instrument of oppression. (Co ·vs. Lim, 604 SCRA 702
[2009].) "It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and
justice, an acquitted defendant is entitle'd to the right of repose as a
direct consequence of the finality of his. acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is
'part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches
to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction.'
(People vs. Velasco, supra.) Such is the magnitude of the accused's
right against double jeopardy that even an appeal based on an
alleged misappreciation of the evidence by the trial court will not
lie." (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 74 [2002].)
2
It is embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of
E~g!an?, a_nd undoubtedly_ every system of jurisprudence, and instead of having specific
0~1g11~, 1t sunply a~ways existed. It found expression in the Spanish law and in the Con-
stitution of the_ Uruted States and is now embodied in our own Constitution as one of the
fundamental nghts of the citizens. (Ibid.)
"Without the safeguard this [section] establishes in favor of the accused his fortune
s~ety and pea~e of mind would be entirely at the m ercy of the complaining ~itness, wh~
nught rep~at his accusatio~ ~s o_ften as dismissed by the court and whenever he might
see fit, subJect to no other hm1tat1on or restriction than his own will and pleasure. The ac'
cus~d would ~ever be free fro~ ~e cru_el and c~nstant menace of a never-ending charge,
which the mahce of the cornplauung witness might hold indefinitely suspended over his
head." (Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil. 247 [1903]; People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 [1933).)
"The:~derlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of JUnsprudence, is that ~he State with all its resource~ and power sho uld not
be allowed to make repealed a ttempts to convict an individunl for nn ollogocl offense,
~ereby subj~ctlng him to embnrossment, expense and orclenl nnd compcllln15 him lo llvu
ma contlnumg s tntc of nnxloly nnd lnsccudty, us well 11s enhancing Iha pott~lhlllty lhhl
even thoueh\lnnocont, hu m11y bu Co1111d i;ullty," (Poo plc vs. Vclnsco, 133 SCH/\ (,11$,
SCRA 207 [2000); Pcioph v,i, Vy, 11'71 !K"l{i\ 66!J [2005),)
I
/\ I') \II Jill I I 11 1 I II d 11 1 IINI/
1
1 11 I
1<111111 A11t1l1111t I >u11hh1J1101J111dy
Requisites for existence of double jeopardy.
Jeopardy i~ the risk, danger or peril in which an accused is
placed when c:harged·before a competent court upon an indictment
or information sufficient to sustain a conviction. (see People vs.
Vergara, 221 SCRA560 [1993].)
Under present law and jurisprudence, the accused is placed in
double jeopardy if the following conditions are present:
(1) He has been previously brought to trial;3
(2) The court which tried him is a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, i.e., has jurisdiction to try him for the crime charged;
(3) The complaint or information under which he has been
charged is valid, i.e., sufficient in form and substance to sustain n
conviction;
', l (4) He has been validly arraigned (see Sec. 14[2].) and pleaded
(either guilty or not guilty) to the charge;
(5) He has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, that is, the former case against him has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent;4 and
(6) He is being charged again for the same offense.5 (see Rules
of Court, Rule 116, Sec. 1; Rule 117, Secs. 3[i], 7; Rule 118, Sec. 1.)
Attachment of first jeopardy.
(1) When the first five (5) requisites are present in the first
criminal action, the first jeopardy has legally attached. (see, however,
dissenting opinion in People vs. Pineda, 219 SCRA 1 [1993], infra.)
3Preliminary investigation is not part of the trial.
4Conviction or acquittal means not only one after trial on the merits. Conviction
includes that upon a plea of guilty to a lesser offense made with the consent of the
prosecutor and the offended party. Acq uittal embraces dismissal or termination of the -
case without the express consent of the accused (after he has pleaded to the charge)
which is equivalent to acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy and the discharge of
the nccused to act as a State ·wih1ess provided he performs his part of the bargain. Such
conviction, acquittal, or unconscntcd clismissnl or termination of the case becomes res
J11rl/c(l/a nncl, therefore, n bar to another prosecution for the same or identical offense.
111,us, lh<,1 principle of double jcopnrcly flnds no nppllcntlon in administrative cases.
:wo {{ ·11yrw•Los11m vH. Rnmolclc, 571 SCRA 139 [2008].)
 111011 1' 111111 '1' 11'/ I llt/ 1 , I III IIIH Jfl/\ l~ I /\W
J 11'l 11 1lpl •1J11111J '1111•fl ,
(2) The second or dou.ble jeopardy ~No, 6.) which is prohibited
must be for: (a) the same offense as that in the first, or (b) the second
offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or (c) is an attempt to commit the
same, or (d) a frustration thereof.6 (infra.)
A person may be tried and convicted for two separate offenses
wh~re one is malum prohibitum (e.g., illegal recruitment) punished
under special law, while the other, malum in se (e.g., estafa, under the
Revised Penal Code).
Where case not yet deemed
terminated.
(1) Case remanded to trial court. - .The remand 0£ a case by the
Court of Appeals-to the trial court for further reception of evidenc~
to determine the actual value of the personal property involve.cl
and for the imposition of the appropriate penalty under the Anti-
Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612.), will not place an ac~sed in double
jeopardy. The concurrence of the requisites does not occur when the
case is remanded to the trial court,. (Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People,
234 SCRA 63.[1994].) . .
(2~ Ear~ier decision in regard only to liability for civil indemn.ity.
- Neither 1s the constitutional proscription violated by a Court of
Appeals' order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision
sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if earlier the same
decision has been promulgated in regard only to the ;ayment of
the civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise
state~,. ~e prom~lg~tion of one part of the decision, i.e., the liability
for c1v1l mdemrnty 1s not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of
the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability. Since
6
In othe_r w~rds, the requisites of double jeopardy are:
(1) a first Jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) . the s~eond jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first. (Gorio'n
vs. Regional Tnal Court of Cebu, 213 SCRA 138 [1992]; People vs. Vergara, 221 SCRA 560
(1993]; People vs. ~ampal, 244 SCRA 202 [1995]; People vs. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 [1996];
see Braza vs. Sand1ganbayan, 691 SCRA 471 [2013).) There is no double Jcopnrdy whc,·o
the fr<1_udulent acts (of estnfn) charged were committed ngninst different p orno1111; lti•uci•,
they do not constitute the sn111e offense, nllhough the cnses nrose out of the Hnnio 1id 11 ,11w,
(People vs. Onlnsn, 295 SCRA 49 ('1998].)
/\ I I 1111 I l l I I t •I I II , t I I
'' Ht11l1lA1111h111l 1'11111,1, J1,11p111 dy
I I
I I the promulgation of on:l,y the civil ~sp~ct of the _case is not merely
t incomplete but is als0 void, the criminal case 1s not yet deemed
terminated; henc-e, do.u ble jeopardy cannot prosper as a dffense.
(Cuison vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159 [1998].)
r. (3) Order of dismissal not an adjudication on the merits ..- Where
the order dism1ssing a criminal case Wi;lS not·an adjudication on the
• I
merits, but upon an erroneous conclusion 0£ the judge that ~s c~urt
.had no "territ0rial jurisdiction," said order cannot b~ as ~es JUd1~ata
a subsequent case based on the same offense. The d1sm1ssal be~g
null.and void, the proceedings before the local court may not be said
to h,we been lawfully terminated. (People vs. Gorospe, 157 SCRA
154 [1988].)
(4) Acquittal/convi'ction of accused or dismissal of case has not yet
taken place. - There is no violation of the right ag~in~t dou~lc
., . ',
f 'J
jeopardy, even if the trial court approves the prosecution s motion
to ·re-open the case after its earlier approval of the accused's plea
to the lesser offense of homicide with conditions, where the court
still had to render a decision on the criminal and civil liabilities
of the accused, i.e., the case was not yet terminated as a result of
the accused's acquittal or conviction or its dismissal. (People vs.
Romero, 399 SCRA 386 [2003].)
(5) Motion for reconsideration of decision filed by accused. - When
the accused himself' files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked
because the accused waives his right not to be placed therein by filing
such motion. His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify
its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of
law and make them conformable with the statute applicable to the
case in the new judgment it has to render. (People vs. Astudillo, 401
SCRA 723 [2003].)
Double jeopardy, a ground for a motion
to dismiss.
_The right against double jeopardy is a matter which the accused
may raise in a motion to dismiss. (Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec.
3[h].)
It has been h eld that where the ground of double jeopardy was
not raised in the motion to quash before the trial court, that ground

10110 • J ' lJ I I ,I l'I 'I NH l :t )N! ,J Jll'Jfl 1ILJNA I , J ,/\ W I 11',
Pdnolplea uncl1 ·us 1:1 1 • .
di:nn:0t be made the basis for·attribtiting;fgrave abttse ofdis<ll'etion'-to
'llhe prosecutor in filing several1nfortnati<i>rls itwolving,i according .to
the accused's theory, one and tl::{'e1sarne offense·. ([fagan .vs, ,C0u~t 0'.f
Appeals,239SCRA5Z5·[1994J.) · .. ,. ;. < ·-> . ·' ., ·.: a,·
Double Jeopar.~y. m~r~ly a, matte.r.of:,de.fen~e.
The· accused cannot invoke the doctrine of double ,jeopardy
as an argument agait:tst the constituti0rt'a1ity·0£ a 1avt Even if:foch
a subsequent or ·second jeopardy doe'S arise, the law will not be
rendered unconstitutional. That the accttsed will be exposed to
double 'jeopardy if he is prosecuted under ·another law is not a
ground to nu1lify that law. Double jeopardy is merely a defens.e
that an accused. m~y raise to . defe~t a su,bseql,lent prc;,secution or
convi_c tion for the same offense. (Misola vs. ·Panga, 181 SCRA 648
[1990].) · jeopardy. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant p lea_ds
But a. law 'Contrary to the ex postfacto·or bill ofattainder provision
of the Constitution·(Sec. 22.) would be unconstitutional. ·
Effect of a judgment of acquittal.
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine is followed as
a safeguard against double jeopardy.
. .
(1) A judgment of acquittal is final,, unappe~able, apq i;ip.rn(:-
diately executory upon rendition or promu.lgation and entitles.
the accused to be released; hence, it may no longer b~ ,~el)ded
or corrected by the court, except for clericalerrors,or mistakes.. To
amend or alter it will not only violate thi~ l?.:i.s.k p.rj.nciple but woulg.
also p1ace_the.accused in doµble jeppardy, (Peopl~ vs ..CFI of:Ri,zal,
161 S<;;RA 249 [1988]; People vs. Sand~g#{~aJ:anr ~9i . SCRA 85_2
[2006]; People vs. Court of Appeals, 516 SCRA 383 [~007].) . .
(2) A person acquitted of a criminal charge can no longer b~
charged, detained, or re-arrested for the same ·offense! (Toyoto vs.
Ramos, 139 SCRA 316 [1985].) ·
· (3) As a general rule, a void judgment-will not result' in the
acquittal of the accused. (Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, 297 .SCRA 95
[1998].) Where the judgment is void, no double jeopardy results
from the re-filing of the criminal case (Barbers vs. Laguio, Jr., 35'1
SCRA 606 [2001].) as where there is a finding of mis trial 1-eR11lting In
I' IL )111 111 11 , 1111 I led 11 1 1111 1
,l
t<lght A1,11h111l l )1 111l 1l1 J11op1mly
a,denial.of due process. But in the ab>ser-1.<.e of a find~g of mistrial, i.e.,
the:ttiminaHriah-v.as a sham, the-judgment of acquittal is final and
t!mappealabltron the ground of.double jeopardy, whether it happens
afl:he trial coui'H.evel or at the Coutt of Appeal$; (People vs; Court
'of-Ap~eals; 423 sdRA 605 [2004]; People vs. Tria-Tirona, 463 SCRA
462 [2005]; People vs. Sandiganbayan, 631 SCRA 128 [2010].)
',lalid,previous.proce.edlngs.
The doc~rine of double jeopardy requires "valid previous
proceedings." Thus:
(1) A court cannot render a valid judgment under an invalid
complaint or information (e.g., one filed by the prosecutor or fiscal
for adultery 0i' concilbinage); hence, its dismissal and the filing of
the corrected information will not place the accused w1de1· double
guilty to a defective or insufficient information that is voluntarily
dismissed by the prosecution. But where an information is motu
proprio dismissed on the ground that it is defective when it is not
so, in fact, it has been held that the dismissal is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. (U.S. vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil.
67 [1911]; see Cudia vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173 [1998].)
(2) Where the proceedings before the municipal court under
which the accused was· convicted are null and void for not being
r~corded, he was not placed in double jeopardy when he was tried
and convicted anew 'in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court} in the exercise of the latter's concurrent original jurisdiction.
~People vs. Brecimo, 125 SCRA 182 [1983].) ·
(3) Where the dismissal or decision of acquittal is void for lack
of jurisdiction, the defense of double jeopardy cannot be raised by
the accused in the second prosecution. There is an exception to this
rule. (see infra.)
(4) A preliminary investigation is not a trial or part of a trial
for which double jeopardy attaches. (Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan, 202
SCRA 726 [1991].) It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties' evidence but only such as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the
nccused is probably guilty thereof. (Vincoy vs. Court of Appeals, 432
SCRA 36 (2004].)

1012 J.JlllL.ll'J.IIN Jl 'UNh l.ilflll)I~! 11)1/\ l. l ,A W
.
PrinciJ!lles and Cases ...' . ·
(5) There is no doubl~jeQPfil'.9U .\Y;f},~;r;~,"-,t_o;t; ~Xil~F)~,.J.q' jµq,g~,
exonerated by the Supreme_CQw:jt,:is,qi~g~ql:for,.the sprµ~•.9,c((ens~fµ\
the Sandiganbayan. Di?ti.n.c~iol:'\~i-~~tst, b,~f;W.e~n.P-P.n:ti.nisJ:r:c;1;ti~~ ,~d
criminal proceedings, and p.rosec;µt}oµ i!:1:91(\~ l§;.-.tl,.er~£.0r~1J1ot ~; PM
to the other. (kasiano, Jr: vs. SW't:digan~~y,m, 20;) BCRA ~771}99:21.-)
Existence of a plea.
(1) The existence of ~ valid pleif:ii§:.aft.'ies·sem:#al- ,rett_tiisife to
double jeopardy. The tlJ,eory.: ,of tlae .feqµir;!i?ment;is tiw:t a1conviction
is void unless the issue pas been joined• betwe.e ~ ,the a~a,i§.E;l(,l ,an¢ .
the State, by arraignmert and plea.7 Jeopardy only begins.when the
accused has been duly arrajghed.8 . • . , _ .. .. ••
. .
There can be no double jeopardy,where;!he accused entered.a
plea (of not guilty) in court that had no :jurisdiction. (Zapatos vs.
People, 411 SCRA 148 [2003].), or. to .an information·that is neither
valid nor sufficient to sustain a conviction.; (Cabo vs. Sandiganbayan,
491 SCRA264 [2006].) · absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for t:he
(2) Where the accused after entering a plea of guilty is subse-
quently allowed to testify in order to prove mitigating circumstances
7
22 C.J.S. 385. There are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to
obviate an improvident plea of guilt by the accused: (1). It must conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full apprehension by the accused of the consequences
of his plea; (2) It must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) It must ask the accused whether
he desires to present evidence on his behalf or allow him to do so if he so desires. (People
vs. Misa, 535SCRA543 [2007].)
8
It has been held, however, that in order for first jeopardy to attach, the .plea of the
accused to the charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination
of the previous case without his express consent; otherwi!le, no former jeopardy can be
pleaded to abate the second prosecution. (People vs. Pineda, 219 SCRA 111993].)
Legal jeopatdy exists from the moment the-accused has pleaded to the charge, the
disposition of.his case thereafter being merely the. consequence of.the former as to consti-
tute a bar to another prosecution. "The issue of double jeopardy arises in three different
ways, that is, when: (a) the accused is charged with the ·s ame offense ih two separate
pending cases, in one of which he has validly pleaded; (b) the accused is prosecuted anew
for the same offense after he has previously been convicted or acquitted thereof or the
charge therefor has been dismissed without his consent; or (c) the prosecution makes a
legally unauthorized appeal from a judgment in the same case. The first instance is con-
templated in Section 3, paragraph (h}, Rule 117; the second is covered by Section 7 of the
same Rule; and the third -is gbverned by Section 2; Rule 122.' ' (Regalado, J,; concurring
and dissenting.) . ncqulltol, but the motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan "for lack of merit there
Note: Sec. 3, par. h (now pat. i.), Rule 117, spec1ks also of "or i11 jtopnrtly a/ lln/118
convicted" which is no longer found in par. i. For Section 2 (now Sec. 1.), Hula 1:>?, 1100
Note 10.
I I
II I ;1 I
'
/\ It I Ill 1111 I I II 1111 ,111
1{11,llt A~11l1111l l)111thl Jllll)lilldy
11111
and •he says that he acted· in complete self-defense, said testimony
has the effect of vacating his plea of not guilty, and the court should
require him to plea anew on the charge or at least direct theft a new
p1ea of guilty be entered for him. If this is not done, there is no
st<lftding plea, and it follows that there can be no double jeopardy
with respect to the appeal from a judgment of acquittal. (People vs.
Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119 [1966].) ·
(3) A conviction under a plea of guilty for a lesser offense,
made with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
is equivalent to a .conviction of the offense charged for purposes of
double jeopardy. (Rules of Court, Rule 116, Sec. 2.) If the plea was
made without such consent, the conviction of the accused shall not
be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
intludes the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
~Ibid., Rule 117, Sec. 7; see People vs. Villarama, 210 SCRA246 (1992].)
(4) It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits
offense imputed to him. A conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to
the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him is equivalent
to a plea of not guilty; hence, the trial court should vacate such a plea
and enter a plea of not guilty. A judgment of conviction rendered
by a trial court based on a void plea-bargaining is void ab initio.
Since the judgment is void, double jeopardy will not lie. (People vs.
Magat, 332 SCRA 517 [2000].)
An improvident plea of guilt, not made voluntarily with full
comprehension of the consequences (see Rules of Court, Rule 116,
Sec. 3.), should be disregarded and a judgment of conviction based
thereon is also void. Verily, a judgment of conviction cannot stand
upon an invalid arraignment.
Dismissal before arraignment and plea.
At any time before the plea, the prosecution may be discontinued
without prejudice to the institution of another prosecution.9
9
In a case which was then set for arraignment, the accused, rather than enter a plea
to the offense charged, verbally moved to quash the case on the ground of previous
hnvlng no nrrnlgnment nnd trlnl yet." Petitioner nrgues tl1at since the p~osecution p~ayed
(or tho dlamlasnl of the! infonnnHon without nny condition or rcservnhon to refile 1t, the
dlRmlnsnl wno conclusive nnd d oflnlto, Thuo, II In contondod thnt the d lsmlssnl h nd the

Jtl t,1 1'1111.ll'l ' JN I ( 'UN: irJ I ~J I lUNt\ l , I.AW ! l it'. J I
PrinGiples and t11ses
As a general rule, a nol·le prosequi .or cl.ismissaLentered b,efore the
accused is placed on trial and ·before:l,:1e is eaJle.d , on to plead is not
equivalent to an acqulttal. It is not a fma1 ·disposition of the case.
Rather, it partakes of the nature ofa,no1;t-s.uit or-discontinuance ina
m
civil suit and leaves the matter the saine,conditionin. which it ,w as
before the commencement of the prosecution. (Galvez vs. Court.of
Appeals, 237 SCRA 685 [1994].)
Right to appeal from judg:ment
of acquittal or conviction.
(1) · By the State. - The government has nQ:right to ap,peal from a
judgment of acquittal for theappeal would putthe accu.sed'in second
je0pru:dy or danger of pµnishment for .the ,same offense (Central
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA.4?;,_[1989],) pursuant to the
constitutional m,~date that no person ~hall be twice put in j,eopardy
for the sam~ offense. 10 A verqict of acquittal, :w-heth,er it oc_~ rs at the
level of ilie trial co_urt or .on a_ppea). from a judgment o~ convictio~,
is immediately final and executory ~pot} its -promulg~?,~n._ "T?e
philosophy under lying this rule establishing the abs.o hite nature
of acquittals is part of the paramount importance crimiraJ justice
system attaches to the protection of the innocent ag;:iinst wrongful
conviction."
(a) The interest in the finality-6£;-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilti i!; .easy to-understand: it is
a need for 'repose,' a desire fo know the exact extent .of one' s
liability. With this. right of_repose, the criminal justice system
has built in a protection to insure that the .innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will .not be found
guilty in a subsequent proceeding. (People vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA
305 [1989]; People vs. Serrano, Sr., 315 SCRA 686 [1999]; People
vs. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 [2000].)
(b) Errors committed by the trial court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, or even the legal soURdness of its decision, errors of
judgment, or mistakes in its findings or conclusiveness are not
effect of double jeopardy. It was held that there was no double jeopardy for petitioner had
not yet pleaded to the offense. (Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 415 [1986].)
10sec. 1. Wfzo may appeal. - Any party may appeal from a judgment 0 1· final order
except if the accused will be plnced in double jeopardy. (Rule 122, Rules of Courl.)
A I ' I ' I( 11I I 11l 'I • I II I I 11 d I I ' 1111'1
I l I I
Hight l\t£Phlllt Uo11bluJ11op11rdy
proper subjects.-of .app,eal from a judgment of acqujttal. (People
vs. Sartdiganbayan;.491 SCRA 185 [2006].)
(cf Mistrial.is ·the only exception to the rule that acquittal
is irrimediafely final ·a nd cannot be appealed on the ground
of double jeopardy. (People vs. Court of Appeals, .677 SCRA
575 [2012].) Appeal should be allowed when the judgment is
manifestly again·s t-.the evidence or contrary to law, or dearly
violative of the pr.0.secutor'·s right to due process, or rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. T-he gener al ntle, however, is that an appeal by the
government ;Would --i nfringe the constitutional guarantee. (see
Palu-ay vs. -C0urt of Appeals, ·293 SCRA 358 [1998]; People vs.
Serrano, Sr., supra.)
(d) The appeal on both the criminal and civil liabilities
is not permitted under the rule on double jeopardy. (Heirs
_'.f, Rillorta vs. Etrrn.e, 15.7 ,SCRA 519 [1988].) The State caimot
appeal from a judgment of conviction where the accused did not
-_a ppeal his conviction for \he purpose of increasing the penalty
imposed even tf the decision be errorteous. The only way to
nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper
p etition for c~rtiorr:iri to show grave abuse of dis_c retion. (People
vs. Liones, 366 SCRA 535 [200n People vs. Ruiz, 81 SCRA 453
[1978]; People vs. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 137953, April 11, 2002.)
(2) By the offended ·party. - Offended parties in criminal cases
have sufficient interest and personality as "persons aggrieved," in
the maintenance of the criminal prosecution. They have the right
to appeal from a resolution of the trial court which is derogatory to
their right to demand civil liability arising from the offense, the only
limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do
so would place the accused in double jeopardy. 11 (Martinez vs. Court
of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575 [1994]; Mozquerra vs. Panganiban, 258
SCRA473 [1996].)
(3) By the accused. - The accused, after having been convicted,
may appeal to a higher court, but the latter may raise the penalty
11The offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment of
acquittal on the civil aspect of the criminal case. (Salazar vs, People, 411 SCRA 59~ [200~].)
In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against ~
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State, and only via
petition for certiorari -u nder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

l(J.lo . l'! l ll.11'1 'J N ll 'UNl i rl'I' (; J 1,l>NWI. I ,AW I ill ,
Pdnclples 1:u'ld 'Cnllcsn , ·
iltr\posed on him by the lower c0urnmd:su:dh-ls:-n0t'secbhd j'e'dpard.y;
(Kepner v. United States~ '1-95 U.S; 100;,'rroti:6,;vs,. t:rnitedi,States,· '11·
Phil. 726 [1908].) On appeaJ;,,t11e ac:9usec\Js:q.eeimed to:-haye waived
the constitutional safeguard ag~4lf,lt d0ulqle:j€lOPardy an~ tprows the
whole case open for review on
any questiori.;;qy. the appellate court,
which is then called, upqn to correct for err9r~_,as may be found· in
the appealed judgment even if they have 11qt,1?.e~n assigi:tecj.9r raised
by the parties and to render such jud~m,~ftf, whether favor,a.ble or
unfavorable, as the law and justice dictate. (K_o Bu Len vs. Court of
Appeals, 118 SCRA 573 (1982]; People vs. Alejandro, 225 SCRA 347
[1993]; Qbosa vs. Court of Appeals, 26'6 S~RA.281 (1997]; People vs.
Las Pin.as, Jr., 377 SCRA 377 [2002]; Orie,nte vs. People, 513 SCRA
348 [2007]; People vs. Lianes, 366 SCRA535 [2001].)
Kinds of acquittal. ,'. ' ' There can be no double jeopardy where the second -offense Js
Our law recognizes two (2) kinds :of acquittal, with different
effects on civil liability.
(1) An acquittal on the ground that th~-~ccused is not the author
of the act or omission complained of, closes .the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator for a
crime cannot and can never be held liable for the sa,me. (see Rules of
Court, Rule 111, Sec. 2.)
(2) An acquittal based on reasonable· doubt on the guilt of the
accused, does not exempt him from civil Hability. which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. (see Art. 29, Civil
Code.) Although the civil action for damages is "for the same act
or omission," the two actions (criminal and civil) have different
purposes, the parties are not the same, and different rules.of evidence
are applicable. In determining whether Artide 29. is applicable, the
court may look into the question of the accused's negligence or
reckless imprudence. (Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA
387 [200i].) .
Kinds of double jeopardy.
It is to be observed that the provision deals with two classes of
double jeopardy.
(1) Under the firs t sentence of Section 21, the protection iH
against double jeopai-dy for the same offense and not for the Hnnw 1wL.
U I
'I A IC. I , IJI Jill.I. l l ll I H d 11 Hill
H.lghl t\~0Jn11l Uol1~lo Joop11l'dy
When tl.,,.e subsequer_tt information charges another with a different
offense, a<!tho:ugh a,risi;ug .from the same act or set of acts, there is no
pr.o hibited dpuble jeopardy except if -the· "act is punished by a law
and an ordinance." Thus, subject -to, this excepHon, the doctrine can
be invoked if the second charge is for the same offense, whether or
not. for the same act . . · . ,
(2) The second seri.tence modifies the same offense requirement
of double jeopardy in the first sentence. It contemplates double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act and it applies although the
offenses charged are d~ffe.rent, if one constitutes a violation of a
statute and the other, of an
ordinance in which case "conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same ac:t."
different from_the first and arose from a different act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same offense.
(1) General rule. -The first sentence of Section 21 sets forth the
general rule:. the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that
m
is different from the offense charged the first or prior prosecution,
althoµgh both the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same ac:t or set of acts. It may be invoked only for the "same offense"
or identical offense. The meaning of the terms, however, has been
expar,i.ded to include not only the particular offense charged in the
foqner complaint or information. (infra.)
(2) Identity .of offenses. - Under the first sentence, one may
be put twice in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided
that he is charged with different offenses (e.g., they are punished by
different laws), or the offense charged in one case is not included
in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. Put a
little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes (e.g.,
Revised Penal Code and a special law), the important inquiry relates
to the identity of offenses charged, The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown
to exist between the earlier and th e subsequent offenses charged,

JUltl l'llll.ll'l'I NH ' N!, II1 ,U III Ul'I.IAl , J,AW
Pdnclples nncl Casei; :• ..
The question of identity or lack df-. identity o'f offenses is
addressed by examining the essential1e.lemet1.ts of each o.f the•twb
0ffenses charged, as such elements 1 <!-J:((s,~t·out in the respective
legislative definitions of the .: offense$, · ~vofved, The •protection
cann9t be inv0ked,.although both:offe:n?e? ~is_d rom the.!same.facts,
if each crime involves some important ac_t which is not an essential
element of the other.12 ' ..:- '~
(3) Identity 11fed not be ab~olute id~~_tit,Jf:- .The,:r~le limiting--the
constituti,;";tal prot~ction against doub-le,j~qpar,d y to a subsequent
prose~tion for the same offens.e is not ,t.o · be understood -with
absolute liJeralness..The jdentjqr:..9£ ~pffenses th,at mus~ ~e shown
J:!e~';l not be absollf~e ide_i;i.tityATh~ first~d:secol}.d offenses may be
regarded as the "same offense" where the secohd offense necessarily
includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first
offensefor where the second offense is· art atfempfto commit the first
or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the,<;Q~?ti'~tional plea of double
jeopardy to be available, not all the t~cl:µ;tical elements constituting
the first offense need be present in. th~ technical definition of the
second offense.
The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person
by multiple prosecutions for offenses whicili though different from
12The same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinctive offenses
because it vioh1tes two or more provisions of the same statute or different statutes. No
double jeopardy attaches as long as there is a variance between the elements of the two
offenses charged. What is forbidden is another prosecution for the same offense. (Suero
vs. People, 450 SCRA 350 [2005].) In other words, two ,(or m_ore) offenses arising from
the same act are not "the same" if each crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the others. (People vs. Doriquez,· 24\SCRA 163 [1968]; Loney vs.
People, 482 SCRA 194 (2006).)
Reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a single quasi-
offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such.that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecutio11 for the same quasi-offense
regardless of its various resulting acts or the consequences alleged for both charges, e.g.,
barring subsequent prosecution for physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence following an acquittal or conv,iction foi: ";reckless imprudence with
physical injury," or "reckless driving." (lvler vs. Modesto.-San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191
[2010].) · '
13The so-called "same ·evidence" test is not a concltisive, much less exclusive, test
in double jeopardy cases of the first category. To detemtlne the "same offense" under
the guarantee, it has been held that the rule appli~able is the following:' "Where the
same ·act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test· to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether
each.provision requires proof of an additional fact which the otl;ier does not." (People vs.
Quijada, supra, citing American cases.)
I I
I\ I< I , 111 , 111 l, I, \ )I I Ill I~ ti I I : 1111!1
Kight Against L)oublo Joopotdy
! I
one.another, are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical -elements.
· (4) Con:v1ction or acqut'ttal not indispensable. - Convi'ction or
a~q_uitfa.l is.not indlspensable to sustailfthe plea of do~ble jeopardy
of Rurushment for the ·same offense. So Ion~ as Jeopardy has
attached under one of the 'lniormations charging said offense, the
defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there h;as been neither conviction nor acquittal
(People vs. Relova, 148 SCRA 292 [1987]; see Lamera vs. Court of
Appeals, 198' SCRA' 186 [1991]; People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191
~1996}.), where .there• has been an unconsented dismissal in the
first case which lakes place· when it ''.it is dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused." 14
Prosecution for the same act.
(1) Exception to general rule. -The second sentence of Section 21
embodies an exception to the general proposition: "The constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised
Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or
set of acts."
'
.1 . (2) Identity of acts. - Where one offense is charged under a
mupicipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the
critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said
to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the
two offenses. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise
to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.
The question of identity of the acts which are claimed to have
generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the
14Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for a motion to
quash and includes therein as paragraph (i): "That the acCllsed has been previously
convicted, or in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed, or otherwise terminated without his express consent."

1uio • 1•1111 ,11 •111N ll ;UN! ' I 11, t lll1H Nl\1. I.AW
Pdnclplcs oncl CMOS!, 1 ,
location of such acts in time and space.. When the•acts .of the accused
as set out in the two informations are so related.to each other,in time
and space as to be reasonably regarded .as having take:r;tplace on the
same occasion and where those acts have:peen movsd by .one and
the same, or a continuing intent or volurtary design or n~~ligence,
such acts may be appropriately char~cterized as an integral whole
capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously u_nder
different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national
statute). ·
(3) Reason for the rule. -The question may be raised why one
rule should exist where two offenses Wl.der-two different sections
of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and
another rule for the situation where one offense is charged-under a
municipal ordinance and another offen~~ ~~er a n_ational statute.
If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not
been written into the Constitution, conviction cir acquittal under
a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense
penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an
offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the
same offense, having been promulgated by different rule-making
authorities - though one be subordinate to the other - and the
plea of double jeopardy would never lie.
The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention
show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose
of extending the constitutional protection against double j~opardy
to a situation which would not otherwise be covered· by the first
sentence.15 (People vs. Relova, supra.) · effect that the evidence with his adversary produced is insufficient
Appeal by the prosecution from
an order of dismissal.
(1) General rule. - The dismissal or termination of a case after
arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall
15
1£ the State chooses to accuse a person under a general law, nlocnl government unit
cannot accuse him ngnin undcl' nn ordinance bccnuse the lntter is just n pnl't of iho former
nnd vice varsn, nncl co11Mldurln1; lhnt both cnscs Involve tho enmo Cncto nncl uvltlt111r 1,,
would ba unjLWl to 1, 1111111c11I him 11ndu1' both lnw nnd orcllnnnco on thu f\l'tlu11cl thnl th11111
nro two m1pnrnt<• 0((1111111·•1,
J
/\ I l , ll l. ll lJ ,J , tl tl l lt1 II I
Rlght Agt1l111;t l.>oublu JoQponly
be, a •bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to conunit the same or £i:ustration ~e~eof, or fa~ any
offense which necessarily includes or 1s necessarily included m the
complaint or information. 16 (Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 7.)
(2) Exceptions. -An appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute
double jeopardy if: ·
(a) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent, of the defendant;
(b) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and
(c) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court
is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found in~o.rrect,
the ease would have to be remanded to the court of or1gm for
further proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. (People vs. Desalisa, 125 Phil. 21 [1966),17 cited in
People vs. City Court of Manila, 154 SCRA 175 [1987}; People
vs. Gimenez, 217 SCRA 386 [1993}.)
In a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal is the State,
and not the private complainant or offended party whose interest is
op.ly limited only to the civil liability. He may take such appeal but
only as to the civil aspect of the case. A judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.
(3) Order granting demurrer to evidence. - A demurrer to evidence
is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action to the
in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the
whole evidence to sustain a verdict. (Rivera vs. People, 460 SCRA 85
[2005]; Oropesa vs. Oropesa, 671 SCRA 174 [2012}.)
16"The effect of prosecuting first the lesser offense where a larger offense has been
committed and could be prosecuted would be to split the larger offense into its lesser
pnrts, thus bringing the man into jeopardy for each of such parts. This is u n ~ble
I; uncial' n cl villzed system of criminal justice. The State in electing to prosecute the first one
wntvcn, In lognl cffocl, nil others." (People vs, Besn, 74 Phil. 57 (1942).)
l'lNol l'Ol)Ol'tacl l11 tho Supremo C:oul'l RcpOl'lBAnnototcd (SCRA).
l02Z • 1'1 uu ~11'JN u 'UN ~ wi vµ·11r~uNA1, 1.Aw
P1faciples ang ~.a~.~s,, •. , ,
The demurrer to evidence in a crintin,al c~§.e is ''.file:.d. :~ #er the
prosecution has rested its case." 1& When :the ,qaw~:is g:ranteg} it. cctlli;
"for an appreciation of the. evidenc¢ ~cklui;e,q,,1,y the .};n;o,seoµtion
and its sufficiency to warrant c.onviction•b.e,y:9,µd reasonahle doubt,
resulting in a di~missal of the case on th,~_n,:ttrit~, ta,n~all}!)lJll,t to an
acquittal of the accused/ Such a disquss~Iby.t;hl:l gra,nt of d'e~µrfer
to evidence may not be appealed, nor ma.y' the order granting th,e
demurrer be set aside although the conclusion of the trial· court
may be wrong, for to do so would be to pl~ce the accused in do.u ble
jeopardy. (Dayap vs. Sendiong, 577 SCRA 134 [2009]; People vs.
Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 74 and 447 SCR.A 291 [2004]; .Bautista
vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan, 684 SCRA 521 [2012).) The dismissal is still
reviewable only through certiorari. (infra.)
(4) Order based on absence of probable cqu?e for issuance of warrant
of arrest. - Double jeopardy cannot be· fri\·•_o ked where the accused
has not been arraigned. While the absence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is a ground for the dismissal of the
case, the same does not result in the acquittal of the accused. (People
vs. Court of Appeals, 626 SCRA 352 [2010].)
(5) Failure of accused to object to the appeal. - Where the accused
did not seasonably object to the appeal of the prosecution on the
ground that such an appeal would place him in double jeopardy, he
is deemed to have waived his constitutional immunity from double
jeopardy. An immunity must be especia~ly pleaded at the earliest
opportunity. (People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961], ,reversing
People vs. Bao, 106 Phil. 243 [1956].)
Acquittal and dismissal distinguish~c:1.
An "acquittal" is always based on the merits, that is, the accused
is acquitted because the evidence does not show his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It is immediately final and cannot be reconsidered
or appealed. On the other hand, a "dismi$sal" does not decide the
case on the merits or that the accused is not guilty, as where it is based
on the fact that the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction
18rhe court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, for good reasons nnd in the
paramount interest of justice, may require or allow the prosecution to prcsonl nddlllonnl
evidence (at its own initiative or upon a motion) after a demurrer to ovklonco 111 Olod.
(People vs. Sandiganbayan, 665 SCRA 89 [2012].)
II l ', , I i\ l 1, 111 , JIIIJ , ~ 11 1 111.111 1 II! I
H115hl /\!51'1h111l l) u11bl J1i111J111dy
or the evidence does not show that the offense was cornn:itted
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the co.mplamt or
information is not valid· or sufficient in form and substance.,
For dismissal to be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have
the effect o£ acquittal.19 (Galvez vs. Court of App_eals, 23? SCRA 685
{1994]; People vs. Salico, M'Phil. 722 {1949]; Paulin vs. Gimenez, 217
SCRA386 [1993].)
Where acquittal or dismissal void.
A void judgment is the s~me as if ther~ were no judgme~t _at al~,
and, since the accused was never legally m danger of conv1ction, it
cannot be the basis for double jeopardy.
(1) Decision after a pre-trial. - In a case, the court precipitately
rendered a decision of acquittal after a pre-trial. The prosecut~on wai;
thereby deprived of the opportu_nity_ to prosecute an~ pro".e -~ts case.
The decision that was rendered m d1sregard of such 11npe1at1ve was
held void for lack of jurisdiction. It was not a court of competent
jurisdiction when it rendered the decision. The manda~e of the rules
is that a trial should follow a pre-trial. Thus, double Jeopardy had
not set in this case. (People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143 (1989].)
(2) Dismissal. without trial proper. - Likewise, when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismiss:d a c~se ~d, as
a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution ?f 1~s right_ to
introduce evidence and prove its case, the order of d1sm1ssal, bemg
null and void cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy. In :ffect, the first jeopardy was never terminated and the
remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/ or trial amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not expose
the accused to a second jeopardy.20 (People vs. Albano, 163 SCRA
19A dismissal is in reality an acquittal or has the effect of an acqui~al whe~ it is based
on the merits as when the case is dismissed on the ground that the ev1?ence fails to show
defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It h as been held that _while the delay of the
proceedings for about six (6) years was caused by the repeated motions for postp?nem~nt
by the prosecution and the accused have b een opposing the postponement an~ invoking
their cons titutional right to speedy trial, the dismissal of the case, on motion of the
occuscd, amounts to acqulltal. (Pndlllo vs. Apns, 487 SCRA 29 [2006).) .
2owhcre Lho order of dismissal is purely capricious or devoid of renson, or was issued
nl O time when the cnsc was not !'Ondy (or 11'111I 011d od j11dicntlon, the order Is null and

HWl .1 11JIJ,ll'l 'INI! JNIA J.J.AW
) N{J IIJ lJI\I
Principles and CMcsr
511 [1988]; People vs. Boca1; 138 SCRA166, [1985].; Saldana vs, Gourt
of Appeals, 190 SCRA 396 [1990]; State'·Rr-oseeutors vs · Miu0 236
SCRAS0S [1994].) . .. . . . . . ,· .~
. (3) G:ant.of de~u.rrer to evidence;~ 9~rnu~re~to~v1deµc_e (supra.)
due to its m~uffic1ency presupposes. :fh<J,t the prosecution had
already rested 1ts case. (see Rules.of 0:>Uft;'. Rul~.119, Sec·,.15; p'e ople
:s: Dumlao, 580 S~RA 409 [2009] .) Hence; th~ motion is premati.u:e
1f mteri:ose? at a_ time when the prosecutio:17- is still in the process of
presenting its evidence. (Paulin vs. Gimeri.ez/ 217 SCRA 38CJ [19931()
Once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to or
operates.as an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused
would v_1olate the constitutiom1.l prescription dn double jeopardy.z1
Double 1eo~ardy, however, will not attach in dismissing the case
w,hen the tr~al cou~t a~te~ ':ith grave abuse ?f dlscretion·amounting
to l~ck or excess 1ur~sd1ction, such as 'when the prosecution was
denied the opp~rtumty to present its c~se or where the triai was
a sh~, or considered a mock trial22 as .fu the Galman case, infra.
(Sanv1cente vs. People, 392 SCRA 610 [2002]; Lasoy vs. Zencroza
455 SCRA360 [2005].) ' . (a) A decision of a court convicting the accused in violation
But .mere errors or irregularities which do not render the
proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of double jeopardy.
(People vs. Dante Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010.)
. (4) D.ecision rendered by a partial court subjected to pressure. -The
nght against ~ouble jeopardy cannot be invoked where a petition
for a declarat10n of a mistrial is granted on the ground that the
void, does not exist in legal contemplation and thus, cannot b e the source o f an acquittal
(see Peop1e vs. C ourt of Appeals 308 SCRA 687 [1999)· p
98 [1969)· S · ' ' . eopIe vs. p am1ttan
· 30· SCRA·
, . : onano vs. Angeles, 339 SCRA 366 [2000),) There is ·also no valid dlsmissal or
ternunation of the case where the order granting the withdrawal of the Info t'
committed 'th b . . rma 10n was
. . w1 grave a use of d1scret10n. (Summerville Gen. Merchandise & Co In
Eugeruo, Jr., 529 SCRA 274 [2007].) ., c. vs,
2
, '.1£ the accused files a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court and the same
feave
deru~d, he ~ay pr~sent ~vi~ence in his defense, If the demurrer is .filed without prior
o co.urt, e wa1~es hts n ght to present evidence and $Ubmits the case for 'ud mcnt
on th; bas15 of tl;ie ev1d:nc~ for ~e prosecution. (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of co!irt/
througi;1!:i~~~.the ts~1ssal is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewnbic but only
~a\~:::~:
2611]· D
1:~i~a;tlt~b~si! :!~~d~~~~:ti~~'
~~~r:1Ji~~rt~r!e:: ~~~~~ !~c8!~
:~~1~;1~i
J~po o1 to clls penso justice. (People vs. Snnclignnbnynn 616 SCKI\ 72'/
[ of the State's right to due process ou sts courts of their jurisdiction and warrants a remand
' angnynn, ~. vo. Dnngoynn, 659 SCRA 590 (2011),) '
11111•, ) I A l I. 1111 JI il I l II I II ,1 1 1'
lHe;hl Ag,1h1Hl l)ouulu Juu~m·tly
p:1:0ce.edings have been vitiated by lack of due process, e.g., the
prosecution and the judge who tried and decided the case acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to beibeyond
~eir cap~.city to resist a,nd which not only prevented the prosecution
from offering ail ·the ' evidences which it would have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, A
scripted verdict of acqufttal is a void judgment. The cardinal precept
is' that where there, is a, violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of tneir jurisdiction. A re-trial becomes necessary.
(Galmi'!Il vs. Sancliganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 [1986].)
(5) Decision violated accused's or State's right to due process of law.
- A judgment rendered With grave abuse of d is•cretion or without
due process or when there was mistriat is null and void could never
beco:m,e final and could be attacked in any appropriate proceeding.
(Villa vs. Lazaro, 189 SCRA 34 [1990]; People vs. H ernandez, 499
SCRA 688 [2006]; Salvador vs. People, 559 SCRA 449 [2008]; Castro
vs. People, 559 SCRA 676 [2008].) A denial of due process results in
a loss or lack of jurisdiction.
of his right to the substantive and procedural due process of
law is void. As a general rule, a void decision will not result in
the acquittal of the accused. The case ought to be remanded to
th~ court of origin for further proceedings for a void judgment
does not expose an accused to double jeopardy. (Marcos vs.
Sandiganbayan, 297 SCRA 95 [1998]; People vs. De Grano, 588
SCRA 550 [2009].)
· (b) Where the State is deprived of due process in a criminal
case and there is a finding of mistrial, or where there has been
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case is void; hence, double
jeopardy cannot also be invoked by the accused .23 (Dimatulac
23The State is also'entitled to due process in criminal cases. A capricious dismissal ·o f
an information for lack of jurisdiction or an arbitrary denial of a timely and well-founded
motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal will
be set aside to give the State its day in court and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Such
dismissal or denial is invalid and, consequently, there is n o second jeopardy to appeal of.
(People vs. Puna, 208 SCRA 550 [1992]; People vs. Alberto, 387 SCRA 615 [2002].) A denial

1026 • P H I.LlP.L' lNH '(.).Nf '1'l'llU'l11XJNIA.J., LAW
Prlnciples and,0.rses t 1.: 1
vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 [1998]; People ·v s, C:::ourt of Appeals,
308 SCRA 687 [1999];. People vs. .Sand4.ganbayan, ·467 SCRA 137
[2005]; Villareal vs. Aliga, 713 SCRA52 [2014].)
(c) There can be no double jeopardy if the acquittal is based
on a void indictment. An .acquitt~l rendered with, gnwe abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess 9f jud1,dic.t~on does
not really "acquit" and, therefore, does not terminate the case.
(People vs. Court of Appeals, 389 SCRA ~61 [2002].)
(6) Decision rendered by a court marf:ial without jurisdiction- over
civilians. - In Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 (50 SCRA 144
[1987].), 'the Supreme Court affirmed tha~.a military commission1or
tribunal cannot try and exercisejurisdictj.on even during the period
of martial law, over civilians for offenses. allegedly ~ommi-tted by
them, as long as civil courts are open and functioning and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null ahd
void for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, no breach of the constitutional
prohibition against twice putting an accused, who was convicted
and still serving sentence, in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense would result from the retrial of_his case for the simple.reason
that the absence of jurisdiction of the court martial to ti;y and coI).vict
him prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous
proceedings are required in order that the defense .of double
jeopardy can b e raised by the accused in the .second prosecution.
(Cruz vs. Emile, 160 SCRA 780 [1988].)
However, in the illustrative case below, where the accused
had been acquitted by a military com.mission the• jurisdiction of
which has been affirmed by the Supreme .Court but subsequently
invalidated, the Court ruled that the refiling of the information
against them would place them in double jeopardy.
of the case to the trial court for further proceeding and reception of evidence. (Paulin vs.
Jimenez, 217 SCRA 386 (1993]; People vs. Verra, G.R. No. 136732, May 29, 2002.) Certiorari
may be resorted to (under Rule 65, Rules of Court), to cure an abusive ncqui\tnl. (People
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140633, Jleb. 4, 2002.) The righ t of the accused ogninf1t cloublo
jeopardy bars appeal from a judgment of ncquitlnl through the rcmcclics o { ordl11nry
appeal nnd a cerllornri pcllllon under Rule 45, Rules of Court. Inn Rulo 65 pc1lllo11, m•1m•11
of jurlecllctton nro ndcfrc~~ccl, while In nn ordlnnry npponl nnd Rulo ~5 p<111110111 lll'l'rlatt nf
juclRmont nro tho 11mpor 1111hj<iC'l>1.
l,'\ l>t., JI, JJII , Jll l ,1, 1111 JJH , 11 1 l i
Right A$Gl11tlt l)o~tbl • Jcopttl'dy
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
1 Petitioners ioha'were acquitted · by a military commission during
the perioaof 'martial'iaw, were charged again for the same offense in the
regional trial court.
Facts: On June 10, 1976 (during the period of martial 1aw), a
decision entitled "'Findings and Sentence" was promulgated by
a Military Commission in Crime Case No. MC-1-67 finding five
accused guilty of murder,
On May 22, 19.87, the Supreme Court promulgated a deci_sion in
Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 (150 SCRA 144), vacating the
sentence rendered by the Commission against Olaguer ~n December
4, 1984 and declaring that military commissio~s and tnbuna.ls_l;ave
no jurisdiction·even during the period of i:nart!al law, ov<;1' _civilians
charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civ1l courts,
as long as these courts ctre open and functioning as they di~ d~dng
the period of martial law. The Court declared unconstitutional
the creation of military commissions to try civilians and annulled
all their proceedings. Conformably .with the rulin~ in .~laguer,
the Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700 [1988].) nullified the
proceedings leading tc the conviction of non-political detainees
still serving' the sentences meted to them, wh:o should have been
brought b~fore the courts of justice as their offenses were. totally
to
unrelated the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule,
but, without ordering their release, directed the Department of
Justice to file the necessary information against them in the proper
courts."
On December 9, 1988, the respondent, in his capacity as State
prosecutor, without conductu_1g an investig~tion/ re~vestigation,
filed two informations for illegal p ossession of firearms and
murder against the petitioners. In their p~titio~ for cert!orari and
prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Tnal Cour_t,
the petitioners alleged that the State Prosecutor exceeded _his
jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting
them upon the supposed authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for, among
others, the following reasons:
(1) The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the
filing of in.formations by the Secretary of Justice against THO~E
who, like the petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial
proceedings during the period of martial law;

1028 • P I-ll LU f lN.l:i C.:ONS'l'l'l 'U'l1'10N¼L LAW ~cc. 21
Principles and 0asesi ·1• ••
(2) The decision in Cruz ·1JS: Emile, does n·ot, ,apply, 'to'. the
m,
P.e titioners who.were ~<?t l?,arJ:ie·s . thaf,~a.s(!,(\~ho W-,E!re not heard,
and.over whom ui~ _cpur~ di~ n'?t a!;q~~!j~f$'d.\sµqn; . _, : , . '. ..
(:3) The reprosecution of the petjtj:ohers' woµld · violate their
right to pr<;>tectjon a&ainst double,jeqJ19-r4i; .a;1\d:
(4) The retroactive '·irtvalidation i of: :llie· 'jurisdiction of the
military court that acquitted thE!ipetitiofiers would arrrount an ex to
post facto ruling.
Issue: Would the reprosecution of petitioner violate• their right
against double jeopardy?
Held: The petition is meritorious.
(1) No authority to reproserzute. ,,-. "The , public· respondents
gr9vely abused their discretion and:acted witho.ut or in excess of their
jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive
portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority
to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners
who had been tried and acquitted by Military Commission No. 1
during the period of Martial Law. It is an unreasonable.application
of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in vain
for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced
a court martial, much less those who had been cicquitted by such
bodies more than a decade ago like ~e petitioners herein/
(2) Cruz vs. Enrile case applicable only to parties therein. - "The
decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be ari instrument of.oppression
and injustice unless given a lh!1,ited application only to the :p arties l
petitioners therein who sought the annulment of the·court martial
proc~edings against themselves and pi;ayed for a re-trial·in the civil
courts of the criminal case$ against them,,They alone are affected
by the judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not.all and sundry who.at one
time or another had been tried and sentenced by a court martial
during the period of martial law. x-x x
This court's pronouncement in · Cruz 'vs. En rile .nullifying the
proceedings in military courts against" The civilian . petitioners
therein and ordering the refiling of informations against them in
the proper civil courts, may not affect the .rights of .persons who
were not parties in, that case and who, not liaving submitted to the
court's jurisdiction, did not have their day in court. (Busacay vs .
Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 1033 (1954].) Their reprosecution, based on
.< \~ I', Ill. IW ,J,t ti l( lt d 11 ! HU'J
Right Against Double Jeopardy
the decision in .Cruz vs. Enrile in which they .took no part and were
n~t hea~d,-would be vi9lative oftheir rightto due process, the same
right of the petijicm~rs in C:ruz vs. Enrjle that this Court en~.eavored
· ~o protect :when it nullified the proceedings again.st them in the
~ilitary tribunals by applying the Olaguer doctrine that the trial of
civilians by military process was not due process."
(3) Court .martial proceedings valid as to petitioners who were
acquitted, - "We did not nullify the court martial proc~e~ings
against the other civilians-petitioners who: (1) had finished
serving their sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3)
had been acquitted by the military courts. We did not order
their reprosecution, retrial, and resentencing by the proper civil
courts. We set them free. In effect, the Court applied one rule for
those civilians who were convicted by the military courts and
were still serving their sentences, and another rule for those who
were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of their
sentences. The Court applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the
first group (whom the Court ordered to be reprosecuted before the
proper civil courts) and another of prospective invalidity for the
others (whom the Court ordered to be released from custody)."
_.:f . (4) Doctrine of "operative facts" applicable to proceedings against
petitioners. - "The trial of thousands of civilians for common
crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created
under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise
of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly
ignored. The belated declaration irt 1987 of the unconstitutionality
and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
· consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer
was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer
to the limit of its logic.
The doctrine of 'operative facts' applies to the proceedings
against the petitioners and their co-accused before Military Com-
mission No, 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction
of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to
obliterate the ' operative facts' that in the particular case of the
petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious
violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the ·
jurisdiction of the military c:o:mmission that heard and decided the
charges against them during the period .of martial law, had been
 • Pl Ill ,11 ' l 'I NI! l'tJN! JI 11 lJ 11 NA I , l~A W
Prlnclplcs ond Cases
affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63
SCRA 546.) years before the Olaguer case ·arose and came .before us.
. Beca~se of ~es~ _establi~hed.:'P~l'.fltjve_ fac~, the refiling of the
information ag~m~t. the petitioners ·~ould _place them in aouble
jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional Jqgjc,"
(5) Reprosecutio71: of petitioners woitld ·vl~J~te their right against
double jeor,l(Jrdy; ,_ "The doctr~e of do~pl~.~opaiqy .protects the
accused from harrassment by the·strorig arrll ohhe S~ate:
'The constitu.tjonal mandate i~ .(fl:tus)_ a rule of finality.
A single prosecution for any offen~e is ~11 the law allows. It
protects an accused from har_a_ssm!'?nt, · eli\~bles him to treat
what had transpired as _a 9lose¢i chap~er. in _his life, either to
exult in his fr~edom or to be -resigt).edJo w:1:;iatev:er penalty is
imposed, and is a bar to Unf!ecessary litigation, in itself time-
consuming and expense-proqucing for t;he state as well. It has
been_referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of
a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenev.er it
pleases the state to do so.' (Fernando, The Constitution of the
Philippines, 2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)"
(6) Invalidation of the court martial proceedings would amount
to an ex post facto law or ruling. - "Furthermore, depriving the
petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered
bf the_ military co~mission in their particular case by retroactively
divesting the m1htary c;ommission of the jurisdiction it had
exercised over them would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling,
again, in sharp reality if not in strict constitutional theory.
Article Iv, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the
enachnent of an ex postfacto law or bill of attainder." (Tan vs. Barricis,
190 SCRA 686 [1990], through Justice Griiio-Aquino.)
Dismissal with/without the express
consent of the accused.
. (1) Dismi~sal _where accused's consent implied from his failure to
ob1ect. - A d1sm1ssal of a case on motion of the accused himself
or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the
. accused will not be a bal' to another prosecution for in auch ov •nt,
the accused thereby wnlvc•n hlt-1 conHLllutionnl rltshl by p1•11v<111111111
the romt from prm'Pndlng wllh tlw ldnl 1111d 1'<'11tfrt•l1111 J11d1\t11111111t
A I( I , 111 , 1111 I I II I I I d I I '
HIUhl A1y'll1111I Uoubl •J op11rdy
therein. (People vs. Solico, 84 Phil. 72¥- [1949].) Such a dismissal is
.. l ,
denominated proviswna .24
•
The raison d'etre for the requirement for the express consent
to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will
place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense
necessarily included therein. (People vs. Lacson, 400 SCRA 267
[2003]; see Sec. 8, Rule 117, Rules of Criminal Procedure.)
(2) Dismissal upon a motion to quash. - Generally, a dismissal
upon a motion to quash filed by the accused will not bar another
prosecution for the same offense. The reason is that the defendant,
in having the case against him dismissed, thereby waives his
constitutional right against double jeopardy for the dismissal
effectively prevents the trial court from proceeding against him. The
application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel is subject to
two (2) sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must have been
sought or induced by the defendant, either personally or through
counsel; and second, such dismissal must not have been on the
merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. 25 (Ceniza
vs. People, 159 SCRA 16 [1988]; People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249
[1968].')
24A dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made
without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it
be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. The consent must
be express, so as to leave no doubt as to his conformity; otherwise, the dismissal will be
regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case. (Caes vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 [1989).)
Express consent is that which is directly given either viva voce or in writing. It is
a positive, direct unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply
its meaning. Where what the accused did was merely to move for reinvestigation of
the cases against them before the prosecutor who, with a counsel for accused, jointly
moved for the suspension of the trial by the court p ending the outcome of said motion
for reinvestigation which was resolved in their favor by the Provincial Prosecutor, the
dismissal of the cases by the court after the reinvestigation on motion of the prosecuting
officers cannot be equated with express consent of the accused to the dismissal on the
ground that such dismissal was their ultimate intention in moving for reinvestigation.
Since there was no express consent to the dismissal, the refiling of new informations
would pince the nccusecl in double jeopordy. (People vs. Vergara, 221 SCRA 560 {1993).)
" J\n o.rder RusininIng n molion to qunsh on grounds other than extinction of criminal
llnblllty or d ouble jcopnrcly (sec Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 3(g], (i).) does not preclude
llm (1111111 of 1111othor ln(ormntlon fol' n crlmo con•1lllttting the some £nets. (Cudia vs. Court
111/\ppm,111, ?IM HCl<i\ l.'1:l I 199111; Uui1111111th1i, VII, Monnlo, 197 SCR/\ 89 [2006).)
1092 P lHLll .P!NLl CUN8'1'1'1'U'/JJU,.[~V~.J~ LAW
Pri+iciples and C_,!ses . . .
(3) Dismissal where prosecution refuses ,ta ,present evi~ence pen,ding
ruling on motion for inhibition. - For double.jeopardy to attaoh, the
general rule is that tl;le. dismissal _of the..,case. must b.e :wi,thout the
express consent of the accused. (People_vs,.J~.rdin, 126 SCRA lW
[1983); People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA ~12 U98J].) .
(a) This requisite is lacking ,where the accused orally
invoked their constitutional right to a. speedy trial when the
prosecution refused to present evidence until the trial court had
ruled on the motion for inhibition and it was on the oral motion
that the court ordered the case to be dismissed. (Que ~s. Cosico,
177 SCRA410 (1989].)
(b) But the oral manifestation at the hearing by the counsel
for the accused that he had no objection to the dismissal of the
case was held equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its
dismissal or to an express consent to its termination. (People vs.
Pilipa, 79 SCRA 81 [1977).)
Dismissal on the erroneous belief that information was.fatally
(4)
defective. - Where the accused has• been arraigned, pleaqed "not
guilty," and was tried upon a va~id and sufficient infonnation and
the case against him was dismissed by decision of the trial court
(hence, without his consent and not upon his motion) on the
erroneous belief that the information was "fatally defective," he
has been placed in jeopardy for the offense charged, and although
the dismissal may constitute a miscarriage of justice, the erroneous
dismissal may no longer be disturbed for it .would violate his right to
be exempt from double jeopardy. (People vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305
(1989].)
(5) Two situations when double jeopardy will attach. - Double
jeopardy will attach even if the dismissal is made with the
express consent of the accused, or upon his own motion, only if
it is predicated on either of two grounds, i.e., insufficiency of the
evidence or denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial where
the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation
of this right. (Commission on Elections vs. Court of Appeals, 229
SCRA 501 (1994]; People vs. Bellaflor, 233 SCRA 196 [1994]; People
vs. Hernandez, 499 SCRA 688 [2006]; Bonsubre, Jr. vs. Yerro, 750
SCRA 490 [2015].) If the dismissal does not fall under either of these
two instances and it was made with the express consent of the
A l~'I'. 111. UJ I.I I l JI I l{ l l 'I I 11 WI\
Right Agnlnst Double Joopnrdy
acettsed, it would· n:ot thereby be a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense: (People vs. Declaro, 170 SCRA 142 [1989); People
vs. Quizada, 160 SCRA516 (1988]; People vs. City Court of Silay, 74
SCRA248 [1976].)·
(a) Insufficiency of evidence. - A dismissal upon dem~rrer
to evidence being based on the merits, amounts to an acquittal.
It falls under the fitst exception.26 '(Philippine Savings Bank
vs. Bermoy, 471 SCRA 94 (2005]; People vs. Uy, 471 SCRA 668
[2005].)
(b) Right' to a speedy trial. - In the second case, there is, in
effect, a failure to prosecute.27 The mere fact, however, that the
accused invoked his right to a speedy trial would not necessarily
place him in double jeopardy where the dismissal was ordered
by the court on his motion for failure of the prosecution to
26in People vs. ·verra (G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002.), private complaina~t (victim's
wife) was the one who .joi,ntly moved with counsel of the accused _cha_rged with ~urd~r
for the dismissal of the case for lack 9 f evidence. The order of d1srrussal was given in
open court without any remonstrance fro°'. th_e pro~ecution. Hel~: "!here was a val.id
termination of the case on the basis of the trial iudge s Order to D1sm1ss the case. While
it is true that the respondent joined the prosecution in praying for its dismissal, double
jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling was the insufficiency of evidence of
the prosecution. In view of private complainant's desistance and ~er testimo~y th~t other
witnesses have tu.med hostile and are also no longer interested m prosecuting this case,
petitioner clearly Jacks the evidence to support the charge. In Vegafria vs. Castaneda (21~
SCRA 132 [1992].), the provisional dismissal of a criminal case was based on an a~dav1t
of desistance .executed by the complaining witness, private respondent, wherein " the
latter admitted that he mis-apprehended the facts surrounding the issuance of the check,
that there was error in accounting, and that he was no longer interested in pursuing
the case. It appears, however, that he was induced to withdraw his complaint because
the accused, petitioner, represented that he would liq\,\idate ~s obligation but the _latter
failed to settle his obljgation ?n the due date. The _re~pondent iud_ge granted_~e motio_n of
private respondent for the remsta_tement of the cr~al case a~a.inst the petitioners. Smee
the provisional dismissal was with the conforrmty of the petitioner who even took the
witness stand and expressly agreed to the same, and the trial court expli~tly inf?rmed
him of the nature of the provisional dismissal, which could mean a possible revival ~f
the case against him, aside fro~ the f act that it would_ ~e unfa(r fo_r him to ~enege ?n his
commitments which was the raison d1 etre for the prov1s1onal d1sm1ssal of his case, it wa~
held that he could not invoke double jeopardy upon reinstatement of the case.
27The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial is deemed abandoned or
waived where the delays in the prosecution were caused by the accused himself through
numerous postponem!!nts or tactical maneuvers. Therefore, the ~ismissal on the ground
of delay may be validly appealed by the State. (see People vs. Jardin, 12~ SCRA_167 (1983].)
What offends the right are unjustified postponements by the prosecution which prolong
trial for an unreasonable length of time. (People vs. Tampa!, 244 SCRA 202 [1995).)
 • l'1Jll.ll 1 l'LNJ.1 'UNo'l'lJ'U'lllUN~L LA W
Principles and Ct1ses1,/,.-1 ~1
. · present evidence due to ,the absente'f.of;p11i'Viate !Complainamt:at
the hearing and not for violafion o:£.,rus:dght to::a·tp~e.dy;trial.
(People vs. Gines, 197.SCRA 481 [19~11,):-The accused should
insist on his right to a speedy trial and .the dismissal'•-mus.r- be
predicated on su~ right.
(c) In both cases_. ..,..... The dismi~·s;_l ~!!Jr
irnv.e, th~. ~ffe12t of
an acquittal even if :tl}.e dismissal be, erroneous _and !1~tho.ugh
a miscarriage of justjce" would .res,ul.t thereby. (Ibid:) If the
dismissal amounted to an acquitta!, double jeopardy m~y be
invoked even if the court states it:1 .t 4e orc!.er that ,t he d_ismissal is
without prejudice to the filing of another infon,n.~tipn. (B~rmisa
vs. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 136 [1979]; Gandicela vs. Lutero,
88 Phil. 299 [1951].)
Doctrine of supervening event.
The rule of identity (supra,) does not apply when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case, there is no possibility for the
accused during the first prosecution to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Thus, where an accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the
charge of homicide against the same accused does not put him
twice in jeopardy. (Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 [1950].) This is in
accordance with the "doctrine of supervening event or supervening
fact."
Under the doctrine, if, aft~r the first prosecution, ~ new fact
supervenes which alters the character.,of the ftrst indictment under
which the accused may have already been charged or convicted,
and gives rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be
said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.28 (Ibid.;
28
0n this point, the Rules ot Court provides that the conviction of the accused shall
not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(1) The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same
act or omission constituting the former charge; or
(2) The facts constituting ·the graver charge became known or were discovered
only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party.
!; ·. 2 1. :;\ 1,1/'l«, JUJ.UJLI , 11 J,U :11'1:
Right Against D01i1ble Jeclpnl'dy
People vs. -Bulin-g;· -1!©7 PhiL 712 [1960]; People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA
230 ,~1971];-Peop,le vir,.Adil} 76 SCRA 462 [1977].)
'
'. • ;
.
.
tLtustRATi% CA'SES:
I. The President used or misused his authoritar-ian powers to assure
the acquittal of respondents-accused military officers in the Aquino-
Galman murder case. ·
Facts: The records showed that Presid,ent Marcos had staged-
managed in and from Malacafiang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the case and
that the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan (now
Ombudsman) actually succumbed to the presidential pressure,
as i;nanifested by their subsequent actuations in their respective
handling of the case.
Petitioners, mother and brother of the murdered Rolando
Galman, prayed for judgment nullifying the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal and ordering a retrial
of the cases. Respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy.
Issue: Would a retrial of the cases violate respondents' right
against double jeopardy?
Held: (1) Prosecution was denied due process oflaw. - "More so does
the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at
bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where
the authoritarian President ordered respondents Sandiganbayan
and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire
proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal
and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which
saw him near the end 'deactivating' himself from the case, as it
was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone
conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the
overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the
case of the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate
and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them .
from testifying.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves ~ "':hole or in
part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same In the event of conviction for the
graver offense. (Rule 117, Sec. 7 thereof.)
1036 . PHILIPPINE CONS1'!1~U'llJl0.NIV~L LAW
Principles and·Ga.9.esl r•. , . ·,
Fully aware .of .the' pro:secutip,i(:h di'fficulties 1jin -.locating
witnesses and overcoming, their -natur,al ,fea:11. ~d r¢1J;lc~ance to
appear and testify, respondent Sandigap.b~yan maintained a
'dizzying tempo' of the proceedings at.19, ~0.41\<;,~~ it§ ¥:t~n,ti9n to
terminate the proceedings in about sb<'(61,months 'time or less than
a year, pursuant to the scripted scenatio.
' . • t"f : ' t . • ' ~· • - • ,'.. • : •'
The prosecutio'n . cciinplained of ./the ,Pi;~siq.~g .Justice's
seemingly hostile attitude to"Va~ds (itX ,~l'J.d their being the subject
of warnings, reprirrfarid, and· co'ritefupf .pi'o'ceedings a~ :compared
to the _nil situation for the def~m~e: Herrera· likewise ·complained
of being 'cajo~ed µ:ifb produdhg wifne$ses·aria presse'd oh making
.asstir.ances: that ff given ·a certain. pertqcl, they- will'·be-'able to
produce:ll1eir witnesses/Herrera pleaded rfor ;a reasbmitile period
ofpr_eparation of its evidence' arid dted Hther pending cas¢s before
respondent court that were pending tdal fbr' a much longer time
· . where the 'diz.zying tempo' ,and 'fast pace~-were. not maintained
· by the court. Manifestly, the prosecution'a:nd the sovereign people
were denied due process of law -with a1p:artial cour.t and biased
Tanodbayan under the constant and -pervasive monitoring and
pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the
carrying out of his instructions."
(2) Judgment of acquittal is void. - "A dictated, coerced and
scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a va.id
judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither
binds nor bars aayone. Such a judgment is 'a lawless thing which
can be treated as .an outlaw.' It is a terrible and unspeakable affront
to the so_ciety and the people." (Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA
43-(1986], through Chief Justice Teehankee.)
2. Accused was charged under an ordinance for installing a
metering device to lower his electric bills and then subsequently charged
for theft under the Revised Penal Code.
Facts: The relevant acts took place within the same time frame:
from November 1974 to February 1975: During this period, the
accused installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring
a:n~ devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary
permit or authorization from the municipal autho~·ities, The
accused. conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of reducing his electl'ic powor bJII.
Sec, 2,J. A l'l'J'. llll. UJ l ,J, II I-t i !I 1,1'0 IUJ'l
!!lee. 21
Right Agaipst Double Jeopaxdy
Issue: May'•the accused successfully invoke his right against
double je:opardy? ,
Held: (i) Acts form qn"integral whole. - "The acts of the accused
·are so related to each other in time and place as to be reasonably
- regarded -as .having ta:keri r1ace on the sam'~ occasion, and since
the acts have beeh moved by the same intent, they may be
. '
·characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal
'liability simultaneously'both ttnder·the ordinance and the Revised
Penal Code. The corruptintent was present from the very moment
that the unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical
effect of the unauthorized installation was the- inward flow _of
electric current into accused's ice plant without the corresponding
recording thereof in his electric meter. In other wo_rds, ~e 'tak.i'.1g'
of electric current was integral with the unauthonzed mstallnhon
of electrical wiring and ,devices."
dy hps attached. - "The dismissal of the
, (2) Legal jeopar_
information for violation qf the ordinance upon the ground that
such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of
the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code, 'prescription of the crime' is one of the grounds for 'total
extinction of criminal liability.' Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on- prescription is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense."
(3) Absence ofreservation of the right to file separate civil action will
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. - "The civil li~bility
aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of
the right to file a separate civil action was made by the Batan?a_s
City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of c1V1l
liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted
with the criminal action both before the City Court of Batangas
City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of
criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double
jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising
from the offense charged.
In the present case, the accused freely admitted during the
police investigation having stolen electric c~rrent thro~gh the
installation and use of unauthorized electncal connections _or
devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty before the .City
Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropnated
electric power. Howeve1~ there is no evidence .In l'\w rccorcl on lo tlw

I I ii ' , J I
1038 . Pl-llLIPPlNE CON STlTUttON'AL LAW
Principles and Cases •
amount or value of the electric power cippropriated by the accused,
the criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City
Court and by the Court of First Instance. Accordingly, the related
civil action which has not been wai'red, ~xpressly or impliedly;
should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City
for receptiori of evidence on the amnunt or value of the electric
power appropriated and converted by the accused, and rendition
of judgment conformably with such evidence." (People vs. Relova,29
148 SC]0 292 [19871, through Justice Feliciano.)
3. Accused was charged in a criminal case for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law and subsequently for estafa under the Revised
Penal Code.
Facts: After the prosecution had ·,rested its case, .accused
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. the estafa cases invoking the
constitutional guarantee against being placed twice in double
jeopardy.
Issue: Are the requisites for double jeopardy present in this
case?
Held: (1) Offenses in the two informations must be the same in law
and in fact. - "The prohibition is against a second jeopardy for
the same offense. The plea of double jeopardy applies where the
offenses in the two informations are the same in law and in fact. It
29In Yap vs, ·Lutero ([Unrep.] 105 Phil. 1307 [1959].),. cited in the Re/ova case, the
Supreme Court, through Justice Concepcion, ruled: · ·
"The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the
informationin[C]ase No. 16443, petitioner [Clase No. if he failed to plead double jeopardy
~ be .convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which he has already been
acquitted. The inform,ation in case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in
the place therein stated; petitioner herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven
and operated 'recklessly and without reasonable caution' an automobile described in
said information.
Upon the other hand, the information in case No. 16443 similarly states that, on
the same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the aforementioned
automobil!! in a 'reckless and negligent manner at an excessive rate of speed and in
violation qf the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992.), \IS amended.by R.A. No. 587,
and existing city ordinances.' Thus, if the theories mentioned in the second information
were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in Case No. 16443
of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in Case No. 16054, unless he
pleaded double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred in eventually sustaining the
theory of petitioner herein." '
A I~ J , 111 , I 111 I , I II ' lit 11 , I I I 111111
Right Agolosl IJouble Juoplll'dY
is not necessarily dedsive that the two offenses may have m~terial
facts in common, pr that they are similar, where they are not m fact
the same, The test is not whether the defendant has already been
tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for
the same offense. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 97 [1922].)
. A single -act may offend against two {or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision of law req1,.1ires
proof of an additional fact or element while the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one
does not bar prosecution under the other. (People vs. Bacolod, 89
Phil. 622 (1951]; U.S. vs. Capurro, 7 Phil. 24 [1906]; People vs. City
Court of Manila, 154 SCRA 176 [1987].)
In other words, where two (2) different laws (or articles of the
saQ'le Code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is
no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which 'is not an essential element of the other. (People vs. Alvarez,
45 Phil. 472 [1923].)"
(2) The t~o offenses are different and distinct from each other. - "In
the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing bad check/sunder the
Revised Penal Code, deceit and damage are two essential elements
of the offense a~d have to be established with satisfactory proof
to warrant conviction (People vs. Gorospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988].)
with the further requisite that deceit in causing the defraudation
must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.
For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law under B.P. Blg. 22, on the
other hand, these elements are not necessary, the essential element
being knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the che~k
of the insufficiency of his funds. The gravamen of the offense 1s
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its p resentation for payment and not the non-
payment of an. obligation. (Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
[1986]; Dingle vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 595
[1987].)
Distinction between the two offenses is further found in their
nature. Whereas the offense under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code is a malum in se requiring proof of criminal
intent on the part of the offender as an essential ingredient focusing
mainly on the damage caused to th e property rights of the victim,
the crime under B.P. Blg. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless
 10,JO • P!llLlPPlNJJ 'ONS1'1'1'U'J.lJ,O~L LAW
Principles and Gases• •. .
check ma!u1:7 prohibitum wherein c~iminal·_mfent need not be proved
becau~e 1t 1s presumed and cons1de;·1d, a· violat-ion thereof. as-one
committed against public interest." . .. , .
· (~) Th~re is no identity of ~ffenses._..:.. "With these distinctions
there IS no 1denti~ of off~ses invblv~clfor which legal jeopardy ~
one case ~ay be mv?ked m the othexn;ohsidering that the offenses
charged m the two informations are J:)erfectly distinct in point of
la~ however ~early they may be connected in point of fact. The
ev1d~nce reqwred to prove one offense is' not the same evidence
requrred to prove t~e other. The ~efense of double jeopardy cannot,
the_refore~ prosper. 30 (Ada vs. VtroJ:a; 172 SCRA 336 [1989), through
Chief Justice Fernan.)
4. Two informations were filed for the same offense.
Fac!s: The ac~used-petitioner was dlarged in Criminal Case No.
1758 with the cnme of murder with the use of unlicensed firearm.
Subsequently, the offense was changed to homicide with the use
of an ~nlicensed firearm to which the accused entered a plea of
not gmlty. ~ate~, an information docketed as Criminal · Case No.
19350 ~as file~ m the same court indicting the petitioner for illegal
poss~s_s1on of fi~earms and ammunition used in the commission of
l10m1c1de as defined and punished under Pres. Decree No. 1866.
!ssue: Is there double jeopardy in the filing of the two (2) infor-
mations?
BP '711
8
S · · g,
~ierr:vs, Dacuyc_uy (181 SCRA 1 (1990].) where two sets of information under
an ~~;; Arhcl~ 315(p~. ~' d.) of the Revised Penal Code were filed, the
upreme Court s~1d, ~xx a sm~le crurunal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses
and where there 1s ~anance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law
and another la":' as m the case at bar, there will be no double jeopardy because what the
~ on _d ouble Jeopardy pr_ohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses.
erwi~e stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is
pr~ser,tio~ f~r the_same offense. Hence, the merefilihg of two (2) sets of information does
n[ o o 1tse give rise to double jeopardy. (citing People vs, Miraflores 115 SCRA 5
1982]; see People vs. Reyes, 228 SCRA 13 [1993].) . ' 70
• ~: 0 1e v~ Guliniio (179 SCRA 776 (1989].), the accused claimed double jeopardy in
view o e act at the second-cr~nal case involved the same firearm and ammunition.
: the firs~ c~se, the charge "".as for illegal possession of firearms and in the second case,
,, e co;nus~1on ~f m~der with the use of an illegally possessed firearm. It was held:
xx X • ere 1s no identity of the crime charged and hence, no double jeopard xx x os the
~~s:s1: ~:~eof ha_d taken pla_ce in two separate and distinct plnces and )tirlsclictions
e o uuormahons state different dates of commission,"
J\ li('J', Ill , 11 11 ,1,\ IJ f I ll ,1 1 l 'i
Hl15ht Ag"foHl l)o11blu J 'OJ'Ul'dy
Held: None. Mere filing is not an appropriate basis for invoking
I d.o.uble jeopardy. - "The first jeopardy had not yet attached. It is
i
j well-settle'd that the mere filing of two.informations or cortplaints
charging the sarne offense does not yet afford the accused in those
cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy
twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary
basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that accused has already
-been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has
been terminated without his express consent. It is the con:viction
or jeopardy of being convicted or the acquittal of the accused or
termination of the. case 'Ulat bars further prosecution· of the same
offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." 31
(Tangan vs. People, 155 SCRA 435 [1987], through Justice Paras.)
31Same ruling in People vs. Pineda (219 SCRA 1 (1993],) which held that "the mere
filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the
invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous
conviction, acquittal or termination of the case w ithout the consent of the accused."
Regalado,]., dissenting. "This would be correct if what had transpired was the merefiling of
the tw.o informati,ms charging identical offense, but wha t about the situation where the
accused has already entered a plea to the first charge and is now confronted with a second
charge for the same offense? xx x categorically submit that where an accused has validly
pleaded to the appropriate indictment sufficiently charging him with an offense in a court
of competent jurisdiction, he can seek and obtain the quashal of subsequent charge for
the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy even before the final disposition of
the first case." '
In People vs. Fernandez (239 SCRA 174 [1994],), the two (2) informations against
accused-appellant charged him with two (2) distinct offenses, i.e., murder, punished by
; I Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and illegal possession of firearms punished by
P.O. No. 1866, a special law: He urges that the right against double jeopardy proscribes
simultaneous prosecution for several offenses made out of the same act, The Supreme
Court .ruled that th.e second charge is not necessarily included in the. first. The accused
cannot, therefore, complain that he has been charged with ·two (2) offenses on the basis
of the same act.
The rule laid down in the cases is that an accused who kills another with an unli-
censed firearm can be prosecuted and punished for the hyo separate offenses of violation
of the second paragraph of Section 1 'of P.O. No; 1866 and for homicide or murder under
the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Quijadii, 259 SCRA 191 [1996].)
In People vs. Lumilan (323 SCRA 170 (2000].), ruled out the application of double
jeopardy in the simultaneous prosecution for murder or h omicide and. qualified illegal
possession of firearms used in mW'der or h omicide against the same accused involving
the sameJatal act. The-first is penalized under the Revised Penal Code while the second
is punished under ·a· special law. The latter is not included in the former.
Note: Due to the amendment of P.O. No. 1866 by R.A. No. 8294, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the com.mission of homicide or murder is no longer punishable as
a separate offense, but is treated merely as an aggravating circumstance. (See People vs.
Molina, 292 SCRA 742 [1998].)
 I l
• Pllll .LJ'l'J NH ' N B'LJ'J U'J/L NALl.i\W
Principles and <:nscs
5. Criminal case was provisionally dismissed due to variance
between information and prosecution evidence.
Facts: The wder of the trial co1.:1rt dismissing Criminal Case No.
2148 was without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint and/
or information charging the appellant with the pro.per offense. The
case was;n0t terminated because the dis,p.ositjve p.ortionof theo.rder
expressly directed ,the ProvinciaL .Fis.@l · artd/ or the pros(;!cuting
fiscal, t6 file a new complaint and/:p,r. information d:targ!,ng the
aceused with. the proper offense ;~f ;:rc1pe committed on or qefore
.February 5, 1976. The case was disnussed for no other reason except
to -correct the date of the crime from 'on or about the 13th day of
February' to 'on or about the 5th day pf February.' Accordingly, the
corrected, eriminal complaint was file1i,-
Issue: Was the appellant place4 in -double jeopardy?
. Held: Dismissal did not have the -effect of acquittal. - "Section
9, :Rule 117 of the Revised Rules ·of Court, now substantially
reproduced as Section 7, Rule 117 in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, lays down the necessary requisites in ordrr that'defense
of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit: o11 •
'Former conviction or acquittal;_double jeopardy. - ·When
defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, 0.r the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated wi~out the
express consent of the defendant by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal ·of the defendant or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offertse ·charged in the former
complaint or information.'
Dismissalof the first ~ase c_ontemplated by.this rule presupposes
a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.
(Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 [1950); People vs. Manlapas, 5 SCRA
883. [1962); People vs. Surtida, 43 SCRA 29 [1972]; People vs.
Mogol, 131 SCRA 296 [1984].) And 'for dismissal to be a bar under
the jeopardy clause of the Constitution, it must have the offoct of
A,~·I , ,JI I , 1111 ,I , f II~ I t It d I I • JIIII
l.Hghl Agoh11il l)oublc Jeopardy
acquittal." (People vs. Molero, 144 SCRA 397 [1986], through Justice
Gutierrez, Jr.)
,,-
'
6. Dismissal upon defendant's. own motion is predicated on the
right to $pe~dy trial.
Facts: After six (6) postponements, four (4) of which were
•.· - m1.:1tually agreed upon by the parties, covering a period of more
; •' than three (3) years, the special ·prosecutor failed to appear at the
· scheduled hearing. When the prosecutor still failed to appear after
an hour, the trial court provisionally dismissed the case on motion
of defense counsel. A motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal was denied.
Issue: Did the order amount to an acquittal as would bar a re-
instatement of the criminal case by reason of double jeopardy?
Held: Yes. (1) Doctrine of double jeopardy is applicable. - "The
petitioner adopts the ruling once follo;'ed by this ~ou_rt to tl:e e~fect
that a dismissal upon the defendant s own motion 1s a d1sm1ssal
consented to by him and, consequently, 'will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense, because his action in having the
case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or
privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him.' (People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722 [1949].)
. But this authority has long been abandoned and the ruling therein
expressly repudiated.
Thus, in the case ,of People vs. Robles, G.R. No. L-12761, June
29, 1959, citing People vs. Bangalao, L-5610, February 17, 1954; People
vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954; People vs. Albano, L-7862, May 17,
1955; and People vs. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956, We said:
'x x x. In reaching the above conclusion, this Court has not
overlooked the ruling in the case of People vs. Salico, 47 O.G.
4765, to the effect th at a dismissal upon defendant's motion will
not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense as said
dismissal was not without the express consent of the defendant
which ruling the prosecution now invokes in support of its
appeal; but said ruling is not now controlling, having been
modified or abandoned in subsequent cases wherein this Court
sustained the theory of double jeopardy despite the fact that
the dismissal was secured upon motion o'f the accused.'

10M PHILIPPINE CONSTI;(C,U!,RO).S:.t\-L LAW $cc.2:t
Principles.and,9.~~~'1::~.•'>
Also, the rule that a· distnissal.-uppn.,q~{en~ant's ,motion will
.not be a bar to another .p,rosecuHon (O,t; .!l'le. S!'\me .of:f~:11se as said
dismissal is not without the express <;onsent of the defendant, has
no application to a case where the dismissal~ as here; js. predicated
on the right of a defendant to a speedy tri:aL" · · · We reiterate in the case of People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30,
(2) Qualification of dismissal as "pro71ision'al '' is. not determinative
of legal effect oforder of dismissal. - "A ·conditiona:l,, provisional, or
without prejudice dismissal admitteday;<ilann'.O~ be. the legal basis
for a .claim to the protection of the double jeopardy rµle_.The issue
in this case, however, is not the validity of that proposition. Rather,
the is.sue is whether the qualifi~ationnotwiths.tanding; the dismissal
entered on August 15, 1962 was definite or wi.t hqut prejudice.
In the case of People vs. Diaz, G.R. No.·L-6518, March 10, 1954,
this Court ruled that the dismissal of a case up.on motion of the
defense for failure of the fiscal to b¢ pres,mt on the cic1y of trial
constitutes a bar to a subsequent prosecuti_on of the accused for
the same offense. Again, in the case qf feo'ple vs. LabateteJ G.R. No,
L-12917, April 7, 1960, We said:
'We again call attention to the' fact th_a t jud,ges. should
be careful in the use of the term 'dis'iriissal' and riot use the
term in cases where there has been trial·on· the rnedt·s and the
court finds that the evidence is insufficient, in which case the
judgment that should be entered is orie·of acquittal, ·not merely
dismissal. Even where the fiscal Jail's to· prosecute ·and· the judge
dismisses the case, the termination is ·n(?t real·d}$,ti'issal buf acquittal
because·the prosecution failed to prove' thuase whe.ri the time'.therefor
came.' · · · ·
. Considering the foregoing jurisprudence; ,therefore,· V,,e can
only conclude that the dismissal here complained of was not-truly a
'dismissal( but an acquittal.. Forit was entered upon.the defendants'
insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial arid by reason
of the pro~ecution's failure to appear on th~ date of trial.
If, therefore, the qualification by the respondent Judge of the
dismissal ~to 'provisional' has any consequence in law, it is what
We expressed in the case of Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 PhiL 209 [1951].),
to wit:
'x xx Courts have no discretion to determine or.characterize
the legal effects of their orders or
decisions, unless expressly
authorized to do so as provided for in Rule 30 of the Rules
of Court. The addition of such words ,:without prejudice,'
'provisionally' or 'definitely' to their. order or decision would
AH.'1'. HL. lJll ,I , U J,l J{I :L ,I I 1 ltW1
Sec. 21
Right Agninst Double Jeopardy
be mere surplusage if the legal effect under the law is otherwise
because courts•cannot amend the law. So, it is not for the court
to state in the order or decision th-at the case is dismissed either
definitely or without prejudice.'
1954, the above doctrine. Then, We said:
'Here, the prosecutor was not even present on the day, of
trial so as to be in•a position to proceed with the presentation
of evidence to ·p rove the guilt of the accused. The case was
set for hearing twice .and the prosecution, without asking for
postponement or giving any explanation, just f~iled to appear.
So the dismissal of the case, though at the instance of the
defendant Diaz, may,,according to what we said in the G1111d11/a
case, be regarded as an acquittal.'
The reinstatement would, therefore, operate, to violntc the
respondents' right against double jeopardy." (People vs, Claribel, 11
SCRA 805 [1964], through Justice Rega/a,)
7. Accused consented to dismissal as provisional although it should
really be final.
Facts: More than seven (7) years after the provisional dismissal
of the criminal case, a new information charging petitioners was
filed. The petitioners claim that the order of dismissal wh~ch was
predicated on their right to a speedy trial and on the failure of
the government to prosecute amounts to an acquittal and bars
a prosecution for the same offense, upon the groun~ of dou~le
jeopardy. They further claim that when the new information
was filed, n years have already. elapsed .from the time they were
originally indicted in the municipal court.
Issue: Is the contention that the petitioners would be placed in
double jeopardy tenable?
Held: No, (1) Accused asked for and consented to a provisional
dismissal. - "In the order of dismissal, the accused and their
counsel not only asked for, but also consented to, the provisional
dismissal of the case. Their act operates as a waiver of their defense
of double jeopardy in the second prosecution for the same offense.
When a criminal case is dismissed upon the application and express
consent of the accused and his counsel, the dismissal is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in

.L lllLH'l'lN.IJ t:UNBU'l'IJ'.Ll.L ,_N,(\1. I..AW
Principles and Cases .· ·
having the case dismissed constitu,tes,a· waiver of his constitutional
prerogative against double jeopardy; as he thereby prevents the
court from proceeding to the trial .o n the merits ·ari.d rendering
judgment of conviction against him.. (People ·vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 7'.22
[1949]; see also People vs. Hinauti, 105 Phil. 303 [1959].)"
(2) Accused sho.uld have asked insfeqdfor the trfal,of the case. - "If
the defendant wants: to exercise his coris~tutiol:lal r!ght to a speedy
trial, according to the Court in the case· of Esmeiia'vs .. Pogoy (102
SCRA 861 [1981}.), '.h e should ask'not £9r the dismissal, but for the
trial of the case.' After the prosecution's moti9n' for postponement
of trial is.denied and upon order ¢I£ the court, the fiscal does not,
or cannot, produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove
the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall
dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the
defendant:"
(3) Accused were not denied their right to aspeedy trial. - "The right
to a speedy trial means one that is free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court
litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within
the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose, and
is violated not only when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, but also when, without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without having
his case tried. (Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 26 SCRA 247 [1970).)"
(4) There was no arraignment yet 'when the new information was
filed. - "The delay in the re-filing of the case more than seven (7)
years after the provisional dismissal of the first case is not a delay in
a trial amounting to a violation of a constitutional right since there
was no trial to speak of as there was no indictment as yet. The right
to a speedy trial cannot be violated by delay between offense and
indictment, though it can be violated by an inordinate ~elay in the
return of the indictment after the arrest has been made." (Andres vs.
Cacdac, Jr., 113 SCRA 216 [19821, through Justice Concepcion, Jr.)
8. Prosecution appeals from an erroneous order of dismissal.
Facts: After the accused had pleaded not guilty to an inforn:rntlon
for bigamy, she moved to quash the same on the ground thnt it docs
I 11
HM'/
A l~'l'. Ill. IJLLI. U11 l{ I :u :1't
Right Against Double Jeopardy
,,
I
ft
I,: not allege £acts-constituting an offense. The lower court erroneously
:, dismissed the case against her.
Issue: boes the appeal of the prosecution from the er'roneous
order of.dismissal place the accused in double jeopardy?
Held: No. The accused is guilty of estoppel. - "Granting, arguendo
that appellee may be prosecuted for bigamy as an accomplice u~d~r
the information filed by the government prosecut<:>r because it 1s
alleged therein that she married her co-ac~sed with kno~ledge of
the fact that the latter was previously married and the marriage was
still subsisting, and that it was error for the lower court to quash the
information cin the alleged ground that it does not allege all the
elements necessary to constitute the offense against appellee, the
latter, however, cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of dou~le
jeopardy after inducing the trial c?urt to commit an error which
otherwise it would not h ave committed.
In other words, appellee cannot adopt a posture of double
dealing without running afoul with the doctrin_e of estoppel. It
is well-settled that parties to a judicial proceeding may not, on
appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained
in the lower court. Consequently, appellee is now estopped from
invoking the plea of double jeopardy upon the theory that she
could still be convicted under an information which she branded
to be insufficient in the lower court." (People vs. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698
[1961], through Justice Bengzon.)
In the earlier case of People vs. Casiano (1 SCRA 478 [1961].), the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Concepcion, ruled:
(1) Waiver of immunity from double jeopardy. - "The
provision in the Rules of Court for appeals in criminal cases
was adopted as a procedural measure fo:
the purpos~, n~t of
affecting substantive rights, but of enforcing the :~nstitutio~al
immunity from double jeopardy, a personal privilege which
the accused may waive. Where the accused did not seasonably
object to the appeal of the prosecution on the groun~ that such
an appeal would p lace him in double jeopar~y, he is deemed
to have waived his constitutional immunity from double
jeopardy. If a defendant pleads to the ch arge, withou.t invoking
his immunity from a second jeopardy, the same is d eemed
 ,, , • I I ,'\ 11 I 111 1111 I I ti I 11 11 I I
1048 l-'111Lll1L'1N H '(.)N 'ff!IU'l'J 'MY\1, I.A W
Principles and Cases ·•' · Wtslll l\g11l1111t 1J1111uh1 )l'l11m, dy

waived. An immunity must be speciaUy pleaded at the earliest has been prosecutecj. aJ:1q acquitted or convicted, a new complalnt
or prosecution would entitle the accused to such a defense. The
opportunity." · ' ·. · · ·
(2) Conflicting posUions of defend~~i/ :..:_ ' 1A defendant, after
waiver has._no applic~~ion to an apfe.al £~,r
the reason ~at the
remedy is completely banned or proh1b1ted.
a
attacking the court's jurisdiction in motion to dismiss, cannot
ther.eafter invoke double jeopardy, which plea assumes that
the court has jurisdiction. A party cannot be allowed to take -oOo-
a
inconsistent positions. Parties to judicial proce.e ding may not,
on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they
sustained in the lower court. When a party deliberately adopts
a certain theory, and the case is tried and decided upon that
'> theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal."
(3) Estoppel on the issue of jurisdiction. - "If the lower court 1 . .
had no jurisdiction, but the case was. tried and decided upon I

the theory that it had jurisdiction, .the parties are not barred,
on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must
exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent
of the parties or by estoppel. However, if the lower court had
jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon the
theory that it had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to
adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume
an inconsistent position - that the lower court had jurisdiction.
The principle of estoppel applies.
The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and does not
depend upon the will of the parties has no bearing thereon."

Paras, C.J., dissenting:

(1) When appeal from erroneous order of dismissal places the
accused in double jeopardy. - "The Government cannot appeal an
order of dismissal or on the merits of a criminal case although said
order is erroneous. Where, after a witness had testified, the lower
court dismissed a criminal case, upon motion of the accused on
the ground that there was lack of preliminary investigation, and
said dismissal is erroneous because there was in fact a preliminary
investigation, the prosecution cannot appeal from the erroneous
order of dismissal because such an appeal would place the accused
in double jeopardy."
(2) Waiver of defense of double jeopardy. - "The waiver of the
plea of double jeopardy is only possible when, after an accused I

lL

EX POST FACTO -LAW/BILL
OF ATTAINDER
SEC. 22. No ex post facta law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted. · ·
Meaning of ex post facto law.
An ex post facto law is one which, operating retrospectively -
(1) makes an act done before the passage of a law, innocent
when done, criminal, and punishes such ac~'. or
(2) aggravates a crime or makes it g~~ater than when it was
committed; or ' ··
(3) changes the punishment and inflic;:t,s a greater punishment
than what the law annexed to the crime wheri committed; or
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less testimony
than or different testimony from what the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender; or
(5) which in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters
the situation of a person to his disadvantage; or
(6) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect,
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; or
(7) deprives a person accused of a .crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, ·such as the protection
of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty,
alters the situation of a person, in relation tQ the offense or its
consequences, to his disadvantage. (In re ;Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.,
35 SCRA 429 [1970]; Mekin vs. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 [1903]; Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298 (1999); Republic vs. Desierto, 353
SCRA 570 [2001).)
J\ I'( I , 111 , 1111 ,1, I II I l<H , I I I w, 1
Hx l'oat 'l111cl0 Low/ Lllll u{ Allnlndl 1· 1
(i !. Characteristics of ex post facto laws.
They are as follows:
l' !
. '
l
(1) Ex p~st facto laws relate to penal or criminal matters o~ly
I. '
1, . (civil interests are protected by the non-impairment guarantee), 1.e.,
!: laws penal in nature (Geronimo vs. Commission on Elections, 107
SCRA 617 [1981].);
(2) They are retroactive in their operation;1 and
(3) They deprive persons accused of crime of some protection
or defense previously available, to their disadvantage.
The guarantees against ex post fact? la:-"s an~ ~ills of at~ain~er
are, like substantive due process, constitutional hm1ts on leg1slahve
power.
Retroaotive application of penal law
to accused's prejudice.
Penal laws are laws which prohibit certain acts and provide
penalties for their violations or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature and provide for their punishment. (see Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary, supra; Salvador vs. Maj a, Jr., 539 SCRA 34 [2007];
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee vs. Desierto, 548 SCRA
295 [2008}.)
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the accused, are
absolutely prohibited by the Constitution because they are patently
unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive .. Hence, even without the
IWhen the law is not penal in nature, its retroactive application will not violate
the prohibition, such as a law expanding the territorial juris_diction of a ~ourt (U.~. vs.
Jueves, 23 Phil. 100 [1912].);•or- extending the allowable period of detention of P:ison·
ers under detention (Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 [19461; People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535
[1947].); or providing for the suspension of a public officer from office pending trial fo_r
an offense committed before its effectivity since suspension is not a penalty because 1t
is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings (Bayot vs. Sandiganba~an, 128 SCRA
383 [1984].); or defining unfair labor practices as a basis for an order of reinstatement ?f
dismissed workers since such order is not a penalty (see Tolentino vs. Angeles, 99 Phil.
309 [1 956).); or providing for certain disqualification of a candidate aspiring to be chosen
to an elective office.
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, Rules regulating the procedure of courts, how-
r•vl'I', nrc retroactive in nature and are thus, applicable to actions pending or unresolved
ot tho time o f their passage.

I I
1' 1111 ,ll ' l ' II Iii t t IN 11 l' I IJ I I~ IJ IA I , l AW
l'J'i ncl ph.!11 und 'MH.:IJ• ,
prohibition, such laws are subject to'constitut,lqnal objectiom.,on due
process grounds.2 . .._.
(1) An ex~pJe of an ex post facto l,?.w·is a statute declaring as
usurious and unlawful a rate of interest_prqy-id'~~ in contract which a Borrie v. Columbia, 378 y.s. 347.)
was not usurious under the laws in force at th'e. tirrte of the execution
of the con.t ract (U.S. vs. Conde, 42 Phil. .766 '.[1922].); or iricreasiJ:1,g
the penalty for a crime. (U.S. vs. Ang Ko, .6:Phil. 376 [1906]; U.S. vs.
Bungavil, 34 Phil. 835 [1916].) . ; ,.
(2) The forfeiture to the State of ill~gotten wealth of a public
officer or employee prescribed by the Ariti~Graft ·and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 1379.), being in the nature of penalty and
tr:~ forfeiture proceedings being deemed criminal or penal, cannot
be made to apply to acquisitions made prior to its passage without
running afoul of the constitutional provision condemning ex post
facto laws or bills of attainder. (Katigbak vs. Solicitor General, 180
SCRA540 [1989]; Cabal vs. Kapunan, Jr., 65 SCRA 1059 [1962].)
(3) A law (P.D. No. 957.) which makes punishable thereunder
the failure of the owner-developer or administrator to deliver the
title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment, is not ex post
facto although the contract to sell was executed long before the
enactment of the law, because what is being punished is not the
execution of such contract but the failure to deliver such title after
the enactment of the law. (Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA
106 [1991].)
(4) The prohibition is against laws that are ex post facto. There
is no constitutional restriction on the power of a court to overrule
• 2Art. 22. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony who is not a h abitual criminal. (Rev, Penal Code.)
Whe(e an act which was penalized by a prior law ceases ·to be criminal under a
new law, the previous offense is obliterated and prosecution cannot be had. (People vs.
Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 [1998).)
"Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate pro-
spectively o~y and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially
those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in
the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal Jaw, for, in this area more
than in any other, it is imperative that the punishnbility of an act be reasonably foreseen
for the guidance of society." (People w. Luccrn, 65 SCRA 270 [1975],)
A judlclnl intcrprctntion of n stntutc cons titutes part of thnt law ns of tho dnto of
its orignnl pnasnfl<I, Such lntoqnotntlon cloca not Cl'Cntc n new Jnw but conotruc11 n pre••
oxl~tlng lnw. It nw,·cly 01111111 1111111 upon tho contcmpornncouolcglolntlvo lntont of thnt lnw
( ·on11•0 vH, 1)11lor1•n, /i7'l NC'l<A 20 12Wll,)
Iii~ 1
/\ 1,._ t Ill 1111 1 11 1 I 11, 1 11'
llx J 10t1l L', U-J L11w / 11111 of At1 11lt1dPr
precedent or decision of a -lower court by holding a criminal statute
to apply to acts previously held to be excluded from the statute's
coverage but a conviction.may violate due process of law wl-\ere the
reinterpretation has practically the effect of an ex post facto law. (see
(5) Although an·additional fine of PlS,000 is imposed by R.A.
No. 8294 which amenas Pres. Decree No. 1866 punishing illegal
possession of firearms, the same is still advantageou_s ~o the ac~sed
considering that the i~prisonment is lowered to przston correccwnal
in its maximum pet:iod from reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion. perpetua under Pres. Decree No. 1866. (Valeroso
vs. People, 546 SCRA450 [2008].)
(6) The imposition of a higher penalty on habitual delinquents
is not violative of the constitutional principle, as such penally is not
considered punishment for previously unpunished acts. (People vs.
Salinas, 54 Phil. 39 [1929]; People vs. Sy Chuy, 64 Phil. 900 [1937).)
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Mode of procedure for appeal was changed by law.
Facts: Pres. Decree No. 1486 (as amended by P.D. No. 1606.)
creates the Sandiganbayan and prescribes its own "unique rules
of procedure." It is contended, among others, that the Decree is
contrary to the ex post facto provision of the Constitution because
"petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy-
wise."
Before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10,
1978, all persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft
and corruption and .estafa were entitled to review of a trial court's
judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions
of fact and law and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on both
questions of fact arid law. This right to a review by two appellate
tribunals on both factual and legal issues was taken away by Pres.
Decree No. 1606.
Issue: Is the change within the constitutional ban against ex post
facto law?
Held: (1) Change in modes of procedure is not embraced in prohibition.
- "Even the most careful scrutiny of the definition of ex post facto
Jaw fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The 'lawful protection'
'
l l I l ] l
1054. l lHLll'l'JNIJ 'OM.:i'l'l'l'U'q ONAI. I.A W
Principles and Case13 ' '·
to which an accused 'has become entitled'.is. qualified, not given a
!t
broa~ scope. hardly can be argued that !1).e mode of pro~edure
pr~v~ded for m the statutory right to appeal is therein .embraced.
This 1s hardly a controversial matter.
T~is Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People vs. Vilo
(82 Phil. _524.), a 1949 decision, speaking tlu:ough the then Justice
late~ Chief Justice Paras, it made cleart:};l~t seven of thenin;
J~stices then composi~g this Court, ex:cepting onJy the ponente
himself and.t1:e late Justice Perfecto, we):'e of the opinion that Section
9 of ~e !ud1crnry Act_of 1948, doing. away '1i,th the requirement of
unarumi~ 1;1-nder Artic~e 47 of the Revis~\i .P~nal Code with eight
votes sufficmg for the rmposition pf the death sentence, does not
suff~r from any _constitutio~al infirmity. For them its applicability
to crimes committed before its enactment- would not make the law
ex post-facto." . to the petitioner is not a valid excuse for remanding the said cases
. \2) Change ~ust no~ dimi~ish subsfru,itia[ protections accorded by
existing ~aws.-:---. On th1~ sub1ect, Thompso·n v. Utah (170 U.S. 343.)
made this reahshc appraisal: 'The difficulty is not so much as to the
so~dness of the general rule that an accused has no vested right in
particular mod.es of pro~edure as in determining whether particular
statutes by then operation take from an accused any right that was
regarded, ~t the time of the adoption of the Constitution, as vital for
the protect10n of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time
of the commission of the offense charged against him.'
. To the sa~e effect is Duncan v. Missouri (152 U.S. 377.), where
it was categorically stated that the prescribing of different modes
of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation of new
ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with
which the existing laws surround the person accused of crime are
not considered
, within the constitutional inhibi'tion". (Nunez
- ' vs.
Sand1ganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 [19821, through Chief Justice Fernando·
see Escafio vs. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 429 [1988]; Mejia v;
Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457 (1988].)
2. Graft cases were transferred by law to Sandiganbayan.
Fact~: Pet~tioner is charged with 118 counts of qualified theft in
connection ":'1th ~er employment with a government corporation.
In the cases filed rn the then Court of Fir:st Instance where petitioner
has not yet been arraigned, the court, upon motion of the City
J
101111
II Sec. 22 /\1<1'. 111 . IJ.I LI , l 1 l-< tt :I l'I'~
Ex Post Facto Law/ Bill of Attainder
!
'
Fiscal, transferred said cases to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to
Section 8 of Pres. Decree No. 1606.
Issue: The issue is whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to return the cases
involved to the then Court of First Instance. Petitioner argues that
the Decree is an ex post facto law,
Held: Law in question is not a penal statute. - "The argument is
without merit. The Decree is not a penal statute. It merely provides
for the transfer of jurisdiction over certain cases where the defendant
has not yet been arraigned, from the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court.) to the Sandiganbayan. The fact that the trial
will be held here in Manila in which case it will bring inconvenience
from the Sandiganbayan, which has proper jurisdiction over them
to, ilie Court of First In~tance." (Olivia vs. Sandiganbaynn, 137 SCRA
63 [1985], through Justice Relova.)
Teehankee, J., dissenting:
The transfer trenches upon the due process clause and is violative of
the ex post facto clause. - "The petitioner's pending criminal cases
for qualified theft.which were duly filed with the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court.) of Lanao del Norte, should
have been retained and tried until final judgment in the said trial
court instead of being transferred to respondent Sandiganbayan.
The trial court had duly acquired jurisd iction over the said
criminal cases and the transfer thereof to respondent Sandigan-
bayan pending arraignment of petitioner-accused (as stated in the
separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Makasiar
in Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan with which I concurred) 'trenches upon
the due process clause of the Constitution, because the right to ap-
peal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court,
was already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner
was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime(s)
charged against [her].'
The said opinion further stressed that the guarantee against
ex post facto laws is violated since 'there is greater guarantee of
justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject
to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the
eviden ce and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and
 1056
• P HILlPPINH CONST11'U 'J~l G>NAL LAW Scc.22
Principles and Cases,, · •
impartiality unaffected as they ar.e 'bf'.Vie¾ts and :·prejudices that
may be engendered during the trial.'" •~+,i ~•,· · .· -· ,, ··,· .;
Meaning of bill of attainder/bill
of pains and penalties. .
' " ..
. (1) A ~ill ~f~ttainder is a legislative act'which inflicts punishment
without a JUdlClal trial. • ·
. (2) 1!
the punishment is less than death (i.e., deprivation of
1~~er~, rights, o~ p~operty), the act is called a bill ofpains and penalties.
I. _1s ~clu~ed w1th111 the meaning of bill of attainder as used in the
Con~t1tuh~n. (see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303; Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.)
Purpose and basis of prohibition
against bill of attainder.
. (1)_ The prohibition against the enactment of bills of attainder
1s des1?1'e_d, as a g~neral safeguard against legislative exercise
of the JUd1C1al function, or simply trial by legislature. History in
perspective, bill_s _of atta~d~r.were employed to suppress unpopular
cause_s at:d political IlUI),onties, and it is against this evil that the
constrtuh?nal p_r?hibition is directed. The singling out of a definite
clas~, the 1:npos1tion of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice
to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.
(2) .Its ~ssence is ~e substitution of a legislative for a judicial
det~rmmat10n of ~.ult. The constitutional ban against bills of
attamd~r ~erves t_o implement the principle of separation of powers
by _co~ng legis~atures to rule-making and thereby forestalling
legislative usurpation of the judicial function. (People vs. Ferrer 48
SCRA 382 [1972].) ' punishment consisting of deprivation of life, liberty, or property for
Characteristics of a bill of attainder.
They are as follows:
(1) The statute applies to specifically defined or easily
ascertainable person or group of persons;
(2) It applies retroactively and reacJ-les past conduct; and
. (3) A c~nviction or sentence is pronounced by the law (i.,,.,
legislature), mstead of by the courts (i.e., without judicial trio!).
AN.l l~' HI I , 1111.1. l 11' I It .111 1
lJx l'os~ llM"to I,nw / Ulll of All11l11dt11·
Conviction anct.pu.nlsl:lment
without judicial tri.al.
(1) By th; legislative body. - In a bill of attainder, the le~islative
body, in addition to its legitimate functions, _exercises fne-~ower
and office of judge; it pronounces upon the guilt of a party, without
any of the forms and safeguards of a judicial trial (e.g., right to be
'
I'
heard, application of the rules of evidence); and it fixes the ~egree of
"·, ..
punishment in accordance with its own notions of the gravity of the
offense.3 (see Ex Parte Garland, supra; Pierce v. Carskdon, 16 Wall.
234.) Thus:
(a) A law passed declaring members of an association
guilty of subversion and subjecting them to imprisonment is
unconstitutional because it convicts and penalizes without the
benefit of judicial trial.
(b) In a case where a law passed by the United States
Congress declared in one of its sections that three government
employees named therein were not to receive any salary after
a certain date because of their subversive activities, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the enactment was in the nature of a
bill of pains and penalties, the Congress assuming the role of a
judge and giving no hearing to the parties. Hence, the provision
was void. (U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303.)
But the detention of a prisoner for a certain period pending
investigation and trial is not a punishment; it is a necessary extension
of the well-recognized power of the State to hold a criminal suspect
for investigation. (People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535 [1947].)
(2) For past conduct. - To constitute a bill of attainder, only
3The Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Big. 22.) is not a bill of attainder for under it every
element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for
violation thereof. (Recuerdo vs. People, 395 SCRA 638 (2003].)
The Attrition Act of 2005 (R.A. No. 9335) does not possess the elements of a bill of
attainder. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a Bureau of Internal
Revenue or Bureau of Customs official or employee and provides for the consequences
Lhereof. The constitutional rights of the concerned official or employee are amply
protected. (Bureau of Customs Employees Assoc. vs. Teves, 661 SCRA 589 [2011].) The
Act crcMes a rewards and incentive fund and a personnel performance board which is
gi ven the power to tcrmim,te or remove from the service officials and personnel for poor
pcrfonnnncc ln nccorclnncc with the cl'ilcl'in ndopted in the Act.

1058 .PHILIPPINE CONSTIT,ll.JT:r0NAL LAW Sec.22
Principles and Cas·es , ·'
pc1st conduct i$ considered. Any deprivati0rtNt'iposed,0Rlytb.prevent
future conduct is not prohibited; and a ·d~i!>'ri:vati~li · is ~tioiis1dered
prev~n~ive, so not covered_1;,y the prohibitio1:1; .if it.is. -~~s~apable," .
that 1s, 1f the people affected can avoid:harm'by acting.i.n;ru;cordance .
with the statute, .(U:S. v. Lovett, supra; J\~erican Coµ:i.~unieations
Associatioh v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382.) · .
Thus, a · state is entitled to require as a :condition:· for public
employment, nort-membership in organizations .advocati:J!lg the
violent overthrow of the government. It may discharge , those
employed by it who are affiliated with theml or refuse to affirm or
deny them. (see Gerende v. Board .o f SuperV;\E!ion of El~c;_tion, 341
U.S. 56; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 488; B~itat1 v. Board of
Education, 357 U.S. 399.) · · Facts: The Act is condemned by the lower court as a b ill of
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2 direct recoven; of ill-gotten
properties.
Facts: The executive orders which were promulgated by· the
President under the Provisional Constitution stress the urgent
need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime and give specific data and
directions respecting their recovery. They were assailed as bills of
a ttainder.
Issue: Are the executive order assailable as bills of attainder?
Held: (1) Executive orders implement a constitutional mandate. -
"The impugned executive orders are avowedly meant to carry out
the explicit command of the Provisional Constitution, ordained by
Proclamation No. 3, that the President - in the exercise of legisla-
tive power which she was authorized to continue to wield 'until a
legislature is elected and convened under the new Constitution' -
'shall give priority, among-others, to recover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the.previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or
freezing of assets or accounts."'
(2~ TJi_ey are not bill ofattainders. - "In the first-place, nothing in
the executive orders can be reasonably constru,ed as a determination
of guilt. On the contrary, the executive orders, inclusive of Executive
Order No. 14, make it perfectly clear that any judgment of guilt in
the amassing or acquisition of ' ill-gotten wealth' is to be handed
1059
Sec.22 A.t.R"t. ,1.U. l:HLL 01-1 RIGHTS
Ex Post Facto-.Law / Bill of Attainder
. down by a judicial trjqunal, in this case, the Sanddganbayan, upon
complaint filed an~tp~qsecuted by the PC~G. In the second place,
no. punishment-is inflicted by the executive orders as the lI\erest
.glance at their .provisions will immediately make apparent. ~ no
..·. sense, therefore, rn.ay the executive orders be regarded as a bill ?f
. attainder." (BASECO. vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 18,1 [1987], through Justice
' l
';
Narvasa.)
2. Law outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and
"other subversive associations" and punishes any person who "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or re_mai_ns a
member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
attainder because it "tars and feathers" the CPP as a continuing
menace to the freedom and security of the country; it has expressly
created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused
can never hope to overthrow; and by means of the Act, Congress
"usurped the powers of the judge."
4
Issue: Is the law, the Anti-Subversion Act (R.A. No. 1700.), a bill
of attainder?
Held: No. (1) Act does not specifiJ the CPP or its members for
purposes of punishment. - "W~en the Act is v~ewed in its ac~al
operation, it will be seen that 1t does not specify the Communist
Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of :he Gover~ent for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in Section 4, again~t member-
ship in the out1awed organization. The term 'Communist Party of
the Philippines' is used solely for definition purposes_. .In ~act, the
Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines b~t
also to 'any other organization having the same purpose and their
successors.' Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct."
(2) Under the Act, guilt of accused must be judicially established. -
"Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would
be totally unnecessary to charge communists in co.urt, as_ the law
alone without more, would suffice to secure their pumshment.
But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially
"The Act has been repealed by R.A. No. 7636 dated September 4, 1992.

1060 • PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.22
Principles and Cases ·
established. The Government has yet 'to' prove at the trial that the
accused jo~_ed the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts and
that they Joined the Party, knowing its subversive .character and
with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow
the existing Government by force, deceit, and othedllegal means
and place the country und'erthe control and dbmination·of a foreign
power."
(3) Mere membership in Communist ·Party is not punished. -
" As to the ~!aim that under the statute, organizational guilt is
nonetheles~ ":11-puted despite the require_.ment of proof of knowing
membership m the Party,.suffice it to say that that is precisely the
nature of conspiracy, which has been r~forr-ed to as a'dragnet device'
whereby all who. participate in the criminal covenant are liable.
The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as
punishing mere membership devoid of anyspecific intent to further
the unlawful g~als of the Party. But the statute specifically requires
that membership must be knowing or active, with. .specific intent
to further the illegal objectives of the Par,ty. That is what Section 4
means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be
shown to have been acquired 'knowingly, willfully and by overt
~cts.' ~his consti_tutes an element of 'membership' distinct from the
mgr~~1en~ of ~ilty knowledge._The former requires proof of direct
participation m the organization's unlawful activities while the
latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal
objectives."
} 4) Even ifth~ Act specifies individuals, it will not be abill ofattainder.
- Even assummg, however, that the Act specifies individuals
and_ not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of
attamder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities
an~ underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of
national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons
mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts
deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not
to be a bill of attainder. (Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System v. Agnew, 329 ~.S. 441.~ Similarly, a statute requiring every
secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty
to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of
such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof,
was. declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply
onl~ to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. (New York ex rel. Bryant
v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63.)
IUl\l
/\l~ ll. lll. 1\lLI , )J1 l•Ul 1111 t
Bx Post, Facto Law/ 131U of AttnInder
In the Philippines, the validity of Section 23(b) of the Industrial
Peace Act .(repeale<A b:y..R.A..No. 4241.) .requiring labor unions to
file witch the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers 'to
the effect that ·they.are not members of the Communist Party and
that they are not members -of any .organization which teaches
the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or
.,l unconstitutional methods,' was upheld by this Court. (Philippine
Assoc;iation of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA
40 [1969].)
Indeed, it is .only when a statute applies either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does
i. it become a bill of attainder. But when the judgment expressed in
legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be
'judicially noticeable,' the legislature may apply its own rules, and
judic~al hearing-is not needed fairly to make such determination."
(5) Character of Communist Party as construed by Supreme Co11rt.
- "In the Philippines, the character of the Communist Party has
been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932, we
found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal
association. In 1969, we again found that the objective of the
Party was the 'overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed
struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of
government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China.'
More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia (42 SCRA 448 [1971].), we
noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and
the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations
such as the Kabataaan Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of
the New People's Army (NPA). After meticulously reviewing the
evidence, we said: 'We entertain, therefore, no doubtey about the
existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in
arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are
engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines."'
(6) To be bill of attainder, statute must not only·specify persons
or groups but also it must reach past conduct. - "Nor is it enough
that the statute specify p~rsons in order that it may fall within
the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct.
This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a
legislative adjudication of guilt.

woz .1 lJll ,ll',PJ NH ' NU'J.'J,'l U'irt J N/\ 1, l ,I\W
. Principles and·Cnsos
The st~ternent of the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the
U ;S; Federal _S ubve.rsive Activitie&·Controb;Act- of 1950 - 'Nor the
statute made an act of 'outlawry' or attainder by the fact that the
conduct which it regulates is described with such particularity that,
in probability, few ,organizations will .c ome within the statutory
terms. Legislatures may act to curb behaviour which they regard
as harmful to the public welfare, whether that conduct is found to
be engaged in by many persons or by one. So long as the incidence
of legislation is such that the persons who engage in the regulated
conduct, be they many or few, can escape regulation merely by
altering the course of their own p"resent activities, thete can be no
complaint of an attainder.' - may be said of the Anti-Subversion
Act. Section 4 thereof expressly states that the prohibition therein
applies only to acts committed. 'After the approval of this Act.' ...
Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive
organization at the time of the enactment of the law, were given
opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in
writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law
expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt
such persons from penal liability." (People vs. Ferrer, 48 Phil. 382
[1972], through Justice Castro.)
To qualifiJ the offense, the information charging illegal possession
3.
offirearms and ammunition: alleges that the: same were used in furtherance
of subversion.
. Fa~ts: ,:"n informatio_n was filed against the petitioner charging
him with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. It alleged
that the firearms and ammunition were used in furtherance of
subversion so as to qualify the offense under S~ction 1 (3rd par.)
of Pres. Decree No. 1866, which provides: "If the violation of this
Section is in furtherance of, an incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death
shall be imposed." · Note: Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Decree
Issue: Should the Decree be struck down as unconstitutional for
being a bill of attainder?
Held: No. (1) Elements ofabill ofa_ttainder. - "The Court, in People
vs. Ferrer (supra.), defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which
inflicts punishment on indiv iduals or members of a particula r
group without a judicial trial. Essentia l to a bill of a ttainder rn·1' n
sp ecification of ccl'toin lnd iviclw1Js o r a g ro u p of inclJvld1ml11, 1lw
I I
A I{ I. 111 , I111 , I , l II I I I l ii I I
Ux 1'otJI 11ucto•Low /Hill uf Alllllndui·
imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, an~ the lack_ of
judicial trial. This last-element, the tota,l lack of court mtervention
in the finding of guilt and the determination .of the actual p~nalty
to be imposed, is the most essential.
Pres. Decree No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of
attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial
trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an
imposition of a corresponding punishment."
(2) Law merely d~fines the offense and provides for the imposable
penalty. - "What the decree does is to define the offense and
provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying _t~e
qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There 1s
no encroachment on the power of the court to determine afte r due
hearing whether the p rosecution has pr?ved b ~yond reasonable
doubt that the .o ffense of illegal possession of firearms has been
committed and that the qualifying circumstance attach ed t~ it ~as
been established beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitu tion
and judicial precedents require." (Misolas vs. Pa figa, 181 SCRA 648
[1990], through Justice Cortes; see Veroy vs. Layague, 210 SCRA 97
[1992].)
Cruz, J., dissenting:
An unconstitutional act is illegal per se. - "I join Justice
Sarmiento's dissent, with these additional brief observations.
As I submitted in Guazon vs. De Villa (181 SCRA 624 [1990].), we
should not unreasonably inhibit ourselves on technical grou~ds
when a constitutional question is presented to us for resolution.
An unconstitutional act is illegal per se and must be slain on
sight. It should not be reprieved simply because it has not been
properly challenged, to be struck down only if ~nd when all the
formal requirements are satisfied. In the meantime, the lawless
act continues to corrode the Constitution, and all because we have
refused to act."
solely on the ground of substantive due process. The Court
considered the theory raised b y Justice Sarmiento that the Decree.
constitutes a bill of attainder.
Sarm.iento, J,, dissenting:
(1) Decree is a bill of altainder. - "It is a bill of attainder because
it presumes the accused, u pon conviction, to be guilty - as well
1064 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Scc.22
Principles and Cases

- of the crimes (mmder and homicide under the second par. of

Sec, .1, and rebellion, insurrection; and.,su:bv.ersi9n under .the third
par..of Sec. 3) fhat-suppos~dly'm~relytqualify the offense of 'illegal Article IV
possession' (or 'illegal manufactare/-asthe case·may be) when the
accused has not b~en tried and found$1,tilty of either crime in any
judicial proceeding.Jn tj:,:e q1se at b_ar,; th~fact that the petitioner ·CITiZENSHIP.
has been charged with illegal possessi_on_9.ffirearms 'in furtherance
of subversion' means that the petitioner has committed subversion,
is
notwithstanding the fact that he, not stahcl~g trial for subversion." SECTIQN i. 'TI{e f~llowing are citizens of the Philip-
(2) It is the court's duty to pass on the- constitutional question pines: ·
though raised for the first time on appeal. - "I am aw~e that this (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
suit has been brought on the theory that the charge of 'illegal time of the adoption of this Constitution~
possession' against the accused supposedly offends the rulings
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
in People vs. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]); People vs. Geronimo
(100 Phil. 90 [1956].); and People vs. Rodriguez (i07 Phil. 659 [1960].) Philippines; ·
and not, rather, on the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1866, as (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filip~no
amended. It is my view, however, that the ·case -is nonetheless ripe mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
for constitutional adjudication albeit the constitutional question
the age of majority; and _
has not been asserted.
It has indeed been held: 'But we must state that the general rule (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may
determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality Meaning of citizenship and citizen.
of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1984), 95 N.Y. 135,
(1) Citizenship1 is a term denoting membership of a citizen in a
144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict
of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first
time at any stage of the proceedings,_ either in the trial court or on
appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it.has been held that it
is the duty of a court to pa_ss on the constitutional question, though tl,e
lThe doctrine of res judicata does not apply to ques~ons ~£ c~~enshi~!':1
.tiz'enship of a person is material or indispensable m a 1ud1c1al or _a
Cl • dmini tr ti uthority decides as to su
~=
s ra ch
case, whatever the corresponding c9urt or _a . s a ve _a. thr bed out a ain
raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination citizenship is generally not considered res 1ud1cata; he~ce'. it IS to be . es , 42 S~RA
of the question is necessary to a decision of the case."' and again as the occasion may demand. (Lee vs. Comm1ss1oner of lnunigration,

561 [~!lJoctrine may be applied only if the following requirements are pres~nt: (1) A
' a'tiz'enship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said persthon
-oOo- person s · . · . ti t k ctive part in e
. arty· (2) The Solicitor .G~e~al or his authorized repres!)nta ve oo a C
::Jutio~ thereof; and (3) The' finding of citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme ourt.
(Board of -Commissioners-LCID] vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 854 [199lp ck f It ul·
attack on a erson's citizenship may be done through a direct atta or s n
. An gh c llateral a roach. (see Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [197?].) Thus,
~~ty, not ~ou f ~tiZ' o nship cannppot be properly ventilated as a collateral issue 11\ a com·
we question o c1 e · d (S b Court of
· · tin of title and damages against the buyer of Ian . ur an vs.
plaint fl~r2q1u91escl 309 [1993].) The power of the House of Representatives (o~ Se_nate)
Appea s, · · · d cl , d not carry with 1t the
Electorial Tribunal, no matter now complete an ex us1ve, oes

1065
1066 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
political society, which membership impos.es,·recip·rocally, a duty of
allegiance on the part of the member and d.llty of protection on the .
part of the State. It thus involve?. poli.tjcitl s~atus. 2 _ of a state, not all nationals are citizens of a state,
(2) Citizen is a person h~ving the title or status of citizenship.
He is a member of a dem<?cratic commurµtyj.'enjoying full civil and
political rights3 (subject to special disqualifi<;:ations, e.g., minority),
and is accorded protection inside and .ou\side the territory of
the Stat~. Along with other citizens, . they compqse the political
community. To be a Filipino citizen, a person must'b'elong to any of
the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1.
Distinguished from na~ionality
and nationals.
• ~ I
From the point of view of international law, the terms "citizen-
ship" and "citizen" do not exactly mean the·same as ·"nationality"
and ·"national." - · · · · •. ·
1'.he latter terms have a bro'ader me'ariing,_'~~~racing all who pwe
allegiance to a state, whether q.emocratic or not,· without thereby
becoming citizens. Eor exampl~, prior to the granting of Philippine
independence by the United States on July 4, 1946, the Filipinos
were deemed American nationals because th~y owed allegiance to
the United States but were not citizens thereof. ·
It can, therefore, be said that the nationals of a state inciude not
only its citizens who enjoy full civil and political privileges but also
authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization of a member's father
in the pursuit of disqualifying said member; for to rule otherwise, would operate as a col-
lateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissibli!. (Vilando vs. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 656 SCRA 17 (2011].)
Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for holders of public office, may be
questioned anytime. (Ibid.)
2
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries: In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
jus~ice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship,
which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. The 20th
century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, ·which laid emphasis
on the ~ight of the ci_tize~ to economic well-being and social security. The ide·a of citizenship
has gam:d expres_s1on m the modern welfare state·as 'it so developed in Western Europe,
~ ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking globnl
village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship." (Tecson vs. Commission on
Elections, 424 SCRA 277 (2004); sec Go vs. Republic, 729SCRA 138 (2014].)
3
Subject to spcclnl d isqunlificntions provided by law.
A lit' I', l.V" l 'l' l IZ l •. N! ll 111 '
all others who are not its citizens, but because they owe allegiance
to it, are not reg~rded as· aliens. Thus, while all citizens are naqonals
I
I
Meaning of subject and alien or foreigner.
' '
(1) A citizen is a member of a democratic community who
enjoys full civil and pol~tieal righ~. In a mona,rchial state, he is often
called subject.'
(2) An alien or foreigner is a citizen of ,a country who is residing
in or passing through another country. He is popularl~ ca~led
"foreigner" owing allegiance to another coun_try and who i_s still a
if.
··'
subject or citizen of s;tld country. He is not given ~ e ~11 n ghts to
citizenship (such as the right to vote, to hold publ~c office, to own
lands, to engage in a certain business and to practice a p rofession)
but is entitled to receive protection as to his person and property.
General ways of acquiring citizenship.
They are:
(1) Involuntary method. - By birth, because of blood relationship
or place of birth. Here, there is a lack of free choice; and
· (2) Voluntary method. - By naturalization, e~cept in_case of
collective naturalization of the inhabitants of a territory which takes
place when it is ceded by one state to another as a result of conquest
or treaty.
These two modes of acquiring citizenship correspond to the
two kinds of citizens - natural-born and naturalized citizens.
(infra.) The Philippines adopts only two method~ of ~cquiring
Filipino citizenship- by birth because of blood relationship and by
naturalization.
4There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church records, ~e natives we~e called
"indios," denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the arch1pelag?. Sparush laws
on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but th_e~ shee_r number
mnde it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these otiZenship la"."~ of
Spain, however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for tl\ose exphatly
extended by Royal Decrees. (Tecson vs. Commission on Elections, supra.)
1
1068 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles _and Cases
Citl~e.n~ by birth.
· . There are two principles or·rtiles :fhat tgovern:,cinzenship -by
birth, namely: '" ·· , · ' ·. '. · · . -:· ·, ,, . · · .,. ,.
(1) Jus sanguinis. z, ..Bll)_od r~l'-'tiol")ship_is .th!ti,P<\Sis fo~ the
acquisition of citizenship under this rule. The children follow the
citizenship of theµ- parents Orone df them. Tf:tjs;is the predori:linating
principle in the Philippines (see se·c. 1[2J.);"cii1.'d ··
(2) Jus soli or jus loci. - Place of birth serves as the basis for
acquiring citizenship under this rule. A person becom·es ·a citizen
of the State where ·he is born, irrespective of the dtizenship of the
parents. This principle prevails in the United States. It does not mean
though that the principle of jus sanguinis is notHkewise recognized.
Citizens at the time of the adoption · ·
of the Constitution.
The citizens referred to are those. considered Filipino citizens
under the 1973 Constitution,5 at the time of the effectivity of the new
Constitution on February 2, 1987 by virtue of Proclamation No. 58
of the President.
The purpose of Section 1(1) is to protect the status of those who
were already citizens at the time the new Copstitution took effect.
However, it is not the intention of the Constitution to legalize the
status of those who acquired th_eir citizenship through fraudulent
means. AFilipino citizen under the 1973 Constitution who has lost
his citizen_ship at the time,of the ratification of the new Constitution
is not a citizen of the Philippines.6 · who was married to a foreigner, is born an alien and remains an
5 There is, however, no express prohibition on Congress to pass a supplementary law
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers ;ire citizens of the Philippines; (3)
Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five; (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
(Art. m, Sec. 1, 1973 Constitution.) . 8
. . 611)~ ·provisions of ~ e 1973 and J.987 Constitutions on the election of Philippine
otizenshiphave no curative effect on any irregularity .i n the acquisition of citizenship for
those covered by the 1935 charter. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge
under the old charter, it remains subject to challen ge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Conslllullon.
(Re Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, 316 SCRi\ 1 (1999].)
!:lee. 1 A 1L<'1'. l..Y. 'l'l'.1ZHN. J JJ I' l(JtJI/
Citizens by blood relatlonship.
. The Philippiires; Jrr ,accordance with Section 1, paragiiaph 2,
follows the principle of jus sanguinis.7
(1) In the determination of the citizenship of the child, Filipino
mothers are placed by the Constitution on equal footing with their
husbands consistently with the principle of "equality" enunciated
in the Preamble and the State Policy to "ensure the fundamental
l
equality before the law of men and women." (Art. II, Sec. 15.) The
. 1;
father or mother of the child may be a natural-born Filipino, or a
· Filipino by naturalization or by election.
(2) Under the provision, a child born of a Filipino citizen is
a citizen of the Philippines and this is true although the child ls
illegitimate since the Constitution does not make any distinction. In
the case o_f a Filipino mother, what is importan t is that the mother
was a Filipino at the time of the birth of the child and the birth took
place on or after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January
17, 1973.
(3) If the child is born in a state where the rule of jus soli obtains,
or the child's father or mother is an alien whose country follows also
the principle of jus sanguinis, it would be a case of dual citizenship.
(see Sec. 4.)
Citizens by election under-
the 1935 Constitution.
Under the 1935 Constitution, a child born of a Filipino mother,
alien during his minority until he elects Philippine citizenship. 8
7
on citizenship adopting the principle of jus soli or any of its features. The application of
this principle to persons born in our country of alien parentage would encourage dual
allegiance which, in the long run, might prove detrimental to both countries of which
such persons claim to be citizens. (Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 269 [1947).)
"Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philip pines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship." (Art. VI, Sec. 1(4] thereof.) The phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority" has been consb·ued to mean within a reasonable period
after reaching the age of the majority. Generally, election should be made within three
years after reaching such age. (Op. of Sec. of Justice No. 129, S. 1948; Re Application for
Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, s11pm.) The three-year period is not,
however, an inflexible rule. (Cuenco vs. Sccrclnry of Justice, 5 SCRA 108 (1962].)

1070 · PI-IILIPPIN.E CONSTITUTIONAL LAW s '<.:, J,
Principles and Cases
Prior to such election, he has only an ir.choate right to Filipino
citizenship. (s~e Villahermoso vs. Conun!, ,qf;.ImJ,nigratipn, 80 Phil.
541 [1948J.) But there is no need to elect Philippine citizenship if
during his minority his mother reacquires h~r c~tizenship.
Citizens born on or after ratification ·
of 1973 Constitution.
If the child was born on or after the· .r~tification ·of the 1973
Constitution on January 17, 1973, he is a citizen u:r:ider Section
1, paragraph 2 thereof, making the children of a female citizen
Philippine citizens without having to make an election. In the latter
instance, he is a citizen from birth. The rule ·t hen, as it is now, is
that a Filipina does not lose her citizenship by her marriage· to an
alien. (Sec. 4.) However, it was n:ot clear whether those who had
elected citizenship under the 1935 Constitution (having been ·born
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973)
are to be considered as natural-born Filipino citizens. Under Section
1, paragraph 3 in relation to Section 2, they are now declared as
natural-born citizens.
An illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his or her legally
known parent, the mother. Hence, there is also no need to elect
Philippine citizenship.
Citizens by naturalization.
(1) Meaning ofnaturalization. -It is the act of formally adopting
a foreigner into the political body of the State and clothing him with
The right to elect Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
625. It provides that the option shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn
to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry, accompanied with the Oath of Allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. (Sec. 1, C.A. No. 625; see Republic
vs. Sagun, 666 SCRA 321 [2012].) Registration, although a requirement under CA No. 625,
is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. (Cnbiling vs.
Fernandez, Jr., 625 SCRA 566 [2010].) Where the party concerned resides abroad, he must
make the statement before nny office!' of the government nuthodzcd lo ndmlnistcl' onth9,
and must forwnrd such stntemont together with his onth of nllcglonce to tho civil roglatmr
of M1,mJJn. (Sec, 2, Ibid.)
·11,10 lnw, to tho <'XI.Mt thnt ii 111 not l11co1111lol<'nt with tho Conntlt11ttou, cuntlu111·•1tu
bo In f01'('0 1111111 n1111111dc1cl, 1111:idlflncl or rt111<1nlocl by Con111·<•11•1 p111.·ttun11t 111 lfo11tlt111:11:1r
A1'll~l11 XVIII t 1\•11t11;lt,11 y 111, 1vl11lrnlll),
l 1
A l t IV I 11 lit l I I' ll Ill ' Ill I
I
I'
I
f the rights and privileges of citizenship. It implies th~ r~nunciat~on
of a former nationality·and the fact of entrance to a s1m1lar relation
towards a new-body politic.9 •
Ii:t the contemplation of the Consti~tion, even those who are
not Filipino ciUzens at birth and who cannot take advantage_ ~f the
right giv.e n to the children of Filipino mothers, may become citizens
by naturalization. In other words, citizenship may not be based on
th~ principle of jus sanguinis.
, · (2) Nature of naturalization. - An alien does not have a natural,
-inherent or vested. right to be admitted to citizenship in a state.
Citizenship is a matter of grace, favor or privilege of the most
discriminating, as well as delicate and .exacting nature, affecting as
it does public intere.st of the highest order, and which a sovereign
government may confer on, or withhold from, an alien or grant to
him under such conditions as it sees fit without the support of any
reason whatsoever. 10 (see Cuaki Tan Si vs. Republic, 6 SCRA 545
[1962].)
Citizenship in our Republic, be it ever so small and weak, is
always a privilege; and no alien be he a subject of the most powerful
nation of the world can take for granted such citizenship or assume
it as a matter of right. (Ng Sin vs. Republic, 97 Phil. 988 (1955].) It can
never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. (Re Application for Admission to
the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, supra.)
(3) Construction of naturalization laws. - In view of the above
principles, the rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of
citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and
against the applicant for naturalization. 11 (Cheng Kiat Giam vs.
92 AM. JUR. 651.
10 3 c.J.S. 832-834. .
11In Friva/do vs. Commission on Elections (see Note 9.), the Supreme Court relaxed the
rule. "Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo [elected
Governor of Sorsogonl deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws_ and wh~t~ver
defect there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
x x x And lt Is but right nnd just thnt the mandate of the people already twice frustrated,
11hould now prcvnll. Under the clrcumst:nnccs, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in
tt1•11 tlni1Jll'lvnklo'n roputdntlon ns hnvlna boconio effective ns of the date of his application.
 l \
1072 1Jf 11L1P1'1NJ.J 'ON!:f!'l'l'U'l!l NAL LAW
Principles and Cases
Republic, 14 SCRA 320 [1965]; Ong Chia vs .. Republic, 328 SCRA
749 (2000}.) Naturalization laws are ri:gidly·enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and1 against the applicant.
(Republic vs. Ong, 673 SCRA 485 [2012]; see Republic vs. Karbasi,
764 SCRA352 [2015].)
(4) Ways of acquiring citizenship by naturalization. 12 - A person
may be naturalized in three (3) ways: ..
(a) By judgment of the court or judicial naturalization, - The
foreigner who wants to become a Filipino citizen must apply for
naturalization with the proper Regional Trial Court. He must
have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law, and must coin.ply with all the procedure and
conditions prescribed;13
(b) By direct act of Congress or legislative naturalization. - In
this case, our l~wm'a king body simply enacts an act directly
conferring citizenship on ~ foreigner;14 or
• •
12
N~turalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
c1tizensh1p. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization
as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to.reacquire Philippine citizenspip
must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section
4 of C.A. No. 473. (Sec. 4, C.A. No. 63; Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electo~al
Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001].)
All Philippine citizens who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions provided in R.A. No.
9225, the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." (infra.)
13
~he _Revised Naturalization Act (C.A. No. 473, as amended.) is the present
naturalization law. (see Go vs. Republic, 729 SCRA 138 (2014].)Such law shall also continue
in force pursuant to the transitory provisions of the Constitution. (Art. XVIIL Sec. 3.)
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization
procee~ings shall b!! executory until after two (2) years from its promulgation. (see
Republic vs, Dela Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994].) A naturalization case is a proceeding in
rem.
14Pursuant to Presidential Letter of Instructions No. 270 (dated April 11, 1975, as
a~e~ded_ ~y P.D. No. 491, dated Dec. 29, 1976.), deserving aliens desiring to become
F1hpmo c1tiZens were naturalized by presidential decree after undergoing administrative
screening without h~v_ing to undergo court procedures. A special screening committee
composed of the Solicitor General, Undersecretary •Of Foreign Affairs, and the Director
General of the National Intelligence Service Agency .(NISA) was created to receive, and
consider and submit recommendations on applications for naturalization by (presidential)
decree from aliens.
11
A'N.'l ', •LV. 'l l 11/.l•.N~lJll'
•· (c) By administrative proceedings ·or administrat-ive naturaliza-
tion. - R.A. No. 91-39 (Administ,rative Naturalization Law of
2000) provides for the qualificati@ms and disqualification~ of an
l applicant for naturalization by administrative act. (see So vs.
i.
Republic, 513 SCRA 267 [2007}.)
A fourth optio11, called derivative naturalization, which is
available to alien women married to Filipino husband& is ·found
,under Section 15· of CA Nq. 473. Under the provision, foreign
women who are married to Filipino citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove
that they possess o~er quali!ications for naturalization at the time
of thefr marriage nor. to they have to submit themselves to judicial
naturalization. (Republic vs. Batuigas, 706 SCRA 746 [2012].)
Naturalization may also be effected by a collective ch ange of
nationality as a result of cession, conquest, or unification. The grant
of ·citizenship to a parent extends to minor children under parental
authority. (see C.A. No. 473, Secs. 15, 16.) Similarly, the repatriation
(infra.) of a parent entitles the minor children to Philippine citizen-
ship. (Republic vs. Tandayag, 117 SCRA 637 [1982]; Talaroc vs. Uy,
92 Phil. 52 [1952].)
(5) Certain rights and privileges limited to Filipino citizens. -
Section 1, paragraph 4 which declares as citizens of the Philippines
"those who are naturalized in accordance with law" possesses
great significance. Under our Constitution and our laws, there are
certain rights and privileges that can be enjoyed only by Filipino
citizens. Thus, under the Constitution, only qualified citizens
LOI No. 270 was ad hoc, temporary; it established a deadline for the Committee
to complete its work. While not limited in its application to Chinese, it was obviously
directed at the Chinese residents of the country. Its iss1,1ance was prompted by the
decision to establish diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the People's
Republic of China. ("LOI No. 270 and Naturalization," by Sol. General Estelito P.
Mendoza, IBP Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 265.) Exec. Order No. 460 (Dec. 3, 1997) reactivates
the jurisdiction and authority of .the Special Committee on Naturalization to consider
and evaluate petitions for naturalization of deserving aliens and to recommend action
thereon to the President.
Memorandum Circular No. 112 (March 26, 1990) reactivated the committee but
only for the limited purpose of acting on the pending petitions for naturalization of alien
wives and minor children of persons naturalized by decree.
See R.A. No. 8171, Note 6 to Section 3.
 I 1
l' U IJ , ll 'l'lN /1 ' NS'fJ.'l'U'l'JJUNAl~ J.i\.W 8oc. 2
Ptinciples and Cases
can exercise the right of.suffrage; (Att: ¼•Sec. 1.) No person may
be elected President or Vice.-President j~r; ~ember of Congress, or
appointed member of the Supreme Co.urt or any lower collegiate
court, or mernber of any of the Constitutional Commissions, or of
the central monetary authority, Ombudshlan-or his Deputy unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. (see Art. VII, Secs. 2,
3; Art. VI, Secs. 3 and 6; Art. VIII, Sec. 7[1];'Art. IX-B, Sec. 1(1], IX-C,
Sec. l[l], IX'~D, Sec. 1[1]; Art. XI, Sec. 8; Art. XII, Sec. 20.) From these
positions, naturalized citizens and citizen~ by election are barred by
the Constitution.15 · sentence·of Section 2.
The Constitution is nationalistic in character. (see Art. XII, Secs.
1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 13; Art. XIV, Secs. 4(2], 14, 15, 16; Art. XVI, Sec. it.)
Even the Preamble speaks of""our patrin:wny" and of securing to
ourselves and "our posterity" the blessings of independence and
democracy. · reacquired it is not a natural-born citizen in view of letter (b) above.
SEC. 2. Natural-born citizens are th~se who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citiz~nship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship.in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
15Philipp ine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is n·one other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another i;_lation, sh all govern our people and
country, or a unit of territory thereof. (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA
727 [1996].) The power of Congress to m ake d istinctions or _c lassifications am on g p erson s
on the basis of citizenship is not curtailed or denied 'by .t he equal protection of the laws
guarantee. (see Inchong v s . Hernandez, 101 Phil. t155 [1957).)
' Frivaldo held that Section 39 of the Local Government Code does. not specify any
particular date or ti.me when a candidate must p ossess.citizenship unlike tha t for residence
and age. The citizenship qualification should be possessed when the "elective [or elected]
official" b egins to govern, i.e., at the ti.me be is proclaimed 'and a t the start of his term (on
June 30, 1995). Moreover, the repatriation of Frivaldo [candidate for p,ovincial governor
retroacted to the date of filing of his application for re p!\triation w ith the Office of th e
Presiden t on August 17, 1994.
Under R.A. No. 9225 (i11fm.), those soaking public of(ice in thc,Ph lllpplncu, who re•
ncqulrcd Philippine cltlzcnnhlp 11ndc!' tho Act·, "nhnll xx x nt tho llmo of tho (1111111 ,1r thu
corllflcnto or cnndldncy, n1ftk<1 n purHonnl nnd riwor11 rnm1nct111lon of nny 11ml nil f<m1ln11
clllt,1U\1lhlp lm(mu n1,y p11hll(' ornt ,.,, lllllhtiditifl I() 11rlinlnl11l(II' IH1 onth."
ART. IV. Cl'flZEN SHIP 1075
Kinds -of.citizens under the Constitution.
The citizens of tlie' Philippines may be grouped under four (4)
dasses. 1
.
- ·
.
·· ·
.
(1) Natural-born citizens. - There are two requisites:
(~) They mustk~, at the moment of their birth (see Note 2.),
.al.J;eady citizens of i41:,? :Philippines; and
(b) They do not have to perform any act ~o acq_u ire or perfect
his Philippine cifizenship; except as provided m the second
So a chiid born of Filipino parents, or a Filipino father, or a
Filip~o mother after the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on
January 17, 1973 is a natural-born. cit~z.en. It _would seem that a
natural-born citizen who has lost his c1hzensh1p but subsequently
(see, however, R.A. No. 9225, infra.)
The term includes the citizens mentioned in No. (2) (except
naturalized citizens) and No. (3) below. In effect, all citizens are
natural-born except only those who are naturalized and who
subsE!qm!:htly reacquired their citizenship. The Supreme ~~urt,
however has ruled that if one was originally a natural-born citizen
before h~ lost his citizenship, the act of repatriation allows him to
return to his former status as a natural-born- Filipino. (Bengzon
III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545
[2001].) By this ruling, only naturalized citizens are considered not
natural-born citizens. ·
lthe Bureau of Immigration and Deportation h as the exclusive author~ty and
ju risdiction to try and h ear c~~es against allege~ aliens and}n the,-proc~ss, ~et~r":111'~ ~lso
their citizenship. A m ere claim of citizen ship cannot operate to· divest 1~of its !ur'.sd'.c~on
in deportation proceedings. However, this rule that ~ e B~rea~ h~s. pr1!11ary iu1:sd1ction
over deportation proceedings, admits of an exception, 1.e., JUd1cial rntervention may
be resorted to in cases where -the claim of citize nship is so substantial that ~ere are
reasonable grounds to believe that the claim i.s corr~c~. Incidentally, the Bureau 1s not of.
equal rank as the regional trial court; hence, 1t~ dec.1s10ns may be appealed to and may
be reviewed through special civil action for certioran by the said court. (B.P. Blg. 129, Sec.
21[1]; G'a tchalian vs . Board of Commissioners !CID), 197 SCRA 854 (1991].)
The nllcged subsequent recognition of a p erso~'s natur~l:bom sta~s by the Bur~au
nnd the Department of Justice cannot amend the final decis1~n of a tn al cou_rt stating
1h11t 111,ch lndlvldu ol nncl his moth er were naturalized along with his father. (Kilosbayan
J1011 ntlotlo11 vn. llnnlto, 526 SCRA 353 [2007).)

1076
PHILIPPINE CONST!TUil'lQN,AL LAW
Principles and Cases
(2) Citizens at the timK1of.theJ1§J.optiontoh1fl:ie,17ew.Qo.ns-titution. +
They ,r efer to those who are C?,n~J~tre,d;;9iti~rns of~~ Philippines
under the 1973 Constitution at the tim~ of the. adoption of the 11ew
Constitution. (supra.) · ways and/ or events:
(3) Citiz.ens through ·electiiik ''- ·They. refe~ . to thok~· born of
Filipino mothers before Jariuary ·1:7; 1973 who, ·upoh :reaching the
age of majority, elect Pltilfppme 'citizerl~Wii aftef the fatuication
of the 1973-Constitution (even .prior to ,the .Elffe,qti;vity·ofthe ·new
Constitu9,on.on ;Feb. 2,.1987) pu~su.an~;t.0Jh~:"E?tov.isi9ni,;~f the, 1935
Constitution. 2 (Sec. 1[3].) They are placed 09-,tJ::t,e: sa,m!3._lev,e tas those
born of Filipino.mothers on or after Januacy17, 1973. Their chilp.ren
are also natural-born.
Those bolll_, of Filipino mothe!'S_1:iefore January . 17, 1973 .put
who.failed to ele~t Rhil,ippi.ne citizensl}ip upq,n r~j:\chjng t}le .age .of
majority (see Not~ 5, under Sec. 1.) are ~lier,stb.1:1t they c;an be Filipino
citizens by naturalization. It is elei,ne~taL ¢at n<;i.t ~l .qtj.zens enjoy
all the rights and privileges of a natural-born citizen.. (Pretchard vs.
Republic, 81 Phil. 244 [1948].) . court;1 and
(4) Naturalized citizens. - They refer to those who were
originally citizens of another country, but who, by an int~rv.ening
act (i.e., naturalization), have acquired new citizenship in a different
country.
A child born after his father or mother was naturalized is
natural-born because he is a citizen from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his citizenship.Sectio;n:15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act applies its benefits to,the minorchildren
of the parent who has been naturalized. (Co vs. House Electrical
Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 [1991].)
SEC. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reac~
quired in the manner provided by law. · vs. Ong, supra; Republic vs. Li Ching Chung, 694 SCRA 249 (2013].)
2 . ~ .~ , .. • It ~ ·. . .
Citizens who had elected Philippine citjzenship tU1cleOhe 1935 ~onstitution before
January 17, 197.3 ·a re natural-born citizens underNo1 (2) s\nce frpm their-birth they had
an inchrn1.te right to elect F.ilipino citizenship. 'fhlliI\ electjon•diclnpI .confer- a <;itiz~nship
but ~ erely served to.fix their right to it. They,are citizens by •Qi.rth though.not,.a~th~ tlm~
of )n.rth. It may be argued that Sections 1(3). and 2 ap.ply. <!lso to electiQl'\S· m~d.e before
Januruy 17, 1973 since no distinction is made. . .
l l 1 1 l
.l\ h::l,', 'I V. (. IJ l '/ ,HN ! JI Ill ' 11111
Ways by which citizenship
maybe lost.
A Filipino citizen m·ay
iose his citizenship in any of the following
(1)' Voluntarily; -They are:
(a) by naturalization in a foreign country (See RA. No.
9225, infra.);
(b) by express renunciation of citizenship;
- (c) by subscribing•to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution and laws·of a foreign country; and
(d) by rendering service to, or accepting commission i~1,
the armed forces of a· foreign country (except under certam
circumstances); and
(2) Involuntarily. _:_They are:
(a) by cancellation of his certificate of naturalization by the
(b) by having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter in the Philippine armed forces in time of war. (see Sec.
J, C.A. No. 63,2 as amended by RA. Nos. 106, 2039, and 3839.)
Loss of citizenship by expatriation.
The voluntary loss or renunciation of one's nationality is called
expatriation. The right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of
1The grant of citizenship is never considered res judi~ala: (Labo, Jr. v~. Commission
on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989].) Neither estoppel nor res 1ud1cata may be invoked to bar
the State from initiating an action for the cancellation or nullification of the certificate of
naturalization issued by a court (Yao Mun Tek vs. Rep ublic, 37 SCRA ~5 (1971].), or ~e
reopening of the case to give it another opportunity to present new evidence. (Republic
2Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, governs the manner b y which Philippine
citizenship may be lost and reacquired. It sha~ li~ewise continue t? _be in force pursuant
to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution. But the pro~1~1on of_th,~. law t~ the
, . effect that a Filipino woman married to a foreigner shall lose her citizenship 1f by vrrtue
of the law in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality" is no longer in
il force as it is inconsistent with Article IV, Section 4 of the new Constitution. (supra.)
R.A. No. 9225 (infra.) allows natural-born citizens to retain their citizenship after
being naturalized in a foreign country amending C.A. No. 63 under w~ch, natural-ho~
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of another country automatically loose therr
·1 Philippine citizenship.

1078 PI-IlLlPPlNE CON S'l'l'l'U'l 1IO NAL LAW
Sec. 3
Principles and C~ses
all people. Whether an individual has ewatr-iated himself depends
upon the circumstances of his particular·case.3 (Roa vs. Collector, 23
P1;tll. 315 [1912].) Expatriation may be express or implied. Implied
renunciation of citizenship is not, however, recognized under
C.A. No. 63. Express renunciation usually occurs when a new and
different citizenship is assumed. (Haw vs. Collector, 59 Phil. 612
[1934].)
In the absence of clear evidence that one had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes mentioned above, it cannot be
presumed that he had ceased to be a citizen. (see Aznar vs. Com-
mission on Elections, 185 SCRA 708 [1990], infra.) In times of war, a
Filipino citizen cannot expatriate himself.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
Despite his naturalization as a Filipino citizen, petitioner applied for
.i
and was. issued a Portuguese passport,· and declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.
Facts: The present controversy originated with a petition for
habeas corpus filed with the Supreme Court seeking the release from
detention of the petitioner. The Supl/eme Court resolved to give
the petitioner a non-extendible period of three days from notice
to explain and prove why he should still be considered a Filipino
citizen despite his acquisition and use of Portuguese passport.
Petitioner's own compliance with the Court's resolution
reveals that he was regularly issued a Portuguese passport in 1971,
valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite
his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on
July 21, 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese
passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in
Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport
expired on 20 July 1986.
While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced,
upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all aUegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty"
3
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one's native country is necessarily
a political act, it does not follow that the act .is inevitably politically or economically
motivated. There are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship.
(Tabasa vs. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA 9 [2006).)
l l ll IJ
1079
AR'1'. 1V. C.:l'1'1'.LilN SllUJ
and pledged "to maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republ~c
of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portugues_e m
commercial documents he signed, specially, the Company's registry
of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
Issue: By his acts, did petitioner expressly renounce his Philip-
pine citizenship?
Held: (1) Petitioner expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.
- "To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together
constitute an express '):enunciation of petitioner's Phi!ipp~e
citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners vs. Go Oaltano (25 SCRA 890 [1968].), express
renunciation was held tc:i'mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly artd not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge and legal capacity'. after
having renounced Portuguese citizenship _upon _nat-u.rahzn tion
as a Philippine citizen,4 resumed or teacqmred his pn or statw;
as a Portuguese citizen, · a:Rp!ied for a rene':al of. ~is Portuguese
passports and. representecf -himself a~ such ~~ o~cial. ~ocuments
even after he had become a naturalized Ph1hppme citizen. Such
resumption or reacquisi.tion of .Portu~~se _citiz~~ship ~s ~rossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Ph1hppme c1hzensh1p.
(2) When issue of renunciation may be resolved in non-adversary
proceedings. - "This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pen~ing
hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. H owever, pleadings
submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have
4In Oh Hek How vs. Republic (29 SCRA 94 (1969].), Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion,
speaking for the CciurE, said: "Section 12 of Coirunonwealth~ct No. 473 provides, howev;
er that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall 'solemnly swear,
i:ter a/ia, that he renounces ' absolutely and forever all allegiance and fid elity to any for-
eign prince, potentate' and particularly to the state of whic~ he is a 'subject ~r citizen.'
The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality,_ before
acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise he would have two na~onahties and
owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except_ th~t
pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born F1hp1-
no citizen from one ·of the Iberian and any friendly democrattc Ibero-American countries
shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that country
grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had ~e.e n agr~e~ upon ~y tr~aty between
the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship 1s acquued.
5A passport is d efined as ~ offic_
ial do~ment of ~denti~ ~~ nationality issued t~ a
person intending to travel or so1ourn m foreign countries. (Phihppme Legal Encyct.o pe~1a,
1986 ed., p. 699.) Conformably with the universal conc~~t of a passport, .t he Phihppme
Foreign Service Code, Section 136, provides that a _P hthppme passport 1s a document
certify ing to the Philippine citizenship of the holder m use for travel purposes.
1080 . PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.3
Principles and Cases .
unequivocally shown that petitioner l_,.p,.~. ;expressly ienounced his
Philippine citizenship. The material fa~ts ar~ not only esta;blis~ed
by the pleadings - they are not di~pu~~-~-?Y petitioner. _A rehearing.
on this point with the CID would be.·unnE!cessary and superfluous.
Denial, if any, of due process was bbviated when petitioner was
given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued
Philippine citizenship, but he has failed. .
While normally the question 9£ whether or not a per~on ~as
renounced his Philippine citizenshlp's~ould be heard before a trial
court oflaw in adversary proceedings, f:Flishad become.unnecessary
as this Court, no less, upon the insistenc~ of petitioner, had to look
into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim
to continued Philippine citizenship ~~ ~eritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity
or ware to be displayed when reguired and suppressed when
convenient." (Yu vs. Defensor-Santiqgo, 169 SCRA 364 !1989], through
Justice Padilla.) ·· · serious implications ·of de-Filipinization, the correct proce-
Fernan, C.J., dissenting:
(1) A full-blown trial should have been held. - "The tre~t~ent
given by the majority to the petition cl_oes not meet the traditional
standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner
herein is being effectively depriyed of his -Filipino citizenship
through a summary procedure and upqn pieces of documentary
evidence that, to my mind, are not .sufficiently substantial and
probative for the purpose and coqclu~ion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hu;go E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his
,, dissenting opinion that (c)onsidering the serious implications of
de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be
applied, is appropriate. By this, it IDE;ans a full-blown trial ~der
the.more rigid rules of evidence presc;ribed in court proceedings.
And certainly, the review powers. being ·exercised by this Court
in this case fall short of this req¢rement. Said powers of review
cannot be substituted for the demands of due process, particularly
in the light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is not a
trier of facts."
(2) Evidence relied upon is inadequate. - "I find the evidence on
record relied upon by the majority to be inadequate to support the
conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino citizenship.
Renunciation must be shown by clear and express evidence and
not left to inference or implication."
Sec. 3 · ART.: IV. CITIZEN SHIP 1081
Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissentin'g:
. (1) Pelition f9r: de~~turalization should have been filed and
prosecuted. - "I disa,gree .'Yith the summary procedure employed
in his case to divest a Filipino of his citizenship.
• Judging from th~ r~~ords available to us, it appears that Mr.
Billie Yu is far from being the desirable kind of Filipino we would
!
encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this reason, believe
that a petition for dena~ralization should have been filed and
prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the shortcut ~ethods
we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I must emph~s~ze that
the Bill of Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on
the untrammeled exercise.of government power find their fullest
expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or
undesirable characters;" ·
(2). Petitioner was ~ntitled to a full trial. - "Considering the
dures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a
Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand in the way of
the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where
a person pleads with all his might that ~e ha~ n.ever formally
renounced his citizenship and that he might die 1£ thrown out
;Ij of the country, he deserves at the very least a full trial where the
reason behind his actions may be explored and all the facts fully
ti: I ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr.
Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching
that it should not be left to summary proceeding."
I
r- .
· (3) Summan; administrative determination violates due process. -
"I find it dangerous precedent if administrative officials on such
informal evidence as that presented in this case are allowed to rule
that a Filipino has 'renounced' his citizenship and has, therefore,
become stateless or a citizen of another country (assuming that the
other country does not reject him because he formally renounced
citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately
throw him out of the Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign pass-
port is ipso facto express renunciation of Filipino citizenship. A
Filipino may get a foreign passport for convenience, but h~ rema~s
at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so because he wants to give up his
Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained
in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an
administrative determination of a most summary nature.

• PHILIPPINE CONSTI'ifl:JlfIG>NAL LAW Sec. 3
1082
Principles and Cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the·point. Like any other
Filipino being denaturalized or other.wise deprived ..of citizenship,
he deserves his full day in court. ii. tl;i.erefor~, -r~gretfully. dissent on
grounds of due process." · · ·
Cruz, f., concurring in the result: . · · ' ·· ·
• i l j
. sp~uses at ¢.e time they acquired the property in question from
(1) Petitioner Jailed to overcome. .'the., p;refttmption . .that. he has
forfeited hifi sta.tus as ~ naturalize(i F,iljpiryo dtizen: .~ ''.I concur in
the.result because I believe the peHtioIJ.ei;-1:\as ,failed to ,o:verqome
the presumption that he has forfeited -his .status as a naturalized
Filipino by his obtention of a Portl;l;guese ·pas!lport. Passports are
. generally issued by a state only tQ its matipnals. The petit~_o ner has
not shown that .h e .c omes under th~ exc~ptj.oi;,. and was gr,at,:l;ted the
Portuguese passport despite his PhUippi,ne citizenship.".
(2) Evidence did not· show express.:renun_ciation. - "~egretfully,
I cannot agree with the finding thal the petitioner has e~pressly
.renounced his Philippine cit~zenship. The evidence on this point is
in my view rather meager. Express-renunciation of citizenship as a
mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is .a n unequivocal
and deliberate act with full awar.e ness of its significance and
consequences. I do not think the 'commercial documents he signed'
suggest such categorical disclaimer."
Cortes, J., dissenting:
(1) CID was not divested of jurisdiction by claim of Filipino citizen-
ship. - "I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of
Filipino citizenship in deportation proceedings does not .ipsofacto
deprive the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to judicial
review."
(2) Loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has not been established.
- "However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that
in this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been
establish ed. The evidence on record, consisting of the photocopy
of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that ·
petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport in
1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies of commercial
papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without
authentication by the appropriate Philippine Consul, to my mind,
do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law, petitioner
has lost his Filipino cltize11ship by express renunciation.
I
See. 3 · ART. LV. CITIZENSHIP 1083
I find the-CID's evidence inadequate to create even a prima Jacie
case of s~h renunciation."
•
Note: In Surban vs. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 309 [1993].),
the petitioners, in their petition for review ·on certiorari, raised the
. issue, concerning the l\,merican citizenship of private respondent
the parents of the husband. Dismissing the petition, the Supreme
'Court said: "With respect to the allegation that private respondents
are American citizens, suffice it to say that the Court of Appeals
found no' proof that [they] were no longer Filipino citizens when
they acquired their parents' property in 1979. The determination
.t hat a person has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous and far-
reaching-that it should not be left to summary proceedings. (Yu vs.
Defen~or-Santiago, 168 SCRA 364.) Neither may it be raised as a
collateral issue in a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages,
where it cannot prop(?lY be ventilated."
Reacquisition of lost Philippine
citizenship.
C.A. No. 63 enumerates the three (3) modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
(1) By naturalization, provided the applicant possesses none of
the disqualifications mentioned in the naturalization law;
(2) By repatriation (see R.A. No. 965, No. 2630, No. 81711,6 and
R.A. No. 9225, infra.); and
6R.A. No. 965 and No. 2630 apply only to persons who had lost their citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission to, the armed forces of an allied foreign
country or the armed forces of the United States of America. All they have to do is to take
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
(Angat vs. Republic, 314 SCRA 438 [1999].)
R.A. No. 8171 which has lapsed into Jaw on Oct. 23, 1995, provides for the
repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philipp ine citizenship by marriage
to aliens, and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity. The law did not designate which agency, body, ·
or committee shall determine who are qualified to avail of the benefits of repatriation and
who are disqualified therefrom. Under Administrative Order No. 285, promulgated by
the President on August 22, 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, the petition for repatriation
shall be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. After petitioner has taken
the oath of allegiance, the-Committee shall issue a Certificate of Repatriation and forward
the same together with a copy of said oath to the Local Civil Registrar for regist ration
and another copy to the Bureau of Immigration which shall cancel the Alien Certificate
of Registration of the repatriated citizen. (see Angat vs. Republic, 314 SCRA 438 [1999].)
 1 I
1084 · PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec.3
Principles and Cases
(3) By direct act of the Congress of the Philippines. (Sec. 2, C.A.
No, 63.)
Reacquisition by repatriation.
Repatriation is not .a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted
by the State. (Tabasa vs. Court of ApP,eals, 500 SCRA 9 [2006].)
(1) How effec~ed. - Repatriation is ,effected l;>y merely taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the PhUippines and
registering said oath in the prop.er civil registry7 (S~cs. 2, 4, Ibid.)
in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines (Angat vs. Republic, 314 SCRA 438 [1999].) and in the
Bureau of Immigration which shall thereupon cancel the pertinent
alien certificate of registration (ACR) and issue the certific~tion of
identification as Filipino citizen to the r~patriated citizen. (R.A. NG.
8171.) It requires an express and unequiv9cal 'act, by one who has
abandoned or lost his Filipino citizenship, of formally rejecting his
adopted state and reaffirming his total: and exclusfve allegiance and
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. · a resident of the municipality !'for at least one (1) year immediately
The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy wh~rein petitioner
claimed that he is a Filipino citizen is not a sufficient act of
repatriation. (Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 265
[1989].) Neither may it be accomplished by-election to public office.
(2) Effect. - Repatriation means the restoration of citizenship,
not a grant of new citizenship. It res1;11ts in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. (Bengzon
III vs. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545
[2001].)
7
• • P.D: No. 725 (dat_e d June 5, 1975), amending C.A. No. 63, allows Philippine
atizenship to be reacqu1red through repatriation by (1) Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage (before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution)
to aliens; and (2) natural-born Filipinos, by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by LOI No. 270, headed by the Solicitor General. (see Note 9 to
Sec. 1.)
!:J ' C. 3 Al{!': lV. ' l'J'l1/,liM :ilJH 1
~
10116
(3) Proofofprior citizenship. -A womah who married a foreigner
and desires to be repatriated must prove her Filipino citizenship
J)rior to such marriage. (see Sec. 4.) The mere taking of'oath of
fllegiance is not sufficient for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. A
would-be repatriate shoulq. show by conclusive evidence that he or
ti she has the qualifications to be repatriated. If there is no conclusive
I.
! proof of her citizenship previous to her marriage, the question
can be judicially determined before she can be legally repatriated.
(People vs. Avengoza, 119 SCRA 1 [1982]. )
(4) Citizenship/residency requirement for candidate for public office.
- In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections (257 SCRA 727 (1996].), the
question was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation
on the same day that his term as Governor of Sorsogon began on
June 30, 1985, complied with the citizenship requirement under
Section 39(a) of the Local 'Government Code (R.A. No. 7160.) it
was held that he had, because a citizenship may be possessed even
on the day that the candidate assumes office. But in the case of
residency, Section 39(a) requires that the candidate must have been
preceding the day of the election."8 {See R.A. No. 9225, infra.)
(5) No repatriation by judicial proceeding. - There is no law
requiring or authorizing repatriation by judicial proceedings.
Philippine citizenship may not be declared in a non-adversary suit
where the persons whose rights are affected by such a declaration
are not parties such as an action for declaratory relief, a petition for
judicial repatriation, br an action to cancel registration as an alien.
There is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any
8The status of being an alien and a non-resident alien can be waived either separately,
when one acquires the s tatus of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship,
or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual
may obtain an immigrant visa \ll\der Sec. 13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948
and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-
resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization
under C.A. No. 473, as amended , or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may
reacquire Philip pine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he
waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident aliens. (Coquilla
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002.) In Coquilla, the Supreme
Court ruled that petitioner did not reestablish residence in the country in 1998 when he
came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections by merely securing a Community Tax
Certificate in that year and by "constantly declarlng" to his townmates of his intention to
seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
 (J
1086 • PHILIPPINE CONSTITUtIONAL LAW
Sec. 4
Principles and <:;:ases
person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of
justice to that effect or in regard to hls citizenship. (Jao vs. Republic,
121 SCRA358 [1983].) . _
SEC. 4. Citizens of the Philippin¢s who marry aliens
shall retain their citizenship, unless bY'their act or omis-
to
sion they are deemed, under the law, have r~nounced it.
Effect of marriage of a citizen
to an alien.
Under Section 4, a citizen of the Philippines who marries an
alien does not lose his/her Philippine citizenship even: if by the
laws of his /her wife's /husband's country, he/ she acquires, her /his
natiomi.lity. The provision has no retroactive application.
The exception is where "by their act o~ omission they are;deemed,
under the law, to have renounced their citizenship," such as (under
an existing law) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution and the laws of a foreign country. A Filipino woman
who upon marriage to an alien acquires his citizenship will possess
two citizenships - Philippine citizenship and that of her husband.
Effect of marriage of alien woman
to <J. Filipino.
(1) Filipino citizenship acquired if without any disqualification. -
Under Section 15 of C.A. No. 473, an alien woman who marries a
Filipino, natural-born or naturalized.; becomes a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section
4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently haturalized follows the Philippine citizenship
of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. (Burca vs. Republic; 51 SCRA 248 [1973]; Ang
Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 330 [1975].)
(2) Procedure followed in Bureau .of Immigration for declaration as
Filipino citizen. - It is not necessary for the alien wife of a Filipino
citizen to resort to the procedure in naturalization cases before she
can be declared a citizen by reason of her marriage. Regarding the
steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
J
Sec. 4 ,<-'-1<.T, IV. '.l'l'lZJJN 8l llP !Oil'/
citizen in order to secure recognition of her status as a Filipino
citiz~n, the administrative procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration ii> as follows:
The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified
from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of
C.A. No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which
should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit -~f the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner
does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by Sectio~ 4 fr?m
becoming naturalized Filipino citizens, the Bureau of Ir:nmigrahon
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition.' Judicial reco~rse w ould
be available to the alien wife in case of an adverse action by the
Immigration Commissioner. (Burca vs. Republic, supra; Moy Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 [1971].)
(3) Acquisition of Filipino eitizenship not_ ipso Jae~~- :--- T~~re is
presently no law guaranteeing aliens married to F1hpmo c1hze~s
the right to be admitted, much less to be given p~rmanent_ ~es1-
dency, in the Philippines. The fact of ma~riage of a~ ahe~ to ~ citizen
does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration law
governing the admission and exclusion of al~ens. Marriage of an
alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart
from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as
an alien. (Djumantan vs. Domingo, 240 SCRA 746 [1995].)
Controversy regarding citizenship
of an individual.
(1) Judicial action for declaration of citizenship not allowed. -
Under our laws, there can be no judicial action or proceeding for the
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. It is an incident only
of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy that ·
a court may pass upon and make a p ronouncement relative to their
status. (Burca vs. Republic, supra; Moy ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 [1971].) In fact, there is no SJ?ecific
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceedmg to
declare that a person is a Filipino citizen.
 1088
• PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Principles and Cases
(2) Collateral attack on a person's cifit.enship not allowed: _ An
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through ad' t
attack fo~ its nullity, not through a collateral approach. (See
vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA ~2 [197_0].) Thus, the question of citizenship·
cannot be properly ventilated ma; complaint for quieting of title and
damages against the buyer of land. (Surba,n vs. Court of Appeals
219 SCRA 309 ,[1993].) . ,
(3) Finality_ of decision conclusive oil · question citizenship. _
Th~ ~ule now 1s that where the citizenship of a party in a case is
defimtely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency after
a full-blown hearing and the finding on the citizenship is affirmed
by the ~upreme Court, the decision o'n the matter shall constitute
concl_us1:'e proo~ of such person's cit1zenship, in any other case or
proceed1_ng p~ov1ded that the decision on'the question of citizenship
was obarned rn a~cordance with the procedure prescribed by law..'
(Burca vs. Republic, supra.) · ·
. (~) ~ en issue of one's citizenship may still be- subject· t~ future
ad;udtcatzon. - In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections
(257 S_CRA 727 [1996].), the Supreme Court r uled that decisions
declarmg the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under
~y of th~o~~s reco?nized by law for the purpose. Indeed, if the
issue o~ on~ s c1hzensh1p, after it has been passed upon by the courts,
leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason
wh~ the. gover~~nt should not be precluded from questioning
ones claim to Phrhppine citizenship, especially so when the same
has never been threshed out by any tribunal. (Go Sr vs Ramos 598
SCRA 266 [2009).) ' · · ,
.SEC. _s. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
iThe former ~ule is that where the administrative agency concerned ·shall have
fount as a~ established fact that the applicant ls a Filipino citizen, even if, such finding
may ave een affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal th!! sa
as conclusive on the question of such citizenship. Such a r:sult is c:s~::::~~~
~ar~. con~erned. Instead of according finality and stability to judicial or administr ti
ec1SJons, it engenders confusion and multiplicity of suits. (Ibid.)
Sec.5 Sec.5 J\HT. ! V. 'l'J'lZ Ji N SJ rn~
Dual allegiance of citizens.
Qu::~ Section 5 prohibits more particularly foreign nationals w ho
become naturalized Filipinos from practicing what is called "dual
allegiance," which refers to the continued allegiance of naturalized
citizens to their mother conntry after they have acquired Filipino
citizenship.
(1) Dual allegiance, not dual citizenship, prohibited. - What
Section 5 prohibits is not dual citizenship (see Secs. 1[2], 4.) but
' I dual allegiance of citizens2 declaring it inimical to national interest
I and requiring that it be dealt with by law.3 A Filipino citizen who
' i! also owes allegiance to a foreign conntry may circumvent or negate
r any of the provisions of Article XII on the "National Economy and
Patrimony." In the case of public officers and employees, whether
elective or appointive, dual citizenship may be constitutionally
prohibited by law for, as public servants, they are required to serve
the people "with outmost xx x loyalty" and "act with patriotism"
(Art. XI, Sec. 1.) in the performance of their duties and functions .
(2) Dual citizenship may be regulated or restricted by law. - Dual
citizenship, on the other hand, refers to the possession by a person of
two citizenships, that of his original country and that of the country
where he became naturalized citizen. It is allowed under R.A. No.
9225. (infra.) Our laws cannot control the lpws of other countries on
citizenship w hich may also allow dual citizenship to their nationals.
While it is not per se objectionable, the status of dual citizenship may
be regulated or restricted by law where it is conducive or could lead
to dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to
both countries of wh ich a person might claim to be a citizen.4
2
According to Commissioner Blas Opie, dual allegiance " is larger and more
threatening than that of mere dual citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps,
never insidious." Dual citizenship "is often a function of the accident of marriage or birth
in a foreign soil." (1 ConCom Record 190-191.)
3The provision was addressed mainly to leading members of the Filipino-Chinese
community who continued to maintain their close ties with either the Republic of China
(or Taiwan) or the People's Republic of China on the mainland through massive economic
investments and open political activities there. It was claimed that the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce (FFCCC) was even represented in the Legislative
Yuan of Taiwan.
1::~
·
1
~Section 5 is a declaration of policy and is not self-executing. Sections 2 and 3 of
R.A. No. 9225 (infra.) are not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status
of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
a ve
alter their naturalization. The case of Mercado vs. Manzano (Illus. Case No. 2, infra.) did

1090 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. S
Principles and Cases
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
_1. Responde_nt candidate for Governor, the son of a Filipino father is
registered as an alien.
Facts: Thi~ i~ a petition. for certiorari assailing the resolution ·
of the_ Co~1ss1?n on Ele~tions which dismissed the petition for
the ~1s~ualificahon of private respondent EO as candidate for
Prov11_1cial ??vernor of Cebu Province on the ground of being an
American citizen.
At the ~earing_b~fore the Commission, the·petitioner presented
the follov,:mg exh_i~its: Application for Alien Registration signed
by EO; Ahen Certificate of Registration in the name of EO· Permit
to Re-enter the Philippines; and Immigratjon Certificate of
Clearance. EO, on the other hand, maintained that he is Fili' ·
c't'i 11 . h h . . a pmo
1 ~en, a egmg: t at . e is the legitimate child of a Filipino; that
he i~ a holder of ~ :ah~ and subsisting passport; tha~ he has been
continuously residmg m the Philippin~s since birth and has not
gone out of the country for more than six (6) months· .and that he
has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
Issue: Has respondent lost his Filipino citizenship?
Held:. Pe~tion~r' s contention is not supported by substantial
and convmcmg evidence.
,,(1) There is no _direct evidence that respondent lost his citizenship.
- In the p~oceedmgs before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed
t? presen_t direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these 8:e:_ (1) by ~a.turalization in a foreign country;
(2) by express ren~ciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribin
to a~ oath of allegiance to support the G:onstitution or laws of ~ Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was
foreign country.
I~ ~oncluding that private respondent had been naturalized
as ~ citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely
relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate
~~:::~~~J::;:ie~ers of w~~ con~~tutes ~ual allegiance but merely made a distinction
allegiance Untile:::;.cedan _ual citizenship. Congress still has to enact the law on dual
ing the S . C is one, it co~ld be premature for the judicial department indud-
Adh upreme. ourt,. to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. (Advocates and
erents of Social Justice, etc. vs. Datumanong 523 SCRA 108 [2007] )
the P:de~ Secti~nth12 ofif_C.A. ~o. 473, an appli;ant cannot be naturalized as a citizen of
1ppmes w1 out rst validly renouncing hi f " hi
Republic, 29 SCRA 94 (1969].) s ormer citizens p. (Oh Hek How vs.
1091
Sec .. 5 AR1' IV. CITIZENSHIP
of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the
Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent
is an American and 'being an American,' private responden\ ' must
have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the
U.S. Naturalization Laws.' Philippine courts are only allowed to
determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether
or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the
I
.I United States does not concern us here."
(2) Son of a Filipino father is presumed a Filipino. - "By virtue of
his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private
respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove that private respondent had Jost his Philippine
. citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to
positively establish this fact.
The cases of Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (176 SCRA 265 [1989),) and
.,.
j .
Labo vs. COMELEC (176 SCRA_l [1989).) are not applicable to the
case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized
as a citizen of the United States. Frivaldo expressly admitted in his
answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed
that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect
himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court,
however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable,
pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary
to abandon their status as Filipinos.
married to an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an
Australian citizen. The authenticity of the above evidence was not
disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the
Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the
Court considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are
indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a
foreign state. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently
denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He
1092 PHILIPPINE C ONSTITUTIGNAL LAW Sec. 5
Principles and Cases
is a holder of a v.alid and subsisting )j'hiJippine passport and has
c?ntinuously participated in .the elec_toral process in this coµntry
since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate.
Thus, private tespondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship ·cannot be presum:~d." . ' ·
(3) Certificate that one is an Americ.aµ citizen does not .mean he
is not a Fi~ipino. - "Considering_the fact.that admittedly Osmefia
was both a Filipino and ·an American; the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American \:ioes not mean th.it he is not
still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two
brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother
named Jose, this does not me.a n that-he does not have a brother
~amed M_ario; _o_r if a person is_enrolled as student simultaneously
m two uruversihes, namely Uruversity X and University Y, presents
a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not
necessarily mean that he is not a studer:it of University Y.
In the case of Osmefia, the Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not ·still a Filipino, possessed as he is,
of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there
is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be 'express,' it stands to reason that there can be no such loss
of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either
'express' or 'implied.'"
(4) Provision has no retroactive effect. - "Parenthetically, the
~t~te_m:nt in the 1987 Constitution that 'dual allegiance of citizens
is Ininucal to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law'
(Art. IV, Sec. 5.) has no ·retroactive effect. And wnile it is true
that even before the 198~ Constitution, our country had already
~o~ned upon ~e concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact
is, it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited
proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be
dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted."
(Aznar vs. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 703 [1990], through
Justice Paras.)
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissenting:
Registration as an alien is an unambiguous declaration that one
is not a citizen. -:- "While_ it may be that dual citizenship usually
results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
Sec. 5 AR't'. '1V. 1Tl2ENSI-llP 1093
individual concerned-la~some point in time in his life, involving as
it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was m~de by private respondent when, p 1958,
at the age of 24, and in 19'79, at ·45, he obtained Alien Certificates of
Registration. Registratioh as an alien is a clear and unambiguous
act or declaration that bne is not a citizen. If, in fact, private
respondent was · merely compelled to so register because of the
"uncboperativeness" 'bf• the past regime, he could have, under
the new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of th0se Alien
Certificates arid abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran
for public office in 1988 ... That statement [in Sec. 5] is but a
reaffirmation of an innate ctmviction shared by every Filipino. The
law referred to need not be awaited for one to consider givu,g up
the legal convenience of dual citizenship."
Cruz, J., dissenting:
(1) Terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive. - "It
seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he
is, in effect, affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms 'citizen' and
'alien' are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law,
which is what really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline,
one is either a citizen of the local state or he is not; and the question
is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those of any
other state."
. (2) Renunciation is not necessarily dependent on naturalization.
- '"Express renunciation' is a sepa.rate mode of losing Philippine
citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on 'naturalization in
a foreign country,' which is an0ther and different mode. When a
person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage,
he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable
fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom he has totally
and solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he
protests he married a second.time simply for material convenience
and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At
worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character."
(3) Respondent expressly renounced his dtizenship by choosing
to register as an American citizen of his own free will. - "If the
government had confined himself to simply seeking and using an
American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone
constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem,
though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What
ll IJ J
1094 PHlLlPPlNE 'ONS'l'lT UT!O NAL LAW
Sec. 5
Principles and Cases
he actually did was register with the Philippine government as an
alien within its own territory presumably so he could be insulated
from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a
voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he ..;,as not required ·
to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own
free w~l~. Bf this decision, h,e categoricapy asked. the Republic of
the P~hppmes to ~ea:
h~ ,as .an American and not a Filipino,
choosmg to be an ahen m this land that was willing to co1,1Sider him
its own."
(4) No particular form is requiredfor express renunciation. - "C.A.
?3
N~. ~oes ,n_ot nec:ssarily require tliat the express renunciatio~ of
Phihppme citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization
of the :rstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be
made independently of naturalization proceeding. Moreover, no
sacram~n~al words are prescribed by the statute for the express
:enuncrah?n of Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation
1s ca~egoncal en~ugh and the preferenee for the foreign state is
urumstakable, as m the case at bar,, Philippine citizenship is lost."
(5) "Filipino citizenship is a gift that must be deserved. - "The
private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can
n~ver be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a
gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines, for all
her modest r~sources compared to those of other states, is a jealous
and P?ssessive _mother demanding total love and loyalty from
her children. It 1s bad enough that the Jove of the dual national
is _shared witJ:i _an~ther state: ':hat is worse is where he formally
reiects the Philippines, and 111 its own territory at that and offers
his total devotion to the other state. ' cannot be underestimated. For, if private respondent believed that
I am aware of the praise-worthy efforts of Gov. Osmefia
to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the
corru_n:nda~le record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the
ad~stration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not the
pomt. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office
~! pers~~ who, although supported by the electorate, is not a
Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot ignore."
Padilla, J., dissenting:
(1) How express renunciation is made. - "As held in Board of
Immigration Co7;1-m_issioners vs. Go Callano (125 SCRA 890 [1968].),
express renuncration means a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
/\ l{'l '. l V. ' I J 11/.liN!JI ILI'
('
. Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual
citizenship holder - like the private respondent - of age, and
with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies
with the Philippine Government for registration as an alien, insofar
as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And
because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be
considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration
authorities issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 dated November 21, 1979, Permit to Re-
enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated November 21, 1979, and
Iml.tligration Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated January
3, 1980."
(2) Documents issued were predicated on proposition that
respondent was an alien. - "All the foregoing documents issued by
- the Philippine irturtigration authorities to the private respondent
1' at his request are predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
\:_ mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bat~
private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born
Certificate of Residence. This document is again predicated on
the proposition that private respondent is a duly-registered alien
(American) residing in the Philippines."
(3) Other documents. - "Another relevant document that
merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed
and signed by private respondent, again under oath, and verified
from the records at the CID, wherein private respondent expressly
stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document
he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application
for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every Filipino citizen
to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that
private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-entry
Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an
i
abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continues to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.
I
; It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private
respondent had already [first] registered as an alien with the Bureau
f
I
of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950. (R.A. No.
562.)
J
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken,
in my view, as an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship,
II IJ l IJ IJ
1096 n -ULlIJl''lNlJ CONSTl'l'l!'.l'l'i NAJ., LAW
Principles and Cases
11 ,
bec_au~e .(1) at that time; ~e was almosf2_1 ·years old •- the'age of
ma1onty, and (2) more importantly, uhder the applicable Alien
Registration Act (R.A. No. 562.), an aiien 14 years or over has to
register in person ·(and not through hkparents or guardian')."
(4) Acts ~! express renunciation were done right in. the Philippines.
-:-."If all. the foregoing acts of exp~e~s renunciation of Philippine
c1tizensh1p had been made or filed by private ' respondent
elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could
perhaps be some room for contention that vis-ct-vis the Philippine
Government, private respondent had ri.ot renounced his Philippine
citizenship. But said acts of express -renunciation were filed with
the Philippine Government and done right in the Philippines.
In tur~,. the Philippine Government, through the immigration
authorities, accepted and acted ,o n private respon~ent's aforesaid
representations, and. registered and· documented him· twice as an
alien under Philippine law."
(5) Dual citizen has to make · a' :choice. - 1'Dt1al ·citizenship,
in my considered opinion, musCbe eschewed. While having the
'best of two (2) worlds' may be the res.ult of birth or other factors
accidentally brought about, the' dual-citizen' has to make a choice
a! o:ie time or another. Having two_(2) citizenships is, as I see it,
similar in many ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when. as a
matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1)
spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield, in their book on Immigration Law and
Procedure,5 state: ·
'Dual nationality is universally recognized as an
undesirable phenomenon. ~t inevitably results in questionable
loyalties and leads to international conflicts . . x x x. Dual
nationality also makes possible -tl,1e u~e of citizenship. as a
?adg~ of con~enience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it
irnpaus the singleness of commitment which.is the hallmark
of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to
choose his own nationality, and this choice should be honored
by aHcountries. However, he should not be entitl~d to claim
more than one nationality. 111
(6) Respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice. -, "Private
respondent-made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked
5
Vol. 4, Nationality, pp. 11-12 (1989),
ll
Hm •, ! 1 1\ 10 , I V1 l 111 ;,UN I Ill '
the Philippine Gov.emme;ttt - which, dike many o~r countries,
considers dual allegianee as against national or public interest -
to ~egister l:µm at least twice (and, tl;i.erefore; unmistakably) as an
alien in this country:. That choice.pro tanto was a renunciatiorrnf his
Philippine.citizenship. 'iFhe choice must be respected as a conscious
and kpowledgeableiact of a,discerning, distinguished and respected
person who must he presumed to have known the full import of his
acts."
(7) Majority ruling is. inconsistent with Labo case decision. -
"Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that
it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in
Labo, Jr. vs. Commissioh on Elections (supra.), I see no valid justification
for holding Mr. Labo an alien under Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority
states: 'In fact, in a number of sworn statements; Labo categorically
declared that he was a citizen of Australia! And that is exactly
what p~ivate respondent .did. In a number of sworn statements, he
declared that he was a citizen of the United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, 'so be it, you are an Australian,' yet
to the private respondent,' despite such sworn statements that he is
a U.S. citizen, the Court says, 'never mind those sworn statements,
you are still a Filipino.' Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is
sauce for the gander. 1he doctrinal ·basis of the Court's decisions
should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really make
no difference."
Sarmiento, J., concurring:
(1) Respondent acquired American citizenship not by choice.
- "The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has
acquired American citizenship, only that he did not necessarily
lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however,
inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I find that there
is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by
naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63;
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, supra; Labo vs. COMELEC, supra.) If he,
however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli,
it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not
lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born of Filipino
parents."
1098
-
PHILIPP INE CON S"Jil1'(LrnoNAL LAW
Principles and Cases
(2) €':essation ofrespondent's citizer;:ship :cannot be presumed.1~ "In
the,absence of eviden<i:e,we,canrnoy1presu:rµe.'thathe.ha:d ceased to
be. a citizen ,of the,.Philippittes,, simpl:5!.'.becaµse ,he is;,aUhe·Same
time, a cit:ize~ !O~ ~:-U~t~d:Sta~es, ~~e:~ust· be a :clear.'s'howing
that he lost-his Fihpmo citizenship qy•afyy,,gfthe,mea.n s·em:imefated
by Commonwealth ;Acl No;,63.·'.Fh~,J~:ct::thaf,J:te,had obtained an
alien certificate of registration, standing:aione~ does riot ,a mount to
'express renunciation."' · ·
~- Private respond~nt. was sou,gM ((o ,be:di;qu.qlified as a candidate
for Vice-Mayor ofMaka.ti City for bei1J.8tfl duql cjtizen.
Facts: The proclamation of priv,ate respondent EBM was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed
by a certain EM who alleged that EBM was not a. c.itizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.. The COMELEC's Second
Division granted the petition anc;f.o.r.d ered,the cancellation of the
c~~tificate of candidacy of EBM on_the ground that he is a dual
citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
persons ~ith ~ual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elect!~~ ~ffice. The Comelec En Ba~~ reversed the ruling of the
Second D1V1s10n and declared EBM quali.(ied to run for Vice-Mayor
of the City of Makati on the May 11, 1998 ele~tions.
The petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the aforesaid
resolution of the COMELEC En Banc and to declare EBM
disqualified to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
Issue: Is dual citizenship ground for disqualification for any
elective position? · •
. f!eld: No. The disqualification of private respondent Manzano
1s being sought under Section 40 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (RA. N.o. 7160.), wh.i':11 declares as "disqualified from running
for. any el~c.tive. !~cal position: ... (d) Those with dual citizenship."
This prov1s10n 1s incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.
. .(1) Dual citizenship different from dual allegiance. - "The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a ~ational by the said states.· For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus 'sanguinis is born in ~ state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without
I.I .,
A l ~ H I V, l 111 1 I I' ll I ll ' II d
any voluntary act on his· part, is concurrently considered a citizen
ofaboth states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV.) of our
Constitution, 'it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
to
Phiiippines possess dual citizenship: ,
(1) Those born or'
Filipino fathers and/ ?r m?thers in
foreign countries whiqh follow the principle of ;us sol!;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers
and alien fathers if by the laws of their father~s country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the la!ter's
country the former anfconsidered citizens, unless by t~:1r ~ct
or omission they are deemed to have renounced Ph1hppme
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citize~ of the
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constih1tional provisions of citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual's volition."
(2) Constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegia~ce.. -
"With respect to dual allegiance, Article IY, Sec. S of the Cons~tut~on
provides: x xx This provision was included in the 1987 Cons_htuti?n
at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its
necessity as follows:
'xxx xxx
What we would ·like the Committee to consider is to take
constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance..For
example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections
of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about.600 chapters all over the country. There
is a Peking .ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known
is the fact that the Filipino~Chinese community is represented ·
in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan.
And until recently, the s ponsor might recall, in Mainland
China in the People's Republic of China, they have the
Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein
 1 l llLlPPJ N .Ll 'l)N "l'J'J'U'l'l N A I , l.,AW
Principles ru~d Cases
all of Southeast Asia including .some European: and Latin
countries were represented, whi~ was -dissolved after several
years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Pilipino-
Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, .therefore, I speak of
this unsettled kind of allegiance of-Filipinos, ,of. cifizens who
are alr~ady FijJpin.os but who, by .thi::ir acts, may be said to
be bou~~ by a•.sec~>n~,a)le~~c~11~thfr.t9 .P.~~g,o~ Taiwan.
.~~l?~~~~f.<L~Y
1 alsc> took c~ose l)qte 'ot, tl1~--l~q~~~.,~ - some
Commissioners yesterday, mclu~mg Commissioner Villacorta,
· who were concerned about the lad< of guarantees· of thorough
assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who
has always been worried about.minority claims ort our natural
resources.
•, . Dual allegiance, can actually s~phon scarce national capital
, to, Taiwan,. Singapore, China or Malaysia,. and this is already
h,a ppening. Some of the great-commercial ,p laces in -d owntown
Taipei are· Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese - it is
of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capHal
outflows when we have to endure a capital famine which a:lso
means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and
social unrest. x x x' "
(3) Concern about double citizenship with its attendant risk of
double allegiance. - "In another session of the Commission, Ople
spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:
'x x x In the course of those debates, I think some noted
the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these
naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October
10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government may be just to enter into
tli.e spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun
Yat-Sen Republic is commemorat.e d. And so, I h ave detected
a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with
its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to
our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the
Committee said that this could be Jeft to the determination of
a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem,
the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let
J\ l{'i', I V, 'I I l/.llN:11 Ill ' 11111
us say, potentially gr~at numbers of_ double citiz_ens professing
double allegiance; will the Comm1tte~ enter~a1? ~ proposed
amend.ment at the proper time that will prohibit, m e~ect, or
regulate double citizenship?'"
(4) Concern of Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizenship per se. - "Clearly, in includ_ing_ Sec. 5 in Ar~ic~e IV on
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Comm1ss1on was
not with dual .citizens per se but with n aturalized citizens wh_o
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase 'dual citizenship' in RA. No.
7160 Sec. 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Sec. 20 must be understood
as r:ferring to "dual allegfance." Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. ~nlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the terminatio~ of_ their status'. ,for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice 1£, upon the flhng
of their.certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states.
As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most pe;ceptive ~embe~s ~f
the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship 1s
just a reality imposed on us because we have ~o cont~ol of th:_la_ws
on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of F1hpmo
i.
'. mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control.' "
(5) Filing of certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship. - "By electing Philippine citizenship, such
· candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which th ey are also citizens and thereby termi_n ate their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the pomt of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual had not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on Sec. 40(d) between Senators Enrile and
Pimentel clearly sh ows. x x x This is similar to the requirement that
an applicant for naturalization must renounce 'all allegi~nce ~nd
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovere1g~ty of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be 1Ssued
a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. x x x
However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and
' i
1102 . PHILIPPlNJJ CONST1TU'f10NAL LAW !::lcc. o
Principles and Cases
in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's
certificate of candidacy, filed on Ma.rch 27,. 1998, contained the
following statements made under oath,
XXX XXX
To recapitulate, by declaring in _his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental' -reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of·this co.untcy are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to
the Philippines, when considered with_the fact that he has spent
his youth and adulthood, receive~ l;iis education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be takeDc ~pon the faith that he will fulfill
his undertakings made under oath, Should he betray that trust,
there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In
Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago (169 SCRA 364 [1989].), we sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was ·a Portuguese national.
A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship." (Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 [1999),
through Justice Mendoza.)
Retention and reacquisition of citizenship.·
Filipinos abroad may now acquire dual citizenship. 6 R.A. No.
9225, the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003"
6
Almost 89 countries allow some form of dual, multiple citizenship, in~luding the
United State, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Switzerland, Germany, Ireland,
Russia, Cambodia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and 14 out of 17 Latin American nations. Even
such staunch nationalistic countries as Israel and Cuba allow their citizens to retain their
citizenship after being naturalized in another country.
1\1{' 1~ IV, ' I I li',HN : I II I' IIUI
~
(approved August 29, 2003.) declares it the policy of the State that
. all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of the Act.7
(1) Retention of Philippine citizenship. - Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citize;:ts of a foreign country are deemed to
have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Repµblic:
"I _ _ _ _ _ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
_.J
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal ~r~er~ pro:11utgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Ph1hppmes; and. I hereby
declar~ that I recognize an_d accept the supreme authonty of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance there~o;
and that I impose this _obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
The natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of the Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath,8
7Administrative Order No. 91, series of 2004, authorizes the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) as the implementing agency, to promulgate and issue rules and regulations to
implement R.A. No. 9225. Under Memorandum C_ucular_ ~o. _AFF _o~-002 (_effective Nov.
2 2005) which contains the revised rules goverrung Philtppme citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225 and Administrative Order N o. 91, a former natural-born Philippine citizen who
is in the country shall file a verified petition for retention/ ~eacquisition of P~!PP~e
citizenship with the Bureau of Immigration; if abroad, with the nearest Phihppme
Foreign Post.
8The oath is an abbreviated reparation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship
and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to the
certain conditions imposed In Section 5 of the Act (i.e., No. 3, infra.; Sobehana-Condon
vs. Commission on Elections, 678 SCRA 267 [2012); see David vs. Agbay, 753 SCRA 526
[2015].) . . . .
The Jaw benefits millions of overseas Filipinos (more than 2 millions 11\ the Uruted
States alone) majority of whom embraced foreign citizenship, not as~ ~atter of free will,
but mainly for economic reasons or for broadening career oppor~ru~es for themse_lves
and their families, and still maintain their allegiance to the Ph1hppmes and continue
to retain their links with their native land. Proponents believe that the measure would
heighten Interest among Filipino citizens In the country's political, social, and economic
affairs, and boost investn,ents and domestic tourism.
 AlZ'l'. 1V.. '1T11/,HNSU IL' lll1~
1104 . PHlLIPPlNE CONSTlTlJTIQNAL LAW Sec. 5 Sec. 5
Principles and Cases

Act imposes no residency requireme,nt;on the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship issuap.c~ of a·BI registered alien.
(2) Derivative citizenship. - The i.uilii.arried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 1~ years of age; of those
who re-acquire Philippine citizenship· up~n effectivity of the Act
shall be deemed citizens of the Philipp~e.s:~ ·
(3) Civil and political rights and Iiabiffties. - Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship \iHdei the Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing·laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
(a) Those intending to ex~rcise their right of suffrage
must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, R.A. No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(b) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
swor~ ren~nciation of_ any and all foreign citizenship before any
pubhc officer authorized to administer an oath;10
(c) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and its duly constitutecl,authorities prior to their assumpttori of
office. They must renoqr\.ce their oath.of allegiance to the foreign
country where they took that ~ath;
(d) Those intending. to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage- irl such practice; and ·
(e) The righffo vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines Gannot be exercised by, or extended to,
those who:
(1) are candidates for or are occupying any public office
in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/
or
(2) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
of which they are naturalized citizens. (Secs. 2-5, R.A. No.
9225.)
-oOo-

9
• , A.child _who i~ 18 years of age or above at the time of the.parent's reacquisition of
Phihpp~e citizenship but was born when either parent was still a Filipino citizen, shall
be considered to have been a natural-born Filipino and may apply for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship on his/her own behalf. (Sec. 15, Memo. Cir. No. AFF. 05-002.)
. 1°The filing of the certificate of candidacy does not- ipso faclo amount to a renuncia-
tion of the candidate's foreign citizenship. (De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections 590
SCRA 149 [2009].) The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit
duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer•oath. (Sobehana-Condon vs. Com-
mission on.Elections, supra.) The twin requirements of swearing- to an oath of allegiance
and executing .a. ~nunciatio~ of foreign citizenship in.R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to a
natural-born F1hpmo who did not subsequently become a naturalized alien of another
country. (Cordova vs. Commission on Elections, 580 SCRA 12 [2009].)
The act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is fatal
to a person's bid for public office, as it effectively imposes on him a disqualification to
run for an_el~ctive positi?n· He reverts to his earlier status as a dual citizen. (Maquiling
vs. Comrruss1on on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 [2013). It is a positive declaration that one is
a c!tizen of the country which issued the passport. Anyone who seeks to run for a public
office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. (Ibid., 700 SCRA 367 (2013).)
IJ I.I
Arti'cfe
. v··.. ·
'. ' '
SUFFRAGE
SECT~ON 1. S,uf;fr~ge m;iy l:ier~~~i~is~{by ~ltizens all
o~ th~ Philippi~e~ not otherwise disqualified by law, who
. are a't least eighteen years of agl\ an:d who .shall 'have re-
sided in the Philippines for a.t lea~t one ·y~ar ail~. in t~e
place wherein they propose to ,v:ote for .at least six months
-imtnediately prec~ding the election. •No literacy, property,.
· •tlr other substantive requirement_shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage. · · ··· ·
The,ory. of:popular sovereignty.
Theoretically but fundamentalL¼. the people combined represent
~e sov~reign power of the State. In practice, however, sovereignty
1s exercised by the electorate and tho_se chosen, directly or indirectly,
by them - the elective and the appointive officials. Republicanism,
in so far as it implies the adoption · of a representative type of
government (see Art. II, Sec. 1.) necessarily points to the enfranchised
citizens as the ultimate source of established authority. (Moya vs.
Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 [1939].) ·
Suffrage, therefore, is the embodiment of the popular will; it is
the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The protection
and preservation of this right ensure that the State derives its power
and authority from the consent of the governed.
Meaning of suffrage.
Suffrage is the right and duty1 to vote of qualified citizens in the
1
It is not a _co~titutional obligation the exercise of which may be compelled by law.
The ~~73 Constitution _(Art. V, Sec. 4 thereof,) imposed the "obligation" on "every citizen
~ualified to vote to ~gister and cast his vote." Note that Section I uses _the word "may" as
m the 1935 charter tn place of the word "shall" in the 1973 Constitution. Election boycott
1106
.,
11()1
election of certain naµonal and local 0fficets of the government and
in the decision .of public questions submitted to the people. Thus,
it includes not only electiol'.\ J,ut also the other forms by which the
people determine particular 1ssues.
Nature of suffrage,
(1) -A constitutional right. - Suffrage is not a natural right of
the dtizens. It-is not a necessar.y accompaniment 0£ citizenship. It is
granted to individucrls ort~y. upon the fulfillment of certain minimum
·conditions deemed essential for.the welfare of society. The theory is
that suffrage is a pri~ilege; 11gtanted by the State to such persons or
classes as are most likely-to exercise it forthe public good." (People
vs. Corral, 62 Phil. 945 f1936J.~:-
Suffrage is an attribU:te ofdtizenship reserved only to Filipinos.
It is now a right conferred. by the Constitution evolving from a mere
statutory right, beyond the power of Congress to withhold or take
away, although subject to its power to prescribe disqualifications
for voters and procedural· requirements designed to regulate its
exercise.
(2) A political right. - In the sense of a right conferred by the
¢onstitution, suffrage is classified as a political right, enabling every
citizen to participate in the process of government to assure that
it derives its powers from the consent of the governed. (Pungutan
vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 1 [1972].) It is ancillary to the principle of
republicanism enshrined in Section 1 of Article II.
The modern conception of suffrage is that voting is a function
of government. It is the expression by the people of their sovereign
will. Aliens are thus excluded from suffrage. (People vs. Corral,
supra.)
(3) A .personal right. - Suffrage is personal to every qualified
voter; hence, its exercise cannot be delegated to another. To insure
the freedom of voters in the exercise of the right of suffrage, Congress
as a form of political protest ca_ n no longer be punished by law. During the period of
martial law, failure to register and vote without jus t cause was made a punishable offense
(see P.D. No. 210 and 229.) to compel the people to vote and thus give color of legitimacy
to elections, plebiscites and referenda which were publicly perceived to be dishonest and
fraudulent.

1108 • PHILIPPINE CONSTI1'U1'!0NAL LAW Sec. 1
Principles and Cases
is m~dated to provide a system for sedu1.1ing.the secrecy and the
sanctity -of the ballot. . .. .... · ·.
.. ~ ~ . f.
Scope of suffrage.
Suffrage includes:
it
(1) Election. - Strictly speaking; is the m~ans ·by which the
people choose their officials for definite •and fixed perioals and to
who1:' they entrust, for the time being-as -their representatives, the
exercise of powers of government . (Gar.chitorena vs. Crescini 39
Phil. 258 [1918].); .. ___ ' suffrage, is essential to the exercise but not to the possession thereof.
_ (2) !'lebisci:e. - . It is the nan:ie -9iven to a vote of the people
expre~smg their ch01ce for or against a proposed law or enactment
subrr:11tted to ~em. In the Philippines; the' term is applied to an
electi~n a_t w~1ch an~ proposed .~ endni.~ut to., or revision of, the
Constitution 1s submitted to the people ~or their ratification. (Art.
XVII, Sec. 2.) · ·· ·
Plebiscite is likewise required ,by·the Constitution to secure the
approval of ~e people dir.ectly affectect, before cer~ain proposed
changes affecting local government units may be implemented (Art.
X, Secs. 10, 11, 18.);
(3) Referendum: - It is the submi~i,J_<?n of~ law, _oi: part thereof
passed by th: na~1?na~ <?r local le&isfat~ve:.bC?,<;!Y · to·.tl).e qualified
voters for their ratification or rejection (see j\rt. VI, Sec. 32.)j ·
(4) Initiative. - It is the process ·whereby th~
p~ople directly
propose_ and enact laws. Congress is mandated. by the Constitution
to provide as ~arly as possible for· a system of initiative ·and
refe~endum. (Ibid.) Amendme11.ts fo the-Constitution· may'likewise
be directly proposed by the people,through initiative (Art XVII s
2.); and . , ec.
(5) Recall. ~ It is a method by which a public officer may be
removed from office during his tenure or before the expiration of his
term by a vote of the people after registration of_a petition signed by
a required percentage of the qualified voters. (see Art. X, Sec. 3.)
Qualifications of a voter.
They are as follows:
(1) He is a citizen (male or female) of the Philippines;
(2) He is not otherwise disqualified by law;
111r1
Sec. .l
(3) He is at least 18 years of age; and
• (4) He has resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and
in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) mo:r;i.ths
preceding the election.
Congress cannot modify or add to the above qualifications
although it may provide.for certain disqualifications.
~egistratlon of qualified :vot~rs.
Registration, as a pre-condition for the exercise of the right of
The provision of law requili?g registration cannot, therefore, be
co~strued as adding to the qu~1ifications of a voter prescribed under
Section 1. In other words, registration is not a condition essential to
be a "qualified voter." The.r_ight to vote must be possessed before
registration; the latter does npt confer it. (Aportadera vs. Sotto, 3
SCRA 626 [1961]; see Yra vs. Albano, 52 Phil. 380 [1928].)
r Registration of voters i~ -~-procedural ~equirement. Only those
who are "qualified voters" as prescribed in Section 1 may be
r~gistered.
( I ;
!
' Age qualification.
A voter must be at least 18 years of age on the day of voting.
One is 18 on his 18th birthday. (s~e Art. 13, Civil Code.) He may,
however, register as a voter before his 18th bir_thday.
Obviously, there must be some minimum age for voting.
No one., no matter how ardent his belief in democracy, has ever
contended that human being~ m.ust be permitted to participate in the
selection.of public officials fron:, the day of their birth. This suffrage
qualification is based on the assumption that under a certain age,
human beings do not have ~e maturity, experience, education, and
sense of judgment that will enable them to vote with any reasonable
degree of intelligence. ·
No general agreement exists as to the exact age at which the
individual supposedly attains the maturity sufficient for political
participation. While there is a minimum vote age in every state, no
country, however, has as yet seen fit to set a maximum age limit.1
2 SCHMANDT & STEINBICKER, op. cit., p. 249.
1110 . PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Sec. 1
Principles and :cases
.Re~ldent·e quallficatloi1;
The requirement as to residence. is des(ra't,le in order that
registration lists may be prepared and ch.ecked in ample time .to
prevent fraud.3 . notwithstanding, it continues to be fhe domicile of that person.
. (1) Period ·of re~i~en~e, - A voter.must hav:e been a. permanent
resident of the Philippines for at least .one· (1) year preaeding the
election.
Six (6) months residence in a pi'bvince, city, or municipality
':here ~e. prop?ses to vote is considered the minimum length of
time within which a person can adequately familiarize himself with
~e nee~s and conditions and the personalities of the locality. Giving
him a nght to vote before that period, ~t is contended, will result in
unpurposive and mechanical voting.
(2) Place ofresidence. - The term "residence" is to be understood
not in its common acceptation as 'referring to "dwelling" or
"habitation" but rather to "domicile" or "legal residence." (Coquilla
vs. Commission on Elections, 385 SCRA 607 [2002]; see Ang Kek
Chen vs. Calasan, 528 SCRA 124 [2007].) As used in the election law,
the terms "residence" and "domicile" are synonymous. A person
can have but one domicile at a time. (Limbona vs. Commission on
Elections, 555 SCRA 391 (2008].)
(a) In at least three (3) cases d~cided prior to and after the
1935 Constitution, the term "residence" has been interpreted as
synonymous with domicile which imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place
coupled with cdnduct indicative of such intention. In other
words, where there has been a charige of residence, there must
be an_iritention to r~main_(animus manendi) in his present place
of residence and ah rntention to abandon (animus non revertendi)
his _former residence'. (see Nuval vs.
Guray, 52 Phil. 645 [1928];
Gallego vs. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 [i941]; Faypon vs. Quirino 96
Phil.194 [1954].) · '
(b) the framers of the 1987 Constitution adhered fo the
~adier d~finition givE:n to the word "residence" which regarded
it as havmg the same meaning c\s ddmicile. the term "domicile"
3 ' ' •
JACOBSEN and LIPMAN, op. cit., p. 82,
111 1
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent for
business or pleasur~, one intends to return. The absence of a
person from said permanent i;es.i~ence, no matter ho"'i long,
In other woi;qs, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi.4
(Co vs. House EleGtoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991]; Ong
Huan vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967].; Ujano vs. Republic, 17
SCRA 147 [1966].) A beach house is at most a place of temporary
relaxation; it can hardly be considered a place of residence. (see
Dumpit-Michelena vs. Boado, 275 SCRA 790 [2005].)
(c) A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It
is usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues
until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile,
his domicile of choice by being naturalized in a foreign country,
(Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections, supra.) It has been ruled
that immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard"
(which entitles one to reside permanently in that country),
constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With
more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result
in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. (Caasi vs.
Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 229 [1990].)
(d) The requirement of permanent residence or domicile
should refer only to the residence qualification of "at least cine
year" in the Philippines. Thus, one temporarily residing in a
municipality for six (6) months or more, may vote either in the
said municipality or in his domicile or residence of origin where,
despite his absence, the intention to return (animus revertendi) to
the latter place has not forsaken him.
(e) Congress may, by law, provide for a system of absentee
voting. (see Sec. 2.)
4
Three (3) rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) a person must have a residence
or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; ,ind
(3) a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time. (Romualdez vs. Regional
Trial Court, 226 SCRA 408 (1993).) To successfully effect a transfer of domicile, one
ffil\St demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which
correspond with the purpose. That must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
rever/endi. (Romualdez vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 [1995); Asistio vs.
Aguirre, 619 SCRA518 [2010],)
1112 . PI-IILIPPINIJ CONSTrI;U'nDNAL LAW
Principles and Cases
{3) Dual citizens. - There is no, F!O:Vi~ion in R.A. No. 9225,
the dual citizenship law (see Art. IV.) requiring duals to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines just before
they can excuse the right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. No. 9225, iri
implicit acknowledgment that they are- most likely non-residents,
grants under its Section 5(1), the same_.~i&ht.of suffrage as gr;mted
as absentee voter under R.A. No. 9189. (infra.) "Duals" may now
exercise the right of suffrage through the•absentee voting scheme
and as overseas absentee voters, {Nico1as~Lewis vs. Commission on
Elections, 497 SCRA 644 [2006].) ·
Persons disqualified to vote.
The responsibility of determining . who may be "disqualified
by ·law," and, therefore, may be preclµ9-ed from exercising the
right of .suffrage, is left by the Constitution to Congress. Such dis-
qualifi:catkms, however, should not be. in the nature of additional
qualifications. Disqualifications would rE?fer to .any of the grounds for
the deprivation, loss, or forfeiture of the right of suffrage.
As to who are disqualified to vote; the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 118.) eri.utnerates them as follows:
(1) Any person who has been senten~ed by final judgment to
suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year, such disability
not having been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
But such person shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon
expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;
(2) Any person who has been adjµdged by final judgment
by competent court or tribunal of hav;ng committed any crime
involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms
laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his
full civil and political rights in accordance with law. Such person
shall likewise automatically regain his right to vote upon expiration
of five (5) years after service of sentence;5 and
'"Presidential Decree No. 1290 repealed Presidential Decree No. 1052 which
temporarily disqualified any person detained for subversion or other crimes against
national security from exercising the right to vote or to be voted for public office in view
of doubts expressed as to its constitutionality. Indeed, even a formal accusation before any
court or tribunal for the commission of a crime cannot lie considered a pri17!aJacie evidence
!:, C::, 1 /\ 1'\'J', V. bU l•l'l(A l :n 1111
(3) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent
authority. · · ·
The above persons are _n ot qualified to vote even if they ha-ve the
necessary qualifications.
Reasons for setting disqualifications.
Apart from poss~;sing the necessary qualifications, a v~ter
must not suffer f~Oil:f .a!1-Y disqualification. The reasons for setting
4isqualifications for _the exercise of the . right of suffrage are
elaborated in a case, viz.:
"The modern conception of suffrage is that voting ~s a
£unction of government. The'right to v~te is ~o: a natural n ght
but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a pnv~lege granted ~y
the State to such persons· or classes as are rrtost hkely t? exercise
it for the p~blic g9od. In the early stages of the e_voluhon of_ the
represen_tative system of government, ~e exercise ?f th~ right
of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants.
But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the
franchise in the moq.ern states has come to embrace the mass of
the adult male population. For reasons of public policy, certain
classes of persons ·are excluded from the franchise. Among the
generally excluded . classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and
convicts.
The right of the State to deprive person~ of the ri_ght ~f
suffrage by reason of their having been convicted. of_ crime, 1s
beyond question. The manifest purpose o~ such restnchons u~on
this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption
is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other
base offenses indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise
the privilege of suff~age or to hold o~ce. T~~ ex_clusi_on must
for this reason be adjudged a mere d1squahfi~ation, 1_m posed
for protection .and · not for punishment, the withholding of a
privilege and not the denial of a personal right." (People vs.
Corral, 62 Phil. 945 [1936]; see Macalintal vs. Commission on
Elections, 405 SCRA 614 [2qo3].)
of such fact. The Constitution ~xplicitly declares that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall b e presumed innocertt w1til the contrary is proved." (see Art. III, Sec. 14.)
II &I II
1114 . PHILIPPINE CONS'fITU.P1GNAL LAW
Principles and Cases
Argum.ents justifying the lowering . : . , ;.,
· of voting age.
The following are among the reasons given for lowering the
voting age fro;n 21 to 18: · · ··
(1) It has the effect of broadening t4e base of democratic
participation in the political process; ·· · · ·
(2) The communication media expfosion has resulted in
making today's 18-year-old Filipino youth better informed and
more intelligent and politically mature tl\art 21-year-old citizens of
the past decades;
(3) If at the age of 18 one can enter into a marriage. contract,
which is the most important in the 'life ofa person, there is no reason
why an 18-year-old should not be ·permitted to vote;
(4)· If at the age of 18 one is mature enough to fight in defense of
a
his country, he is old enough to be given voice in the determination
of its public policy; and · favored the elimination of the literacy requirement. It must be
(5) Voting is the major, if not the sole, participation of common
citizens in the political process of the State. It is, und.er. present
circumstances, the most effective medium_'for securing c9nS,ent to
or rejection of government short of exq~-:c;qnstitution.al remedies.
the smaller the number of electors in a p?rticular community, the
more limited the basis of consent. The reduction of the voting age
is consistent with the theory of popular sove;eignty which is one of
the fundamental premises of our gover~e;nt.6
Arg,uments justifying removal
of literacy requirement.
The 1973 Constitution removed the req~ir~ment under the 1935
Constitution on ability to read and write for the exercise of the right
to vote. The arguments for its removal have been summarized as
follows:
"In keeping with the trend for the broadening of the
electoral base already begun with the lowering of the voting
age to 18 and in keeping further_ with the committee's desire to
discontinue the alienation and exclusion of millions of citizens
6
See 1970 UPLC Constitution Revision Project, pp. 219-225 ..
II II II II II II
Sec. 1 Sea. 1 lll!i
from the political ,system and from participation in the political
life in fue country, the requirement ofliteracy for votin~ has be~n
eliminated:·It.is noted .tha.t there are very few countnesdeft m
the world where.literacy remains a condition for voting. There is
no Southeast Asian country that imposes this requirement. The
United States Supreme Court, only a few months ago, declared
unconstitutional any state law that would continue to impose
this requirement for voting.
Although there were more resolutions submitted proposing
the increase of educational requirements for voting than those
advocating the elimination of the literacy requirem~nt, the
committee felt that favoring the elimination of the reqmrement
would be more in keeping with its objective and that of the
Constitutional Convention encouraging popular participation
and equalizing the privileges and rights of the people. It is
to be -noted that all those who testified before the committee
stressed that these witnesses represented all levels of society,
namely, labor leaders such as Jeremias Montemay?r, Pres~dent
of the Federation of Free Farmers, Ramon Jabar, Vice President
of the Federation ·of Free Workers, Atty. Feliciano Belmonte,
President of the Manila Jaycees, Fr. Tantoco, representing the
Knights of Colui:nbus; Miss Charito Planas, of t:1e CNEA, Mrs.
Charo Moran and Uta Jose of WOMAN, Mr. Luis Alcuaz, of the
youth organization KASAPI and finally noi:ie other than former
Secretary of Education Dr. O.D. Corpuz who strongly advocated
the elimination of the literacy requirement stressing the lack of
meaningful relationship between elementary education and the
capacity for intelligent voting.
According to the Bureau of Censu s and Statistics, the
projection for the population of the Philippines over 18 years
old for 1970 is 17,659,000. Of this, 12,384,000 are considered
literates. However, the same Bureau admitted that there is no
real scientific literacy test in counting literates. All that is done is
to ask each meml:>er of the population the question whether he
is able to read and write and to take his answer at its face value.
These circumstances plus the well-known practice in all
elections in which political leaders spend their time in the
barrios showing the prospective voters how to write the name of
1116 .J'!-11LlP1J!Nl.i CONS'l'l'l1U'l'lON.AL LAW
Principles and Cases
the·candidates instead of.expla:ming:tlie-ptilitica:Lissues to them,
strengthened the ·conviction- of-the Cc;}ttnhittee th.at 1fue present
literacy requirement is more 0£ ajo~~,(cfrt<;l~.worsej':a cleterrent to _
intelligent discussibhs'·of the issues. $,ina]1y; ..th-e' committee took
note of the·~onvincing argument th~t,·.~e iequirement to read
and write was written into our .Consfil:tution·,at a-time.when the
only medium of information was the,pr-int~d-w.ord :a nd•even the
public meetings were not as large and: su~tessfu:bbeoause·of the
absence of amplifying equipment.. Iti~--~-;~~Mhaqpd~y the vast
majority of the pop~lation lear~ ab~~t-_I}a,tional matters ,much
more from the audio-yisual media, .namely,: raqi6 .~.4 ~e~evision,
.and.public meetings have become_rm.t,ch, n:tore!~ffecqve.sit:tce the
advent of amplifying equipment."' .. . ... _ . . ;· ..
· In the 1986 Constitutional C6inmission; ··Co:n'Utlissi6ner
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., summed up the·posit1or\' ofthe Committee on
Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights· and Obligations, and
Human Rights as follows:
"First of all, intelligence is not measured by. the ·ability to
read and write, and the capacity to be informed is not necessarily
limited by the lack of ability to read and write. ' Social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor
If we look at . . . the communication situation in the
Philippines now, the means of communication that has the
farthest reach is AM radio. People get their information not
from reading newspapers but from AM radio - farmers while
plowing, and vendors while selling. thing~, listen to _the i;adio.
Without knowing how to ·read ~d_wp.te, they are adequately
informed about many things haJ?pe!}mg,in the counti;y.
Second, illiteracy shows gover_nment negle_ct o~ education,
and if we disenfranchise t~e illitei:'.ates, it will only aggravate the
situation of the illiterates·becai.ise theirVoic~s will not.be heard
then, , . , lj /t
,f~ r , I
The representative quality of .go:v,eq:unent is determined by
the voting base . . . Therefore, as. man,·.~s,possible should be
allowed to choose their representativ_es so·that those who profess
7Explanatory Note of Resolution No. 03 o~ the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms, 1973 Cons titutional Convention. ·
Hu<.:, 1
to be represerttatiy~s .can say that "yes, we are representing the
-illiterates" -be<sause,th~y have been chosen by the illiterates.
· I am ;ery _dishJr~ed - very disturbed - by tht! elitist ten-
dency of narrowing· the mass base. I think it is a retrogressive
act, and it y;ill do a dfsservice to the efforts of the nation to pro-
mote·social justice and to uplift the condition of the masses ..."s
Property requirement prohibited.
. .
Under Section 1, Congress cannot also impose property
requirement for the exer~ise.of suffrage.
(1) Property ownership not a test of an individual's capacity. -
The justification for the abolition of property qualification is the
assuID:ption that ownersllip of property, per se, neither adds to nor
detracts from a man's capacity to function properly and fully as n
social and political beir}g. 'l;'oday, the argument that only proper~y
holders have "a stake in the community" is considered obsolete. It 1s
the human person, not property, that is to be represented, and given
primacy in the hierarchy of values.9
(2) Property requirement inconsistent with social justice principle. -
alike. (see Art. XIII, Sec. 1.) Accordingly, no person shall, by reason
of poverty, be denied the chance to vote and to be elected to public
office. In a case, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional a
law (R.A. No. 4421.) requiring all candidates for public offices to post
a surety bond equivalent to the one (1 )-year salary or emoluments of
the position for which they are candidates which shall be forfeited if
the candidates, except when declared winner, fail to obtain at least
10% of the votes cast for the office to which they have filed their
c:ertifi_cates of candidacy.
This law, according to the Supreme Court, in effect, imposed a
property qualification. (Maquera vs. Borra, 15 SCRA 7 [1965].)
· (3) Property requirement inconsistent with concept of republican
government. - The imposition of property qualifications on the
8II ConCom Record 16.
9SCHMANDT & STEINBICKER, op. cit., p. 253.

11 111 I ' IIII ,ll 'l 'l l l lt I I H ll il 11 1/ I ll) hlA I. I AW
• l'rlnt'lpl(•IJ nntl 'tHH.'ll
voters would be inconsistent with the .Y~FY ,na.t ure and essence of
our republican system of government ordaine9 in our Constitution,
for said political system is premised upol): µte, tenet that sovereignty
resides in the people and all goverrunentc}.1 11:µthority emanates from·
them (Art. II, Sec. 1.), and .this, in turn,'impli~s ruk:essarily that the
right to vote and to be voted shall not be dependent upon the wealth
of the individuai concerned.10 ·
Other substantive requirements
prohibited.
Congress is likewise prohibited by the C_~t\Stitution to impose
additional substantive requirements for suffrage similar in nature
to literacy or ownership of property. (Sec. 1.) Examples are:
(1) Education. - As a general principle, the more. education a
man has, 'the better and more valuable memb('!r bf society he will be.
Yet it is quite possible for a person to 'become an important asset to
government and the social body with lit:tle or no formal schooling.
Formal education itself is no guarantee of good citizenship or of
intelligent voting. Furthermore, the requirement of a high school or
even an elementary education would disenfranchise large segments
of the poorer classes of our populafion.11
In a democracy, the vote of a moron counts a:s much as the vote
of a genius. The principle is that of one man, one vote. The votes are
counted, not weighed;
(2) Sex. - The antagonism in the past to female suffrage
stemmed in some degree from the \>elief that a woman's place was in
the home and that the performance of public duties was the function
of the male members of the family. In other cases, the opposition
10As aptly said in Maquera: "Since the effect of R.A. No. 4421 is to require of candidates
for Congress a substantial property qualification, and to disqualify those who do not
meet the same, it goes against the provision of the Constitution which, in line with its
democratic character, requires no property qualification for the right to hold said public
office. Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general election implies
the right to freely choose from all qualified candidates fot public office. The imposition of
unwarranted restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified candidates from running
is, therefore, violative of the constitutional guaranty offreedom in the exercise of elective
franchise. It seriously interferes with the right of the electorate to cho.ose freely from
among those eligible to office whomever they may desire." (Bengzon, J., concurring.)
11
/bill., pp. 252-255.
&I II II II I " 1,1
1111
J\ I I , V, 1I J1 1l 1l{ M ,I
was based on political expediency rather than on principle. the ':t
present time, unless one is willing to contend that wom~n, si~ply
by virtue of th~ir womanhood, are incapable of free and mt~lhgent
social and politic;al activity, there would seem to ~e no. adequ~te
or justifiable· basis for depriving them of equal voting nghts with
men·.,12 and .
(3) Taxpaying ability. - This restriction is related to property
requirement for voting. Congress cannot, by ~aw, deny to an
· d' 'd -a l the right to vote on the ground that he 1s exempted from
m ivi u . •ct b h' f
taxation, or is not lia~le to pay tax, or the taxes p~i. Y im or 13or
which he is liable during the year are below a specified amount.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for secur-
ing the secrecy and sanctity of t~~ bal~~t ~s well as a sys-
tem for absentee voting by qualified F1hpmos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the dis-
abled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of
other persons. Until then, they shall be allowe~ vote t?
under existing laws and such rules as the Comm1ss1on on
Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the bal-
lot.
i2lbid. . . hi
131n a case, petitioners claim, among others, tha~ t~ prohibit t~e voters m a h1g. Y
b · d city from voting for elective provincial officials would unpose a substantive
~:q:~:~ent on the exercise of suffrage contrary to Article VI, Section 1 (now Art. V, Sec.
1 ) of the 1973 Constitution. , hib· ·
· In re·ecting the contention, the Supreme Court pointed out: 'The pro 1tion co~-
t l ted in the Constitution however, has reference to such requirements as the Vu-
~~p a 11 t invalidated in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (383 U.S. 663.), or the
~~~ firk r:;uirement that to be eligible to vote in a school dis_trict, one must b_e a par(;~~
of a child enrolled in a public school, nullified in Kramer v. Umon Free ~ch?ol Distn~t .
u s 621 ) which impose burdens on the right of suffrage without ach1evmg perm1ss1bl~ 0
State ob:;ctives. In this particular case, no such burdens are ii:1P?sed u~on the voters
the citie~ of Cebu and Mandaue. They are free to exercise their nghts_w~thout any other
requirement, save that of being registered voters." (Ceniza vs. Conuruss1on on Elections,
95 SC~d:~3~~9~iJJ Constitution (Art. XI, Sec. 4[1].), "highly urbanized .ci1es, as/eter~
mined b standards established by the local government code, sh~ll be m epen ent _o
f ,, · w hlch they are geographically located. The exclus10n by law of the city
· · J ffi · 1 was
tl1e provmce 111 •
eir right to ·participate in the election of elective provmcia o c1a s
vo ters fr om th C . . )
based on this provision. (see Art. X, Sec. 12, 1987 onstJtuhon.
II IJ 1111~11 11~1111 &I
J12() . .l'lJLLll'.L'lNH ' N~Tnu·u NA(,LAW lll t:. 2
Prlnclplcs nncl Cl\ses
Systemfor securing the secrecy ,
and sanctity,of the ballot. • •.·
(1) Need for such a system. - The rigN .~~ vote has reference to .
a ~onstituti~nal guar~t~e- of the utmost s_ignificance. It.is a right
without which the pnnc1ple of sovereignty residing in the people
(Art. II, Sec. 1.) becomes nugatory. (see Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43
SCRA 1 [1972].) It is essential then to insu.re that the voters shall
exercise their right freely, "uninfluenced by· threa,ts, intimidation
or corrupt motives" and "to secure a fair and honest count of the
ballots." (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521 [1914].) To accomplish
this aim, Congress is directed by the Con_stitution "to provide a
system for securing the secrecy and sanctity' of the ballot."
(2) Voting procedure for the benefit of the disabled and illiterate. -
~iththe enfranchi~ement of the illiterates and the existence of many
d1sabl~d voters, th1S responsibility of the legislative body assumes
more importance. The sanctity of the electoral process requires
secrecy of the vote. Congress will have to enact a law prescribing
procedures that will enable the disabled and the illiterates to
secretly cast their ballots without requiring the assistance of other
per~~~s, to pr~vent thet:1 fr?m being manipulated by UI)Scrupulous
pol~hc1ans to msure their victory at the polls. Perhaps, a method of
voh1:g. by symbols may be devised to make it possible for disabled
and illiterate citizens to exercise their right of suffrage.
Until Congress provides for the appropriate procedure, they
shall be allowed to vote under the existing law and such rules as
the Commission on Elections (Art. IX-:-A, ~ec. 6; IX-C, Sec. 2t1nmay
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Validity of conducting exit polls.
~ e~it ~o~l is a species of electoral survey conducted by
qualified md1v1duals or groups of individuals for the purpose of
det~rmining the probable result of an election by confidentially
~sking . randomly selected voters whom they have voted for,
unmed1ately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results
of th~ survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass
me~ia, t? g~v~ an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the
polling md1viduals or organizations, the electorate voted. (ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA
811 [2000].)
II II .aJ
I , ', i I IJI
In the above case, the Supreme Court nullified and set aside
the COMELEC Resolution which banned the holding of exit polls
and tjle cl,issemination of their results through mass jlledia. 1 The
COMELEC, argu!:!s, inter alia, "that exit polls inc;iirectly transgress
the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot."
~ystem for .absentee yoting
· · · by qualified Filipinos;
(1) Filipinos temporarily abroad. - Section 2 extends the right
of suffrage even to Filipinos temporarily abroad provided they
possess all the qualifications mentioned therein and none of the
disqualifications provided by law. 2
Filipinos who, by force of circumstances (e.g., the need to earn
a living), have to temporarily work and reside abroad but maintain
their love and loyalty to their native land, are still part of our
· Republic. They are also affected by the quality of public officials and
the policies of the government. They remain liable to pay taxes and
are subject to many of its laws. Hence, they should not be deprived
of the constitutional right to vote.
1The Supreme Court said:
"The contention-o f public respondent that exit polls Indirectly transgress the sanctity
and the secrecy of the b_allot is.off-,t angentto the real issue, Petitioner does not seek access
to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is fo avoid vote buying through
voter identification. Thus, voters are p rohibited from exhibiting the contents of
their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting
distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the
contents of the ball_ots cast by pai:.ticular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate
voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters
with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that ihe votes have been cast in
accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved
merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they
have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore,
the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters
may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored counter-measures
may be prescribed by the COMELEC, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems.
in the conduct of exi_tpolls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people."
2Section 2,.Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement
found in Section 1, "H is. precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the
implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commi.ssion explicitly mandated
Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting." (Macalintal vs. Commission
on Elections, 405 SCRA 614 (2003) ,)
 1122 .l"lllLl!-'PlNU C.:0N8'l'l'l'U'1'l0NAL LAW
Principles and Cases
. .Congress is mandated to provide tliEVtnechanics for .absentee
voting by qual~fied Filipinos abroad: .JHs-bbuhd >to set asi'cfe fund's
and other requ1.re~ent~ for the pt:1rpose and· to' provide safeguards
to ensure that elections overseas ·are held in aifree, clean, and orderly ·
manneL ·
.(2) Resident Filipinos. - It may i3ls9 ptovid,e :'local ab~ente~
voting'' ~r t~ use anoth~r term, "tran~;\~rit-~~-Wt¥;! .f}llJ~µfied
~y
voters (studying or working elsewhere) wno are in the country but
are temporarily. absent from the places wliere they are registered.3
The Constitution makes no distin~tion between national and
local elections. · acquire the righ t to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after
System of overseas absentee
. I
VOt mg.
R.A. No. 9189 (Feb. 13, 2003), otherwise k.no~n as "the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" provides for a system of overseas
absentee voting by qualified citizens abroad. It was enacted in
observance to the mandate of Section 2. For purposes of the Act
abs~~tee_voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of th~
Ph1hppmes abroad exercise their right to vote. (Sec. 3[a] R A No
9189.) ' . . . permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
(l) Coverage. -All citizens of the Phj.Iippines abroad who are
not oth~rwise disqualified by la~, at lea~t ~8 years of age ;n the day
of elec~ons, may vote for pres1dent, v1c:e-president, senators and
party-list representatives.
.(2) Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from
voting under the Act:
(a) Those who h ave lost their Filipino citizenship in
accordance with Philippine Laws;
3 in the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters and the annotations as overseas
• Absentee v_o ting is provided under R.A. No. 7166 (Nov. 26, 1991) whereby
go;:~ent officrals and employees, including members of the Armed Forces of the
Phibppmes (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), who are registered voters
are all ~llowed to vote_ for. the positions of President, Vice-presil:lent, and Senators and
Party-Lis~ Repr~sentative m places where they are riot registered but where they are
temporarily assigned on election day to perform election duty. • removed by the Commission from the Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters for his / her
_RA N~: 10380 _(Mar~ 14, 2013) provides for local absentee voting for media and
media practitioners, mcludmg their technical and support staff:
...
{b) Those wh o have expressly renounced their Philippine
, dtizei:i.ship :and. who have pledged allegiance to a foreign
country; ,
•
· (c) Th ose whdhave committed and are convicted in a final
judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by
imprisonment ofnot less than one (1) year, including those who
-have committed ,mdbeen found guilty of Disloyalty as defined
. under Article -137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not
having been removed-by plenary pardon or amnesty. Any person
disqualified to vote as under this paragraph shall automatically
service of sentence.
The Commission on Elections may take cognizance of fina l
judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the
basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities an d processes
prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country, unless he / she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/ she shall resume actual physical
(3) years from approval of his/her registration under the Act.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/ she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause
for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanen t
resident from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters•
and his/ her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia; and
4The Commission shall maintain a National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
. Approved applications of overseas absentee registrants shall also be included in the per-
manent list of voters of the city or municipality where the registrant is domiciled, with
the corresponding annotation that such person has been registered or will be voting as
an overseas absentee voter. The registry shall also include those registered under R.A.
No. 8189 and who have been issued certification as overseas absentee voters. The entries
absentee voters in the Certified Voters' List shall be permanent, and cannot be cancelled
or amended except in any of the following cases: (a) When an overseas absentee vote
files a letter under oath addressed to the Commission that he/ she wishes to be removed
from the Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters, or that his / her name be transferred to the
regular registry or voters; or (b) When an overseas absentee voter's name was ordered
failure to exercise his/her right to vote under that Act for two (2) consecutive national
elections. (Sec. 9, ibid.)
 l,J
I ' I 111 , ll ' l'lf-J 1, l l INI , I J I 11 1 l tJN A I, I ,AW
l'l'i n lpl<mond 'osoiJ
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines · .abroad previously
declared insane or incompetent by authority-in the Philippines
or abroad, qS verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates
or foreign service establishm.e nts concerned, unless such
competent a1,1thority subsequently certified tha.t such person is
no longer insane or ine2ompetent. (Sec~. 4 ~d 5, ihid.)
(3), Security measures to safeguard the s.e,crecy and sanc.ti.ty ofballots.
- At . all stcl-ges of the elector.a l process/ the .Commission ,shall
ensure that the see2recy and integrity of the ballots are· preserved.
The Committee on Absentee Voting of. the Commission -shall be
resppnsible for ensuring the secrecy and s,wcµ!::y , of the absentee
voting process. · ·
. · , (a) In the inte!est of transparency, ~J necessary and
.• practicable .measures shaff be adopteq to allow i:epresentation
.0£ -~~ candidates, a.c credited m<:tjor .po~i0:ca~,parties,. accredited
citlze~s' arms and .non-governmertt. 9rg~zations to ,assist,
and intervene ~ ~ppropriate ca~es, ll). all stages of the electoral
exercise and to prevent any and all forms of fraud and coercion.
(b) No officer or member of the foreign service corps,
including those belonging to attached agencies shall be
transferred, promoted, exerted, recalle.d or otherwise moved
from his current post or position one (1) .year before anq.. three
(3) months after the day of elections, except upon the approval
of the Commission. (Sec. 23, ibid.) . 575-577.)"
' ~
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
A petition for certiorari and pro.hibition..is filed seeking a declaration
that certain provisions of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 suffer
from constitutional infirmity.
Facts: Above.
Issues: The petitioner raises three principal questions-(1) Does
Section 5(d) of R.A No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters
who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by
their mere a.ct of executing an affidavit e:icpressing their intention
to return to the Philippines, violate thf? residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
(2) Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices
and party-list representatives including the President and the
" ~ II II IJ " ~
11'11
"
Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section
4 Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as wll111-ers by
Congress?
(3) May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Ov~rsight
Committee · created in Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, exercise the
power to review; revise, amend, and a~pr~ve the Imp~ementing
Rules and Regulations that the Comm1ss1on on Elections shall
promulgate without violating the indepe~de~oe of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Held: (1) Concept of Absentee Voting. - "The concept is relatively
new. It is viewed, thus:
'Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and
economic conditions devised to accommodate those engaged
in military or.civil life whose ·d uties make it impracti~able for
them to attend their polling places on the day of election, and
the privilege of absentee voting m_a y flow fro~ ~ons~tutional
provisions or be conferred by statutes, existing m so~e
jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the ca~t~ng
and reception of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other qualified
voters absent on election day from the district or precinct of
their residence. Such statutes are regarded as conferring a
privilege and not a right, or an absolute right.' xx x. (29 C.J.S.
(2) Residence.considered synonymous with domicile. - "Ordinarily,
an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at
the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under
our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court
pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous
with domicile."
(3) Millions of Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic
reasons. - "Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an
overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the
Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to
require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting,
thus: x x x Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the
fact that while millions of Filipinos reside abroad principally for
economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small measure to

1126 RHl LlPPlNE CON Srlil'f U'f1<0N./\L LA W
Principles and Cases
the economic uplift of•th.is country, their voices are mal'ginal insofar
as the choice of this country's'1eaders-is,.concemed." :• . ·
(4) Residency requirement i/2 Section '{ is nbtappli{able. - "The
Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then
existing and considering the novelty of ·the . system of absentee
voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos with the right
to vote would spawn constitutional problems· especially because
the Constitution itself provides for the. residency requirement of
voters.xx x
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being
to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency
requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that
could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the
largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in 'the Philippines
that the Constitutional Commissio!"( explicitly mandated Congress
to provide a system for overseas absentee voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect
of the residency requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution on the proposed system of absentee voting for
qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening. x x x"
(5) Intent is to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad. - "Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising
a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated
in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This
is in fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission opted
for the term qualified Filipinos abro_a d with respect to the system
of absentee voting that Congress should dra~ up. As stresse'd
by Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified
with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they h ave
the "qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote." In
fine-tuning the provision on absentee votiag, the Constitutional
Commission discussed how the system should wo;rk: x x x
lt is clear from these discussions of the members of the
Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise
as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who h ave not
abandoned their domkile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos w ho reach voting age abroad whose
parents' domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them
qualified as voters for the first time."
11 II II i II II
II I
, (6) Section 2 is an exception to residency req~ir~ment. - _"It is in
pursuance of that intention that .the Comm~ss1on p row1de~- for
Section 2 immediately after the residency reqmrement of. Secho~ 1.
By the doctrine of necessary implication in st~tut?ry const~c~on,
l which may be applied in construing const).tuhonal pr~v1s:ons,
the, strategic location of S,ection 2 indi~ates that the Consti~tional
Commission provided for an except10n to. ~1e a~~~l residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to q_uahfied Fihpmo.s _abro~~-
The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Fili-
pinos who are not in the Philippines may be ~llowed ~o vote_ even
though they do not satisfy the residency requirement m Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an except~on
i to the residency requirement found in Section 1 ?f the same Arh~le
I was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which
l' became R.A No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floot~
I:
I thus: XX x"
,.
(7) Disqualification of immigrant or permanent resident. - "A_ s
finally approved into law, Section S(d) of R.A No_. 9189 spec~-
fically disqualifies an immigrant or permanen t r~sid~nt ':ho 1s
'recognized as such in the host country' ~eca~se imm1g~a~on or
permanent residence in another cou_n~ry implies renunciation_ of
one's residence in his country of ongm. However, same Section
allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as
voter fo r as long as h e/ she executes an affidavit to show tha~ he/ she
has not abandon ed his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that 'all citize~s of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law' must be entit~ed
to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must estab~ish
a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, _if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense fo~ the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a
system for absentee voting."
(8) Execution of affidavit itself is not the enabling or enf:'anchising
act. - "Contrary to the claim of petitioner,_ ~he execution ~f th:
affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit .
required in Section S(d) is not only proof of the intention _of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume reside~cy
in the Philippines, but more significantly, it ~erves ~s. an ex~h~it
expression that he ha:d not in fact aband oned his dom1c1le of ongm.
Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affid avit under
1128 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 2
Principles and Cases
Section S(d) violates -the Constitution that proscribes pl!ovisional
registtiation or a promise by a voterto•perform a condition'to be
qualified to vote .in a political exercise, ·
To repeat, the affidavit is reqy.ir~d. of_ imxp.igr~~s _ and
permanent residents abroad because by their status in their host
countries, -they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to
return to this country; thus, withoutthe·affidavft, th~ presumption
of abandonment of Philippine _domicile shall remain.
Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings
discloses another reason why the Senate -required the execution of
said -affidavit. It wanted the affiant to exercise the option to return
or to express his intention to returnto his-domicile of origin and not
to preempt that choice by legislation. x xx."
(9) Abs"entee Voting rights of green card holders. - "The
jurisprudential declaration in Caa.si vs. Col!-rt of Appea.ls that green
card holders are disqualified to run for any elective office finds no
application to the present case because the Caasi case did not, for
obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of Filipinos
who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host
countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or
R.A. No. 9189, they may still be considered as a 'qualified citizen
of the Philippines abroad' upon fulfillment of the requirements of
registration under the new law for the ·purpbse of exercising their
right of suffrage."
(10) Filipino must not have applied for foreign citizenship. -
"Section S(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
'resume actual· physical permane_n t residence in the Philippines
not later than three years from approval of his/her registration,'
the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied
for citizenship in another country. Thus, -they must return to the
Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return 'shall be cause for the
removal' of their names 'from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/ her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.'
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which
a Filipino voter permanently residing abroad who is ·a t least
eight~en years old, not otherwise disqualified •by law, who has
not relinquished Philippine citizenship,.and who has. not actually
abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of
~' ·. z ....
11l'I
.~rigin, .the Philippines,.is ~Bowed to register and v.ote in the Philip-
pine:embassy; cons~late ,or other foreign service establishments of
the place which has jurisdiction over the c0untry where he/ she
has indicated his/her address for p11-rposes of the elections, while
providing for safeguards to a clean election.
. 'IJ,us, Sectjon-11 [Procedure for Application to Vote in absentia]
:,)
of R.A. No. 91S9 provides: xx x"
(11). Section 5(d) and Section 11 are' components of the system of
O'£!erseas aqsen.tee iJoting. .- "Contrary to petitioner's claim that
Section S(d} -circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the
law prescribing a ~ystem of overseas absentee voting in compliance
with the constitutional mandate. Such_mandate expressly requires
that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily
i presupposes that the 'qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad'
I is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections
l
.ll:
!_'.
S(d) and 11 'are components of the system of overseas absentee
voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad
who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile
j· in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile
by his physical absence from this country. His having become an
ii. immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not
I necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his
domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he
must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually
· abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit
required by Sections S(d) and 8(c) of the law."
I
(12) Deterrence is provided in Section S(d). - "Indeed, the
probability that after an immigrant has exercised the right to vote,
he shall opt to remain in his host country beyond the third year
from the execution of the affidavit, is not far-fetched. However, it is
ndt for this Court to determine the wisdom of a legislative exercise.
As expressed in Tafiada vs. Tuvera, the Court is not called upon to
rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find
it impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in
fact, it has addressed the expected problem. Section S(d) itself
provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to
return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under
Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote
for two consecutive national elections, his name may be ordered
1130 PHILIPPINE CON S.TlTU'(lO NAL LAW Sec. 2
• Principles and Cases
r1;?moved from the N.ational Registry-of.PNe;seas Absentee .Vot~rs."
(Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, 405 SCRA 614 [2003), through
Justice Austria-Martinez.)
Dissenting Opinion (Puna, J.):
(1) Section 2 does not dispense with resi~enetJ requirement in Section
1. - "The intent of the members of th~ Consqtutional Commis~ion
to apply the residence requir~ments to ~bsente~ vot_ers ~s evident
from its deliberations. They precisely used th~ phras~,'QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS ABROAD' to stress that the aosentee voter mu.st have
all the qualifications in S~ction 1, Ar~cle ~~:<if the Constitution, viz.:
XXX
In the course of .the deliberations,. Fr. Bema/l perceived a
problem that may arise from the meanini; of the s_econd residence
requirement on the place of registration qnd voting: As noted, a
qualified voter normally registers ·and votes. in the _place where he
is domiciled or has resided for six months.- Fr. Bernas feared that the
second residence requirement may pose a constitutional obstacle
to absentee voting 'unless the vote of the person who is absent is a
vote which will be considered as cast in the place of his domicile,'
viz.: XXX
Following the observation of Father Bern.a s and to· obviate
the constitutional problem, the members of ·the: Constitutional
Commission then discussed the system of registration of qualified
Filipinos abroad who will be allowed to ·vote. lt was agreed that
their registration abroad would be considered as registration, in a
particular locality in the Philippines where he is domiciled, and
the vote cast abroad would be considered cast in that particular
locality, to wit: xx x
It is crystal clear from the foregoing deliberations, that the
majority erred in ruling that Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution
dispensed with the residence requirements. provided under Sec-
tion 1 of the same Article."
(2) Three cases ofdomicile. - "There are three classes of domicile,
namely: domicile of origin, domicile of choice, and domicile by
operation of _law. At any given point, a P.erson can only have one
domicile.
Domicile of origin is acquired by every person at .birth and
continues until replaced by the acquii,ition of another domicile.
More specifically, it is the domicile of the child's parents or of
Sec. 2 AKl1• ....V.' SlJPFlU\.GJJ 1131
the persons upon whbm the child is legally dependent at birth.
Although also referred' to as d0micile of birth, domicile of origin is
actually the domicile of one's parents at'the time of bir\h and may
not necessarily be the actual place of one's birth.
Domicile. of choice. is a domicile chosen by a person to replace
his or her former domicile. An adult may change do,micile at will.
The choice involves an e~ercise. of free will and presumes legal
capacity to make a choic~. While intention is a princip;:il ,feature
of domicile of choice, a mere intention without the fact of actual
presence in the lo·cality cannot bring about the acquisition of a new
domicile. Domicile of choice generally consists of a bodily presence
in a particular locality and a concurrent intent to remain there
perma~ently or at leas!'indefinitely.
. Domicile by operation of law is a domicile that the law attributes
to a person· indepen~ent of a person's residence or intention. It
applies to infants, incompetents, and oth~r pe'rsons under dis-
abilities that prevent them from acquiring a domicile of choice."
· (3) An immigrant or a "permanent resident" of a foreign country
has lost his domicile in the Philippines. - "The doctrine in Caasi is
by no means new. Our election laws have continuously regarded
'immigrants' or ' permanent residents' of -a foreign country to have
lost their domiciles in the Philippines and hence are not qualified to
run for public office. There is no reason not to apply the Caasi ruling
in disputes involving the qualification of voters. In essence, both
cases concern fulfillment of the residence requirements.
Section 5(d) of RA. No. 9189 itself reinforces the applicability
of the Caasi doctrine. As observed by the majority, Rep. Act No.
9189 disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in another country 'because immigration or
permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of
one's residence in his country of origin."'
(4) Execution of affiant is not sufficient proof of abandonment of
residence in the Philippines. - "The majority ruling on the nature of the
affidavit to be executed by an 'immigrant' or a 'permanent resident'
is inconsistent. On one hand, it theorizes that the act 'serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile
of origin.' This concedes that while an 'immigrant' or a 'permanent
resident' has acquired a new domicile in a foreign country by virtue
of his status as such, RA. No. 9189 would consider him not to h11vc
 II
1132 .PHILIPPINE CQN S'Ji'l'fU'.rIP,NAL LAW Sec..2
·Principles and Cases
· ~bqt199rn_id .1:is domiciJe .i n the PhJJit:£?PM'.<:&, Qq ~e ,other h:inp, the
majority ,al~o :~eorizes th~t .t)-1~. affid.c;i.v~t. 9-onstjtutes ~Jl ,~r<press
wc'!,iver· of .hls status .as an ~mi;t\¾grant .,01. p.~:rm.anent resident, and
upon fulfillment ,of the requirE;Jn~nts ,of registrafion/ he.,m ay still
be cortsidered as a 'qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad' for
purposes' of exercisi.n:g-his right d£1sti.ffrage,'.'1his presupp?ses_~at
the 'linmigranl' 'o·r ~permanent ri!sid'ent'''ao'aridone'd his dom1C1le
in the Philippines, but seeks to reacquire this domicile by the
execution of the affidavit.
The fir~t theory is,unten~bl~_. .It~)ne~tt~b~e result :"'_oµl:cl. be the
establishment of two domiciles, i.e., q.om1qle m the Philippines and
domicile in a foreign country where·~e is considered an 'immigrant'
or a 'permanent resident.'This ruling :-Vill contravene the princip:e
in private international law that a person can be domiciled only m
one place at a given time.
The second theory is equally untenable. A person who has
abandoned his domicile of origin by establishing a domicile of
choice cannot fust revert back to his domicile of origin. He must
satisfy the same requisites for acquiring a new domicile, i.e,1 an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and acts which correspond with.t he purpose. An·existing
domicile cannot be lost by abandonment- alone, ,even if there is an
intent to acquire a new one; the existing. domicile continues ·until
a new one is in fact gained. To abandon :domicile, a person must
choose a·new domicile, actually-reside-.in 'the place dtosen, and
intend that it be the principal and permanent residence. That is,
· there can be no change of domicile witho:ut the concurrence of act
and intent." · voters violates the sovereignty of our people. The validation by
(5) Affidavit merely proves the intent to return. ~ "Intent, which is
not coupled with actual physical transfer, is not sufficient either to
abandon the former domicile or to establish a new d9midle. Thus,
th~ view that domicile could be estabHshed as soon as the old is
abandoned even though the person has not yet arrived at the new
domicile, has not been accepted. x x x"
(6) Burden of establishing change of domicile. - "To stress, the
burden of establishing a change in domicile is upon th<:; party
who asserts it. A person's declarations as to what kte considers his
home, residence, or domicile are generally admissible 'as evidence
of his attitude of m ind.' I·Iowcve1; whatever the context, 'their
II
Sec. 2
ll33
accuracy is suspect because of their self-serving nature, particularly
when they are made to achieve some legal objective.' ,
In the case at bar, . the burden rests on an 'immigrant' or a
'permanent resident' to prove that he has abandoned his domicile
in the foreign country and reestablished his domicile in the
Philippines.A self-serving affidavit will not suffice, especially when
what is at stake is a very important privilege as the right of suffrage.
I respectfully submit that what makes the intent expressed in the
affidavit effective and operative is the fulfillment of the promise
to return to the Philippines. Physical presence is not a mere test
of intent but the 'principal confirming evidence of the intention
of the person.' Until such 'promise is fulfilled, he continues to be
a domiciliary of another country. Until then, he does not possess
the necessary requisites and, therefore, cannot be considered a
qualified voter."
· (7) Valid votes of fully qualified voters will be diluted. - "The
only consequence imposed by R.A. No. 9189 to an ' immigrant' or
a 'permanent resident' who does not fulfill his promise to return
to the Philippines is the removal of his name from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia. But his vote would be counted and accorded
the same weight as that cast by bona fide qualified Filipino voters.
I 'respectfully submit that this scheme diminishes the value of
the right of suffrage as it dilutes the right of qualified voters to
the proportionate value of their votes. The one person, one vote
principle is sacrosanct in a republican form of government. The
challenged provision which allows the value of the valid votes of
qualified voters to be diminished by the invalid votes of disqualified
the majority of this unconstitutional provision may result in the
anomaly where the highest public officials of our land will owe
their election to 'immigrants' or 'permanent residents' who failed
to fulfill their promise to return to our country or who repudiated
their domicile here."
Dissenting Opinion (Ynarez-Santiago, J.):
(1) Questioned law allows non-residents to vote. - "Proponents
of R.A. No. 9189 are trying to construe Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution as a proviso which expands and enlarges the scope
of t:he preceding section. They overlook the fact that while Section
2 provides a system for absentee voting, any absentee who votcfl
 II
1134 .PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 2
Principles and Cases
must first meet the qualifications fouri.d in Section 1 of the same
article. · supported by the records at hand.
As state_d by the petitioner; if the framei;s of the Constitution.
intended to,make Section 2 of Article Va proviso.or exception to its
first section1 they should have added ittd .t he latter.
Section 1 would have incorporated · as its last elause the
following proviso:
'Provided, the. Congress shall-provide a system for absentee
voting by Filipino citizens who are r~sidirig abroad.' .
The Constitution does not make the absentee voting provision
a mere proviso of the first section on .r esidence qualifications.
Together with the system which secures the S(;!crecy and sanctity of
the ballot, the provision on absentee voting is an entirely distinct
and separate section which allows only those qualified under
Section 1 to take advantage of the privilege under Section 2."
(2) Constitutional Commission envisioned two different groups
of people as beneficiaries of provision. - "1. Qualified Filipinos
temporarily residing abroad - citizens who belong to this category
reside abroad for extended periods of time without intending to
make their host countries their permanent residence. This would
include Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW's) with fixed periods of
employment, students studying abroad, holders of treaty trader's
visas, or seamen away from the Philippines for extended periods.
The Department of Foreign Affairs has tabulated the majority of the
5,488,167 Filipinos living abroad as faliing under this category.
Qualified Filipinos temporarily ab1.1oad, but not residing therein
- this contemplates a situation wherein the temporary absence
from the Philippines is not coupled with any temporary residence
in a foreign country at all. This would include Filipinos who just so
happen to be absent from the Philippines for brief periods of time,
but including election day itself, usually because they have flown
to foreign countries for short trips.
It is submitted that a valid and very real distinction exists
between either of these two groups of Filipinos, on the one hand,
and those Filipinos who are permanent residents or immigrants
in their host countries, on the other. The key difference lies in the
change of permanent residence or lack thereof, for the framers of
our Constitution clearly intended that Filipfoos who had taken up
permanent residence in their host countries would be excluded
I II II II II
1:i<.: •. 2 11 I~
fr~m the benefits of al:>sentee voting. No other interpretation can be
It is clear that the Constitutional Commission did not intend
to make absentee voters an exception to the general rule on
residence in the exercise of the right of suffrage. We do not agree
with the majority' s belief that the position of Article V, Section 2
of the Constitution is indicative of an intent to make it appear to
be an exception to the resiclence requirement provided for in the
section immediately preceding it. As earlier stated, Section 2 is not
a proviso of Section 1."
(3) "Absentee" cannot refer to immigrants. - '"Absentee' has to
be qualified. It refers only to those people residing abroad whose
intent to return home and forsake the foreign country is clear. It
cannot refer to immigrants. A mere promise to return home within
three years from voting is no proof of intent to return to a per-
manent residence. The sanction for its enforcement is so feeble that
the promise will be an empty one. As earlier stated, an immigrant
&ives up many things, including the right or opportunity of voting
in the Philippines, when he moves with his family abroad. A
sanction of future disenfranchisement would not bother him in the
least bit. In the meantime, the immigrant vote in closely contested
cases may have elected the President, a Senator or a Congressman.
Unqualified voters will have swung the elections. In the same way
that a counterfeit coin drives away or results in the hoarding of
genuine or good coins, the votes of non-qualified persons w ill not
only weaken or nuUify the value of the good votes but may make
an election itself sham and meaningless."
Dissenting Opinion (Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.):
(l) Residence is a question of fact and intention. - "No person
has more than one domicile at a time. A Filipino immigrant, by his
permanent residency in the host country, loses the Philippines as
.his domicile. He cannot reacquire it by the m ere act of executing
an affidavit expressing his intention to return to the Philippines at
some future time. Residence for voting is not wholly a question
of intention, but it is a question of fact and intention. Unless his
intention is fortified by the concurrent act of reestablishing the
Philippines as his domicile, he cannot be considered a qualified
voter under the Philippine Constitution."
(2) Intent as to meaning of terms "qualified Filipinos abroad." -
"Significantly, at the early stage of the deliberation, the Framers
made it clear that the term 'qualified Filipinos abroad' refers only
ti " , t 1llll ll'l ' ltl ll l t1 Nh 1111 J IH NA l, J,AW
l'rliwlpl1 rJ nnd 'U!K'II
1
to those whose presence in the foreign country is only 'temporary'
and whose domicile . is still the Philippines - thus, definitely
excluding immigrants or permanent resic,lents of a foreign country.
XXX
The intention of the Framers to limit the- phrase 'qualified
Filipinos abroad' to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad' is clear
and unmistakable. Therefore, a law, such as R.A. No. 9189, which
expands the meaning as to include those otherwise- not covered
(such as Filipino immigrants or permanent residents of foreign
countries), through the mere imposition of certain requirements,
'risks a declaration of unconstitutionality.'"
(3) Only way for an immigrant to satisfy' the residency requirement.
- "There be-ing an abandonment of the Philippine dorrticile, the
only way for an immigrant to satisfy the 'reside:ncy' requirement
• Uil· enable him to exercise ·his right of suffrage .is to ·reacquire or
reestablish his domicile in this country. It is an established rule
that 'where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires
one in another state, he canrtot again vote in the state of his former
residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence.' In
short, for an immigrant to reestablish his d~micil~ .in the Philip-
pines, he must again reside in this country with.the intention to
remain here and abandon his old dom1dle in the foreign land. The
waiver of his immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it."
(4) Section 5(d) is unconstitutional. - "Section S(d) of R.A.
No. 9189 is unconstitutional for it diminishes the 'residency
requirement' of the Constitution by including within the phrase
'qualified Filipinos abroad' immigrants and permanent residents
of foreign countries. It defies the clear Jntent of the Constitution
to limit the application of the absentee voting law to Filipinos who
are 'temporarily abroad.' Thus, as statutes which purport to modify
constitutionally fixed qualifications are void, so must Section S(d)
of R.A. No. 9189 suffer the same fate."
Dissenting Opinion (Callejo, Sr., /.):
(1) Section 2 was not intended as an exception to the residency
requirementin Section 1. - "Basicis the rule in statutory construction
that the Constitution should be constmed in such a maimer as to
give effect to each and every part of the entire instrnment. Courts
should lean in favor of n constrncllon thnt will hnrmoni:t.e every
provisio n of J·he onRl1l11IIM rnllwr thnn one whlC'h rnl1w11 ronnic1
I l;I'/
between its provisions, -or render inutile any portion thereof.
· Section 2 can and m"1.st b~ construed to contemplate within its
terms the e•nfranchisement only of Filipinos who pos~ess aU the
prerequisite qualifications specified under Section 1, but who are
abroad arid cannot exercise their right to vote in the Philippines
on the day •Of ·t he election. Even from a cursory ·examination of the
proceedings of' the Constitut'ionaL Commission which drafted the
1987 ·Constitution, the foregoing intendment is made crystal clear.
Thus:xx x
· It is irrefragable from the foregoing deliberations of the
members of the Constitutional Commission that Section 2, Article
V encompasses within its terms Filipino citizens who, during
election time, are temporarily abroad but who possess all the
. mahdatory qualifications for enfranchisement outlined under
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution. It is also clear that
Section 2, Article V was enacted merely to allow Congress to devise
a system by which this c1ass of Filipinos abroad may be allowed to
exercise their political right to vote in their homeland on the day of
J the election,"
'(2) An immigrant acquires a new residence in host country. -
"Cleady for voting purposes, one cannot have a residence or be
domiciled in two places at the same time, for the right to vote in a
certain place or precinct requires the concurrence of two things: the
act of residing coupled with the intention to do so. Accordingly, in
order to work a change of residence for voting, there must be an
actual removal, an actual change of domicile, corresponding with a
,,1 '
bona fide intention -of <j.bandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one. xx x
An immigrant, as defined in law, is a person who removes
into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. Therefore,
a Filipino 'immigrant' or 'permanent resident,' as the very
designation of his status clearly implies, is a Filipino who has
abandoned his Philippine residence or domicile, with the intention
of residing permanently in his host country. Thenceforward, he
acquires a new residence in his host country and is deemed to have
abandoned his Philippine domicile. It has been held that where a
voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another
state, although he afterward changes his intention and- returns, he
cannot again vote in the state of his former residence or domicile
until he has regained his residence by remaining in the jurisdiction
for the statu tory period."
IJ Ill , l'I 111.ll ' l ' I N I ! t 't:INH I I I l I I IONA J. 1,/\W
Prlodpl1111 1111d CllH 'II

(3) Section 5(d). enfranchises a voter .without actual residence. - "I

am in complete accord with the petitioner's position that Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 virtually enfranchises .a voter who, on the
date 0f the election, does ·n ot pos,sess ,the residency requireme~t as
. ord<\.ined under Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution. Indeed,
the undertaking required of an immigrant/permanent resident
under the aforesaid section, 'that he/ she. shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
(3) years from the approval of his/her registratio~,' is ipso facto an
admission that he/ she is not an actual resident of the Philippines
and does not, therefore, possess the residency requirement on the
date of the election but merely promises to.possess the same within
three (3) years from registration. Consequently, Section S(d), which
in effect attempts to permit non-residents to exercise the right of
suffrage, in dir.ect contravention of the constitutional prescription
in Section 1, Article V, must be stricken from R.A. No. 9189 as an
invalid and unconstitutional provision."
(4) Section S(d) is violative of the equal protection guarantee. -
"Section S(d) is vulnerable for another cogent reason. I believe
that the provision is violative of the 'equal protection' clause of
the Constitution. While it allows a Filipino permanently residing
in a foreign country to vote on the mere pledge that he will again
permanently reside in this country within three years from his
voting in the elections, a Filipino permanently residing in the
Philippines but for less than one year or, ip -the place where he
proposes to vote, for less. than six months· is not allowed to vote.
The voter classification sought to be effected by Section S(d) does
not rest on substantial distinctions for it unduly favors and,extends
the privilege of the elective franchise to Filipino citizens who do
not in any way comply with the residency requirement prescribed
by our Constitution, while withholding the same privilege to those
who are and have been permanent residents of the •Philippines,
albeit not in the locality or precinct where they intend to vote."

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