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Lesbian and Gay Marriage: Transformation or

Normalization?
Victoria CLARKE

Cheshire Calhoun: Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet:
Lesbian and Gay Displacement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
175pp. £21.99, ISBN 0–19–829559–6.
William N. Eskridge Jr.: Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of
Gay Rights. New York: Routledge, 2002. 296pp. £11.99, ISBN 0–415–
93073–1 (pbk).
Jennifer M. Lehmann (ed.): The Gay & Lesbian Marriage & Family
Reader: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st Century. New
York: Richard Altschuler & Associates, Inc., 2001. 330pp. $39.95, ISBN
1–884092–57–8 (pbk).

Debates about lesbian and gay ‘marriage’ both within and outside of the lesbian and
gay community have been sharply polarized. According to anti-lesbian/gay com-
mentators, homosexuality is abnormal (and there can be no equality between normal-
ity and abnormality), unnatural and a sin. Lesbians and gay men are enemies of the
family and lesbian and gay marriage is a threat to the family, marriage and morality.
The ‘non-negotiable truth’ (Smith and Windes, 2000: 158) of marriage is that it is a
heterosexual institution: the (legal) union of one man and woman as man and wife.
When arguing with the right-wing, supporters of lesbian and gay marriage typically
either answer them on their own terms (e.g. defending the normality and naturalness
of homosexuality) or advance an equality argument: marriage is a human good that
lesbians and gay men have the right to share in.
The frequently cited debate between Thomas Stoddard and Paula Ettelbrick
(originally published in the lesbian and gay journal Out/Look in 1989) provides a
good example of the basic pro- and anti-marriage positions in lesbian and gay poli-
tics. Both Stoddard and Ettelbrick argue that traditional marriage is oppressive, but
Stoddard argues for equality despite this, whereas, according to Ettelbrick, this is one

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Vol. 13(4): 519–529.
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reason among many to reject marriage (see note later). For Ettelbrick, marriage
represents normalization. In fighting for the right to marry, lesbians and gay men are
essentially fighting for the right to conform and assimilate, to be ‘just like’ hetero-
sexuals. The very purpose of the lesbian and gay movement is, she argues, fighting
for justice despite our differences: ‘as a lesbian, I am fundamentally different from
non-lesbian women. That’s the point’ (Ettelbrick, 1997 [1989]: 758). By contrast, for
Stoddard, rather than marriage normalizing lesbians and gay men, lesbians and gay
marriage would transform traditional, oppressive marriage into ‘something new’
(1997 [1989]: 757). He argues that, ‘abolishing the traditional gender requirements of
marriage – can be one of the means, perhaps the principal one, through which the
institution divests itself of the sexist trappings of the past’.
Although there are still a number of vocal anti-marriage critics (e.g. Robson, 1998;
Warner, 1999), most lesbians and gay men writing about marriage support the exten-
sion of marriage rights. It is hardly surprising, then, that the three books I review
here all construct strong arguments in favour of lesbian and gay marriage. In the
remainder of this essay, I provide a summary of the books, and then outline some of
the arguments they develop in support of lesbian and gay marriage. These arguments
are: domestic partnerships are an illegitimate alternative to marriage; lesbian and gay
marriage will diminish social prejudice, provide access to rights currently denied to
lesbians and gay men, not encourage distinctions between good and bad gays and
transform traditional gender roles; and fears about normalization are misplaced.

SUMMARIZING THE BOOKS

The Gay & Lesbian Marriage & Family Reader is a collection of previously pub-
lished papers, consisting of contributions from psychologists, sociologists, social
workers, lawyers and others. Most of the contributions focus on lesbian and gay
parenting issues such as child custody (Duran-Aydintug and Causey; Swisher and
Cook), step-families (Berger, Erera and Fredriksen) and second-parent adoption
(Connolly). The other topics covered by the book are the coming out process of young
lesbians, bisexual women and gay men (Newman and Muzzonigro; Oswald), lesbian
and gay couples/relationships (Caron and Ulin; Dolan and Stum; Groves and
Schondel) and lesbian and gay marriage (Bolte). Angela Bolte constructs a number of
arguments in support of same-sex marriage, challenging arguments against same-sex
marriage both from outside of and from within the lesbian and gay community. This
is an interesting collection of papers, an engaging alternative to most US (psychologi-
cal) work on lesbian and gay families that relentlessly emphasizes their normality.
In Equality Practice, William Eskridge, a professor of law at Yale Law School,
maintains that lesbian and gay marriage is a liberal right, the denial of which cannot
be justified, but it is not a right that should be immediately delivered if it would
‘unsettle the community’ (2002: xiii). There is, he argues, a need to accommodate
traditional values as the state proceeds to address the needs and interests of its lesbian
and gay citizens. This is ‘equality practice’, essentially an incremental approach to
recognizing same-sex marriage. The struggle over lesbian and gay marriage is a
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Review Essay: CLARKE: Lesbian and Gay Marriage 521

struggle between the ‘politics of recognition’ and the ‘politics of preservation’. That
is, between lesbians and gay men fighting for equal rights and social recognition
and traditionalists fighting to stop the liberalization of the law. For Eskridge, the
advantage of equality practice is that it recognizes the need to accommodate both
new ideas (i.e. lesbian and gay marriage) and the ‘inability of human beings and their
communities to do so without a long process of education and personal experience’
(2002: xv).
Equality Practice explores the process of legally recognizing lesbian and gay
relationships in the USA and in other first world countries. In the first half of the
book, Eskridge tells his version of the story of the Hawaii same-sex marriage lawsuit,
when Hawaii came close to recognizing same-sex marriages, of the creation of
civil unions in the state of Vermont in 2000, and of similar developments in other
countries. The second half of the book explores in more detail the legalities of the
Vermont ‘compromise’ (2002: xii) and others like it. Eskridge appears undecided as
to whether equality practice is the process by which the extension of marriage rights
to lesbians and gay men (in first world countries) is unfolding or an argument for
how this should happen. Equality Practice provides a thorough survey of recent
developments in relation to the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Because
The Netherlands legalized same-sex marriage just as the book was going to press,
however, it is (in a positive sense) already out of date.
In Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet, Cheshire Calhoun, pro-
fessor of philosophy at Colby College in the USA, argues that marriage should be at
the centre of lesbian and gay politics. Lesbian and gay politics should focus on the
private, family sphere and the (related) public sphere of citizenship. She seeks posi-
tive moral arguments in favour of marriage, arguing that, ‘the moral significance of
extending rights is to a large extent a function of the sorts of arguments that get
culturally circulated in the process of extending rights’ (2000: 109). This means that
it matters which arguments get culturally circulated, so arguments for same-sex
marriage warrant careful scrutiny. We should not only ask who should have marriage
rights, but how important these rights are, and whether anyone should have them.
Putting the family at the centre of lesbian and gay politics may look reactionary
rather than revolutionary, but Calhoun argues that feminists have failed to grasp
lesbians’ distinctive relationship to the family. Their arguments against the family
have been based on an assessment of the negative effects of the family on hetero-
sexual women. From a feminist perspective, it does not make sense to champion the
importance of love, marriage and the family, but this is precisely where lesbian and
gay politics should start. The heart of heterosexual privilege is right of access to the
family and couple relationships; unlike racial and gender oppression, lesbian and gay
subordination displaces lesbians and gay men from both the public and the private
sphere. Because the idea that lesbians and gay men are unfit for family relationships
is central to the ideological construction of lesbian and gay identity, family issues
belong at the top of the lesbian and gay political agenda.
Calhoun argues that there is a need for a specifically lesbian theory rather than
feminist theory applied to lesbians. She rejects the lesbian feminist argument that
lesbianism can liberate women as interpreting lesbianism from a heterosexual stand-
point. From a heterosexual standpoint, lesbianism may appear to offer women
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522 Feminism & Psychology 13(4)

liberation, but from a lesbian standpoint the daily experience of lesbianism is one of
oppression within a system that privileges heterosexuals and heterosexuality. To be
lesbian is ‘simply to leap out of the frying pan of individual patriarchal control into
the fire of institutionalized heterosexual control’ (2000: 31).
For Calhoun, heterosexism is not a by-product of sexism, a particular kind of patri-
archal oppression; rather, gender oppression and lesbian and gay oppression are two
theoretically separable systems. Heterosexual women and men have a strong interest
in maintaining a system of heterosexual privileges. Challenging lesbian and gay
oppression is not the same as challenging women’s oppression; feminist and lesbian
politics, although overlapping, may sometimes part company. From a feminist point
of view (judging resistance to practices that oppress women), butches and femmes,
lesbian sex radicals who promote pornography and s/m are anti-feminist, but from a
lesbian point of view (judging resistance to heterosexuality), butches and femmes
are political. Lesbian resistance to heterosexuality is not necessarily resistance to
patriarchy. Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet is an engaging and
challenging book. I found myself being ‘seduced’ by Calhoun’s arguments, even
though I occupy a position – radical lesbian feminist – that she critiques throughout
the book. I do agree with some of her aims, such as the need to develop a specifically
lesbian theory, but differ with her interpretation of what they mean. However, as
detailed further below, I reject her central argument that lesbians should ally them-
selves with gay men, rather than with (heterosexual) feminists.
I now consider some of the arguments these authors construct in favour of
marriage.

DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS ARE AN ILLEGITIMATE ALTERNATIVE TO

MARRIAGE

Bolte (in The Gay & Lesbian Marriage & Family Reader) and Eskridge both com-
ment on the meaning and value of alternatives to marriage, such as domestic partner-
ships and civil unions. Eskridge outlines a ‘menu’ of six partnership recognition
options currently available in the USA and in Europe. He orders the options in
terms of the level of commitment required and in terms of the degree to which they
approximate our romantic vision of traditional marriage. The options on the menu are:

1. Domestic partnerships (which provide employment benefits without necessarily

much commitment);
2. Cohabitation (economic obligations and more benefits);
3. Cohabitation plus (like cohabitation but with partnership rights);
4. Civil unions (all of the above plus family rights and obligations);
5. Marriage (all of the above plus the name and the intangible benefits); and
6. Covenant marriage (all of the above plus harder to exit).

Eskridge maintains that domestic partnerships and civil unions can ‘pave the way’
for lesbian and gay marriage. First the state must decriminalize homosexuality, then
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Review Essay: CLARKE: Lesbian and Gay Marriage 523

institute laws prohibiting discrimination against lesbians and gay men, then it can
recognize lesbian and gay relationships first in the form of domestic partnerships and
civil unions and then finally in the form of marriage, and do so without creating a rift
in the community. Each stage promotes the status of lesbians and gay men and allows
for the education of heterosexuals, which in turn helps them to adjust to the next
stage. Ettelbrick (1997 [1989]) argued – rightly I think – that we should ‘avoid the
pitfall of framing the push for legal recognition of domestic partners . . . as a stepping
stone to marriage’ (Ettelbrick, 1997 [1989]: 761), and struggle for recognition for
many different kinds of relationships.
I question Eskridge’s use of the word ‘menu’ to describe the options currently
available for legally recognizing partnerships in the USA and Europe, because he is
clearly describing a hierarchy and not a menu. There can be no doubt that marriage is
at the pinnacle of relationship recognition; after all, marrying couples are rewarded
with the most (economic, practical and intangible) benefits. Ordering the options in
terms of the level of commitment they require of couples suggests that couples are
free to pick and choose from the menu (which of course lesbian and gay couples are
not). Although Equality Practice celebrates the emergence of this ‘menu’, ultimately
it endorses marriage as the ideal.
Bolte argues for full legal marriage for same-sex couples; she rejects domestic
partnership as an illegitimate alternative, arguing that it is only through marriage that
lesbians and gay men will achieve their full rights as citizens. She is critical of
activists who are working to expand the coverage of domestic partnerships. Their goal
is, she argues, to expand the benefits attached to domestic partnerships equivalent to
marriage; as such no fundamental difference will exist between domestic partnerships
and marriage. Essentially, domestic partnerships would become marriage by a differ-
ent name and so ‘it appears that these advocates are engaged in self-deception, in that
they want the rights and benefits of marriage, but not the label’ (2001: 41). Bolte also
rejects the argument that domestic partnerships are beneficial because they can ‘pave
the way’ for same-sex marriage because there is a more realistic chance they will be
implemented soon. She maintains that domestic partnerships expanded in scope could
be viewed as reminiscent of the ‘separate but equal’ regime of US segregation and
used to side-step ‘real’ justice for lesbians and gay men. There is no reason to believe
that a national law on domestic partnerships is more likely to be realized (sooner) than
a law on marriage. Although Calhoun does not comment specifically on domestic
partnerships etc., she does strongly argue that it is the ban on same-sex marriage in
particular that plays a central role in lesbian and gay subordination, so lesbians and
gay men should demand the right to marry.

LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE WILL DIMINISH SOCIAL PREJUDICE

Bolte, Eskridge and Calhoun all argue that marriage is the issue most likely to end
lesbian and gay subordination. For Calhoun, the argument that lesbians and gay men
are not fit for marriage lies at the heart of lesbians’ and gay men’s subordination and
their exclusion from civil society. Being fit for marriage is bound up with what it
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524 Feminism & Psychology 13(4)

means to be a citizen, because marriage plays a foundational role in sustaining civil

society. As such, the sexual orientation caste system would be seriously threatened by
the recognition of lesbian and gay marriage. Bolte argues that the legalization of
same-sex marriage would help to eliminate homophobia by elevating homosexuality
to acceptability and acknowledging lesbian and gay relationships as legitimate.
Likewise, Eskridge argues that homosexuality and relationship choices are normal-
ized by the evolving menu of relationship recognition options available to lesbian and
gay (and heterosexual) couples. He further argues that the incremental normalization
effected by equality practice offers a better strategy for challenging homophobia than
radical strategies. Homophobia can be exacerbated by angry confrontation: ‘the in-
your-face queer is likely to confirm rather than disrupt anti-gay attitudes’ (2002: 226).
Traditionalists appropriate radical declarations that marriage is an outdated institution
as examples of the real ‘homosexual agenda’ and to demonize same-sex marriage. He
cites evidence from social science research which shows that homophobes are more
likely to change their attitudes when someone close to them ‘comes out’ as lesbian or
gay. For Eskridge, every same-sex marriage will stimulate a dialogue among family
members, work colleagues and communities.
From my perspective, what we should be challenging is heterosexism: the organi-
zation of society around a heterosexual norm (and all the consequences that flow from
this). I agree with Calhoun that marriage and the family lie at the heart of heterosex-
ual privilege, but this means we need to demand a complete and utter transformation
of these institutions. Adding lesbians and gay men into marriage, will not de-centre
marriage, but rather reinforce marriage as the ideal, as the ‘gold standard’ in rela-
tionship recognition. Indeed, Bolte argues that by allowing everyone to marry the
partner of his or her choice, marriage will be strengthened. Lesbian and gay marriage
will become a ghetto within the broader institution, and in a ‘post-equality’ society
marriage will become a personal choice that anyone is free to make, and that has few
– if any – political implications. My concern is that lesbians and gay men will relax
into the complacency of being married – of having the right to marry – and be too
busy registering at Harvey Nichols to transform the institution from within.
Recognizing lesbian and gay marriage is part of the process of constructing a liberal
lesbian and gay identity; as such it will act as an instrument of social control by
depoliticizing lesbian and gay identity (and further marginalizing radical lesbians and
gay men) and colluding in (or at least not questioning) the privileging of normative
heterosexuality.

LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE WILL PROVIDE ACCESS TO RIGHTS CUR-

RENTLY DENIED TO LESBIANS AND GAY MEN

Bolte argues that same-sex marriage would provide protections to partners in lesbian
and gay relationships, ensuring a fair division of assets, and avoiding the burden of
lawyers’ fees when relationships end. Bolte and Eskridge also contend that lesbian
and gay marriage will provide children with access to rights they are currently denied.
Bolte maintains that, contrary to traditionalist claims that lesbian and gay marriage is
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Review Essay: CLARKE: Lesbian and Gay Marriage 525

bad for children, children are directly harmed by the denial of marriage rights because
when a lesbian or gay relationship ends there are no institutions in place to ensure the
protection of children. Calhoun – I think rightly – argues that appealing to formal
equality is not a sufficient justification for recognizing lesbian and gay marriage,
because it only answers the question of who should have this right and not the equal-
ly important question of whether anyone should have this right. My view is that mar-
riage is not a right anyone should have; the real solution for economic inequality is
universal benefits, not lesbian and gay marriage.

LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE WILL NOT ENCOURAGE DISTINCTIONS

BETWEEN GOOD AND BAD GAYS

One of Ettelbrick’s (1997 [1989]) key arguments was that recognizing lesbian and
gay marriage will further marginalize lesbians and gay men (particularly women,
people of colour, working-class and poor people) who choose not to marry. Eskridge
questions this assertion, arguing that there is no empirical basis for accepting or
rejecting this proposition. He notes that most of the plaintiffs in the cases he reports
are from one of the groups Ettelbrick mentions, and that the Vermont same-sex
marriage campaign was organized by women and the majority of its members were
women. He also cites social science evidence showing that lesbians report greater
satisfaction from committed relationships than gay men.
Bolte also rejects the argument that recognizing lesbian and gay marriage will
result in the further marginalization of lesbians and gay men ‘at the fringes of the gay
and lesbian rights movement’ who choose not to get married (2001: 38). She believes
that these concerns are overstated: ‘since these elements are currently ostracized,
legalizing same-sex marriage could not do a great deal more to harm those who are
excluded’ (p. 38). She agrees that lesbians and gay men who choose not to marry will
be discriminated against ‘at times’ ( p. 38), as single heterosexuals currently are, but
overall recognizing lesbian and gay marriages will have a liberalizing rather than a
conservative influence, bringing lesbians and gay men into the mainstream. Lesbian
and gay marriage will broaden the definition of what is considered acceptable, mak-
ing other forms of difference more acceptable. The notion that marriage will main-
stream lesbians and gay men is in my view precisely the problem. Assimilation is not
liberation. I find Bolte’s complacency with regard to the position of marginal (and
radical) lesbians and gay men rather disappointing; it seems that in the rush to get to
the altar some lesbians and gay men are choosing to dismiss as irrelevant radical inter-
ests and perspectives.

LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE WILL CHALLENGE TRADITIONAL GENDER

ROLES

Both Bolte and Ettelbrick endorse the view that lesbian and gay marriage will chal-
lenge traditional gender roles. Bolte maintains that recognizing same-sex marriage
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526 Feminism & Psychology 13(4)

would ‘revolutionize the institution of marriage with regard to gender roles that sup-
port heterosexism and homophobia’ (2001: 40). This means that same-sex marriage
will have a positive impact on all lesbians and gay men regardless of their marital sta-
tus. Eskridge argues that lesbian and gay marriage will undo traditional gender roles
and compulsory heterosexuality, generating benefits both for lesbians and gay men
and for heterosexual women. He quotes Michael Warner (1999) who argues that
same-sex marriage will improve things for heterosexual women, if not for lesbians
and gay men. He vigorously rejects Warner’s view, arguing that lesbians and gay men
should be allies of straight women and we should celebrate any empowerment of het-
erosexual women that might result from the recognition of same-sex marriage. The
same-sex marriage movement allies the interests of heterosexual women, lesbians and
gay men.
Calhoun, like Warner, maintains that the gender argument provides a better reason
for heterosexuals to make same-sex marriage a priority because the primary benefi-
ciaries would be heterosexual women. Thus, it is not a positive moral argument for
lesbian and gay marriage. Calhoun contends that heterosexual women and lesbians
are fighting separate battles: heterosexual women to end gender oppression and les-
bians to end lesbian and gay subordination. Lesbians have interests of their own in
marrying and forming families, interests that may conflict with those of heterosexual
women. Any attempts to combine the interests of lesbians and heterosexual women
can lead to problems.
Calhoun’s argument seems to be that lesbians should ally themselves with gay
men, but the lesbian and gay movement provides many examples of lesbians’ inter-
ests getting subsumed by gay men’s and their difference as women disappearing when
lesbians and gay men work together. One of my greatest concerns is that hetero-
sexuals see the fight for lesbian and gay liberation as much their responsibility as it is
‘ours’. Many white readers probably share my experience of when objecting to a
racist comment the person responsible defends themself by pointing out that there is
not a black person present. This of course suggests that racism is only offensive to
black people, and that racism is only racism when it is directed against black people.
Just as white people should be offended by, and take responsibility for, challenging
racism, heterosexuals should be offended by, and take responsibility for, challenging
heterosexism (even when there is an ‘out’ lesbian or gay person present). If a society
free from heterosexism is a universal good, which I believe it is, then it does not
matter whose interests it serves; you do not have to benefit from it to fight for it. We
should foster a sense of mutual responsibility and obligation and consider the conse-
quences of our demands for others, especially for our political allies and, unlike
Calhoun, as a lesbian feminist I do believe that heterosexual feminists are lesbians’
obvious political allies.

FEARS ABOUT NORMALIZATION ARE MISPLACED

Building on the gender argument, Bolte argues that recognizing same-sex marriage
may lead to the eradication of traditional western marriages. Eskridge describes the
‘overheated’ (2002: 221) same-sex marriage debate as ‘triangular’ (p. 198), with
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Review Essay: CLARKE: Lesbian and Gay Marriage 527

defenders of same-sex marriage (liberals) occupying one position, traditionalists the

second and progressives (radicals) the third. Eskridge rejects what he sees as the ide-
ological posturing of progressives and traditionalists in favour of developing an evi-
dence-based argument for same-sex marriage. In repudiating ideological arguments
about the possible consequences of recognizing same-sex marriages, he states that ‘no
one actually knows the consequences, especially the long-term consequences, of state
recognition for same-sex marriage. Who can tell what will be ‘normalized’ by same-
sex marriage: Homosexuality? Marriage?’ (2002: 202). He is critical of gay radicals
such as Michael Warner for making ‘extravagant causal claim[s] and . . . dubious fac-
tual assertions’ (p. 219). Instead, he points out that most lesbians and gay men do not
have radical agendas and most want to be normalized (i.e. to be treated as regular peo-
ple). He discards fears that recognizing marriage will preclude the creation of other
institutions for sanctioning relationships by noting that when The Netherlands legal-
ized same-sex marriage in 2001 the registered partnership legislation instituted in
1998 was left in place. According to Eskridge, we should all be grateful for the same-
sex marriage movement, because couples in many western countries have options that
did not exist prior to the struggle for marriage rights. Radical critics (and anti-les-
bian/gay critics) overstate – sometimes ‘hysterically so’ (2002: 221) – the power of
the state to normalize people, because the state does not support goals in a linear way.
Eskridge’s jettison of what he sees as ideological abstractions in favour of argu-
ments grounded in evidence is untenable because he too constructs an ideological
argument for equality practice, and speculates about the normalizing consequences of
marriage. He argues that lesbian and gay marriage and the menu of relationship
recognition options will normalize homosexuality and relationship choice and denor-
malize marriage. He writes that:

as a single person well-accepted by my ‘married’ lesbian, gay, and bisexual

friends, I am not . . . pessimistic . . . that normalization will ostracize people like
me. The reason is that state-recognized (or church-recognized) relationships do
not carry as much normative force as they did a generation ago. (2002: 213)

I am glad that Eskridge feels accepted by his married friends, but this is not the
point. The point is that fewer economic and practical privileges accrue to being
single (and although being single, particularly when younger, may be less stigma-
tized, it is still I think regarded as a ‘passing phase’ rather than an acceptable way of
organizing one’s personal life). I agree with Calhoun that recognizing same-sex
marriage may result in unmarried lesbians and gay men being further marginalized
(she goes on to argue that countering lesbians’ and gay men’s family outlaw status is
not the same as fighting for equal recognition for an array of relationships).
Calhoun too argues that fears about normalization are misplaced, and ignore the
fact that many heterosexuals have been anything but assimilationist. Evolution in
marriage law and marital and parenting practices has been a result of heterosexuals’
resistance to the legal and social understanding of traditional marriage. If having the
right to marry has not prevented heterosexuals from challenging traditional marriage,
there is no reason to think that lesbians and gay men will stop thinking critically about
marriage when they are granted the right to marry. Demanding the right to marry does
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528 Feminism & Psychology 13(4)

not mean that one endorses the traditional conception of marriage and the current sys-
tem of rights and benefits; one can want the right but be critical of the system.
Calhoun suggests that radical arguments against marriage and the family (e.g.
Robson, 1998) do not allow us to put into circulation arguments challenging the ide-
ology of lesbian and gay oppression – that lesbians and gay men are unfit for mar-
riage, parenting and family.
In conclusion, since the Stoddard and Ettelbrick debate was published in 1989 the
prospect of lesbian and gay marriage has become less of a legal fairytale. The
Netherlands and Belgium now recognize same-sex marriage and other localities (e.g.
the state of Vermont in the USA) offer lesbian and gay couples the same package of
benefits and responsibilities that come with marriage, if not the name. Given this
rapidly shifting legal terrain, I am disappointed that the marriage debate appears only
to be populated by a liberal orthodoxy. Now more than ever radicals need to speak out
against marriage. I, for one, think that, to paraphrase a well known radical feminist
saying, lesbians and gay men who want to be just like heterosexuals lack ambition.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Thanks to Sara-Jane Finlay for her helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.

NOTE

Lewin (2001) notes that since this essay was written Ettelbrick has modified her position
and is now an advocate for the legalization of lesbian and gay marriage.

REFERENCES

Ettelbrick, Paula L. (1997[1989]) ‘Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?’, in Mark

Blasius and Shane Phelan (eds), We are Everywhere: A Historical Sourcebook of Gay
and Lesbian Politics, pp. 757–61. New York: Routledge.
Lewin, Ellen (2001) ‘Weddings Without Marriage: Making Sense of Lesbian and Gay
Commitment Rituals’, in Mary Bernstein and Renate Reimann (eds), Queer Families,
Queer Politics: Challenging Culture and the State, pp. 44–52. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Robson, Ruthann (1998) Sappho Goes to Law School: Fragments in Lesbian Legal
Theory. New York: Columbia University Press.
Smith, Ralph R. and Windes, Russel, R. (2000) Progay/Antigay: The Rhetorical War over
Sexuality. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Stoddard, Thomas B. (1997[1989]) ‘Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry’, in
Mark Blasius and Shane Phelan (eds), We are Everywhere: A Historical Sourcebook of
Gay and Lesbian Politics, pp. 753–7. New York: Routledge.
Warner, Michael (1999) ‘Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage’, GLQ: A Journal
of Lesbian & Gay Studies 5(2): 119–71.
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Review Essay: CLARKE: Lesbian and Gay Marriage 529

Victoria CLARKE is a lecturer in the School of Cognitive, Developmental

and Social Psychology at the University of the West of England. Her research
interests include lesbian, gay and heterosexual relationships and marriage.
ADDRESS: School of Cognitive, Developmental and Social Psychology,
Faculty of Applied Sciences, University of the West of England, Oldbury Court
Road, Bristol BS16 2JP, UK.
[email: Victoria.Clarke@uwe.ac.uk]