COMMENTARY
Okonjo Iweala, and Angelina Jolie among
others. It has also chosen to overlook the
views of the Organisation of Islamic Co-
operation which reprimanded the act of
kidnapping as a “gross misinterpretation
of Islam” (Daily Trust, 9 May 2014). It is
possible that offers of help to the Nigerian
government would harden the attitude
of the BH with attendant escalation
of violence.
In this fluid situation, Jonathan has
rightly rejected the possibility of the
Undermining Panchayati Raj
Institutions in Gujarat
Atulan Guha
This article argues that the
panchayati raj institutions in
Gujarat are being undermined by
the state government. The failure
to evolve financial devolution
to fund the PRIs is making them
financially dependent on the
state government. Further, the
Samras Gram Yojana, which
encourages consensus candidates
without elections plays into
the hands of traditional
dominant castes’ power.
This article is drawn from the talk titled “State
of Fiscal Federalism in Gujarat”, delivered at
the Global Development Network and IRMA
Policy Dialogue on Panchayati Raj, Political
Empowerment and Service Delivery in India,
28 November 2013, New Delhi.
Atulan Guha (atulanguha@yahoo.com) is with
the Institute of Rural Management Anand,
Gujarat.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW MAY 31, 2014
government entering into any arrange-
ment of exchanging the girls for BH
prisoners. But how long will he hold out?
The next few days are critical for the
very survival of Nigeria as a nation.
Nigeria is indeed poised “on the thin
edge of the knife” as Wole Soyinka said
in an interview (Al Jazeera, 8 May 2014).
References
BBC News (2012): “Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan:
Officials Back Boko Haram”, 8 January.
G
ujarat has a three-tier panchayat
system and does hold regular
panchayat elections. As a policy,
in these elections, political parties are
debarred from participation. As a result,
the elected members of these panchayati
raj institutions (PRIs) are individually ac-
countable to the villagers. This account-
ability becomes non-existent if an indi-
vidual member does not want to contest
further. But the likelihood of political
parties avoiding accountability is less
compared to individuals as it would be
unlikely for political parties to skip elec-
tions. Further, as political parties do not
fight panchayat elections, the function-
ing of the panchayat does not figure
substantially in mainstream political
discourse of the state.
Incentive for No Election
But it is not only Gujarat; there are many
other states where political parties are
not allowed to participate in panchayat
elections. But what makes Gujarat dif-
ferent from other states is its Samras
Gram Yojana. Under this scheme sub-
stantial financial incentives are given to
village panchayats that do not hold elec-
tions, but select consensus candidates
instead. Further, informal priority is given
to such panchayats in project approvals
and implementation. These are called
Samras villages under the Samras Gram
vol xlIX no 22
Burton, Bronwyn (2014): The New York Times in a
local radio talk on 7 May.
Ezekwesili, Oby (2013): Vanguard, 28 August.
Mailafia, Obadiah (2012): “Conflict and Insurgency
in Nigeria”, website: http://247ureports.com.
26 September.
Onuoha, F C (2010): “The Islamist Challenge:
Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Explained”, African
Security Review, Vol 19, No 1, p 55, This Day,
2 August 2009.
Phan, Peter J (2012): “Boko Haram’s Evolving
Threat”, African Security Brief, No 20, April.
Reuters (2012): “Factbox on Recent Boko Haram
Strikes on Nigerian Churches”, US edition,
17 June.
Soyinka, Wole (2014): Al Jazeera Correspondent,
8 May.
Yojana. There are greater incentives for
women sarpanchs or all women Samras
village or scheduled caste (SC) sarpanch
Samras villages. The website of the Samras
Gram Yojana at the department of pan-
chayat, rural housing and rural develop-
ment of Government of Gujarat has the
following to say about the scheme:
In state elections, there are parties and sym-
bols, but there is no symbol of any party in
gram panchayat elections. There are con-
vincing reasons for this is an unique custom
of Arya culture. Original existence of the
village, its originality, its events, customs etc
are preserved. Various communities-castes
take part in festivals on many occasions and
have maintained family spirit...Village peo-
ple gather and decide representatives from
among them unanimously for the adminis-
tration of Gram Panchayat.
The quote itself explains a lot about
the vision behind it. It envisions the
power structure in the villages to be syn-
onymous with the brahminical social
order associated with Arya culture. In
recent history, there has been an ab-
sence of mass movements or only weak
mobilisations on social and class issues of
disadvantaged communities and classes
in Gujarat. If any mass mobilisation has
happened in the recent past it was of
religious majority against the minority.
So, power structures have remained
unchanged, and continue to favour tra-
ditionally powerful communities. In this
situation a greater deepening of demo-
cracy at the grass-roots level through
decentralisation has the potential to create
greater space for disadvantaged commu-
nities. The Samras Yojana limits this
possibility. The expected consequence of
this scheme is that representatives in-
cluding the sarpanch have to be accept-
able to the dominant family or group of
21
COMMENTARY
families in the village. It is only intended
to make PRIs free of social and class con-
flict, hence perpetuating the dominance
of elites over rural society.
Within the Samras Yojana there are
provisions for reservation for women, SC
and scheduled tribe (to fulfil the consti-
tutional requirement). In fact, there are
greater monetary incentives for the pan-
chayats who select a woman or a dalit
representative. Since this has to be
through consensus, these representa-
tives who are either women or from
backward social groups cannot raise
issues that are uncomfortable for the
dominant power groups within the vil-
lages. Presently, out of 13,996 village
panchayats of Gujarat, 3,915 are Samras
villages (27.97%).
No Decentralised Planning
In Gujarat, at the most 6.6% of the state
plan fund is available to PRIs for planning
at the district panchayat level. Even with
this minuscule fund there is no integrat-
ed district plan in the actual sense. In
fact, despite a resolution passed by the
state government to have a district plan-
ning committee (DPC) in each district (in
2009), on the ground there are no DPCs
formed.1 Even the composition of the
DPC, which is part of the resolution,
shows that the state cabinet can directly
intervene with the functioning of the
DPC as the minister-in-charge and co-
in-charge minister of the district are
chairman and co-chairman of the DPC,
respectively. District panchayat presi-
dent and collector are vice-chairman
and co-vice-chairman respectively. And
district planning officer is the member-
secretary. Even on paper, there is no pro-
vision of planning at the village level.
Further, fiscal federalism within Gu-
jarat is non-existent. There is no formula
for the devolution of funds from the
state government to the PRIs. The first
State Finance Commission (SFC) had not
suggested a devolution formula. The
second SFC did suggest a devolution for-
mula that was rejected by the state gov-
ernment. Though the third SFC was sup-
posed to make recommendations for the
period 2011-12 to 2015-16, it has not sub-
mitted its report yet. In fact, it got an ex-
tension for the third time till December
22
2014. It has been extended despite news-
paper reports suggesting the completion
of substantial amounts of work by mid-
2013.2 In fact all the three SFCs that were
constituted in Gujarat suffered from a
few common ailments:
(a) delay in formation of SFCs and pro-
viding manpower. Even if after some de-
lay manpower was provided, it was of-
ten inadequate. As a result, all the com-
missions submitted their reports with
substantial delay.
(b) the first two SFCs show that most of
the recommendations, especially those
suggesting greater allocations to PRIs
have not been accepted by the state gov-
ernment. Further, most recommenda-
tions that were accepted by the govern-
ment either have not been implemented
or were implemented at a snail’s pace.
These ailments reflect the non-seri-
ousness of the state government towards
the SFC, a constitutional body. In fact,
the budget of the SFC, unlike the central
government’s practice of putting the
budget of Central Finance Commission
under the Ministry of Finance, comes
under the department of panchayat and
rural housing.
Arbitrary Allocations to PRIs
Despite having no devolution formula,
the state budget documents reveal that in
2010-11, an impressive figure of 22.78% of
total revenue receipts of the state gov-
ernment was passed on to PRIs as grants
and loans. This has gradually increased
from a low 9.78% in 2006-07. But a closer
look at these figures raises questions.
First, the state budget does not show
how much of grants and loans are
sourced from the state and how much of
it is from the centre. According to the re-
ports of the Thirteenth Finance Com-
mission, Gujarat has scored “0” in the
index of devolution. For 2005-06, 2006-
07 and 2007-08, the non-plan revenue
grant given by the Central Finance Com-
mission has been passed on partially to
PRIs; the state government on its own
has passed on nothing to the PRIs.
Second, it does not show how much of
the allocated amount has been spent by
the departments whose administrative
and monitoring authorities are not PRIs.
Only 11 activities fully and 14 activities
MAY 31, 2014
partially have been transferred to PRIs.
Education is one of the partially trans-
ferred activities. The accountability of
the schools and teachers has not been
transferred to PRIs; but the salaries
have been.
The accountability of teachers and
schools is with the state government,
only the salaries of teachers are deposit-
ed in the PRI account for dispersal. Be-
tween 2006-07 and 2012-13, education
has constituted, on average, more than
60% of the grant shown in the state budg-
et. In fact, according to a senior bureaucrat
with the Government of Gujarat, more
than 80% of the grant that has been
shown as allocated to PRIs is actually
used by various departments that oper-
ate at the district level. These depart-
ments are accountable to the state gov-
ernment, and not to PRIs. As a result, the
actual resources flowing into PRIs is sub-
stantially lower.
In a nutshell, the Gujarat model of
PRIs is against the spirit of the 73rd and
74th amendments of the Constitution.
This model entails institutional mecha-
nisms that hinder the deepening of grass-
roots democracy. The PRIs are treated as
an extension of the state government
panchayat department. It only helps the
state government implement various
schemes. The decentralised planning
process is in its nascent stages. Even the
funds transferred to PRIs are low and
arbitrary with no devolution formula
in existence.
Notes
1 The Times of India, Surat (26 July 2013), http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/surat/3-years-
on-no-sight-of-district-planning-committees-
in-Gujarat/articleshow/21351212.cms
2 Also mentioned in the letter written by
H S Shylendra, published in EPW, Volume 49,
Issue 17, 26 April 2014.
EPW on Scopus Database
EPW is now indexed on Scopus.
Scopus, published by Elsevier, is the world’s
largest abstract and citation database of
peer-reviewed literature with tools that track,
analyse and visualise research.
Scopus has begun indexing EPW articles
and soon all articles from 2007 onwards will
be indexed.
Please visit www.scopus.com via your
institutional subscription to that database.
vol xlIX no 22 EPW Economic & Political Weekly