Disqualification by Reason of Death or Insanity of Adverse Party

Also known as Dead Man’s Statute or Survivorship Rule

Rationale

To close lips of the plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the defendant in order to discourage
perjury and protect the estate from fictitious claims.

Purpose:

It is designed to close the lips of the plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the defendant, in order to
remove from the surviving party the temptation to do falsehood and possibility of fictitious claims
against the deceased.

To prevent perjury considering that the other party cannot say anything anymore because of he/she is
dead.

If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by reason of death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to give his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of transaction, because it will cause an undue advantage.

Applicability of Dead Man’s Statute

This rule “applies only to civil cases or a special proceeding over the estate of a deceased or insane
person”

It is still applicable even if the property has already been judicially adjudicated to the heirs regardless
whether the deceased died before or after the suit.

Elements: [Sec. 23, Rule 130]

1. Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted

2. Against:

a. An executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or

b. A person of unsound mind

3. Upon a claim or demand against

a. The estate of such deceased person, or

b. Such person of unsound mind

4. Cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before

a. The death of such deceased person

b. Such person became of unsound mind

Extent of disqualification by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party

It constitutes only a partial disqualification as the witness is not completely disqualified but is only
prohibited from testifying on the matters therein specified.

Facts favorable to the deceased are not prohibited

The rule does not operate to exclude testimony favorable to the deceased because the rule seeks to
protect his interests.

Who may invoke the protection of the Dead Man’s statute?

1. Executor, administrator and any other representative of a deceased person, when they are the
defendants in a claim against the estate of the deceased; or

2. Person of unsound mind in a claim filed against him

The Following CANNOT testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind:

1. Parties or assignors of parties to a case or persons in whose behalf of a case is prosecuted; and

2. Against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a

person of unsound mind

Waiver of the protection of the Dead Man’s statute

The protection may be waived by:

1. Failing to object to the testimony;

2. Cross-examining the witness on the prohibited testimony; or
3. Offering evidence to rebut the testimony
 ENRIQUE RAZON v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS:

In his complaint, Vicente B. Chuidian, prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon be ordered to deliver
certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc.

In his answer, Razon alleged that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., he distributed shares of stock
previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan
T. Chuidian. The shares of stock were registered in the name of Chuidian only as nominal stockholder
and with the agreement that the said shares of stock were owned and held by the Razon but Chuidian
was given the option to buy the same.

The RTC ruled in favor of Razon. However, the CA reversed this ruling and held that Chuidian is the
owner of the shares of stock.

Razon now assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute
rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule
is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not
object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T.
Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the
deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination
regarding such testimony.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Dead Man’s Statute is applicable in this case.

RULING:

NO.

Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:

Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as
to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind."
The reason for the rule (Rule 130, Sec. 23) is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the
deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him
(deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the
latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give
false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party."

The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the
administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.

In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of Razon, to the affect that the
late Juan Chuidian and the him agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in
E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by Razon, unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same
which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The
case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the
petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's
testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that
the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN, v. CHUA

FACTS

Lamberto Chua alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of Shellane LPG. For business convenience, Lamberto and Jacinto allegedly agreed to
register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER, under the name of
Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Both Lamberto and Jacinto contributed P100,000.00 to the partnership,
with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them.

The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, sister-in-law of Lamberto.
Upon Jacinto’s death in the later part of 1989, his daughter, Lilibeth took over the operations of Shellite
without Lamberto’s consent. Despite Lamberto’s repeated demands for accounting, she failed to
comply.

On June 22m 1992, Lamberto filed a complaint against Lilibeth with the RTC. RTC decided in favor of
Lamberto.

Lilibeth questions the correctness of the finding that a partnership existed between Lamberto and
Jacinto. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership between Lamberto and
Jacinto, Lilibeth argues that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of Lamberto and
his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three (3) years after Jacinto’s death.
To support the argument, Lilibeth invokes the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE OR SURVIVORSHIP RULE” under
Sec. 23, Rule 130. Lilibeth thus implores this Court to rule that the testimonies of Lamberto and his alter
ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person
(Jacinto).

ISSUE

Whether or not the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE” applies to this case so as to render inadmissible Lamberto’s
testimony and that if his witness, Josephine.

HELD

No.

The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own contradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.

Lilibeth filed a compulsory counterclaim against Lamberto in their answer before the RTC, and with the
filing of their counterclaim, Lilibeth herself effectively removed this case from the ambit of the “Dead
Man’s Statute”. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, Lamberto, may testify to occurrences before
the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim,
Lamberto is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been bought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.

The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute” for the simple reason that she is
not “a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted”. Lamberto
offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between Lamberto and
Jacinto. Lilibeth’s insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of Lamberto does not make her an assignor
because of the term “assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not
the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen”. Plainly then, Josephine is merely
a witness of Lamberto, latter being the plaintiff.

Lilibeth’s reliance alone on the “Dead Man’s Statue” to defeat Lamberto’s claim cannot prevail over the
factual findings that a partnership was established between Lamberto and Jacinto. Based not only on
the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, they considered the evidence for
Lamberto as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
 TERESITA P. BORDALBA v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On April 16, 1980, petitioner Teresita Bordalba was granted Free Patent over a parcel of lot in Mandaue
City. Upon learning of the same, private respondents filed with the RTC the instant complaint against
petitioner Teresita Bordalba praying that the patent be declared void and ordered cancelled. They also
prayed that they be adjudged owners thereof.

Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that the subject lot was acquired by her through purchase from
her mother, who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. In her answer,
petitioner traced her mother’s ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 deed of extra-judicial partition
presented by private respondents, and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, and Candida Flores occupied a
portion of it by mere tolerance of her mother.

On May 28, 1990, The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining the patent
and the title, declared them as void and ordered its cancellation. The CA affirmed the ruling with
modification.

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters
occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same
violated the dead man’s statute.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Dead Man’s Statute is applicable.

RULING:

NO.

The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to fraud
and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioner’s application, insofar as her
declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other person. Her declaration is
belied by the extrajudicial partition which she acknowledged, her mother’s aborted attempt to have the
lot registered, private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest’s opposition thereto, and by the occupancy
of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme and his family since 1945.

As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that said rule finds no application
in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any
matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the
deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.

Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based,
inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial
court.