HELMUT KRASSER, HORST LASIC, ELI FRANCO, BIRGIT KELLNER (ED.

Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis

Proceedings of the
Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference
Vienna, August 23–27, 2005
ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
DENKSCHRIFTEN, 424. BAND

BEITRÄGE ZUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS

Nr. 69
 ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
DENKSCHRIFTEN, 424. BAND

HELMUT KRASSER, HORST LASIC, ELI FRANCO, BIRGIT KELLNER (ED.)

Religion and Logic in Buddhist

Philosophical Analysis
Proceedings of the
Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference
Vienna, August 23–27, 2005

VERLAG DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN

WIEN 2011
Vorgelegt von k. M. HELMUT KRASSER in der Sitzung am 17. Dezember 2010

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ISBN 978-3-7001-7000-6
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Contents

Frontispiece: Paricipants at the conference .................................................. v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Account of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference in Vienna, August 23–27, 2005
Program .............................................................................. xi
List of participants .................................................................... xv
Ernst Steinkellner, Opening speech – News from the manuscript department .................... xvii

Proceedings

Piotr Balcerowicz, Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (ane-
kāntavāda) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Junjie Chu, Sanskrit fragments of Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi ........................... 33

Vincent Eltschinger, Studies on Dharmakīrti’s religious philosophy (3): Compassion and its
role in the general structure of PV 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Koji Ezaki, Can we say that everything is ineffable? Udayana’s refutation of the theory of
apoha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Eli Franco, Perception of yogis – Some epistemological and metaphysical considerations ......... 81

Toru Funayama, Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Brendan S. Gillon, Dharmakīrti on inference from effect. A discussion of verse 12 and the
Svavṛtti of the Svārthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Klaus Glashoff, Problems of transcribing avinābhāva into predicate logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Keijin Hayashi, Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of mental perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Yoshichika Honda, Bhoja and Dharmakīrti ................................................... 151

Pascale Hugon, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s views on perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Masahiro Inami, Nondual cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Hisataka Ishida, On the classification of anyāpoha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Takashi Iwata, Compassion in Buddhist logic – Dharmakīrti’s view of compassion as inter-

preted by Prajñākaragupta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
viii Contents

Kyō Kanō, Dichotomy, antarvyāpti, and dṛṣṭānta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

Kei Kataoka, Manu and the Buddha for Kumārila and Dharmakīrti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Shoryu Katsura, From Abhidharma to Dharmakīrti – With a special reference to the concept
of svabhāva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

Yohei Kawajiri, A critique of the Buddhist theory of adhyavasāya in the Pratyabhijñā school ...... 281

Birgit Kellner, Dharmakīrti’s criticism of external realism and the sliding scale of analysis ........ 291

Hisayasu Kobayashi, On the development of the argument to prove vijñaptimātratā . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

Taiken Kyuma, On the (im)perceptibility of external objects in Dharmakīrti’s epistemology ....... 309

Lawrence McCrea, Prajñākaragupta on the pramāṇas and their objects .......................... 319

Shinya Moriyama, pramāṇapariśuddhasakalatattvajña, sarvajña and sarvasarvajña . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

Yasutaka Muroya, Bhāsarvajña’s Interpretation of bhāva eva nāśaḥ and a related chrono-
logical problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

Hiroshi Nemoto, The proof of impermanence in the dGe lugs pa’s pramāṇa theory ............... 363

Miyako Notake, The concept of samayābhoga in the refutation of the existence of universals. . . . . . . 375

Hideyo Ogawa, On the term anupalabdhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395

Masamichi Sakai, Śākyabuddhi and Dharmottara on the inference of momentariness based on

the absence of external causes of destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407

Kiyokuni Shiga, antarvyāpti and bahirvyāpti re-examined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

John Taber, Did Dharmakīrti think the Buddha had desires? .................................... 437

Tom J.F. Tillemans, Dignāga, Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti on apoha. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449

Toshikazu Watanabe, Dharmakīrti’s intention to quote Pramāṇasamuccaya III 12 ................ 459

Jeson Woo, Vācaspatimiśra and Jñānaśrīmitra on the object of yogipratyakṣa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469

Zhihua Yao, Non-cognition and the third pramāṇa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477

Chizuko Yoshimizu, What makes all the produced impermanent? Proof of impermanence and
theory of causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Reconsidering the fragment of the Bṛhaṭṭīkā on restriction (niyama) ......... 507
 Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva path1
Toru Funayama, Kyoto

Introduction
The scope of pramāṇa Buddhism principally remains within the range of ‘completely conven-
tional matters’ (sāṃvyavahārika).2 The relationship between the pramāṇa tradition and the reli-
gious world which is alluded to by the terms mokṣa (‘the final liberation’), paramapuruṣārtha
(‘the supreme goal of human beings’) and the like was and still is very much a controversial
issue. Bearing this in mind, at least two different approaches were utilized to clarify the
religiosity (or religious elements) of the pramāṇa school. One is to examine the school’s atti-
tude towards the Buddha or his attributes, such as ‘omniscience’ (sarvajñatva) and ‘great
compassion’ (mahākaruṇā), where the connection with the theory of two or three kinds of
Buddha body might also be a derivative topic. This approach has been studied in close connec-
tion with the pramāṇasiddhi-chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika and its commentaries. The other
approach, which I think at least or even more important, is to consider how the pramāṇa sys-
tem is related to the bodhisattva path where a practitioner ascends religious steps of practice
one by one. This aspect is described as the process for a worldling (pṛthagjana) to become a
holy one or saint (ārya; lit. “noble one”). These two things are closely related to each other in
being the final goal and its means, because in Mahāyāna Buddhism a practitioner’s final goal is
to become awakened and because in the pramāṇa texts, even the All-Knowing Buddha is
depicted as a yogin, ‘a practitioner of contemplation’, as we shall see below.
In this paper, I would like to make an inquiry into Kamalaśīla’s ideas regarding the second
approach in the above overview by focusing especially on the yogipratyakṣa-theory.3 Kamala-

1
This article is to a degree based on discussions which have already been developed in Japanese in Funayama
[2000], [2003] and [2004]. The contents of this paper also partially overlap what I tried to roughly sketch in
“Perception, Conceptual Construction and Yogic Cognition according to Kamalaśīla’s Epistemology,” Chung-
Hwa Buddhist Journal 中華佛學學報 18, 2005, 273–297 (esp. 287–292). I would like to express my thanks to
Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek and Mr. Anthony R. Black for their kind help with stylistic improvements to my
English.
2
For the significance of sāṃvyavahārika-pramāṇa ‘(means of) valid cognition participant in completely con-
ventional matters,’ which appears at the very end of the Pramāṇaviniścaya I in contrast to pāramarthika-pra-
māṇa, see Inami [1989: esp. 59–63] and Tilmann Vetter, “Pāramārthika-pramāṇa in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-
viniścaya and in Gtsang-nag-pa’s Tshad-ma rnam-par nges-pa’s ṭi-ka legs-bshad bsdus-pa,” in Ihara, Shōren
and Yamaguchi, Zuihō (eds.), Language, History and Culture. Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar
of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Narita 1989, Narita: Naritasan Shinshōji 1992, 327–332.
3
The problem of mystic cognition requires a multi-angled approach. One of the most important questions con-
cerns the object of yogipratyakṣa, viz., whether yogipratyakṣa is related only to svalakṣaṇa or has any connec-

Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner (eds), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis.
Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference. Vienna, August 23–27, 2005. Wien 2011, pp. 99–111.
100 Toru Funayama

śīla’s system of practice has been studied by Moriyama Seitetsu.4 Ichigō Masamichi5 has re-
cently presented a reconsideration of Kamalaśīla’s view on adhimukticaryābhūmi (i.e. nirve-
dhabhāgīya, see Section III below), which should be practiced prior to the stage of yogipraty-
akṣa, the main topic of this paper. Indebted to these studies, I will concentrate on the problem
of yogic perception and try to bring to light some new perspectives on this mystical experi-
ence.
Dharmakīrti created the definition of yogipratyakṣa but wrote almost nothing about its rela-
tion to praxis. To be sure, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti counted yogipratyakṣa as a type of direct
perception, but neither of them gave us even a hint what they thought about the relationship
between the bodhisattva path and their epistemology. What is different between before and af-
ter experiencing yogic perception? Is it easy or difficult to attain?

I. Vinītadeva (ca. 690–750)6

Dharmakīrti maintained that there are four kinds of direct perception: sense-perception
(indriyapratyakṣa), mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa), self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and
yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa). Of them, the definition of the fourth kind, in Nyāyabindu I
11, runs as follows:
Further, (the fourth type of direct perception) is yogic cognition which occurs from the final stage in the ele-
vated condition of repeated contemplation on a true object.7

Regarding this, to the best of my own limited knowledge Vinītadeva’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā is the
single exception among the commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s works that explicitly refers to the

tion with sāmānyalakṣaṇa in spite of the general definition of direct perception. In my understanding, one of
the key concepts needed to precisely define the object of yogipratyakṣa is vijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇam ‘the
particular as being excluded from the heterogeneous,’ which originally comes from apoha-theory, in the sense
of a kind of sāmānyalakṣaṇa. For the usage as well as an analysis of the term, see Funayama [2000: 120–122]
and [2004: 378–380]. The same topic is also taken up in McClintock [2000: 238 n. 23]. Further, one of the
earliest texts to mention sāmānyalakṣaṇa as the object of meditation in the pramāṇa tradition is Yijing’s 義淨
(635–713) Chinese translation of Dharmapāla’s commentary on the Viṃśatikā entitled Cheng weishi baosheng
lun 成唯識寶生論 (Taishō No. 1591, Vol. 31, 96c10: 彼但總相爲其境故 “Because he [= the Buddha] has the
universal [sāmānyalakṣaṇa] as his cognitive range.”), as already pointed out in Funayama [2004: 379 and 385f.
n. 22]. The Cheng weishi baosheng lun is composed on the basis of Dignāga’s svasaṃvedana-theory, and the
above-cited passage is found in the context of the same scheme. Therefore we can regard it as a pramāṇa text.
A relevant discussion can be found in n. 31 below in this paper.
4
Moriyama, Seitetsu 森山清徹, “Kamalaśīla no yuishiki shisō to shūdō ron – yugagyō chūgan ha no yuishiki
setsu no kannsatsu to chō’etsu” Kamalaśīla の唯識思想と修道論 – 瑜伽行中観派の唯識説の観察と超越 [Ka-
malaśīla’s Yogācāra Thought and his Theory of Practice: Yogācāra-Madhyamaka’s Observation and Tran-
scendence of Yogācāra Views], Bukkyō daigaku jinbungaku ronshū 佛教大學人文學論集 19, 1985, 43–77:
esp. 64–74.
5
Ichigō [2002].
6
For this chronology, see Funayama, Toru, “On the Date of Vinītadeva” in Raffaele Torella (ed.), Le Parole e i
Marmi: Studi in Onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70° Compleanno, Roma: IsIAO 2001, 309–325.
7
bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānam ceti.
 Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva paths 101

relationship between yogipratyakṣa and Buddhist praxis.8 Vinītadeva comments on bhūtārtha-

bhāvanāprakarṣaparyantaja- in the following way:
bhūta (a true object) means a non-reversed object. It is the four noble truths. The repeated contemplation of
that is (meant by) bhūtārthabhāvanā. bhāvanā is repeated exercise (*abhyāsa). The elevated condition of that
is (signified by) bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣa. (They are) the stage of mindful observations (*smṛtyupasthāna;
the establishment of mindfulness), the stage of ‘the heated’ (*ūṣmataga), the stage of the summit (*mūrdhan),
and the stage of acceptance (*kṣānti). The final stage of these is (expressed by) bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣa-
paryanta. paryanta is the stage of the highest elements (*agradharma). What occurs from that is (stated by)
bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantaja.9

Here, Vinītadeva holds the view that bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta signifies laukikāgra-

dharma, which is the final stage of the nirvedhabhāgīya in the normal practice of Mahāyāna
Yogācāra as well as in Śrāvakayāna practice.

II. Some background theories

Judging from the systems of the Sarvāstivāda school and the Yogācāra school, the stages of
practice assumed by Vinītadeva may roughly be sketched as follows: After a certain number of
preparatory steps such as aśubhābhāvanā ‘the realization of an impure [body],’ which means
the practice of meditating on the progressive deterioration of corpses, one enters the stage of
catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni, where a practitioner first observes that the body (kāya) is impure
(aśuci), that the sensations (vedanā) are suffering (duḥkha), that the mind (citta) is transient
(anitya), and that the existent elements (dharma) are selfless (anātman), respectively, and then
further observes in a unified way that the body, the sensations, the mind and the existent ele-
ments are all impure, suffering, transient, and selfless. After this twofold mindful observation
which constitutes mokṣabhāgīya together with the above-mentioned preparatory steps such as
aśubhābhāvanā, the practitioner next enters what is called nirvedhabhāgīya10 where, according
to Śrāvakayāna and Vinītadeva, the object of meditation is the four noble truths (caturārya-
satya).11 This process of abhisamaya ‘full comprehension’ is comprised of four stages; viz.,

8
I.e., Dharmottara and his followers do not mention any stages of practice in their commentaries.
9
Louis de La Valée Poussin (ed.), Tibetan Translation of the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti (A Treatise on Bud-
dhist Logic) with the Commentary of Vinitadeva, Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, rep. 1984 (first published in
1913), 47,4–12: yang dag pa ni phyin ci ma log pa’i don te / ’phags pa’i bden pa bzhi po dag go // de bsgoms
pa ni yang dag pa’i don bsgoms pa ste / bsgoms pa zhes bya ba ni goms pa’o // de’i rab ni yang dag pa’i don
bsgoms pa’i rab ste / dran pa nye bar bzhag pa dang / dro bar gyur pa dang / rtse mo dang / bzod pa’i gnas
skabs so // de’i mtha’ ni yang dag pa’i don bsgoms pa’i rab kyi mtha’ ste / mtha’ ni chos kyi mchog rnams so /
de las skyes pa ni yang dag pa’i don bsgoms pa’i rab kyi mtha’ las byung ba’o //
10
The nirvedhabhāgīya was often expressed by the word 四善根 (Ch. sishan’gen, Jap. shizen’gon; shan’gen for
kuśalamūla) in East Asian Buddhism. The nirvedhabhāgīya itself is translated as 順決擇分 (Ch. shunjuezefen,
Jap. junkecchakubun).
11
Note that the object of meditation in nirvedhabhāgīya differs in the case of Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama,
where one reaches the contemplation of the non-dualistic cognition that has neither a cognizer nor an object to
be cognitzed in reality (ibid. 224,7–10: yadā tu grāhyagrāhakākārarahitam advayaṃ jñānaṃ bhāvayet, tadā-
gradharmākhyaṃ nirvedhabhāgīyaṃ bhavati. ānantaryaś ca samādhir ucyate, tadanantaram eva tattvapra-
veśāt) through the strict rejection of the individual nature (svabhāva) of all entities (sarvadharma). Moreover,
there is no reference to mindful observation (smṛtyupasthāna) in the Bhāvanākrama. In this way, Kamalaśīla’s
system of praxis makes use of different elements than the Sarvāstivāda school's system does, but the scheme of
a yogin proceeding from nirvedhabhāgīya to darśanamārga/prathamabhūmi is also found in the traditional
102 Toru Funayama

ūṣmagata (or uṣmagata), mūrdhan, kṣānti and agradharma (or laukikāgradharma). To put it
simply, the Buddhist practice is very often described in the following manner:12
preparatory steps such as aśubhabhāvanā and ānāpānasmṛtibhāvanā
→ smṛtyupasthāna ‘mindful observation (or the establishment of mindfulness)’
→ ūṣma-/uṣmagata ‘the heated’
→ mūrdhan ‘summit’
→ kṣānti ‘acceptance’
→ laukikāgradharma ‘highest worldly elements’
The condition of being a worldling (pṛthagjana) is retained through these stages. From the next
moment starts the new phase as a holy being (ārya),13 which in the Śrāvakayāna system is pre-
scribed as the path of seeing (darśanamārga) and the path of contemplation (bhāvanāmārga),
and in the case of Mahāyāna, the bodhisattva’s ten stages.
Further, it is often stated in various Mahāyāna texts that the bodhisattva’s first stage, which
is called the stage of ‘joyous’ (pramuditā bhūmiḥ), amounts to the Śrāvakayāna's path of seeing
(darśanamārga). That is to say, Śrāvakayānists go from laukikāgradharma to darśanamārga,
while Yogācāra-Mahāyānists, after laukikāgradharma, enter the first stage.
Bodhisattvas are classified as two kinds: either worldlings or holy beings, where the bodhi-
sattva as holy being is called ‘a bodhisattva who has entered the (holy) stages’ (bhūmipraviṣṭo
bodhisattvaḥ; viz., the bodhisattva of the first stage or higher), as found in the Mahāyāna-
sūtrālaṃkāra,14 the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā15 and the like.
From the system as sketched above, we can surmise Vinītadeva’s intention to take prakarṣa-
paryanta in the sense of agradharma. However, it is not fully clear whether Vinītadeva means
that yogipratyakṣa takes place within this stage or in the stage immediately following, viz., in
the first of the ten stages. Moveover, modern scholars represent both views to this question. It

theory.
12
This sequence is shared by Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra, while some other schools of Śrāvakayāna adopt a dif-
ferent system. For example, the sequence of practice prescribed by the Saṃmitīya (/Saṃmatīya) school is:
→ kṣānti → nāmasaṃjñā → nimittasaṃjñā → agradharma, instead of ūṣma → mūrdhan → kṣānti → agra-
dharma as listed above. Cf. Namikawa, Takayoshi, “The Sāṃmitīya Doctrines: Kleśa, Karma, and Āryasatya,”
in Buddhist and Indian Studies in Honor of Professor Sodo Mori, Tokyo: Kokusai Bukkyoto Kyokai 2002,
307–309.
13
The holy condition is also expressed by the words alaukika ‘non-worldly’ and lokottara ‘super-worldly.’
14
Cf. Sylvain Lévi (ed.), Asaṅga. Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra, Tome I, Paris 1907, XVIII 72 (apraviṣṭapraviṣṭānāṃ
dhīmatāṃ mṛdumadhyamā / aśuddhamūmikānāṃ hi mahatī śuddhabhūmikā //) and Vasubandhu’s commentary
thereon (esp. 147,19f.). Generally speaking, the term bhūmipraviṣṭo bodhisattvaḥ is rendered into Chinese as
dengdi pusa 登地菩薩, ru(qingjing)di pusa 入(清淨)地菩薩, dishang pusa 地上菩薩 and so forth. The opposite
term abhūmipraviṣṭa is expressed in Chinese as diqian pusa 地前菩薩 and weirudi pusa 未入地菩薩.
15
Louis de La Vallée Poussin (ed.), Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. Prajñākaramati’s Commentary to the Bodhicaryā-
vatāra of Çāntideva, Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica 1901–14, 349,9–11 (= Vaidya ed. 176,4–5): sā ca prajñā dvi-
vidhā. hetubhūtā phalabhūtā ca. hetubhūtāpi dvividhā. adhimukticaritasya ca bhūmipraviṣṭasya ca bodhisattva-
sya. The word adhimukticarita means a bodhisattva who has started exercising adhimukticaryā(bhūmi), which
denotes the same four stages as nirvedhabhāgīya. Further, as we will observe in chapter III below, Kamalaśīla
also employs the word praviṣṭa in the BhK III (30,3–8) in the context of darśanamārga, which he identifies
with Mayāyanistic prathamabhūmi.
 Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva paths 103

appears that Kawasaki Shinjō16 and Inami Masahiro17 take yogipratyakṣa as arising at the stage
of agradharma, whereas according to Th. Stcherbatsky's18 and Nagasaki Hōjun's19 interpreta-
tion, yogipratyakṣa takes place in the stage following agradharma. A point of divergence in
interpretation lies in how we should construe the actual meaning of -ja (‘occuring from’ or
‘produced by’), not only from the grammatical point of view but also from the actual use of the
term and its synonyms. A good example is found in a prominent text depicting yogipratyakṣa
from a later period: in the opening of the Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa, Jñānaśrīmitra sets forth the
following syllogism:
yad yad bhāvyate tat tad bhāvanāprakarṣaparyante sphuṭābhaṃ sambhavati, yathā kāmukasya kāminyākāraḥ.
bhāvyate ca paramapuruṣārthinā kṣaṇikatve nairātmyādayo vastudharmā iti.20

In this syllogism we notice the expression prakarṣaparyante in the locative form, but on the
other hand, interestingly enough, Jñānaśrī uses the wording bhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajātam21
in the next paragraph, most probably with the same intention. Further, as we shall see below,
Kamalaśīla also employs the expression bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantagamane in the
locative form to signify the condition for the production of yogipratyakṣa.22
Which then is correct: during or after the moment of prakarṣaparyanta? I myself prefer ‘af-
ter the moment of prakarṣaparyanta’ as the first choice, but at the same time, I also suppose
that there is actually very little difference between the two interpretations, in spite of their
seeming disparity. The problem is related to the real state of laukikāgradharma. According to
the tenets of the Sarvāstivāda school, laukikāgradharma lasts only a single moment23 and in the

16
Kawasaki, Shinjō 川崎信定, “Issai chisha no sonzai ronshō” 一切智者の存在論証 [Proofs for the Existence of
the Omniscient Being], in Hirakawa Akira, Kajiyama Yūichi and Takasaki Jikidō (eds.), Kōza daijō bukkyō 9
ninshiki ron to ronri gaku 講座・大乗仏教 9 認識論と論理学, 1984, 310f. = id., Issai chi shisō no kenkyū 一切
智思想の研究 [A Study of the Omniscient Being (sarvajña) in Buddhism], Tokyo: Shunjūsha 春秋社 1992, 242.
17
Inami [1989: 63].
18
Th. Stchertatsky, Buddhist Logic Vol. 2, Bibliotheca Buddhica 26, 1930, 31 n. 2.
19
Nagasaki, Hōjun 長崎法潤, Jaina ninshikiron no kenkyū ジャイナ認識論の研究 [A Study of Jaina Epistemol-
ogy], Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten 1988, 68.
20
Ananthalal Thakur, Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute 1987, 323,3–
5. Cf. A German translation of the passage is given in Steinkellner [1978: 130]: “Was immer man betrachtet,
das ist am Höhepunkt einer intensiven Betrachtung in einem deutlichen Bild gegeben, wie einem Liebhaber
die Gestalt der Geliebten. Und betrachtet werden die (wesentlichen) Beschaffenheiten der Dinge wie
Augenblicklichkeit, Wesenlosigkeit und andere von dem, der sich das höchste Ziel der Menschen zu eigen
macht.”
21
Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali 323,10.
22
It seems that Kamalaśīla uses the word -prakarṣaparyantagamane in the sense of ‘the final stage of the ele-
vated condition is finished,’ and not in the sense of ‘at the beginning of or during the final stage of the elevated
condition.’ On this issue, see also n. 34 below.
23
Erich Frauwallner, “Abhidharmastudien III. Der Abhisamayavādaḥ,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-
asiens 15, 1971, 69–121: esp. 83 = Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical
Systems (translated by Sophie Francis Kidd under the supervision of Ernst Steinkellner), Albany: SUNY 1995,
163. Katō, Junshō 加藤純章, “Arakan e no michi: Setsu issai ubu no gedatsu” 阿羅漢への道 – 説一切有部の
解脱 [The Path to Arhat: Mokṣa for the Sarvāstivāda School], in Bukkyō shisō 8. Gedatsu 仏教思想８解脱
[The Buddhist Thought 8. Mokṣa], Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten 1982, 149–192: esp. 175–78. Cf. the Abhidharma-
104 Toru Funayama

next moment, the practitioner enters darśanamārga. It seems that the view of taking agra-
dharma as lasting only a moment is applicable to the Yogācāra system as well, because the
Yogācāra equivalent for agradharma is called ānantaryaḥ samādhiḥ ‘the concentration which
is immediately succeeded (by the first stage)’ in texts such as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha,24 the
Bhāvanākrama I25 and the like.

III. Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795)

To the best of my knowledge, Kamalaśīla does not offer an elucidation of the definition of
yogipratyakṣa in the commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s works that are extant. However, we find
that Kamalaśīla alludes to this definition when using an expression typical to the definition of
yogic cognition, (bhūtārtha-)bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta(-ja-), in texts such as the last chapter
of the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā and the Bhāvanākrama III.26 Therefore, from these statements
we can surmise Kamalaśīla’s understanding of yogipratyakṣa.
In the last chapter of the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, entitled Atīndriyārthadarśiparīkṣā ‘The
Examination of the Perceiver of Super-Sensory Things,’ Kamalaśīla minutely discuss the topic
of sarvajña, where we find some important characteristics of yogipratyakṣa. On the basis of
stanzas by his master Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla develops his views on the omniscient Buddha in
the following way:
The omniscient being (sarvavid) is maintained because He simultaneously cognizes all real beings in their en-
tirety; (omniscient cognition) is realized not by visual cognition and the like (cakṣurādidhī) but by mental
cognition (monovijñāna) which occurs from the final stage of the elevated condition of repeated contemplation
on the truths in their entirety, bearing special characteristics such as transientness and the like, which underlie
each and every real being, having all objects in its cognitive range, and endowed with the nature of being di-
rect perception27 through its vivid manifestation and being non-belying.

kośa VI 19 and the commentary thereon.

24
Nagao, Gadjin 長尾雅人, Shō daijō ron: wayaku to chūkai, ge 摂大乗論、和訳と注解、下 [The Mahāyāna-
saṃgraha. A Japanese Translation and Annotations. Pt. 2], Tokyo: Kodansha 1987, 68–74 (esp. 72).
25
BhK I 224,7–10: yadā tu grāhyagrāhakākārarahitam advayaṃ jñānaṃ vibhāvayet, tadāgradharmākhyaṃ nir-
vedhabhāgīyaṃ bhavati, ānantaryaś ca sa samādhir ucyate, tadanantaram eva tattvapraveśāt. A close relation-
ship between the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Bhāvanākrama on this topic is specified in Ichigō [2002: 470].
See also the next note.
26
In addition, Kamalaśīla alludes to the wording of the yogipratyakṣa-theory in Bhāvanākrama I 204,15–19: na
cāpi sphuṭatarajñānālokodayaṃ antareṇa samyag āvaraṇatamo ’pahīyate. bhāvanābahulīkārataś cābhūte ’py
arthe sphuṭatarajñānam utpadyate, yathā’subhādipṛthivīkṛtsnādisamāsannānām. kuṃ punar bhūte. The under-
lined expressions are based on the Pramāṇavārttika III 284: aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādy abhūtam api varṇyate /
spaṣṭābhaṃ nirvikalpaṃ ca bhāvanābalanirmitam //. On this issue, see also Funayama [2004: 375]. It is evi-
dent that the Bhāvanākrama was composed based on the concepts and wording of the pramāṇa tradition,
although it is also certain that the text was deeply influenced by certain traditional Yogācāra ideas. Relevant
discussions are found in notes 11, 25, 32, and 39.
27
Direct perception is usually defined by using the following two qualifiers: ‘being free from conception/con-
ceptual construction’ (kalpanāpoḍhatva) and ‘being non-erroneous’ (abhrāntatva); the latter can be para-
phrased with ‘being consistent/non-deceptive’ (avisaṃvādakatva) in Kamalaśīla’s epistemology. On this issue,
see my paper, “Kamalaśīla’s Interpretation of ‘Non-Erroneous’ in the Definition of Direct Perception and Re-
lated Problems,” Katsura, Shoryu (ed.), Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philoso-
phy. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1999, 73–99: esp. 80–82.
 Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva paths 105

Here, the underlined passage, whose original Sanskrit runs samastavastugatānityatvādi-

lakṣaṇāśeṣatattvābhyāsaprakarṣaparyantaja, is based on Dharmakīrti’s definition of yogic
perception, bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantaja-. We can therefore confirm that Kamalaśīla
intentionally adopted the definition of yogipratyakṣa in the context of the All-Knowing Bud-
dha. In other words, in the above citation the Buddha is depicted as a yogin28.
Another significant feature discernible in the same passage is that Kamalaśīla remarks that
yogic perception is not a kind of sense-perception but is mental cognition (manovijñāna).29
This means that through the process of meditation, the momentariness of all entities, for exam-
ple, is not seen but mentally known.30 However, it must be qualified that Kamalaśīla sometimes
metaphorically uses the expression ‘to see’ in order to describe the real state of affairs in
meditation. For example, he states that a yogin should practice meditation “until he quite viv-
idly sees the (true object) as if it were presented in right in front of him.”31 It seems that this

28
The word ‘yogin’ has a wide range of meaning. In the present context, Kamalaśīla applies ‘yogin’ to the Bud-
dha as a person in meditation (in other words, the Buddha’s śuddhalaukika cognition is not taken into consid-
eration), while in the Bhāvanākrama the same word is used throughout the text; viz., the word yogin can sig-
nify not only the person who has realized or attained yogic cognition, but also the person who still is in a vari-
ety of preliminary stages before the attainment of yogic cognition. Such a situation of ‘yogin’ is more or less
the same with what is meant by ‘bodhisattva’, which can mean not only the bodhisattva as a holy being (ārya;
bhūmipraviṣṭo bodhisattvaḥ), but also the bodhisattva as a worldling (pṛthagjana) who is in the stage before
attaining darśanamārga/prathamabhūmi.
29
The word manovijñāna is sometimes replaced by mānasaṃ jñānam. For the usage of manovijñāna or mānasa,
see the TS 3157, 3380–3388 and the TSP thereon. For an exposition of this issue, see Funayama [2000: 116–
118] and McClintock [2000: 239].
30
The significance of this viewpoint was first pointed out by Steinkellner [1978: 128]. I am not sure who takes
credit for being the first author to distinctively state the mental character of yogic cognition, but it can safely
be said that one of the earliest statements appears in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha (e.g. 3380–81 regarding
the cognition of the All-Knowing Buddha) and, more explicitly in Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā (see n. 28). As far as I
understand, the reason why Kamalaśīla explains the Buddha’s omniscient cognition as mental cognition, and
not as one of the five cognitions such as visual cognition, lies in the point that visual cognition, which is lim-
ited in terms of space, time and nature (cf. deśakālasvabhāvaviprakarṣa), is not fit for the limitless all-knowing
character of the Buddha’s cognition, whereas mental cognition can have all objects in its cognitive range (TSP
1126,7: monovijñānasya ca sarvārthaviṣayatvāt). Incidentally the Tarkarahasya later suggests two different
interpretations with respect to the nature of yogipratyakṣa concerning whether it is visual cognition (cakṣur-
[vi]jñāna) or mental cognition (mānasa). Paramanandan Shastri (ed.), Tarkarahasya, Patna: Kashi Prasad
Jayaswal Research Institute 1979, 58,18–21: tena paramārthaviṣaye kṣaṇikatvādau cakṣurjñānam api sad yogi-
jñānam. atha vā cakṣurjñānaṃ vā mānasaṃ sat yogijñānaṃ cotpadyate. For a Japanese translation, see Yaita,
Hideomi 矢板秀臣, “Tarkaharasya kenkyū (IX) – genryō no shurui” Tarkarahasya 研究 – 現量の種類 [Studies
in the Tarkarahasya. Pt. 11: the kinds of direct perception], Naritasan bukkyō kenkyūsho kiyō 成田山仏教 研究
所紀要 19, 1996, 65–121: esp. 108.
31
BhK III 4,18: yāvat sphuṭataraṃ puro’vasthitam iva taṃ paśyet. This expression is presumably based on the
following statement in the Pramāṇavārttika III 282: kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ abhūtān
api paśyati purato’vasthitān iva //. Further, some of the terms signifying ‘meditation’ or ‘contemplation’ have
from the beginning had a close connection with visual cognition. For example, among the two keywords of
meditation for Kamalaśīla, śamatha and vipaśyanā, the latter is derived from the verbal root paś- ‘to see,’ and
in the expression bhūtārthapratyavekṣaṇā(/-avekṣā), which is the definition of vipaśyanā, there is also a
connection with the verbal root īkṣ- ‘to see.’
106 Toru Funayama

preference for using terms that are associated with visual cognition has something to do with
an earlier Indian Buddhist tradition.32
So far we have observed Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic cognition by taking particular note of a
passage in the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, where he develops his view on the basis of what had
already been expressed in his master Śāntarakṣita’s stanzas. Bearing this in mind, it might
prove difficult to distinguish Kamalaśīla’s own ideas from those of his master. On the other
hand, we can discern his own understanding from the three pieces of the Bhāvanākrama, which
are composed partially on the knowledge of the pramāṇa-theory and its wording. I want to pay
great attention to the following account in the Bhāvanākrama III:
… When (the yogin) attains33 the final stage in the elevated condition of repeated contemplation on a true ob-
ject, a super-worldly cognition takes place; it is devoid of the net of each and every conceptual construction
(sakalakalpanājālarahita-),34 quite vivid (in manifestation);35 it is the direct experience of the reality of a
dharma, being free from defilement; and it is just like a candlelight put in a windless spot. At that time, (the
practitioner) comes to acquire the object of cognition called ‘the ultimate condition of reality’ (which is indi-
cated in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra),36 and he has (concurrently) entered the path of seeing (in the Abhidhar-
mic terminology) and has attained the (bodhisattva’s) first stage (in the Mahāyāna practice).37

32
The expression darśanamārga (the verbal root dṛś- ‘to see’) probably has a connection with this tradition. Fur-
ther, interestingly enough, von Rospatt points out a passage of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra “where it is docu-
mented that the yogins envisage the rise and fall of conditioned factors and thereby come to see (paśyanti!)
their destruction at every moment.” Alexander von Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness, Stutt-
gart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1995, 198.
33
Here Kamalaśīla uses the expression -prakarṣaparyantagamane in the locative form. This locative must have
something to do with Jñānaśrīmitra’s expression -prakarṣaparyante (see n. 22 above). Although I am quite un-
sure about the grammatical explication, I think that perhaps this locative suggests the time when the final stage
of the elevated condition (parkarṣaparyanta) has ended, and not when it begins or approaches, because this
locative form functions as the condition for the emergence of yogic perception that corresponds to dar-
śanamārga and pramuditābhūmi. It is noteworthy that Dharmottara in his Nyāyabinduṭīkā also uses the
word -gamana (and also -gati in the same sense) in the following way: prakarṣasya paryanto yadā sphuṭābha-
tvam īṣad asaṃpūrṇaṃ bhavati. yāvad dhi sphuṭābhatvam aparipūrṇam, tāvat tasya prakarṣagamanam. saṃ-
pūrṇaṃ tu yadā, tadā nāsti prakarṣagatiḥ. tataḥ saṃpūrṇāvasthāyāḥ prāktany avasthā sphuṭābhatvaprakarṣa-
paryanta ucyate (Malvania ed. 67,6–68,2) “At the time of the final stage of the elevated condition, vividness of
manifestation is still slightly imperfect, for inasmuch as vividness of manifestation is not fully perfect, it (=
elevated condition) attains the final stage. On the other hand, when it becomes perfect, then there is no (fur-
ther) attainment of the final stage, therefore the state prior to the perfected state is called the final stage of the
elevated condition of vividness in manifestation.” See also n. 3 above.
34
The term kalpanājālarahita is used in specific contexts in the pramāṇa tradition: Dharmakīrti employs this
peculiar word in the Pramāṇavārttika either for the Buddha (cf. the namaskāraśloka of the Pramāṇavārttika I)
or for a holy yogin (cf. III 281: prāguktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayam / vidhūtakalpanājālaṃ
spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate //). The latter matches Kamalaśīla’s usage here. Prior to Dharmakīrti, Bhāviveka uses
the word (aśeṣa)kalpanājāla in the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (III 10 and 137). Ejima, Yasunori 江島惠教,
Chūgan shisō no tenkai – Bhāvaviveka kenkyū 中観思想の展開 – Bhāvaviveka 研究 [Development of Mādhya-
mika Philosophy in India: Studies on Bhāvaviveka], Tokyo: Shunjūsha 1980, 270 and 302.
35
For the significance of the term ‘vivid’ (spaṣṭa/sphuṭa), which is one of the most important notions in the yogi-
pratyakṣa-theory after Dharmakīrti, see the following studies: Tosaki, Hiromasa 戸崎宏正, Bukkyō ninshiki
ron no kenkyū, jōkan 仏教認識論の研究、上巻 [Research into the Buddhist Epistemology], Tokyo: Daitōshup-
pansha 1979, 387–380; Funayama [2000: 130 n. 37]; and [2004: 370 and 370f. n. 9].
36
Étienne Lamotte, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, Louvain/Paris 1935, 88: / bcom ldan ’das kyis zhi gnas dang lhag
 Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva paths 107

Here, the wording of yogic perception is evident, and the stage of darśanamārga in Śrāvaka-
yāna is taken to be equivalent to pramuditā bhūmiḥ in Mahāyāna.
Thus, it was Kamalaśīla who evidently correlated the yogipratyakṣa-theory with the tradi-
tional view of the stages of praxis for the first time, yet it is highly probable at the same time
that Vinītadeva’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā played the role as the catalyst for the further development of
Kamalaśīla’s ideas.38
It is notable that the above passage appears nearly at the very end of the Bhāvanākrama III
and no elucidation of the stages higher than the first stage is found. The same tendency is more
or less true of the Bhāvanākrama II, which mentions the condition of the first stage with an ex-
pression39 quite similar to the passage in the first chapter, likewise nearly at the end of the text.
In contrast, the Bhāvanākrama I does contain a description of the ten stages as well as the stage
of the Buddha,40 but it is by no means an in-depth explanation, being less based on descriptions
of reality if compared with Kamalaśīla’s exhaustive and lively description of the preceding
stages. What does this mean? Perhaps a realistic depiction of the bodhisattva acts deeds in the
stages higher than the first was not of paramount concern for him. In other words, it is possible
to assume that the composition of the Bhāvanākrama was aimed at describing as minutely and
concretely as possible how to meditate on religious truths for the bodhisattva attaining the first
stage.

IV. Legends of bhūmipraviṣṭa-bodhisattva

Next, I would like to examine yet another problem concerning yogic perception: Who experi-
ences it? Should we believe that Indian masters such as Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla had their
own experience of yogipratyakṣa? It goes without saying that there can be no satisfactory an-

mthong gi dmigs pa’i dngos po bzhi po ’di lta ste / 1. rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa’i gzugs brnyan dang / 2.
rnam par mi rtog pa’i gzugs brnyan dang / 3. dngos po’i mtha’ dang / 4. dgos pa yongs su grub pa’o. Cf. BhK
III 1,14–17: ata eva bhagavatā catvāry ālambanavastūni yogināṃ nirdiṣṭāni. nirvikalpapratibimbakam, savi-
kalpapratibimbakam, vastuparyantatā, kāryaniṣpattiś ca.
37
BhK III, 30,3–8 (cf. n. 40 below): … bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantagamane sakalakalpanājālarahitaṃ
sphuṭataraṃ dharmadhātvadhigamaṃ vimalaṃ niścalanivātadīpaval lokottarajñānam utpadyate. tadā ca vastu-
paryantatālambanaṃ pratilabdhaṃ bhavati. darśanamārgaṃ ca praviṣṭo bhavati. prathamā ca bhūmiḥ prāptā
bhavati. For an exposition of this passage, see also Funayama [2000: 112] and [2004: 375–376].
38
By and large, the Bhāvanākrama is deeply influenced by traditional Yogācāra views. For example, the similar-
ity regarding the notion of adhimukticaryābhūmi in the Bhāvanākrama and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is ob-
served in Ichigō [2002]. Further, as briefly mentioned in Funayama [2004: 384 n. 13], the number of defile-
ments (kleśa) that should be abandoned in darśanamārga (the first stage; 112 defilements) and the bhāva-
nāmārga (from the second to the tenth stages; 16 defilements) indicated in the Bhāvanākrama I is identical to
traditional Yogācāra views. For relevant issues, see also notes 25 and 26.
39
Goshima, Kiyotaka (ed.), The Tibetan Text of the Second Bhāvanākrama, Kyoto: private publication 1983,
77,7–14: … yang dag pa’i don la bsgom pa rab kyi mthar phyin par gyur nas ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes rtog
pa’i dra ba mtha’ dag dang bral ba / chos kyi dbyings spros pa med pa shin tu gsal bar rtogs pa / dri ma med
cing mi g.yo la mar me rlung med par gzhag pa bzhin du mi g.yo ba tshad med par gyur pa / chos thams cad
bdag med pa’i de kho na mngon du byed pa mthong ba’i lam gyis bsdus pa don dam pa’i byang chub kyi sems
kyi ngo bo nyid ’byung ngo // (the underlined wording is shared by the BhK III in n. 38).
40
BhK I 534–538. This part is entitled by the editor G. Tucci “§23. The ten bhūmis and the Buddhabhūmi.”
108 Toru Funayama

swer to this question. Though what I will write below is also not definitive, I would like to try
to find a plausible answer.
When we observe the system of bodhisattva’s ten stages as depicted in Mahāyāna sūtras
such as the Daśabhūmika, we quite easily form the impression that the bodhisattva’s path be-
gins from the first stage itself, simply because the text starts its narrative from this stage. This
would lead us to the incorrect idea that all Mahāyāna practitioners have always been holy be-
ings. However in fact, when we turn our attention to the problem of the bodhisattva theory of
practice as shown above, we understand that the bodhisattva’s first stage is realized on the ba-
sis of a number of preceding stages, and that bodhisattva training must be undertaken for an
immeasurable length of time before one reaches even the first stage, the starting point of
saintliness. Under such circumstances, just out of curiosity, I cannot help but ask a naïve ques-
tion: Was anyone – Kamalaśīla, Dharmakīrti or another proponent of the pramāṇa tradition –
regarded as being a holy monk in the history of the Logico-Epistemological tradition? If the
answer were yes, it turns out that the author in question would have to be considered as having
experienced yogic perception, because in Kamalaśīla’s epistemology, experiencing
yogipratyakṣa is a synonym for having attained the first stage.
A related subject, and surprising – at least very surprising to me –, is that legends of Indian
Mahāyāna Buddhism reveal a very limited number of holy monks.41 Here, by ‘holy’ (ārya; lit.
“noble one”) I mean a person who was historically believed to have attained the first or higher
stages. As far as I know, the most popular legends in later times were introduced by Bu ston in
his History of Buddhism (1322 C. E.):
In the Prasphuṭapadā which is a commentary on the Small Commentary, it is stated that although the master
Asaṅga attained the third stage called Prabhākārin, he (descended to this world and) indicated the teachings of
Mind-Only in order to convert Vasubandhu. In the Cittamātrālaṃkāra […] it is stated that Maitreya is a
Bodhisattva of the tenth stage, Asaṅga is a Bodhisattva abiding in the third stage, and Nāgārjuna is a Bodhi-
sattva abiding in the first stage.42

In the above citation, the Praspuṭapadā is Dharmamitra’s commentary on Haribhadra’s Abhi-

samayālaṃkāra-nāma-Prajñāpāramitopadeśa-śāstravṛtti (Sphuṭārthā), called the Small Com-
mentary in Tibet. Remarkably, the belief that Asaṅga was a bodhisattva of the third stage was
certainly confirmed in Dharmamitra’s Prasphuṭapadā, but the expression there is rather differ-
ent43 from the manner it is cited by Bu-ston. On the other hand, the text referred to as the Citta-
mātrālaṃkāra signifies the Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti-Madhyamakapratipadāsiddhi which was

41
I. e., the number of Mahāyāna holy monks is much smaller than we modern researchers vaguely assume,
whereas the number of Śrāvakayāna holy monks more closely fits our assumptions. Funayama [2003: 134–
133].
42
Lokesh Chandra (ed.), The Collected Works of Bu-ston. Part 24 (Ya), New Delhi: International Academy of In-
dian Culture 1971, fol.841,1–4: 'grel chung gi bshad pa tshig gsal du / slob dpon thogs med sa gsum pa 'od
byed pa brnyes kyang dbyig gnyen gdul ba'i don du sems tsam du bstan no zhes pa dang / sems tsam rgyan las /
[…] byams pa ni sa bcu pa'i byang chub sems dpa'o // thogs med ni sa gsum pa la gnas pa'i byang chub sems
dpa'o // klu sgrub ni sa dang po la gnas pa'i byang chub sems dpa'o // zhes so //. Cf. Obermiller [1932: 140–
142].
43
P. No. 5194 nya 10a 5–6; D. 3796 nya 9a1–2: 'phags pa thogs med sa [P: pa D] 'od byed pa brnyes pas kyang
de 'dul ba dang 'tsham [D: mtshams P] par bkrol [D: dkrol P] te / sems can [P: tsan D] gcig gi don gyi phyir //
phyi mtha'i bar du gnas par bgyi // zhes gsungs pa'i rjes su 'brang bas so //. For Bu ston’s citation, see n. 43
above.
 Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva paths 109

composed by Ratnākaraśānti,44 one of the representatives of the final phase of the history of
Buddhist academism in India, around the first half of the eleventh century. Bu ston’s citation is
almost the same as the original text.45
The belief that Nāgārjuna was a bodhisattva of the first stage stems from a passage in the
Laṅkāvatārasūtra46 – a reference to the entry of ‘bhikṣu Nāga(-āhvaya)’ in the form of the Bud-
dha’s prophecy – which was later adopted in the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa (ca. the middle of the 8th
c.?).47 Moreover, the Madhyamaka masters themselves sometimes maintain that the name of
their founder is referred to in the Laṅkāvatāra. For example, in the Madhyavakāvatāra Candra-
kīrti mentions the stanza from the Laṅkāvatāra in question as signifying Nāgārjuna’s career.48
The same attitude is also verified in Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā.49 These reveal that the
account of Nāgārjuna as a bodhisattva of the first stage did not belong to folk beliefs, but was
officially accepted by scholarly monks of the Madhyamaka school.
As to the Yogācāra founder Asaṅga, the reason he was believed to have attained the third
stage is not clear to me, but the fact that this tradition was followed by Ratnākaraśānti and Bu
ston reveals its popularity from a certain period of Buddhist history in India and Tibet. The
Chinese sources testify, on the other hand, that Xuanzang 玄奘 (d. 664) and his followers in-
troduced a similar but yet different tradition to the effect that both Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna were
believed to have attained the first stage.50

44
The author also expresses the same view in the ninth chapter of the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya-Ratnālokālaṃkāra.
P. No. 5331 a 340a8–b1; D. No. 3935 ki 291b2–3: 'phags pa klu sgrub ni sa dang po la gnas pa yin la [D: om.
P] 'phags pa thogs med ni sa gsum pa la gnas pa yin pas grub pa'i mtha' yang mtshungs pa nyid de / ci ltar kho
bos bsgrub pa bzhin no //.
45
However, no reference to Maitreya appears in the original text. P. 117b7–8; D. 102b2–3: 'phag pa thogs med
sa gsum pa dang / 'phags pa klu sgrub ni sa dang po pa yin te /.
46
Nanjio, Bunyiu (ed.), The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Kyoto: Otani University Press 1923, 286: dakṣiṇāpathavedalyāṃ
bhikṣuḥ śrīmān mahāyaśāḥ / nāgāhvayaḥ sa nāmnā tu sadasatpakṣadārakaḥ // 165 // prakāśya loke madyānaṃ
mahāyānam anuttaram / āsādya bhūmiṃ muditāṃ yāsyate 'sau sukhāvatīm // 166. The word nāga(-āhvaya) ‘to
have the appellation Nāga’ is interpreted in the Tibetan tradition to mean Nāgāhvaya, a bodhisattva different
from Nāgārjuna. However, in an earlier tradition in China, nāga(-āhvaya) was identified with Nāgārjuna, as
the word in question was rendered into Chinese by Bodhiruci (Putiliuzhi 菩提流支) as Nāgārjuna (Longshu 龍
樹) in the Ru Lengjia jing 入楞伽經 (Taishō No. 671, Vol. 16, 569a23–27) which was translated as early as in
513 C. E. This translation suggests that not only a few people took the Nāga in question to be Nāgārjuna, the
founder of the Madhyamaka school. Funayama [2003: 133].
47
Āryamañjuśrīmūlakalpa, chapter 53 Rājavyākaraṇaparivarta v. 449 (P. L. Vaidya ed., Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgra-
ha Part II, Darbhanga 1964, 482): caturthe varṣaśate prāpte nirvṛte mayi tathāgate / nāgāhvayo nāma 'sau
bhikṣuḥ śāsane 'smiṃ hite rataḥ / muditābhūmilabdhas [emended: muditāṃ bhūmilabdhas ed.] tu jīved varṣa-
śatāni ṣaṭ.
48
Louis de La Vallée Poussin (ed.), Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica 9, 1907–12,
76,10–17. Cf. David Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Wiesba-
den: Otto Harrassowitz 1981, 56 n. 161.
49
D. No. 3859 wa 22b1–3, za 338b1–3.
50
The details of this issue are analyzed in Funayama [2003: 129–126]. Among Xuanzang’s translations, the tale
of Asaṅga, who abided in the first stage, is found in the commentary on the Yogācārabhūmi called Yujiashidi
lun shi 瑜伽師地論釋 (Taishō No. 1580, Vol. 30, 883c, esp. ll. 12–17), together with a reference to Nāgārjuna
as a bodhisattva of the first stage. This reveals that the tradition had its origin in India.
110 Toru Funayama

These traditions have of course no direct relation with the pramāṇa tradition. However,
when we take the existence of such traditions, which were more or less generally found in In-
dia, Tibet and China, as circumstantial evidence, common sense leads us to assume the rather
high probability that the legends of the founders as stated above were known to the masters of
the pramāṇa tradition as well.

A possible hypothesis
In the case of Tibetan Buddhist historio-hagiography such as Bu ston’s or Tāranātha’s Chos
’byuṅ, as well as commentary literature, it seems plausible that Tibetans used the epithet
’phags pa (ārya; a saint) on the basis of their solid knowledge of Indian Mahāyāna. The title
’phags pa is not, indeed never, used in an emotional way, even for the praise of the concerned
monk. Only a limited number of Indian Mahāyāna authors are referred to with this epithet.
Some examples are Ārya-Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Asaṅga, Ārya-Vimuktisena; it is not easy for me to
enumerate more. Interesting in this respect are Bu ston’s comments on the name of Āryadeva,
the successor of Nāgārjuna:
Tradition says that the teacher (Āryadeva) has attained the 8th stage. But, as the Mañjuśrīmūlatantra speaks of
him: – Though not a Saint he will bear the name of a Saint, – this must be accurately examined.51

This is a telling account of Bu ston’s strict understanding of the word ’phags pa/ārya. On
the other hand, authors like Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are never
called saints in India and Tibet; at least I have never encountered a case thereof. They are
merely referred to as ācārya ‘master/teacher.’52
Indian Buddhism often takes the view of declining history. In other words, it was extremely
difficult for later people to believe that they could reach the same or a higher spiritual condi-
tion than the level attained by their founder. Namely, the attainment of buddhahood can surely
be the final aim, but it is possible only through innumerable repetitions – for aeons of aeons –
of reincarnation and transmigration as a merciful bodhisattva. If we take this into account, it
becomes clear why only a small number of practitioners in the history of Indian Mahāyāna
were considered to have realized the first stage, and consequently to have attained yogic
perception as well.
Thus, as a working hypothesis I would like to claim here that the theory of yogic perception
was probably not describing direct experiences of the pramāṇa tradition authors, but rather

51
This is the translation in Obermiller [1932: 130–131]. According to The Collected Works of Bu-ston. Part 24
(Ya), edited by Lokesh Chandra (see n. 43 above), fol. 834,5–6, the original passage runs as follows: slob dpon
’dis brgyad pa par grags te / ’jam dpal rtsa rgyud las / ’phags pa min la ’phags pa’i ming // zhes gsungs pas
brtag par bya’o //. The citation of the Mañjuśrīmūlatantra, which is more often called Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa (see
also n. 48 above), appears in its chapter 53 Rājavyākaraṇaparivarta v. 875c: anāryā [sic!] āryasaṃjñī ca. This
passage is cited in Obermiller [1932: 114] as well.
52
With respect to the Chinese legend that Vasubandhu was not a holy monk, but a worldling who ascended the
stage of ‘the heated’ (ūṣmagata), the first of the four stages of the nirvedhabhāgīya, see Funayama [2003: 129–
125]. Dharmakīrti is rich with epithets. He is called paṇḍita-cakracūḍāmaṇi, prāmāṇika-cakracūḍāmaṇi,
nyāyaparameśvara and so on, but never *Ārya-Dharmakīrti. Next, Śāntarakṣita is often called “mkhan po,”
“bodhisattva” or both, as “mkhan po bodhisattva,” but never – again as far as my knowledge allows – is the
form *Ārya-Śāntarakṣita used. Kamalaśīla is not called ārya either.
 Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva paths 111

their goal of attainment in the future, and that for Mahāyānists the bhūmi-theory is also reli-
giously possible as higher stages.

Abbreviations of works consulted repeatedly

BhK I The First Bhāvanākrama by Kamalaśīla. Giuseppe Tucci (ed.), Minor Buddhist Texts. Part II.
Roma: IsMEO 1958.
BhK III The Third Bhāvanākrama by Kamalaśīla. Giuseppe Tucci (ed.), Minor Buddhist Texts. Part
III. Third Bhāvanākrama. Roma: IsMEO 1971.
D Derge Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
Funayama 2000 Funayama, Tōru 船山徹, “Kamarashīra no chokusetsu chikaku ron ni okeru ‘i ni yoru nin-
shiki’ (mānasa)” カマラシーラの直接知覺論における「意による認識」 (mānasa) [Mental
Cognition (mānasa) in Kamalaśīla’s Theory of Direct Perception], Tetsugaku kenkyū 哲學研
究 569, 105–132.
Funayama 2003 Id., “Ryūju, Mujaku, Seshin no tōtatsu shita kaii ni kansuru shodenshō” 龍樹、無著、世親の
到達した階位に關する諸傳承 [Traditions Relating to the Stages of Praxis Attained by
Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu], Tōhōgaku 東方學 104, 134–121.
Funayama 2004 Id., “Meisō no jissen ni okeru funbetsu chi no igi: Kamarashīra no baai” 瞑想の実践に おけ
る分別智の意義──カマラシーラの場合 [The Significance of Conceptual Cognition in the
Practice of Meditation: Kamalaśīla’s Case] in Mikogami Eshō kyōju shōju kinen ronshū. Indo
tetsugaku bukkyō shisō ronshū 神子上恵生教授頌寿記念論集 インド哲学佛教思想 論 集,
Kyoto: Nagata bunshō dō 永田文昌堂, 363–386.
Ichigō 2002 Ichigō, Masamichi 一郷正道, “‘Shingegyōji’ ni kansuru Kamarashīra no kenkai” 「信解行 地
」に関するカマラシーラの見解 [Kamalaśīla’s View of Adhimukticaryābhūmi], in Sakurabe
Hajime hakase kiju kinen ronshū. Shoki bukkyō kara abidaruma e 櫻部建博士喜寿記念 論集,
初期仏教からアビダルマへ, 467–482.
Inami 1989 Inami, Masahiro 稲見正浩, “Darumakīruti ni okeru butsudō” ダルマキールティにおける 仏
道 [Dharmakīrti, on the Way to Buddhahood], Nippon bukkyō gakkai nenpō 日本佛教學會 年
報 54, 59–72.
McClintock 2000 Sara McClintock, “Knowing All through Knowing One: Mystical Communion or Logical
Trick in the Tattvasaṃgraha and Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā,” Journal of the International Asso-
ciation of Buddhist Studies 23/2, 225–244.
Obermiller 1932 E. Obermiller, History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyung) by Bu-ston. II. Part. The History of Bud-
dhism in India and Tibet, Heidelberg.
P Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
Steinkellner Ernst Steinkellner, “Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem im Buddhismus,” in Gerhard Ober-
1978 hammer (ed.), Transzendenzerfahrung: Vollzugshorizont des Heils: Das Problem in indischer
und christlicher Tradition, Wien: Institut für Indologie der Universität Wien, 121–134.
Taishō Taishō shinshū daizōkyō.
TS The Tattvasaṃgraha by Śāntarakṣita. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri (ed.), Tattvasaṅgraha of
Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalashīla. 2 vols. Varanasi:
Bauddha Bharati 1968.
TSP The Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā by Kamalaśīla. See TS.