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Performance Appraisal Politics From Appraisee Perspective: A Study of Antecedents in The Indian Context
Performance Appraisal Politics From Appraisee Perspective: A Study of Antecedents in The Indian Context
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To cite this article: Amit Dhiman & Sunil Kumar Maheshwari (2013) Performance appraisal politics
from appraisee perspective: a study of antecedents in the Indian context, The International Journal
of Human Resource Management, 24:6, 1202-1235, DOI: 10.1080/09585192.2012.706816
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The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 2013
Vol. 24, No. 6, 1202–1235, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2012.706816
This research did improve our understanding of different scales, formats, performance
criterion, cognitive processes, appraisal errors and biases, but it had limited influence on
advancing PA accuracy (Ilgen et al. 1993).
The research focused on appraisal accuracy is based on the premise that employee
appraisal is a rational and objective process. It also reflects an assumption that appraiser
being a rationalist is interested in searching and establishing objective reality. However,
Folger, Konovsky and Cropanzano (1992) argued that the assumptions underlying rational
approach in PA are unrealistic. Work arrangements do not furnish reliable and valid
performance information readily; undisputable rational appraisal criteria does not always
exist (Folger et al. 1992) and many times appraisers cannot and are not interested in
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identify key appraisal-related structural, process, and contextual variables and investigate
their mitigating influence on politics afflicting the appraisal as perceived by the decision
recipient. The explanations for these influences are drawn from justice theories – procedural,
informational and interpersonal (Colquitt 2001). Thus this research contributes to the
justice–politics literature by studying the relative significance of these theoretical arguments
in influencing political perceptions related to appraisals. Politics has symbiotic relation with
formal and informal power that social actors leverage to attain their self-interests
(Pfeffer 1981; Folger et al. 1992). Inevitably, political perceptions will be influenced by such
cultural dimensions as dyadic power distance (Aryee, Chen and Budhwar 2004) and
relationship orientation (Varma, Pichler and Srinivas 2005) in a particular cultural context.
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Cultural context
High power distance, paternalism,
relationship orientation
Family run organizations
PA Context
Unmet Rationality Assumptions Appraisal Politics
- Ambiguous, incomplete Appraiser & appraisees’
performance information political manipulations
- Disagreement on criteria Pay and Promotion decisions
- Appraiser’s questionable
intention and capability to
do accurate appraisal
High PA Instrumentality
PA structural and process antecedents that can mitigate appraisal politicking and associated
perceptions.
Longenecker, Gioia and Sims (1987) described appraisal politics as constituting
appraiser’s manipulations of ratings. Subsequently, Longenecker and colleagues conducted a
series of interview-based studies to investigate antecedents and organizational consequences
of appraiser’s political behavior (Longenecker and Goff 1992; Gioia and Longenecker 1994;
Longenecker and Gioia 2000). The first serious shortcoming in these studies is the complete
absence of any reference to the appraisee’s political behavior while conceptualizing appraisal
politics. Second is the ambiguity about the respondent’s perspective. Except for the first
study by Longenecker et al. (1987), none of the other studies makes it clear whether the
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Ravden 2005). But these studies constituted student subjects, and it cannot be inferred whether
rating distortions were deliberate and hence political. In case of appraisee’s political behavior,
personality factors of self-monitoring (Fandt and Ferris 1990) and Machiavellianism (Pandey
1981), and situational factors of appraisee’s accountability to superiors (Tetlock, Skitka and
Boettger 1989), and accountability’s interaction with ambiguity (Fandt and Ferris 1990) have
been shown to influence appraisee’s political behavior.
2001). This research investigates appraisal politics in the Indian cultural context. While at
the macro-level social, cultural, economic and political factors strongly influence Indian
HRM policies and practices (Budhwar and Sparrow 2002), at micro-level social contacts,
caste, relationships and politics strongly influence Indian HRM policies and practices
(Sparrow and Budhwar 1997). Past studies have shown that Indians in general are more
compliant and dependent on superiors, respect power, and are caste conscious and clan
oriented (Tayeb 1987; Amba-Rao, Petrcik, Jatinder and Thomas 2000). The emphasis is
on collectivism – family and group affiliations take precedence over performance
(Kanungo and Mendonca 1994; Budhwar and Khatri 2001). These findings match the
characterization of Indian culture by Hofstede and Bond (1988) and Brodbeck, Chhokar
and House (2007) as high on power distance and medium on collectivism.
Further, in many Indian organizations HRM practices, including appraisals and
promotions, continue to be ad hoc and are easily manipulated by employers (Venkata Ratnam
1995; Sparrow and Budhwar 1997; Saini and Budhwar 2004). In private sector organizations
in India, decisions related to promotions, transfers and benefits are influenced by social
contacts and personalized relationships (Dutta 1997). However, recent evidence suggests that
in the past decade or so, many Indian organizations have adopted structured, progressive
and innovative HRM practices in view of economic liberalization (Agarwala 2003;
Budhwar, Luthar and Bhatnagar 2006; Som 2008; Budhwar and Bhatnagar 2009). Varma and
Budhwar (2012) reported that increasing influence of MNCs in Indian economy has resulted
in Indian businesses revising and upgrading their performance management systems. Despite
these developments, Indian organizations provide rich context where in-groups are very
important and politics play an important role in affecting pay and promotion decisions
(Gopalan and Rivera 1997). Varma et al. (2005) compared American and Indian appraisers,
and found that Indian appraisers inflated ratings of low performers more based on their affect
for appraisee. Also, Indian firms in the public and private sectors tend to communicate with
employees mainly through immediate superior rather than through any other formal channel
(Budhwar and Boyne 2004). ‘The paternalistic nature of the culture continues to influence
PMS, . . . employees rely on their supervisors to “take care of them”’ (Varma and Budhwar
2012). Therefore, the Indian cultural context of high power distance, paternalism and
relationship orientation provides a rich context to study appraisal politics (refer Figure 1).
The Indian cultural ethos as portrayed above is nowhere more strongly evident than in the
Indian family-run organizations. In general, the extant literature on family businesses show
that, irrespective of cultural context, the family ownership and management has an influence
on the type of governance mechanisms. Owing to the allegiance of managers to the owner
family by way of blood relation or otherwise, the agency issues are far less serious compared
to non-family firms (Pollak 1985; Steier 2003). Further, the stewardship theory explains the
presence of strong commitment, emotional bond and long-term view among the owner–
managers who work toward firm’s success (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997;
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 1207
Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006). The evidence is strong for relative non-existence of strict
governance and monitoring mechanisms such as formal PAs in family-owned and managed
firms, especially when managers belong to the promoter family or are close to it (Reid and
Adams 2001; De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik 2006). Loyalty to the family-mandated norms and
values at the cost of professional HRM practices become the norm of governance framework
in such firms (Chow 2004). However, as the firm grows in size and complexity, the evidence
suggests that even family-run firms adopt professional HRM practices to address issues such
as agency problem similar to those encountered by non-family-run firms (Kim and Gao
2010). Nonetheless, association and proximity to owner–managers remain important factors
governing the superior–subordinate interaction. The predominant relationship-based and
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Appraisal politics
Consistent with the past literature (Ferris and Judge 1991; Kozlowski et al. 1998;
Longenecker and Gioia 2000), appraisal politics in this research refers to the manipulative
actions taken by appraisers and appraisees to influence ratings to achieve their self-serving PA
goals. Therefore, we consider both appraiser’s and appraisee’s PA-related political behavior
as two dimensions of appraisal politics. Specifically, we adopt Longenecker and Gioia’s
definition of appraisal politics as appraiser’s politics, i.e. ‘superior’s deliberate manipulations
of employee ratings to enhance or protect self or department interest’ (2000, p. 17). It needs to
be emphasized here that appraisers use their legitimate power to appraise and reward. They
pursue following goals through PA rating: task performance goals (motivate subordinates),
interpersonal goals (maintain good relations with appraisee) and personal goals, e.g. own or
department’s reputation (Murphy and Cleveland 1995). Specifically, appraisers try to avoid
confrontation with subordinates, avoid written record of poor appraisee performance, hide
poor department performance, shock appraisees to improve, favor appraisee they like or who
is powerful, and send message to appraisee to leave organization or improve (Klimoski and
Inks 1990; Gioia and Longenecker 1994). Appraisers fulfill these goals by inflating or
deflating the performance ratings while ignoring employee’s actual performance.
Longenecker and Gioia (2000) argued that whenever short-term ramifications of accurate
ratings are negative for appraiser, temptations to manipulate ratings to lessen negative impact
are strong.
Appraisees try to influence their supervisors for favorable assessment by using upward
influence tactics such as ingratiation, entitlements and exchange (Kipnis et al. 1980). On the
basis of the definition of political influence by Kipnis et al. (1980), appraisees’ political
behavior is defined as upward influence tactics employed by appraisee directed at appraiser
to obtain higher performance ratings and rewards. Past research in influence tactics and
impression management streams has found that following tactics are used more frequently in
upward direction and are relevant in appraisal context: supervisor-focused tactics (e.g.
ingratiation), job-focused tactics, exchange, upward appeal and coalitions (Schriesheim and
Hinkin 1990; Yukl and Tracey 1992; Wayne and Liden 1995). From appraisee’s perspective,
these tactics have a positive influence on decisions such as PA rating (e.g. Dulebohn and
Ferris 1999) and promotions (e.g. Thacker and Wayne 1995). These tactics may either
1208 A. Dhiman and S.K. Maheshwari
constitute overt use of expert, referent, or coercive power (French and Raven 1959) or covet
use of subtle influence such as ingratiation.
The third dimension we have conceptualized as constituting appraisal politics is pay and
promotion decisions. Within organizations, pay and promotion decisions, the outcome of PA,
are one of the most political decisions in nature (Ferris and Kacmar 1992). And because pay
and promotion decisions are mainly linked to appraisal ratings, their discriminatory nature
also constitutes appraisal politics. Here discriminatory means pay raise and promotion
decisions ignoring performance. Though appraiser’s rating and recommendations will have
large influence on pay and promotion decisions, sometimes appraiser’s ratings may not have a
close and visible relation with the final rewards. This happens when reviewer or some top
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management committee changes these decisions. And these changes may be discriminatory,
driven by political motives. For example, top management tends to favor those departments
that have more clout at the top. Thus, discrimination can happen at both the appraiser level and
higher levels. Invariably such discriminatory decisions are justified on the basis of some PA or
reward policy (Kozlowski et al. 1998). One such policy that is often abused is the bell curve
norm for distribution of ratings that appraisers are required to follow for their department or
section. Often a reviewer committee may change original rating recommendations for a
department on the pretext of bringing rating distribution closer to bell curve norms. These
changes are often opaque and driven by political motives. This was borne out by the informal
discussions first author had with the respondents during the pilot studies. In such cases
appraiser may not be blamed for playing politics but policies might be blamed.
The above-discussed three dimensions are consistent with the three dimensions of
organizational politics – supervisor’s political behavior, co-workers’ political behavior, and
application of pay and promotion policies (Ferris and Kacmar 1992). Appraisal politics is a
subset of organizational politics.
Appraisal politics is an amorphous concept and therefore it might be perceived differently
by different stakeholders based on their distinct goals. Therefore, this research has focused on
the perceptions of appraisal politics as perceived by appraisee. The focus is on appraisees’
perceptions because being the decision recipients, they have higher instrumental stake in the
decision than appraisers, and so they experience ‘appraisal politics’ more acutely.
Appraisee’s perception of appraisal politics (APAP) are formed based on appraiser behavior,
co-workers’ behavior and application of pay and promotion policies. From an appraisee’s
perspective, APAP is defined as perceptions about those appraiser actions (rating ignoring
performance criteria), fellow appraisees’ actions (upward influence behaviors to get
higher ratings/rewards) and appraisal-linked discriminatory pay and promotion decisions
(ignoring performance criteria) that are aimed at achieving appraisers’ and fellow
appraisees’ self-serving ends, and which may affect appraisee’s own appraisal rating/
rewards interests.
Performance in the context of PA is typically appraisee’s achievements on a priori set
criteria, standards and goals during the appraisal period (Folger et al. 1992). Self-serving ends
constitute appraiser goals1 such as enhancing own or departmental reputation, maintaining
good relationships, building in-groups and handling dependency threats2; and appraisees goal
of getting ratings higher or at least at par with what they think they deserve.
Empirically too, Longenecker and Goff (1992) found that high appraisal politics cause
dissatisfaction with the appraisals and hurt organization’s performance culture.
Therefore, Folger et al. (1992) proposed a ‘due process’ perspective of PA, focusing on
the objective of fair decision-making and constraining the unbridled use of power and
influence by social actors. As per this perspective, PA can be viewed as a dispute over
performance rating and allocation of rewards, a view shared with the political perspective.
‘Due process’ perspective is an extension of political view but the two diverge primarily
on the mechanisms to resolve disputes. ‘The political view posits that power inevitably
dictates the outcomes of decisions, whereas the due process view highlights a mechanism
[legal procedures ] for imposing constraints on exercise of power’ (Folger et al. 1992,
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p. 160), i.e. ‘society’s inclusion of legal procedures to resolve disputes’ (p. 139). The central
proposition of this study brings together the two perspectives and posits that in the presence
of due process elements, the political manipulations by social actors are mitigated.
Extending the due process view to appraisals, Folger et al. (1992) delineated its three
essential features in the context of PA. First, adequate notice constitutes advance publication
and explanation of PA objectives and standards; appraisee’s inputs into formulation of
objectives and standards; and regular and timely feedback to the appraisee. Adequate notice
implies that individuals can be held responsible for adhering to norms/laws only when these
norms are published and communicated to them. Second, fair hearing constitutes appraiser’s
familiarity with appraisee’s performance, a precondition for admissibility of their PA
evidence; consideration of appraisee’s viewpoint about their performance or self-appraisal;
and an opportunity for appraisee to interpret, rebut or support PA evidence. Lastly, judgment
based on evidence requires maintenance of judicial integrity through accountability; provision
of appeal; explanation and discussion of decision-making process and decisions; and valid
criteria and use of best measurement technology available (Taylor et al. 1994). There is
empirical support for favorable influence of some or all ‘due process’ elements in mitigating
appraiser’s need to distort rating (Taylor et al. 1998), and in positively influencing appraisee’s
perceived system fairness, perceived accuracy and their organizational commitment
(Greenberg 1986; Folger and Konovsky 1989; Agarwala 2003). Therefore, the due process PA
elements will mitigate appraisee’s appraisal politics perceptions.
obtaining outcomes they desire. Therefore, perception of control enhances procedural justice
perceptions and mitigates political perceptions. The control perceptions are formed by
processes of self-appraisal and opportunity to rebut appraiser’s evidence (both fair-hearing
elements), and appeal and accountability for maintaining integrity of PA process and decision
(both elements of judgment based on evidence). However, elements providing control also
have non-instrumental effects on procedural justice perceptions. As an alternative explanation
of procedural justice, Lind and Tyler (1988) posited the group value/relational model of
procedural justice. According to this view, the due process elements take value in and of
themselves, a manifestation of organizational process values, and not only because these
achieve certain outcomes. These processes indicate to appraisees that they have been treated
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Antecedents of APAP
The elements delineated in the previous section as constituting due process appraisal along
three dimensions of adequate notice, fair hearing and judgment based on evidence have been
categorized in this study as communication processes and structural elements. Specifically,
following elements constitute upward communication opportunities or voice for apppraisee:
inputs in setting objectives, standards and goals or participative performance planning;
opportunity to question appraiser’s evidence or self-appraisals; and appeal against
unfavorable decisions. Voice primarily provides appraisees a perceived process and decision
control. And the elements representing communication in the downward direction to help
appraisees understand and predict their appraisals better are termed as downward
communication. It constitutes following elements: clear communication of PA policies,
objectives and standards; effective performance feedback; and communication of final PA
decision. Other due process elements such as objective and valid criteria, and appraiser’s
accountability to maintain judicial integrity, represent PA structural features. These structural
variables also enforce Leventhal’s (1980) normative rules of fair procedures – consistency,
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 1211
bias suppression and accuracy. In this study, these process and structural variables are
hypothesized to be the key antecedents influencing APAP.
on appraisee’s reactions such as fairness and trust in management. Cooper, Dyck and Flohrich
(1992) found that participation in fair reward distribution rule development enhanced
respondents’ productivity more than the fair reward itself. Appeal represents Leventhal’s
(1980) criterion of correctability of decisions and is an essential feature of procedural justice.
Appeal provision can have a deterrent effect on appraiser, because they also foresee negative
outcomes for themselves in case of an appeal to a third party (Lewin and Peterson 1999).
Voice gives process and/or decision control, affects understanding of process and helps in
prediction of outcomes to some extent. This control also mitigates the appraisee’s perceptions
about influence of co-workers’ PA political tactics. Partial decision control also mitigates
perceptions that PA-determined rewards are manipulated. Appraisees will perceive positive
working relation with those appraisers who implement voice processes such as self-appraisals
effectively. Voice mechanisms such as self-appraisals and appeal force appraisers to build up
justification for their assessment. And when appraisers have to justify it to appraisees
themselves, it is likely to reduce appraisees APAP. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Perception of effective voice in PA process will be negatively related
with APAP.
perception and task motivation. Since downward communication processes enhance the
transparency and appraisees’ understanding of the decision process, they are less likely to
believe that co-workers’ influence tactics will be effective. Clarity of procedures, frequent
feedback and decision explanation procedures increase appraisee’s confidence that reward
decisions based on PA will not be manipulated. Effective implementation of these processes
enhances appraisees’ confidence that they have been treated fairly (Greenberg 1986) and it
improves their interpersonal and informational justice perceptions. Therefore it is
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 2: Perception of effective downward communication in PA process will be
negatively related with APAP.
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Appraiser’s PA accountability
Appraiser’s accountability for following the appraisal process is one of the structural factors
considered in this study. Appraisers should not only follow the ‘due process’ administrative
procedures, but they should also implement them without deliberate bias or politics. The ‘due
process’ procedures suppress political manipulations, but are not enough unless appraiser is
made accountable to an appropriate authority for applying these procedures.
Appraiser’s accountability is defined as appraisee’s belief about appraiser’s need to justify or
defend rating decision to a neutral authority, which has potential reward and sanctions power
affecting appraisers, and where such rewards and sanctions are perceived as contingent on
accountability conditions. (adapted from Frink and Klimoski 1998)
Past research shows that decision-makers indulge in more effortful thinking and data analysis
when they are accountable to an unbiased authority – a judge whose views are unknown, who
is interested in accuracy, who is interested in procedures rather than specific outcomes, who is
reasonably well-informed and who has reward/sanction power (Lerner and Tetlock 1999).
In case of PA, such an unbiased authority could be appraiser’s superior who functions as
appraisal reviewer, or an appraisal review committee. In the presence of such accountability
conditions, appraisees will view the process procedurally fair and less influenced by
appraiser’s politics. But it is essential that appraisee perceives the authority as neutral. Such
accountability measures indirectly influence appraisee’s perception of control on the PA
decisions. They tend to believe that appraiser will not be able to manipulate ratings much,
otherwise he/she may not be able to defend it in front of neutral authority. Further, appraisees
are likely to believe that such an answerable appraiser will be less influenced by co-workers’
political behavior. Finally, if appraisees perceive authority as neutral, they are less likely to
believe that appraisal-based reward decisions, which the authority may strongly influence,
will be politically determined. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: Appraisee’s perception of appraiser’s accountability for conducting fair
PA to neutral authority will be negatively related with APAP.
Criteria relevance
The performance criteria reliability, validity and objectivity issues are not only critical for
appraisal accuracy, but also influence appraisee’s perceptions (Tziner and Kopelman
2002). We define a construct: criteria relevance as appraisee’s perception that the criteria
used to assess their performance are valid, measure critical dimensions of their job and
are objective. This is another ‘due process’ structural element hypothesized to be critical
for influencing political perceptions. A belief that the assessment criteria measure critical
dimensions of the actual job performance quite closely will have a positive effect on
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 1213
appraisee’s perceptions. For example, Huffman and Lisa (2000) showed that making
adjustments for territory difficulty increases perceptions of PA fairness and usefulness
among salespeople. Also, past research on goal-setting has proved that goal specificity or
objectivity positively influences performance (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987).
A valid instrument signals to the appraisees that it is performance that is considered for
appraisal rating rather than other non-performance factors. This reduces their tendency to
influence rating using methods such as ingratiation. Similarly, it will be difficult for the
appraisers to distort ratings in such a case, because it can be questioned and rebutted by
appraisee and others. Further, appraisal-based rewards cannot be arbitrarily delinked from
well-established criteria and performance on it. Relevant criteria will increase appraisee’s
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Control variables
Distributive Justice
The distributive justice perceptions were controlled in the study to investigate the
independent influence of procedural, structural and interpersonal variables on APAP. Equity
theory (Adams 1963; Homans 1974) forms the basis of distributive justice and is considered
to be met when recipient’s perception of ratio of their work-related outcomes to their work
inputs compares favorably with significant others. There is a strong evidence that favorable
outcomes produce positive reactions (Lind and Tyler 1988; Folger and Konovsky 1989).
Further, some of the demographic variables such as appraisee’s age, qualification and
experience were also controlled.
Method
Levy and Williams (2004) in their review categorized antecedents affecting appraiser and
appraisee behavior as proximal structural (e.g. performance dimensions or criteria, purpose)
and process variables (e.g. feedback), and distal organizational variables (e.g. organizational
1214 A. Dhiman and S.K. Maheshwari
sector Indian organizations in manufacturing. Indian manufacturing sector has far lesser
attrition rates compared to service sector because of comparatively lesser employee
demand, which implies that appraisal instrumentality for rewards is higher and the probable
political manipulations will be more manifest in such contexts (Ferris and Judge 1991).
Also, the sectoral choice ensured some commonality across organizations in the nature of
job classes (e.g. maintenance, production, support functions), another contextual factor that
may influence APAP. Third, only Indian-owned private-sector organizations were
considered, and multinational organizations were not approached. This constraint ensured
that only organizations in the Indian cultural settings were included. Culture in multinational
subsidiaries is influenced by parent organization’s work culture and policies. Further, only
those companies that were profitable in the past 3 years were approached to participate;
resource scarcity for rewards linked to appraisal may lead to more politics (Bhatnagar 1992).
Though we had tried to target a well-defined population, we conducted ANOVA on the
means of APAP and other independent variables to test for any distinct groupings in the six
organizations from where we collected data. No significantly distinct groupings were found,
implying that the six sample organizations belong to same population, and therefore we
could combine data from the six organizations for further analysis.
The data were collected using survey method and the questionnaire had 60 items. Thus
the sample size needed for analysis ranged from 240 to 600 as per the recommendations
for exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; Hinkin 1995). We collected 407
data points from six organizations. The details of six organizations are given in Table 1.
The authors requested 24 organizations to participate in the project. These organizations
were selected from Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy database with profiles similar to
the desired one. Of these, 11 showed interest in participating in the project. These
organizations were asked to provide information about the employee turnover and the PA
design elements. It was necessary that in the participating organizations, there is some degree
of homogeneity in existence of the formal appraisal elements (including administrative
purpose, goal-setting, self-appraisal, feedback and appeal). Though past research has found
considerable gap between a written policy and what gets implemented, participants can
respond to what is at least prescribed. We also excluded those organizations where turnover
was greater than 5% and where, in the past 3 years, any major change has been made in the
appraisal system. This procedure yielded seven organizations from where we expected to
collect requisite number of responses. The main data were collected in the six organizations
between November and February. The data collection timing ensured that the effects of last
year’s PA outcomes on responses were minimized. This control was necessary because
evidence exists that last appraisal’s outcome favorability confounds respondent’s perceptions
(Murali 1994).
Since individual appraisee is the unit of analysis, data collection involved appraisee’s
self-reports on the antecedent variables and appraisal politics perceptions. Same method has
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been adopted by many studies (e.g. Harrell-Cook, Ferris and Dulebohn 1999) testing similar
model and hypotheses in the context of organizational politics. In all, 523 questionnaires were
distributed in six participating organizations, and 407 acceptable questionnaires were used
for testing hypotheses. The target respondents were employees in the junior, middle and
senior management levels in the organizations. Typically, they had work experience of 2–3,
3–7 and .8 years, respectively. There were negligible number of female employees in these
organizations, and therefore 99% respondents were males. The average age of the
respondents was 39 years (SD ¼ 7.70) and the average experience was 15 years (SD ¼ 8). To
be eligible for the study, the respondents must have undergone a minimum two complete
cycles of PA in the current organization. This much time was considered necessary for the
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Measures
Three key variables in the study – APAP, downward communication and voice – were
measured as second-order factors of equally weighted components discussed in the
hypotheses. Most of the other variables were measured with scales used in the previous
studies. Few items were modified, based on preliminary face and content validation
exercise and pilot test. Moreover, new items were included for co-workers’ PA political
behavior and appraiser’s accountability. The sources of scales and their reported reliability
values are given in Table 2.
The final scales were subject to factor analysis using varimax rotation. The results are
given in Tables 3 and 4.
The scales were further subjected to CFA using structural equation modeling (SEM) as
discussed by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). The fit indices indicated moderate-to-good
fit3 for these constructs. The reliability values for all scales (refer Table 2) are greater than
minimum acceptable value of a ¼ 0.70 recommended by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994).
Factor
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Downward communication
Communication/clarity of PA policies and standards
I understand the performance appraisal system being used in my organization 0.76
My appraiser and I agree on the criteria used for my performance appraisal 0.72
I understand the objectives of the present performance appraisal system 0.81
I have good understanding of how the performance appraisal system works 0.79
I understand how my last performance appraisal rating was determined 0.69
I know the criteria used by my appraiser to evaluate my performance 0.70
I understand the standards of performance my appraiser expects 0.68
My organization clearly communicates to me the objectives of the performance appraisal system 0.63
Effective feedback
My performance was frequently reviewed during the appraisal period 0.64
I was given performance feedback regularly during the appraisal period 0.67
Performance feedback focuses on how I can improve my performance 0.76
My last performance feedback increased my understanding of the job 0.71
My last performance feedback gave me a good idea of how well I am doing in my job 0.70
I think performance feedback helped me learn to do a better job 0.65
PA decision explanation
My appraiser gave me adequate explanation about the appraisal (rating) decision 0.70
My appraiser was open/sincere in communicating appraisal (rating) decision to me 0.74
My appraiser thoroughly explained the procedures used to arrive at appraisal 0.70
A. Dhiman and S.K. Maheshwari
(rating) decision to me
My appraiser listened to the reasons I gave for the performance 0.68
My appraiser gave me opportunity to ask questions 0.67
about appraisal (rating) decision
The explanations regarding the appraisal (rating) decision were reasonable 0.59
Voice
Self-appraisals
I had detailed discussion with my appraiser on my self-appraisal 0.68
My appraiser seriously considered my self-appraisal 0.73
My self-appraisal influenced the final rating I received 0.66
Participative performance planning
My appraiser asked for my inputs on setting performance targets 0.77
My inputs influenced my performance targets 0.76
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Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalisation.
Rotation converged in seven iterations.
The International Journal of Human Resource Management
1219
1220 A. Dhiman and S.K. Maheshwari
Factor
Item 1 2 3
Perception of appraisal politics
Appraiser politics
To pay back personal favors done by appraisees, 0.77
my appraiser gives higher appraisal ratings
Appraiser-appraisee personal relationship 0.74
determines appraisal rating
To teach rebellious/ disobedient appraisee a lesson, 0.65
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Analysis
Zero-order correlation provided preliminary support to the hypotheses by revealing strength
and direction of the bivariate relations. The main hypotheses testing involved two-stage
multivariate analysis (MVA) – multiple and hierarchical regression. Latter was used because
possible hierarchical causal order among the independent variables might hide direct effects
in the multivariate regression. The hierarchical model was tested for data fit using SEM.
Amos Basic, version 7.0, was used for testing the SEM model. The SEM analyses revealed
interesting results apart from validating hierarchical regression-based hypotheses.
Results
The means, standard deviations, correlations and reliability values are given in Table 5.
The bivariate correlation values reveal that most of the relations are significant at p , 0.05.
The signs are also in the expected direction. Therefore, all hypotheses are supported on the
basis of the bivariate correlation results. We also found that across six organizations, the signs
of bivariate results were consistent. However, the controlled demographic variables – age,
qualification, level and experience – did not show significant bivariate effects and were
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Antecedents B(t)
(Constant) (30.78)
Voice 2 0.002 (0.04)
Downward communication 2 0.27**(24.2)
Appraiser’ accountability 2 0.09* (2 1.68)
Criteria relevance 2 0.12** (2 2.27)
Appraiser – appraisee relations 2 0.092** (2 2.04)
Distributive justice 2 0.20 **(2 3.96)
Note: n ¼ 407.
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inconsistent in signs across six organizations. These results for demographics are similar to
what was reported by Kacmar and Baron (1999) for perceptions of organizational politics in a
meta-analysis. The demographic variables were ignored in the MVA because of weak and
inconsistent effects and missing data (average reported data 65%). However, distributive
justice variable was included in the regression analysis to control for the influence of outcome
equity perceptions of earlier appraisals. The results of multivariate regression are presented in
Table 6.
The regression model explained moderate level of variance in APAP with R 2adj ¼ 0.417
(F ¼ 49.4, p , 0.001). Following variables showed strong effect size at p , 0.05: downward
communication, criteria relevance, appraiser–appraisee relations and control variable
distributive justice. Appraisal accountability was significant at p , 0.10. Therefore, all
hypotheses were strongly or partially supported, except for voice hypothesis.
Models
Antecedents 1 2 3 4
Distributive justice 20.52** 2 0.29** 2 0.21** 20.20**
Appraiser’s accountability 2 0.20** 2 0.12** 20.09*
Criteria relevance 2 0.25** 2 0.15** 20.12**
Downward communication 2 0.29** 20.27**
Voice 2 0.01 20.002
Appraiser – appraisee relations 20.12**
DR 2 0.28 0.102 0.031 0.007
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p , 0.05 except for voice in Model 3. Therefore, hierarchical regression shows strong
support for Hypotheses 2–5, but not for Hypothesis 1 related to voice.
Criteria
relevance Downward
communication
Appraiser-
appraisee
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APAP
relations
Voice
Appraiser’s
accountability
Discussion
Appraiser’s criticality in influencing perceptions
Multivariate regression revealed that the following antecedents influenced APAP
significantly: appraiser–appraisee relations (b ¼ 20.12, p , 0.05), downward communi-
cation (b ¼ 20.27, p , 0.01), criteria relevance (b ¼ 20.12, p , 0.05) and appraiser’s
accountability (b ¼ 20.09, p , 0.1). The results show that the PA communication process
variables such as downward communication, structural variables such as criteria relevance
and accountability and interpersonal variables, all have significant direct influence on APAP.
These belong to different variable categories supporting the basic premise that PA structural,
process and interpersonal factors influence political perceptions. However, SEM test
revealed that only appraiser-centric antecedents –downward communication and appraiser–
appraisee relations – have a significant direct influence on APAP. The other appraiser-centric
process, voice, had insignificant relation with APAP.
A closer look at the components of downward communication reveals that these
processes are spread over different stages of the appraisal cycle. ‘Communication/clarity of
PA policies’ may be spread over the complete cycle; feedback is intermittently spread over
the cycle, more so near the end; and PA decision explanation happens toward the end. This
spread across the PA cycle is critical in reinforcing the appraisee’s perceptions. Appraiser
drives the downward communication processes, especially the latter two. Therefore,
appraisee is likely to believe that the appraiser who delivers useful feedback and justifies and
explains appraisal decision and process will not manipulate rating much. It also gives
appraisees an opportunity to highlight their achievements. Regular feedback brings the
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– 0.06
Criteria Downward
relevance 0.09 communication
– 0.49**
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0.06
Appraiser’s Appraiser-
APAP
accountability appraisee
0.8** relations
– 0.17**
Voice
– 0.13*
appraiser’s viewpoint about individual appraisee’s performance in the open early in the
process, which appraiser may find difficult to drastically change later on at the time of
appraisal (Klimoski and Inks 1990). Thus regular feedback not only helps appraisee
understand his/her performance issues, do course-correction and predict their appraisal, but it
also curbs appraiser’s tendency to manipulate ratings (Taylor et al. 1994). Decision
explanation also enhances appraisee’s understanding of the decision and the process. It also
brings accountability pressure on appraiser to justify the decision to appraisee (Curtis et al.
2005). Thus these factors enhance appraisee’s perceptions of control, understanding and
predictability of PA decision. These results corroborate the informational justice explanation
(Greenberg 1986; Colquitt 2001), and the instrumental control model explanation of
procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker 1978). The results also imply that information and
understanding lends semblance of indirect power to appraisee to question appraiser’s actions
and curb appraiser’s unfettered self-interested pursuit of political goals.
Appraisees perceive the appraisal process through the lens of their relationship with
appraiser. If the appraisee perceives good relations with the appraiser, then the appraisee is
unlikely to believe that the appraiser will manipulate ratings to hurt appraisee’s interests.
Further, in such cases appraisees are less likely to believe that co-workers’ influence tactics
will hurt their interest. Informal discussions with respondents revealed that frequent work-
related interactions with their appraisers improved working relations. Therefore, good
appraiser–appraisee relations may bring about more transparency and vice versa, possibly
mitigating appraisee’s political perceptions. This is in line with the findings of interpersonal
justice model that fairness evaluations are determined more by the relational quality with
authority figure than the outcomes (Tyler 1994; Dulebohn and Ferris 1999). From politics–
power perspective, good relation always conveys a sense of influence power appraisees can
have on their appraiser, and which gives them an advantage over their peers.
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 1227
treatment meted out to appraisee at work place, and the justification of decisions derived from
explanation enhance the fairness perceptions. Therefore, this study demonstrates the key role
appraiser plays in influencing appraisee’s perceptions.
The significance of appraiser-centric variables in influencing political perceptions might
be unique to the Indian cultural context in which the study was carried out. The paternalistic
orientation of Indian managers, employee’s expectation of nurturant managerial behavior, and
the importance of relations in decisions such as PA in Indian context have been well
established in the extant literature (Sinha 1984; Gopalan and Rivera 1997; Varma et al. 2005;
Brodbeck et al. 2007; Varma and Budhwar 2012). Moreover, this research was conducted in
the Indian family-run organizations. The role of appraisers and the significance of personal
relationships and loyalty in HR decisions such as appraisals assume more importance in
family-run businesses in India (Som 2010).
processes such as feedback and decision explanation by appraiser may mitigate appraisees’
perceptions that they are being discriminated in the appraisal. Varma et al. (2005)
demonstrated that superior–subordinate relations play a greater role in the appraisal decision
in the Indian context compared to the American context. Further, mediation of voice effect by
downward communication implies that appraisees may not like to enter into a conflict or
argument with the appraiser, unless they perceive their appraisers as kind and helping. It was
found during informal discussion with the respondents in this study that appraisees raise their
appeal/complaint only with their appraiser, and that too when they perceive the appraiser
approachable and considerate. This behavior will be accentuated in Indian family-run
businesses where compliance may be more valued than conflict (Som 2010). This suggests
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that the cultural contingences may make certain practices more relevant than the others.
Alternatively, the result can also be explained by the two models: procedural justice
control model (Thibaut and Walker 1978) and group value model (Lind and Tyler 1988).
Tyler (1989) demonstrated that in case of milder disputes such as appraisals, the group
value/relational model of procedural justice better explained the decision recipient’s justice
evaluations than the instrumental control model. Voice represents processes which provide
more decision control, and downward communication influences appraisee’s perceptions of
their relation with appraiser and their group status. Though this is another plausible
explanation, the SEM analysis in the study did not show any enhancement of appraiser–
appraisee relationship because of downward communication. Therefore, these alternative
arguments need to be tested in future research in different cultural contexts and decision
situations.
argued that political perspective provides a more realistic framework to study appraisal
decision compared to test or rational perspective. This is because of the unrealistic
assumptions underlying the rational perspective. Due to the inherent ambiguity,
accountability and high instrumentality in appraisal decision (Ferris and Judge 1991), the
social actors indulge in political play to safeguard their self-interest.
However, unfettered exercise of power and politics is damaging for performance
culture and performers (Longenecker and Gioia 1992). Folger et al. (1992) argued that the
power play and politics need to be curbed and proposed ‘due process perspective’, which
can constraint the political behavior. Current research combines the political and due
process perspectives. The studies carried out by Taylor et al. (1994), and Taylor et al.
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(1998) are the only studies that take this integrated view in appraisal context. They found
that ‘due process’ PA mitigates appraiser’s tendency to distort rating.
This research expands the concept of appraisal politics and provides a preliminary-level
scale for measuring it. To reiterate, extant research has studied appraiser’s rating
manipulation or appraiser’s politics (e.g. Longenecker 1989) independently of appraisee’s
upward influence tactics or impression management attempts to get higher ratings and
rewards (e.g. Judge and Bretz 1994). There has been a mention of the need to integrate the two
streams (e.g. Ferris and Judge 1991), and this study makes an attempt at it.
Although much of the political manipulation in appraisal is directly in control of
appraisers, their actions are influenced by subordinates as well as their superiors and fellow
managers in other departments. Thus three dimensions used to measure APAP are interrelated,
but these can also work independently. The appraiser may be interested in using appraisal
politically, although subordinates may not indulge in the influence tactics themselves and vice
versa. Similarly, pay and promotion decisions in the organization may be discriminatory, but
the appraiser may not be. For example, top management’s favor for certain levels or
departments is a situation not in control of an appraiser. However, appraiser’s PA decisions
influence the pay and promotion decisions the most. The three dimensional conceptualization
is in line with the developments in the organizational politics literature (Ferris, Russ and Fandt
1989; Kacmar and Baron 1999).
Appraisal politics perceptions differ according to different perspectives (Longenecker
and Gioia 1992), and current research studies it from the appraisee’s perspective. Past research
has largely ignored the appraisee’s perspective, though being the decision and reward
recipients their perceptions are critical. This study identifies important appraisal process, and
structural and interpersonal antecedents that mitigate appraisee’s appraisal politics
perceptions. This is another gap in the appraisal politics literature that this study tries to fulfill.
This research also brings closer the politics and organizational justice literature in the
context of PAs, advancing the extant work in this direction (e.g. Dulebohn and Ferris 1999;
Aryee et al. 2004). The results suggest that procedural, interpersonal and informational justice
elements in appraisal system are all important in shaping appraisee’s political perceptions.
However, the study suggests that the interpersonal fairness elements including relationship
with authority figure, and informational fairness elements involving downward communi-
cation such as feedback and justification are more critical in shaping perceptions than
procedural control elements such as appraiser’s accountability and voice.
The significance of appraiser-related variables in influencing perceptions may reflect the
Indian cultural idiosyncrasy. The high power distance and relationship-driven decision
processes unique to Indian cultural setting might make the role of decision-maker more
prominent than other cultures where these influences are weaker. The surprising results for
voice vis-à-vis downward communication might also be a result unique to Indian manager’s
unique nurturant task-oriented leadership style. These results might have been accentuated in
1230 A. Dhiman and S.K. Maheshwari
the family business context. These results are important contributions of this study and need to
be tested in comparative cultural contexts and decision situations.
From practitioner’s perspective, this study demonstrates that communication process
variables are important for the success of appraisal system. The influence of structural
elements is mediated by downward communication process elements. Therefore, for the
success of any appraisal system, it is imperative that these processes are implemented
properly. The research also demonstrates the criticality of the appraiser vis-à-vis appraisal
system design or structure in influencing appraisee’s perceptions. Therefore, organizations
need to train appraisers in processes such as feedback, and provide them supportive
environment for implementation of these processes. In cross-cultural context, managers need
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Conclusion
Overall the research has contributed to the understanding and development of the concept of
appraisal politics. It has also contributed a scale to measure APAP, which needs to be further
validated. The research revealed the importance of appraisers in implementing the appraisal
processes. These processes emerged as more significant predictors of perceptions compared
to the structural variables. Comparison of means for structural and process variables shows
that respondents reported significantly lower values for latter. Thus, organizations need to
focus on processes such as downward communication and train appraisers for these
processes. However, they also need to ensure that appraisees can see clear relation between
appraisal and rewards, otherwise appraisals will continue to be neglected by the managers.
Further, research proved that the human resource practices are contextual, and researchers
and practitioners need to take cultural factors into account while studying and designing these
systems. This research also combined two perspectives on PA – political and justice, as
suggested by Folger et al. (1992). Only Taylor et al. (1998) had taken this integrated view in
the appraisal context. Lastly, SEM test supported the unexplored part of the appraisal process
model by Landy and Farr (1980).
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 1231
Notes
1. These goals are inferred from the analysis of 25 items in the ‘appraiser’s political consideration
in PA’ scale developed by Tziner et al. (1996).
2. Appraisers are dependent on their appraisees for their own outcomes, e.g. department’s task
performance, appraiser’s own rewards, etc. These dependencies arise because of many reasons
such as appraisee’s rare work expertise, appraisee’s political connections, etc. Such appraisees
exploit this dependence to get concessions from appraisers in the form of higher ratings, e.g.
expert threatening to leave if not given higher salary, etc. Appraisers comply with appraisee’s
demands to safeguard their own interest. They face such situation when appraisees use hard
tactics – upward appeal, exchange and coalition.
3. Cut off values are chi square/dof¼ 3.0; AGFI¼. 0.90; CFI.0.95; RMSEA, ¼0.60 (Hair et al.
1998).
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4. The multiple mediation tests were conducted using Preacher and Hayes’ (2006) macro. The tests
were multiple-mediation tests because we could test whether the process variables – ‘voice’ and
‘downward communication’ – jointly mediated the influence of structural variable ‘criteria
relevance’ after controlling for other structural variable ‘appraiser accountability’. Thus,
spurious mediation effects were controlled.
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