Vsol 006 P

TEAM CODE: VSOL006
3rd Thiru. ISARI VELAN MEMORIAL

NATIONAL MOOT COURT (VIRTUAL) COMPETITION – 2021
26th and 27th March 2021
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF BHARATHISTHAN
IN RE: CRIME REPORT ON HONOUR KILLING V. UNION OF BHARATHISTHAN

& 29 OTHERS
Clubbed With:
SOCIAL WELFARE PARTY OF BHARATHISTHAN Petitioner

Versus
STATE OF JAISTHAN Respondent
AND
ZERO RELIGION ASSOCIATION Petitioner

Versus
STATE OF LUCK PRADESH Respondent
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES OF SUPREME COURT OF

BHARATHISTHAN
MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY THE COUNSELS APPEARING ON

BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
3RD THIRU. ISARI VELAN MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT (VIRTUAL)
COMPETITION – 2021
TABLE OF CONTENTS
S. No. ______________________________________________________________ Page No.
1) List of Abbreviations …………………………………………………………… 3
2) Index of Authorities ……………………………………………………………. 4
3) Statement of Jurisdiction…………………………………………………………10
4) Statement of Facts………………………………………………………………. 11
5) Issues Raised…………………………………………………………………….13
6) Summary of Arguments…………………………………………………………14
7) Arguments Advanced…………………………………………………………….16
8) Prayer…………………………………………………………………………….35
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MEMORANDUM FOR PETITIONERS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Symbols Abbreviations
& And
Art. Article
A.I.R. All India Report
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
L.R Law Reports
W.P. Writ Petition
S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter
Cri LJ Criminal Law Journal
S.C. Supreme Court
H.C. High Court
E.R. English Reports
D.L.T. Delhi Law Times
Cal. Calcutta High Court
Raj. Rajasthan High Court
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
SL.No. Case Title Citation

1. A.K. Roy v. Union of India A.I.R. (1982) S.C. 710.
2. Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller E & (1974) 2 S.C.C. 348.

I
3. Associated Provinvial Picture Hiuses Ltd. v. [9148] (1) K.B. 223.
Wednesbury Corporation
4. B.P.Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 S.C.C. 331.
5. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898.
6. Balasaheb Sanap v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 S.C.C. 364.
7. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India A.I.R. (1984) S.C. 802.
8. Chairman v. T.K. Raju A.I.R. (2006) S.C. 3504.
9. Chanran Lal Sahu v. Union of India A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480.
10. Coffee Bd. v. Joint C.T.O. A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 870.
11. D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 S.C.C. 261.
12. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar A.I.R. (1987) S.C. 579.
13. Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R. (1961) S.C. 1457.
14. E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu A.I.R. (1974) S.C. 555.
15. Epuru Sudhakar v. Union of India (2006) 8 S.C.C. 161.
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16. Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 344.
17. Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746.
Union Territory of Delhi
18. Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726
(1972).
19. Garg v. Union of India A.I.R (1981) S.C. 2138.

20. Gopal Das v. Union of India A.I.R. (1955) S.C. 1.
21. Grihkalyan Kendra Workers Union v. Union of (1991) 1 S.C.C. 619.

India
22. Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee v. (2003) 7 S.C.C. 546.
C.K. Rajan
23. Harmelin v. Michigan 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
24. Haryana Development Authority v. Dropadi Devi (2005) 9 S.C.C. 514.
25. Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. Union of India A.I.R. (2017) S.C. 4904.
26. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India A.I.R. (1993) S.C. 477.
27. K.A. Abbas v. Union of India A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 48.
28. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India A.I.R. 2017 S.C. 4161.
29. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569.
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30. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and A.I.R. (1980) S.C. 1992.
Kashmir
31. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 S.C.C. 1.
32. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India A.I.R. (1997) S.C. 1125.
33. L.I.C. v. Sushil (2006) 2 S.C.C. 471.
34. Lakshmi Khandasari v. State of U.P. A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 873.
35. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1999) 6 S.C.C. 9.
36. M.G. Vadappanavar v. State of Karnataka A.I.R. (2001) S.C. 260.
37. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 300.
38. Mahabir Auto Store v. Indian Oil Corporation, A.I.R. (1990) S.C. 1031.
39. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India A.I.R. (1978) S.C. 597.
40. Maru Ram v. Union of India A.I.R. (1980) S.C. 2147.
41. Mohan Anna Chavan v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 7 S.C.C. 561.
42. Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali v. The State (Govt. (2012) 2 S.C.C. 584.
Of Nct)
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43. Musser v. Utah 92 L. Ed. 562.
44. Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 996.
45. R. v. Fergusson (2008) 1 S.C.R. 96.
46. Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh , A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 916.
47. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice S.R. A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 538.
Tendolkar
48. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India A.I.R. (2006) S.C. 980.
49. Ranchi Municipal Corpn. v. Kamakhya Narain (1982) 3 S.C.C. 387.

Singh
50. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 388.
51. Rattiaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 4 S.C.C. 516.
52. Rural Litigation & Entitlement Kendra v. State of A.I.R. (1985) S.C. 652.
U.P.
53. S. P. Gupta v. Union of India A.I.R. (1982) S.C. 149.
54. S. Seshachalam v. Chairman Bar Council Of A.I.R. (2015) S.C. 816.

Tamil Nadu
55. S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India (1967) 2 S.C.R. 703.
56. Sardar Gyan Singh Purewal v. State of Bihar A.I.R. (1975) Pat. 69.
57. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. (1974) S.C. 2192.
58. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India A.I.R (2015) S.C. 1523.
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Sl.No. Case Title Citation
59. Shrinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 929.
60. Som Raj v. State of Haryana A.I.R. (1990) S.C. 1176.
61. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad [1961] 1 S.C.R. 970.
62. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar A.I.R. (1952) S.C. 75.
63. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Adm A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1589.
64. Suresh Chandra Sharma v. Chairman A.I.R. (2005) S.C. 2021.
65. Thimmappa v. Central Board of Directors A.I.R. (2001) S.C. 467.
66. Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi A.I.R. (1970) S.C. 898.
67. Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 S.C.C. 355.
68. Venkata v. State of Andhra Pradhesh A.I.R. (1985) S.C. 724.
69. Vikram Singh v. Union of India (2015) 9 S.C.C. 502.
70. Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] U.K.H.L. 1.
Books Referred:
• P. N. BAKSHI, The Constitution of India, (Ninth Edition, Law Publishers
• Pvt Ltd, Allahabad, 2011)
• D.D. BASU, Commentary On The Constitution Of India, Wadhwa, India,
• (8th Edition, Volume I and II, 2007)
• D.D. BASU, Constitution Of India, Lexis Nexis, India, (8th Edition, 2009)
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• D.D. BASU, Shorter Constitution Of India, Lexis Nexis, India, (14th Edition
• 2009).
• M.P. JAIN, India Constitutional Law, Lexis Nexis, India, (6th Edition 2010)
• KAGZI, Constitution Of India, India Law House, India, (6th Edition 2004)
• P. ISHWARA BHAT, Fundamental Rights, Eastern Law House, India, (1st
• Edition 2004).
Websites Referred:
• http://www.scconline.com
• http://www.manupatra.com
• http://www.legalserviceindia.com
• https://indiankannon.org
• https://casemine.com
• www.lexisnexisacademic.com
• www.legalblog.com
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The petitioner humbly submits that this memorial is in response to two writ petitions filed before
the Hon‘ble High Courts of Jaisthan and Luck Pradesh, and is transferred together by the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court by exercising its power under Art. 139(A) of the Indian Constitution.
Art. 32 of the Constitution of Bharathistan
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the SC by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The SC shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto & certiorari, whichever may be appropriate,
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the SC by clause ( 1 ) & ( 2 ), Parliament may
by law empower any other Court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of
the powers exercisable by the SC under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by
this Constitution.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background:
Republic of Bharathisthan highly characterized by a diversity of religious beliefs and practices.

The Constitution of Bharathisthan has taken every measure to preserve this and the country has no
official religion. Dhau is the most common religion in Bharathisthan, accounting for about 80%
of the population. Dham is the second-largest religion at 13% of the population. Other major
religious groups in Bharathisthan are Dhan (2.3%), Dhax (1.9%), Dhak (0.8%) and Dhaj (0.4%).
These religions are sub-categorized into various castes and sub-castes.
Relevant Facts:
In the month of December, 2019, a shocking report was published by National Crime Records
Bureau of Bharathisthan, which pointed out tremendous increase in number of Honour Killings.
In the wake of the massive increase in number of Honour Killings in the year 2019, the Supreme
Court of Bharathisthan took Suo Motu cognizance and issued notice to Union Government,
National Human Rights Commission and all the State Governments. The Supreme Court called
for reports from the Chief Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Director-General of Police of
every state on the steps taken by them to prevent such crimes in compliance with a series of
directions issued by the Supreme Court on March 27, 2018.
On this basis, the Prime Minister also urged chief ministers of every state to act expediently to put
an end to the menace of honour killings. Understanding the seriousness and gravity of the issue,
the State Governments were prompted to formulate appropriate legislations.
At this juncture, a bill was passed in the Jaisthan State Assembly on 15th September, 2020 to curb
incidents of honour killing in the State with the provision of punishment of death penalty or life
imprisonment for murdering couples in the name of family honour. The Jaisthan Prohibition of
Interference with the Freedom of Matrimonial Alliances in the Name of Honour and Tradition Bill,
2020 was passed by a voice vote. The Opposition members belonging to Social Welfare Party
termed the Bill a blow to the culture and societal norms and demanded it be sent to a select
committee and for public opinion, which was rejected by the Speaker.
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The Social Welfare Party of Bharathisthan (SWPB), which constantly focuses on abolishing
capital punishment, is particularly distressed by the penalizing provisions of the bill. Further, the
party opposes the bill as it is a blow to the culture and societal norms and demands it be sent to a
select committee and for public opinion. For that reason, the party files a petition before the High
Court of Jaisthan to call off the Bill and the case is pending.
Meantime, while appearing before the Supreme Court in the suo motu case, the Government of
Jaisthan responded that it has taken a stringent measure to curb Honour Killing by passing the
Jaisthan Prohibition of Interference with the Freedom of Matrimonial Alliances in the Name of
Honour and Tradition Bill, 2020 in the Assembly, but the same has not been implemented as an
Act as it is pending before the Hon‟ble High Court of Jaisthan. Hearing the contention, the
Supreme Court of Bharathisthan in its discretion ordered for the transfer of said case from the High
Court of Jaisthan to its original jurisdiction. Taking note of the viciousness of honour crimes and
considering their catastrophic effect on society, on the other side, the Luck Pradesh Government
has constituted a “High Committee” to enquire on the rising number of honour killing crime in the
state. The Committee has been directed to submit its report by/on/before 31-05-2020.
The report of high committee submitted that the rise in number is mainly due to forceful marital
conversion. About 83% of crime happened in the state is due to marital conversion only. The
Committee recommended for special legislative rules to prohibit the conversion from one religion
to another religion for the reason of marriage. On the basis of the recommendation of the
committee and on the advice of the council of Ministers, the governor promulgated the Luck
Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020.
Zero Religion Association, a nationwide NGO, functioning for protecting the secular rights and
works for eliminating the religious discrimination in the society. The organization has made
significant contributions in upholding secular rights in various parts of the country. With such
motive, the association filed a petition in the High Court of Luck Pradesh to strike down the
ordinance. The case is pending before the Hon’ble High Court of Luck Pradesh This pendency of
litigation was also intimated to the Supreme Court of Bharathisthan by the Government of Luck
Pradesh on the hearing date of the suo motu case. The Supreme Court has transferred this pending
case also to its jurisdiction for further decision.
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ISSUES RAISED
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY SOCIAL WELFARE PARTY OF

BHARATHISTAN AND ZERO RELIGION ASSOCIATION IS MAINTAINABLE
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF BHARATHISTAN?
2. WHETHER CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
3. WHETHER THE JAISTHAN PROHIBITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE

FREEDOM OF MATRIMONIAL ALLIANCES IN THE NAME OF HONOUR AND
TRADITION BILL, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
4. WHETHER THE LUCK PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL CONVERSION

OF RELIGION ORDINANCE, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

(¶1.) It is humbly submitted that the Writ Petitions filed by the ‘Social Welfare Party Of
Bharathistan’ and the NGO ‘Zero Religion Association’ is maintainable, as it is independent of
any alternative remedy. The NGO has the locus standi to file the Public Interest Litigation. Further,
there is infringement of Fundamental Rights & therefore the statute is being challenged as it
violates the basic structure. The S.C. has the powers to transfer cases of similar and substantial
question of law by invoking its powers under Art. 139A of the Constitution.
¶(10.) It is humbly submitted that capital punishment, i.e, death penalty violates Art. 14 of the
constitution. Death penalty deprives the accused of his right to life that is guaranteed under Art.
21 of the constitution. Therefore, it is the humble contention of the counsel for petitioners that
capital punishment is to be declared constitutionally invalid.

¶(21.) It is humbly submitted that the provisions of the impugned act are in direct contravention
to Art. 14 of the constitution on the grounds that the provisions are vague, arbitrary and
unreasonable. Moreover, Sec 8 of the Impugned Act is disproportionate to Art. 14. Also,
Presumption of guilt against the accused is in violation of Art 21 and Art 20(3) of the Constitution.
Therefore, for the above stated reasons it is the humble submission of this counsel that the bill is
to be declared as constitutionally invalid.
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OF RELIGION ORDINANCE, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
(¶43.) It is humbly submitted that the ordinance making power of the governor can only be
exercised by him during exceptional circumstances. This discretionary power of the governor is
subject to judicial review as per Art. 13 of the constitution. The provisions of the prohibition of
unlawful conversion of religion ordinance is violative of Art. 14 on the grounds that it is arbitrary,
vague, and unreasonable. The ordinance is also violative of Art. 21 as it denies free and fair trail
to the accused.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

(¶1.) It is humbly submitted that the Writ Petitions filed by the ‘Social Welfare Party Of
Bharathistan’ and the NGO ‘Zero Religion Association’ is maintainable, as it is independent of
any alternative remedy. The NGO has the locus standi to file the Public Interest Litigation. Further,
there is infringement of Fundamental Rights & therefore the statute is being challenged as it
violates the basic structure. The S.C. has the powers to transfer cases of similar and substantial
question of law by invoking its powers under Art. 139A of the Constitution.
1.1 Writ Petition Can Be Filed Under Art. 32 For The Violation Of Fundamental Rights.
(¶2.) It is humbly submitted that Art. 32 of the Constitution guarantees the right to file a Writ
Petition for the violation of Fundamental Rights.1 In the instant case, The Jaisthan Prohibition of
Interference with the Freedom of Matrimonial Alliances in the Name of Honour and Tradition Bill,
2020 and the Luck Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020 are
violate of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 & 25. Art. 32 can be invoked
when there is a threat for violation of Fundamental Right & the petitioner need not wait till the
actual violation takes place.2 The Fundamental Right should either be violated or threatened
imminently the violation may be actual or potential & the aggrieved party has the right to file the
petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution.3
(¶3.) It is humbly submitted that the violation of Fundamental Right is the sine qua non of the
exercise of the right conferred by Art. 32.4 It is indeed certain that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Art. 32 can be invoked only when Fundamental Right has been infringed.5 No question
1 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1984) S.C. 802

2 D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 S.C.C. 261.
3 Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller E & I, (1974) 2 S.C.C. 348.
4 Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 344.
5 Gopal Das v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1955) S.C. 1.
16 | P a g e
other than relating to a Fundamental Right will be determined in a proceeding under Art. 32. 6 It
is humbly submitted that the right to approach this Hon'ble Court in case of violation of
fundamental rights is itself a fundamental right enshrined in Art. 32. This right is absolute and may
not be impaired on any ground.7 Further, unlike in Art. 226, the remedy provided by Art. 32 is a
fundamental right and not merely a discretionary power of the Court.8
(¶4.) It is humbly submitted that a Public Interest Litigation can be filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution for enforcement of Fundamental Rights as guaranteed by part III of the Constitution.9
Social Welfare Party Of Bharathistan And Zero Religion Association in the present case has the
litigational competence of a public interest litigant as it has justified the prerequisites, i.e. firstly,
an appropriate issue or concerns with reference to a constitutional right10 and secondly an
appropriate person who can be entrusted with the bona fide responsibility to pursue such issues or
concern.11 As per the principles laid down by Supreme Court in Guruvayur Devaswom Managing
Committee v. C.K. Rajan12 the common rule of locus standi should be relaxed and raising question
on the maintainability of the petition should be barred for the better interest of the people.
1.2 The Petitioners Have The Locus Standi To File The Public Interest Litigation.
(¶5.) It is humbly submitted that the power of judicial review is an integral & essential feature of
the Constitution constituting the basic part & forms the basic structure of the Constitution.13 The
Courts exercising their power of judicial review found to its dismay that the poorest of the poor,
depraved, the illiterate, the urban & rural unorganized labour sector, women, children,
handicapped by ‘ignorance, indigence & illiteracy’ & other down trodden have either no access to
justice or had been denied justice. Therefore, ‘Public Interest Litigation’ was evolved with a view
to render complete justice to the aforementioned classes of persons.14
6 Coffee Bd. v. Joint C.T.O., A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 870.

7 Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 996.
8 Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. (1961) S.C. 1457; Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, A.I.R. (1970)
S.C. 898.
9 Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, (2003) 7 S.C.C. 546.
10 Justice B. P. Banerjee, Writ Remedies, 1303 (4th ed. Rep. 2008).
11 Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 3838 (8th ed. 2008).
12 Id. At 9.
13 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1997) S.C. 1125.
14 Id. At 9.
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(¶6.) It is humbly submitted that where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to
a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional right, any member of
public can maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ Art. 32 seeking
judicial redress for the legal wrong or legal injury caused to such person or determinate class of
persons.15 An NGO, acting in bona fide interest has the locus standi to file a Public Interest
Litigation under Art. 32 of the Constitution.16 The SC has entertained the Public Interest Litigation
filed by an NGO.17
(¶7.) It is humbly submitted that The Court relaxed the rule of locus standi & observed that every
citizen must act in public interest.18 The Court expressed its appreciation for the bold initiative
taken by the petitioner who is not an aggrieved party in bringing the Public Interest Litigation
before the Court.19 Therefore, the political party ‘Social Welfare Party Of Bharathistan’ and the
NGO ‘Zero Religion Association’ have the locus standi to file the respective writ petitions.
1.2 The Supreme Court Has The Inherent Powers To Transfer Cases From Any Lower
Courts.
(¶8.) It is humbly submitted that While exercising powers under Art. 139A of the Constitution, the
Court must take it into account the existence of a similar and substantial question of law and pass
an order of transfer of a case only to serve the interest of justice as per the true spirit of Article
139-A read with Order XL of Supreme Court Rules, 2013.20 The court, suo moto, has the power
to transfer cases.21
(¶9.) It is humbly submitted that the similar and substantial question of law present in the case at
hand is with relation to respective bill and the ordinance wherein both revolves around curbing of
honour killings in the state. The former seeks to penalize persons committing the offence of honour
killings and the latter seeks to prevent the cause of honour killings which was identified to be
15 S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1982) S.C. 149.

16 Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. Union of India, A.I.R. (2017) S.C. 4904.
17 Id. At 1.
18 Rural Litigation & Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., A.I.R. (1985) S.C. 652.
19 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 S.C.C. 9.
20 Ranchi Municipal Corpn. v. Kamakhya Narain Singh, (1982) 3 S.C.C. 387.
21 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569.
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forceful conversion of persons from one religion to another. In the present case, the matter lying
before the respective high courts of the state of Jaisthan and Luck Pradesh merits a transfer to the
apex court as the question of law being dealt with in that case is of pertinence to the matters being
heard at the SC currently.
¶(10.) It is humbly submitted that capital punishment, i.e, death penalty violates Art. 14 of the
constitution. Death penalty deprives the accused of his right to life that is guaranteed under Art.
21 of the constitution. Therefore, it is the humble contention of the counsel for petitioners that
capital punishment is to be declared constitutionally invalid.
2.1 Capital Punishment Is In Violation Of Art. 14 Of The Constitution.
¶(11.) It is humbly submitted that capital punishment violate the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Part III of the Constitution. Art. 14 guarantees equal protection not only with regards to
substantive laws but procedural laws as well. It condemns discrimination not only by a substantive
law but also by a law of procedure22. Art. 14 has evolved into a very meaningful guarantee against
any action of the Administration which may be arbitrary, discriminatory or unequal23. Art. 14 also
ensures equality before law and strikes at arbitrary and discriminatory state action.
¶(12.) It is humbly submitted that in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,24 Rule of law
which permeates the entire fabric of the Indian Constitution excludes arbitrariness. Wherever we
find arbitrariness or unreasonableness there is denial of rule of law. An action per se arbitrary itself
denies equality of protection by law. Art.14 is primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness in state
action and the doctrine of classification has evolved only as a subsidiary rule for testing whether a
particular state action is arbitrary or not. It has been held that any penalty disproportionate to the
gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Art.14.
22 Chanran Lal Sahu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480.

23 Shrinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 929.
24 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898.
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¶(13.) It is humbly submitted that the prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution,
but when the prosecution becomes persecution depends on the facts of a given case25. The court
starts with the premise that Fundamental Rights do not stop at the prison gates. Thus, no personal
harm, whether by way of punishment or otherwise, is to be suffered by a prisoner without affording
a preventive, or in special, post facto remedy before an impartial, competent and available agency.
The Court has also stressed the point that the “goal of imprisonment is not only punitive but also
restorative, to make an offender a no-offender”. The court has given several directions to improve
many aspects of prison administration and condition of prisoners26.
¶(14.) It is humbly submitted that in the case of Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh,27 the
Court did agree with the proposition that, as death penalty finally deprives the accused of his right
to life and other Fundamental Rights, the validity of such punishment can be tested with reference
to Art.14 and 21. Art.21 guarantees fair procedure; Art.19 is based on reasonableness of
deprivation of freedom to live and exercise the seven liberties guaranteed therein; Art. 14 is an
assurance of non-arbitrary and civilized punitive treatment.
¶(15.) It is humbly submitted that Art. 14 ensures that principled sentences of death, not arbitrary
or indignant capital penalty, shall be imposed. Art. 14 bars unusual cruelty which spells
arbitrariness. Ordinarily, for murder, a life-term would be appropriate save where special reasons
exist for imposing death penalty. The crime may be shocking and yet the criminal may not deserve
death penalty.
2.2 Death Penalty Is Violative Of Art. 21 Of The Constitution.
¶(16.) It is humbly submitted that Art. 21 requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procedure must be reasonable,
fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful.28 The decision of the US Supreme Court in
25 Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 S.C.C. 355.

26 Sunil Batra v. Delhi Adm., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1589.
27 Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 916.
28 Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746.
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29
Furman v. Georgia, in which the death penalty was declared to be unconstitutional as being cruel
and an unusual punishment.
¶(17.) It is humbly submitted that human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort should be
made to protect it. Therefore, inasmuch as Art. 21 is available to all the persons including convicts
and continues till last breath if they establish and prove the supervening circumstances. The Privy
Council observed in a case of such an inordinate delay in execution, viz., "The anguish of
alternating hope and despair the agony of uncertainty and the consequences of such suffering on
the mental, emotional and physical integrity and health of the individual has to be seen."
¶(18.) It is humbly submitted that the ground of procedural lapses is one of the important
supervening circumstances for the plea of commuting death sentence. The Union Government has
laid down certain guidelines for deciding mercy petitions under Article 72/161. Non-compliance
of the guidelines affects the very spirit and soul of Article 21 which is the paramount principle on
which rights of the death row convicts are based.
2.3 The Principles Of Sentencing Have Been Violated As The Punishment Is Disproportional.
¶(19.) It is humbly submitted that a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence around the
world is that the punishment must be proportionate to the offence it seeks to curb.30 A savage
sentence is an anathema to the right to life.31 The concept of ‘desert’ prescribes that a wrong action
should be met by a sanction appropriate to the action.32 The Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.33 The principle of proportionality is
also categorically stated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights as, “The severity of penalties must
not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.”34
¶(20.) It is humbly submitted that A variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence,

retribution, or rehabilitation may play a role in a State’s sentencing scheme. This does not take
29 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972).

30. Mohan Anna Chavan v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 7 S.C.C. 561.
31 Vikram Singh v. Union of India, (2015) 9 S.C.C. 502.
32 Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 (4), UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW, 973, 1003 (1985); Susan
Easton, SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT: THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE, 57 (2012).
33 The Constitution of the United States of America, 1787.
34 Art. 49, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/01 (Adopted on October 2, 2000).
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away from judicial discretion if the legislature provides alternative punishments for an offence.35
The principles of sentencing do not require strict proportionality between crime and sentencing.
Rather, only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ are forbidden.36 Therefore, for
the above reasons the counsel for petitioners humbly contends that capital punishment is to be
declared as unconstitutional.

¶(21.) It is humbly submitted that the provisions of the impugned act are in direct contravention
to Art. 14 of the constitution on the grounds that the provisions are vague, arbitrary and
unreasonable. Moreover, Sec 8 of the Impugned Act is disproportionate to Art. 14. Also,
Presumption of guilt against the accused is in violation of Art 21 and Art 20(3) of the Constitution.
Therefore, for the above stated reasons it is the humble submission of this counsel that the bill is
to be declared as constitutionally invalid.
3.1 The Provisions Of The Impugned Act Are In Violation Of Art 14.
¶(22.) Art.14 when bisected envisages equality before law and equal protection of law. As per law,
Classification must be based upon two things. Firstly, it should be based upon the intelligible
differentia and secondly, the intelligible differentia should have a rational nexus with the object
sought to be achieved37and in order to satisfy the test of reasonable classification under Art.14, the
differentia must not be arbitrary, evasive, or artificial. The petitioner humbly submits that the
intelligible differentia adopted by the state is not reasonable and it has no rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved.
35 Id. At 31.
36 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); R. v. Fergusson, (2008) 1 S.C.R. 96.
37 Lakshmi Khandasari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 873.
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¶(23.) Art.14 strikes at arbitrariness in any form and because it negates equality38 and it permeates
the entire fabric of rule of law39 and arbitrariness is the antithesis of Art.14. Therefore, every state
action must be guided by reason for public good and not by whims, caprices, and abuse of
power.40It is important to emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the
rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of
law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly
defined limits.41
3.2.1 Impugned Act Is In Violation Of Art 14 Of The Constitution As It Is Vague In Nature.
¶(24.) For a person to know whether he has breached the potence of law, he should know the
defined boundaries upon which the law operates. In the absence of the same, the court at hand
stands against to be a draconian one which stands against and poses itself as a threat to the rule of
law. It was held to be violative of Art.14 when an act conferred arbitrary power on the government
for the exercise of discretion to classify cases or offence at its pleasure42 with vague and arbitrary
definition as to what the offence is.43
¶(25.) It is humbly submitted that the definition of the offence of “endangerment of liberty”
provided under Sec 4 of The Jaisthan Prohibition Of Interference With The Freedom Of
Matrimonial Alliances In The Name Of Honour And Tradition Bill, 2020, is unreasonable and
arbitrary and hence violative of Art 14 of the Constitution.
¶(26.) The Sec 4 of the impugned Act uses very vague terminologies which are capable of being
interpreted in any manner in an arbitrary way so as to charge a person under this provision. The
terms such as “counsel” or “exhort” covers a very wide ambit under its meaning and therefore
38 Suresh Chandra Sharma v. Chairman, A.I.R. (2005) S.C. 2021.

39 Id. At 24.
40 Haryana Development Authority v. Dropadi Devi, (2005) 9 S.C.C. 514.
41 S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 703.
43 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, A.I.R. (1952) S.C. 75.
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capable of having plural interpretation which makes it unreasonable for a person subject to this
law to understand whether the act he has committed is an offence or not.
¶(27.) The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held in a series of judgments that where no
reasonable standards are laid down to define guilt in a Section which creates an offence, and where
no clear guidance is given to either law abiding citizens or to authorities and courts, a Section
which creates an offence and which is vague must be struck down as being arbitrary and
unreasonable. Thus, in Musser v. Utah,44 a Utah statute which outlawed conspiracy to commit acts
injurious to public morals was struck down.
¶(28.) In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad,45 an inclusive definition of the word
“goonda” was held to be vague and the offence created by Section 4A of the Goondas Act was,
therefore, violative of Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution.
¶(29.) Similarly giving an inclusive definitions coupled with the usage of the term “otherwise”
leaves the scope of the provision open ended thereby gives unfettered powers to the executive
authority to bring any trivial act which is harmless per se, also be to bought under the ambit and
application of Sec 4 and Sec 5 of the impugned Act.
¶(30.) In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,46 it was held that “It is the basic principle of legal
jurisprudence that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
Vague laws offend several important values. It is insisted or emphasized that laws should give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly.
3.2.2 Sec 8 Of The Impugned Act Is Disproportionate And In Violation To Art 14 Of The
Constitution.
¶(31.) Equality is a basic feature of the Constitution of India and any treatment of equals unequally
or unequals as equals will be a violation of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. 47 It is
44 Musser v. Utah, 92 L. Ed. 562.

45 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 970.
46 Id. At 21.
47 M.G. Vadappanavar v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. (2001) S.C. 260.
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trite that the concept of equality implies and requires equal treatment for those who are situated
equally. One cannot draw comparisons between unequals. 48 The Constitutional principle that
equals cannot be treated unequally and unequals cannot be treated equally based on Art. 14
overrides other considerations.49
¶(32.) Sec 8 of the impugned Act penalizes the attempt to an offence in the same manner as if the
offence was committed. It is pertinent to note that attempt and accomplishment to an offence are
two different stages of a crime. Thus penalizing the act of attempt to an offence and
accomplishment of an offence in the same manner clearly treats unequals equally which amounts
to a violation of Right to Equality enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution.
¶(33.) The ‘Doctrine of proportionality’ is of a European origin. It is engraved in the European

Droit Administratif and is one of the most important legal principles in the ‘European
Administrative Law’. In Britain, the ‘Principle of Proportionality’ has, for so long, been treated as
a part of the Wednesbury’s principle50 of unreasonableness which postulated the basic standard of
Reasonableness that ought to be followed by a public body in its decisions. To have the right to
intervene, the court would have to conclude that:
(i) It is based on wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration,

(ii) It has ignored a very relevant material which it should have taken into consideration,
or
(iii) It is so absurd that no sensible person could ever have reached it.51
¶(34.) Reading the provision of Sec 8 along with Sec 7 makes the punishment for the offence an
highly disproportionate one for the act committed by the offender. Sec 8 reals along with Sec 7(1)
of the impugned Act punishes the mere attempt with life imprisonment as the minimal punishment.
¶(35.) It is submitted that the minimum punishment of life imprisonment for merely an attempt to
an offence is arbitrary and disproportionate.
48 Grihkalyan Kendra Workers Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 S.C.C. 619.

49 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1993) S.C. 477.
50 Associated Provinvial Picture Hiuses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, [9148] (1) K.B. 223.
51 L.I.C. v. Sushil, (2006) 2 S.C.C. 471; Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, A.I.R. (2006) S.C. 980.
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¶(36.) The main area where the court has applied the proportionality principle is i.e. punishments
and penalties, which means not only the ‘Quantum of Punishment’ has to be in proportion to the
mischief done, but also the punishment has to be in consonance with the ‘arbitrary’ principle as
enshrined under Art. 14.52
3.2 Presumption Of Guilt Against The Accused Is In Violation Of Art 21 And Art 20(3) Of
The Constitution.
¶(37.) Right to a fair trial is a concept which is essentially embodied in the Constitution of India.
In a democratic country like India, even an accused cannot be denied his right to life and personal
liberty. Indian Constitution through its Article 21 renders the fair trial a part of life and personal
liberty. The Supreme Court in the case of Rattiaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh,53 observed that
the fair trial is the heart of criminal jurisprudence. A fair trial is a fundamental right which flows
from article 21 of the Constitution. Denial of the fair trial is the denial of human rights. Also, the
Court in Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali v. The State (Govt. Of Nct),54 stated that every person,
therefore, has a right to a fair trial by a competent court in the spirit of the right to life and personal
liberty. Thus, right to a fair trial being a fundamental right cannot be refused to any person by the
virtue of Constitution.
¶(38.) An accused brought to trial must be given a fair chance to be heard and cannot be presumed
to be guilty of a crime till the prosecution can prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This
principle is commonly known as the “Presumption of Innocence”. In the famous case of
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions,55 this principle was referred to as ‘golden thread
principle of criminal law’. Today, this principle finds place in the criminal jurisprudence of various
common law countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa and United States of
America.
52 Id. At 43.
53 Rattiaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 S.C.C. 516.
54 Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali v. The State (Govt. Of Nct), (2012) 2 S.C.C. 584.
55 Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] U.K.H.L. 1.
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¶(39.) The Indian Judiciary has recognized presumption of Innocence under Article 20 and 21 of
the Constitution. In the landmark Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,56 presumption of innocence
was held to the fundamental right of the accused.
¶(40.) In the instant case, Sec 6 of the impugned Act imposes a reverse onus on the part of accused
to prove his innocence for certain offences. This provision is in violation of the Right to Fair trial
enshrined under Art 21 of the Constitution and the same is unreasonable and invalid in the eyes of
law.
¶(41.) By virtue of Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution, no person can be compelled to be a
witness against himself. The scope of Article 20(3) has been elaborately dealt with by the judiciary
in many cases. Widening the scope of the provision in the case of M.P. Sharma v. Satish
Chandra,57 the Supreme Court held that the right against self-incrimination includes right to
remain silent. In reverse when the onus of burden of proof is reversed, it creates a situation where
the accused, now presumed guilty must adduce evidence beyond reasonable doubt to prove his
innocence and be granted an acquittal. It thus violates the right to remain to silent of an accused
which comes in the ambit of fundamental rights in the constitution.
¶(42.) Hence based on the aforementioned reasons it is contended that the impugned is in violation
of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution and therefore liable to be struck down
as unconstitutional.

OF RELIGION ORDINANCE, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
(¶43.) It is humbly submitted that the ordinance making power of the governor can only be
exercised by him during exceptional circumstances. This discretionary power of the governor is
subject to judicial review as per Art. 13 of the constitution. The provisions of the prohibition of
unlawful conversion of religion ordinance is violative of Art. 14 on the grounds that it is arbitrary,
56 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1978) S.C. 597.

57 M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 300.
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vague, and unreasonable. The ordinance is also violative of Art. 21 as it denies free and fair trail
to the accused.
4.1 The Governor Can Promulgate An Ordinance Only During Exceptional Circumstances.
(¶44.) An ordinance is a rule established by authority; a permanent rule of action; a law or statute.
It generally is used to designate the enactments of the legislative body.58 Article 213 of the
Constitution provides that when the Governor of the State is satisfied that circumstances exist
which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances
as the circumstances appear to him to require.59
(¶45.) It is humbly submitted that the legislative power of the executive to promulgate Ordinances
is to be used in exceptional circumstances and not as a substitute for the law making power of the
legislature.60 It is also well settled that the ordinance is subject to same limitation as the law of
legislature.61 An Ordinance promulgated under the Art. 213 shall have the same force and effect
as an Act of Legislature of the State.62 It is also well established that promulgation of ordinances
is a legislative function.63 The vires of the ordinance have to be judged by the legislative
competence of Parliament under List 1 or List 2, on the application of “the principles for the
interpretation of the legislative lists”.64
(¶46.) It is humbly submitted that in this instant case, there is no exceptional circumstances present
that requires the governor of Luck Pradesh to promulgate the Luck Pradesh Prohibition Of
Unlawful Conversion Of Religion Ordinance, 2020. Since, the ordinance making power of the
governor is not an absolute power wherein it is subject to certain restrictions such as it can only be
exercised during exceptional circumstances. The promulgation of this ordinance is unwarranted
and is not backed by the presence of exceptional circumstances whereby the governor has acted
beyond the scope of Art. 213.
58 6, BLACK’s LAW.
59 Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 S.C.C. 1.
60 D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. (1987) S.C. 579.
61 A.K. Roy v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1982) S.C. 710.
62 Balasaheb Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 S.C.C. 364.
63 Venkata v. State of Andhra Pradhesh, A.I.R. (1985) S.C. 724.
64 Sardar Gyan Singh Purewal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. (1975) Pat. 69.
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4.2 The Discretionary Power Of The Governor Is Subject To Judicial Review.
(¶47.) It is humbly submitted that the Power of Discretion guaranteed under the Constitution of
India cannot be used when there is no such situation prevailing in the country. The term discretion
means ‘choosing from amongst the various available alternatives but with reference to the rules of
reason and justice and not according to personal necessities’. In the case of Epuru Sudhakar v.
Union of India,65 it was held that “Likewise it seems to me that when discretionary powers are
entrusted to the executive by the prerogative in pursuance of the treaty-making power, the courts
can examine the exercise of them so as to see that they are not used improperly or mistakenly”.
(¶48.) It is humbly submitted that the President or the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head in the case of the Union and the Chief
Minister as the head in the case of state in all matters which vests in the executive whether those
functions are executive or legislative in character.66 “In a democracy based on Rule of Law, no
authority has any unfettered and unreviewable discretion”.67 The discretion of the Government has
been held to be not unlimited in that the Government cannot give or withhold Largesse in its
arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will”.68
(¶49.) It is humbly submitted that in the case of In Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar,69 the
state of Bihar took over the control of the management and control of the non-governmental
schools through an ordinance; which it re-promulgated several times until 1992. Wherefore Justice
Sujatha Manohar invalidated all the ordinances which were re-promulgated which includes the
original one. It was observed that “The state gave no justifications for the immediate action nor
did it have any intention of placing any ordinance before the legislature”. Keeping in mind that
ordinance is a “Circumstantial conditional legislative power” only and hence cannot be given the
scope of an ordinary legislative power.
65 Epuru Sudhakar v. Union of India, (2006) 8 S.C.C. 161.

66 Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. (1974) S.C. 2192.
67 B.P.Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 S.C.C. 331.
68 Maru Ram v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1980) S.C. 2147.
69 Id. At 59.
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(¶50.) It is humbly submitted that it must be shown that there existed an expedient situation that
rendered it necessary to promulgate the ordinance. Without such justifications being given it is not
possible for the ordinance to stand the test of judicial review. In the instant case, no justification
was provided by the government for the instantaneous promulgation of the ordinance.
4.3 The Ordinance Is Violative Of Art. 14.
(¶51.) It is humbly submitted that the impugned ordinance is clearly in violation of the principles
of Art. 14 as the provisions of the ordinance are vague, ambiguous and arbitrary. The classification
made is unreasonable and there is no intelligible differentia.
(¶52.) It is humbly submitted that in the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice
S.R.Tendolkar,70 it was observed that, In order to pass the test for permissible classification two
conditions must be fulfilled, namely- The classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of
the group the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question.71 The classification, however, must not be ―arbitrary, artificial, or evasive but
must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the legislation.72 In the absence of a just cause to the classification,
the classification is deemed discriminatory and ex facie are in violation of Art.14.73
(¶53.) It is humbly submitted that there may be an infinite variety of considerations which may
have to be taken into account by the governor in formulating the provisions and it is on a total
evaluation of various considerations which have weighed the governor in taking a particular action,
that the court would have to decide whether action of governor is reasonable and in public
interest.74
70 Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 538.
71 Thimmappa v. Central Board of Directors, A.I.R. (2001) S.C. 467.
72 S. Seshachalam v. Chairman Bar Council Of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. (2015) S.C. 816; Garg v. Union of India, A.I.R
(1981) S.C. 2138.
73 Id. At 43.
74 Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. (1980) S.C. 1992.
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(¶54.) It is humbly submitted that in administrative law, ‘reasonableness’ is a standard indicator
by the true construction of act which distinguishes from what a statutory authority may or may not
be authorized to do so. Any law which involves arbitrariness is said to violate Art.14 of the
constitution. There should be absolute supremacy of law and absence of arbitrary powers. The
absence of arbitrary power is the first postulate of rule of law which our whole constitutional
edifice is based.75 Moreover, every action of state executive authority must be subject to rule of
law and must be informed by reason and the same can be impeached on the ground that the decision
is arbitrary or violative of Art.14 and henceforth whatever be the activity of public authority, it
should meet the test of Art.14 of the constitution.76
(¶55.) It is humbly submitted that an authority must not act illegally, irrationally or arbitrarily.
Any such illegal, irrational or arbitrary actions whether in the nature of legislative, administrative
or quasi-judicial exercise of power is liable to be quashed being violative of Art.14.77 The
provisions of the act in question are arbitrary and hence violative of Art.14, thereby it can be
reviewed under Art.13 that provides for judicial review .A law that is made in contravention of
fundamental rights is void ab initio.
(¶56.) It is humbly submitted that it is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.78 Vague laws offend several important
values.79 A legislation must not be so vague, the language so loose, as to leave to those who have
to apply it too wide a discretion for sweeping within its condemnation.80 It is a fairly settled
principle of law that when a penal provision is vague, it denies the equal protection of laws
guaranteed under Art.14.81
(¶57.) It is humbly submitted that in this instant case the classification is completely unreasonable
and does not have any object which is to be attained. Section 12 of the ordinance shifts the burden
on the accused to prove that he/she has not indulged in unlawful conversion. Section 6 is vague as
75 Som Raj v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. (1990) S.C. 1176.

76 Mahabir Auto Store v. Indian Oil Corporation, A.I.R. (1990) S.C. 1031.
77 E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. (1974) S.C. 555.
78 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, A.I.R (2015) S.C. 1523.
79 Id. At 21.
80 K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 48.
81 Chairman v. T.K. Raju, A.I.R. (2006) S.C. 3504.
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to the context that it invalidates marriage only when a man unlawfully converts a woman but the
vice versa does not invalidate the marriage. This classification in shift in burden of proof as per
section 12 and section 6 invalidating a marriage based on unlawful conversion of a man alone are
completely unreasonable and have no nexus to the object to be attained. Thus, there is no
intelligible differentia in the classification made thereby clearly violating Art.14.
4.4. The Impugned Ordinance Interferes With The Free Exercise Of Right To Religion
Under Art 25 Of The Constitution.
(¶58.) Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees that every person shall have the freedom of
conscience and shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate religion, subject to public
order, health and morality. Under constitutional scheme every person has a fundamental right not
merely to entertain the religious belief of his choice but also to exhibit this belief and ideas in
manner which does not infringe the religious right and personal freedom of others. Since freedom
under article 25 belongs to every person, the freedom of one cannot encroach upon similar freedom
belonging to other person. Furthermore, the State has reserved unto itself the power to make laws
providing for social reform and social welfare even though they might interfere with religious
practices.
(¶59.) It is humbly submitted that though the freedom of conscience and religious belief are
absolute, the right to act in exercise of man’s freedom of conscience and freedom of religion cannot
override public interests and morals of the society and in that view it is competent for the State to
suppress such religious activity which is prejudicial to public interest. Article 18 (3) of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also describes the limitations on the
freedom of religion. Since no fundamental right can be absolute in a modern state, freedom of
religion cannot be absolute.
(¶60.) It is humbly submitted that in the case of Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay,82
the S.C. held that every person has a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to
entertain religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or conscience but to exhibit his
82 Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 388.

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belief and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and further to
propagate his religious views for edification of others.
(¶61.) It is submitted that certain definitions and provisions of the impugned ordinance is left open
ended which allows the law enforcing agency to apply the provisions of this ordinance even in
cases of certain genuine and lawful conversions. In such cases it is pertinent to note that under the
impugned ordinance when the presumption is against the person converting to another religion to
prove that it is a case of genuine conversion, it causes unnecessary hindrance and obstruction to
the free exercise of the Right to Freedom enshrined under Art 25 of the Constitution.
4.5 The Impugned Ordinance Is In Violation Of Right To Privacy Enshrined Under Art 21
Of The Constitution.
(¶62.) It is submitted that Sec 8 of the impugned ordinance infringes the Right to Privacy
guaranteed under Art 21 of the Constitution of the person intending to convert his religion as
matters of religious choices fall under the ambit of privacy.
(¶63.) Justice Bobde, in the landmark judgment of the SC in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India,83 held that marriage, procreation of child, sexual orientation are all matters pertaining to an
individual upon which invasion by the State is impermissible. Further, these are matters upon
which only the concerned individual can exercise his decisional autonomy. Autonomy of the
individual is the ability to make decisions on vital matters of concern to life. The main aim of
privacy is to protect the personal choices of individuals. The privacy rights of the individuals are
not surrendered when it comes of public forum. Widening the scope of privacy Justice
Chandrachud held that, Privacy recognises the right of every person to make essential choices
which affect the course of life.
(¶64.) It is contended that Sec 8 of the impugned ordinance mandates the person to make a public
declaration of his choice of religion 60 days prior to his intended date of conversion. Such a
provision which makes it obligatory to publicly declare a choice of his private choice before a
83 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2017 S.C. 4161.

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public forum squarely falls with the ambit of violation of Right to Privacy enshrined under Art 21
of the Constitution and therefore liable to be struck down as unconstitutional.
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PRAYER
In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly prayed that
this Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare that:
1. The Jaisthan Prohibition Of Interference With The Freedom Of Matrimonial Alliances In

The Name Of Honour And Tradition Bill, 2020 formulated by the Jaisthan legislative
assembly is unconstitutional.
2. To declare that Capital Punishment is constitutionally invalid in the country of

Bharathisthan.
3. The Luck Pradesh Prohibition Of Unlawful Conversion Of Religion Ordinance, 2020

which was promulgated by the governor of the state of Luck Pradesh is constitutionally
invalid.
AND/OR
Pass any other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience. And
for this, the Petitioner as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.
COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
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TEAM CODE: VSOL006

3rd Thiru. ISARI VELAN MEMORIAL

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF BHARATHISTHAN

IN RE: CRIME REPORT ON HONOUR KILLING V. UNION OF BHARATHISTHAN

SOCIAL WELFARE PARTY OF BHARATHISTHAN Petitioner

ZERO RELIGION ASSOCIATION Petitioner

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES OF SUPREME COURT OF

MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY THE COUNSELS APPEARING ON

1) List of Abbreviations …………………………………………………………… 3

2) Index of Authorities ……………………………………………………………. 4

A.I.R. All India Report

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

L.R Law Reports

W.P. Writ Petition

S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter

Cri LJ Criminal Law Journal

S.C. Supreme Court

H.C. High Court

E.R. English Reports

D.L.T. Delhi Law Times

Cal. Calcutta High Court

Raj. Rajasthan High Court

SL.No. Case Title Citation

2. Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller E & (1974) 2 S.C.C. 348.

5. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898.

6. Balasaheb Sanap v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 S.C.C. 364.

7. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India A.I.R. (1984) S.C. 802.

8. Chairman v. T.K. Raju A.I.R. (2006) S.C. 3504.

9. Chanran Lal Sahu v. Union of India A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480.

10. Coffee Bd. v. Joint C.T.O. A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 870.

11. D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (1971) 2 S.C.C. 261.

12. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar A.I.R. (1987) S.C. 579.

15. Epuru Sudhakar v. Union of India (2006) 8 S.C.C. 161.

SL.No. Case Title Citation

19. Garg v. Union of India A.I.R (1981) S.C. 2138.

21. Grihkalyan Kendra Workers Union v. Union of (1991) 1 S.C.C. 619.

24. Haryana Development Authority v. Dropadi Devi (2005) 9 S.C.C. 514.

26. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India A.I.R. (1993) S.C. 477.

27. K.A. Abbas v. Union of India A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 48.

28. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India A.I.R. 2017 S.C. 4161.

29. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569.

SL.No. Case Title Citation

31. Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 S.C.C. 1.

32. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India A.I.R. (1997) S.C. 1125.

33. L.I.C. v. Sushil (2006) 2 S.C.C. 471.

34. Lakshmi Khandasari v. State of U.P. A.I.R. (1981) S.C. 873.

35. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1999) 6 S.C.C. 9.

36. M.G. Vadappanavar v. State of Karnataka A.I.R. (2001) S.C. 260.

37. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 300.

39. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India A.I.R. (1978) S.C. 597.

40. Maru Ram v. Union of India A.I.R. (1980) S.C. 2147.

41. Mohan Anna Chavan v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 7 S.C.C. 561.

45. R. v. Fergusson (2008) 1 S.C.R. 96.

49. Ranchi Municipal Corpn. v. Kamakhya Narain (1982) 3 S.C.C. 387.

54. S. Seshachalam v. Chairman Bar Council Of A.I.R. (2015) S.C. 816.

58. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India A.I.R (2015) S.C. 1523.

61. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad [1961] 1 S.C.R. 970.

65. Thimmappa v. Central Board of Directors A.I.R. (2001) S.C. 467.

66. Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi A.I.R. (1970) S.C. 898.

67. Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2009) 3 S.C.C. 355.

68. Venkata v. State of Andhra Pradhesh A.I.R. (1985) S.C. 724.

69. Vikram Singh v. Union of India (2015) 9 S.C.C. 502.

70. Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] U.K.H.L. 1.