FIRST DIVISION 2. Criminal Cases Nos.
36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
[G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006]
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO
B. OCON, Petitioners, v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June
2003 Resolution denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders,
the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is
hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby
ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and
Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2)
Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-
3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25,
2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela;
andcralawlibrary
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED
to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of
private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal
in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok
Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the
dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo
Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin,
SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999,
the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced
them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal
who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The
case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we,
on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground
of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On
27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe,
as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon
and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted
the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001,
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or
quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint
Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion
cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime,
petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing
the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered
the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner
Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and
Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State
Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the
inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22
October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and
seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad
dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001,
and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving
to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases.
Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a
Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two
Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November
2001, this Court took note of respondent's cash bond evidenced
by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued
the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the
Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November
2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of
the previous referral to it of respondent's petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus .
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City,
as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to
this Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21,
2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in
criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in
upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6,
2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any
judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction
of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue
the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become
final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody
of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals
with the Court of Appeals' ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction
over the person of the accused may be acquired either through
compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his
voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police
or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court (Pete M. Pico v. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused
must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court
may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any
judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise
deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion
to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall
and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by
arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is
required before the court can act on their motion to quash the
warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent
Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired
Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to
first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to
dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of
the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado v.
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of
the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused
having been arrested. In Paul Roberts v. Court of Appeals (254
SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary
of Justice. And in Lacson v. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA
1025 ), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the
dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person
was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion,
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7 :
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of
the law is required before the court can act upon the application
for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished
either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance.10 One can be under the custody of the
law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such
as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced.11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and
liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law.12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the
Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the
issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail
of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire
paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody
of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has
not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right
to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should
have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant
and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as
it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks
an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court.15 As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil
or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In
Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to
secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail
to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.' " The
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein
the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor.17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings
seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and
the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of
the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in
civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not
other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to
quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the
fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused
that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal
cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court
even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the
general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement
for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best
illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused
who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to
have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.
Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail,
nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction
over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause,
we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from
enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein
from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate
the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused's
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed
respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further
proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of
warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the
accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional
Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of
the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to
quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to
persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many
persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could
elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the
quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of
the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled
to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same
judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether
or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of
probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if
he really did find probable cause after personally examining the
records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official
functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is
quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at
any time of the day and night.22 Furthermore, the continued
absence of the accused can be taken against him in the
determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of
guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his
freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher
preference in the hierarchy of rights than property
rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty
must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed
Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice and based on
doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too
eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners.
First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his
predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the
Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the
existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the
city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutor's resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the
basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the
case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of
petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant
prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of
arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad,
"x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a
deferment of the proceedings is but proper." 24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is
inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in
prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants
of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might,
in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor's resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. But even if the Petition for Review was filed
before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains
that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's
resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot
assail as premature the filing of the information in court against
them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the
adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice.
Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
herein should not have been quashed as premature on the
same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of
the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the
Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere
to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2,
Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this
query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised,
this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in
the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe"
Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the
Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case,
including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the
prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that
Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the
arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order
itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable
cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal
and not on a separate determination personally made by the
Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the
order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based
only on the fiscal's certification.28
Petitioners' claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan's Joint Order
contains no such indication that he relied solely on the
prosecutor's certification. The Joint Order even indicated the
contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor,
the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable
cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor's certification
was accompanied by supporting documents, following the
requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The
supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C.
Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; andcralawlibrary
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and
Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no
violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2,
of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the
substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable
cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that
the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following
reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody
of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by
someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a
fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an
obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was
given during the election period amidst a "politically charged
scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each
other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and
former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of
DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other." 32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and
found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of
Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility
of a witness is not within the province of the determination of
probable cause. As we held in Webb33 :
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable
cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less
than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It
is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this
Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground,
among other things, that there was a Petition for Review of the
assistant prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutor's resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the
two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the
following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People v. Wilfredo
Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his
sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda - the
mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the
direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the
Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly
makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies"
and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who
were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April
27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal
made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value." This Court
agrees with the defense's views. Indeed, of what use is
Maderal's statements when the Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution's evidence presented and adduced in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state
witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court
decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is
practically nil.
xxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused
Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary
dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest
decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v.
Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused
therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by
the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had
no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of
SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision,
even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime
cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge
Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision
in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in
Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there
was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein,
since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial
evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the
criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is
here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño
furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao's son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony
of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of
reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements
and therefore the same is without probable value." 35 On the
contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño,
an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points
to the probability of the prosecution's version of the facts
therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad's dismissal of the
informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing
of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from
further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day
after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of
the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations
(days after this Court's resolve to issue a TRO against Judge
Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge
Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the
Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest
issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad
to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the
petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done
so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the
issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the
reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight
inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the
dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the
other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25
June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the
warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise
declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void.
Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be
deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside
by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad's order quashing
the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those
warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the
issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of
probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them
to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been
available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this
Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to
personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely
on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado
v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of
probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had
resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable
cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision
of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal
case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court
of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524,
alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become
final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order
of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of
those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent
Tuliao's Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed
by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As
carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision,
only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were
questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; andcralawlibrary
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge
Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-
3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed
Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not
have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of
November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao's
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not
with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of
Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to
them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was
filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14
November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001
Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this
Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the
Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the
Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent
Tuliao's petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus .
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public
Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order
within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals.
In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court
in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had
ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14
November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so
as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In
said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent
Tuliao's filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00.
Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in
contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court
and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt
which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part
of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in
contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed
before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been
arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was
dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao's prayer (in both the original petition
for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to
disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in
this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the
part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of
People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18
December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification
that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be
transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City
of Manila. In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge

of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to
effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt
hereof;

2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago,

Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance
hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;

3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to

raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;

4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed

to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within
ten (10) days from said compliance; andcralawlibrary

5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is

directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.

6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue

forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners
Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and
accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU
BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and
Lucia Baguio.
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano
for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company,
Inc.
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the
spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil
Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against
the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to
recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest
thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the
whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the
complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against
defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon
the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on
the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their
answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of
the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court
issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ
having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec.
on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written
opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the
payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these
grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion
for execution against its counter-bond but also the
following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding
company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id.
p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no
previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand
was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the
judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution
against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing
thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted
the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion.
Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion
for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground
that the same was issued without the required summary hearing
provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As
the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court
of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying
its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal
was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it
filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones
covered by the following assignment of errors:
 I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its
order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident
as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing
and compliance with the other mandatory requirements
provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the
issuance of execution against the herein bonding
company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the
motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the herein
bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent
motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or
setting aside the writ of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the
question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of
Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the
orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice
of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time
within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the
same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled
MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees
action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a
month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective,
Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of
the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not
exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the
Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion
prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court
of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to
dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the
same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to
certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution
read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at
bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the sum of
exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the
complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of
First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which
the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's
motion is an important one which merits serious
consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July
19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for
almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until
after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable
Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration in
connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs.
Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-
10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc.
vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591,
 September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092,
September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme
Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of
appellants submitting their case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the
"exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which
the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1,
Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have
no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this
case to the Supreme Court.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of this case be
forwarded to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy
spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only —
an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date
when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the present case —
which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that
the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at
this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done
heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January
12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was
exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety
became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed
a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment
issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19).
Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific
obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance
with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs.
Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the
counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition
thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability
under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support
of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not
being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against
the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask
for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This
motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition,
the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R.
79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction
or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride,
141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as
in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26,
1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.,
G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of
the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in
force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct
on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced
on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is
not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the
entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do
nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision be given time within which to answer the motion, and so
rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as an order was issued in open court, as
follows: follows:1äwphï1.ñët

In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr.,
Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a sum of money, counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.,
a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday,
properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the
discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after
Fidelity Co., Inc. which this incident shall be deemed submitted
for resolution.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
The writ of execution against defendants having been
returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under
Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution
against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the
obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the
surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was
"no showing that a demand had been made, by the
plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the
amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p.
60).

Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the

surety for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the
latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again
filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of
writ of execution against the surety, with notice of
hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the
surety received copy of said motion and notice of
hearing.

It appears that when the motion was called on

November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that he
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233
on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April
26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof,
are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this
appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises
issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be
admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged
in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the
crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro
City for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner
was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed
on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of
Gingoog City,1 had initially indicted for multiple murder
eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John
Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged
conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses
Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion
later escaped from prison. The others have remained at
large up to the present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas
was implicated in the crime. In an amended information
dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused
therein. As herein petitioner was his former employer
and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's
services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course
of the preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in
a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he
later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as
the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the
Bucag family.3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of
July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance
of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both
the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal
Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new
prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was
finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case
in a second amended information dated October 6,
1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-
accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No. 96080
entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M.
Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F.
Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In
an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the
Court sustained the filing of the second amended
information against him.4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to
start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served
on him, petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28,
1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court
which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992.
Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty.
Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial
court proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of
petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State
Prosecution's Office appeared for the prosecution.5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol
College General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis,"
his counsel manifested that they were submitting
custody over the person of their client to the local
chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines
and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the
law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the
trial court that in accordance with the directive of the
chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor
opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail
judge.6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor
Abejo announced that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence. On that note and in a
resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial court
admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00.
The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner,
apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then,
managed to personally appear before the clerk of court
of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed.
He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued,
he also personally appeared and attended all the
scheduled court hearings of the case.7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution
filed twenty (20) days later on November 26, 1992 by
Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the
petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was
denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated March 29,
1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later,
Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court
of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus were
the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to
petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now
under review, on the ground that they were tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the
time of petitioner's application for bail, he was not yet "in
the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually
arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted
that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out
by the fact that no bail was recommended by the
prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of
bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution,
according to respondent court, was not afforded an
opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail
contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence, this
appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of
this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,9 his filing
of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court
effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his
person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in
the custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the
"invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by
filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him
within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on
record negates the existence of such strong evidence as
would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore,
the prosecution, by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor
Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to oppose
the application for bail and whose representation in court
in behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot
legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due
process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special
civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent court
after an unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable
and the equities involved in this case, the Court finds for
petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as
the security given for the release of a person in custody
of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned
upon his appearing before any court as required under
the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose,
then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial.10 As bail is intended to obtain or
secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be
posted before custody over him has been acquired by
the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or
voluntary surrender.11 As this Court has put it in a case
"it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free."12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and
prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
whereby an accused could just send another in his stead
to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the
court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor. 13 Thus,
in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,14 where the
petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with
murder went into hiding without surrendering himself,
and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to
fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending
trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that
said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who
have either been arrested, detained, or other wise
deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek
the protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The
person seeking his provisional release under the
auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal
complaint or information to be filed against him as it is
available to "all persons"15 where the offense is bailable.
The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or
limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the
custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section
6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5,
Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities.17 in this
light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago
vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what
purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at
the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious
physical injuries which she sustained in a major
vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought
leave "that she be considered as having placed herself
under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for
purposes of the required trial and other proceedings."
On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the
Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail
bond for her provisional liberty without need of her
personal appearance in view of her physical incapacity
and as a matter of humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure
order against her, she question the jurisdiction of that
court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on
the ground that "she neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has
not validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court" In rejecting her arguments,
the Court held that she was clearly estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her
own representations in the urgent ex parte motion for
bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction.
Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail was
accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to
its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the
matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the
same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that
he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail
before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual
ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing
of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of
the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have
voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law
and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court
which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an
arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee
or merely by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.19 The latter mode may be exemplified
by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military
offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted
to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his
counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution
and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he
could not personally appear as he was then confined at
the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital
for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain
medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution
and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit
knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner,
never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly
served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the
slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody
of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and
under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer
away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the
constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial
court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since
they never attempted to have him physically restrained.
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical
and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the
application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by
furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts;
and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to
his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced
any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed
his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he
was charged in court, up to the submission application
for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual
confinement at the hospital on account of an acute
ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they
were easily verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his
good faith and of his actual recognition of the authority
of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the
court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner
to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Misamis Oriental Chapter.20 In other words, the motion
for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in
the manner of the former practice which the law
proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority and
jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened
in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy
employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able
to avoid arrest should the application therefore be
denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule
that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except
only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance
thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that
all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial
court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
personal nature21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one
is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption
of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not
be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond
reasonable doubt.22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional
trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions
thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with
a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment23 and the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for
admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused
should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in
accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the
other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial
discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the
rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,24 is required
with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of
the applicant.25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required
quantum.26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the
prosecution must be give an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce
before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally
entitled as the accused to due process.27 If the prosecution is
denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural
due process, as a consequence of which the court's order in
respect of the motion or petition is void. 28 At the hearing, the
petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented
by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal.29 When, eventually, the court issues an order either
granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as
to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 30 The court,
though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their
contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of
evidence that the law requires.31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a
violation of procedural due process when the court below
allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution,
instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed
to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to
handle the case and who received his copy of the motion only
on the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly,
the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no
authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence
in opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter
to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue
that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to
oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor acted as the collaborating counsel,
with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No.
86-39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State
Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through radio
message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of
the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This
authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it was
expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn
only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned
the authority of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado
and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance
as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal
case.32 It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the same
Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana
entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the
previous hearing in said case.33 Hence, on the strength of said
authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail,
the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor
Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing
held on November 5, 1992.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor
Abejo was allegedly not familiar with the case, he
nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position
of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the matter.
Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of
the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is,
October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to
manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither
supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that
they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion.
Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at
that particular posture of the case, was waiving the
presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the
court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was
the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo,
the latter readily answered in the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in this case just now Your
Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received
a copy of the motion as early as October 28. There
is an element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only
informed just now. The one assigned here is State
Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick
son. I do not know about this but before I came I
received an instruction from our Chief to relay to this
court the stand of the office regarding the motion to
admit bail. That office is neither supporting nor
opposing it and we are submitting to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Place that manifestation on record. For the record,
Fiscal Abejo, would you like to formally enter your
appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office represented by State
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you want the Court to
understand that in effect, at least, the prosecution is
dispensing with the presentation of evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the
denial . . .
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the
incident covered by this particular motion for
resolution by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
 Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the
prosecution, on the instructions of Regional State
prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose
the motion for bail and this should be so notwithstanding
the statement that they were "neither supporting nor
opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the
manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the
motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court."
By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was
dispensing with the introduction of evidence en
contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of
the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing
for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself
that such was the position of the prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,35 it was
stressed that where the trial court has reasons to believe
that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the
application for bail is not justified, as when he is
evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of
duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire
from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And,
in the very recent administrative matter Re: First
Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de
Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department of
Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan
City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay
vs. Domagas, etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor
interposes no objection to the motion of the accused, the
trial court should nevertheless set the application for
hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the
bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process,
could therefore be attributed to the trial court here as
regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of
the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its
resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order
of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous
adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in its
aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all
means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of
evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the
evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and
only after sifting through them did the court conclude that
petitioner could be provisionally released on bail.
Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and
up to the present, petitioner has ever committed any
violation of the conditions of his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given
the opportunity to present its evidence within a
reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The
records indicate that the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on
the very same day that the it was filed with the trial court
on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the
day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the
prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster such
evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that
hearing in opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the
circumstances, that period was more than reasonable.
The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of
 the application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the SO ORDERED.
point for, as already established, the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor was authorized to appear for
the People.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the

prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable period of
time that elapsed before it questioned before the
respondent court the resolution and the omnibus order
of the trial court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the
delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred
eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due
to the attendant difficulties which characterized the
prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But
then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the
respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case
had ensued in the court below with the active
participation of prosecution lawyers, including
Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now
in that the special civil action for certiorari should not be
instituted beyond a period of the three months,38 the
same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration
of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained to annul the same.39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993,
annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent court's
resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the
Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.
Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 117363 December 17, 1999
MILA G. PANGILINAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Is the conviction of the accused-appellant by the Regional Trial
Court under an information falling within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court valid?
On 20 September 1990, appellant Mila G. Pangilinan was
charged with the crime of Estafa in an information 1 which
reads:
The undersigned Asst. Prov'l. Prosecutor
accuses Mrs. Mila Pangilinan of the Crime of
Estafa, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 1984 in
the municipality of Tanay, Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above-named accused, by means of false
pretenses and misrepresentation introduced and
misrepresented herself that she was instructed
by Mr. Rodolfo Elnar, father of Miss Luzviminda
SJ Elnar, a girl 15 years of age, to get one (1)
stereo component, marked Fisher PH 430k
valued at more or less P17,000.00, one (1)
headphone, one (1) electrical jack and two (2)
record tapes worth P450.00, or with total amount
of P17,450.00 from their house and falsely
alleging that said father of the minor further
instructed her that the stereo component be
tested in a turntable somewhere in EDSA,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and taking
advantage of the inexperience and feelings of
the said minor, induce the said minor Luzviminda
SJ Elnar to give her said stereo component and
electrical parts belonging to spouses Rolando
Elnar and Soledad SJ Elnar when in truth and in
fact said accused was not authorized by Mr.
Rolando Elnar to have said stereo components
be tested and once said accused had in her
possession the said articles, she took them away
to the damage and prejudice of such Mr. and
Mrs. Rolando Elnar in the aforesaid amount of
P17,450.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 12 March 1991, appellant was arraigned before the Regional
Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, where she entered a plea of "not
guilty." After due trial, said court in a Decision dated 7 October
1991 2 convicted the appellant of the crime of ESTAFA under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
This unfavorable verdict was appealed to the Court of Appeals
which, on 13 August 1993, affirmed the conviction but modified
the sentence, to wit:
. . . and that there being no proof of mitigating
and or aggravating circumstances which
attended the commission of the offense, the
appellant should suffer the penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor and a fine of
 P17,450.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. 3
A Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent
court on 11 November 1993. 4 On 3 December 1993, appellant
filed a Petition for New Trial in the Court of Appeals 5 which was
denied by said Court on 10 January 1994. 6 Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court premised on the following grounds:
I Correcional, as minimum to Five (5) years, Five
THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED IS NULL AND VOID
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME
CHARGED. BEING NULL AND VOID, THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON APPEAL HEREIN
CANNOT VALIDATE IT;
II
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ASSUMING WITHOUT
ADMITTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE GUILT OF
THE PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. 7
The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and
finds the appeal to be impressed with merit.
The information uses the generic term Estafa as the
classification of the crime appellant is charged with without
citing the specific article of the Revised Penal Code violated.
The trial court, however, presumed that the petitioner was
charged with the crime of estafa falling under Article 315 of the
RPC. This is evidenced by the trial court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the case and its subsequent conviction of the
appellant for this form of estafa, 8 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused MILA
PANGILINAN, GUILTY of the Crime of Estafa, in
violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended and hereby sentences her to
suffer imprisonment of One (1) year, Eight (8)
months and Twenty (20) days of Prision
(5) months and Eleven (11) days of Prision
Correcional as maximum, plus costs.
Further to pay the complainant Soledad Elnar
the amount of P17,000.00 the value of the
unrecovered one stereo component.
SO ORDERED.
In order to find estafa with abuse of confidence under
subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315, the following elements
must be present:
1. That money, goods, or other personal property
be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same;
2. That there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and
 4. That there is a demand made by the offended
party to the offender. 9
A circumspect examination of the allegations in the information
will disclose that the information under which the appellant is
charged with does not contain all the elements of estafa falling
under Article 315 (b). There was a failure to allege that demand
was made upon the appellant by the offended party.
Thus, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals in the
questioned decision, to which the Solicitor General agrees,
appellant was charged under an information alleging an offense
falling under the blanket provision of paragraph 1 (a) of Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code, which treat "Other Deceits." 10
As prescribed by law, a violation of Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code is punishable by imprisonment for a period ranging
from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. At the
time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force
was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Under the express provision of
Section 32 of B.P. 129, the offense of which the petitioner was
charged with falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in criminal cases.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine
of not more than four thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive jurisdiction
where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
Settled is the rule that it is the averments in the information
which characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court
before which it must be
tried. 11 Without a doubt, it was the Municipal Trial Court who
had jurisdiction over the case and not the Regional Trial Court.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
appellant is barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, estoppel
having already set in.
This contention is without merit. In our legal system, the
question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The Office of the Solicitor General relies on this
Court's ruling in the landmark case of Tijam
vs. Sibanghanoy 12 where the Court stated that:
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction. In the case just cited, by
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because
the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is
 valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public
policy.
The Office of the Solicitor General's reliance on the said ruling
is misplaced. The doctrine laid down in the Tijam case is an
exception to and not the general rule. Estoppel attached to the
party assailing the jurisdiction of the court as it was the same
party who sought recourse in the said forum. In the case at bar,
appellant cannot in anyway be said to have invoked the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Thus, we apply the general rule that jurisdidion is vested by law
and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on
appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue
of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling
that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the
question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court had jurisdiction or not. If
it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and
decided upon the theory it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a
matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by
estoppel." 13
Estoppel in questioning the jurisdiction of the court is only
brought to bear when not to do so will subvert the ends of
justice. Jurisdiction of courts is the blueprint of our judicial
system without which the road to justice would be a confusing
maze. Whenever the question of jurisdiction is put to front,
courts should not lightly brush aside errors in jurisdiction
especially when it is the liberty of an individual which is at stake:
Where life or liberty is affected by its
proceedings, the court must keep strictly within
the limits of the law authorizing it to take
jurisdiction and to try the case and to render
judgment. It cannot pass beyond those limits in
any essential requirement in either stage of
these proceedings; and its authority in those
particulars is not to be enlarged by any mere
inferences from the law or doubtful construction
of its terms. There has been a great deal said
and written, in may cases with embarrassing
looseness of expression, as to the jurisdiction of
the courts in criminal cases. From a somewhat
extended examination of the authorities we will
venture to state some rule applicable to all of
them, by which the jurisdiction as to any
particular judgment of the courts in such cases
may be determined. It is plain that such court has
jurisdiction to render a particular judgment only
when the offense charged is within the class of
offenses placed by the law under its jurisdiction;
and when, in taking custody of the accused, and
its modes of procedure to the determination of
the question of his guilt or innocence, and in
rendering judgment, the court keeps within the
limitations prescribed by the law, customary or
statutory. When the court goes out of these
limitations its action, to the extent of such
excess, is void. 14
The Office of the Solicitor General makes a final attempt to
bolster its position by citing Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
 Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal
allegation and proof. When there is a variance Case No. 0867-M.
between the offense charged in complaint or
information, and that proved or established by SO ORDERED.
the evidence, and the offense as charge is
included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged
or of the offense charge included in that which is
proved.

According to the OSG, since the offense proved (Article

318 of the Revised Penal Code) is necessarily included
in the offense charged, then the decision of the
respondent court modifying the court of origin's
judgment is perfectly valid and the petitioner's claim that
the trial court had no jurisdiction must necessarily
fail. 15

This argument is specious. Aforementioned section applies

exclusively to cases where the offense as charged is included
in or necessarily includes the offense proved. It presupposes
that the court rendering judgment has jurisdiction over the case
based on the allegations in the information. However, in the
case at bar, from the onset of the criminal proceedings, the
lower court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court

did not have jurisdiction to try the case against the appellant, it
is no longer necessary to consider the other issues raised as
the decision of the Regional Trial Court is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CR No. 12320 is set aside as the Regional Trial Court, whose
 G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse
the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the
petition for certiorari filed by Renato M. David (petitioner).
Petitioner assailed the Order 2 dated March 22, 2011 of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro
denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.
The factual antecedents:ch
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a
Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in
2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach
in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a
residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is public land
and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in
Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a
Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on
the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to
own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as
evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by
the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October
11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could
declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought
the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that
the subject property was titled land and they have the right and
authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the
institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private
respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner
for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the
filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed
before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting
petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA which was void ab initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed
by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the
presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public
document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner
notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or
intended to injure a third person in committing the act of
falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of
Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No.
2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and
before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-
Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the
provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court
denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction
between those who became foreign citizens during its
effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before
its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act
No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was
charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on
April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time
still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC
ordered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the
foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He
argued that since his application had yet to receive final
evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila,
it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner)
who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he
applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a
petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first,
jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-
condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court
that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011
Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born
Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship
is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said
naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized
that the act of falsification was already consummated as
petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and
his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only
affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was
long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying
the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate
petitioner is not left without any remedy or recourse because he
can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a
Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown
trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner
for falsification, the lower court has disregarded
 the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-
born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the
same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by
legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the
time of his naturalization in Canada and through
the time when he was said to have falsely
claimed Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his
legal residence in Canada and to surrender or
allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for
his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship,
the lower court has pre-empted the right of
petitioner through his wife and counsel to
question the validity of the said warrant of arrest
against him before the same is implemented,
which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s
argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without
merit. It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on
Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor
cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in
the present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause
for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved,
that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land
Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in
falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea
of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to
petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense
which may be properly raised and proved in a full-blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused
(petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an
affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion
for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed
to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by
his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled
that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and
personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their
respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the
court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may
be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino
in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A.
9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for
re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3
of said law read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy
of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who
have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the
phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down
such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of
oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born
Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but
the terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first
group, and “retain” for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
“Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law
intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to
describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of
the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they
shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in
a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends
CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing
dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-
acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of
those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance
under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-
acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in
criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the
accused is preferred because it is consistent with the
constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it
becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of
law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who
is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31,
201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating
that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by
Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention
of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held
on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was
responding to the query of Representative Exequiel
Javier:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under
Section 3 of the Senate version, “Any provision of law on the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so
forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have
lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the
effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens
here. Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship
after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained
their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino
citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to
have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to
say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American
citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-
born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who
lost their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no
longer natural born citizens because they have just reacquired
their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr.
Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate
version is precisely retention and reacquisition. The
reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the
effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the
effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act
63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have
reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the
act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship
applying to future instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we
are here making distinctions between natural-born citizens.
Because this is very important for certain government positions,
‘no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a
specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the
law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later
on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the
explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our
conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously
lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act
63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian
citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first
category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at
the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the
rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his
category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words,
Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who
became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases
after the new law’s effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A.
9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the particular
application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation
more favorable to the accused following the time-honored
principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225,
however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in
relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a
private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not
take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or
commercial documents. The elements of falsification of
documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC
are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of
said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign
country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen
loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification
was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable
cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for
re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed
prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required
for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for
bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash
warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person
was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion,
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.cralawred
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will
of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body
of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
x x x x
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as
it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited
case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes
voluntary appearance.
x x x x
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal
cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction
over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he
must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his
motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly
erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s
order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack
of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated
October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case
No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government
scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling
government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar
ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari
assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,
denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information and her
motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the
University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was
appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term
starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President
Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings
and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according
to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5 The
succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D.
Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the
Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office
of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the
crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her
 official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with
intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by
falsely and fraudulently representing to former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be
renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount
of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President,
and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to
said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION
PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana
on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their
personal use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused
to do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student
regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no
jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over
crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes
Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from
the coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
public officer since she merely represented her peers, in
contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and
did not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to
receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board
of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive
funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her
official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s
interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation
to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution
countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense.
It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR,
she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds
the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a
public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated,
hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not
an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation
has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition,
petitioner was compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal
offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction
of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation
to their office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his
office.
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in
representation of the student body, she was never a
public officer since she never received any
compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27,
is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the
Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over
all offenses involving the officials enumerated in
subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades,
because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of
these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and
functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated
provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of
Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To
receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law
such sums as may be provided by law for the support of
the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own
government and to enact for the government of the
university such general ordinances and regulations, not
contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of
the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of
the President of the University, professors, instructors,
lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix
their compensation, hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to
them in its discretion leave of absence under such
regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove
them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall
have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the
corporation can act only through its board of directors,
or board of trustees in the case of non-stock
corporations. The board of directors or trustees,
therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of
the University of the Philippines is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock
corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being
a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly
falls within the category of public officials upon whom
this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction,
regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s
contention that the same of P15 Million was received
from former President Estrada and not from the coffers
of the government, is a matter a defense that should be
properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this
case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a
Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below,
namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa;
(b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she
paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed
in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally
came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on
procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not
a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court
clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions,
thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss
is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal
until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule
41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a
case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a
motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer
a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of
acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the
court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to
quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper
venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such
cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain
and adequate. The following are a few examples of the
exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial
of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of
Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the
case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial
of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over
the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition
and enjoined the respondent court from further
proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial
of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined
the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case
except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of
a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the
respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted
the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based
on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge
and ordered him to desist from further action in the
criminal case except to dismiss the same.
 In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying
the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this
Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave
abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We
note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash
before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the
instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of
authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or
typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated
this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of
the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept
that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March
23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A.
No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249
further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now
stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27'" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher,
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall
not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate,
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through
its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry
with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve
the filing such civil action separately from the criminal
action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved
on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft
or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant to
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the
said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section
4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on
private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall
be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or
exploit or take advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some
business, transaction, application, request or contract
with the government, in which such public official has to
intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or
relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil
degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include
close personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving
 rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public
officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices
and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends
that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument,
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said
provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust
or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there
is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan,
ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at
katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words,
petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that
a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that
the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. 36 Optima
statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa
ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon
ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as
one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development
Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was
created originally as an Executive Committee on
January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon
Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive
Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National
Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7,
 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3).
Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest
Development, Department of Natural Resources, on
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39,
issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27,
1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the
President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees
listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the
Office of the President and allotments for its
maintenance and operating expenses were issued
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated
with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent
parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer
Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the
simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction
over the offenses. As already above intimated, the
inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of
Bondoc’s cases and those of the government
employees separately charged for the same crimes, has
not altered the nature of the offenses charged,
as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six
years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government
employees in conspiracy with private persons, including
Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot
be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from
the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a
joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She
does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be
called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the
definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not
define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created
and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise
by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public
Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public
office under our political system is therefore not a natural
right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by
virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such
thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or
even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur.
881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of
Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We
held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials
with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision
of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner
falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an
essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and
is not a corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a
public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in
relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act
without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with
then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by
the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act
was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments
in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent
in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent
almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while
in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE
IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x."
(Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based
on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President
Estrada’s private funds and not from the government coffers.
Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came
from the Office of the President and not its then occupant,
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is
averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of
the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000
in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that
the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should
be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,
misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as
a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s
counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that
"a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v.
Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro
D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled
that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name
different from that with which he was authorized. We severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may
warrant suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and
accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court
should be characterized by candor and fairness. 57 The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not
act with complete candor and honesty before the courts. 58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO
PLAZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2,
2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse
and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No.
27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for
lack of jurisdiction.
The facts follow.
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this
case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines
for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on
December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand
Pesos (₱33,000.00) . The Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking
public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office,
having obtained cash advances from the City Government of
Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received
by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate
the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent
and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of ₱33,000.00,
Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss 3 dated
April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued
an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its
comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition5 to the Motion to
Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated its Resolution6 on July 20, 2005 dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before
the proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby
ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its
filing in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal
jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees
enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended
by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not
occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and
above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A.
1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes
committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner
questioned the Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of this Court's
decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that
the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019,
R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1)
of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which
was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A.
3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in
relation to public office.
In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza
argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended,
it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was
defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are
provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of
Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it
has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where
the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher;
(b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade
27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration
in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his
offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and
(c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the
three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public
official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher
in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over
him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or
not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27
and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the
affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante9 is a case
with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the
respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein
respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this
case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to
liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five
Pesos (₱71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate
the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below
27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background on the conferment of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,
promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of
official conduct required of public officers and employees,
based on the concept that public officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the
people.11
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March
23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A.
No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249
further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975
which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be
applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly
committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information
having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained
in the earlier mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not
at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The
exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249,
where it expressly provides that to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense: x x x.14
Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under
Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by
public officials or employees in relation to their office are
involved where the said provision, contains no exception.
Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule
that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the
time of the commission of the offense. The present case having
been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249
shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
 assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified
as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses,
the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the
executive branch occupying positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold
the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly
and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-
govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials
of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and
higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and
PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors
or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the
same law provides that other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application
of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily
falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it
was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4
(a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary
grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed
Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case
of People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante,17 that the Inding case did not categorically nor
implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D.
1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense
charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As
thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25
and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that
the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official,
this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions
contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and
not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or felonies involved are
those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4
(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation
to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision
shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to
their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in
scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation
to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled
that as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have
been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the
crime and had the accused not have committed it had he
not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have
been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his
office.18 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et
al..,19 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to
include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction
is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether
he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. x x x
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public
official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained
allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage
of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as
defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming
a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing,
after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of
petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such allegations,
the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by
public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held
that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal
mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that
"accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s
criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of
the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his
response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was
not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by
whatever private complainant might have said during said
privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case.1avvphi1
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading
of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation
of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said
offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall
under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if
the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the
exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan
could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need
to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed
by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the
other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it
is not disputed that public office is essential as an element
of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses
and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the
said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the
public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in
relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court
elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the
principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and
to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People
v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out
in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the accused’s office if "the offense
cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a
constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, SO ORDERED.
the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
"although public office is not an element of the crime of murder
in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with

[the accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated while
they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed
it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x" 21

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of

Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the public
officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section.
Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27
and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-
settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation
and signification,22 unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics
supplied.)24

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case
of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,25 the issue as to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is

hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA
ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA,
JR., petitioner-intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No.
8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr.,
also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple
murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties'
pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where
slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements
of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group
(ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of
the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May
18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and
the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of
investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This
panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995
incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate
police operation.1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding
and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against
twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and
intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the
Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against
Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was
among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for
murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among
those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-
the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on
March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations 5 before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an
accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr.
and other. One of the accused6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend
that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or
PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier
General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the
amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector,
and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated
on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices
Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and
Garchitorena dissenting,9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the
amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and
exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved
for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with
the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some
of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending
resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up
with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996,
House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 (sponsored by
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among
others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused"
in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as
R.A. No. 824913 by the President of the Philippines on February
5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated a Resolution14 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands
pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and
ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and
Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before
Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and
dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted
Republic Act 8249 and the President of the
 Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997.
Considering the pertinent provisions of the new
law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in
favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration.
Justice de Leon has already done so in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of
these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents:
namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and
Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet
begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of
arrest has been issued — this court has
competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing
is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted
the Amended Informations in these cases by the
unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide
the cases16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that
the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner
argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were
introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as
it was made to precisely suit the situation in
which petitioner's cases were in at the
Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof
to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due
process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident
involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may
have been timed to overtake such resolution to
render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the
exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from
the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar
circumstances in which petitioner's cases were
under, namely, that the trial had not yet
commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make
certain that those cases will no longer be
remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try
them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation
and a denial of the right of petitioner as an
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to
procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it
contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in
Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA
7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention,
add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to
have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed
upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post
facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the
Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the
Sandiganbayan.18 They further argued that if their case is tried
before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process
would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered
appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A.
7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General
filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that
both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties to file
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days
from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of
whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case
Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning
Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said
cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing
the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The
burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a
special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and
civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by
law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution
under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may
be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No.
148621 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following
laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were
enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
123,23 P.D. No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and
R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest amendments introduced by
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No.
1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
classified as-Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified
as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and
connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise
in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued
in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that
the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office
of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in
1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employee, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall
apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975.
Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree
[Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
pricipal accused are afficials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineer, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified
as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying
the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final
judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court
where all the accused are occupying positions
lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered
by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal
cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper
courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word
"principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-
quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was
deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the
parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A.
7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases
since none of the principal accused under the amended
information has the rank of Superintendent28 or higher. On the
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special
Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the
Supreme Court except in certain cases,29 contends that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that
to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended
(the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the
law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d)
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986
(sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee32 holding any of the positions enumerated
in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in
relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being
charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title
VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b,
Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation
to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too
broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus,
under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that
is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not
make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused
public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress
simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does
not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law33 because
its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of
the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of
the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the
party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness.34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification
is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of
four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only,
and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same
class,35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut
the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the
questioned provisions. The classification between those
pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose
trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already
started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences.36 In the first instance,
evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the
latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is
within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts
subject to the constitutional limitations,37 it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide
for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus,
petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and
7 placed them under a different category from those similarly
situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides
that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials
and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases
pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors'
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any
court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one
of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial
had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision
under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy
reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya38 for
their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong
Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by
the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further
contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims
to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos
as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph
a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory
provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted,
deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate
and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of
the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings,
the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an
otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since
the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which
one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member
thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation.40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases constitutes an ex post facto law41 for they are deprived of
their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail
of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired
under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post facto law is
one —
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when committed, and
punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when
it was committed; or
 (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves
less or different testimony that the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense on order to convict the
defendant.43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage.44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty.45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal
laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those
acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations;47 or those that define crimes, treat
of their nature, and provide dor their punishment.48 R.A 7975,
which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters,
has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly
a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice.49 Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-
tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been
diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same
contention has already been rejected by the court several
times50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right
but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode
of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not
included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.51 R.A.
8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely
an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex
post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore,
does not come within the prohibition.52 Moreover, the law did not
alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been
ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to
appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On
the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme
Court still has the power of review to determine if he
presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-
one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is
placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to
"expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have
to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement
that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this
case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which
the statute seeks to achieve.58 Such rule is liberally interpreted
and should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such
requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general
subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions
of the law are germane to that general subject.59 The Congress,
in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within
its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself
empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject
amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of
R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the
allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple
murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or informations,61 and not by the evidence presented
by the parties at the trial.62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner
and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A.
8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.63 This jurisdictional
requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan
shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the
public officers and employees, including those in goverment-
owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as
may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was
reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in
Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the
offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the
office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have
been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense charged
and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations."66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations,
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or
omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition not necessarily in
the terms of the statute defining the offense, but
in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis
supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." 67 The
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the informations nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital
of facts in the complaint or information.68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was —
First; To furnish the accused with such a
descretion of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense and second to
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause and third, to inform the court of the
facts alleged so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that the requirement may
be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent these must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the
facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no
indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense."70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present
case, we find the amended informations for murder against
herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual
averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the
offense charged and the discharge of official function of the
offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
informations71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III.
Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses
CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF
INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO
V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ,
SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON,
CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO
A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO
III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR
INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO
LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalize under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as
follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the
accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO,
CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR
INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP.
RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG,
and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking
advantage of their public and official positions as
officers and members of the Philippine National
Police and committing the acts herein alleged in
relation to their public office, conspiring with
intent to kill and using firearms with treachery
evident premeditation and taking advantage of
their superior strenghts did then and there
willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL
AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused his instantaneous death
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F.
CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR
SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES,
SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to
office as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police are charged herein as
accessories after-the-fact for concealing the
crime herein above alleged by among others
falsely representing that there where no
arrest made during the read conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early
dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-
named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in
relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of
herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories
after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is
alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime
herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing
that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by
the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro
Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted
by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in
the amended information that the victim was one of those
arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and
arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately
preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting
of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and
shooting happened in the two places far away from each other
is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended
information that the said accessories committed the offense "in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we,
however, do not see the intimate connection between the
offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as
earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which
the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere
allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office
is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of
law, not a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy
between the offense charged and the discharge of the
accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we
ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information and not by
the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the
amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as
such, has organized groups of police patrol and
civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policeman and . . . special policemen appointed
and provided by him with pistols and higher power
guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo
which is under his command . . . supervision and
control where his co-defendants were stationed
entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations as well as assumed
the authority to arrest and detain person without
due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such,
and acting upon his orders his co-defendants
arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied
in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed
in relation to the office of the accused because it
was perpetreated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular of their
official functions and would not have been
committed had they not held their office, besides,
the accused had no personal motive in committing
the crime thus, there was an intimate connection
between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below
do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in
the course of the investigation. The informations
merely allege that the accused for the purpose of
extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims,
 and failing in their common purpose they shot; and
killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by
the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy

that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not
appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties
and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify
the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations

that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.

8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the said cases.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.