ELECTOR JODI HAWKS,

PETITIONER,

VS.

CANDIDATE JULIUS HALL,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENT OF ELECTIONS

SEPTEMBER 9, 2021.

As City Clerk for the City of Port Wentworth, the statutory responsibility to serve as
Municipal Superintendent of Elections (the “Superintendent”), is mandated by Georgia Law. See
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-70.1. The Superintendent shall oversee all City elections held by the City,
including qualifying candidates, hearing challenges and making decisions as to the qualifications
of any challenged candidate. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-6.

On August 20, 2021, the Superintendent received a timely written complaint by Port
Wentworth elector Jodi Hawks (“Challenger” or “Petitioner”) challenging the Constitutional and
statutory qualifications of Julius Hall, a candidate for the office of mayor in the upcoming
November 2, 2021, municipal election. (“Candidate” or “Respondent”). See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
6(b). It is undisputed that the Petitioner is an elector in the City and has the right to challenge
Candidate Hall.

On September 3, 2021, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Superintendent to

determine if the Respondent was qualified to seek and hold the public office for which he is
offering. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-6(c). The hearing was held before a certified court reporter to
record the proceedings. The Parties appeared, presented evidence and made argument. At the
conclusion of the hearing the Superintendent took the matter under advisement to consider the
evidence and the applicable law before issuing a decision.

The Superintendent makes the following undisputed findings of fact:

1. Candidate Hall was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia on December 6, 1991, of numerous crimes of moral turpitude. (Exh. R-2 -
Judgment and Commitment Order).

2. Candidate Hall was ordered to serve imprisonment and, as a part of his sentence, was
ordered to serve supervised release upon release from prison. (Exh. R-2 – Judgment and
Commitment Order).

1
 3. Candidate Hall was released from federal prison on July 18, 2013. (Exh. R-3 – Bureau of
Prisons release date for Julius Phillip Hall, Inmate No. 07594-085).

4. Candidate Hall was released from supervised release by the U.S. Probation Office on
January 26, 2016. (Exh. R- 4 – Order of Hon. Lisa Godbey Wood).

5. Candidate Hall applied for and received a Restoration of Civil and Political Rights Order
from the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles on January 26, 2021. (Exh. R-1–
Restoration Order).

6. Candidate Hall is a registered voter and timely qualified in the City of Port Wentworth to
run for the office of mayor on August 16, 2021. (Exh. Superintendent S-1 – Notice of
Candidacy).

7. Elector/Challenger Jodi Hawks presented a timely written complaint to the Superintendent

on August 20, 2021, challenging Candidate Hall’s qualifications. (Exh. P-1 – Petitioner
challenge).

8. A Notice of Complaint and Notice of Hearing was emailed and mailed by first class mail
to the Parties on August 27, 2021. (Exh. Superintendent S-2 – Notice of Complaint and
Hearing).

ISSUES PRESENTED

After considering the Petitioner’s written complaint, the evidence and argument of the
Parties, the Superintendent sets forth the following issues to be decided to determine Candidate
Hall’s eligibility to hold office:

1. Has ten (10) years elapsed from the date Candidate Hall completed his federal sentence
prior to November 2, 2021 as provided by ART. 2, § 2, ¶ III of the Georgia Constitution?

2. If Candidate Hall is within the ten (10) year proscription to hold office what effect, if any,
does the January 26, 2021, Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles Restoration of Civil and
Political Rights Order have on the ten (10) year Constitutional eligibility requirement?

2
 DISCUSSION

Georgia Code Ann., § 21-2-6 sets forth the qualifications to hold municipal office,
challenges to a candidate’s qualifications and procedural guidelines to be followed by the
municipal superintendent. It provides:

(a) Every candidate for county office who is certified by the county executive
committee of a political party or who files a notice of candidacy, and every
candidate for municipal office who is certified by a municipal executive committee
of a political party or who files a notice of candidacy, shall meet the constitutional
and statutory qualifications for holding the office being sought.

(b) The superintendent upon his or her own motion may challenge the qualifications
of any candidate referred to in subsection (a) of this Code section at any time prior
to the election of such candidate. Within two weeks after the deadline for
qualifying, any elector who is eligible to vote for any such candidate may challenge
the qualifications of the candidate by filing a written complaint with the
superintendent giving the reasons why the elector believes the candidate is not
qualified to seek and hold the public office for which the candidate is offering.
Upon his or her own motion or upon a challenge being filed, the superintendent
shall notify the candidate in writing that his or her qualifications are being
challenged and the reasons therefor and shall advise the candidate that he or she is
setting a hearing on the matter and shall inform the candidate of the date, time, and
place of the hearing.

(c) The superintendent shall determine if the candidate is qualified to seek and hold
the public office for which such candidate is offering. If the superintendent
determines that the candidate is not qualified, the superintendent shall withhold the
name of the candidate from the ballot or strike such candidate's name from the
ballot if the ballots have been printed. If there is insufficient time to strike the
candidate's name or reprint the ballots, a prominent notice shall be placed at each
affected polling place advising voters of the disqualification of the candidate and
all votes cast for such candidate shall be void and shall not be counted.

(d) In the event that a candidate pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is
subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically
find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being
sought, unless the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the
check certifies in writing by an officer's or director's oath that the bank, credit union,
or financial institution erred in returning the check.

(e) The elector filing the challenge or the candidate challenged shall have the right
to appeal the decision of the superintendent by filing a petition in the superior court

3
 of the county in which the candidate resides within ten days after the entry of the
final decision by the superintendent. The filing of the petition shall not itself stay
the decision of the superintendent; however, the reviewing court may order a stay
upon appropriate terms for good cause shown. As soon as possible after service of
the petition, the superintendent shall transmit the original or a certified copy of the
entire record of the proceedings under review to the reviewing court. The review
shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the superintendent as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision or
remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the
decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the superintendent are:

(1) In violation of the Constitution or laws of this state;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the superintendent;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedures;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
An aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the superior court
by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as provided by law.

(Emphasis added).

The Georgia Constitution, at Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III sets forth certain eligibility requirements for
persons to hold office.

No person who is not a registered voter; who has been convicted of a felony
involving moral turpitude, unless that person's civil rights have been restored and
at least ten years have elapsed from the date of the completion of the sentence
without a subsequent conviction of another felony involving moral turpitude; who
is a defaulter for any federal, state, county, municipal, or school system taxes
required of such officeholder or candidate if such person has been finally
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to owe those taxes, but such
ineligibility may be removed at any time by full payment thereof, or by making
payments to the tax authority pursuant to a payment plan, or under such other
conditions as the General Assembly may provide by general law; or who is the

4
 holder of public funds illegally shall be eligible to hold any office or appointment
of honor or trust in this state. Additional conditions of eligibility to hold office for
persons elected on a write-in vote and for persons holding offices or appointments
of honor or trust other than elected offices created by this Constitution may be
provided by law.

(Emphasis added).

ISSUE I

WHETHER CANDIDATE HALL IS WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE TEN (10) YEAR

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT TO HOLD OFFICE PROVIDED BY ART. 2, § 2, ¶ III OF THE
GEORGIA CONSTITUTION.

A person seeking to hold any office or appointment of honor or trust in Georgia State must
meet the eligibility requirements as now set forth in Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 92-3, Feb.
25, 1992. The date of election has consistently been fixed as the time at which a person’s eligibility
for public office is determined. Hulgan v. Thornton, 205 Ga. 753, 757, 55 S.E.2d 115 (1949). In
this case the date of the municipal election is November 2, 2021.

Respondent was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia on December 6, 1991, for crimes of moral turpitude. (Exh. R-2). Respondent was ordered
to serve imprisonment and, as a part of his sentence, was ordered to serve a term of supervised
release upon his release from prison. (Exh. R-2). Subsequently, Respondent’s term of
incarceration was reduced twice, first on April 13, 1998, to 340 months and then on February 5,
1999, to 300 months. Respondent was released from federal prison on July 18, 2013. (Exh. R-
3). Respondent was released from federal supervised release by the U.S. District Court on January
26, 2016. (Exh. R-4).

Respondent stipulated for the record that he will be within the ten (10) year eligibility
requirement of Article 2, § 2, ¶ III on November 2, 2021. The Superintendent need not decide
whether the ten (10) year eligibility requirement begins to run from the Respondent’s release from
imprisonment on July 18, 2013, or when he was released from federal supervised release on
January 26, 2016. The Superintendent finds that, using either date, on election day on November
2, 2021, Respondent will be inside the ten (10) year eligibility requirement.1

1 It would appear under these facts that Respondent’s ten (10) year proscription from holding office would begin on the date of his
release from federal supervised release on January 26, 2016. Under controlling federal law, release from supervised release is the
date when his sentence actually ended. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3583(a) allows the district court to include supervised
release as part of the sentence, not as part of the imprisonment ordered. In United States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th
Cir.1995), citing (United States v.) West, (898 F.2d 1493, 1504 (11th Cir.1990)), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held “that
a defendant's term of supervised release was in addition to his term of imprisonment and was not limited to the time of a defendant's
prison sentence ... We relied on the Senate Committee Report for 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), which states “the term of supervised release
would be a separate part of the defendant's sentence, rather than being the end of the term of imprisonment.” See also, United
States v. Watkins, 14 F.3d 414, 415 (8th Cir.1994) (“a term of supervised release is to be imposed in addition to any incarceration
authorized by a particular substantive criminal statute”); United States v. Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“18 U.S.C.

5
 ISSUE II

SINCE RESPONDENT IS WITHIN THE TEN (10) YEAR ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT TO

HOLD OFFICE, WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, DOES THE GEORGIA BOARD OF PARDONS
AND PAROLES RESTORATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ORDER HAVE ON
THE TEN (10) YEAR CONSTITUTIONAL ELIGIBILITY TO HOLD OFFICE
REQUIREMENT?

Official Code of Georgia, Section 1-2-6(a)(5), provides that citizens have the right, without
limitation, to hold office, unless disqualified by the Constitution and laws of Georgia. (Emphasis
added). Respondent urges that, because the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles issued the
January 26, 2021, Restoration of Civil and Political Rights Order, the State Board of Pardons and
Paroles had the discretionary authority to remove all disabilities imposed by law, including
eligibility requirements proscribed by the Georgia Constitution itself.

Art. 4, §2, ¶ I of the Georgia Constitution creates a State Board of Pardons and Paroles and
provides the Board with certain powers and authority. Those powers are, in pertinent part:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, the State Board of Pardons and
Paroles shall be vested with the power of executive clemency, including the
powers to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles; to commute penalties; to
remove disabilities imposed by law; and to remit any part of a sentence for any
offense against the state after conviction.

Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III provides, in material part, that two things must occur before a convicted
felon may hold any public office in Georgia: (1) the person’s civil rights must have been restored;
and, (2) at least ten years must have elapsed from the date of completion of the person’s sentence
without a subsequent conviction (. . .). The two requirements of Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III are conjunctive,
not disjunctive, eligibility requirements and both must occur before a person may hold public
office. In this instance, the record shows that Respondent has satisfied one, but not both eligibility
requirements.

While the Superintendent recognizes the broad discretionary authority given to the Board
under Art. 4, §2, ¶ I, its discretionary authority is not without limits. The language of Respondent’s
Restoration of Civil and Political Rights Order is instructive. The Order does not cite, discuss or
even mention the separate constitutional eligibility provision at Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III. By not doing so,
it would appear that the Board itself recognizes that its authority does not extend to impairing or
removing the candidate eligibility requirements of Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III. Second, the plain wording of
the captioned title of Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III itself shows that the provision is clearly intended to be a
separate eligibility requirement to hold office. Third, the Order does not specifically state that the

§ 3583(a) authorize[s] a period of supervised release to be imposed in addition to a maximum term of imprisonment”); United
States v. Butler, 895 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir.1989) (“The addition of a period of supervised release ... cannot create a violation
of the maximum prison sentence allowed by statute”).

6
Board intends to remove the ten-year eligibility requirement as a legal disability, which
presumably would be outside of its enumerated powers set forth in Art. 4, §2, ¶ I.

The Georgia Attorney General has rendered an opinion essentially on point with the facts
presented here. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 92-3, Feb. 25, 1992. The Attorney General concluded that the
ten (10) year lapse requirement is an additional qualification to hold office rather than an increase
in punishment for a criminal conviction. Citing Whittle v. Jones, 198 Ga. 538, 542-43 (1944).
Thus, while a constitutional provision cannot be applied retroactively to divest rights from a person
convicted of a criminal offense, a candidate’s eligibility for public office is determined on the date
of election. Griggers v. Moye, 246 Ga. 452, 453 (1983). Further, the “loss of the right to hold
public office which results from conviction of a crime is not part of the punishment for the violation
of a criminal statute but a collateral consequence that results solely by reason of a constitutional
or statutory provision prescribing eligibility requirements for public office.” Op.Atty.Gen. No.
92-3, p.12. Thus, while the Board of Pardons and Paroles can relieve a person of legal disabilities,
eligibility for public office is not a legal disability the Board can remove.

Just one year later, the Supreme Court of Georgia had occasion to consider the same issue
the Attorney General had earlier opined upon. In McIntyre v. Miller, et al., 263 Ga. 578 (1993),
the appellant there was convicted of a felony in 1984, completed his sentence in 1987 and later
had his civil and political rights restored before Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III of the Constitution was amended
to include the ten (10) year eligibility requirement. The Supreme Court held that a person who
had his civil and political rights restored does not have a vested right to seek public office. Further,
the (then) newly enacted, separate Constitutional amendment (Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III) which created new
eligibility requirements to hold public office did not impair any of appellant’s vested rights. The
Court further held that, even though there was no ten (10) year proscription from holding office
before appellant’s civil rights were restored to him, the appellant still had no vested rights at a later
date which mandated a deviation from the long-standing rule that eligibility to hold public office
is determined by the statutory and Constitutional requirements in effect on the date of the election.
Id., at 578.

The holding in McIntyre v. Miller et al. is clear and in accord with the Attorney General’s
persuasive 92-3 Opinion. Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III enacted separate candidate eligibility requirements
which are to be determined for each candidate on the date of election, even if the candidate has
received a restoration of civil and political rights order. The people of Georgia chose to change
the public policy of the State in 1991 to disqualify convicted felons until their civil rights have
been restored and until they have waited ten years since the completion of their sentence.
Respondent here has no vested right to seek or hold public office and the Board of Pardons and
Paroles Restoration Order he received did not and could not have provided a vested right to run
for and hold office until the requirements of Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III were satisfied.

Respondent’s reliance upon Ferguson v. Perry, 292 Ga. 666 (2013) and O.C.G.A. § 45-2-
1(3) is misplaced supporting the position that the Board of Pardons and Paroles has unfettered

7
discretion to remove disabilities under its discretionary authority, including eligibility to hold
office requirements. Ferguson addresses a felon’s right to possess a firearm, not the right to hold
public office. The right to possess a firearm has no collateral eligibility to hold public office
requirement under the Constitution. In other words, the right to possess a firearm is a legal
disability which may be removed because no constitutional provision overrides it, provided all
federal requirements have been met as well. If Respondent’s position were true, the Board could
use its constitutional power to obtain an unconstitutional result; i.e., to not require Respondent to
adhere to candidate eligibility requirements. As previously stated, the Board of Pardons and
Paroles does not have the authority and the dicta in Ferguson does not suggest that the Board can
usurp plainly worded constitutional provisions regarding the eligibility of persons to hold public
office. The January 26, 2021, Restoration Order’s conclusory language that Respondent may run
for and hold public office does not remove or negate Respondent’s obligation to otherwise adhere
to the Georgia Constitution’s separate eligibility requirements as set forth in Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III. 2

FINAL DECISION

WHEREFORE, after careful consideration of all the evidence and argument of the Parties,
the DECISION of the Municipal Superintendent of Elections is that Candidate Julius P. Hall has
not satisfied the material candidate eligibility requirements of Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III of the Georgia
Constitution in that at least ten years have not elapsed from the date he completed his federal
sentence. Candidate Julius P. Hall is, therefore, found to be NOT QUALIFIED to hold public
office as of November 2, 2021.

The Chatham County Board of Elections, the City’s contractor and creator of the official
ballot for the upcoming election, is directed to withhold the name of mayoral candidate Julius P.
Hall from the ballot for the November 2, 2021, City of Port Wentworth municipal election.

This _____ day of September 2021.

___________________________________
Shanta Scarboro
Municipal Superintendent of Elections
City of Port Wentworth

2
Respondent presented Ms. Carrie Smith whose testimony appeared to suggest that O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1(3) was
controlling authority under these facts and that, because Respondent had received a restoration of rights order, he is
qualified to hold office. Put succinctly, Ms. Smith’s conclusion is incorrect because of the supremacy of the Georgia
Constitution over conflicting state statutes. Further, § 45-2-1(8) itself recognizes the supremacy of the Georgia
Constitution and precludes Ms. Smith’s suggested result. Art. 2, § 2, ¶ III is preeminent, and the public office
eligibility requirements are not disabilities the Board can remove, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has held in
McIntyre v. Miller et al.

8
 NOTICE OF AGGRIEVED PARTY’S RIGHT TO APPEAL

BE ADVISED THAT ANY PARTY AGGRIEVED BY THIS DECISION MAY APPEAL

THE DECISION OF THE SUPERINTENDENT BY FILING A PETITION IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF CHATHAM COUNTY, GEORGIA WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS
AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE FINAL DECISION.