Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crim Outline - GCS
Crim Outline - GCS
Crim Outline - GCS
Purposes of Punishment
a. Deterrence
i. general- discourage public @ large
ii. specific- discourage individual offenders from repeating their crimes (self-interest not to be punished again)
b. Rehabilitation- instill values and attitudes & provide means to live a productive life
c. Incarceration (incapacitation or protection)- rendering the criminal incapable of doing harm
i. prison, death
ii. difference b/t incarceration & specific deterrence: don't care about mindset, are physically removed
d. Retribution- "give the offender what he deserves"
i. satisfies a societal need to avenge the harm, rather than a desire to rehabilitate or deter the offender
e. Burden of Proof
i. In re Winship
i. The Constitution requires the prosecutor to persuade the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime charged, in both juvenile proceeding and adult criminal trials, because the same stigma and
potential loss of liberty is there
b. §1.02—Purposes
1. The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are:
a. To forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial
harm to individual or public interests
b. To subject to public controls persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit
crimes
c. To safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal
d. To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense
e. To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offset
2. The general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of offenders are:
a. To prevent the commission of offenses
b. To promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders
c. To safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment
d. To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on conviction of an offense
e. To differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment
b. Statutory Crimes- look @ words, leg. intent, prior interpretations, analogous statutes, other jurisdictions
i. Keeler v. Superior Court- D kneed ex-wife in stomach (who was significantly pregnant) causing baby to be stillborn; D
charged w/murder of baby
1. Court looks to legislative intent when statute was first enacted – determine that legislature meant to exclude an
unborn fetus from the definition of “human being” w/i the murder statute
2. Court can't redefine "human being" b/c to do so would be to create a new common law crime and they don't
have the power to do so, only legislature can create crimes
a. Judicial enlargement proposed couldn't have been foreseeable by defendant and to adopt it would
deny him due process of law requirement of fair warning
c. Void-for-Vagueness
i. Basic principle of due process: an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined
1. b/c laws must give a reasonable person an opportunity to know what it prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly
2. void if the statute could be arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced
a. however, doesn’t completely eliminate this problem – have to make statutes very specific to diminish
the problem
3. It must provide
a. fair warning that it is a crime to a person of ordinary intelligence
b. must have explicit standard of enforcement for those who apply them (avoid arbitrary &
discriminatory enforcement), and
c. Must be clear in terms to avoid inhibiting the freedom of exercise of 1st Amendment rights.
i. People will censor their behavior if they don’t know where the line b/t legal & illegal is
ii. Grayned v. City of Rockford- D took part in protest in front of school; arrested for violating “anti-picketing” and “anti-
noise” statutes
1. Supreme Court doesn’t have power to “interpret” state statute, therefore, “extrapolate” determine how IL
Supreme Court would interpret the statute if they had to
a. Held that statues weren’t vague don’t contain a broad invitation to subjective or discriminatory
enforcement
iii. Kolender v. Lawson- D charged w/violating law that requires people stopped by cops to provide “credible & reliable” ID
1. statute is unconstitutionally vague w/i meaning of Due Process clause by failing to clarify what is meant by the
requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reliable" ID
a. ordinary person must understand what the statute is asking for (fair warning) no standard to
determine what a suspect has to do in order to fulfill the requirement of providing "credible and
reliable" ID
iii. US v. Shabani- D charged w/conspiracy to distribute coke; D asking court to read into the statute an overt act that
wasn’t there
1. Legislative intent was to omit the requirement of an overt act in the conspiracy statute (consistent w/common
law) there is still an act however, the agreement to commit the crime is the unlawful act necessary for
conspiracy
iv. Powell v. Texas- D arrested for public drunkenness; argued that b/c he had chronic alcoholism, it was cruel & unusual
punishment under the 18th Amendment to arrest him for it since he had no control over his behavior
1. Held it wasn’t cruel & unusual statue includes act requirement & D’s conduct fulfilled that requirement
b. Affirmative Acts
i. Some crimes committed just thru speech: conspiracy, perjury, yelling “boo!” behind someone standing @ the edge of a
cliff (jumps out of fright & falls off cliff)
ii. Every involuntary act is preceded by a voluntary act
1. Have to identify the relevant conduct that leads to the act (voluntary or involuntary)
iii. People v. Shaughnessy- D was passenger in a car that went onto private property & was charged w/violating statute
prohibiting entry upon private property; argues statute is unconstitutional b/c punishes someone criminally w/o
individual having the intent to commit an act that constitutes a crime
1. Held: An involuntary act isn’t criminal An overt act or an omission to act must occur in order for the
establishment of a criminal offense
iv. Wise v. State- D got into bar fight, was hit on side of head w/bottle, ends up stabbing other guy in chest; claims to have
suffered a certain type of seizure b/c of blow to head and was unconscious during the attack
1. Reversed conviction & remanded to allow expert witness re: D’s seizure can’t punish an involuntary act
a. None of the purposes of punishment would be served by convicting D (solitary act that’s unlikely to
reoccur)
c. Omissions
i. State v. Miranda- D convicted of assault for abuse of gf’s child – had legal duty to protect child
1. In general there is no legal duty to help someone else in danger, BUT there are 4 exceptions
a. Where one stands in a certain relationship to another ( @ common law: parent-child; husband-
wife; master-servant)
b. Where a statute imposes a duty to help another (have to stop if in a car accident)
c. Where one has assumed a contractual duty (lifeguard, babysitter, nursing home)
d. Where on voluntarily has assumed the care of another (dr-patient; caretaker of elderly)
2. A person must act when (1) they have a legal duty to act and (2) they can physically perform the act
a. Also implicit is that there is little risk to the individual in performing
3. D had assumed role of father, therefore, had legal duty to protect child
ii. What's the difference b/t civil negligence and criminal negligence?
1. Matter of degree
a. Degree of departure from standard of care
i. Gross deviation: criminal
ii. Any deviation from standard of care of reasonable person: civil negligence
b. The risk the actor fails to perceive must be of a greater magnitude for criminal negligence than
for civil negligence
iii. MPC "negligence" is really "criminal negligence"
1. "should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk"
a. Question to ask re: Garris Whether his conduct created a substantial risk of killing someone
i. YES- could have not only killed other people, but himself and driver
b. Need to look at surrounding facts and circumstances b/c same conduct in different
circumstances may not amount to criminal negligence
i. Doing this on a deserted street @ 3am wouldn't amount to a "substantial risk" of killing
someone- no one's around!
2. "Justifiable"- had D grabbed wheel to avoid hitting a group of children in the middle of the road, conduct
would've been justifiable
iv. Distinction b/t reckless and negligent conduct that the MPC makes is in the conscious disregard of the risk by the
reckless actor and failure to perceive the risk by the negligent actor
v. Santillanes- D convicted of child abuse for cutting nephew’s throat during an altercation; statute: Abuse of a child
consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to
be: (1) Placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health
1. Affirmed but only b/c there was no reversible error (evidence established criminal negligence)
a. A criminal standard of negligence , which requires a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and a gross
deviation rather than a civil standard (which was in jury instructions), which only requires an
unreasonable risk and a deviation, is used in felony cases when no mens rea element is specified nor
is a standard of proof because the stakes are so high in felony cases
vi. Garris- D convicted of criminally negligent homicide for pulling steering wheel of car down and causing it to go off road,
hitting someone on sidewalk
1. Affirmed
a. Evidence established D's failure to perceive the substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would
result from his conduct
vii. Budish- D indicted for unlawfully burning structures when a strong wind picked up embers of his fire; statute: recklessly
sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned; indictment was dismissed
1. Affirmed
a. No evidence D acted recklessly- use subjective standard
i. MPC: he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
ii. CA penal code: aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
viii. Leonardo- D charged w/1st degree assault for accidentally shooting girl when he was taking target practice @ a tree;
indictment was dismissed
1. Reversed
a. Can only dismiss indictment if the evidence isn’t legally sufficient to establish the charge or lesser
included offenses (same conduct & result but lower level of culpability)
i. Evidence established recklessness (culpability for lesser included offenses)
ii. To establish recklessness People must show:
1. D was "aware of and consciously disregarded" a risk that injury would occur
a. This is more difficult to establish
2. That the risk was "substantial and unjustifiable"
a. Court finds that firing a gun in a community creates a substantial risk
3. That disregard of that risk is a "gross deviation from the standard of conduct that
a reasonable person would observe"
a. If D was aware of that risk & disregarded it, it would be a gross deviation
d. Strict Liability- always a presumption against strict liability unless there’s clear leg. intent for it
i. Factors to look @ when determining if offense should be construed as a strict liability crime
1. Seriousness of harm to society – more serious S.L. likely
2. opportunity of actor to ascertain true facts – no opp. S.L. likely
3. difficulty of proof of culpability – more difficult S.L. likely
4. severity of penalty – more severe not S.L.
5. felony v. misdemeanor/ violation – felony not S.L.
6. Origin of the offense (statutory or common law) – statute S.L. likely
ii. US v. Balint- D’s convicted of unlawfully selling opium derivative; argued statute didn’t make knowledge a requisite
element, therefore the fact that they didn’t even know it was a drug excuses them of liability; indictment dismissed
1. To determine strict liability applies (if culpability is left out of the statute):
a. Is the offense created by statute to be a public welfare offense (regulatory; malum prohibitum; protect
public from great harm) or was it created by common law (malum in se – theft – purpose is to punish)
b. Is the injustice of subjecting an innocent party greater than that of exposing the public to dangers
c. Do people have an opportunity to find out the facts of the offense
d. Did congress wish to make it easier for the state to prove their case, reduce the burden by removing
culpability
2. Court doesn’t look @ penalty of the offense, however
iii. Staples v. US- D convicted for possessing an unregistered machinegun; statute is silent on culpability; D claims he didn’t
know it was a machinegun (automatic)
1. Reverse & remand faulty reasoning though
a. If no culpability was necessary, any ignorant gun owner (inherited a gun) would be liable
b. Court reads a mens rea requirement into the statute: Harsh penalty leads court to decide that
Legislature didn’t intend for it to be a strict liability offense
i. D needs to have the knowledge that he has a gun that needs to be registered or that has
characteristics that would subject it to regulation
iv. §1.04(1)
An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State for which a sentence of [death or of] imprisonment is
authorized, constitutes a crime. Crimes are classified as felonies, misdemeanors or petty misdemeanors.
v. §1.04(5)
An offense defined by this Code or by an y other statute of this State constitutes a violation if it is so designated in this
Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil
penalty is authorized upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code which now provides that the
offense shall not constitute a crime. A violation does not constitute a crime and conviction of a violation shall not give
rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense. …
vi. §2.05
(1) The requirements of culpability prescribed by Section 2.01 [voluntary act or omission] and 2.02 [purposeful,
knowing, reckless, or negligent conduct] do not apply to:
(a) offenses which constitute violations, unless the requirement involved is included in the definition of the
offense or the Court determines that is application is consistent with effective enforcement of the law defining the
offense; or
(b) Offenses defined by the statutes other than the Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute
liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of existing law and unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides:
(a) when absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of an offense defined by a statute
other than the Code and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a violation; and
(b) Although absolute liability is imposed by law with respect to one or more of the material elements of an
offense defined by a statute other than the Code, the culpable commission of the offense may be charged and
proved, in which event negligence with respect to such elements constitutes sufficient culpability.
e. Mistake of Fact
3. Discards distinction b/t specific & general intent crimes encourages each crime to be defined w/the
appropriate level of culpability
f. Ignorance/Mistake of Law
g. Intoxication
i. §2.08 Intoxication
1. Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it
negatives an element of the offense.
2. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is
unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
3. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of Section 4.01…
4. Intoxication which (a) is not self induced or (b) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of
such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its
criminality (wrongfulness) or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
5. Definitions: In this Section unless a different meaning plainly is required:
a. “intoxication” means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the
introduction of substances into the body…
b. “self induced intoxication” means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly
introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know,
unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a
defense to charge a crime.
c. “Pathological intoxication” means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of
the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.
ii. Only allowed as potential defense for:
1. MPC – offenses requiring purpose or knowledge as the level of culpability
a. Examples
i. Larceny- intoxication could be a defense b/c it states “taking with the intent to steal”
ii. Offense against the person- culpability required: intent to endanger or recklessly doing so;
awareness of the risk is a necessary part of recklessness, so why not allow intoxication as a
defense if he is unaware of the risk?
a. Person is aware that he/she may be creating risks the drunker and
drunker he gets- it’s the continuing to drink that’s the culpability
2. What if the culpability required was “negligently” endangering a life?
a. Wouldn’t be allowed as a defense either- negligence “should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk” and that would be determined by using
the reasonable person standard; a reasonable person wouldn’t have
become intoxicated to that point; by definition uses a “reasonable sober
person” standard
2. Common law – specific intent crimes; treated intoxication like a disease or defect
a. @ early common law- jury instructions properly excluded b/c intoxication not allowed as a defense
b. @ later common law- intoxication allowed as a defense to a specific intent crime- if it negates the
material element of the offense
iii. Bryant v. State- D convicted of attempted murder, statutory maiming, assault w/intent to disable & assault & battery;
argued b/c he was high on a mix of drugs & alcohol defense of intoxication should’ve been allowed for statutory maiming
& assault w/intent to disable
1. Reversed & remanded
a. Defense should have been allowed b/c the charges were specific intent crimes and if jury found that
intoxication negated the required intent, can’t find D guilty of the crime
iv. Montana v. Egelhoff- D convicted of 2 counts of deliberate homicide (purposely or knowingly causing the death of
another); had been out drinking w/the victims; argued that intoxication should be allowed as a defense b/c he was
physically incapable of committing the murder (too drunk)
1. Affirmed
a. Didn’t allow evidence of intoxication as a defense b/c it’s not uniformly accepted & common law
tradition of excluding it is still supported by valid justifications
V. Accomplice Liability
a. In General
Common Law MPC
Principal in the 1st degree – individ who personally commits Treats all actors, except those involved after the commission of the
the crime or uses an innocent agent to commit the crime crime as equal
o Innocent agent – someone who (1) commits a criminal §2.06 – Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity
act but (2) lacks capacity to commit a crime or the mens o Before the crime principal
rea for the crime and (3) is fooled or forced to commit Solicits another to commit a crime, which is then
the criminal act committed by person solicited OR
Aids, agrees or attempts to aid another in
Principal in the 2nd degree – individ who intentionally helps planning a crime who then commits the crime OR
or encourages the principal in the 1st degree to commit the Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of
crime and is actually present @ the crime scene or is the crime, fails to do so
constructively present (near enough to assist if needed – o During the crime principal
lookout; driver of getaway car) Personally commits the crime OR
Uses an innocent or irresponsible person
§242.3 – Hindering apprehension or prosecution
Accessory before the fact – aids & abets before the crime o After the crime
takes place but isn’t present or nearby when it does occur Hinders apprehension or prosecution
(obtains murder weapon; cases the store)
Accessory after the fact – aids and abets after the crime (buys
plane tickets)
i. Standefer v. US- D convicted of 5 counts of aiding and abetting a revenue official in accepting compensation; argued
that b/c official (principal) wasn’t convicted, he couldn’t be convicted as an accomplice based on common law rule
1. Affirmed
a. Statute superseded common law & legislative intent clear that statute meant to allow conviction
of accessories even if principal was acquitted
ii. Hicks v. US- D convicted of murder; principal was shot and killed by cops; “take your hat off and die like a man”
1. Reversed
a. Act or words must be done or said w/the purpose to aid and abet
b. If he went there and didn’t aid and abet, then he had intent, but didn’t do anything. No act. That is
insufficient for liability unless there is a prior conspiracy. (Act of simply being there is
encouragement and reinforcement in itself if there is a prior agreement).
iii. Wilson v. People- D convicted of aiding and abetting burglary & larceny; argues he didn’t have the intent to commit
the offenses
1. reversed
a. “for one to be guilty as principal in the second degree, it’s essential that he share in the criminal
intent of the principal in the first degree”
i. D had intent to aid & abet (wanted principal to get caught) but didn’t have required
intent for burglary (breaking and entering w/the intent to commit a theft) or larceny
(intent to deprive the true owner of property)
Depraved Heart
Manslaughter INTENT (-) RECKLESS
Extreme emotional or mental Reckless
disturbance
Culpable Negligence
Heat of passion
RECKLESS (-)
Criminal negligence
Culpable Negligence
a. Murder
i. Common Law murder = unlawful killing of another human being w/malice aforethought, either express or
implied
1. criminal – murder & manslaughter
2. innocent – justifiable & excusable
a. today doesn’t matter what category it falls into, no liability for either
5. Intent To Kill- conscious object or purpose was to cause death or knowingly that death was
practically certain as result of conduct
a. State v. Stanley- D convicted of murder for shooting victim; argues no proof beyond reasonable
doubt that he had intent to kill
i. Affirmed
1. Deadly weapon doctrine – use of deadly weapon on a vital part of another
may allow factfinder to infer there was an intent to kill
a. Can infer the intent to kill from the type of weapon used, the manner
in which it was used, the type of wounds it inflicted and the events
leading to and immediately following the death
i. Look @ how object was used, not what it’s inherent
nature is (baseball bat- not inherently dangerous
UNLESS used in a specific manner)
ii. Use to make inference as to actor’s subjective intent
b. HYPO
i. Go to liquor store, pull gun on clerk and say “this is a stick up, give me all the money or
i’ll kill you”
ii. Clerk reached under counter and pulls gun on robber
iii. Robber shoots clerk twice in chest, clerk dies
iv. Can Robber be guilty of murder?
1. YES- shooting someone in the chest, no matter in what situation, infers the
intent to kill
a. No need to go to felony murder b/c have inference of an intent to kill
via the deadly weapon doctrine exists
8. Felony Murder- death resulting from the commission of an inherently dangerous felony, wherein
such commission results in a high probability of death (examples: rape, armed robbery)
a. Common Law: all felonies were punishable by death so felony murder rule didn’t arise- doesn’t
matter if you killed someone during the commission of a felony, going to be put to death
regardless
b. ascribes malice aforethought to someone who kills accidentally during the commission of a
felony
i. implies intent, even though D may not have had the requisite intent to kill- opposite of
the holding in Cunningham
c. highly criticized: Legislatures have placed restrictions on the felony murder rule felony has to
be “inherently dangerous to human life”
d. People v. Hansen (CA)- D shot into what he thought was an unoccupied house & killed teen
i. Affirmed – Rudstein doesn’t agree w/this decision (no substantial risk if house is empty)
1. Looked @ elements of the felony in the abstract to determine if it’s
inherently dangerous to human life
a. “an inherently dangerous felony is one which by its very nature
cannot be committed w/o creating a substantial risk that someone
will be killed”
b. “inherently dangerous felony is an offense carrying a high
probability that death will result”
Common Law ii. DISSENT – confusing likelihood of people being present w/likelihood of death; if def. of
dwelling doesn’t require people to be present, then there can’t be a high probability that
death will result
1. Example – False imprisonment felonious when accompanied by violence,
fraud, or deceit. Not inherently dangerous, because could be done with fraud
or deceit, which create almost no risk of death.
e. Ex Parte Mitchell- D convicted for shooting death that occurred when selling weed; argued
selling weed not inherently dangerous to life
i. Affirmed – Rudstein doesn’t really agree w/this one, not enough facts to know
1. Adopts factual approach – look @ the facts of the case to decide if the D
carried out the predicated felony in a way that was dangerous to human life
2.
f. Problems p.273
i. Felony: possession of sawed-off shotgun
1. Majority of the time anyone who has a sawed-off shotgun, it’s there to be used
a. However, under CA (Hansen) rule, looking @ felony in the abstract,
possession of a sawed-off shotgun isn’t inherently dangerous to life
ii. Felony: false imprisonment
a. By violence- inherently dangerous, obviously
b. By menace- substantial possibility that it will result in violence
c. By fraud- not inherently dangerous
d. By deceit- not inherently dangerous
2. In the abstract- not inherently dangerous b/c there are instances when it can be
committed w/o any danger to another
a. What’s wrong w/this approach?
i. Wording of the statute lumps together various way in which felony
can be committed- 2 of which aren’t inherently dangerous
3. Factual approach- inherently dangerous; felony perpetrated by violence (placed gun
@ person’s neck)
iii. Felony: furnishing cocaine
1. Hansen rule- could sustain felony murder- comes close to Mitchell rule
a. statute here creates various crimes since it describes the selling, furnishing,
administering, giving away, or transporting, etc. etc
g. Barnett v. State- D killed man w/garden hoe; underlying felony – assault in 1st degree
i. Reversed
1. Merger doctrine: Can’t instruct on felony murder when it’s based on a felony
that’s directly resulted in or is an integral part of the homicide; elements of
the felony must be independent of the homicide (assault & battery)
a. Being able to prove murder by proving the intent element for assault
instead of the required mens rea for murder/manslaughter would
eliminate AL’s homicide laws & be contrary to legislative intent
b. Limits the scope of the felony murder rule
h. Rodriguez v. State- D convicted of felony murder as accomplice to attempted robbery (principal
executed victim but didn’t steal anything); argued murder was an independent act from robbery
i. Reversed
1. Evidence that the murder was separate independent act, didn’t occur in
the course of or the furtherance of the attempted robbery
i. People v. Lowery- D convicted of felony murder when victim of armed robbery (that he’d
attempted) shot @ him and accidentally killed a bystander; conviction was reversed
i. Reversed
1. Proximate cause of liability- liability attaches under felony murder rule for
any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity
a. victim’s retaliation was a foreseeable consequence of the initial
criminal act
b. D put the events that led to the shooting into motion
2. Idea of legal safety: felony ends when D reaches a point of legal safety
3. Broad application of the felony murder rule (shooting wasn’t really in self-
defense, D was being chased by victim)
j. People v. Washington (CA, 1965)- D convicted of felony murder when accomplice was killed by
victim of their attempted robbery
i. Reversed
1. Agency theory: killing must be commited by felon or an accomplice b/c
otherwise it’s not committed in the perpetration of the felony
ii. Narrowed scope of felony murder rule
k. Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda Co. (CA, 1970)- D convicted of felony murder when
accomplice was killed by victim of their attempted robbery; same as Washington
i. Affirmed
1. How did they distinguish Washington?
a. All Washington decided was that for the felony murder rule to
apply, it has to be one of the felons that fired the fatal shot (D is right
in that he can’t be found guilty under the felony murder rule)
2. Court isn’t relying on the felony murder rule- relying on depraved heart
murder to find that D had malice aforethought
a. Where do they find the malice aforethought that shows a conscious
disregard of a substantial risk of death or grievous bodily harm?
i. Provoking the “gun battle”- don’t have to fire the first shot
to initiate the gun battle
ii. D is liable through accomplice/vicarious liability b/c it was
his accomplice that initiated the gun fight
b. Manslaughter
i. §210.3 Manslaughter
1. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
b. A homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be
2. Manslaughter is a felony of the 2nd degree
5. People v. Pouncey- D convicted of 2nd degree murder for shooting victim after argument re: theft of a car;
conviction reversed b/c vol. manslaughter intruction should’ve been given
a. Reversed
i. 3 components of vol. manslaughter
1. D must kill in heat of passion
a. Emotions must be so intense that they distort D’s reasoning
i. D stated that he wasn’t angry when he went inside the
house & got the gun
2. Passion must be caused by adequate provocation
a. Must be of a nature that it’s a cause a reasonable person to lose
control
i. Mere word don’t constitute adequate provocation
ii. “informative words” have been found to
constitute adequate provocation
iii. Words that fit into the categories defined as
sufficient for adequate provocation (p.327)- being
told is one step removed form actual conduct that
fits into the category
3. There can’t be any lapse in time during which a reasonable person could
control his passion
a. Enough time passed b/t time that D went into house & came back out
w/the gun to constitute a cooling period
6. Girouard v. State- D stabbed wife 16 times & convicted of 2nd degree murder
a. Affirmed – mere words not enough for adequate provocation; takes common law approach
there are certain well-defined categories of provocation
7. People v. Sullivan- D convicted of 1st degree murder for stabbing death of his wife
a. Affirmed – provocation wasn’t adequate to cause a reasonable person to lose control (mental
qualities of the D are irrelevant in determining the adequacy of the provocation)
1. In General
a. common law- criminal negligence (gross, culpable negligence) was necessary for invol.
manslaughter
b. MPC- elevated the culpability necessary to “recklessly” committing homicide
i. What’s the problem w/the MPC elevating it to “recklessly”?
1. Blurs line b/t invol. manslaughter & depraved heart murder
2. What gap is left under MPC b/c of this elevation?
a. No liability for manslaughter if only criminal negligent
ii. Eliminate this gap by creating “negligent homicide”
c. §210.3 Manslaughter
1. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when
a. It is committed recklessly
2. Manslaughter is a felony in the 2nd degree
3. Unlawful Act
a. Common law rule that a charge of involuntary manslaughter for a homicide committed without
malice aforethought, that is neither justified not excused if a killing occurs during the commission
of an unlawful act (such as battery, assault, speeding etc.)
i. Must be a causal relation between the violation and the death
1. Malum Prohibitum conduct: Look to whether the prohibited aspect of the
conduct actually caused the death, and if it was a natural of foreseeable
consequence. (failing to renew driver’s license, then runs over a pedestrian)
2. Malum in Se Conduct: the unlawfulness adheres to the entirety of the act. Look
to whether there was but-for causation
ii. allows an unlawful act to be the basis of invol. manslaughter conviction even if conduct
didn’t create any perceptible risk of death
b. MPC has eliminated unlawful act manslaughter & requires criminal negligence (substantial risk
of death)
c. State v. Pray- D convicted of manslaughter after hitting victim causing him to fall & crack head
on pavement
i. Reversed – instructions for invol. manslaughter shouldn’t have been given, they were
wrong
1. Common law rule no longer applicable
III. Causation
a. §2.03 Causal Relationship between Conduct & Result
1. Conduct is the cause of a result when:
a. It is an antecedent but for which the result in question wouldn’t have occurred; and
b. The relationship b/t the conduct and the result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by
the Code or by the law defining the offense.
2. When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established
if the actual result is not within the purpose or contemplation of the actor unless:
a. The actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a
different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or
contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
b. The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and isn’t too
remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of
the offense.
3. When recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element isn’t establishes if
the actual result isn’t with the risk of which the actor is aware, or in the case of negligence, of which he should be
aware unless:
a. The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different
property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more
extensive than that caused; or
b. The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and isn’t too remote or
accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of the offense.
4. When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law,
the element isn’t established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor’s conduct
b. Defense of Another
i. MPC – 3 conditions need to be met for defense of another
1. Actor would be justified in using such force to protect himself against he injury he believes to be
threatened to the other person
2. Under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be
justified in using such protective force
3. Actor believes that his intervention is necessary for the protection of the other person
ii. State v. Beeley- D convicted of simple assault for punching guy in face once
1. Reversed
a. Rejected the alter ego rule used by lower court objective standard (common law)
i. the right to defend another is dependent on that person’s right to defend themselves
b. followed MPC rule
i. defense of another is a justification if D reasonably believes that the person is being
unlawfully attacked
c. Duress
i. Common law – not available for any intentional killing
1. Rule for defense of duress
a. D must demonstrate that his criminal conduct was the product of an unlawful threat that
caused him reasonably to believe that performing the criminal conduct was his only
reasonably opportunity to avoid imminent death or serious bodily harm, either to himself
or to another
b. Can’t rely on this defense if he had reasonable opportunity to “both refuse to do the criminal act
and also to avoid the threatened harm”
ii. MPC –
1. Affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct b/c he was coerced to do so by use of, or threat
to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness
in his situation would’ve been unable to resist
2. Unavailable if actor recklessly or negligently put himself in the situation
iii. Daung Sam v. Commonwealth- D convicted of murder; argued defense of duress can be based on threats to family
members
1. Affirmed
a. Defense of duress can be based on threats to family BUT D had a chance to stop his participation
in the crimes & warn his family but failed to do so, therefore, defense of duress is unavailable to
him
b.
iv. People v. Anderson- D convicted of 1st degree murder & kidnapping; argued instruction on defense of duress
should’ve been given
1. Affirmed
a. Defense of duress isn’t available for murder
i. Never was @ common law & isn’t by statute
ii. Conflicts w/the rationale behind the defense of duress: “it’s better that the D faced with
a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil (violate criminal law) in order to avoid the
greater evil threatened by the other person”
1. The resulting harm in murder committed under duress (death of an innocent
person) is @ least as great as the threatened harm (death of D)
d. Necessity
i. Elements of the defense
1. that there is no 3rd and legal alternative available
2. that the harm to be prevented was imminent
3. that a direct causal relationship may be reasonable anticipated to exist b/t D’s action and the avoidance of
the harm
ii. State v. Messler- D convicted of speeding b/c he sped up to get out of trooper’s way
1. Reversed
a. Evidence to support the defense of necessity, therefore, instruction should’ve been given