BANTOLINO VS COCAL BOTTLERS
examination.
FACTS: February 1995 sixty-two (62)
employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers,
Inc., and its officers, filed a complaint against
respondents for unfair labor practice through
illegal dismissal, violation of their security of
tenure and the perpetuation of the Cabo System.
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either
attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or
submit their respective affidavits, the claims of
fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were
dismissed.
Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted
clarificatory hearings to elicit information from
the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners
herein) relative to their alleged employment with
respondent firm. They further maintained that
when respondent company replaced them and
prevented them from entering the company
premises, they were deemed to have been
illegally dismissed.
Respondent company filed a motion to dismiss
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of
action, there being no employer-employee
relationship between complainants and Coca-
Cola Bottlers
Labor Arbiter ruled that the testimonies of the
complainants were more credible as they
sufficiently supplied every detail of their
employment, specifically identifying who their
salesmen/drivers were, their places of
assignment, aside from their dates of
engagement and dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of
the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an
employer-employee relationship between the
complainants and respondent company when it
affirmed in toto the latter’s decision.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the
Court of Appeals that the affidavits of some of
the complainants should not have been given
probative value for their failure to affirm the
contents thereof and to undergo cross-
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals
should not have given weight to respondent’s
claim of failure to cross-examine them. They
insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are
decided based merely on the parties’ position
papers and affidavits in support of their
allegations and subsequent pleadings that may
be filed thereto. As such, according to
petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be
strictly applied in this case specifically by
putting them on the witness stand to be cross-
examined because the NLRC has its own rules
of procedure which were applied by the Labor
Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their
favor.
ISSUE: WON the affidavits should be given
probative value despite the failure of the affiants
to affirm their contents and undergo test of
cross-examination.
HELD: The Sc held that the Rules of evidence
cannot be insisted upon the NLRC. The NLRC
can use or admit which is not otherwise
admissible in judicial proceedings.
The Rules of Evidence are not strictly observed
in proceedings before administrative bodies like
the NLRC where decisions may be reached on
the basis of position papers only. Citing Rase v.
NLRC, tt was not necessary for the affiants to
appear and testify and be cross-examined as it
would negate the rationale and purpose of the
summary nature of the proceedings mandated by
the Rules and to make mandatory the application
of the technical rules of evidence.
Ong Chia vs Republic
Facts: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in
Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy,
he arrived at the port of Manila on board the
vessel „Angking. Since then, he has stayed in
the Philippines where he found employment and
eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina t the age of 66, he filed a verified
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
under CA. No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.
August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the
petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship.
The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed contending that
petitioner:
(1) failed to state all the names by which he is or
had been known;
(2) failed to state all his former places of
residence
(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in
the Philippines
(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation
and his previous incomes have been insufficient
or misdeclared,
(5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and
denied petitioner’s application for naturalization.
Petitioners’ principal contention is that the
appellate court erred in considering the
documents which had merely been annexed by
the State to its appellant’s brief and, on the basis
of which, justified the reversal of the trial
court’s- decision.
Not having been presented and formally offered
as evidence, they are mere „scrap(s) of paper
devoid of any evidentiary value, so it was
argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
Issue: WON the Ca erred in admitting the
documents annexed by the State to its
Appellant’s brief on the ground that they were
presented and formally offered as evidence?
Ruling: The rule on formal offer of evidence
(Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner
is clearly not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization.
The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132,
134) is not applicable to a case involving a
petition for naturalization. Under Rule 143, it
states that “these rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization, and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.
ANG vs CA
Facts: complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and
accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan
University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted
Irish and they became „on-and-off‰
sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish
learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-
in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in
touch with Irish and tried to convince her to
elope with him, saying that he did not love the
woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the
proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their
child. Irish changed her cellphone number but
Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and
sent her text messages.
Irish received through MMS a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face
superim- posed on the figure. Irish surmised that
he copied the picture of her face from a shot he
took when they were in Baguio in 2003.
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other
text messages from Rustan. He threatened to
spread the picture he sent through the internet.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria
Aurora who referred her to the police. Under
police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan
through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish
asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort
in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He
came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he
walked towards Irish but the waiting police
officers intercepted and arrested him.
The RTC found Irish’s testimony completely
credible, given in an honest and spontaneous
manner. The RTC observed that she wept while
recounting her experience.
The CA denied Rustan’s motion for
reconsideration Thus, Rustan filed the present
for review on certiorari.
Issue: whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish
by cellphone message the picture with her face
pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting
anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation
on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
Held: Rustan claims that the obscene picture
sent to Irish through a text message constitutes
an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-
01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this
objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit „A‰, for the first time before
this Court. The objection is too late since he
should have objected to the admission of the
picture on such ground at the time it was offered
in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the
present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.
People vs Enojas
Facts: PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2
Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the
evening of August 29, 2006, he and PO2
Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were
patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and
SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto
Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza
and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers
approached the taxi and asked the driver, later
identified as accused Enojas, for his documents.
The latter complied but, having entertained
doubts regarding the veracity of documents
shown them, they asked him to come with them
to the police station in their mobile car for
further questioning.
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police
officers and left his taxi behind. On reaching the
7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang
Road, however, they stopped and PO2
Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there.
As he approached the store’s door, however, he
came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out
with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect
dead and hit the other who still managed to
escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan
causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came
around and fired at an armed man whom he saw
running towards Pilar Village. He saw another
man, who came from the Jollibee outlet, run
towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his
gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but
the men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2
Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance.
On returning to his mobile car, he realized that
accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with
them had fled.
Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver
who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery,
they searched the abandoned taxi and found a
mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind.
P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3
Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages
The RTC rendered judgment,[8] finding all
the accused guilty of murder qualified by
evident premeditation and use of armed men
with the special aggravating circumstance of use
of unlicensed firearms.

the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the

appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of the
accused.[9] The CA, however, found the
absence of evident premeditation since the
prosecution failed to prove that the several
accused planned the crime before committing it.

The defense points out that the prosecution

failed to present direct evidence that the accused
took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead., the
prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the
evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Court must, however, disagree with the

CAÊs ruling

the RTC admitted them in conformity with the

CourtÊs earlier Resolution applying the Rules
on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.[15]
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony
of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them.

Issue:

Held: As to the admissibility of the text messages,

the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on
Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the
other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As
the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.