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the p icture theory of the proposition 47

Pictures can be more or less abstract, more or less like what they picture:
their pictorial form can be more or less rich. But there is a minimum
which must be common between reality and picture if the picture is
to be able to portray even incorrectly: this minimum, Wittgenstein
says, is logical form (tlp 2.18). What this amounts to is that the
elements of the picture must be capable of some combination with
each other in a pattern corresponding to the relationship of the elements
of what is pictured (cf. tlp 2.0141). What ‘combining’ amounts to
will differ for different representational forms: in a score, for instance, the
ordering of the notes on the page from left to right represents the ordering
of the sounds in time. The spatial arrangement of the notes is not part of
the pictorial form, but only of the representational form, for the sounds
are not in space. The ordering, however, is common to both; and this
common ordering is (it may be surmised) the kind of thing Wittgenstein
had in mind when he spoke of logical form. Since every picture must have
logical form in common with what it depicts, logical form is part of the
pictorial form of every picture; every picture is a logical picture in
addition to being e.g. a spatial picture, or whatever other particular
kind of picture it may be. Every picture represents a possible state of
affairs, which may be called its sense; it is a true picture if its sense agrees
with reality, and otherwise a false picture. No picture will itself show
whether it is true or false: for this it must be compared with reality (tlp
2.201–2.225).
So much for the general theory of picturing. Wittgenstein goes on to
apply this theory first briefly to thoughts and then at greater length to
propositions. A logical picture of a fact, he says, is a thought; and in a
proposition a thought is expressed in a manner perceptible to the senses
(tlp 3, 3.1). Presumably a proposition is not the only perceptible form of
expression of a thought: from what has been said elsewhere it would seem
that a painting, a sculpture, a musical score would all be expressions of
thoughts (cf. tlp 4.014). Since a picture is a combination of elements, the
question arises: what are the elements of a logical picture, of a thought?
This was put to Wittgenstein by Russell in 1919, and received a rather
brusque answer. Since a thought is a fact, Russell asked ‘What are its
constituents and components, and what is their relation to those of the
pictured fact?’ ‘I don’t know what the constituents of a thought are’
Wittgenstein replied ‘but I know that it must have such constituents
which correspond to the words of Language. Again the kind of relation
of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It
would be a matter of psychology to find out.’ ‘Does a thought consist of
words?’ insisted Russell. ‘No, but of psychical constituents that have the
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48 wittgenstein

same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I

don’t know’ (nb 129–30).
In the Tractatus we are told little about thoughts. A few conclusions are
drawn from the definition of a thought as a logical picture of the facts plus
the general theory of picturing. Every picture, of course, is a logical
picture; but thoughts are logical pictures par excellence since logical struc-
ture is the whole of their pictorial form. Take away logic, and logical
pictures are impossible, so thought cannot represent anything which
would contradict the laws of logic; just as we cannot make a spatial
representation of something contravening the laws of geometry (tlp
3.03–3.0321). But thought cannot represent logic any more than it can
represent illogicality, for no picture can depict its pictorial form, and logic
is the pictorial form of thought (tlp 2.172; cf. 4.0312).
If logic is thought’s pictorial form, what is its representational form? We
are not told; presumably it is the possibility of modelling in the mysterious
mental medium mentioned in the letter to Russell. Whatever it is, it
cannot be thought about, since no picture can place itself outside its
representational form (tlp 2.174).
Only possible states of affairs can be thought of (tlp 3.02). The totality
of true thoughts is a picture of the world (tlp 3.01). Since any picture
needs to be compared with reality to tell whether it is true or false, there
cannot be a thought whose truth is recognizable from the thought itself:
hence no thought can be an a priori truth (tlp 3.04–3.05).
Thought appears in the Tractatus mainly as the link between proposi-
tions and states of affairs. To illustrate this, Wittgenstein often uses the
metaphor of geometrical projection. The propositional sign (the spoken or
written sentence), when it is used, is a projection of a possible state of
affairs; the method of projection is to think of, i.e. to form a logical picture
of, the possible state of affairs which is the sense of the proposition (tlp
3.5, 3.11–3.12). It is the thought which makes the sign into a symbol, which
makes the propositional sign into a proposition; so much so that some-
times Wittgenstein speaks of a proposition as actually being a thought
(tlp 3.5–4) and not just, as seems more natural, as being the expression of
a thought (tlp 3.2). The projection lines, as it were, run from the sentence
to the state of affairs via the thought in the mind. In an ideal language the
elements of a sentence would correspond to the elements of the thought
which in their turn correspond to the objects involved in the possible state
of affairs (tlp 3.2). The projection lines would, so to speak, be very simple.
In everyday language, however, the form of the thought is disguised in the
sentences, for language is no more designed to reveal the form of the
thought than clothing is designed to reveal the form of the body (tlp
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the p icture theory of the proposition 49

4.002). The understanding of ordinary language depends on enormously

complicated conventions: a great deal is added in thought to each prop-
osition and not said (nb 70). The projection lines are not simple, but as
complicated as the human organism. Philosophical analysis is needed to
make the elements of propositions correspond to elements of thought and
reveal the real logical form behind the appearances of ordinary speech
(tlp 4.0031).
The picture theory of the proposition grew out of a contrast which
Wittgenstein drew and gradually deepened between propositions and
names. This historical fact is reflected in the order of the propositions of
the Tractatus, where the ways in which the pictorial nature of the propos-
ition marks it off from non-pictorial names are spelt out (tlp 3.14ff.) long
before the theory that a proposition is a picture is explicitly enunciated
(tlp 4.01). The steps of the development of the contrast are worth
retracing.
For Frege names and propositions alike had both sense and reference.
When Wittgenstein wrote the ‘Notes on Logic’ in 1913 he accepted that
propositions have a reference, but instead of treating the truth-value of the
proposition as its reference, he counted as the reference of a proposition
the fact that corresponds to it (nb 94, 111). Thus the reference of ‘p’, if ‘p’ is
true, is the fact that p; if ‘p’ is false it is the negative fact that not-p. But if
one explains the reference of propositions in this way then there is an
important contrast between the relation between names and what they
refer to, on the one hand, and the relation between propositions and what
they refer to, on the other. For in order to understand a proper name, like
‘Wellington’, I must know whom or what it refers to; but I can perfectly
well understand a proposition without knowing whether it is true or false,
i.e., on this account, without knowing its reference (nb 94). For Wittgen-
stein in 1913, then, propositions, though they have reference, are already
sharply distinguished from names. Later he thought it less misleading to
say that a false proposition has no reference at all (nb 24); but he
continued to speak of a reality ‘corresponding to’ a false proposition
(tlp 4.0621).
What we understand, when we understand a proposition, is not its
reference, but its sense (nb 94, 111). We have to know what would be the
case if it were true and what would be the case if it were false. Both of these
elements are necessary: as Wittgenstein puts it, ‘Every proposition is
essentially true-false. Thus a proposition has two poles (corresponding
to case of its truth and case of its falsity); we call this the sense of a
proposition’ (nb 94). This differentiates it from a name. A name can
have only one relationship to reality: it either names something or it is