INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY

CH153

Q3 AY 2020-2021

1
THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT PROCESS

Chemical plant accidents follow typical patterns. It is important to study these

patterns in order to anticipate the types of accidents that will occur.

Probability of Potential for

Type of Accident Potential for Fatalities
Occurrence Economic Loss
Fire High Low Intermediate
Explosion Intermediate Intermediate High
Toxic Release Low High Low

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THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT PROCESS
Types of Loss for Large Hydrocarbon-Chemical Plant
Fires and
Accidents Others
windstorms
8%

The most damaging type of

explosion is an unconfined
vapor cloud explosion,
Vapor Cloud
where a large cloud of Fires Explosions
volatile and flammable 29% 22%

vapor is released and

dispersed throughout the
plant site followed by
Fires and
ignition and explosion of the Explosions
cloud. 42%

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THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT PROCESS
Causes of Losses for Largest Hydrocarbon-Chemical Plant Accidents

4
THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT PROCESS
Hardware Associated with the Largest Hydrocarbon-Chemical Plant Accidents

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THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT PROCESS
Initiation Propagation Termination
the event that starts the event or events the event or events
the accident that maintain or that stop the
expand the accident accident or diminish
it in size

• A worker walking across a high walkway in a process plant stumbles and falls toward the edge.
• To prevent the fall, he grabs a nearby valve stem.
• The valve stem shears off and flammable liquid begins to spew out.
• A cloud of flammable vapor rapidly form and ignited by a nearby truck.
• The explosion and fire quickly spread to nearby equipment.
• The resulting fire lasts for six days until all flammable materials in the plant are consumed, and
the plant is completely destroyed.

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THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT PROCESS
Initiation Propagation Termination
the event that starts the event or events the event or events
the accident that maintain or that stop the
expand the accident accident or diminish
it in size

Failure of a threaded 1 1/2 “ drain connection on a rich oil line at the base of an absorber tower in a
large gas producing plant allowed the release of rich oil and gas at 850 psi and -40F. The resulting
vapor cloud probably ignited from the ignition system of engine-driven recompressors. The 75’ high x
10’ diameter absorber tower eventually collapsed across the pipe rack and on two exchanger trains.
Breaking pipelines added more fuel to the fire. Severe flame impingement on an 11,000-horsepower
gas turbine-driven compressor, waste heat recovery and super-heater train resulted in its near total
destruction. Identify the initiation, propagation and termination steps for this incident.

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THE NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT PROCESS
Initiation Propagation Termination
the event that starts the event or events the event or events
the accident that maintain or that stop the
expand the accident accident or diminish
it in size

Initiation: Failure of threaded 1 ½” drain connection.

Propagation: Release of rich oil and gas, formation of vapor cloud, ignition of vapor cloud by
recompressors, collapse of absorber tower pipe rack.

Termination. Consumption of combustible materials in process.

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INHERENT SAFETY
An inherently safe plant relies on chemistry and physics (rather than control
systems and special operating procedures) to prevent an accident.

An inherently safer plant is

• tolerant of errors and is often the most cost effective.
• more tolerant of operator errors and abnormal conditions

Safety must be considered at the early stages of process development when

process engineers and chemists have the maximum degree of freedom to
consider basic process alternatives.

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INHERENT SAFETY
The safety of a process relies on multiple layers of protection.

First layer Process design features Inherent safety is

part of all layers of
Subsequent layers Control systems protection!

Interlocks The best approach

Safety shutdown systems to prevent
accidents is to add
Protective systems process design
features to prevent
Alarms hazardous
situations
Emergency response plan

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INHERENT SAFETY
The major approaches to inherently safer process designs can be categorized into 4
techniques.
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Change from large Use solvents that Use vacuum to reduce boiling point Keep piping
batch reactor to a are less toxic systems neat and
Reduce process temperatures and
smaller continuous Use chemicals visually easy to
pressures
reactor with higher flash follow
points, boiling Refrigerate storage vessels Label vessels and
Reduce storage
points or other less Dissolve hazardous materials in safe controls to
inventory of raw
hazardous solvents enhance
materials
properties understanding

11
INHERENT SAFETY
The major approaches to inherently safer process designs can be categorized into 4
techniques.
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Change from large Use solvents that Use vacuum to reduce boiling point Keep piping
batch reactor to a are less toxic systems neat and
Reduce process temperatures and
smaller continuous Use chemicals visually easy to
pressures
reactor with higher flash follow
points, boiling Refrigerate storage vessels Label vessels and
Reduce storage
points or other less Dissolve hazardous materials in safe controls to
inventory of raw
hazardous solvents enhance
materials
properties understanding

12
INHERENT SAFETY
Categories
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Improve control to Use mechanical Place control rooms away from Design plants for
reduce inventory of gauges vs. operations safe and easy
hazardous mercury Separate pump rooms away from other maintenance
intermediate rooms
chemicals Add fire-and
Use welded pipe vs. Barricade control rooms and tanks
explosion-resistant
Reduce process flanged
barricades
hold-up

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INHERENT SAFETY
The major approaches to inherently safer process designs can be categorized into 4
techniques.
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Change from large Use solvents that Use vacuum to reduce boiling point Keep piping
batch reactor to a are less toxic systems neat and
Reduce process temperatures and
smaller continuous Use chemicals visually easy to
pressures
reactor with higher flash follow
points, boiling Refrigerate storage vessels Label vessels and
Reduce storage
points or other less Dissolve hazardous materials in safe controls to
inventory of raw
hazardous solvents enhance
materials
properties understanding

14
INHERENT SAFETY
Categories
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Improve control to Use mechanical Place control rooms away from Design plants for
reduce inventory of gauges vs. operations safe and easy
hazardous mercury Separate pump rooms away from other maintenance
intermediate rooms
chemicals Add fire-and
Use welded pipe vs. Barricade control rooms and tanks
explosion-resistant
Reduce process flanged
barricades
hold-up

15
INHERENT SAFETY
The major approaches to inherently safer process designs can be categorized into 4
techniques.
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Change from large Use solvents that Use vacuum to reduce boiling point Keep piping
batch reactor to a are less toxic systems neat and
Reduce process temperatures and
smaller continuous Use chemicals visually easy to
pressures
reactor with higher flash follow
points, boiling Refrigerate storage vessels Label vessels and
Reduce storage
points or other less Dissolve hazardous materials in safe controls to
inventory of raw
hazardous solvents enhance
materials
properties understanding

16
INHERENT SAFETY
Categories
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Improve control to Use mechanical Place control rooms away from Design plants for
reduce inventory of gauges vs. operations safe and easy
hazardous mercury Separate pump rooms away from other maintenance
intermediate rooms
chemicals Add fire-and
Use welded pipe vs. Barricade control rooms and tanks
explosion-resistant
Reduce process flanged
barricades
hold-up

17
INHERENT SAFETY
The major approaches to inherently safer process designs can be categorized into 4
techniques.
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Change from large Use solvents that Use vacuum to reduce boiling point Keep piping
batch reactor to a are less toxic systems neat and
Reduce process temperatures and
smaller continuous Use chemicals visually easy to
pressures
reactor with higher flash follow
points, boiling Refrigerate storage vessels Label vessels and
Reduce storage
points or other less Dissolve hazardous materials in safe controls to
inventory of raw
hazardous solvents enhance
materials
properties understanding

18
INHERENT SAFETY
Categories
Intensification Substitution Attenuation Limitation of Simplification /
Effects Error Tolerance

Minimize Substitute Moderate Simplify

Improve control to Use mechanical Place control rooms away from Design plants for
reduce inventory of gauges vs. operations safe and easy
hazardous mercury Separate pump rooms away from other maintenance
intermediate rooms
chemicals Add fire-and
Use welded pipe vs. Barricade control rooms and tanks
explosion-resistant
Reduce process flanged
barricades
hold-up

19
INTRODUCTION TO SAFETY

CH153

Q3 AY 2020-2021

20