Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation, Petitioner vs Hon.

Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan Montaño

and Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation, Respondents. G.R. NO. 182836 October 13, 2019

Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a
member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death
and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of
their unborn child.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. It posited that the express
provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.

Issue:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.

Ruling:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.
The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to,
and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot
be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had
a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born
alive but died subsequently.

The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother.
If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Quimiguing vs ICAO, 34 SCRA 132
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of
Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of
complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through
force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop
studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a child
had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment
to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of
action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth
in complaint
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent
cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which includes its
right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds
that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of
Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of
order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation
of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil
Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction,
rape or other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs against Icao.
Geluz vs CA, 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again
became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she
had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus,
in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar
Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fee
and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover
damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?

RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that
birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy
to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission
to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code
because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated from its mother’s
womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted
directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.