2 Characteristics and Basic Principles

Generality of Criminal Law

Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 1

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.

Civil Code, Art. 14

ARTICLE 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
(8a)

Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), Art. V

Criminal Jurisdiction

1. Subject to the provisions of this article:

(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses
committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.

(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and
disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States over United States
personnel in the Philippines.

2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the laws of the
Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States.

(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable under the laws of the
United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines.

(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security
means:

(1) treason;

(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:

(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed
by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this
Article.

(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States
personnel subject to the military law of the United States in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely against the
property or person of United States personnel; and

(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.

(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to waive
their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.

(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order and
discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive their
primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If the
Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall communicate
such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the Philippine authorities
receive the United States request.

(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities of the
Philippines against United States personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of
official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination. This certificate will be
transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute sufficient proof of
performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In those cases where the
Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a review of the duty
certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult immediately.
Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its validity. United
States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where appropriate, United
States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against offenders in official duty cases, and
notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.

(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of
the other government as soon as possible.

(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition of all
cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to exercise
jurisdiction.

4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and the United States
shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handing them
over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.

5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of
United States personnel who are subject to Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine
authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention of any United
States personnel.

6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the
offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the
person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to
the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into full
account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States
shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time
necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial
procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine
authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist each other
in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses and shall cooperate in providing for the
attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure and, in proper
cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.

8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this article and
have been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have had
their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the same
offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States military
authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the act
or omission which constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.

9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine
authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At
the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:

(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;

(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to have
reasonable time to prepare a defense;

(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;

(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;

(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as nationals of
the Philippines;

(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;

(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to have
such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the court, in
accordance with Philippine law, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.

10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out
in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States personnel
serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.

11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and
shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.
US v. Sweet, 1 Phil 18 (1901)

US v. Sweet, 1 Phil 18 (1901)

NATURE:
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force
by arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of
the United States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are
given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six
months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed." The
offense was therefore cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant
was at the time of its alleged commission an Employee of the United States military
authorities in the Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom it is
alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in the custody of such
authorities, are sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction. We must assume that both these
facts are true, as found, either upon sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the
prosecuting attorney, by the court below.

FACTS:

Philip K. Sweet was an employee of the U.S. Army in the PH. He assaulted a prisoner
of war for which he was charged with the crime of inflicting physical injuries. The
Defendant-appellant interposed the defense that the fact that he was an employee of
the U.S. military authorities deprived the court of the jurisdiction to try and punish him.

ISSUE:

WON the fact that the offense was committed by Philip K. Sweet, an employee of the
U.S.military authorities, deprive the court of jurisdiction.

RULING:
NO.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The court found no provision limiting its jurisdiction. The general jurisdiction conferred
upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine
Commission above cited, and are not aware of the existence of any such provision.
The case is therefore open to the application of the general principle that the
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of
the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of
England and America and which must, we think, prevail under any system of
jurisprudence unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary. (United
States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.)
Liang v. People, 355 SCRA 125

Liang v. People,    355 SCRA 125 

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime
in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of grave oral defamation. According to the ADB Administrative Tribunal
Report released in 1996, Ms. Cabal reported that Mr. Liang had called her a bitch and
insinuated that she was a thief. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, he
was released to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an office of protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
ADB Headquarters Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government. Acting
based on such protocol communication, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. Subsequently, the RTC of Pasig City set
aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it
earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the
case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review invoking that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement.

ISSUE:
WON, petitioner Liang, as an official of the ADB, is immune from our criminal jurisdiction
under Section 45 of the ADB Headquarters Agreement.

RULING:
NO, Jeffrey Liang, as an international official of ADB is not covered by the immunity
from our country’s criminal jurisdiction.

 1. The immunity under Section 45 is not absolute; it only covers acts done in official
capacity Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities: a. immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in
their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. The immunity
mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in
official capacity. It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner’s case falls within the
ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to
rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.

2. The crime of slander is not within the scope of the immunity under Section 45 Third,
slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions.
3. Petitioner cannot likewise seek protective mantle from the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations

Assuming petitioner is a diplomatic agent, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As
already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
 Principle of Territoriality

RPC, Art. 2

Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone,
but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

Constitution (1987), Art. 1

ARTICLE I
National Territory

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters
of the Philippines.
US v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978 (1917)
Miquiabas v. Commanding General,    80 Phil 262 (1948)
AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, 11 January 2018.
Continuing crime

Evangelista vs. People, G.R. No. 163267, 05 May 2010.

Ruling:

Facts:
That on or about the 30th day of January 1996, at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and... feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control the following items:
One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine;
One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two (2) magazines;
Nineteen (19) 9mm bullets.
without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.
After posting his bail, petitioner filed on February 14, 1996 an Urgent Motion for (a)
Suspension of Proceedings and (b) the Holding of A Preliminary Investigation.
The RTC granted the motion and, accordingly, the State Prosecutor conducted the...
preliminary investigation.
In a Resolution[8] dated March 6, 1996, the State Prosecutor found no probable cause to
indict petitioner and thus recommended the reversal of the resolution finding probable
cause and the dismissal of the complaint.
Thereafter, a Motion to Withdraw
Information[9] was filed but it was denied by the trial court in an Order
Acting on the "Motion to Withdraw Information" filed by State Prosecutor Aida Macapagal on
the ground that [there exists] no probable cause to indict the accused, the Information
having been already filed in Court, the matter should be left to the discretion of the
Court to assess the evidence, hence, for lack of merit, the same is hereby denied.
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
In the morning of January 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police
assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command, was informed
by his superior that a certain passenger of Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight No. 657 would be
arriving... from Dubai bringing with him firearms and ammunitions.
Acierto asked petitioner if he brought... firearms with him and the latter answered in the
affirmative adding that the same were bought in Angola.
During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos (Bustos)
that he bought the subject items in Angola but the same were confiscated by the Dubai
authorities, which turned over the same to a PAL personnel in Dubai.
Bustos likewise verified from the Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no record to...
show that the firearms were legally purchased.
Among the documents Bustos had gathered during his investigation were the Arrival
Endorsement Form[12] and Customs Declaration Form.[13] A referral letter[14] was...
prepared endorsing the matter to the Department of Justice. Bustos admitted that petitioner
was not assisted by counsel when the latter admitted that he bought the firearms in Angola.
SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and representative of the FEO, upon verification, found that petitioner is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder.
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner, with leave of court, filed his Demurrer to
Evidence,[16] the resolution of which was deferred pending submission of petitioner's
evidence.
Version of the Defense
On January 30, 1996, he was approached by the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, who
informed him that a Filipino contract worker from Angola who is listed as a passenger of
PAL flight from Dubai to Manila, was being detained as he was found in possession of...
firearms; that if said passenger will not be able to board the airplane, he would be
imprisoned in Dubai; and that the Arabs will only release the passenger if the Captain of
PAL would accept custody of the passenger [herein petitioner] and the firearms. Capt.
Nadurata agreed to... take custody of the firearms and the passenger, herein appellant, so
that the latter could leave Dubai. The firearms were deposited by the Arabs in the cockpit of
the airplane and allowed the appellant to board the airplane. Upon arrival in Manila, Capt.
Nadurata surrendered the... firearms to the airport authorities.
Meanwhile, in view of the unavailability of the defense's intended witness, Nilo Umayaw
(Umayaw), the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, the prosecution and the defense agreed and
stipulated on the following points:
That PAL Station Manager Mr. Nilo Umayaw was told by a Dubai Police that firearms and
ammunitions were found in the luggage of a Filipino passenger coming from Angola going
to the Philippines;
That he was the one who turned over the subject firearms to Captain Edwin Nadurata, the
Pilot in command of PAL Flight 657;
That the subject firearms [were] turned over at Dubai;
That the said firearms and ammunitions were confiscated from the accused Teofilo
Evangelista and the same [were] given to the PAL Station Manager who in turn submitted
[them] to the PAL Pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata who has already testified;
That [these are] the same firearms involved in this case.
Issues:
Issues
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the charge of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, Illegal Possession of Firearms.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Evangelista was never in possession
of any firearm or ammunition within Philippine jurisdiction and he therefore could not have
committed the crime charged against him.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Evangelista committed a continuing
crime.
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the results of the preliminary
investigation.
Ruling:

NO. Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the
Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at
the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the
Philippines.

And more than mere possession, the prosecution was able to ascertain that he has no license or
authority to possess said firearms. It bears to stress that the essence of the crime penalized under
PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the accused’s lack of license to possess the firearm. The fact of
lack or absence of license constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of
firearm. Since it has been shown that petitioner was already in the Philippines when he was found in
possession of the subject firearms and determined to be without any authority to possess them, an
essential ingredient of the offense, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated and
completed in no other place except the Philippines.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. In this case, the information specifically and categorically alleged that on or
about January 30, 1996 petitioner was in possession, custody and control of the subject firearms at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City, Philippines, certainly a territory within the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present
charge happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a situation
between life and death, firmly denied possession and ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there
is no record of any criminal case having been filed against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the
discovered firearms. Since there is no pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason
that there was no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must
prove his allegation applies.31

2.3 Characteristic: Prospective Application

Prospective Application

RPC, Arts. 21, 22

Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed. — No felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission. chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a

retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same. chanrobles virtual law library

Civil Code, Art. 4

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)

Case:
 Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons -Crim Digest

Facts:

Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson
and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise
pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and
were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on
March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol,
stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and
on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since
then imprisoned and served for more than 13 years by virtue of the above convictions.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners be given a retroactive effect with habeas corpus as

appropriate remedy.

Held:

Yes.
Ratio:

In Director v. Director of Prisons, it was explicitly announced by the Court “that the
only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favourable to the accused… is the
writ of habeas corpus.” While the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over
the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is
the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favourable decision
holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their
release.

Ortega vs. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008.

Ortega vs. People

G. R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008

Facts:

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The
case was pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted
amending among others the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years
old. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of
majority.

Issue:

Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in
the resolution of the case.

Held:

The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of
R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this
law is evidently favorable to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by
petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age
was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably,
petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A.
No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
People v. Gonzales,  G.R. Nos. 113255-56. July 19, 2001 |||

FACTS:
On February 27, 1991, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Jaime J. Bustos of Pampanga filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Angeles two informations charging accused Romeo
Gonzales y Sun with violation of R.A. No. 6425, Sections 8  and 4,  reading as follows:
4 5

Crim. Case No. 91-180 on the possession, custody and control two (2) block size of
marijuana weighing 1.5 kilos more or less and ten (10) medium size plastic bags of dry
marijuana weighing 300 grams more or less. 
Crim. Case No. 91-181 on selling more or less one (1) kilo of high-grade marijuana, for
and in consideration of the amount of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P1,200.00).
Early in February 1991, the police in Agusu, Brgy. San Francisco, Mabalacat,
Pampanga received an information that accused Romeo Gonzales was selling large
quantities of marijuana. They conducted a surveillance for four (4) days. On February
13, 1991, they conducted a buy-bust operation. 8

After the arrest, the team brought accused Gonzales to their office for interrogation. Pfc.
Cruz informed him of his constitutional rights. Pfc. Cruz testified that accused Gonzales
orally admitted that he was selling marijuana to different buyers, but claimed that
somebody else owned the marijuana he sold. When asked to identify the owner, he kept
silent. He also refused to give a written statement, so Pfc. Cruz proceeded to prepare
the charges against him. 21

On July 5, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, considering that the prosecution has abundantly established the

guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused ROMEO GONZALES y SUN guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Violation of Sections 8 and 4, Art. II., R. A. 6425, and hereby
accordingly imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day and a fine of P6,000.00 with regard Criminal Case No. 91-180 and
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 with regard Criminal
Case No. 91-181.

Issue: 
WON Death Penalty Law in so far as prospective application of the law applicable to
Criminal Case No. 91-181.
Ruling: 
NO, under our criminal justice system, an amendatory law can not be given retroactive
effect unless it is favorable to the accused. In the case at bar, accused-appellant,
therefore, shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court.
Decision: 
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. 91-181, the accused-
appellant is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. 
 
Note: Death Penalty Law was approved on December 13, 1993. The commission of
crime was on February 13, 1991. DPL cannot retroactively apply as it imposes a
heavier penalty against the accused-appellant.
2.4. Principle: Legality

Legality

RPC, Art. 5.

Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any
act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when
a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.

Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, 27 February 2006

*See PDF*

Laurel vs. Abrogar (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration), G.R. No. 155076, 13 January
2009.

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL VS. HON, ZEUS C. ABROGAR etc, et al.G.R. NO. 155076,
JANUARY 13, 2009

THEFT

On February 27, 2006, this Court’s First Division rendered judgment in this case as follows:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the
Regional Trial Court and the Decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is directed to issue an order granting the motion of the petitioner to quash the
Amended Information.

SO ORDERED.1

We resolve to grant the Motion for Reconsideration but remand the case to the trial court for proper
clarification of the Amended Information.

Facts:Petitioner Luis P. Laurel is charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the RPC.
Under thefacts, petitioner, with intent togain and without consent from Philippine
Long Distance Telephone(PLDT), stole and use the international long distance calls
belonging to PLDTby conducting InternationalSimple Resale (ISR), which is a method of
routing and completing international long distance calls usinglines, cables, antennae, and/or
air wave frequency which connect directly to the localor domesticexchange facilities of the
country wherethe call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT.Petitioner
filed a motion to quash, on theground that the factual allegations in the AmendedInformation
do not constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner’s specialcivil
action for certiorari was dismissed by theCourt of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the
instant petitionfor review with this Court

.Issue:Is petitioner’s act constitute theft of respondent PLDT’s business and service?

Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 308 of RPC,Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain butwithout violence against, or intimidation ofpersons nor force upon things, shall
takepersonal propertyof another without the latter’s consent.Since the passage of the Revised
Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property"has had a generally accepted
definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personalproperty" is defined
as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter(not
real property)." To appropriate means to deprive thelawful owner of the thing. The word "take"
inthe Revised Penal Code includes any actintended to transfer possession which, as held in the
assailedDecision, may be committed through the use ofthe offenders’ own hands, as well as any
mechanicaldevice, such as an access device or card as in the instant case.In the instant case, the
act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipmentor apparatus to
private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resellor r e-
route international long distance calls using respondent PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three
actsofsubtraction. The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire,meter, or
other apparatusinstalled or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity,
telegraph or telephoneservice; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any
electric current from such wire,meter, or otherapparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the
benefits of any deviceby means of which onemay fraudulently obtain any current of electricity
orany telegraph or telephone service. The business ofproviding telecommunication or
telephone service is likewise personal property which canbe the objectof theft under Article
308of the Revised Penal Code. Business may beappropriated under Section 2 ofAct No. 3952
(Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft:Therefore, the business of providing
telecommunication and the telephone serviceare personalproperty under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of"subtraction" penalized
under said article. However, the Amended Information describes thething takenas, "international
long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from

PLDT" as themanner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct
this inaccuracyof description,this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution
directed to amend the AmendedInformation, to clearly state that the property subject of
the theft are the services and business ofrespondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this
amendment is not necessitated by a mistakein charging theproper offense, which would have
called forthe dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14and Rule 119, Section
19of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Tobe sure, the crimeisproperlydesignated
as one of theft. The purpose ofthe amendment is simply to ensure thatthe accused is
fullyand sufficiently appraised of the nature and cause of thecharge against him, and thus
guaranteed of hisrights under the Constitution

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
February 27, 2006 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68841 affirming the Order issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 150, which denied the Motion to Quash (With Motion to Defer
Arraignment) in Criminal Case No. 99-2425 for theft, is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the
trial court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the Amended
Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business of the private
offended party.

People vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-39274, 26 July 1991.

FACTS:
A complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3701 entitled "An Act to Discourage Destruction of Forests,
Further Amending for this Purpose Section 2751 of the Revised Administrative Code" docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1183, was filed on 10 October 1970 before the Municipal Court of Balungao,
Pangasinan against private respondent Bartolome Padilla y Domingo.
On 29 November 1972, Judge Amando G. Lazaro of the Municipal Trial Court rendered a decision
finding respondent Padilla guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of seven (7)
months and to pay a fine of P1,200.00 as the value of the forest products destroyed by appellee,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 1

Respondent Padilla filed his notice of appeal, and in an order dated 13 February 1973, the Municipal
Trial Court ordered the case elevated to the higher court. 2

Respondent Padilla then filed a motion to dismiss, dated 14 July 1974, claiming that upon inspection
of the land involved by the Municipal Treasurer of Balungao, Pangasinan for the 1964 tax
declaration, it was found that the land was not public land.  Respondent also argued that assuming
4

the land to be public, the 12 June 1974 proclamation of the then President Ferdinand Marcos
promised to recognize private rights acquired in respect of alienable and disposable public lands. 5

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Juanito R. Morante filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, dated 8
August 1974, arguing that since R.A. No. 3701 had not been repealed, that statute must be
enforced. 6

On 22 August 1974, public respondent Judge Narciso A. Aquino issued an order dismissing the case
on the ground that the proclamation cited by private respondent Padilla had given him the
opportunity to apply for a homestead patent, thus, rendering the case against him moot and
academic.  The respondent judge further ruled that:
7

That Court is inclined to sustain the theory of the accused that the Court has lost jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case inasmuch as in consonance with the spirit of the New
Society to implement the land reform program and/or giving land to the landless, and to
resolve in favor of the accused the benefit of the doubt, this case can no longer prosper
under the aforesaid circumstances. 8

The People, through the Solicitor-General, then filed with this Court a Petition for Review. In a
Resolution, dated 30 October 1974, the Petition was given due course.    9

ISSUE: 
1. Whether or not the respondent court, which was possessed of uncontroverted jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this case, had thereafter lost such jurisdiction by reason of the "spirit and meaning
of various Presidential Decrees, Orders and Proclamations issued by his Excellency, the President
of the Philippines, in implementing the Land Reform Program and/or giving land to the landless" that
allegedly rendered this case "moot and academic".
2. Whether or not the dismissal of this case by reason of the "spirit and meaning of various
Presidential Decrees, Orders and Proclamations issued by his Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, in implementing the Land Reform Program and/or giving land to the landless" is an act
without or in excess of the respondent court's jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 

RULING:
NO. Under Article 7 of the Civil Code, a law may be repealed only by a subsequent law. w

Accordingly, in the absence of a law repealing Section 2751 of the Revised Administrative Code. A
judge has no choice save to apply and enforce Section 2751.
Thus, while Judge Aquino was obviously aware of the applicable legal principle, he chose to
disregard that principle by invoking "the spirit and meaning" of various presidential decrees. This
constitutes a rejection of the principle of legality so fundamental in criminal law that it is very difficult
to understand how a judge could reach such a conclusion. 
No "spirit and meaning" that are not given statutory form and content can be invoked as over-turning
a prior statute or as giving rise to new legal rights and duties. The "proclamation" relied upon by
Judge Aquino was not a law and did not purport to be a law. In fact, that "proclamation" was merely
an extraction from a speech of the then President of the Philippines, a speech in which some
proposed policies concerning the disposition of public lands were announced. No decree or
legislative enactment exempting "kaingineros" from liability for destruction of forest resources was
promulgated after the presidential speech. As a matter of fact, Presidential Decrees Nos. 389  and 19

705,  enacted subsequently to that Independence Day Speech of former President Marcos,
20

penalized the practice of kaingin in forest reserves.

DECISION: 

The Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition for Review and to REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Order of public respondent Judge Narciso A. Aquino dated 22 August 1974. The trial
court is hereby ORDERED to resume proceedings in Criminal Case No. 148-R of the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch 14, against private respondent Bartolome D. Padilla. Costs
against private respondent.
United States vs. Taylor, G.R. No. 9726, 08 December 1914.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARSON TAYLOR, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-9726     December 8, 1914

Nature of the Action: An appeal for criminal libel

Facts: Defendant, as alleged, was then and there the acting editor and proprietor,
manager, printer, and publisher of Manila Daily Bulletin, a paper of large circulation
edited in English and Spanish. Thereafter, an article against one Atty. Ramon Sotelo
was published in said newspaper which implicated that there had been conspiracy and
fraud between said attorney and owner of the burnt building so as to collect insurance.
Atty. Sotelo further contended that the article was of a certain false and malicious
defamation and libel. The CFI agreed to Atty. Sotelo; hence, this appeal.

Issue: Did the lower court erred in ruling that the defendant was criminally liable?

Ruling: For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the
record showing that the defendant was the “author, the editor, or the proprietor” of the
newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the complaint
dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de
officio.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes; explained by the Supreme Court, common law crimes do not
exist in the Philippine islands. Thus, an act does not constitute a crime when no law
makes it so. In the instant case, although libel is made a crime, the defendant is not the
author, editor, or proprietor of the said newspaper—instead, only its manager. Neither
does the proof show in the record that the manager played a part in the publication of
the article.

Nullum Crimen Sine Lege

RPC, Arts. 3, 21

Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.
(People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, [March 12, 2018])

Fifty (50) police officers were ordered to undergo random drug testing under the
provisions of Section 36 of Republic Act 9165 by the then City Director of Butuan City,
Senior Superintendent Nerio Bermudo.  Among those selected was POI Johnny Sullano. 
His result turned out to be positive for the presence of shabu, and the same was
confirmed in a confirmatory test.  PSSupt Bermudo thus filed a complaint for violation
of Section 15 of Republic Act 9165 against POI Sullano.  In his Manifestation, he
admitted submitting the urine sample but denied using dangerous drugs, though he had
no way of contesting the test’s veracity.  He pleaded for the dismissal of the case and
manifested that he had undergone rehabilitation program in a center.

An Information was subsequently filed against Johnny for violation of Section 15, RA 
9165.  After the prosecution had rested its case, Johnny filed a demurrer to evidence,
arguing in the main that for Section 15 to be applicable, the person should have
beenapprehended or arrested or actually caught using any dangerous drug. He was
neither of the three instances.

The RTC granted the demurrer to evidence, which the CA affirmed, denying the petition
for certiorari filed by the prosecution.

The Issue:

Whether or not an arrest or apprehension is a condition precedent for an accused to be

charged for violation of Section 15 of Republic Act 9165.

The Ruling:

The petition is unmeritorious.

At the heart of this petition is the question of whether Section 15, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 requires the apprehension or arrest of a person for the latter to be considered as
violating the provision. Taking into consideration the text of the law itself, general
criminal law principles, and previous jurisprudential interpretation, the answer is in the
affirmative, given the specific facts of this case.

The provision, Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person apprehended or arrested, who

is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory
test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for
the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00): Provided, That this
Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her
possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this
Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that this section should be read in conjunction with Section 36, Article
III of the same law, which mandates the random drug testing for certain employees, and
pertinently includes police officers like respondent. Section 36, Article III of R.A. No.
9165 states:

Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. – Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited
and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH shall take
steps in setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing centers to
further reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others,
two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of the drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. Drug test certificates issued by accredited drug testing centers shall be
valid for a one-year period from the date of issue which may be used for other purposes.
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxx

(e) Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement
agencies. – Officers and members of the military, police and other law
enforcement agencies shall undergo an annual mandatory drug test;

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
(emphasis supplied)

The constitutionality of certain portions of Section 36 has already been questioned

in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (SJS).

As stated, several factors militate against petitioner’s construction of the phrase “a

person apprehended or arrested” appearing in Section 15. It is likewise important to
note that the allegations in the information against respondent clearly state that he is
only being prosecuted for Section 15 and nowhere in the information was it stated that
it should, be read in relation to Section 36.

The cardinal rule in statutory construction is the plain-meaning rule. Verba legis non
est recendendum – “from the words of a statute there should be no departure.” When
the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, the words should be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Especially for penal provisions,
it is not enough to say that the legislature intended to make a certain act an offense, the
legislature must use words which in some way express that intent. [22]

An analysis of the construction of the sentence yields no other conclusion. Section 15 is

unambiguous: the phrase “apprehended or arrested” immediately follows “a person,”
thus qualifying the subject person. It necessarily follows that only apprehended or
arrested persons found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug may be prosecuted
under the provision.

Moreover, the elementary rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, also known as expressio unius est
exclusion alterius, is relevant and applicable. This rule applies where the very terms of
the statute expressly limit it to certain matters; thus it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[23] In the provision in question, Congress
itself confined and restricted the liability arising from use of dangerous drugs to those
who were apprehended or arrested if charged with a violation of Section 15.

Petitioner also advances the argument that a narrow interpretation of Section 15 will
result in an absurd situation where a person found to be positive for use of dangerous
drugs through Section 36 may not be penalized for not being arrested or apprehended,
rendering Section 36 meaningless.

The Court disagrees.

The information, quoted above, against respondent is straightforward: respondent

“wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug and found positive for use, after a
confirmatory test.” The essential element, i.e. the accused was apprehended or arrested,
was not specifically alleged. Moreover, nowhere in the information was Section 36
mentioned. Urging the inclusion of Section 36 in accusing the respondent of the crime
will deprive the latter of the opportunity to prepare his defense and violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. An information must be complete, fully state the elements of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as an information is a recital of the essentials of a crime,
delineating the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused. Convicting an
accused of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground
alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This appears to be petitioner’s
intention here and should not be condoned.

It is true that every part of a statute must be considered together with other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole law. The statute’s clauses and phrases
must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a
harmonious whole. Parenthetically, the Court finds no difficulty in harmonizing Section
36 with a strict interpretation of Section 15. Section 36, last paragraph states “[I]n
addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.” This
may be construed to mean that rehabilitation for six (6) months in a government center,
as stated in Section 15, may be imposed on those found positive of use of dangerous
drugs through a random drug test. This reading of the provisions would still pursue the
intent of the law to encourage not the prosecution and incarceration of those using
dangerous drugs, but their rehabilitation. This reading especially finds relevance in this
case as respondent voluntarily submitted himself to rehabilitation.

Also, criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a law specifically
calls for its punishment. Nullum crimen poena sine lege. Another basic criminal law
precept important to remember here is in dubiis reus est absolvendus – all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused. Any criminal law showing ambiguity will
always be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 10, 2016 Decision and the November 17, 2016 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 06247-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

Bernardo v. People, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)

ISIDRO BERNARDO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 62114, 1983-07-05

Facts:
Petitioner Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa in her riceland in Plaridel,
Bulacan from October 1972 to August 1974.
At the time, petitioner constructed a house therein for his family's dwelling. His son, co-
petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, was... staying with him in said house as his helper in tilling
the land. Subsequently, Isidro left the landholding and transferred to San Nicolas, Bulacan
without the knowledge of the landowner Ledda Sta. Rosa. Before leaving the landholding,
however, Isidro transferred his tenancy... rights to his son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo,
who continued to reside in subject house. Eventually, Ledda Sta. Rosa took possession of
the whole riceland, through her overseer Dr. Patricio E. Cruz.
A case of forcible entry was filed by Ledda Sta. Rosa against herein petitioners
Petitioners lost before the inferior court... hereafter, Ledda Sta. Rosa sent a letter of
demand to petitioners telling them to vacate the house and the land. When the latter failed
to leave, a criminal complaint was filed against them for violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 with the fiscal's office.
That on or about the 22nd day of April 1974... he said accused Isidro Bernardo and
Cayetano Bernardo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and... feloniously, without the
knowledge and taking advantage of the tolerance of the owner Ledda Sta. Rosa y Cruz,
succeed and/or continue in possessing and squatting on a parcel of land of the said owner,
Issues:
has no jurisdiction to entertain the criminal case for alleged violation of Presidential Decree
No. 772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offense or violation of said
law.
Ruling:
The intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities,
particularly to illegal constructions.
the intent and purpose of PD 772 is to prohibit and penalize squatting or similar acts on
public and private lands located in urban communities
[T]hat no person should be brought within the terms of a... penal statute who is not clearly
within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the
statute (
Consequently, the decision of the lower... is null and void and should
ACCORDINGLY, this petition for certiorari is GRANTED, the judgment of conviction is SET
ASIDE, and said Criminal Case No. 3022-M is hereby DISMISSED.

People v. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

Nullum Crimen Nulla Poena Sine Lege
Case No. 29
Source: Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution
Double Jeopardy

People v. Pimentel

288 SCRA 542 (1998)

FACTS:

In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion under RA 1700
(Anti-Subversion Law). As a consequence thereof, a warrant for his arrest has been issued on
July 29,1983 but it could not be served because he could not be found.
7 years later (June 5, 1990), he was arrested on the basis of his warrant of arrest of the
subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver and six rounds of live
ammunition were found on his possession.
On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion under Presidential Degree 1866. On July 16 1990, Tujan filed the motion
to quash the second criminal case contending that common crimes such as illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed by the crime subversion. He is
entitled to invoke constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Degree 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy

RULING: No

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state
that for double jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have
occurred. In this case, first case was not even arraigned yet.
Also the cases are not of the same issue. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes
illegal possession of firearms.

However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to
the accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue.
PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of
subversion

2.5. Principle: In Dubio Pro Reo / Lenity

1. Strict Construction of penal laws against State
Constitution  (1987), Art. III, Sec. 14 (2)

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Cases:

 People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, 30 October 2006

Subject :  Criminal Law 1

Topic :  Principle:  In Dubio Prop Re/Lenity
Title :  PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON
Citation :  G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006

Facts:

Eight (8) information were filed against Alfredo Bon charging him with rape of AAA and BBB, the
daughters of his brother.  The rape allegedly happened many times in the span of 6 years when
the victims were still minors.

RTC convicted Bon on all 6 counts of rape, denying the alibi presented by Bon.  RTC considered
qualifying circumstance of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and Bon.

On the appeal on the penalty, CA ruled affirming the 6 counts rape but modified the 2 as
attempted rape.  According to the CA, the evidence on the 2 rapes was insufficient to make Bon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.  CA then reduced the penalty for the two counts of rape from
death to indeterminate penalty of 10 years as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum for attempted rape.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court should affirm the conviction of Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six
counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces.
2. Whether or not the Alfredo Bon’s penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the
penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should
be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

Ruling

1. Court affirms.  The Court affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is quilty of six (6) counts of rape and
two (2) counts of attempted rape.  However, in the light of Republic Act No. 9346, the
appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.
2. By Republic Act No. 9346, appellant Alfredo Bon is spared the death sentence, and
entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the
downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of
attempted rape.  For the six (6) counts of rape, the Court downgrade the penalty of death
 to reclusion perpertua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346.  For
each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, the Court downgrade by one degree lower
the penalty imposed the Court of Appeals.  Supreme court hold that there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be imposed
in it medium period.  Thus, the new penalty of the two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correctional as minimum, to eight (8) and one (1) day of prision mayor
as maximum.

Pascual v. Board of Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

Facts:

Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would
present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled
Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from
a competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The
lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial
disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim
of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and
testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself."
Hence, the Board appealed.

Issue:

Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.

Held:

Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while
administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would
result in the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can
refuse to take the witness stand.

The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer questions put to the
accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the
witness stand when called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self
incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the
human personality. (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969)
Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v. People G.R. No. 181409 : February
, 

11, 2010
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, 01 September 1994

*See PDF for Interstate and Centero*

Bernardo vs. People, G.R. No. L-62114, 05 July 1983.

Bernardo vs. People, 123 SCRA 365 (1983)

FACTS: Bemardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa’s Riceland in Bulacan from Oct. ’72 to Aug. ‘74. His
son stayed with him in the house built on that land. The tenancy rights of the house were
left with the son when the father transferred but without Sta. Rosa knowing. Eventually, Sta. Rosa took
possession of the whole rice field and filed a case of forcible entry against the Bernardos. The Bernardos
lost in their cases before the Municipal Court Sta. Rosa sent a letter of demand to petitioners telling them
to vacate their house and land but since they refused, a criminal complaint was charged against them for
violation of PD 772 on squatting.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to entertain criminal case for alleged violation of
presidential decree no 772 since the facts obtaining in the case do not constitute an offence or violation of
said law

RULING: Petition for certiorari is granted. No person should be brought within the terms of a penal statute
who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is
not clearly made so by the statute. Based on its preamble, PD 772 applied only to squatters in urban
areas and not to agricultural lands.