CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PRELIMINARY TITLE

Chapter 1
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

Arti~I~ 1: This Act shall be known as the Civil Code

of the Ph1hppmes.

REPUBLIC ACT NUMBER 386. The main draft of the Civil

Code was prepare d by the Roxas Code Commission which was
created via E.O. No. 48 of March 20, 1947 by President Manuel
Roxas. Dr. Jorge C. Bocobo was the chairman. The members were
Judge Guillermo B. Guevarra, Dean Pedro Y. Ylagan, and Francisco
R. Capistrano. Arturo M. Tolentino was added to the Commission
but, later on, had to resign due to his election as a member of the
Congress. In his place, Dr. Carmelina Alvendia was appointed. The
1947 Code Commission started working on May 8, 1947 and ended on
December 15, 1947. On January 26, 1949, the Senate and the House
of Represe ntatives of the Philippines passed R.A. No. 386, which is
"An Act to Ordain and Institut e the Civil Code of the Philippines."

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days

following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after publication.

EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE. The 1950 Civil Code of

the Philipp ines took effect on August 30, 1950.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBER 200. Article 2 of the Civil
Code has been expressly amen ded bY E ·O· No · 200 dated June
. ' th t' f
18, 1987 issued by Preside nt Corazon Aquino during e ime o

1
~ -
2
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW
. ment Hereunder is the text of the
her revolutionary govern · Done in the City of M .
executive order:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS
EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER
OF GENERAL CIBCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR TREIB EFFECTMTY.
WHEREAS Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides
that "laws shall , take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided xx x";
WHEREAS, the requirement that the laws to be effective
only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette shall suffice
has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme
Court in Tanada, et al. u. Tuuera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915,
December 29, 1986) when it observed that "there is much to
be said of the view that the publication need not be made in
the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited
readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wide circulation,
and come out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of
the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so that laws to be
effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
SECTION 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386 otherwise
~nown_ as the "_Civil Code of the Philippines," and all.other laws
mco~sistent wi~h this Executive Order are hereby repealed or
modified accordmgly.
. S_ECTION 3_. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.
Art. 2
~
p.rt.2 EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
-
3
8 a1'd
amla th·
18 18
year of Our Lord, nineteen h dr, th day of June in the
un ed a nd eighty-seven.
. '
_EFFE~TM1: ?FLAWS. When a st
rovide for its effect1V1ty, it shall h atute does not explicitly
P · ave effect O 1 f
of the 15· d ay penod following th . n Yater the expiration
1
in the Official Gazette or in a ne:~omp etion of its publication either
Philippines. The publication and pt~er of general _circulation in the
are intended to enable the people etol~~Y penod _~equirements
statute. They are necessary requis·te ome familiar with the
with notice of the statute's pro • ~ s an~ no one shall be charged
completed and the 15-day perio;~:: :°t_il th
e sai~ p~blication is
in full or it is not publication at all sine x?tsired. Publi~atio_n must be
. f ·t t (,.,, - e 1 purpose IS to inform the
pu bl1c o 1 s con ents 1. anada
. h t f h' • v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446). After the
accomp l·1s l men
b o t 1s • reqmrement ' the peopl e are d eeme d to have
conel us1ve y een notified of the law even if act uaIIy t h e peop1e or
some of the same have not read them.
~overed by this rule are presidential decrees and
execu~ive ?rders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislati~e powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by th~ le_gislature,_ ~r, at_present, directly conferred by the
Constit~tion. ~dm1~strative rules and regulations must also
be_ p~bhshed if their purpose is to enforce or implement [an]
existmg law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
m nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
All presidential decrees must be published, including those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting
him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the
Central Bank Act which the body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions
issued by, [e.g.,] the Minister of Social ~elfare on the ca~e
studies to be made in the petitions for adoptions or the rules laid
 4 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW
'
down by the head of a government agency on the assign
or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office unjf,ments
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered b orlll~.
rule but by the Local Government Code (Tanada u. Tuue y this
SCRA 446). ra, 146
THE CLAUSE 'VNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVJn
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" solely refers tot En.~
day period and not to the requirement of publication. Publi ~e 16.
an indispensable requisite; the absence of which will not re c~tion is
law effective (See Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigast ;r
the
Military Shrine Services, G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013). In~ ~c. lJ.
v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, where the clause, "unless it is oth ~~
provided" contained in Article. 2 of the Civil, Code was inte ~~se
by the Supreme Court, it was stated that: l'Jl eted
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that
such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely
if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall becom~
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the
lack of publication or after an unreasonable short period af\er
its publication, it is not unlikely that persons not aware 6~
it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not \
because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they ,
did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only ,
of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many
non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can
begin to operate.
If the law provides for a different period shorter or longer than
the 15-day period provided by Section 1 of E.O. No: 200, then such
shorter or longer period, as the case may be, will prevail. If the law
provides that it shall take effect immediately, it means that it shall
take effect immediately after publication.
LAWS. Section I of E.O. No. 200 uses the word "laws." Hence,
the effectivity provision refers to all statutes, including those1local
a nd private laws (Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446), unless there
are special laws providing a different effectivity mechanism for
p a rticular statutes.
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. (2)
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 5
¼. a ,Mt· 4
REASON. ~e legal precept that "ignorance of the law excuses
ne from comphance therewith" is founded not only on expediency
poO policy bu~ al so on necessity
llJld . (Zulu.eta u. Zulu.eta, 1 Phil. 254; US
v. ora!, 8 Phil. 506; US v. Delosa, 11 Phil. 180; Delgado v. Alon~o,
ph1l. 739). That every person knows the law is a conclusive
44resumption (Taiiada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446). When a law
fs pass~d by the Congres~, duly approved by the President of ~he
philippUles, _ProperI~ ~ublished, and consequently becomes effective
rsuant to its effectivity clause or to some provision of a general law
pu the effectivity of statutes, the public is always put on constructive
~~tice of the law's existence and effectivity. This is true even if a
person has no actual knowledge of such law. To allow a party to set
up as a valid defen~e the ~act that he has no actual knowledge of a
laW which he ~as violated 1s to foment disorder in society. Howeve~,.
,r ,Article 3 applies only to mandatory and prohibitory laws (ConsunJi
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001).
11 1
~ Article 3 is a necessary consequence of the mandatory provision
that all laws must be published. Without such notice and publication,
there will be no basis for the application of the maxim, "ignorantia
tegis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one (Tanada v.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27).
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. (3)
NON-RETROACTMTY OF LAWS. Laws have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided, for it is said that the law looks
to the future and has no retroactive effect unless the legislature may
have given that effect to some legal provisions, and that statutes
are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the
purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used, and that, in case of doubt, the same must be resolved
against the retrospective effect (Buyco v. PNB, 2 SCRA 682; Lazaro
v. Commissioner of Customs, 17 SCRA 37; Universal Corn Products,
Inc. v. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCRA 1048; Cebu Portland Cement
Co. v. CIR, 25 SCRA 789).
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. Well-settled is the principle
that while the legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws
which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously
 ~
6 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW ~
.\i-t,. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 7
,.v-t. 4
vested rights, it is equally true.tha t statutes are not to be
as intended to have a retroacti ve effect so as to affect t hconst),,. correct errors or irre 1 . .
=~~=
. . e •1.1.eq and effective attempt!:: a~ties ?nd to render valid
proceedi ngs, unless sueh mtent 1s expressl y declared O Pendi would otherwise
be ineffective for the P ac s which
th
necessar ily implied from the languag e of the enactme n; ~ear_Iy a~ They are intended to e parties intended.'
8
Cipriano , 55 SCRA 533). Ptrit4 Ii, effect that which they have d!E_lfsons to c~ into
but which has failed of expecte~feed and mtended,
The following are instance s when a law may be ocnv by reason of some statutory di b ·lal co_nsequences
effect:
• en ret
roactive in their action. They, thus m:: ::;r megul~ty
_d th~t which,
before enactment of the statut e, was mvalid There
1. When the law express_ly provides for r etr 0 . . canno t be any doubt • ·
that one 0 f th e purposes of
Thus, the Family Code of the Philippin es that became 3ttvi.ty. Congress w . h en 1t .enacted RepubliC ACt N0 . 3147
on August 3, 1988 specially provides in Article 256 thee :ctl'Ve h by amen dmg Section 13 of Republic Act No. 85,
the_sai_d cod~ "sh~ll have retroacti~e eff~ct insofar as it ~:°est at . . . any
was to erase b doubt regarding th e 1egality of'
pre3udice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordan ~ot t h e acqms1t10n y t~e DBP of the 159 lots from the
the Civil Code or other laws." ce With PHHC for the. housmg project which it m . tended to
esta bli sh fior _its employees who did not yet have
2. When the law is curative or remedial. Since cur f houses of t~err own. This is obvious from the fact
Jaws are not within constitut ional inhibition s or retrospea/ve that Republic Act No. 314 7 was enacted on Jul 17
legislation impairing the obligation of contracts or distur~ _ive 1961, at a time when the legality of the acquiJtio~
vested rig~ts, statutes of~ curative nature, ~hich are necessar~ ; of the lots by the DBP for its housing project was
retrospective, must be given a retrospec tive operation by th under question. It is therefore a curative statute to
courts (25 RCL 790). The legislatur e has the power to pas: render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159
healing acts which do not impair the obligations of contracts n1:>r "' lots from the PHHC."
interfer~ with vested rights. They ~e re~e~ial by ~uring defects t ,,130
and ~dding to the me~ns of enfor~mg exi~tmg ob~gations. The ,d Also, laws which regulate the registration of instruments
rule m regard to curative statutes 1s that, 1fthe thmg omitted or ,, 11 affecting titles to land may be held to apply to deeds dated before
failed to be done, and which constitut es the defect sought to be as well as after their enactment when a reasonable time is given
removed or make harmless , is somethin g which the legislature within which the effect of such statutes, as applied to existing
might have dispensed with by previous statutes, it may do so by conveyances, may be avoided and rendered harmless in respect
subseque nt ones. If the irregular ity consists in doing some act, to vested rights (25 RCL 790).
or doing it in the mode which the legislature might have made 3. When the law is proaedural. When a statute deals
immateri al by an express law, it may do so by a subsequent with procedure only, prima facie, it applies to all actions -
one (Government v. Municipa lity of Binalona n, 32 Phil. 634). J
those which have accrued or pending and future actions. Thus, a
Retroacti ve operation will more readily be ascribed to legislation , oJ law prescribing the form of pleadings will apply to all pleadings
that is curative or legalizing than to legislatio n which may tf
filed after its enactment, although the action is begun before
disadvan tageously , though legally, affect past relations and that time (25 RCL 791).
transacti ons (People v. Zeta, L-7140, Decembe r 22, 1955). .,q Also, it has been held that while changes in substantive law
Hence, in Developm ent Bank of the Philippin es v. Court or Supreme Court judicial doctrines interpreting the application
of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342, where there were some questions as of a particula r law may not be applied retroactively, especially
to the legality of the purchase of certain lots acquired by the when prejudice will result to the party that has followed the
DBP pursuan t to Republic Act No. 85 and where the Congress earlier law or judicial doctrine (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270),
enacted Republic Act No. 3147 precisely to correct any invalidity that principle does not obtain in remedial or procedural law
as to the said acquisition, the Supreme Court observed and (Araneta v. Doronilla, 72 SCRA 113, citing Aguillon v. Director
ruled: of Lands, 17 Phil. 507-508; Hosana v. Diomano and Dioman,
56 Phil. 741, 745-746; Guevara v. Laico, 64 Phil. 150; Laurel
"It may be stated, as a general rule, that v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372, 378; People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764,
curative statutes are forms of 'retrospec tive ·IJ
h reach back on past events to
 ~
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW
8 Art. 5
765, 766). This is especially true in the Philippines where it
is within the power of the Supreme Court to excuse failure to
literally observe any rule under the Rules of Court to avoid
possible injustice, particularly in cases where the subject matte
is of considerable value and the judgment being appealed fro~
is, by its nature, reasonably open to possible modification, if not
reversal (Araneta v. Doronila, 72 SCRA 413).
4. When the law is penal in character and favorable
to the accused. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code specifically
provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, although at the time of the publication of such laws
a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is servin~
the same. Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a
person shall be deemed a habitual delinquent, if within a period
of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction of the
crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto,
estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any said crimes a
third time or oftener.
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions
of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity. (4a)
MANDATORY AND PROHIB ITORY LAWS. A mandato ry
provision of law jg when the omission of which, renders the
proceedi ng_or acts, to which it r ela tes gene..rall y illegal or void. Thus,
prescrip tive periods provided by the law for filing particul ar suits
are mandato ry in characte r. For instance , the-Fam ily Code provide§,
among others, that the husband , in order to impugn t he legitimacy
of a child, must file a case within one year from the knowled ge of the
birth of the child or its recordin g in the civil register, if he should
live within the same municip ality where the birth took place or
was recorded . Should the husband file the case beyond the one-year
period, such case will be dismissed.
:J
Prohibit ory laws are those which contain positive prohibiti ons
and are couched in the negative terms importin g that the act required
shall not be done otherwis e than designat ed (Brehm v. Republic,
9 SCRA 172). Acts committ ed in violation of prohibit ory laws are
likewise void. Hence, under the Family Code, it is specifically
provided that "No decree of legal separati on shall be based upon a
stipulat ion of facts or a confessio n of judgmen t."
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 9
JVl· 6
Howeve r, if the law express! .
initted in violation of a mandI provides fo~ ~he validity of acts
h ct h II b . tory or prohibitory provision of a
corn
><>tute, sue a s a e considered valid and enforceable.
s-
Article 6. Rights may
.
•
be waived , un1ess the waiver
is contrary t o Iaw, pubhc policy' morals or 9ood customs,
· d' · 1t h
or preJU 1c1a o a t lrd person With a n·ght recognlzed
by IaW.
WA.IVER. Waiver is the intention al relinquishment of a
known right (Castro v. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196). Waivers are not
presUined,_ but ~uS t be clearly and convincin gly shovm., either by
express ~tipulatlon_ or ac~ admittin g no other reasonable explana-
tion (Arrieta v. National Rice and Corn Corporation 10 SCRA 79). It
is essentia l that a righ~, in order that it may be validly waived, must
be in existenc e at the time of the waiver (Ereiieta v. Bezore, 54 SCRA
13) and it must be exercised by a duly capacitated person actually
possessi ng the right to make the waiver.
It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party
has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It
must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that
the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the
time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the
party's rights or of all material facts upon which they depended .
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given
under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. (Consunji v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001)
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver
when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate
knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver
requires knowledge of the facts basic to the exercised of the right
waived with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver
is mad~ knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the
record or by evidence. (Consunji v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
137873, April 20, 2001)
PROHIB ITION AGAINST WAIVER. Waivers cannot be made
if they are contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs , or prejudic ial to a third person with a right recogniz ed
by law. Hence, in Gongon v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 412, the
Suprem e Court held that the preferen tial rights of tenants under
10 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW
~ EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
¼,6
Commonwe alth Act No. 539 to purchase a public land
validly waived, as such waiver was against public policy. p:~~llot be
the Supreme Court said:
1nently,
On the second issue, petitioner's position is th t .
preferential right could not be validly waived, such a . his
being against public policy. Under Article 6 of the Ne:~~e.r
Code, "rights may be waived, unless the waiver is co t l'\7i,J,
to law, public order, public policy, morals or good cuaton rlif¥
preju~i~ial to a thU:d person ~th a r~g~t recogn~zed by law~\'hr
old Civil Code (Article 4) earned a s1m1lar provision, altho , 'h _e
mentioned only public interest or public order." · ug it
That Commonwe alth Act No. 539 lays down a ·Publi
policy there can be no doubt. In the case of Juat v. Lan.d Ten. c
Administrati o_n, G .R: No. L-17080, ?anuary 28_, 1961, the Co~e
thru Mr. Justice Fehx Angelo Bautista, ruled m this wise:
"x x x it may also be stated that the avowed poli
behind the adoption of such a measure is, as aptly observ~~
by the Court of Appeals, to provide the landless elements
of our population with ·lots upon which to build their
homes and small farms which they can -cultivate anil from
which they can derive· livelihood without being beholden
to any man (Pascual v. Lucas , 51 O.G., No. 4 , p. 2429)
suc4 measure. having been adopted in line with the polic;
of social justice enshrined in our Constitution to reniedy
and cure the social unrest caused by the concentration
of landed estates in the ha:rids of a few ·b y giving to the
landless elements a piece of land they ·call their o'wn." · •
Being contrary to publi<, policy, the alleged wai~er of his
right made by herein petition~r should be considered null and
void. ' · · ,.
Likewise it has been held that the signing by a disabled
employee of a satisfaction receipt does 'not constitute a waiver;
the law does ·not consider as valid any agreement to receive less
compensat ion than the worker is entitled to recover under the
law (Franklin B(J.ker Co. of the Philippine s v. Alillana, 21 SCRA
1247). Also, it has been held that the acceptance of bene fits such
as separation pay and terminal leave benefits would not amount to
estoppel or waiver of right of employee to contest his illegal dismissal
(San Miguel Corporatio n v. Cruz, 31 SCRA 819).
Rights, protections , and advantage s conferred by statutes
may be generally waived. Where, however, the object of a statute
is to promote great public interests, liberty and morals) it cannot
11
I µt · 1
defeated by any ~riv~te stipulation (Griffith v. New York L. Ins.
be 1 01 Cal. 62 7 , cited m 25 RCL 781). Hence since marriage is a
C0 ·: 1 institution greatly affected by public in~rest and the purity
· concern o f t h e state, a private agreement between
s ociah . ch is a b as1c
\
0 fW l
h sband an d a wife provi' ding that they consent or allow the
3
Jll':nission of"ad'ultery ~r_concu~in3 :ge by the other spouse, as th:e
c0 JllaY be, thereby waiving their nghts to live with each other, 1s
case •d agreement or a vo1'd waiver · ·
of nghts · contrary
as the same 1s
d
a vo1 blic interest an morals.
to pU
Article 7. · Laws are repealed only by subsequen t
ones, and their violation or non~bserva nce shall not
be excused by disuse, or custom, or practice to the
contrary.
'
When the courts declare a law to be inconsisten t
with the Constitutio n, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administra tive or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution -
,
REPEAL. Repeal of a law is the legislative act of abrogating
through a subsequent law the effects of a previous statute or porti ons
thereof. Repeal is either express or implied. An implied repeal takes
place when a new law contains provisions contrary to or inconsistent
with those of a former without expressly repealing them (25 RCL
911) . Rep e a l s and · amendment s by unplication s are not favored
(Quimsing v. Lachica, 2 SCRA 182).
An express repeal is one which is literally declared by a new
law , either in specific terms, as where particular laws and provisions
a re named and identified and declared to be repealed, or in general
terms, as where a provision in a new law declares all laws and parts
oflaws inconsisten t therewith to be repealed (25 RCL 911). However,
in lloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association , Inc. v. Feliciano, 13
SCRA 377, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that:
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that ''all laws
and parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingl~ is certainly not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate
the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition
12 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW
¼.7 µf,· 7 EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
13
l
that substantial conflict must be fo~d in e~St in? an~ Prior acts In substantially simil la
Such being the ca~e the p~esumpt1on a_gamst imp~ed repeal~ . .
and the rule against. strict construction regarding imPl'led
recognized in the jurisprudear nee of the Co the same exception 18
nguage,
.
repeals apply ex proprw uigore. . ''The general rule is that urt, thus:
void, as repugnant . where Part
to th e organicl •
. of a statut e 1s
.
Also it is a well-establis hed rule in statutory construct·ion •that,' valid ' t h e valid portion if aw' while another part 1.s
' ' separable fro m the invalid may
stand and be enforced B t . - uinord '
A special statute, providing for a particular case or cl 88 ' ;
· er to do this, the valid
portion must be so far ind
·t . f . . . portion
.ependent of.the invalid
of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general ;~ ~ t h at 1 1s air to presume that h
· ·
terms, provis10ns
·
and applicat·ions, un1ess th e intent to re.... its
al 1 enacted it by itself if the ha! .e Legislature would have
or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general lawpe not constitutionally ena: th supposed that they could
broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special ;ire remain to make a complete _e ot~ei:- x x x Enough must
(Manila Railroad Co. u. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 225, 228· Cit a~ which carries out the legisl~:te~gible and valid statute,
Manila u. PSC, 52 Phil. 515; National Power Corpo~atio~:
Arca, 25 SCRA 931). ·
l
used in the invalid part of
force or efficacy for
t:: :ai:t xx x. The language
te can have no legal
• any Purpose whate d h
remains must express the legi l ti . ver, an w at
UNCONSTIT UTIONAL STATUTES. The Constitution is th of the void part, since the Cour:ha ve will indepen~ently
_.,, (B as no power to legislate
supreme, organic, and fundamental law of the land. It is axiom / xx x arrameda_ v. Moir, 25 Phil. 44, 47-48 quoted~
that no ordinary statute can override a constitutiona l provi: le Government v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 , 292)_
(Fl.oresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 136). Buti~n
deciding the constitutiona lity of a statute, every presumption favoin RULES AND REGULATIONS/ADMINISTRATIVE AND
the ~alidity of t~e same a~d whene~er possi~le, ~tat~tes sho~: EXECUTIVE ACTS. Rules and regulations when promulgated
be given a meanmg that will not brmg them m conflict with the in p~r.suan~e of the procedure o_r authority ~onferred upon the
Constitution (Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 774). adm1mstratl ve agency by law, partake of the nature of a sanction
provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched
The constitutiona lity or unconstitutio nality of a statute in general terms, afte:r expressing t~e policy, purposes, remedies and
depends upon factors other than those existing at the time of the sanctio:p.s intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of
enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law carrying out the la~ ar~ oftentimes left to the administrative agency
enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently entrusted with its enforcement (Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v.
to the passage or approval of the law (Gonzales v. Commission 'of Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 627).
Elections, 21 SCRA 774). I
A rule is binding on the courts so lQng as the procedure fixed
PARTIAL UNCONSTIT UTIONALIT Y OF STATUTES. Where for its promulgation is followed, and its scope is within the statutory
a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutio nal and the remainder authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not
valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutiona l portion in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom
upheld. However, the Supreme Court in Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 (Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 4
SCRA 496, held: SCRA 627).
The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
"x x x But when the parts of the statute are so mutually particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effe~t its general
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot
a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and
that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would be extended, so long, however, as the regulations relat~ solel~ to
not pass the residue independently, then if some parts are carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid (United
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, States v. Tupasi, 29 Phil. 119).
conditional or connected, must fall with them."
 'I
ATIONS LAW 15
PERSONS AND FAMILY REL Art.a EFFECT AND APPLICATION
OF LAWS
14 p.rt. 8
e or el( ecut,v. is a
well as .adm. ini stra tiv by numerous aut hor itie s
Ru les and regulations as . e The settled rule supported vim obt ine t,,
the Constitut10n are mvalid · ~nu 8 1· xim "legis interpretatio legis
'l't..
acts violative of the law and SCRA 585 ' 11 res tate me nt of the legal ma com pet ent
Bo ard of Ad min istr ato r, 33 upon the written law by a
Teoxon v. Members of the 'the _ the interpretation placed ).
sta ted : ople v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
Sup rem e Court per tin ent ly court has the force of law (Pe e and
reme Court are aut hor ita tiv
the Constitution limits th Judicial decisions of the Sup the Co urt
It cannot be otherwise as se of the inferior courts and
whom all executive power resi
de e precedent-setting while tho y of jud ges
authority of the President, in suasive. Indeed , it is the dut
be faithfully executed. No
less:; of Appeals are mer~ly per (Secretary of
to take care that the laws or agency then, contrary to the eted by the Supreme Court
ce to apply the law as mterpr 948).
administrative executive offi ution, assert for itself a mor A 62; Albert v. CF!, 23 SCRA
stit Justice v. Catolico, 68 SCR
express language of the Con th: TH E
arily, it is bound to observe IONS DEEMED PART OF
extensive prerogative. Necess with WHEN JUDICIAL DECIS (Supreme]
re must be strict compliance interpretation placed by the
constitutional mandate. The terms must be followed. The LAW. The application and e of its (th e
the legislative enactment.
Its t of the law as of the dat
not departure from, its provisi
ons. Court upon a law is par tion and
statute requires adherence to, [Supreme) Court's applica
the terse language of the pre
sent Jaw) ena ctm ent since the leg isla tiv e
No deviation is allowable. In ished the contemporaneous
ive agency "cannot amend an
act of int erp ret atio n merely establ effect (People v.
Chief Justice, an administrat law purports to carry into
int ent tha t the construed
Congress." Licera , 65 SCRA 270).
Su pre me
g inal, 55 SCRA 607 , the
ns applying or interpretin However, in People v. Jab
Article 8. Judicial decisio legal
ion shall form part of the Court hel d tha t:
the laws or the Constitut
(n)
system of the Philippines. Court is overruled and a
When a doctrine of this
new doctrine should be applied
TIO N AND INTERPR
ETATION. different view is adopted , the ly to parties who had relied on
JU DIC IAL CO NS TR UC olving legal app
prospectively, and should not faith thereof. This is especially
The cou rts have the princi
pal function of not only res the
g vague provi- the old doctrine and acted on where
int erp ret ing and con str uin application of criminal laws,
controversies but also of tio n, verily, is true in the construction and ably
paz:ticular dis put e. Construc ishability of an act be reason
sions ofl aw rel ativ e to a meaning and it is necessary that the pun iety.
eri ng and exp oun din g the foreseen for the guidance of soc
the art or process of dis cov application to a
the law wit h res pec t to its fer red his
int ent ion of the aut hor s of l, am ong others where the accused was con
ent ion is ren der ed doubtfu Th us, in the Jab ina l case, d to pos ses s
given case, wh ere tha t int tly provided for fidential agent and aut hor ize
the giv en cas e is not explici app oin tm ent as a secret con enu nci ate d by
by rea son of the fact tha t 1, cite d in Caltex, nt to a prevailing doctrine
ret ati ons of Law s, pag e a firearm in 1964 pur sua no cri mi nal
in the law (Black, Int erp . No. 205837, previous cases, und er which
247; see PIT C v. COA, G.R the Su pre me Court in two sai d fire arm
Inc. v. Pa lom ar, 18 SCRA tion with the possession of
liab ilit y att ach ed in connec urt rul ed tha t
No vem ber 21, 2017). a permit, the Supreme Co
decisions in spi te of the absence of d. Th is is so
L DE CIS IO N. Jud ici al olved of the crime charge
EF FE CT OF JU DI CIA of the legal sai d accused should be abs ers ed by the
the law sha ll for m pa rt ns were sub seq uen tly rev
app lyi ng and interp ret ing even if the sai d two decisio 196 7 sho uld be
In effect, jud ici al decisio
ns, alt~ough in The doctrine laid down in
sys tem of the Ph ilip pin es. Su pre me Co urt in 1967. s who rel ied
um e the sam e aut ho rity
as the1 statute should not prejudice per son
the ms elv es not laws, ass prospectively applied and l con tro llin g.
ari ly become, to es while the sam e were stil
tiv ely aba ndo ned , nec ess on the ove rtu rne d doctrin ew ise bee n hel d
its elf and , unt il aut hor ita ich mu st control , 65 SCRA 270 , it has lik
app lica ble , the cri ter ia wh Th us, in People v. Licera new doc trin e
the ext ent tha t the y are reb y but e abrogates an old rule, the
of tho se cal led upo n to abi de the tha t, where a new doctrin ers ely aff ect
the act uat ion s not onl y ltex, Inc. v. only and should not adv
orce obe die nce the ret o (Ca should ope rat e prospectively ally those who rel ied the reo
n and
also tho se du ty bou nd to enf ute evidence of tho se favored by the old rul
e, especi
ese dec isio ns als o con stit
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247). Th 270).
ople v. Licera, 65 SC RA
wh at the law me ans (Pe
14
16

pgRSON:, ru · -
. b thereof (See also PITC v. C0,4.
thefa1t ,Gn,
. . ~o

,- ~
Art· 10 EFFECT AND APPLI CATIO N OF LAWS
17
acted on 21 2017). • \
ber . • v Cantero, A.M. No. MTJ 95-10
Nove111 of the value of
Jn ;tpiag 327 where a judg e ente red -int 70, 0F'eb
, Civil Code does not provide for reimbursement
ac ~Ctfs6 without havi ng his first voi /; sec 1l.d ~ demolished improvements, the wife should not
be indemnified .
TE
91, 79
19 act 1n llitY the Supr eme Cour t ruled artiag
contr
~~ Suffice it to mention th e ancient maxim of
"J ure naturae aequum est, meminem cum alteri
the Roma n law,
us detrim en to et
St e li t~at ;~~ I , ed by the Partidas
declared 11 nu t b; the basis of adm inist rativ injuria fi.eri locupletiorem" which was restat
IIlarriage_canno litY because, at the time of the
ability eJ in these terms: ''Ningu.no non deue enriqu ecerse
tortizeram ente
or ambig uous,
con dano de otro." When the statutes are silent
judge!~rif1!;~:;rudenc~ was that a judic ial
prevaiJing/ void rnarriages. The subs eque nt
de:i ::on ~~, i
at1on 11
~~rri_age of ~~
or''\ this is one of those fundam ental principles
which the court s
invok e in order to arrive at a solution that would
respo nd t.o the
74 Phil. 377).
not neede :ed just before the Supr eme Cour vehement urge of conscience (In Re: Padilla,
ri ec1ded t the· '
w~s solern; mpio Diy, 143 SCR A 499, decla
that thhe ~ the middle nam e
Wiegel v. . edicial declaration of nulli ty of a vo1?dglllarri E!l'e lt • Also, in a case where the law does not provide
r, the Supr eme Cour t
need for a JU . d age_ ~, of a child adopted by her illegitimate fathe
ss use the surn ame. of
ruled that the adopted child can neverthele
Article 9. No JU ge or court .shall custom" that a child
e the biological mother becau se "it is a Filipino
ender judgment by reason of the silence 0 declin er (In the Matt er of the
~ sufficiency of the laws. (6)
m
it.. lo
' bscur--~~ uses as middle name the surname of the moth
Adoption of Stephanie Astorga Garcia, Honorato
B. Catindig, G.R.
No. 1483 11, March 31 , 2005) .
OF JUDGES. ,J udge s ar ~ ta~k ed with the dis JUDICIAL LEGISLATION. Our government
is divided into
pt th:tnsa~(
. D?~ cordance with t he cons t1tu t1ona l prece three great depa rtments, namely the executive,
the legis latur e, and
without dno ~ ach into the respe ctive
justice lil a rived of.life, liber ty, a nd prop_erty the judic iary. Each department cannot encro
shall be d1 rnust not evad e perfo rman ce of this ue
of Jaw. Ju gesf an appa rent non- existhence
of any larespo~
P~
domain of the other . Hence, the legislature
cannot unde rtake the
legislate subs tanti al
w go,- . execution of the law. Neither could the executive
• t because o . ~ contr overs ies and
Th, . gal dispu te or beca use t e law involved 1s l'allh. law. The judiciary is tasked with resolving legal
JUS
rticu1ar 1e . legislate. Legi slatio n
con ~ pa t He rnust always be guid ed by equit y, fairn e,o;• inter preti ng statu tes. The judiciary cannot
ess, 811d however, in Floresca
sioi madequa e. . .
t10ns.
Wh th
ere e conclusions of an,,1. . 1 is the function of the Congress. Interestingly
. t·ce in these s1tua the Supr eme Cour t
the senseof JUS 1 .
1
•
or reaso n, he cannot be said, ':" v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 136,
. h' d •si·on are not with out ogic of the conc ept that
m 1s ec1 C b l said that, while there is indeed the existence
int,
have been incompetent (Corpus u. a a una,
55 SCRA 374). , that myth has been
the court s cannot engage in judicial legislation
giv, , which prov ides that
rty of the II exploded by Article 9 of the new Civil Code
by 1 Thus , in a cas~ wher e the para pher n~l prope "no judge or court shall decline to render judg
ment by reaso n of the
in t ion of another hui1'4
was demolished to give way for the cons tr~ct silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws
."
Inc. .partnership of 811
which redounded to the bene fit of ~he conJ ugal of the Civil Code,
Nm wife to be reimhUIII Hence, even a legislator through Article 9
of the spouses and wher e the claim of the s, in the lang uage of
resisted hecallSe Ill recognizes that in certain instances, court
of the value of the demo lishe d prop erty was Justi ce Holm es, "do and must legislate" to
fill in the gaps in the
emen t can he mn
ap~ law did not expressly prov ide that reim burs law; because the mind of the legislator, like
all hum an bein gs, is
its liquidation of !It ble cases to whic h the
sys1 by the conjugal partn ershi p at the time of finite and therefore cannot envisage all possi
eme Court ruledb the infin ite capa city to
the: amount of the property dem olish ed, the Supr law may apply. Nor has the huma n mind
itse the reimbursement by sayin g, thus : antic ipate all situations .
the
and
the
x x x it is but just therefore that the value
of the old buildings Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation
lawmaking
alsc
at the time they were torn down shou ld be paid
to the wife. application of laws, it is presumed that the
Pal [The Cou~] dismiss[es], as with out any meri
t whatever the body intended right and justice to prevail. (n)
par. 2 of the
appellants contention that beca use Article 1404,
whi
,..
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW Arte. 11-12
18
STATUTES. Where the law is clear, it must be
DOUBT~UL 't ambiguous provisions. It must be taken as
lied according to I s un . (A . C . .
~~p . f . d' · l ddition and subtraction ctmg om missioner
1t 1s devoid O JU iCia a
u 'la Electric Company, 77 SCRA 469) · Th e first
of Customs u. maniof the Court 1s ·
. to app ly t h e law. Construction
and foremos t d u ty , b d d
. tati'on come only after 1t has een emonstrate that
and mterpre . ·h h (R ·
epublic
.; 1s
app Ii cawon · 1·mpossible or madequate wit out t em
Flour Mills, Inc. u. Commissioner of Customs, 39 SCRA 269).
"This provision, according to ~he Code ~ommissi?n, . is
necessary that it may tip the scales m favor ~f nght and Justice
when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.
(In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Natty, Astorga Garcia,
C.R. No. 148311, March 31 , 2005)
If there is ambiguity in the law, interpretation of the law
requires fidelity to the legislative purpose. What Congress intended
is not- to be frustrated. Its objective must be carried out. Even if
there. be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the
interpretation should not be at war with the end_soughtJ to be
attained (Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 39
SCRA 269).
The Supreme Court has time and again cautioned against
narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the
legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result (of injustice
or absurdity) and that, therefore, a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results (Bello v. Court
of Appeals, 56 SCRA 509).
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.
(n)
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence. (n)
CUSTOMS. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct
formed by :r:.epetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of
custom. A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of
p.rt. 13
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OP LAWS
19
evidence. A l~calt ~ustom as a source of right cannot be considered
by a court of ~US lce ~nless such custom is properly established by
cornpetent evidence hke any other fact. Merely because something
. done as a matter
IS c of practice does not mean that courts can rely
10
the same r purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
~:ridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The
f rner can supplement statutory law or applied in the absence of
orch statute. Not so with the latter. Customs which are contrary to
~uw public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. Custom,
a n' if proven, cannot prevail over a statutory rule or even a legal
eve ··
le enunciated by the Supreme Court (In the Matter of the Petition
f~r Authority to Continue Use of the Firm name "Ozaeta, Romulo,
et c. , "92 SCRA 1).
In a case, the Su?re~e Court allowed an adopted child to use
the surname of the biological mother as the child's middle name
despite absence of law. The Supreme Court reasoned that "it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father ." (In the Matter of
the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311,
March 31, 2005)
Article 13. When the law speaks of years, months,
days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty
days; days, of twenty four hours; and nights from sunset
to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they
shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded, and the last day included. (7a)
COMPUTATION OF LEGAL PERIOD. For pur_pose~ of
computing the legal period, Article 13 has already been i~phedly
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. In CIR vh.PrSimetown
. . No• 162155 • August 28, 2007, t e upreme
Property G roup, GR
Court ruled:
d t d Article 13 of the Civil Code provides
As alrea Y quo e ' k f year it is understood to be
that when the law spe; s; t~ al Marketing Corporation v.
equivalent to 365 days. n a ion
 Art. 13 J,.rt, 13 EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 21
PERSONS AND pM{ILY RELATIONS LAW
20
ar is equivalent to 365 days same subject matter - the computation of legal periods. Und~r
d that a ye a Ieap year. the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whethe r
it 1s
h Court ru1e I r year or
Tecson, t e h ther it is a regu a a regula r year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code
regardless ofw e or the Administrative Code s.
O 292 of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar month
However, in 198 7, ~ 31 Chapter VIII, Book I thereof the
d Section • Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987,
of 1987 was enac te . numbe r of days is irrelevant.
provides: ''Year" s h all
. Le al Periods . -
Section 31. ; twelve calend ar month s; YEAR . In Garvida v. Sales, 82 SCAD 188,27 1 SCRA 767, the
be unders to?d t;
th1
y: unless it refers to a specific Supre me Court discus sed the one-year cycle of succes
sive years in
"month" of ~~ :hich case it shall be computed constr uing Sectio n 428 of the Local Govern ment Code
provid ing that
calend~ montht inumber of days the specific month certai n electiv e officials should not be more than 21
years of age on
~
n a day of twenty-1our
to , ,e to hours an d ;
. g. "d
accordin
1 1· d) the day of their electio n, to wit:
, ay '
containsfrom E h .
"night" sunrise to sunset. ( mp as1s supp ie
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not
A calendar month is "a month d~signated in ~he,,cal~ndar very
.h t rd to the number of days it may contain . It 1s the be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is
. . . ,
wit ou rega red clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months
"period of time running from the begmrung of~ certain numbe that
day nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood
day up to, but not including, the _corresponding_ numbe red is
f the next month, and if there 1s not a sufficient numbe r
of years are 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year
after
~ays in the next month, then up to and including the last day
of consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day
first
that month." To illustrate, one calendar month from Decem
ber his birth - the last day of the year. In computing years, the
the
31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to Januar y 31, 2008;
one year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After
.
calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from Februa ry
1, first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins
years
2008 until February 29, 2008. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two
21
old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime - a person turns
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This
means
r)
declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by anothe that on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span
of
be
or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for
his
reasonably reconciled with the previous one). Section 27, Book 22nd year begins. The day after the 366th day is the first
day of
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states: the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the
365th
Section 27. Repealing clause. - All laws, day.
decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day
cycles.
repealed or modified accordingly. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fractio
n of
t repealing clause like Section 27 above is not an express
a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles.
more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22
"Not
years
n:e
r:!:ato c~:~t:h :~c~~: :t fails to. i?entify or design ate
the
old," contrar y to petitioner's claim. The law does not state
that
repealed all I · · . ' th e proV1swn above only impliedly the candid ate be less than 22 years on Election Day.
1987. aws mcons1stent with the Admin istrativ e Code of
when
Implied repeals how DAY, NIGH T, AND PERIO D. The law also provid es that
days are of 24
repeal must have b~en re~, are not f~vored. An implied the law speak s of days, it shall be unders tood that
ed
by the legislature Th tc ea~ Y and unmist akably intend hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise . In counti
ng a period , the
. e est is wheth er t h e subseq uent law ed. Hence , if a
encompasses entirely the b' first day shall be exclud ed and the last day includ
and
they cannot be logically o su Ject matter of the former law ve on the 20th
r reasonably reconciled law states that a particu lar statute is to be effecti
. ly made on
Both Article 13 of the c· . day from its public ation and such public ation was actual
on Febru ary 23,
VIII, Book I of the Administ:;Jv~oge and Section 31, Chapte
r Febru ary 3, 1998, then the law shall be effecti ve
ode of l987 deal with the
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAw
Arts. l,i.l&
22
p.rt. 16
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
. h . February 3, 1998, is excluded Whil 23
1998. The first day, wh1c is23 1998 is included. e the
last day which is February ' abroad to obtain an absolute di
who 1s· a lso a Fili'pmo
· and vorce from hi
. Penal laws and those of public security .· eventuall bee · s wife or her husband
14 an absolute divorce decree th Y . • omes successful in getting
Article h~II be obligatory upon all who live or
such absolute divorce. This '. e Philippines will not recognize
an~ saf~ty P~ilippine territory, subject to the principles . is so beca
paragrap h of Art
. . 1~le 26 of the Farnil use, pursuant to the second
soJour~ 1~ t ati·onal law and to treaty stipulations. (Sa) which the Phihppmes may r . Y ~ode, the only absolute divorce
of pubhc m ern . d ecognize is . d .
Filipmo an a foreigne». Hen . a ~ixe marnage between a
OBLIGATORY FORCE OF PENAL LAWS . Citizens an are still married and therefor:e~~~~~e_eyes of Philippine law,.. th:y
. b. ct to penal Jaws and all other laws design d he or she can be considered to h an!one o~ them marry agarn,
foreigners are su Je . b'li £ ed t case of the husband or adult ~ve committed either concubinage in
. .. . blic security and safety. The 1ia i ty or any violat· o
ma1mrun pu Escano, 15 SCRA 355).
'd I ws will even attach regar dl ess of wh eth er a foreign ion
.
ery m case of the wife (See Tenchavez v.
0 f tesa1
h a .. . . er 18
merely sojourning in Ph1lippme territory. In Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen G
2014, the Supreme Court ruled th '4 .R. No. 1~3707, ~ecember ~O,
EXCEPTION. While foreigners may be liable ~or committin
enunciates the nationalit at, on t~e basis of Article 15 which
offenses in violation of penal laws and thos~ of public security an~ y ru1e, a foreigner who try' 1
safety, they may however ~e immun~ _fro~ sm_t and th~refore, cannot does not require support for the childr will se coun s aw
. . en generally be follow§(l..
be criminally prosecuted m the Phihppmes m certam cases wh However, if a smt 1s filed here in the Phili·ppmes, . such ~ .
foreigner
the Philippine government has waived its criminal jurisdiction Oere has to pl ead an d prove. such foreign law • 0therwise,. because of th e
them on the basis of the principles of public international law:: processual presumpt10n
. rule , Philippm
· e 1aw will be cons1. dere d t h e
same as t h e fore1gn law. T,he foreigner will b . d
treaty stipulations. . h'ld · th Phili . e reqUITe to support
h 1s c 1 m e ppmes.
Under t~~ 19_61 V~enna_Conventi?~ on Di~lomatic Relations of
Yi which the Phihppmes 1s a signatory, 1t 1s proV1ded that t he perso Article 16. Real property as well as personal
'~.c!r I of the diplomatic agent shall be inviolable and he shall not be liabt
to any form of arrest or detention (Article 29, Vienna Convention)
p~operty is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
I '
He shall enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction of t he receivin~
,-r·-=~ state (Article 31 , Vienna Convention). A diplomatic agent, under
H~wever, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
~it~ Article 1 of the same convention, is the head of the mission or a
member of the diplomatic staff of the mission.
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
Also, heads of state who are officially visiting here in the
f~ Philippines are immune from Philippine criminal jurisdiction.
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (10a)
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of LAW GOVERNING REAL PROPERTIES. ,The law ot the
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, country where the real property is situated shall be the governing
even though living abroad. (9a) law over such real property. However, with respect to the order
of succession and the amount of successional rights, whether in
NATIONALITY RULE. Regardless of..,w here a citizen of the intestate or testamentary succession, they shall be regulated by the
Philippines may be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws national law of the deceased and this is applicable regardless of the
with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her nature of the property. Thus, in a case where a citizen of Turkey
status, condition,.and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino, regardless made out a last will and testament providing that his property shall
of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition be.disposed of pursuant to Philippine laws, the Supreme Court ruled
 24 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW
that such provision is illegal and void because, pursuant to Arr 11
10 (noJ Article 16) of the Civil Code, the national law should gov~
and therefore Turkish laws and not Philippin e laws should a pj;
(Miciano u. Brimo,_5 0 Phil. 867).
In,._Bellis u. ~!~ 20 SCRA 358_, wh er ~ :(Qj
~ at the,tim~:11;t~ u~~~
will~ the PJ:ii.liJ ! P ttates
a nabona lffl~~ t and also~dollllcile<l..Jp--1,be Ilwt@i
State§., the Supreme Court observed :
Article 16, par. 2 and Article 1039 of the Civil Code
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate
or testament ary_succession , with regard to fou_r items: (a)~
order of success10n; (b) the amount of success1onal rights; (c)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of th~ wi.q; and (d) the
caJ!acity to succeed. The Court provides that-
"ARTICL E 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is situ ated.
However, intestate and testamen tary succession s, both
with r espect to the order of successio n and to the amount of
successio nal rights and to the intrinsic validity of testament ary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under considera tion, whatever may be the
n ature of the property and regardles s of the country wherein
said property may be found.
ARTICLE 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by t9e
law of the nation of the decedent.j "
Appellant s would, however, counter that Article 17, par. 3,
of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Prohibiti ve laws concernin g persons, their
acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffectiv e by laws or judgment s
promulga ted, or by determina tions or conventio ns
agreed upon in a foreign country."
prevails as the exception to Article 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code
afore-quo ted. This is not correct. Precisely, the Congress deleted
the phrase, "notwiths tanding the provisions of this and the next
precedin g article" when they incorpora ted Article 11 of the old
Civil Code a s Article 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproduci ng
without s ubstantia l ch an g~ t h e s~cond par agraph of Article IO
of the old Civil Code as Article 16 m th e n ew. It must have been
Art. 16 EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 25
/>,fl· 17
their purpose to make the sec d .
specific provision in itself hi on paragraph of Article 16 a
intestate successions As ~ ch m~st_ be applied to testate and
intent, the Congress ~dded rther
rnd i_c~tion of this legislative
PP Y which decrees that ca aci a new proVJ~JOn, under Article 1039,
national law of the de~ede:.to succeed is to be governed by the
It is therefore
. ' po Ji cy or good
evident that wh a t ever pu bl 1c
..
customs.may be mvolved in our system ofl egit1mes, t he Congress
bas. not mtended . to extend the same to th e succession· ofr,ore1gn·
nat10nals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amo~nt of s~c_cess1onal rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific proVJSJOns must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed
two wills - one to govern his Texas estate and the other bis
Philippine estate-arg uing from this that he intended Philippine
Jaw to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it
would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect tha_lhis properties shall b~ribut ed in accordance with
PJiilippine l a a t ~ his national law, is ille&!Jluidvoid.
for his nationalJa w cannot ~~ed in) egard to those ma~ s
that Article IO~ now.Al:t.icle 16-ofthe Civil Code states said
national law sho~Jd_govern .-' -
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was
a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,u11 UWIIDder the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs 0111e;ilimee• At dialllY, since
the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of suc~ sional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Phili11pine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. 13ellis. I
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before
the diplomat ic or consular officials of the Republi~. of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the sole'!'nit1e_s
established by Philippine laws shall be observed m their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, th_eir acts ~r
property, and those which have for their obJect pubhc
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
J
r "
26 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a

Art. 17 Afl· 17 EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

for havin~ tech~call y committed adultery, considering that the
absolute divorce IS not recognized in the Philippines (See Tenchave z

foreign country. (11a)
The law provides clearly that th
\ EXTRINS IC VALID~
forms and solemniti es of public. instrume nts, wills, and contrac~
shall be-govern ed by the laws ofthe country where they are executed.
Thus, if in Japan, for example, it is required that for a holograph ic
will to be valid, the date thereof need not be in the handwrit ing of
the testator, "then" such a will is valid even if under Philippin e ,laws
t h e con tents of.a holograpr uc will, including the date, must all be in
I
~
r
27
l
v. Escano, 15 SCRA 355).
In Del Socorro v. Van Wilsen, G.R. No. 193707, December 10,
Court held_
20 14, the Supreme
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding
that the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not
punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability, in
light of the ruling in Bank of America. NT and SA v. American

the handwrit ing of the testator.

ACTS BEFORE DIPLOM ATIC AND CONSUL AR OFFI-
CIALS. Diplomat ic and consula r officials are represent atives of the
state. Hence, any act or contract ma de in a foreign country before
diplomat ic and consular officials must conform to the solemniti es

Realty Corporation, to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that
the English Law on the matter were properly plead-
ed and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid
i down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign
under Philippin e,Jaw. J his is so, because the host country where law would still not find applicability.
such diplomat ic or consular officials are assigned, by rules of
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or con-
internati onal law, waives its jurisdicti on over the premises of the
tract is contrary to a sound and established public
diplomat ic office of another country located in the said host country. policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment
Hence, marriage s between two Filipinos solemniz ed by a consular or order shall not be applied.
official 'abroad must be made following Philippin e laws. Thus, the
issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning per-
sons their acts or property, and those which have
registrar and of the solemniz ing officer with regard to the celebratio n for their object public order, public policy and good
of the marriage shall be performe d by a consul-ge neral, consul, or customs shall not be rendered ineffecti~e b! laws
:I vice-cons ul abroad (See Article 10 of the Family Code). or judgments promulgated. or by determmatlons or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
PROHIB ITIVE LAWS. Under our law, prohibitiv e laws
concernin g persons, their acts or property, and those which have The public policy sought to be protected i? t~e
for their object public order, public policy and good,cus toms shall instant case is the principle imbedded m our JUTIS·
not be rendered ineffectiv e by laws, or judgmen ts promulga ted, or diction proscribing the splitting up of a smgle cause
by determin ations or conventio ns agreed upon in a foreign country. of action.
Hence, consideri ng that the only ways to terminat e a marriage in Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Pro-
the Philippin es are by nullifying a marriage or by annulling the cedure is pertinent
same on the basis of the specific grounds exclusive ly enumera ted
If two or more suit:-are institu~ed ofn the ba-
under the Family Code of the Philippin es, and by filing an affidavit or a
f
. of the same cause of ac Ion, . o ·1onebl
the filing
of reappear ance for the purpose of terminat ing a subseque nt SIS ·t
t on the mer1 s m
• any one 1s avai a e as
. d
marriage solemniz ed under Article 41 of the same code, any Filipino JU gmen rup the d'1sm1ss . al of the others. Moreover, .
who procures an absolute divorce abroad against his/her Filipino a ground ior b plied when its applica-
•·
r · l w should not e ap
1ore1gn a d . bl injustice to the c1t1zens
spouse will remain, in the eyes of Philippin e law, as not having been
tion would work ~ erua ;o give justice is the most
divorced . Thus, in a case where a Filipina wife obtained a divorce or residents of t~e orful m.. hence a law' or judgment
abroad and later remarrie d an American , the Filipino husband in important function o aw, '
the Philippin es can file a legal separatio n case against the wife
J
 pERSONSAND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW Art. 18
r }.rt- 18 EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 29
28
. b •ously unjust negates the fun- where the · ·offer was made ·• Th"1s latter article
· . .
or contract t?a~ isl o ~ Conflict of Laws. the proVIS1ons of Article 54 of the
.
is ID opposition to
Code of Commerce.
damental princ1p es o
g even if the Jaws of the Netherlands If no mistake has bee d .
• ,
A pJ.nng the ,orego ,
in·
hi • steps by which the Court~ mah e ID announcing the successive
. P J-· arent's obligation to support s child nor . . . eac esaconcl . h
uty re~ammg 1s for the Court to usion, t e~ :he only
ne1th~r enfihorce a pmpl1' ance therewith, such obligation is stilJ d
The legislature in its wisdom h ~pply the law as 1t is found.
pe nalize t e nonco · Id be of great law on
• the Philippines because 1t wou insurance, and expressly re pea1ed avrng · · a new
the enacted •
duly e orcea bl e ID .
. . •nfi to the child to be denied of financial support when the of Commerce on the same sub·ect nd pro".1Sions m the Code
!DJUStJce in the commercial law it wouldl seem ' a haVlilg thus left a void
latter is entitled thereto. . ' locnc 1to k f h
only pertinent provision of 1 £ nd . .,. a ma e use o t e
related to the chapter co a~ ou ID the Civil Code, closely
-f Article 18. In matters which are governed by the ncemmg life annuities.
-· V Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency
'
hall The th Code rule th. a t an acceptance made by letter
bind Civil
' , ) ~· ., shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a) ~ . e person making the offer only from the date
1 .
1t came to his knowledge • may not be th e best expresSion . of
', '.,/.1"() -"'
/' I.I) { I mo_,, ern commercial. . d th at its
usage · Still, it must be adJilltte .
., SUPPLETORY NATURE. The law clearly provides that, in d
· b · avoids
emorcement d uncertainty and tend s to secunty. . Not onl y
matters which are governed by the"Code of Commerce or by special 1
. . principle may not be taken too Iigh t y,
this,. ut m .or er that. the
Jaws, any-deficiency in the latter shall be suppli_ed by the provisions .
let 1t be noticed . . 1es announced
that 1t 1s identical wi"th th e princ1p
df the Civil Gode. Thus, in Insular v. Sun Life, 41 Phil. 269, the by a considerable number of respectable courts in the United
Supreme Court held that there was no perfection of a life annuity States. xx x
because there was no acceptance of the contract. The Supreme Court The Court holds that the contract for a life annuity in the
applied the rules on contracts under the Civil Code in view of the cas~ at b~ was not perfected because it has not been proved
absence of any provision in the Insurance Act relative to the manner sat1sfactonly that the acceptance of the application ever came
by which a contract is perfected. Thus, the Supreme Court observed to the knowledge of the applicant.
and ruled:
Also, it has been held that the word "loss" in Section 3(6)
While, as just noticed, the Insurance Act deals with life of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is determinable under the
insurance, it is silent as to the methods to be followed in order concept given to it by the Civil Code in accordance with Article
that there may be a contract of Insurance. On the other hand, 18 providing for the suppletory nature of the said code (Ang v.
the Civil Code in Article 1802 not only describes a contract of life American Steamship Agencies, Inc., 19 SCRA 631). However, not all
annuity markedly similar to the one the Court is considering, deficiency in the Carriage of Goods by the Sea Act can be supplied
but in two other articles, gives strong clues as to the proper by the Civil Code. Hence, in Dole Philippines, Inc. u. Maritime Co.
disposition of the case. For instance, Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, 148 SCRA 119, the Supreme Court rejected the
provides that "In matters which are governed by special laws, contention of the petitioner that the one-year prescriptive period for
any deficiency of the latter shall be supplied by the provisions making a claim for loss or damage under Section 3, par. 6 of the
of this Code" [now Article 18 of the Civil Code]. On the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was tolled by making an extrajudicial
supposition, therefore, which is incontestable, that the special
demand pursuant to Article 1155 of the Civil Code which should be
law on the subject of insurance is deficient in enunciating the
principles governing acceptance, the subject-matter of the Civil applied in a suppletory nature pursuant to Article 18 of the same
Code, if there be any, would be controlling. In the Civil Code code. Pertinently, the Supreme Court observed and ruled:
is found Article 1262, providing that "Consent is shown by the
The substance of its argument is that since the provisions
concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the thing
and consideration which are to constitute the contract. An of the Civil Code are, by express mandate of said code, suppletory
acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and special laws in
offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, matters governed by the latter [Article 18, Civil Code], and there
in such case, is presumed to have been entered into at the place
 LY RELATIONS LAW
PERSONS AND FAMI
"rt.le
30 Jut . 18 ON OF LAWS
EFFECT AND APPLJCATJ
* * * w1'th res pe ct to the toJJ·1ng 31
iciency in th C i
. "* ** a pa ten t def· d * * * pro vid ed for . e arr
bem g . . . t is su b· age as
of the prescr1pt1ve pe
rio
ipt10n un de r sa id Ac d_a by sea be decided in
d b S Act prescr Jec t to ing tr ansportation of gOO -
le 1155 of the Civil
Code on toU1·ng; a d the application of the pro
of Goo s. _Y seoafArtic ay n short a time aa P0saible;of the new Civil Code would
the prov1S1on da ma ge ma de on M 4 1972 visions of Article 1155 Period and permit delays
ole's claim for loss. or di • 1 d em and wh 1c " h •
wo uld t o1I or
because D itt en extraJU c1a 11 un necessarily extend thestions affecting transporta-
t d to 8 wr Ar t' 1
ic e
55 ·t
, i_ op era ted to tol lt in the set tlement of que intent and Purpose of the
amoun e ~n de r of Go od s b Y 8he ry to the clear
int err upt prescription un de r the Ca rri ag e ea tio * * tra
lawn,. con *"
• tion also in actions . h f h gu me nt ba s ed on
presc npmuch the sam e effect 1s t e ur t 'der arh
Act . To h ' h es t at th e rig hts an d or da mage but on
il Code w ic proVI t predicated upon loss
Article 1176 of the Civ rne d by the Cod Ho wever , for su its no the applicable rule on
ca rri ers sh all be go ve conversion of the goods,
obligations of common rs no t re gu la te de t lle ge d mi sd eli ve ry or de, namely, eithe r ten
years
cial law s in all ma tte t found in the Civil Co
Commerce an d by spe y
a re scr ipt ion is th~ quasi-delict, and not
the Civil Code. ~ brruealechonofprea wrscrittiptenioncoinntrthe
ac t or four ye ars for
~
Sea Act (Ang v.
r co ns ide rat·ion Ca rriage of Goods by
gh t me rit. wehigh tie 631).
Th ese arg um en ts mi Ir
as a ea dy rec eiv ed
a encies, Inc., 19 SCRA
t th at t h e ques~1~n ~ ;erican Steamship Ag
were it no t for the fac n tak en by Do le, in
the
ve rse ~o the pos1t10
definitive an sw er, ad . v. Americ
rine Insurance Co., Ltd
Yek Tong Lin Fire & Ma il. 1125]. Th ere, in a pa ra llel factu:~
3 Ph
President Lines, Inc. [10 ma ge to ca rg o sh ipp
ed
it to rec ov er for da
sit ua tio n, wh ere su ed mo re th an tw o
ye ars
o to M an ila wa s fil
by vessel from To ky , th e Co ur t rej ected
the
rec eip t of th e ca rgo
aft er th e co ns ign ee s' tol led th e pr es cri pti
ve
tra jud ici al de ma nd
co nte nti on th at an ex od s by Se a Ac t, viz
.:
in th e Ca rri ag e of Go
pe rio d pro vid ed for
iff .
en t of er ro rs pla int
"In the sec on d assig nm e co ur t a quo
at it wa s er ro r for th
ap pe lla nt arg ue s th int iff -ap pe l-
red th e ac tio n of pla
no t to ha ve co ns ide ma nd wh ich
th e ex tra jud icia l de
lan t su sp en de d by mo tio n to
to de fen da nt' s ow n
too k pla ce, ac co rdi ng tic e th at
dis mi ss, on Au gu st
22 , 1952. Th e Co ur t no
wh en th e
s sta tin g any da te
wh ile pla int iff av oid e all eg ati on
ila , it rel ies up on th
goods arr ive d in M an a pr ot es t wa s
n to dis mi ss th at
ma de in th e mo tio sh ow th at
filed on Au gu st 22,
1952 - wh ich go es to
en lay in g th e
co un se l ha s no t be
pla int iff -ap pe lla nt's co ns id er ati on
e th e Co ur t for th e
fac ts sq ua rel y be for dy de cid ed
ca se . W e ha ve alr ea
of th e me rit s of the e of Go od s by
rn ed by th e Ca rri ag
th at in a case go ve de of Ci vil
pr ov isi on s of th e Co
Se a Ac t, the ge ne ral t be ma de to
cri pti on sh ou ld no
Pr oc ed ur e on pr es ., G.R.
ap ply (Chua Kuy v.
Everett Steamship Corp
Co ur t no w
No . L-5554, M ay 27
, 1953). Si mi lar ly, th e
pr ov isi on s of
a ca se th e ge ne ra l
ho lds th at in su ch ot be m ade
(A rti cle 1155) ca nn
th e ne w Ci vil Co de ve th e' eff ec t
pli ca tio n wo uld ha
to ap pl y, as su ch ap pr es cr ip tio n
on e-y ea r pe rio d of
of ex ten di ng th e at te rs aff ec t-
is de sir ab le th at m
fix ed in th e law. It j
 ~
µts · 19-21 HUMAN RELATIONS 33
xxx xxx xxx
t under Article 19 are the
The elements of an abuse of righ
t or duty; (2) which is exercised
following: (I) There is a legal righ
int~nt of prejudicing or inju nng
Chapter 2 in bad faith; (3) for the sole
ses Corp_ u. Court of Appeals ,
ano the r x x x (Albenson Enterpri
2 11 SCRA 16).
HUMAN RELATIONS
e Committee in explaining
On the other hand, the 1947 Cod
enunciated in the said Article
rcise of Article 20 stat ed _that the said rule
E ry person must, in the exe per vad es the entire legal system,
and renders it impossible tha t
his duties, act with use another has violated some
Article 1~· t;: performance of a pers on who suffers damage beca
nd observe honesty and self without relief (Report of the
his righ~ a '" ne his due, and lega l provisi?n'. should find him
justice, give everyo Code Comm1ss1on, page 39).
good faith. contrary to law,
rticle 20_ Every person who, lippines u. Court of Appeals,
ther, shall In Development Bank of the Phi
A ,,·gently causes damage to ano 500 , the Sup rem e Cou rt said
:
willfully or neg 4 45 SC RA
e.
indemnify the latter for the sam of said provision. Good
fully causes loss or Malice or bad faith is at the core
Article 21. Any person who w!ll alleges bad faith has the duty to
trary to morals, fait h is pres ume d and he who
to another in a manner that 1s con rs to the stat e of the mind which
prove the same. Good faith refe
;~~d
. .
customs or public policy sha
ll compensate the
is man ifes ted by the acts of the
of the intention to abstain from
individual concerned. It consists
taking an unconscionable and
latter for the damage. ther. Bad faith does not simply
uns cru pul ous advantage of ano
ple negligence, dishonest purpose
, AC TS CO NT RA RY TO LAW connote bad judgment or sim
HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH conscious doing of a wrong, a
PUBLIC or some moral obliquity and
GOOD CU STO MS , AND e motives or interest or ill-will
AND AGAINST MORALS, of righ t" bre ach of known duty due to som
21 enu nci ate the "ab use fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or
POLICY. Articles 19, 20, and tha t par tak es of the nature of
rule of con duc t tha t is con sist
ent with to duty. It implies an inte ntion
doctrine. Article 19 provides a spit e and spe aks not in response
rela tion ship bet wee n and
am ong men harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
an orderly and har mon iou s to do ulte rior and unjustifiable
pla y 80
cep t of wh at is jus tice and fair motive.
and women. It codifies the con
son will be pre ven ted .
that the abuse ofri ght by a per rt of Appeals,
Acc ord ing to Albenson Enterprises Corp. u. Cou all oth er
t is commonly refe rred to aks of the gen eral san ctio n for
Article 19, known to contain wha 217 SC RA 16, Art icle 20 spe san ctio n.
sets cert ain stan dar ds which not esp ecia lly pro vide the ir own
as the principle of abuse of rights, pro vis ion s of law whi ch do exe rcis e
cise of one's righ ts but also \villfully or neg lige ntly , in the
may be observed not only in the exer Thu s, any one who , wh eth er ind em nify
es. These stan dar ds are the ses dam age to ano ther , sha ll
in the performance of one's duti of his leg al rig ht or dut y, cau
give everyone his due ; and to suff ered ther eby .
following: to act with justice; to his or her vic tim for inju ries
The law, ther efor e, recognizes
observ_e hon~sty_a~d g~d faith. con cern ed, the sam e 194 7
Cod e
rights; tha t in the ir exercise, Ins ofa r as Art icle 21 is
the pnmordial hm1tat1on on all des ign ed to fill in the "co unt less
gap s in
forth in Art icle 19 mu st be Com mit tee sta ted tha t it was
tte norms of human conduct set hel ple ss,
legal bec aus e recognized or man y vict ims of mo ral wro ngs
0
servtdedb. A right, though by itself the sta tute s, whi ch leav e so ral inju ry"
h 1
gran e Y law as such may nevert e ess become a sou rce of ally suff ered mat eria l and mo
some ill 1· Wh en a' righ eve n tho ugh the y hav e actu ple, 4 76
t · · · sion , pag e 39, Manuel u. Peo
ega ity. is exerc1s?d m _a ma nne r whi
ch (Re por t of the Cod e Com mis
does not conform with the 19 and Com mis sion con tinu ed, thu s:
results in damage to th norms ens hrm ed m Art icle SC RA 461 ). The 194 7 Code
ted
for which the wrong:no er, at be legal wrong is ther eby commit purview of the fore going
oer mus held responsible. "An example will illustrate the
year-old dau ghte r of X ' A
norm: JI.' seduces the nineteen
32
 34
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW ~
¾a, 19_2\
p..rtS, 19-21
. either has not been made, or can H\.J}.\,\N Rl'l.,\'l'IONs
- of marriage U d h not b
promise 'rl becomes pregnant. n _er t e present e 35
proved.• Thecnme,gi airl is above eighteen. years of1avva,
a s the .,- a Articles 19 20 a d
there 1s n0 . . action for breach of promise of ,,.. ge_ · ' ' n 21
·h n any c1vi1 . •..arrj these Articles, an act wh· h are related
Ne1t er ca ~ though a grievous moral wrong ha bage the basis for an award l~f causes injury~oeach other and, under
be fil ed There1ore, dh f . s e
. . d though the girl an er amlly have S"f" en v. Court of Appeals, 217 S~amages <.A!bens~nother may be made
mnntted, an dh " •ered
~ moral damage, she an er parents cannot b . under Articles 19 and RA 16). 'l'her . n Enterprises Corp.
mcalc~abl; damages. But under the proposed article sh l'lng 21 nd
. h f • • e and 1-1owever, Article 20 does ~: . t~at is, the::: a comm?n element
any action 1or uld have such a rig t o action. t
"willfully," or "negligently .,\ di~tinguish: the muS be intentional.
her parents wo · ,1btd.) act may be done either
Thus, at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing l'Ul In a case where a part·ttular
e
.
[werel approved , would . . remedY ,.1or
h" h . legal
vouchsafe adequate out by the d eputy administ government empl .
that· untold number of moral wron~s w ic. it is impossible for
"" · ht to provide for specifically m the statutes•
f~r obtaining b~nefits afte::~t~:nd strict\~ subj:~:: ~oa~:~~e~
human 1oresig situated were hber~lly granted t~nt while employees similarl
But, it may be asked, would not this_ proposed article rules were subst_antially complied h~ir benefits for as long as t~
affirmed the ruling of the lower with by them, the Sunreme Court
obliterate the boundary line betw~en morality and law? The court aw di .,
the goverr_iment employee on the basi ar _ng damages in favor of
answer 1s . . law draws i'ts
· that , in the last analysis every good
by observing and stating thu . s of Article 19 of the Civil Code
breadth of life from morals,_ from those. prmc1ples which are ' s.
written with words of fire m the consciei:ice of man. If this
premise is admitted, then the propose~ rule is a prudent earnest . As the Court said, the acts of p ft'
is, pursuant to procedure) b . e_1 ioner were legal (that
of justice in the face of the impossibility of en~ri:ierating, one by it does not follow, as rrti s' _ads he msiSt s in this petition, yet
one, all wrongs which cause damage. When it is reflected that 'th F
f a1 . or emphasis
L• ,1 a1 ' t at his a t
he had . c s were done in good
while codes of law and statute~ have chan~ed fr~m age to age, • ' no valid re •
a sudden with respect to M C . . ason to go legal" all of
0
the conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient moorings, employees who, as the Sant unb • smce he had cleared three
. igan ayan found ...__ 11 'mil l
one cannot feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute, as far circumstanced in that they all had . , were a. s1 ar y
as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to every their clearances were filed for .d pen?ing obligations when,
legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its official action." consi eration, warranting similar
superlative attributes.
. _T~e Codurt i~ convinced that the petitioner had unjustly
Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful d IScnmmate against Mr. Curio.
consequences upon the social order than that a person may with . · It is no defense t:1at the petitioner was motivated by no ill-
impunity cause damage to his fellowmen so long as he does not will (a grudge, according to the Sandiganbayan), since the facts
break any law of the State, though he may be defying the most speak for themselves. It is no defense either that he was after
sacred postulates of morality. What is more, the victim loses ~11, _complying merely with legal procedures since, as lthe Court1
faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the three retiring
relief. (Report of the Code Commission, pages 40-41). other employees. There can be no other logical conclusion that
he was acting unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio.
It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code, under which
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the
the petitioner was made to pay damages, together with Article
following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which 27, that the performance of duty be done with justice and good
is contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy; faith. In the case of Velayo u. Shell Co. of the Philippines, 120
3) and it is done with intent to injure (Albenson Enterprises Corp. Phil. 187 , lthe Court) held the defendant liable under Article 19
v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16). It presupposes loss or injury, for disposing of its property - a perfectly legal act - in order
to escape the reach of a creditor. In two fairly recent cases,
material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of such
Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 171 and Valenzuela u.
violation (Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association v. Court Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 1, (It) held that a princip~l is liable
of Appeals, 207 SCRA 343). under Article 19 in terminating the agency - agam, a legal
 ~
....rn f,l\ldlLY RELATIONS LAW Arta. 19,21 µt,S· 19-21 HlJMAN RELATIONS 37
pERSONS JUW
36 would deprive the agent of bonds and that she had ap
. ating the agencYSandiganbayan, 202 SCR.A obligation to the Bank, as sh!!:e~tly "the means to pay her
th
beD ter~ (Llorente u. granted several sugar crop loans OYf e fact that she has been
act - ~. te bUSJ.JleSS pS0,000 for the agricultural the total value of almost
195~ to 1956," there was
bis JegitJIDa no reasonable basis for the ~e~
though a person may not h
309). .
1
. the same princ1~:~ertheless undertake acts w~;e have rejected the lease agreem:r ~f D1rectors of petitioner to
pzoo.oo. nt ecause of a measly sum of
Fo~o~ ~ , he or sh~ caN tional Bank u. Court of Appeals ~
acted cnJI1lilhar ~n Philippine ta was mortga
• · anot e ,
iniure 7 where a sug
arquoa
ged to the PNB a~d
b th d ht
otment made y e e or to a thir
a or disapproving the proposed
rtgaged to the Bank th
~=~te
While petitioner had the u1 •
a_uthorithy of approving
~mce t e quota was
'. e 1atter certainly cannot escape its
scRA 23dch sugar quota all f the pNB and where the responsibld rno . ..
of observing' for the protecti·onote •
f hmtere
lease of s Ull' . ed the consent
0
or and the lessee that PNB 'llhl~ respons · ibility d st
rson reg ld the 1ess . ·• 1.1.1 of pnvate respon ents, that degree of care, precauti.on and
f the same to t thereof was increased from P2 50 . . hi h th . ·ustly demand m · approvm · g
pe
and the lessee a""e. d . e w . c e circumstances 1
Vigilanc
officers ~he lease if the amoun n the lessor . 'd .,. e or disapproVlllg the lease of said sugar quota. The law makes it
approve d whereupo ,
to p2.so per picul ~n m ted even the V1Ce-pres1 ent of the banJt impe~ative that every person "must in the exercise of his rights
to the increase which prm3 pBoard of Directors the approv
al of th and m the performance of his duties, act wi'th JUS ·
· ti'ce, give
to recommend to the P tly was twice turned down by the 'sai~ everyone hi_s .due, and ob?erve _h?nesty and good faith" (Article
lease but which: conse !;~ ;aise the consideration to P3.0Q Per 19 of the Civil Co?e). This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it
Board because 1t wan l by the lessee of the amount of P2 80Q ' knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its
. to the oss deliberating . h . ' disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable
picul, resulting after on the ot er important
to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the
the Supreme Court, ding the case, observed and ruled, to wit: reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding
circumstances surroun .
circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently
. estion that Tapnio's failure dto utilize liable for damages caused on private respondents. Under Article
There 1s no qu 957 ~as ue to the
ta for the crop year 1956-1 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who willfully causes loss
h~r sugaralquof th lease by the Board of Dl.l'ectot·rs · of the · or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
disapprov
.. Tho · e therefore , is whether or not pe 1tloner 1s good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
petitioner. e issue,
liable for the damage caused. the damage." The aforecited provisions on human relations were
AB observed by the trial court, time is of the es~ence in intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by
i
I the approv al Of the
lease of sugar quota allotments, smce the
..
u t be utilized during the milling season, because any
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
same m s illi' provide in the statutes.
'll allotment which is not filled during such m ng season may be
reallocated by the Sugar Quota Administration to other holders
ii' of allotments. There was no proof that there was any other Also, in a case where a person sold a parcel of land to anothe r;
;;;/ person at that time willing to lease the sugar quota allotment thereby transfe rring title to such other person and subsequently
the
the
of private respondents for a price higher than P2.80 per picul. same transfe ror claimed and misrepresented that the title to
"The fact that there were isolated transactions wherein the said land was lost during the second World War, which enabled him
consideration for the lease was P3.00 a picul," according to the to procur e anothe r title which he used to have the same proper
ty
trial court, "does not necessarily mean that there are always sold to anothe r person with the active participation of the registe
r
ready takers of said price." The unreasonableness of the position of deeds and the lawyer-son of the said register of deeds, who both
adopted by the petitioner's Board of Directors is shown by the r of
knew of the first sale, the Supreme Court held that the registe
fact that the difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul
offered by Tuazon and the P3.00 per picul demanded by the deeds and his lawyer-son
Board amounted only to a total sum of P200.00. Considering
that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were are likewise civilly liable for failure to observe honesty and
secured by the chattel m rt .
ent good faith in the performance of their duties as public officer
of leasehold ri hts and _o gage on standmg cro~s, assignm and as member of the Bar (Article 19, New Civil Code) or for
J
g mterea ts on her properties, and surety
 ~
38

pERSONSANDFAMJLYRELA
tly caus1n

TIONSLAW
. g damage to ano.the .
r (Article 20,
sing loss or mJury to another

Arts. 19,21 p.ris- 19-21

!hrU
he rig ht of respondent

HlJMAN RELATIONS
its authorized officers.
Lungsod Corp. to conduct its ope
rations

39
'
•Jifull or negligen illfullY cau d customs andJo r
WI c ·Y . ,,_,1e), or •
for w rary to morals , goo ._, d La. h
N w 1V11I.JOU ont il Code) (Vua. e ig v. Cou
rt Significantly, while a breac of proIIllS .
e to marry is not
. e anner that is c N w Civ actionab1e (Gashem Shooka
t Baksh
in a III . (Article 21. e to formall v. Court of Appeal
s, 219 SCRA
public pahc~ scRA 294). t5) , it ha s bee n held tha t
of Appeals ,
2 . . .
re denied irrigati 1 spe nd f?r all the wedding pre
and
::et_
a wedding and go through
licity, only to
. where the petitioners we matrimon p ations and pub
er to ma ke the m vacate e1r
tho·n walk ou t of it when the
is pal paJ was abo~t ~ be
solemnized, is
In the same vein, 1 t i·n ord d t 'ltd e .the plaintiff8 a dif fer ent ma tte r. This
· farm os
eld tha t the defen an s VIO ~ defend Y and un1 ustifiably contrary to
water for the_ir
to the lat ter by the unJust
ifie d diver 1. good cus tom s for which the t
landholdings, it was ~ dj
werable for
11 h Ar tic l~t US be ~e~d ans
ard of damages unde~ Art
icle 21 ca~ ~ daillages in accordance wit _of ~he Civil Code (Wassmer
rights and caused ~:~ ~h /:w are protecte~ v Velez, 12 SCRA 649). In
the sam
d tha t for
SCRA 329). Also, cre dit ors e a woman e vteh~• it ~astbee. ld his
n hel
of the water for whi!AC, 137 er, any•thir . Illa rrie d ma n to forc is wi£
d to defra~d the m. Fu rth no 0
_to _lus t
made (Magbanu v. intende ll be liable!' d a on of the rights of his e. _yie
tracts ther to violate his
con tra ct sha con stit ute s a cle ar violati e~t1t~ed
er Article 21 f th c·':ctim e (Qu imi gum g
d Ar . 1or wh ic~
in cases of conuce 20 and
hO ind s ano act ing par ty a1so un er bcles b her to com pen sat ion und ila . Go e ivil Cod
person w to the oth er contr . L Compan,y ' 20 rcao 34 SCRA 133). Sim r1Y, m ashem Sh 00 k0 t Baksh u. urt
Co
damages ·viJ COd (Peonl e's Bank v. Dahican um er v. l.' '
21 of the Ci e r
of Ap,ner
als , 219 SCRA 115 , the Supreme Court ruled:
SCRA 84). vers' group, clai,m ing to prote... able purpose of Article 21 the
I .mil 1 in a case where a dri . 1 t spo rt a t'1op . ." compan,;,i, I_n the light ?f_the above laud ' .
I ar ran so hold , that where a man,s promise
SI ar y,
t f all drivers of a par tic 'd
u d ":' · Y Court 1s of. the. opm1on, and his
I . . .
the mterestesot of certain policies oft he sa1 · com pan y, ec1 ded to take mate cause of the acceptance of
. · th C o~ C~~a•~_ .·,
route
· to ma rry is m fact the p_roxi resentation to fulfill that promise
and mpro pney ser ~ce m . e oge love by a woman and his rep
I over the operation of the jee ss1i ~ a.pd in ate cause of the giving of herself
the Public ~erVIce Comm1 thereat:ter ~ecomes the proxims proof that h h d, m ality
'
without authorization from pan y to operate its sexual congres , ea · re ,
I
· l ti' of the right of the
tra nsp ort ati on com
.fi f bl' . unt· t . m af
o him
and that the promise was only a
I
con venience , no m ention o marrying her
vto a onin the said route und er its cert1 cat e o, pu d .1c. device to entice or inveigle her
to
sem·ces ed the lo~ er co urt s ec1
s1o n a~arding subtle scheme or deceptive ld
the Supreme Court affirm consent to the sexual act, cou
nsp ort ati on com pan y by
observing and ~cce_pt him and to obtain her ause
damages in favor of the tra s pursuant to Article 21 not bec
Justify the award of damage eit
because of the fraud and dec
of such promise to marry but to her honor and reputation
Ii
..
I,:
ruling, to wit:
x x x Although there is
exercise their constit\ltional
no question tha t petitioner
right to redress their grie
vances
can
this

behind it and the willful inju

which followed thereafter.
injury should have been com

ry
It is essential however, that
mitted in a manner contrary
such
to
p., the manner by which morals, good customs or pub
lic policy.
with respondent Lungsod Cor ine
:1 exercised should not underm ent Court found that it was
I constitutional right is to be rights In the instant case, respond
should it violate the legal and deceptive protestations of
love
l public peace and order nor th~t the petitioner's "fraudulent
of the Civil Code provides intiff that made her surrender
her
of other person . Article 21
I
! any person who willfully cau
ses loss or injury to anothe
rals, good customs or public
r in a '
policy
for and promise to marry pla
virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the hon
est
s
manner that is contrary to mo ld keep said promise, and it wa
damages. The provision cov
ers a, and sincere belief that he wou on on appellant's part tha t
s~all ~ompensate the latter for lated by likewise these fraud and
decepti
a legal right which was vio ee to their daughtets living-in
with
s1tuatio~ where a person has public made plaintiffs parents agr
an~ther m a manner contrary
tomorals, good customs orerw posed marriage." In short, priv
ate
or injury, material or oth
ise, him preparatory to their sup sion
pol~cy. It presupposes loss virginity, the cherished posses
ult of such violation It is
clear respondent surrendered her ~o~al
which one may suffer as a res because oflust but beca~s~ of
e that petitioner formed ~ of every single Filipina, not
bar rica de m 1ts
th this
from e. facts of ov cas ted by the Code Comm1ss1on
. of the seduction, the kind illustra
and forcibly took . er th e· µiotor units and personnelies and
d
paralyzed the usual activit example earlier adverted to.
res ~n en: c~rporabon. This violate.cl
the period of ten days and
earmngs o t e latter during
 ~
40

pgRSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW

Arts. 19,2
1
~ 8• 22-23
HUMAN RELATIONS
t a dem and lette r to the susp ct'

41
l
xxx yer making outright
xxx sefl satio ns agai nst the suspect dese -~ e~plo
xxx nce showing that there
case for w . accu a possibility that payment wa 8pi :vide
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this the Supreme Court held
been im htl, wast the company violated the abu ~a .e, under Articles
indeed, th• pri" " respondent ,nay not h"' flied and 21 in unduly sendin se \ nght doctrine
,ubm itt,d O tba
by the """ t of intenth>n•, ,1,e e,,nt u,Jly 19, 20 ~pect's reputation in the g sue f a letter
intended to tarni sh
but bee th,
"""" "" ;n ,.,uo l co -• not out of lust, tbe ~ said that "to malign res; y;s o h:r
employer. The Supreme
she had 4/r8e of
moral seduction. In fact, it is appa rent that enft without substanti. alhevide nce
as she fo and
ms of CoU d spite the latte r's possess·n f
conscience about the entire episode for as soon 1 nd e ly impermissible" wn o enough evi.dence m er avor,
all she ~ ?Ut
that petitioner was not going to marry her after petition e t him.
the
a
is clear .
She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with b h
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offen
se or cri e~. Pari While a seller has a right to verify wh ether or not a uyer as
conceded~~ equal h ase, t h e Supreme Court held m · CCI u. Qu mane - s,
in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it could be Pal
.d her pure5822 O b gh
is merely in delicto.
at she
G.J:l. No: 17 cto er l3, 2013, that when the seller, throu
th nt despite the latte r
le .
"Equity often interfered for the relief of thehr ss filty of
speculation, accused e ?uyer of non-payme
payment and eve n sent a 1etter t o
the parties, where his transgression has
been shawing the , seller a receipt. of
ayment using accusatory
by the imposition of undue influence of the
party oug t about the buye rs ~mp1oyer report~ng such non-p
whom the
on wher h'1 investigation thereby
burden of the original. wrong principally
rest s, or langu~g~ with out conductmg a thorough
red by fraud ,, e s for damages for abuse
consen to t he transaction was itself procu hum ihatm g the buyer, the seller can be liable
t
of right .
ever no damages can be recov ered unde r Articles 19 23, 2015, where
. d 1
of vo untariness In BDO v. Gomez, G.R. No. 199601, November
I
~

d
How
21
'
where the sexual intercourse 1s a pro uct
:d mutual desire (Hermosisima v. Cour
~ 9), Thus, in Constantino v. Mendez, 209
~ 62
ti was shown that, where a man invited the
after meeting in a resta uran t a~d that the
I cted to the man and that
old then and admitted that she was attra
sexual intercourse trans pired between the
confessed that he was married, the Supr eme
the claim of the woman that she was dece
representation that he would have his marr
wife annulled and there after he would marr
1., •. I
!. I
that no damages under Articles 19 and 21
11 'I
woman because the attra ction to the man
fl
I I
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been
because of a promise of marriage, she
severed her sexual relation with the man
could have immediately
was a marr ied man. Her
t of Appeals, 109 Phil.
SCRA 18, where it
an employer deducted from its employee
salar y equi vale nt to what the employer believ
a certain amount of her
ed was the amount of
the investigation was
money it had lost throu gh her negligence while
woman to go to a hotel the employer abused its
still pend ing, the Supreme Court ruled that
woman was 28 years
righ t in the conduct of disciplining its empl
oyee.
In Coca-Cola v. Spouses Bernardo, G.R. No. 1906
67, November
two even after the man
7, 2016, whe re a corporation promised
to renew the exclusive
Court, in disregarding
distr ibuto rship of a dealer provided the latte
r gave a list of its clients
ived by the man in his
to the form er and where such dealership
was not renewed but the
iage with his present
corporation inste ad directly contacted the
clients of the dealer and
y her, accordingly held
ts to directly deal with
can be awar ded to the crea ted a sche me making it costly for the clien
the deal er, the Supreme Court ruled that the
corporation was in bad
was the reaso n why she
faith and abus ed its rights and can be liable
for damages.
indu ced or deceived
whe n she was informed

Article 22. Every person who through an

performance by another, or any other mean
or comes into possession of something at

act or
s, acquires
the expense
after their first sexual intercourse that he
ths, they repe ated their return the
declaration that in the following three mon of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
ion and not the alleged
sexual intercourse only indicated that pass same to him.
that mad e her submit ing
promise of marriage was the moving force Article 23. Even when an act or event caus
th~ fault or
hers elf to the man. damage to another;s property was not due to
be hable for
In California Clothing, Inc. v. Quinones, G.R.
No. 175822, negligence of the defendant, the latter shall
benefited.
thou gh havi ng a right indemnity if through the act or event he was
October_23, 2013, where a clothing company,
from its store , nevertheless
to quest10n a person suspected of steal ing
 PER SON S AND FAM ILY REL ATIO
NS LAW
42 J\i.te, 2•~-2a
on can clai
UN JUS T ENR ICH ME NT. No pers or she sh 1r;
Wha t •8
ce, he
vali dly and lega lly his or hers . Hen
s. not mer itor ious lyo~ d not ,_/
prof it on som ethi ng whi ch doe
cle 22, nam ely, the elon g tolld~ly
or her. This is the conc ep~ of Arti
whe re an orig in 1 frev enti 0 hillJ
unju st enr ichm ent. Thu s, in a case
er whi ch, thou gh p atl UYer b 4ti
deli vere d the sa ~r ~ unPa i~ !rht
170 ca van s ofp ala y from the sell
said orig inal buy er late r sold and
g info rme d tha t t~ ric~ to a t~!he
pers on who , in turn , upo n bein
the orig inal sell er,: said _ cava
''Q(j
pala y was not yet full y paid fro1:1 as re1nibl.Qri of
to the orig inal b
of the amo unt of mon ey he paid
ala y, the Sup rem 6er but did sed
deli ver bac k the sub ject ca van ofp e ourt , refe ~~
d:
to Arti cle 22, obs erve d and rule
pric e by Cha n L ·
Hav ing been repa id the purc hase
volu ntar ily resc ind Jn, the
sale , as betw een them , had been
eby dive sted of any c~ '. and
the peti tion er-d efen dan t was ther
he shou ld retu rn the ~lln to
the rice .· Tech nica lly, ther efor e,
r, aga in from the peti ;!ce to
Cha n Lin, but sinc e even the latte
oted , was read y to i~ne r.
defe nda nt's own test imo ny abov e-qu
r's driv er den ies that tie ~rn
the rice to San dova l, and the latte
efen dan t eith er to him e rice
had been retu rned by peti tion er-d
er-d efen dan t shou ld re~r to
Cha n Lin, it follo ws that peti tion
efen dan t can not be allo weI :
the rice to San dov al. Peti tion er-d
ense of ano ther by hold ing
unju stly enri ch him self at the exp
to him . In law and in equ itn
to prop erty no long er belo ngin g
reco ver the rice , or the val: ,
ther efor e, San dov al is enti tled to '.1
pric e ther efor (Ob ana u. Gour;
ther eof sinc e he was not paid the
ofApp eals , 135 SCR A 557 ) .
cer tain properties, without
Also , in a cas e whe re the rec eive r of
ted him as receiver, entered in
app rov al of the Cou rt tha t app oin
y he bou nd him self liable as
an ind emn ity agr eem ent whe reb
cor por atio n und er receivership,
prin cipa l to the obl iga tion s of the
por atio n sou ght pay men t of the
suc h tha t the cre dito r of the cor
em ent s ma de on a the ater owned
con stru ctio n mat eria ls and imp rov
ip from the said rece iver who
by the cor por atio n und er rec eiv ersh
t the the ate r was adjudicated
eva ded pay men t on the gro und tha
to him and not the corporation
in ano the r cou rt cas e as bel ong ing
Cou rt hel d tha t it is but just
und er rec eive rsh ip, the Sup rem e
bur se the cre dito r of the cost
tha t sai d own er-r ece iver sho uld reim
ate r as he ben efit ed from it and
of imp rov eme nts ma de on the the
fur the r obs erv ed and rule d:
obli gati on due the
Moreover, it will be recalled tha t the
rep rese nted the cost of
Paciiic Mer cha ndis ing Cor por atio n
~
p.rts· 22-2 3 ffl1MAN RELATIONS 43 1
.
mat eria ls used in the const
llot ~f the Paris Thea tre. The re
cannot_ be any ques tion tha~ :on
d ch impr ovem ents, in the final
anal ysis , redo unde d to th
e and _perB?~al prof it of
appe llan t _Paja rillo beca us: ~h:a ?tag
Judg men t m Civil Case No.
5020 1, whic h was in subs t
Of
ahffirmed by the App ellat.e Cou rt
orde red that the "possessioancfe
n ° t e land s , build ings, equi· pme nt,
furn iture , and acce ssor ies* **" th e thea ter be tran sfer red to
said appe llan t as own er there of. of
As the trial cour t ap tl Y observed "*. * * it · onl y s1.
· 1s ·mple
·usti ce that Paja rillo shOuld
J uld be enri chin g hi mself p~y for the said claim ; othe rwis e, he
wost of cert ain mate ri l th with out
a · h l · tiff ,or
. p _ymg t e P am
" th e
* It is
a s at wen t mto its cons truct ion * *
co •
argu ed, how· everf , that he did so only a rece iver x x x u
as ·b tall of
to Paja rillo by virtu e
the pr«;>perties O _Leo _ei:iterprises pass
ed on
men t ID Civil Case No. 5021 0 * * * . "The oma n
R La w
of ·the· Judg m t zocup ze t an· po t es t "
l f «u
prin cip e .o .nem o . cum alter ious detr;• en o) and
is emb odie d ID_Arti cle 22 (Hum an
Rela tions Arti cles 2142
Civil Cod e Lon g befo re
to 2175 (Qua si-C ontr acts ) of the New
ever , the prin ci~le of unju st
the. enac tme nt _of t_h is Code, how
y lega l syst em, was alre ady
enri chm ent whi~ h is _basi~ in ever on.
expr essl y reco gmz ed ID this juris dicti
As earl y as 1903 , in Pere z v. Pom ar,
2 Phil. 682, th[e] Cou rt
rule d tha~ whe re one has rend ered
serv ices to anot her, and
latte r, in the abse nce of proo f
thes e serv ice~ are acce pted by the
uito usly, it is but just that he
that the serv ice was rend ered grat
atio n ther efor beca use "it is a
shou ld pay a reas onab le rem uner
no one shou ld be perm itted to
well -kno wn prin cipl e of law, that
her." Sim ilarl y in 1914 , [It]
enri ch him self to the dam age of anot
even in the abse nce of stat ute,
decl ared that in this juris dicti on,
one pers on may not
"* * * und er the gene ral prin ciple that
enri ch him self at the expe nse of
anot her, a judg men t cred itor
the purc hase pric e of land sold
wou ld not be perm itted to reta in
as the prop erty of the judg men t debt
or afte r it has been mad e to
had no title ther eto * * * ." The
app ear that the judg men t debt or
h spri ngs from the foun tain
fore goin g equi tabl e prin cipl e whic
{ ce are appl icab le to the case at
bar (Pac ific
of good cons cien
Mer cha ndis ing Corporation u. Consola
cion Insu ranc e & Sur ety
· Co., Inc. , 73 SCR A 564) .
In Rep ubl ic v. Ball oca nog , G.R. No.
163 794 , Nov emb er 28,
in good fait h inv este d mo ney
200 8, 572 SCR A 436 , whe re a pers on
s on lan d whi ch he bel iev ed
to dev elop and grow frui t-be arin g tree ber land belo ngi ng to the
as his own but whi ch turn ed out
as tim
ed the own ersh ip of the Sta te
Sta te, the Sup rem e Cou rt recogniz
per son the val ue of the act ual
ove r the lan d but ord ered it to pay the
arly , the Sup rem e Cou rt said :
imp rov eme nts he mad e. Mo re part icul
 PERSON S AND FAMILY RELATI ONS LAW
44
Att..~t~
To order Reyes to simply surrend er all of th ~ - 24
bearing trees in favor of the State - because the dee· ~Se i'- ·t HllMAN R"E:LA110Ns
. 1s1on .-ll.l.
reversio n case declarin g that the land 1s part of inalien b in. th. 45
land and belongs to the State is already final and im a le fores~ As for Article 23 it lik .
would inequita bly result in unjust enrichm ent of t:utabl e _ 'fhe 1947 Code Com~issio:w:1lsle seeks to -prevent . .
1 U8trate to . Un)u8tennchme
the expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith . e S t ate at 8• Wit: nt.
For example.· w·t'-
l ,,,out A'
Nemo cum alterius detrime nto locuple tari p _ cattle w th~ cultivate 8
basic doctrin e on unjust enrichm ent simply means tho~e st· 'I'b.i~ · destroyed h.1ghland
b u t B 's cro-p 18
llnow\edg e a 11.- ~ ~-', .
d• rue A o,• B• A •'s catt' """ uuves bis
shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himsel f ine a _a Person benefi d l
. 1
, '
, e are saved,
ro te . t 18 but right an d el\\Utab\
• . was not at fault b t ,.
, u ue was
another's expense . There is unjust enrichm ent whequi tably at B v,eport of the Code Com.mis . e that he should indemnif y
unjustl y retains a benefit to the loss of anothe r Blon, pages 4.l-42) .
or whn a Person
re~~s mone~ or. propert_y of anothe r against' the fu.nda ena
Persoi{ A.rtic\e 24. \n a\\ cont
prmc1p les of Justice, equity and good conscie nce. Art· i111enta1 relations, when one of \he pa::~ '• pro~n'1 or other
the Civil Code states the rule in this wise: lC e 22 of
accoun t of his mora\ depend 1
~ a\ a disadvantage on
me·n ta\ weakness tende ence, Ignorance, indigence,
. ' rageo ro\h
ARTIC LE 22. Every person who, throug h an H,
courts must be '1igi\ant for his protect:n.hand\cap, the
act of perform ance by anothe r, or any other means q
acquire s or comes into possess ion of someth ing at th~ ii
COURT VIGILA NCE
expens e of the latter withou t just
(IJ · Th. e_ courts must render Justice
. .
shall return the same to him.
or legal ground •IH therefo re, they m~st be very vigilant m protecting tb.e rigb.ts otand,tb.e
' 1..1~ disadv antage~ with t~e :nd. in view tb.at any decision will be in
The requisi tes for the applica tion of this doctrin e V'> conson ance w 1th what 1s ngb.t and legal. Thus, in De Lima u. Laguna
presen t in the instant case. There is enrichm ent
Tayaba s Company, 160 BCRA. 70, wb.ere tb.e pauper litigant s, who
on the P~
of the petition er, as the State would come into possess ion of 1 were the aggriev ed parties in a collision case whlcb. was pending for
~
and may technic ally approp riate - the a long time with the Court, appealed. tb.e decision ot tb.e lower court
more than one thousan tl
fruit-be aring trees planted by the private respon dent. Theri/ to the Court of A1rpeals on some pomts oflaw but not on tb.e q,uestion
is of the interes t which they believed. sb.ould be award.ed. to tb.em, the
impove rishme nt on the part of Reyes, becaus e he stands to lose Suprem e Court, becau~ e of the sp~ial circumstances oi tb.e case and.
the improv ements he had painsta kingly planted and investe
d of the litigan ts, decided to ad.opt a liberal view and. d.ecided even tb.e
in. There is lack of valid cause for the State to acquire these
improv ements , becaus e, as discuss ed above, Reyes introdu issue on the interes t which was not ap-pealed in the Court of A.-p-peals
ced
the improv ements in good faith . by observ ing and ruling, thus:
The prohibi tion agains t unjust enrich ment likewise At any rate, the Court is inclined to ad_o~t a liberal stance
applies to the Govern ment. Thus, in Republ ic v. Lacap, in this case as lt has done in previous dec1S1ons where_lt has
G.R. No.
158253 , March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA held. that litigatio ns s~ould, as much as \JOSsible, be dec1d.ed on
255, where the contrac tor
who was engage d by the govern ment was found out to their merits and. not on technicality•
have
an expired license in violatio n of the law, the Suprem e Court . k te of the fact that \)etitioners are
The Court ta es no h the may not have a\)-pealed ,
ruled that this will subject the contrac tor to penalti es but litigatin g as -pau-pers. Altho~g
it Ysid.eration with the Court
would not deprive him of the payme nt due him. The Suprem they had filed. their motion ;~ r~o:ct on it. By reason ot their
e
Court said, "Since respon dent had render ed service s to a quo which unfo~unately . e~obut -petitioners 1)e Lima and
the
full satisfa ction and accepta nce by petitio ner, then the· foi:m~r indigen ce, they failed_to ap-pu tation ma\ung reforence to the
should be compe nsated for them. To allow petitio Requijo had filed. their man eshi h they base their \ltayer for
ner to acquire •
the finishe d project at no cost would law and. juris-prud.ence,:-pon ";led.ca brief.
undou btedly constit ute . . t't' oner r 1ores u
unjust enrich ment for the petitio ner to the prejud ice rehef whi1e -pe 1 1 . '- uld. be construed.
of · the medial laws sno .
respon dent. Such unjust enrich ment is not allowe d by law." Pleadin gs as well as re have ample op\lortumty
h litigants may
19.'/I liberall y in ord.er t h at t e
j(
,.-
.. ~··-
~·-··
PERSONS AND FAMILY 1rnw -, l\tta. 25.
26
46
e den · 47
. tive claims and tha t a pos sibl of
Art. 26 HUMAN RELATIONS
tech nica litie s ma y be avo idtadl
to pursu~ ~ e1r _resxec to legal e .
substan tial 1ust1ce ue this cas e wh er
r the circ ums tances of e th for damages prevention nd
a
Moreover, un de •n the
'd h
traffic acc1 ent c ose not to
app 1 e produce _a cause of action '
. . . II ea in other rehef:
heirs of t.he VJctl m I ion com pan y w1t 1pay the dar na
tran spo rtat ges
t the r t 'd
e y sa1 corn " y,,, 1 another's residence;
th e hope tha
b
lower cou rt ut un1or huna ' h Pan ( ) Prying into the privacy of
awarded bY th e ea1s, w Jc s_tep w_a s obvious} turbing the private life or
still appealed to the Court of A~p thZt . (2) Meddling with or dis
righ ts of the said cla ima nts: family relations of anothe
r;
dilatory and oppressive of the th
cou rt for abo ut ~O yea rs from another to be alie nat ed
the case had been pending in era~ (3) Intriguing to cause
tha t as a~ exc ept ion to the gen
date of the accident in 1958 so e fro m his friends;
rs who did not app eal jud grn
rule aforestated, the said hei st~ ~ another on acc oun t of
reli ef by_the cou rt~ ~s it mu . (~) . Vexing or humiliating
should be afforded equit~ble The station in life, place of birt
h,
(see Ai:ticle ~4, ClVl~ Code). his r~hg1ous beliefs, lowly
vigilant for th~ir protect10~ sonal condition.
reas e m the ~nd emm ty sho uld
b physical defect, or other per
claim for legal inte rest and i~c th!
ure of the cla ima nts to app eal
~nte rtai ned in spite of the fail DIG NIT Y. The exp lan atio n
of t he
P~( ?TE CT ION OF HU MA N 26 in
Judgment. tive to the inc lusion of Art icle
1947 ClVll Cod e Com mis sion rela
elu cid atin g.
cut ed a con tra ct, imp lern
, the New Civ il Cod e is qui te
In a cas e wh ere the par ties exe ous proe?t_ ed it
pur sua nt to its una mb igu \1J.s1on8 onality is a concom itan t
for a len gth y per iod of tim e . The sacr edness of human pers
e, t h e S upr em e Cour t reJ ect
ed the 1 . , ation. The touchstone of every
and ben efit ed fro m the sam of every pla n for hum an amelior ,
d pu r: a i~ of and civilization of every cou ntry
sai d par ty wa s dis adv ant
age syst em of law s, of the cult ure is
one of the par ties tha t the s un :ant to legislat ion, inadequ ate reg ard
t it wa s pro ven tha t the par
tie is how far it dignifies man. If in
ty; if the laws do not sufficie ntly
Art icle 24 con sid erin g tha
len gthy neg otia tion s bef ore
said par ty wa s goo d in bus

the con tra ct wa s fin aliz ed

ine ss (Sps. Domingo v. Ast
.

and the~took
org a, G.: .
o.
:e observed for hum an life and safe
fore stal l hum an suffering or do
factors or influences tha t wou
sta tute s insufficiently protect

not try effectively to curb tho se

ld the noblest sentiments; if
persons from being unj ust ly
the
130982, Sep tem ber 16, 2005).
ly
an personality is not proper
hum ilia ted, in short, if hum is
ed defective. Sad to say, suc h
exalte d- the n the laws are inde .
agance in expenses e oflegislation in the Phi lipp ines
Article 25. Thoughtless extrav to some degree the present stat l
the laws is one of the principa
a period of acute public 1 To rem edy this grave fault in
for pleasure or display during
ed
e. Inst ances will now be specifi
stopped by order of the aims of the Proj ect Civil Cod
' want or emergency may be x x x (tex t of Article 26 omitted
).
i government or private an inviolab le righ t. Yet , the
courts at the instance of any The privacy of one's hom e is
effectively protect this right .
charitable institution. law s in force do not squ arely and
are mul tifarious, and yet
The acts referred to in No. 2 e.
ERGENCY. The law see ks the purview of the law s in forc
many of them are not within
EXTRAVAGANCE DURING EM dur ing t imes Alienat ion of the affection of
anothe r's wife or hus ban d, unl
ess
and ost ent atio us act ivi ties inage, is not condemned by the
to pre ven t inc ons ide rate vid es for the it con stit utes adulter y or concub ,
Art icle 25 spe cifi cal ly
pro ety. The re are num ero us acts
of em erg enc y. Ho wever , law, mu ch as it may shock soci
inj unc tio n: any whereby the hus band or wife
leg al sta ndi ng to see k an sho rt of criminal unfaithfulness,
I
entitie s wh ich are giv en s causing untold mo ral suff erin
g
bre aks the mar ital vows, thu
Ii gov ern me nt or privat e cha
rita ble ins titu tio n.
respect the dignity,
to the oth er spouse. Why sho
mat ter of a civil action for mor
uld not thes e acts be th e sub
al damages? In Am eric an law
ject
,
Article 26. Every person shall th ey are.
I personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors
Again, the re is the meddlin
g of so-called frie nds who
ins t
owing and similar acts, e member s of the fam ily aga
and other persons. The foll poison the mind of one or mor
a criminal offense, shall
though they may not constitute
r · pERSON:, , u --
48
I this manner, many a happy f
the other members. ; Why should not the law try t arnily .
broken ~p or e~t;a:!1o~ for moral damages? o stop t~:
bY creating a ciVl ture is that class of acts specified .
Of the same "~other to be alienated from his fri in No. 3.
intriguing to cause . . ends. .
. us are the acts ment10ned m No 4
tlessserio fh " 1·. . ·v
N.0 . . another on account o 1s re 1gious belie· eltin
or h_um1_l1a:g lace of birth, physical defect or other fs, low1!
statI?~ in Th: penal laws against defamation anfersona.J.
conditI~onars.e glaringly inadequate. Unfost
vexa on
Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to
heap
and disrepute upon another by reason of th e 1atte,
obl oquY
religion.
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with .,,_1
' I I · · 1·~ conte '
because of the latter s ow y stat10n m 11e. To a certa. lllpt
this is inevitable, from. the nature h of the social makin e-upextent
b administrative action that may be taken.
there ought to be. a limit . t ere, even
d somew . when the p enal •l ut
against defamat10n an ~nJ_us vexat10n are not trans aws
In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Th gressed.
will recognize it in each case. Social equality is not sou ;t courts
legal provision under consideration, but due regard fog d by the
and propriety. r ecency
Place of birth, physical defect and other personal c di . ,
are too often the pretext of humiliation cast upon person tions
tampering with human personality, even though the Pon\ Such
are not violated, should be the cause of civil action. ena laws
The article under study denoun~ed "similar acts" which
could readily be named, for they occur with unpleasant frequency
(Report of the Code Commission, pages 32 to 34).
In RCPI v. Verchez, G.R. No. 164349, January 31, 2006, where
a family in Sorsogon sent a telegram to another member of a family
in Manila asking for money for their ailing mother and where the
telegram-company was negligent in failing to send the telegram on
time and in not immediately informing the family of the reason for
the delay, thereby causing filial disturbance on the part of the family
as they blamed each other for failing to respond immediately to the
emergency involving their mother, the Supreme Court 'awarded
damages on the basis of Article 26(2) of the Civil Code considering
that the act or omissjon of the telegraph company disturbed the
peace of mind of the family. · ·
In Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736 June 26 2013, where
a neighbor installed .' video surveillance c;meras directed qn a
~ .¾
Art. 27 49
HUMAN RELATlONS
neighboring business office without the consent of the owner th~reof,
the Supreme Court ruled that such act violates the right to pnvacy
under Article 26(1) prohibiting the "prying into the pri~acy of
another's residence." The Supreme Court said that, considenng ~he
· Article
· ·1ar acts," business offices are inclu ded in
· 1u des "s1m1
1aw me
26(1) where the owner ''has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access."
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or employee refuses
rs or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official
du~ may file an action for damages and other relief
against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
RELIEF AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS. A public official
is supposed to be an agent or at least a representation of the
government; therefore, the law exacts on him or her, an obligation
to be very vigilant and just so that the public can be assured that the
government is truly effective in servicing their needs. Any person,
suffering from the refusal or neglect of any government employee or
public servant to perform his duties, is entitled to damages. Thus,
in a case where the president of a state college, in bad faith and
despite the decision and directives of the Office of the Bureau of
Public Schools, refused to graduate a student with honors, an award
which the student honestly earned and deserved, the Supreme Court
ruling that the award of damages in favor of the said student under
Article 27 was proper (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 449).
Thus, the Supreme Court said:
The Solicitor General tries to cover-up the petitioner's
deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it
was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the
Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless
the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have
done so considering that he received the decision on April 27,
1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the
case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of
only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the
decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform
the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner
likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith
which the appellate court correctly pointed in its decision, to wit:
"Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish
Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision, he could have used his