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ADMIN LAW MIDTERMS
ATTY. CHAVEZ
GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Definition / nature of administrative law
That branch of modern law under which the executive department of
the government, acting in quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity,
interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of
promoting the well-being of the community, as under laws regulating
public interest, professions, trades and callings, rates and prices, laws
for the protection of public health and safety and the promotion of
public convenience.
The primary function of the administrative agency is to enforce the
law, which it can actually perform even without exercising either
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power, which, if conferred upon it,
may be invoked or exercised by it only for purposes of enhancing its
enforcement prerogative and only within the confines of the
constitutional or statutory grand of either.
Roots of Administrative Law
The origin of Administrative Law is in the legislation and its
justification is expediency.
Doctrine of separation of powers
Under this doctrine, all rules of conduct are supposed to be laid down
directly by the legislature, subject to the (likewise) direct
enforcement of the executive department, and the application or
interpretation, also directly, by the judiciary.
The legislative and the judiciary departments no longer had time or
the need of expertise to attend to these new problems.
Doctrine of Delegation of powers
By delegation, therefore, the legislature is able to relive itself of the
responsibility to legislative directly on relatively minor matters and of
attending as well to the adjudication of essentially factual questions
that more properly pertain to the executive authorities. In this
manner, the legislature can concentrate on the matters of national or
greater significance.
Present Status
Administrative Law, at this point, must proceed on a trial-and-error
basis as it seeks to discover the most acceptable ways by which it
may ensure the proper enforcement of law with a minimum of
interference with individual rights.
Sources
1. Constitutional or statutory enactments creating
administrative bodies;
2. Decisions of courts interpreting the charters of
administrative bodies and defining their powers, rights,
inhibitions, among others, and the effects of their
determination and regulations;
3. Rules and regulations issued by the administrative bodies in
pursuance of the purpose for which they were created; and
4. Determinations and orders of the administrative bodies in
the settlement of controversies arising in their respective
fields.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections
88 SCRA 251, Nos. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979
Same; Administrative law; As the superior administrative body having control
and supervision over boards of canvassers, the COMELEC may review the
actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its
inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in question.—While
nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the
actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain
quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines
of May 23, 1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the
matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations
does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction conferred anywhere in the
Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And
in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting
citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control
over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have
done. Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387,
cited by petitioner, to the contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault
respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that
undertaken by the Board of Canvassers. On the contrary, it must be stated that
Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of
its envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of
elections and electoral processes and procedures in doing what petitioner
claims it should not have done.
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board, 192 SCRA 363, G.R. Nos. 95203-
05, G.R. Nos. 95119-21 December 18, 1990
Energy Regulatory Board; Due Process; Executive Order 172; While under
E.O. 172, a hearing is indispensable, the Board is not precluded from
ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase in the price of petroleum products.
—Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of a hearing,
have overlooked the provisions of Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172,
which we quote: "SECTION 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief.—The
Board may, upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any
stage thereafter and without prior hearing, on the basis of supporting papers
duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on motion of a party in
the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after
hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings, together with such
affidavits, documents and other evidence which may be submitted in support
of the motion, substantially support the provisional order: Provided, That the
Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty
(30) days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected parties. x x x
What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing
is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a
provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether
or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to
deny the application. Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts,
which are given ex parte, and which are subject to the resolution of the main
case.
Administration
Administration as institution
Refers to the aggregate of individuals in whose hands the rein of
government are for the time being. Refers to the persons who actually
run the government during their prescribed term of office.
Transitional in nature which actually mans the government, which, in
turn, is a more or less permanent fixture in every state.
Administration as a function
The actual running of the government by the executive authorities
through the enforcement of laws and the implementation of policies.
Any activities outside legislation and rendering of judicial decision
will come under administration.
Internal administration
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Covers those rules defining the relation of public functionaries inter functions are defined by law or regulation.” An instrumentality is deemed to
se and embraces the whole range of the laws of public officer. refer “to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
Internal administration consists, among others, of rules laid down in a department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
particular agency or office, like those prescribing work assignments endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
or jobs descriptions, uniform, procedures for the submission of
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
reports, and the like, all of which are imposed by the superior in said controlled corporations.”
office upon his subordinates.
The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial functions: “Quasi-judicial function”
External administration is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative
The relations of the public office with the public in general. The rules officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
prescribe thereunder do not necessarily affect the personnel of the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis
office but are promulgated for observance by those who have for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”
dealings or transactions with said office.
Separation of Powers; It does not depart from its basic nature as an
administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still,
Administration vis a vis Law administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the
Law Administration judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of
- An impersonal - Preventive rather than separation of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three
command provided with sanctions punitive and is accepted to more (3) great powers into its three (3) branches—the legislative, the executive, and
to be applied in case of violation. personal than law. the judiciary—each department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme
- Concerned only with - Has a more sympathetic
in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own
obedience to its mandate and not regard for the individual and seeks
fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary.
with the circumstances or excuses to spare him from the punishment
of the violator. of the law by persuading him to Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is
observe its commands. empowered “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
- May clarify certain discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
ambiguous provisions in the statues branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
through the issuance of
interpretative regulations meant to
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. The Executive Secretary, 531
make it easier for the people to
SCRA 583, G.R. No. 166052 August 29, 2007
understand and so obey the law.
- May however constitute The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over
a defect, permits a disregard or executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays
misapplication of the impersonal down a limitation on the legislative power. The Constitution’s express grant of
provisions of the law at the will of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out
those who are supposed to enforce reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
it.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature
ADMINSITRATIVE AGENCIES necessarily ordains an executive agency’s position in the scheme of
administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the
President’s continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As
Definition of administrative agency far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned,
A body endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers for the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a
the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it for particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad
enforcement or execution. authority to carry out reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of
1987 is one such law.
United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. vs. Commission on the
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the
Settlement of Land Problems, 353 SCRA 782, G.R. No. 135945 March 7,
Office of the President to any other department or agency, subject to the
2001
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
Administrative Law; Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
and efficiency. Gauged against these guidelines, the challenged executive
(COSLAP); Origin.—The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order
orders may not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in
No. 561 dated September 21, 1979. Its forerunner was the Presi dential Action
violation of the rule of law.
Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) founded on July 31, 1970 by virtue
of Executive Order No. 251. As originally conceived, the committee was
tasked “to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of land Categories of Administrative Relationships
disputes, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and 1. Supervision and control;
decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other solutions.” 2. Administrative supervision; and
It was given the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum 3. Attachment.
and to call upon any department, office, agency or instrumentality of the
government, including government owned or controlled corporations and local
government units, for assistance in the performance of its functions. At the Ley son, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman
time, the PACLAP did not exercise quasi-judicial functions. 331 SCRA 227, G.R. No. 134990 April 27, 2000
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC); Requisites—
An agency is defined by statute as “any of the various units of the Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL was a
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government owned or controlled corporation the employees of which fell
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of The Anti-
distinct unit therein.” A department, on the other hand, “refers to an Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. We upheld the jurisdiction of the
executive department created by law.” Whereas, a bureau is understood to Tanodbayan on the ratiocination that—While it may be that PETROPHIL was
refer “to any, principal subdivision of any department.” In turn, an office not originally “created” as a government-owned or controlled corporation,
“refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major after it was acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or controlled
functional unit of a department or bureau including regional offices. It may corporation, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its
also refer to any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it

“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34

was acquired to perform functions related to government programs and
policies on oil, a vital commodity in the economic life of the nation. It was
acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential
government or government-related functions, as the marketing arm of the
PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum products
to assure and maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply. But these
jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF
companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are
incomplete without resorting to the definition of “government owned or
controlled corporation” contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions
of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its
capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any
agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
Where there is no showing that certain corporations, majority of whose shares
are owned by the UCPB-CIIF, are vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, they are not within the
scope of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.
People vs. Sandiganbayan,
451 SCRA 413, G.R. Nos. 147706-07 February 16, 2005
Section 2(13) of EO 292 defines government-owned or controlled
corporations as follows: x x x From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a
government-owned or controlled corporation, and organized and incorporated
under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal
Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of
PPSB belongs to the government while the rest is nominally held by its
incorporators who are/were themselves officers of PHILPOST. The creation
of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354, otherwise
known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, “to
encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the
general public, especially the youth and the marginalized sector in the
countryside x x x” and to facilitate postal service by “receiving collections and
making payments, including postal money orders.”
Manila International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 495 SCRA
591, G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006
Administrative Law—Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock
corporation, MIAA does not qualify as a government-owned or controlled
corporation. What then is the legal status of MIAA within the National
Government? MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any
other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested
with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code defines a government “instrumentality” as follows: SEC.
2. General Terms Defined.––x x x x (10) Instrumentality refers to any agency
of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. x x x
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also
corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent
domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same
time, MIAA exercises “all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation
Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order.”
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally
autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
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machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The
MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a “separate and
autonomous body” will make its operation more “financially viable.”
Manila International Airport Authority vs. City of Pasay, 583 SCRA 234,
G.R. No. 163072 April 2, 2009
Administrative Agencies—A close scrutiny of the definition of “government-
owned or controlled corporation” in Section 2(13) will show that MIAA
would not fall under such definition. MIAA is a government “instrumentality”
that does not qualify as a “government-owned or controlled corporation.” As
explained in the 2006 MIAA case: “A government-owned or controlled
corporation must be “organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.” MIAA is
not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no
stockholders or voting shares. x x x”
University of the Philippines vs. Dizon, 679 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 171182
August 23, 2012
Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a
government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from
the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the
purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act
No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any
interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution,
constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should always be
aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to
auditing by the COA.
Republic vs. City of Parañaque
677 SCRA 246, G.R. No. 191109 July 18, 2012
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they
do not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition
before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC. Examples are the
Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the
University of the Philippines, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these
government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not
organized as stock or non-stock corporations as required by Section 2(13) of
the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. These government
instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government corporate entities.
They are not, however, GOCCs in the strict sense as understood under the
Administrative Code, which is the governing law defining the legal
relationship and status of government entities.
Nature
An arm of the legislature insofar as it is authorized to promulgate
rules that have the force of law by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power. Loosely considered a court because it performs
functions of a particular judicial character, as when it decides factual
and sometimes even legal questions as an incident of its general
power of regulation. Administrative agency pertains to the executive
department because its principal function is implementation for the
law in accordance with the policies and instructions laid down by the
legislature.
Administrative bodies endowed with quasi-judicial prerogative are
essentially executive agencies, and are not to be considered as courts,
or do not form part of the judiciary.
Agra vs. Commission on Audit
661 SCRA 563, G.R. No. 167807 December 6, 2011
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Definition of an “Incumbent”.—We
have defined an incumbent as “a person who is in present possession of an
office; one who is legally authorized to discharge the duties of an office.”
There is no question that petitioners were not incumbents as of June 30, 1989.
We have likewise characterized NEA as a GOCC in National Electrification
Administration v. Morales, 528 SCRA 79 (2007). Thus, Section 5.5 quoted

above, issued pursuant to the authority given to the DBM under Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6758, was correctly applied by the COA.
As petitioners were hired after June 30, 1989, the COA was correct in
disallowing the grant of the benefit to them, as they were clearly not entitled
to it. As quoted above, we have repeatedly held that under Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6758, the only requirements for the continuous grant of
allowances and fringe benefits on top of the standardized salary rates for
employees of GOCCs and GFIs are as follows: (1) the employee must be an
incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) the allowance or benefit was not
consolidated in the standardized salary rate as prescribed by Republic Act No.
6758.
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines vs.
Manalang-Demigillo, 681 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 176343 September 18, 2012
Administrative Law; Preventive Suspension―Under Section 51, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the imposition of preventive suspension by the
proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves
dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of
duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges
which would warrant his removal from the service. Section 51 nowhere states
or implies that before a preventive suspension may issue there must be proof
that the subor dinate may unduly influence the witnesses against him or may
tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office.
Yamane vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation, 474 SCRA 258,
G.R. No. 154993 October 25, 2005
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Congress; Jurisdictions; Statutes.
— The stringent concept of original jurisdiction may seemingly be neutered
by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which lists a
slew of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial tribunals or their officers
whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. However, the basic law of jurisdiction, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), ineluctably confers appellate jurisdiction on
the Court of Appeals over final rulings of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commission, by explicitly using the phrase
“appellate jurisdiction.” The power to create or characterize juris diction of
courts belongs to the legislature. While the traditional notion of appellate
jurisdiction connotes judicial review over lower court decisions, it has to yield
to statutory redefinitions that clearly expand its breadth to encompass even
review of decisions of officers in the executive branches of government.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine American Accident
Insurance Company, Inc., 453 SCRA 668, G.R. No. 141658 March 18,
2005
Administrative Law; Court of Tax Appeals—Dedicated exclusively to the
study and consideration of tax problems, the CTA has necessarily developed
an expertise in the subject of taxation that this Court has recognized time and
again. For this reason, the findings of fact of the CTA, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally conclusive on this Court
absent grave abuse of discretion or palpable error, which are not present in
this case.
Creation and Abolition
The administrative body may be created by the Constitution or by
Statute. Other administrative agencies have been created by, and
exclusively in the discretion of, the legislature. The agencies make up
the majority pf the coterie of officers that constitute the so-called
administrative department.
If created Constitution itself, the administrative body can be altered
or abolished only by constitutional amendment. But where the body
is created only by statute, the legislature that breathed life into it can
amend or even repeal its charter, thereby resulting its abolition, which
is justified if made in good faith and not attended by grave abuse of
discretion.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
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Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. DENR Region 12
Employees, 409 SCRA 359, G.R. No. 149724 August 19, 2003
Administrative Law; Department of Environment and Natural Resources—
This Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be simply
disregarded for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not
merely a game of technicalities. Time and again, courts have been guided by
the principle that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid
and technical manner, as rules of procedure are used only to help secure and
not to override substantial justice. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of
this Court to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.
Banda vs. Ermita
618 SCRA 488, G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010
The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise
of a delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31,
Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the Office
of the President, “in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.”
This is a matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization
of such an office through executive or administrative order is also recognized
in the Administrative Code of 1987.
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only
to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the
executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the
constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed
that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive
department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. x x x Stated alternatively, the presidential power to
reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is
subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which
results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees, would
be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718 (2001), we
even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office.
Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right to an office or salary.
Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, 677 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 196425
July 24, 2012
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional
and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct
anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing
office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required
no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA
through the establishment of a third division—the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division—through which ODESLA could take on the additional
functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority
but must also be pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried
out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency. It
appears in this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the
President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind. In its Whereas
clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of
eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and
efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the
reorganization is shown by the fact that while Congress had initially
appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC’s operation in the 2010 annual
budget, no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever
required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Advantages
Administrative agencies have the advantages not only of expertise
derived from specialized training and experience, but also of

adaptability to change and ease in reacting to new and even
emergency situations, given its flexible nature because of its basic
rule-making authority and adjudicatory prerogatives.
Unlike court of justice, they can initiate actions and not simply wait
for their jurisdiction to be invoked. They may, in addition, proceed to
the solution of the problems confided to their attention with more
expeditiousness and efficacy, owing to the flexibility of their powers,
than can ordinarily be expected from the legislature.
Relation to Regular Departments
In the exercise of the powers delegated to it by the legislature, the
administrative body acts as an agent of the law-making body and so
is bound to obey and implement the legislative will. Being a creature
of legislature, it enables the legislature to exert a great deal of
influence upon the administrative body that can impair its
independence.
Administrative agency pertains to executive department and so comes
under the constitutional control of the President, which control
generally cannot be withdrawn or limited even by the legislature.
Given the power of control exercised by the President over the
administrative agency, it cannot claim independence from the
executive department.
Courts can review, or even reverse, the administrative acts even of
the Chief Executive. The rules of procedure promulgated by
administrative bodies in connection with their exercise of their
adjudicatory functions are subject to the disapproval by the Supreme
Court, make the administrative body also subservient to the judicial
department.
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Powers
The powers of the administrative body are generally classified into
the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial.
Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) vs. National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC), 408 SCRA 678, G.R. No. 151908, G.R. No. 152063
August 12, 2003
Administrative Law; National Telecommunications Commission; Powers;
Quasi-Legislative Power—Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative
or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are
the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law,
and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations
may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to
what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which
are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict
between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
5
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. vs. International
Communication Corporation, 435 SCRA 55, G.R. No. 135992 July 23,
2004
Administrative Law; Public Utilities; Telecommunications; National
Telecommunications Commission—The power of the NTC to grant a
provisional authority has long been settled. As the regulatory agency of the
national government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities, it
is clothed with authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional
permit or authority. It also has the authority to issue Certificates of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and
maintenance of communications facilities and services, radio communications
systems, telephone and telegraph systems, including the authority to determine
the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications services. In this
regard, the NTC is clothed with sufficient discretion to act on matters solely
within its competence.
The power of the NTC in granting or denying a provisional authority to
operate a local exchange carrier service is a quasi-judicial function, a sphere in
which the DOTC cannot intrude upon—if at all, the service area scheme
provided in DOTC Dept. Circular No. 91-2660 is only one of the factors, but
should not in any way tie down the NTC in its determination of the propriety
of a grant of a provisional authority to a qualified applicant for local exchange
service.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
231 SCRA 292, G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
Administrative Law; Sec. 16 E.O. 192; A Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
under the office of DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of
the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of
pollution cases.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions
for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power
and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from
the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the
LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all
plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies
within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises
where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA
for the development of the region.
LLDA has the power and authority to issue a “cease and desist” order under
RA. 4850 and its amendatory laws. The cease and desist order issued by the
LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its
garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done
in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant
environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the
LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to “make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution.” (Italics for emphasis) Section 4, par. (d)
explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The power to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution is also expressly bestowed upon LLDA by E.O. No. 927, series of
1983. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule

that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied
in the exercise of its express powers.
PAB has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is
prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards
set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.
The relevant Pollution control statute and implementing regulations were
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive sovereign power to
protect the safety, health and general welfare and comfort of the public, as
well as the protection of plant and animal life commonly designated as the
police power.
The Quasi-Legislative Power
Definition
The authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative
body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of a law and implement legislative policy.
These regulations are regarded as “little laws possessed of the same
legal force and, perhaps, with even more efficacy than the statues
they are supposed to implement,
In general rules and regulations issued by administrative or executive
officers pursuant to the procedure or authority conferred by law upon
the administrative agency have the force and effect, or partake the
nature, of a statue. Administrative regulations and policies enacted to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force
of law, and are entitled to great respect.
Administrative rule is defined in the administrative code as “any
agency statement of general applicability that implements or
interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice
requirements of, an agency, including its regulations.
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources
Corporation, 567 SCRA 354, G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008
The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate
provisions of law, where a reasonable construction that will support the law
may be given.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules
and regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers’ providing
general regulations for various and varying details of management. To rule
that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of
Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the
implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made
to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act
wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. It
is well established that administrative authorities have the power to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to
effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the
terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into
effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and
regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or
deviate from the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where the statute contains
sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its
implementation.
Distinguished from Legislative Power
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
6
The discretion to determine what the law shall be is exclusively
legislative and cannot be delegated. The power to make rules to carry
out a policy declared by the lawmaker is administrative and not
legislative. There is a distinction between delegation of power to
make the law which necessarily involves a discretion as to what the
law shall be and the conferring of authority or discretion under an in
pursuance of the law.
Hontiveros-Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board
751 SCRA 271, G.R. No. 181293 February 23, 2015
Unless there is a law that specifically requires a franchise for the operation of
a public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch may issue
authorizations and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public
utilities. In the instant case, there is no law that states that a legislative
franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities.
The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on
which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act
personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through
executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter.
Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law
but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of
control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they
may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the
particular field. If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive
Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a
department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he
appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of
his secretaries.
Associated Communications & Wireless Services-United Broadcasting
Networks vs. National Telecommunications Commission, 397 SCRA 574,
G.R. No. 144109 February 17, 2003
Administrative Law; Delegation of Powers.—The Court is not unmindful that
there is a trend towards delegating the legislative power to authorize the
operation of certain public utilities to administrative agencies and dispensing
with the requirement of a congressional franchise as in the Albano case which
involved the provision of cargo handling and port related ser vices at the
Manila International Port Complex and the PAL case involving the operation
of domestic air transport. The rationale for this trend was explained in the
PAL case, viz.: “. . . With the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the
approval of the practice by the courts. (Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs.
The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, June 26, 1940, 70 Phil.
221) It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from
the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to
grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than
those of a legislative nature. (Dyer vs. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Port. 296, 27
Am. D. 655; Christian-Todd Tel. Co. vs. Commonwealth, 161 S.W. 543, 156
Ky. 557, 37 CJ.S. 158) In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges
conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as
much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of
the Legislature. (Superior Water, Light and Power Co. vs. City of Superior,
181 N.W. 113, 174 Wis. 257, affirmed 183 N.W. 254, 37 C.J.S. 158.) The call
to dispense with the requisite legislative franchise must, however, be
addressed to Congress as the lawmaker of the land for the Court’s function is
to interpret and not to rewrite the law. As long as the law remains unchanged,
the requirement of a franchise to operate a television station must be upheld.
Sources
The power to promulgate administrative regulations is derived from
the legislature, by virtue of a valid delegation.
Test of Delegations

Completeness test
The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature so that when it reaches the delegate, it will have
nothing to do but enforce it. If the law is complete in itself, setting
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate.
Sufficient standard test
If the law fixes a standard – the limits of which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. One which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the
same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. Based on
this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and
the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies
the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on
purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used.
Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita
469 SCRA 14, G.R. No. 168056, G.R. No. 168207, G.R. No. 168461, G.R.
No. 168463, G.R. No. 168730 September 1, 2005
With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution
provides that “the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power,
which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a
complete law—complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to
whom it shall be applicable—and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be justified in
holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must
appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature—that is, one
appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the
power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which
determines the validity of its delegation. Nonetheless, the general rule barring
delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized
limitations or exceptions: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President
under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of
emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local
governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
7
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority—in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward.
When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President,
it simply means that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant
and agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
such as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of
Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds office in an advisory
capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, “should be of the
President’s bosom confidence” and, in the language of Attorney-General
Cushing, is “subject to the direction of the President.”
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting
as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate, and he is not subject
to the power of control and direction of the President—he is acting as the
agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon
which its expressed will is to take effect, becoming the means or tool by
which legislative policy is determined and implemented.
The Quasi-Judicial Power
Definition
The power of the administrative authorities to make determinations of
facts in the performance of their official duties and to apply the law
as the construe it to the facts so found. Administrative officers can
interpret and apply the law to the facts ascertained by them because
this function is necessary to the discharge of their primary function of
regulation.
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Universal Rightfield Property
Holdings, Inc., 763 SCRA 197, G.R. No. 181381 July 20, 2015
The Court has consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is
cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be
heard on such motion. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice, but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be
heard.
The revocation of registration of securities and permit to sell them to the
public is not an exercise of the SEC’s quasi-judicial power, but of its
regulatory power. A “quasi-judicial function” is a term which applies to the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Although Section 13.1 of the SRC
requires due notice and hearing before issuing an order of revocation, the SEC
does not perform such quasi-judicial functions and exercise discretion of a
judicial nature in the exercise of such regulatory power. It neither settles
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, nor adjudicates private rights and obligations in cases of
adversarial nature. Rather, when the SEC exercises its incidental power to
conduct administrative hearings and make decisions, it does so in the course
of the performance of its regulatory and law enforcement function.

Source
The quasi-judicial power is incidental to the power of regulation
vested in the administrative body but is often expressly conferred by
the legislature through specific provisions in the charter of the
agency. The power is needed to enable the administrative officers to
perform their executive duties. Often referred to as the power of
adjudication.
Determinative Powers
Enabling powers
Those that permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes to
regulate nad which would be unlawful without government approval.
Directing powers
It orders the doing to performance of particular acts to ensure
compliance with the law and are often exercised for corrective
purposes. This includes the dispensing, the examining and the
summary powers.
Dispensing powers
Allows the administrative officer to relax the general
operation of law or exempt from the performance of a general
duty.
Examining powers
Enables the administrative body to inspect the records,
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entitles
coming under its jurisdiction. This will include the following,
among others, to wit:
1. Issuance of subpoenas;
2. Swearing in of witnesses;
3. Interrogation of witnesses;
4. Calling for production of books, papers and records;
5. Requiring written answers to questionnaires;
6. Requiring periodic or special reports; and
7. Requiring the filing of statements.
Summary powers
Those involving the use by administrative authorities of force
upon persons or things without necessity of previous judicial
warrant.
Commission on Elections vs. Español, 417 SCRA 554, G.R. Nos. 149164-
73 December 10, 2003
Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is
empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses.
The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the petitioner
to assure the people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election.
Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its
duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election
Code, and to prosecute the same. The petitioner may avail of the assistance of
the prosecuting arms of the government. In Section 2, Rule 34 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, all Provincial and City Prosecutors and/or
their respective assistants are given continuing authority as its deputies to
conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses
under election laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed
directly with them or may be indorsed to them by the petitioner or its duly
authorized representatives.
The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the
need for prompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an
indispensable part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
8
credible elections. Enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its
workload, the petitioner does not have a sufficient number of legal officers to
conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases. The prosecutors
deputized by the petitioner are subject to its authority, control and supervision
in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of
such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal
contemplation, the acts of the petitioner itself. Such authority may be revoked
or withdrawn any time by the petitioner, either expressly or impliedly, when
in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the
integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that
successful prosecution of the case can be done by the petitioner. Moreover,
being mere deputies or agents of the petitioner, provincial or city prosecutors
deputized by the petitioner are expected to act in accord with and not contrary
to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of the petitioner in
relation to election cases such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and
prosecute. Otherwise, the only option of such provincial or city prosecutor is
to seek relief from the petitioner as its deputy.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation of election offenses for the purpose
of determining whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, should be subjected to
trial is the function of the petitioner. The Court will not even interfere with the
finding of the petitioner absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Neither should the respondent. This principle emanates from the COMELEC’s
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
and to prosecute the same except as may otherwise be provided by law. While
it is the duty of the petitioner to prosecute those committing election offenses,
it is equally its duty not to prosecute those offenses where no probable cause
exists. The exclusion and inclusion of persons in Informations for election
offenses is a prerogative granted by the law and the Constitution to the
petitioner. The petitioner may not be compelled to charge a person or include
the latter in an Information when it believes that under the law and on the
basis of the evidence in its possession, such person should not be charged at
all.
Exercise of Powers
Duties of the administrative body are generally considered
discretionary, especially as the involve the interpretation or
construction and enforcement of the law and the appreciation of
factual question may be submitted to it for resolution. Some
administrative duties are merely ministerial, however, which means
that no judgment or discretion is required or allowed in their exercise.
The jurisdiction ad powers of administrative agencies are limited to
those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in
the legislation creating such bodies.
Cerafica vs. Commission on Elections, 743 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 205136
December 2, 2014
The Court reminds the Comelec that, in the exercise of it adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases
first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. Where
a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-
judicial. As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first decided
this case.
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
Kinds of Administrative Regulations
Administrative regulations are either interpretative or legislative.
Legislative v. Interpretative Rule/Regulation
Legislative
Accorded by the courts or by express provision of the statue the force
and effect of law immediately upon going to effect. The
administrative agency is acting in a legislative capacity

supplementing the statue, filling in the details, or “making the law”
and usually acting pursuant to a specific delegation of legislative
power. It is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.
Legislative regulation is issued by the administrative body pursuant
to a valid delegation of legislative power and is intended to have the
binding force and effect of a law enacted by the legislature itself.
Interpretative
Those which purport to do no more than interpret the statute being
administered, to say what it means, they constitute the administrator’s
construction and of statute. The administrative agency is merely
anticipating what ultimately must be done by the courts; they are
performing a judicial function rather than a legislative function, and
interpretative regulations, in the absence of legislature, have validity
in judicial proceeding only to the extent that they correctly construe
the statue and the, strictly speaking, it is the statute and not the
regulation to which the individual must conform.
Issued as an incident of its power to enforce the law and is intended
merely to clarify its power to enforce the law and is intended merely
to clarify its provisions for proper observance by the people.
BPI Leasing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 4, G.R. No.
127624 November 18, 2003
Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature and
substance: legislative and interpretative. A legislative rule is in the matter of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is
in charge of enforcing. The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to
be legislative in nature.
The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative rules
and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication.
La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos
421 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004
When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the
administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts
that finally determine what the law means.
Supplementary regulation
Intended to fill in the details of the law and “to make explicit what is
only general.” its purpose is to enlarge upon a statute, subject only to
the standards fixed therein, to ensure its effective enforcement in
accordance with legislative will.
Contingent regulation
Issued upon the happening of a certain contingency which the
administrative body is given the discretion to determine or “to
ascertain, under and pursuant to the law, some circumstances on
which the law, by its own terms, makes its own action depend, or to
find the facts or conditions properly prescribed under which a law as
passed will or will not operate, that is, putting in effect, applying or
suspending a law.”
Security Bank and Trust Company vs. RTC of Makati, Br. 61
263 SCRA 483, G.R. No. 113926 October 23, 1996
All the promissory notes were signed in 1983 and, therefore, were already
covered by CB Circular No. 905. Contrary to the claim of respondent court,
this circular did not repeal nor in any way amend the Usury Law but simply
suspended the latter’s effectivity.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
9
Requisites of Administrative Regulations
1.) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.
2.) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature.
3.) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure.
4.) It must be reasonable.
Promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.
Authority to promulgate the regulation is usually conferred by the
charter itself of the administrative body or by the law it is supposed to
enforce.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Solidbank Corporation, 416 SCRA
436, G.R. No. 148191 November 25, 2003
In general, rules and regulations issued by administrative or executive officers
pursuant to the procedure or authority conferred by law upon the
administrative agency have the force and effect, or partake of the nature, of a
statute. The reason is that statutes express the policies, purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature in general terms. The
details and manner of carrying them out are oftentimes left to the
administrative agency entrusted with their enforcement.
A revenue regulation is binding on the courts as long as the procedure fixed
for its promulgation is followed. Even if the courts may not be in agreement
with its stated policy or innate wisdom, it is nonetheless valid, provided that
its scope is within the statutory authority or standard granted by the
legislature.
Review Center Association of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 583 SCRA 428,
G.R. No. 180046 April 2, 2009
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the
functions of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) under Republic
Act (RA) 7722, since, legislative power, which is the authority to make laws
and to alter or repeal them, is vested with the Congress.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power
through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only
exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA
7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither
institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting
programs.
Department of Health vs. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.,
754 SCRA 452, G.R. No. 202943 March 25, 2015
It must be stressed that RA 9211 is a special legislation which exclusively
deals with the subject of tobacco products and related activities. On the other
hand, RA 7394 is broader and more general in scope, and treats of the general
welfare and interests of consumers vis-à-vis proper conduct for business and
industry. As such, lex specialis derogat generali. General legislation must give
way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted
as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. In
other words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one specially designed therefore should prevail.
Must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature
The power of the administrative officials to promulgate rules and
regulations in the implementation of a statue is necessarily limited
only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry
out, not supplant or modify the law.
Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 385, G.R. Nos. 179431-
32 June 22, 2010
As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative
power, for doing so will be unconstitutional; Under certain circumstances, the
Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the

authority to adopt and promulgate Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRRs), but the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal
principles that are to control in given cases.
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative
purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power
exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The
rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or
be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a
law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the
law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation
cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that
the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or
executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.
Fermin vs. Commission on Elections, 574 SCRA 782, G.R. No. 179695
December 18, 2008
A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative
enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of
ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds.
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 583 SCRA 168, G.R. No. 158885 April 2, 2009
The authority to prescribe regulations can pertain to more technical matters,
such as how to appraise the value of the inventory or what papers need to be
filed to properly itemize the contents of such inventory. But such authority
cannot go as far as to amend Section 105 itself, which the Commissioner had
unfortunately accomplished in this case. It is of course axiomatic that a rule or
regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the
enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid. In case of conflict
between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail. Indeed,
the CIR has no power to limit the meaning and coverage of the term “goods”
in Section 105 of the Old NIRC absent statutory authority or basis to make
and justify such limitation. A contrary conclusion would mean the CIR could
very well moot the law or arrogate legislative authority unto himself by
retaining sole discretion to provide the definition and scope of the term
“goods.”
Heirs of Aurelio Reyes vs. Garilao, 605 SCRA 294, G.R. No. 136466
November 25, 2009
It is a general rule that the power of administrative officials to promulgate
rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited
only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to
great weight and respect.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque
III, 535 SCRA 265, G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent World Health
Assembly (WHA) Resolutions are customary international law that may be
deemed part of the law of the land. Consequently, legislation is necessary to
transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The
provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of
the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a
law enacted by the legislature.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only
orders, issuances and rules and regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it
is within the DOH’s rule-making power. An administrative agency like
respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-making power or the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within
the confines of the granting statute and the Constitution, and subject to the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. Such express grant of
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
10
rule-making power necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter, or
repeal the same. This is to allow administrative agencies flexibility in
formulating and adjusting the details and manner by which they are to
implement the provisions of a law, in order to make it more responsive to the
times. Hence, it is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior
issuances of administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are
declared repealed or modified.
Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431,
G.R. Nos. 217126-27 November 10, 2015
The fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it
the right to encroach upon the constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary.
Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the
legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate judicial
proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have preempted the
field.
Must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure
Administrative bodies can promulgate the regulation in its exclusive
discretion and on the basis of information acquired by it through
methods other than the holding of a public hearing except where the
legislature itself requires and mandates that the regulation shall be
based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
Dagan vs. Philippine Racing Commission, 578 SCRA 585, G.R. No.
175220 February 12, 2009
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an
administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice
and hearing. In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, 442 SCRA 507
(2004), this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-
legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that
have to be established or ascertained.
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated or as expressed
in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest; Rule admits of
recognized exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to
administrative agencies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected.
Merida Water District vs. Bacarro, 567 SCRA 203, G.R. No. 165993
September 30, 2008
When a local water district increases water rates, the law requires the district
concerned to conduct a public hearing regarding these rates. The same rates
are subject to review by the LWUA, which is tasked to determine whether the
establishment of the rates complies with the law. Thus, compliance with the
public hearing requirement means that the rates presented in the hearing
should be the same rates submitted to the LWUA for review and approval.
Considering that there was no finding with regard to this question of fact,
whether the rates presented in the hearing were the same rates approved by the
LWUA, the NWRB must be given the opportunity to resolve this matter.
Securities and Exchange Commission , vs. GMA Network, Inc., 575
SCRA 113, G.R. No. 164026 December 23, 2008
The clear directive of R.A. No. 3531 to impose the same fees for the filing of
articles of incorporation and the filing of amended articles of incorporation to
reflect an extension of corporate term. R.A. No. 3531 provides an
unmistakable standard which should guide the SEC in fixing and imposing its
rates and fees. If such mandate were the only consideration, the Court would
have been inclined to rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees
 11

as outlined in the questioned memorandum circular, GMA’s argument
notwithstanding.
The questioned memorandum circular of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it has
been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR); The
questioned Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) memorandum
circular is likewise ineffective for not having been filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law
Center as required in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department
of Justice, 427 SCRA 46, G.R. No. 159747 April 13, 2004
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published—OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an
internal circular between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining
authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office
of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation and does not
regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general. Accordingly, there is
no merit to petitioner’s submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001
has to be published.
administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 566
SCRA 451, G.R. No. 164314 September 26, 2008
In the case under review, there is an evident violation of the due process
requirement. It is admitted that the SEC failed to satisfy the requirements for
promulgation when it filed the required copies of the said regulation at the UP
Law Center only fourteen (14) years after it was supposed to have taken
effect. The SEC violated the due process clause insofar as it denied the public
prior notice of the regulations that were supposed to govern them. The SEC
can not wield the provisions of the 1990 Circular against PICOP and expect its
outright compliance. The circular was not yet effective during the time PICOP
filed its request to extend its corporate existence in 2002. In fact, it was only
discovered in 2004, fifteen (15) days before the SEC filed its second motion
for reconsideration.
Must be reasonable
It must not be unreasonable or arbitrary as to violate due process.

Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848, No. L-77372 April 29,
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 vs.
1988
Commission on Audit (COA), 469 SCRA 397, G.R. No. 160396 September
It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not
6, 2005
act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be
To stress, the failure to publish DBM-CCC No. 10 meant that the COLA and
valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to
the amelioration allowance were not effectively integrated into the
secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes
standardized salaries of the PPA employees as of July 1, 1989. The integration
for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be
became effective only on March 16, 1999. Thus, in between those two dates,
invalid.
they were still entitled to receive the two allowances. Be it remembered that
the “other additional compensations” not expressly specified in Section 12 of
RA 6758 had to be determined by the DBM before they could be deemed Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation,
included or not included in the standardized salary rates. True, Section 12 117 SCRA 597, No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
could be considered self-executing in regard to items (a) to (f) above, but it As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject every
was not so in regard to item (g). It was only upon the issuance and effectivity taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can
of the corresponding DBM Implementing Rules and Regulations that the open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and
enumeration found in item (g) could be deemed legally completed. even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to
all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years
supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by
Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 169777, G.R.
that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on
No. 169659, G.R. No. 169660, G.R. No. 169667, G.R. No. 169834, G.R. No.
investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for
171246 April 20, 2006
safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are
While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not
in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight
follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for
hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of
publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general,
arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986), states: The term “laws” should refer
to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to Penal Regulations
them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular The power to define and punish crime is exclusively legislative and
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant may not be delegated to the administrative authorities. Administrative
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the authorities cannot prescribe penalties.
public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298,
body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992 (mali ata pag kakalagay ni sir pang 4th
even in courts of justice. Although the above statement was made in reference
requisite of a valid administrative regulation yung doctrine neto)
to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to
publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is,
therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may
question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should Requisite of a valid administrative regulation with a penal
have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. sanction
1) The law itself must make a violation of the administrative
Villanueva vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 755 SCRA 182, G.R. No. 211833 regulation punishable.
April 7, 2015 2) The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the
As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, violation of the regulation.
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement 3) The regulation must be published.
existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several
exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations
Construction and Interpretations of Administrative Regulations
and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the

“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34

The same rules on the construction and interpretation of statues are
applied to administrative regulations, with the specific requirement
that the regulation should be read in harmony with the statute and not
in violation of the authority conferred on the administrative
authorities.
Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Phils. vs. Civil Service
Commission, 207 SCRA 801, G.R. No. 100599 April 8, 1992
The well-entrenched principle is that “a statute operates prospectively only
and not retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made
manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary
implication.” (Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 [1984] cited in Puzon
v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 [1989]). We rule that the same principle is
applicable to administrative rules and regulations issued by the government
agencies in their duty to implement laws. The Memorandum Circular does not
indicate that it should be applied retroactively, hence the general rule that a
statute operates prospectively must be followed.
Philippine National Oil Company vs. Court of Appeals, 457 SCRA 32,
G.R. No. 112800 April 26, 2005
When there appears to be an inconsistency or conflict between two statutes
and one of the statutes is a general law, while the other is a special law, then
repeal by implication is not the primary rule applicable. The following rule
should principally govern instead: Specific legislation upon a particular
subject is not affected by a general law upon the same subject unless it clearly
appears that the provisions of the two laws are so repugnant that the legislators
must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the earlier legislation. The
special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the
particular subject and the other as the general law of the land. (Ex Parte
United States, 226 U. S., 420; 57 L. ed., 281; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S.,
556; 27 L. ed., 1030; Partee vs. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 204 Fed. Rep., 970.)
Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular,
and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if
standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the
special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an
exception to the general act or provision, especially when such general and
special acts or provisions are contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be
presumed to have intended a conflict. (Crane v. Reeder and Reeder, 22 Mich.,
322, 334; University of Utah vs. Richards, 77 Am. St. Rep., 928.) It has, thus,
become an established rule of statutory construction that between a general
law and a special law, the special law prevails—Generalia specialibus non
derogant.
Guidelines in resolving dispute in re: interpretation by an agency
of its own rules and regulation
Basic guidelines in resolving disputes concerning interpretation by an
agency of its own rules and regulations are:
1) Whether the delegation of power was valid;
2) Whether the regulation was within that delegation;
3) Whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process
test.
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 566
SCRA 451, G.R. No. 164314 September 26, 2008
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the interpretation given to
a rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the
greatest weight by the courts construing such rule or regulation. While this
Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to such doctrine, it
will not hesitate to set aside an executive interpretation if there is an error of
law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) vs.
Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI), 586 SCRA 658,
G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of
the President, the latter’s interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and
deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical
construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
12
which may be regarded as bases thereof—factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. These factors include the respect due the governmental agencies
charged with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law
they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to
advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application
of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute.
Enforcement of Administrative Regulations
This may be effected through judicial action, as in petitions for
mandamus and injunction, or through sanctions that the statue may
allow the administrative body to impose.
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources
Corporation, 567 SCRA 354, G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that criminal
complaints for violations of rules and regulations enforced or administered by
the SEC shall be referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary
investigation, while the SEC nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers.
Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned law.
The Code empowers the SEC to conduct only administrative investigations
and to impose fines and other administrative sanctions against violators of the
Code. Section 54.2 of the Code states that the “imposition of x x x
administrative sanctions shall be without prejudice to the filing of criminal
charges against the individuals responsible for the violation.” Thus, the
criminal charges may proceed separately and independently of the
administrative proceedings.
Amendment or Repeal
The administrative regulation made thereunder is subject to
amendment or repeal by the authorities that promulgated them in the
first place.
Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251, G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval
by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment; A valid
exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers—it can be
exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of
either or both chambers.
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval
or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by
Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution
is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative
veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect
without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by
the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
law.
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Concept
Quasi-Judicial is the term applied to the action, discretion of officers
who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of

facts and draw conclusions from the mas a basis for their official
action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Definition
Quasi-Judicial power is the power of the administrative agency to
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply,
in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself.
Nature
Performs in a judicial manner an acct which is essentially of an
executive administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to, or reasonably necessary for, the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad, 458 SCRA 441, G.R. No.
127198 May 16, 2005
The DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of
questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second
refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of
administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before
the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function. Thus, the
trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.
Balangauan vs. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, 562 SCRA
184, G.R. No. 174350 August 13, 2008
Though some cases describe the public prosecutor’s power to conduct a
preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the
extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the
similarity ends at this point; A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial
agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the
rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause to file an Information against a
person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is
reviewing the former’s order or resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a
quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no
application.
2 Conditions of The Proper Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Power
1. Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the
administrative body.
2. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings.
Jurisdiction
The competence of an office or body to act on a given matter or
decide a certain question.
Distinction between Jurisdiction in Administrative vis-à-vis
Judicial Proceedings
Legislature has the power to confer jurisdiction upon the
administrative body and so limit or expand its authority.
Unfortunately, there is no uniform rule concerning the jurisdiction of
administrative bodies that one might rely on as in the courts of
justice.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
13
Administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.
Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
Art IX-B Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
Hidalgo vs. Republic, 623 SCRA 391, G.R. No. 179793 July 5, 2010
It is not the absence or presence of the required appointment from the Civil
Service Commission, or the membership of an employee in the Social
Security System or in the Government Service Insurance System that
determine the status of the position of an employee—it is the regulation or the
law creating the Service that determines the position of the employee.
Armed Forces of the Philippines Commissary and Exchange Services
(AFPCES); The historical background of its creation and establishment
indicates that AFPCES is an agency under the direct control and supervision
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines as it was established to take charge of
the operations and management of all commissary facilities in military
establishments all over the country—all Armed Forces of the Philippines
Commissary and Exchange Services (AFPCES) personnel should therefore be
classified as government employees and any appointment, promotion,
discipline and termination of its civilian staff should be governed by
appropriate civil service laws and procedures.
Jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
Art IX-C, Section 2, 1987 Constitution. The Commission on
Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
1. xxx
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit
Art. IX-D, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.
1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority,
and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures
or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a
post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy
or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through
the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity. However, where
the internal control system of the audited
agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
adopt such measures, including temporary or
special pre-audit, as are necessary and

appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall
keep the general accounts of the Government
and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to
the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its
audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or
uses of government funds and properties.
Powers and Functions of the Commission on Human Rights
Art XIII, Section 18, 1987 Constitution. The Commission on Human
Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
1. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
2. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court;
3. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well
as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
4. Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
5. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human
rights;
6. Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
7. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
8. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth
in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
9. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
10. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law;
and
11. Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided
by law.
Vesting of Jurisdiction on Administrative Bodies by the
Legislature
Each administrative body has its own peculiar jurisdiction as
conferred upon it by the specific provisions of its charter. The
legislature may leave certain controversies to an administrative body
while, at the same time, assigning other controversies of a similar
nature to courts of justice.
Jurisdiction of Administrative Agencies in various cases
Sabio v. Garcia
504 SCRA 704, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly
repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG
members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
14
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes.22 It even extends "to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."23 PCGG belongs to this class.
Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights
204 SCRA 483, G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on
adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of cases like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission
the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations invoking civil
and political rights. It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Interport Resources
Corporation, 567 SCRA 354, G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008
Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, entitled “Adjudication,”
does not affect the investigatory functions of the agencies—the Rules of
Practice and Procedure of Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s)
Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) need not comply with the
provisions of the Administrative Code on adjudication, particularly Section
12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII.
The law creating PED empowers it to investigate violations of the rules and
regulations promulgated by the SEC and to file and prosecute such cases. It
fails to mention any adjudicatory functions insofar as the PED is concerned.
Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1, G.R. Nos. 212140-41
January 21, 2015
This Court held that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-
judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like
quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different
from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined
as “an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making.”
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) vs. Africa,
700 SCRA 453, G.R. No. 184622 July 3, 2013
Consequently, we agree with the CA’s consolidated decision promulgated on
September 30, 2008 that the RTC (Branch 138), not the Sandiganbayan, had
jurisdiction because Civil Case No. 04-1049 did not involve a sequestration-
related incident but an intra-corporate controversy.
Abad vs. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation, 753 SCRA
544, G.R. No. 200620 March 18, 2015
We ruled that it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction
over cases which do not involve a sequestration-related incident but an intra-
corporate controversy.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Sandiganbayan, 5th
Division, 759 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 203023 June 17, 2015
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dispute in the present case is an intra-
corporate controversy. As such, it is clear that the jurisdiction lies with the
regular courts and not with the Sandiganbayan.
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A conferred original and exclusive
jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes on the SEC. However, Section 5.2 of
R.A. 8799, transferred the jurisdiction over such cases to courts of general
jurisdiction, or the appropriate RTC.

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) vs.
Republic, 805 SCRA 1, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, G.R. No. 178193 October 5,
2016
The acknowledgment that the Court has no jurisdiction over SMC in the
present case is not “allow[ing] San Miguel Corporation to keep these treasury
shares under the guise of technicalities.”37 The question of jurisdiction, the
Court has repeatedly explained, is not a mere question of technicality or a
simple matter of procedure but an element of due process.38 Indeed, it is
unsporting, nay the height of injustice and a clear violation of the due process
guarantee, to order SMC to comply with any decision rendered in CC 0033-F
when it was never given the opportunity to present, explain, and prove its
claim over the presently contested shares.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Republic, 686 SCRA 472, G.R. No. 180705 November
27, 2012
Both deal with the recovery of sequestered shares, property or business
enterprises claimed, as alleged in the corresponding basic complaints, to be ill-
gotten assets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and acquired by
taking undue advantage of relationships or influence and/or through or as a
result of improper use, conversion or diversion of government funds or
property. Recovery of these assets―determined as shall hereinafter be
discussed as prima facie ill-gotten―falls within the unquestionable
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) vs. Dumayas,
765 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 210901 August 11, 2015
Under Section 4(C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A.
No. 8249, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of
ill-gotten wealth and related cases: (C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant
to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986. x x x x The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may
be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of
the Supreme Court.
Divinagracia vs. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. , 584 SCRA 213,
G.R. No. 162272 April 7, 2009
An important proviso is stipulated in the legislative franchises, particularly
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582, in relation
to Section 11 of R.A. No. 3902. The provision authorizes the President of the
Philippines to exercise considerable infringements on the right of the
franchisees to operate their enterprises and the right to free expression. Such
authority finds corollary constitutional justification as well under Section 17,
Article XII, which allows the State “in times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires x x x during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.” We
do not doubt that the President or the State can exercise such authority through
the NTC, which remains an agency within the executive branch of
government, but such can be exercised only under limited and rather drastic
circumstances. They still do not vest in the NTC the broad authority to cancel
licenses and permits.
These provisions granting special rights to the President in times of
emergency are incorporated in our understanding of the legislated state policy
with respect to the operation by private respondents of their legislative
franchises. There are restrictions to the operation of such franchises, and when
these restrictions are indeed exercised there still may be cause for the courts to
review whether said limitations are justified despite Section 3, Article I of the
Constitution. At the same time, the state policy as embodied in these
franchises is to restrict the government’s ability to impair the freedom to
broadcast of the stations only upon the occurrence of national emergencies or
events that compromise the national security.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
15
Continental Micronesia, Inc. vs. Basso, 771 SCRA 329, G.R. Nos. 178382-
83 September 23, 2015
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso,
notwithstanding his citizenship, when he filed his complaint against CMI. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the
coercive process of service of summons. We note that CMI never denied that
it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily appeared and
participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign
corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local
business address here. The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign
corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject
the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.
Cantemprate vs. CRS Realty Development Corporation, 587 SCRA 492,
G.R. No. 171399 May 8, 2009
Petitioners are partly correct in asserting that under Section 1 of P.D. No.
1344, an action for specific performance to compel respondents to comply
with their obligations under the various contracts for the purchase of lots
located in the subdivision owned, developed and/or sold by respondents CRS
Realty, Casal and Salvador is within the province of the HLURB. The
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint for specific
performance to compel respondents CRS Realty, Casal and Salvador as
subdivision owners and developers to deliver to petitioners the certificates of
title after full payment of the subdivision lots. On this score, the Court affirms
the findings of HLURB Arbiter Aquino with respect to the obligation of
respondents Casal, Salvador and CRS Realty to deliver the certificates of title
of the subdivision to petitioners pursuant to their respective contracts to sell.
Important Matters pertinent to Jurisdiction of Administrative
Agency
Rules of Procedure
When an administrative body is expressly granted the power of
adjudication, it is deemed also vested with the implied power to
prescribe the rules to be observed in the conduct of its proceedings.
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation vs. Chinese General Hospital
and Medical Center, 456 SCRA 459, G.R. No. 163123 April 15, 2005
The Supreme Court will not hesitate, whenever necessary, to allow a liberal
implementation of the rules and regulations of an administrative agency in
cases where their unjustifiably rigid enforcement will result in a deprivation of
legal rights. A careful reading of RA 7875 shows that the law itself does not
provide for any specific period within which to file claims, thus it can safely
be presumed that the period for filing was not per se the principal concern of
the legislature.—A careful reading of RA 7875 shows that the law itself does
not provide for any specific period within which to file claims.
While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules and regulations of
administrative bodies interpreting the law they are entrusted to enforce have
the force of law, these issuances are by no means iron-clad norms.
Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact “bent the rules” for
reasons of public interest.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) vs.
Lubrica, 457 SCRA 800, G.R. No. 159145 April 29, 2005
In the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with
only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over a petition for
certiorari—neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its
rulemaking power justifies such self-conferment of authority. The quantum of
judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise
is defined in the enabling act of such agency.
That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure does
not permit it with unbridled discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily
conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from
jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear
and decide a class of cases is put into action. Rules of procedure are remedial
in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules on pleadings and practice.

Power to Issue Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum
The power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum is not inherit
in administrative bodies. It is settled that theses bodies may summon
witnesses and require the production of evidence only when duly
allowed by law, and always only in connection with the matter they
are authorized to investigate.
Differentiation between Investigation and Adjudication, and
other important matters
To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular
or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
Investigate
“Investigate” commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of “investigate” is “to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: “to search or inquire into: xx to subject to an official
probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of “investigate” is essentially the same: "(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation, To trace or
track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking
of evidence; a legal inquiry;" “to inquire; to make an investigation,”
“investigation” being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing.
2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for
the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters." (Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483,
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991)
Adjudicate
“Adjudicate,” commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as “to settle finally (the rights and duties
of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: xx act as judge." And “adjudge” means
“to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy xx."
In the legal sense, “adjudicate” means: “To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in
its strictest sense;” and “adjudge” means: “To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power “to investigate,” cannot and should not “try and resolve on the
merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90–775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot
do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. (Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA
483, G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991)
Pascual, Jr. vs. Board of Medical Examiners
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
16
28 SCRA 344, No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect. In an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, x
x x the x x x Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent. A proceeding for malpractice possesses a criminal
or penal aspect in the sense that the respondent would suffer the revocation of
his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation than
forfeiture of property.
Manalo vs. Roldan-Confesor
215 SCRA 808, G.R. No. 102358 November 19, 1992
That the administrative determination of facts may result in the suspension or
revocation of the authority of CPSI does not require a higher degree of proof.
The proceedings are administrative, and the consequent imposition of
suspension/revocation of Authority/ License does not make the proceedings
criminal. Moreover, the sanctions are administrative and, accordingly, their
infliction does not give rise to double jeopardy when a criminal action is
instituted for the same act.
The Contempt Power
The power to punish for contempt is essentially judicial and cannot
be claimed as an inherent right by the administrative body.
Bedol vs. Commission on Elections
606 SCRA 554, G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009
The effectiveness of the quasi-judicial power vested by law on a government
institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or
their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings
To withhold from the Commission on Elections the power to punish
individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a
previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s
investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional
mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case,
the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when petitioner
obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions
regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen
while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC
could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings.
Simon, Jr. vs. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, G.R. No.
100150 January 5, 1994
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power “to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided
for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however, should
be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines
and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To
exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons
who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work.
Notice and Hearing
The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-
observance will as a rule invalidate the administrative proceeding.
Persons are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their
interest so that, if they are minded, they may claim the right to appear
therein and present their side or refute the position of opposing
parties.

Padilla vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 457, G.R.
No. 114764 June 13, 1997
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain one’s side or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Thus, the Labor Code requires the employer to furnish the
employee with a written notice containing a statement of the cause for
termination and to afford said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. The
employer is also required to notify the worker in writing of the decision to
dismiss him, stating clearly the reasons therefore.
Administrative Due Process
There is no requirement for strict adherence to technical rules as are
observed in truly judicial proceedings. It is a general rule that they are
unrestricted by the technical or formal rules of procedure which
govern trials before a court, especially where the administrative order
has the effect of only prima facie evidence.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Hantex Trading Co., Inc., 454
SCRA 301, G.R. No. 136975 March 31, 2005
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the best evidence
obtainable may consist of hearsay evidence, such as the testimony of third
parties or accounts or other records of other taxpayers similarly circumstanced
as the taxpayer subject of the investigation, hence, inadmissible in a regular
proceeding in the regular courts. Moreover, the general rule is that
administrative agencies such as the BIR are not bound by the technical rules
of evidence. It can accept documents which cannot be admitted in a judicial
proceeding where the Rules of Court are strictly observed. It can choose to
give weight or disregard such evidence, depending on its trustworthiness.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. vs. Tiamson, 474
SCRA 761, G.R. Nos. 164684-85 November 11, 2005
Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies like the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers.
Handwritten listings and unsigned computer printouts that were
unauthenticated are unreliable—mere self-serving evidence should be rejected
as evidence without any rational probative value even in administrative
proceedings.
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases.
However, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard
certain fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing
in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the
NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of
admissibility for it to be given some probative value. … The decisions of this
Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of
authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of documents.
Absent any such proof of authenticity, the printout of the CAMA tape should
be considered inadmissible, hence, without any probative weight.
Seven (7) Cardinal Rights in Administrative Due Process
Ang Tibay vs. Court oF Industrial Relations etc.,
69 Phil. 635, No. 46496 February 27, 1940
1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision.
4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
17
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
Department of Health vs. Camposano, 457 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 157684
April 27, 2005
Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the
following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must
be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the
decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial
evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have
simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be
rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and
the various issues involved.
Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, supra.
The rights to due process in administrative cases as prescribed in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), as amplified in GSIS v.
Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 514 (1998), are granted by the Constitution;
hence, these rights cannot be taken away by mere legislation. On the other
hand, as repeatedly reiterated by this Court, the right to a preliminary
investigation is merely a statutory right, not part of the “fundamental and
essential requirements” of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay and
amplified in GSIS. Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by
legislation. The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him does not apply in preliminary investigations; nor will the absence
of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the
witnesses against him. A preliminary investigation may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
process clause to a fair trial.
Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim
G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009
Moreover, it is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the
determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution.
This Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against
the supposed offender.
As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions. Hence, the principle of
non-interference does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion which
would authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ gravely abused its
discretion when it suspended the hearing of the charges for violation of the
Corporation Code on the ground of prejudicial question and when it dismissed
the criminal complaints.
Santos vs. Go, 473 SCRA 350, G.R. No. 156081 October 19, 2005
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies
whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable
cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court

of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for review.
Inclusion of Observance of Procedural Due Process in
Administrative Proceedings; Requisites supplementing the 7
Cardinal Rights
Anillo vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
534 SCRA 228, G.R. No. 157856 September 27, 2007
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3)
a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
China Banking Corporation vs. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177, G.R. No. 164919
July 4, 2008
This Court establishes that the issue herein is one involving procedural due
process. Procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which the
law is enforced.” It consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as
well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal.
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and
hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests; and upon notice, they may claim the
right to appear therein, present their side and refute the position of the
opposing parties.
Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 541 SCRA 444, G.R. No. 166780
December 27, 2007
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trialtype proceeding; In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. As opposed to a regular trial court, an administrative agency, vested
with quasi-judicial functions, may investigate an irregularity on its own
initiative. Concerning the right to representation, it is sufficient that
petitioner’s counsel of choice was allowed to submit in writing his
observations on the investigation. Petitioner’s counsel even filed a
memorandum before the CAB. What is frowned upon is the absolute
deprivation of the right to counsel. The counsel’s participation in a proceeding
similar to that of a courtroom trial is not required. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against
him is decided.
Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532, G.R. No. 164763 February 12, 2008
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee
should be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary,
jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not
indispensable in administrative proceedings.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing
and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be
akin to a criminal proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
18
Montemayor vs. Bundalian
405 SCRA 264, G.R. No. 149335 July 1, 2003
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-
appearance of the complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC
of its authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth; Complaints
involving graft and corruption may be filed before the PCAGC in any form or
manner against presidential appointees in the executive department.
It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against
him is decided. This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.
On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in
administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove
by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in
reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government,
the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to
weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in
matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in
an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize
the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned.
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings not to the exercise of administrative powers.
Minimum Standards of Procedural Due Process in School
Administrative Proceedings
De La Salle University, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 541 SCRA 22, G.R. No.
127980 December 19, 2007
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies
a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the
traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a
civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional behest
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law is solemn and inflexible. In administrative cases, such as investigations
of students found violating school discipline, “[t]here are withal minimum
standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right
to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.”
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to
which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings; A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and
in all instances, essential to due process—it is enough that the parties are

given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can
be based. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary, and
cross examination is not an essential part thereof.
Additional Principles to be observed in Administrative
Proceedings
Cada vs. Time Saver Laundry/Leslie Perez
577 SCRA 566, G.R. No. 181480 January 30, 2009
In Quasi-judicial proceedings before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and its arbitration branch, procedural rules governing
service summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is
sufficient. In labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules
may be relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should not defeat the
complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties.
A party who has availed himself of the opportunity to present his position
cannot claim to have been denied due process. What the law prohibits is
absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign
denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present
his side.
NASECO Guards Association-PEMA (NAGA-PEMA) vs. National
Service Corporation (NASECO)
629 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 165442, August 25, 2010
The respondent’s right to due process in this case has not been denied. The
order in the first Court of Appeals (CA) decision to recompute and reevaluate
was satisfied when the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
Secretary reexamined their initial findings and adjusted the awarded benefits.
A reevaluation, contrary to what the respondent claims, is a process by which
a person or office (in this case the DOLE secretary) revisits its own initial
pronouncement and makes another assessment of its findings. In simple terms,
to reevaluate is to take another look at a previous matter in issue. A
reevaluation does not necessitate the introduction of new materials for review
nor does it require a full hearing for new arguments. From a procedural
standpoint, a reevaluation is a continuation of the original case and not a new
proceeding. Hence, the evidence, financial reports and other documents
submitted by the parties in the course of the original proceeding are to be
visited and reviewed again. In this light, the respondent has been given the
opportunity to be heard by the DOLE Secretary.
Marcoleta vs. Commission on Elections
586 SCRA 765, G.R. No. 181377 April 24, 2009
When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition
or motion shall be denied; Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a
majority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.
Since neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a majority in the En Banc
Resolution of November 6, 2007, the Resolution served no more than a record
of votes, lacking in legal effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of the
First Division Resolution. The Comelec is well within its authority to order a
re-hearing, it having the inherent power to amend or control its processes and
orders before these become final and executory.
Marcelo vs. Bungubung, 552 SCRA 589, G.R. No. 175201 April 23, 2008
It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, including those before the
Ombudsman, cases may be submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits
and pleadings. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
19
It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for
an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies. Undoubtedly, due
process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of, which requirement was afforded Bungubung.
When the findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not adequately supported by
substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts. Within the
field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to
quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of
substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot
be disregarded.
Montoya vs. Varilla
574 SCRA 831, G.R. No. 180146 December 18, 2008
The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable to
administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of; What includes due process in
administrative proceedings.
Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are
not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and
equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process. Notice to
enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere
technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. In
the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to
be heard. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.
Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio
632 SCRA 457, G.R. No. 186652 October 6, 2010
A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since the
prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor]. A preliminary
investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the
sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial
nature may be taken.
Even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or
resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-
judicial proceeding since the “DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.” Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by
the DOJ Secretary.
Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613, G.R. No. 166051 April 8,
2008
As can be seen above, among these rights are “the decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected”; and that the decision be rendered “in
such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.” Note that there is no
requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative
decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently
informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due
process requirement is satisfied.
Administrative Appeals and Review
Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from
a final decision of the administrative agency may be taken to the
Department Head, whose decision may further be brought to the
regular courts of justice, in accordance with the procedure specified

by the law. The appellate administrative agency may even conduct
additional hearings in the appealed case, if deemed necessary.
Rule 43 Section 1 of the Rules of Court
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments
or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among
these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of
the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform
under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
(n)
Rule 64 Section 1 of the Rules of Court
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall govern the review of judgments
and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit. (n)
Section 2. Mode of review. — A judgment or final order or resolution
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may
be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari
under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. (n; Bar Matter No.
803, 17 February 1998)
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
XXX
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter
is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as
may be provided by law.
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
XXX
Section 2.
1. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
XXX
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
20
Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of
compensation of government officials and employees, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions.
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
XXX
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission
on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold
and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies
to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that
may be prescribed by law.
6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent
and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other

disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive
report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall.
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre- proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges,
or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or
regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space ,and
the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by
the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.
XXX
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
XXX
Section 2.
1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority,
and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures
or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a
post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy
or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through
the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity. However, where
the internal control system of the audited
agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
adopt such measures, including temporary or
special pre-audit, as are necessary and
appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall
keep the general accounts of the Government
and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
21
2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to
the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its
audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or
uses of government funds and properties.
Cayetano vs. Commission on Elections, 648 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 193846
April 12, 2011
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or
interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC—the
Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution, a rule which admits of exceptions as when the issuance of the
assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of
jurisdiction to issue the same. Although it is not the duty of the Court to point
to litigants to the appropriate remedy which they should take from orders of
COMELEC Divisions, the aggrieved party can still assign as error the
interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the
main case to the COMELEC En Banc.
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections, 688 SCRA 129, G.R. No. 192289
January 8, 2013
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides
that any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions
may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days
from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or
issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court states that it shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
Enforcement of Decisions of Administrative Bodies
In the absence of any statue providing for the enforcement of an
administrative determination, the same cannot be enforced except
possibly by appeal to the force of public opinion. Usually, the
administrative body is allowed certain sanctions that it may impose
directly for the enforcement of its own decisions.
Soriano vs. Laguardia, 587 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009
In fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in
the enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement.
Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech
made on prime-time “G” rated TV program; it does not bar future speech of
petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent
administrative sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on
speech. The investiture of supervisory power would be meaningless if it did
not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised as may be proportionate
to the offense proved.
Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in
the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample latitude
in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due
regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to
effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.
Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352, G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power “is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance.” As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available

Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is,
thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain
public order in the barangay.” We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an
officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be
and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an
exercise of judicial powers.”
Res Judicata; Principle; Application
As a general rule, administrative decisions are not considered res
judicata so as to preclude its subsequent reconsideration or
revocation. Administrative decision-making is a continuing process.
Philippine National Oil Company vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
A compromise agreement constitutes a final and definite settlement of the
controversy between the parties. A compromise agreement, even if not
judicially approved, has the effect of res judicata on the parties. Article 2037
of the Civil Code provides: A compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance
with a judicial compromise. (Emphasis supplied) The compromise agreement
has the force of law between the parties and no party may discard unilaterally
the compromise agreement. Under Section 8.1 of RMO No. 39-86, upon
payment of the compromise amount, the tax “case is already closed.” The
Solicitor General, who withdrew as counsel for the BIR, maintains that the
compromise agreement is valid.
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines
679 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman’s Internal Affairs Board properly
conducted a subsequent and parallel administrative action against petitioner,
its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption against petitioner
could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from
proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption.
After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. In Montemayor v.
Bundalian, the Court sustained the President’s dismissal from service of a
Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
who was found liable for unexplained wealth upon investigation by the now
defunct Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The
Court categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman
of similar charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in the
PCAGC case.
B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 159 SCRA 355, No. L-38569 March 28, 1988
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) it must be rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter, and cause of action.
“The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once juducially determined
by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. x x x
It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with
power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the
Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication
may be pleaded as res judicata” (Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497, 503). Still
later, this Court further elucidated that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be
said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood
as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof. “The more
equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies
upon whom judicial powers have been conferred” (Ipekjian Merchandising
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 9 SCRA 75)
JUDICIAL REVIEW
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
22
General Rule
Administrative decisions may be appealed to the courts of justice if
only the Constitution or the law permits or if the issue to be reviewed
involve questions of law. Outside of these exceptions, the
administrative decision is no more reviewable by the courts of justice
than are judicial decisions reviewable by administrative bodies. As a
rule, the administrative decision may be validly rendered final and
inappealable at the administrative level without allowing the aggrieve
party a final resort to the courts of justice.
Article IX-A Section 7, 1987 Constitution
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter
is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Section 1, Republic Act No. 7902
Section 1. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
XXX
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall govern the review of judgments
and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and
the Commission on Audit. (n)
Philippine National Oil Company vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
It is generally true that purely administrative and discretionary functions may
not be interfered with by the courts; but when the exercise of such functions
by the administrative officer is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of
the law, then it is incumbent on the courts to set matters right, with this Court
having the last say on the matter. The manner by which BIR Commissioner
Tan exercised his discretionary power to enter into a compromise was brought
under the scrutiny of the CTA amidst allegations of “grave abuse of discretion
and/or whimsical exercise of jurisdiction.” The discretionary power of the BIR
Commissioner to enter into compromises cannot be superior over the power of
judicial review by the courts. The discretionary authority to compromise
granted to the BIR Commissioner is never meant to be absolute, uncontrolled
and unrestrained. No such unlimited power may be validly granted to any
officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. In
this case, the BIR Commissioner’s authority to compromise, whether under
E.O. No. 44 or Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, can only be
exercised under certain circumstances specifically identified in said statutes.
The BIR Commissioner would have to exercise his discretion within the
parameters set by the law, and in case he abuses his discretion, the CTA may
correct such abuse if the matter is appealed to them.

Cagas vs. Commission on Elections, 663 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 194139
January 24, 2012
A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision, although it confers
on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to
review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by
a Division of the COMELEC.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) vs.
Aumentado, Jr., 625 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 173634 July 22, 2010
PAGCOR is correct that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions
for review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the
CSC. Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules provides: SECTION 1. Scope.—This
Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, x x x.
(Emphasis supplied) It is clear from the Rules that the Court of Appeals can
entertain appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of the
CSC.
Remedies in Rulings of the CIR or the Commissioner of Customs
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 855 SCRA 395,
G.R. No. 207843 February 14, 2018
The apparent conflicting jurisprudence on the matter involving the Court’s
2008 En Banc ruling in British American Tobacco and the Court’s Third
Division Ruling in Philamlife has been seemingly settled in the 2016 En Banc
case of Banco De Oro v. Republic of the Philippines (Banco De Oro), 800
SCRA 392 (2016), wherein it was opined that: Section 7 of Republic Act No.
1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes, appeals from the
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related
problems must be brought exclusively to the Court of Tax Appeals. In other
words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals to
have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of
certiorari against the acts and omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies
should thus be filed before the Court of Tax Appeals.
Bureau of Customs vs. Devanadera, 770 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 193253
September 8, 2015
By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial
power in the Supreme Court (SC) and such lower courts as may be established
by law, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, in relation to
Section 5(5), Article VIII thereof, vesting upon it the power to promulgate
rules concerning practice and procedure in all courts, the SC thus declares that
the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari
assailing the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolution in a preliminary
investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily transferred to
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9282, and that such petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 776
SCRA 395, G.R. No. 207112 December 8, 2015
A distinction must be made between administrative cases appealed due to
inaction and those dismissed at the administrative level due to the failure of
the taxpayer to submit supporting documents. If an administrative claim was
dismissed by the CIR due to the taxpayer’s failure to submit complete
documents despite notice/request, then the judicial claim before the CTA
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
23
would be dismissible, not for lack of jurisdiction, but for the taxpayer’s failure
to substantiate the claim at the administrative level. When a judicial claim for
refund or tax credit in the CTA is an appeal of an unsuccessful administrative
claim, the taxpayer has to convince the CTA that the CIR had no reason to
deny its claim. It, thus, becomes imperative for the taxpayer to show the CTA
that not only is he entitled under substantive law to his claim for refund or tax
credit, but also that he satisfied all the documentary and evidentiary
requirements for an administrative claim. It is, thus, crucial for a taxpayer in a
judicial claim for refund or tax credit to show that its administrative claim
should have been granted in the first place. Consequently, a taxpayer cannot
cure its failure to submit a document requested by the BIR at the
administrative level by filing the said document before the CTA.
Question of Law vis a vis Questions of Fact
It should be noted as well that, for purposes of appeals, distinction
may also be made with respect to questions of fact and questions of
law. When it comes to questions of law, administrative decisions
thereon are appealable to the courts of justice even without legislative
permission even against legislative prohibition.
Standard Chartered Bank vs. Standard Chartered Bank Employees
Union (SCBEU), 568 SCRA 135, G.R. No. 165550 October 8, 2008
With respect to the procedural issue, we agree with respondent that the issues
raised by the bank are essentially questions of fact that cannot be the subject
of this petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court provides that only questions of law may be raised on appeal by
certiorari. Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the principle that this Court is
not a trier of facts and that it is neither the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh the evidence of the parties all over again. The ruling in Microsoft
Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 438 SCRA 224 (2004), elucidates the
distinction of a question of law and a question of fact as follows: . . . A
question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is
on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. x x x x x x x x x There is a question of
law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing
the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and
their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.
Method of Review
The methods of judicial review are prescribed by the Constitution,
statues or the Rules of Court.
Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative
disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such
as from an incident in a criminal action.
Whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-
judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that
quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. Appeals
from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to
be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.
Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra.
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that
no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure
questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on

in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction
to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2)
reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase “application for remedy” or the word
“findings” refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is
solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure
question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory
construction to resolve the ambiguity.
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt vs Bacungan,
GR No. 149050, March 25, 2009
The Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel
of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line
with the procedure outlines in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now
embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of
the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and
consistent with the original purpose to provide a uniform procedure for the
appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction (prior resort)
Does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agency
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
and technical training and knowledge of such agency.
Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections
698 SCRA 742, G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013
The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined
only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds
no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of
administrative functions. The distinction between the two is well-defined.
The Court held that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate’s disqualification to run for
elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate to
enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu
proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition
initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. Thus, the
Court stated:
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
anyone suffering from the access ory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of
the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law
itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification
is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final
judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to
the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound
to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election.” The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under
the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court,
is part of the enforcement and administration of “all laws” relating to the
conduct of elections.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
24
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special
disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely
exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was
elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in
its constitutional duty to “enforce and administer all laws” relating to the
conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public
office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a
final judgment.
Unduran vs. Aberasturi, 773 SCRA 114, G.R. No. 181284 October 20,
2015
View that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from
determining a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.
Badillo vs. Court of Appeals
555 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 131903 June 26, 2008
An action to enforce statutory and contractual rights against subdivision
owners is a specific performance case which falls under the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB’s) exclusive jurisdiction. When an
administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies
relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be
included within its jurisdiction—split jurisdiction is not favored; The
argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the
provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times.
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Laigo, 768 SCRA 633, G.R. No.
188639 September 2, 2015
From the effectivity of the Pre-Need Code, it is the Insurance Commission
(IC) that “shall have the primary and exclusive power to adjudicate any and all
claims involving pre-need plans.” The transitory provisions of the Pre-Need
Code, however, provide that “[n]otwithstanding any provision to the contrary,
all pending claims, complaints and cases (referring to pre-need contract and
trust claims) filed with the SEC shall be continued in its full and final
conclusion.” The Pre-Need Code recognizes that the jurisdiction over pending
claims against the trust funds prior to its effectivity is vested with the SEC.
Such authority can be easily discerned even from the provisions of the SRC.
Section 4 thereof provides that despite the transfer of jurisdiction to the RTC
of those matters enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC
remains authorized to “exercise such other powers as may be provided by law
as well as those which may be implied from, or which are necessary or
incidental to the carrying out of, the express powers granted the Commission
to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws.”
Alijandro vs. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau, 695 SCRA 35, G.R. No. 173121 April 3, 2013
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of
a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.―The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, as we
held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission of a
public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or
other investigative agencies.

In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more
disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which
opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of
other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Delijero, Jr., 634 SCRA 135, G.R. No.
172635 October 20, 2010
The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public
school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper
committee of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). In
sum, We reiterate that it is the School Superintendent and not the Ombudsman
that has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Masing, 542 SCRA 253, G.R. No. 165416,
G.R. No. 165584, G.R. No. 165731 January 22, 2008
Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The public schoolteachers
in Fabella were charged with violations of civil service laws, rules and
regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DECS Secretary. In
contrast, herein respondents Masing and Tayactac were administratively
charged in letter-complaints duly filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao. The charges were for violations of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, collecting unauthorized fees, failure to remit authorized fees,
failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious misconduct,
discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity
or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts and omissions
complained of relate to respondents’ conduct as public official and employee,
if not to outright graft and corruption.
Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation vs. Macroasia
Corporation, 541 SCRA 166, G.R. No. 169080, G.R. No. 172936, G.R. No.
176226, G.R. No. 176319 December 19, 2007
RA 7942, similar to PD 463, confers exclusive and primary jurisdiction on the
DENR Secretary to approve mineral agreements, which is purely an
administrative function within the scope of his powers and authority. In
exercising such exclusive primary jurisdiction, the DENR Secretary, through
the MGB, has the best competence to determine to whom mineral agreements
are granted. Settled is the rule that the courts will defer to the decisions of the
administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience
in the matters assigned to them pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Administrative decisions on matter within the jurisdiction of
administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of
grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. Unless it is shown that the
then DENR Secretary has acted in a wanton, whimsical, or oppressive
manner, giving undue advantage to a party or for an illegal consideration and
similar reasons, this Court cannot look into or review the wisdom of the
exercise of such discretion. Blue Ridge failed in this regard. Delineation of
powers and functions is accorded the three branches of government for the
smooth functioning of the different governmental services. We will not disturb
nor interfere in the exercise of purely administrative functions of the executive
branch absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
People's Broadcasting(Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) vs. Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, 587 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 179652
May 8, 2009
The law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim when the
employer-employee relationship has terminated or such relationship has not
arisen at all. The reason is obvious. In the second situation especially, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is a matter which is not easily
determinable from an ordinary inspection, necessarily so, because the
elements of such a relationship are not verifiable from a mere ocular
examination. The intricacies and implications of an employer-employee
relationship demand that the level of scrutiny should be far above the cursory
and the mechanical. While documents, particularly documents found in the
employer’s office are the primary source materials, what may prove decisive
are factors related to the history of the employer’s business operations, its
current state as well as accepted contemporary practices in the industry. More
often than not, the question of employer-employee relationship becomes a
battle of evidence, the determination of which should be comprehensive and
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
25
intensive and therefore best left to the specialized quasi-judicial body that is
the NLRC.
The approach suggested by the dissent is frowned upon by common law. To
wit: [I]t is a general rule, that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself
jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case
upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends; and however its decision may
be final on all particulars, making up together that subject matter which, if
true, is within its jurisdiction, and however necessary in many cases it may be
for it to make a preliminary inquiry, whether some collateral matter be or be
not within the limits, yet, upon this preliminary question, its decision must
always be open to inquiry in the superior court. A more liberal interpretative
mode, “pragmatic or functional analysis,” has also emerged in ascertaining the
jurisdictional boundaries of administrative agencies whose jurisdiction is
established by statute. Under this approach, the Court examines the intended
function of the tribunal and decides whether a particular provision falls within
or outside that function, rather than making the provision itself the
determining centerpiece of the analysis. Yet even under this more expansive
approach, the dissent fails.
Lakeview Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. Luzvimin Samahang Nayon,
585 SCRA 368, G.R. No. 171253 April 16, 2009
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.
Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Section 17 of Executive Order No.
229 vests in the DAR the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform. Through Executive Order No. 129-A, the
President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume
the powers and functions of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases.
Department of Health vs. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.,
supra.
In fine, the Court agrees with the CA that it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the
DOH which has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion activities
as explained in the foregoing discussion. As such, the DOH’s ruling, including
its construction of RA 9211 (i.e., that it completely banned tobacco
advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as promotion is inherent in
both advertising and sponsorship), are declared null and void, which, as a
necessary consequence, precludes the Court from further delving on the same.
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort
first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review.
Manubay vs. Garilao
585 SCRA 134, G.R. No. 140717 April 16, 2009
Elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an administrative
official should first appeal to the higher administrative authority before
seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case, the complaint will be
dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action.
Oporto vs. Members of the Board of Inquiry and Discipline of National
Power Corporation, 569 SCRA 93, G.R. No. 147423 October 15, 2008
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies mandates that
whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no
judicial recourse can be made until all such remedies have been availed of and
exhausted. This rule is based on the practical principle that the administrative
agency should be given a chance to correct its error, and that relief first sought
from a superior administrative agency could render court action unnecessary.
While admittedly violation of due process is an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioner was not denied due process
of law. Due process is not a mantra, the mere invocation of which shall
warrant a reversal of a decision. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
Aquino vs. Aure
546 SCRA 71, G.R. No. 153567 February 18, 2008
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay
conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies—the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and
the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the
conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Ruivivar vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 565 SCRA 324, G.R. No. 165012
September 16, 2008
For a fuller appreciation of our above conclusion, we clarify that although
they are separate and distinct concepts, exhaustion of administrative remedies
and due process embody linked and related principles. The “exhaustion”
principle applies when the ruling court or tribunal is not given the opportunity
to re-examine its findings and conclusions because of an available opportunity
that a party seeking recourse against the court or the tribunal’s ruling omitted
to take. Under the concept of “due process,” on the other hand, a violation
occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving him or her
the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the exhaustion principle is based on the
perspective of the ruling court or tribunal, while due process is considered
from the point of view of the litigating party against whom a ruling was made.
The commonality they share is in the same “opportunity” that underlies both.
In the context of the present case, the available opportunity to consider and
appreciate the petitioner’s counter-statement of facts was denied the
Ombudsman; hence, the petitioner is barred from seeking recourse at the CA
because the ground she would invoke was not considered at all at the
Ombudsman level. At the same time, the petitioner—who had the same
opportunity to rebut the belatedly-furnished affidavits of the private
respondent’s witnesses—was not denied and cannot now claim denial of due
process because she did not take advantage of the opportunity opened to her at
the Ombudsman level.
Reasons for the Doctrine
1. The administrative superiors, if given the opportunity, can
correct the errors committed by their subordinates.
2. Courts should as much as possible refrain from disturbing
the findings of administrative bodies in deference to the
doctrine of separation of powers.
3. On practical grounds, it is best that the courts which are
burdened enough as they are with judicial cases, should not
be saddled with the review of administrative cases.
4. Judicial review of administrative cases is usually effected
through the special civil actions of certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition, which are available only if there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission
on Elections, 419 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 159139 January 13, 2004
A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that regular courts of justice
should not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. The underlying
principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the
presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is
afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule.
This doctrine is relative, and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
26
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an
administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting
this remedy before the courts will act. No recourse can be had until all such
remedies have been exhausted and special civil actions against administrative
officers should not be entertained if superior administrative officers could
grant relief. In Hon. Carale v. Hon. Abarintos, the Court enunciated the
reasons for the doctrine, thus: Observance of the mandate regarding
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and policy. It
ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary sifting process,
particularly with respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of the
administrative agency, avoidance of interference with functions of the
administrative agency by withholding judicial action until the administrative
process had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by
a resort to them in the first instance. The underlying principle of the rule rests
on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete
chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both
legal and practical reasons for this principle. The administrative process is
intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes.
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review,
and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts,
for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain the case unless
the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the
errors committed in the administrative forum.
In Paat vs. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the instances when the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded: . . . (1)
when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely
a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the
part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Merida Water District vs. Bacarro, 567 SCRA 203, G.R. No. 165993
September 30, 2008
Respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies by their failure to
appeal to the NWRB. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders the
action premature. The Court has consistently reiterated the rationale behind
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: One of the reasons for
the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other
departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better
position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that
errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their
superiors if given a chance to do so… It may be added that strict enforcement
of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable
cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion has been upheld in cases
when the patent illegality of the assailed act is clear, undisputed, and more
importantly, evident outright. In these cases, the assailed act did not require
the consideration of the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other for the Court to conclude that
the act was indeed patently illegal. In the case at bar, certain facts need to be
resolved first, to determine whether petitioners’ increase of the water rate is
patently illegal act.
Buston-Arendain vs. Gil, 555 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 172585 June 26, 2008
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an administrative
decision must first be appealed to the administrative superiors at the highest
level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. This Court has
consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the

court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the court’s
intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding
of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without
its practical and legal reasons; for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice, for reasons of
comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as tested by a battery
of cases, is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one, and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case.
Civil Service Commission vs. Department of Budget and Management
464 SCRA 115, G.R. No. 158791 July 22, 2005
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by respondent
applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such
administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. As
petitioner is not mandated by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary
of Budget and Management prior to filing the present action, its failure to do
so does not call for the application of the rule.
Estrada vs. Court of Appeals, 442 SCRA 117, G.R. No. 137862 November
11, 2004 (MAG SAWA SI SER SA EXEMPTIONS PUCHA HAHA)
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be
first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy
falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of
justice for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still
available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to
decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going
to court. A premature invocation of a court’s intervention renders the
complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground. The reason
for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses
and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with.
While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and
may be disregarded in certain instances, such as: (1) when there is a violation
of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when
to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter
is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no administrative
review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified political agency
applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot—we find, however, that the instant case does not fall
under any of the recognized exceptional circumstances.
Exceptions
The doctrine of administrative remedies, which is based on sound
discretion of public policy and practical consideration, is no
inflexible.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
27
First 12 Exceptions
1. Where there is estoppel on the part of the of the party
invoking the doctrine;
2. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
3. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complaint;
4. Where the amount involved is relatively small as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive;
5. Where the questions raised is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
6. Where judicial intervention is urgent;
7. Where its application may cause great and irreparable
damage;
8. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
9. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot;
10. Where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
11. When strong public interest is involved; and
12. In quo warranto proceedings.
Batelec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Energy Industry Administration
Bureau (EIAB), 447 SCRA 482, G.R. No. 135925 December 22, 2004
In light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action for certiorari
may be availed of. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls
for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities to accord them the
prior opportunity to decide controversies within their competence before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is presumed that an
administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will
decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its
forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the
courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative
agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to
the cause of action of the petitioner.
It is a settled rule, it is true, that on purely legal question the aggrieved party
need not exhaust administrative remedies. This is because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be done or can be done in the administrative forum.
But the pivotal issue in this case of whether petitioner, not the NPC, should
supply the power needs of PSC requires a probe into the technical and
financial capability of petitioner to meet the requirements of bulk power
supply of PSC—a question of fact, the determination of which is within the
expertise of the Bureau. The contention of petitioner that the issue is on pure
question of law is, therefore, hollow.
Specific Exceptions
When the question raised is purely legal
The reason behind providing an exception to the rule is that issues of
law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.
Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in
futility. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of
justice rather than to an administrative body.
Castro vs. Gloria, 363 SCRA 417, G.R. No. 132174 August 20, 2001
Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative
remedies available to petitioner. But where the case involves only legal
questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such
judicial relief can be sought. In Cortes v. Bartolome, a case involving a
petition for mandamus, we ruled that “while it may be that non-judicial
remedies could have been available to respondent in that he could have
appealed to the then Secretary of Local Government and Community
Development and thereafter to the Civil Service Commission, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the
question is purely legal.” This is because issues of law cannot be resolved
with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer
would only be an exercise in futility.

It is settled that for a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them. And the distinction is well known. There is a question of law
when the doubt or differences arise as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or differences arise as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.
Rubio, Jr. vs. Paras, 455 SCRA 697, G.R. No. 156047 April 12, 2005
In fine, the petitioner had a remedy in the ordinary course of law, namely, a
motion for the reconsideration of the formal charge against him, including his
preventive suspension. The general rule is that the aggrieved party is
mandated to exhaust all administrative remedies available before resorting to
judicial recourse. The tribunal, either judicial or quasi-judicial must be given a
chance to correct the imputed errors on its act or order. The rule is an element
of the petitioner’s right to action, and if he fails or refuses to avail himself of
the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere.
When the administrative body is in estoppel
Administrative body could not invoke the doctrine after denying the
petitioner’s backpay application on the ground that aliens were not
covered by the backpay law despite an opinion of the Secretary of
Justice.
Perez vs. City Mayor of Cabanatuan
3 SCRA 431, No. L-16786 October 31, 1961
There being an appropriate administrative remedy that could have first been
availed of by petitioner, his action for mandamus is, therefore, premature. In
other words, no recourse to the courts can be had until all administrative
remedies have been exhausted
When the act complained of is patently illegal
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Apex Investment and Financing
Corporation, 401 SCRA 283, G.R. No. 149422 April 10, 2003
On the first assigned error, this Court has consistently held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible
depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a)
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b)
the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Verceles vs. Bureau of Labor Relations-Department of Labor and
Employment-National Capital Region, 451 SCRA 338, G.R. No. 152322
February 15, 2005
The argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot
be sustained. One of the instances when the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies may be disregarded is when there is a violation of due
process. In this case, the respondents have chronicled from the very beginning
that they were indefinitely suspended without the benefit of a formal charge
sufficient in form and substance. Therefore, the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies cannot squarely apply to them.
Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya vs. Martinez, 547 SCRA 416, G.R. No. 170626 March 3, 2008
This Court in Castro v. Gloria, 363 SCRA 417 (2001), declared that where the
case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all
administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. The reason
behind providing an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an
exercise in futility. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of
justice rather than to an administrative body.
When there is urgent need for judicial intervention
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
28
Alzate, etc, vs. Aldana, etc. et al.
107 Phil. 298, No. L-14407 February 29, 1960
In case at bar the parties had to agree and the court had to approve the
agreement that the Director of Public Schools shall recommend to the proper
officials not later than June 30, 1958 and before the closing of office hours on
that date the commitment of the sum of P840.00 claimed by petitioner to be
due him under Republic Act No. 842, to accounts payable in order to prevent
its reversion. This is a recognition by the parties as well as the court of the
validity and urgency of the action taken by petitioner. Under the
circumstances, petitioner should be deemed to have had sufficient cause of
action at the time he filed his petition for mandamus on June 11, 1958, and in
view of the special situation, resort to the court without awaiting for the final
decision of the administrative officers is not premature.
When the claim involve is small
Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291, No. L-27793 February 28, 1972
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded
when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Thus, to
require an ordinary employee of the government to go all the way to the
President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the
small total of P949 would not only be oppressive but would be patently
unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall have been decided by the
President, the amount of much more than P949 would in all likelihood have
been spent.
When irreparable damage will be suffered.
De Lara, Jr. vs. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269, No. L-21653 May 31, 1965
The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable if it should
appear that an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if he
should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative
official concerned on the matter.
When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
Marquez-Azarcon vs. Bunagan, 399 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 124611 March
20, 2003
SAGANA, in its Comment once more maintains that Azarcon’s petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed due to her
failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. The questioned Order, however,
merely involves an interpretation of the dispositive portion of the Board
decision which had become final and executory. Hence, Azarcon properly
filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals where she ascribed
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the order.
When strong public interest is involved
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation vs. Chinese General Hospital
and Medical Center, supra.
While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules and regulations of
administrative bodies interpreting the law they are entrusted to enforce have
the force of law, these issuances are by no means iron-clad norms.
Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact “bent the rules” for
reasons of public interest.
When the subject of the controversy is private land
Buston-Arendain vs. Gil, supra.
Based on the ninth exception stated in the preceding paragraph, the doctrine
requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse to
the courts can be had is confined to land cases involving public lands; it is
inapplicable to cases in which the subject matter is private lands. Upon
registration, the homestead granted to Antonia and Miguel Gil ceased to have
the character of public land and so was removed from the operation of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In quo warranto proceedings

Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr.
4 SCRA 749, No. L-17860 March 30, 1962
The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies
be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said
remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto
proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public off ice
allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts,
should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As
emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 46
O.G. 3683, public interest requires that the right to a public office should be
determined as speedily as practicable.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 144, G.R.
No. 126332 November 16, 1999
With the issue of jurisdiction of SAC already settled, this Court finds it
unnecessary to determine whether the order to transfer ownership of subject
lands from private respondent to the Republic of the Philippines before the
DARAB had settled with finality the matter of their proper valuation qualifies
as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
inapplicable when the issue is rendered moot and academic, as in the instant
case where the DARAB dismissed the valuation proceedings before it on 29
November 1993.
Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 443 SCRA 56,
G.R. No. 156109 November 18, 2004
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner’s alleged failure
to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to
them, the determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom
and the propriety of PCST’s academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should
have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under
Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to “protect, foster and
promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels
and to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is accessible to all.”
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case
since she is praying for damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED
and well within the jurisdiction of the courts. Petitioner is correct. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the
present case. In Factoran, Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on the
rationale behind this doctrine: “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should
not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been
resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum. x x x.” Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the
policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final
examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A
reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her
grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents’ acts
could no longer be undone or rectified.
Appeal to the President
The question of whether or not a decision of the Cabinet member has
to be appealed first to the President before it may be brought to a
court of justice.
Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 666, G.R. No. 122363 April 29,
2003
The purpose of DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, is to provide a mode
of appeal for matters not falling within the jurisdictional ambit of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) under R.A.
No. 6657 and correct technical errors of the administrative agency; On the
other hand, the purpose of SC Adm. Circ. No. 1-95, now embodied in Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is to invoke the constitutional power of
judicial review over quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of
Agrarian Reform under R.A. No. 6657 and the Office of the President in other
cases providing for an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
29
On the other hand, it is the contention of public respondent, the Office of the
Solicitor General, that an exception to this well-settled principle is the
doctrine of qualified political agency. Where the respondent is a Department
Secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter, unless the President actually disapproves them,
administrative remedies have already been exhausted. Recourse to the court
may be made at that point, according to private respondents, a view that was
sustained by the Court of Appeals. In this case, the appellate court ruled that
the appeal before it was filed beyond the reglementary period as petitioner
appealed to the Office of the President, and not to the Court of Appeals, where
it should have been brought. In Tan v. Director of Forestry this Court ruled
that even if the respondent was a Department Secretary, an appeal to the
President was proper where the law expressly provided for exhaustion. As a
valid exercise of the Secretary’s rule-making power to issue internal rules of
procedure, DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, expressly provides for an
appeal to the Office of the President.
In Calo v. Fuertes this Court held that an administrative appeal to the
President was the final step in the administrative process and thus a condition
precedent to a judicial appeal. Hence, an appeal to the Office of the President
from the decision of the Department Secretary in an administrative case is the
last step that an aggrieved party should take in the administrative hierarchy, as
it is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner.
Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 168056, G.R.
No. 168207, G.R. No. 168461, G.R. No. 168463, G.R. No. 168730
September 1, 2005
Facts: In view of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2005, which required
Former Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of court for conduct which puts the Court and its
Members into dis-honor, disrepute and discredit, and degrades the
administration of justice. Purisima cites the July 11, 2005 edition of the
Philippine Star and the July 10, 2005 edition of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
which reported that Purisima did not directly accuse the President of
influencing the Court in issuing the TRO, and that he would neither confirm
nor deny the reports that the President had a hand in its issuance. The Court
finds Purisima’s explanation unsatisfactory.
Issue: WON SC should hold Purisima in contempt.
Held: Yes. At the time the reports came out, Purisima did not contro-vert the
truth or falsity of the statements attributed to him. It was only after the Court
issued the show-cause order that Purisima saw it fit to deny having uttered
these statements. By then, it was already impressed upon the public’s mind
that the issuance of the TRO was the product of machinations on the Court by
the executive branch.
If it were true that Purisima felt that the media misconstrued his actions, then
he should have immediately rectified it. He should not have waited until the
Court required him to explain before he denied having made such statements.
And even then, his denials were made as a result of the Court’s show-cause
order and not by any voluntary act on his part that will show utter regret for
having been “misquoted.” Purisima should know that these press releases
placed the Court into dishonor, disrespect, and public contempt, diminished
public confidence, promoted distrust in the Court, and assailed the integrity of
its Members. The Court already took a beating before Purisima made any
disclaimer. The damage has been done, so to speak.
Land Car, Inc. vs. Bachelor Express, Inc.
417 SCRA 307, G.R. No. 154377 December 8, 2003
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the Office of
the President to review any determination or disposition of a department head.
The doctrine allows, indeed requires, an administrative decision to first be
appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may
be elevated to a court of justice for review, Thus, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before the court’s
judicial power is invoked.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary
206 SCRA 290, G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk
and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to
mean “the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at
the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. The
President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of
the Cabinet who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdiction in the executive department.
Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation vs. Board of Investments, 578
SCRA 113, G.R. No. 175787 February 4, 2009
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the
remedy of appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions of
executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or
order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of
the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of
appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226,
explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent
BOI involving petitioner’s application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of
special nature and should prevail over A.O. No. 18.
Moran, Jr. vs. Office of the President of the Philippines
736 SCRA 644, G.R. No. 192957 September 29, 2014
The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No.
18, Series of 1987. Section 1 thereof provides: SECTION 1. Unless otherwise
governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be
taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from… (Emphasis
supplied) In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of
Investments, 578 SCRA 69 (2009) we interpreted the above provision and
declared that “a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not
be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that
provides for a different mode of appeal.”
Amadore vs. Romulo, 466 SCRA 397, G.R. No. 161608 August 9, 2005
Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, prescribes the rules and
regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Sections 7 and 9 read as follows: SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the
Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws,
become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof
by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed
and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. SEC. 9. The Rules of
Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
It is clear from Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 that only one motion
for reconsideration is allowed to be filed from a decision, resolution or order
of the Office of the President. A second motion for reconsideration is allowed
only in exceptionally meritorious cases. In the case of petitioner, he, together
with a co-respondent, filed a second motion for reconsideration claiming he
will be presenting evidence that he was not able to present during the
hearings, which, if admitted, will alter the decision. The Court of Appeals
relied heavily on Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court mandating that only
one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Under Administrative Order
No. 18, a second motion for reconsideration can be permitted in exceptionally
meritorious cases. It does not absolutely prohibit the filing of a second motion
for reconsideration. In the case at bar, petitioner filed a second motion for
reconsideration believing that he will be exonerated if the evidence he will be
presenting will be accepted. He was of the opinion that his case is
exceptionally meritorious and is worthy of a second look via a second motion
for reconsideration. It is the rules of the Office of the President
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
30
(Administrative Order No. 18) which shall govern as to how many motions for
reconsideration of its decision/resolution/order shall be allowed. In this case, a
second motion for reconsideration is allowed in exceptionally meritorious
cases. More importantly, Section 9 of its rules provides only for the suppletory
application of the Rules of Court. Inasmuch as Administrative Order No. 18
provides for the rule on motions for reconsideration, Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court should find no application.
Effect of non-compliance
It should be noted that failure to exhaust administrative remedies
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court and merely results in the
lack of a cause of action which may be invoked in a motion to
dismiss.
Rule 16, Section 1, Rules of Court
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has
been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under
the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with. (1a)
Castro vs. Gloria, supra.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to
the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy
falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts
of justice for review. It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine results in
lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of
Court for the dismissal of the complaint.
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
331 SCRA 55, G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be
raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked
at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the
court could take cognizance of the case and try it.
Calub vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 55, G.R. No. 115634 April 27,
2000
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be
raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked
at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the
court could take cognizance of the case and try it.
Reviewable Questions

Two kinds of questions are reviewable by the courts of justice, to wit,
the question of facts and the question of law. There is a question of
law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. There is question of facts when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of the alleged facts.
Question of fact
When it comes to question of facts, review of the administrative
decision lies in the discretion of the legislature, which may or may
not permit it as it sees fit. Denial of this remedy does not violate due
process for the right to appeal is not deemed embraced in a hearing.
Question of law
When it comes to question of law, the administrative decision may be
appealed to the courts of justice independently of legislative
permission or that the judiciary cannot be deprived of its inherent
power to review all decisions on questions of law, whether made
initially by the lower court and more so by an administrative body
only.
Tamondong vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 158397, November 16, 2004
The appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC and the
payment of the requisite fees therefor unless record on appeal is required in
other cases. However, under Section 2(c) of the said rule, where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be taken to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. The nature of the issues to be raised can be gleaned
from the appellant's notice of appeal and his brief in the CA. If it appears from
the brief that the only issues raised are legal and not factual, the appellate
court is mandated to dismiss the appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 50
of the Rules of Court.
If the appellant desires to raise only questions of law in the appellate court, he
should file a petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court within the
period therefor, serving a copy thereof on the lower court concerned in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a
doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or the alleged falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.
Ortiz vs. San Miguel Corporation, 560 SCRA 654, G.R. Nos. 151983-84
July 31, 2008
This Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a
doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the alleged truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The test of whether a question is one
of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is
a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Factoran,
Jr., 154 SCRA 49, No. L-75501 September 15, 1987
lt is apparent that the second issue as to whether or not there was a valid
location and discovery of the disputed mining claims is a question of fact best
left ft to the determination of the administrative bodies charged with the
implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by
the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by
evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not
shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is
needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
31
support a conclusion." (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil.
635, 642; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984]). In the case at
bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines' decision was
supported by substantial evidence.
Rumbaoa and Teves. Tapispisan vs. Court of Appeals, 459 SCRA 695,
G.R. No. 157950 June 8, 2005
The designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves was well within the
prerogative of the said respondents DECS officials. It behooves the Court to
refrain from unduly interfering with the exercise of such administrative
prerogative. After all, it is well settled that administrative decisions on matters
within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are entitled to respect and can
only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
None of these vices has been shown as having attended the designation of
respondents
Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 429 SCRA 285, G.R. No. 124261 May 27,
2004
The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on
substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is settled
that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of
the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their
jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave
abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these vices has been shown
in this case. As we held in Pabuaya v. Court of Appeals: . . . Factual findings
of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and final so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case. It is not
the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence and credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court,
tribunal or office. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Its jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, its
findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.
Question of Fact
Administrative agencies’ findings of fact on matters falling under
their jurisdiction are generally accorded respect, if not finality.
Mac Adams Metal Engineering Workers Union-Independent vs. Mac
Adams Metal Engineering, 414 SCRA 411, G.R. No. 141615 October 24,
2003
The labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in
their findings that private respondents’ closure of business was bona fide and
that private respondents did not engage in the operation of run-away shops.
We have always held that we are bound, in principle, by the factual findings
of administrative officials, if supported by substantial evidence. Their factual
findings are entitled not only to great weight and respect but even finality,
unless petitioners are able to show that the labor arbiter and the NLRC
arbitrarily disregarded the evidence before them or misapprehended evidence
of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated. We
find no cogent reason to depart from the rule.
Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
The Court has reviewed the findings of the ATO and fully concurs with its
conclusion. In reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of
the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long
as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Administrative decisions in
matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in
an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize
the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned.
Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs. National Irrigation
Administration, 441 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 160215 November 10, 2004

In closing, we restate the rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies.” An action by an administrative agency may be
set aside by the judicial department only if there is an error of law, abuse of
power; lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with
the letter and spirit of the law. In the case at bar, there is no cogent reason to
depart from the general rule because the action of the CIAC conforms rather
than conflicts with the governing statutes and controlling case law on the
matter.
Ateneo De Manila University vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 100, No. L-
56180 October 16, 1986
By reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling
of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, we ordinarily
accord respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals.
However, there are exceptions to this rule and judicial power asserts itself
whenever the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the
findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion; where the procedure
which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.
Soliva vs. Commission on Elections, 357 SCRA 336, G.R. No. 141723
April 20, 2001
We agree with the findings of the COMELEC that there was a failure of
election in the municipality of RTR, as the counting of the votes and the
canvassing of the election returns was clearly attended by fraud, intimidation,
terrorism and harassment. Findings of fact of administrative bodies charged
with a specific field of expertise are afforded great weight and respect by the
courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made
from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive
and should not be disturbed. The COMELEC, as the administrative agency
and specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough
expertise in its field that its findings and conclusions are generally respected
and even given finality.
Philippine Ports Authority vs. Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services,
Inc., 475 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 147861, G.R. No. 155252 November 18,
2005
More importantly, even if PASSI had been able to establish a basis upon
which a preliminary injunction could be issued under Rule 58 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure, the application of P.D. No. 1818 would override the
right to an injunctive remedy. P.D. No. 1818 deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to issue any preliminary injunction or temporary retraining order
on essential government projects, including arrastre and stevedoring
operations. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals paid no heed to established
jurisprudence that there are only two exceptional circumstances which warrant
the non-observance of P.D. No. 1818, namely: (1) where there is clear grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the government authority or private person
being enjoined, and (2) where the effect of the non-issuance of an injunction
or a restraining order would be to “stave off implementation of a government
project.”
Obviously, the subject situation does not present itself as an instance where
the non-issuance of an injunctive writ would itself inhibit the implementation
of a government project. In fact, the non-issuance of an injunctive writ would
allow PPA to run Pier 8 in the manner it deems fit instead of having a court-
imposed extension of “holdover” operations by PASSI.
Eleven (11) exceptions to the rule that the findings of fact of
Administrative Agencies do not bind the courts
1. When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures;
2. When the interference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible;
3. When there is grave abuse of discretion;
“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34
32
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When in making its findings, the CA went beyond to the
admission of both the appellant and the appellee;
7. When the findings are contrary to the trial court;
8. When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents;
10. When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and
11. When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
Acevedo vs. Advanstar Company, Inc., 474 SCRA 656, G.R. No. 157656
November 11, 2005
The pivotal issues in this case are factual: (a) whether the respondent ACI was
the employer of respondent Jalapadan; (b) whether the petitioner is the
employee of respondent ACI; and (c) whether the petitioner resigned from his
employment. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may
be raised in and resolved by this Court. The reason for this is that the Court is
not a trier of facts; it is not to reexamine and calibrate the evidence on record.
Moreover, findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, and
affirmed by the CA in due course, are conclusive on this Court, unless the
aggrieved party establishes that grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction was committed. Thus, in exceptional cases, this Court
may delve into and resolve factual issues. Indeed, the Court has reviewed the
records in this case and holds that the findings of the NLRC and that of the
CA on substantial matters are contrary to the evidence on record.
Malabaguio vs. Commission on Elections, 346 SCRA 699, G.R. No.
142507 December 1, 2000
It is conceded that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of an
administrative agency like the COMELEC over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. Thus, their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality by the courts. It bears emphasis, however, that even decisions of
administrative agencies which are declared “final” by law are not exempt from
judicial review when so warranted. Factual findings of administrative agencies
are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness,
or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
Questions of law
Administrative bodies may be allowed to resolve questions of law in
the exercise of their quasi-judicial function as an incident of their
primary power of regulation. However, their determination on this
matter is only tentative at best and, whenever necessary, may be
reviewed and reversed by the courts in proper cases. Decisions of
legal questions is an essentially judicial power that may not be
withheld or withdrawn from the courts by legislation as the power is
inherent in the judiciary.
Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 463
SCRA 222, G.R. No. 161882 July 8, 2005
Neither can the petitioner be deemed to have waived its right to file this
petition. Realizing that the remaining issue was a pure question of law, it
withdrew its Notice of Appeal stating that it was appealing the 28 January
2002 Order on both questions of law and fact. Section 9 of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court provides that prior to the transmittal of the original record, the
court may allow withdrawal of the appeal. Nothing in the Rules prevents a
party from filing a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court after
seasonably withdrawing the Notice of Appeal as long as it is done within the
reglementary period and the issue involved is purely one of law. In this case it
was before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal that the petitioner
 33

withdrew its Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals and filed with us a
motion for extension of time to file a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. And the petition was filed within the extended period we granted,
raising only one question of law.

Nor is there a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Section 2(c),

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court categorically provides that in all cases where
only questions of law are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the
Regional Trial Court shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334, G.R. No.

115994 July 14, 1995
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be
followed by government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and
legality of the questioned bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own
rules should be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the
law it is merely tasked to administer.

The Rules and Regulations issued by the COP to implement R.A. No. 7181 set
aside 10% of the shares subject of the privatization to be offered first to the
small local investors, and made clear that as far as said 10% block is
concerned, the small investors shall have the first crack to buy the same.
These Rules have been consistently applied in previous privatizations, and
they constitute a contemporaneous construction and interpretation of a law by
the implementing, administrative agency. Such construction is accorded great
respect by the Court (Nestlé Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA
504 [1991]).

“For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” Luke 12:34