DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES

I. Introduction
A. Provisions in Article II generally not self-executing; Exception

CASES:

BCDA v. COA, G.R. No. 178160, February 26, 2009

SUMMARY:
Bases Conversion and Development Authority petitions CA ruling disallowing YEB to Board and Consultants and
asking them to pay said amount back to government.

NATURE:

• On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 72273 creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA). Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board)
shall exercise the powers and functions of the BCDA...(including)...adoption of a compensation and benefit
scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the
Board...adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.

• On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation...scheme which included a P10,000 year-
end benefit (approved by President Ramos)...In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its
officials and employees. In 2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to
P35,000...Pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit scheme
of the BCDA shall be at least equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board increased the year-end benefit of
BCDA officials and employees from P10,000 to P30,000.

• On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Españo of the COA issued Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-0047 stating that the grant of year-end benefit to Board members was
contrary to DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002 (disallowing YEB to Board
Members/consultants).

• In a letter dated 20 February 2004, BCDA President and Chief Executive Officer Rufo Colayco requested
the reconsideration of Decision No. 2004-013. In a Resolution dated 22 June 2004, Director Tablang
denied the request. The BCDA filed a notice of appeal dated 8 September 2004 and an appeal
memorandum dated 23 December 2004 with the COA.

• COA RULING:
Affirmed disallowance of YEB. Presumption of good faith does not apply because DBM issued clarificatory
memo and Board still proceeded to grant YEB after.

ISSUE:
1. Whether board members and consultants of BCDA entitled to YEB
2. Whether denial of YEB for Board and consultants by CA is against Article III section 1 of Constitution (RA 7227)
3. Whether SC is estopped from correcting the decision of Pres. Ramos who approved of the YEB that has been
received by the Board and Consultants since 1997

HELD:
1. No. Board Members and consultants are not entitled to YEB as per DBM circulars:

• DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, "Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not
salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB
and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law.
 • DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that, "YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted
in addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid."
Consultants do not receive salaries.

2. No. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of
proof is on the BCDA to show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.A law enacted by
Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and unequivocal one. BCDA fails to provide sufficient prove
of unconstitutionality of RA 7227 (which limits BCDA's power to give compensation).

3. No. The State is not estopped from correcting a public officer’s erroneous application of a statute, and
an unlawful practice, no matter how long, cannot give rise to any vested right.

However, petitioners relied on Section 1 of RA 7227 which allows Board to adopt compensation schemes and on
the authorization of President Ramos. They cannot be presumed to have faulted and denied good faith upon their
receipt of the YEBs over the years.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12
April 2007 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Board members and full-time consultants of the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority are not required to refund the year-end benefits they have already
received.

BFAR Employees Union v. COA, GR No 169815, Aug.13, 2008

Petition: Review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Commission on Audit-Legal and Adjudication
Office
Plaintiff and appellee: BFAR Employees Union, Regional Office No. VII
Defendant and appellants: Commission on Audit
Facts:

• BFAR Employees Union issued Resolution No. 01 requesting the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket
allowance to alleviate “high cost of living”.
• Cesar M. Drilon, Jr., Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock of the Department of Agriculture approved
(P10,000.00 each to the 130 employees of BFAR Region VII for a total of P1,322,682.00).
• Commission on Audit-Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) disallowed the grant of Food Basket
Allowance.
• Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and appeal were both denied. Hence this appeal
Issue:
1. WoN the disallowance is unconstitutional as it contravenes Secs. 9 and 10, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution
2. WoN the approval of the Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock (Drilon) is tantamount to the authority
from the president
3. WoN the food basket allowance conforms with Sec. 12 of the Salary Standardization Law
4. WoN the food basket allowance is not included in the National Compensation Circular No. 59 (List of
allowances that are integrated into the Basic Salary)
Ratio:
1. No. The social justice provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing principles. To give them effect,
legislative enactment is required.
2. No. DA Undersecretary has not authority to grant any allowance to the employees of BFAR. (Based on
Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16)
3. No. The benefits excluded from the standard salary rates are those which are granted to employees for
the reimbursement of the expenses incurred in the performance of their official functions. The food basket
allowance is not a reimbursement. It is a form of financial assistance to employees of the BFAR.
4. Yes. The food basket allowance falls under the 14th category (incentive allowance/fee/pay). Thus it is
already incorporated in their salary and can no longer be granted by the government
Held: Petition is DENIED. Decision of COA-LAO is AFFIRMED.
Notes:

• Sec. 9, Art II. (1987 Constitution).

“The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence
of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.”
• Sec. 10, Art II. (1987 Constitution).
“The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.”
• Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16
“All agencies are hereby prohibited from granting any food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of
incentives/allowances except those authorized via Administrative Order by the Office of the President.”
• Sec 12 of Salary Standardization law
All kinds of allowances are integrated in the standardized salary rates except… (7) such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM

II. Democracy & Republicanism; Supremacy of Civilian Authority; Honesty

and Integrity in Public Service (Sec. 1, 3 & 27); related provisions: Art. XI
(Accountability of Public Officers)
CASES:

Rulloda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198, January 20, 2003

FACTS: In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the
contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002,
Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away.

His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections seeking permission to run as
candidate for Barangay Chairman. Petitioners request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several
signatures of people purporting to be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto. Tomas.

On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and Members of the
Barangay Board of Canvassers: read the same as it is written but add the words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY
NOT COUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT COUNTED". Petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio
Placido received 290 votes. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman.

Petitioner learned that the Commission issued Resolution No. 4801. Section 9 of the same – “There shall be no
substitution of candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials”. Petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217.

ISSUE: WON substitiion is allowed in barangay SK elections.

RULING: the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on Elections,
insofar as it denied due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy, is declared NULL and VOID. The
proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay Chairman is SET ASIDE, and the Board of
Canvassers is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.

RD: Election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people.

Respondents base their argument on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code on Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another. Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is
non-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute.
However, it is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the
popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific
provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against
said substitution.

Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Facts:

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a
resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the
entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections
dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a
motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending
the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Issue: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

Held:

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude
strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a
previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac
for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged
lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati
City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a
resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila)
indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile
but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully
disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 (concurring

opinion of J. Vicente V. Mendoza)
FACTS:
During the May 1998 election, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued
by problems that slowly eroded his popularity.

On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a long time friend of the petitioner, accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately
ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signedby 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives
to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On
January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis.
Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet
secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20,
2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day,
he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting
President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting
capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question.
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article
VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down
that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .”

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of
people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances
which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject
to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

SECOND ISSUE

Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
a.) The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that
petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
b.) The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open
the second envelop to clear his name.
c.) During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points
at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period.
d.) His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the
past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of’ the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

THIRD ISSUE

The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII:

“Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions.”
Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of Representative
passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states:
“RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT
FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.”
The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states:
“RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still,
he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure
President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH ISSUE

The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot
be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment
trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of
the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The
plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission
make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the
proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the
presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping
him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
FIFTH ISSUE

Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does
not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the
case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence
of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does
not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change
even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
David v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127116, April 8, 1997
Sec. 8 Art. X of the Constitution: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law.(term of office of barangay officials)
FACTS:
This case involves the consolidation of 2 petitions that tackle the common question of how long the term
of office of barangay chairmen and other barangay officials who were elected to their respective office on the
second of May 1994. Petitioner in his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and
as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas filed before this Court on December 2, 1996 a petition for
prohibition , under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the
second Monday of May 1997. On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with
petitioner and praying that "the election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance." Respondent
Commission on Elections filed a separate Comment, dated February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On February
11, 1997, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty days from notice. It also requested former
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. 1 to act as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum also within a non-extendible
period of twenty days. It noted but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997 Accordingly, the parties filed their respective
memoranda. In a separate case filed before this court Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter
represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039, "to seek a judicial
review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which prescribed the term of
barangay officials to be for 3 years which shall begin on the regular election to be held on the second Monday of
May 1994. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on
May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the term of office of barangay officials shall be for 3 years as prescribed by RA 7160(The
Local Government Code of ) or 5 years as prescribed by RA 6653.
2. Whether or not RA 7160 sec 43(c) is unconstitutional
HELD:
1. Yes , The Court held that term of office of barangay officials shall be for 3 years as prescribed by RA 7160.
Since RA 7160 is a newer law than RA 6653, notwithstanding the fact that RA 7160 is a general law since the
particular provision on the term of office of barangay officials is a specific provision which supersedes the provision
in RA 6653.
2. No, The Court held that RA 7160 sec 43(c) is not unconstitutional. Since under Sec 8 Art X of the
Constitution the term of office of barangay officials shall be as determined by law. There is nothing in the
Constitution or in the record of the constitutional commission which would support the view that the term of office
of barangay officials could not be for 3 years.

Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987

FACTS

• November 1984 - more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces
raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of
loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives.
• “zona” – the practice not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of
rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing
them outright
• People inside the compound resisted, which resulted in the exchange of gunfire and casualties
• Petitioners surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be
finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and
 confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in
the premises.
• On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them,
to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination.

ISSUES

(1) W/N search was legal or incidental to a lawful arrest - NO

(2) W/N fingerprinting and photographing violated petitioners’ right against self-incrimination – NO

HELD

(1) Search happened without a warrant, only under “superior orders” which cannot supersede the Constitution
- No state of hostilities in the area to justify the repression of the petitioners
- Raid wasn’t urgent, they had time to get a warrant
- Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless
considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement
authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on
the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a
fussy redundancy.
- The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At
the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even
been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military.
- If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime
about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no
allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos.
(2) The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it
in Holt v. United States, "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."

RULING

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and
all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings.
However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been
or may later be filed against the petitioners.

IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

Facts:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility
patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner
by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was
placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a sustained street patrolling to minimize
or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose
members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

Issue:
1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2, Section 3 of the
Constitution;
2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement;
3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the
government
4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under the Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not
the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review, and,
(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a
political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one
police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution

III. The Incorporation Clause (Sec. 2)

CASES:

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v.

Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51
(Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond the law it is supposed to implement. Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of
the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted several resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.
Issue/s:
1. Whether pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land
and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR
2. Whether the RIRR is in accord with the international agreements
Ruling:
1. Yes for ICBMS. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law
be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.

The ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through
local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in
this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.

The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point
that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of
 promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such
materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

2. No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA
Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.

Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution embodies the incorporation method – The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity with all nations
"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international
law which are binding on all states. Custom or customary international law means "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]."

The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at
least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions
into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding
from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes)
have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have
the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT
LAW – non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of
international law.

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No.175352, July 15, 2009 (decision); January

18, 2011 (resolution on the MR)
Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo and Salvador M. Viari, petitioners, v Richard J. Gordon, respondent,
Philippine National Red Cross, intervenor

Facts: This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by respondent
Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC), and the latter’s Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper filed on December 23, 2009.

In the Decision, the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the
chairmanship of PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an
office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC charter insofar as it creates PNRC
as a private corporation.

In its Motions for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court sustain the constitutionality of its Charter on
one of the grounds that PNRC’s structure is sui generis; “it is a class of its own. While it is performing humanitarian
functions as an auxiliary to government, it is a neutral entity separate and independent of Government control, yet
it does not qualify as strictly private in character.”

The Philippine National Red Cross was created by an act of Congress after the Republic of the Philippines became
an independent nation on July 6, 1946 and proclaimed on February 14, 1957 its adherence to the Convention of
Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field.
The submitted position paper by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies contend
that a National Society, like PNRC, partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected component of the Red
Cross movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva Convention. This sui generis character is also
emphasized by the Fourth Geneva Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot require any change
in the personnel or structure of a National Society.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Red Cross’ structure is Sui Generis
Ruling: Yes.
 This Court must recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of
the Philippine National Red Cross in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force
and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land.

Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009

FACTS:

Tagitis, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007 at ASY Pension House.
Tagitis asked Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip.
Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition)
with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla

There is an information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands
of the uniformed men, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City.

Being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

However, they argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action
against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

RULING:

The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo applies.

Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under
this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.

There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows
that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen
nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and
even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions
the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed
in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945

FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which were initiated during the
Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting
such authority.
During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and jurisdiction of the
different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and
enforced.

ISSUE: Whether the governments established in the Philippines (Philippine Executive Commission and Republic
of the Philippines) during the Japanese military regime were de facto governments.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1 by the
Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces and therefore a de
facto government of the second kind. The source of its authority comes from the Japanese military, it is a government
imposed by the laws of war. The same is true with the Republic of the Philippines. Apparently, established and
organized as a sovereign state, independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and
reality, a government established by the Japanese forces of occupation.
In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de
facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political
in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government, remain good.
All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained
as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign.

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS:

• The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government
and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of
the Philippine Senate.

• The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments
in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
 • Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.”

ISSUE:

Main: Whether VFA is unconstitutional?

Specific: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective?

RULING:

• Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred
in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

• There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at
least 16 Senators that concurred.

• As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-
entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

• The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has
fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance
with the mandate of the Constitution.

• Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate,
should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty,
with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification
is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal
acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of
ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly
believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification.

• With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under principles of
international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than
Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity with all nations.

Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

FACTS
Lao Ichong, a Chinese businessman and herein petitioner, is believed to have grossly abused the privileges given
to him as he enjoyed monopolistic control in the local market in Pasay. As a response, the legislature enacted
Republic Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business," which in effect nationalizes the retail trade
 business and generally prohibits aliens from engaging directly and indirectly in the retail trade and from
establishing or opening additional stores or branches of retail business.
Petitioner, in his own behalf and of other alien residents, brought this action to ask for the invalidation of
the Retail Trade Nationalization Act on the ground that 1) it violated or contravened international and treaty
obligations concluded by the Republic of the Philippines and is likewise unconstitutional and that 2) it denied the
petitioner equal protection of the laws. Further, the generally accepted principles of international law should have
been observed by the Philippines in good faith.
The Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that 1) no treaty or international
obligations were infringed and that 2) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State,
which is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that
ISSUE
Whether or not the RA 1180 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Sub-issue: Whether or not the Act was passed in the valid exercise of police power.
RULING
As regards the main issue, the law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration
of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China
of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals
of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited
from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent or municipal law.
On the sub-issue, assuming that there was indeed conflict between the statute and the treaty, the former
should be upheld because it represented an exercise of police power which, being inherent, could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Police power derives its existence from the very existence
of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self
- protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. In this regard, the law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about
the desired legislative objective i.e. to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges.

In re Garcia, August 15, 1961

Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required
bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City,
of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was
approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid
where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was
allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees
and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the
Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Issue:
Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?

Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition.

Ratio Decidendi:
The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot
be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession
in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino
citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and
is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges
provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the
contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify the
laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963

FACTS:
Respondent authorized the importation of the 67,000 tons of foreign rice from private sources. Petitioner then,
questioned said act because R.A. 3452 which allegedly repeals or remands R.A. 2207- explicitly prohibits the
importation of foreign rice by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. Hechanova
countered that the importation was authorized by the President for military stock pile purposes. He also contended
that the government had entered into contracts in the purchase of rice with Vietnam and with Burma and that these
contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law which are binding and effective upon
signing thereof by the representative of both parties.
ISSUE:
Whether/ not the contracts entered into by the government with Vietnam and Burma are the same as executive
agreements.
RULING:
NO. Contracts should not be regarded as the same with executive agreements. However, the court ruled that
assuming that they are, the former are still null and void from a constitutional viewpoint being inconsisten with the
provisions of R.A. 2207 and 3452.

Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011

Facts:
This petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 assails and seeks to nullify the Non-Surrender
Agreement concluded by and between the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the United States of America
(USA).
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
For their part, respondents question petitioner’s standing to maintain a suit and counter that the agreement being
in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons
detailed in their comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the agreement.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the agreement was contracted validly, which resolves itself into the question of whether or not
respondents gravely abused their discretion in concluding it
2. Whether or not the agreement which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence, contravenes and
undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties.
Ruling:
Petitioners’ contention––
perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargons is untenable. One
of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
An exchange of notes falls "into the category of inter-governmental agreements," which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement.
On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President "sometimes take the form of exchange of
notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’"

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral

Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008
FACTS
On August 05, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion
of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. When Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought the resumption
of peace talks. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian
government. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli Libya and Vyberja, Malaysia. In 2005,
several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the
draft of the MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
ISSUE
Whether the constitutionality and the legality of MOA is ripe for adjudication
RULING
There can be no question that the provisions of MOA-AD cannot all be accommodated under the present
Constitution and law. As Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the Supreme Court added a discussion citing
international principles.
International Law has long recognized the right to self-determination of people. Among the conventions referred
to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, which state, in Article 1 of both covenants that all people, by virtue of the right of self-
determination, freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development. The people’s right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to
a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-
determination.
Scope of the Right of Self-Determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a
people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination a people’s pursuit of its political, economic,
social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
 determination (which in the case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances.
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on
Friendly relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with
an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people
constitutes modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.

127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of
respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support
the existence of a people’s right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the
conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an
existing states territorial integrity or stability of relations between sovereign states.

JUSMAG Phils. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108813, December 15, 1994

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari. JUSMAG assails the Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (public respondent), in reversing the Order of the Labor Arbiter, and ordering the latter to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Florencio Sacramento (private respondent) against
petitioner. Florencio Sacramento, was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP)
working at JUSMAG-Philippines. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent
President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His services were terminated
allegedly due to the abolition of his position. Private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor
and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. JUSMAG
then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It further alleged
lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. Labor Arbiter
dismissed the subject complaint " for want of jurisdiction." Private respondent appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission which reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter as it held that petitioner had lost its right not
to be sued. The resolution was predicated on two grounds: (1) the principle of estoppel — that JUSMAG failed to
refute the existence of employer-employee relationship under the "control test"; and (2) JUSMAG has waived its
right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of private respondent.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not we recognize and adopt the Immunity of State as generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.
2. Whether or not JUSMAG can invoke immunity from suit as an agency of the United States.
Ruling:
1. Yes, Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law that the
Philippines recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. In this jurisdiction, we recognize and
adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of State
from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law, “immunity” is commonly
understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This
is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert
jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no
power over an equal). Same; As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has
been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii), and does not extend to commercial,
private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).—The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone
further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that
 sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between
sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive
application of the doctrine. As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been
restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be
extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
2. Yes, JUSMAG can invoke immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. A suit against JUSMAG
is one against the United States Government, and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to
the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.—From the foregoing, it is apparent that when
JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of
the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree
with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not
impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit,
the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.

IV. Duties of the Government: Serve and Protect the People, Defend the
State, Etc. (Sec. 4 & 5)
CASES:

People v. Lagman, G.R. No. L-45892, July 13, 1938 & People v.
Soza, G.R. No. L-45893, July 13, 1938
Facts:
In these two cases, the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa were charged with the violation of section 60
of Commonwealth Act No. 1known as National Defense Law for willfully and unlawfully refusing to register in the
military service between the 1st and 7th of April 1936, notwithstanding the fact that they were required to do so.
Appellants contend that this is due to the fact that Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and had to support his mother
and 8-year old brother, while Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, had no military learnings and does
no wish to kill or be killed. They further question the constitutionality of the National Defense Law on the ground
that it is against Section2, Article 2 which provides as follows;
“Sec 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty, all citizens may
be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”

Issue:
Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No, the National Defense Law is constitutional and is rather in pursuant to the said provision. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an
army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient
men who volunteer to enlist therein. What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether
actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.

Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Facts:

This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family
and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert
that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections
1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no
law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has
been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:

"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel.

Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat
the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.

What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state".

On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence
and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However,
right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and
the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right
to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as
part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return
of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino
has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

V. Renunciation of War; Independent Foreign Policy; and Nuclear-Free

Policy (Sec. 2, 7 & 8); related provisions: Sec. 25, Art. XVIII (re presence of
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the Phils.
CASES:

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000 – re

constitutionality of the VFA

Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009 – another

challenge on the constitutionality of the VFA
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Ratification of a Treaty – Validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement
**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo
FACTS
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the
said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime
against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a
treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with
the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was
not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA
Petitioner Jovito Salonga, et al. challenged the validity of the said agreements contending that the
Philippines should have custody of Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional since it violates
Art. XVlll, Sec. 25 of the constitution.

ISSUE
Is the VFA constitutional? Granting that it is constitutional, Are the Romulo-Kenney Agreements in accordance
with the provisions of the VFA itself?

SUGGESTED ANSWER
The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
entered into on February 10, 1998, is constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22,
2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.

VFA is Constitutional

The SC ruled that “the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty
by the United States,” and “the fact that (it) was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
The issue, the Court said, is “whether or not the presence of the US Armed Forces in Philippine territory
pursuant to the VFA is allowed ‘under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.’” “It is,” the Court ruled. “The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the
joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,”
the Court held.

Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 - re

constitutionality of the EDCA
FACTS:

• EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the Philippines and
America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within
certain "Agreed Locations" in the country.
• After eight rounds of negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S.
Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III
ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014.
• It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no longer
necessary.
 • Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The resolution expresses the "strong sense" of the
Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for
deliberation and concurrence
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties.
RULING:

• The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified
by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry
into execution the law”.
• The role of the President as the executor of the law includes the duty to defend the State, for which purpose
he may use that power in the conduct of foreign relations. It is the President's prerogative to do whatever
is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests (commander-in-chief powers).

• The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities;
or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. No court can tell the President to desist from
choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case
falls squarely within Article VIII, Section 25.

• EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be bound through the President without the
need of senatorial votes for its execution. EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops
has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement.
Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty led this Court to the conclusion that
an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both
treaties

Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011 (read also the
concurring opinion of J. Velasco)
FACTS
Congres enacted RA 9522, amending RA 3046 and making it compliant with the terms of the UNCLOS III. RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes
of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens,
taxpayers or legislators, as the case may be, assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds,
namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
ISSUES

1. Whether or not UNCLOS III compliant baselines law is deemed part of the law of the land.
2. Whether or not RA 9522 violates Section 8, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING
Regarding the first issue, internationally accepted baselines or baselines compliant with the provisions of the
UNCLOS III are deemed part of the law of the land considering Section 2 of Article 2 of the Constitution: "The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations."
Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
devoid of internationally accepted baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is
measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to
freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it
weakens the country's case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences
Congress wisely avoided. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of
the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
SEPARATE OPINION (Velasco, Jr., J., concurring)
With regard to the second issue, the adverted Sec. 8, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution declares the adoption and
pursuit by the Philippines of a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. On the other hand, the
succeeding Sec. l6 underscores the States firm commitment to protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Following the allegations of
petitioners, these twin provisions will supposedly be violated inasmuch as RA 9522 accedes to the right of innocent
passage and the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage provided under the LOSC. Therefore, ships of all nations
be they nuclear-carrying warships or neutral commercial vessels transporting goodscan assert the right to traverse
the waters within our islands.

VI. Separation of Church and State (Sec. 6); related provisions: the
establishment and free-exercise clauses (Sec. 5, Art. III); the prohibition
against appropriations for sectarian purpose (Sec. 29(2) of Art. VI)
CASES:

Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of
the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of
the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held:

Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial
of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man
to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence
is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the
aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop
the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense
religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power
to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of
course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to
appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular
church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of
the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the
stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 (decision);

June 22, 2006 (resolution)
FACTS:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes of RTC Branch 253 requesting for an investigation of
rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, the court interpreter of the same court, is living with a man not her
husband and had a child of 18 to 20 years old with him. The reason that prompted him to file a charge against
respondent is that such behavior is immoral and tarnishes the image of the court. Escritor, however, testified that
when she entered the judiciary, she was already a widow and has been living with Luciano Quiliapo without the
benefit of marriage for 20 years, but their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. Being
members of the Jehovah’s witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, after 10 years of living
together, they executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness. Petitioner argued that said declaration is binding
only to her co-members and serves only the internal purpose of displaying to the rest of the congregation that she
and her mate are a respectable couple. Their religious belief and practice cannot override the norms of conduct
required by law for government employees. Still, respondent insists the validity of the said declaration.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence
on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.

RULING:
In order to resolve the case, the respondents’ claim of religious freedom is being subjected to the compelling state
interest from a benevolent neutrality stance.
First, determine whether the respondent’s said right has been burdened. Based from the facts, in choosing
between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and family on the one hand and keeping
her religious practice and family on the other, puts a burden on the exercise of her right.
Second, ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief, Evidently, respondent appears to be sincere in her
religious belief. In the testimony of the ministers from the congregation, the declaration was not whimsically issued
to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct but to make the union of their members under the same circumstances
of the respondent honorable before God and men.
To properly settle the issue, the government should be given opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance. To do otherwise would be an unconstitutional
encroachment of her right to religious freedom which is protected by the Free Exercise Clause. The Court ruled
that this case is of first impression where it is applying the compelling state interest test in a case involving purely
religious conduct.
Therefore the case is remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator and the OSG is ordered to
intervene to adduce evidence showing that the State has more “compelling interest” to defeat the claim of the
respondent to religious freedom.
RULING: ( June 22, 2006)
No. The conjugal arrangement of the respondent cannot be penalized since it is an exercise of her fundamental
right to freedom of religion. The court recognizes that in the exercise of religious freedom, there must be a showing
of a compelling state interest that should not be violated. Otherwise, he will be held accountable by the state.
The presented evidence by the OSG fails to demonstrate “gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests” which could limit respondent’s fundamental right nor did it show that it seeks to achieve its legitimate
state objective in a least intrusive means. It invoked that the states has a compelling interests in order to protect
the marriage and family as basic social institutions. But such is not the case. What must be weighed against the
respondent’s claim is the State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which
respondent’s faith finds moral. In the case at bar, the state has not presented any concrete interest in enforcing
the charges against the respondent.
The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach which gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, the argument that respondent should be held
administratively liable for the arrangement is inherently immoral by universally recognized standards failed to
appreciate the benevolent neutrality which allowed for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided that
it does not offend compelling state interests.

VII. Social Justice and Human Rights (Sec. 9, 10, 11, 18 and 21); related
provisions: Article XIII re Social Justice and Human Rights
CASES:

Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940

Facts:
National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30Am
to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic.
Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion?
Ruling:
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state inorder to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations

Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,

G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989

FACTS
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands
do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating lands. The petitioners
claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the abovementioned decree.
ISSUE
Whether or not PD No. 27 is valid
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court sustained the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. All major obstacles to the
comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may
now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from exploitation or disdain of the past and
from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. Wherefore, the Court holds that landowners who were
unable to exercise their rights of retention under PD No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by RA No. 6657
under the conditions therein prescribed.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, GR No. 112844, June 2, 1995

(with concurrence of J. Brion)
Facts:
Petitioner, Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer. On March 19, 1998, the
date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end
of April 1998. Respondents did not deliver on their promise. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer
and was repatriated to the Philippines serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month
from June 1998 to February 1999, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and
exemplary damages. The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing
his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for
salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for
damages as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3) months
salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the
provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995. Serrano filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section
10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee
with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA),
reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the
reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
Ruling:
The answer is in the affirmative. Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the
labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare. To Filipino
workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and
parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation
of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the
claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other
OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs
and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector
protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines
whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any actual
enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection
through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just
for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working
class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), formulated
the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection—such as the working class or a section thereof—the
Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

VIII. Family, Women and Youth (Sec. 12, 13, 14); related provisions: Article
XIII, Sec. 14 and Article XV, Sec. 1-4
CASES:

Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR- No. 2677, affirming the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy.
The conviction is based on the fact that on or about 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Eduardo P.
Manuel, being then married to Rubylus Gaa, contracted a marriage with Tina Gandalera Manuel, without having
the first marriage legally dissolved.
Eduardo claimed that when he met Tina, she was working as a Guest Relations Officer at a bar and fell in love
with her. He was only forced to marry Rubylus and when she was convicted of estafa, he visited her in jail after
three months and never saw her again. He contracted said marriage 20 years after, assuming that Rubylus is
dead, and in good faith that there is no need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death, in pursuant to Article
390 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judicial declaration for presumptive death is necessary to contract a subsequent marriage given
the 20-years absence of the first wife.

RULING:
Yes
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage
is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that
the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed
and the causes specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety,
good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity
of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient
ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and
death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious
that
the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the
first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse after the lapse of the period provided for under the
law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To
sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would
make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals. Only with such proof can marriage be
treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages. Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made
the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts
easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally
wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also
unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their
children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a
single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of
access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent
and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING:

No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal
footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light
of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring
gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed
by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based
classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS:

• Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
• Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
▪ The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
▪ The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
▪ The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
▪ The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
▪ The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
▪ The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
▪ The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
▪ The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

ISSUE:

Whether RA 10354 or Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to health

RULING:

• Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase
of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of
getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.

• Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the
status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.

• The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner.

• Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

PT&T Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997

IX. Right to Health (Sec. 15); Right to Healthful and Balanced Ecology (Sec.
16)
A. Right to health

CASE:

Imbong v. Ochoa, supra

FACTS:
 • Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
• Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
▪ The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
▪ The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
▪ The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
▪ The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
▪ The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
▪ The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
▪ The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
▪ The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

ISSUE:

Whether RA 10354 or Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to health

RULING:

• Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase
of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of
getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.

• Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the
status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.

• The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription
of a qualified medical practitioner.

• Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine
that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

B. Right to healthful and balanced ecology

CASES:

Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771,

April 21, 2015)
FACTS
Two sets of petitioners separately filed an action challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46)
awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX), which allowed JAPEX for the exploration, development
and exploitation of petroleum resources in the Tañon Strait situated between Negros and Cebu.
The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by two individuals
namely Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio acting as legal guardians of the marine mammals.
Petitioners collectively referred to as "Resident Marine Mammals” are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises,
and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
The second petition was filed by the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC) representing
the interests of the fisherfolks in Region VII, along with representatives from fishing communities affected by the
exploration activities.

The petitioners filed their cases shortly after JAPEX began conducting exploration and drilling activities in
the strait. Petitioner Resident Marine Mammals avers that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the
fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent and incidences of fish kill have also been observed. FIDEC
confirmed the allegations of the petitioner Resident Marine Mammals.
In 2008, JAPEX and the Government of the Philippines, through the Department of Energy and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, mutually terminated the service contract and the oil
exploration activities ceased.
ISSUES
Main issue: Whether or not energy resource exploitation and utilization is allowed in Tañon Strait.
Sub-issue: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and other
relevant laws.
RULING
True to the constitutional policy provided in Section 16 of Article II that the "State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature," Congress
enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment
of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. The exploitation and utilization of this energy resource
in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS
area. But since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no
energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
The Court finds that Service Contract No. 46 is null and void for non-compliance with the requirements of
the Constitution. Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any
service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by
the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., likewise, the contract had not been reported to the
Philippine Congress, contrary to the said constitutional requirement.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA, G.R. No. 110120,

March 16, 1994
FACTS:
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an
open dumpsite at
the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environ
mental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under
Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued
a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.
ISSUES:
1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of
garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
• Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The
authority shall have the following powers and
functions: (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditi
ons and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished
• As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases w here the special law provides for another forum
RULING:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 an
d its amendatory law s to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting
and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal an
d Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such
a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility
to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes f
rom the surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press powers.
In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE:
HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993 (read also the
concurrence of J. Feliciano explaining the nuances of the
ponencia of J. Davide)
FACTS:

The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit "representing their generation as well
as generations yet unborn based on the twin concept of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice. Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered ordering defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to a) cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and b)
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
RTC dismissed the motion on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action and raises a political
question.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court in dismissing the case on the ground that the petitioners failed to allege a specific legal
right involved that they are seeking to enforce or a specific legal wrong that they are seeking to redress giving rise
to a cause of action.

RULING:
Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The court ruled that these right are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. Being
embedded in the Constitution is for the purpose of imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve,
advance, and protect the said rights. In conformity of the enunciate right, then Pres. Aquino promulgated E.O. No.
192 creating the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources. Thus, the right of the petitioners
to a balanced and healthful ecology is clear and the denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative to respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.

The Supreme Court does not agree on the trial court’s conclusion. The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec.16.The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
— the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.

Petition granted and the previous decision set aside.

Concurring opinion (J. Feliciano)

The disputed right cannot be characterized as specific. By finding petitioner’s cause of action as anchored on a
legal right, is in effect declaring that Sections 15 and 16 of Article II are self- executing provisions and are judicially
enforceable, thereby giving rise to future implications that are far-reaching in nature.

Justice Feliciano suggested that the petitioners should show a more specific legal right that is or may be
violated by actions or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgement granting the relief prayed for. Failure to do so would unable the defendants to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively, thereby violating due process. Other than that, the petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded concept of judicial power. In this case, the legislative and executive
departments must be given an opportunity to promulgate specific and operable norms and standards and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.

MMDA, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., G.R.

Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011

Facts:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively
ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.
Issue:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up
Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
Ruling:
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean
- up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in
said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.
Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

X. Education, Science and Technology, etc. (Sec. 17); Information and

Communications (Sec. 24)
A. Related provisions: Art. XIV (re Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports)

XI. National Economy (Sec. 19 & 20); related provisions: Art. XII (re National
Economy and Patrimony)
CASES:

Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

FACTS
Lao Ichong, a Chinese businessman and herein petitioner, is believed to have grossly abused the privileges given
to him as he enjoyed monopolistic control in the local market in Pasay. As a response, the legislature enacted
Republic Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business," which in effect nationalizes the retail trade
business and generally prohibits aliens from engaging directly and indirectly in the retail trade and from
establishing or opening additional stores or branches of retail business.
Petitioner, in his own behalf and of other alien residents, brought this action to ask for the invalidation of
the Retail Trade Nationalization Act on the ground that 1) it violated or contravened international and treaty
obligations concluded by the Republic of the Philippines and is likewise unconstitutional and that 2) it denied the
petitioner equal protection of the laws. Further, the generally accepted principles of international law should have
been observed by the Philippines in good faith.
The Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that 1) no treaty or international
obligations were infringed and that 2) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State,
which is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that
ISSUE
Whether or not the RA 1180 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Sub-issue: Whether or not the Act was passed in the valid exercise of police power.
RULING
As regards the main issue, the law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration
of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China
of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals
of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited
from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent or municipal law.
On the sub-issue, assuming that there was indeed conflict between the statute and the treaty, the former
should be upheld because it represented an exercise of police power which, being inherent, could not be bargained
away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Police power derives its existence from the very existence
of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self
- protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. In this regard, the law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about
the desired legislative objective i.e. to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges.

Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010

FACTS:

On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals
from engaging in the retail trade business. On October 11, 2000 petitioners filed the present petition, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Respondents countered that the petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition.
Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially
demandable. And that the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional as it violates Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution
and would result to alien dominance of other areas of business.

RULING:

As the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations
of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise
to a cause of action in the courts.

The Court further explained in Tañada that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of
economic nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; and
(3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit
of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus,
while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes
the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
 Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain
areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can
enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino
citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.

Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, Nov. 5, 1997

Facts:
This is a petition against Republic Act No. 8180 entitled, “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and
For Other Purposes.”
Petitioners contend that the provisions of Section 5, 6 and 9 are contrary to Section 9 Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions are as follow:
(1) Section 5 (b) – “Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty
shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same
as that for imported crude oil. Provided that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and
refined petroleum products shall be the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be amended only by an
Act of Congress.

(2) Section 6 which states — "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products supply, the
DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower," and

(3) Section 9 (b) which states — "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream
oil industry, the following acts shall be prohibited:

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 8180 Sections 5, 6 and 9 is in violation of Section 19 Article XII of the Constitution.

Ruling:
No.
Section 9 Article XII provides, “The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.
No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”
While the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation of
monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public interest. This distinct free enterprise system is dictated
to achieve the goals of our economy as defined by Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more
equitable distribution o opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding enterprise. It also calls on the
State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.
Section 19 of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of
competition is reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair
competition, and the reason for regulating unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of
section 19 Article XII which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180.

Garcia v. Corona, G.R. No. 132451, December 17, 1999 – timing of

full deregulation not justiciable
FACTS:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy and Lagman, et al., v. Hon.
Ruben Torres, et al.,[1] declared Republic Act No. 8180, entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry
and For Other Purposes, unconstitutional, and its implementing Executive Order No. 392 void.
R.A. 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free competition were
shown to achieve the opposite result. More specifically, this Court ruled that its provisions on tariff differential,
stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere
with the free interaction of the market forces.
While R.A. 8180 contained a separability clause, it was declared unconstitutional in its entirety since the three (3)
offending provisions so permeated the law that they were so intimately the esse of the law. Thus, the whole statute
had to be invalidated.
As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new deregulation law without the
offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of Congress, has now brought this
petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing
in his attempts to have Congress incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses, petitioner now asks us,
in the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo a violation which he claims Congress has committed.

The assailed Section 19 of R.A. 8479 states in full:

SEC. 19. Start of Full Deregulation. --- Full deregulation of the Industry shall start five (5) months following the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, That when the public interest so requires, the President may accelerate
the start of full deregulation upon the recommendation of the DOE and the Department of Finance (DOF) when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and the value of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable, taking into account relevant trends and prospects; Provided, further, That the
foregoing provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-month Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG, regular
gasoline and kerosene as socially-sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum products shall be covered by
the automatic pricing mechanism during the said period.
Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein, the Transition Phase is deemed terminated and
the following laws are repealed:
a) Republic Act No. 6173, as amended;
b) Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended;
c) Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984;
d) Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as amended;
e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985;
f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and
g) Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137:
Provided, however, That in case full deregulation is started by the President in the exercise of the authority
provided in this Section, the foregoing laws shall continue to be in force and effect with respect to LPG, regular
gasoline and kerosene for the rest of the five (5)-month period.
Petitioner contends that Section 19 of R.A. 8479, which prescribes the period for the removal of price control on
gasoline and other finished products and for the full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry, is patently
contrary to public interest and therefore unconstitutional because within the short span of five months, the market
is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly of the three (3) private respondents, namely, Shell, Caltex and
Petron.
The objective of the petition is deceptively simple. It states that if the constitutional mandate against monopolies
and combinations in restraint of trade[2] is to be obeyed, there should be indefinite and open-ended price controls
on gasoline and other oil products for as long as necessary. This will allegedly prevent the Big 3 --- Shell, Caltex
and Petron --- from price-fixing and overpricing. Petitioner calls the indefinite retention of price controls as partial
deregulation.

(TO BE CONTINUED…)
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release
and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos
(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the
WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of
both Congress and the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and
impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine
Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.

Held: No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty, particularly
the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it
concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our
own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international
agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound
to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.”

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus,
treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for
example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct
of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying
down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty
of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture:
(1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by
treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-
sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages
industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against
a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can
compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered
under a policy of laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

(Read also the dissent of J. Puno)
Facts:
 • Pursuant to the privatization program under proclamation No. 50, GSIS decided to sell thru public
bidding 30 to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Among others, the
winning bidder is to provide management/expertise to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.
• On Sept. 18, 1995, a close bidding was held with only 2 bidders participating: Manila Prince hotel
Corp., a Fil. Corporation which offered to buy of the MHC or 15, 300 shares at P41.58 and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian Firm which bid for the same number of shares at P44 shares or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
• On Sept. 28, 1995, Pet. Sent a letter to GSIS matching the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
and later sent a manager’s check which GSIS refused to accept.
• Pet. Came to the court on prohibition and mandamus enjoining respondent from consummating
the sale to the Malaysian Firm on the grounds that Petioner should be preferred as Sec. 10, 2nd par. of Art. 12 of
the 1987 Constitution gave Filipinos prederence over foreign corporations; and that Manila Hotel has become part
of national patrimony, being a part of the tourism industry, the hotel business of the respondent GSIS is part of the
national economy which is covered in the aforementioned consti. provision.
• Respondents argued that said consti prov. Is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is
not a self-executing provision and required enacting legislations; that manila Hotel does not fall under national
patrimony.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 10m 2nd par. of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision?

RULING:
1.Yes, the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently,
if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium

XII. Indigenous Cultural Communities (Sec. 22); Read also the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act (IPRA) and its IRR
CASE:

Cruz v. Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

Respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed their comment to the
petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit.
 On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated comment.

Sec. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, Ikalahan Indigenous People, the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural
Resources, Inc., and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a motion to intervene. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed. Motions granted.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of the IPRA, to wit, Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8,
57 and 58 and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not the IPRA violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

RULING

It has been held that the IPRA did not violate the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
Ancestral domain and lands referred to do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.

As defined in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.

The provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other natural
resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize the rights of the
indigenous peoples. These, as set forth hereinbefore, include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State
recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development.

The petition was dismissed.

XIII. The Role of NGOs, etc.; Read also Sec. Sec. 15 & 16, Art. XIII (re Role of
POs)

XIV. Local Autonomy (Sec. 25); Read also Art. X (Local Government) & R.A.
7160 (the Local Government Code)
CASE:

Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, Nov. 19, 2013

FACTS:

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
 The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF.

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. Six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into
about 20 bogus NGO which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects
but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on:

(1) Political dynasties

(2) Local Autonomy

RULING:

(1) No, PDAF does not violate the provision of the Constitution on Politival dynasty.

Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it
has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

(2) Yes it violates the provision of local autonomy.

The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
“making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on
the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding
as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to
the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in
some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional
Pork Barrel as well.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.

XV. Opportunities for Public Service; Prohibition against Political Dynasty

(Sec. 26)
CASES:

Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency, the
Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due course. Pamatong requested a case for
reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along
with 35 other people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC noted that
such candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are either not nominated by a political party or not
supported by a registered political party with national constituency.”

Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service,” citing
Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this
manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most qualified among all the presidential candidates” and supported
the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage national and international campaigns, and
his government platform.

ISSUES

Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for
such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service.

HELD

1. Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along with
the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public service. – NO

The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-self executing. As such,
the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially enforceable
rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action” by presenting ideals/standards
through the policies presented.

Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is subject to limitations provided
by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without discrimination, then the equal access clause is not
violated. The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of
ensuring rational, objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes
a “mockery” if anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run.

Note:
Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for candidacy. The Court however
stated that it is not within their power to make such assessments.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary, supra

XVI. Full Disclosure of Public Transactions (Sec. 28); read also Sec. 7, Art.
III, the right to information on matters of public concern
CASE:

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the

Phils., G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008
Facts:
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to
sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the
MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon and prayed
that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997)

Ruling:
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not
grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

I. Separation of powers
A. Allocation of governmental powers in the Constitution

B. Manner/form of conferment of power

1.Express Powers

2. Implied powers: the doctrine of necessary implication

CASES:

Angara v. Electoral Commission, GR No L-45081, July 15, 1936

Facts: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution
confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said
resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner
before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not
submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of
respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter, if yes, Whether or not EC acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by Consti (through separate
articles for each branch) but check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there are
conflicts between the boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to review
and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to
actual cases and that the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other
two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. — But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination
in the workings of various departments of government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is
80 far made a check on the legislative power that his assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however,
is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve
it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also
the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain ocers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members
is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme
Court shall be established, to dene their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the judicial department. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the nal arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

FACTS:
In the latter part of October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought
two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively.
P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident
American, thru his two attorneys-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault. However, Ernest H.
Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second
from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to
complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners was canceled.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to
the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The
Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural
Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which
the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as
stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate
the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined
various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the
committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to
Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of the only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed
to have forfeited anyway long before October 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon
of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the
Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same
occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he
himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the
present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the Senate then approved a resolution that
cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.

Issue: WON the Congress has the power to punish non-members for contempt.

Ruling: Yes.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in three independent
but coordinate Departments — Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the
Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence
of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the
Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision empowering either of the two Houses
of Congress to punish non-members for contempt.

In analogy with the jurisprudence of similar cases from the United States, it has been provided that although there
is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with the power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry — with the process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.

Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete, so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what
is needed. The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.
But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required
in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.

3. Inherent powers
CASES:

In re Dick, G.R. No. L-13862, April 15, 1918

Facts: Congress enacted the Amendments to the Judicial Code which require the litigants of the court, who wants
the judgment of the domestic court to be reviewed by the supreme court of the United States, to file an application
for a writ of certiorari in the clerk's office of the Supreme Court of the United States. Application made must be
timely and in good faith that the execution of the judgment would subject him to irreparable loss, damage, or injury
in the event of its subsequent reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States.

In this case, petitioner applied for the suspension of execution of his deportation order and was remanded to the
custody of the Chief of Police. The petitioner (who, by virtue of the suspending order remained in the custody of
the court) was released from the technical custody of our sheriff, and set at liberty upon filing an approved bond.

Now, Solicitor-General prays for an order vacating these orders providing for a stay or suspension of the execution
of our judgment on setting the petitioner at liberty on bail. The Solicitor-General contends that the Governor-
General is vested with power to deport the petitioner, and the courts have no power to interfere with or to control
his action in the premises.

The petitioner, pending the final adjudication of the question raised by him as to the existence and legality of the
power raised by the Governor-General in ordering his deportation; and although this court has solemnly declared
that the Governor-General is lawfully vested with such power, there can be no question as to the right of the
petitioner to apply to the Supreme Court of the United States for a review of our judgment.

Issue: Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to suspend the execution of its judgment.

Ruling: We are satisfied that under the law and the settled practice of this court, we have jurisdiction to
suspend the execution of our judgment, and to withhold the order remanding the petitioner for deportation for a
period of time sufficient to give him a suitable opportunity to apply for a writ of certiorari form the Supreme Court
of the United States. (U. S. vs. Lim, 36 Phil. Rep., 682; Campagnie de Commerce et de Navigation D'Extreme
Orient vs. Hamburg Amerika Packetfacht Actien Gesellschaft, 36 Phil. Rep., 590; E. Viegelmann & Co. vs.
Collector of Customs, 37 Phil. Rep., 10; R. G. No. 11899, Ynchausti & Co. Board of Public Utility Commissioner.1)

Having held that he Governor-General was lawfully authorized to institute and maintain deportation proceedings
against the petitioner under the provisions of section 69 of the Administrative code; and having declared that we
have no jurisdiction in these habeas corpus proceedings to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence
on which he based his ruling in the course of these proceedings; and the Governor-General having declared, as
a result of an investigation lawfully held under his direction, that the petitioner is an undesirable alien, whose
presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the community; it would seem to be a
flagrant abuse of our discretion to turn him loose upon the community at such a time as this, in the face of the
insistent objection of the Chief Executive who is primarily charge with the maintenance of the safety, peace, and
good order of these Islands.

But this discretion is a sound judicial discretion to be exercised in the light of all the surrounding facts and
circumstances. After having held that a petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings had been lawfully adjudged a
dangerous lunatic or a desperate criminal no court would be justified, except under the most extraordinary
circumstances, letting him to bail merely for the purpose of securing a review of the proceedings by a superior
court. So this court, after upholding the legality of the order deporting the petitioner and of the proceedings wherein
he was adjudged an undesirable alien whose presence in the Philippine Island is a menace to the pace and safety
of the community cannot consistently turn him loose upon the community under bail, for the more or less prolonged
period necessary to secure a review of the proceedings by the Supreme Court of the United States, when objection
to that course is interposed by the executive officer more especially charged with the maintenance of the peace
and safety of the community.

We have conclude, therefore, that while we should and must deny the motion of the Solicitor-General to vacate
our order staying the execution of our judgment and to turn the petitioner over to the chief of police for deportation
forthwith, we would not be justified in maintaining in force the order of letting the petitioner to bail, over the well-
founded objection of the Chief Executive who is primarily charged with the conservation of the peace, safety and
good order of the Islands. Accordingly, we will entertain a new or an amended motion by the Solicitor-general to
take the petitioner into the immediate custody of the court, to cancel the bond upon which he is now at large, and
thereafter to turn him over to the custody of the chief of police of the city of Manila or such other officer as may be
designated by the chief Executive, for detention pending the stay of execution of our judgment in these habeas
corpus proceedings.

In Re Sotto, January 21, 1949 (Read also the concurrence of J.

Perfecto)
Facts:
♦Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo
the statement was published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The court required
Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court.

♦ Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the
Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress
with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith
and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his
opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or
integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.

Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court?

Ratio:
♦ Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not
punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt

♦ That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly
accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since
our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.

♦ Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the
court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but lif it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it
should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.

♦ Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members
of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing
the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of
Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the
case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the
majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these
last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of
the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very
loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark
of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned
jurists who were the honor

RULING: Yes, V. S. Is punishable for contempt. Therefore, even on the false hypothesis that penalties for
contempt are not procedural in nature, courts of justice may impose said penalties, if not under Rule 64, under the
provisions of Act No. 190.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of justice. It springs from the very nature of their
functions. Without such power, courts of justice would be unable to perform effectively their functions. They
function by orders. Every decision is a command. The power to punish disobedience to command is essential to
make the commands effective.

Respondent is in error in maintaining that the Supreme Court has no power to enact Rule 64, He is correct in
calling it judicial legislation although he fails to remember that judicial legislation in matters of judicial practice and
procedure is expressly authorized by section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution.

Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is
also required to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
In re Integration of the Philippine Bar
Facts
Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor" which was later signed by President Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect
on the same day as Republic Act 6397. Section 1 of this law provides that “within two years from the approval of
this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.”

Issue
Whether or not the Court has the power to integrate the Philippine Bar

Ruling
Yes. The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII,
Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional
authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is
a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively."

Santiago v. Vazquez, G.R. Nos. 99289, January 27, 1993

FACTS:

A criminal case was filed against Santiago with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019,otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. Santigao filed before the SC a petition seeking to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the RTC from proceeding with the criminal cases, but was later on dismissed.
During the proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against the petitioner who at that time
intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes. In the instant case, petitioner
raises one of her arguments that the hold departure order violates her right to due process since it was issued
without notice and hearing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in issuing the hold departure order without notice and hearing.

RULING:

NO. Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said implied from a general grant of jurisdiction. These
powers are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction, or essential to the existence, dignity
and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice, or are directly appropriate, convenient
and suitable to the execution of their granter powers and include the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and
render it effective in behalf of the litigants. In the present case, the hold departure order is an exercise of the
Sandiganbayan’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the accused.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19,

1999
FACTS:
• BACKGROUND: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape
of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the
said crime was all set.
• On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled
on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the
action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive
to grant reprieve.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution
of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO,
the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

RULING:
The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process
of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its
processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.
The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted
reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has
been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate
courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a
state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of
the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the
Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of
the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for
the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect
the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers
of the 3 branches of the government.
It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court,
contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to
restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of
republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord
with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the
assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of
execution of their decisions.

MMDA, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al., G.R.

Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011 (Read also the respective
dissents of JJ. Carpio and Sereno)
C. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction – corollary to separation of powers
CASE:

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation v. Republic, G.R. No.

177857-58, September 17, 2009
Facts:
COCOFED seeks the Court's approval of the conversion of its Class "A" and Class "B" common shares of San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) registered in the names of Coconut Industry Investment Fund and the so-called "14
Holding Companies" (collectively known as "CIIF companies") into SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares.

Oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al. anchor their plea for reconsideration on the following submission or issues:
1. The conversion of the shares is patently disadvantageous to the government and the coconut farmers,
given that SMC’s option to redeem ensures that the shares will be bought at less than their market value.
2. The honorable court overlooks the value of the fact that the government, as opposed to the current
administration, is the winning party in the case below and thus has no incentive to convert.

There are perceived economic disadvantages and harm that the government would likely suffer by the approval
of the proposed conversion. The proposed redemption is a right to buy the preferred shares at less than the market
value. That the market value of the preferred shares may be higher than the issue price of PhP 75 per share at
the time of redemption is possible. But then the opposite scenario is also possible. Again, the Court need not delve
into policy decisions of government agencies because of their expertise and special knowledge of these matters.
Suffice it to say that all indications show that SMC will redeem said preferred shares in the third year and not later
because the dividend rate of 8% it has to pay on said shares is higher than the interest it will pay to the banks in
case it simply obtains a loan. When market prices of shares are low, it is possible that interest rate on loans will
likewise be low. On the other hand, if SMC has available cash, it would be prudent for it to use such cash to
redeem the shares than place it in a regular bank deposit which will earn lower interests. It is plainly expensive
and costly for SMC to keep on paying the 8% dividend rate annually in the hope that the market value of the shares
will go up before it redeems the shares. Likewise, the conclusion that respondent Republic will suffer a loss
corresponding to the difference between a high market value and the issue price does not take into account the
dividends to be earned by the preferred shares for the three years prior to redemption.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court can question the wisdom and reasons behind the decision of the executive branch to
ask for the conversion of the common shares to preferred shares as administered by the PCGG.

Ruling:
Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the courts will DEFER
to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the
matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are
to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
The only instance when the Courts ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has acted with grave
abuse of discretion or violated a law. A circumspect review of the pleadings and evidence extant on record shows
that the PCGG approved the conversion only after it conducted an in-depth inquiry, thorough study, and judicious
evaluation of the pros and cons of the proposed conversion. Based on the facts and circumstances prevailing as
of even date and the results of the study conducted by the UCPB-TBG, UCPB, as the administrator of the CIIF
and in compliance with its mandate under PD 1468, concluded that it is financially beneficial to convert the CIIF
SMC shares as offered by the San Miguel Corporation.

II. Checks and balances

A. Blending of powers
CASE:
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928) (Read the oft-quoted dissent of J. Holmes regarding
blending of powers)
Facts:
The National Coal Company, created by Act 2705, March 10, 1917 and amended by Act 2822, vested the voting
power of all stocks owned by the government of the Philippine Islands exclusively in a committee consisting of the
Governor General, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The National Bank was created by Act 2612 and amended by Act 2747 on February 20, 1918 and Act 2038 on
January 30, 1921. The authorized capital of the bank was 10, 000, 000 pesos, with 100, 000 pesos shares of
which, by legislative provisions, belong to the Philippine Government, and the rest owned by private persons. The
voting powers of the government-owned stock was vested exclusively of the board of control consisting of the
Solicitor General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Moreover, the
Governor General was vested with the power to appoint the president and vice president of the bank, with their
election to be authorized to be made by the directors from among their own number. A provision was also made
for a general manager, to be appointed or removed by the board of directors with the advice and consent of the
board of control. The manager was to be chief executive of the bank, with an annual [277 U.S. 189, 199] salary
to be fixed by the board of directors with the approval of the board of control. Further duties were conferred upon
the board of control in connection with the management of the bank which it does not seem necessary to set forth.
This voting power has been similarly devolved by the Legislature upon The National Petroleum Company by
Act 2814, The National Development Company, by Act 2849, The National Cement Company, by Act 2855 and
the National Iron Company, by Act 2864.

Issue: In pursuant to the provisions of the Organic Act to the Philippine Islands, WON the Legislature has the
power to elect and manage agents.

Ruling: No.
The Organic Act, following the rule established by the American Constitutions, both state and federal,
divides the government into three separate departments-the legislative, executive, and judicial. Some of our state
Constitutions expressly provide in one form or another that the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.
Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them
or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. Not having
the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the Legislature cannot ingraft
executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection,
though the case might be different if the additional duties were devolved upon an appointee of the executive.

Here the members of the Legislature who constitute a majority of the 'board' and 'committee,' respectively,
are not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
the performance of any such functions by the Legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the
duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they
are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within
the authority of either of these two constitutes a logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the
remaining one of the three among which the powers of government are divided.

Assuming, for present purposes, that the duty of managing this property, namely, the government-owned
shares of stock in these cor porations, is not sovereign but proprietary in its nature, the conclusion must be
the same. The property is owned by the government, and the government in dealing with it, whether in its quasi-
sovereign or its proprietary capacity, nevertheless acts in its governmental capacity. There is nothing in the Organic
Act, or in the nature of the legislative power conferred by it, to suggest that the Legislature, in acting in respect of
the proprietary rights of the government, may disregard the limitation that it must exercise legislative and not
executive functions. It must deal with the property of the government by making rules, and not by executing them.
The appointment of managers (in this instance corporate directors) of property or a business, is essentially an
executive act which the Legislature is without the capacity to perform directly or through any of its members.

Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes:

 The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.
It does not seem to need argument to show that however, we may disguise it by veiling words we do not
and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into wateright compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing
that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
The only qualification of such latitude as otherwise would be consistent with the three-fold division of power is the
provision in section 22 of the Organic Act 'that all executive functions of the government must be directly under
the Governor General or within one of the executive departments,' etc. That does not appear to me to govern the
case. The corporations concerned were private corporations which the legislature had power to incorporate.

Whoever owned the stock the corporation did not perform functions of the government. This [277 U.S.
189, 212] would be plain if the stock were in private hands, and if the government bought the stock from private
owners the functions of the corporations would not be changed. If I am right in what I have said I think that
ownership would not make voting upon the stock an executive function of the government when the acts of the
corporation were not. I cannot believe that the Legislature might not have provided for the holding of the stock by
a board of private persons with no duty to the government other than to keep it informed and to pay over such
dividends as might accrue. It is said that the functions of the board of control are not legislative or judicial and
therefore they must be executive. I should say rather that they plainly are no part of the executive functions of the
government but rather fall into the indiscriminate residue of matters within legislative control. I think it would be
lamentable even to hint a doubt as to the legitimacy of the action of Congress in establishing the Smithsonian as
it did, and I see no sufficient reason for denying the Philippine Legislature a similar power.

B. Checks and balances

1. Between the Executive and Congress
a. Law-making [Article VI, §27(1)]
b. Grant of amnesty (Article VII, §19)
c. Ratification of treaty (Art. VII, §20)
2. Between the Executive and the Constitutional Commissions a. President’s pardon,
amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence in cases involving violations of election
laws, rules, and regulations requires a favorable recommendation from the COMELEC
[§5, Article IX(C)]
3. Between the Executive and Congress, and the Judiciary a. After a conviction by final
judgment in a criminal case, the President may grant to reprieve, commutation of
sentence, pardon, or remits of the fine and forfeiture imposed by the court (Article VII,
§19) b. Congress has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts (Article VI, §2), subject to the limitation that it may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Article VI, §5 (Ibid.), and that
no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in the Constitution without the latter’s advice and concurrence (Article VI, §30)
c. Congress may also pass a law reorganizing the judiciary, but it should not undermine
the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary (Article VI, §2) i.
Examples CASES:

Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-7910, Jan. 18, 1955

De La Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing
its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization
and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure
of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute
(BP 129).

RULING:
Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a
non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure
to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved.
If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the
two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to
be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this
Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even
one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.”

4. The Role of the Judiciary

a. Judicial power and the power of judicial review
i. Expanded power to determine grave abuse of discretion (Sec. 1, Article VIII)
ii. Review of the factual basis of Martial Law (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
CASE:

Lagman v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

Facts:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted
to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed
out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and
worsened with the passing of time. It stated that on 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon
Hapilon, a senior leader of the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute,
was confronted with armed resistance which escalated into open hostility against the government. Through these
groups' armed siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities, institutions and
establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and political foundations of Marawi City
which led to its paralysis which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus. The petitioners claim that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court has a judicial power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus

Ruling
No. The 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated
powers' including: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare martial law."

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it
therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere
exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power
to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call
on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to
address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount
to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at
least initially, lies with the President.

Case dismissed.

b. The judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, is the constitutional organ mandated to allocate
constitution boundaries
CASE:

Angara v. Electoral Commission, GR No L-45081, July 15, 1936

Facts: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution
confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said
resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner
before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not
submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of
respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter, if yes, Whether or not EC acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by Consti (through separate
articles for each branch) but check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there are
conflicts between the boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to review
and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to
actual cases and that the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other
two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. — But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination
in the workings of various departments of government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is
80 far made a check on the legislative power that his assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however,
is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve
it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also
the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain ocers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members
is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme
Court shall be established, to dene their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the judicial department. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the nal arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

c. Presumption of constitutionality – a consequence of separation of powers

d. Congress need not be impleaded in cases assailing constitutionality of statutes
CASE:

SPCMB Law Offices v. CA, G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016

e. Supreme Court ruling on constitutional issues cannot be undone, or in effect reversed, by
Congress
CASES:

Endencia v. David, G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953 –

Sameer Overseas Placement v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August
5, 2014
f. Judicial power does not include the power to rewrite the Constitution
CASE:

Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

g. Political vs. justiciable questions
i. Political questions
CASES:

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186

– the six characteristics of a political question
Alejandrino v. Quezon, G.R. No. 22041, September 11, 1924
Facts: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges
of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives,
privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate
President Manuel Quezon from executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the case filed by the petitioner involves a political question

Decision: Yes it involves a political question. No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold
that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular
action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of either of the other departments, it will
be the end of popular government as we know it in democracies.

The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the one hand, no consideration of policy or
convenience should induce this court to exercise a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no
consideration of policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to exercise.
But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It
should not be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where mischievous
consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to unseemly
conflicts or which might be disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for any
possible collision between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch of a
coordinate department, or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the Legislature.

It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any
other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. This was,
in effect, our holding in the comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs. Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when we
had under particular consideration a legislative attempt to deprive the Chief Executive of his constitutional power
of appointment. What was there announced is equally applicable to the instant proceedings.

Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize
it to suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well
stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue,
for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the
Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy,
the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for
the judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes
down the halls of legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against the Legislature
and the Chief Executive.

We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of
their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and
the demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it
must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court.

(NOTE: ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)

Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946

Facts:
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report
regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and
violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did
not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering
that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for
senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be
sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for
its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert
the validity of the pendatum resolution.

Issue:
● Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the
said provinces are valid.
● Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero
should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections.

RULING: The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that
the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be
admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political
in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts The case is therefore dismissed. (NOTE: ruling
no longer supported by the 1987 Consti)

Words from the book: page147

In Vera V. Avelino, three senators-elect who had been prevented from taking their oaths of office by
resolution of the Senate went to the Supreme Court and alleged that only the Electoral tribunal had jurisdiction
over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Again, the Supreme Court refused to intervene,
holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislation to determine who shall
be admitted to its membership.

(NOTE: ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution)

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution
of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance
thereto." Three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed as having
been elected senators and representatives. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the
opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election.
The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House. As a consequence
these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor
was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative
votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress.

Issue: Whether or not the issue is justiciable

Ruling: No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent
that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provision. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is
to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to
one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution
itself. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest,
there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of ratification.

J. Perfecto
J. Perfecto alleged that the "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty in
determining what matters fall within the designation of political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is
not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope
of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political department of the
government." According to him, it is a pseudo-doctrine which is based on the unsettled meaning of political
question. The general proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary" is just one of
the many numerous general pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous
tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to them.

He agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process to make it effective, as
provided in Article XV of the Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion
that a litigation as to whether said article has been complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the
tribunals, because to arrive at this conclusion we must accept as a major premise the pseudo-doctrine which we
have precisely exposed as erroneous and false.

(NOTE: ruling no longer supported by the 1987 Constitution) → IMP’T: Read also the scathing dissent
of J. Perfecto, especially on the political question doctrine

Arnault v. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee Arnault was an attorney-in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. On 1950, the Senate of the Philippines
adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a special committee to determine “whether said purchase was honest, valid
and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just. During the investigation conducted by the
special committee, Arnault was asked to whom a part of the purchase price or 440,000 was delivered, but he
refused to answer. As a result, he was imprisoned in the new bilibid prison until such time when he shall answer
the said question. Eventually, while in Bilibid, Arnault executed an affidavit stating the events surrounding the
acquisition of the estates of Gen. Burt when he met one by the name of Jess D. Santos. Nonetheless, after the
presentation of the affidavit and the subsequent investigation, the committee adopted Resolution No. 114 which
provides that petitioner continues to refuse to reveal the person whom he gave the amount of 440,000. Arnault
then filed for the writ of habeas corpus in the CFI. During the proceeding, the court a quo arrogated itself the power
to review the finding of the special committee and declaring that the Senate abused its discretion in continuously
detaining petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the continued detention
and confinement of Jean Arnault, in pursuance of S.R. 114 is illegal.

RULING:
YES. The courts does not have the authority to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative of legislation in the same manner that the legislature may not encroach upon the judicial department
in interpretation and application of the law for such would violate the principle of separation of powers. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoker are when there has been a violation of a constitutional
inhibition or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion. In the case at bar, the court
only has the right to determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process has been accorded to petitioner
Arnault before his incarceration by legislative order. Evidently, this right has been granted to Arnault prior to the
approval of S.R. 114 ordering his continued imprisonment.

– SC cannot review the findings of the Houses of Congress in the exercise of their legislative
prerogatives

Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

– political question: whether a legislator’s action constitutes “disorderly behavior” or “disorderly conduct”
FACTS:
 ● Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House
making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a
Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth
of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in
case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by
the House.

● Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that
it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House.
Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance
to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was
issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

● Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for
speeches
2. Whether the court can pass upon the question if the conduct of the legislator-petitioner is disorderly?

RULING:

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators
or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was
taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for
their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected
from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal
or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct
for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in
the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the
general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may
deem sufficient.
De Castro v. Committee on Justice, G.R. No. L-71688, September
3, 1985
– political issue: whether the action of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan in dismissing, for
insufficiency in form and substance, the impeachment complaint against President Marcos was valid
FACTS:
August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, claiming to be members of good standing of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayers, filed a petition with this Court for certiorari to annul the
resolution of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, dismissing the complaint for the
impeachment of the President of the Philippines signed by the petitioners in the present case, and mandamus to
compel said Committee on Justice and the Batasan, represented by its Speaker, to give due course to said
complaint for impeachment. In denying due course to said petition and dismissing outright the same.

ISSUE:
Political issue: whether the action of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan in dismissing, for insufficiency in
form and substance, the impeachment complaint against President Marcos was valid

RULING:
1. The l973 Constitution has vested in the Batasan Pambansa the exclusive power to initiate, try and decide
all cases of impeachment. The action of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan to whom the complaint for the
impeachment of the President had been referred dismissing said petition for being insufficient in form and
substance involves a political question not cognizable by the Courts. The dismissal of said petition is within the
ambit of the powers vested exclusively in the Batasan by express provision of Sec. 2, Article XIII of the Constitution
and it is not within the competence of this Court to inquire whether in the exercise of said power the Batasan acted
wisely.

There is no allegation in the petition for certiorari that in the exercise of its powers the Batasan had violated
any provision of the Constitution. The fact that the Committee on Justice dismissed the petition on the same day
it was filed after deliberating on it for several hours as reported in the newspapers, radio and television (which
must have been the basis of petitioners' claim that the Committee had acted with undue haste in unceremoniously
dismissing the complaint for impeachment) does not provide basis for concluding that there had been a violation
of any provision of the Constitution which would justify the Court's intervention to ensure proper observance of
constitutional norms and conduct.
Beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its Members
and that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the members thereof, the
Constitution says no more. It does not lay down the procedure to be followed in impeachment proceedings. It is
up to the Batasan to enact its own rules of procedure in said impeachment proceedings, which it had already done,
The interpretation and application of said rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review. The powers of the
Batasan to dismiss a petition for impeachment which in its judgment it finds not meritorious or defective in form
and substance are discretionary in nature and, therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion.

2. The doctrine of separation of powers still exists under the 1973 Constitution though in a modified form
made necessary because of the adoption of certain aspects of the parliamentary system in the amended 1973
Constitution. The major powers of the Government have been distributed by the Constitution to the President, who
is the head of the State and chief executive of the Republic, the Batasan Pambansa and the Judiciary. Under the
doctrine of separation of Powers as interpreted by the decisions of the Court, mandamus will not he from one
branch of the government to a coordinate branch to compel performance of duties within the latter's sphere of
responsibility. More specifically, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan to compel it to
give due course to the complaint for impeachment. 1
We did not dismiss outright the present petition as We did G.R. No. L-71688 but required respondents to
comment thereto in view of the claim of petitioners that the provisions of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, more specifically Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 pursuant to which the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government had dismissed Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for the impeachment attached
thereto are unconstitutional, implying thereby that the Batasan or the Committee thereof had, in the exercise of
powers vested upon it by the Constitution, transgressed or violated the Constitution, certainly a justiciable question
Philippine Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, December
20, 1985
– political issue: whether the “snap” presidential elections of 1986 should be enjoined

Romulo v. Yñiguez, G.R. No. 71908, February 4, 1986

– political issue: whether the Supreme Court should order the Committee on Justice to recall from the
Batasan archives the impeachment resolution and complaint against President Marcos and the Batasan
to conduct a trial on the charges contained therein
Facts:
Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling for the
impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government (CJHRGG). The committee found the complaint not sufficient in
form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved the Resolution and dismissed all the
charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and
sent to the Archives. The next day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of
the Resolution and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.

The present petition was then filed with the Court praying that pertinent provisions of the Batasan Rules granting
power to the Batasan to determine whether an impeachment complaint is sufficient and its power to approve of
deny such complaint be declared unconstitutional.

They also pray that dismissal by the CJHRGG of the resolution and the impeachment complaint attached thereto
be declared null and void. It is the petitioner’s contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are
unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the
amendatory process provided in the Constitution. Further, the said provisions vest CJHRGG the power to decide
whether to impeach or not, which should be decided by the Batasan as a collegiate body and not by a small body
of the Batasan.

They also content that the Batasan Rules impose an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that
the complaint for impeachment can proc.eed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the
members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules
impose at least 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the case at hand raises a political question

Ruling: Yes it raises a political question. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the
impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested
upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to
conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the
resolution and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government had acted.

Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for
impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which
of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with any order from
the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan
itself.

The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority
to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-
at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the
will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the spectacle presented of the court ordering the
secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the
Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing.
The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has
the absolute power to execute it.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

– Political: Whether a law is void because the House failed to comply with its own internal rules (read
also the concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Puno)
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is
violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate
approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House.
During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a
roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.

After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved
for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.

Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed
by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House.

Ruling:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily
have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently,
mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot
be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

– legislative policy underlying the enactment of a statute not reviewable by the Court; Court rejected
argument that, because R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse—
which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife—gender alone is not enough basis
to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law

Metrobank v. Tobias, G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012

– principle of non-interference
Facts
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public
documents. The property he mortgaged to the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (METROBANK) was not found
in the registry vault. Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was granted. Nonetheless, the City Prosecutor
of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being charged with estafa through
falsification of public document. Tobias appealed to the DOJ and then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas
N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. Secretary of Justice
Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's motion for reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK challenged the
adverse resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the
innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminary investigation; and that the CA
disregarded such lapse.

Issue
Whether or not the COA committed patent error in dismissing Metrobank’s petition

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA in keeping with the principle of non-interference. The CA stressed
that the determination of probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor
and, ultimately, of the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such determination.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their
own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice.

The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause
for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Case dismissed.

Spouses Balangauan v. CA, G. R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008

– exception to the principle of non-interference: when Secretary of Justice commits grave abuse of
discretion
FACTS:
Petitioner Katherene, a premier customer services representative of respondent Bank HSBC, managed
the accounts of HSBC depositors with premier status, including Roger Dwayne York. When York inquired about
the status of his time deposit in the amount of 2.5 million pesos, it was revealed that no record of said placement
in the banks data base can be found. So as not to affect its credibility, HSBC reimbursed York with the said amount
and filed a criminal complaint for estafa and/or qualified estafa against the petitioners. The latter denied these
allegations. ACP Victor Laborte recommended for the dismissal of the complaint for an absence of a probable
cause HSBC then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo denied the
petition since there is no evidence showing that Katherine Balangauan took the money and invested it somewhere
else. But, this was annulled by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause.

RULING:
NO. Although generally, courts should not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving
the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, such rule cannot be applied when the
officers acted without or in excess of authority resulting from a grave abuse of dicretion. In the foregoing case, in
requiring hard facts and solid evidence as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners liable, the
DOJ, disregards the definition of probable cause. Probable cause is merely a belief that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. It demands more than bare suspicion but requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction. The court agrees with the CA that perusals of records, documents and an
analysis of the facts of the case are enough to excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the petitioners are guilty.
Whether or not they will be convicted by a trial court based on the same evidence is not a consideration. To
reiterate, it is enough that the acts or omissions complained of by respondent HSBC constitute the crime of estafa
and/or qualified estafa.

ii. Justiciable questions

CASES:

Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949 (decision);

March 14, 1949 (resolution)
→ (Read also concurrence of J. Perfecto to the March 14, 1949 resolution, especially his critique of the judicial
“hands-off” policy)
FACTS:
● On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate
charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb.
21, 1949).
● On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon
insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced
to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall
Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino
and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s
camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they
requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left
his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and
asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the
Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution
(No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even
recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter.
● Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

RULING:

DECISION (MARCH 4, 1949)

By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of
powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its
own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain
in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall —
not in the Supreme Court.

Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957

Facts:
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme
Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority
senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed
this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be
dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election
contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take
cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members
of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue
before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

RULING:
This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations.
It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in
connection therewith. Hence, this Court has, not only jurisdiction, but, also the duty, to consider and determine the
principal issue raised by the parties herein.

MEANING OF "POLITICAL QUESTION"; CASE AT BAR. — The term "political question" connotes, in
legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government (16 C. J. S.,
413).

It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In the case
at bar, the question for determination is whether the election of two senators, by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by another senator, who is a member and spokesman of the party
having the largest number of votes in the Senate, on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination of the party having the
second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void.

Javellana v. Exec. Secretary, GR No. L-36142, Mar. 31, 1973

Sanidad v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
Facts:
On September 2, 1976, President Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a National Referendum on October
16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies to resolve, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement,
the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence and the length of the period for the exercise of the
president of his present powers.

On September 22, 1976, the President issued PD No. 1031 amending PD 991 providing for the mariner
of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite of October 16, 1976 and repealed Section 4 of PD 991 providing the age of the participants of the
plebiscite and the …. On the same day, the President issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be asked to the
plebiscite.

Petitioners argued (1) that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution, as what is in PD 991
and PD 1031, (2) that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution,
and (3) that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a
constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; that a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, that the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time
for a deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; that to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people
via referendum, and that allowing 15-year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which
confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General replied that the issues are not justiciable.

Issue: WON the issues are justiciable

Ruling:
Yes. The amending process, both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality of the validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable
or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the
power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose
amendments is, therefore, a downright justiciable question.

Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

Facts:
House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments
among several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. 24
members of the Liberal Party joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, reducing their former party to only 17
members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza. On December 5th, the chamber elected
a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C.
Singson as the additional member from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.

Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and
the assumption of his seat by the Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the
Commission on Appointments.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent. He claimed that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based
on a permanent political realignment because the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a duly registered political
party and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is a justiciable one.

RULING: Yes it is a justiciable question. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue
involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is
political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
.
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, respondent Rizalino Navarro, Department of Trade and Industry Secretary,
representing the RP, signed the Final Act embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations. The Uruguay Round Final Act was then sent to the Senate in pursuant of the Article VII of the
Constitution and was then later ratified.
The World Trade Agreement provides that “each Member shall ensure the conformity of laws, regulations
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. Petitioners maintain
that this “unduly limits, restricts, and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power vested upon
the Philippine Congress.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give
preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.

Issue:
Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.

Ruling:
It is justiciable. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation
of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution, as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our
political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion
brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
government.

As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course
and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.

We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom
of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO or pass upon the merits of
trade liberalization as a policy espoused by the said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other
import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether or not there had been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the
WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261,

November 10, 2003
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved
by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The
following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.”

Issue:
● Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
● Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
● Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of
the controversy.

The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase
“to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”

Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power
to make rules. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law.

If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum. It falls within the one year
bar provided in the Constitution. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. Considering
that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.

Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution

DELEGATION OF POWERS

I. GR: What has been delegated, cannot be further delegated (principle of

non-delegability)
EXC: cases of permissible delegation
II. Instances of permissible delegation
A. Legislative power
1. GR: Legislative power is vested in Congress (except to the extent retained by the people
through the system of initiative and referendum)
2. EXC: Delegation of legislative power a. Rationale – the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of Congress to cope directly with the problems demanding
its attention b. Instances of delegation of legislative power
i. legislative power to local governments (Sec. 16 and 18, R.A. 7160) NOTE: power of taxation
not delegated by Congress through R.A. 7160, but expressly conferred to the LGUs under §5,
Article X of the Constitution ii. power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, etc. to the
President (Sec. 28(2), Article VI)
iii. ordinance power to the President under the Administrative Code (E.O. No. 292, The
Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, Chapter 2)
iv. Delegation to administrative bodies: the power of subordinate legislation
CASES:

Cruz v. Youngberg, G.R. No. L-34674, October 26, 1931

FACTS
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry,
requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter
thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of
cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. Also, petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not
holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers. The respondent
demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court
sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another
complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.

ISSUE
1.Whether or not Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional
2.WON the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General
to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation
of the legislative powers
RULING
1. Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. The Legislature passed this Act to protect the cattle industry of the country
and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through the importation of foreign cattle. It is now
generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of
the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. It has been shown that at
the time Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said
that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or
vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise
or the best that might have been adopted
2. The power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition provided in the act do not constitute an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers but an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, October 18,
1988
v. emergency powers to the President (Sec. 23(2), Article VI)
CASES:

Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949 (decision);

September 16, 1949 (resolution on rehearing)
FACTS:
● Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta
appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO
62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the
EO has no legal basis.
● Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a
shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit
issued to him.
 ● L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant
to EO 225.

● L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national
elections.

● They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY
AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency
Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

RULING:
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio
vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and
226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special
session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention
of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such
subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the
EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to
be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the
Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to
interpretation. We test a rule by its results.

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out a declared national policy.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period."
"Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive
in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.)
The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration.
Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be
an emergency."

It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory
would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed
to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to
repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to
terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become
permanent law," for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the
approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create
the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them
back.
Rodriguez v. Gella, G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953
III. Tests of valid delegation
A. Completeness test
CASES:

U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122, February 27, 1922
Facts:
Act No. 2826 entitled “An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding, and speculation in, palay, rice, and
corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-
General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making
an appropriation for this purpose” authorizes the Governor-General “for any cause, conditions arise resulting in
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of
State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of the Act”. Pursuant to this
authorization, the Governor-General issued regulations fixing ceiling prices for palay, rice and corn.
The appellant, Ang Tang Ho, was prosecuted in pursuant to the Executive Order No. 53 which was in pursuant
to the provisions of Act No. 2868, due to the fact that he sold one ganta of rice for 0.80 centavos which was above
the ceiling price. Appellant challenges the validity of Act No. 2826 on the ground that it constituted an invalid
delegation of legislative power for failure to conform with the completeness test
.
Issue: WON Act. 2826 constitute an invalid delegation of power and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

Ruling: Yes.
By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what
reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued “for any cause”, and
leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: “For
any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature
does not specify or define what is “an extraordinary rise”. That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to issue and
promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify
or define what is a temporary rule or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take
effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but
has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not “a cause,”
and what is or what is not “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice,” and as to what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for carrying out the purposes of the Act.

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-
General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation
of the proclamation, a crime, unconstitutional and void.

Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, G.R. No.

159149, June 26, 2006
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision1 and Order2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, which nullified Circular No. 2000-06-010 of the Department of Energy (DOE). Batas
Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and
underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of
underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators.

On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33.
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being
contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the request for lack of merit.
 Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court.
After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not
included in the law. The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each
violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law.

Issue: Whether or not the circular contravened its delegating statute.

Ruling: No, the circular did not contravene the law. For an administrative regulation, such as the
Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made
a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.

The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading,
adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products.

As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as
amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum
of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is
P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular
is silent as to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the
aforesaid statutory maximum limit.

Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run
counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products
and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements
the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in
the Circular contravenes the law.

Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide the
DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and
shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the
Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against
the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders.

B. Sufficient standard test

CASES:

People v. Rosenthal, G.R. Nos. L-46076 and L-46077, June 12, 1939
Doctrine: Due process & equal protection Keywords: void of vagueness, equal protection, undue delegation of
legislative authority Date: June 12, 1939 Ponente: Justice Laurel

Facts:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil
Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell
petroleum, natural gas and other oil products.

Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to
individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.

The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise of future promotion
and development of the oil business, rather than on actual tangible assets.
On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds:
1) That it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer
2) that it does not afford equal protection before the law
3) that it is vague and ambiguous

Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act
which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued,
thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative
powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer
to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The
certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or
corporation applying therefor “has complied with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued
by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other
hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon
a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.”

In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the public against “speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock in fly-
by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, — the
SC held that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching
a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.

Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated
criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere
general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act,
the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . . ”

Cervantes v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1952

Facts

This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim for quarters
allowance as manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as the NAFCO.
Petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year. By a resolution of the Board
of Directors of this corporation, he was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the
first of that month. Submitted the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said
resolution was disapproved by the said Committee on strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor. The
petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider its action and approve his claim for allowance.

Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such
reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the President promulgated Executive Order
No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council advising the President in the exercise of his power of
supervision and control over these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might
be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. Petitioner claim that Executive Order No. 93 is null and
void, not only because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislature power to
executive, but also because it was promulgated beyond the period of one year limited in said law.

Issues: whether or not Executive Order No. 93 is null and void

Ruling:
No. The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute"
there is no undue delegation. Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others,
to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the
purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government
of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and
the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in
question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940

People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937
FACTS:

● Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions
for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded
the appeal to the lower court for a new trial.
● While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was
convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO
denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to
be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng
under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
● Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated
therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute
discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said
probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.

RULING:
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard
provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial
boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of
power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221
in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction
of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to
it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo
in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the
benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality, leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine.

Ynot v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

Facts:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-
A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the
carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule
on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also
upheld the ruling of RTC.

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626
in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there

Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was
not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

Ratio:
On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters
– Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts subject to review of the
Supreme Court.
“..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to the review of the highest
tribunal.”
– Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution
Police power as used by the government to justify E.O. 626-A
– Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used in the case, but this is the same with the fit
between means and objective test)
– 1 “present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the
small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.”
– Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable connection between conservation of carabaos (not having
them slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of carabaos.

Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, Nov. 5, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes” which ends 26 years of government regulation of the
downstream oil industry.

In March 1996, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act
of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude
oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Petitioners claim that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to
guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend
to the President the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it
practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when
the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso
to the US dollar is considered stable.

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the world market"
and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They
submit that they do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the President in his
decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.

Issue: Given the fact that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 does not provide a determinate or determinable standard
to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, WON it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy.

Ruling: No

Section 15, RA 8180 provides:

“Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation - Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the
DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later
than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable ...”

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional landscape. As sagely
observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the
task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are
assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz
states "that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate
the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity."

Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground
of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation
will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March
1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is
complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance
the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment
of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been
defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission
deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men
of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as
meaning to take a downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that
these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the
Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
Abakada Guro v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Facts:
RA 9335 or the Attrition Act of 2006 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board) and covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months
of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the
law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic
and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Issue: WON the law unduly delegates power to the President.

Ruling: No.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To
be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA
9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at
least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous
to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil
service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process.

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: public interest, justice and
equity, public convenience and welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare. In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.

Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, Dec. 24, 1965

Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created
or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”

Issues: Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.

Ruling:
 Yes, Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate —

and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority.

Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse
— to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation
of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above
referred to.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies
no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by
its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which
he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices.

In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that
vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact
opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, Nov. 19, 2013

Tatad v. Executive Secretary, supra
IV. Delegation of ascertainment of facts strictly not the same as delegation
of legislative power
CASES:

Cruz v. Youngberg, supra

Abakada Guro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005