REMEDIES OF MISREPRESENTATION

The remedies available for misrepresentation are, first, contract rescission and,
second, damages for losses caused by the misrepresentation. These will be taken into
account in turn. The remedies available for misrepresentation will be determined by
whether the deception was committed innocently, carelessly, or fraudulently.

Rescission

Withdrawal indicates the contract is reserved, in which the parties place themselves in
the situation in which the contract would not have been entered upon. All traded
products or money should be returned.
     
No withdrawal is automatic if misrepresentation has place, misrepresentation
rendering a contract invalid. The applicant can therefore choose either to cancel or to
confirm a contract. If the applicant decides to cancel the proceedings, the normal
practise is to have his decision to cancel the representative's notice. Dyson Lord
Justice, with the case of Islington (2006), held that a contract still remains in place
until and until the Court orders the withdrawal order at the request of a party desiring
to cease and terminate the deal.

In the case where a representor deliberately absconds and makes it impossible for the
representee to give him notice of his decision to rescind, then rescission can be
affected by giving notice to relevant third party. So when thief persuades an owner to
part with his car by a fraudulent misrepresentation, and thief cannot subsequently be
traced, the owner can validly rescind by notifying the police or automobile association
(Car and Universal Finance Company) (1965)).

In the event of an agent abstaining purposefully and preventing the representative

from notifying him of his desire to withdraw, the withdrawal can be effect by
notifying an applicable third party. When the owner is persuaded by a thief to divide
his car by means of fraude, and the thief is then not found, the owner can legitimately
cancel by contacting the police (Vehicle & Universal Finance Company) (1965) or the
car industry association.

BARS

The claimant may be deprived of his right of withdrawal, if the third Party acts in
good faith or considers or takes time over, by the involvement of innocent rights of
third parties after he finds that the truth. When the representative learns about the
deception and claims the misrepresentation and suffers losses, then the representative
is unable to cancel it later on (Long v Lloyd).

Affirmation takes place when the 'dual knowledge' test is met (Peyman v Lanjani
[1985] Ch 475). It is important that the representative be aware both of the reality and
the fact that this right has arisen when the course is claimed to constitute an
affirmation.
The Second obstacle to withdrawal is the passage of time when the delay between the
detection of error and the withdrawal is considerable. The interval was five years in
Leaf v International Galleries. As the instance of non-fraudulent misrepresentation
has been Leaf v International Galleries, time has passed from the contract date. The
benefit of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is that the time is from the day the
deception was detected (2015).

The third bar is 'restitution cannot be made' (Clarkes v Dickinson). Since there is a
notion of rescission, if the property transferred has been eaten or inextricably
combined with any other property, the party would have rescinded the position in
which the parties would have been in if the contract had not been entered into. See
Clarke v. Dickson [1858] 120 ER 463, for instance. However, if money is paid to
cover the use, the fact that property has been used (instead of being utilised), will not
necessarily prohibit rescission.

When handed to a third party, the fourth bar to cancellation cannot happen. The
clearest example is when items were sold to the defective agent who sold them before
the contract was avoided to an innocent third party (Philips v Brooks). Of the 2007
rescission in Crystal Palace Football Club the interest of other parties was
unavailable.

In accordance with section 2(2) of the Missouri Resolution Act 1967 the Court
utilised its jury discretion to grant damages in lieu of rescission. The option of the
court to grant damages rather than rescission, when it is found equitable to do so, is
set forth in paragraph 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act, taking consideration of the
repercussions on both the parties. In the past, Jacob J concluded that the claimant may
seek damages according to Section 2(2) if there is lapse of time in Thomas Witter Ltd
(1996). The result of the loss of the ability to rescind was that the Court had no
jurisdiction for damages under Section 2(2) in Floods of Queensferry Ltd (2000).

Damages
    

In cases of wrongful loss of expression, tort of deception might be recovered. The

purpose of a damages award is to position the claimant in the event the wrong has not
been committed. It's aimed at protecting the interest of his dependence. The defendant
shall also be accountable for any damages resulting directly from the false induction
(1997). In order to recompense the complainant for harm to his sentiments,
aggravated damages may be granted [Archer v Brown (1985)].

Statutory misrepresentation – under the Misrepresentation Act 1967. This Act

introduced the "fraud fiction." Where a claimant can show a misrepresentation, the
burden of evidence shifts to the claimant to establish it has reasonable reasons and has
believed that the statement he has made is truthful.

Under case of faults in the common law, the faults wronged the faults misrepresenter
and damages can be demanded accordingly. The mis-representation Act 1967 is
applicable in the context of a claim under section 2(1).

Initially, there was substantial debate over the measurement of recoverable damages.
In the instance of [Royscott v Rogerson], the reliance measures had to be specified.
The trust measures may include profit loss that the claimant would have gained if
there was not a deception (International Trade Corporation Limited (2013)

The conventional common law rule in the event of an innocent misrepresentation was
that no harm was available. However, in exchange for rescission in the event that
innocent misrepresentation takes place, the courts now have the power to grant
compensation under paragraph 2(2) Misrep Act 1967. In relation to section 2(2), the
following considerations should be addressed;

1. A discretionary power to grant damages.

2. The claimant is not able to collect damages later in exchange of the

withdrawal if he decides to withdraw the claimant.

3. The confirmation of the discretion There is wide scope in the courts to do what
is fair. [Sindall William v Plc (1994)

In section 2(3) the latter shall have to account when evaluating the former if damages
are granted pursuant to s.2(1) and s.2(2). This means that the harm in paragraph 2(2)
is lower than that in section 2. (1). The fundamental measure under s. 2(2) was
indicated in William Sindall Plc c v Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 WLR
1016 to be the difference in value between the claimants' erroneous belief that they
got it under the agreement and what they actually got.

As an estimate on the loss of rescission rights, this appears to be realistic. It was noted
here, Obiter, that a low cost (£18,000) of reprocessing the sewage was the correct
measurement of damages rather than cancellation, assuming an error had been made
regarding the existence of a tiny sewer under development site purchased for £5
million. Where the misrepresentation in respect of the contract is more egregious,
damages will be rejected instead of rescission (Harsten Developments Ltd v Bleaken
[2012] EWHC 2704).