G.R. No.

L-7927            August 8, 1913

JUAN BARRAMEDA, petitioner,
vs.
PERCY M. MOIR, (Judge of First Instance) ET AL., respondents.

Rafael de la Sierra for petitioner.

Thos. L. Hartigan, W. A. Kincaid, and Jose Robles Lahesa for respondent Judge Moir.
Facundo Salazar in his own behalf.
Manly and McMahon for respondent Valera Basmayor.

TRENT, J.:

This is an original application for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner relates that the he was defendant in
a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try title to a parcel of land; that the case was decided
adversely to him; that he appealed to the Court of First Instance; and that the judge of that court, on
motion of the appellee, dismissed the appeal with directions to the justice of the peace to proceed
with the enforcement of the judgment. At the request of the petitioner, a preliminary injunction was
issued by this court to stay the execution of the judgment, and he now prays that the respondent
judge be ordered to proceed with the case on appeal. The said judge has demurred to the complaint
on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The basis of the
demurrer is that Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace
to try title to real state, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By
Act No. 2041, section 3, it was provided:

Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of title to real
estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two
hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred
pesos the justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 are unconstitutional

RULING:

Yes. In the case of Weigall vs. Shuster (11 Phil. Rep., 340) it was held that the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance, as fixed by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be
added but to not diminished by the Philippine Legislature. This holding has never been questioned,
and it seems unnecessary now to discuss the grounds upon which it was based. Therefore, there
will be sufficient reason for declaring the disputed provisions of Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 repugnant
to the Philippine Bill and, consequently void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance where the title to realty is involved. The original jurisdiction of those courts extends to "all
civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest therein,"
except in forcible entry and detainer cases. (Act No. 136, sec. 56, par. 2.)

There remains to be considered the concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon justice of the peace by
the disputed provisions of those Acts in cases where the amount in controversy exceeds P200, but
is less than P600, was meant only as supplemental and ancillary to the exclusive jurisdiction over
the cases not exceeding P200. This concurrent

This concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be considered as inseparable from and absolutely
dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive jurisdiction which has already been declared void.
The concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be declared void also.

Other additional jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 is not
before the court. We need only say that such other additional jurisdiction bears no relation whatever
to those void provisions of the statutes which provide for jurisdiction in real-estate actions; and
applying the same rules to the rest of the Act which we have applied to the clause conferring
concurrent jurisdictional in real-estate actions between the amounts of P200 and P600, we are
clearly of the opinion that the validity of the remainder of the Act is not in any case dependent upon
the said void provisions.

In conclusion, it seems advisable to state that the able brief of counsel for the respondent judge is
based upon the a priori assumption that original jurisdiction of Court of First Instance in real-estate
actions is, by the Organic Law, made exclusive. We have found it quite unnecessary to postulate
any such theory in disposing of the case. Nor has it been necessary to rely upon the second point
made by counsel to the effect that jurisdiction in real-estate actions has never been conferred upon
justices of the peace in the United States or England.

The judgment of the justice of the peace which it is desired to have the respondent judge on this
action review is an absolutely nullity. The respondent judge acquired jurisdiction of the cause only for
the purpose of dismissing the appeal, and in further directing the justice of the peace to proceed with
the execution of the void judgment, the respondent judge was in error.
 Therefore, the preliminary injunction granted by this court, staying the execution of the
judgment, will be made permanent, and the writ of mandamus prayed for must be denied. The
petitioner will pay the costs of the cause. This opinion will be substituted for the one handed down by
this court in the same case at the close of the last term.