1. David v. Arroyo, G.R. No.

171396, May 3, 2006

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.]

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L.

ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, petitioners, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 171409. May 3, 2006.]

NIÑEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO.,

INC., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 171485. May 3, 2006.]

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO

A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN
EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA,
LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO,
ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G.
VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN,
NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO
V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO
LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, respondents.

[G.R. No. 171483. May 3, 2006.]

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND

SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS- KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL
PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, EMILIA P.
 DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, petitioners, vs. HER
EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO
LOMIBAO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 171400. May 3, 2006.]

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO
LOMIBAO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 171489. May 3, 2006.]

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR

M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI,
J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS PNP CHIEF, respondents.

[G.R. No. 171424. May 3, 2006.]

LOREN B. LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY

AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO
SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
 All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are
necessary. 1 Superior strength — the use of force — cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the
courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban's philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In
cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of
the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that
restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their constitutional
validity." 2
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of
the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances
are void for being unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the
Constitution of a free people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with
the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license? 3
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of
the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . .
may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress . . . rebellion. . . ," and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have
conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA
and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists — the historical
enemies of the democratic Philippine State — who are now in a tactical alliance and
engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down
the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the
President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by
certain segments of the national media;
 WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State — by
obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the people's confidence in government and their faith in the future of
this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left
and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the
democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and
preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of
Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications
and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the
integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people; SHECcD
On the same day, the President issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have
conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA
and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists — the historical enemies
of the democratic Philippine State — and who are now in a tactical alliance and
engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down
the duly- constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our
republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by
certain segments of the national media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing
governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the
people's confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left
and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the
democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and
preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of
Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications
and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the
integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued
declaring a State of National Emergency;
 NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers
vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well
as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence. CaATDE
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and
after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021
which reads:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a
state of national emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 5 and No. 6 dated February 24,
2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of
lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be
necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and
quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby
declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People's Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. 4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts
leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from
petitioners' counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized
that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that
it is not respondents' task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are
presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
 On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento,
Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood
mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to
remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to "show and proclaim our
displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in
protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I" which
detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in
Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President
Arroyo herself. 6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni
Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the
PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas
province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between
members of the Magdalo Group and the National People's Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette
cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents. 7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced
through DZRH that the "Magdalo's D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa
I." TAaIDH
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the
PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding
General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a
public statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers
with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory
Aquino's brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the
Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo
critic, called a U.S. government official about his group's plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also
phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the
Army's elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo." 8
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso
Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would
join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on
February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the
soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the
President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of
command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the
Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the
military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA
spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary movement
and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate
task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not
take much longer to end it." 9
 On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North
Central Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing
rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted
personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field." He claimed that with the forces of
the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the
groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the President's ouster is nearing
its concluding stage in the first half of 2006. AcDaEH
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And
also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000
Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. 10
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several
cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both
the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid
and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the
streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to
hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political
rallies, which to the President's mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.
Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including media, can already be implemented." 11
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed,
groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-
Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of
converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by
huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields,
water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed
participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao,
Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot
policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in
Makati City. 12
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the
dispersal of their assemblies. TacSAE
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner
Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested
was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided
the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents,
pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were
stationed
inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police
District were stationed outside the building. 13

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded
the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a 'strong
presence,' to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down
this government." The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow
"standards set by the government during the state of national emergency." Director General Lomibao
stated that "if they do not follow the standards — and the standards are — if they would contribute to
instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No.
1017 — we will recommend a 'takeover.'" National Telecommunications' Commissioner Ronald Solis
urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of
national emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events
surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to
recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the
national security is threatened. 14
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing
the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in
Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran's lawyer explained that the
warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long
been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they
could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained,
while the rest were dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during
a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were
taken into custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was
arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael
Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan
Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was
turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay
indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran,
Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in these petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 were filed with this Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
 In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1)
it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. HDTISa
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged
the CIDG's act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint."
They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and
twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur
Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a
declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling
out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a
showing that there is necessity to do so."
In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact
laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of
expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4 15 of Article II, (b) Sections
1, 16 2, 17 and 4 18 of Article III, (c) Section 23 19 of Article VI, and (d) Section 17 20 of Article XII of the
Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary
and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not
really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of
emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes
beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code."
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are "unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights
such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all
guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these
issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. IaESCH
In respondents' Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions
should be dismissed for being moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda),
171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is
not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has
constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people's right to free expression
and redress of grievances.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard petitioners on the above
interlocking issues which may be summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos.
171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have
legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
A. PROCEDURAL
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
I — Moot and Academic Principle
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial
review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison. 21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation
—
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the
ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national
government. . . . If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these
limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart
its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of
the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is
the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review. 22
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting
capacity." 23 Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there
must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. 24
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our
discussion thereon. HICSTa
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. 25 The
Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present
petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, 26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 27 Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case 28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness. 29
 The Court holds that President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions
moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according
to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or
valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the
present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it
imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative." 30
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; 31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; 32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 33 and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. 34
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court's assumption of jurisdiction
over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public's interest, involving as
they do the people's basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has
the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and
the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. 35 And lastly,
respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial
review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban's Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary. 36 However, they failed to
take into account the Chief Justice's very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be
decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or
damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the
mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
II — Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it
imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 37 In
private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." 38 Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a
"stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or 'taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. cCEAHT
 Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public
actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, 39 where it was held that the plaintiff in
a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff
is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the
public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: 40 "In matter of
mere public right, however . . . the people are the real parties. . . It is at least the right, if not the duty,
of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that
a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan 41 held that "the right
of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds
to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies
engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury"
test in Ex Parte Levitt, 42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. 43 The same Court ruled that for a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, 44 it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld
in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, 45 Manila Race Horse Trainers'
Association v. De la Fuente, 46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works 47 and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix. 48
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases,
Araneta
v. Dinglasan, 49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act
liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, 50 this Court resolved
to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding its
categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain
of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress,
and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations
and rulings. 51
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct
injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are
the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority , 52 where the Court ruled that the
enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of
natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the
petitioner with locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 53 wherein the Court held that
"given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax
the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct
injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement;
 (3) Lim v. Executive Secretary, 54 while the Court noted that the petitioners
may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01"
involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling
in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 55 that in cases of transcendental
importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing
requirements may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that
the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. STADIH
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court's attitude toward legal
standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a people's
organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery
contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a
taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen
as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec, 57 the Court
reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to concerned citizens' cases involving constitutional
issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act."

In Lacson v. Perez, 58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its
leaders, members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members
of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the President's declaration of a state of rebellion is
a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to
petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be
devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
 The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond
doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing
Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by
police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal
standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative
powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever
the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those
affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court
the alleged violations of their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v.
Enriquez, 60 Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan , 61 Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 62 Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 63 and Tañada v. Tuvera, 64 that when the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMU's assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful
assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to
assert the rights of their members. 65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the
President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which
the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No.
5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 66 the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP
of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares
that petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as
there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of
no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will
not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented
her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017
will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental
importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality
doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a
judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel,
the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical
matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a
relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."
 This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. aETDIc
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, 67 may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity
of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance
or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike
the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that
the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people
68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. 69
B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for
President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the President's exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point — from the indulgent days of Barcelon v.
Baker 70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda 71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia, 72 Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile, 73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile. 74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining "political
questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." 75 Barcelon and Montenegro were
in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There,
the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire
into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the
principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, "under
which the President is supreme, . . . only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the
Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme." 76 In 1973, the unanimous
Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile. 77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the
issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. 78
Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-
examine the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or national emergency, the President must
be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The
President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God." 79
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora 80 — a recent case most pertinent to these
cases at bar — echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the President's
"calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion." This ruling is mainly a
result of the Court's reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has
 been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government. 81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in
terms of power but also of duty. 82
As to how the Court may inquire into the President's exercise of power, Lansang adopted the
test that "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's
decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not
correctness, but arbitrariness. 83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis"
and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings."

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo's exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP
1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General's Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military
aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply
fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President
in Times of Emergency
This case brings to fore a contentious subject — the power of the President in times of
emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate
backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of
prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law
enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action
necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative "power to act
according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes
even against it." 84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of
prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse
be avoided?Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people have no other remedy in
this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven." 85
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic
processes of government in time of emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to
circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring
about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State. . .
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to
render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse. .
.
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle
to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence
all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there
is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the people's first intention is that
the State shall not perish. 86
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he
termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon
an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid
perpetuation of the dictatorship. 87
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from
condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a
temporary dictatorship." 88
Nicollo Machiavelli's view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited
government, furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and
attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus: AScHCD
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra-
constitutional measures; for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the
precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they
will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes.
Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything,
having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it. 89
Machiavelli — in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill — sought to incorporate into the
constitution a regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and
controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a
capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective
constitutional restraints. 90
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to
emergency by constitutional democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional
dictatorship. 91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means
for the defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect established institutions from the
danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to
the previous forms of political life." 92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of
emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of
the executive, while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that power." 93 Watkins placed his
real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a
dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship must be relatively short. . . Dictatorship should always be
strictly legitimate
in character. . . Final authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never
rest with the dictator himself . . ." 94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be
"strict political conservatism." HCacDE
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins. 95 "It is a problem of
concentrating power — in a government where power has consciously been divided — to cope with . . .
situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to
equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to what
end." 96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers,
to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means — i.e., he must be
legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency
powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action
must be the defense of the constitutional order." 97
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great
Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of
"constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency. 98 Like
Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the "constitutional dictatorship,"
thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship
should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of
the State and its constitutional order. . .
2) . . . the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in
the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator. . .
3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making
specific provisions for its termination. . .
4) . . . all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization
of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal
requirements.
..
5) . . . no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no
regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of
the particular crisis . . .
6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional
dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect. . .
7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every
part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .
8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a
constitutional dictatorship. . .
9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to
institute one should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the
dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of
the crisis for which it was instituted. . .
 11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as
possible to the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of
the constitutional dictatorship. . . 99
Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers
than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or
termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional
investigating committees. 100
Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience,
were one in saying that, "the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an
authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional
theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort
the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal
sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering
emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from the
implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the "concept
of constitutionalism" articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:

A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of

problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this
study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means
necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of
government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political
responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in
government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the
historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate
processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to equate
constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis
upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He
found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the
weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there
is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with
"limited" as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain meant government
limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The
two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of
liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political
responsibility of government to the governed. 101
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists —
from Lock's "theory of prerogative," to Watkins' doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually,
to McIlwain's "principle of constitutionalism" — ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency
governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while
insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective
limitations and checks. SADECI
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive
regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a
government in the concept of Justice Jackson's "balanced power structure." 102 Executive, legislative,
and
judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each
is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each
branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the
President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic
integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within
carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
a. "Facial Challenge"
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that
its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases. 103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In
United States v. Salerno, 104 the US Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment" (freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
"harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 105 it was held:
It remains a 'matter of no little difficulty' to determine when a law may
properly be held void on its face and when 'such summary action' is inappropriate. But
the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function,
a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it
forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that
conduct —even if expressive — falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal
laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." 106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;" 107 The reason for this is obvious.
Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to
whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. 108 A writer and
scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
 The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can
only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates
the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.
The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to
examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to
petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris, 109 it was
held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely
if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-
line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed
law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is
unwarranted. STaCIA
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that " a
law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application." 110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it
is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth,
it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its
application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the
meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
 The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII . . . do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
any act of insurrection or rebellion"

Second provision:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;"
Third provision:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power
The first provision pertains to the President's calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary, 111 this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to
the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, 112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
"whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated
earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue
PP 1017. Owing to her Office's vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the
actual condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act
that goes beyond the President's calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he
wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power,
the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President's authority to
declare a "state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency.
While President Arroyo's authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief
Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
President Arroyo's declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In
these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did
not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on
the State's extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of
Sanlakas. DHIETc
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial
Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the
President invoked was her calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called
upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency
lasts,
they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more
difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law." 113
In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza, 114 an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It
is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute
critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to
secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In
fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a
call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be
used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other
purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants;
(b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-
Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is
merely an exercise of President Arroyo's calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, 115 the primary function of the
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office,
he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will,
among others, "execute its laws." 116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may
employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country, 117 including the Philippine National Police 118 under the Department of the Interior and Local
Government. 119
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael
Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it
arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI
of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction."

Petitioners' contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it

was lifted 120 from Former President Marcos' Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of
the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief,
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling
clause states: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by
President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees . . . promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following: DHATcE
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or
statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of
administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a
particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum
orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or
some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
 Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
issued as general or special orders.
President Arroyo's ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees
are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution. 121
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that
these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017,
to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
. . . and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national
emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency
under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees . . ."
but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires,
the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP
1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports
to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law"
thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. 122 In effect at the time of its approval was President
Marcos' Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National
Defense to take over "the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the
Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the
successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national
emergency."
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President
Arroyo's inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature's emergency
powers.
This is an area that needs delineation. DIEcHa
A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to declare "a state of national
emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.
But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war
but also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to
withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence
of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical
conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed
together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to
the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. 123
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to
national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of
emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may
not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress. 124
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to
Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent
on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer, 125 held:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must
be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express
constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that
presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the
Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President ;" that "he shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's
military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government
attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not
concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot
with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for
the nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional
provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our
Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in
the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing
of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who
shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article
says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States " 126
 Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article
XII refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane" and "similar occurrences." This is a limited view of
"emergency."
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the
degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this
definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception. 127 Emergencies, as perceived by
legislature or executive in the United States since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of
situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, 128 b) natural disaster, 129 and c)
national security. 130
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include
rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of
nationwide proportions or effect. 131 This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission,
thus:
MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committee's definition of "national
emergency" which appears in Section 13, page 5? It reads:
When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for
example, calamities or natural disasters.
MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about
strikes and riots? TcIaHC
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national
emergency."
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would
paralyze government service. 132
xxx xxx xxx
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers
to military national emergency or could this be economic emergency?"
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.
MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much. 133
It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene
and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest.
In Araneta v. Dinglasan, 134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which
extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.
"xxx xxx xxx
After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system
of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form
 of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the
commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting
parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other
democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is,
under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the
time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the
United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours,
have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to
another department — unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative
policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was
fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve
the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times
of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances 'the various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial,' given the ability to act, are called upon 'to perform the duties
and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor
can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that
military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history
reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of
speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they
were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People
Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on
February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three
policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis
was PP 1017.
 And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members
were "turned away and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the
20th Anniversary of People Power I.
A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they
resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017. EHaDIC
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal
acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be
abused and misabused 135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application. 136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and
its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. 137 PP 1017 is
merely an invocation of the President's calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to
suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police,
expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens' constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its
implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute
or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion. 138 This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations
when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted
arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon
by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared
unconstitutional a long time ago.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders
are "acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for
the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except
between the official who issues them and the official who receives them. 139 They are based on and are
the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object. 140 For these
reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or
capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the
Constitution, and which is invariably associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase
"acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and
punishing acts of terrorism.
In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism"
confronts not only our country, but the international community as well. The following observations are
quite apropos:
 In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against
terrorism" has become one of the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of
the use of force against certain states and against groups operating internationally.
Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist organizations are set up and
constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always known to the
public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.
The basic problem underlying all these military actions — or threats of the use
of force as the most recent by the United States against Iraq — consists in the absence
of an agreed definition of terrorism.
Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of
violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by
individuals.
The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One country's terrorist is
another country's freedom fighter." The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency
in the use of the term "terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the historical fact
that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa,
Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few,
were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time,
but later became internationally respected statesmen.
What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts — the differentia
specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually legitimate acts of national
resistance or self-defense?
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been
trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization
has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between
those who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by non-state groups against
civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who
believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign
occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a
state is concerned. CSIcTa
The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by
reference to the contradicting categorization of organizations and movements such as
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) — which is a terrorist group for Israel and a
liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims — the Kashmiri resistance groups — who
are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan — the
earlier Contras in Nicaragua — freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for
the Socialist camp — or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become
the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom
fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet
Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations
that cannot be reconciled in any way — because of opposing political interests that
are at the roots of those perceptions.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and
evaluations of one and the same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis,
the
 basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states.
Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a
rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of
terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of
the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a
"liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are
concerned, and vice-versa.
The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the
definition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign
states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement
(i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy.
A "policy of double standards" on this vital issue of international affairs has been the
unavoidable consequence.
This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign
states — and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United
Nations Charter! — has become even more serious in the present global power
constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council,
former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly
being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States. 141
The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part
of the police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking
spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest
them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be
remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and
imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated
January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled
"Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in
Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the following provision: "That one who
conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines . . .
by force, violence, terrorism, . . . shall be punished by reclusion temporal "
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not
define "acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone,
under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on
this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without
warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and
dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in
the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they
violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism"
portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
 Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts
beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of
their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)
The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized." 142 The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches,
seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest. 143

In the Brief Account 144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he
was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third,
he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked
like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to
push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
No. 880 145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was
eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
xxx xxx xxx.
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David's warrantless
arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the
arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of
the rally. 146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if
he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated
that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known
whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally. 147
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against
warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.
 Section 4 of Article III guarantees:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. IEHScT
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements
the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right
to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to
assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior
issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly
is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly
itself, may be validly required.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising
their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a
clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even
the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers' conduct. In De
Jonge
v. Oregon, 148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding
of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in
the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is
not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as
to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of
the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling
have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy
against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or
other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of
prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable
assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the
members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on
the basis of Malacañang's directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units.
This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle
that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent." 149 Tolerance is the rule
and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present
danger that the State may deny the citizens' right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or
convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies
was eliminated.
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice
and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were
not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. 150 The first time they learned of it was
at the
time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a person's right is restricted by
government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair,
reasonable, and according to procedure.
G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the
freedom of the press. Petitioners' narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute,
established the following: first, the Daily Tribune's offices were searched without warrant; second, the
police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00
o'clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any
official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed
themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a 'strong presence,' to tell
media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow the standards — and
the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe
to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 — we will recommend a 'takeover.'" National
Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate"
with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency
will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for
media coverage during times when the national security is threatened. 151
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in
the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of
two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9states that
the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of
the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Not only that, the search violated petitioners' freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and
democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of
Staff 152 this Court held that —
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing
offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum" newspapers. As a
consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a
virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and
even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.
 While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives
exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of
policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government
officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who
tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is
permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. 153 Undoubtedly, the The
Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments.
This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most
defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.
154
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of
the Tribune's offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that
the same are inadmissible "for any purpose," thus: cIaHDA
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when
inspected the Tribune for the purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted
that the policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of
the admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know,
Your Honor, and these are inadmissible for any purpose. 155
xxx xxx xxx
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do
is to get those past issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 o'clock in the
morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of
the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it
is not based on Proclamation 1017.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017
which says that the police could go and inspect and gather clippings from
Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
 Is it based on any law?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I don't know if it is premature to
say this, we do not condone this. If the people who have been injured by this
would want to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this. 156
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the
Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
I don't know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts
committed on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You
cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These
are acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility. 157
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and
"should result in no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter."
The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been
exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by
the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in
implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which
violate the citizens' rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional
and illegal. DaAISH
In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban's concurring opinion, attached hereto, is
considered an integral part of this ponencia.
SUMMATION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 — a supervening event — would
have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal
acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one
similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that
allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently,
the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to
prevent future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017's
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct
the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on
the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of
the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public
utility and private business affected with public interest. SIEHcA
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President — acting
as Commander-in-Chief — addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
Significantly, it also provides a valid standard — that the military and the police should take only the
"necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."
But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made
punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has
been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the
courts, to determine the limits of the AFP's authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that
(1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the
rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on
media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the
whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually
identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal
Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from
making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are
ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without
unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.
During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they
should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people's liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various
competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with
crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits
to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed. 158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize
the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest
without prior legislation. DHcESI
 G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless
arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J. and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., please see concurring opinion.
Puno, J., is on leave.
Carpio, J., also concurs with Chief Justice's opinion.
Corona, J., share the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Tinga.
Carpio Morales, J., the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice merits also my concurrence.
Callejo, Sr., J., also concurs with the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Panagniban.
Tinga, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., joins the dissent of J. Tinga.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, C.J., concurring:

I was hoping until the last moment of our deliberations on these consolidated cases that the
Court would be unanimous in its Decision. After all, during the last two weeks, it decided with one voice
two equally contentious and nationally significant controversies involving Executive Order No. 464 1 and
the so-called Calibrated Preemptive Response policy. 2
However, the distinguished Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga's Dissenting Opinion has made that hope
an impossibility. I now write, not only to express my full concurrence in the thorough and elegantly
written ponencia of the esteemed Mme. Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, but more urgently to
express a little comment on Justice Tinga's Dissenting Opinion (DO).
The Dissent dismisses all the Petitions, grants no reliefs to petitioners, and finds nothing wrong
with PP 1017. It labels the PP a harmless pronouncement — "an utter superfluity" — and denounces
the ponencia as an "immodest show of brawn" that "has imprudently placed the Court in the business of
defanging paper tigers."
Under this line of thinking, it would be perfectly legal for the President to reissue PP 1017 under
its present language and nuance. I respectfully disagree.
Let us face it. Even Justice Tinga concedes that under PP 1017, the police — "to some minds" —
"may have flirted with power." With due respect, this is a masterful understatement. PP 1017 may be a
paper tiger, but — to borrow the colorful words of an erstwhile Asian leader — it has nuclear teeth that
must indeed be defanged.
Some of those who drafted PP 1017 may be testing the outer limits of presidential prerogatives
and the perseverance of this Court in safeguarding the people's constitutionally enshrined liberty. They
are playing with fire, and unless prudently restrained, they may one day wittingly or unwittingly burn
down the country. History will never forget, much less forgive, this Court if it allows such misadventure
and refuses to strike down abuse at its inception. Worse, our people will surely condemn the misuse of
legal hocus pocus to justify this trifling with constitutional sanctities.
And even for those who deeply care for the President, it is timely and wise for this Court to set
down the parameters of power and to make known, politely but firmly, its dogged determination to
perform its constitutional duty at all times and against all odds. Perhaps this country would never have
had to experience the wrenching pain of dictatorship; and a past President would not have fallen into
the precipice of authoritarianism, if the Supreme Court then had the moral courage to remind him
steadfastly of his mortality and the inevitable historical damnation of despots and tyrants. Let not this
Court fall into that same rut. HCTEDa

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring:

The only real security for social well-being is the free exercise of men's minds.
-Harold J. Laski, Professor of Government and Member of the British Labor
Party, in his book, Authority in the Modern State (1919).
The ideals of liberty and equality, the eminent U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo
once wrote, are preserved against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles. 1 In an open and democratic society, freedom of thought and expression is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. 2
I share the view that Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) under which President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo declared a state of national emergency, and General Order No. 5 (GO No. 5), issued
by the President pursuant to the same proclamation are both partly unconstitutional. aEAcHI
I fully agree with the pronouncement that PP 1017 is no more than the exercise by the
President, as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, of her power to call out
such armed forces whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. This is allowed under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, such "calling out" power does not authorize the President to direct the armed forces
or the police to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The same does not
allow the President to promulgate decrees with the force and effect similar or equal to laws as this
power is vested by the Constitution with the legislature. Neither is it a license to conduct searches and
seizures or
arrests without warrant except in cases provided in the Rules of Court. It is not a sanction to impose any
form of prior restraint on the freedom of the press or expression or to curtail the freedom to peaceably
assemble or frustrate fundamental constitutional rights.
In the case of Bayan v. Ermita 3 this Court thru Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna emphasized that the
right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.
These rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would be meaningless and unprotected.
On the other hand, the direct reference to Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution as the
constitutional basis for the declaration of a state of national emergency is misplaced. This provision can
be found under the article on National Economy and Patrimony which presupposes that "national
emergency" is of an economic, and not political, nature. Moreover, the said provision refers to the
temporary takeover by the State of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest in times of national emergency. In such a case, the takeover is authorized when the public
interest so requires and subject to "reasonable terms" which the State may prescribe.
The use of the word "State" as well as the reference to "reasonable terms" under Section 17,
Article XII can only pertain to Congress. In other words, the said provision is not self-executing as to be
validly invoked by the President without congressional authorization. The provision merely declares a
state economic policy during times of national emergency. As such, it cannot be taken to mean as
authorizing the President to exercise "takeover" powers pursuant to a declaration of a state of national
emergency.
The President, with all the powers vested in her by Article VII, cannot arrogate unto herself the
power to take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without Congressional authorization. To do so would constitute an ultra vires act on the
part of the Chief Executive, whose powers are limited to the powers vested in her by Article VII, and
cannot extend to Article XII without the approval of Congress.
Thus, the President's authority to act in times of national emergency is still subject to the
limitations expressly prescribed by Congress. This is a featured component of the doctrine of separation
of powers, specifically, the principle of checks and balances as applicable to the political branches of
government, the executive and the legislature. HTCaAD
With regard to GO No. 5, I agree that it is unconstitutional insofar as it mandates the armed
forces and the national police "to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country." There is presently no law enacted by Congress that defines terrorism, or classifies what acts
are punishable as acts of terrorism. The notion of terrorism, as well as acts constitutive thereof, is at
best fraught with ambiguity. It is therefore subject to different interpretations by the law enforcement
agencies.
As can be gleaned from the facts, the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes "terrorism"
have led the law enforcement officers to necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
giving rise to unrestrained violations of the fundamental guarantees of freedom of peaceable assembly
and freedom of the press.
In Kolender v. Lawson, 4 the United States Supreme Court nullified a state statute requiring
persons who loitered or wandered on streets to provide "credible and reliable" identification and to
account for their presence when requested to do so by a police officer. Writing for the majority, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor noted that the most important aspect of vagueness doctrine was the imposition of
guidelines that prohibited arbitrary, selective enforcement on constitutionally suspect basis by police
officers. This rationale for invocation of that doctrine was of special concern in this case because of the
potential for arbitrary suppression of the fundamental liberties concerning freedom of speech and
expression, as well as restriction on the freedom of movement.

Thus, while I recognize that the President may declare a state of national emergency as a
statement of a factual condition pursuant to our ruling in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 5 I wish to
emphasize that the same does not grant her any additional powers. Consequently, while PP 1017 is valid
as a declaration of a factual condition, the provisions which purport to vest in the President additional
powers not theretofore vested in her must be struck down. The provision under GO No. 5 ordering the
armed forces to carry out measures to prevent or suppress "acts of terrorism" must be declared
unconstitutional as well. ScCDET
Finally, it cannot be gainsaid that government action to stifle constitutional liberties guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights cannot be preemptive in meeting any and all perceived or potential threats to
the life of the nation. Such threats must be actual, or at least gravely imminent, to warrant government
to take proper action. To allow government to preempt the happening of any event would be akin to
"putting the cart before the horse," in a manner of speaking. State action is proper only if there is a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil which the state has a right to prevent. We should bear in mind
that in a democracy, constitutional liberties must always be accorded supreme importance in the
conduct of daily life. At the heart of these liberties lies freedom of speech and thought — not merely in
the propagation of ideas we love, but more importantly, in the advocacy of ideas we may oftentimes
loathe. As succinctly articulated by Justice Louis D. Brandeis:
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground
to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. . . . But even advocacy of
violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech
where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and
incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy,
must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it
must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was
advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy
was then contemplated. 6
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to PARTLY GRANT the petitions.

TINGA, J., dissenting:

I regret to say that the majority, by its ruling today, has imprudently placed the Court in the
business of defanging paper tigers. The immodest show of brawn unfortunately comes at the expense of
an exhibition by the Court of a fundamental but sophisticated understanding of the extent and limits of
executive powers and prerogatives, as well as those assigned to the judicial branch. I agree with the
majority on some points, but I cannot join the majority opinion, as it proceeds to rule on non-justiciable
issues based on fears that have not materialized, departing as they do from the plain language of the
challenged issuances to the extent of second-guessing the Chief Executive. I respectfully dissent.
The key perspective from which I view these present petitions is my own ponencia in Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, 1 which centered on Presidential Proclamation No. 427 (PP 427), declaring a "state
of rebellion" in 2003. The Court therein concluded that while the declaration was constitutional, such
declaration should be regarded as both regarded as "an utter superfluity", which "only gives notice to
the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it",
and "devoid of any legal significance", and "cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights."
I submit that the same conclusions should be reached as to Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017). Following
the cardinal precept that the acts of the executive are presumed constitutional is the equally important
doctrine that to warrant unconstitutionality, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. 2 Also well-settled as a rule of construction
is that where thee are two possible constructions of law or executive issuance one of which is in
harmony with the Constitution, that construction should be preferred. 3 The concerns raised by the
majority relating to PP 1017 and General Order Nos. 5 can be easily disquieted by applying this well-
settled principle.
I.
PP 1017 Has No Legal Binding
Effect; Creates No Rights and
Obligations; and Cannot Be
Enforced or Invoked in a
Court Of Law
First, the fundamentals. The President is the Chief of State and Foreign Relations, the chief of
the Executive Branch, 4 and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 5 The Constitution vests on
the President the executive power. 6 The President derives these constitutional mandates from direct
election from the people. The President stands as the most recognizable representative symbol of
government and of the Philippine state, to the extent that foreign leaders who speak with the President
do so with the understanding that they are speaking to the Philippine state. TcCEDS
Yet no matter the powers and prestige of the presidency, there are significant limitations to the
office of the President. The President does not have the power to make or legislate laws, 7 or disobey
those laws passed by Congress. 8 Neither does the President have to power to create rights and
obligations with binding legal effect on the Filipino citizens, except in the context of entering into
contractual or treaty obligations by virtue of his/her position as the head of State. The Constitution
likewise imposes limitations on certain powers of the President that are normally inherent in the office.
For example, even though the President is the administrative head of the Executive Department and
maintains executive control thereof, 9 the President is precluded from arbitrarily terminating the vast
majority of employees in the civil service whose right to security of tenure is guaranteed by the
Constitution. 10
The President has inherent powers, 11 powers expressly vested by the Constitution, and powers
expressly conferred by statutes. The power of the President to make proclamations, while confirmed by
statutory grant, is nonetheless rooted in an inherent power of the presidency and not expressly
subjected to constitutional limitations. But proclamations, as they are, are a species of issuances of
extremely limited efficacy. As defined in the Administrative Code, proclamations are merely "acts of the
President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest upon the existence
of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend". 12 A proclamation, on its own,
cannot create
or suspend any constitutional or statutory rights or obligations. There would be need of a
complementing law or regulation referred to in the proclamation should such act indeed put into
operation any law or regulation by fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of a public moment or
interest related to such law or regulation. And should the proclamation allow the operationalization of
such law or regulation, all subsequent resultant acts cannot exceed or supersede the law or regulation
that was put into effect.
Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, among the constitutional powers of the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is to "call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion". 13 The existence of invasion or rebellion could allow the President to
either suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law, but there is a fairly elaborate constitutional procedure to be observed in such a case,
including congressional affirmation or revocation of such suspension or declaration, as well as the
availability of judicial review. However, the existence of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion does not
ipso facto cause the "calling out" of the armed forces, the suspension of habeas corpus or the
declaration of martial law
— it remains within the discretion of the President to engage in any of these three acts should said
conditions arise.
Sanlakas involved PP 427, which declared the existence of a "state of rebellion." Such
declaration could ostensibly predicate the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
declaration of martial law, but the President did not do so. Instead, PP 427, and the accompanying
General Order No. 4, invoked the "calling out" of the Armed Forces to prevent lawless violence, invasion
and rebellion. Appreciably, a state of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion could be variable in scope,
magnitude and gravity; and Section 18, Article VII allows for the President to respond with the
appropriate measured and proportional response.
Indeed, the diminution of any constitutional rights through the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the declaration of martial law is deemed as "strong medicine" to be used sparingly and only as a
last resort, and for as long as only truly necessary. Thus, the mere invocation of the "calling out" power
stands as a balanced means of enabling a heightened alertness in dealing with the armed threat, but
without having to suspend any constitutional or statutory rights or cause the creation of any new
obligations. For the utilization of the "calling out" power alone cannot vest unto the President any new
constitutional or statutory powers, such as the enactment of new laws. At most, it can only renew
emphasis on the duty of the President to execute already existing laws without extending a
corresponding mandate to proceed extra-constitutionally or extra-legally. Indeed, the "calling out"
power does not authorize the President or the members of the Armed Forces to break the law.

These were the premises that ultimately informed the Court's decision in Sanlakas, which
affirmed the declaration of a "state of rebellion" as within the "calling out" power of the President, but
which emphasized that for legal intents and purposes, it should be both regarded as "an utter
superfluity", which "only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it," and "devoid of any legal significance," as it could not "cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights." The same premises apply as to PP 1017. DTCAES
A comparative analysis of PP 427 and PP 1017, particularly their operative clauses, is in order.

PP 427 PP 1017
 NOW, THEREFORE, I, NOW, THEREFORE, I Gloria
GLORIA MACAPAGAL- Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
ARROYO, by virtue of the Republic of the Philippines and
powers vested in me by law, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
hereby confirm the existence of an Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of
actual and on-going rebellion, the powers vested upon me by Section
compelling me to declare a state 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
of rebellion. Constitution which states that: "The
President. . . whenever it becomes
In view of the foregoing, I am necessary, . . . may call out (the)
issuing General Order No. 4 in armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .
accordance with Section 18, rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as
Article VII of the Constitution, their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
calling out the Armed Forces of command the Armed Forces of the
the Philippines and the Philippine Philippines, to maintain law and order
National Police to immediately throughout the Philippines, prevent or
carry out the necessary actions suppress all forms of lawless violence
and measures to suppress and as well any act of insurrection or
quell the rebellion with due regard rebellion and to enforce obedience to
to constitutional rights. all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and
as provided in Section 17, Article 12
of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.
Let us begin with the similarities. Both PP 427 and PP 1017 are characterized by two distinct
phases. The first is the declaration itself of a status or condition, a "state of rebellion" in PP 437, and a
"state of national emergency" under PP 1017. Both "state of rebellion" and "state of national
emergency" are terms within constitutional contemplation. Under Section 18, Article VII, the existence
of a "state of rebellion" is sufficient premise for either the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law, though in accordance with the strict guidelines under
the same provision. Under Section 17, Article XII, the existence of a state of national emergency is
sufficient ground for the State, during the emergency, under reasonable terms prescribed by it, and
when the public interest so requires, to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-
owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Under Section 23(2), Article VI, the existence of a state of national
emergency may also allow Congress to authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. EDCIcH
Certainly, the declaration could stand as the first step towards constitutional authorization for
the exercise by the President, the Congress or the State of extraordinary powers and prerogatives.
However, the declaration alone cannot put into operation these extraordinary powers and prerogatives,
as the declaration must be followed through with a separate act providing for the actual utilization of
such powers. In the case of the "state of rebellion," such act involves the suspension of the writ or
declaration of martial law. In the case of the "state of national emergency," such act involves either an
order for the takeover or actual takeover by the State of public utilities or businesses imbued with public
interest or the authorization by Congress for the President to exercise emergency powers.
In PP 427, the declaration of a "state of rebellion" did not lead to the suspension of the writ or
the declaration of martial law. In PP 1017, the declaration of a "state of national emergency" did not
lead to an authorization for the takeover or actual takeover of any utility or business, or the grant by
Congress to the President of emergency powers. Instead, both declarations led to the invocation of the
calling out power of the President under Section 18, Article VII, which the majority correctly
characterizes as involving only "ordinary police action."
I agree with the ponencia's holding that PP 1017 involves the exercise by the President of the
"calling out" power under Section 18, Article VII. In Integrated Bar v. Zamora, 14 the Court was
beseeched upon to review an order of President Estrada commanding the deployment of the Marines in
patrols around Metro Manila, in view of an increase in crime. 15 The Court, speaking through Justice
Santiago Kapunan, affirmed the President's order, asserting that "it is the unclouded intent of the
Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to
call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such
discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded
respect from this Court." 16 Tellingly, the order of deployment by President Estrada was affirmed by
the Court even though we held the view that the power then involved was not the "calling out" power,
but "the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of
the general welfare." 17
It was also maintained in Integrated Bar that while Section 18, Article VII mandated two
conditions — actual rebellion or invasion and the requirement of public safety — before the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law could be declared, "these
conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is
that 'whenever it becomes necessary', the President may call the armed forces ‘to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." 18 The Court concluded that the implication was "that the President is
given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other
powers." 19
These propositions were affirmed in Sanlakas, wherein the invocation of the calling out power
was expressly made by President Arroyo. The Court noted that for the purpose of exercising the calling
out power, the Constitution did not require the President to make a declaration of a state of
rebellion. 20 At the same time, the Court in Sanlakas acknowledged that "the President's authority to
declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same
time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers." 21
 For still unclear reasons, the majority attempts to draw a distinction between Sanlakas and the
present petitions by that the statutory authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from the
Administrative Code of 1987, particularly the provision authorizing the President to make proclamations.
As such, the declaration of a "state of rebellion," pursuant to statutory authority, "was merely an act
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest." The majority grossly misreads Sanlakas,
which expressly roots the declaration of a state of rebellion from the wedded powers of the Chief
Executive, under Section 1, Article VII, and as Commander-in-Chief, under Section 18, Article VII.
Insofar as PP 1017 is concerned, the calling out power is definitely involved, in view of the
directive to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to "suppress all forms of lawless violence". But there are
nuances to the calling out power invoked in PP 1017 which the majority does not discuss. The directive
"to suppress all forms of lawless violence" is addressed not only to the Armed Forces but to the police as
well. The "calling out" of the police does not derive from Section 17, Article VII, or the commander-in-
chief clause, our national police being civilian in character. Instead, the calling out of the police is
sourced from the power of the President as Chief Executive under Section 1, Article VII, and the power
of executive control under Section 18, Article VII. Moreover, while the permissible scope of military
action is limited to acts in furtherance of suppressing lawless violence, rebellion, invasion, the police can
be commanded by the President to execute all laws without distinction in light of the presidential duty
to execute all laws. 22
Still, insofar as Section 17, Article VII is concerned, wide latitude is accorded to the discretion of
the Chief Executive in the exercise of the "calling out" power due to a recognition that the said power is
of limited import, directed only to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and incapable of imposing any
binding legal effect on the citizens and other branches of the Philippines. Indeed, PP 1017 does not
purport otherwise. Nothing in its operative provisions authorize the President, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or any officer of the law, to perform any extra-constitutional or extra-legal acts. PP 1017
does not dictate the suspension of any of the people's guarantees under the Bill of Rights.
If it cannot be made more clear, neither the declaration of a state of emergency under PP
1017 nor the invocation of the calling out power therein authorizes warrantless arrests, searches or
seizures; the infringement of the right to free expression, peaceable assembly and association and
other constitutional or statutory rights. Any public officer who nonetheless engaged or is engaging in
such extra-constitutional or extra-legal acts in the name of PP 1017 may be subjected to the
appropriate civil, criminal or administrative liability.

To prove this point, let us now compare PP 1017 with a different presidential issuance, one that
was intended to diminish constitutional and civil rights of the people. The said issuance, Presidential
Proclamation No. 1081, was issued by President Marcos in 1972 as the instrument of declaring martial
law. The operative provisions read:

PD. 1081 PP 1017

Now, thereof, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, NOW, THEREFORE, I Gloria

President Of the Philippines, by virtue of Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
the powers vested upon me by article VII, Republic of the Philippines and
Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, do hereby place the entire
Philippines as defined in the article I,
Section 1, of the Constitution under
martial law, and in my capacity as their
commander-in-chief, do hereby command
the arned forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.
In addition, I do hereby order that
all persons presently detained, as well as
others who may hereafter be similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection
or rebellion, and all other crimes and
offenses committed in furtherance or on
the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or in connection therewith, for crimes
against national security and the law of
nations, crimes, against the fundamental
laws of the state, crimes against public
order, crimes involving usurpation of
authority, rank, title and improper use
of names, uniforms and insignia, crimes
committed by public officers, and for
such other crimes as will be enumerated
in Orders that I shall subsequently
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Section
18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: "The
President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the)
armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .
rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as
their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and
as provided in Section 17, Article 12
of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.
promulgate, as well as crimes as a
consequence of any violation of any
decree, order or regulation promulgated
by me personally or promulgated upon
my direction shall be kept under
detention until otherwise ordered
released by me or by my duly
designated representative. (emphasis
supplied)
Let us examine the differences between PP No. 1081 and PP 1017. First, while PP 1017 merely
declared the existence of a state of rebellion, an act ultimately observational in character, PP 1081
"placed the entire Philippines under martial law," an active implement 23 that, by itself, substituted
civilian governmental authority with military authority. Unlike in the 1986 Constitution, which was
appropriately crafted with an aversion to the excesses of Marcosian martial rule, the 1935 Constitution
under which PP 1081 was issued left no intervening safeguards that tempered or limited the declaration
of martial law. Even the contrast in the verbs used, "place" as opposed to "declare," betrays some
significance. To declare may be simply to acknowledge the existence of a particular condition, while to
place ineluctably goes beyond mere acknowledgement, and signifies the imposition of the actual
condition even if it did not exist before. aHCSTD
Both PP 1081 and PP 1017 expressly invoke the calling out power. However, the contexts of
such power are wildly distaff in light of PP 1081's accompanying declaration of martial law. Since martial
law involves the substitution of the military in the civilian functions of government, the calling out power
involved in PP 1081 is significantly greater than the one involved in PP 1017, which could only
contemplate the enforcement of existing laws in relation to the suppression of lawless violence,
rebellion or invasion and the maintenance of general peace and order.
Further proof that PP 1081 intended a wholesale suspension of civil liberties in the manner that
PP 1017 does not even ponder upon is the subsequent paragraph cited, which authorizes the detention
and continued detention of persons for a plethora of crimes not only directly related to the rebellion or
lawless violence, but of broader range such as those "against national security," or "public order." The
order of detention under PP 1081 arguably includes every crime in the statute book. And most
alarmingly, any person detained by virtue of PP 1081 could remain in perpetual detention unless
otherwise released upon order of President Marcos or his duly authorized representative.
Another worthy point of contrast concerns how the Supreme Court, during the martial law era,
dealt with the challenges raised before it to martial law rule and its effects on civil liberties. While
martial law stood as a valid presidential prerogative under the 1935 Constitution, a ruling committed to
safeguard civil rights and liberties could have stood ground against even the most fundamental of
human rights abuses ostensibly protected under the 1935 and 1973 constitutions and under
international declarations and conventions. Yet a perusal of Aquino v. Enrile, 24 the case that decisively
affirmed the validity of martial law rule, shows that most of the Justices then sitting exhibited diffidence
guised though as deference towards the declaration of martial law. Note these few excerpts from the
several opinions submitted in that case which stand as typical for those times:
 The present state of martial law in the Philippines is peculiarly Filipino and fits
into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents. In the first place I am convinced
(as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence as in an ordinary
adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the
cognizance not only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at that
time.
. . . The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that while armed
hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions
except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain
martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifications of
rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between
organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes
subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely
where there is no actual fighting. Underground propaganda, through printed
newssheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruiting of armed and ideological
adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and materiel, fifth-column activities
including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion which by their
nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted
effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context. 25
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he fact that courts are open cannot be accepted as proof that the rebellion
and insurrection, which compellingly called for the declaration of martial law, no
longer imperil the public safety. Nor are the many surface indicia adverted to by the
petitioners (the increase in the number of tourists, the choice of Manila as the site of
international conferences and of an international beauty contest) to be regarded as
evidence that the threat to public safety has abated. There is actual armed combat,
attended by the somber panoply of war, raging in Sulu and Cotabato, not to mention
the Bicol region and Cagayan Valley. I am hard put to say, therefore, that the
Government's claim is baseless.
I am not insensitive to the plea made here in the name of individual liberty.
But to paraphrase Ex parte Moyer, if it were the liberty alone of the petitioner Diokno
that is in issue we would probably resolve the doubt in his favor and grant his
application. But the Solicitor General, who must be deemed to represent the
President and the Executive Department in this case, has manifested that in the
President's judgment peace and tranquility cannot be speedily restored in the country
unless the petitioners and others like them meantime remain in military custody. For,
indeed, the central matter involved is not merely the liberty of isolated individuals,
but the collective peace, tranquility and security of the entire nation. 26
xxx xxx xxx
It may be that the existence or non-existence or imminence of a rebellion of
the magnitude that would justify the imposition of martial law is an objective fact
capable of judicial notice, for a rebellion that is not of general knowledge to the public
cannot conceivably be dangerous to public safety. But precisely because it is capable
of judicial notice, no inquiry is needed to determine the propriety of the Executive's
action. EcHTCD
 Again, while the existence of a rebellion may be widely known, its real extent
and the dangers it may actually pose to the public safety are not always easily
perceptible to the unpracticed eye. In the present day practices of rebellion, its
inseparable subversion aspect has proven to be more effective and important than
"the rising (of persons) publicly and taking arms against the Government" by which
the Revised Penal Code characterizes rebellion as a crime under its sanction.
Subversion is such a covert kind of anti-government activity that it is very difficult even
for army intelligence to determine its exact area of influence and effect, not to
mention the details of its forces and resources. By subversion, the rebels can extend
their field of action unnoticed even up to the highest levels of the government, where
no one can always be certain of the political complexion of the man next to him, and
this does not exclude the courts. Arms, ammunition and all kinds of war equipment
travel and are transferred in deep secrecy to strategic locations, which can be one's
neighborhood without him having any idea of what is going on. There are so many
insidious ways in which subversives act, in fact too many to enumerate, but the point
that immediately suggests itself is that they are mostly incapable of being proven in
court, so how are We to make a judicial inquiry about them that can satisfy our
judicial conscience.

The Constitution definitely commits it to the Executive to determine the

factual bases and to forthwith act as promptly as possible to meet the emergencies of
rebellion and invasion which may be crucial to the life of the nation. He must do this
with unwavering conviction, or any hesitancy or indecision on his part will surely
detract from the needed precision in his choice of the means he would employ to
repel the aggression. The apprehension that his decision might be held by the
Supreme Court to be a transgression of the fundamental law he has sworn to 'defend
and preserve' would deter him from acting when precisely it is most urgent and
critical that he should act, since the enemy is about to strike the mortal blow. 27
xxx xxx xxx
To start with, Congress was not unaware of the worsening conditions of peace
and order and of, at least, evident insurgency, what with the numerous easily
verifiable reports of open rebellious activities in different parts of the country and the
series of rallies and demonstrations, often bloody, in Manila itself and other centers of
population, including those that reached not only the portals but even the session hall
of the legislature, but the legislators seemed not to be sufficiently alarmed or they
either were indifferent or did not know what to do under the circumstances. Instead
of taking immediate measures to alleviate the conditions denounced and decried by
the rebels and the activists, they debated and argued long on palliatives without
coming out with anything substantial much less satisfactory in the eyes of those who
were seditiously shouting for reforms. In any event, in the face of the inability of
Congress to meet the situation, and prompted by his appraisal of a critical situation
that urgently called for immediate action, the only alternative open to the President
was to resort to the other constitutional source of extraordinary powers, the
Constitution itself. 28
xxx xxx xxx
 Proclamation 1081 is in no sense any more constitutionally offensive. In fact,
in ordering detention of persons, the Proclamation pointedly limits arrests and
detention only to those "presently detained, as well as others who may hereafter be
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and
offences committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or
in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations,
crimes, against the fundamental laws of the state, crimes against public order, crimes
involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and
insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be
enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a
consequence of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me
personally or promulgated upon my direction." Indeed, even in the affected areas, the
Constitution has not been really suspended much less discarded. As contemplated in
the fundamental law itself, it is merely in a state of anaesthesia, to the end that the
much needed major surgery to save the nation's life may be successfully undertaken.
29
xxx xxx xxx
The quoted lines of reasoning can no longer be sustained, on many levels, in these more
enlightened times. For one, as a direct reaction to the philosophy of judicial inhibition so frequently
exhibited during the Marcos dictatorship, our present Constitution has explicitly mandated judicial
review of the acts of government as part of the judicial function. As if to rebuff Aquino, the 1987
Constitution expressly allows the Supreme Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law and decide the same within 30 days from the filing of the appropriate case.
30 The Constitution also emphasizes that a state of martial law did not suspend the operation of the
Constitution or supplant the functioning of the judicial and legislative branches. 31 The expediency of
hiding behind the political question doctrine can no longer be resorted to.
For another, the renewed emphasis within domestic and international society on the rights of
people, as can be seen in worldwide democratic movements beginning with our own in 1986, makes it
more difficult for a government established and governed under a democratic constitution, to engage in
official acts that run contrary to the basic tenets of democracy and civil rights. If a government insists on
proceeding otherwise, the courts will stand in defense of the basic constitutional rights of the people.
Still, the restoration of rule under law, the establishment of national governmental
instrumentalities, and the principle of republicanism all ensure that the constitutional government
retains significant powers and prerogatives, for it is through such measures that it can exercise sovereign
will in behalf of the people. Concession to those presidential privileges and prerogatives should be made
if due. The abuses of past executive governments should not detract from these basic governmental
powers, even as they may warrant a greater degree of wariness from those institutions that balance
power and the people themselves. And the rule of law should prevail above all. The damage done by
martial rule was not merely personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the caprices and whims
of the iniquitous past is to respect the confines of the restored rule of law. 32
Nothing in PP 1017, or any issuance by any President since Aquino, comes even close to
matching PP 1081. It is a rank insult to those of us who suffered or stood by those oppressed under PP
1081 to even suggest that the innocuous PP 1017 is of equivalent import.
 PP 1017 Does Not Purport
or Pretend that the
President Has The Power to Issue Decrees
There is one seeming similarity though in the language of PP 1017 and PP 1081, harped upon by
some of the petitioners and alluded to by the majority. PP 1017 contains a command to the Armed
Forces "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations by [the
President]". A similar command was made under PP 1081. That in itself should not be a cause of
surprise, since both PP 1017 and PP 1081 expressly invoked the "calling out" power, albeit in different
contexts.
The majority however considers that since the President does not have the power to issue
decrees, PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it enforces obedience "to all decrees." For one, it should
be made clear that the President currently has no power to issue decrees, and PP 1017 by no measure
seeks to restore such power to the President. Certainly, not even a single decree was issued by President
Arroyo during the several days PP 1017 was in effect, or during her term thus far for that matter.
CETDHA
At the same time, such power did once belong to the President during the Marcos era and was
extensively utilized by President Marcos. It has to be remembered that chafed as we may have under
some of the Marcos decrees, per the 1987 Constitution they still remain as part of the law of the land
unless particularly stricken down or repealed by subsequent enactments. Indeed, when the President
calls upon the Armed Forces to enforce the laws, those subsisting presidential decrees issued by
President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers are included in the equation.
This view is supported by the rules of statutory construction. The particular passage in PP 1017
reads "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations," with the phrases
"all the laws and to all decrees" separated by a comma from "orders and regulations promulgated by
me." Inherently, laws and those decrees issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers, and even those executive issuances of President Aquino in the exercise of her legislative
powers, belong to the same class, superior in the hierarchy of laws than "orders and regulations." The
use of the conjunction "and" denotes a joinder or union, "relating the one to the other." 33 The use of
"and" establishes an association between laws and decrees distinct from orders and regulations, thus
permitting the application of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to construe "decrees" as those decrees
which at present have the force of law. The dividing comma further signifies the segregation of concepts
between "laws and decrees" on one hand, and "orders and regulations" on the other.
Further proof that "laws and decrees" stand as a class distinct from "orders and regulations" is
the qualifying phrase "promulgated by me," which necessarily refers only to orders and regulations.
Otherwise, PP 1017 would be ridiculous in the sense that the obedience to be enforced only relates to
laws promulgated by President Arroyo since she assumed office in 2001. "Laws and decrees" do not
relate only to those promulgated by President Arroyo, but other laws enacted by past sovereigns,
whether they be in the form of the Marcos presidential decrees, or acts enacted by the American
Governor-General such as the Revised Penal Code. Certainly then, such a qualification sufficiently
addresses the fears of the majority that PP 1017 somehow empowers or recognizes the ability of the
current President to promulgate decrees. Instead, the majority pushes an interpretation that, if pursued
to its logical end, suggests that the President by virtue of PP 1017 is also arrogating unto herself, the
power to promulgate laws, which are in the mold of enactments from Congress. Again, in this respect,
the grouping of "laws" and "decrees" separately from "orders" and "regulations" signifies that the
President has not arrogated unto herself the power to issue decrees in the mold of the infamous Marcos
decrees.
 Moreover, even assuming that PP 1017 was intended to apply to decrees which the current
President could not very well issue, such intention is of no consequence, since the proclamation does
not intend or pretend to grant the President such power in the first place. By no measure of
contemplation could PP 1017 be interpreted as reinstating to the President the power to issue decrees.
I cannot see how the phrase "enforce obedience to decrees" can be the source of constitutional
mischief, since the implementation of PP 1017 will not vest on the President the power to issue such
decrees. If the Court truly feels the need to clarify this point, it can do so with the expediency of one
sentence or even a footnote. A solemn declaration that the phrase is unconstitutional would be like
killing a flea with dynamite when insect powder would do.
PP 1017 A Valid Exercise of Prerogatives
Inherent and Traditional in the Offic of
e
The Presidency
Thus far, I have dwelt on the legal effects of PP 1017, non-existent as they may be in relation to
the citizenry, the courts or on Congress. Still, there is another purpose and dimension behind PP 1017
that fall within the valid prerogatives of the President.
The President, as head of state, is cast in a unique role in our polity matched by no other
individual or institution. Apart from the constitutional powers vested on the President lie those powers
rooted in the symbolic functions of the office. There is the common expectation that the President
should stand as the political, moral and social leader of the nation, an expectation not referred to in of
the oath of office, but expected as a matter of tradition. In fact, a President may be cast in crisis even if
the Chief Executive has broken no law, and faithfully executed those laws that exist, simply because the
President has failed to win over the hearts and minds of the citizens. As a Princeton academic, Woodrow
Wilson once observed that with the People, the President is everything, and without them nothing, and
the sad decline of his own eventual presidency is no better proof of the maxim. Such are among the
vagaries of the political office, and generally beyond judicial relief or remedy.
Justice Robert Jackson's astute observation in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 34 on the
unique nature of the presidency, has been widely quoted:
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head in whose
choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public hopes and
expectations. In drama, magnitude, and finality, his decisions so far overshadow any
others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear. No other personality in public
life can begin to compete with him in access to the public mind through modern
methods of communications. By his prestige as head of state and his influence upon
public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to check and
balance his power which often cancels their effectiveness. 35
Correspondingly, the unique nature of the office affords the President the opportunity to
profoundly influence the public discourse, not necessarily through the enactment or enforcement of
laws, but specially by the mere expediency of taking a stand on the issues of the day. Indeed, the
President is expected to exercise leadership not merely through the proposal and enactment of laws,
but by making such vital stands. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt popularized the notion of the
presidency as a "bully pulpit", in line with his belief that the President was the steward of the people
limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution, or impleaded by
Congress under its constitutional powers.
 Many times, the President exercises such prerogative as a responsive measure, as after a mass
tragedy or calamity. Indeed, when the President issues a declaration or proclamation of a state of
national mourning after a disaster with massive casualties, while perhaps de rigeur, is not the formalistic
exercise of tradition, but a statement that the President, as the representative of the Filipino people,
grieves over the loss of life and extends condolences in behalf of the people to the bereaved. This is
leadership at its most solemn. ASIDTa
Yet the President is not precluded, in the exercise of such role, to be merely responsive. The
popular expectation in fact is of a pro-active, dynamic chief executive with an ability to identify problems
or concerns at their incipience and to respond to them with all legal means at the earliest possible time.
The President, as head of state, very well has the capacity to use the office to garner support for those
great national quests that define a civilization, as President Kennedy did when by a mere congressional
address, he put America on track to the goal of placing a man on the moon. Those memorable
presidential speeches memorized by schoolchildren may have not, by themselves, made operative any
law, but they served not only merely symbolic functions, but help profoundly influence towards the right
direction, the public opinion in the discourse of the times. Perhaps there was no more dramatic example
of the use of the "bully pulpit" for such noble purposes than in 1964, when an American President from
Texas stood before a Congress populated by many powerful bigots, and fully committed himself as no
other President before to the cause of civil rights with his intonation of those lines from the civil rights
anthem, "we shall overcome."
From an earlier era in American history, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation stands out as a
presidential declaration which clearly staked American polity on the side of the democratic ideal, even
though the proclamation itself was of dubitable legal value. The proclamation, in short form, "freed the
slaves", but was not itself free of legal questions. For one, the notion that the President could, by
himself, alter the civil and legal status of an entire class of persons was dubious then and now, although
President Lincoln did justify his action as in the exercise of his powers as commander-in-chief during
wartime, "as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing [the] rebellion." Moreover, it has been
pointed out that the Proclamation only freed those slaves in those states which were then in rebellion,
and it eventually took the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to legally
abolish involuntary servitude. 36 Notwithstanding the legal haze surrounding it, the Emancipation
Proclamation still stands as a defining example not only of the Lincoln Presidency, but of American
democratic principles. It may be remembered to this day not exactly as an operational means by which
slaves were actually freed, but as a clear rhetorical statement that slavery could no longer thenceforth
stand.
The President as Chief Government Spokesperson of the democratic ideals is entrusted with a
heady but comfortable pursuit. But no less vital, if somewhat graver, is the role of the President as the
Chief Defender of the democratic way of life. The "calling out" power assures the President such
capability to a great extent, yet it will not fully suffice as a defense of democracy. There is a need for the
President to rally the people to defend the Constitution which guarantees the democratic way of life,
through means other than coercive. I assert that the declaration of a state of emergency, on premises of
a looming armed threat which have hardly been disputed, falls within such proper functions of the
President as the defender of the Constitution. It was designed to inform the people of the existence of
such a threat, with the expectation that the citizenry would not aid or abet those who would overturn
through force the democratic government. At the same time, the Proclamation itself does not violate
the Constitution as it does not call for or put into operation the suspension or withdrawal of any
constitutional rights, or even create or diminish any substantive rights.
I submit that it would be proper for the Court to recognize that PP 1017 strikes a commendable
balance between the Constitution, the "calling out" power, and the inherent function of the Presidency
as defender of the democratic constitution. PP 1017 keeps within the scope and limitations of these
three standards. It asserts the primacy of the democratic order, civilian control over the armed forces,
yet respects constitutional and statutory guarantees of the people.
II.
Section 17, Article
XII of the
Constitution
In Relation to PP 1017
My next issue with the majority pertains to the assertion that the President does not have the
power to take over public utilities or businesses impressed with public interest under Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution without prior congressional authorization. I agree that the power of the State to
take over such utilities and businesses is highly limited, and should be viewed with suspicion if actually
enforced.
Yet qualifications are in order with regard to how Section 17, Article XII actually relates of PP
1017.
I agree with the majority that a distinction should be asserted as between the power of the
President to declare a state of emergency, and the exercise of emergency powers under Section 17,
Article
XII. The President would have the power to declare a state of emergency even without Section 17, Article
XII.
At the same time, it should be recognized that PP 1017, on its face and as applied, did not
involve the actual takeover of any public utility or business impressed with public interest. To some
minds, the police action in relation to the Daily Tribune may have flirted with such power, yet ultimately
the newspaper was able to independently publish without police interference or court injunction. It may
be so that since PP 1017 did make express reference to Section 17, Article XII, but it should be
remembered that the constitutional provision refers to a two-fold power of the State to declare a
national emergency and to take over such utilities and enterprises. The first power under Section 17,
Article XII is not distinct from the power of the President, derived from other constitutional sources, to
declare a state of national emergency. Reference to Section 17, Article XII in relation to the power to
declare a state of national emergency is ultimately superfluous. A different situation would obtain
though if PP 1017 were invoked in the actual takeover of a utility or business, and in such case, full
consideration of the import of Section 17, Article XII would be warranted. But no such situation obtains
in this case, and any discussion relating to the power of the State to take over a utility or business under
Section 17, Article XII would ultimately be obiter dictum. TaDAHE

I respectfully submit that the Court, in these petitions, need not have engaged this potentially
contentious issue, especially as it extends to whether under constitutional contemplation, the President
may act in behalf of the State in exercising the powers under Section 17, Article XII. Nonetheless,
considering that the majority has chosen to speak out anyway, I will express agreement that as a general
rule, the President may exercise such powers under Section 17, Article XII only under the grant of
congressional approval. Certainly, the notion that congressional authority is required under Section 17,
Article XII is not evident from the provision. Even Fr. Bernas notes that Section 17 does not require, as
does Article VI, Section 23(2), that the authorization be "by law", thus leaving the impression that the
authorization can come from the President. 37
After the 1989 coup d'etat, President Aquino issued issued Proclamation No. 503 on 6 December
1989, declaring a state of national emergency, and referring therein to Section 17, Article XII by citing
the
entire provision. The declaration was subsequently reaffirmed by Congress when two weeks after, it
enacted Republic Act No. 6826. Notably, Section 3(3) of the law authorized the President "to temporarily
takeover or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest that violates the herein declared national policy". Tellingly, however, such authority was
granted by Congress expressly "pursuant to Article VI, Section 23(2) of the Constitution", and not the
take-over provision in Section 17, Article XII. Evidently, the view that Section 17, Article XII requires prior
congressional authority has some novelty to it.
Still, I concede that it is fundamentally sound to construe Section 17 as requiring congressional
authority or approval before the takeover under the provision may be effected. After all, the taking over
of a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest would involve an
infringement on the right of private enterprise to profit; or perhaps even expropriation for a limited
period. Constitutionally, the taking of property can only be accomplished with due process of law, 38
and the enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the
President may exercise the powers of the State under Section 17 stands as the best assurance that due
process of law would be observed.
The fact that Section 17 is purposely ambivalent as to whether the President may exercise the
power therein with or without congressional approval leads me to conclude that it is constitutionally
permissible to recognize exceptions, such as in extreme situations wherein obtention of congressional
authority is impossible or inexpedient considering the emergency. I thus dissent to any proposition that
such requirement is absolute under all circumstances. I maintain that in such extreme situations, the
President may exercise such authority subject to judicial review.
It should be admitted that some emergencies are graver and more imminent than others. It is
not within the realm of impossibility that by reason of a particularly sudden and grave emergency,
Congress may not be able to convene to grant the necessary congressional authority to the President.
Certainly, if bombs from a foreign invader are falling over Manila skies, it may be difficult, not to
mention unnecessarily onerous, to require convening Congress before the President may exercise the
functions under Section 17, Article XII. The proposition of the majority may be desirable as the general
rule, but the correct rule that should be adopted by the Court should not be so absolute so as to
preclude the exercise by the President of such power under extreme situations.
In response to this argument, the majority cites portions of Araneta v. Dinglasan, 39 most
pertinent of which reads: "The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for
Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious."
For one, Araneta did not involve a situation wherein the President attempted to exercise
emergency powers without congressional authority; concerning as it did the exercise by President
Quirino of those emergency powers conferred several years earlier by Congress to President Quezon at
the onset of the Pacific phase of World War II. The Court therein ruled that the emergency that justified
then the extraordinary grant of powers had since expired, and that there no longer existed any authority
on the part of the President to exercise such powers, notwithstanding that the law, Commonwealth Act
No. 671, "did not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness".
Clearly, the context in which the Court made that observation in Araneta is not the same
context within which my own observations oscillate. My own submission is premised on the extreme
situation wherein Congress may be physically unable to convene, an exceptional circumstance which the
hard-line stance of the majority makes no concessions for. TICDSc
 Indeed, even the factual milieu recounted in Araneta conceded that such extreme circumstance
could occur, when it noted President Quezon's claim that he was impelled to call for a special session of
the National Assembly after foreseeing that "it was most unlikely that the Philippine Legislature would
hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." 40 That the National Assembly then
was able to convene and pass Commonwealth Act No. 671 was fortunate, but somewhat a luxury
nonetheless. Indeed, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the emergency contemplated would
be so grave that a sufficient number of members of Congress would be physically unable to convene and
meet the quorum requirement.
Ultimately though, considering that the authorized or actual takeover under Section 17, Article
XII, is not presented as a properly justiciable issue. Nonetheless, and consistent with the general tenor,
the majority has undertaken to decide this non-justiciable issue, and to even place their view in the
dispositive portion in a bid to enshrine it as doctrine. In truth, the Court's pronouncement on this point
is actually obiter. It is hoped that should the issue become ripe for adjudication before this Court,
the obiter is not adopted as a precedent without the qualification that in extreme situations wherein
congressional approval is impossible or highly impractical to obtain, the powers under Section 17, Article
XII may be authorized by the President.
III.
Overbreadth and "Void for Vagueness"
Doctrines Applicable Not Only To
Free Speech Cases
The majority states that "the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on
their faces' statutes in free speech cases" 41 , and may thus be entertained "in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only 'spoken words', and not conduct. A similar characterization
is made as to the "void for vagueness" doctrine, which according to the majority, is "subject to the same
principles governing overbreadth doctrine . . . also an analytical tool for testing 'on their faces' statutes
in free speech cases." 42
As I noted in my Separate Opinion in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 43 citing Justice Kapunan,
there is a viable distinction between "void for vagueness" and "overbreadth" which the majority sadly
ignores.
A view has been proferred that "vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not
applicable to penal laws." These two concepts, while related, are distinct from each
other. On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that
infringe upon freedom of speech. On the other hand, the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other
fundamental constitutional right. (not merely those that regulate speech or other
fundamental constitutional rights.) The fact that a particular criminal statute does not
infringe upon free speech does not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on
vagueness grounds cannot succeed. 44
The distinction may prove especially crucial since there has been a long line of cases in American
Supreme Court jurisprudence wherein penal statutes have been invalidated on the ground that they
were "void for vagueness." As I cited in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 45 these cases are Connally v.
General Construction Co., 46 Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 47 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 48
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 49 Kolender v. Lawson, 50 and City of Chicago v. Morales. 51
 Granting that perhaps as a general rule, overbreadth may find application only in "free speech"
52 cases, it is on the other hand very settled doctrine that a penal statute regulating conduct, not
speech, may be invalidated on the ground of "void for vagueness". In Romualdez, I decried the elevation
of the suspect and radical new doctrine that the "void for vagueness" challenge cannot apply other than
in free speech cases. My view on this point has not changed, and insofar as the ponencia would hold
otherwise, I thus dissent.
Moreover, even though the argument that an overbreadth challenge can be maintained only in
free speech cases has more jurisprudential moorings, the rejection of the challenge on that basis alone
may prove unnecessarily simplistic. I maintain that there is an even stronger ground on which the
overbreadth and "void for vagueness" arguments can be refuted — that Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP 1017) neither creates nor diminishes any rights or obligations whatsoever. In fact, I submit
again that this proposition is the key perspective from which the petitions should be examined.
IV.
General Order No. 5
Suffers No Constitutional
Infirmity
The majority correctly concludes that General Order No. 5 is generally constitutional. However,
they make an unnecessary distinction with regard to "acts of terrorism", pointing out that Congress has
not yet passed a law defining and punishing terrorism or acts of terrorism.

That may be the case, but does the majority seriously suggest that the President or the State is
powerless to suppress acts of terrorism until the word "terrorism" is defined by law? Terrorism has a
widely accepted meaning that encompasses many acts already punishable by our general penal laws.
There are several United Nations and multilateral conventions on terrorism 53 , as well as declarations
made by the United Nations General Assembly denouncing and seeking to combat terrorism. 54 There is
a general sense in international law as to what constitutes terrorism, even if no precise definition has
been adopted as binding on all nations. Even without an operative law specifically defining terrorism,
the State already has the power to suppress and punish such acts of terrorism, insofar as such acts are
already punishable, as they almost always are, in our extant general penal laws. The President, tasked
with the execution of all existing laws, already has a sufficient mandate to order the Armed Forces to
combat those acts of terrorism that are already punishable in our Revised Penal Code, such as rebellion,
coup d'etat, murder, homicide, arson, physical injuries, grave threats, and the like. Indeed, those acts
which under normal contemplation would constitute terrorism are associated anyway with or subsumed
under lawless violence, which is a term found in the Constitution itself. Thus long ago, the State has
already seen it fit to punish such acts. aTcHIC
Moreover, General Order No. 5 cannot redefine statutory crimes or create new penal acts, since
such power belongs to the legislative alone. Fortunately, General Order No. 5 does not assume to make
such redefinitions. It may have been a different matter had General Order No. 5 attempted to define
"acts of terrorism" in a manner that would include such acts that are not punished under our statute
books, but the order is not comported in such a way. The proper course of action should be to construe
"terrorism" not in any legally defined sense, but in its general sense. So long as it is understood that
"acts of terrorism" encompasses only those acts which are already punishable under our laws, the
reference is not constitutionally infirm.
The majority cites a theoretical example wherein a group of persons engaged in a drinking spree
may be arrested by the military or police in the belief that they were committing acts of terrorism
pursuant
to General Order No. 5. Under the same logical framework that group of persons engaged in a drinking
spree could very well be arrested by the military or police in the belief that they are committing acts of
lawless violence pursuant to General Order No. 5, instead of acts of terrorism. Obviously such act would
be "abuse and oppression" on the part of the military and the police, whether justified under "lawless
violence" or "acts of terrorism". Yet following the logic of the majority, the directive to prevent acts of
"lawless violence" should be nullified as well.
If the point of the majority is that there are no justiciable standards on what constitutes acts of
terrorism, it should be pointed out that only the following scenarios could ensue. For one, a person
would actually be arrested and charged with "acts of terrorism", and such arrest or charge would be
thrown out of the courts, since our statute books do not criminalize the specific crime of terrorism.
More probably, a person will be arrested and charged for acts that may under the layperson's
contemplation constitutes acts of terrorism, but would be categorized in the information and charge
sheet as actual crimes under our Revised Penal Code. I simply cannot see how General Order No. 5 could
validate arrests and convictions for non-existent crimes.
Interestingly, the majority, by taking issue with the lack of definition and possible broad context
of "acts of terrorism", seems to be positively applying the arguments of "overbreadth" or "void for
vagueness", arguments which they earlier rejected as applicable only in the context of free expression
cases. The inconsistency is breath-taking. While I disagree with the majority-imposed limitations on the
applicability of the "overbreadth" or "void for vagueness" doctrines, I likewise cannot accede to the
application of those doctrines in the context of General Order No. 5, for the same reason that they
should not apply to PP 1017. Neither General Order No. 5 nor PP 1017 is a penal statute, or have an
operative legal effect of infringing upon liberty, expression or property. As such, neither General Order
No. 5 nor PP 1017 can cause the deprivation of life, liberty or property, thus divorcing those issuances
from the context of the due process clause. The same absence of any binding legal effect of these two
issuances correspondingly disassociates them from the constitutional infringement of free expression or
association. Neither "void for vagueness" nor "overbreadth" therefore lie.
Another point. The majority concludes from General Order No. 5 that the military or police is
limited in authority to perform those acts that are "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence," and such acts committed beyond such
authority are considered illegal. I do not dispute such conclusion, but it must be emphasized that
"necessary and appropriate actions and measures" precisely do not authorize the military or police to
commit unlawful and unconstitutional acts themselves, even if they be geared towards suppressing acts
of terrorism or lawless violence. Indeed, with the emphasis that PP 1017 does not create new rights or
obligations, or diminish existing ones, it necessarily follows that General Order No. 5, even if premised
on a state of emergency, cannot authorize the military or police to ignore or violate constitutional or
statutory rights, or enforce laws completely alien to the suppression of lawless violence. Again,
following the cardinal principle of legal hermeneutics earlier adverted to, General Order No. 5 should be
viewed in harmony with the Constitution, and only if it the Order irreconcilably deviates from the
fundamental law should it be struck down.
V.
Court Should Refrain Making Any
Further Declaration, For Now,
Relating to the Individual
Grievances Raised by the Petitioners
in Relation To PP 1017
 I respectfully disagree with the manner by which the majority would treat the "void as applied"
argument presented by the petitioners. The majority adopts the tack of citing three particular injuries
alleged by the petitioners as inflicted with the implementation of PP 1017. The majority analyzes the
alleged injuries, correlates them to particular violations of the Bill of Rights, and ultimately concludes
that such violations were illegal.
The problem with this approach is that it would forever deem the Court as a trier or reviewer at
first instance over questions involving the validity of warrantless arrests, searches, seizures and the
dispersal of rallies, all of which entail a substantial level of factual determination. I agree that PP 1017
does not expand the grounds for warrantless arrests, searches and seizures or dispersal of rallies, and
that the proclamation cannot be invoked before any court to assert the validity of such unauthorized
actions. Yet the problem with directly adjudicating that the injuries inflicted on David, et al., as illegal,
would be that such would have been done with undue haste, through an improper legal avenue,
without the appropriate trial of facts, and without even impleading the particular officers who effected
the arrests/searches/seizures. TIaCHA
I understand that the injurious acts complained of by the petitioners upon the implementation
of PP 1017 are a source of grave concern. Indubitably, any person whose statutory or constitutional
rights were violated in the name of PP 1017 or General Order No. 5 deserves redress in the appropriate
civil or criminal proceeding, and even the minority wishes to makes this point as emphatically clear, if
not moreso, as the majority. Yet a ruling from this Court, without the proper factual basis or prayer for
remuneration for the injury sustained, would ultimately be merely symbolic. While the Court will not
be harmed by a symbolic reaffirmation of commitment to the principles in the Bill of Rights, it will be
harmed by a ruling that unduly and inappropriately expands the very limited function of the Court as
a trier of facts on first instance.
In my dissent in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, 55 I alluded to the fact that our legal system may run
counter-intuitive in the sense that the seemingly or obviously guilty may still, after trial, be properly
acquitted or exonerated; to the extent that even an accused who murders another person in front of
live television cameras broadcast to millions of sets is not yet necessarily guilty of the crime of murder or
homicide. 56 Hence, the necessity of a proper trial so as to allow the entire factual milieu to be
presented, tested and evaluated before the court. In my theoretical example, the said accused should
nonetheless be acquitted if the presence of exempting circumstances is established. The same principle
applies in these cases. Certainly, we in the Court can all agree that PP 1017 cannot be invoked to justify
acts by the police or military officers that go beyond the Constitution and the laws. But the course of
prudence dictates that the pronouncement of such a doctrine, while enforceable in a court of law,
should not yet extend itself to specific examples that have not yet been properly litigated. The function
of this Court is to make legal pronouncements not based on "obvious" facts, but on proven facts.
A haphazard declaration by the Court that the arrests or seizures were "illegal" would likewise
preclude any meaningful review or reevaluation of pertinent legal doctrines that otherwise could have
been reexamined had these acts been properly challenged in regular order. For example, the matter of
the warrantless arrests in these cases could have most certainly compelled the Court to again consider
the doctrine laid down in Umil v. Ramos on warrantless arrests and rebellion as a continuing crime, a
doctrine that may merit renewed evaluation. Yet any healthy reexamination of Umil, or other
precedents for that matter, require the presentation and trial of the proper factual predicates, a course
which the majority unfortunately "short-cuts" in this present decision.
 Of course, despite the grandiloquent pronouncement by the majority that the acts complained
of by the petitioners and implemented pursuant to General Order No. 5 are illegal, it could nonetheless
impose civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers concerned, as these
officers had not been "individually identified and given their day in court". Of course, the Court would be
left with pie on its face if these persons, once "given their day in court", would be able to indubitably
establish that their acts were actually justified under law. Perhaps worse, the pronouncement of the
majority would have had the effect of prejudging these cases, if ever lodged, even before trial on the
merits.
Certainly, a declaration by the majority that PP 1017 or General Order No. 5 cannot justify
violation of statutory or constitutional rights (a declaration which the minority would have no qualms
assenting to) would sufficiently arm those petitioners and other persons whose rights may have been
injured in the implementation of PP 1017, with an impeccable cause of action which they could pursue
against the violators before the appropriate courts. At the same time, if the officers or officials
concerned have basis to contend that no such rights were violated, for justifications independent of PP
1017 or General Order No. 5, such claims could receive due consideration before the courts. Such a
declaration would squarely entrench the Court as a defender of the Bill of Rights, foster enforceable
means by which the injured could seek actual redress for the injury sustained, and preserve the integrity
and order of our procedural law.
VI.
Conclusion
The country-wide attention that the instant petitions have drawn should not make the Court
lose focus on its principal mission, which is to settle the law of the case. On the contrary, the highly
political nature of these petitions should serve as forewarning for the Court to proceed ex abundante
cautelam, lest the institution be unduly dragged into the partisan mud. The credibility of the Court is
ensured by making decisions in accordance with the Constitution without regard to the individual
personalities involved; with sights set on posterity, oblivious of the popular flavor of the day. DScTaC
By deciding non-justiciable issues and prejudging cases and controversies without a proper trial
on the merits, the majority has diminished the potency of this Court's constitutional power in favor of
rhetorical statements that afford no quantifiable relief. It is for the poet and the politician to pen
beautiful paeans to the people's rights and liberties, it is for the Court to provide for viable legal means
to enforce and safeguard these rights and liberties. When the passions of these times die down, and
sober retrospect accedes, the decision of this Court in these cases will be looked upon as an extended
advisory opinion.
Yes, PP 1017 and General Order No. 5 warrant circumspect scrutiny from those interested and
tasked with preserving our civil liberties. They may even stand, in the appropriate contexts, as viable
partisan political issues. But the plain fact remains that, under legal contemplation, these issuances are
valid on their face, and should result in no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to
their letter.
I vote to DISMISS all the petitions.
||| (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424,
[May 3, 2006], 522 PHIL 705-854)
 2. Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976

RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

MARTIN, J,:

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of
the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the
absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his
present powers.1

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text
of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to
the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a
plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of
the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law,
shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different
regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective
sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional
representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be
determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their
election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.

2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.

3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the
members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall
have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall
continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to
discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution.

4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President
(Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime
Ministers as he may deem necessary.

5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have
been lifted.

6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters
of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers,
and composition may be altered by law.

Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may
be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding
any important matter whether of national or local interest.

8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full
force and effect.

9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they
have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-
44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well
as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections,
The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only
the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.

On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-
44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII
of the Constitution.3

Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL
M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.

These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the
proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to
lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to
vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those
citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.

Justiciability of question raised.

1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of
such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement.
At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No.
991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6
The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion
affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired
into.

2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the
domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification,
raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate
the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into
a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one,
within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution
provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.. . ." The Supreme Court has
the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has
been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the
incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process
confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum
fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear
Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in
1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of
inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme
Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this
inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of
the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-
political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on
the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the
Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification
Cases12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the
Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice
Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We
rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new
Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it
partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases,
questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the
Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971,
despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda,
insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply.
For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections,
the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief
Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the
same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and
plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and
constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases
partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."

II

The amending process as laid out

in the new Constitution.

1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by
the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all
its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members,
submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.

SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions
is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:

SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof.

There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by
a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.

2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with
that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly.
Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country."
Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen
the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of
the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could
convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a
matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was
rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of
the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National
Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their
sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of
February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially
convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already
resolved against it.

3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in
the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for
the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly).
While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science
a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative
character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. 17 Such being the case, approval of the
President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19

III

Concentration of Powers

in the President during

crisis government.

1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today
are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded
as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually
independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of
constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a
total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary
governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a
decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in
the life of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action,
even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one
man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet
the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis
potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important
harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be
to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than
presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded;
it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on
the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside
the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the legislative power had not
provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the
government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal
times restored.

2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That
sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions,
thus:23

The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been
elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen
hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the
Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National
Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then
exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done
by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.

"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the
Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National
Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the
exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would
be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely
important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation
of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis
government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase
in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino
people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and
economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines
the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces,
yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting
the same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV

Authority of the incumbent

President t to propose

amendments to the Constitution.

1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the
President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).
Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative
functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions
of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that
Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its
gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim
National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges
of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the
Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For
the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would
leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal
times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant
voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like
the President now, are mere agents of the people .26

2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong
Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay,
and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same
number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-
provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the
abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial law and
amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently
proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a
referendum to be held on October 16 . 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under
Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with
cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng
mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16,
the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial
law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of
the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate
the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree
No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the
National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.

The People is Sovereign

1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the
Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them .30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular
organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31
This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the
people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions
on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as
Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment." 34 "The necessities of
orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted to
permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting
decision of the people when they adopt it. 35

2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign
power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from
the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only
into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal
vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-
plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the
President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the
authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.

VI

Referendum-Plebiscite not

rendered nugatory by the

participation of the 15-year olds.

1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be
continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by
the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt
to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the
proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite
aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it
would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results.
The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the
plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in
consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of
proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds
above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one
containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the
ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years
of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above
contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately
prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes.38

2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely

consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted
to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the
executive power of the President.39 It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless
of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand,
involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and
in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election Literacy,
property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.

VII

1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the
freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of
Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice.
To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of
that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing
freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself had announced that he would not
countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes"
or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters
soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the
proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a
settled matter.43 Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to
participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44

VIII

Time for deliberation

is not short.

1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates
or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of
the day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago.
The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the
contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for
constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls: "Under the old Society,
15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the
women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937
(Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-
Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to
the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the
bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the
Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was
fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting
the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45

2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date
when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme
court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions,
political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body
or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because
proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor,
the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when
there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable
implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third,
ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done
contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has
relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment
may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon,
unless a second time proposed by proper body

IN RESUME

The three issues are

1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?

2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now
obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as
set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor
a sufficient and proper submission?

Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio
Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G.
Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar,
Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz
Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is
concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the
power of the President to propose amendments.

Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion
Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed
amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the
hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and
Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the competence and
cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ
Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to
propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient
information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in
the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).

Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion,
Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted
to grant the petitions.

ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, J, in the result.

Separate Opinions

CASTRO, C.J.:, concurring:

From the challenge as formulated in the three petitions at bar and the grounds advanced be the Solicitor
General in opposition thereto, as well as the arguments adduced by the counsels of the parties at the
hearing had on October 7 and 8, 1976, three vital issues readily project themselves as the centers of
controversy, namely:

(1) Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?

(2) During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental circumstances now
obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as
set up the required machineries and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor
a sufficient and proper, submission"

First Issue

The threshold question is not at all one of first impression Specifically on the matter of proposals to
amend the Constitution, this Court, in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1), inceptively announced the
dictum that-

Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the

Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charges by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention
by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary
be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification.

In time, however, the validity of the said pronouncement was eroded. In the assessment of the Court
itself-

The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate
(81 Phil. 818), Avelino vs. Cuenco (L-2581, March 4 and 14, 1949), Tanada vs. Cuenco (L-10520, February
28, 1957), and Macias vs. Commission on Elections (L-18684, September 14, 1961).

xxx xxx xxx

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress-acting as a constituent assembly-violates the
Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the
extent this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point." (Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, et al, L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 786-787).

The abandonment of the Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito doctrine appears to have been completed when, in
Javellana vs. Secretary, et al. (L-36142, March 3l, 1973, 50 SCRA 30), six members of the Court concurred
in the view that the question of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV (Amendments) of the 1935 Constitution is inherently and essentially justiciable.

As elucidated therein, with extensive quotations from Tanada vs. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051)-

... the term 'political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinarily
parlance, namely, a question of policy in matters concerning the government of a State,
as a body politic. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it
refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government.' It is
 concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.'

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected,
is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested
act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those
prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught." (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary,
supra).

So it is in the situation here presented. The basic issue is the constitutional validity of the presidential
acts of proposing amendments to the Constitution and of calling a referendum-plebiscite for the
ratification of the proposals made. Evidently, the question does not concern itself with the wisdom of
the exercise of the authority claimed or of the specific amendments proposed. Instead the inquiry vel
non is focused solely on the existence of the said power in the President - a question purely of legality
determinable thru interpretation and construction of the letter and spirit of the Constitution by the
Court as the final arbiter in the delineation of constitutional boundaries and the allocation of
constitutional powers.

For the Court to shun cognizance of the challenge herein presented, especially in these parlous years,
would be to abdicate its constitutional powers, shirk its constitutional responsibility, and deny the
people their ultimate recourse for judicial determination.

I have thus no hesitancy in concluding that the question here presented is well within the periphery of
judicial inquiry.

II

Second Issue

The main question stands on a different footing; it appears unprecedented both here and elsewhere. Its
solution, I believe, can be found and unraveled only by a critical assessment of the existing legal order in
the light of the prevailing political and factual milieu.

To be sure, there is an impressive array of consistent jurisprudence on the proposition that, normally or
under normal conditions, a Constitution may be amended only in accord with the procedure set forth
therein. Hence, if there be any such prescription for the amendatory process as invariable there is
because one of the essential parts of a Constitution is the so-called "constitution of sovereignty" which
comprises the provision or provisions on the modes in accordance with which formal changes in the
fundamental law may be effected the same would ordinarily be the controlling criterion for the validity
of the amendments sought.

Unfortunately, however, during the present transition period of our political development, no express
provision is extant in the Constitution regarding the agency or agent by whom and the procedure by
which amendments thereto may be proposed and ratified fact overlooked by those who challenge the
validity of the presidential acts in the premises. This is so because there are at least two distinctly in the
transition from the old system of government under the 1935 Constitution to the new one established
by the 1973 Constitution.

The first stage comprises the period from the effectivity of the Constitution on January 17, 1973 to the
time the National Assembly is convened by the incumbent President and the interim President and the
interim Prime Minister are chosen Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3[1]. The existence of this stage as an
obvious fact of the nation's political life was recognized by the Court in Aquino vs. Commission on
Elections, et al. (L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275), when it rejected the claim that, under the
1973 Constitution, the President was in duty bound to convene the interim National Assembly soon
after the Constitution took effect.

The second stage embraces the period from the date the interim National Assembly is convened to the
date the Government described in Articles VII to IX of the Constitution is inaugurated, following the
election of the members of the regular National Assembly (Article XVII, Section 1) and the election of the
regular President and Prime Minister,. This is as it should be because it is recognized that the President
has been accorded the discretion to determine when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly, and his decision to defer the convocation thereof has found overwhelming support by the
sovereign people in two previous referenda, therein giving reality to an interregnum between the
effectivity of the Constitution and the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly, which
interregnum, as aforesaid, constitutes the first stage in the transition period.

Against this factual backdrop, it is readily discernible that neither of the two sets of provisions embodied
in the Constitution on the amendatory process applied during the said first stage. Thus, Section 15,
Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) provides-

"Sec. 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take
effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."

Patently, the reference to the "interim National Assembly" and the "interim Prime Minister" limits the
application thereof to the second stage of the transition period, i.e.,., after the interim? National
Assembly shall have been convened and the interim Prime Minister shall have been chosen.

Upon the other hand, the provisions of Article XVI (Amendments), to wit-

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by
the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention.

(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question
of ceiling such a convention to the electorate in an election.

SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
unequivocally contemplate amendments after the regular Government shall have become fully
operative, referring as they do to the National Assembly which will come into being only at that time.

In the face of this constitutional hiatus, we are confronted with the dilemma whether amendments to
the Constitution may be effected during the aforesaid first stage and, if in the affirmative, by whom and
in what manner such amendments may be proposed and ratified.

Susceptibility to change is one of the hallmarks of an Ideal Constitution. Not being a mere declaration of
the traditions of a nation but more the embodiment of a people's hopes and aspirations, its strictures
are not unalterable. They are, instead, dynamic precepts intended to keep in stride with and attuned to
the living social organism they seek to fashion and govern. If it is conceded that "the political or
philosophical aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next and entirely discarded by the third,"
then a Constitution must be able to adjust to the changing needs and demands of society so that the
latter may survive, progress and endure. On these verities, there can be no debate.

During the first stage of the transition period in which the Government is at present - which is
understandably the most critical - the need for change may be most pressing and imperative, and to
disavow the existence of the right to amend the Constitution would be sheer political heresy. Such view
would deny the people a mechanism for effecting peaceful change, and belie the organic conception of
the Constitution by depriving it of its means of growth. Such a result obviously could not have been
intended by the framers of the fundamental law.

It seems, however, that the happenstance that the first period would come to pass before the
convocation of the interim National Assembly was not anticipated, hence, the omission of an express
mandate to govern the said situation in so far as amendments are concerned. But such omission
through inadvertence should not, because it cannot, negate the sovereign power of the people to
amend the fundamental charter that governs their lives and their future and perhaps even the very
survival of the nation.

Upon the other hand, it is clear from the afore-quoted provisions on the amendatory process that the
intent was, instead, to provide a simpler and more expeditious mode of amending the Constitution
during the transition period. For, while under Article XVI thereof, proposals for amendment may be
made directly by the regular National Assembly by a vote of at least three-fourths of all its members,
under Section 15 of Article XVII, a bare majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly would
suffice for the purpose. The relaxation and the disparity in the vote requirement are revealing. The can
only signify a recognition of the need to facilitate the adoption of amendments during the second stage
of the transition period so that the interim National Assembly will be able, in a manner of speaking, to
iron out the kinks in the new Constitution, remove imperfections therein, and provide for changed or
changing circumstances before the establishment of the regular Government. In this contest, therefore,
it is inutile speculation to assume that the Constitution was intended to render impotent or ar the
effectuation of needful change at an even more critical period - the first stage. With greater reason,
therefore, must the right and power to amend the Constitution during the first stage of te transition
period be upheld, albeit within its express and implied constraints.

Neither can it be successfully argued, in the same context and in the present posture, that the
Constitution may be amended during the said first stage only by convening the interim National
Assembly. That is to say and require that he said stage must first be brought to an end before any
amendment may be proposed and ratified. Settled jurisprudence does not square with such a
proposition. As aptly noted in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, et al., supra, the framers of the
Constitution set no deadline for the convening of the interim National Assembly because they could not
have foreseen how long the crises which impelled the proclamation and justify the continued state of
martial law would last. Indeed, the framers committed to the sound judgment is not subject to judicial
review, save possibly to determine whether arbitrariness has infected such exercise; absent such a taint,
the matter is solely in the keeping of the President. To thus content that only by convening the interim
National Assembly may the Constitution be amended at this time would effectively override the
judgement vested in the President, even in default of any he has acted arbitrarily or gravely abuse his
discretion. Furthermore, to sustain such a contention would not only negate the mandate so
resoundingly expressed by the people in two national referenda against the immediate convening of the
interim National Assembly, but as well deride their overwhelming approval of the manner in which the
President has exercised the legislative power to issue proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions
having the stature and force of law.

Given the constitutional stalemate or impasse spawned by these supervening developments, the logical
query that compels itself for resolution is: By whom, then, may proposals for the amendment of the
Constitution be made and in what manner may said proposals be ratified by the people?

It is conventional wisdom that, conceptually, the constituent power is not to be confuse with legislative
power in general because the prerogative to propose amendments to the Constitution is not in any
sense embraced within the ambit of ordinary law-making. Hence, there is much to recommend the
proposition that, in default of an express grant thereof, the legislature - traditionally the delegated
repository thereof - may not claim it under a general grant of legislative authority. In the same vein,
neither would it be altogether unassailable to say that because by constitutional tradition and express
allocation the constituent power under the Constitution is locate in the law-making agency and at this
stage of the transition period the law-making authority is firmly recognized as being lodged in the
President, the said constituent power should now logically be in the hands of te President who may thus
exercise it in place of the interim National Assembly. Instead,, as pointed out in Gonzales vs. Commission
on Elections, et al., supra, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto

... is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours - t o make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental
Law.

As such, it is undoubtedly a power that only the sovereign people, either directly by themselves or
through their chosen delegate, can wield. Since it has been shown that the people, inadvertently or
otherwise, have not delegated that power to inadvertently or otherwise, have not delegated that power
to any instrumentality during the current stage of our hegira from crisis to normalcy, it follows of
necessity that the same remains with them for them to exercise in the manner they see fit and through
the agency they choose. And, even if it were conceded that - as it is reputedly the rule in some
jurisdictions - a delegation of the constituent authority amounts to a complete divestiture from the
people of the power delegated which they may not thereafter unilaterally reclaim from the delegate,
there would be no violence donde to such rule, assuming it to be applicable here, inasmuch as that
power, under the environmental circumstance adverted to, has not been delegated to anyone in the
first place. The constituent power during the first stage of the transition period belongs to and remains
with the people, and accordingly may be exercised by them - how and when - at their pleasure.
At this juncture, a flashback to the recent and contemporary political ferment in the country proves
revelatory. The people, shocked and revolted by the "obvious immorality" of the unabashed manner by
which the delegates to the Constitutional Convention virtually legislated themselves into office as ipso
facto members of the interim National Assembly by the mere fiat of voting for the transitory provisions
of the Constitution. and the stark reality that the unwieldy political monstrosity that the interim
Assembly portended to be would have proven to be a veritable drain on the meager financial resources
of a nation struggling for survival, have unequivocally put their foot down, as it were, on the
convocation thereof. But this patently salutary decision of the people proved to be double-edged. It
likewise bound the political machinery of the Government in a virtual straight-jacket and consigned the
political evolution of the nation into a state of suspended animation. Faced with the ensuing dilemma,
the people understandably agitated for a solution. Through consultations in the barangays and
sanggunian assemblies, the instrumentalities through which the people's voice is articulated in the
unique system of participatory democracy in the country today, the underpinnings for the hastening of
the return to constitutional normalcy quickly evolved into an overwhelming sentiment to amend the
Constitution in order to replace the discredited interim National Assembly with what the people believe
will be an appropriate agency to eventually take over the law-making power and thus pave the way for
the early lifting of martial rule. In pursuit of this sentiment, and to translate its constraints into concrete
action, the Pambansang Katipunan ng Barangay, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang
Barangay, the Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay, the Pambansang Katipunan
ng mga Kabataang Barangay the Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, and
finally the Batasang Bayan, to a man and as one voice, have come forward with definitive proposals for
the amendment of the Constitution, and, choosing the President the only political arm of the State at
this time through which that decision could be implemented and the end in view attained as their
spokesman, proposed the amendments under challenge in the cases at bar.

In the light of this milieu and its imperatives, one thing is inescapable: the proposals now submitted to
the people for their ratification in the forthcoming referendum-plebiscite are factually not of the
President; they are directly those of the people themselves speaking thru their authorized
instrumentalities. The President merely formalized the said proposals in Presidential Decree No. 1033. It
being conceded in all quarters that sovereignty resides in the people and it having been demonstrated
that their constituent power to amend the Constitution has not been delegated by them to any
instrumentality of the Government during the present stage of the transition period of our political
development, the conclusion is ineluctable that their exertion of that residuary power cannot be
vulnerable to any constitutional challenge as being ultra vires. Accordingly, without venturing to rule on
whether or not the President is vested with constituent power as it does not appear necessary to do so
in the premises the proposals here challenged, being acts of the sovereign people no less, cannot be said
to be afflicted with unconstitutionality. A fortiori, the concomitant authority to call a plebiscite and to
appropriate funds therefor is even less vulnerable not only because the President, in exercising said
authority has acted as a mere alter ego of the people who made the proposals, but likewise because the
said authority is legislative in nature rather than constituent.

III

Third Issue

Little need be said of the claimed insufficiency and impropriety of the submission of the proposed
amendments for ratification from the standpoint of time. The thesis cannot be disputed that a fair
submission presupposes an adequate time lapse to enable the people to be sufficiently enlightened on
the merits or demerits of the amendments presented for their ratification or rejection. However,
circumstances there are which unmistakably demonstrated that the is met. Even if the proposal appear
to have been formalized only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1033 on September 22,
1976, they are actually the crystallization of sentiments that for so long have preoccupied the minds of
the people and their authorized representatives, from the very lowest level of the political hierarchy.
Hence, unlike proposals emanating from a legislative body, the same cannot but be said to have been
mulled over, pondered upon, debated, discussed and sufficiently understood by the great masses of the
nation long before they ripened into formal proposals.

Besides. it is a fact of which judicial notice may well be taken that in the not so distant past when the
1973 Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification, an all-out campaign, in which all the
delegates of the Constitutional Convention reportedly participated, was launched to acquaint the
people with the ramifications and working of the new system of government sought to be inaugurated
thereunder. It may thus well be assumed that the people in general have since acquired, in the least, a
working knowledge of the entirety of the Constitution. The changes now proposed the most substantial
of which being merely the replacement of the interim National assembly with another legislative arm
for the Government during the transition period until the regular National Assembly shall have been
constituted do not appear to be of such complexity as to require considerable time to be brought home
to the full understanding of the people. And, in fact, the massive and wide-ranging informational and
educational campaign to this end has been and still is in full swing, with all the media the barangay, the
civic and sectoral groups, and even the religious all over the land in acting and often enthusiastic if not
frenetic involvement.

Indeed, when the people cast their votes on October 16, a negative vote could very well mean an
understanding of the proposals which they reject; while an affirmative vote could equally be indicative
Of such understanding and/or an abiding credence in the fidelity with which the President has kept the
trust they have confided to him as President and administrator of martial rule

IV

Conclusion

It is thus my considered view that no question viable for this court to pass judgment upon is posed.
Accordingly, I vote for the outright dismissal of the three petitions at bar.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

These three petitions, the latest in a series of cases starting from Planas v. Commission on Elections
continuing with the epochal resolution in Javellana v. Executive Secretary and followed successively in
three crucial decisions, Aquino v. Ponce Enrile Aquino v. Commission on Elections, and Aquino v Military
Commission,5 manifest to the same degree the delicate and awesome character of the function of
judicial review. While previous rulings supply guidance and enlightenment, care is to be taken to avoid
doctrinaire rigidity unmindful of altered circumstances and the urgencies of the times. It is inappropriate
to resolve the complex problems of a critical period without full awareness of the consequences that
flow from whatever decision is reached. Jural norms must be read in the context of social facts, There is
need therefore of adjusting inherited principles to new needs. For law, much more so constitutional law,
is simultaneously a reflection of and a force in the society that it controls. No quality then can be more
desirable in constitutional adjudication than that intellectual and imaginative insight which goes into the
heart of the matter. The judiciary must survey things as they are in the light of what they must become
It must inquire into the specific problem posed not only in terms of the teaching of the past but also of
the emerging political and legal theory, especially so under a leadership notable for its innovative
approach to social problems and the vigor of its implementation. This, on the one side. It must equally
be borne in mind through that this Court must be conscious of the risk inherent in its being considered
as a mere subservient instrument of government policy however admittedly salutary or desirable. There
is still the need to demonstrate that the conclusion reached by it in cases appropriate for its
determination has support in the law that must be applied. To my mind that was the norm followed, the
conclusion reached being that the three petitions be dismissed. I am in agreement. It is with regret
however that based on my reading of past decisions, both Philippine and American, and more
specifically my concurring opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, I must dissent from the proposition set
forth in the able and scholarly opinion of Justice Martin that there is concentration of power in the
President during a crisis government. Consequently, I cannot see my way clear to accepting the view
that the authority to propose amendments is not open to question. At the very least, serious doubts
could be entertained on the matter.

1. With due respect then, I have to dissociate myself from my brethren who would rule that
governmental powers in a crisis government, following Rossiter, "are more or less concentrated in the
President." Adherence to my concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile leaves me no
choice.

It must be stated at the outset that with the sufficiency of doctrines supplied by our past decisions to
point the way to what I did consider the appropriate response to the basic issue raised in the Aquino
and the other habeas corpus petitions resolved jointly, it was only in the latter portion of my opinion
that reference was made to United States Supreme Court pronouncements on martial law, at the most
persuasive in character and rather few in number "due no doubt to the, absence in the American
Constitution of any provision concerning it." 7 It was understandable then that it was only after the
landmark Ex parte Milligan case, that commentators like Cooley in 1868 and Watson in 1910 paid
attention, minimal by that, to the subject." It was next set forth that in the works on American
constitutional law published in this century specially after the leading cases of cases Sterling v. Constant
in and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, "there was a fuller treatment of the question of martial law While it is
the formulation of Willoughby that for me is most acceptable, my opinion did take note that another
commentator, Burdick, came out earlier with a similar appraisal.10 Thus: "So called martial law, except in
occupied territory of an enemy is merely the calling in of the aid of military forces by the executive, who
is charged with the enforcement of the law, with or without special authorization by the legislature.
Such declaration of martial law does not suspend the civil law, though it may interfere with the exercise
of one's ordinary rights. The right to call out the military forces to maintain order and enforce the law is
simply part of the Police power, It is only justified when it reasonably appears necessary, and only
justifies such acts as reasonably appear necessarily to meet the exigency, including the arrest, or in
extreme cases the. killing of those who create the disorder or oppose the authorities. When the
exigency is over the members of the military forces are criminally and civilly habit for acts done beyond
the scope of reasonable necessity. When honestly and reasonably coping with a situation of insurrection
or riot a member of the military forces cannot be made liable for his acts, and persons reasonably
arrested under such circumstances will not, during the insurrection or riot, be free by writ of habeas
corpus." 11 When the opinion cited Willoughby's concept of martial law, stress was laid on his being
"Partial to the claims of liberty."12 This is evident in the explicit statement from his work quoted by me:
"There is, then, strictly speaking, no such thing in American law as a declaration of martial law whereby
military law is substituted for civil law. So-called declarations of martial law are, indeed, often made but
their legal effect goes no further than to warn citizens that the military powers have been called upon by
the executive to assist him in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts,
they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment not commit any acts which will in any way render more
difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law. Some of the authorities stating
substantially this doctrine are quoted in the footnote below Nor did I stop there. The words of Willis
were likewise cited: "Martial law proper, that is, military law in case of insurrection, riots, and invasions,
is not a substitute for the civil law, but is rather an aid to the execution of civil law. Declarations of
martial law go no further than to warn citizens that the executive has called upon the military power to
assist him in the maintenance of law and order. While martial law is in force, no new powers are given
to the executive and no civil rights of the individual, other than the writ of habeas corpus, are
suspended. The relations between the citizen and his stature unchanged."14

The conclusion reached by me as to the state of American federal law on the question of martial law
was expressed thus: 4'1 It is readily evident that even when Milligan supplied the only authoritative
doctrine, Burdick and Willoughby did not ignore the primacy of civil liberties. Willis wrote after Sterling.
It would indeed be surprising if his opinion were otherwise. After Duncan, such an approach becomes
even more strongly fortified. Schwartz, whose treatise is the latest to be published, has this summary of
what he considers the present state of American law: 'The Milligan and Duncan cases show plainly that
martial law is the public law of necessity. Necessities alone calls it forth, necessity justifies its exercise;
and necessities measures the extended degree to which it may be It is, the high Court has affirmed, an
unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned,
may, never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires. If martial law rule survive the necessities on
which alone it rests, for even a single minute it becomes a mere exercise of lawless violence.' Further:
Sterling v. Constantin is of basic importance. Before it, a number of decisions, including one the highest
Court, went or on the theory that the executive had a free hand in taking martial law measures. Under
them, it has been widely supposed that in proclamation was so far conclusive that any action taken
under it was immune from judicial scrutiny. Sterling v. Constantin definitely discredits these earlier
decisions and the doctrine of conclusiveness derived from them. Under Sterling v. Constantin, where
martial law measures impinge upon personal or property rights-normally beyond the scope of military
power, whose intervention is lawful only because an abnormal Actuation has made it necessary the
executive's ipse dixit is not of itself conclusive of the necessity.'" 15

There was likewise an effort on my part to show what for me is the legal effect of martial law being
expressly provided for in the Constitution rather than being solely predicated on the common law power
based on the urgent need for it because of compelling circumstances incident to the state of actual clash
of arms: "It is not to be lost sight of that the basis for the declaration of martial law in the Philippines is
not mere necessity but an explicit constitutional provision. On the other hand, Milligan, which furnished
the foundation for Sterling and Duncan had its roots in the English common law. There is pertinence
therefore in ascertaining its significance under that system. According to the noted English author,
Dicey: 'Martial law,' in the proper sense of that term, , in which - it means the suspension of ordinary law
and the temporary government of a country or parts of it be military tribunals, is unknown to the law of
England. We have nothing equivalent to what is called in France the "Declaration of the State of Siege,"
under which the authority ordinarily vested in the civil power for the maintenance of order and police
passes entirely to the army (autorite militaire). This is an unmistakable proof of the permanent
supremacy of the law under our constitution. There was this qualification: 'Martial law is sometimes
employed as a name for the common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by force in
the case of invasion, insurrection, riot, or generally of any violent resistance to the law. This right, or
power, is essential to the very existence of orderly government, and is most assuredly recognized in the
most ample manner by the law of England. It is a power which has in itself no special connection with
the existence of an armed force. The Crown has the right to put down breaches of the peace. Every
subject, whether a civilian or a soldier, whether what is called a servant of the government,' such for
example as a policeman, or a person in no way connected with the administration, not only has the
right, but is, as a matter of legal duty, bound to assist in putting down breaches of the peace. No doubt
policemen or soldiers are the persons who, as being specially employed in the maintenance of order,
are most generally called upon to suppress a riot, but it is clear that all loyal subjects are bound to take
their part in the suppression of riots."16

Commitment to such an approach results in my inability to subscribe to the belief that martial law in
terms of what is provided both in the 1935 and the present Constitution, affords sufficient justification
for the concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis. The better view, considering
the juristic theory on which our fundamental law rests is that expressed by Justice Black in Duncan v.
Kahanamoku: "Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American institutions; they are
indispensable to our government. 17 If there has been no observance of such a cardinal concept at the
present, it is due to the fact that before the former Congress could meet in regular session anew, the
present Constitution was adopted, abolishing it and providing for an interim National Assembly, which
has not been convened.18 So I did view the matter.

2. Nor did I ignore Rossiter in my Aquino v. Ponce Enrile opinion. Reference was made to the first
chapter on his work on Constitutional Dictatorship where he spoke of martial rule as "a device designed
for use in the crisis of invasion or rebellion. It may be most precisely defined as an extension of military
government to the civilian population, the substitution of the will of a military commander for the will of
the people's elected government."19 Since, for me at least, the Rossiter characterization of martial law
has in it more of the common law connotation, less than duly mindful of the jural effects of its inclusion
in the Constitution itself as a legitimate device for coping with emergency conditions in times of grave
danger, but always subject to attendant limitations in accordance with the fundamental postulate of a
charter's supremacy, I felt justified in concluding: "Happily for the Philippines, the declaration of martial
law lends itself to the interpretation that the Burdick, Willoughby, Willis, Schwartz formulations paying
due regard to the primacy of liberty possess relevance. lt cannot be said that the martial rule concept of
Rossiter, latitudinarian in scope, has been adopted, even on the assumption that it can be reconciled
with our Constitution. What is undeniable is that President Marcos has repeatedly maintained that
Proclamation No. 1081 was precisely based on the Constitution and that the validity of acts taken there
under could be passed upon by the Supreme court. For me that is quite reassuring, persuaded as I am
likewise that the week- of Rossiter is opposed to the fundamental concept of our polity, which puts a
premium on freedom."20

3. Candor and accuracy compel the admission that such a conclusion his to be qualified. For in the
opinion of the Court in the aforecited Aquino v. Commission on Elections, penned by Justice Makasiar,
the proposition was expressly affirmed "that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or administrator of
martial law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can reclamations, orders and decrees during the
period Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the
political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of
rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide
recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly developed
countries." 21 To that extent, Rossiter's view mainly relied upon, now possesses Juristic significant in this
jurisdiction. What, for me at least, gives caused for concern is that with the opinion of the Court this
intrusion of what I would consider an alien element in the limited concept of martial law as set forth in
the Constitution would be allowed further incursion into the corpus of the law, with the invocation of
the view expressed in the last chapter of his work approving tile "concentration of governmental power
in a democracy [as] a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of
powers." 22 It is to the credit of the late Professor Rossiter as an objective scholar that in the very same
last chapter, just three pages later, he touched explicitly on the undesirable aspect of a constitutional
dictatorship. Thus: "Constitutional Dictatorship is a dangerous thing. A declaration of martial law or the
passage of an enabling act is a step which must always be feared and sometimes bitterly resisted, for it
is at once an admission of the incapacity of democratic institutions to defend the order within which
they function and a too conscious employment of powers and methods long ago outlawed as
destructive of constitutional government. Executive legislation, state control of popular liberties,
military courts, and arbitrary executive action were governmental features attacked by the men who
fought for freedom not because they were inefficient or unsuccessful, but because they were dangerous
and oppressive. The reinstitution of any of these features is a perilous matter, a step to be taken only
when the dangers to a free state will be greater if the dictatorial institution is not adopted."23

4. It is by virtue of such considerations that I find myself unable to share the view of those of my
brethren who would accord recognition to the Rossiter concept of concentration of governmental
power in the Executive during periods of crisis. This is not to lose sight of the undeniable fact that in this
country through the zeal, vigor, and energy lavished on projects conducive to the general welfare,
considerable progress has been achieved under martial rule. A fair summary may be found in a recent
address of the First Lady before the delegates to the 1976 international Monetary Fund-World Bank
Joint Annual Meeting: "The wonder is that so much has been done in so brief a time. Since September
1972, when President Marcos established the crisis government, peace and order have been restored in
a country once avoided as one of the most unsafe in the world. We have liberated millions of Filipino
farmers from the bondage of tenancy, in the most vigorous and extensive implementation of agrarian
reform."24 Further, she said: "A dynamic economy has replaced a stagnant order, and its rewards are
distributed among the many, not hoarded by a few. Our foreign policy, once confined by fear and
suspicion to a narrow alley of self-imposed isolation, now travels the broad expressways of friendship
and constructive interaction with the whole world, these in a new spirit of confidence and self-reliance.
And finally, forced to work out our own salvation, the Filipino has re-discovered the well-springs of his
strength and resilience As Filipinos, we have found our true Identity. And having broken our crisis of
Identity, we are no longer apologetic and afraid. "25 The very Idea of a crisis, however, signifies a
transitory, certainly not a permanent, state of things. President Marcos accordingly has not been
hesitant in giving utterance to his conviction that full implementation of the modified parliamentary
system under the present Constitution should not be further delayed. The full restoration of civilian rule
can thus be expected. That is more in accord with the imperatives of a constitutional order. It should not
go unnoticed either that the President has referred to the present regime as one of "constitutional
authoritarianism." That has a less objectionable ring, authority being more Identified with the Idea of
law, as based on right, the very antithesis of naked force, which to the popular mind is associated with
dictatorship, even if referred to as "constitutional."

For me likewise, that equally eminent scholar Corwin, also invoked in the opinion of the Court, while no
doubt a partisan of d strong Presidency, was not averse to constitutional restraints even during periods
of crisis. So I would interpret this excerpt from the fourth edition of his classic treatise on the
Presidency: "A regime of martial law may be compendiously, if not altogether accurately, defined as one
in which the ordinary law, as administered by the ordinary courts, is superseded for the time being by
the will of a military commander. It follows that, when martial law is instituted under national authority,
it rests ultimately on the will of the President of the United States in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief. It should be added at once, nevertheless, that the subject is one in which the record of actual
practice fails often to support the niceties of theory. Thus, the employment of the military arm in the
enforcement of the civil law does not invariably, or even usually, involve martial law in the strict sense,
for, as was noted in the preceding section, soldiers are often placed simply at the disposal and direction
of the civil authorities as a kind of supplementary police, or posse comitatus on the other hand be
reason of the discretion that the civil authorities themselves are apt to vest in the military in any
emergency requiring its assistance, the line between such an employment of the military and a regime
of martial law is frequently any but a hard and fast one. And partly because of these ambiguities the
conception itself of martial law today bifurcates into two conceptions, one of which shades off into
military government and the other into the situation just described, in which the civil authority remains
theoretically in control although dependent on military aid. Finally, there is the situation that obtained
throughout the North during the Civil War, when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended as to certain classes of suspects, although other characteristics of martial law were generally
absent."26

It is by virtue of the above considerations that, with due respect to the opinion of my brethren, I cannot
yield assent to the Rossiter view of concentration of governmental powers in the Executive during
martial law.

5 There is necessity then, for me at least, that the specific question raised in all three petitions be
squarely faced. It is to the credit of the opinion of the Court that it did so. The basic issue posed
concerns the boundaries of the power of the President during this period of martial law, more precisely
whether it covers proposing amendments to the Constitution. There is the further qualification if the
stand of respondents be taken into account that the interim National Assembly has not been convened
and is not likely to be called into session in deference to the wishes of the people as expressed in three
previous referenda. It is the ruling of the majority that the answer be in the affirmative, such authority
being well within the area of presidential competence. Again I find myself unable to join readily in that
conviction. It does seem to me that the metes and bounds of the executive domain, while still
recognizable, do appear blurred. This is not to assert that there is absolutely no basis for such a
conclusion, sustained as it is by a liberal construction of the principle that underlies Aquino v.
Commission on Elections as to the validity of the exercise of the legislative prerogative by the President
as long as the interim National Assembly is not For me, the stage of certitude has not been reached. I
cannot simply ignore the vigorous plea of petitioners that there is a constitutional deficiency consisting
in the absence of any constituent power on the part of the President, the express provision of the
Constitution conferring it on the by team National Assembly. 27 The learned advocacy reflected in the
pleadings as well as the oral discourse of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza 21 failed to erase the
grave doubts in my mind that the Aquino doctrine as to the possession of legislative competence by the
President during this period of transition with the interim lawmaking body not called into session be
thus expanded. The majority of my brethren took that step. I am not prepared to go that far. I will
explain why.

The way for me, is beset with obstacles. In the first place, such an approach would lose sight of the
distinction between matters legislative and constituent. That is implicit in the treatise on the 1935
Constitution by Justices Malcolm and Laurel In their casebook published the same year, one of the four
decisions on the subject of constitutional amendments is Ellingham v. Dye 31 which categorically
distinguished between constituent and legislative powers. Dean Sinco, a well-known authority on the
subject, was quite explicit. Thus: "If there had been no express provision in the Constitution granting
Congress the power to propose amendments, it would be outside its authority to assume that power.
Congress may not claim it under the general grant of legislative power for such grant does not carry
with it the right 'to erect the state, institute the form of its government,' which is considered a function
inherent in the people. Congressional law- making authority is limited to the power of approving the
laws 'of civil conduct relating to the details and particulars of the government instituted,' the
government established by the people."12 If that distinction be preserved, then for me the aforecited
Aquino decision does not reach the heart of the matter. Nor is this all. In the main opinion of Justice
Makasiar as well as that of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Castro, support for the ruling that the
President cannot be deemed as devoid of legislative power during this transition stage is supplied by
implications from explicit constitutional provisions. 13 That is not the case with the power to propose
amendments. It is solely the interim National Assembly that is mentioned. That is the barrier that for me
is well-nigh insurmountable. If I limit myself to entertaining doubts rather than registering a dissent on
this point, it is solely because of the consideration, possessed of weight and significance, that there may
be indeed in this far-from-quiescent and static period a need for al. amendments. I do not feel confident
therefore that a negative vote on my part would be warranted. What would justify the step taken by the
President, even if no complete acceptance be accorded to the view that he was a mere conduit of the
barangays on this matter, is that as noted in both qualified concurrences by Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma in Aquino, as far as the legislative and appropriately powers are concerned, is the
necessity that unless such authority be recognized, there may be paralyzation of governmental
activities, While not squarely applicable, such an approach has, to my mind, a persuasive quality as far
as the power to propose amendments is concerned.

Thus I would confine myself to the expression of serious doubts on the question rather than a dissent.

6. The constitutional issue posed as thus viewed leaves me free to concur in the result that the petitions
be dismissed. That is to accord respect to the principle that judicial review goes no further than to
checking clear infractions of the fundamental law, except in the field of human rights where a much
greater vigilance is required, That is to make of the Constitution a pathway to rather than a barrier
against a desirable objective. -As shown by my concurring and dissenting opinion in Tolentino
Commission on Elections '34 a pre-martial law decision, the fundamental postulate that sovereignty
resides in the people exerts a compelling force requiring the judiciary to refrain as much as possible
from denying the people the opportunity to make known their wishes on matters of the utmost import
for the life of the nation, Constitutional amendments fall in that category. I am fortified in that
conviction by the teaching of persuasive American decisions There is reinforcement to such a conclusion
from retired Chief Justice Concepcion's concurring and dissenting opinion in Aytona v. Castillo,17 Which
I consider applicable to the present situation. These are his words: "It is well settled that the granting of
writs of prohibition and mandamus is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts, to be
exercised on equitable principles, and that said writs should be issued when the right to the relief is
clear * * by As he noted in his ponencia in the later case of Gonzales v. Hechanova,19 an action for
prohibition, while petitioner was sustained in his stand, no injunction was issued. This was evident in the
dispositive portion where judgment was rendered "declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had
and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting
said authority; that said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that,
for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied." 40 With
the illumination thus supplied, it does not necessarily follow that even a dissent on my part would
necessarily compel that I vote for the relief prayed for. Certainly this is not to belittle in any way the
action taken by petitioners in filing these suits. That, for me, is commendable. It attests to their belief in
the rule of law. Even if their contention as to lack of presidential power be accepted in their entirety,
however, there is still discretion that may be exercised on the matter, prohibition being an equitable
remedy. There are, for me, potent considerations that argue against acceding to the plea. With the
prospect of the interim National Assembly being convened being dim, if not non- existent, if only
because of the results in three previous referenda, there would be no constitutional agency other than
the Executive who could propose amendments, which, as noted. may urgently press for adoption. Of
even greater weight, to my mind, is the pronouncement by the President that the plebiscite is intended
not only to solve a constitutional anomaly with the country devoid of a legislative body but also to
provide. the machinery be which the termination of martial law could be hastened. That is a
consummation devoutly to be wished. That does militate strongly against the stand of petitioners. The
obstruction they would pose may be fraught with pernicious consequences. It may not be amiss to refer
anew to what I deem the cardinal character of the jural postulate explicitly affirmed in both the 1935
and the present Constitutions that sovereignty resides in the people. So I made clear in Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections and thereafter in my dissent in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary" and my
concurrence in Aquino v. Commission on Elections. 42 The destiny of the country lies in their keeping.
The role of leadership is not to be minimized. It is crucial it is of the essence. Nonetheless, it is their will,
if given expression in a manner sanctioned by law and with due care that there be no mistake in its
appraisal, that should be controlling. There is all the more reason then to encourage their participation
in the power process. That is to make the regime truly democratic. Constitutional orthodoxy requires,
however, that the fundamental law be followed. So I would interpret Laski, 43 Corwin, 44 Lerner,45, Bryn-
Jones, 46 and McIver.47

7. There is reassurance in the thought that this Court has affirmed its commitment to the principle that
the amending process gives rise to a justiciable rather than a political question. So, it has been since the
leading case of Gonzales v. Commission on Election S. 48 It has since then been followed in Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections 49 Planas v. Commission on Elections," and lastly, in Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary This Court did not heed the vigorous plea of the Solicitor General to resurrect the political
question doctrine announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito. 52 This is not to deny that the federal rule in the
United States as set forth in the leading case of Coleman v. Miller , 53 a 1939 decision, and relatively
recent State court decisions, supply ammunition to such a contention., 51 That may be the case in the
United States, but certainly not in this jurisdiction. Philippine constitutional tradition is to the contrary. It
can trace its origin to these words in the valedictory address before the 1934-35 Constitutional
Convention by the illustrious Claro M. Recto: "It is one of the paradoxes a democracy that the people of
times place more confidence in instrumentalities of the State other than those directly chosen by them
for the exercise of their sovereignty It can be said with truth, therefore, that there has invariably been a
judicial predisposition to activism rather than self-restraint. The thinking all these years has been that it
goes to the heart of constitutionalism. It may be said that this Court has shunned the role of a mere
interpreter; it did exercise at times creative power. It has to that extent participated in the molding of
policy, It has always recognized that in the large and undefined field of constitutional law, adjudication
partakes of the quality of statecraft. The assumption has been that just because it cannot by itself
guarantee the formation, much less the perpetuation of democratic values or, realistically, it cannot
prevail against the pressure of political forces if they are bent in other directions. it does not follow that
it should not contribute its thinking to the extent that it can. It has been asked, it will continue to be
asked, to decide momentous questions at each critical stage of this nation's life.

There must be, however, this caveat. Judicial activism gives rise to difficulties in an era of transformation
and change. A society in flux calls for dynamism in "he law, which must be responsive to the social forces
at work. It cannot remain static. It must be sensitive to life. This Court then must avoid the rigidity of
legal Ideas. It must resist the temptation of allowing in the wasteland of meaningless abstractions. It
must face stubborn reality. It has to have a feel for the complexities of the times. This is not to discount
the risk that it may be swept too far and too fast in the surge of novel concepts. The past too is entitled
to a hearing; it cannot just be summarily ignored. History still has its uses. It is not for this Court to
renounce the virtue of systematic jural consistency. It cannot simply yield to the sovereign sway of the
accomplished fact. It must be deaf to the dissonant dialectic of what appears to be a splintered society.
It should strive to be a factor for unity under a rule of law. There must be, on its part, awareness of the
truth that a new juridical age born before its appointed time may be the cause of unprecedented travail
that may not end at birth. It is by virtue of such considerations that I did strive for a confluence of
principle and practicality. I must confess that I did approach the matter with some misgivings and
certainly without any illusion of omniscience. I am comforted by the thought that immortality does not
inhere in judicial opinions. 8. 1 am thus led by my studies on the subject of constitutional law and, much
more so, by previous judicial opinions to concur in the dismissal of the petitions. If I gave expression to
byes not currently fashionable, it is solely due to deeply-ingrained beliefs. Certainly, I am the first to
recognize the worth of' the social and economic reforms so needed by the troubled present that have
been introduced and implemented. There is no thought then of minimizing, much less of refusing to
concede, the considerable progress that has been made and the benefits that have been achieved under
this Administration. Again, to reiterate one of my cherished convictions, I certainly approve of the
adherence to the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty which, to be meaningful however,
requires both freedom in its manifestation and accuracy in ascertaining what it wills. Then, too, it is
fitting and proper that a distinction was made between two aspects of the coming poll, the referendum
and the plebiscite. It is only the latter that is impressed with authoritative force. So the Constitution
requires. Lastly, there should be, as I did mention in my concurrence in Aquino v. Commission on
Elections,56 full respect for free speech and press, free assembly and free association. There should be
no thought of branding the opposition as the enemy and the expression of its views as anathema,
Dissent, it is fortunate to note, has been encouraged. It has not been Identified with disloyalty. That
ought to be the case, and not solely due to presidential decrees. Constructive criticism is to be
welcomed not so much because of the right to be heard but because there may be something worth
hearing. That is to ensure a true ferment of Ideas, an interplay of knowledgeable minds. There are
though well- defined limits, One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach
rebellion under the cloak of dissent.. What I mean to stress is that except on a showing of clear and
present danger, there must be respect for the traditional liberties that make a society truly free.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

1. On the merits: I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit and vote to
grant the petitions for the following reasons and considerations: 1. It is undisputed that neither the 1935
Constitution nor the 1973 Constitution grants to the incumbent President the constituent power to
propose and approve amendments to the Constitution to be submitted to the people for ratification in a
plebiscite. The 1935 Constitution expressly vests the constituent power in Congress, be a three-fourths
vote of all its members, to propose amendments or call a constitutional convention for the purpose The
1973 Constitution expressly vests the constituent power in the regular National Assembly to propose
amendments (by a three-fourths vote of all its members) or "call a constitutional convention" (by a two-
thirds vote of all its members) or "submit the question of calling such convention to the electorate in an
election" (by a majority vote of all its members ) .2

The transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution expressing vest the constituent power during the
period of transition in the interim National Assembly "upon special call be the Prime Minister (the
incumbent President 3)... by a majority ore of all its members (to) propose amendments."
Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government,
defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and
the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime
Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrease proposing and submitting constitutional
amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom
the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis.

2. The doctrine in the leading case of Tolentino vs. Comelec is controlling in the case at bar In therein
declaring null and void the acts of the 1971 Constitutional Convention and of the Comelec in calling a
plebiscite with the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971 for the purpose of submitting for
the people's ratification an advance amendment reducing the voting age from 21 years to 18 years, and
issuing writs of prohibition and injunction against the holding of the plebiscite, this Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Barredo ruled that --The Constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the
procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other
departments of the government, (land) are no less binding upon the people

As long as an amendment is formulated and submitted under the aegis of the present
Charter, any proposal for such amendment which is not in conformity with the letter,
spirit and intent of the Charter for effecting amendments, cannot receive the sanction
of this Court ;8

The real issue here cannot be whether or not the amending process delineated by the present
Constitution may be disregarded in favor of allowing the sovereign people to express their decision on
the proposed amendments, if only because it is evident that the very Idea of departing from the
fundamental law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the
rule of law,"; 9 and

-Accordingly barred the plebiscite as improper and premature, since "the provisional nature of the
proposed amendments and the manner of its submission to the people for ratification or rejection" did
not "conform with the mandate of the people themselves in such regard, as expressed in the
Constitution itself', 10 i.e. the mandatory requirements of the amending process as set forth in the
Article on Amendments.

3. Applying the above rulings of Tolentino to the case at bar, mutatis, mutandis, it is clear that where the
proposed amendments are violative of the Constitutional mandate on the amending process not merely
for being a "partial amendment" of a "temporary or provisional character" (as in Tolentino) but more so
for not being proposed and approved by the department vested by the Constitution with the
constituent power to do so, and hence transgressing the substantive provision that it is only the interim
National Assembly, upon special call of the interim Prime Minister, bu a majority vote of all its members
that may propose the amendments, the Court must declare the amendments proposals null and void.

4. This is so because the Constitution is a "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means"
11 but only by the particular mode and manner prescribed therein by the people. As stressed by Cooley,
"by the Constitution which they establish, (the people) not only tie up the hands of their official agencies
but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate
body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law." 12
The vesting of the constituent power to propose amendments in the legislative body (the regular
National Assembly) or the interim National Assembly during the transition period) or in a constitutional
convention called for the purpose is in accordance with universal practice. "From the very necessity of
the case" Cooley points out "amendments to an existing constitution, or entire revisions of it, must be
prepared and matured by some body of representatives chosen for the purpose. It is obviously
impossible for the whole people to meet, prepare, and discuss the proposed alterations, and there
seems to be no feasible mode by which an expression of their will can be obtained, except by asking it
upon the single point of assent or disapproval." This body of representatives vested with the constituent
- power "submits the result of their deliberations" and "puts in proper form the questions of
amendment upon which the people are to pass"-for ratification or rejection. 13

5. The Court in Tolentino thus rejected the argument "that the end sought to be achieved is to be
desired" and in denying reconsideration in paraphrase of the late Claro M. Recto declared that "let
those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any mandate of the fundamental
purportedly in order to attain some laudable objective bear in mind that someday somehow others with
purportedly more laudable objectives may take advantage of the precedent and continue the
destruction of the Constitution, making those who laid down the precedent of justifying deviations from
the requirements of the Constitution the victims of their own folly."

This same apprehension was echoed by now retired Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar in his dissenting opinion
in the Ratification cases 14 that "we will be opening the gates for a similar disregard to the Constitution
in the future. What I mean is that if this Court now declares that a new Constitution is now in force
because the members of the citizens assemblies had approved said new Constitution, although that
approval was not in accordance with the procedure and the requirements prescribed in the 1935
Constitution, it can happen again in some future time that some amendments to the Constitution may
be adopted, even in a manner contrary to the existing Constitution and the law, and then said proposed
amendments is submitted to the people in any manner and what will matter is that a basis is claimed
that there was approval by the people. There will not be stability in our constitutional system, and
necessarily no stability in our government."

6. It is not legally tenable for the majority, without overruling the controlling precedent of Tolentino
(and without mustering the required majority vote to so overrule) to accept the proposed; amendments
as valid notwithstanding their being "not in conformity with the letter, spirit and intent of the provision
of the Charter for effecting amendments" on the reasoning that "If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the interim National Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot
validly discharge the functions."15

In the earlier leading case of Gonzales vs. Comelec 16, this Court speaking through now retired Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, pointer out that "Indeed, the power to Congress" 17 or to the National
Assembly.18 Where it not for the express grant in the Transitory Provisions of the constituent power to
the interim National Assembly, the interim National Assembly could not claim the power under the
general grant of legislative power during the transition period.

The majority's ruling in the Referendum cases 19 that the Transitory Provision in section 3(2) recognized
the existence of the authority to legislate in favor of the incumbent President during the period of
martial law manifestly cannot be stretched to encompass the constituent power as expressly vested in
the interim National Assembly in derogation of the allotment of powers defined in the Constitution.
Paraphrasing Cooley on the non-delegation of legislative power as one of the settled maxims of
constitutional law, 20 the contituent power has been lodged by the sovereign power of the people with
the interim National Assembly during the transition period and there it must remain as the sole
constitutional agency until the Constitution itself is changed.

As was aptly stated by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmak case of Angara vs. Electoral
Commissioner21, "(T)he Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language and restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution".

7. Neither is the justification of "constitutional impasses" tenable. The sentiment of the people against
the convening of the interim National Assembly and to have no elections for "at least seven (7) years"
Concededly could not ament the Constitution insofar as the interim National Assembly is concerned
(since it admittendly came into existence "immediately" upon the proclamation of ratification of the
1973 Constitution), much less remove the constituent power from said interim National Assembly.

As stressed in the writer's separate opinion in the Referendum cases 22, "(W)hile it has been advanced
that the decision to defer the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly was supported by the
results of the referendum in January, 1973 when the people voted against the convening of the interim
National Assembly for at least seven years, such sentiment cannot be given any legal force and effect in
the light of the State's admission at the hearing that such referendums are merely consultative and
cannot amend the Constitution or Provisions which call for the 'immediate existence' and 'initial
convening of the interim National Assembly to 'give priority to measures for the orderly transition from
the presidential to the parliamentary system' and the other urgent measures enumerated in section 5
thereof".

While the people reportedly expressed their mandate against the convening of the interim National
Assembly to dischange its legislative tasks during the period of transition under martial law, they
certainly had no opportunity and did not express themselves against convening the interim National
Assembly to discharge the constituent power to propose amendments likewise vested in it by the
people's mandate in the Constitution.

In point of fact, when the holding of the October 16, 1976 referendum was first announced, the
newspapers reported that among the seven questions proposed by the sanggunian and barangay
national executive committies for the referendum was the convening of the interim National
Assembly.23

It was further reported that the proposals which were termed tentative "will be discussed and studied
by (the President), the members of the cabinet, and the security council" and that the barangays felt,
notwithstanding the previous referenda on the convening of the interim National Assembly that "it is
time to again ask the people's opinion of this matter " 24

8. If proposals for constitutional amendments are now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted
for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process
as provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the teaching of Tolentino that
the proposed amendments must validly come from the constitutional agency vested with the
constituent power to do so, namely, the interim National Assembly, and not from the executive power
as vested in the Prime Minister (the incumbent President) with the assistance of the Cabinet 25 from
whom such power has been withheld.

It will not do to contend that these proposals represent the voice of the people for as was aptly
stated by Cooley "Me voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only
when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and
pointed out by the Constitution. "26

The same argument was put forward and rejected by this Court in Tolentino which rejected the
contention that the "Convention being a legislative body of the highest order (and directly elected by
the people to speak their voice) is sovereign, in as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the
control of Congress and the Courts" and ruled that the constitutional article on the amending process" is
nothing more than a part of the Constitution thus ordained by the people. Hence, in continuing said
section, We must read it as if the people said, "The Constitution may be amended, but it is our will that
the amendment must be proposed and submitted to Us for ratification only in the manner herein
provided'".27

This Court therein stressed that "This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the
Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same
ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power,
second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have
chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the
people within the country and those subject to its sovereignity, ever constitution worthy of the people
for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is
obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the
whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and
deliberation;" and that "written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if
not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people,
hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing
political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and
conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their
amendment."28

9. The convening of the interim National Assembly to exercise the constituent power to proposed
amendments is the only way to fulfill the express mandate of the Constitution.

As Mr. Justice Fernando emphasized for this Court in Mutuc vs. Comelec 29 in the setting as in of a
Comelec resolution banning the use of political taped jingles by candidates for Constitutional
Convention delegates int he special 1970 elections, "the concept of the Constitution as the fundamental
law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest
official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to amnifst fealty to
the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal heirarchy.
The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have
no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guart lest the restrictions on its authority,
whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot
ignore of disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases,
the judiciary is called upon the maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law."

This is but to give meaning to the plan and clear mandate of section 15 of the Transitory Provisions
(which allows of no other interpretation) that during the stage of transition the interim National
Assembly alone exercises the constituent power to propose amendments, upon special call therefor.
This is reinforced by the fact that the cited section does not grant to the regular National Assembly of
calling a constitutional convention, thus expressing the will of the Convention (and presumably of the
people upon ratification) that if ever the need to propose amendments arose during the limited period
of transition, the interim National Assembly alone would discharge the task and no constitutional
convention could be call for the purpose.

As to the alleged costs involved in convening the interim National Assembly to propose amendments,
among them its own abolition, (P24 million annually in salaries alone for its 400 members at
P600,000.00 per annum per member, assuming that its deliberations could last for one year), suffice it
to recall this Court's pronouncement in Tolentino (in reflecting a similar argument on the costs of
holding a plebiscite separately from the general elections for elective officials) that "it is a matter of
public knowledge that bigger amounts have been spent or thrown to waste for many lesser objectives.
... Surely, the amount of seventeen million pesos or even more is not too much a price to pay for fealty
and loyalty to the Constitution ... " 30 and that "while the financial costs of a separate plebiscite may be
high, it can never be as much as the dangers involved in disregarding clear mandate of the Constitution,
no matter how laudable the objective" and "no consideration of financial costs shall deter Us from
adherence to the requirements of the Constitution".11

10. The imposition of martial law (and "the problems of rebellion, subversion, secession, recession,
inflation and economic crisis a crisis greater than war") 32 cited by the majority opinion as justifying the
concentration of powers in the President, and the recognition now of his exercising the constituent
power to propose amendments to the Fundamental Law "as agent for and in behalf of the people"33 has
no constitutional basis.

In the post-war Emergency Powers 33*, former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras reaffirmed for the Court the
principle that emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful
'Adherence to the Constitution".

The martial law clause of the 1973 Constitution found in Article IX, section 12 , as stressed by the writer
in his separate opinion in the Referendum Cases,14 "is a verbatim reproduction of Article VII, section 10
(2) of the 1935 Constitution and provides for the imposition of martial law only 'in case of invasion,
resurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it and hence the
use of the legislative power or more accurately 'military power' under martial rule is limited to such
necessary measures as will safeguard the Republic and suppress the rebellion (or invasion)". 35

11. Article XVII, section 3 (2) of the 1973 Constitution which has been held by the majority in the
Referendum Cases to be the recognition or warrant for the exercise of legislative power by the President
during the period of martial law is but a transitory provision. Together with the martial law clause, they
constitute but two provisions which are not to be considered in isolation from the Constitution but as
mere integral parts thereof which must be harmonized consistently with the entire Constitution.

As Cooley restated the rule: "effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to every
section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable,
and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which
may make some words Idle and nugatory.

This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the people will
be presumed to have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms,
corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little
as possible to implication. It is scarcelly conceivable that a case can arise where a court
would bye justified in declaring any portion of a written constitution nugatory because
of ambiguity. One part may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it
otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood by itself; but one part
is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two can be
made to stand together. 36

The transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well
as set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals has been
withheld from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of the Executive Power, presumably in
view of the immense powers already vested in him by the Constitution but just as importantly, because
by the very nature of the constituent power, such amendments proposals have to be prepared,
deliberated and matured by a deliberative assembly of representatives such as the interim National
Assembly and hence may not be antithetically entrusted to one man.

Former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion had observed before the elevation of the l971 Constitutional
Convention that the records of past plebiscites show that the constitutional agency vested with the
exercise of the constituent power (Congress or the Constitutional Convention) really determined the
amendments to the Constitution since the proposals were invariably ratified by the people 37 thus:
"although the people have the reserved power to ratify or reject the action taken by the Convention,
such power is not, in view of the circumstances attending its exercise, as effective as one might
otherwise think: that, despite the requisite ratification by the people, the actual contents of our
fundamental law will really be determined by the Convention; that, accordingly the people should
exercise the greatest possible degree of circumspection in the election of delegates thereto ... " 38

12. Martial law concededly does not abrogate the Constitution nor obliterate its constitutional
boundaries and allocation of powers among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Departments. 39

It has thus been aptly observed that "Martial law is an emergency regime, authorized by and subject to
the Constitution. Its basic premise is to preserve and to maintain the Republic against the dangers that
threaten it. Such premise imposes constraints and limitations. For the martial law regime fulfills the
constitutional purpose only if, by reason of martial law measures, the Republic is preserved. If by reason
of such measures the Republic is so transformed that it is changed in its nature and becomes a State
other than republican, then martial law is a failure; worse, martial law would have become the enemy of
the Republic rather than its defender and preserver." 40
II. On the question of the Court's jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of the questioned
presidential decrees: let it be underscored that the Court has long set at rest the question.

The trail was blazed for the Court since the benchmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission when
Justice Jose P. Laurel echoed U.S. Chief Justice Marshall's "climactic phrase" that "we must never forget
that it is a Constitution we are expounding" and declared the Court's "solemn and sacred" constitutional
obligation of judicial review and laid down the doctrine that the Philippine Constitution as "a definition
of the powers of government" placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature,
scope and extent of such powers" and stressed that "when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments . . . but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obliteration entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them".

At the same time, the Court likewise adhered to the constitutional tenet that political questions, i.e.
questions which are intended by the Constitutional and relevant laws to be conclusively determined by
the "political", i.e. branches of government (namely, the Executive and the Legislative) are outside the
Court's jurisdiction. 41

Thus, in Gonzales,42 (by a unanimous Court) and in Tolentino43 (by the required constitutional majority),
the Court has since consistently ruled that when proposing and approving amendments to the
Constitution, the members of Congress. acting as a constituent assembly or the members of the
Constitutional Convention elected directly for the purpose by not have the final say on whether or not
their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same
at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that outs is it government of lawsom not of men, and to the rigid
nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers
upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political
character of treaty-making power".44

As amplified by former Chief Justice Concepcion in Javellana vs Executive Secretary 45 (by a majority
vote), "when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations. the issue on whether
or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations by expected, is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act,
not its wisdom Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions and limitations-particularly those prescribed or
imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught".

The fact that the proposed amendments are to be submitted to the people for ratification by no means
makes the question political and non- justiciable since as stressed even in Javellana the issue of validity
of the President's proclamation of ratification of the Constitution presented a justiciable and non-
political question

Stated otherwise, the question of whether the Legislative acting as a constituent assembly or the
Constitutional Convention called fol- the purpose, in proposing amendments to the people for
ratification followed the constitutional procedure and on the amending process is perforce a justiciable
question and does not raise a political question of police or wisdom of the proposed amendments,
which if Submitted, are reserved for the people's decision.
The substantive question presented in the case at bar of whether the President may legally exercise the
constituent power vested in the interim National Assembly (which has not been granted to his office)
and propose constitutional amendments is preeminently a justiciable issue.

Justice Laurel in Angara had duly enjoined that "in times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof".

To follow the easy way out by disclaiming jurisdiction over the issue as a political question would be
judicial abdication.

III. On the question of whether there is a sufficient and proper submittal of the proposed amendments
to the people: Prescinding from the writer's view of the nullity of the questioned decree of lack of
authority on the President's part to excercise the constituent power, I hold that the doctrine of fair
and proper submission first enunciated by a simple majority of by Justices in Gonzales and
subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority of the Court in is
controlling in the case at bar.

1. There cannot be said to be fair and proper submission of the proposed amendments. As ruled by this
Court in Tolentino where "the proposed amendment in question is expressly saddled with reservations
which naturally impair, in great measures, its very essence as a proposed constitutional amendment"
and where "the way the proposal is worded, read together with the reservations tacked to it by the
Convention thru Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is too much of a speculation to assume what
exactly the amendment would really amount lo in the end. All in all, as already pointed out in our
discussion of movants' first ground, if this kind of amendment is allowed, the Philippines will appear
before the world to be in the absurd position of being the only country with a constitution containing a
provision so ephemeral no one knows until when it will bet actually in force", there can be no proper
submission.

In Tolentino a solitary amendment reducing the voting age to 18 years was struck down by this Court
which ruled that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may
be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent
appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole," and that there was no proper Submission
wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on

2. The now Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Makasiar with two other members 46 graphically pointed out in
their joint separate opinion that the solitary question "would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous.
But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after
all".47

They further expressed "essential agreement" with Mr. Justice Conrado V. Sanchez' separate opinion in
Gonzales "on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper
submission to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" which reads thus:
 ... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification', if
construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution a fundamental charter that is
legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will - is that it can
only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure
ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the
people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps.
They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of
extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word submitted' can only
mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort
to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments
and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as
saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there
is no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the
Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in
submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency
within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to
their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is
submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent.
consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the
amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree
their own fate.48

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that " ... " The great men who builded
the structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge
Cooley, who has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and.
popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober
second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. xxx xxx xxx
Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: All great
mutations shake and disorder state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil ;another evil may succeed
and a worse'." 49

Justice Sanchez thus stated the rule that has been adopted by the Court in Tolentino that there is no
proper submission "if the people are not sufficiently affirmed of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner......." 50

3. From the complex and complicated proposed amendments set forth in the challenged decree and the
plethora of confused and confusing clarifications reported in the daily newspapers, it is manifest that
there is no proper submission of the proposed amendments. Nine (9) proposed constitutional
amendments were officially proposed and made known as per Presidential Decree No. 1033 dated,
September 22, 1976 for submittal at the "referendum-plebiscite" called for this coming Saturday,
October 16, 1976 wherein the 15-year and under 18-year- olds are enjoined to vote notwithstanding
their lack of qualification under Article VI of the Constitution. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino, an
acknowledged parliamentarian of the highest order, was reported by the newspapers last October 3 to
have observed that "there is no urgency in approving the proposed amendments to the Constitution
and suggested that the question regarding charter changes be modified instead of asking the people to
vote
on hurriedly prepared amendments". He further pointed out that "apart from lacking the parliamentary
style in the body of the Constitution, they do not indicate what particular provisions are being repealed
or amended".52

As of this writing, October 11, 1976, the paper today reported his seven-page analysis questioning
among others the proposed granting of dual legislative powers to both the President and the Batasang
Pambansa and remarking that "This dual legislative authority can give rise to confusion and serious
constitutional questions".53

Aside from the inadequacy of the limited time given for the people's consideration of the proposed
amendments, there can be no proper submission because the proposed amendments are not in proper
form and violate the cardinal rule of amendments of written constitutions that the specific provisions of
the Constitution being repealed or amended as well as how the specific provisions as amended would
read, should be clearly stated in careful and measured terms. There can be no proper submission
because the vagueness and ambiguity of the proposals do not sufficiently inform the people of the
amendments for, conscientious deliberation and intelligent consent or rejection.

4. While the press and the Solicitor General at the hearing have stated that the principal thrust of the
proposals is to substitute the interim National Assembly with an interim Batasang Pambansa, a serious
study thereof in detail would lead to the conclusion that the whole context of the 1973 Constitution
proper would be affected and grave amendments and modifications thereof -would apparently be
made, among others, as follows:

Under Amendment No. 1, the qualification age of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa is
reduced to 18 years;

Under Amendment No. 2, the treaty-concurring power of the Legislature is withheld from the interim
Batasang Pambansa;

Under Amendment No 3, not withstanding the convening of the interim Batasang Pambansa within 30
days from the election and selection of the members (for which there is no fixed date) the incumbent
President apparently becomes a regular President and Prime Minister (not ad interim);

Under Amendment No. 4, the disqualifications imposed on members of the Cabinet in the Constitution
such as the prohibition against the holding of more than one office in the government including
government-owned or -controlled corporations would appear to be eliminated, if not prescribed by the
President;

Under Amendment No. 5, the President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law is
lifted;

Under Amendment No. 6, there is a duality of legislative authority given the President and the interim
Batasang Pambansa as well as the regular National Assembly, as pointed out by Senator Tolentino, with
the President continuing to exercise legislative powers in case of "grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof" (without definition of terms) or when said Assemblies "fail or are unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action", thus radically
affecting provisions of the Constitution governing the said departments;
Under Amendment No. 7, the barangays and Sanggunians would apparently be constitutionalized,
although their functions, power and composition may be altered by law. Referendums (which are not
authorized in the present 1973 Constitution) would also be constitutionalized, giving rise to the
possibility fraught with grave consequences, as acknowledged at the hearing, that amendments to the
Constitution may thereafter be effected by referendum, rather than by the rigid and strict amending
process provided presently in Article XVI of the Constitution;

Under Amendment No. 8, there is a general statement in general that the unspecified provisions of the
Constitution "not inconsistent with any of these amendments" shall continue in full force and effect; and
Under Amendment No. 9. the incumbent President is authorized to proclaim the ratification of the
amendments by the majority of votes cast. It has likewise been stressed by the officials concerned that
the proposed amendments come in a package and may not be voted upon separately but on an "all or
nothing" basis.

5. Whether the people can normally express their will in a genuine manner and with due circumspection
on the proposed amendments amidst the constraints of martial law is yet another question. That a
period of free debate and discussion has to be declared of itself shows the limitations on free debate
and discussion. The facilities for free debate and discussion over the mass media, print and otherwise
are wanting. The President himself is reported to have observed the timidity of the media under martial
law and to have directed the press to air the views of the opposition.54

Indeed, the voice of the studentry as reflected in the editorial of the Philippine Collegian issue of
September 23, 1976 comes as a welcome and refreshing model of conscientious deliberation, as our
youth analyzes the issues "which will affect generations yet to come" and urge the people to mull over
the pros and cons very carefully", as follows:

THE REFERENDUM ISSUES

On October 16, the people may be asked to decide on two important national issues -
the creation of a new legislative body and the lifting of martial law.

On the first issue, it is almost sure that the interim National Assembly will not be
convened, primarily because of its membership. Majority of the members of the defunct
Congress, who are mandated by the Constitution to become members of the interim
National Assembly, have gained so widespread a notoriety that the mere mention of
Congress conjures the image of a den of thieves who are out to fool the people most of
the time. Among the three branches of government, it was the most discredited. In fact,
upon the declaration of martial law, some people were heard to mutter that a 'regime
that has finally put an end to such congressional shenanigans could not be all that bad'.

A substitute legislative body is contemplated to help the President in promulgating laws,

and perhaps minimize the issuance of ill-drafted decrees which necessitate constant
amendments. But care should be taken that this new legislative body would not become
a mere rubber stamp akin to those of other totalitarian countries. It should be given real
powers, otherwise we will just have another nebulous creation having the form but
lacking the substance. Already the President has expressed the desire that among the
powers he would like to have with regard to the proposed legislative body is that of
 abolishing it in case 'there is a need to do so'. As to what would occasion such a need,
only the President himself can determine. This would afford the Chief Executive almost
total power over the legislature, for he could always offer the members thereof a carrot
and a stick.

On the matter of lifting martial law the people have expressed ambivalent attitudes.
Some of them, remembering the turmoil that prevailed before the declaration of martial
law, have expressed the fear that its lifting might precipitate the revival of the abuses of
the past, and provide an occasion for evil elements to resurface with their usual tricks.
Others say that it is about time martial law was lifted since the peace and order
situation has already stabilized and the economy seems to have been parked up.

The regime of martial law has been with us for four years now. No doubt, martial law
has initially secured some reforms for the country The people were quite willing to
participate in the new experiment, thrilled by the novelty of it all. After the euphoria,
however, the people seem to have gone back to the old ways, with the exception that
some of our freedoms were taken away, and an authoritarian regime established.

We must bear in mind that martial law was envisioned only to cope with an existing
national crisis, It was not meant to be availed of for a long period of time, otherwise it
would undermine our adherence to a democratic form of government. In the words of
the Constitution. martial law shall only be declared in times of 'rebellion, insurrection,.
invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it'. Since we no
longer suffer from internal disturbances of a gargantuan scale, it is about time we
seriously rethink the 'necessity' of prolonging the martial law regime. If we justify the
continuance of martial by economic or other reasons other than the foregoing
constitutional grounds, then our faith in the Constitution might be questioned. Even
without martial law,. the incumbent Chief Executive still holds vast powers under the
constitution. After all, the gains of the New Society can be secured without sacrificing
the freedom of our people. If the converse is true, then we might have to conclude that
the Filipinos deserve a dictatorial form of government. The referendum results will show
whether the people themselves have adopted this sad conclusion.

The response of the people to the foregoing issues will affect generations yet to come,
so they should mull over the pros and cons very carefully."

6. This opinion by written in the same spirit as the President's exhortations on the first anniversary of
proclamation of the 1973 Constitution that we "let the Constitution remain firm and stable" so that it
may "guide the people", and that we "remain steadfast on the rule of law and the Constitution" as he
recalled his rejection of the "exercise (of) power that can be Identified merely with a revolutionary
government" that makes its own law, thus:

. . . Whoever he may be and whatever position he may happen to have, whether in

government or outside government, it is absolutely necessary now that we look
solemnly and perceptively into the Constitution and try to discover for ourselves what
our role is in the successful implementation of that Constitution. With this thought,
therefore, we can agree on one thing and that is: Let all of us age, let all of us then pass
away as a pace in the development of our country. but let the Constitution remain firm
 and stable and let institutions grow in strength from day to day, from achievement to
achievement, and so long as that Constitution stands, whoever may the man in power
be, whatever may his purpose be, that Constitution will guide the people and no man,
however, powerful he may be, will dare to destroy and wreck the foundation of such a
Constitution.

These are the reasons why I personally, having proclaimed martial law, having been
often induced to exercise power that can be Identified merely with a revolutionary
government, have remained steadfast or the rule of law and the Constitution. 54*

IV. A final word on the Court's resolution of October 5, 1976 which in reply to the Comelec query
allowed by a vote of 7 to 3, judges of all courts, after office hours, "to accept invitations to act as
resource speakers under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 991, as amended, as well as to take
sides in discussions and debates on the referendum-plebiscite questions under Section 7 of the same
Decree."55

The writer with Mr. Justice Makasiar and Madame Justice Munoz Palma had dissented from the majority
resolution, with all due respect, on the ground that the non-participation of judges in such public
discussions and debates on the referendum-plebiscite questions would preserve the traditional non-
involvement of the judiciary in public discussions of controversial issues. This is essential for the
maintenance and enhancement of the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. The questions of
the validity of the scheduled referendum- plebiscite and of whether there is proper submission of the
proposed amendments were precisely subjudice by virtue of the cases at bar.

The lifting of the traditional inhibition of judges from public discussion and debate might blemish the
image and independence of the judiciary. Aside from the fact that the fixing of a time limit for the
acceptance of their courtesy resignations to avoid an indefinite state of insecurity of their tenure in
office still spends litigants and their relatives and friends as well as a good sector of the public would be
hesitant to air views contrary to that of the.

Judge. Justices Makasiar and Munoz Palma who share these views have agreed that we make them of
record here, since we understand that the permission given in the resolution is nevertheless addressed
to the personal decision and conscience of each judge, and these views may he of some guidance to
them.

BARREDO, J.,: concurring:

While I am in full agreement with the majority of my brethren that the herein petitions should be
dismissed, as in fact I vote for their dismissal, I deem it imperative that I should state separately the
considerations that have impelled me to do so.

Perhaps, it is best that I should start by trying to disabuse the minds of those who have doubts as to
whether or not I should have taken part in the consideration and resolution of these cases. Indeed, it
would not be befitting my position in this Highest Tribunal of the land for me to leave unmentioned the
circumstances which have given cause, I presume, for others to feel apprehensive that my participation
in these proceedings might detract from that degree of faith in the impartiality that the Court's
judgment herein should ordinarily command. In a way, it can be said, of course, that I am the one most
responsible for such a rather problematical situation, and it is precisely for this reason that I have
decided to begin this opinion with a discussion of why I have not inhibited myself, trusting most
confidently that what I have to say will be taken in the same spirit of good faith, sincerity and purity of
purpose in which I am resolved to offer the same.

Plain honesty dictates that I should make of record here the pertinent contents of the official report of
the Executive Committee of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian submitted to the Katipunan itself about
the proceedings held on August 14, 1976. It is stated in that public document that:

THE ISSUE WITH REGARDS To THE CONVENING OF A LEGISLATIVE body came out when
the President express his desire to share his powers with other people.

Aware of this, a five-man Committee members of the Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
headed by Supreme Court Justice Antonio Barredo proposed on July 28, the establishment of
'Sangguniang Pambansa' or 'Batasang Pambansa' which would help the President in the performance of
his legislative functions. The proposed new body will take the place of the interim National Assembly
which is considered not practical to convene at this time considering the constitution of its membership.

Upon learning the proposal of Justice Barredo, the country's 42,000 barangay assemblies on August 1
suggested that the people be consulted on a proposal to create a new legislative body to replace the
interim assembly provided for by the Constitution. The suggestion of the barangay units was made
through their national association, Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay headed by Mrs. Nora Z.
Patines. She said that the people have shown in at least six instances including in the two past referenda
that they are against the convening of the interim National Assembly. She also said that since the people
had ruled out the calling of such assembly and that they have once proposed that the President create
instead the Sangguniang Pambansa or a legislative advisory body, then the proposal to create a new
legislative must necessarily be referred to the people.

The federation of Kabataang Barangay, also numbering 42,000 units like their elder counterparts in the
Katipunan ng mga Barangay also asserted their own right to be heard on whatever plans are afoot to
convene a new legislative body.

On August 6, a meeting of the national directorate of PKB was held to discuss matters pertaining to the
stand of the PKB with regards to the convening of a new legislative body. The stand of the PKB is to
create a legislative advisory council in place of the old assembly. Two days after, August 8, the
Kabataang Barangay held a symposium and made a stand which is the creation of a body with full
legislative powers.

A nationwide clamor for the holding of meeting in their respective localities to discuss more
intellegently the proposal to create a new legislative body was made by various urban and rural
Sangguniang Bayans.

Numerous requests made by some members coming from 75 provincial and 61 city SB assemblies, were
forwarded to the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD).

On August 7, Local Government Secretary, Jose A. Rono granted the request by convening the 91
member National Executive Committee of the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian on August 14
which was held at Session Hall, Quezon City. Invited also to participate were 13 Regional Federation
Presidents each coming from the PKB and the PKKB

Actually, the extent of my active participation in the events and deliberations that have culminated in
the holding of the proposed referendum- plebiscite on October 16, 1976, which petitioners are here
seeking to enjoin, has been more substantial and meaningful than the above report imparts. Most
importantly, aside from being probably the first person to publicly articulate the need for the creation of
an interim legislative body to take the place of. the interim National Assembly provided for in the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, as suggested in the above report, I might say that I was the
one most vehement and persistent in publicly advocating and urging the authorities concerned to
directly submit to the people in a plebiscite whatever amendments of the Constitution might be
considered necessary for the establishment of such substitute interim legislature. In the aforementioned
session of the Executive Committee of the Katipunan, I discourse on the indispensability of a new
interim legislative body as the initial step towards the early lifting of martial law and on the fundamental
considerations why in our present situation a constitutional convention would be superfluous in
amending the Constitution.

Moreover, it is a matter of public knowledge that in a speech I delivered at the Coral Ballroom of the
Hilton Hotel in the evening of August 17, 1976, I denounced in no uncertain terms the plan to call a
constitutional convention. I reiterated the same views on September 7, 1976 at the initial conference
called by the Comelec in the course of the information and educational campaign it was enjoined to
conduct on the subject. And looking back at the subsequent developments up to September 22, 1976,
when the Batasang Bayan approved and the President signed the now impugned Presidential Decree
No. 1033, it is but human for me to want to believe that to a certain extent my strong criticisms and
resolute stand against any other alternative procedure of amending the Constitution for the purpose
intended had borne fruit.

I must hasten to add at this point, however, that in a larger sense, the initiative for all I have done, was
not altogether mine alone. The truth of the matter is that throughout the four years of this martial law
government, it has always been my faith, as a result of casual and occasional exchanges of thought with
President Marcos, that when the appropriate time does come, the President would somehow make it
known that in his judgment, the situation has already so improved as to permit the implementation, if
gradual, of the constitutionally envisioned evolution of our government from its present state to a
parliamentary one. Naturally, this would inevitably involve the establishment of a legislative body to
replace the abortive interim National Assembly. I have kept tract of all the public and private
pronouncements of the President, and it was the result of my reading thereof that furnished the
immediate basis for my virtually precipitating, in one way or another, the materialization of the
forthcoming referendum-plebiscite. In other words, in the final analysis, it was the President's own
attitude on the matter that made it opportune for me to articulate my own feelings and Ideas as to how
the nation can move meaningfully towards normalization and to publicly raise the issues that have been
ventilated by the parties in the instant cases.

I would not be human, if I did not consider myself privileged in having been afforded by Divine
Providence the opportunity to contribute a modest share in the formulation of the steps that should
lead ultimately to the lifting of martial law in our country. Indeed, I am certain every true Filipino is
anxiously looking forward to that eventuality. And if for having voiced the sentiments of our people,
where others would have preferred to be comfortably silent, and if for having made public what every
Filipino must have been feeling in his heart all these years, I should be singled out as entertaining such
preconceived opinions regarding the issues before the Court in the cases at bar as to preclude me from
taking part in their disposition, I can only say that I do not believe there is any other Filipino in and out of
the Court today who is not equally situated as I am .

The matters that concern the Court in the instant petitions do not involve merely the individual interests
of any single person or group of persons. Besides, the stakes in these cases affect everyone commonly,
not individually. The current of history that has passed through the whole country in the wake of martial
law has swept all of us, sparing none, and the problem of national survival and of restoring democratic
institutions and Ideals is seeking solution in the minds of all of us. That I have preferred to discuss
publicly my own thoughts on the matter cannot mean that my colleagues in the Court have been
indifferent and apathetic about it, for they too are Filipinos. Articulated or not, all of us must have our
own preconceived Ideas and notions in respect to the situation that confronts the country. To be sure,
our votes and opinions in the- major political cases in the recent past should more or less indicate our
respective basic positions relevant to the issues now before Us. Certainly, contending counsels cannot
be entirely in the dark in this regard. I feel that it must have been precisely because of such awareness
that despite my known public participation in the discussion of the questions herein involved, none of
the parties have sought my inhibition or disqualification.

Actually, although it may be difficult for others to believe it, I have never allowed my preconceptions
and personal inclinations to affect the objectivity needed in the resolution of any judicial question
before the Court. I feel I have always been able to appreciate, fully consider and duly weigh arguments
and points raised by all counsels, even when they conflict with my previous views. I am never beyond
being convinced by good and substantial ratiocination. Nothing has delighted me more than to discover
that somebody else has thought of more weighty arguments refuting my own, regardless of what or
whose interests are at stake. I would not have accepted my position in the Court had I felt I would not
be able to be above my personal prejudices. To my mind, it is not that a judge has preconceptions that
counts, it is his capacity and readiness to absorb contrary views that are indispensable for justice to
prevail. That suspicions of prejudgment may likely arise is unavoidable; but I have always maintained
that whatever improper factors might influence a judge will unavoidably always appear on the face of
the decision. In any event, is there better guarantee of justice when the preconceptions of a judge are
concealed?

Withal, in point of law, I belong to the school of thought that regards members of the Supreme Court as
not covered by the general rules relative to disqualification and inhibition of judges in cases before
them. If I have in practice actually refrained from participating in some cases, it has not been because of
any legal ground founded on said rules, but for purely personal reasons, specially because, anyway, my
vote would not have altered the results therein.

It is my considered opinion that unlike in the cases of judges in the lower courts, the Constitution does
not envisage compulsory disqualification or inhibition in any case by any member of the Supreme Court.
The Charter establishes a Supreme Court "composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices",
with the particular qualifications therein set forth and to be appointed in the manner therein provided.
Nowhere in the Constitution is there any indication that the legislature may designate by law instances
wherein any of the justices should not or may not take part in the resolution of any case, much less who
should take his place. Members of the Supreme Court are definite constitutional officers; it is not within
the power of the lawmaking body to replace them even temporarily for any reason. To put it the other
way, nobody who has not been duly appointed as a member of the Supreme Court can sit in it at any
time or for any reason. The Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court composed as the Constitution
ordains - that power cannot be exercised by a Supreme Court constituted otherwise. And so, when as in
the instant where, if any of the member of Court is to abstain from taking part, there would be no
quorum - and no court to render the decision - it is the includible duty of all the incumbent justices to
participate in the proceedings and to cast their votes, considering that for the reasons stated above, the
provisions of Section 9 of the Judiciary Act do not appear to conform with the concept of the office of
Justice of the Supreme Court contemplated in the Constitution.

The very nature of the office of Justice of the Supreme Court as the tribunal of last resort and bulwark of
the rights and liberties of all the people demands that only one of dependable and trustworthy probity
should occupy the same. Absolute integrity, mental and otherwise, must be by everyone who is
appointed thereto. The moral character of every member of the Court must be assumed to be such that
in no case whatsoever. regardless of the issues and the parties involved, may it be feared that anyone's
life, liberty or property, much less the national interests, would ever be in jeopardy of being unjustly and
improperly subjected to any kind of judicial sanction. In sum, every Justice of the Supreme Court is
expected to be capable of rising above himself in every case and of having full control of his emotions
and prejudices, such that with the legal training and experience he must of necessity be adequately
equipped with, it would be indubitable that his judgment cannot be but objectively impartial, Indeed,
even the appointing power, to whom the Justices owe their positions, should never hope to be unduly
favored by any action of the Supreme Court. All appointments to the Court are based on these
considerations, hence the ordinary rules on inhibition and disqualification do not have to be applied to
its members.

With the preliminary matter of my individual circumstances out of the way, I shall now address myself to
the grave issues submitted for Our resolution.

-I-

In regard to the first issue as to whether the questions posed in the petitions herein are political or
justiciable, suffice it for me to reiterate the fundamental position I took in the Martial Law cases, 1 thus

As We enter the extremely delicate task of resolving the grave issues thus thrust upon
Us. We are immediately encountered by absolute verities to guide Us all the way. The
first and most important of them is that the Constitution (Unless expressly stated
otherwise, all references to the Constitution in this discussion are to both the 1935 and
1973 charters, since, after all, the pertinent provisions are practically Identical in both is
the supreme law of the land. This means among other things that all the powers of the
government and of all its officials from the President down to the lowest emanate from
it. None of them may exercise any power unless it can be traced thereto either textually
or by natural and logical implication. "The second is that it is settled that the Judiciary
provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all
conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means. While the other
Departments may adopt their own construction thereof, when such construction is
challenged by the proper party in an appropriate case wherein a decision would be
impossible without determining the correct construction, the Supreme Court's word on
the matter controls.

xxx xxx xxx

 xxx xxx xxx

The fifth is that in the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the
Executive by the Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial
power vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is the very whole of that
power, without any limitation or qualification.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

From these incontrovertible postulates, it results, first of all, that the main question
before Us is not in reality one of jurisdiction, for there can be no conceivable
controversy, especially one involving a conflict as to the correct construction of the
Constitution, that is not contemplated to be within the judicial authority of the courts to
hear and decide. The judicial power of the courts being unlimited and unqualified, it
extends over all situations that call for the as certainment and protection of the rights of
any party allegedly violated, even when the alleged violator is the highest official of the
land or the government itself. It is, therefore, evidence that the Court's jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and to decide the instant petitions on their merits is beyond
challenge.

In this connection, however, it must be borne in mind that in the form of government
envisaged by the framers of the Constitution and adopted by our people, the Court's
indisputable and plenary authority to decide does not necessarily impose upon it the
duty to interpose its fiat as the only means of settling the conflicting claims of the
parties before it. It is ingrained in the distribution of powers in the fundamental law that
hand in hand with the vesting of the judicial power upon the Court, the Constitution has
coevally conferred upon it the discretion to determine, in consideration of the
constitutional prerogatives granted to the other Departments, when to refrain from
imposing judicial solutions and instead defer to the judgment of the latter. It is in the
very nature of republican governments that certain matters are left in the residual
power of the people themselves to resolve, either directly at the polls or thru their
elected representatives in the political Departments of the government. And these
reserved matters are easily distinguishable by their very nature, when one studiously
considers the basic functions and responsibilities entrusted by the charter to each of the
great Departments of the government. To cite an obvious example, the protection,
defense and preservation of the state against internal or external aggression
threatening its very existence is far from being within the ambit of judicial responsibility.
The distinct role then of the Supreme Court of being the final arbiter in the
determination of constitutional controversies does not have to be asserted in such
contemplated situations, thereby to give way to the ultimate prerogative of the people
articulated thru suffrage or thru the acts of their political representatives they have
elected for the purpose.

Indeed, these fundamental considerations are the ones that lie at the base of what is known in
American constitutional law as the political question doctrine, which in that jurisdiction is
unquestionably deemed to be part and parcel of the rule of law, exactly like its apparently more
attractive or popular opposite, judicial activism, which is the fullest exertion of judicial power, upon the
theory that unless the courts intervene injustice might prevail. It has been invoked and applied by this
Court in varied forms and mode of projection in several momentous instances in the past, (Barcelona vs.
Baker, 5 Phil. 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612;
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 85; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
Cabin vs. Francisco, 88 Phil. 654; Montenegro vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882, Santos vs. Yatco, 55 O.G. 8641
[Minute Resolution of Nov. 6, 19591 Osmena vs. Pendatun, Oct. 28, 1960.) and it is the main support of
the stand of the Solicitor General on the issue of jurisdiction in the cases at bar. It is also referred to as
the doctrine of judicial self-restraint or abstention. But as the nomenclatures themselves imply, activism
and self- restraint are both subjective attitudes, not inherent imperatives. The choice of alternatives in
any particular eventuality is naturally dictated by what in the Court's considered opinion is what the
Constitution envisions should be by in order to accomplish the objectives of government and of
nationhood. And perhaps it may be added here to avoid confusion of concepts, that We are not losing
sight of the traditional approach based on the doctrine of separation of powers. In truth, We perceive
that even under such mode of rationalization, the existence of power is secondary, respect for the acts
of a co-ordinate, co-equal and independent Department being the general rule, particularly when the
issue is not encroachment of delimited areas of functions but alleged abuse of a Department's own basic
prerogatives. (59 SCRA, pp. 379-383.)

Applying the foregoing considerations to the cases at bar, I hold that the Court has jurisdiction to pass
on the merits of the various claims of petitioners. At the same time, however, I maintain that the basic
nature of the issues herein raised requires that the Court should exercise its constitutionally endowed
prerogative to refrain from exerting its judicial authority in the premises.

Stripped of incidental aspects, the constitutional problem that confronts Us stems from the absence of
any clear and definite express provision in the Charter applicable to the factual milieu herein involved.
The primary issue is, to whom, under the circumstances, does the authority to propose amendments to
the Constitution property belong? To say, in the light of Section 15 of Article XVII of the Charter, that
that faculty lies in the interim National Assembly is to beg the main question. Indeed, there could be no
occasion for doubt or debate, if it could ' only be assumed that the interim National Assembly envisaged
in Sections 1 and 2 of the same Article XVII may be convoked. But precisely, the fundamental issue We
are called upon to decide is whether or not it is still constitutionally possible to convene that body. And
relative to that question, the inquiry centers on whether or not the political developments since the
ratification of the Constitution indicate that the people have in effect enjoined the convening of the
interim National Assembly altogether. On this score, it is my assessment that the results of the
referenda of January 10-15, 1973, July 27-28, 1973 and February 27, 1975 clearly show that the great
majority of our people, for reasons plainly obvious to anyone who would consider the composition of
that Assembly, what with its more than 400 members automatically voted into it by the Constitutional
Convention together with its own members, are against its being convoked at all.

Whether or not such a manifest determination of the sentiments of the people should be given effect
without a formal amendment of the Constitution is something that constitutional scholars may endlessly
debate on. What cannot be disputed, however, is that the government and the nation have acquiesced
to, it and have actually operated on the basis thereof. Proclamation 1103 which, on the predicate that
the overwhelming majority of the people desire that the interim Assembly be not convened, has
ordained the suspension of its convocation, has not been assailed either judicially or otherwise since the
date of its promulgation on January 17, 1973.
In these premises, it is consequently the task of the Court to determine what, under these
circumstances, is the constitutional relevance of the interim National Assembly to any proposal to
amend the Constitution at this time. It is my considered opinion that in resolving that question, the
Court must have to grapple with the problem of what to do with the will of the people, which although
manifested in a manner not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, was nevertheless official, and
reliable, and what is more important clear and unmistakable, despite the known existence of well-
meaning, if insufficiently substantial dissent. Such being the situation, I hold that it is not proper for the
Court to interpose its judicial authority against the evident decision of the people and should leave it to
the political department of the government to devise the ways and means of resolving the resulting
problem of how to amend the Constitution, so long as in choosing the same, the ultimate constituent
power is left to be exercised by the people themselves in a well- ordered plebiscite as required by the
fundamental law.

-2-

Assuming We have to inquire into the merits of the issue relative to the constitutional authority behind
the projected amendment of the Charter in the manner provided in Presidential Decree 1033, I hold that
in the peculiar situation in which the government is today, it is not incompatible with the Constitution
for the President to propose the subject amendments for ratification by the people in a formal plebiscite
under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. On the contrary, in the absence of any express
prohibition in the letter of the Charter, the Presidential Decree in question is entirely consistent with the
spirit and the principles underlying the Constitution. The correctness of this conclusion should become
even more patent, when one considers the political developments that the people have brought about
since the ratification of the Constitution on January 17,1973.

I consider it apropos at this juncture to repeat my own words in a speech I delivered on the occasion of
the celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1975 before the members of the Philippine Constitution
Association and their guests:

To fully comprehend the constitutional situation in the Philippines today, one has to
bear in mind that, as I have mentioned earlier, the martial law proclaimed under the
1935 Constitution overtook the drafting of the new charter by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971. It was inevitable, therefore, that the delegates had to take into
account not only the developments under it but, most of all, its declared objectives and
what the President, as its administrator, was doing to achieve them. In this connection,
it is worthy of mention that an attempt to adjourn the convention was roundly voted
down to signify the determination of the delegates to finish earliest their work, thereby
to accomplish the mission entrusted to them by the people to introduce meaningful
reforms in our government and society. Indeed, the constituent labors gained rapid
tempo, but in the process, the delegates were to realize that the reforms they were
formulating could be best implemented if the martial law powers of the President were
to be allowed to subsist even after the ratification of the Constitution they were
approving. This denouement was unusual. Ordinarily, a constitution born out of a crisis
is supposed to provide all the needed cures and can, therefore, be immediately in full
force and effect after ratification. Not so, with our 1973 Constitution, Yes, according to
the Supreme Court, 'there is no more judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect', but in truth, it is not yet so in full. Let me explain.
To begin with, in analyzing the new Constitution, we must be careful to distinguish between the body or
main part thereof and its transitory provisions. It is imperative to do so because the transitory provisions
of our Constitution are extraordinary in the sense that obviously they have been designed to provide not
only for the transition of our government from the presidential form under the past charter to a
parliamentary one as envisaged in the new fundamental law, but also to institutionalize, according to
the President, the reforms introduced thru the exercise of his martial law powers. Stated differently, the
transitory provisions, as it has turned out, has in effect established a transition government, not, I am
sure, perceived by many. It is a government that is neither presidential nor parliamentary. It is headed,
of course, by President Marcos who not on retains all his powers under the 1935 Constitution but enjoys
as well those of the President and the Prime Minister under the new Constitution. Most importantly, he
can and does legislate alone. But to be more accurate, I should say that he legislates alone in spite of the
existence of the interim National Assembly unequivocally ordained by the Constitution, for the simple
reason that he has suspended the convening of said assembly by issuing Proclamation No. 1103
purportedly 'in deference to the sovereign will of the Filipino people' expressed in the January 10-15,
1973 referendum.

Thus, we have here the unique case of a qualified ratification. The whole Constitution was submitted for
approval or disapproval of the people, and after the votes were counted and the affirmative majority
known, we were told that the resulting ratification was subject to the condition that the interim
National Assembly evidently established in the Constitution as the distinctive and indispensable element
of a parliamentary form of government should nevertheless be not convened and that no elections
should be held for about seven years, with the consequence that we have now a parliamentary
government without a parliament and a republic without any regular election of its officials. And as you
can see, this phenomenon came into being not by virtue of the Constitution but of the direct mandate
of the sovereign people expressed in a referendum. In other words, in an unprecedented extra-
constitutional way, we have established, wittingly or unwittingly, a direct democracy through the
Citizens Assemblies created by Presidential Decree No. 86, which later on have been transformed into
barangays, a system of government proclaimed by the President as 'a real achievement in participatory
democracy.' What I am trying to say, my friends, is that as I perceive it, what is now known as
constitutional authoritarianism means, in the final analysis, that the fundamental source of authority of
our existing government may not be necessarily found within the four corners of the Constitution but
rather in the results of periodic referendums conducted by the Commission on Elections in a manner
well known to all of us This, as I see it, is perhaps what the President means by saying that under the
new Constitution he has extra-ordinary powers independently of martial law - powers sanctioned
directly by the people which may not even be read in the language of the Constitution. in brief, when we
talk of the rule of law nowadays, our frame of reference should not necessarily be the Constitution but
the outcome of referendums called from time to time by the President. The sooner we imbibe this vital
concept the more intelligent will our perspective be in giving our support and loyalty to the existing
government. What is more, the clearer will it be that except for the fact that all the powers of
government are being exercised by the President, we - do not in reality have a dictatorship but an
experimental type of direct democracy."

In the foregoing disquisition, I purposely made no mention of the referendum of February 27, 1975. It is
important to note, relative to the main issue now before Us, that it was originally planned to ask the
people in that referendum whether or not they would like the interim National Assembly to convene,
but the Comelec to whom the task of preparing the questions was assigned was prevailed upon not to
include any -such question anymore, precisely because it was the prevalent view even among the
delegates to the Convention as well as the members of the old Congress concerned that that matter had
already been finally resolved in the previous referenda of January and July 1973 in the sense that. the
Assembly should not be convened comparable to res adjudicata.

It is my position that as a result of the political developments since January 17, 1973 the transitory
provisions envisioning the convening of the interim National Assembly have been rendered legally
inoperative. There is no doubt in my mind that for the President to convoke the interim National
Assembly as such would be to disregard the will of the people - something no head of a democratic
republican state like ours should do. And I find it simply logical that the reasons that motivated the
people to enjoin the convening of the Assembly - the unusually large and unmanageable number of its
members and the controversial morality of its automatic composition consisting of all the incumbent
elective national executive and legislative officials under the Old Constitution who would agree to join it
and the delegates themselves to the Convention who had voted in favor of the Transitory Provisions -
apply not only to the Assembly as an ordinary legislature but perhaps more to its being a constituent
body. And to be more realistic, it is but natural to conclude that since the people are against politicians
in the old order having anything to do with the formulation of national policies, there must be more
reasons for them to frown on said politicians taking part in amendment of the fundamental law,
specially because the particular amendment herein involved calls for the abolition of the interim
National Assembly to which they belong and its substitution by the Batasang Pambansa.

It is argued that in law, the qualified or conditional ratification of a constitution is not contemplated. I
disagree. It is inconsistent with the plenary power of the people to give or withhold their assent to a
proposed Constitution to maintain that they can do so only wholly. I cannot imagine any sound principle
that can be invoked to support the theory that the proposing authority can limit the power of
ratification of the people. As long as there are reliable means by which only partial approval can be
manifested, no cogent reason exists why the sovereign people may not do so. True it is that no
proposed Constitution can be perfect and it may therefore be taken with the good and the bad in it, but
when there are feasible ways by which it can be determined which portions of it, the people disapprove.
it would be stretching technicality beyond its purported office to render the final authority - the people
impotent to act according to what they deem best suitable to their interests.

In any event, I feel it would be of no consequence to debate at length regarding the legal feasibility of
qualified ratification. Proclamation 1103 categorically declares that:

WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy six thousand five hundred sixty-one
(14,976.561) members of all the Barangays voted for the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine
(743,869) who voted for its rejection; but a majority of those who approved the new
Constitution conditioned their votes on the demand that the interim National Assembly
provided in its Transitory Provisions should not be convened.

and in consequence, the President has acted accordingly by not convening the Assembly. The above
factual premises of Proclamation 1103 is not disputed by petitioners. Actually, it is binding on the Court,
the same being a political act of a coordinate department of the government not properly assailed as
arbitrary or whimsical. At this point, it must be emphasized in relation to the contention that a
referendum is only consultative, that Proclamation 1103, taken together with Proclamation 1102 which
proclaimed the ratification of the Constitution, must be accorded the same legal significance as the
latter proclamation, as indeed it is part and parcel if the Act of ratification of the Constitution, hence not
only persuasive but mandatory. In the face of the incontrovertible fact that the sovereign people have
voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly, and faced with the problem of amending
the Constitution in order precisely to implement the people's rejection of that Assembly, the problem of
constitutional dimension that confronts Us, is how can any such amendment be proposed for ratification
by the people?

To start with, it may not be supposed that just because the office or body designed by the constitutional
convention to perform the constituent function of formulating proposed amendments has been
rendered inoperative by the people themselves, the people have thereby foreclosed the possibility of
amending the Constitution no matter how desirable or necessary this might be. In this connection, I
submit that by the very nature of the office of the Presidency in the prevailing scheme of government
we have - it being the only political department of the government in existence - it is consistent with
basic principles of constitutionalism to acknowledge the President's authority to perform the
constituent function, there being no other entity or body lodged with the prerogative to exercise such
function.

There is another consideration that leads to the same conclusion. It is conceded by petitioners that with
the non-convening of the interim Assembly, the legislative authority has perforce fallen into the hands
of the President, if only to avoid a complete paralysis of law-making and resulting anarchy and chaos. It
is likewise conceded that the provisions of Section 3 (2) of Article XVII invest the President with
legislative power for the duration of the transition period. From these premises, it is safe to conclude
that in effect the President has been substituted by the people themselves in place of the interim
Assembly. Such being the case, the President should be deemed as having been granted also the
cognate prerogative of proposing amendments to the Constitution. In other words, the force of
necessity and the cognate nature of the act justify that the department exercising the legislative faculty
be the one to likewise perform the constituent function that was attached to the body rendered
impotent by the people's mandate. Incidentally, I reject most vehemently the proposition that the
President may propose amendments to the Constitution in the exercise of his martial law powers. Under
any standards, such a suggestion cannot be reconciled with the Ideal that a Constitution is the free act
of the people.

It was suggested during the oral, argument that instead of extending his legislative powers by proposing
the amendment to create a new legislative body, the President should issue a decree providing for the
necessary apportionment of the seats in the Regular National Assembly and call for an election of the
members thereof and thus effect the immediate normalization of the parliamentary government
envisaged in the Constitution. While indeed procedurally feasible, the suggestion overlooks the
imperative need recognized by the constitutional convention as may be inferred from the obvious
purpose of the transitory provisions, for a period of preparation and acquaintance by all concerned with
the unfamiliar distinctive features and practices of the parliamentary system. Accustomed as we are to
the presidential system, the Convention has seen to it that there should be an interim parliament under
the present leadership, which will take the corresponding measures to effectuate the efficient and
smooth transition from the present system to the new one. I do not believe this pattern set by the
convention should be abandoned.

The alternative of calling a constitutional convention has also been mentioned. But, in the first place,
when it is considered that whereas, under Section 1 (1) and (2) of Article XVI, the regular National
Assembly may call a Constitutional Convention or submit such a call for approval of the people, Section
15 of Article XVII, in reference to interim National Assembly, does not grant said body the prerogative of
calling a convention, one can readily appreciate that the spirit of the Constitution does not countenance
or favor the calling of a convention during the transition, if only because such a procedure would be
time consuming, cumbersome and expensive. And when it is further noted that the requirement as to
the number of votes needed for a proposal is only a majority, whereas it is three-fourths in respect to
regular Assembly, and, relating this point to the provision of Section 2 of Article XVI to the effect that all
ratification plebiscites must be held "not later than three months after the approval" of the proposed
amendment by the proposing authority, the adoption of the most simple manner of amending the
charter, as that provided for in the assailed Presidential Decree 1033 suggests itself as the one most in
accord with the intent of the fundamental law.

There is nothing strange in adopting steps not directly based on the letter of the Constitution for the
purpose of amending or changing the same. To cite but one important precedent, as explained by Mr.
Justice Makasiar in his concurring opinion in Javellana 2, the present Constitution of the United States
was neither proposed nor ratified in the manner ordained by the original charter of that country, the
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.

In brief. if the convening and operation of the interim National Assembly has been effectuated through a
referendum-plebiscite in January, 1973, and ratified expressly and impliedly in two subsequent
referenda, those of July, 1973 and February, 1975, why may not a duly held plebiscite suffice for the
purpose of creating a substitute for that Assembly? It should be borne in mind that after all, as indicated
in the whereas of the impugned Presidential Decree, actually, the proposed amendments were initiated
by the barangays and sanggunian members. In other words, in submitting the amendments for
ratification, the President is merely acting as the conduit thru whom a substantial portion of the people,
represented in the Katipunan ng Mga Sanggunian, Barangay at Kabataang Barangay, seek the approval
of the people as a whole of the amendments in question. If all these mean that the sovereign people
have arrogated unto themselves the functions relative to the amendment to the Constitution, I would
regard myself as totally devoid of legal standing to question it, having in mind that the most
fundamental tenet on which our whole political structure rests is that "sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them."

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I hold that Presidential Decree No. 1033 does not infringe
the Constitution, if only because the specific provision it is supposed to infringe does not exist in legal
contemplation since it was coevally made inoperative when the people ratified the Constitution on
January 17, 1973. I am fully convinced that there is nothing in the procedure of amendment contained in
said decree that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of constitutionalism. On the contrary, I
find that the Decree, in issue conforms admirably with the underlying tenet of our government - the
sovereignty and plenary power of the people.

On the issue of whether or not October 16, 1976 is too proximate to enable the people to sufficiently
comprehend the issues and intelligently vote in the referendum and plebiscite set by Presidential
Decree 1033, all I can say is that while perhaps my other colleagues are right in holding that the period
given to the people is adequate, I would leave it to the President to consider whether or not it would be
wiser to extend the same. Just to avoid adverse comments later I wish the President orders a
postponement. But whether such postponement is ordered or not, date of the referendum- plebiscite
anywhere from October 16, 1976 to any other later date, would be of no vital import.

In conclusion, I vote to dismiss all the three petitions before Us.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

Since the validity or effectivity of the proposed amendments is to be decided ultimately by the people in
their sovereign capacity, the question is political as the term is defined in Tanada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al.
(103 Phil. 1051), which is a bar to any judicial inquiry, for the reasons stated in Our opinion in Javellana,
et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L-36142); Tan, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L,36164); Roxas,
et al. vs Executive Secretary, et al. (L-36165); Monteclaro, etc., et al. vs' Executive Secretary, et al.
(@36236); and Ditag et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L-W283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 204-
283). The procedure for amendment is not important Ratification by the people is all that is
indispensable to validate an amendment. Once ratified, the method of making the proposal and the
period for submission become relevant.

The contrary view negates the very essence of a republican democracy - that the people are sovereign -
and renders meaningless the emphatic declaration in the very first provision of Article II of the 1973
Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state, sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. It is axiomatic that sovereignty is illimitable The
representatives cannot dictate to the sovereign people. They may guide them; but they cannot supplant
their judgment, Such an opposite view likewise distrusts the wisdom of the people as much as it
despises their intelligence. It evinces a presumptuous pretension to intellectual superiority. There are
thousands upon thousands among the citizenry, who are not in the public service, who are more learned
and better skilled than many of their elected representatives.

Moreover, WE already ruled in Aquino, et al. vs- Comelec, et al. (L 40004, Jan. 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275,
298-302) that the President as enforcer or administrator of martial rule during the period of martial law
can legislate; and that he has the discretion as to when the convene the interim National Assembly
depending on prevailing conditions of peace and order. In view of the fact that the interim National
Assembly has not been convoked in obedience to the desire of the people clearly expressed in the 1973
referenda, the President therefore remains the lone law-making authority while martial law subsists.
Consequently, he can also exercise the power of the interim National Assembly to propose amendments
to the New Constitution (Sec. 15,,Art. XVII If, as conceded by petitioner Vicente Guzman (L-44684),
former delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention which drafted the 1973 Constitution. the
President, during the period of martial law, can call a constitutional convention for the purpose,
admittedly a constituent power, it stands to reason that the President can likewise legally propose
amendments to the fundamental law.

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify what is a "political question". It must be noted that this device
has been utilized by the judiciary "to avoid determining questions it is ill equipped to determine or that
could be settled in any event only with the effective support of the political branches." 1 According to
Weston, judges, whether "personal representatives of a truly sovereign king, or taking their seats as the
creatures of a largely popular sovereignty speaking through a written constitution, derive their power by
a delegation, which clearly or obscurely as the case may be, deliminates and delimits their delegated
jurisdiction.* * * Judicial questions * * * are those which the sovereign has set to be decided in the
courts. Political questions, similarly, are those which the sovereign has entrusted to the so-called
political departments of government or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-government or has
reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action." 2 Reflecting a similar concept, this Court
has defined a "political question" as a "matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity or that has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer
of the government, with discretionary power to act." 3 In other words, it refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. 4

In determining whether an issue falls within the political question category, the absence of satisfactory
creterion for a judicial determination or the appropriateness of attributing finality to the action of the
political departments of government is a dominant consideration. This was explained by Justice Brennan
in Baker v. Carr,5 thus :

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional lack of judicially discoverrable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. . . .

To decide whether a matter has in a measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government or retained be the people to be decided by them in their sovereign capacity, or whether
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is indeed a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation.

In Coleman v. Miller, 6 the United States Supreme Court held that the efficacy of the ratification by state
legislatures of a constitutional amendment is a political question. On the question of whether the State
Legislature could constitutionally relative an amendment, after the same had been previously rejected
by it, it was held that the ultimate authority over the question was in Congress in the exercise of its
control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment. And in connection with the second
question of whether the amendment has lost its, vitality through the lapse of time, the Court held that
the question was likewise political, involving "as it does....an appraisal of a great variety of relevant
conditions, political, social and economic, which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of
evidence receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would be an extravagant extension of juridical
authority to assert judicial notice as the basis of deciding a controversy with respect to the validity of an
amendment actually ratified. On the other hand, these conditions are appropriate for the consideration
of the political departments of the Government. The questions they involve are essentially political and
not justiciable." '

In their concurring opinions, Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas stressed that:

The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to control submission off

constitutional amendments. Final determination by Congress their ratification by three-
fourths of the States has taken place 'is conclusive upon the courts.' In the exercise of
that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, A whether
submission, intervening procedure for Congressional determination of ratification
conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by apolitical
department of questions of a t@ which this Court has frequently designated 'political.'
And decision of a 'political question' by the political department' to which the
 Constitution has committed it 'conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of ... government. Proclamation under authority of Congress that
an amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress
that ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a
proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, learning to the
judiciary its traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion
in the present case even by implieding assumes a power to make judicial interpretation
of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and by ratification
of amendments, we are unable to agree.

Relying on this doctrine enunciated in Coleman v. Miller supra this Court, in Mabanag v. Lopez
Vitol, 7 speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason, ruled that the process of constitutional amendment,
involving proposal and ratification, is a political question. In the Mabang case, the petitioners sought to
prevent the enforcement of a resolution of Congress proposing the "Parity Amendment" to the
Philippine Constitution on the ground that it had not been approved by the three-fourths vote of all the
members of each house as required be Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. It was claimed that three (3)
Senators and eight (8) members of the House of Representatives had been suspended and that their
membership was not considered in the determination of the three- fourths %- ore In dismissing the
petition on the ground that the question of the validity of the proposal was political, the Court stated:

"If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. The question to steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a
single objective. It is to be noted that amendatory process as provided in Section I of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution 'consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification.' There is no logic
in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend
the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself....." (At pages 4-5, Italics supplied.)

It is true that in Gonzales v. Comelec, 8 this Court held that "the issue whether or not a Resolution of
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly - violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not
political, and hence, subject to judicial review." What was involved in Gonzales, however, was not a
proposed What was involved in Gonzales, however, was not a proposed amendment to the Constitution
but an act of Congress,9 submitting proposed amendments to the Constitution. Similarly, in Tolentino v.
Commission an Elections, 10 what was involved was not the validity of the proposal to lower the voting
age but rather that of the resolution of the Constitutional Convention submitting the proposal for
ratification. The question was whether piecemeal amendments to the Constitution could submitted to
the people for approval or rejection.

II

Here, the point has been stressed that the President is acting as agent for and in behalf of the people in
proposing the amendment. there can be no question that in the referendums of January, 1973 and in
the subsequent referendums the people had clearly and categorically rejected the calling of the interim
National Assembly. As stated in the main opinion, the Lupang Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga
Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, the
Kabataang Barangay organizations and the various sectoral groups had proposed the replacement of the
interim National Assembly. These barangays and the Sanggunian assemblies are effective
instrumentalities through which the desires of the people are articulated and expressed. The Batasang
Bayan (Legislative Council), composed of nineteen (19) cabinet members and nine (9) officials with
cabinet rank, and ninety-one (91) members of the Lupang Tagapagpaganap (Executive Committee) of
the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayani voted in their special session to submit directly to the people
in a plebiscite on October 16, 1976 the afore-mentioned constitutional amendments. Through the
Pambansang Katipunan by Barangay and the Pampurok ng Katipunan Sangguniang Bayan, the people
have expressed their desire not only to abolish the interim National Assembly, but to replace it with a
more representative body acceptable to them in order to effect the desirable constitutional changes
necessary to hasten the political evolution of the government towards the parliamentary system, while
at the same time ensuring that the gains of the New Society, which are vital to the welfare of the
people, shall be safeguarded. The proposed constitutional amendments, therefore, represent a
consensus of the people.

It would be futile to insist that the intemi National Assembly should have been convened to propose
those amendments pursuant to Section 15 of Article XVII of the Constitution. This Court, in the case of
Aquino v. Commission or Elections,11 took judicial notice of the fact that in the referendum of January,
1973, a majority of those who approved the new Constitution conditioned their votes on the demand
that the interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Provisions should not be and the
President "in deference to the sovereign will of the Filipino people" declared that the convening of said
body shall be suspended.12 As this Court observed in the Aquino case:

His decision to defer the initial convocation of the byiitttit National Assembly was
supported by the sovereign people at the by referendum in January, 1973 when the
people voted to postpone the convening of the interim National Assembly until after at
least seven (7) years from the approval of the new Constitution. And the reason why the
same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted at the referendum
on February 27, 1975, is that even some members of the Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who are already byjso ofitto members of the intetini
National Assembly are against such inclusion; because the issue was already bycciled in
the January, 1973 referendum by the sovereign people indicating thereby their
disenchantment with any Assembly as the former Congress failed to institutionalize the
reforms they demanded and wasted public funds through endless debates without
relieving the suffering of the general mass of citizenry (p. 302.) The action of the
President in suspending the convening of the interim National Assembly has met the
overwhelming approval of the people in subsequent referenda.

Since it was the action by the people that gave binding force and effect to the new Constitution, then it
must be accepted as a necessary consequence that their objection against the immediate convening of
the interim National Assembly must be respected as a positive mandate of the sovereign.

In the Philippines, which is a unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them."13 The term "People" as sovereign is comprehensive in its context. The
people, as sovereign creator of all political reality, is not merely the enfranchised citizens but the
political unity of the people. 14 It connotes, therefore, a people which exists not only in the urgent
present but in the continuum of history. The assumption that the opinion of The People as voters can be
treated as the expression of the interests of the People as a historic community was, to the
distinguished American journalist and public philosopher, Walter Lipunan, unwarranted.
 Because of the discrepancy between The People as Voters and the People as the
corporate nation, the voters have no title to consider themselves the proprietors of the
commonwealth and to claim that their interests are Identical to the public interest. A
prevailing plurality of the voters are not The People. The claim that they are is a bogus
title invoked to justify the usurpation of the executive power by representative
assemblies and the intimidation of public men by demagogue politicians. In fact
demagoguery can be described as the sleight of hand by which a faction of The People
as voters are invested with the authority of The People. That is why so many crimes are
committed in the People's name 15

In Gonzales v. Comelec, supra, the Court clearly emphasized that the power to propose amendments or
to amend the Constitution is part of the inherent power of the people as the repository of sovereignty in
a republican state. While Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution, it acts pursuant to
authority granted to it by the people through the Constitution. Both the power to propose and the
authority to approve, therefore, inhere in the people as the bearer of the Constitution making power.

Absent an interim National Assembly upon whom the people, through the Constitution, have delegated
the authority to exercise constituent powers, it follows from necessity that either the people should
exercise that power themselves or through any other instrumentality they may choose. For Law, like
Nature, abhors a vacuum (natural vacuum abhorret).

The question then is whether the President has authority to act for the people in submitting such
proposals for ratification at the plebiscite of October 16. The political character of the question is,
therefore, particularly manifest, considering that ultimately it is the people who will decide whether the
President has such authority. It certainly involves a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their
sovereign capacity, hence, it is essentially political, not judicial.

While it is true that the constituent power is not to be confuse with legislative power in general because
the prerogative to propose amendments is not embraced within the context of ordinary lawmaking, it
must be noted that the proposals to be submitted for ratification in the forthcoming referendum are, in
the final analysis, actually not of the President but directly of the people themselves, speaking through
their authorized instrumentalities.

As the Chief Justice aptly stated in his concurring opinion in this case:

... The President merely formalized the said proposals in Presidential Decree No. 1033. It
being conceded in all quarters that sovereignty resides in the people and it having been
demonstrated that their constituent power to amend the Constitution has not been
delegated by them to any instrumentality of the Government during the present stage
of the transition period of our political development, the conclusion is ineluctable that
their exertion of that residuary power cannot be vulnerable to any constitutional
challenge as beingultravires. Accordingly, without venturing to rule on whether or not
the President is vested with constituent power - as it does not appear necessary to do
so in the premises - the proposals here challenged, being acts of the sovereign people
no less, cannot be said to be afflicted with unconstitutionality. A fortiori, the
concomitant authority to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor is even less
vulnerable not only because the President, in exercising said authority, has acted as a
mere ofiffet
 byf of the people who made the proposals, but likewise because the said authority is
legislative in nature rather than constituent.

This is but a recognition that the People of the Philippines have the inherent, sole and
exclusive right of regulating their own government, and of altering or abolishing their
Constitution whenever it may be necessary to their safety or happiness. There appears
to be no justification, under the existing, circumstances, for a Court to create by
implication a limitation on - the sovereign power of the people. As has been clearly
explained in a previous case:

There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of
it to be obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government;
because the measure derives all its vital force from the action of the people at the ballot
box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established form to a free
people, the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law The means
provided for the exercise of their Sovereign right of changing their constitution should
receive such a construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and
embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of free government, which
is inherent in the people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is the free
and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the
mode prescribed by the instrument.

III

The paramount consideration that impelled Us to arrive at the foregoing opinion is the necessity of
ensuring popular control over the constituent power. "If the people are to control the constituent power
- the power to make and change the fundamental law of the State," observed Wheeler," "the process of
Constitutional change must not be based too heavily upon existing agencies of government." Indeed,
the basic premise of republicanism is that the ordinary citizen, the common man. can be trusted to
determine his political destiny. Therefore, it is time that the people should be accorded the fullest
opportunity to decide the laws that shall provide for their governance. For in the ultimate analysis, the
success of the national endeavor shall depend on the vision, discipline and I by ininess of the moqqqtai
will of every Filipino.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We vote to dismiss the petitions.

Aquino, J., concur.

MUNOZ PALMA, J., dissenting:

I concur fully with the remarkably frank (so characteristic of him) dissenting opinion of my distinguished
colleague, Justice Claudio Teehankee. If I am writing this brief statement it is only to unburden myself
of some thoughts which trouble my mind and leave my conscience with no rest nor peace.
Generally, one who dissents from a majority view of the Court takes a lonely and at times precarious
road, the burden byeing lightened only by the thought that in this grave task of administering justice,
when matters of conscience are at issue, one must be prepared to espouse and embrace a rightful cause
however unpopular it may be.

1. That sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them is a
fundamental, basic principle of government which cannot be disputed, but when the people have
opted to govern themselves under the mantle of a written Constitution, each and every citizen, from
the highest to the lowliest, has the sacred duty to respect and obey the Character they have so
ordained.

By the Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up he hands of their official
agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the
whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. p. 56, Italics Our).

The afore-quoted passage from the eminent jurist and author Judge Cooley although based on
declarations of law of more than a century ago, lays down a principle which to my mind is one of the
enduring cornerstones of the Rule of Law. it is a principle with which I have been familiar as a student of
law under the tutelage of revered Professors, Dr. Vicente G. Sinco and Justice Jose P. Laurel, and which I
pray will prevail at all times to ensure the existence of a free, stable, and civilized society.

The Filipino people,. wanting to ensure to themselves a democratic republican form of government,
have promulgated a Constitution whereby the power to govern themselves has been entrusted to and
distributed among three branches of government; they have also mandated in clear and unmistakable
terms the method by which provisions in their fundamental Charter may be amended or revised. Having
done so, the people are bound by these constitutional limitations. For while there is no surrender or
abdication of the people's ultimate authority to amend, revise, or adopt a new Constitution, sound
reason demands that they keep themselves within the procedural bounds of the existing fundamental
law. The right of the people to amend or change their Constitution if and when the need arises is not to
be denied, but we assert that absent a revolutionary state or condition in the country the change must
be accomplished through the ordinary, regular and legitimate processes provided for in the
Constitution.'

I cannot subscribe therefore to the view taken by the Solicitor General that the people, being sovereign,
have the authority to amend the Constitution even in a manner different from and contrary to that
expressly provided for in that instrument, and that the amendatory process is intended more as a
limitation of a power rather than a grant of power to a particular agency and it should not be construed
as limiting the ultimate sovereign will of the people to decide on amendments to the Constitution .2
Such a view will seriously undermine the very existence of a constitutional government and will permit
anarchy and/or mob rule to set afoot and prevail. Was it the Greek philosopher Plato who warned that
the rule of the mob is a prelude to the rule of the tyrant?

I would use the following excerpt from Bernas, S.J. 'The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases"
as relevant to my point:

. . . the amendatory provisions are called a 'constitution of sovereighty' because they

define the constitutional meaning of 'sovereignty of the people.' Popular sovereignty, as
 embodied in the Philippine Constitution, is not extreme popular sovereignty. As one
American writer put it:

A constitution like the American one serves as a basic check upon the popular will at any
given time. It is the distinctive function of such written document to classify certain
things as legal fundamentals; these fundamentals may not be changed except by the
slow and cumbersome process of amendment. The people themselves have decided, in
constitutional convention assembled, to limit themselves ana future generations in the
exercise of the sovereign power which they would otherwise possess. And it is precisely
such limitation that enables those subject to governmental authority to appeal from the
people drunk to the people sober in time of excitement and hysteria. The Constitution,
in the neat phrase of the Iowa court, is the protector of the people against injury by the
.people. *

Truly, what need is there for providing in the Constitution a process by which the fundamental law may
be amended if, after all, the people by themselves can set the same at naught even in times of peace
when civil authority reigns supreme? To go along with the respondents' theory in this regard is to render
written Constitutions useless or mere "ropes of sand allowing for a government of men instead of one of
laws. For it cannot be discounted that a situation may arise where the people are heralded to action at a
point of a gun or by the fiery eloquence of a demagogue, and where passion overpowers reason, and
mass action overthrows legal processes. History has recorded such instances, and I can think of no
better example than that of Jesus Christ of Judea who was followed and loved by the people while
curing the sick, making the lame walk and the blind see, but shortly was condemned by the same people
turned into fanatic rabble crying out "Crucify Him, Crucify Him" upon being incited into action by chief
priests and elders of Jerusalem. Yes, to quote once more from Judge Cooley:

A good Constitution should be beyond the reason of temporary excitement and popular
caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought
of the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or
hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be sale
can be allowed efficiency......Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit
is certain." (quoted in Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1, 15,) 3

Crawford v. Gilchrist 64 Fla. 41., 59., So. 963, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 916; State v. Hall, 159 N.W., 281; Opinion
of Marshall, J. in State ex. rel. Poster v. Marcus, 152 N.W., 419;

From Kochier v. Hill, Vol. 15, N.W., 609, we quote:

xxx xxx xxx

It has been said that changes in the constitution may be introduced in disregard of its
provisions; that if the majority of the people desire a change the majority must be
respected, no matter how the change may be effected; and that the change, if
revolution, is peaceful resolution. ...

We fear that the advocates of this new doctrine, in a zeal to accomplish an end which
the majority of the people desire, have looked at but one phase of the question, and
 have not fully considered the terrible consequences which would almost certainly follow
a recognition of the doctrine for which they contend. It may be that the incorporation of
this amendment in the constitution, even if the constitution has to be broken to
accomplish it, would not of itself produce any serious results. But if it should be done by
sanctioning the doctrine contended for, a precedent would be set which would plague
the state for all future time. A Banquo's ghost would arise at our incantation which
would not down at our bidding.

xxx xxx xxx

We ought to ponder long before we adopt a doctrine so fraught with danger to

republican institutions. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Appellants' counsel cite and rely upon section 2, art. 1, of the constitution of the staff This section is a
portion of the bill of rights, and is as follows: 'All political power is inherent in the people. Government is
instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of of the people; and they have the right at all times
to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require.' Abstractly considered, there can
bye no doubt of the correctness of the propositions embraced in this suction. These principles are older
than constitutions and older than governments. The people did not derive the rights referred to by on
the constitution. and, in their nature, thee are such that the people cannot surrender them ... .

2. Presidential Decrees Nos. 991 and 1033 which call for a national referendum-plebiscite on October
16, 1976 for the purpose, among other things, of amending certain provisions of the 1973 Constitution
are null and void as they contravene the express provisions on the amending process of the 1973
Constitution laid down in Article XVI, Section 1 (1) and Article XVII, Section 15, more particularly the
latter which applies during the present transition period. The Opinion of Justice Teehankee discusses in
detail this particular matter.

I would just wish to stress the point that although at present there is no by tterint National Assembly
which may propose amendments to the Constitution, the existence of a so-called "vacuum" or "hiatus"
does not justify a transgression of the constitutional provisions on the manner of amending the
fundamental law. We cannot cure one infirmity - the existence of a "vacuum" caused by the non-
convening of the interim National Assembly - with another infirmity, that is, doing violence to the
Charter.

All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil;
another evil may succeed and a worse. (Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 311., quoted in Ellingham
v. Dye, supra, p. 15)

Respondents contend that the calling of the referendum-plebiscite for the purpose indicated is a step
necessary to restore the state of normalcy in the country. To my mind, the only possible measure that
will lead our country and people to a condition of normalcy is the lifting or ending of the state of martial
law. If I am constrained to make this statement it is because so much stress was given during the
hearings of these cases on this particular point, leaving one with the impression that for petitioners to
contest the holding of the October 16 referendum-plebiscite is for them to assume a position of blocking
or installing the lifting of martial law, which I believe is unfair to the petitioners. Frankly, I cannot see the
connection between the two. My esteemed colleagues should pardon me therefore if I had ventured to
state that the simple solution to the simple solution to the present dilemma is the lifting of martial law
and the implementation of the constitutional provisions which will usher in the parliamentary form of
government ordained in the Constitution, which, as proclaimed in Proclamation 1102, the people
themselves have ratified.

If the people have indeed ratified the 1973 Constitution, then they are bound by their act and cannot
escape from the pretended unfavorable consequences thereof, the only y being to set in motion the
constitutional machinery by which the supposed desired amendments may properly be adopted and
submitted to the electorate for ratification. Constitutional processes are to be observed strictly, if we
have to maintain and preserve the system of government decreed under the fundamental Charter. As
said by Justice Enrique Fernando in Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections

... The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
funcitonary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
hierarchy.....(36 SCRA, 228, 234, italics Ours)

A contrary view would lead to disastrous consequences for, in the words of Chief Justice Cox of the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Ellingham v. Dye, (supra, p. 7) liberty and popular sovereignty are not
meant to give rein to passion or thoughtless impulse but to allow the exercise of power by the people
for the general good by tistlercoitaitt restraints of law. 3 . The true question before Us is is one of power.
Does the incumbent President of the Philippines possess constituent powers? Again, the negative
answer is explained in detail in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee.

Respondents would justify the incumbent President's exercise of constituent powers on theory that he is
vested with legislative powers as held by this Court in Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., L-40004, January 31, 1975. 1 wish to stress that although in my separate opinion in said
case I agreed that Section 3 (2) of the Transitory provisions grants to the incumbent President legislative
powers, I qualified my statement as follows:

.... As to, whether, or not, this unlimited legislative qqqjwwel of the President continues
by exist even after the ratification of the Constitution is a matter which I am not ready
to concede at the moment, and which at any rate I believe is not essential in resolving
this Petition for reasons to be given later. Nonetheless, I hold the view that the
President is empowered to issue proclamations, orders, decrees, etc. to carry out and
implement the objectives of the proclamation of martial law be it under the 1935 or
1973 Constitution, and for the orderly and efficient functioning of the government, its
instrumentalities, and agencies. This grant of legislative power is necessary to fill up a
vacuum during the transition period when the interim National Assembly is not yet
convened and functioning, for otherwise, there will be a disruption of official functions
resulting in a collapse of the government and of the existing social order. (62 SCRA, pp.
275,347)

I believe it is not disputed that legislative power is essentially different from constituent power; one
does not encompass the other unless so specified in the Charter, and the 1973 Constitution contains
provisions in this regard. This is well-explained in Justice Teehankee's Opinion. The state of necessity
brought about by the current political situation, invoked by the respondents, provides no source of
power to propose amendments to the existing Constitution. Must we "bend the Constitution to suit the
law of the hour or cure its defects "by inflicting upon it a wound which nothing can heal commit one
assault after the other "until all respect for the fundamental law is lost and the powers of government
are just what those in authority please to call them?'" 5 Or can we now ignore what this Court, speaking
through Justice Barredo, said in Tolentino vs. Comelec:

... let those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any mandate
of the fundamental law purportedly by order to attain some laudable objective bear in
mind that someday somehow others with purportedly more laudable objectives may
take advantages of the precedent in continue the destruction of the Constitution,
making those who laid down the precedent of justifying deviations from the
requirements of the Constitution the victims of their own folly. 6

Respondents emphatically assert that the final word is the people's word and that ultimately it is in the
hands of the people where the final decision rests. (Comment, pp. 18, 19, 22) Granting in gratia
argument that it is so, let it be an expression of the will of the people a normal political situation and not
under the aegis of martial rule for as I have stated in Aquino vs. Comelec, et al., supra, a referendum
(and now a plebiscite) held under a regime of martial law can be of no far reaching significance because
it is being accomplished under an atmosphere or climate of fear as it entails a wide area of curtailment
and infringement of individual rights, such as, human liberty, property rights, rights of free expression
and assembly, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, liberty of abode and of travel, and
so on.

4. The other issues such as the sufficiency and proper submission of the proposed amendments for
ratification by the people are expounded in Justice Teehankee's Opinion. I wish to stress indeed that it is
incorrect to state that the thrust of the proposed amendments is the abolition of the interim National
Assembly and its substitution with an "interim Batasang Pambansa their in by in Proposed amendment
No. 6 will permit or allow the concentration of power in one man - the Executive - Prime Minister or
President or whatever you may call him - for it gives him expressly (which the 1973 Constitution or the
1935 Constitution does not) legislative powers even during the existence of the appropriate legislative
body, dependent solely on the executive's judgment on the existence of a grave emergency or a threat
or imminence thereof **

I must be forgiven if, not concerned with the present, I am haunted however by what can happen in the
future, when we shall all be gone. Verily, this is a matter of grave concern which necessitates full,
mature, sober deliberation of the people but which they can do only in a climate of freedom without the
restraints of martial law. I close, remembering what Claro M. Recto, President of the Constitutional
Convention which drafted the 1935 Philippine Constitution, once said: .

... Nor is it enough that our people possess a written constitution in order that their
government may be called constitutional. To be deserving of this name, and to drive
away all lanirer of anarchy as well as of dictatorship whether by one man or a few, it is
necessary that both the government authorities and the people faithfully observe and
obey the constitution, and that the citizens be duly conversant not only with their rights
but also with their duties...7
Jose P. Laurel who served his people as Justice of the Supreme Court of this country gave this reminder;
the grave and perilous task of halting transgressions and vindicating cherished rights is reposed mainly
oil the Judiciary and therefore let the Courts be the vestal keepers of the purity and sanctity of our
Constitution.' On the basis of the foregoing, I vote to declare Presidential Decrees Nos. 991 and 1033
unconstitutional and enjoin the implementation thereof.

CONCEPCION JR., J., concurring:

I vote for the dismissal of the petitions.

1. The issue is not political and therefore justiciable.

The term "political question", as this Court has previously defined, refers to those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with the issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.1

Here, the question raised is whether the President has authority to propose to the people amendments
to the Constitution which the petitioners claim is vested solely upon the National Assembly, the
constitutional convention called for the purpose, and the by the National Assembly. This is not a political
question since it involves the determination of conflicting claims of authority under the constitution.

In Gonzales vs. Comelec, 2 this Court, resolving the issue of whether or not a Resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution, ruled that the question is essentially
justiciable, not political, and hence, subject to judicial review.

In Tolentino vs. Comelec 3 this Court finally dispelled all doubts as to its position regarding its
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, as
well as those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the
constitution. Insofar as observance of constitutional provisions on the procedure for amending the
constitution is concerned, the issue is cognizable by this Court under its powers of judicial review.

2. As to the merits, a brief backdrop of the decision to hold the referendum-plebiscite will help resolve
the issue. It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, an interim National Assembly was
organized to bring about an orderly transition from the presidential to the parliamentary system of
government.' The people, however, probably distrustful of the members who are old time politicians
and constitutional delegates who had voted themselves by to membership in the interim National
Assembly, voted against the convening of the said interim assembly for at least seven years thus
creating a political stalemate and a consequent delay' in the transformation of the government into the
parliamentary system. To resolve the impasse, the President, at the instance of the barangays and
sanggunian assemblies through their duly authorized instrumentalities who recommended a study of
the feasibility of abolishing and replacing the by interim National Assembly with another interim body
truly representative of the people in a reformed society, issued Presidential Decree No. 991, on
September 2, 1976, calling for a national referendum on October -16, 1976 to ascertain the wishes of
the people as to the ways and means that may be available to attain the objective; providing for a
period of educational and information campaign on the issues; and establishing the mechanics and
manner for holding thereof. But the people, through their barangays, addressed resolutions to the
Batasang Bayan, expressing their desire to have the constitution amended, thus prompting the
President to issue Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to @ submitted to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,1976.

As will be seen, the authority to amend the Constitution was removed from the interim National
Assembly and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Since the Constitution emanates from the
people who are the repository of all political powers, their authority to amend the Constitution through
the means they have adopted, aside from those mentioned in the Constitution, cannot be gainsaid. Not
much reflection is also needed to show that the President did not exercise his martial law legislative
powers when he proposed the amendments to the Constitution. He was merely acting as an instrument
to carry out the will of the people. Neither could he convene the interim National Assembly, as
suggested by the petitioners, without doing violence to the people's will expressed overwhelmingly
when they decided against convening the interim assembly for at least seven years.

3. The period granted to the people to consider the proposed amendments is reasonably long and
enough to afford intelligent discussion of the issues to be voted upon. PD 991 has required the
barangays to hold assemblies or meetings to discuss and debate on the referendum questions, which in
fact they have been doing. Considering that the proposed amendments came from the representatives
of the people themselves, the people must have already formed a decision by this time on what stand to
take on the proposed amendments come the day for the plebiscite. Besides, the Constitution itself
requires the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment not later than three (3) months
after the approval of such amendment or revision but without setting a definite period within which
such plebiscite shall not be held. From this I can only conclude that the framers of the Constitution
desired that only a short period shall elapse from the approval of such amendment or resolution to its
ratification by the people.

3. Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, 28 January 2000

G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to
the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol"
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding
the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by
the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court
to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases
were filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner
is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is
only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and
in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to
due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of
the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged
utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper
time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the dropping of the charges. 2

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in
"official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it
must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. 3 The
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 4 It
appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the
stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
state outside his official functions.5 As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part
of official duty.

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that
preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at
bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required
in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. 8 Besides the absence of preliminary investigation
does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective.9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

4. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf
of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents), duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor.
In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the
JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1)
vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute
itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate
Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on
August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the
meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012
Resolution8 reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10)
days from notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of
the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is
immediately executory."9

Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda. 10

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of
appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in
the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times
that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their
appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body. 13

Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body,
the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power
became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must
have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.

Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process,
and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. 16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is
entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but
alternately or by rotation.

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1âwphi1 An eighth
member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting
simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. 17

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.

Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC
would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the
proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3]
that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the
JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member
composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds
listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues
covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with
respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.

As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.

Ruling of the Court

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the
several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. 19 The Framers
reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and
the framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they
say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite
purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent
which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly
says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to
interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter
"a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in
tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the
presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-
President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of
Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter
would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to
their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents
cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it
was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive
power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative
function.

The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2)
Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House plays,
regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately.
Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of
appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of war, 25 canvassing of electoral returns for
the President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these
instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and
with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation
in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a
unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major
branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial
Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative of
the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing,
the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of
Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position 28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:

I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation.
Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate
the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single
representation of Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-
quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to
the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion, 29 which reads:

8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended
to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is
that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs
counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in
the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to
eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear
violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:

As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7)
representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category of
members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature
of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is
explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives
from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the
Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a
former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating. 31 Thus:

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC
reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the
community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main
branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the
judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as
representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting
members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by
Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the
other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of
Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under our
constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts
with the other two co-equal branches of government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same
weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the
judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch
and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of
prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three
branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and
vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a
constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full
vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the
voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or
tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot
be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of
Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full
vote.

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC
simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and
balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to
a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of
members of Congress.

Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply
because it was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or
laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very
beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.

It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as
if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products,
Inc.
v. Fertiphil Corporation:32

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine
is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in
reliance upon a law creating it.33

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct
action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate.
Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into
the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a
perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to
the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus
"a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted." 34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature
would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial
legislation."37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution
against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the
Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. 38 In cases
like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an
excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of
congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not
included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and
tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or
reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, T hereby certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 257-286.

2
Id. at 287-298.

3
Entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
defer the consideration of all nominees and the preparation of the short list to be submitted to
the President for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;" id. at 303-304.

4
Entitled "Resolution expressing anew the sense of the Senate that the Senate and House of
Representatives should have one (1) representative each in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
and that each representative is entitled to a full vote;" id. at 305-307.

5
Entitled "Resolution to file an urgent motion with the Supreme Court to set for oral argument
the motion for reconsideration filed by the representatives of Congress to the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) in the case of Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G..
Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas Jr., G.R. No. 2022242 considering the primordial importance of the
constitutional issues involved;" id. at 308-310.

6
Entitled "Resolution authorizing Senator Joker P. Arroyo to argue, together with the Counsel-
of-record, the motion for reconsideration filed by the representative of the Senate to the
Judicial and Bar Council in the case of Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr.;" id. at 311-312.

7
Id. at 313-314.

8
Id. at (318-I)-(318-K).

9
Id. at 318-J.

10
Petitioner’s Memorandum, id. at 326-380; Respondents’ Memorandum, id. at 381-424.

11
Malolos Constitution Article 80 Title X. – The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the
Solicitor-General shall be chosen by the National Assembly in concurrence with the President of
the Republic and the Secretaries of the Government, and shall be absolutely independent of the
Legislative and Executive Powers."
12
1935 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. – The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges
of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments."

13
1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, 437.

14
Section 4 Article X of the 1973 Constitution provides: "The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President."

15
1 Records, Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, p. 487.

16
List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries and
Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council, rollo, pp. 62-
63.

17
Id.

18
Id. at 80, citing Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Meeting, January 12, 2000 and Minutes
of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 2001.

19
Malcolm, The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands (2nd ed. 1926), p. 26.

20
1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 4. – The President and the Vice-President shall be
elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified
for election to the same office at any time.

xxx

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case
two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x.

21
1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 9. – Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-
President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately. (Emphasis supplied)

22
1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 18. – The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to
be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it. (Emphasis supplied)

23
1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 27(1). – Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If,
after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the
date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

24
1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 24. – All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

25
1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 23 (1). – The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.

26
1987 Constitution, Article VII Section 4. – The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted
to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case
two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.

27
1987 Constitution, Article XI Section 3 (1). – The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
 xxx

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

28
Dated March 27, 2007; Annex "D," rollo, p. 104.

29
Annex C, id. at 95. Quoting the interpretation of Article VIII, Section (1) of the Constitution by
Fr. Joaquin Bernas in page 984 of his book, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, A Commentary. He quoted another author, Hector de Leon, and portions of the
decisions of this Court in Flores v. Drilon, and Escalante v. Santos, before extensively quoting the
Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 (pages 444 to 491).

30
Annex "E," id. at 1205.

31
Rollo, pp. 91-93.

32
G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.

33
Id. at 516-517. (Citations omitted.)

34
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., p. 198.

35
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2009 ed., p. 231.

36
Id., citing Cartwrite v. Cartwrite, 40 A2d 30, 155 ALR 1088 (1944).

37
Id., Agpalo, p. 232

38
Dissenting Opinion, Chief Justice Panganiban, Central Bank (Now Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas)
Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004,
446 SCRA 299, citing Peralta v. COMELEC. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30, 77, citing
concurring and dissenting opinion of former Chief Justice Fernando, citing Malcolm.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

ABAD, J.:
On July 17, 2012, the Court rendered a Decision 1 granting the petition for declaration of
unconstitutionality, prohibition, and injunction filed by petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, and declaring that
the current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is unconstitutional. The Court
also enjoined the JBC to reconstitute itself so that only one member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

On July 24, 2012, respondents Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
moved for reconsideration.2 The Court then conducted and heard the parties in oral arguments on the
following Issues:

1. Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight members, two of
whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.

A. Whether or not the JBC should be composed of seven members only.

B. Whether or not Congress is entitled to more than one seat in the JBC.

C. Assuming Congress is entitled to more than one seat, whether or not each representative of Congress
should be entitled to exercise one whole vote.

I maintain my dissent to the majority opinion now being reconsidered.

To reiterate, the vital question that needs to be resolved is: whether or not the Senate and the House of
Representatives are entitled to one representative each in the JBC, both with the right to cast one full
vote in its deliberations.

At the core of the present controversy is Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied)

In interpreting Section 8(1) above, the majority opinion reiterated that in opting to use the singular
letter "a" to describe "representative of the Congress," the Filipino people through the framers of the
1987 Constitution intended Congress to just have one representative in the JBC. The majority opinion
added that there could not have been any plain oversight in the wordings of the provision since the
other provisions of the 1987 Constitution were amended accordingly with the shift to a bicameral
legislative body.

The mere fact, however, that adjustments were made in some provisions should not mislead the Court
into concluding that all provisions have been amended to recognize the bicameral nature of Congress.
As I have previously noted in my dissenting opinion, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the
Constitutional Commission himself, admitted that the committee charged with making adjustments in
the previously passed provisions covering the JBC, failed to consider the impact of the changed
character of the Legislature on the inclusion of "a representative of the Congress" in the membership of
the JBC.3

Indeed, to insist that only one member of Congress from either the Senate or the House of
Representatives should sit at any time in the JBC, is to ignore the fact that they are still separate and
distinct from each other although they are both involved in law-making. Both legislators are elected
differently, maintain separate administrative organizations, and deliberate on laws independently. In
fact, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives can by itself claim to represent the Congress.

Again, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to limit the term "Congress" to just
either of the two Houses can be seen from the words that they used in crafting Section 8(1 ). While the
provision provides for just "a representative of the Congress," it also provides that such representation
is "ex officio" or "by virtue of one's office, or position." 4

Under the Senate rules, the Chairperson of its Justice Committee is automatically the Senate
representative to the JBC. In the same way, under the House of Representatives rules, the Chairperson
of its Justice Committee is the House representative to the JBC. Consequently, there are actually two
persons in Congress who hold separate offices or positions with the attached function of sitting in the
JBC. If the Court adheres to a literal translation of Section 8(1 ), no representative from Congress will
qualify as "ex officio" member of the JBC. This would deny Congress the representation that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution intended it to have.

Having said that the Senate and the House of Representatives should have one representative each in
the JBC, it is logical to conclude that each should also have the right to cast one full vote in its
deliberations. To split the vote between the two legislators would be an absurdity since it would
diminish their standing and make them second class members of the JBC, something that the
Constitution clearly does not contemplate. Indeed, the JBC abandoned the half-a-vote practice on
January 12, 2000 and recognized the right of both legislators to cast one full vote each. Only by
recognizing this right can the true spirit and reason of Section 8(1) be attained.

For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 226-250.

2
Id. at 257-284.

3
http://opinion.inquirer.net/31813/jbc-odds-and-ends (last accessed February 15, 2013).

4
Webster's New World College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 477.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I dissent.

Both the Senate and the House of Representatives must be represented in the Judicial and Bar Council.
This is the Constitution's mandate read as a whole and in the light of the ordinary and contemporary
understanding of our people of the structure of our government. Any other interpretation diminishes
Congress and negates the effectivity of its representation in the Judicial and Bar Council.

It is a Constitution we are interpreting. More than privileging a textual preposition, our duty is to ensure
that the constitutional project ratified by our people is given full effect.

At issue in this case is the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution which provides the
following:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of

Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. (Emphasis provided)

Mainly deploying verba legis as its interpretative modality, the main opinion chooses to focus on the
article "a." As correctly pointed out in the original dissent of Justice Robert A bad, the entire phrase
includes the words "representative of Congress" and "ex officio Members." In the context of the
constitutional plan involving a bicameral Congress, these words create ambiguity.

A Bicameral Congress

Our Constitution creates a Congress consisting of two chambers. Thus, in Article VI, Section 1, the
Constitution provides the following:

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives x x x. (Emphasis provided)

Senators are "elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines". 1 Members of the House of
Representatives, on the other hand, are elected by legislative districts 2 or through the party list
system.3 The term of a Senator4 is different from that of a Member of the House of
Representatives.5 Therefore, the Senate and the House of Representatives while component parts of the
Congress are not the same in terms of their representation. The very rationale of a bicameral system is
to have the Senators represent a national constituency. Representatives of the House of
Representatives, on the other hand, are dominantly from legislative districts except for one fifth which
are from the party list system.

Each chamber is organized separately.6 The Senate and the House each promulgates their own rules of
procedure.7 Each chamber maintains separate Journals. 8 They each have separate Records of their
proceedings.9 The Senate and the House of Representatives discipline their own respective members. 10

To belabor the point: There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a
Senate President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives. There is no single journal for the
Congress of the Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate and a journal for the House of
Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for the entire Congress of the Philippines, but there
is a Record of proceedings for the Senate and a Record of proceedings for the House of Representatives.
The Congress of the Philippines does not discipline its members. It is the Senate that promulgates its
own rules and disciplines its members. Likewise, it is the House that promulgates its own rules and
disciplines its members.

No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the Senate. No
Member of the House of Representatives reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she
reports to the House of Representatives.

Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress does not exist separate
from the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate must get directions from the Senate.
By constitutional design, he or she cannot get instructions from the House of Representatives. If a
Senator represents the Congress rather than simply the Senate, then he or she must be open to amend
or modify the instructions given to him or her by the Senate if the House of Representatives’
instructions are different. Yet, the Constitution vests disciplinary power only on the Senate for any
Senator.

The same argument applies to a Member of the House of Representatives.

No Senator may carry instructions from the House of Representatives. No Member of the House of
Representatives may carry instructions from the Senate. Neither Senator nor Member of the House of
Representatives may therefore represent Congress as a whole.

The difference between the Senate and the House of Representative was a subject of discussion in the
Constitutional Commission. In the July 21, 1986 Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Commissioner Jose F. S. Bengzon presented the following argument during the discussion on
bicameralism, on the distinction between Congressmen and Senators, and the role of the Filipino people
in making these officials accountable:

I grant the proposition that the Members of the House of Representatives are closer to the people that
they represent. I grant the proposition that the Members of the House of Representatives campaign on
a one-to-one basis with the people in the barrios and their constituencies. I also grant the proposition
that the candidates for Senator do not have as much time to mingle around with their constituencies in
their respective home bases as the candidates for the House. I also grant the proposition that the
candidates for the Senate go around the country in their efforts to win the votes of all the members of
the electorate at a lesser time than that given to the candidates for the House of Representatives. But
then the lesson of the last 14 years has made us mature in our political thinking and has given us
political will and self-determination. We really cannot disassociate the fact that the Congressman, the
Member of the House of Representatives, no matter how national he would like to think, is very much
strongly drawn into the problems of his local constituents in his own district.

Due to the maturity of the Filipinos for the last 14 years and because of the emergence of people power,
I believe that this so-called people power can be used to monitor not only the Members of the House of
Representatives but also the Members of the Senate. As I said we may have probably adopted the
American formula in the beginning but over these years, I think we have developed that kind of a system
and adopted it to our own needs. So at this point in time, with people power working, it is not only the
Members of the House who can be subjected to people power but also the Members of the Senate
because they can also be picketed and criticized through written articles and talk shows. And even the
people not only from their constituencies in their respective regions and districts but from the whole
country can exercise people power against the Members of the Senate because they are supposed to
represent the entire country. So while the Members of Congress become unconsciously parochial in
their desire to help their constituencies, the Members of the Senate are there to take a look at all of
these parochial proposals and coordinate them with the national problems. They may be detached in
that sense but they are not detached from the people because they themselves know and realize that
they owe their position not only to the people from their respective provinces but also to the people
from the whole country. So, I say that people power now will be able to monitor the activities of the
Members of the House of Representatives and that very same people power can be also used to
monitor the activities of the Members of the Senate.11

Commissioner Bengzon provided an illustration of the fundamental distinction between the House of
Representatives and the Senate, particularly regarding their respective constituencies and electorate.
These differences, however, only illustrate that the work of the Senate and the House of
Representatives taken together results in a Congress functioning as one branch of government. Article
VI, Section 1, as approved by the Commission, spoke of one Congress whose powers are vested in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Thus, when the Constitution provides that a "representative of Congress" should participate in the
Judicial and Bar Council, it cannot mean a Senator carrying out the instructions of the House or a
Member of the House of Representative carrying out instructions from the Senate. It is not the kind of a
single Congress contemplated by our Constitution. The opinion therefore that a Senator or a Member of
the House of Representative may represent the Congress as a whole is contrary to the intent of the
Constitution. It is unworkable.

One mechanism used in the past to work out the consequence of the majority’s opinion is to allow a
Senator and a Member of the House of Representative to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council but to each
allow them only half a vote.

Within the Judicial and Bar Council, the Chief Justice is entitled to one vote. The Secretary of Justice is
also entitled to one whole vote and so are the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the private sector, legal
academia, and retired justices. Each of these sectors are given equal importance and rewarded with one
whole vote. However, in this view, the Senate is only worth fifty percent of the wisdom of these sectors.
Likewise, the wisdom of the House of Representatives is only worth fifty percent of these institutions.

This is constitutionally abominable. It is inconceivable that our people, in ratifying the Constitution
granting awesome powers to Congress, intended to diminish its component parts. After all, they are
institutions composed of people who have submitted themselves to the electorate. In creating shortlists
of possible candidates to the judiciary, we can safely suppose that their input is not less than the input
of the professor of law or the member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or the member from the
private sector.

The other solution done in the past was to alternate the seat between a Senator and a Member of the
House of Representatives.

To alternate the seat given to Congress between the Senate and the House of Representatives would
mean not giving a seat to the Congress at all. Again, when a Senator is seated, he or she represents the
Senate and not Congress as a whole. When a Member of the House of Representative is seated, he or
she can only represent Congress as a whole. Thus, alternating the seat not only diminishes congressional
representation; it negates it.

Constitutional Interpretation

The argument that swayed the majority in this case’s original decision was that if those who crafted our
Constitution intended that there be two representatives from Congress, it would not have used the
preposition "a" in Article VIII, Section 8 (1). However, beyond the number of representatives, the
Constitution intends that in the Judicial and Bar Council, there will be representation from Congress and
that it will be "ex officio", i.e., by virtue of their positions or offices. We note that the provision did not
provide for a number of members to the Judicial and Bar Council. This is unlike the provisions creating
many other bodies in the Constitution.12

In other words, we could privilege or start our interpretation only from the preposition "a" and from
there provide a meaning that ensures a difficult and unworkable result -- one which undermines the
concept of a bicameral congress implied in all the other 114 other places in the Constitution that uses
the word "Congress".

Or, we could give the provision a reasonable interpretation that is within the expectations of the people
who ratified the Constitution by also seeing and reading the words "representative of Congress" and
"ex officio."

This proposed interpretation does not violate the basic tenet regarding the authoritativeness of the text
of the Constitution. It does not detract from the text. It follows the canonical requirement of verba legis.
But in doing so, we encounter an ambiguity.

In Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 13 we said:

As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.

However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined
in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the
Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or
remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not the
panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.

Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in
the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to

be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle
and nugatory. (Emphasis provided)

And in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,13 we said:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

The authoritativeness of text is no excuse to provide an unworkable result or one which undermines the
intended structure of government provided in the Constitution. Text is authoritative, but it is not
exhaustive of the entire universe of meaning.

There is no compelling reason why we should blind ourselves as to the meaning of "representative of
Congress" and "ex officio." There is no compelling reason why there should only be one representative
of a bicameral Congress.

Proposed Reasons for Only One Representative of Congress

The first reason to support the need for only one representative of Congress is the belief that there
needs to be an odd number in the Judicial and Bar Council.

This is true only if the decision of the constitutional organ in question is a dichotomous one, i.e., a yes or
a no. It is in this sense that a tie-breaker will be necessary.

However, the Judicial and Bar Council is not that sort of a constitutional organ. Its duty is to provide the
President with a shortlist of candidates to every judicial position. We take judicial notice that for
vacancies, each member of the Judicial and Bar Council is asked to list at least three (3) names. All these
votes are tallied and those who garner a specific plurality are thus put on the list and transmitted to the
President. There had been no occasion when the Judicial and Bar Council ever needed to break a tie. The
Judicial and Bar Council’s functions proceed regardless of whether they have seven or eight members.

The second reason that the main opinion accepted as persuasive was the opinion that Congress does
not discharge its function to check and balance the power of both the Judiciary and the Executive in the
Judicial and Bar Council. From this premise, it then proceeds to argue that the Representative of
Congress, who is ex officio, does not need to consult with Congress as a whole.

This is very perplexing and difficult to accept.

By virtue of the fundamental premise of separation of powers, the appointing power in the judiciary
should be done by the Supreme Court. However, for judicial positions, this is vested in the Executive.
Furthermore, because of the importance of these appointments, the President’s discretion is limited to
a shortlist submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar Council which is under the supervision of the
Supreme Court but composed of several components.

The Judicial and Bar Council represents the constituents affected by judicial appointments and by
extension, judicial decisions. It provides for those who have some function vis a vis the law that should
be applied and interpreted by our courts. Hence, represented are practicing lawyers (Integrated Bar of
the Philippines), prosecutors (Secretary of the Department of Justice), legal academia (professor of law),
and judges or justices (retired justice and the Chief Justice). Also represented in some way are those that
will be affected by the interpretation directly (private sector representative).

Congress is represented for many reasons.

One, it crafts statutes and to that extent may want to ensure that those who are appointed to the
judiciary are familiar with these statutes and will have the competence, integrity, and independence to
read its meaning.

Two, the power of judicial review vests our courts with the ability to nullify their acts. Congress,
therefore, has an interest in the judicial philosophy of those considered for appointment into our
judiciary.

Three, Congress is a political organ. As such, it is familiar with the biases of our political leaders
including that of the President. Thus, it will have greater sensitivity to the necessity for political
accommodations if there be any. Keeping in mind the independence required of our judges and justices,
the Members of Congress may be able to appreciate the kind of balance that will be necessary -- the
same balance that
the President might be able to likewise appreciate -- when putting a person in the shortlist of judicial
candidates. Not only do they appreciate this balance, they embody it. Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives (unlike any of the other members of the Judicial and Bar Council), periodically
submit themselves to the electorate.

It is for these reasons that the Congressional representatives in the Judicial and Bar Council may be
instructed by their respective chambers to consider some principles and directions. Through resolutions
or actions by the Congressional Committees they represent, the JBC Congressional representatives’
choices may be constrained. Therefore, they do not sit there just to represent themselves. Again, they
are "representatives of Congress" "ex officio".

The third reason to support only one representative of Congress is the belief that there is the
"unmistakable tenor" in the provision in question that one co-equal branch should be represented only
by one Representative.14 It may be true that the Secretary of Justice is the political alter ego of the
President or the Executive. However, Congress as a whole does not have a political alter ego. In other
words, while the Executive may be represented by a single individual, Congress cannot be represented
by an individual. Congress, as stated earlier, operates through the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Unlike the Executive, the Legislative branch cannot be represented by only one
individual.

A Note on the Work of the Constitutional Commission

Time and again, we have clarified the interpretative value to Us of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Thus in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we emphasized:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention ‘are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give
Us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.’The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding
thereof.15 (Emphasis provided)

Also worth Our recall is the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in
constitutional exegesis:16

The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it was, when it
is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not say it,
surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down in the
document, prying into what else they wrote and what they said, anything we may find is only
advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on
theirs.17 (Emphasis provided)
In addition to the interpretative value of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission, we should
always be careful when we quote from their records without understanding their context.

The Committees of the Constitutional Commission were all tasked to finish their reports not later than
July 7, 1986.18 The Second and Third Readings were scheduled to finish not later than August 15,
1986.19 The members of the Sponsorship and Style Committee were tasked to finish their work of
formulating and polishing the style of the final draft of the new Constitution scheduled for submission to
the entire membership of the Commission not later than August 25, 1986. 20

The Rules of the Constitutional Commission also provided for a process of approving resolutions and
amendments.

Constitutional proposals were embodied in resolutions signed by the author. 21 If they emanated from a
committee, the resolution was signed by its chairman. 22 Resolutions were filed with the Secretary-
General.23 The First Reading took place when the titles of the resolutions were read and referred to the
appropriate committee.24

The Committees then submitted a Report on each resolution. 25 The Steering Committee took charge of
including the committee report in the Calendar for Second Reading. 26 The Second Reading took place on
the day set for the consideration of a resolution. 27 The provisions were read in full with the amendments
proposed by the committee, if there were any. 28

A motion to close debate took place after three speeches for and two against, or if only one speech has
been raised and none against it.29 The President of the Constitutional Commission had the prerogative
to allow debates among those who had indicated that they intended to be heard on certain
matters.30 After the close of the debate, the Constitutional Commission proceeded to consider the
Committee amendments.31

After a resolution was approved on Second Reading, it was included in the Calendar for Third
Reading.32 Neither further debate nor amendment shall be made on the resolution on its Third
Reading.33 All constitutional proposals approved by the Commission after Third Reading were referred to
the Committees on Sponsorship and Style for collation, organization, and consolidation into a complete
and final draft of the Constitution.34 The final draft was submitted to the Commission for the sole
purpose of determining whether it reflects faithfully and accurately the proposals as approved on
Second Reading.35

With respect to the provision which is now Article VIII, Section 8 (1), the timetable was as follows:

On July 10, 1986, the Committee on the Judiciary presented its Report to the
Commission.36 Deliberations then took place on the same day; on July 11, 1986; and on July 14, 1986. It
was on July 10 that Commissioner Rodrigo raised points regarding the Judicial and Bar Council. 37 The
discussion spoke of the Judicial and Bar Council having seven members.

Numerous mentions of the Judicial and Bar Council being comprised of seven members were also made
by Commissioners on July 14, 1986. On the same day, the amended article was approved by unanimous
voting.38
On July 19, 1986, the vote on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary took place. 39 The vote was 43
and none against.40

Committee Report No. 22 proposing an article on a National Assembly was reported out by July 21,
1986.41 It provided for a unicameral assembly. Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., made the presentation
and stated that they had a very difficult decision to make regarding bicameralism and
unicameralism.42 The debate occupied the Commission for the whole day.

Then, a vote on the structure of Congress took place. 43 Forty four (44) commissioners cast their votes
during the roll call.44 The vote was 23 to 22.45

On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was reopened for purposes of introducing amendments
to the proposed Sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, and 14. 46

On October 9, 1986, the entire Article on the Legislature was approved on Third Reading. 47

By October 10, 1986, changes in style on the Article on the Legislature were introduced. 48

On October 15, 1986, Commissioner Guingona presented the 1986 Constitution to the President of the
Constitutional Commission, Cecilia Munoz-Palma.49

It is apparent that the Constitutional Commission either through the Style and Sponsorship Committee
or the Committees on the Legislature and the Judiciary was not able to amend the provision concerning
the Judicial and Bar Council after the Commission had decided to propose a bicameral Congress. We can
take judicial notice of the chronology of events during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. The chronology should be taken as much as the substance of discussions exchanged
between the Commissioners.

The quotations from the Commissioners mentioned in the main opinion and in the proposed resolution
of the present Motion for Reconsideration should thus be appreciated in its proper context.

The interpellation involving Commissioners Rodrigo and Concepcion took place on July 10, 1986 and on
July 14, 1986.50 These discussions were about Committee Report No. 18 on the Judiciary. Thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.

On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about appointments of members of the Supreme Court
and of judges of lower courts. At present it is the President who appoints them. If there is a Commission
on Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. In
this proposal, we would like to establish a new office, a sort of a board composed of seven members,
called the Judicial and Bar Council. And while the President will still appoint the members of the
judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this Council.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO: Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President appoints four of
them who are the regular members.
 xxxx

MR. CONCEPCION: The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate partisan politics. 51

xxxx

It must also be noted that during the same day and in the same discussion, both Commissioners Rodrigo
and Concepcion later on referred to a ‘National Assembly’ and not a ‘Congress,’ as can be seen here:

MR. RODRIGO: Another point. Under our present Constitution, the National Assembly may enact rules of
court, is that right? On page 4, the proviso on lines 17 to 19 of the Article on the Judiciary provides:

The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence
of the Supreme Court.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

MR. RODRIGO: So, two things are required of the National Assembly before it can repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, etc.
— it must have the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.

MR. CONCEPCION: That is correct.52

On July 14, 1986, the Commission proceeded with the Period of Amendments. This was when the
exchange noted in the main opinion took place. Thus:

MR. RODRIGO: If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be exactly the same as the
provision in the 1935 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.

xxxx

If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, this will
be a diminution of the appointing power of the highest magistrate of the land, of the President of the
Philippines elected by all the Filipino people. The appointing power will be limited by a group of seven
people who are not elected by the people but only appointed.

Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in our constitutional
provisions on appointments. The members of the Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the
government. Even a municipal judge cannot be appointed by the President except upon
recommendation or nomination of three names by this committee of seven people, commissioners of
the Commission on Elections, the COA and Commission on Civil Service x x x even ambassadors, generals
of the Army will not come under this restriction. Why are we going to segregate the Judiciary from the
rest of our government in the appointment of the high-ranking officials?

Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the honor of our President
without being effective at all because this Council will be under the influence of the President. Four out
of seven are appointees of the President, and they can be reappointed when their term ends. Therefore,
they would kowtow to the President. A fifth member is the Minister of Justice, an alter ego of the
President. Another member represents the legislature. In all probability, the controlling party in the
legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this representative from the National Assembly is
also under the influence of the President. And may I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that even the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court is an appointee of the President. So, it is futile; he will be influenced
anyway by the President.53

It must again be noted that during this day and period of amendments after the quoted passage in the
Decision, the Commission later on made use of the term ‘National Assembly’ and not ‘Congress’ again:

MR. MAAMBONG: Presiding Officer and members of the Committee, I propose to delete the last
sentence on Section 16, lines 28 to 30 which reads: "The Chief Justice shall address the National
Assembly at the opening of each regular session."

May I explain that I have gone over the operations of other deliberative assemblies in some parts of the
world, and I noticed that it is only the Chief Executive or head of state who addresses the National
Assembly at its opening. When we say "opening," we are referring to the first convening of any national
assembly. Hence, when the Chief Executive or head of state addresses the National Assembly on that
occasion, no other speaker is allowed to address the body.

So I move for the deletion of this last sentence. 54

Based on the chronology of events, the discussions cited by the main ponencia took place when the
commissioners were still contemplating a unicameral legislature in the course of this discussion.
Necessarily, only one Representative would be needed to fully effect the participation of a unicameral
legislature. Therefore, any mention of the composition of the JBC having seven members in the records
of the Constitutional Commission, particularly during the dates cited, was obviously within the context
that the Commission had not yet voted and agreed upon a bicameral legislature.

The composition of the Congress as a bilateral legislature became final only after the JBC discussions as
a seven-member Council indicated in the Records of the Constitutional Commission took place. This puts
into the proper context the recognition by Commissioner Christian Monsod on July 30, 1986, which runs
as follows:

Last week, we voted for a bicameral legislature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of what the thinking of this
group is, that all the provisions that were being drafted up to that time assumed a unicameral
government.55

The repeated mentions of the JBC having seven members as indicated in the Records of the
Constitutional Commission do not justify the points raised by petitioner. This is a situation where the
records of the Constitutional Commission do not serve even as persuasive means to ascertain intent at
least in so far as the intended numbers for the Judicial and Bar Council. Certainly they are not relevant
even to advise us on how Congress is to be represented in that constitutional organ.

We should never forget that when we interpret the Constitution, we do so with full appreciation of
every part of the text within an entire document understood by the people as they ratified it and with all
its contemporary consequences. As an eminent author in constitutional theory has observed while going
through the various interpretative modes presented in jurisprudence: "x x x all of the methodologies
that will be discussed, properly understood, figure in constitutional analysis as opportunities: as starting
points, constituent parts of complex arguments, or concluding evocations." 56

Discerning that there should be a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives that sit in the
Judicial and Bar Council so that Congress can be fully represented ex officio is not judicial activism. It is in
keeping with the constitutional project of a bicameral Congress that is effective whenever and wherever
it is represented. It is in tune with how our people understand Congress as described in the fundamental
law. It is consistent with our duty to read the authoritative text of the Constitution so that ordinary
people who seek to understand this most basic law through Our decisions would understand that
beyond a single isolated text -- even beyond a prepos1t10n in Article VIII, Section 8 (1 ), our primordial
values and principles are framed, congealed and will be given full effect.

In a sense, we do not just read words in a legal document; we give meaning to a Constitution.

For these reasons, I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration and deny the Petition for lack of merit.

5. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995

JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,

vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of Finance;
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS
OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995

RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.

G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA), petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995

KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR.,
JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L.
GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"),
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., and PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC. and WIGBERTO
TAÑADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995

COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.

G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995

PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE BOOK

SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the
Commissioner of Customs, respondents.

RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases
for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in
these cases, with the exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association, Inc. and the
Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc., petitioner
in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply. In turn the
Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply.

On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.

I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners (Tolentino,
Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
(CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in
the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H.
No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward
it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means
Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what
the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner
Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by
striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the
bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."

The contention has no merit.

The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a
House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two occasions during
the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with
House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. These were:

R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY EXTENDING FROM
FIVE (5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND DUTY EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL
EQUIPMENT) which was approved by the President on April 10, 1992. This Act is actually a consolidation
of H. No. 34254, which was approved by the House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was
approved by the Senate on February 3, 1992.

R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE REWARD TO ANY
FILIPINO ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES) which was approved by the President on
May 22, 1992. This Act is a consolidation of H. No. 22232, which was approved by the House of
Representatives on August 2, 1989, and S. No. 807, which was approved by the Senate on October 21,
1991.
On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the
consolidation of House and Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates on which
the laws were approved by the President and dates the separate bills of the two chambers of Congress
were respectively passed:

1. R.A. NO. 7642

AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28,
1992).

House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992

Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992

2. R.A. NO. 7643

AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO REQUIRE THE

PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY MONTH AND TO ALLOW LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT REVENUE, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992)

House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992

Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992

3. R.A. NO. 7646

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO PRESCRIBE THE

PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES BY LARGE TAXPAYERS, AMENDING
FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
AS AMENDED (February 24, 1993)

House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992

Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992

4. R.A. NO. 7649

AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS,

INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO DEDUCT AND WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX DUE AT THE RATE OF THREE PERCENT (3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE
PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SIX PERCENT (6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR SERVICES
RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April 6, 1993)

House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993

 Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993

5. R.A. NO. 7656

AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO

DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)

House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1168, November 3, 1993

6. R.A. NO. 7660

AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE

DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR
SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (December 23, 1993)

House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1330, November 18, 1993

7. R.A. NO. 7717

AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF STOCK

LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL STOCK EXCHANGE OR THROUGH INITIAL
PUBLIC OFFERING, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, BY INSERTING A NEW SECTION AND REPEALING CERTAIN
SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5, 1994)

House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993

Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994

Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise of its
power to propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its own version of a
House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners
Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to approve it on second and third readings.

On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino, concerns a
mere matter of form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make if, as the
Senate actually did in this case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute
measure, "taking into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."

Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:

 RULE XXIX

AMENDMENTS

xxx xxx xxx

§68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be considered.

No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is submitted

in writing.

Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.

§69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to the
subject matter of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.

xxx xxx xxx

§70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another which
covers a subject distinct from that proposed in the original bill or resolution. (emphasis
added).

Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine Senate
possesses less power than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between constitutional
provisions giving them the power to propose or concur with amendments.

Art. I, §7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.

Art. VI, §24 of our Constitution reads:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase
"as on other Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the intention of the framers
of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose amendments to revenue bills. Petitioner
Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" was inserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as in
any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these bills were not to be like other bills but
must be treated as a special kind."

The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of constitutional
intent are nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the Senate. It will be
recalled that the 1935 Constitution originally provided for a unicameral National Assembly. When it was
decided in 1939 to change to a bicameral legislature, it became necessary to provide for the procedure
for lawmaking by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The work of proposing amendments to
the Constitution was done by the National Assembly, acting as a constituent assembly, some of whose
members, jealous of preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought to curtail the powers of the
proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:

All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the
Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon,
the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for
corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should fail to finally act on any such
bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening of the next regular session of
the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the
members of the Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted
and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action.

The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the proposal. It
deleted everything after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was approved by the National
Assembly and embodied in Resolution No. 38, as amended by Resolution No. 73. (J. ARUEGO, KNOW
YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The proposed amendment was submitted to the people and
ratified by them in the elections held on June 18, 1940.

This is the history of Art. VI, §18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, §24 of the present
Constitution was derived. It explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the American text from
which the framers of the Philippine Constitution borrowed and why the phrase "as on other Bills" was
not copied. Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of the Senate to propose amendments
must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are
required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue
measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House,
however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from
the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.

That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to concur is clear
from the following commentaries:

The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without
restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re-
write a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill.
For example, a general revenue bill passed by the lower house of the United States
Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an inheritance tax . This was
changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The amending authority of the Senate
was declared by the United States Supreme Court to be sufficiently broad to enable it to
make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].

(L. TAÑADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247 (1961))
 The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of Representatives
because it is more numerous in membership and therefore also more representative of
the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of
the country in regard to the enactment of the legislation involved.

The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to propose or
concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of Representatives. Thus, in
one case, a bill introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives was changed by the
Senate to make a proposed inheritance tax a corporation tax. It is also accepted practice
for the Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment by substitution, which may
entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of Representatives.

(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).

In sum, while Art. VI, §24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the
exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As
petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of
the following:

(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or
adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as
a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report
at all.

(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))

To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the House by
prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be
preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the original body
of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No.
1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the
Senate could have made.

II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S.
No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that it
was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734
and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something substantially different between the reference to
S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716
originated both in the House and in the Senate and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because
neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."

In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the
provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of petitioner
Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates that the
provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.

Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a
mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass the Senate on
second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the
Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the House
of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the Conference Committee.

There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. When the
House bill and Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the disclosure of bank deposits),
were referred to a conference committee, the question was raised whether the two bills could be the
subject of such conference, considering that the bill from one house had not been passed by the other
and vice versa. As Congressman Duran put the question:

MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House bill is
passed by the House but not passed by the Senate, and a Senate bill of a similar nature is
passed in the Senate but never passed in the House, can the two bills be the subject of a
conference, and can a law be enacted from these two bills? I understand that the Senate
bill in this particular instance does not refer to investments in government securities,
whereas the bill in the House, which was introduced by the Speaker, covers two subject
matters: not only investigation of deposits in banks but also investigation of investments
in government securities. Now, since the two bills differ in their subject matter, I believe
that no law can be enacted.

Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:

THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is precisely in cases
like this where a conference should be had. If the House bill had been approved by the
Senate, there would have been no need of a conference; but precisely because the
Senate passed another bill on the same subject matter, the conference committee had
to be created, and we are now considering the report of that committee.

(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))

III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are distinct and
unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention that because
the President separately certified to the need for the immediate enactment of these measures, his
certification was ineffectual and void. The certification had to be made of the version of the same
revenue bill which at the moment was being considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it
would be necessary for the President to certify as many bills as are presented in a house of Congress
even though the bills are merely versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough that he certifies
the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994
the Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For that matter on
June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment because it was the
one which at that time was being considered by the House. This bill was later substituted, together with
other bills, by H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision that
the phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, §26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must
be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but also the requirement that before a
bill can become a law it must have passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only textual
support for such construction but historical basis as well.

Art. VI, §21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:

(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its
passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereof shall be
allowed and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.

When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, §19 (2):

(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Members three days
before its passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, §26 (2) of the
present Constitution, thus:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate
days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law
may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant
to address.

Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country
like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous
budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its
enactment any less an emergency.

Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases) believed that
there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the call of the
President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on the same day. While the judicial
department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the President's certification, the respect due
coequal departments of the government in matters committed to them by the Constitution and the
absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of the judicial hand.

At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where it
was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was actually
dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994).
Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading
and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate on third
reading.

The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform
the members of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is
progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to
prepare their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A.
No. 7716.

IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in violation of the
constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the people's right to know (Art. II, §28 and Art. III, §7)
the Conference Committee met for two days in executive session with only the conferees present.

As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such sessions
with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when a new rule was
adopted requiring open sessions. Unlike its American counterpart, the Philippine Congress has not
adopted a rule prescribing open hearings for conference committees.

It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975, at least staff
members were present. These were staff members of the Senators and Congressmen, however, who
may be presumed to be their confidential men, not stenographers as in this case who on the last two
days of the conference were excluded. There is no showing that the conferees themselves did not take
notes of their proceedings so as to give petitioner Kilosbayan basis for claiming that even in secret
diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees keep notes of their meetings. Above all, the
public's right to know was fully served because the Conference Committee in this case submitted a
report showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate.

Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports must contain
"a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other amendments." These changes are
shown in the bill attached to the Conference Committee Report. The members of both houses could
thus ascertain what changes had been made in the original bills without the need of a statement
detailing the changes.

The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400 (Land Reform
Act of 1955) was reported by the Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised a point of order.
He said:
 MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report of the
conference committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by reason of the provision of
Section 11, Article XII, of the Rules of this House which provides specifically that the
conference report must be accompanied by a detailed statement of the effects of the
amendment on the bill of the House. This conference committee report is not
accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr. Speaker. Therefore it is out of order to
consider it.

Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:

MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in connection with
the point of order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.

There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from
Pangasinan, but this provision applies to those cases where only portions of the bill have
been amended. In this case before us an entire bill is presented; therefore, it can be
easily seen from the reading of the bill what the provisions are. Besides, this procedure
has been an established practice.

After some interruption, he continued:

MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason for the
provisions of the Rules, and the reason for the requirement in the provision cited by the
gentleman from Pangasinan is when there are only certain words or phrases inserted in
or deleted from the provisions of the bill included in the conference report, and we
cannot understand what those words and phrases mean and their relation to the bill. In
that case, it is necessary to make a detailed statement on how those words and phrases
will affect the bill as a whole; but when the entire bill itself is copied verbatim in the
conference report, that is not necessary. So when the reason for the Rule does not exist,
the Rule does not exist.

(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))

Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling was
appealed, it was upheld by viva voce and when a division of the House was called, it was sustained by a
vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)

Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions as long as
these are germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges Association
v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction of the
conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may
propose an entirely new provision. What is important is that its report is subsequently approved by the
respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it would not entertain allegations that, because
new provisions had been added by the conference committee, there was thereby a violation of the
constitutional injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."
 Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members
of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))

It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines in a 1979
study:

Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These committees may
be given instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left without instructions.
Normally the conference committees are without instructions, and this is why they are
often critically referred to as "the little legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them,
the conferees have almost unlimited authority to change the clauses of the bills and in
fact sometimes introduce new measures that were not in the original legislation. No
minutes are kept, and members' activities on conference committees are difficult to
determine. One congressman known for his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on
export incentives for my interest group [copra] in the conference committee but I could
not have done so anywhere else." The conference committee submits a report to both
houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the committee is
discharged and new members are appointed.

(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND

LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M. SHAW, eds.)).

In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite it only to
say that conference committees here are no different from their counterparts in the United States
whose vast powers we noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all events, under Art. VI,
§16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings," including those of its
committees. Any meaningful change in the method and procedures of Congress or its committees must
therefore be sought in that body itself.

V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, §26 (1) of
the Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the
withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.

Pursuant to §13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of all other
taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or
description, imposed, levied, established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial or
national authority or government agency, now or in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by §103 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, which provides as follows:

§103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory.

R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by amending §103,
as follows:

§103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The amendment of §103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING
AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM [BY]
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES
AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,
AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to amend
any provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.

PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by specific
reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the constitutional
requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions
of the NIRC, among which is §103(q), in order to widen the base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which
becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197
and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to §103 of the NIRC as among the provisions sought to be
amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of these bills in
Congress before they were enacted into what is now R.A.
No. 7716.

In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL was
rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING
ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking
privileges. It was contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of
the law. In holding that there was sufficient description of the subject of the law in its title, including the
repeal of franking privileges, this Court held:

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but
would actually render legislation impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed.,
p. 297] As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title,
but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and
adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be
included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the
machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties
for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If
such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in
the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in
the title. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)

(227 SCRA at 707-708)

VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition, the press is
not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press
prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for special
treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the
publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.

Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred,
"even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason
is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative.

Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to
which other businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in the cases
invoked by the PPI. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936)
was found to be discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers
whose weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the result that the tax applied only to 13 out of 124
publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of Senator Huey Long who controlled the state
legislature which enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for the law was thus evident.

On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75
L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it could have been made
liable for the sales tax or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using, storing or consuming
tangible goods, the press was not. Instead, the press was exempted from both taxes. It was, however,
later made to pay a special use tax on the cost of paper and ink which made these items "the only items
subject to the use tax that were component of goods to be sold at retail." The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal of regulation is not related to
suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional." It would therefore appear
that even a law that favors the press is constitutionally suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that
case)

Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn "absolutely
and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those previously granted
to PAL, petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority,
and many more are likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to exemptions which are partially withdrawn,
in an effort to broaden the base of the tax.

The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that transactions,
which are profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some of
these transactions will suffice to show that by and large this is not so and that the exemptions are
granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor General says, such exemptions are granted, in some cases, to
encourage agricultural production and, in other cases, for the personal benefit of the end-user rather
than for profit. The exempt transactions are:

(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine
and forest products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings,
fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance
agriculture (milling of palay, corn, sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds,
fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).

(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of
citizens returning to the Philippines) or for professional use, like professional
instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.

(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for
manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to
percentage tax.

(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services
rendered under employer-employee relationship.

(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.

(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.

(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.

(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.

(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)

The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press
because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
PPI cites in support of this assertion the following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):

The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection

afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not
acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First
Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and
treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom
of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred position.

The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise
of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to
the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of
religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to
impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for
delivering a sermon."

A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957)
which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of
general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by the
American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to propagate.

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much
less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or
the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the
press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived
from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to those who cannot
afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale.
Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as
to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic imposition that might make the right to
disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the
tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to
make a sermon.

On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by §107 of the NIRC, as amended by §7 of
R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of registration and
enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in §108 of the NIRC. That the PBS
distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of
this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be
decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation.
CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as
covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and
equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."

With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing contracts of
the sale of real property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result in substantial
increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is
pointed out, is something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the contract.

The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from numerous
sources are cited by the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a new subject, or an
increased tax on an old one, interferes with a contract or impairs its obligation, within the meaning of
the Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt
of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and
release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can
it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense." (La Insular v.
Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not only existing laws but also
"the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order." (Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts
must be understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority
of the government and no obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that authority. (Norman v.
Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).

It is next pointed out that while §4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural
products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the
sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of real property for socialized and low-cost
housing is exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate transactions of "the less poor," i.e.,
the middle class, who are equally homeless, should likewise be exempted.

The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and
services was already exempt under §103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No.
7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while
subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Moreover, there is a difference between the
"homeless poor" and the "homeless less poor" in the example given by petitioner, because the second
group or middle class can afford to rent houses in the meantime that they cannot yet buy their own
homes. The two social classes are thus differently situated in life. "It is inherent in the power to tax that
the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities
which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord, City of Baguio v. De Leon,
134 Phil. 912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984); Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).

Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, §28(1)
which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or
ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation. (City of
Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)

Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A. No.
7716 merely expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law was questioned
in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 383 (1988) on grounds
similar to those made in these cases, namely, that the law was "oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and
regressive in violation of Art. VI, §28(1) of the Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the challenge to the law,
this Court held:

As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. . . .

The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the
public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services
by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding
P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application.
Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, so that the costs of
basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are
expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.

(At 382-383)

The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative Union of the
Philippines, Inc. (CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes the mandate of
Congress to provide for a progressive system of taxation because the law imposes a flat rate of 10% and
thus places the tax burden on all taxpayers without regard to their ability to pay.

The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are
regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are to be preferred
[and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)). Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but
to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect
taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, §17(1) of the 1973 Constitution
from which the present Art. VI, §28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.

Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case
of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of
certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, §3, amending §102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to
other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, §4, amending §103 of the NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are exempted from the
VAT:

(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine
and forest products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings,
fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance
agriculture (milling of palay, corn sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds,
fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).

(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of
citizens returning to the Philippines) and or professional use, like professional
instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.

(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for
manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject
to percentage tax.

(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services
rendered under employer-employee relationship.

(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.

(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.

(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.

(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.

(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)

On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve goods and
services which are used or availed of mainly by higher income groups. These include real properties held
primarily for sale to customers or for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business, the right or
privilege to use patent, copyright, and other similar property or right, the right or privilege to use
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion picture films, tapes and discs, radio, television,
satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels, restaurants and similar places, securities, lending
investments, taxicabs, utility cars for rent, tourist buses, and other common carriers, services of
franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph.

The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations by
tendering issues not at retail but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully developed record
which can impart to adjudication the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to show in
the concrete the application of the law to actual contracts and exemplify its effect on property rights.
For the fact is that petitioner's members have not even been assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is not
made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no different from those dealt with
in advisory opinions.
 The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere
allegation, as here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such
unconstitutional taint. Considering that petitioner here would condemn such a provision
as void on its face, he has not made out a case. This is merely to adhere to the
authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal protection clauses are
invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a
need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent
such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.

(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)

Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be that
postponement of adjudication would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case, however.
Enforcement of the law may give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an actual case and not an
abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be presented.

Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise,
adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really settle legal
issues.

We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 to decide whenever a claim is made that "there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This duty can only arise if an actual case or controversy is before us.
Under Art . VIII, §5 our jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and all that Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 can
plausibly mean is that in the exercise of that jurisdiction we have the judicial power to determine
questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, §1, ¶2 is "judicial power," which is "the power of a court
to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue and be sued in the courts
of law and equity" (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as distinguished from legislative and
executive power. This power cannot be directly appropriated until it is apportioned among several
courts either by the Constitution, as in the case of Art. VIII, §5, or by statute, as in the case of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The
power thus apportioned constitutes the court's "jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by law
upon a court or judge to take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States v.
Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot inquire
into any allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government.

VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative Union of the
Philippines (CUP), after briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to adopt a definite
policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on
cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy.
Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No. 175 was promulgated exempting cooperatives from the payment
of income taxes and sales taxes but in 1984, because of the crisis which menaced the national economy,
this exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in 1986, P.D. No. 2008 again granted cooperatives
exemption from income and sales taxes until December 31, 1991, but, in the same year, E.O. No. 93
revoked the exemption; and that finally in 1987 the framers of the Constitution "repudiated the
previous actions of the government adverse to the interests of the cooperatives, that is, the repeated
revocation of the tax exemption to cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the
cooperatives by way of the grant of tax exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:

§1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to
broaden the base of their ownership.

§15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of
cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled out
cooperatives by withdrawing their exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175, §5. What
P.D. No. 1955, §1 did was to withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments theretofore granted
to private business enterprises in general, in view of the economic crisis which then beset the nation. It is
true that after P.D. No. 2008, §2 had restored the tax exemptions of cooperatives in 1986, the
exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, §1, but then again cooperatives were not the only ones
whose exemptions were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax incentives applied to all, including
government and private entities. In the second place, the Constitution does not really require that
cooperatives be granted tax exemptions in order to promote their growth and viability. Hence, there is
no basis for petitioner's assertion that the government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of
vacillation, as far as the grant of tax privileges was concerned, and that it was to put an end to this
indecision that the constitutional provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a matter of policy
cooperatives should be granted tax exemptions, but that is left to the discretion of Congress. If Congress
does not grant exemption and there is no discrimination to cooperatives, no violation of any
constitutional policy can be charged.

Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt
from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt
from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-
stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).

CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies cooperatives the
equal protection of the law because electric cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The classification
between electric and other cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers cooperatives, marketing
cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a congressional determination that there is greater need to
provide cheaper electric power to as many people as possible, especially those living in the rural areas,
than there is to provide them with other necessities in life. We cannot say that such classification is
unreasonable.

We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A. No. 7716.
We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution of these
cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the infirmities attributed
to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the government does not constitute
a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity, desirability or expediency must be
addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally responsible, remembering that, as Justice Holmes
has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed.
971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce
the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in passing the law in question by voting
for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of
enactment. This Court does not sit as a third branch of the legislature, much less exercise a veto power
over legislation.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary restraining
order previously issued is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

6. In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic
Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and
the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per
cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised
to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the
Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of
the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371,
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated
their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as
follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have
passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he
may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately,
the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned
whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected
by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended
to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following
statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972
total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either
motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic
Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a
passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in
previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as
provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952,
and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient
reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession
and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the
court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or
not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the
bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle,
the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A.
Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it,
aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or
partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of
the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the
statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were
abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and
enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began
to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those
are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but
the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal
history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by
the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the
law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against
its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24
Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us
as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New
York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be
admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the
people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before
them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the
insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause.
There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion
of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken
of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
 These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of
Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission
to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public
or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of
Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the
students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a
test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that
of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to
its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the
plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to
indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship,
etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question.
(p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the
bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission
of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by
our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on
the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
 which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass
the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the
people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis.,
525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache
of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least
in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the
practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases
235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an
entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element
of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a
part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised
by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine
who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution
which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any
manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a
purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the
legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely
to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a
fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may
be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute
the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
 deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely

true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In
re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so
admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep.
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts,
it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is
the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such
right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This
arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in
People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys
at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be
a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of
the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for
assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly
and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to
 determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for
what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong
for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession
of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of
the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is
the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time
 of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.
— Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the
case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court
has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys
at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of
individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules
on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires
it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should
consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that
with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise
within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of
the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by
a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of
the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court
of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for
the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law
in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme
Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
 shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75.
We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the
face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications
of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the
bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds
the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object
which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the
earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention
of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and
17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to
it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and
with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But
in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys
prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
 necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we
think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his
case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of
the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to
present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In
re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the
fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary
and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December
31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or
to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied
for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court
declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under
which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to
revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1,
1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to
the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules
of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a
license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al,
54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December
31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at
least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior
to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The
other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights
and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited

by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing
an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in
general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference
which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40
N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl.
878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes
— First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in
the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there
seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and
limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma
granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-
sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to
practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in
the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must
spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before
December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the
 prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification
cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by
law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a
class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of
every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may
choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may
be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their
successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in
them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal
property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have
been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered
such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas
Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172,
76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed
the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit
to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of
the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who
(were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th,
1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per
cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on
 the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as

follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to
one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation
of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the
situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances
of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in
their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless
there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on
all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will
be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been
invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is
fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those
years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from
1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under
the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does
not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of
candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72
per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per
cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as
equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be
sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be
objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly
does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress
lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in
1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are
not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place.
This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment
of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in
what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that
the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its
nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-
1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by
this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this
Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of
the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This
is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted
that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and
no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended
to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of
justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary
to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students
inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue
in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues
who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight
members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for
the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are
considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision
has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo,
Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon.
Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon.
Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates 481
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed 249
Number of candidates who failed 228
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Passing grade (per cent) 72
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty.
Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates 749
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed 409
Number of candidates who failed 340
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59
Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41
Passing grade (per cent) 69
(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P.
Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava,
Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates 899
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
71's 29
70's 35
Number of candidates who passed 490
Number of candidates who failed 409
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60
Passing grade (per cent) 70
 (by resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon.
Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty.
Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 55
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 686
Number of candidates who failed 532
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72
Passing grade (per cent) 74
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A.
Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
Number of candidates 1,316
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and
authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed 432
Number of candidates who failed 894
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon.
Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso
Felix, Members.
Number of candidates 2,068
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 112
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
Number of candidates who failed 879
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio
P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr.,
Members.
Number of candidates 2,738
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 163
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose
S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la
Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates 2,555
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 100
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,570
Number of candidates who failed 986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
 Passing grade (per cent) 75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which
they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law,
which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
 24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
29. Condevillamar, Antonio 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
V.
MRD- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
30.
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
 55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
 87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
MRD- Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
102.
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
MRD- Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
104.
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
110.
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
115.
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2
MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25
117.
MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
118.
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
120.
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD- Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
126.
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
131.
MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
132.
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
134. Cabangbang, Santiago B. 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
138.
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25
140.
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
 142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
148.
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
151.
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
161.
MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
162.
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
165.
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
167.
MRD- Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
168.
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
 170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
171.
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
173.
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
175.
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
MRD- Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
179.
MRD- Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35
180.
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
182.
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75

MRD- 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Tiausas, Miguel V.
196.
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
204.
MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
205.
MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
206.
MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
207.
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
210.
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
213.
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
218.
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
Felicidad
MRP- Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
220.
MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
221.
MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
222.
223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
226.
MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
227.
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
230.
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
233.
MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
234.
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
239.
MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
240.
MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
241.
MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
242.
MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
243.
MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
244.
MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
245.
MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
246.
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
250.
MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5
251.
MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
252.
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
255.
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8
257.
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
263.
MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
264.
MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
265.
MRP- Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
266.
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
MRP- Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15
269.
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
 271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85
276.
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
279.
MRP- Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
280.
MRP- Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
281.
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
285.
MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
286.
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
288.
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
290.
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
292.
MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
293.
MRP- Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
294.
MRP- Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
295.
 296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
297.
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
302.
MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
303.
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
306.
MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
307.
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
313.
MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
314.
MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
315.
MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
316.
MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
317.
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
319.
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
325.
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
331.
MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
332.
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
336.
MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
337.
MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
338.
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP- Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
341.
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
 348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
350.
MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
351.
MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
352.
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
MRP- Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
354.
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
356.
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
364.
MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
365.
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
368.
MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
369.
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75
MRP- Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
374.
MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
375.
MRP- Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
376.
MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
377.
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
379.
MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
380.
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
382. D.
MRP- Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
383.
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
386.
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
MRP- Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15
389.
MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05
390.
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
MRP- Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
392.
MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
393.
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
395.
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
 397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
399.
MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
400.
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
403.
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
405.
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
409.
MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
410.
MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
411.
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
413.
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
415.
MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
416.
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP- Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
420.
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
 422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
423.
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
426.
MRP- Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
427.
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
430.
MRP- Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
431.
MRP- Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
432.
MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4
433.
MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
434.
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
440.
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
443.
MRP- Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
444.
445. Rodriguez, Orestes 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
Arellano
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
 447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95
449.
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95
453.
MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
454.
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
457.
MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
458.
MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
459.
MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
460.
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
462.
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
466.
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95
468.
MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
469.
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
MRP- Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
472.
MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
473.
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
475.
MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
476.
MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
477.
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
479.
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
482.
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
486.
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
488.
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
MRP- Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
490.
MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
491.
MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
492.
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRP- Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15
494.
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
 496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP- Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1
497.
MRP- Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
498.
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous
examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades
and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied,
indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraña, Arsenio s.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Peña, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
 1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions
for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those
candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked
the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
 9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
Concepcion
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
 13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the
bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent
in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who
obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of
Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments
embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us.
The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall
be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages,
5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent;
International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5
per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70
 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a
general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to

repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to
give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75
per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while
three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests
us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a
bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for
the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so
as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may
be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have
forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of
the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations
every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass
the examination in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or
number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and
the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge
and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so
as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service
required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have
obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year
later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50
per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all
required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.
 xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides
that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar
candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years,
will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the
Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who
have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for
reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the
general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal
implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru
a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders
a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain
law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not
affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers
of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the
Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year
since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for
that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared
that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present
amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to
all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was
unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and
allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of
the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the
legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill
contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
 Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the
Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would
have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions
of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision
also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such
as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3
vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in
1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in
all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact
one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily
not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has
been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent
arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed
in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows;
For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953
bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that
the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for
relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took
up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as
well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from
those years preceding the last world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered
the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent
of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have
been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the
rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the
precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent
with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute
which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against
class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class
is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered
factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park
Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
 Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must
be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so,
the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so,
the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit
special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the
general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. .
. . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion
conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the
care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from
the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again
asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in
the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many
times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine
admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the
power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments
to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit
or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a
candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope
of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general
average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as
having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It
is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing
mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and
discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations
in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking
earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit
members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered
to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates
included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were
raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the
list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a
general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would
indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or
more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had
been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent
were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in
August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949.
Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year
1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of
Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly
ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this
Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con,
approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per
cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by
the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by
the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding
(1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social
Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding
of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due
respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by
him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955
bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass.
Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No.
972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions,
praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation
that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6,
1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially
authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici
curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter"
involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of
law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which
in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The
 existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and
the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held
prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court
refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place,
resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases
where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because
said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme
Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because
bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto,
would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection
of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal
protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain
obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in
certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because
we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that
there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At
any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body.
It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and
circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly
sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the
Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of
separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not
produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other.
Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had
obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and
unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after
July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because
said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court,
namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the
passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when
this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent
or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule
127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section
(fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to
admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and
70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since
this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had
doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying
them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public
was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are
bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had
taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may
observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to
make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the
people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are
thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right
men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its
entirety.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine
admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the
power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments
to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit
or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a
candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope
of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general
average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as
having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It
is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing
mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and
discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations
in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking
earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-
making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit
members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have
passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered
to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates
included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were
raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the
list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a
general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would
indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or
more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had
been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent
were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in
August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949.
Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year
1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of
Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly
ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this
Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con,
approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per
cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by
the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by
the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding
(1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social
Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding
of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due
respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by
him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955
bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass.
Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No.
972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions,
praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation
that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6,
1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially
authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici
curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter"
involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of
law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which
in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
 The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and
the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held
prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court
refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place,
resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases
where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in
any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because
said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme
Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because
bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto,
would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection
of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal
protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain
obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in
certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because
we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that
there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At
any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body.
It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and
circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly
sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the
Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of
separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not
produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other.
Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had
obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and
unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after
July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because
said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court,
namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the
passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when
this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent
or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule
127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section
(fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to
admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to
the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and
70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since
this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had
doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying
them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public
was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are
bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had
taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may
observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to
make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the
people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are
thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right
men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its
entirety.
 7. Ang Nars Party List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746, [October 8, 2019]

[ G.R. No. 215746, October 08, 2019 ]

ANG NARS PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY CONGRESSWOMAN LEAH PRIMITIVA G. SAMACO-PAQUIZ,

AND PUBLIC SERVICES LABOR INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL
SECRETARY ANNIE E. GERON, PETITIONERS, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, AND THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Ang Nars Party-List (Ang Nars), represented by Congresswoman Leah Primitiva G. Samaco-Paquiz (Rep.
Paquiz), and Public Services Labor Independent Confederation (PSLINK), represented by its General
Secretary Annie E. Geron (Geron), filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus1 before this Court
assailing the validity of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 8112 (EO No. 811), with prayer for the Court to
compel the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Budget and Management, and the Secretary of Health
(respondents) to implement Section 32 of Republic Act No. 91733 (R.A. No. 9173), otherwise known as
the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002.

Ang Nars is "an accredited party-list organization that promotes the socio-economic, political, and
professional rights of nurses with the responsibility and accountability to provide safe and quality
nursing care to the Filipino people,"4 while PSLINK is "an umbrella organization of 481 public sector
unions representing over 85,000 public sectors in the government."5 Ang Nars and PSLINK are
collectively referred to here as petitioners.

The Antecedent Facts

On 21 October 2002, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) approved

R.A. No. 9173. Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 provides:

SEC. 32. Salary. - In order to enhance the general welfare, commitment to service and professionalism of
nurses, the minimum base pay of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not be lower than
salary grade 15 prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the "Compensation and
Classification Act of 1989": Provided, That for nurses working in local government units, adjustments to
their salaries shall be in accordance with Section 10 of the said law. (Emphasis supplied)

On 28 July 2008, then Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Prospero C. Nograles approved Joint Resolution No. 4, authorizing the President of the
Philippines "to Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the
Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and For Other Purposes."
Joint Resolution No. 4 is a consolidation of House Joint Resolution No. 36 and Senate Joint Resolution
No. 26 that were adopted by the House of Representatives and the Senate on 1 June 2009 and 2 June
2009, respectively.

On 17 June 2009, President Macapagal-Arroyo approved Joint Resolution No. 4, which provides:

xxxx

(16) Amendment of Existing Laws - The provisions of all laws, decrees, executive orders, corporate
charters, rules, regulations, circulars, approvals and other issuances or parts thereof that
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Joint Resolution such as, but not limited to Republic Act No.
4670, Republic Act No. 7160, Republic Act No. 7305, Republic Act No. 8439, Republic Act No. 8551,
Executive Order No. 107 dated June 10, 1999, Republic Act No. 9286, Republic Act No. 9166, Republic
Act No. 9173 and Republic Act No. 9433 are hereby amended.

All provisions of laws, executive orders, corporate charters, implementing rules and regulations
prescribing salary grades for government officials and employees other than those in Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6758 are hereby repealed. (Emphasis supplied)

Also on 17 June 2009, President Macapagal-Arroyo signed EO No. 811 to implement Joint Resolution No.
4. Section 6 of EO No. 811 provides:

SECTION 6. Changes in Position Titles and Salary Grade Assignments of Certain Positions -

The position titles and salary grade assignments of the entry levels of the following positions are hereby
modified:

Salary Grade
Position Title
Fro T
m o
Teacher I 10 11

Nurse I 10 11

Medical Officer I 14 16

Accountant I 11 12

[Legal Officer I] Attorney I [14] 16

The DBM, in coordination with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), shall review the other levels of the
above-listed positions and other classes of positions to determine their appropriate levels, and to
allocate them to their proper salary grades.
Accordingly, the DBM, in coordination with the CSC, shall update the Index of Occupational Services,
Occupational Groups, Classes, and Salary Grades, in accordance with organizational, technological,
professional and other developments. (Emphasis supplied)

On 21 May 2014, Rep. Paquiz wrote a letter6 to then Secretary Enrique T. Ona (Secretary Ona) of the
Department of Health (DOH) inquiring about the non-implementation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173
mandating that the salary base pay for nurses shall be Salary Grade 15. On even date, Rep. Paquiz wrote
a similar letter7 to then Secretary Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). Rep. Paquiz's identical letters to the DOH and the DBM stated:

Greetings of peace and good health to you and your bureaucracy!

ANG NARS advocates for "KALUSUGAN PARA SA BAYAN" through an empowered health workforce. We
are passionate in our advocacy of improving the plight of our nurses especially those who struggle in
precarious working conditions.

The enactment of Republic Act No. 9173, otherwise known as "The Philippine Nursing Act of 2002",
mandated that the minimum base pay of nurses shall be at least Salary Grade 15, to wit:

SEC. 32. Salary. In order to enhance the general welfare, commitment to service and professionalism of
nurses[,] the minimum base pay of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not be lower
than salary grade 15 prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the "Compensation
and Classification Act of 1989": Provided, That for nurses working in local government units,
adjustments to their salaries shall be in accordance with Section 10 of the said law.

Thus, I would like to inquire about the non-implementation of Salary Grade 15 as minimum base pay for
nurses despite the fact that this provision has been in effect since 2002. x x x.

I am hoping that we will all work together towards a healthier nation.8 (Emphasis in the original)

On 27 May 2014, Secretary Ona replied, as follows:

xxxx

As per your communication letter received by our office last May 26, 2014, we would like to clarify that
our staffing standards and salary grade classification at the Department is based on policies and
guidelines issued by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), pursuant to Republic Act No.
6758 "Compensation and Classification Act of 1989" and Senate Joint Resolution No. 26 "Joint
Resolution Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Modify the Compensation and Classification
System of Civilian Personnel...".

The Manual on Position Classification and Compensation by the DBM prescribes a detailed classification
process for every occupational group identified. This manual states as a general rule that: "only the
duties and responsibilities of the position are considered in position classification..". Therefore, our
agency has carefully studied and analyzed each of our position classification based on the tasks and
weight of responsibility assigned for each position. Thus, a Nurse I position with a salary grade 11 might
have less complicated tasks and fewer range of responsibility than a Nurse II with salary grade 15.9
Secretary Ona recommended that Rep. Paquiz direct her inquiries about the implementation of R.A. No.
9173 to the DBM.

On 26 May 2014, the DBM, through its then Officer-in-Charge and Assistant Director Edgardo M.
Macaranas, replied to Rep. Paquiz stating that:

xxxx

Under Section 34 of National Budget Circular No. 521 implementing Senate and House of
Representatives Joint Resolution No. 4, s. 2009, certain medical and allied medical positions requiring
PRC license examination were re-allocated to give meaning to the long-honored truism of "equal pay for
equal work" wherein positions which have substantially equal qualifications, skills, effort and
responsibility under similar conditions shall be paid similar salaries. In particular, the entry level for
Nurses in government hospitals was upgraded from SG-10 to SG 11.

While the law expressly provides for SG-15 as the entry level for Nurses, its implementation would
distort the hierarchical relationships of medical, and allied positions, as well as other positions in the
bureaucracy.

Likewise, the proposed upgrading of entry level 4,787 Nurse I positions would require additional PS
costs of Php438,109,687 per annum that would further strain the government coffers. Necessarily, the
corresponding higher level nurses and other allied medical positions will require additional PS cost.

Meanwhile, the DBM has conducted a salary survey of the private sector for benchmark jobs
predominant in the government like Nurses, Medical Officers and allied medical positions, among
others. The survey results shall be the basis for recommendations for future salary
adjustments.10

On 13 October 2014, Rep. Paquiz wrote then Secretary Leila De Lima (Secretary De Lima) of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) requesting for a legal opinion on whether the DBM can disregard the
implementation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173.11 On 22 October 2014, Secretary De Lima declined to
render a legal opinion and replied, as follows:

xxxx

With regret, we have to decline to render the opinion requested.

It must be stressed, at the outset, that the ruling assailed was rendered by the bureau under the DBM
specifically empowered to "classify positions and determine appropriate salaries for specific position
classes and review the compensation benefits programs of agencies" and "design job evaluation
programs." Since the DBM Secretary not only has "supervision and control" but also the power of
"jurisdiction over all bureaus, offices, agencies and corporations" under his Department, which power
necessarily include[s] the authority to review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units, the DBM Secretary, more than any other government official, is in the best
position to assist your query. This is especially because it is the DBM that is mandated to be responsible
both "for the formulation and implementation of the National Budget with the goal of attaining our
national socio-economic plans and objectives" and "for the efficient and sound utilization of government
funds and revenues to effectively achieve our country's development objectives."
Moreover, this Department cannot rule on the issue raised without passing upon National Budget
Circular No. 521 which was issued by the DBM. Pursuant to settled practice and precedents, however,
the Secretary of Justice does not render opinion or express any comment on questions involving the
interpretation and application of duly issued administrative rules and regulations, unless requested by
the promulgating agency, since such matters are best left to the determination of the said agency by
reason of its knowledge of the specific intent and purposes of the issuance and the extent of the
application thereof.

Finally, even if we want to rule on your query, we cannot. Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9173, it is the
Board of Nursing and the Professional Regulation Commission, in coordination with the DBM and
Department of Health, among other concerned agencies, that is mandated to issue the law's
Implementing Rule[]s and Regulations, and had, in fact, already issued one through Board of Nursing's
Board Resolution No. 425, s. 2003.

Being essentially advisory in nature, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice need not bind the Board of
Nursing (and the DBM), if that be their pleasure. As the government agencies primarily responsible for
the implementation, administration and enforcement of the law (and Senate and House Resolution No.
4, s. 2009), they may, if they so decide, formally adopt the position they take on the issue raised and
assume responsibility therefor.

It is suggested that you elevate the matter to the DBM Secretary.12

Finding the replies of the DOH, DBM, and DOJ unsatisfactory, petitioners filed this petition before the
Court.

The Issues

Petitioners raised the following issues in their petition:

(1) Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion and exceeded the authority
granted by Joint Resolution No. 4 when they downgraded the salary grade for government
nurses in Executive Order No. 811;

(2) Whether Joint Resolution No. 4 (Series of 2009) of the Senate and the House of
Representatives amended Section 32 of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002; and

(3) Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in asserting that the entry level
for government nurses should only be Salary Grade 11 and disregarding the provisions of [RA
No. 9173.13

Petitioners allege that Joint Resolution No. 4 authorized the President to modify the compensation and
position classification system of civilian personnel and the base pay schedule of military and uniformed
personnel in the government. However, petitioners assert that Joint Resolution No. 4 did not authorize
the President to revise the salary grade system under Republic Act No. 675814 or the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, which in tum, was amended by R.A. No. 9173 which provided that the
minimum base pay for government nurses, except for those employed under the Local Government
Code, would be Salary Grade 15. Petitioners point out that Section 6 of Joint Resolution No. 4 expressly
states that "[nothing] in [this] Joint Resolution shall be interpreted to reduce, diminish or, in any way,
alter the benefits provided for in existing laws on Magna Carta benefits for specific officials and
employees in government, regardless of whether said benefits have been already received or have yet
to be implemented.15 Petitioners point out that EO No. 811, being an administrative issuance, must be
consistent with laws and should not amend or modify the law.

Petitioners further claim that Joint Resolution No. 4 did not amend Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 and did
not lower the entry level of nurses to Salary Grade 11. According to petitioners, respondents ignored
and failed to implement Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 despite the issuance of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9173 through the Board of Nursing's Board Resolution No. 425, series of 2003. In
addition, petitioners argue that EO No. 811 violated the principle of non-diminution of salaries
stipulated in Joint Resolution No. 4 since EO No. 811 also repealed Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173, a repeal
that is beyond the authority given to the President under Joint Resolution No. 4.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondents, questions
petitioners' legal standing to file this petition. The OSG alleges that petitioners have not identified their
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. According to the OSG, petitioners are not nurses
employed in the government who are entitled to the benefits under Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 and are
not directly affected by EO No. 811.

The OSG alleges that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy in filing this petition for certiorari and
mandamus before this Court instead of a petition for declaratory relief. Further, the OSG asserts that,
granting petitioners availed of the correct remedy, they violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in
filing the petition directly with this Court.

The OSG argues that Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 was amended, not by EO No. 811, but by Joint
Resolution No. 4 adopted by both the Senate and the House of Representatives which has the force and
effect of a law. The OSG adds that the issuance of EO No. 811 fixing the entry level of government
nurses at Salary Grade 11 is a valid delegation of power under Joint Resolution No. 4. In addition, the
OSG argues that there is no diminution in the salary of nurses because the minimum base pay under EO
No. 811 is higher than the minimum base pay under Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173.

The OSG further alleges that petitioners cannot avail of the remedy of mandamus. The OSG asserts that
Joint Resolution No. 4 repealed Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173. In addition, the DBM never implemented
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 because its implementation would create inequality and distortion in the
hierarchical relationships of the medical and allied positions and the other positions in the bureaucracy.
Citing the occupational service of Medicine and Health Service, the OSG points out that the
implementation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 would result to a situation where a Nurse I would have a
benchmark pay of Salary Grade 15 while a doctor designated as Medical Officer I would only have a
benchmark pay of Salary Grade 14. Further comparing it to other positions, the OSG states that a lawyer
designated as Legal Officer I has only a benchmark pay of Salary Grade 14. As such, the implementation
of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 would cause inequality in compensation among government workers.

In their Reply, petitioners maintain that Rep. Paquiz has a legal standing to file the petition because as a
party-list representative, she represents both government and private nurses and it is her right and duty
to protect the welfare of her constituents. On the other hand, Geron represents the members of PSLINK
who are government nurses. In addition, petitioners argue that they are taxpayers whose rights have
been infringed by respondents' grave abuse of discretion in disregarding Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 as
they are deprived of quality health care with the enforcement of Joint Resolution No. 4 and EO No. 811
which are invalid.

Petitioners likewise maintain that certiorari is the proper remedy in this case under the expanded
jurisdiction of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. In addition, the
delivery of health care services by the government is of paramount importance. Petitioners claim that
the implementation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 would have positive effects on nurses and could help
prevent the flight of nurses abroad that results to a dearth of competent nurses in the public and private
sectors in the country. Petitioners allege that Rep. Paquiz wrote both the DBM and the DOH but she did
not receive any satisfactory response, thus justifying her filing of this petition before this Court.
Petitioners further allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to implement
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 and in issuing EO No. 811.

The Ruling of this Court

We uphold the continued validity of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 but dismiss petitioners' prayer to
compel respondents to implement Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173.

Legal Standing to File the Petition

Respondents assail petitioners' legal standing before this Court.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. In a private suit, the real party in interest is one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the reliefs sought in
the suit.16 In a public suit, the plaintiff acts as a representative of the general public.17 This Court has
explained:

x x x. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a
"stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer."18

We first discuss the legal standing of PSLINK.

PSLINK is "a confederation of public sector unions of Philippine government employees, from different
national government agencies, state universities and colleges, local government units, government-
financial institutions, health, teachers, and special sectors."19 PSLINK includes government nurses
among its members. However, PSLINK is an unincorporated association. As such, it cannot be considered
a juridical person or an entity authorized by law that can be a party to a civil action.20 PSLINK lacks legal
capacity to sue in its own name or in the name of the members of its association without proper
authorization or valid authority from its members.21 Hence, PSLINK has no legal standing to file this
petition.

On the other hand, Rep. Paquiz filed the petition as the representative of Ang Nars Party-List that
represents both government nurses who are directly affected by EO No. 811 as well as nurses from the
private sector. The Court, explaining the legal standing of members of the Legislature, has ruled that this
legal standing should pertain to questions on the validity of any official action that they claim to infringe
on the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution to their office.22 Thus, the Court
has declared:

We emphasize that in a legislators' suit, those Members of Congress who are challenging the official act
have standing only to the extent that the alleged violation impinges on their right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of the institution of which they are members. Legislators have the standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and
are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action, which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators. As legislators, they must clearly show that there was a direct injury to their
persons or the institution to which they belong.23

Nevertheless, there are instances when the Court, in its discretion, waives the requirements of locus
standi, citing the transcendental importance of the cases before it as well as their far-reaching
implications.24 Indeed, the Court has held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere
procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.25 The Court has
ruled that locus standi is a matter of procedure, and it has allowed some cases to be brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.26

In Bayan Muna v. Romulo,27 the Court ruled that petitioner, through its party-list representatives who
filed the suit as concerned citizens, had the locus standi because they had complied with the qualifying
conditions or specific requirements exacted under the locus standi rule.28 As citizens, their interest in
the subject matter of the petition was direct and personal.29 In the case before us, Rep. Paquiz is duly-
elected as party-list representative of Ang Nars Party-List which seeks to be the voice of the nurses in
the country. Although she will not suffer direct injury because of the non-implementation of R.A. No.
9173, her interest is direct insofar as she is the duly-elected representative of nurses in the country. As
such, the Court recognizes Rep. Paquiz's legal standing to file this petition on behalf of her constituents
who are directly affected by the non-implementation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173.

Hierarchy of Courts and Petitioners' Remedy

To justify their action to file this petition directly with this Court, petitioners cite the transcendental
importance of the issues involved.

The doctrine on the hierarchy of courts states that petitions for certiorari and prohibition, which fall
under the concurrent jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, the higher courts, and this Court, must first
be brought to the lowest court with jurisdiction.30 In Rayos v. The City of Manila,31 the Court held:

Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction. However,
such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor [495 Phil. 422, 432 (2005)], citing People v. Cuaresma [254 Phil.
418, 426-427 (1989)], the Court held:

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
[the] Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom
of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for
that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.32 (Emphasis
in the original)

This rule, however, is subject to exceptions. In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,33 the
Court stated:

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This [C]ourt has "full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly
with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and
specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions
to this doctrine:

xxxx

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts
from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

xxxx

Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the
Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform
its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket. Nonetheless, the invocation of this
Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the
ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the
public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.34

The case before us involves a law that has been approved in 2002 but has remained unimplemented up
to the present.ℒαwρhi ৷ Seventeen years have passed and the nurses who stand to benefit from the
implementation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 continue to be in limbo as to the status of their salary
grade classification. It is in the best interest of all concerned for the Court to put an end to this
controversy by relaxing the rules on hierarchy of courts.
The OSG argues that petitioners' proper remedy could have been an action for declaratory relief before
the appropriate Regional Trial Court under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In Spouses
Imbong v. Ochoa,35 the Court declared:

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying
for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule
65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.36

The same far-reaching implications are present in this case. Hence, we dispense with technicalities and
give due course to this petition.

Effects of Joint Resolution No. 4

Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. Before a bill can become a law, it must pass three
readings on separate days, unless the President certifies that its enactment is urgent. Section 26, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal. (Emphasis supplied)

The purpose for which three readings on separate days are required is two-fold: (1) to inform the
members of Congress of what they must vote on, and (2) to give the members of Congress notice that a
measure is progressing through the legislative process, allowing them and others interested in the
measure to prepare their positions on the matter.37

The Senate Rules of Procedure enumerate the types of legislation as follows:

Types of Legislation

The types of measures that Congress may consider and act upon (in addition to treaties in the Senate)
include bills and three kinds of resolutions. They are:

1. Bills

These are general measures, which if passed upon, may become laws. A bill is prefixed with S., followed
by a number assigned the measure based on the order in which it is introduced. The vast majority of
legislative proposals - recommendations dealing with the economy, increasing penalties for certain
crimes, regulation on commerce and trade, etc., are drafted in the form of bills. They also include
budgetary appropriation of the government and many others. When passed by both chambers in
identical form and signed by the President or repassed by Congress over a presidential veto, they
become laws.

2. Joint Resolutions

A joint resolution, like a bill, requires the approval of both houses and the signature of the President. It
has the force and effect of a law if approved. There is no real difference between a bill and a joint
resolution. The latter generally is used when dealing with a single item or issue, such as a continuing or
emergency appropriations bill. Joint resolutions are also used for proposing amendments to the
Constitution.

3. Concurrent Resolutions

A concurrent resolution is usually designated in the Senate as S. Ct. Res. It is used for matters affecting
the operations of both houses and must be passed in the same form by both of them. However, they are
not referred to the President for his signature, and they do not have the force of law. Concurrent
resolutions are used to fix the time of adjournment of a Congress and to express the "sense of Congress"
on an issue.

4. Simple Resolutions

It is usually designated with P. S. Res. A simple resolution deals with matters entirely within the
prerogative of one house of Congress, such as adopting or receiving its own rules. A simple resolution is
not considered by the other chamber and is not sent to the President for his signature. Like a concurrent
resolution, it has no effect and force of a law. Simple resolutions are used occasionally to express the
opinion of a single house on a current issue. Oftentimes, it is also used to call for a congressional action
on an issue affecting national interest.38

The Senate's definition of a joint resolution states that it is no different from a bill. However, under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only a bill can be enacted into law after following
certain requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution. A joint resolution is not a bill, and
its passage does not enact the joint resolution into a law even if it follows the requirements
expressly prescribed in the Constitution for enacting a bill into a law.

Section 6439 of the Rules of the Senate states that "[p]rior to their final approval, bills and joint
resolutions shall be read at least three times." However, Section 6840 of the same Rules provides that
"[n]o bill shall be passed by the Senate unless it has passed three (3) readings on separate days x x
x."41 There is no express provision in the Rules of the Senate that applies Section 68 to Joint
Resolutions. The approval process under Section 68 only applies to bills and not to joint resolutions. In
short, there is no express language in the Rules of the Senate that a joint resolution must pass three
readings on separate days. Thus, the Senate can pass a joint resolution on three readings on the same
day. In contrast, Section 5842 of the Rules of the House of Representatives states that "[n]o bill or joint
resolution shall become law unless it passes three (3) readings on separate days and printed copies
thereof in its final form are distributed to the Members three (3) days before its passage except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency."43
In any event, neither the Rules of the Senate nor the Rules of the House of Representatives can amend
the Constitution which recognizes that only a bill can become a law. However, a joint resolution can be
part of the implementation of a law as provided in the law itself. A joint resolution can also be treated as
a recommendation to the Executive on how the law can be implemented.

The Position Paper for the Senate of the Philippines states that bills and joint resolutions, for all practical
purposes, are treated alike procedurally. According to the Senate, it is not uncommon to find a proposed
piece of legislation, in identical language, introduced in the Senate as a Senate bill and in the House as a
joint resolution, and vice versa. The Senate added that while at one time or another, there might have
been definite distinctions between the two types of proposed legislation, they have for all practical
purposes been lost.

On the other hand, the House of Representatives asserts that a joint resolution possesses the force of
law if it resembles a bill as to form and procedure for adoption. The House of Representatives states
that the legislative intent to accord to a joint resolution the same effect as a law should be deemed
controlling, notwithstanding the form and style of enactment. In addition, a joint resolution is treated in
the same way as a bill under the Rules of the House of Representatives.

The Rules of the Senate and the Rules of the House of Representatives can change since a new Congress
is not bound to adopt the rules of the previous Congress. In fact, the Senate and the House of
Representatives of every Congress can amend their own Rules of Procedure at any time. In Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,44 the Court sustained the
OSG that "every Senate is distinct from the one before or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held
every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate's membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit."
Thus, in that case, the Court required the publication of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate Governing
the Inquiries in Aid of Legislation for the 14th Congress.

The same rule applies to the House of Representatives. The House of every Congress must adopt its own
rules at the start of its term. In particular, the House is admittedly not a continuing body since the terms
of all Members of the House end at the same time upon the expiration of every Congress. Thus, upon
the expiration of every Congress, the Rules of Procedure of the House also expire. That is why Section 1,
Rule 1 of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress, adopted on 25 July 2016,
provides: "After the oath-taking of the newly-elected Speaker, the body shall proceed to the adoption of
the rules of the immediately preceding Congress to govern its proceedings until the approval and
adoption of the rules of the current Congress."

Again, the Constitution provides that only a bill can become a law. When a bill is proposed, either in the
Senate or in the House of Representatives, the public is immediately informed that there is a proposal
being considered which, if it becomes a law, can bind them. It is imperative for the public to know when
a bill is being considered so that they can send their comments, proposals, or objections to the bill. This
is in consonance with the requirement on transparency in public transactions under Section 28, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "[s]ubject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest." If a joint resolution is proposed instead of a bill, the public will not be alerted that there is a
proposed legislation, and a law can pass stealthily without notice to the public.
Sections 24 and 25, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, on legislative appropriations, likewise refer only
to bills. These Sections state:

SEC. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.

SEC. 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation
of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may
be prescribed by law.

(7) If, by the end of any Fiscal Year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the General
Appropriations Bill for the ensuing Fiscal Year, the General Appropriations Law for the preceding
Fiscal Year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the General
Appropriations Bill is passed by the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, Section 27(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the veto power of the President
over every bill which must be presented to him for approval. It provides:

SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (Emphasis supplied)

The veto power of the President applies expressly only to bills, not to joint resolutions. If a joint
resolution is given the effect of, and treated as, a law, Congress will be taking away the veto power of
the President since the Constitution only provides for the President's veto power over a bill. In short,
Congress can enact a joint resolution into a law that is not subject to the President's veto power, a
situation that clearly violates the Constitution.

The United States House of Representatives defines joint resolutions as follows:

Joint Resolutions

Joint resolutions may originate either in the House of Representatives or in the Senate. There is little
practical difference between a bill and a joint resolution. Both are subject to the same procedure, except
for a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. On approval of such a resolution by
two-thirds of both the House and Senate, it is sent directly to the Administrator of General Services for
submission to the individual states for ratification. It is not presented to the President for approval. A
joint resolution originating in the House of Representatives is designated "H.J. Res." followed by its
individual number. Joint resolutions become law in the same manner as bills.45

On the other hand, the United States Senate describes joint resolutions as follows:

Joint Resolutions

Joint Resolutions are designated H.J. Res or S.J. Res. and are followed by a number. Like a bill, a joint
resolution requires the approval of both Chambers in identical form and the president's signature to
become law. There is no real difference between a joint resolution and a bill. The joint resolution is
generally used for continuing or emergency appropriations. Joint resolutions are also used for proposing
amendments to the Constitution; such resolutions must be approved by two-thirds of both Chambers
and three-fourths of the states, but do not require the president's signature to become part of the
Constitution.46

Indeed, under both the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, there is no difference between a
bill and a joint resolution. This practice, however, cannot be applied in this jurisdiction.

Article 1, Section 7 of the United States Constitution provides:

Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become
a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two
thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the
other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and
Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of
each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a
Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may
be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United
States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.47 (Emphasis supplied)

There is no counterpart provision in our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions insofar as "Order, Resolution
or Vote" is concerned. All our Constitutions, including our present 1987 Constitution, have only provided
that a "bill" can be enacted into law but have never provided that an "Order, Resolution or Vote" can
also be enacted into law.

Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa asserts, that the Philippine Congress' concept of joint resolution is
equivalent to the United States Senate's characterization of joint resolution as a piece of legislation that
requires the approval of both chambers and is submitted to the President for possible signature as a
law. Justice Caguioa declares:

Additionally, the Philippine Congress' concept of joint resolution is equivalent to the United States
Senate's characterization of joint resolutions, i.e., a piece of legislation that requires the approval of
both chambers and is submitted (just as a bill) to the president for possible signature into
law.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Such interpretation by the United States Senate is in accordance with the U.S. Constitution where an
"Order, Resolution or Vote" may be enacted into law. We cannot adopt in our jurisdiction the U.S.
Senate's characterization of joint resolutions even if we follow the same procedure in enacting a bill into
law.

First, what we are applying here is the Philippine Constitution, not the U.S. Constitution. There s no
language, express or implied, in all our Constitutions, including our present 1987 Constitution, providing
that a joint resolution can be enacted into:law if the same procedure for enacting a bill into law is
followed. The language of the 1987 Constitution is plain, simple and clear: a bill can be enacted into law,
and the same Constitution does not mention any other act or measure that can be enacted into law.
There is no need for interpretation here but only application of the Verba Legis rule.

Second, granting that the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions have borrowed from the U.S.
Constitution the basic system of government with three co-equal branches, our Constitutions have
never adopted wholesale or verbatim the U.S. Constitution. Our Constitutions have adopted major
parts, but not all parts, of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution expressly recognizes that a "Bill,"
"Order, Resolution or Vote" can be enacted into law. What our Constitutions have adopted is that a bill
can be enacted into law. Our Constitutions have never included the phrase "Order, Resolution or Vote"
that appears in the U.S. Constitution. Applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
correct interpretation, if interpretation is required, is that our Constitutions recognize that only a bill can
be enacted into law. The Court has explained this principle:

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the
rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressum facit cessare
tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

xxxx

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation.
They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated
upon one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.49 (Emphasis supplied)

This principle particularly applies because a contrary interpretation will result in an absurdity.

Third, inserting by interpretation to our 1987 Constitution the phrase "Order, Resolution or Vote" in the
U.S. Constitution will result in an absurdity. If a joint resolution can be enacted into law under the 1987
Constitution by simply following the procedure for enacting a bill into law, then an "Order x x x or Vote"
can also be enacted into law by following the same procedure. An "Order x x x or Vote" being enacted
into law by our Congress is as strange as it is absurd.

Fourth, applying in this jurisdiction by interpretation express provisions in the U.S. Constitution, that do
not appear in our Constitutions, including our present 1987 Constitution, sets an extremely dangerous
precedent. Where the U.S. Constitution expressly specifies four grounds, and our Constitutions,
including our present 1987 Constitution, only specify one of the four grounds, it would not only be
absurd but also dangerous to interpret that the three other grounds are also incorporated into our
Constitutions.

Justice Caguioa asserts that the Constitution does not preclude the passage into law of joint resolutions.
Citing the history of the constitutional provision on the passage of laws, Justice Caguioa contends that
the original proposed draft recommended by the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention Committee on
Legislative Power states that joint resolutions shall become law after undergoing the legislative process.
According to Justice Caguioa, the term "joint resolutions" was removed when the Constitutional
Convention decided to adopt a unicameral legislative system and the sub-committee modified the
proposed provisions by deleting joint resolutions because there are no joint resolutions under a
unicameral legislature. For Justice Caguioa, the deletion of the term "joint resolutions" in the 1935
Constitution, which deletion was later carried over to the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, was deemed a
"clerical error." No one, however, has pointed out this "clerical error" until now, after 84 long years from
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution. The fact that the term "joint resolutions" was in the draft but was
not included in the final version approved by the Constitutional Convention only means that the
deletion of the term "joint resolutions" was deliberate and not a mere "clerical error." Incidentally, the
terms "joint resolution" and "resolution" do not appear at all in any provision of the 1935 Constitution.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the framers of the 1935 Constitution committed this "clerical
error," this "clerical error" should have been corrected by the framers of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. They did not because, very obviously, there was no "clerical error" at all. To repeat, no
one ever complained about, or pointed out, this alleged "clerical error" except Justice Caguioa, and only
now after more than eight (8) decades since the alleged "clerical error" was committed. No
constitutional law textbook writer, no decision of this Court, and no law journal article ever raised this
alleged "clerical error." If in an enumeration of words in a draft, a word is removed from the final
approved version, the logical conclusion is that the removal of the word was intentional. If indeed there
was a "clerical error," this error appeared not only in one provision of the 1935 Constitution, but in all
provisions of the 1935 Constitution where the word "bill" appeared seventeen (17) times in relation to
proposed legislations. This would constitute a compendium of "clerical errors" in the fundamental law of
the land which should have been the major focus of many law journal articles; yet, not a single article
about such alleged "clerical errors" has ever been written.

Section 19(a) of the Jones Law of 1916, on the Procedure for Law-Making, provides:

(a) Legislative journal and the veto power. - That each house of the Legislature shall keep a journal of its
proceedings and, from time to time, publish the same; and the yeas and nays of the members of either
house, on any question, shall, upon demand of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal,
and every bill and joint resolution which shall have passed both houses shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the Governor-General. If he approve[s] the same, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall
return it with his objections to that house in which it shall have originated, which shall enter the
objections at large on its journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds
of the members elected to that house shall agree to pass the same, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds
of all the members elected to that house it shall be sent to the Governor-General, who, in case he shall
then not approve, shall transmit the same to the President of the United States. The votes of each house
shall be by the yeas and nays, and the names of the members voting for and against shall be entered
[on] the journal. If the President of the United States approve[s] the same, he shall sign it and it shall
become a law. If he shall not approve the same, he shall return it to the Governor-General, so stating,
and it shall not become a law: Provided, That if any bill or joint resolution shall not be returned by the
Governor-General as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him the same shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the
Legislature by adjournment prevents its return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the
Governor-General within thirty days after adjournment: Provided, further, That the President of the
United States shall approve or disapprove an act submitted to him under the provisions of this section
within six months from and after its enactment and submission for its approval; and if not approved
within such time, it shall become a law as if it had been specifically approved.

While a part of the 1935 Constitution was patterned after the Jones Law, the final version of the 1935
constitution did not adopt the term "joint resolutions." While the Jones Law of 1916 required that
"every bill and joint resolution which shall have passed both houses shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the Governor-General[,]" the term "joint resolutions" was not adopted in the 1935
Constitution and in the succeeding 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Section 19(a) of the Jones Law of 1916
also referred to the power of the Governor-General to return the bill or joint resolution, with his
objections, to the house in which it should have originated, which is similar, though to a limited extent,
to the veto power of the President. However, the veto power of the President under the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions expressly refers only to bills and not to joint resolutions. The Court cannot expand
the Constitution by inserting a term that is not expressly found in the Constitution.

In its First Progress Report dated 10 December 1968, Committee IV of the Constitutional Revision
Project,50 submitted its Draft of a Bicameral Legislative Department of a Presidential Type of
Government.51 Section 18 of the Draft states:

SEC. [20] 18. (1) EVERY BILL PASSED BY [THE] CONGRESS SHALL, BEFORE IT BECOMES A LAW, BE
PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT. IF HE APPROVES THE [SAME] BILL, HE SHALL SIGN IT; BUT IF NOT, HE
SHALL RETURN IT WITH HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATED, WHICH SHALL ENTER
THE OBJECTIONS AT LARGE ON ITS JOURNAL AND PROCEED TO RECONSIDER IT. IF, AFTER [SUCH], THE
RECONSIDERATION, [TWO-THIRDS] A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF [SUCH] THE HOUSE SHALL
AGREE TO PASS THE BILL, IT SHALL BE SENT, TOGETHER WITH THE OBJECTIONS, TO THE OTHER HOUSE
BY WHICH IT SHALL LIKEWISE BE RECONSIDERED, AND IF APPROVED BY [TWO-THIRDS] A MAJORITY OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT HOUSE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. IN ALL [SUCH] THOSE CASES, THE VOTES
OF EACH HOUSE SHALL BE DETERMINED BY YEAS AND NAYS, AND THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS
VOTING FOR AND AGAINST SHALL BE ENTERED [ON] IN ITS JOURNAL. IF ANY BILL SHALL NOT BE
RETURNED BY THE PRESIDENT AS HEREIN PROVIDED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS (SUNDAYS AND HOLIDAYS
EXCEPTED) AFTER IT SHALL HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO HIM, THE [SAME] BILL SHALL BECOME A LAW IN
LIKE MANNER AS IF HE HAD SIGNED IT, UNLESS [THE] CONGRESS BY ADJOURNMENT PREVENTS ITS
RETURN, IN WHICH CASE IT SHALL BECOME A LAW UNLESS VETOED BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THIRTY
DAYS AFTER [ADJOURNMENT] IT SHALL HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO HIM.

Clearly, this 1968 draft of the proposed revision to the 1935 Constitution mentions that only a bill can be
enacted into law. No one can claim that the absence of the term "joint resolutions" in this 1968 draft is a
"clerical error."

The term "joint resolutions" was not also included in the 1987 Constitution. The Court cannot dismiss
the absence of such term as a mere "clerical error" because of its serious implication. The Court cannot
simply insert a term in the Constitution that does not appear in the approved and ratified Constitution,
on the ground that the framers of the Constitution committed a "clerical error," when the insertion of
the term radically changes the substantive application and meaning of the Constitution. The Court has
already ruled that deletions in preliminary drafts of the Constitutional Convention are, at best, negative
guides, which cannot prevail over the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.52

Justice Caguioa opines that the difference between a bill and a joint resolution is just a matter of
nomenclature. According to Justice Caguioa, joint resolutions also go through the same process as bills.
Joint resolutions go through the same process as bills only because Congress provides for the process
under the Rules of Procedure of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. However, a new
Congress is not bound to adopt the rules of procedure of the previous Congress. Moreover, the Senate
or the House can at any time amend their rules of procedure to provide for a different procedure to pass
joint resolutions.

A bill is, of course, vastly different from a joint resolution. First, a bill to be approved by Congress must
pass three (3) readings on separate days. There can be no deviation from this requirement, unless the
President certifies the bill as urgent. In contrast, Congress can approve a joint resolution in one, two or
three readings, on the same day or on separate days, depending on the rules of procedure that the
Senate or the House may, at their sole discretion, adopt.

Second, the Constitution requires that before a bill is approved, printed copies of the bill in its final form
must be distributed to Members of the Senate and House three days before its passage. There can be no
deviation from this requirement, unless the President certifies the bill as urgent. In contrast, a joint
resolution can be approved on the same day, or several days after, the final printed copies are
distributed to Members of the Senate and the House, depending on the rules of procedure that the
Senate or the House may, at their sole discretion, adopt.

Third, a bill approved by Congress must be presented to the President for his signature or veto. There
can be no deviation from this. In contrast, a joint resolution approved by Congress does not require the
President's signature or veto, unless the Senate, or the House, in their respective rules of procedure, at
their sole discretion, requires such presentation to the President.

Fourth, upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment is allowed, and voting on the bill shall immediately
be taken. There can be no deviation from this requirement. In contrast, there is no such requirement in
approving a joint resolution, unless the Senate and the House, at their sole discretion, adopt such
requirement.

Fifth, the procedure in enacting a bill into law is permanently fixed as prescribed by the Constitution and
cannot be amended by any act of Congress. In contrast, the procedure for passing a joint resolution is
adopted separately by the Senate and the House, and can be changed at any time by the Senate or the
House, respectively.

Under the theory of Justice Caguioa, whether a joint resolution can become a law or not depends on the
procedure prescribed by the Senate or the House, which procedure may vary from one Congress to
another, or may even change during the same Congress. Under this theory, if both the House and the
Senate adopt the same procedure as provided in the Constitution for enactment of a bill into law, then a
joint resolution can become a law. However, if either the Senate or the House does not adopt the same
procedure as provided in the Constitution, then a joint resolution cannot become a law. In short, it is the
sole discretion of either the Senate or the House whether a joint resolution can become a law or not.
This is not how the Constitution prescribes the enactment of a law.

The Constitution unequivocally and mandatorily prescribes how a law is enacted, by expressly providing:
"No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage x x x." Congress has no power to amend this constitutional provision to transform, at the
discretion of Congress, a joint resolution into a law by merely following the procedure prescribed by the
Constitution for the enactment of a bill into a law. The procedure for the enactment of a law cannot be
made to depend on the vagaries of every Congress.

According to Justice Caguioa, the Rules of the Senate allow the proposal of an appropriation, revenue or
tax measure through a joint resolution even when the Constitution provides that public funds shall be
paid out of the Treasury pursuant only to an appropriation made by law thus, making it clear that joint
resolutions are treated by Congress as laws. This is clearly erroneous. First, Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution refers only to "appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills." Section 24 cannot be expanded by the Senate or
the House, by inserting through their rules of procedure, the term "joint resolutions" in Section 24.

Second, any practice, even if regularly done by Congress, is void if it violates the Constitution. An act of
Congress or the Executive, even if repeated over time, cannot operate to amend or repeal any provision
of the Constitution. Any rule of Congress requiring three readings for a joint resolution does not add any
constitutional legitimacy so that a joint resolution can become a law. A joint resolution does not become
a law by undergoing three readings because there is no specific provision in the 1987 Constitution
providing that a joint resolution can become a law.

Justice Caguioa also calls our attention that the Court presumably recognized that Joint Resolutions 1
and 4 were considered laws because they were referred by the Court as Salary Standardization Laws II
and III, respectively. The issue in National Electrification Administration v. Commission on Audit53 is the
NEA's acceleration of schedule of payment of Executive Order No. 389 and NBC No. 458. On the other
hand, Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit54 is a case questioning COA's notice
of disallowance of the Governance Forum Productivity Award. There was no issue as to any amendment
effected by Joint Resolutions 1 and 4. The Court did not make any categorical pronouncement in those
cases that it considers the Joint Resolutions as laws.

Justice Caguioa cites Part XLVI of R.A. No. 9524 (The General Appropriations Act of 2009), particularly
Section 1(b) of the Special Provision on the Miscellaneous Personnel Benefits Fund (MPBF) which
authorizes payment of "[s]alary adjustment and associated benefits and such other benefits as may be
authorized by law or by the President of the Philippines." Precisely, the effectivity of Joint Resolution No.
4 is only as an implementing rule of R.A. No. 6758, and for as long as Congress funds the adjustments as
it did in subsequent General Appropriation Acts, which are themselves laws, the salary increases can be
implemented by a joint resolution. For purposes, however, of repealing an existing law, there must be a
repealing provision, or an irreconcilably inconsistent provision, in a subsequent valid law, not merely a
joint resolution.

The Court's attention is called to the United States case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha55 where U.S. Chief Justice Warren Burger, the ponente of the case, discussed the third
paragraph of the U.S. Constitution which enumerates "Order, Resolution, or Vote" and the process of
presentment and approval or disapproval by the President of the United States.

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha is an alien deportation case. The issue in this case is
not the passing of a bill but the constitutionality of the act of the House of Representatives which
vetoed, without the concurrence of the Senate, the Attorney General's suspension of Chadha's
deportation. The case discussed the requirement of presentment of all legislation to the President
before becoming a law. This case explained that the terms "resolution" and "vote" were added to avoid
"the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a 'resolution' or 'vote' rather than a 'bill.'" Again, we do
not have the same provision in our Constitution. We cannot just adopt the terms used in the U.S.
Constitution as part of our own Constitution without any express provision adopted and ratified by the
people. We cannot likewise adopt the intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution without any act of
the framers of our Constitution, ratified by the people, to incorporate the provisions of the U.S.
Constitution in our Constitution.
Justice Caguioa also points out that the issue of the constitutionality of Joint Resolution No. 4 was not
raised by petitioners in the present case. To recall, petitioners did raise specifically the issue of "whether
x x x Joint Resolution No. 4 (Series of 2009) of the Senate and the House of Representative[s] amended
Section 32 of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002."56 This alone puts in issue the legal status of Joint
Resolution No. 4 - whether it has the status of law that can amend or repeal Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173,
a prior law. Moreover, the Advisory for the Oral Arguments of the present case enumerated the issues
to be considered by the Court, thus:

A. Whether Joint Resolution No. 4 has repealed Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9173:

1. Whether a joint resolution that followed the procedure of a bill passing into law is a law;

2. Whether Joint Resolution No. 4 followed the procedure of a bill passing into a law[.]

B. If Joint Resolution No. 4 has not repealed Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9173, whether the Supreme
Court can compel the respondents to pay the nurses their compensation under Salary Grade 15 as
prescribed in Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9173[.]57

In addition, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to confer with the Senate of the
Philippines and the House of Representatives for the submission of their position papers on whether a
joint resolution can amend or repeal an existing law, and on how the passage of a bill into law compares
with the passage of joint resolution. Thus, the constitutionality of Joint Resolution No. 4, which purports
to repeal Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173, was clearly put in issue in this case.

The Court cannot resolve the other issues raised in this petition without resolving the primordial issue of
the constitutionality of Joint Resolution No. 4. The issues of the constitutionality of Joint Resolution No.
4 and whether it can be considered a law are necessarily intertwined with the issue of whether it
amended or repealed Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173. Hence, it is necessary for the Court to consider the
validity and effect of Joint Resolution No. 4 for a complete determination of the issues raised by
petitioners.

Republic Act No. 6758 (R.4. No. 6758)58 provides for the periodic review of the compensation rates for
government employees. Section 3 of R.A. No. 6758 states:

Section 3. General Provisions. - The following principles shall govern the Compensation and Position
Classification System of the Government:

(a) All government personnel shall be paid just and equitable wages; and while pay distinctions
must necessarily exist in keeping with work distinctions, the ratio of compensation for those
occupying higher ranks to those at lower ranks should be maintained at equitable levels, giving
due consideration to higher percentage of increases to lower level positions and lower
percentage increases to higher level positions;

(b) Basic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the
private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on
minimum wages;
 (c) The total compensation provided for government personnel must be maintained at
a reasonable level in proportion to the national budget;

(d) A review of government compensation rates, taking into account possible erosion in
purchasing power due to inflation and other factors, shall be conducted periodically. (Emphasis
supplied)

After a review of compensation rates, any change in compensation rates should be done by enacting a
new law. Any such change amends an existing law, and such amendment cannot be done by a mere
joint resolution because a joint resolution cannot amend a law.

On 26 July 1993, Congress passed Joint Resolution No. 1. The Whereas clause of Joint Resolution No. 1
recognized that "the President has the authority to revise the existing compensation and position
classification system under the standards and guidelines hereunder provided[.]" As such, it urged the
President to revise R.A. No. 6758 to be more responsive to the economic needs of government
personnel. Joint Resolution No. 1 further recognized that "it is necessary x x x to update the present
compensation and position classification system to make it more responsive to the economic needs of
government personnel, to provide adequate incentive to public servants and, ultimately, to improve the
quality of public service[.]"

Joint Resolution No. 1 was proposed by the Executive-Legislative Committee composed of the Office of
the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives. The Executive-Legislative Committee was
specifically formed to expedite legislative and executive action on salary adjustment. Joint Resolution
No. 1 declared that funds amounting to P11.0 billion, representing compensation: adjustments for 1994
had already been appropriated under Republic Act No. 7663, the 1994 General Appropriations Act (1994
GAA). In short, when ,Joint Resolution No. 1 was passed by Congress, the compensation adjustments
contemplated therein were already fully funded by law under the 1994 GAA. Thus, there was an existing
law authorizing the payment of the compensation adjustments for fiscal year 1994, and such payment
could be triggered by a joint resolution.

On the other hand, Congress passed Joint Resolution No. 459 on 28 July 2008. In its Whereas clauses,
Joint Resolution No. 4 stated that "the present Compensation and Position Classification System has to
be revised further to update the same, to further encourage excellent performance and productivity,
and to clearly distinguish differences in levels of responsibility and accountability among government
officials and employees;" and that "the current structure of the Salary Schedule causes the overlapping
of salaries between salary grades, thereby resulting to salary inequalities between positions[.]"

Joint Resolution No. 4, which seeks to change or revise the Compensation and Position Classification
System established by existing law, cannot take effect without an amendatory law. The revisions
prescribed in Joint Resolution No. 4 are not authorized by any existing law. Thus, an amendatory law is
needed to implement the provisions of Joint Resolution No. 4 that seek to amend existing law.

In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Cawad v. Abad,60 Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen expressed
the opinion that "[t]he validity of Joint Resolution No. 4 was suspect because it revised several laws and
was passed by Congress in a manner not provided by the Constitution."61 Justice Leonen added:
Joint resolutions are not sufficient to notify the public that a statute is being passed or amended. As in
this case, the amendment to a significant empowering provision in Republic Act No. 7305 was done
through a joint resolution. The general public will be misled when it attempts to understand the state of
the law since it will also have to comb through joint resolutions in order to ensure that published
Republic Acts have not been amended.62

Under R.A. No. 6758, there are positions with specific salary grades. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758 provides:

Section 8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and Their Equivalent. - Pursuant to Section 17, Article XVIII
of the Constitution, the salary of the following officials shall be in accordance with the Salary Grades
indicated hereunder:

Salary Grades

President of the Philippines 33

Vice-President of the Philippines 32

President of the Senate 32

Speaker of the House of Representatives 32

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 32

Senator 31

Member of the House of Representatives 31

Associate Justices of the Supreme Court 31

Chairman of a Constitutional Commission 31

under Article IX, 1987 Constitution

Member of a Constitutional Commission 30

Under Article IX, 1987 Constitution

The Department of Budget and Management is hereby authorized to determine the officials who are of
equivalent rank to the foregoing Officials, where applicable, and may be assigned the same Salary
Grades based on the following guidelines:

GRADE 33 - This Grade is assigned to the President of the Republic of the Philippines as the highest
position in the government. No other position in the government service is considered to be of
equivalent rank.

GRADE 32 - This Grade is limited to the Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines and those
positions which head the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the government, namely: the Senate
President, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. No other
positions in the government service are considered to be of equivalent rank.
GRADE 31 - This Grade is assigned to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives and those
with equivalent rank as follows: the Executive Secretary, Department Secretary, Presidential
Spokesman, Ombudsman, Press Secretary, Presidential Assistant with Cabinet Rank, Presidential
Adviser, National Economic and Development Authority Director General, Court of Appeals Presiding
Justice, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice, Secretary of the Senate, Secretary of the House of
Representatives, and President of the University of the Philippines.

An entity with a broad functional scope of operations and wide area of coverage ranging from top level
policy formulation to the provision of technical and administrative support to the units under it, with
functions comparable to the aforesaid positions in the preceding paragraph, can be considered
organizationally equivalent to a Department, and its head to that of a Department Secretary.

GRADE 30 - Positions included are those of Department Undersecretary, Cabinet Undersecretary,

Presidential Assistant, Solicitor General, Government Corporate Counsel, Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court, Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice-President, National Economic and Development
Authority Deputy Director General, Presidential Management Staff Executive Director, Deputy
Ombudsman, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan,
Special Prosecutor, University of the Philippines Executive Vice-President, Mindanao State University
President, Polytechnic University of the Philippines President [] and President of other state universities
and colleges of the same class.

Heads of councils, commissions, boards and similar entities whose operations cut across offices or
departments or are serving a sizeable portion of the general public and whose coverage is nationwide or
whose functions are comparable to the aforecited positions in the preceding paragraph, may be placed
at this level.

The equivalent rank of positions not mentioned herein or those that may be created hereafter shall be
determined based on these guidelines.

The Provisions of this Act as far as they upgrade the compensation of Constitutional Officials and their
equivalent under this section shall, however, take effect only in accordance with the Constitution:
Provided, That with respect to the President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Senators, and the Members of
the House of Representatives, no increase in salary shall take effect even beyond 1992, until this Act is
amended: Provided, further, That the implementation of this Act with respect to Assistant Secretaries
and Undersecretaries shall be deferred for one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act and for
Secretaries, until July 1, 1992: Provided, finally, That in the case of Assistant Secretaries,
Undersecretaries and Secretaries, the salary rates authorized herein shall be used in the computation of
the retirement benefits for those who retire under the existing retirement laws within the aforesaid
period.

Section 9 of R.A. No. 6758, on the other hand, only provides for a benchmark position schedule for other
positions. It states:

Section 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions. - For positions below the Officials mentioned
under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the National Government, local government
units, government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions, the Department of Budget
and Management is hereby directed to prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be guided by the
Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following factors: (1) the education and
experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions; (2) the nature and
complexity of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental and/or physical
strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and external
relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for
accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10)
hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.

Benchmark Position Schedule

Position Title Salary Grade

Laborer I 1

Messenger 2

Clerk I 3

Driver I 3

Stenographer I 4

Mechanic I 4

Carpenter II 5

Electrician II 6

Secretary I 7

Bookkeeper 8

Administrative Assistant 8

Education Research Assistant I 9

Cashier I 10

Nurse I 10

Teacher I 10

Agrarian Reform Program Technologist 10

Budget Officer I 11

Chemist I 11

Agriculturist I 11

Social Welfare Officer I 11

 Engineer I 12

Veterinarian I 13

Legal Officer I 14

Administrative Officer II 15

Dentist II 16

Postmaster IV 17

Forester III 18

Associate Professor I 19

Rural Health Physician 20

xxxx

In short, for other positions in the government, that is, for positions other than Constitutional officials
and their equivalent, R.A. No. 6758 only created a benchmark to guide the DBM in its preparation of the
Index of Occupational Services. The Benchmark Position Schedule may only be amended by law. A joint
resolution cannot amend the Benchmark Position Schedule which is fixed by law. A joint resolution has
only the effect of a recommendation to the government agency authorized to implement a law, in this
case R.A. No. 6758. Section 9 of R.A. No. 6758 gives the DBM the authority to prepare the Index of
Occupational Services for other positions in the government.

The Court is aware that Joint Resolution No. 1 changed the salary grades of Constitutional officials and
their equivalent under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, which Joint Resolution 1 could not amend. However,
this was already corrected when Joint Resolution No. 4 reverted to the salary grades prescribed under
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758. There is no inconsistency between Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758 and Joint
Resolution No. 4 insofar as the salary grades of Constitutional officials and their equivalent are
concerned.

As regards the salary grade of nurses, the change in the salary grade was done through a law, R.A. No.
9173. The authority given to the DBM with respect to the salary grade of nurses was superseded by R.A.
No. 9173, which provided for the new salary, grade of nurses, starting at salary grade 15 as the
minimum. R.A. No. 9173 cannot be amended by a mere joint resolution.

In their respective deliberations on Joint Resolution No. 4, both the Senate and the House of
Representatives considered the implications of the proposed position classification fr nurses under
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173. During the 12 May 2009 deliberations, Rep. Rufus B. Rodriguez raised the
position classification of nurses under Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173, thus:

REP. RODRIGUEZ. x x x.

xxxx
So, may I proceed now to the next set of officials that I would like to ask on, Mr. Speaker, and these will
be the nurses and those in the public health system.

I would like to ask, Mr. Speaker, the distinguished Sponsor: under the Magna Carta for Public Health
Workers, the nurses, under the law, are supposed to already have a salary grade of 15. May I know what
salary grade the nurses will have under this position classification plan?

REP. CUA. Under the proposal, Mr. Speaker, the nurses will be receiving a salary grade of 11...

REP. RODRIGUEZ. 11.

REP. CUA....similar to that of teachers. And we feel that is the level that can be sustained at the
moment, Mr. Speaker.

REP. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Speaker, my question is: would this Joint Resolution No. 9092, under Committee
Report No. 9092, prevail over the expressed provision of law that mandates that nurses should have a
salary level of 15.

REP. CUA. Mr. Speaker, a joint resolution is a resolution that is supposed to be passed by both Houses
and signed by the President. And from my understanding, this joint resolution, if it passes the scrutiny of
both Houses and signed by the President, would have the force and effect of a law. And I think there is
jurisprudence to that effect. And so, that being the case, if having the force and effect of a law, it would
amend that Act.

REP. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Speaker, are we telling the public health sector, the nurses, that we are
withdrawing what had been given them by the previous Congress, Salary Grade 15, and we are
demoting them to Salary Grade 11?

REP. CUA. Mr. Speaker, that is not exactly the sense of the resolution because at the end of the day,
what counts really is the amount of salary that they will begin to bring home to their family.

While it is true that the salary grade that we are proposing is not a salary grade as provided for in the
Nursing Act, you would note that the salary that they will receive or the take-home pay would be a
substantial increase, more than 40 percent, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I understand fully the well-meaning intention at that time. However, it is unfortunate that,
if that law would be implemented which will provide a Salary Grade 15, that will make salaries of nurses,
for example a Nurse I, higher than the salary of a doctor. The doctor or Medical Officer I, under present
legislation, receives Salary Grade 14.

We will have a scenario, Mr. Speaker, if that law is implemented, where a nurse, whose educational
requirement is a four-year course, will be receiving a salary higher than a lawyer, whose educational
qualification requires him to study for as long as eight years and pass the Bar.

We will have a scenario, Mr. Speaker, where a Nurse III for example, will receive a salary higher than the
chief of the hospital. So, it is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that implementing it, much as we want to
because we understand the role that nurses, play, may really endanger the entire compensation system
which has been standardized and has been set at all levels with regard to qualification and
responsibilities of the position holder, Mr. Speaker.

REP. RODRIGUEZ. Mr. Speaker, the reality is, we are losing our workers in the public health sector. They
have been going out of the country and precisely because we have not been able to implement the
Salary Grade 15 under the Nursing Act. The solution is not to demote the salary grade from 15 to 11 by
the mere expedient of a joint resolution because a joint resolution, I believe, cannot amend the law.

Joint resolutions are, according to US jurisprudence, resolutions in Congress for small matters that are
taken up by the Congress. In this case, there is already a law - the Nursing Act that provides for Salary
Grade 15. The solution would have been to increase the salaries of doctors so that the doctors, who
have labored so hard studying, would be able to get their due compensation.

Again, the health sector is very important for the well-being of the people. At the proper time, Mr.
Speaker, I would propose that we have an amendment that we follow and implement the Nursing Act,
instead of repealing the Nursing Act as far as the salary grade of nurses [is] concerned.

May I now go to another point, Mr. Speaker.

REP. CUA (J.). Mr. Speaker, at the proper time, we will have an opportunity to discuss that. But let me
make a short comment to the proposal that the solution is to increase the salaries of the doctors, rather,
to set the salary grade of doctors higher than that of nurses, which is being proposed as Salary Grade 15.

Mr. Speaker, we have asked the DBM to make some calculations. If we adopt such a proposal, the
budgetary implication of increasing the salaries of nurses to Salary Grade 15 and correspondingly
increase the salaries of doctors to higher grades, would already mean a further requirement of more
than P20 billion. And that is only with respect to the public health sector, not to consider the budgetary
implication to say, lawyers and accountants who would naturally clamor for modification of their salary
increase.

Anyway, at the end of the day, Mr. Speaker, the salary grades, to my mind, is not the determining factor.
The determining factor really is the amount of salaries that, at the end of the day or at the end of each
pay day, a position holder brings home to his or her family. And we feel very strongly that, at the levels
of salaries we are proposing, we have substantially increased the amount of salaries and thereby,
improving his ability to cope with economic condition presently obtaining, Mr. Speaker.63

However, when Rep. Rodriguez proposed an amendment to upgrade the salary grade of nurses pursuant
to R.A. No. 9173, the proposal was not carried.64

Similar considerations were, made in the Senate. The 27 May 2009 deliberations65 on Joint Resolution
No. 4 showed that then Senator Alan Peter Cayetano expressed the view that contrary to the DBM's
position, not elevating the nurses to Salary Grade 15 would perpetuate a wage distortion. Then Senator
Edgardo Angara (Senator Angara), however, stated that the implementation of R.A. No. 9173
simultaneously with the salary standardization would widen the distortion of salaries within the allied
health professions. He added that the implementation would affect almost 700,000 positions such as of
lawyers and doctors, and the financial impact for the first year would amount to P137 billion. Senator
Angara also pointed out that there was no move to grant Salary Grade 15 to nurses because it is not only
beyond the capacity of the government to pay but also because of the gross distortion it would create
within the nursing ranks and allied health professions.66 Then Senator Pia Cayetano proposed
amendments that included increasing the salary grade of nurses to Salary Grade 15. However, Senator
Angara did not accept the proposal.67

The deliberations of 20 May 2009 also revealed the following exchange between Rep. Ocampo and Rep.
Cua:

REP. OCAMPO. Thank you for that explanation, Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleague.

This Representation raises this point to stress the fact that he stands on the importance of the
legislature, its authority when it comes to the allocation of funds and particularly, if for salary
adjustments of workers of the State. There would be no room for the assumption that it is the executive
that would be practically telling Congress how to adjust or to regulate the pay and allowances that are
pertinent to the workers of the government.

The other question pertains to previous legislations like the Magna Cartas - for health workers, for
teachers, the Nursing Act and for other sectors - that have not been implemented thoroughly. And, it
looks like under this joint resolution, there appears to be a conflict or difference in the adjustment to be
made and created and all that, and thoroughly, as far as the health workers are concerned that they
have been coordinating with this Representation, they are fearful that the gains that they have achieved
in the Magna Carta for Health Workers, given the fact that it has not been fully implemented, may be
further eroded.

And so, this Representation perceives [the] fact that there is a provision that says that benefits that
would not be granted in the Magna Carta would not be disturbed or be lower than they are. But then
the implementation of the joint resolution has ensured at the same time, the implementation of the
Magna Carta?

REP. CUA. Yes, Mr. Speaker. As the Gentleman has mentioned, he is happy to know that there is
a:statement there ensuring that the Magna Carta benefits would not be disturbed. And this is a clear
pronouncement of the policy that we would like to send. We are not touching, we are not going to
reduce, we are not going to modify benefits that are already provided in the existing Magna Carta laws.

What we are just trying to say is that we are empowering the Department of Budget and Management
to participate in the process so that the guidelines which are not uniformly set now be made uniform.
That is all we are saying here. But we are very categorical in our statement, as you will read in one of the
provisions, that the benefits of the Magna Carta laws will not be disturbed, Mr. Speaker.

REP. OCAMPO. Yes. Now, there is another aspect to that, with regard to authorizing the DBM to make
the necessary guidelines, rules and regulations on the grant of Magna Carta benefits. Under the Magna
Carta, they have consultative bodies, councils, departments and officials previously authorized, and
these are being taken out in the joint resolution. Can it be possible to ensure that the representatives of
the health workers, for instance, be properly given due cognizance and representation with the DBM? Is
it possible for the resolution to be amended to retain, or that such bodies that would coordinate can be
consultative to the DBM?
I am emphasizing this fact because the passage of the Magna Carta of Health Workers and of the Nurses
Act [was] the by product of the assiduous work, lobbying and organizing, so that by their strength, they
were able to convince Congress to enact such laws that would provide them the just compensation and
benefits.

Unfortunately, they have not been enjoying that because of the shortage of funds from the national
government. So, can that, at least, enable to give them a voice whenever they think that the guidelines
and actions of the DBM may be prejudicial to their interest that they would be appropriately hurt.

REP. CUA. Mr. Speaker.

REP. OCAMPO. That would entail possibly some amendments which can be introduced later.

REP. CUA. Yes, Mr. Speaker. Certainly, amendments can be proposed at the opportune time with regard
to that and I will defer to the collective wisdom of the Chamber.

Let me explain this a little further, Mr. Speaker. If you will notice, we are not leaving the whole exercise
to the DBM. There is a statement there that says, "DBM, in collaboration with the concerned agencies,
will craft the guidelines." Certainly, concerned agencies will definitely protect the interest of their
constituents, and what is going to happen here is that the DBM will just provide the balance, in a way, in
the process. If you will note, in the earlier scheme, of things, it was left completely to the discretion of
the lead agency and because of that, the guidelines were not uniform. The guidelines were such that
there is a bias towards the constituencies of the lead agency. Therefore, the benefits, in fact, in some
cases were no longer appropriate. So in other words, we just want to put a balance here. We
categorically say that the benefits already achieved by the employees after a long period of struggle will
not be lost, Mr. Speaker. That is an assurance as it is enshrined in the statement that we put there, Mr.
Speaker.

REP. OCAMPO. Thank you for that assurance and I hope that it would be properly provided. Also, with
regard to hazard pay, possibly the provisions of the Magna Carta, the definition of those who will benefit
by hazard pay is in the resolution, but the Magna Carta provides for hazard pay for those also
categorized under the Magna Carta. Can there be an assurance that the same would apply, meaning to
say, that none of those guaranteed hazard pay under the Magna Carta will not be denied?

REP. CUA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

REP. OCAMPO. All right, thank you.

My last point is this: over the last several Congresses, when we were raising the issue of implementing
the Magna Carta of Health Workers, or implementing the Nursing Act of 1992, even in the budget
deliberations, the argument always presented was that there were no sufficient funds available to
implement these legislations that have been mentioned earlier, that have been assiduously worked for,
struggled for, and won by the health workers and the nurses.

The rationale or the justification for not implementing the legislations was that the government does
not have funds. We have raised the issue of the huge amount of the national income being allotted for
automatic servicing of foreign debts and other debts. And we have come closer to have a joint
resolution calling for an audit of foreign debts so that we could determine what foreign loans could be
renegotiated, could be condoned, could be forgotten altogether, so that we would be able to reduce the
huge amount that had been annually excluded from the lump sum that is being the subject of
appropriations. I reviewed in the earlier questions that the distinguished Sponsor had argued that we
could not change that policy, the Automatic Appropriation Law, because it will have a negative impact
on fiscal policies. I think, it has a negative impact in fiscal policies, precisely they are becoming lesser
and lesser funds for social services on housing, health abd education, and it is time that we revisit that.

This Representation would like to make a strong point: Let us have the political will to look at the other
side—review that weary argument that we will get in the losing end if we—we just say—adhere to the
palabra de honor that we have to service all our debts, when even in the previous Congress, there had
been items in the foreign loans that had been found to be undeserving of services and we had initial
inaction to exclude from the servicing. This Representation strongly urges that we continue with that
thrust of asserting the sovereign power of the legislature in behalf of our people, that we shall be
throwing away the much needed funds that had been coming through the treasury only in servicing of
debts that had not been beneficial to the people.

With that manifestation, thank you, Mr. Speaker. I thank the distinguished Sponsor.68

An implementing resolution, like Joint Resolution No. 4, not being a separate law itself, cannot amend
prior laws. Such implementing resolution can only implement the Salary Standardization Law, not repeal
its enabling law or prior laws. Joint Resolution No. 4 can only recommend to the President in accordance
with the authority given to the DBM under R.A. No. 6758. Thus, the amendatory language in paragraph
16 of Joint Resolution No. 4 cannot revise the salary grades in the Salary Standardization Law or in any
other law like R.A. No. 9173. The amendatory language in said paragraph 16 can only amend prior
congressional resolutions inconsistent with Joint Resolution No. 4.

Despite assurances that R.A. No. 9173 will not be affected, paragraph 16 of Joint Resolution No. 4
expressly amended provisions of R.A. No. 9173 that are inconsistent with said paragraph 16. Joint
Resolution No. 4 also expressly repealed all provisions of law and implementing rules and regulations
prescribing salary grades for government officials and employees other than those in Section 8 of R.A.
No. 6758. To repeat, paragraph 16 of Joint Resolution No. 4 provides:

xxxx

(16) Amendment of Existing Laws - The provisions of all laws, decrees, executive orders, corporate
charters, rules, regulations, circulars, approvals and other issuances or parts thereof that
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Joint Resolution such as, but not limited to Republic Act No.
4670, Republic Act No. 7160, Republic Act No. 7305, Republic Act No. 8439, Republic Act No.. 8551,
Executive Order No. 107 dated June 10, 1999, Republic Act No. 9286, Republic Act No. 9166, Republic
Act No. 9173 and Republic Act No. 9433 are hereby amended.

All provisions of laws, executive orders, corporate charters, implementing rules and regulations
prescribing salary grades for government officials and employees other than those in Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6758 are hereby repealed. (Emphasis supplied)
Again, this amendment or repeal cannot be effected through a mere joint resolution. Moreover, EO No.
811, not being a law, cannot also amend or repeal Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173. There can be no dispute
whatsoever that EO No. 811, a mere presidential issuance, cannot amend or repeal a prior law.
Nevertheless, despite the continued existence and validity of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173, this Court
cannot grant petitioners' prayer to compel respondents to implement Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173, an
implementation that requires the appropriation of public funds through a law. The power of the purse
belongs exclusively to Congress under Sections 24 and 25, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The power to appropriate public funds can only
be made through a law, and the power to enact a law is a purely legislative power. The Court cannot
compel Congress to fund Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173 as the power to appropriate public funds is lodged
solely in Congress. Unless Congress makes the necessary appropriation through a law, Section 32 of R.A.
No. 9173 will remain an unfunded law, a situation that applies to many other laws.

Petitioners may lobby with Congress to fund through a law the implementation of Section 32 of R.A. No.
9173. Congress may also review R.A. No. 6758 and pass amendatory laws to reconcile the distortions in
the salary grades of all government employees. This Court, however, cannot dictate upon Congress
which, under the separation of powers, has the sole Constitutional power of the purse - the exclusive
power to appropriate public funds.69

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part by declaring that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9173
remains valid, and the provisions of paragraph 16 of Joint Resolution No. 4 dated 28 July 2008 and
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 811 dated 17 June 2009, purporting to amend or repeal Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 9173, are hereby declared VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL. However, we DISMISS the
petition in part by refusing to compel the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Budget and Management
and the Secretary of Health to implement Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9173.

We NOTE the Motion-to-Intervene dated 28 May 2019 and DISMISS the Petition-in-Intervention dated
28 May 2019, both filed by the Philippine Nurses Association, Inc., on the ground that they were filed
after the conclusion of the oral arguments.

SO ORDERED.

8. Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE
and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.

x----------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO
S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x----------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -

Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court
shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the
constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin. 3 Historically, its usage may be
traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black
slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with
morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master. 4 This practice was later compared
to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their
districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists
in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and
constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
 spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative
control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of the Legislature, 9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would
evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered 11 as the earliest form of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated
therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund
release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the
Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize
one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the
said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members
thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from
the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year,
the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators.
"For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they
‘being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with
local officials or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with
local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators
for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the
amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the
majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the
Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of
Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the
President – the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly
ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate. 18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after
Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature," 19 the reprieve was
only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP)
under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports, 20 it was under
 the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with
each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their
project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said
ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which
would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s
locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP
also began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the categories of,
among others, education, health and livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and
the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480
Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao
and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented 23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and
the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide
Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA 24 with an initial funding of
₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992, 25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the
President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission
of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent
as to the amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
identification of projects, it has been reported 26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving
₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any
limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks,
medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to
be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others,
individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-
President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators,
₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification
and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds. 33
 Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with
the implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of
projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a)
the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate,
and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50%
was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the
project list, which would be published by the DBM, 35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds"
and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list
herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer
required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other
forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA
(called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political
agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of
executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor."
Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the
implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions. 38 Examples
of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional
Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior
consultation with the representative of the legislative district concerned.” 40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be
spent.41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs,
namely, the "Food Security Program Fund," 43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program
Fund,"44 and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund," 45 all of which
contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for
the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in
the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the
District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was
explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense
category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund
personal services and other personnel benefits. 47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the
same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

 The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special
provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local
government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003, 50 the same
single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to
realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and
Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on
the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the
2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and
projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to
the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept, 55 which is essentially
a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted 56 in 2006
and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was
consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts
allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and
identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the
provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of
Congress61 anent certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that
"the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and
completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public school buildings
x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the
DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board 64 (GPPB)
issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act,
to include, as a form of negotiated procurement, 67 the procedure whereby the Procuring
Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO,
provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically
contracted out to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 2011 70 PDAF Article
included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for
"hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator
as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects."
 Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it
may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education,
Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and
Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the
further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet
been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned. 71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still
be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority
list.74

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and
2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million
in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker
of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project
identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as
the case may be.79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds
of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have,
however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on
March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to
help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. 82 Due
to the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in
Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project", 83 the special fund created
under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD
1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD
1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he
amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985, 86 amending Section
1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
 funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which
the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings
of PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, 89 owing in no
small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain
congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel"
erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous
source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the
pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." 91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘
(standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high
52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping,
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings." 92 "Other sources of kickbacks that
Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later,
the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of
August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig." 93 "The publication of the
stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including
₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage." 94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed. 95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its
probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects." 96 The investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet
Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money
was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts. 97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three
(3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the
propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of
projects by the
appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled
corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in
PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and
VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit
period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report),
entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including
Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators

significantly exceeded their respective allocations.

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring

members of the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the
2007 to 2009 GAAs.

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been
turned over to the government.

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s

endorsement and without considering their mandated functions, administrative and
technical capabilities to implement projects.

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing

agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the
Funds were transferred.

● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation
law or ordinance.

● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy

two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or
submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part
their utilization of the Funds.

● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and

services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from
royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO." 104 According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the
process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds. 105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System"
be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases
are as follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society,
filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition),
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives,
from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in
whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant
thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M.
Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent
Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied
in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, 107 be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray
that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad)
and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order
the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of
legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of
the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto";
and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x
project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto." 108 Also, they
pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-
sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated
August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino)
and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release
to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with
the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health,
the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development
Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951. 112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b)
requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September
10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons
acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress
under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of
"financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖
under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8,
2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment
(Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with
respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and
that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit. 113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the
Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on
September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on
October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on
October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.

On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the
parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues
material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was
directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who
would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the
budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus
curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17,
2013, which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for
the Court‘s resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19,
1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management" 115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the
issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social
Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall
also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, 117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important 119 and, therefore,
shall be discussed forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is
embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one
which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 121 In other words,
"there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe
for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." 124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the
parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization
– such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public
funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered
moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no
more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which,
being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s
declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal
existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by
Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of
unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange between Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law, 127 correct? Solicitor General
Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act,
correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF,
the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was
saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor.
Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to
stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the
Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes
that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF
because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice,
even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was
just exercising precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and
investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to
repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and
academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third,
when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and
local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been
and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as
well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time
when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the
CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that
reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF" 130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern
of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court
finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit
arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s
disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant
and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's,
property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life
to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are
not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only
when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x.
(Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive
ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson
estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the
findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice
Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts. 132 Accordingly, there
is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated
disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and
passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. 133 The
relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for
2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course
of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing
a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a
previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in
order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging." 137 The situation similarly holds true to these
cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance
that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine
which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 139 applies when there is found, among others, "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast
against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to
perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their
constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions
which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The
intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded
the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the
political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto, 142 the expanded
concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine
was explained as follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when
it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are
given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the
new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by
its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully
perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would
not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure
that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of
the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards
achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court
cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is
injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." 146 Clearly, as
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel
System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that
petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the
Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, 147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues
they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the
Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete
breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the
issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare
decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general
procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions
to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in
relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between
the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP,
respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System."
Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality
accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing
pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as
the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched
under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated
as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the
1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing
was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to
be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the
projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function
given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court
reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the
"power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of
Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a
limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a
more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other,
formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related
to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered
as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be
deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members
of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an
aspect of the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this
premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress,
then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual
Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and,
hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as
embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice
Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither
would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may
be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I
am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight
and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its
previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises
serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such
mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima 155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of
post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These
constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing
section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and,
hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in
these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms
"Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential
to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive
branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked
discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse." 156 They assert that the following
elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations
process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the
funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation
are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite
constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official
by yielding rich patronage benefits. 157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two
(2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently
known as the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993.159

Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court
defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by
which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its
members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual
legislators to wield a collective power; 160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier
stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these
cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 162 it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." 163 To the legislative
branch of government, through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court, 166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers
have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." 167 Thus,
"the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make
or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or
the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of
government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates.
Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or
self-interest assertions of another or others. 170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the
principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere
impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; 171 and
"alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is
entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible
(a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function
both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In
Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution
"covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other
related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle. 174 This is rooted in the principle that the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in
them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively
exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided
under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should
not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is
properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters
the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress,
"in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following
the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the
Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the
GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of
implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between
them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that
"from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of
its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." 177 It must be clarified, however, that since the
restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may
still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution
itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any
post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of
executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada: 178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and

investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and
be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
(Emphases supplied)
b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF
Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to
allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after
the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an
illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in
complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers." 180 Further, they point out
that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual
legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their
implementation.181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since
the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains
the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals. 182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa,
"upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so
long as such proposal and identification are recommendatory." 183 As such, they claim that "everything in
the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains
constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation.

At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists, 185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 –
have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be
funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of
Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special
Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows
individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general
program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies
shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard
or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his
choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for
as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3
clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators" 188 and thereunder provides
the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of
Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the
foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-
enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment
authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is
contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be
supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their
statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2,
Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second ,
paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education,
Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry 190 x x x to approve realignment from one
project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the
request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds"
in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. 191 That the said authority
is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this
end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance
on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position
that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary,
respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have
admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF
can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire
budget execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of
the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual
legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no
identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without
the identification by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples.
I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA.
And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.

xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question,
"How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he
must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF
Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed
as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been
constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these
cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we
enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff,
that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of
how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three
lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of
these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in
one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be
thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal
measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the
Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by
the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as
a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely
local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by
law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or
other national emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. 198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-
making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the
law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
operation (contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-
making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren 200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because
of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot
be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled
in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a
certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court
hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which
contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does
not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item
written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his
power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures"
for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. 204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-
making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes
effect as law after the required publication."205

Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the
Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an
integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially
a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as
those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in
this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative
power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which
he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in
the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction
or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in
favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of
an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent
log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive
branch‘s role in the budgetary process. 208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US
Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased
differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad
laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." 209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item"
which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item
of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
(Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be
able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only
"general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by
singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular
purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent
with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may
discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent
Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific
purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item
veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own
corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice
Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by
accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other
operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the
exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds
would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule
on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that
Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall
specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular
lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation
type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual
purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it
cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and
hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President
would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of
its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of
its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-
delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again,
both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the
foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing
authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-
delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the
President the chance to veto that item later on." 212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power
of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is
intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are
essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue
that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed
and textually-grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after
the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point
out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical
missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood
control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of
the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson
relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds." 216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a
"line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing
agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system
provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to
defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that
unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends. 218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In
particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial
interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into
"financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the
PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power
of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of
senators.‘"220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office
is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise
their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the
parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability, 221 hence, the
various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be
checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, 222 congressional oversight
may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power
of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that
individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it
difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted
as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept
of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter
before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed,
while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest,
the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not
strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of
judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of
political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to
the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of
itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or
executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it
has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160, 227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of
1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations,
and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in
their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower
local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective
contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v.
Intermediate Appellate Court:228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local
autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of
our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal
corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of
local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important,
imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This
objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs
which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach
today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national
officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees
with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a
recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the
priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators
justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional
Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as
well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-
projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms,
President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy
goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which
actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes
that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard,
the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic
or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a
highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung
rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what
rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even
the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork
Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is
"to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the
effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts
with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated
to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development,
and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction." 234 Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, 235 their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter
was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise: 236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his
own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project
identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby
subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive
issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD
1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release
of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an
appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto. 237 In similar
regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD
1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR. 238 In view of the foregoing,
petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." 239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable 240 amount of
money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of
amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate
that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall
be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be
"detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be
gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.: 241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
"made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past
but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in
special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific
public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative
intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32
P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave: 242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated
purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose.
An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds
for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to
appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the
"primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a
legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence,
already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of
the Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service
contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations,
fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing
royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration,
development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and
shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a)
Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b)
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a
determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal
appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains
post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These
intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are
made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court
observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion
allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does
not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual
legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be
used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to
the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 244

The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is
sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive 245 either for the purpose of
(a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There
are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are
indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On
the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law
lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative
policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be
restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase "for such
other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely
energy development programs of the government; 250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact,
used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government." 251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have
passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text,
the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same
provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be
underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,"
remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the
aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be
used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869
has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the
same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current
parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.

Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund
may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated
purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte
blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
"priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects"
and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation
of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to
any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying
framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges,
sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential
development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must
be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of
PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are
severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.

Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in
the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List); 254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" 255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is
grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as
follows:

ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for
mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: 256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ
of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced
and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether
the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases
supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr. 257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to
information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform
the act required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular
request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted: 258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA
203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent
to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be
furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which
would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While
petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the
CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be
allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit
investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant
public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so
as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny
petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the
CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished
with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official
documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent
any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte,
while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by
petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject,
however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.: 259

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject
to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons
entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538,
quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts
sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress
of all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from
the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social
Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally
left to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it
must equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of
released funds. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the
remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated
September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release
Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing
agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto
effected by the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and
disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO
had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet
involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of
Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should
remain enjoined.

For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated
allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency
concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they
cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the
TRO by the DBM.262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO
should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013
PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into
a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF
funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as
it has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve
the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds
covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by
the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not
exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover
expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject
to separate approval or clearance by competent authority." 263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and
not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of
placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be
withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other
hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, 264 which is subsequent to
the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during
the Oral Arguments:265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to
enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able
to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is
the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees
depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are
withdrawn by the DBM.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been
"released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by
obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated
pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the
dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been
obligated but not released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b)
funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were
altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to
the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a)
the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar
thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in
effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate
case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional
and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As
explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid,
a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be
no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication." 267 "In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘" 268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In
the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to
wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution,
the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not
textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in
the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of
congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs
of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted
genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit
as well as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development
projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods
and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of
governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect.
Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the
Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change
and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court
fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back
what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may
heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty
and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in
this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all
legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or
collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-
enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification,
modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to
the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which
confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific
projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which
the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be
PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013,
as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not
covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs),
whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent
injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the
general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain
therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby
DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or
detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘
access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds
must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any
valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case
which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the
budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political
branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of
reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful
disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

9. Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA
251

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED

VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR.,
in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his
Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic
Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.4

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or
reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution
in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. 5

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF)
or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or
his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy
Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the
officials nominated by their recognized organization. 6

Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance
with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform
other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to
Congress.7

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and
issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, 8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose. 9

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials
and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There
is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or
BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for
being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or
claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents
acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case.
They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and
does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the
law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of
the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard
that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers.
It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of
power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.

After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall
hereafter be discussed.

Actual Case And Ripeness

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must
be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental
act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 11 Thus, to be ripe for
judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury
to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.12

In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the
mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, 13 petitioners fail either to assert any
specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They
are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this
account, their petition is procedurally infirm.

This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.14

Accountability of
Public Officers

Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the
benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees
have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.

Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption
necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis
thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection. 15

The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned
by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case
where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.

Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into
"bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely
speculative.

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal
one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not
only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is
not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to
duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.

In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the
customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in
violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court
said:

The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and
industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.

In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a
consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue
targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it
will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular
performance of official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:

SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials,
examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of
negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by
 any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse,
malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.

Equal Protection

Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are
classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. 19 When things or
persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,20 this Court declared:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. 21 (emphasis supplied)

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is
the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees
and charges.

The BIR performs the following functions:

Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be
headed by and subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the
DOF], shall have the following functions:

(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;

(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and
duties;

(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;

(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and

(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to
the management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as
Commissioner, shall have the following functions:

(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;

(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;

(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;

(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of
entry;

(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and
aircrafts in all ports of entry;

(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;

(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;

(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;

 (9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of
the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully
satisfy the demands of equal protection.

Undue Delegation

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate. 26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.28

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the
law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the
purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" 29 the delegated power to the President
to fix revenue targets:

SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to
as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in
excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the Excess Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue
the Revenue Targets to the Fund
30% or below – 15%
More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year
when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
 Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR
and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to
the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue
districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR
and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the
President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions
under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%
may be removed from the service:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following
powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with
due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the
rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the
following exemptions shall apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two

years in operation, as has no historical record of collection performance that can be
used as basis for evaluation; and

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the

middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to
nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targets:
Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue
or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about
by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the
Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the
Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the
application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service under this
Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of
 public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public
Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 32 The action for
removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process.

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and
equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.

Separation Of Powers

Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven
Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed
by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members
from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two
members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore
cease to exist.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On
May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing
the law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other
similar laws for that matter).

The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections 34 is illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has
enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies
are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x
xx

Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the
perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of
the 20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the
executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to
make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority
delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny

Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to

administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency
of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny,
Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government.
It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency
involved.

xxx xxx xxx

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that
are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of
facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987
Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru
legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part
of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area.
While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch
actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision
allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically
utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an
agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide
that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time,
only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress
affirmatively approves it.

Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power
between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way
to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the
option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to
repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as
it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One
proponent thus explains:

It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern
government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to
legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the
choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or
may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional
scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of
course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But
without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch,
Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in
accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is
appropriate.

Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the
executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the
legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that
would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that
legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority and
intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government.
Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the
executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit
that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to
 review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for
ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits
Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or
those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They
further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy
control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that
legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the
evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the
validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge
suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the
suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to
invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain
in the United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to
implement the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional
an act of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was
without constitutional authority to order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated
the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied
away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the
presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative
in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the
Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the
President. x x x x x x x x x

Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower
court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower
courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these
provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism
requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even
exercised.35 (emphasis supplied)

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and
considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court
struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint
Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by
the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections. 36

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as
it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. 37 It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. 38 And, when it exercises its
legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures"
specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation40 and

(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present
the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it
entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. 44

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons
of its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch
the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the
latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands
of the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency
when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-
making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. 49 Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute 50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated
judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga

Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress
as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the
rule on presentment.52

Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)

Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative
power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the
two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto
are invalid.

Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented
to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return
the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections
at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all
the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative
veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if
approved by both chambers of Congress.

In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President. 55 As summarized by Justice
Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
 A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for
some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.

The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral
by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.

The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or
without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other
bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common
authorship or as a committee bill.

Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill
is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second
reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.

The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members
merely register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate
is allowed.

Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the
three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a
conference committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if
ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President
for his consideration.

The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated
with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective
chambers…59

The President’s role in law-making.

The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication.60

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to
sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of
the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal
rights and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the
indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the determination as to when a
law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. 62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law
may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.
Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving
or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive
or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there
may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the
Court refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate
case assailing those provisions is brought before us. 64

The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335
on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.

Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent
court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity
shall remain in force and effect.

In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally
enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. x x x

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will
vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with
one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not
have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other
provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any
invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid
portions can stand independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions
still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of
rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on
May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation 66 and became effective 15 days
thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even
without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in
force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

10. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 19671, October 18, 2011, 659
SCRA 270

G.R. No. 196271 October 18, 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN
ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-
E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines, Respondents.

x---------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 196305

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,

vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR.
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Respondents.

x---------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197221

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197280

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS
NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity
as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.

x---------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197282

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x---------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197392

LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x---------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197454

JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------------x

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections
and for Other Purposes" was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011,
to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s
regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to "appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions
against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed
with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these
autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts
shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of
RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially
assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the
first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later
than 90 days after its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended") was the next legislative act passed. This law
provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and
reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140 1 - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first
regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the
plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi
City voted to join ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 93332 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd
Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No.
9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the
postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of
Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756),
on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of
Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA
No. 10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court – G.R.
No. 1962713 - assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the
validity of RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.
Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition 4 also assailing the
validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:

a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 5 filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House
of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221;
 b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition6 filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against
the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction 7 filed by Louis
"Barok" Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed
as G.R. No. 197392; and

d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus8 filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of
Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as
G.R. No. 197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM,
with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM
regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus9 against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No.
9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro
Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and
Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the
same Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality
of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were
instructed to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of
RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their
functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.

The Arguments

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA
No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed
under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply
with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds
are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere
to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative departments of the
ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013
regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article
X of the Constitution.

The Issues
From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the
oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to

Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No.

9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of

autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987
Constitution?

IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.

We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution,10 which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.11

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others
through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether national or local – to once every three
years.12 This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.13

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national
and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, 14 we explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have
been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term
of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date
will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under
Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under
Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.1avvphil

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that
they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed,
in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. 15 As this Court explained in People v.
Derilo,16 "[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, its language should be understood
in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed."

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to something that primarily serves the needs of
a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision. 17 Regional elections in the
ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall
within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited
region of ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government." Autonomous
regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted
to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also
reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include
the regional elections of the ARMM –unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of
our discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this
case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

II. The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to
comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution 18 which provides that before bills passed by
either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate
days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 19 explained the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

xxx

That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of
Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as
urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. 20 Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since
there was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in
Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because
basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills,
which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly
considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis
supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of their legislative discretion – gave full
recognition to the President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the
circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can
justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review. 21

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of action.
Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's
certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and
respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution,
caution a stay of the judicial hand.22
In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement
for three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and
other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2)
to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process. 23

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents
of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason
exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.

III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054

The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply
with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or
revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved
by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than
sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of
these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does
not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No.
10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 – cannot be considered
amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely
filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First
Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix
the specific date of the first ARMM elections, 24 leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, 25 RA No. 8176,26 RA No. 8746,27 RA No. 8753,28 and RA No.
901229 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not
change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter
law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the
first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed
RA
No. 914030 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to
approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, 31 which further reset the date of the
ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date
of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority
(2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 32 has to be struck down
for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business." In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business
and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve
acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively
amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires
for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal
the laws it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS 33 on this subject best
explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the
ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with
equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the
attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments
or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or
things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited
expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body
may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress
and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of
repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.34 (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly
constricts the future legislators’ room for action and flexibility.

III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well
the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the
supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of
the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included
in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to
comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to become effective, 35 questions on the extent of the
matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the
Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every
statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose." With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that
only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of
autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress
must provide for in the Organic Act – require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to
the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the
region’s judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and,
(c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government
under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.36

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically
mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority
votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed
as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.

IV. The synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that
Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an
existing law in fact already exists – RA No. 7166 – as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.
7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional
elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception
of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and
is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in
reality local elections by express constitutional recognition. 37

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMM’s regular
elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of
the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve
this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a
hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;38 (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to
authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected
in the synchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the
power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A. Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully understood.
The first is the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate
for the synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 39 The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. 40 Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.41 Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 42

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations
are generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2)
and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide
their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found "in the evident purpose which was in
view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision
as a part of organic law."43

The constitutional provisions on autonomy – specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the

Constitution – constitute express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its
requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to
legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed
basic structure of government – i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a
legislative assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units;
national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article
X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, "all powers and functions not granted by
this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government."

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must
observe in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of
these sections leave no doubt on what the Constitution intends – the idea of self-rule or self-
government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative
matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the permeating principles of national sovereignty
and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section
15.44 In other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the
notion of imperium et imperio45 in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections
are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If
their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and
affects the whole country, while regional autonomy – as the term suggests – directly carries a narrower
regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on
RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to
synchronize the regional elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM
with governance in the intervening period between the expiration of the term of those elected in August
2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the
Constitution and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of
autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
The Constitution’s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the
old constitution to the new46 and for the introduction of new concepts. 47 As previously mentioned, the
adjustment of elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under
the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough,
particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the
present problem is with us today.

The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required. In
the creation of Quezon del Sur48 and Dinagat Islands,49 the creating statutes authorized the President to
appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although
these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until a new set
of provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified. 50 A similar authority to appoint is provided in
the transition of a local government from a sub-province to a province. 51
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that
does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in
our discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the
synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is
under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional
objective of synchronization that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or
violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the
adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?

B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions
in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term – as an option that Congress could have chosen because a
holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in
Osmeña v. COMELEC:52

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear
implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall
begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the
successors fail to qualify within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

"It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office
the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as
limited by the Constitution." [Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land
dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the
matters so determined or mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none
of the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except only as the
Constitution itself may allow.53 If at all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully
operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing;
this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and
called for.54

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no
room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would
allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at
three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view –
like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.55 Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position
for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President. 56 Hence, holdover – whichever way it is
viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought
before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly
from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, 57 Adap v. Comelec,58 and
Montesclaros v. Comelec,59 where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their
positions in a hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office
are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local
elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension
beyond the term for which they were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, 60 we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. 61

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation,62 except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to
immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and
exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of
the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President,
states:

xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President
shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for xxx the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the
positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided
by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated
either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power. 63

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections
and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for
having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. 64 But our power rests on very narrow ground and is
merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary
to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with
the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and
administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 65 Statutorily, COMELEC has
no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True,
Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to
another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have
already been scheduled to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism,
(c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous
causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous
causes" will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the
scheduled elections. These "analogous causes" are further defined by the phrase "of such nature that
the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible."

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been
scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or
(e) other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses
instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law – i.e., by congressional policy –
and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no
stretch of the imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct
the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of
interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. 66 Clearly, neither
Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal
basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.

D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special
elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office
only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.

In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the
Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the
case of barangay officials,67 is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such
power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least
votes,68 and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President 69 in order to synchronize
elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the
Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. 70 More particularly, not even Congress and certainly
not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years 71 as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM
elections instead of acting on their term (where the "term" means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed
one another, while the "tenure" represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office).72 As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to
shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely
abuse their discretion if they do so.

E. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. 73 The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.74

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be "elective and representative of the constituent political units." This requirement indeed is
an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than
real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.
What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office." This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials
for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the
legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this
is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms.75 Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding
to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for
Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In
more concrete terms and based on the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of
providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint –
for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution – an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of
appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a
government that is not "democratic and republican." For then, the people’s right to choose the leaders
to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the "elective and representative" governance
requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No.
10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance – both under Section
18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 – will not systemically be touched nor affected at all.
To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full
effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that
synchronization of elections requires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders, but this will take place under a
situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been
adopted and used in the creation of local government units 76 and the adjustments of sub-provinces to
the status of provinces.77 These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the
synchronization of elections (considered vis-à-vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these
measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of
the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of
the given circumstances.

Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by
the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the
"elective" aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153
significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of
Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed in its proper context – is a law that
is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as
well under the circumstances.

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to
cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.

This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for
Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the
exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited
purpose – the synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end – the
synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are
likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation
of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections can occur only in
accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon
the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections,
the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months –
or close to 2 years – intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials’ terms expired
and the time the new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao
history – past and current – teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can
transpire in the country’s Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the
past.78 Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting
Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even
temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute
necessity.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to
our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.: 79

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any
vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best
interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws
may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to
the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the
constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of
Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing. 80 (Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays
in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context,
allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint
OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

B. Autonomy in the ARMM

It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to
defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner,
one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates –
synchronization and regional autonomy – such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction –
ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, 81 and one mandate
should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is
clear.82 We refer to the Court’s declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,83 thus:

A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled
and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are

interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No.
10153 which provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least
disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected
instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing features,
except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the
national and local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own
electoral processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves
us far from convinced of its merits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional
entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the
national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the
Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central government, but rather
an efficient working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see
this as an effective partnership, not a separation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political framework of the
nation.84 [Emphasis supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the
Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be
"within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X,
believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the
provision in order to "make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the
autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the national
government[.]"85 Of note is the Court’s pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre 86 which we
quote:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the
entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the
ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the
region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.

Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate – the synchronization of
national and local elections – when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by
which Congress undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation.87 As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our
doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it. 88

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a
legislative problem. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court
will be guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress. 89 The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking
us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic
principles of a republican and democratic government – the separation of powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in
enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 90

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given
an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light
of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of
any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit
to the petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule
that every statute is presumed valid.91 Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of
rebutting this presumption.92 Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality.93 As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:94

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To
doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as
the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. 95 [Emphasis
ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No.
10153, we must support and confirm its validity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA
No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

I join the dissent of J. Velasco with respect to the appointment

of the OIC Governor and vote to hold the law as unconstitutional
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio but disagree

See Dissenting Opinion on the power of the Pres. to appoint OIC-
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Governor of ARMM
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of Justice Velasco

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Velasco

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio I join the dissent of J. Carpio

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Entitled "An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the approval of the amendments to
Republic Act No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the last Monday of November 2001, amending for
the purpose Republic Act No. 9054, entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No.
6734, entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,’ as
amended," and for other purposes.

2
Entitled "An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular elections for Elective Officials of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 9054, entitled "An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled ‘An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended"

3
Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal capacity, and in representation of
Maguindanao Federation of Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc., Hadji Muhmina Usman,
John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T. Odin, Asrin Timbol Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-
e, Kessar Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh Saupi.

4
Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order dated April 11, 2011 was filed against Sixto
Brillantes, as Chairperson of COMELEC, to challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having
been submitted to a plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is inoperative, any other law seeking to
amend it is also null and void.

5
With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writs of Preliminary
Prohibitive and Mandatory Injunction dated June 30, 2011.

6
With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated July 1, 2011.

7
With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated July 12, 2011.

8
With Injunction and Preliminary Injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order dated
July 11, 2011.

9
With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary
Injunction, Both Prohibitory and Mandatory dated July 1, 2011.

10
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held
on the second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which
may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include
the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila
area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
 Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. [emphasis ours]

11
To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution fixes the term of office of elective
local officials at three years, under the above-quoted provisions, the terms of the incumbent
local officials who were elected in January 1988, which should have expired on February 2, 1991,
were fixed to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. In the same vein, the terms of the incumbent
President and Vice President who were elected in February 1986 were extended to noon of June
30, 1992. On the other hand, in order to synchronize the elections of the Senators, who have
six-year terms, the twelve Senators who obtained the lowest votes during the 1992 elections
were made to serve only half the time of their terms.

12
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary
(1996 ed.), p. 1199, citing Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 429-4.

13
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will
temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR
FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992."

This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide
be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view
of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new
proposal. It will read as follows: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."

I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions
giving a term to the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily
then, since the term provided by the Commission for Members of the Lower House and
for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for
said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain,
subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and
consequently, we should not have a local election or an election for Members of the
Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years each.
And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in
1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for
the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election
will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993.
The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to local officials and
the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an
election once every three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the
Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and another six
years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and
12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the
only way to effect the first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a
bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the
local elective officials.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?

MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the
one who proposed that in order to synchronize the elections every three years, which
the body approved — the first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall
continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing.
That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be
for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national,
local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until
1998 and the first twelve Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve
until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then
on, we shall have an election every three years.

So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to
synchronize our elections every three years which was already approved by the body.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent
President and Vice-President in 1992.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

 MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of
the Senators and local officials with the election of the President?

MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the
assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.

MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the
President up to the municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Record of the Constitutional
Commission, pp. 429-431; October 3, 1986)

14
G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 and 100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750, 758.

15
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31
SCRA 413; Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).

16
271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occena v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52265, January 28,
1980, 95 SCRA 755.

17
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, p.1327 (1993).

18
Section 26(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

19
G. R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.

20
A copy of the letter that the President wrote to Honorable Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker
of the House of Representatives dated March 4, 2011 is reproduced below:

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

of the Philippines
Malacañang

14 March 2011

HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.

Speaker
House of Representatives
Quezon City

Dear Speaker Belmonte:

 Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the 1987 Constitution, I hereby
certify to the necessity of the immediate enactment of House Bill No. 4146, entitled:

"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF
OFFICE OF THE ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM
MINDANAO (ARMM) WITH THOSE OF THE NATIONAL AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9333, ENTITLED ‘AN ACT FIXING THE
DATE FOR REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO’, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"

to address the urgent need to protect and strengthen ARMM’s autonomy by

synchronizing its elections with the regular elections of national and other local officials,
to ensure that the on-going peace talks in the region will not be hindered, and to
provide a mechanism to institutionalize electoral reforms in the interim, all for the
development, peace and security of the region.

Best wishes.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

cc: HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Senate President

Philippine Senate

Pasay City

Taken from: http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/15th/1st/15C_1RS-64b-

031611.pdf. Last accessed on September 26, 2011.

21
See Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.

22
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995.

23
Tolentino, id., citing 1 J. G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction §10.04, p. 282
(1972).

24
Section 7, Article XIX of RA No. 6734 states: "The first regular elections of the Regional
Governor, Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Assembly under this Organic Act shall be
held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the ratification of this
Act. The Commission on Elections shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the conduct of said election."
25
Entitled "An Act Providing for the Date of Regular Elections for Regional Governor, Regional
Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes," which fixed the date of the ARMM elections on the
second Monday after the Muslim month of Ramadhan.

26
Entitled "An Act Changing the Date of Elections for the Elective Officials of the Autonomous
Region for Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Section One of Republic Act Numbered
Seventy-Six Hundred and Forty-Seven Entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular
Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes",
which changed the date of the ARMM elections to the second Monday of March, 1993 and
every three (3) years thereafter.

27
Entitled "An Act Providing for the Date of the Regular Elections of Regional Governor, Regional
Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Further Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 7647 entitled
‘An Act Providing for the Date of Regular Elections for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao and for other purposes,’ As Amended, and for other purposes", which moved
the regional elections to the second Monday of September and every three (3) years thereafter.

28
Entitled "An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for the Elective Officials of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao Provided for Under Republic Act No. 8746 and for other purposes",
which reset the regional elections, scheduled on September 13, 1999, to the second Monday of
September 2000.

29
Entitled "An Act Resetting the Regular Elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Second Monday of September 2001, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 8953", which reset the May 2001 elections in ARMM to September
2001.

30
Entitled "An Act Fixing the Date of the Plebiscite for the Approval of the Amendments to
Republic Act No. 6734 and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on the Last Monday of November 2001, Amending for
the Purpose Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No.
6734, Entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,’ as
amended," and For Other Purposes."

31
Entitled "An Act Fixing the Date of Regular Elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao Pursuant to Republic Act no. 9054, Entitled "An Act to Strengthen
and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled ‘An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao’, as Amended," which rescheduled the ARMM
regional elections scheduled for the last Monday of November 2004 to "the second Monday of
August 2005."
32
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be
reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

33
G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 280.

34
Id. at 295-297, citing Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36 (1915); Lewis Southerland on Statutory
Construction, Vol. 1, Section 244, pp. 456-457.

35
This has been established by the following exchange during the Constitutional Commission
debates:

FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic act are:
What segment of the population will participate in the plebiscite? In what capacity
would the legislature be acting when it passes this? Will it be a constituent assembly or
merely a legislative body? What is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation
to ordinary statutes and the Constitution? Finally, if we are going to amend this organic
act, what process will be followed?

MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now appearing in our
report.

First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the region should be
allowed to participate in the plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the character of a
charter passed by Congress, not as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature
and, therefore, the organic act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary
legislative process as now constituted, unless the Gentleman has another purpose.

FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again. [Emphasis ours.];

III Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp.182-183; August 11, 1986.

36
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
37
See discussions at pp. 14-15.

38
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The terms of
office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly
shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September
next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years
thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect
until their successors are elected and qualified. [emphasis ours]

39
Fernando, The Philippine Constitution, pp. 175-176 (1974).

40
Id. at 177; citing the concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran,
63 Phil. 249, 266 (1936).

41
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212 (1946).

42
Ople v. Torres, et al., 354 Phil. 948 (1998); see concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel
in Schneckenburger v. Moran, supra note 40, at 266.

43
State ex rel. Green v. Collison, 39 Del 245, cited in Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law, Vol.
1 (2000 ed.)

44
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities and municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

45
An empire within an empire.

46
Bernas, Joaquin, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government Notes and Cases Part I,
2005 ed., p. 1249.

47
Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives (paragraph 2,
Section 5, of Article VI of the Constitution), and the validation of the power of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government to issue sequestration, freeze orders, and the provisional
takeover orders of ill-gotten business enterprises, embodied in Section 26 of the Transitory
Provisions.

48
RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del Sur Province was rejected by the
voters of Quezon Province in the plebiscite of November 13, 2008.

49
RA No. 9355.

50
Section 50, RA No. 9355 and Section 52 of RA No. 9495.

51
Section 462, RA No. 7160.
52
Supra note 14.

53
In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections [146 Phil. 798 (1970)] the Court held that, "The three
departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted
have no choice but to yield obedience to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed." 146 Phil. 798 (1970).

54
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration [No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31
SCRA 413, 423], the Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique, stated: As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text
of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these
are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

55
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22,
2011.

56
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, citing Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.) 768.

57
481 Phil. 661 (2004).

58
G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403.

59
G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2011.

60
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The terms of
office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the
30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region shall
continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified.

61
Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946).

62
Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356.

63
Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, No. L-25349, December 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465.

64
See CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.

65
See CONSTITUTION, Article IX (C), Section 2(1).
66
Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159268, October 27,
2006, 505 SCRA 654, 663, citing Lapid v. CA, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738,
quoting Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. 29658, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.

67
CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.

68
Article XVIII, Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

69
Article XVIII, Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

70
Cruz, Carlo. The Law of Public Officers, 2007 edition, p. 285, citing Mechem, Section 387.

71
Ponencia, p. 21.

72
See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946); Alba, etc. v. Evangelista, etc., et al.,
100 Phil. 683, 694 (1957); Aparri v. Court of Appeals, No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA
231.

73
Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National Police Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S.
Urro, et al., G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011, citing Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974,
December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549.

74
Sarmiento III v. Mison, supra.

75
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 451 Phil. 812
(2003).

76
Supra notes 47 and 48.

77
Supra note 50.

78
The after-effects of the Maguindanao massacre where the Ampatuans stand charged, the
insurrection by the MILF and its various factions, and the on-going peace negotiations, among
others, are immediately past and present events that the nation has to vigilant about.

79
274 Phil. 523 (1991).
 80
Id. at 532.

81
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA
783.

82
As noted under footnote 37.

83
118 Phil. 1468 (1963).

84
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, August 11, 1986, p. 179.

85
Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 560.

86
391 Phil. 84, 102 (2000).

87
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

88
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil. 411, 427 (1997) citing Pangilinan v.
Maglaya, 225 SCRA 511 (1993).

89
Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605, December 18, 2008,
574 SCRA 468, 581.

90
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315.

91
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., 210 Phil. 187, 207 (1983); Peralta
v. Commission on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 and L-47827,
March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.

92
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001); Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v.
Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.

93
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on
Elections, supra.

94
G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.

95
Id. at 523.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:

The Cases

These are original actions1 assailing the validity of statutes and bills on the holding of elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

Background

The ARMM Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
9054), mandated the holding of the "first regular elections for Governor, Vice-Governor and Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly x x x on the second Monday of September 2001." 2 The elected officials
would serve a three-year term beginning 30 September 2001. 3 Before the September 2001 elections
could take place, however, Congress moved the elections to 26 November 2001 by enacting Republic
Act No. 9140 (RA 9140).4

Nearly four years later, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9333 (RA 9333) fixing the date of the "regular
elections" in the ARMM "on the second Monday of August 2005 [and] x x x every three years
thereafter."5 Elections in the ARMM took place on the second Mondays of August 2005 and August 2008
following RA 9333.

A few months before the ARMM elections on the second Monday of August 2011, several members of
the House of Representatives jointly filed House Bill No. 4146 (HB 4146), moving the date of the
elections to "the second Monday of May 2013 and x x x every three years thereafter." As the term of
office of the then incumbent elective officials in the ARMM would expire on 30 September 2011, HB
4146 authorized the President to appoint officers-in-charge who would hold office from 30 September
2011 until 30 June 2013 when the officials elected in the May 2013 elections would have assumed
office. HB 4146 aimed to synchronize the ARMM elections with the local and national elections
scheduled on the second Monday of May 2013. 6 The House of Representatives approved HB 4146 on 23
March 2011, voting 191- 47 with two abstentions.

After receiving HB 4146, the Senate, where a counterpart measure (Senate Bill No. 2756 [SB 2756]) was
pending, approved its own version on 6 June 2011 by a vote of 13-7, modifying some parts of HB 4146
but otherwise leaving its core provisions intact. The affirmative votes were two votes short of 2/3 of the
Senate membership (23). The following day, the House of Representatives adopted the Senate’s version.
On 30 June 2011, the President signed the measure into law as Republic Act No. 10153 (RA 10153).

After the House of Representatives approved HB 4146, petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 filed their petition
assailing the constitutionality of HB 4146, SB 2756 and RA 9333. Soon after, petitioner in G.R. No.
196305 filed suit assailing the constitutionality of RA 9333. After the President signed into law RA 10153,
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392 and 197454 filed their petitions assailing the
constitutionality of RA 10153. Petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also assail the constitutionality of RA 9140
and RA 9333. In a supplemental petition, petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 joined these latter petitions in
questioning the constitutionality of RA 10153.

The petitions against RA 9140, RA 9333 and RA 10153 7 treat these laws as amending RA 9054 and charge
Congress with failing to comply with the twin requirements prescribed in Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of
RA 90548 for amending RA 9054. These twin requirements are: (1) approval by a 2/3 vote of the
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate voting separately, and (2) submission of the
amendments to ARMM voters in a plebiscite. RA 9140, RA 9333 and RA 10153 do not provide for their
submission to ARMM voters in a plebiscite. On the other hand, although the 191 affirmative votes in the
Lower House for HB 4146 satisfied the 2/3 vote threshold in RA 9054, the 13 affirmative votes in the
Senate for SB 2756 fell two votes short of the 2/3 vote threshold.

Petitioners’ unanimity ends here, however, for they differ on when the elections in the ARMM should
take place. The petitions against RA 10153 favor the holding of elections on the second Monday of
August 20119 while those attacking RA 9333 only, 10 or together with RA 9140 and RA 10153, 11 seek the
holding of elections on the second Monday of September 2011, purportedly following RA 9054. Another
petition, which finds RA 10153 unconstitutional, leave it to the Court to order special elections within a
period "reasonably close" to the elections mandated in RA 9333. 12

The petitions against RA 10153 further raise the following issues: (1) postponing the ARMM elections to
the second Monday of May 2013 undermines the republican and autonomous nature of the ARMM, in
violation of the Constitution and RA 9054; (2) granting the President the power to appoint OICs
unconstitutionally expands his power over the ARMM to encompass not only general supervision but
also control; and, for the petition in G.R. No. 197280, (3) Congress, in enacting RA 10153, defectively
waived the Constitution’s requirement for the separate reading of bills and the advance distribution of
their printed copies because the President’s certification for the urgent passage of HB 4146 and SB 2756
was not grounded on public calamity or emergency.

The petition in G.R. No. 196271 extends the reach of its attack to HB 4146 and SB 2756, for failing to
include a provision requiring the submission of the anticipated law to ARMM voters in a plebiscite.

In their separate Comments to the petitions in G.R. No. 196271 and G.R. No. 196305, the Senate and the
House of Representatives pray for the dismissal of the petitions. The Senate disagrees with the
proposition that RA 9333 constitutes an amendment to RA 9054, treating RA 9333 as merely filling the
void left by RA 9054 in failing to schedule the succeeding regular elections in the ARMM. Thus, the
Senate finds irrelevant the twin requirements in RA 9054 in the enactment of the assailed laws.
Alternatively, the Senate gives a narrow construction to the plebiscite requirement in RA 9054, limiting
the plebiscite to cover amendatory laws affecting "substantive matters," as opposed to "administrative
concerns" such as fixing election dates.13

The House of Representatives accepts the amendatory nature of RA 9333 but attacks the
constitutionality of the twin requirements in RA 9054 mandating a supermajority vote of each House of
Congress and the approval by ARMM voters in a plebiscite for purposes of amending RA 9054. The
Lower House grounds its attack on two points: (1) save in exceptional cases not applicable to the
present petitions, the Constitution only requires a simple majority of a quorum in each House of
Congress to enact, amend or repeal laws; and (2) the rule against the passage of irrepealable laws.
Alternatively, the House of Representatives, like the Senate, narrowly construes the plebiscite
requirement in RA 9054 to cover only amendatory laws creating or expanding the ARMM’s territory.

The Senate and the House of Representatives uniformly contend that the question on the
constitutionality of HB 4146 and SB 2756 is non-justiciable.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and the other individual public respondents, joined causes with the House of Representatives on the
issue of the validity of the twin requirements in RA 9054 for the passage of amendatory laws. In
defending the President’s authority under RA 10153 to appoint OICs, the OSG treats the authority as a
species of legislation falling under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution authorizing the President to
appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." The OSG rejects petitioners’ treatment
of this authority as granting the President control over the ARMM, contending instead that it is
analogous to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, authorizing the President for a limited period to
appoint sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives.

On 9 August 2011, the Court heard the parties in oral argument.

On 13 September 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
implementing RA 10153. Meanwhile, the Court authorized the then incumbent elective officials in the
ARMM to continue in office in the event that the present petitions remain unresolved after the officials’
term of office expires on 30 September 2011.

The Court granted intervention to four groups of parties who filed comments-in-intervention joining
causes with respondents.

The Issues

The following are the issues for resolution:

I. Did the passage of RA 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution?

II. Do Section 2 of RA 10153, Section 1 of RA 9333 and Section 2 of RA 9140 constitute an amendment
to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA 9054? If in the affirmative –

1. Is Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 repugnant to Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and violative of the rule against the passage of irrepealable laws?;
and

2. Does Section 3, Article XVII of RA 9054 apply only in the creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the Constitution?

III. Do Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 –

1. Violate Sections 15, 16, and 18, Article X of the Constitution?;

2. Fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution?; and

3. Repeal the second sentence of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054?

IV. Does RA 10153 implement Sections 2 and 5, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
I vote to declare RA 9333 constitutional, and RA 10153 partly unconstitutional. The synchronization of
the ARMM elections with the national and local elections under RA 10153 is constitutional. However,
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 authorizing the President to appoint OICs in place of elective ARMM
officials are unconstitutional. Save in newly created local government units prior to special or regular
elections, elective officials of local government units like the ARMM cannot be appointed by the
President but must be elected in special or regular elections. Hence, respondent COMELEC should be
ordered to hold special elections in the ARMM as soon as possible.

Pending the assumption to office of the elected ARMM Governor, the President, under his general
supervision over local governments, may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM
Governor. Such appointment is absolutely necessary and unavoidable to keep functioning essential
government services in the ARMM. On the other hand, I vote to declare unconstitutional the second
sentence of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054 authorizing ARMM elective officials to hold over until the
election and qualification of their successors. Such hold over violates the fixed term of office of elective
local officials under the Constitution.

The challenge against the constitutionality of HB 4146 and SB 2756 raises a non-justiciable question,
hence immediately dismissible. Until legislative bills become laws, attacks against their constitutionality
are premature, lying beyond the pale of judicial review. 14

The President’s Certification on Urgency of Legislation

Not Subject to Heightened Scrutiny

Petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 claim that Congress defectively passed RA 10153 for failing to comply
with the requirement in the Constitution for the reading of bills on three separate days and the
advanced distribution of their printed copies in final form under the second paragraph of Section 26,
Article VI, which provides:

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal. (Emphasis supplied)

Although the President certified HB 4146 and SB 2756 as urgent measures, thus dispensing with the
bills’ separate reading and advanced distribution, petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 find the basis of the
President’s certification, namely, the "need to protect x x x ARMM’s autonomy x x x and provide
mechanism to institutionalize electoral reforms," as "flimsy," falling short of the Constitution’s
requirement of public calamity or emergency. 15

The Court has refused in the past to subject to heightened scrutiny presidential certifications on the
urgency of the passage of legislative measures. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,16 petitioners in that
case questioned the sufficiency of the President’s certification of a "growing budget deficit" as basis for
the urgent passage of revenue measures, claiming that this does not amount to a public calamity or
emergency. The Court declined to strike down the President’s certification upon a showing that
members of both Houses of Congress had the opportunity to study the bills and no fundamental
constitutional rights were "at hazard":

It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no
emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual
condition in this country.

It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the
certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994,
the Senate accepted the President’s certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this
Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second
and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for
the study of a vital piece of legislation?

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because
basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills,
which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly
considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. (Emphasis
supplied)

As in Tolentino, Congress, in passing RA 10153, found sufficient the factual bases for President Aquino’s
certification of HB 4146 and SB 2756 as emergency measures. Petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 do not
allege, and there is nothing on record to show, that members of Congress were denied the opportunity
to examine HB 4146 and SB 2756 because of the President’s certification. There is thus no basis to
depart from Tolentino.17

RA 9333 and RA 10153 Supplement

and do not Amend RA 9054

The petitions assailing RA 9333 and RA 10153 are united in their contention that these amendatory laws
to RA 9054 are invalid for failure to comply with the twin requirements in RA 9054, namely, that the
amendments must be approved by a 2/3 vote of each House of Congress and submitted to ARMM
voters in a plebiscite. The underlying assumption of petitioners’ theory – that RA 9333 and RA 10153
amend RA 9054 – is legally baseless.

Section 7, Article XVIII of RA 9054 on the holding of ARMM elections provides in part:

First Regular Elections. – The first regular elections of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor
and members of the regional legislative assembly under this Organic Act shall be held on the second
Monday of September 2001. The Commission on Elections shall promulgate rules and regulations as may
be necessary for the conduct of said election. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
The ambit of Section 7 is narrow, confined to the "first regular elections," scheduled "on the second
Monday of September 2001." This left open the scheduling of elections succeeding the "first regular
elections."

In the exercise of its plenary legislative power, Congress filled this void by enacting RA 9333, Section 1 of
which provides:

Section 1. Date of Election. – The regular election for regional Governor and Regional Vice-Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) shall be held on the second Monday of August 2005. Succeeding regular elections shall be
held on the same date every three years thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)

In the discharge of the same power, Congress subsequently passed RA 10153, Section 2 of which states:

SEC. 2. Regular Elections. - The regular elections for the Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) shall be held on the second (2nd) Monday of May 2013. Succeeding regular elections shall be
held on the same date every three (3) years thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress intended RA 9054 to govern not only the "first regular elections" but
also succeeding regular elections, it would have included in Section 7 of Article XVIII a provision stating
to the effect that the succeeding regular elections shall be held on the same date every three years
thereafter, consistent with the three-year term of office of elective officials in the ARMM. 18 Instead, RA
9054 confines itself to the "first regular elections." Tellingly, it is only in Section 1 of RA 9333 and Section
2 of RA 10153 that Congress touched on the succeeding regular elections in the ARMM, by uniformly
providing that "[s]ucceeding regular elections shall be held" on the date indicated "every three years
thereafter."

The legislative practice of limiting the reach of the ARMM Organic Act to the first regular elections,
leaving the date of the succeeding regular elections for Congress to fix in a subsequent legislation, traces
its roots in the ARMM’s first Organic Act, RA 6734. Section 7, Article XIX of RA 6734 fixed the date of the
"first regular elections," to take place "not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days"
after the ratification of RA 6743. Section 7 reads in full:

The first regular elections of the Regional Governor, Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional
Assembly under this Organic Act shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the ratification of this Act. The Commission on Elections shall promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the conduct of said election. (Emphasis supplied)

To fix the date of the succeeding regular elections, Congress passed several measures, moving the
election day as it deemed proper.19 Like RA 9333 and RA 10153, these enactments merely filled a void
created by the narrow wording of RA 6734. RA 9333 and RA 10153 are therefore separate, stand-alone
statutes that do not amend any provision of RA 9054.

RA 9140 Rendered Functus

Officio after 26 November 2001
Elections
Petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 attack Section 2 of RA 9140 also for its failure to comply with the twin
requirements in amending RA 9054.20 To recall, under Section 2 of RA 9140, which immediately
preceded RA 9333, the date of the first elections in the ARMM under RA 9054 was moved to 26
November 2001.

There is no reason to traverse this issue for the simple reason that Congress passed RA 9140 solely for
the narrow purpose of fixing the date of the plebiscite for RA 9054 (Section 1) and the date of the first
regular elections in the ARMM under RA 9054 (Section 2). These electoral exercises took place on 14
August 2001 and 26 November 2001, respectively. Hence, RA 9140 became functus officio after 26
November 2001. It is futile, in this case, to review the validity of a functus officio law.

Granting that RA 9333 and RA 10153 Amend

RA 9054, these Laws Remain Valid

That RA 9333 and RA 10153 merely filled a void in RA 9054 would have sufficed to dispose of the
argument that these laws are invalid for non-compliance with the twin requirements in RA 9054. These
requirements would have been left unreviewed were it not for the fact that respondents and
intervenors vigorously insist on their invalidity. The issue having been raised squarely, the Court should
pass upon it.

Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054

Requiring 2/3 Vote to Amend RA

9054 Unconstitutional

Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 requires a 2/3 supermajority vote of the members of each House of
Congress to amend or repeal RA 9054. This provision states:

Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the
Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents House of Representatives, COMELEC and individual officials assail this provision’s
constitutionality on two grounds. First, it is repugnant to Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
requiring a mere majority of members of both Houses of Congress to constitute a quorum to do
business.21 Second, it violates the doctrine barring the passage of irrepealable laws, a doctrine rooted on
the plenary power of Congress to amend or repeal laws that it enacts.

Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that "[a] majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business x x x," sets the vote threshold for Congress to conduct its legislative
work in plenary session. Under this provision, a majority of each House suffices for Congress to hold
sessions and pass, amend, or repeal bills and resolutions, upon a vote of a majority of the members
present who constitute a quorum. In short, a majority of a quorum, or a majority of a majority, can
enact, amend or repeal laws or approve acts requiring the affirmative action of Congress, unless the
Constitution prescribes a qualified or supermajority in specific cases.22
By providing that RA 9054 "may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a
vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting
separately," Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 raised the vote threshold necessary to amend RA 9054 to
a level higher than what Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution requires. Thus, without Section 1,
Article XVII of RA 9054, it takes only 72 23 votes in the Lower House and 724 votes in the Senate to pass
amendments or revisions to RA 9054, assuming a simple quorum in attendance in either House. With
the same provision in the statute books, at least 189 votes in the House of Representatives and at least
15 in the Senate are needed to enact the same amendatory or repealing legislation, assuming the same
simple quorum in either House. The repugnancy between the statutory provision and the Constitution is
irreconcilable. Needless to say, the Constitution prevails.

Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 also runs afoul of the inherent limitation on Congress’ power barring it
from passing irrepealable laws.25 Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each
House of Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of
Congress’ amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of
succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to
enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress
has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution.

The Constitution’s rule allowing a simple majority of each House of Congress to do business evinces the
framers’ familiarity with the perennial difficulty plaguing national legislative assemblies in constituting a
quorum. Set the quorum requirement any higher and plenary legislative work will most likely slow down
if not grind to a halt. The 2/3 vote threshold in Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 effectively ensures the
near immutability of RA 9054, in derogation of Congress’ plenary power to amend or repeal laws. Unless
the Constitution itself mandates a higher vote threshold to enact, amend or repeal laws, 26 each House of
Congress can do so by simple majority of the members present who constitute a quorum.

There is no merit in the proposition that Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 is an "additional safeguard[]
to protect and guarantee" the autonomy of the ARMM. 27 Autonomy, even of the expanded type
prevailing in the ARMM, means vesting of more powers and resources to the local or regional
government units. To say that autonomy means shackling the hands of Congress in improving laws or
passing remedial legislations betrays a gross misconception of autonomy.

Nor is the provision in Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution requiring a 2/3 vote for Congress to
override a presidential veto an argument for the validity of Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054. The veto-
override provision neither negates the simple majority rule for Congress to legislate nor allows the
passage of irrepealable laws. The Presidential veto is a power of the Executive to reject a law 28 passed by
Congress, with the associated power of Congress to override such veto by a 2/3 vote. This associated
power of Congress is not an independent power to prescribe a higher vote threshold to enact, amend or
repeal laws, an act which does not involve any Presidential veto but operates as an auto-limitation on
the plenary power of Congress to legislate.

The veto-override provision is a small but vital mechanism presidential systems adopt to calibrate the
balance of power between the Executive and the Legislature. It ensures the Executive a substantial voice
in legislation by requiring the Legislature to surmount a vote threshold higher than the simple majority
required to pass the vetoed legislation. The veto-override provision cannot be used to immobilize future
Congresses from amending or repealing laws by a simple majority vote as provided in Section 16(2),
Article VI of the Constitution.
Plebiscite Mandatory only
in Approving Creation or Expansion
of the ARMM

The second paragraph of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution requires the holding of a plebiscite in
the autonomous region for the approval of its creation, thus:

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 18 of Article X is substantially similar to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, mandating that
no local government unit shall be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially
altered"29 unless, among others, voters of the affected units approve the proposed measure in a
plebiscite.

The narrow ambit of these constitutional provisions, limiting the plebiscite to changes in the size of the
unit’s territory, is commonsensical. The Constitution requires that territorial changes, affecting the
jurisdiction, income, and population of a local government unit, should not be left solely for politicians
to decide but must be submitted for approval or rejection by the people affected. 30

In sharp contrast to the narrow scope of Section 10 and Section 18 of Article X of the Constitution,
Section 3, Article XVII of RA 9054 mandates the holding of a plebiscite in the ARMM to approve
"[a]ny amendment to or revision of" RA 9054, thus:

Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a
majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty
(60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision. (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioners give a literal interpretation to this provision by applying it to all amendments to or revisions
of RA 9054, including the fixing of the date of elections in the ARMM that RA 10153 mandates.

By requiring the holding of a plebiscite to approve "any amendment to or revision" of RA 9054, Section
3, Article XVII of RA 9054, a supposed statutory implementation of the second paragraph of Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution, impermissibly expands the scope of the subject matter that the
Constitution requires to be submitted to a plebiscite. By barring any change to RA 9054 from taking
effect unless approved by ARMM voters in a plebiscite, even if unrelated to the ARMM’s creation,
reduction or expansion, Section 3 of Article XVII directly contravenes Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution.31

True, the Court held in Disomangcop v. Datumanong32 that Republic Act No. 8999 (RA 8999) creating an
engineering office within the ARMM is an "amendatory law which should x x x first obtain the approval
of the people of the ARMM before it can validly take effect." 33 This statement, obviously an obiter dicta,
furnishes no ground to support petitioners’ interpretation of Section 3, Article XVII of RA 9054. What the
Court resolved in Disomangcop was whether RA 8999, creating an office performing functions
inconsistent with those created under the ARMM Organic Act, prevails over the latter. The Court
anchored its negative answer, not on the ground that RA 8999 was invalid for not having been approved
in a plebiscite, but on the fact that RA 8999, signed into law in January 2001, "was repealed and
superseded by RA 9054," enacted in March 2001. Thus, in disposing of the case, we ruled:

WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act No. 9054 repealed Republic Act No. 8999 and rendered
DPWH Department Order No. 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it seeks the writs of certiorari
and prohibition is GRANTED.34 x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The Court was not confronted in Disomangcop, as it is now, with the issue of whether a law changing
the date of elections in the ARMM should be submitted to ARMM voters in a plebiscite.

Congress’ Power to Synchronize National and Local

Elections does not Encompass Appointment of OICs
in Place of Elective Officials

The Constitution impliedly requires the synchronization of elections for President, Vice-President,
members of Congress and local officials after the end of their first term by simultaneously ending their
tenure on 30 June 1992, extending in the process the initial tenure of the members of Congress and
local officials.35 As the Court confirmed in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections:36 "[t]he Constitution has
mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to June 30, 1992 or more specifically as
provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 – on the second Monday of May 1992." 37 After the Court struck down
Republic Act No. 7065 in Osmeña for desynchronizing local and national elections, Congress
subsequently passed Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166) synchronizing elections for presidential, vice-
presidential, congressional, provincial, city and municipal officials. RA 10153 widens the ambit of the
Constitution’s policy of synchronizing elections by including the ARMM into the loop of synchronized
elections. With the passage of RA 10153, only barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections are
excluded from the synchronized national and local elections. 38

The contention of petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 that the elections in the ARMM cannot be
synchronized with the existing synchronized national and local elections is untenable. Petitioners
advance the theory that elections in the ARMM are not "local elections" because ARMM officials are not
"local officials" within the meaning of Sections 2 and 5, Article XVIII of the Constitution.39

Under Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, the ARMM is a local government unit just like provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. Section 1, Article X of the Constitution provides:

The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis supplied)

The entire Article X of the Constitution is entitled "Local Government" because Article X governs the
creation of, and the grant of powers to, all local government units, including autonomous
regions.40 Thus, elective officials of the ARMM are local officials because the ARMM is a local
government unit, just like provinces, cities and municipalities.

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x." In compliance
with this provision, ARMM elective officials serve three-year terms under RA 9054. 41 Congress cannot fix
the term of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than three years. Clearly, elective
officials in the ARMM are "local officials" and elections in the ARMM, a local government unit, are "local
elections."

Congress’ power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials,
however, does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in
place of elective local officials, canceling in the process scheduled local elections. To hold otherwise is to
sanction the perversion of the Philippine State’s democratic and republican nature. 42 Offices declared
by the Constitution as elective must be filled up by election and not by appointment. To appoint
officials to offices mandated by the Constitution to be elective, absent an absolutely unavoidable
necessity to keep functioning essential government services, is a blatant violation of an express
command of the Constitution.

Options to Fill Vacancies in the ARMM

Elective Offices After 30 September 2011

In desiring to include elections in the ARMM in the existing synchronized national and local elections,
Congress faced a dilemma arising from the different schedules of the election cycles under RA 7166 and
RA 9333. Under RA 7166, national and local elections simultaneously take place every second Monday of
May in a three-year cycle starting 1992. On the other hand, under RA 9333, elections in the ARMM take
place every second Monday of August in a three-year cycle starting 2005. Thus, a 21-month gap
separates the two electoral cycles. The horn of the dilemma lies in how to fill up elective offices in the
ARMM during this gap.
There are three apparent ways out of this dilemma, namely: (1) allow the elective officials in the ARMM
to remain in office in a hold over capacity; (2) authorize the President to appoint OICs; or (3) hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire on 30 June 2013. Two petitions favor
partial hold over pending the holding of special elections. 43 On the other hand, the OSG defends
Congress’ choice under RA 10153 authorizing the President to appoint OICs who will hold office until 30
June 2013.

Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 Authorizing

the President to Appoint OICs
in Elective Local Offices in the
ARMM Unconstitutional

Historically, the legislature has authorized the President to appoint OICs for elective local offices only as
an incident to the creation of a new local government unit or to its transition from a sub-unit to a full-
fledged political subdivision. Thus, statutes creating the provinces of Quezon del Sur 44 and Dinagat
Islands45 uniformly authorized the President to appoint "an interim governor, vice-governor and
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, who shall serve only until a new set of provincial officials
have been elected and qualified."46 Similarly, the statute creating the municipality of T’boli in South
Cotabato authorized the President to "appoint the elective officials of the new Municipality who shall
hold office until their successors shall have been duly elected in the general elections next following the
issuance of this Decree."47 The same authorization is found in the Local Government Code for sub-
provinces, authorizing the President to appoint the interim governor, vice-governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan while the sub-provinces are transitioning to the status of a province. 48
These legislative authorizations are rendered imperative by the fact that incipient or transitioning local
government units are devoid of elective officials prior to special or regular local elections. Where the law
provides for the creation of a local government unit prior to the election of its local officials, it
becomes absolutely necessary and unavoidable for the legislature to authorize the President to appoint
interim officials in elective local offices to insure that essential government services start to function.

In authorizing the President to appoint OICs in the ARMM, Section 3 of RA 10153 provides:

Appointment of Officers-in-Charge.—The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who
shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

Section 3 is supplemented by Section 4 which provides the manner and procedure of

appointment49 while Section 5 states the qualifications for the OICs. 50

It takes no extensive analysis to conclude that Section 3 is neither necessary nor unavoidable for the
ARMM to function. The ARMM is an existing, as opposed to a newly created or transitioning, local
government unit created more than two decades ago in 1989. At the time of the passage of RA 10153,
elected officials occupied all the elective offices in the ARMM. No one claims that it is impossible to hold
special local elections in the ARMM to determine its next set of elective officials.

Section 3 of RA 10153 negates the representative and democratic nature of the Philippine State and its
political subdivisions such as the ARMM.51 Section 18, Article X of the Constitution on the organic act of
autonomous regions expressly requires the organic act to define the "[b]asic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall
be elective and representative of the constituent political units."52 The ARMM’s Organic Act, RA 6734, as
amended by RA 9054, implements Section 18, Article X of the Constitution by mandating the popular
election of its executive and legislative officials. 53 Section 3 of RA 10153, however, negates Congress’
implementation of the Constitution under RA 9054 by making the executive and legislative offices in the
ARMM appointive.

There is no merit in the OSG’s argument that Section 3 of RA 10153 is similar to Section 7, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution, authorizing the President to appoint sectoral representatives in Congress pending
the passage of legislation on party-list representation. 54 The filling of seats in the House of
Representatives under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution is authorized by the Constitution itself
and thus can never be questioned as unconstitutional. In ratifying the Constitution, the Filipino people
authorized the President to appoint sectoral representatives for a limited period. However, the
appointment by the President of OICs in the ARMM under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 is not
authorized under the Constitution but is in fact in violation of the Constitution that the Filipino people
ratified overwhelmingly.

What Section 3 of RA 10153 approximates is the provision in the Freedom Constitution allowing "[a]ll
elective x x x officials [to] continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order
or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a
period of one year from February 25, 1986." 55 Wisely enough, none of the respondents saw fit to invoke
this provision as precedent. The mass replacement of elective local officials following the EDSA uprising
in 1986 was part of the then revolutionary government’s purging of the local government ranks of
officials linked to the excesses of the previous regime. In making her appointments, then President
Corazon C. Aquino wielded executive and legislative powers unconstrained by any specific constitutional
limitation. This is not the situation in the present case.

Nor is Section 3 of RA 10153 a species of legislation falling under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution authorizing the President to appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint." This provision does not empower Congress to authorize the President to fill up by
appointment positions that, by express mandate of the Constitution, are "elective and representative"
offices. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution obviously refers only to appointive and not elective
offices.

Clearly, authorizing the President to appoint OICs in place of elective officials in the ARMM,
an existing local government unit, contravenes Section 18, Article X of the Constitution, which mandates
that the "executive department and legislative assembly" of the ARMM "shall be elective and
representative." Elective local offices in the ARMM, after the ARMM’s creation and holding of regular
local elections, cannot be filled up through the appointment of OICs by the President without violating
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

However, under Section 4, Article X of the Constitution, the President exercises "general supervision"
over all local governments. In case it is absolutely necessary and unavoidable to keep functioning
essential government services, the President may, under his power of general supervision over local
governments, appoint OICs where vacancies occur in existing elective local offices and the law does not
provide for succession, or where succession is inapplicable because the terms of elective officials have
expired.

Thus, the President may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM Governor pending the
holding of special local elections in the ARMM. The appointment of such officer-in-charge is absolutely
necessary and unavoidable because someone must insure that essential government services continue
to function in the ARMM. The officer-in-charge shall exercise the powers and perform the functions of
the ARMM Governor under RA 9054 and related laws until the assumption to office of the elected
ARMM Governor. However, all appointments made by the officer-in-charge shall terminate upon the
assumption to office of the elected Governor.

It is, however, not absolutely necessary and unavoidable to appoint OICs in the ARMM Regional
Legislative Assembly because Section 22, Article VII of RA 9054 provides for the automatic reenactment
of the ARMM budget if the Regional Legislative Assembly fails to pass the appropriation bill for the
ensuing fiscal year.56 Even without OIC regional assembly members, the ARMM will have an operational
budget for the next fiscal year. However, following the Local Government Code, which applies
suppletorily to the ARMM,57 "only the annual appropriations for salaries and wages of existing positions,
statutory and contractual obligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and
supplemental budgets for the preceding year" are deemed reenacted. 58 The officer-in-charge in the
office of the ARMM Governor shall disburse funds from the reenacted budget in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Local Government Code and its implementing rules.

Second Sentence of Section 7(1),

Article VII of RA 9054
Authorizing
 the Hold Over of ARMM Officials
Unconstitutional

Petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 invokes the second sentence of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054, which
provides:

Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three
(3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election
and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of
the autonomous region shall continue in office until their successors are elected and
qualified.59 (Emphasis supplied)

as statutory authorization for ARMM elective officials at the time of the passage of RA 10153 to remain
in office until their successors, elected in special elections, assume office. Petitioner in G.R. No. 197221
adopts the same view. On the other hand, respondents-intervenors 60 consider the same provision
unconstitutional for extending the term of office of ARMM officials beyond the three years mandated in
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. There is merit to this latter claim.

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution limits the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, to three years:

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied)

Elective ARMM officials are "local officials" 61 within the meaning of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. The ARMM Charter, RA 9054, complies with Section 8, Article X of the Constitution by
providing that "[t]he terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and members of
the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years." 62

The question of whether a law may constitutionally mandate the "hold over" of local officials beyond
the expiration of their term as fixed in the Constitution is not novel. The Court reviewed such a law
in Osmeña and struck down the law, holding that "it is not competent of the legislature to extend the
term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and
qualified where the [C]onstitution has x x x prescribed the term":

[S]ection 2, Article XVIII of the Constitution x x x provides that the local official first elected under the
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local
officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been
duly elected and qualified. It has been held that:

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear
implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall
begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the
successors fail to qualify with the time. x x x x

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an
office the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the
period as limited by the Constitution.

Also, there is Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which provides that:

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials which shall be determined by law
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. . .

x x x .63 (Boldfacing supplied; italicization in the original)

Osmeña is grounded on reasons of power and public policy. First, the power of Congress to fix the terms
of public offices stems from (1) its inherent power to create such public offices or (2) a constitutionally
delegated power to that effect. Thus, if a public office is created by the Constitution with a fixed term, or
if the term of a public office created by Congress is fixed by the Constitution, Congress is devoid of any
power to change the term of that office. Thus, statutes which extend the term of an elective office as
fixed in the Constitution – either by postponing elections, changing the date of commencement of term
of the successor, or authorizing the incumbent to remain in office until his successor is elected and
qualified – are unconstitutional as it amounts to an appointment of an official by Congress to a
constitutional office, a power vested either in the Executive or in the electorate, 64 or a negation of the
term of office fixed in the Constitution.

Second, constitutional provisions fixing the terms of elective officials serve the ends of democratic
republicanism by depriving elective officials of any legal basis to remain in office after the end of their
terms, ensuring the holding of elections, and paving the way for the newly elected officials to assume
office.65 Such provisions, which are found in the 1987 Constitution, are framed upon the belief that to
ensure democratic values, there must be periodic electoral exercises. By refusing to include hold over
provisions in fixing the terms of elective national and non-barangay local officials, the framers of the
1987 Constitution guaranteed not only the elective nature of these offices 66 but also secured our
democratic values.

The wisdom of Osmeña is magnified when the evils it seeks to bar are applied to the elective officials
whose terms of office the 1987 Constitution fixed, namely:

1. President, with a single term of six years, beginning at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election;67

2. Vice-President, with a term of six years beginning at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election, eligible for one reelection;68
 3. Senators, with a term of six years beginning at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election, unless otherwise provided by law, eligible for two
consecutive reelections;69

4. Members of the House of Representatives, with a term of three years beginning at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election, unless otherwise provided by
law, eligible for two consecutive reelections; 70 and

5. Local officials, except barangay officials, with a term of three years, for a maximum of three
consecutive terms.71

A ruling contrary to Osmeña would allow Congress to pass a law, in the guise of ensuring the continuity
of public service and preventing a hiatus in office, mandating the President, Vice-President, Senators,
Congressmen and elective local officials other than barangay officials to remain in office "until their
successors are elected and qualified." In doing so, Congress would have arrogated to itself the power to
lengthen the terms of office of the President, Vice-President, Senators, Congressmen and non-barangay
elective local officials in contravention of their terms as fixed in the Constitution. The absence in the
Constitution of any provision allowing the hold over of national and non-barangay elective local officials
or of any provision vesting on Congress the power to fix the terms of office of these officials means that
any alteration in their terms of office can only be effected through a constitutional amendment.

The Local Government Code does not authorize the hold over of elective local officials. 72 This is
consistent with the constitutional provision fixing the term, without hold over, of all elective non-
barangay local officials. With the exception of the hold over provision in RA 9054, Congress refrained
from passing laws allowing hold over of non-barangay elective local officials. Congress passed a law to
that effect (Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9164 [RA 9164]) only for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials which the Court reviewed and upheld in Sambarani v. COMELEC.73 The legislature’s
passage of RA 9164 is in accord with the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the power to determine the
term of barangay officials.

In contrast, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054, allowing for the hold over of elective local officials in the
ARMM, finds no basis in the Constitution. Indeed, Section 7(1) contravenes the Constitution by
extending the term of office of such elective local officials beyond the three year period fixed in Section
8, Article X of the Constitution.

Beyond the question of power, Osmeña protects democratic values and assures public order. The
certainty of departure from office that term endings and term limits bring carries with it the certainty of
the holding of regular and periodic elections, securing the voters’ right to elect the officials for the new
term. On the other hand, faced with no choice but to leave office on the day their terms end, elective
officials stand to gain nothing in sabotaging electoral processes to extend their stay in office.

It is immaterial that the laws Congress enacted in the past postponing elections in the ARMM all
contained provisions for the hold over of the incumbents until the election of their successors. 74 None of
these laws were challenged before the Court, thus the Court had no occasion to pass upon their
validity.75
Nor is the Court’s Resolution of 13 September 2011 authorizing the then incumbent ARMM elective
officials to continue in office under Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054 a prejudgment of the provision’s
validity. The Resolution of 13 September 2011 is a preliminary, ancillary remedy to ensure the continued
functioning of essential government services in the ARMM. Implicit in the issuance of the Resolution of
13 September 2011 is the understanding that such was without prejudice to the resolution of the issues
raised in these petitions, including the validity of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054.

Section 5, BP 881 Basis for

Holding of Special Elections

The unconstitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054 and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153
leaves the holding of special elections as the only constitutionally permissible option to fill up the
offices of the ARMM Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
after 30 September 2011. Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (BP 881), as amended, authorizes
respondent COMELEC to hold special elections "[w]hen for any serious cause such as x x x loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records x x x the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision x x x."76 The tight timeframe in the
enactment and signing into law of RA 10153 on 30 June 2011, and the filing of the present petitions
shortly before and after the signing, rendering impossible the holding of elections on 8 August 2011 as
scheduled under RA 9333, is a cause analogous to the administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of
BP 881. The postponement of the ARMM elections was an unavoidable result of the time lag legislative
and judicial processes normally entail. The ARMM officials to be elected in the special ARMM elections
shall hold office until 30 June 2013, when the terms of office of elective national and local officials
covered by the synchronized elections also expire.

Electoral and Other Reforms Must be

Consistent With Principles of Regional
Autonomy and Representative Democracy

Beyond the expressly stated policy in RA 10153 of synchronizing national and local elections, the OSG
calls the Court’s attention to the government’s other policy goals in enacting RA 10153. The OSG
presents RA 10153 as the cure for the ills plaguing the ARMM, manifested in the symptoms of padded
voters’ list, rampant criminality and highly dynastic politics, among others. "Genuine regional
autonomy," in the OSG’s view, starts upon the assumption to office of the newly elected officials on 30
June 2013, when the national government, through the OICs, is done cleaning the ARMM government. 77

In the first place, these policy goals to reform the ARMM society are nowhere stated or even implied in
RA 10153. Electoral reform is mentioned in the President’s certification on the urgency of HB 4146 and
SB 2756 but RA 10153 itself is silent on such policy goal. The only apparent reason for the enactment of
RA 10153 is to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, a policy the
legislature can pursue even in the absence of a constitutional directive to synchronize all elections.

In any event, it is a terribly dangerous precedent for this Court to legitimize the cancelation of scheduled
local elections in the ARMM and allow the appointment of OICs in place of elected local officials for the
purpose of reforming the ARMM society and curing all social, political and economic ills plaguing it. If
this can be done to the ARMM, it can also be done to other regions, provinces, cities and municipalities,
and worse, it can even be done to the entire Philippines: cancel scheduled elections, appoint OICs in
place of elective officials, all for the ostensible purpose of reforming society – a purpose that is
perpetually a work-in-progress. This Court cannot allow itself to be co-opted into such a social re-
engineering in clear violation of the Constitution.

One has to see the problem in the Muslim South in the larger canvass of the Filipino Muslims’ centuries-
old struggle for self-determination. The Muslim problem in southern Mindanao is rooted on the
Philippine State’s failure to craft solutions sensitive to the Filipino Muslims’ "common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics."78 The framers of the 1987 Constitution, for the first time, recognized these causes and
devised a solution by mandating the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, a political
accommodation radically vesting State powers to the region, save those withheld by the Constitution
and national laws.79 Lying at the heart of this unprecedented empowerment is the Constitution’s
guarantee that the executive and legislative offices of the autonomous region shall be "be elective and
representative of the constituent political units."80 The essence of an autonomous region is the
untrammeled right of the people in the region to freely choose those who will govern them. A region is
not autonomous if its leaders are not elected by the people of the region but appointed by the central
government in Manila. It is the solemn duty of this Court to uphold the genuine autonomy of the ARMM
as crafted by the framers and enshrined in the Constitution. Otherwise, our Muslim brothers in the
South who justifiably seek genuine autonomy for their region would find no peaceful solution under the
Constitution.

By disenfranchising voters in the ARMM, even for a single electoral cycle, denying them their
fundamental right of electing their leaders and representatives, RA 10153 strikes at the heart of the
Constitution’s project of creating autonomous regions. In the opinion of the biggest Islamic rebel group
in the region, the cancelation of elections under RA 10153 "speaks loudly why this entity [ARMM] is not
autonomous; it is controlled, nay dictated, by Manila."81 Contrary to the OSG’s view, denial of the right
of suffrage is always too high a price to pay in exchange for promised reforms to be undertaken by OICs
with no mandate from the people. Incidentally, the OICs to be appointed under RA 10153 are not even
barred from running in the next ARMM elections, immediately putting at risk the promised reforms due
to obvious conflict of interest.

The ARMM enjoys no monopoly of the evils the government now belatedly claims it wants to eradicate
in passing RA 10153. Private armies and political dynasties litter the length and breadth of this
archipelago and spurious voters’ registration has perennially polluted the national voters’ list. The
solutions to these problems lie not in tinkering with democratic processes but in addressing their root
causes. Notably, the government recently upgraded the country’s age-old manual elections into an
automated system, ridding the elections of the fraud-prone manual system, without skipping a single
electoral cycle. Similarly, the cleansing of the voters’ list is on track, with the incumbent head of
respondent COMELEC himself admitting that the COMELEC is now 65%-70% done with biometrics
registration.82

In reviewing legislative measures impinging on core constitutional principles such as democratic

republicanism, the Court, as the last bulwark of democracy, must necessarily be deontological. The
Court must determine the constitutionality of a law based on the law’s adherence to the Constitution,
not on the law’s supposed beneficial consequences. The laudable ends of legislative measures cannot
justify the denial, even if temporal, of the sovereign people’s constitutional right of suffrage — to
choose freely and periodically "those whom they please to govern them." 83 The Court should strike a
balance between upholding constitutional imperatives on regional autonomy and republican democratic
principles, on the one hand, and the incumbent administration’s legislative initiative to synchronize
elections, on the other hand. Had it done so here, the Court would have faithfully performed its sworn
duty to protect and uphold the Constitution without fear or favor.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT in part the petitions in G.R. Nos. 196271, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392
and 197454 and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Republic Act No. 10153.
Respondent Commission on Elections should be ordered to hold, as soon as possible, special elections in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao for the positions of Governor, Vice-Governor and
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly. The officials elected in the special elections should hold
office until 30 June 2013. Pending the holding of special elections and the assumption to office of the
elected ARMM Governor, the President may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM
Governor.

I further vote to declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the second sentence of Section 7(1), Article VII and
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of Republic Act No. 9054.