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 ..
• Cautious Steps: The Development and Use of Tactical Air Power by the
RAF during the Second World War

Keith Micbael Lawrence

Oepartment of History

McGiU Univenity, Montreal

January 2001

A tbesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research of McGill

Univenity in partial fulrdment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts•

• © Keith Michael Lawrence 2001

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•
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the doctrinal and practical development of tactical air forces

by the Royal Air Force ootil the end of the Second World War. It focuses on the

tùndamental disagreements over the uses of air power. the preference for a strategie

vision and the pressing need for tactical air forces in the face of the exigencies of war.

This paper will trace the graduaI provision of air support to the land forces and the

fonnidable and fundamental changes that occurred during operations in various theatres

in the Second World War.

RESUME

Cette Thèse examine les doctrines et les pratiques du développement tactique de [a force

aérienne par la "Royal Air Force' durant la période des années 30 jusqu'à la fin de la

deuxième guerre mondiale. Cette thèse élucide sur les désaccords fondamentaux de

l'utilisation du pouvoir de feux aériens. la préférence de la vision stratégique et le besoin

pressant de tactiques aériennes exigées par la guerre. Cette thèse tracera la provision

graduelle du support de feux aériens aux forces terrestres et [es changements

fondamentaux et fomlidables qui ont eu lieu durant les opérations dans les théâtres variés

durant la deuxième guerre mondiale.

•
•
Acknowledgements

This thesis topie was the brainchild of the late Protèssor Robert Vogel of McGiIl
University. l am indebted to him for his insights as weIl as his suggestions on research
locations. l would like to acknowledge the friendly and prompt support received on
numerous visits to the Directorate of History and Heritage. Department of National
Defence. in Ottawa. Further. the kind assistance of the members of the Reference Desk
and lnter-Library looos department of the McLennan Library at McGill University was
invaluable in the tracking down of sources. Special thanks must go to Professor
Hereward Senior, Colleen Parish and Mary ~fcDaid. Professor Senior kindly assumed
the role of supervisor at a difficult moment. Colleen Parish and Mary McDaid of the
McGill History Department never failed to provide the support to see this thesis to its
fruition .

•
•
Cautions Steps: The Development and Use of Tactical Air Power br the
RAF dnring the Second World War

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Page iii

Glossary iv-vi

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 Air Doctrine in the Inter·War Period: Seeking 5

an 'Independent Strategy'

Cbapter Il France and the Low Countries 1940- Two 14

Models.

Chapter III Towards a New Model- Reluctant Change 27

Chapter IV The Western Desert: Early Operations 35

Chapter V The Western Desert: Rationalised Air Power 49

Chapter VI The Desert 1942: Tightening the System of Air 64

Support

Chapter VII 1943: TOReH to HUSKYIBAYTOWN- 72

Bridging the Gap to OVERLORD

Chapter VIII Cross Channel Attack: Air Support in 84

Normandy

Endnotes (Organised by Chapter) 103

Bibliography Primal1· Sources 119

Bibliography Secondary Sources 122

•
 IV

•
Glossary:

Metric Conversion: Throughout this paper, use has been made of the units ofmeasurement of the
era. As such. many of the tenns are in imperial units. The following is a guide to conversion:

1 inch = 2.54 cm
1 foot = 30 cm (approximately)
1 yard = 3 feet = O.9m (approximately)
1 mile = 1.6 km (approximately)
100 mph = 160 km (approximately)
.303 caliber = 7.62 mm (approximately)
2-pounder cannon shell = 40mm (approximately)

ADGB- Air Defence of Great Britain. The strategie air forces of the RAF necessary for Home
Isles Defence. In the 1930's it comprised both Fighter and Bomber Commando

Afrika Korps- The German Expeditionary Force in North Africa: Most famous for its exploits
under General Erwin Rommel.

AFV- Armoured Fighting Vehicle.

AOC/AOC-in..C- Air Officer Commanding or Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief. Titles for

command within the RAF.

ASSU- Air Support Signais Unit. A small unit of Anny signalers involved in the provision of
communications for air-to-ground support.

Air Superiority- The attainment of substantial dominance over an opposing air force such that
both air and ground forces have substantial freedom of movement. A condition necessary for
further air and ground operations.

Air Supremacy- A condition of absolute air superiority.

Armée de l'Air- French Air Farce. Note the use afterminolagy- "Air Army".

Avalanche- Codename for the American landing at Salemo. Italy. September 1943.

Battleaxe- Cadename far British operation to relieve Tabruk. 15-17 June 1941.

Baytown- Codename for British crossing of Messina Straits from Sicily to Italy. September 1943.

BEF- British Expeditionary Force. The British Anny forces during the BattIe of France in 1940.

Bei der Truppe- Gennan term meaning 'in the field.'

Blitzkrieg- Literally. "Lightning War'". A highly mabile form ofwarfare characterised by the use

• of annoured spearheads.

Bocage- The French countryside in Nonnandy characterised by small fields surrounded by thick
hedgerows and sunken roads. Extremely difficult to anack. extremely easy to defend.
 v

•
Brevity- Codename for British operation to relieve Tobruk. 15-17 May 1941 .

Cab-Rank- A formation of ai rc raft circling over a defined area of a battlefield waiting for a cali
from the ground for close air support. Refers to the aircraft looking like London taxis in front of a
hote!.

Close Air Support- The provision of support to the ground by air assets. The air action against
hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration
of each air mission with actions on the ground. The application of air strike forces in support of
ground forces.

Compass- Codename for British advance into Cyrcnaica against Italian forces. 9 December 1940.

Crusader- Codename for British advance against Axis forces in the Western Desert. 18 November
1941- 20 January 1942.

Durcbscblagskraft- German term meaning 'offensive power!.

Fall- German tenn meaning -Case'. Used in the sense of an operation. Eg: Operation Sealion.

Festung Europa- Literally. "Fortress Europe". The Gennan counter-invasion fortifications and
forces.

Flak- Flugabwehrkanonen. German anti-aircraft.

Fliegerkorps- German term meaning air corps. An air force formation.

Gotba- German heavy bomber used in the Great War.

HQ- Short forro for -Headquarters.

Husky- Codename for Allied invasion ofSicily. July 1943.

Interdiction- A type of air operation to prevent the fOr\\'ard or rear\vard movement of men.
vehicles_ equipment or supplies. Typically occurring in the Communications Zone of the
battlefield. Actions included the destruction ofbridges. ferries. barges. rail centres and cross-roads.

Jabo- Gennan slang tor a fighter- bomber aircraft. Usually used when referring to Allied aircraft.

Jagdbomber- Fighter-bomber.

Jubilec- Codename for Commonwealth raid on Dieppe in France. August 1942.

Kampfgruppe- German term meaning a combat command or task force.

Kommandostollcn- German tenn for a type of army headquarters.

•
Luftwaffc- The German Air Force. including Anti-Aircraft and Airbome elements.

LuftnoUe- A portion of the German Air Force operating in a specifie theatre of operations.

M.T.- Motor Transport. Soft-skinned vehicles such as cargo trucks.

 VI

• Nabkampfverabaode- Multi-role air formations 10 suppon ground forces. Possessed integral anti-
aircrafi and maintenance resources allowing them to operate weil forward.

Neptune- Codename for the Allied naval assault phase ofOverlord.

Nen'enkrieg- German term for attacks on an enemy's nerves.

Overlord- Codename for the Allied cross-Channel invasion of France 6 June 1944.

Panzer- German tenn for a tank.

Pointblaok- Codename for the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany 1943-1945.

Regia Aeronautica- The Italian Air Force.

Rbubarb- Codename for a fighter operation by 2-3 pilots launched from Great Britain to seek out
enemy aircraft over France. Belgium or Holland.

Rodeo- Codename for a large fighter sweep, without esconing bombers. over Europe.

Rover- System ofon-cali air to ground support developed during the Mediterranean campaign and
used in Northwestem Europe. Variations included Rover David. Paddy. Joe and Frank.

Rff- Short form for Radio-telephony. A type ofwireless communication.

Schlachtflieger- German tenn for ground anack by aircraft. Usually used in terms of close air
support.

Schutzstaffelo- protection tlights or air escort ta more vulnerable planes.

Stuetzpuokteo- Anny strongpoints on the ground (Field fonifications). Usually centered around
the infantry in a bunker or well-defended position.

Strafen- punishment. or shooting up the ground from the air. The ongin of the word "Strafe:'

Sortic- one aircraft launched on one mission.

Sturzkampmugzeug- ··Diving Battleplanes.'· The Junkers Ju 878 Stuka.

Tactical Air Power- The use of aircraft to prepare the way for an advance of land and/or sea
forces. The \Var aim oftactical air forces is ta assist the surface forces in achieving their \Vider war
aims.

Torch- Codename for the Allied invasion of French North Africa. November 1942.

Wehrmacbt- German Ground Forces- more particularly the army ground forces.

•
• Introduction
Cautious Steps: The Development and Use of Tactica1Air Power br the
RAF during the Second World War

Pa, A,dllaad Aslra

The Royal Air Force had a long an~ overall, successful war. Like its older
sisters, the Royal Navy and the Anny, the 'Junior Service' faced the seerningly
insurmountable task of making war on a global level in the protection of the Home
Islands and the far-flung British Empire. From the buming heat of Cyrenaica, to the
bomb-eratered airstrips of Malta, to the jungle clearings of the Far East and back to the
war in Europe the RAF played a significant and perhaps decisive role towards Allied
victory.
However, despite the diverse conditions and disparate operations that the Royal
Air Force conducted during the Second World War, the available literature on the RAF
focuses prirnarily 00 a few aspects of the war in the air. A
• cursory glance al a book collection on the RAF will yield a
~. ~, bounty of works on the efforts of "the few" during the Hattie
of Britaio as weil as a trove of recollections by pilots and air
commanders concerning their part in the "war in the air."l
Indeed, even the official histories of the RAF candidly gloss
over certain aspects of the wartirne effort such as the problems
of Maintenance, Repaie and Service Command2 • Outside of Fighter Command, and the
geim attrition of the Battle of Britain, it is RAF Bomber Command and the "'strategie" or
heavy bomber operations that have received the preponderance of attention and scrutiny.

While the RAF, along with associated Commonwealth air forces, conducted a
host of operations comprising tens of thousands of sorties, the vision of the lumbering
four-engine bomber taking to a darkened sky remains an enduring one. The "fire-

• bombing" of Dresden, the Thousand Bomber raids on the Ruhr and the Blitz campaign
against Berlin are ail weil documented- if not infamous- operations of the Royal Air

11127
•
Force. Indeed~ the whole question as to the proper use and effectiveness of the bomber
received excruciating attention before, during and after the Second World War and is a
central issue in any discussion on the development and use of tactical air power in Great
Britain. It was a political~ military. economic and moral dilemma that was to gare more
than one individual on its horns. The controversy and raneour in the 1990's over the
erection of a monument to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur --Bomber~' Harris. the architect
of RAF Bomber Command's targeting policies. renewed debate over Bomber
Command~s wartime employment. 3 In Canada and elsewhere the lingering furore over
the content and veracity of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation~s documentary. "The
Va/our and the Horror: Death by Aloonlight- Bomber Command" is another indication of
the passionate debate that still surrounds RAFIRCAf Bomber Commando Further, the
reviews of The Crucible of War. 1939-1945. The Official History of the Royal Canadian
Air Force. the third volume of the RCAF in the Second World War. indicate that the
debate over bomber operations is far from finished. As with the lt'alour and the Horror.
The Crueible of War examines the debate over the strategie or industrial value of the
bombing of German or German-occupied cities and towns and revives the issue of the
morality and effectiveness of the strategie bombing battle. Yet. divided as opinion has
been on Bomber Command's POINTBLANK operations as a "war-winner" or inhumane
"terroe' weapon. it has received broad attention both for its doctrinal roots in the inter-war
period as weIl as a result of the havoe wrought. Nonetheless. as has been pointed out. an
account ofRAF operations does not end in the -tlak' filled skies over Hamburg or on the
grassy fields of a bomber station in the Midlands. Aside from the increasingly
formidable campaigns by Bomber Commando there were the endeavours in the Home
Isles of Fighter. Coastal. Army Co-operation. Balloon. Ferry. Training. Reserve and
Maintenance Commands.-t In addition. in various far-flung operational theatres.. there
were the countless sorties flown by the Overseas Commands and their components. such
as the Desert Air Force (DAF) in Africa and the Third Tactieal Air Force (3TAF) in the
Far East. Mind-numbing anti-submarine patrols over the North Atlantic. rocket attacks
on shipping in the Aegean. harrowing fighter sweeps over France, spine-wracking supply

•
flights across the bumpy skies of Bunna and the dive-bombing of deadly stuetzpunkten in
the bocage ofNormandy were aIl part of the RAF's diverse war in the third dimension.

2/127
•
An aspect of the Royal Air Force~s wartime struggle that has garnered linle
attention were its operations in support of the ground forces. 5 The experiences of the
Great War, the lessons of the Spanish Civil War and the early blitzkrieg campaigns by
Gennan forces in Poland~ the Low Countries and northem France cIearly showed the
importance of air support to the land banle. However. in the early stages of the war, air-
ground operations were neither doctrinally acceptable to the RAF nor feasible to
successfullyexecute. Nevertheless.
from the feehle and disastrous
efforts of the early campaigns in
1940, the Air Ministry would
gradually direct relatively large
resources towards the support of the
various field armies in the form of
tactical air forces. Assistance to the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in
France was conducted with pitiful, ill-equipped, ill-suited and obsolescent squadrons of
Fairey Banles~ Boulton Paul Defiants and Bristol Blenheims with a parsimonious
smattering of modem single-engine fighters. These ill-suited aircraft were used despite
their severe deficiencies in a tactical role in the absence of anything cIse and because the
few available fighters were considered necessary for defensive duties at home. They
proved no match for both the Luftwaffe and the tierce and seemingly ubiquitous
jlugabwehrkanonen. By the time of the OVERLORD operations four years later. the
RAF was operating specially modified interceptors. such as the Hawker Typhoon. on
close air and interdiction missions to aid the ground forces in the lodgement.
consolidation and advance of the land battle. 6

Lacking in the moral controversy surrounding the strategie bomber campaign or

the romance of a dogfight over the white diffs of Dover~ these operations nonetheless
became a vital and expanding concern with better resources~ planning~ equipment and
training. From a few ill-suited aircraft in support of the land battle. the RAF would

• establish three tactical airforces. comprised of dozens of squadrons. designed and trained
to co-operate with the soldier. 7 The extent of this support and the damage inflicted has.

3/127
•
however, been a source of contention as ainnen and soldiers quarrelled over the need and
efficacy of tactical air support. Indeed, by the time of the Allied invasion of the
Continent, the use of aircrafi in support of ground forces- so successful in Africa and the
Mediterranean- had caused rifts among air commanders, between air and ground
commanders and along nationallines as American and Briton, soldier and ainnen, argued
over what resources to use and how best to use them. Nonethcless, the operations and
efforts of the men who flew in support of "Tommy Atkins'. who attacked the roof of
Hitler's "Festllng Europa'~ remains one of the greater efforts by the RAF and one that
sorne wartirne leaders and historians consider to have been decisive in the outcome of
land operations. It deserves a doser look.

• 4/127
•
Cbapter 1
AIR DOCTRINE IN THE INTER-WAR PERlOD: SEEKING AN
'INDEPENDENT STRATEGY'

QUOI homines. loi senlenliae

(Sa many men. sa many opinions)

The RAF' s development of large and sophisticated taetical forces in support of

the Anny was an evolutionary. empiricaI and above aH grudging one. ft was a role that
was viewed favourably by ooIy a small group of "heretical" airmen and one that was
detested by the 'bomber clique ~ who viewed it as an improper use of searee air resources.
For the apostles of bombing~ tacticaI air operations were a slippery slope from being a
constitutionally independent Service into graduai subordination to the Army. 8 The loss
of the Air Fleet Arm to Royal Navy control had been a blow to the RAF and a constant
reminder to airmen to be vigilant against the active 'poaching" of the other Services-
including an Army wishing to have its own aircraft to employ where. when and how il
9
pleased. Indeed both the Anny and the Royal Navy were suspicious of the RAF which,
as it proved, \Vas more interested in pursuing its own ideas than genuinely supporting the
other Services. "The War Office and the AdmiraIty were understandably anxious that a
unified air service. harbouring notions of an independent air offensive. was hardly likely
to devote the time and the energy necessary to the specialised tactical requirements of the
surface forces.~·10 However~ aside from Service jealousies over the control of assets in
the face of stitT fiscal restraints imposed by such measures as the Ten Year Rule. there
were other factors that diverted the RAF away from an anny support role." If on the
Western Front a fundamental- if underdeveloped- mission of the nascent Royal Flying
CorpslRoyal Air Force had been 'trench strafing' and 'ground strafing' it no\-\'" actively
sought a raison d'être deemed more fitting for an independent and separate Service.

Budgetaf)' constraints aside. the crucial explanation for the lack of tactical air
resources at the commencement of hostilities in 1939 was the outcome in Great Britain of

• the inter-war debate over the benefits of either the strategie or tactiea/ employment of

5/127
•
aircraft. 12 These debates paralleled, in many respects, the earlier question of "How to
allocate resources between obtaining and exercising command and how to exercise the
command once it was obtained- in short how to use the air for the object of war.,,13 In
rough terms. the argument was split into two opposing camps. One side touted the merits
of air power as a considerable tactical instrument. l .. Major General J.F.C. Fuller. a
military thinker of note, theorised in his '·Plan 1919" that a combination of tanks and
close air support would be capable of making deep thrusts behind an enemy" s front lines
to paralyse the command system. Fuller would carry on his work with Basil Liddell Hart
on a theoretical framework of air-ground support (ignored by the British military
establishment) that would become a basis for German blitzkrieg warfare. 15

A more influential group saw air forces as a strategie 'war-winning' tool that
would leap over the fighting front and attack both the 'will-to-war' of astate' s civilian
populace as weil as its industrial capability to make war. 16 Indeed. the 1920's and 1930's
saw trernendous theoretical controversy over the 'proper' use of air power with the
differing outcome in countries being the result of a host of econornic. politicaL
17
geographic and historical factors. While sorne states chose to pursue a taetical focus for
air power as embodied by Germany's LujiwajJe others. sueh as Great Britain. moved
towards a strategic concept of air power.

Although somewhat discredited as the ·doyen· of strategic air power theorists, and
more properly viewed as a .prophet', the Italian Giulio Douhees views on the heavy
bomber as a \var-winning tool are indicative of the views of adherents of air power as a
strategie tool. Douhet argued. in such works as The Command of the Air (Il dominio
dell'aria). against any form of air use other than in the strategic sense. The tirst priority
was to win eommand of the air (air superiority. or even air supremac.v) and then exploit
it with 'battleplanes'. Surface forces were 10 be eonsidered defensive or holding forces
tor aerial attacks on the morale of an enemy and his ability to make war. Crushing
attacks on an enemy's centres of communication. industry and population by mass

•
18
bombing. including the use of poison gas. would be the decisive war-winner. Victory
would be bought more cheaply in lives and lreasure by avoiding the horror and slaughter

6/127
•
of the trenches by attacking a nation~s resolve and resources; in effect~ victory could be
bought through the de-stabilisation of the Home Front through what the Germans caIled
Schrecklichkeit or frightfulness.

Both airmen and politicians aIike readily accepted these ideas. although. when
interviewed after the war. Sir Arthur Harris denied that an . Italian' had influenced the
19
deve10pment of strategie air power in Great Britain. For air commanders. the
destruction of the enemf s industrial base and the crushing of the civilian population' s
spirit appeared to be a task that suited an independent air force. [ndeed, in Great Britain,
had not the Royal Flying Corps been transformed into an independent Service as a result
of the fear and panic of Zeppelin and Gotha bomb attaeks on London?

For the politicians. strategie air power represented a way to avoid the horrors.
losses and eosts of treneh warfare. As industrialised nations seemed capable of absorbing
huge losses of manpower and
materiel, strategie bombing was
touted by some, as had occurred also
with the tank. as a way of avoiding or
breaking the trench deadlock of the
Great War - the '~crystallisation of
the lines" as Douhet called it- to
20
return to short and decisive wars. [t
would restore the principle of
mobility to the battlefield. Popular and fancifulliterature on the future of bombing and
the limited yet terrifying experiences of the bomber intruders convineed many that the
use of the bomber in a strategie role was as inexorable as it would be devastating. For the
cra. in light of the poor state of air defence technology and Balfour~s oft quoted bon mot.
"The bomber will always gel through~', aerial bombardment can be seen as haunting on
inter-war society as nuclear weapons are today.21

• War weariness and the horror of a repeat of a conflagration similar to the "War to
End Ali Wars" impelled the British government towards a strategie vision of air power.

7/127
•
Leeriness and the fear of continental eommitments.. perhaps risking millions of lives.
were strong influences to avoid past methods of warfare and seek a ·'better way" to make
war. Further.. as war was now being fought in three dimensions. the RAF eould be used
as an innovation on the age-old role of the Royal Navy. "Strategic bombing could be
viewed as the successor to the old poliey of naval blockade. ·,22 Such arguments.. aJong
with RAF assurances that aircraft a/one could protect and police portions of the Empire
in a more cost-effective manner than the Anny. led to independent air operations as a
colonial ''"aerial police.,,23 Suppression of the ""Mad Mullah" uprising in Somaliland in
1919 at a cost of ooly f77 . 000 was a persuasive example of the efficacy of an
independent air force as were colonial polieing efforts in northem Iraq and in Palestine in
24
1922. As such.. the RAF not only carved itself a strategie niche.. it had demonstrated
that it eould, in certain conditions. rival the Anny as a tool of imperial governance.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard.. the "[ather· of the Royal Air Force. was a
tierce supporter.. along with Air Chief Marshals Sir Charles Portal and Harris.. of a RAF
doctrinally focused on attacking the heartland and minds of an enemy. Like many
military men, ·Boom' Trenchard feh that civilians could not withstand the punishment of
modem or total war. He based his theoretical views on the Home Front collapse in
Russia. Germany and Austria while their annies in the field remained intact. Trenchard
held the position that ·terror" bombing would have a greater affect on an enemy"s will to
make \Var than on his abilitv to make war. 25 Civilians would not be targeted per se:
however. collateral damage was expected to have a morale effect. ·"Throughout the
1930'5 the Royal Air Force was imbued with Treochardian brutalism and sorne of his
26
most avid acolytes were men who would rise to senior positions during the war.··
Further. as the Army. Royal Navy and the RAF were bickering over their share of limited
defence funds. the RAF sought out and embraced a doctrine that bolstered ilS existence as
a separate force. ··The tirst generation of the RAF shared a common bond- the fear of the
Army or Navy ending the independence of their beIoved child.. the RAF. If the senior
leaders in RAF argued amongst themselves 50 be it- to the other services they stood

•
shoulder-to-shoulder:,27 Unquestionably. the Anny did want air assets assigned to
support tasks as had occurred during the Great War. Artillery spotting.. reconnaissance

8/127
 and ground attack gave the Anny heightened abilities; however~ the RAF stonily
• aceepted this idea and no real attempts were made to pursue closer ties and mutual
support throughout the 1920~s and 1930~s. The Army's needs (and the Royal Navy 's.
much to the detriment of early operations against the submarine threat in the Baule of
the Atlantic) were to be ï"gnored in favour of a strategie vision involving a knoekout blow.
""In Britain~ it gave added weight to the demand for an independent air force. Once sueh
a force had been achieved~ the bombing strategy was used as a shield to proteet the RAF
from any further attempt to compromise ilS autonomy. Bombing was championed as a
strategy peculiarly suited to Britain as an island power anxious to avoid anny
commitments in Europe again_ and traditionally attached to blockade strategies. ··28

ln light of the political and doctrinal decision to develop an ·"independenC·

strategie bomber fleet. the Air Ministry pursued aircraft acquisition policies designed to
build up Bomber Command. 29 Prompted in part by the fear of a re-militarised Nazi
Germany. the govemment would pursue a policy of creating a bomber force for
deterrence and a fighter force for air defence. Sueh a procurement policy ensured that
sufficient fighter aircraft. such as the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire. were
available during the Battle of Britain. However. it did not take into aeeount that the
Luftwaffè was primarily a supporting force for ground operations and~ as such. equipped
30
with fighters, light twin-engine bombers and transports. ft was not a strategie ann. As
such. particularly after 1936, with a strategie :force de frappe' and a strategie Home Isles
security force there was little effort put into either the doctrine or tactics of ground
support or. by extension. the development and acquisition of suitable aircraft.

While later and hard-won experience in North Africa and Italy would show that
modified and dedicaled fighter aircraft would prove the most successful ground attack
aircraft. the tactical air theories of the day supported specialised aircraft in this role- none
would he forthcoming. Great Britain would pursue a poIicy of standardised aircraft
designed primarily for the strategie role and grudgingly considered for other purposes. In
effeet. they were blurring~ intentionally or unconseiously~ the line between low attack and

• medium altitude bombers. 31 The long lead times in peacetime for the production and
acceptance of aircraft into operational squadrons (up to seven years for a medium bomber

9/127
•
and eight years for a heavy) also
favoured the standardisation of
models. 32 However. as noted by t-:-:~""'um~·c-an-e---~=.;;..;;.~~---t~~=~~---l
many- including those in the RAF- S itfire
t-B::-If~1O~9----+~~~=----+-::-~;;";:';""=':":"'::"':":""'---!

the disadvantage of standardisation t-F=-W---.,;I_9_0 ~~~ _ _-+~=~~~---1

T hoon
was the multiplicity of roles that the P-51 Mustan
L.....;.......;;...";,,._~~_--'-~~....:......;J-.:..;:..:..~..L...,..,;;..:iii/.,;.:..:...:.:..-::...::.:.:..:..::.=.:.---l

RAF would be expected to perform during open confliet: Missions. such as anti-
submarine pattols. air-sea rescue. reconnaissance and ground attack aIl demanded
different speeds. armament. defensive firepower, range. engine types and crew training. 33
The production of a few modeIs- with the long delivery times- meant that at the outbreak
of war in Europe Great Britain possessed not only an inadequate inventory of aircraft but
also an obsolescent one.

Tactical Air Power: Doctrinal Avoidance

To better understand the doctrinal underpinnings of the RAF- and the lack of
suitable ground support aircraft and doctrine- is worthwhile to examine in delail a key
inter-war RAF document. A 1935 assessment of close support. prepared by the Plans
sections of the Air Staff. IS highly illustrative of the senior airmen·s reluctance to
doctrinally support ground forces with air assets. This six page paper titled. 'Ground
Allack Aircraft. iVole by Plans·. was an extensive review of American (and Italian)
experimentation in the use of "Attack Aviation" or "fast heavily armed aircraft in low-
flying operations against ground targets.·· Il also stated the British approach to tactical
air. 35 The Note established that. as far back as 1924. the Air Ministry had informed the
British Air Attaché in Washington on the correct response to American policy:

"1 am to say that the policy of the Americans is regardcd as quite unsuited to the
needs of this country and that it wou Id be impossible to produce a similar organisation
without starving far more important branches of the R.A.F. The Air Staff. however.
agree with the Americans that manoeuvrable single. or 2-seater machines are the best

• types to employ in lo\\' flying against ground targets ... The idea of armouring aircraft
for use in the RAF has definitely been abandoned and. although il is probable that

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•
extensive use will be made of low tlying attacks against ground targets in the future, the
ordinary service types of machines will be used for this work.·· 3b

The report continues on to state that in 1932.. the RAF had investigated the
etlèctiveness of machine gun tire and the use of bombs against infantf)'. British
experiments into both methods of attack led to a decision to try "to produce a multi-gun
unit capable of being fi tted to the bomb rack 0 f a General Purpose aircraft, a G.P. aircraft.
rather than a single-seater fighter.. being considered the more tactically suitable.. ,J7
Ordinance Board results with such weapons would be poor. leading to a favouring of the
bombing method as both technically superior and with a probability of causing six times
the number of casualties- which fitted nicely with the doctrine of developing a bomber
fleet. What should be noted. however. was the attempt to place a square peg in a round
hole by placing machine guns onto the bomb rack of unsuitable aircraft models.

The paper somewhat dryly sums up the American experience by noting that ··the
main purpose of the 'attack' aircraft is to offer direct assistance to the Army and that
specialised aircraft and formations are involved:· 38 Such a statement is couched in the
context that this would not be an appropriate role for the RAF. although the subsequent
paragraphs succinctly and correctly summarised the benefits of ground support as being:
surprise; moral effect; inefficacy of anti-aircraft defences at low level; improved bombing
accuracy; and, simpler aircraft design when compared to high level bombers. "These
advantages. under certain conditions and against appropriate targets. have always been
appreciated and due reference is made in the War Manual to this form of attack. What has
not so far been conceded is that we should be justified in providing a special type of
aircraft for it.,·39 The note continues on to state that:

··lt is doubtful. therefore. if this specialised type could be used with reasonable
efficiency in tasks other than for which it was designed. whereas existing types of light
bombers and fighters could be used. if the situation demanded for low tlying attacks.
although while so used their maximum performance could not be exploited ... The
concept of attack aviation in both America and Italy appears to be based on the ideal

• requirements of an air force whose primary function is direct co·operation with the
Army in large scale "Iand forces" \Var... Apart trom the necessity of attempting to

11/127
•
provide for essential requirements before considering provision for ideal requirements. it
would appear that neither in the role of the Royal Air Force in war, nor in its "imperial
police" duties in nonnal times is scope offered for the economic employmem of a
specialised type ofthis nature:~o

Quite c1early and unequivocally the senior airmen of the RAF were not interested
in any planned or dedicated support to the land forces. Aircraft were tirst and foremost ta
be a strategie force for attack or defence. Indeed. far from maintaining the existing
training or limited expertise in the support of ground forces the 1935 paper states. "Law
bombing... is at present included only in the training syllabus of tighter squadrons. It is
understood that the Air üfficer Commanding-in-Chief. Air Defence of Great Britain. is in
favour of further limitation of this training to fighter squadrons allotted to the Field
Force. ,.41 As such support would only be "·occasional" the focus would be placed on the
RAF's primary roles. MarshaI of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Tedder conceded in his
memoirs the rnuddle in roles and doctrine when discussing the Air Armament School at
Eastchurch- an installation strangely not considered part of the operationaI air staff:
"These were the men whose duty should have been ta ensure the proper use and
maintenance of aIl forms of armament and advise on new methods...42

Remarkably. the 1935 Nole br Plans was prepared only a month before Nazi
Germany unveiled its new air force. And. while it is does examine and acknowledge
developments. particularly in the United States. it fails to mention any aetivities or
developments of German air power. which would soon be in action in the Spanish Civil
War. Further. the notion of using aircraft in a ground support raIe. '''if the situation
demanded" indicates the degree to which the RAF viewed any corruption of its primary
tasks as being unacceptable. The RAF had no desire to be subordinated ta the Army' s
needs as the American air forces were to their counterparts. 43 Harris. in his post-war
justification of strategie bombing, Bomber Command, did concede that the policy of
foeusing on strategie needs and ignoring tactical questions would cause diffieulties.
"There were sorne doubts at the beginning of the war. whether any such air force could.
in fact. be sufticiently flexible ta do ail the work that might be required of il. In

• particular it was gravely doubted whether any one type of bomber. or crew trained on one
way. could serve for strategie bombing, close support of the army. attack on capital ships.

12/127
 and sea mining:~ Such defences point to the reluctance and inability of senior ainnen to
• form functional and effective Commands other than ones associated with strategie anack
or defence from the same. Even as late as 1939 British intelligence reports were
repeatedly emphasising to the War Office and Air Ministry the role of tactical air power
in support of mobile warfare- with linle effect. 45

The irony of this strategie air policy, in the early days of the war. was that after
years of expenditure on the acquisition of aircraft for strategie purposes, the RAF was
neither capable of fulfilling its desired role nor were the nordinary service types of
machines" in the inventory capable of assisting the BEF in France. Bomber Command
was too oid. too few. too slow and too weak to neutralise Gennany. ··The RAF had set ilS
forces too resolutely against the idea of ail fonns of co-operation~ this was the madness of
1940.~~6 The strategie forces were too smalI to deter Gennany aggression and
qualitatively and quantitatively incapable of a knocking Germany out of the war in a
short and decisive manner. If Trenchard had planted and nurtured the idea of an
independent air force, it had not received the proper and regular diel of aircraft and
anention it needed. It was ill equipped and ill prepared for missions based on its
doctrinal preference and even more inadequate in supporting the other Services in the
face of the exigencies of war. The RAF would have a painfuI lime shedding itself of the
skin of tàIse dogma and Iearning the necessities of embracing the full spectrum of aerial
warfare- included the despised tactical support role.

• 13/127
•
Chapter fi
FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES 1940- TWO MODELS..

"Once the WQT began, batllefield requ;rements forced change. "

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Steadman

The first test in open eonflict for the RAF in any substantive role would be on the
Continent in 1940. Prior to this time, limited operations including the dropping of
leaflets, protective cover flights over the southem coast of England and attacks on
shipping had oceurred. Now,
the RAF would have to operate
in France in essentially an ad
hoc manner and with crews and
aireraft that were fatal 1y
unprepared for their assigned
tasks. ln supporting the British
Expeditionary Force, the RAF
was trying to aid the ground
French ae&lCeS J"
forces and staunch the flow of
the Nazi Fa// Gelb ioto the FRANCE
Low Countries and northem
France in a role that had been
neither embraced nor nurtured. It would prove a disaster. 47 lndeed, as late as the summer
of 1939, Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Wavell, on observing a joint manoeuvre, was
disgusted to note that, "the RAF had done nothing to prepare itself to support ground
forces in the field.,,48 ln his work The Right of the Line, John Termine succinctly states,
"having fought tooth and nail for over a decade to free itself from any kind of shackle to
the other Services, the RAF DOW found its Advanced Striking Force in effect reduced to
Anny co-operation. ,,49 While the Luftwaffe worked seemingly seamlessly with the
Wehrmacht's three eommitted Army Groups in the execution ofwhat Liddell Hart tenned
• the "exaltation of manoeuvre", the RAF struggled to realise that they had not embraced a

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•
key tenet of Douhet. 50 "Victory smiles upon thase who anticipate the changes in the
character of wac. not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occor. ··S 1
The existing German mode! would starkly point out the need to ameliorate their system
of co-operation and support between land and air.

The German Model

"Übung macht den Meister." (Practice makes Perfect.)

The "outlawed'" Luftwaffe. unveiled 1 March 1935, was a constitutionally separate

and distinct Service. However, it possessed deep ties with the Wehrmacht and had been
pollinated with many Army officers such as Field Marshal Albert Kesselring who had
transferred. along \-vith over two hundred other officers.. to the fledgling air force in
1933. 52 If the Luftwaffe was not the ""hand maiden" of the fVehrmacht. many of these
German air commanders had served in the Anny in the Great War and were receptive to
the use of air power to achieve ground objectives. 53 Kesselring stated in his memoirs that
one of his key tasks was.., to disseminate operational principles and the principles of air-
ground support to ground units.,,54 The Wehrmacht was not unsurprisingly in accord with
this view. "For the army. the use of the airplane was just another tool. like gunpowder or
the tank. to support operations.·,55 This new Gennan Air Force was viewed as an
operationally tlexible tool valuable for supporting blitzkrieg ground campaigns. although
it possessed significant general capabilities. The principle of concentration was central to
Gennan military planning. As such. the aircraft of the Lliftwajjè would be concentrated
to support a main attack that was common to both the land and air forces. Indeed.
doctrine stated that to ensure a unit y of effort. supporting air forces would be assigned the
same objectives as the Wehrmacht. The combined dllrchschlagskraft of both the air and
land resources would be a force multiplier during operations.

The prirnary Luftwaffè document that outlined the use of aircraft in the support of

•
ground forces was the air force manual LuftwafJèn Dienstvorschrift J6. published in
1935. 56 The foundations of Schlachtflieger~ or ground attack. were of a somewhat more

15/127
•
narrow nature that the eventual Allied conception of tactical air power; nonetheless. this
handbook outlined the use of all types of aircraft in support of the land battle after the
achievement of air superiority. 57 However. this document was more a doctrinal basis for
ground support than a step-by-step approach. It was the experiences of the 5.000
personnel and 100 aircraft of the Legion Kondor in the leaming ground of the Spanish
Civil War that placed tactical air in a practical and applicable state. 58 In particular. the
efforts of Oberst (later Genera/Major) Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen are noted. "In
the early days. Richthofen himself used to stand on a hill overlooking the battle and lay
on sorties by WIT or landline to the forward landing grounds.~~59 These early and
rudimentary efforts were honed in an empirical environment such that the Gennan Air
Force was prepared to provide vigorous support to the German Army from 1939
onwards. "At the onset of the war~ only the Germans had developed a doctrine and a
procedural system for close air support.·· 60 Although used as a terror weapon in Poland
and as a political lever against Czechoslovakia. the Gennans did not consider the
implications of any independent strategy for the LuftwajJè beyond its utility in direct
support of the Wehrmacht during operations. "The army fonnations had to have constant
strong air support. which meant even doser co-ordination and still doser support of
aircraft. above ail. of Stukas. fighters and pursuit aircraft.·· 61

In May 1938 tive Sch/achtflieger Gruppen (S.f.G.) were formed in Gennany.o2

S.f.G. 10 and S.F.G. 50 were equipped with Hs.123s and S.F.G. 20. 30 and 40 with a
mixture of Ar.66~s. He.46·s and He.51·s- by the time of the outbreak ofhostilities ail had
been re-armed with the lu. 87 Sturzkampfflugzeug or "Stuka." These close air support
squadrons were structured based on the experiences in Spain and were organised into
Lufiflotten and Fliegerkorps. While the S.f.G. were used to soften up enemy forces the
LujiwajJè also fonned units into Nahkampfkorps or tactical air forces which included
aircraft for support and interdiction as weil as reconnaissance and transport. The denial
of the enemy the use of his airfields was a critical function based on the idea of what goes
up must come down or. better still. not to let it go up at ail. In line \vith the doctrine of

•
supporting the main effort, these aircrafi rarely remained stationary at one airfield for
more than a few days as the Fliegerkorps continuously shifted the mass of their dive-

16/127
•
63
bombers, bombers and fighters forward to attaek pre-planned targets on the ground.
Not only did this eonstant forward pressure Mean timely support for the Gennan ground
forces, it also meant that the Luftwaffè could increase the number of sorties flown daily- a
64
lesson that the RAF would learn to great effeet in the eampaign in the Western Desert.

Operational planning was eonducted jointly at co-located mobile headquarters or

/commandos/el/en that were placed as close to the forward edge of battle as prudent. The
headquarter staff jointly designated targets and formed the required groupings and tasks
for air and ground forces for eaeh mission or objective. At the lower levels, sueh as al
division or kampfgruppe, detailed planning eombined the manoeuvre and tire support
elements and detailed the type of air missions, specifie targets and required timetables.

The ground forces and air resources

were linked by Air Signal Liaison Officers
(ASLO) and Ground Attack Control
Detachments (GACO) provided by the
Luftwajjë.65 (See Diagram of the German
Battlefield Air Support System on the following
page). ASLO's were stationed with the la ...- .....;.;;;:lI ...;.......; ~ ....

Ju 87 Stuka Dive Bombers

(the equivalent of the G3-Plans and
Operations). The GACD- pushed weil forward in specially equipped eight wheel
eommand cars- were attached down to regimental level and manned by Luftwaffe
personnel with knowledge of both air and ground operations. Not designed as sources of
advice for ground commanders they were, rather, co-ordination centres and a direet
source of infonnation for the air commanders on the ground situation. The lower the
level that the teams were pushed down to he; der truppe the more active the dulies were.
Ground Attack teams at the regimental level were responsible for direeting close air
support strikes using radios, coloured panels and pyrotechnies. This system of radio and
signais using a fonnalised communication net ensured that engaged Wehrmacht units

•
could receive timely and co-ordinated aerial support. In effeet, the Gennan Air Foree had
suceeeded in ereating a viable system ofsupport for the Anny.

17/127
 • •

From: Hallion. Richard P. Strike frOID the Sky. 1989

1. German Infantry regiment confronts enemy infantry. Requests air support from Division HQ and infonns
Ground Attack Control Detachment for coordination purposes.
2. Division HQ approves the request and passes it to Air Signal Liaison Officer (ASLO) with Air Liaison Team.
3. ALSO relays request to Fliegerkorps HQ.
4. Fliegerkorps HQ allocates air assets by contacting supporting air task force and ordering air strike.
5. Air task force launches air strike.
6. Air task force confirms launching to Flicgerkorps HQ.
7. Fliegerkorps infonns ASLO of strike, giving pertinent details (size, time, composition etc).
8. ASLO relays information to GACD.
9. GACD relays strike information to Infantry regiment.
10. GACD contacts air strike leader and relays pertinent infonnation on enemy and own situation.
• A good example of the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe/Wehrmacht partnership was
the combined operations against the French north of Namur~ BeigiUnt in May 1940.
During the advance. the Germans struck at one of the few Allied annoured divisions in
the field with a combined air and ground attack:

"Nonh of Namur on Il May. Gennan dive bombers (Ju-87s. Stukas) of the

VIII Air Corps attacked French tank columns and assembly areas. highways.
towns. reserves. and anillery positions throughout the day. French assembly and
deployment operations were disrupted. and tanks were destroyed or damaged. so
that the following day German panzer divisions were able to gain a complete
victory and force the French annor to retreat toward the west. For the first lime
supporting aircraft had intervened in a tank battle and contributed substantially to
victory in that battle for the German panzer units. and they were able to continue
advancing into Belgium:·66

Field Marshal Kesselring summarised the Luftwaffe 's raie in the operations in the
West by stating that "'the lessons of the Polish campaign had been put into practice \\iith
immense effect. Victory had proved the correctness of the plan of campaign. Its
execution was worthy of the conception. The hand-in-glove co-ordination of the Anny
Group B and the Air Fleet 2 was c1assical: so was the tactical manoeuvrability of our
grouping and regrouping and concentration:~67 Or. from a Wehrmacht perspective. as
General Siegfried Westphal stated in his wartime summary The German Armv in the
West. "In the six weeks of fighting the Anny gained great experience. particularly in
overcoming water obstacles and permanent defences. and also in co-operating with the
LuftwatTe whose shattering effect on the enemy was the main cause of rapid victory...68

Despite several significant problems with the command and control system. the
LujiwajJe performed effectively on the narrow fronts characteristic of ground operations
in western Europe as "the initial boit of blitzkrieg".69 And. despite the many technical
and command and control improvements in the system. based on recent experiences in

• Poland. the most critical problem was the lack of a single air-to-ground radio command
and control network. which affected co-ordination and led to delays in support. Further.

181127
•
there were only limited air-to-air communication capabilities amongst the various
Luftwaffe fighter, reconnaissance and bomber units. This operational "gap" in command
and control had the potential to- and did- lead to cases of friendly fire in both directions. 70
However. as the German operations in the West were characterised by fluid and fast-
paced thrusts. sorne confusion and casualties were inherent to the style of warfare.
Funher. the use of the air liaison teams (and considering the state of the Allied
opposition) proved effective in maintaining continuous pressure on French and British
foonations.

Outside of a fonnalised system of aerial support, the key to the German air
success in 1940 was the Luftwaffe 's ability to establish numerical and technological air
superiority over the British RAF and the French Armée de "Air. 71 Without the ability to
conduct operations essentially unimpeded. the German army and air force would have
had greater difficulties in advancing. panicularly across significant water obstacles such
as the Meuse River. Air superiority allowed the Luftwaffe to use tactical aircraft to
support the Wehrmacht both in terms of attacking the enemy and in damaging his morale
(JVervenkrieg). Further. the Lujiwa.De fighter coverage masked Gennan movements from
Allied reconnaissance and significantly disrupted their starkly ineffectual tactical efforts.
Air superiority was fundamental. The campaign in the West demonstrated that where the
attacker possessed a significant numencal superiority, it could be translated into air
superiority- especially with modem aircraft facing obsolescent models. When air
superiority \Vas achieved. the attacker could then proceed to attack in detail the enemy" s
ground forces. When this aim was achieved. victory followed. As such. one of the key
lessons the British would learn was that the precursor to effective tactical air support \Vas.
in fàct. air superiority.72

If the Luftwaffe was to falter over the next four years. nonetheless. al the onset of
hostiIities it was the only air force capable of providing real and effective support 10
ground forces. '-The dominant theory of mass and shock tactics. which worked so
successfully up 10 the end of 1941. resulted in a fatal attachment to shon tenn and ad hoc

• principles which were totally inadequate to the conditions of long campaigns and attrition
warfare.·· 73 However~ in France and the Low Countries in 1940. the Luftwaffe and

19/127
 Wehrmacht co-operation was a model of ils kind: the British. after the debacle in France~
• would learn hard lessons in order to achieve the same level of cohesion and effectiveness.

The British Experience in France 1940

"War in the Ihird dimension has ils own /aws." Adolf Galland

If Luftwaffi tactical air operations presented the best model of the day. the RAF's
Advanced Air Striking Force (AASf) and the RAF Component to the BEF were far from
ready for open conflict in terms of doctrine. aircraft and training. And. if the acquisition
of aircraft is the translation of doctrine into application, then the RAF. with its mixed bag
of obsolescent aircraft in two unwieldy organisations, was in a muddled and incoherent
state. 74 However. tactical air power is not just a technical battle of creating and applying
tools~ it requires a wel!-conceived and well-executed command and control system: Both
were absent.

ln the Spring of 1939, as part of contingency planning, the War Office requested
that the commitment to the BEF be increased to 39
squadrons in order to effectively support the
ground forces if called upon. 75 The RAF rejected
this number on two counts: an unwillingness ta
dedicate what would have been a substantial
portion of existing squadrons in a supportive role
and the unavailability of suitable models. In point of tàct the RAF faced a dilemma.
Required to support the BEF in various types of operations, the pre-war doctrinal focus
had left them without proper aircraft to fui fi 1 this raie. As such. the least unsuitable
aircraft would be employed and they \\·ould avoid sorties of a close support nature in
tàvour of targets in the communication zone of the battlefield such as supply columns.
bridges or crossroads. 76

Deployed ta France in early 1940~ the RAF Component. attached directly to Lord

• Gorfs BEF. was organised ta provide air defence and reconnaissance for the British

20/127
 Army.77 Commanded by Air
Bloun~
HOlDe ComlB_ad
• Vice Marshal C.H.B. 1 1
1
it initially consisted of four 1 1
fighter squadrons equipped 1 Command
Rom"",
+- ..
Air Compoaenc
BEF + ~o. 22
Army C o-opcnlliQn
with Hawker Hurricanes, four Group
l 1 ~

bomber and generaJ 1 ~r II~GtoII~"1 1

reconnaissance squadrons Squadrnas Il Squdrn_: 1,2, 4.12, 16
IS, 40, 88, IOJ, 26. 53, 59. 73
flying Bristol Blenheims and los, 1-41, ISO, 85, 87, 613, 614
218,226

four Army Co~peration

squadrons operating Westland Lysanders. 78 However, it lacked both a joint

communications systems as weil as an army-air liaison system ta link the air and ground
forces, except at the highest level.

The Advanced Air Strike Force,

commanded by Air Vice Marshal P.H.L.
Playfair and formerly titled No.l Group of
Bomber Command, was to support the
ground forces by attacking the lines of communication of the Wehrmacht annour
divisions- preferably at bottlenecks- using ten squadrons of Battles and two of Blenheims
for the entire front. '9 It consisted also of two squadrons of Hurricanes for airfield
protection. 80 However, the AASF efforts were uncoordinated with the ground forces,
often operated unescorted and proved to he largely ineffective while at the same lime
suffering massive and unsustainable casualties: it was limited by commander and pilot
experience, numerical strength, terrain, technology and communications. 81 The lack of a
common communication system, in the face of the Wehrmacht's mobile style of warfare,
meant that, when coupled with the Luftwaffe denying the British invaluable aerial
intelligence, even ineffectual operations sutfered a critical time lag.

Worse still, within the Air Component of the BEF and unlike their Gennan
counterparts, individual squadrons were attached to specifie armoured divisions or
infantry corps. This arrangement negated the inherent flexibility of air forces. By using
• "penny packets" of airc~ the RAF was unable to achieve any fonn of massed action or,
more critically, air superiority. And, when faced with a technically and numerically

21/127
•
superior air force operating on the principle of aggregate action.. both RAF components
were unable to achieve any concerted operations.

Thcse early RAF operations demonstrated the inter-relationship between air

superiority and close support and interdiction operations. By not seizing control of the
skies with fighter aircraft, the pilots of the Batlles and Blenheims of the AASF and the
Lysanders of the Army Co-operation squadrons were too busy trying to stay alive let
alone conduct operations against German fonnations or targets. 82 '""First and foremost is
that without achieving at least local air superiority. the attrition suffered by friendly
aircraft will neutralise their contribution to the land battle and leave friendly ground
forces vulnerable not only to the opposing army but to their air power as weil. ,,83 The
RAF would have to embrace the all too evident German idea of Schutzstafjèln. or
protection of more vulnerable planes.. if meaningful ground support was to occur.

Post-war. Harris blamed the Army for the ineffectual parcelling out of aircraft in
1940 when. in tact. the RAF must shoulder a portion of the blame for the conduct of
operations. "Rather naturally the soldiers wanted the specialised air component 10 be a
part of each anny corps or army as its tanks or artillery. It had to be pointed out that this
was not in point of fact how the Germans had used their air force in their successful
campaigns. and that it overlooked the main advantage of an air force. that it can be
concentrated at very short notice al the point that it is needed... ·8~ The Army commanders
did indeed seek full or subslantial control over air assets and had not grasped the concept
of centralised and co-ordinated air support. Memories of aviation under military control
as had occurred in the last war were the aim- army co-operation for them meant army
control of their own air assets. 85 As such. while Harris is strictly correct. this lesson was
still being leamed at the time and errors were still being made on both parts. For the
RAF, it was tùndamentally a question of the RAF not employing suitable aircraft and the
lack of a coherent and logical system of communication between the land and air forces.
After the debacle in France. Blount in his report was critical of the lack of intelligence
l'rom the Army as to both friendly and enemy actions; however. this paucity is principally
an issue of command and control. The cause was the improvised nature of the RAF

• headquarters and communication system as well as the poor lines of communication in

theory and in practice within the BEF. 86

22/127
 • •
Royal Air Force Command Organizatioo: September 1939

1 Air Ministry
, 1
j

IHOMECOMMANIll '+-1
1

.
1
1

1 1 ,...-.--"'---.. 1 1
Training Fi~htcr Air Component Coastal 1 8allooo Resenre
Command Command UEF + No. 22 Command 1 Commaod Commaod
J!l.
ArDt)' Co-operation 1
;....

BOlnber
Comntand
l ..-;1,
"'
Group
l ' 1 IIl1ilnl
1
1
Maintenance
Command
11:11""11 1

T '"
13 Squadrolls
~ ! 1 1
Bomber Groups 1 1 Training 1
2/3/4/5 Group
1
[Hl ~quad..ons 1 1OVERSEAS COMMANI) 1-4-" i

1 1 1 1 l l
RAF RAF UK Forces UK Forces RAF Air Forces RAF
1\1 iddle East Palestinel in Iraq in Aden Mediterranean in Iodla Far East
Jordan

Eg)'pt
(;roup
1 su~"n
Wing
•
Absolute defeat in the air was the result of better Gennan equipment and tactics
and the ineffectual aircrafi and doctrine of the RAf. This can be no better seen than
during the RAF operations in mid-May of 1940.
• • • • , •. :;;''',~.i~~~~~~';~~ _J'Dif.nu;::
Ignonng the need for air supenonty and yet ,:' :~;-;:':_-- ..:~~.~.~~_ _ -- .-.'
. ' ~ -. . , -", . ~~~~:-~ ~ . ~.,,,,,,;,

attempting to iofl uence the battle, the R A F : ~--' ~ .,.::,0' ."

committed aH elements of the RAF Component

and AASF and elements of No. 2 Bomber Group
(operating Blenheims) against oncoming German
forces. Including the French Armée de l'Air. the
Allies lost half of their aircraft in the combat zone within the first two days and. by 20
May 1940~ the RAF was no longer operating on the Continent. 140 Battles. 60
Blenheims and 37 Lysanders were destroyed. The first Victoria Cross of the War would
go to the pilot of a Fairey Battle- posthumously.87

On 10 May, the AASF committed two squadrons of Battles against Gennan

fonnations in Luxembourg, losing thirteen aircraft with nineteen damaged out of thirty-
twO. 88 The next day~s operations saw the AASF lose seven of eight Banles in action. 12
May witnessed the AASF lose ail five Banles on a sortie against a bridge in the
Veldwezelt-Maastricht-Tongres acea. On 14 May the RAF lost 40 out of 71 Battles and
Blenheims in efforts against the Wehrmacht in the Sedan bridgehead. As such. between
10 and 14 May, the RAF in France lost 50% of its effective strength and could no longer
89
operate in daylight or at low level. thus ending any effectiveness. The history of
No.103 Squadron candidly points out. .. It was already becoming clear from early RAF
bomber operations that the aircraft undertaking these duties were no match for the
Luftwaffe fighters and the theory of the self-defending bomber operating in daylight
without fighter escort was not viable:,9o Unfortunately for the Fairey Banle pilots of
No.103 Squadron, the Gennans didn't allow them to live up to the unit motto of Noli me
Tangere- Touch Me Not.

Ironically~ it was only at Dunkirk, where bath the Anny and Royal Navy bitterly
complained about the "Royal Absent Force". that the RAF was able to achieve a fonn of

• success. Committing the Spitfires and Hurricanes of Fighter Command (the British
Alaginot Line as Churchill described them91 ), the RAF was able for the first time to

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•
achieve a sufficient concentration of force against the Luftwaffe. The RAF actions al
Dunkirk were crucial to future air operations and AnnylRAF relations. For the RAF, it
was the frrst positive example of the
qualitative and quantitative benefits of
using modem fighters in support of the
land battle. Further, it was an excellent
example of the benefits of a concentration of force to achieve local air superiority. While
the Army may have hollered~ "Where is the bloody RAF?" Fighter Command,
particularly Air Vice Marshal Keith Park's No.11 Group, was operating inland from the
beaches to isolate the battlefield. It f1ew 2,739 sorties, lost one hundred precious fighters
and managed for the most part to fend off a Gennan airforce with better internaI lines of
supplyand communication. 92 However, the other Services didn't feel that the 'Brylcreem
Boys' were shouldering their load. Take the case of the New Zealander, Flying Officer
Alan Deere. Attached to No.54 Squadron operating out of Hornchurch in Essex, Deere
was shot down over Nieuport beach on 29 May. On board a destroyer he was greeted by
a chilly silence in the wardroom by evacuated Anny Officers. "This caused me to ask of
a young gunner Lieutenant nearby, 'Why 50 friendly, what have the RAF doneT 'That's
just il', he replied, 'What have they done?,,,93 Feelings ran 50 high that there were cases
of soldiers beating up members of the RAF. 94

ln this sense, Dunkirk was a crystallisation of tensions between those on the

ground and those in the air. For the Anny- and Royal Navy- there was a real sense that
they had been let down. On the beaches, and later in Greece and Crete, again and again
the other Services would complain over the Jack of support- out of sight, out of mind
being the key to understanding their anger. 9S Dunkirk- and the feeling of abandonment-
would lead ground commanders to constantly ask for an "air umbrella" or combat air
patroloverhead. However as the official historian of the Royal Air Force stated:

··lt was said at the lime, by our soldiers, that they could not understand what the
RAF were doing when bombs fell among their ranks. Many said they saw littie of the
action of British aircraft in the sky. How could they? From Dunkirk to Nieuport is 17 Yz

•
miles, Dunkirk to Bergues but six. British fighters could flash across the area in a
fraction over a minute, and pass along its whole length in three minutes. Üften their
passage would cany them to the right or left of the perimeter. For the object of the

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•
fighters was not to patrol above the British troops, but to prevent the aircraft of the enemy
From reaching the perimeter. The air fighting had to be fought outside the perimeter
enclosing the troops if it were to have the desired effect of affording protection to the
soldiers therein. To meet the Gennan aircraft only one minute before they reached
position ... British fighters had to be seven miles outside the cordon:· 96

Far from leaving the Anny and Navy in the lurch~ the RAF~s efforts over Dunkirk
were an integral part of the 'miracle of deliverance.· Il demonstrated the importance of
air superiority to either the conduct or the disruption of ground operations. If the RAF
had witnessed the slaughter of its Batdes and Blenheims in the face of stiff opposition.
they now saw the reverse as the Stukas. for the first time. had to operate against modern
fighters.

Dunkirk aside. for the RAF. despite the participating squadrons receiving the
Battle Honour "France and Low Counrries 1939-19-10". the campaign was a defeat in
which hard yet valuable lessons should have been obvious. Above aIl. as the Luftwaffè
successes and Fighter Command operations over Dunkirk quite clearly indicated. any
support to ground forces would he predicated on first achieving air superiority. Without
the ability to conduct tactical air operations unimpeded both the RAF and the Anny
would suffer casualties and experience reverses. It also became evident that the
command of air resources would have to be adjusted. Aircraft could not be squandered in
dispersed operations. Ali resources would have to he centrally controlled so that the
principle of flexibility in operations could he achieved- and that aircraft could be massed
and utilised in the most appropriate and timely manner.'H Tied in with the idea of
improved command and control was the clear need for better and doser liaison and co-
operation between the field forces of the air and of the ground. Both soldier and airmcn
would nced to have a healthier understanding of the abilities and limitations of air power
ln support of the land battle. Ainnen would have to realise the importance of meaningful
combined operations and ground commanders would have to accept a centrally controlled
and directed air effort. And~ particularly on a battlefieId characterised by s\vift and fluid

•
manoeuvre warfare. it is necessary that both air and land commander work hand-in-glove
in close proximity so as to achieve both concentration and economy of effort. Furthcr.

25/127
•
the painfuJ example of the Baules and Blenheims- those least ·unsuitable· models- meant
that the RAF would have to acquire or modify existing models and that a solid doctrine~

reinforced by realistic and effective training~ would have to he put into place.
SpecificaJly. the RAF wouJd have to establish the proper tactics lor ground attack.
develop the machinery and weaponry to make those tactics effective and improve the
mobility of field forces by adopting or improving on the Gennan method of pushing air
forces forward with proper equipment. ground transport and crews. 98

• 26/127
• Chapter III

TOWARDS A NEW MODEL- RELUCTANT CHANGE

"The technique ofU/arfare is a/ways changing. sometimes drastica/(v: yet f'm afraid one must admit that
the mi/irary mind is on(v too ofien very' unreceptive 10 new ideas and new methods." Anhur Tedder.

With the miracle of Dunkirk in the past and fears of Hitler's FaU Seeiowe
invasion of Great Britain in the forefront the RAF quickly reverted to its favoured pre-
war strategy of doing business. Air efforts would be channelled into the defence of Great
Britain_ as embodied by Fighter Commando and Bomber Command·s five (fater six)
operational groups would mount a strategie bombing campaign against Gennany. Aiso.
to counter the threat from the Gennan Navy. particularly the V-boat menace. resources
tor Coastai Command~s support of the Royal Navy would receive increased prominence.
Lastly. precious resources of rnen~ aircraft and equipment would be dedicated to the air
torces of the Overseas Cornmands and to Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt's Anny Co-
operation Command comprising No.70 Army Co-operation Training Group and the 13
squadrons of No. 71 Anny Co-operation Group (See diagram on following page). While Anny
Co-operation would receive greater experirnental attention- although not the attention the
War Office demanded- the RAF would rernain focused on what would become knO\\'ll as
the Battle of Britain and the build-up towards the Cornbined Bomber Offensive against
Gennany. As the Almy·s role would appear to be lirnited to home defence should an
invasion come. the RAF would retum to the idea of protecting Great Britain frorn cross-
channel incursions while putting bornbers in the sk)' over occupied Europe and Gennany-
ooly the barest of effort and resources would be expenàed on developing irnproved
relations and procedures with the Army.

These initial inter-Service and intra-Service efforts of Army Co-operation

Command and the Army were neither smooth nor co-ordinated. Tensions between the
War Office and Air Ministry- between the Army and the RAF- were evident irnmediately

•
following the faIl of France. In a meeting of 6 November 1940 at South Farnborough
discussions were he Id to improve the co-ordination between No.22 Army Co-operation

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•
Group (subsequently re-named) and 4 Annoured Corps. In particular. the conference was
to discuss the Royal Armoured Corps air requirements for the future. This meeting, with
its long trail of subsequent minutes and memoranda. failed in any substantive way to
bring the two parties together on organisation~ tasks or control of resources. If anything.
it highlighted the evident differences in approach to air support, even in the light of the
RAFIBEF failure in France. 99 And. while the AO-in-C of No.22 Group fully appreciated
that ;,"the success of the Gennan Annoured Forces had made it necessary for us to revise
our previous conceptions of the subject.. to think out a new policy and put it into practice
in the shortest possible time". he [elt that time would be better spent discussing aerial
reconnaissance issues. ;'10 the exclusion of close support:,100 However. in the smaller
issues. certain strides were made in establishing better reconnaissance control and co·
ordination as weIl as possible methods for the identification of friendly armoured
vehicles. ··Taking advantage of the lesson thus leamed. the RAF established an Army Co-
operation Command in December. 1940. to develop. with Anny colleagues. the doctrine.
techniques. and procedures for close support of ground forces. Unfortunately. because of
its operational commitments.. the RAF could provide linle support for the command and
was compelled to develop procedures without the benefit of testing them:· 101 Il would
rernain the "sick chiId·· of the RAF.

However. with the legendary victory of ;,;,the tèw·· in the Baule of Britain. the
move towards greater and enhanced air and ground co-operation increased in tempo.
Three streams of development would occur. Army Co-operation Command and Fighter
Command at home and the Desert Air Force in the Middle East would ail reach toward
capable tactical air support. albeit in an uncoordinated and bumpy manner. Roughly
speaking. one would create the doctrine. the other the tools while the last would smooth
theory into practice.

At home. the initial efforts towards improved inter-Service co-operation were

taking place within Army Co-operation Commando Experiments by Group Captain
Wann and Brigadier Woodall into an effective system for air control were ongoing. The
essentials of the nascent Wann/Woodall system were the establishment of a joint

• RAF/Army headquarters that would control a composite group of aircraft as weIl as the
creation of a radio network outside of the normal Anny chain-of-command. specifically

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•
for the purpose of controlling air support. This idea would be fleshed out in the Middle
East and receive further and empirical refinement.

Anny Co-operation efforts aIso included courses for junior and senior air and
ground leaders at the Anny Co-operation school located in the south at Old Sarum. Here.
the commanders and staffs of RAF and Anny formations would receive familiarisation
training on air co-operation and command and control techniques. [n a document titled
;,GHQ Directive on Training in Co-operation with the RAF' the principles of co-
operation were spelled out in c1ear terms. Joint exercises were to be held in order. "To
train Army and RAF formations to work together in battle with the fullest knowledge of
each othe(s possibilities. limitations and procedures." 102

One of the key joint exercises. held 4 to 9 August 1942 in the south of Scotland.
was exercise DRYSHOD. Designed to "exercise the complete maintenance organisation
of the 1st Army: to exercise the 1st Army in striking out from a bridgehead~ and to
practice air support and the problems of communication and landing grounds involved"
this force-on-force exercise was to simulate a cross-Channel attack to seize a bridgehead
in France- an eerie precursor to operation JUBILEE against Dieppe later that month. 103
However. despite certain technical experiences with radios and VHF sets "borrowed for
the exercise··. valuable training was received in the fundamentals of command and
control of air forces. Target recognition. the passage of intonnation. the use of technicaI
equipment and the employment of liaison officers were ail key steps in making anny co-
operation work. However. even at this late date. with a major combined operation only
weeks away. the RAF was still experiencing difticulties with arrny co-operation. As a
report on the exercise states~ "Most of the tighter squadrons appear ta have been thrown
rather hurriedly into the Exercise. Many of the pilots did not knO\V anything about it:
sorne squadrons arrived without certain essential wireless equipment and others had not
been issued with the necessary maps. This sort of thing is not altogether unusual with
fighter squadrons and 1 am convinced that any which may have to operate on the
I04
Continent ought to pay more attention to the problems of mobility in the field:·
{lnterestingly. the 1st Army~ when committed to TORCH operations in Tunisia~ tàiled

• utterly to take into account such experiences as DRYSHOD and would not retum to more

29/127
•
etfective co-ordination and control until the experienced commanders of the Western
Desert arrived.)

A healthy and re-vitalised Fighter Command~ seeking a raison d'être in the post-
glory days of the summer and autumn of 1940. was also looking to play a more offensive
role in the war against Gennany. Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. the new Air-
Officer-in-Chief of No.11 Group, based al Hillingdon House. Uxbridge. began
experiments in the modification of fighter aircraft to attack ground targets as weIl as the
best methods of employment. Even unmodified Spilfires and Hurricanes were better
aircrafi for ground attack than the Fairey Battle and Bristol Blenheim. A Spilfire Mark
Vc could travel at 374 mph at 10.000 feet and was anned with two 20mm cannons and
four .303 machine guns. The Hurricane Ile was considerably slower but was anned with
four 20mm cannons. With the addition of bomb racks these aircraft became potent
weapons tor fast low-Ievel attack. although vulnerable to ground fire.

The initial Fighter Command efforts- much hated by the Spitfire and Hurricane
pilots- involved progressively more complex operations over France and the occupied
countries. CIRCUS and RAMROD operations. as weil as RHUBARD and RODEO
tighter sweeps over Europe against ground targets and the Luftwaffe. became increasingly
elaborate and burgeoning operations by Bentley Prior's Fighter Commando CIRCUS and
RAMRüD were combined operations by Bomber and Fighter Commando Medium or
heavy bombers were escorted by fighter aircraft to cause destruction while attempting to
draw the Luftwaffe into a battle of attrition. RHUBARD missions involved solo or
freelance fighter sorties over the continent. RODEOs were similar to RHUBARD
operations~ however. instead of solo missions. groups of fighters would "sweep· over
France or the Low Countries. The Operations Record Book. or "Log Book' of No.403
(RCAF) Squadron. operating the Spitfire V, is indicative of the new training and roles tor
units within Fighter Commando In August of 1941, the Essex-based "'Wolf' squadron
was involved in diverse operational and training sorties including operational sweeps
(RODEOs), air to ground firing and cannon tests. On one day alone, eleven different
pilots took part in operational sweeps across the Channel. lOS

• 30/127
•
Fighter Command also became involved in air/ground experimentation. As
disseminated to the desert and printed as one of the earliest tactical memoranda. 'Jv/iddle
East Tactical Afemorandum No. 3 '. Fighter Command conducted tests in close air
support. Titled. 'Report on Trials- Fighler v Tank. on Salisbury Plain. 2~/h June, 19-11'.
this joint trial was an examination of simulated air attacks on annour utilising elements of
22 Annoured Brigade with light and 'Cruiser' tanks and No.118 Squadron operating the
Spitfire lIb. 106 ·;'No.118 Squadron delivered twa attacks with twelve aircraft. each attack
lasting one hour; the first began at 1215 hours and the second at 1430 hours:' The rather
basic lessons learned during this experiment were worthy of dissemination both at home
and to the operational theatres. Clearly both air and ground commanders gained an
appreciation for the tactics of defence and attack. For the Army. attacks by pairs of
aircraft were the most disconcerting and attacks that made use of low-Ievel flying using
natural folds in the ground were particularly effective. especially as aircraft could not he
heard over the sound of the tanks' engines, Defensive tactics were devised. including
seeking cover. becoming stationary or making sharp tums. The dangers of being caught
in a defile- as the fVehrmacht would be on several memorable occasions in France in
107
1944- also became quite c1ear.

For the RAF. several crucial lessons were leamed. Modern interceptor tighters
proved an effective platform for tactical operations. However. with the high speed of the
Spittire. it was found difficult to discem key targets such as the lead tank or headquarters
element. Movement was crucial to detection as stationary vehicles or ones making use of
woods or valleys were to difficult to either locate or attack. As a result of the trial the
squadron commander issued the following instructions:
(a) Never attack a tank head-on if"hedge-hopping":
(b) Only attack a tank head-on from 45 degrees:
(c) Ifpossible. attack tanks from behind:
(d) The best attack on a squadron of tanks is by a squadron of fighters. tlying in echeloned line
astern;
(e) A single aircrafi attacking a formation of tanks will get cross tire from every tank he is not
attacking:

•
(t) A single aircrafi should only attacks tanks on the tlank or stragglers:
(g) Break away after attacking a tank should be a steep c1imbing tum;

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•
(h) Tanks are particularly vulnerable when c1imbing a steep hilL as they cannot go fast. nor cao
they tum. 108

Produced in June of 1941, the dissemination of this type of experimentation could

be crucial for operations in the desert. The British Army and RAF were under-going
fundamental change in the Middle East as the easy victories over the Italians has tumed
into serious reverses against Rommel"s Deutsches Afrika Korps. And. at home. with trials
of this kind and in a process removed from the efforts of Anny Co-operation Command-
and divorced from the War Office's strident call for effective tactical air support- Fighter
Command created the necessary tool for doctrine to apply: the fighter-bomber. 109

Improvements in functionality at Anny Co-operation Command aIso occurred as

a result of the co-ordination and the passage of information behveen Commands. in this
case from the Desert Air Force in the Western Desert to Army Co-operation in England.
If the DAF benefited from the early trials and experimentation at home. it was also the
proving ground that provided lessons based on actual battle conditions. Tactics.
grounded on empirical experience. evolved and crystallised in the only theatre were the
Army and RAF were active together. As we shaH see. cogent use was made of
numbered ""Tactical Bulletins'·. such as 'Tactical Bulletin No. 18: Army Co-operation
Work in lvliddle Eas/'. along with memoranda on specifie topics or experiments. '1o Such
documents were vital to the graduai codification and dissemination of information on the
trials. failures and successes in the desert.

In addition to Air Ministry and Inspector-General visits. comprehensive tours by

U.K. based commanders were also undertaken in order that they could see first-hand the
efforts towards co-operation in the Middle East. Barrau of Army Co-operation
Command witnessed air support in action during the Banle of Alam el Halfa while
visiting the Western Desert in May of 1942. Experiences in the desert in the practicalities
of army/air support were invaluable to an organisation striving to accomplish the sarnc
objectives at home via experimentation. Up close Barratt saw the type of co-operation
that made tactical air power a success in the desert. ""Each evening. he later reported to
the Air Ministry. Montgomery would give Coningharn "the c1earest possible appreciation

• of the situation. the information as he knew il. what he intended to do himself and what

32/] 27
•
he expected the enemy to do. ~ Coningham would then say what he could do himself and
a general air plan was agreed upon. ~~ III

However. while Baratt was reaching toward a effective approach to army co-
operation despite poor resources. he was also becoming increasingly concemed with the
overlap with Fighter Commando "The picture becomes a little complicated ... ·· he stated.
because Bentley Prior '"are out to play in this business~ as are their Group Commanders.
and [ rather fear that there is a danger of a series of different regional arrangements being
made by each Anny Commander with his adjacent Group.~"112 The Air Officer
Commanding-in-Chief of Fighter Commando Sir Sholto Douglas. was keen from early
1942 onwards for his Command to play an enhanced tactical role. With Iittle Luftwaffe
activity over Great Britain. the dozens of squadrons in Fighter Command were available
for offensive operations. [n a communication to his Fighter Groups~ particularly No. Il
Group~ Douglas stated that "it is essential that a much closer liaison should be established
between the two services than generally exists at present. .. although 15 squadrons have
been earmarked for Army support duties~ such duties are not outside the scope of any
Fighter Squadron and training should therefore not be confined to these Squadrons. but
should be extended as far as possible." 113 The Log Book for No. 403 Squadron bears
witness to the increasing efforts of Fighter Commando The entries for early 1942 show a
growth in sweeps over France and the Low Countries as weB as increased \\!ork with the
Anny. The entry for 14 April noted that "F/O N. Dick and FIS Olmsted to army 56 Div.
Headquarters for liaison duty. 2nd Lt. M. Trattenberg 10 Royal Berks and Capt. W.F.
Clarke 8 Roy. Fus. arrived for liaison duties:· II "

As such. prior to the extensive and empirical creation and application of tactical
air power in the Desert under the calm hands of Tedder and Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur
. Mary' Coningham. the state of army co-operation \Vas fractured and piece-meal. An
adversarial environment between the War Office and the Air Ministry~ jurisdictional
\\Tangling between Army Co-operation Command and its rich cousin Fighter Command
and the striving and tentative dance between the RAF and the Anny in the Middle East
were ail creating a fractured. insufficient and inetTectual approach to ground support.

• That "sick child"' Anny Co-operation Command~ starved of resources and relegated to
second or third class citizenship in the RAF hierarchy. now had to banle Fighter

33/127
•
Command eager for action as weil as with the Anny. [n the desert. aIso starved of
resources while the Battle of Britain captured the attention of leaders. the creation of
proper, effective and timely air support was a work in progress as airmen and soldiers
crept along the path towards understanding and co-operation. At home and abroad.
experimentation had proved beneficial and experience crucial; however, as the disaster at
Dieppe witnessed, one also had to use air power in a proper. logical and timely
manner. lls It is one thing to espouse air power. another to actually use il in a coherent
and systematic manner.

• 341127
•
Chapter IV
THE WESTERN DESERT: EARLY OPERATIONS

".-1 ir Power mllsl he seen as a whole and nol sepuraled inro close and narrow componenrs. ..
;\tIalcolm Smith.

While co-operation~ trust and doctrine were developing slowly in the strained
environment of Great Britain, the Mediterranean campaign was crucial to the effective
fonnulation of air-grollnd doctrine. More particularly. it was in the Western Desert from
1941 onwards that the formulation of effective and systematic RAF tactical air doctrine
occurred. Here. llnder the guidance of Tedder. Coningham would create the model that
would be adopted and refined for the rest of the war.

The Italian Campaign: Operation COMPASS

The war in the Middle East effectively commenced in July 1940 with an ltalian
advance into British controlled Kenya. Somaliland and the Sudan. On 13 September.
Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. the ltalian govemor in Libya., commenced operations against
British controlled Egypt. Along with the Regill Aeronautica and elements of the Italian
Navy. Graziani's Tenth Army consisting ofthree infantry and two motorised divisions. as
weil as armoured elements. moved sixty miles eastward into Egypt and occupied and
fortified the coastal town of Sidi Baranni. 116 Mussolini- seeking glory that would elude
Italian forces in North Africa and in the Balkans- feh that naval parity in the
Mediterranean. the elimination of the French threat (and Italian opportunity) in Tunisia
and Aigeria and Graziani·s numerical superiority over Wavell (200.000 versus 63.000)
were the necessary conditions to advance.

The weak and disorganised British forces were rightfully concerned that the
Royal Navy·s base at Alexandria and the Anny and RAF's base in Cairo would be
threatened. Indeed. efforts and preparations in the Middle East had been slow and

• fragmented. It was not until the position of General Officer-in-Chief Middle East (under
Wavell) was created in June of 1939 that the three existing and separate Anny commands

35/127
•
were centralised. 117 RAF Middle Eas~ under Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore,
was dispersed with assets in Egyp~ Palestine, the Sudan, the Transjordan, Aden and
Somaliland as weil as lesser places (See diagram below). Inter-Service, there existed no
combined operations centre or headquarters anywhere in the Middle East. AlI Services
were seriously lacking in men and materiel as the Battle for France and then the BattIe of
Britain kept personnel and equipment at home. The virtually complete loss of the BEF's
equipment and fear of invasion meant that vital supplies for ail Services would not he
forthcoming. Bulk stores had to come by sea, which entailed either the dangerous
Mediterranean or the long route around the Cape. 118 Air shipment on any scale was
impossible due to aircraft capacity and the need to retain the bombers (the ooly available
aircraft) for use against Gennany. Further, with the virtual embargo on resources to the
Middle East, much of the available equipment in the desert was obsolescent or lacking in

RAf
\liddle f.ast

1 1 1 1 1 1
RAF UKFon:a UK Forces RAF RAF RAF
r.lestiael i•• rwq iJlAde. Medi~rn. .a Gr'ftCe Eut
Jardn 1 1
1 1 1 1

~o.201 :\0.202 "0.203 :\0. 2~2 '\0.257

Recee Cumposite Fi~htcr/Dllmber figbrer Bomber
Group Group Group Wang '''in:

spare partS. For the RAF (and attached RAAF/SAAF elements) this meant operating
with severely deficient models including, at first, the 1930'5 era Gladiator, Fury, Gauntlet
and Hartebeest, although more modem Wellington bombers, Blenheims and a few
Hurricanes were available. Longmore was told he could not eXPect any substantial re-
annament before the spring of 1941 and that he would have to make do with what could
he spared. To add to the RAF's difficulties, there were fewairfields ready for operations
in Egypt· exacerbated by a Jack of infrastructure and ground personnel.

In the Army's case, it possessed fewand weak armoured elements and no modem
tanks. The 7th Annoured Division was missing one of its three brigades and each of these

• lacked one of their three armoured regiments. ft was operating with the Matilda 1 tank,
which weighed 26 tons, was anned with a two-poundcr gun (approximately 40mm) and

36/127
•
travelled at a sluggish 15 mph. Various early model "Cruiser~' tanks were available with
poor annament and annour and all tanks. including the later Crusader. were considered
mechanically unreliabIe. 119 "The probIems were that the Crusader was under-gunned and
unreliable. with a water-pump that caused continuaI trouble. a serious defect in the desert
where water was always in short supply:,120 The problem of being under-gunned was
exacerbated by the fact that the only available two-pounder ammunition until the summer
of 1941 was solid shot- there was no high-explosive ammunition. 121 Further. both the
Annyand RAF were deficient in transport. particularly four-wheel drive machines. "As
a theatre of operations. the main characteristic of the desert was that it produced nothing
for the support of Armies: every article required for Iife and the war had to he carried
there.,.122

Lastly. the calibre of conlffiander in the Middle East was not what is should have
been. The Anny would see a rotating succession of senior leaders as Ritchie. Norrie.
Cunningham. Wavell and Auchinleck were ail found wanting to one degree or another.
Longmore. who had assumed command of the RAF in theatre from Air Chief Marshal Sir
William Mitchell on 13 May 1940 \vould soon find himself. along with the Canadian Air
Commodore Raymond Collishaw. replaced.

..
•. ',.;. .1, ffardt'a~ •

;;,t
# ":- .:-

,
1-
.( C/Gubii
/61
L B Y A /Y a n o e s e
,'Al.IAN ! .},Jo El Quaitora
'1
~
~! E G .-Y
--"".,'"

However. despite the state of the leadership. organisation. personnel and

equipment the British were soon on the offence in East Africa and in the Western Desert.
The British forces. led by Lieutenant General Richard O·Connor. commenced Operation
COMPASS to push the Italians westward into Cyrenaica. On'Z Day". 9 December 1941.
the Western Desert Force (also referred to as XIII or 13 Corps), including the 7lh

• Armoured Division. the 4 th Annoured Brigade and the 4 th Indian Division as a spearhead.

371127
•
attacked through the Enha Gap and struck the Italians at Sidi Barrani. Quickly routed~
Graziani~s forces retreated westwards. By 16 December 1940~ the Italians had been
pushed out of Egypt. At Bardia in early January the Australian 6 th Division captured
40.000 prisoners. By the 22 nd of January, Tobruk had fallen and the Italians were
retreating on Tripoli. When British operations ceased 7 February 1941 at Beda Fromm,
Cyrenaica was under British control and the larger part of the Italian Army had ceased to
exist with 130.000 prisoners and 1500 guns being captured. 123

Throughout the campaign~ Collishaw's No. 202 Composite Group supported the
British Anny. His command was a new organisation having absorbed No.253 Wing-
earmarked for Army support- just before the invasion.12~ The small RAF force initially
consisted of two squadrons of Hurricanes. one of Gladiators and three squadrons each of
125
Blenheim and Wellington bombers. A further three Army Co-operation squadrons
worked as the RAF component under O'Conno(s Western Desert Force: No. 208
Squadron operating Lysanders and Hurricanes. No. 3 (RAAF) Squadron with Gladiators
and Gauntlets and a flight of No. 6 Squadron flying Lysanders were ail used in various
capacities. The Hurricane was used primarily for tactical reconnaissance (speed and
survivability) and close defence while the Gauntlet. which would never have been
126
employed in the Battle for France. was used for '''a small amount of dive-bombing:·
"Low dive bombing was essential. The only aircraft available to fulfil this raie was a
flight of six Gauntlets. allotted to 3 (RAAF) Squadron. During the battle of Sidi Barrani
this flight \Vas used \\Iith success against retreating enemy columns between Sofafi and
Salum ... o\ving to the age of the Gauntlets and the difficulties experienced in keeping
them serviceable. the tlight was withdrawn from 3 (RAAF) Squadron:· I27

Aircraft had been used to good effect ta turn Italian airfields into aircraft morgues.
ta support the advance. ta prevent Italian anacks on the Western Desert Force and to
interfere with enemy rear area operations through attacks on ports. supply depots and
troop and vehicle concentrations. O·Connor l'eh that the RAF had won the air banle and
provided excellent support to his forces. "The approach march was not interfered with at

•
ail. and the attacks made on the Western Desert Force during the first t\VO or three days of
the banle were not serious.·' 128

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•
The British victory over Graziani's forces came
loUao M 13/40 Tank
despite the state of the Army and the RAF in the desert.
[f the British lacked modem tanks. dissipated the
benefits of concentrated annour and failed to have
proper co-ordination between the air and the ground,
they did so against a numerically superior yet qualitatively inferior foe. COMPASS had
been a success against Italian forces poorly led and lacking sufficient tanks eq ual to the
British and Commonwealth forces. The ltalian MIl /39 and M 13/40 tanks were no match
for British tanks and the Regia Aeronaulica, despite possessing sorne reasonable models.
was largely ineffective. Graziani's predecessor, Maresciallo [tala Balbo. cabled his High
Command in the summer of 1940: "Our assault tanks are old and. being anned with a
sole machine-gun they are a1ready obsolete: the British machine-guns mounted on their
armoured cars riddle them with bullets which fly across the thin annour of our tanks: we
don't have armoured cars. the anti-tank guns are usually old and non effective. the new
.. ..1"'9
ooes 1ac k adequate ammunltlon.. -

[n response to an Air Ministry signal (X.518) of 22 December. 1940 and while the
Western Desert Force was moving on Bardia in Cyrenaica. RAF Middle East prepared a
report titled. 'Rough Notes on RAF Co-operation with the Army in December Operations-
fVestern Desert '. 130 Cautioning that "it would be unsound to base future policy or
organisations on deductions made from experience in these operations" the summary
provided details from an air perspective on experiences to date. It correctly pointed out
that. while the ltalians possessed a 200 to 65 advantage in fighters. the 35 available
Hurricanes (No.33 and No.274 Squadrons) were superior in performance to the best
ltalian fighter. the CR 42. Further. with the limited RAF resources and the ne\voess of
experiences in warfare. one had to be cautious of extrapolating lessons from the
COMPASS operations. The ··rapid movement of 0\\;'0 forces and absence of determined
resistance by enemy land forces~· and the ·'confusion amongst enemy forces. land and air.
due to rapid retreaC also meant that more time and experience were needed to understand
the nature of warfare in the desert. However. even with only the experience of three

• weeks of active operations against the Regia Aeranautica. and despite the "bad weather
and dust conditions·~. certain fundamentals were clear to the RAF. [f the document is

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couched in a cautious manner, there were excellent lessons to he disseminated. First.
aircraft such as the Lysander ··could not carry out tactical reconnaissance" unless
supported by modern fighter aircraft. Secondly, the single seater fighter proved a better
airframe for ground support operations including reconnaissance and artillery spotting.
Lastly, hit was also clear that fighter aircraft would proye most yaluable for ground
·straafing' (sic) of enemy forces:' Ail of these observations had been true of France in
1940. lnterestingly enough, many of the more important lessons can be derived only
from observations contained within the document. The reports states:

"Commencing approximately one week before our anack was timed ta take
place, back aerodromes were systematically bombed by Wellingtons from either Malta or
Canal Zone, and the night before Z day the more forward fighter aerodromes by
Blenheims. This undoubtedly had the etTect of reducing serviceability of Itali~n aircraft
quite considerably... With a superiority in fighter aircraft of nearly four to one it was
necessary ta force the Italian Air Force on the defensive and this was achieved. partly due
ta bombing enemy aerodromes and partly due to Hurricane fighter squadrons being
employed on ground anack of lorry convoys on L ofC .. :· 131

Although ..this organisation was improvised and influenced by what aircraft were
actually available··. the key lessons learned during early COMPASS operations are
profound and would eventuaIly. under Coningham, be fonnalised as part of the way of
doing business. Air superiority proved crucial to both air~to-air operations and ground
support. Air superiority was achieved through the attrition of enemy fighters and through
what one author described as "the fumigation of aerodromes:4132 Attacks were made by
No. 202 Group bombers against airfields at Sidi Barrani Castel Benito and Benina to
4

weaken the Regia and keep it on the defensive. Air superiority was not an objective in its
own right but a necessary condition in order to provide support to the British Annyand.
without il. the operationaI adyantage shifted to the enemy.

ln sorne respects. for the RAF and the other Services. the war in the desert would
come to be a war of airfields. FOf\vard airfields and airstrips were necessary for the RAF
to operate \vithin the radius of ilS aircraft. ln the desert. a Iack of suitable landing

• grounds meant degraded support to the Anny based on distances. fuel consumption. pilot

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skill and the difficulties of navigation. For the Mediterranean campaign as a whole~ the
possession of certain airfields meant the ability to maintain one~s own lines of
communication as weIl as disrupt the enemy·s. Without western airfields~ RAF Middle
East Hurricanes and Beaufighters~ even using long-range tanks. could not support Malta
and the Mediterranean supply route or hamper similar Italian or German efforts.

While the capture and re-use of Italian airfields~ such as at Bardia. allowed the
RAF to continue to operate. COMPASS also highlighted the difficulties for the RAF in
keeping up with the ground advance. Not only did the RAF lack the equipment vehicles~
ground crew and experience in mobile operations, il was also limited in supporting the
Army by where the Army~ in facto travelled. If airfields weren't available. in the future
they would have to be built and the RAF would need a fonnalised yet flexible structure
for mobile warfare.

The campaign also highlighted a re-occurring problem- the co-ordination and

location of Anny and RAF headquarters. For effective support to be achieved it is
necessary for close and intimate co-operation between air and ground leaders and staff.
A memorandum. ·Report on Air Co-operation with the Army during Operations in the
Western Desert and Libya' compiled by No.202 Air Group Headquarters was critical of
the communication and liaison between the two Services. ~·The importance of the highest
military headquarters and the corresponding R.A.F. Headquarters being in the same area
was constantly brought out. At the start of the operations. Advance H.Q... was at Bagush
in close touch \-vith 202 Group. After the battle of Sidi Barrani the tactical conduct of the
campaign \Vas taken over by HQ 13 Corps. which was always 100 miles in advance of
HQ. 202 Group. If it is impossible for the two headquarters to he in the same area. it is
essential that a Staff Officer. capable of representing the views of the military
commander, be attached to RAF Headquarters as long as the two Headquarters are
separated:' The need for better communication- and not just liaison- would be
highlighted in operations against the Afrika Korps.

During COMPASS. the benefits of a concentration of force were apparent with

•
the effectiveness of bombers from both Malta and Egypt against Italian installations.
Attacks on the enemy's lines of communication were a fundamental in hampering re-

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•
supply or, in this case~ retreat. Interdiction would become an increasing role for tactical
air forces, both in the desert and in Europe. The weather and dust conditions and
frequent Ghibli~ or sandstorms.. also displayed the need for modified and specialised
equipment whether in the air or on the ground. Both vehicles and aircraft arriving in the
desert needed detailed preparation for the desert environment in order to function. Indeed.
one of the keys to the future success of air operations in the desert was the solving of the
maintenance question~ which fortunately was not a serious issue against the Italians.
Lastly, the campaign against the Italians proved that the fighter. even an unmodified
Hurricane barely able to keep up as an interceptor in the war in Europe. was a versatile
aircraft for reconnaissance.. photography and aerial support. The specialised aircrafi that
the Air Ministry had refused to purchase for ground support before the war were now
available in the form of the fighter. albeit substantial armament and characteristic
changes would be needed. The 1935 'Note by Plans' had rejected the need for ground
attack aircrafi despite acknowledging that '·advantages.. under certain conditions and
against appropriate targets. have always been appreciated... What has not so far been
conceded is that we should be justified in providing a special type of aircraft for it.··
However, wartime conditions and the expediency of the campaigns in France and in the
Western Desert led the RAF to create the tools for ground support.

The only observation in the report that was perhaps anathema to senior RAF
officers was that the Army should be given control over certain fighter assets for close
defence. This suggestion violated the principle of concentration of torce and the need for
flexible, centralised and co-ordinated air power. However. when radical improvements to
air/ground relations would oceur, this idea would not be one ofthem.

Reversai: The Deutsche Afrika Korps

.. The art ofwor is simple enough. Find out where J'our enem.v is. Gel al him as suon as J'OU con. Slrike
him as hard as you can and as often as you cano and keep moving on." Ulysscs S. Grant

The situation for the British in the Middle East changed rapidly from 12 February

• 1941 onwards- and not for the better. If the campaigns against the Italians had boosted
morale at home and prevented Mussolini's triumphant entry into Cairo. they had done

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nothing to prepare for the arrivai in the desert of a small but well organised and seasoned
force- Rommers Deutsche Afrika Korps. Landing in Tripoli and initially comprising the
5th Liechte Division untii the arrivaI of the ISlh Panzer Division in May~ the Afrika Korps
was quick to stabilise the Italian situation in Tripolitania and to seize the initiative. lJ3

On 24 February~ the Afrika Korps had its first light engagement with British
forces at El Agheila and on 31 March launched a successful attack on O·Connor"s forces
at Mersa Brega. Rommel~ using the Blitzkrieg style of warfare so successful in France
the previous year. had caught the British forces off guard. The
Afri/ca Korps, supported by the Luftwaffe, continued to pursue
the retreating British and advanced eastwards from Tripolitania
through Libya into Cyrenaica. During the retreat~ the Australian
9 th Division and elements of the 3rd Armoured Brigade had
occupied the vital harbour stronghold of Tobruk and were now
invested by the Axis. while the main force picketed it and
bypassed it. 134 During these operations~ the 2nd Armoured Division was decimated. On
13 April. Rommel captured Bardia and Sollum and, by 15 April. had reached the static
British defences on western border of Egypt. O'Connor had been captured during
operations along with Generais Neame and Gambier-Perry causing Wavell to come
forward to take charge of operations. For the British. holding the over-extended Axis
forces was crucial. The loss of Egypt- added to aIl other setbacks- would be devastating.
Egypt was the key to the Suez Canal- and the Canal \\I"as vital for the approaches to [ndia
as weil as the oil fields in Persia and the Gulf.

Operations BREVITY and BATTLEAXE:

"'ma the valley ofdeath rode ... ..

The British position in the desert had certainly suffered at the hands of the ably
led and more experienced German forces. However, the Army. Navy and RAF had not
benefited by the siphoning otT of British. Australian and New Zealander divisions.

• including the 1Sl Armoured Division. and air and naval units for ill-fated operations in

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•
Greece and Crete. Nonetheless, efforts needed to be made- for military and politicaI
reasons to reIieve Tobruk. 135

On 15 May 1941 the re-constituted British forces launched an abortive effort to

relieve the garrison in Tobruk. Operation BREVITY was a counter-offensive in the
Halfaya-Sollum-Ridotta-Fort Capuzzo area; however, by 17 May the operation was over
and by 27 May Rommel controlled the Halfaya Pass.

Just prior to the launching of BREVITY, a major convoy of equipment had

managed to navigate the dangers of the Mediterranean from Gibraltar. Code-named
'Tiger', this convoy docked at Alexandria 12 May 1941. Ils cargo included 135
Matildas. 82 A15 Crusader Mk IV tanks armed with a two-pounder cannon and 21 light
tanks. 136 These vehicles, destined for use by the "Desert Rats' of the th Annoured
Division. would nced to be modified for desert operations. while the Western Desert
Force itself needed further re-organisation and training.

On 28 May, Wavell issued orders for the next effort to relieve Tobruk in order to
re-gain use of the harbour and push the GennanlItalian forces out ofCyrenaica. Launched
15 June. with support from No. 202 Composite Group. operation BATTLEAXE proved a
costly failure. Despite sorne initial successes by the Western Desert Force. the Axis
forces using an anti-tank screen of the versatile 88mm gun. the Panzer III armed \vith a
50mm gun and the new Panzer IV armed with a 75mm gun managed to decimate the
British. The Luftwaffe during this short operation proved tao much for Collishaw's
forces and No.202 Composite Group had enormous difficulties providing support. By 17
June it was c1ear to Wavell that BATTLEAXE would not succeed in breaking through the
Axis lines and the attack was called off.

The Need for Change

.. There is nothing more difficult to take in hand. more peri/ous to conduct. or more uncertain ofslIccess.
than to take the lead in the introduction ofa new order ofthings." Niccolo Machiavelli

BREVITY and BATTLEAXE were dismal failures on the ground. in the air and

• between the Army and the RAF. If. to date. soldier and ainnen relations were cordial if
cool they were now characterised by frustrations. disappointments and inter-Service

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•
bickering. The upshot over the failure to relieve Tobruk~ and the serious acrimony
between air and ground commanders, was a comprehensive and sweeping change in
leadership, organisation and co-operation in the desert. On 5 July 194L General Sir
Claude Auchinleck arrived from India to replace Wavell who had been unabIe to ··make
bricks without straw:~137 The Western Desert Force command fell to Lieutenant General
Alan Cunningham_ who had been involved in the campaigns in East Africa. Tedder.
deputy to Longmore since 10 December 1940~ became head of RAF Middle East
Command just before the commencement of BATTLEAXE. Coningham. handpicked by
Tedder. flew out from England at the end of July to replace Collishaw in command of the
RAF- s forward e1ements.

The problems on the ground and in the air during the retreat east. and highlighted
by BREVITY and BATTLEAXE. were too serious for Churchill to keep the same
inexperienced or incompetent leaders in place. A change in leadership was needed to
create the will to change. Clearly the conduet of ground~ air and combined operations
had becn less than weil planned or co-ordinated. On the ground~ the Western Desert
Force had been seriously out-classed by the German armour and by Gennan tactics both
during the initial retreat and during operations in relief of Tobruk. The British method of
using annour in small and dispersed elements did not allow for a concentration of force.
especially in light of the firepower. mobility and protection characteristics of the
available armour. The bulk of British equipment proved either faulty or insufficient as
did line of communication operations of re-supply. maintenance and recovery... It must
be stressed that the value of an annoured fonnation could not be judged merely by
comparing the number of tanks with those of the enemy. Apart from morale and training.
il depended upon mechanical reliability. armour. relative speed. efficiency of
.tntercommunIcatIon,
.. an d- a bove a Il - fiIre power. ·,138

Further. the Army suffered from poor command and control due to an inferior and
poorly deployed radio communications net. Not only did the British employ the wTong
armour tactics, they did so with a communication system that. in the wide expanses of the
desert. did not allow the commanders to understand current or ongoing deployments.

• Despite their evident failings, the Anny was particularly critical of the RAF' s efforts on
their behalf. Offensively, the Anny feh that the airmen had not done enough to aid the

45/127
 Army to exploit opportunities against the Afrika Korps~ sueh as during the opening phase
• of BATILEAXE. Defensively. the soldiers feh that the RAF had not protected them
from rough treatment at the hands of the Luftwaffe. [n particular~ during the disastrous
armour engagements. the Army feh that the RAF should have been bombing German
Panzers while the RAF believed. eonsidering the types of aireraft available. that the
correct targets were supply vehicles and troops eoneentrations. 139 As Tedder stated in
June 1941. "As far as the Anny was eoncemed. it was largely a question ofeducating the
soldiers in the realities of air power. ~.I"O

The Army was. to an extent. correct. During Rommel's push eastward into
Cyrenaiea the RAF had had enonnous difficulties operating air-to-air and air-to-ground
both in terms of air support and in tenns of anny co-operation. As with the initial
advanee against the ltaIians, support was a matter of aireraft radius. The loss of airfields
highlighted the combined nature of wartàre as the hasty retreat on the ground caused the
RAF to continuously push back its forward elements leading to disruptions in effieacy.
This rapid and constant backward movement was exacerbated by the RAF's laek of
airfield maintenance equipment and poor mobility due to a lack of suitable vehicles or air
transport. In particular. there was a great paucity of RAF salvage and repair units which.
when combined with the meagre supplied making it to the desert from home, meant that
serviceability became an increasing concem. 141

One enormous difficulty during this new phase of the war in the desert. which the
Anny perhaps didn't appreciate, was the change in the skill and technology of the
opponent. The Regia Aeronaulica was a far easier proposition for the RAF than a
Luftwaffe bloodied in Europe and increasingly operating the far superîor Bf 109
'\lesserschmitt. Kesselring's Luftjlolle II. based in Italy, Sicily and North Afrîca. was
committed to the assistance of the Afrika Korps in every tactical sense.

However. the RAF had worked prodigiously with the airframes and equipment
available. [n the case of Tobruk. the German advance had left them with difticult options
in order to support the garrison. At first~ the RAF operated two squadrons, including

•
No.73 with Hurricanes. from airstrips within the perimeter. However. the difficulties of
maintenance and re-supply- not to mention the constant shelling- forced Collishaw to

46/127
•
withdraw to airfields near Maaten Bagush in Egypt with forward refuelling at Sidi
Barrani- 120 miles from Tobruk. 142

Tactically. the RAF was certainly having difficulties growing ioto the air support
to the land battle task. [n particular. it had difficulties with inexperienced pilots~

navigation and target identification in the featureless desert. At times, flying in the desert
had to be done with a watch and compass. 143 However. as with the Western Desert
Force, BREV[TY and BATTLEAXE were a learning ground for the RAF. COMPASS
operations certainly pointed in the right direction; however. as the RAF had cautioned: "it
would be unsound to base future policy or organisations on deductions made from
experience in these operations."' [n Iight of the newness of these types of operations. and
the internai difficulties each Service was facing, the RAF in the Western Desert was at
least attempting to come to ternIS with air support unlike their more sceptical brethren at
home. Further, both BREVITY (15-17 May) and BATTLEAXE (15-17 June) were
operations of extremely short duration. As such. there was little scope for either Service
to develop close ties leading to the practical development of techniques. 144 [n effect, in
tenns of co-operation and integration of operations, the Anny and RAF were too busy
and too concemed with their own internaI \vorries to come to grips with establishing an
etTective partnership.

The greatest frustration and cause of acrimony during these operations were
communications. both inter-personal and technical. During the BATTLEAXE offensive.
a distance of eighty miles separated ü'Connor"s and Collishaws' headquarters with poor
liaison and worse communication links. Clearly. the ainnen and the soldiers were not co-
ordinating their efforts in an adequate let alone meaningful manner. They neither lived
together nor worked together.

[f the Army "Vas vociferous over the lack of air support. the RAF felt it was due to
poor intonnation. More specifically. the RAF deemed that the lack of timely and detailed
infonnation on intentions. timetables. unit locations and Army needs led to poor air
support during BREV[TY and BATTLEAXE. While the links between air and ground

•
were acknowledged as poor, the RAF believed that the poor wireless links between
forward ground units and their headquarters meant that the Army was incapable of

47/127
 controlling its units or providing the airmen with the required information. Of particular
• concern to air commanders and pilots was the forward location of advancing units and the
Anny~s placement of a bomb-line. This situation was exacerbated by a failure of air to
ground recognition signals~ the fluid nature of the battle and the joint unfàmiliarity of
combined operations. 1-&5 Despite there being doctrinal guidelines in the fonn of manuals.
such as 'Employnlenr ofAir Forces with the Army in the Field'. 'R.A.F .Manual ofArmy
Co-operation' and the 'R.A.F Signal A.fanual' both Services seemed incapable of proper
co-operation and co-ordination. 146

The complete overhaul of the leadership in the Middle East attests to the
seriousness and bittemess of efforts and relations in the spring of 1941. Churchill
became personally involved in the air/ground issue as infonnation flowed back to Great
Britain on operations. As Tedder stated in his autobiography, ·"The main difficulty
throughout the entire operation. 1 told the Chief of the Air Staff. had been the almost
complete lack of information from the ground. Arrangements had been made for
communication and recognition between our ground and air forces. CaBs from the air for
acknowledgement of the recognition signal were never answered. In such circumstances
close support bombing became impossible. Indeed. Army Headquarters had great
difficulty even in giving a bomb-line:,147

• 48/127
 • Royal Air Force Command Organization: Janus" 1941
•
Air Mioistry
, 1

H(lME
C()MMANI> .... 1

.1
"&

1 r
r - - - " ' - - -... 1 1
Technical Fightcr ~ p.-I Army Co-operation Coastal 1 8allooo RAF
Training ('nmmand Command Commaod 1 Command Nortbern
Command Ireland
1 1 i
80mber t No. 70
Army Co-operation
No. 71
Army Co-operation
1
Maintenance Flylng
Command 1 Training G fOUP Group 1 Training
Command
J 1 Command
1 1
IJ Squadrons 1 1 illtill'd
1 1
1 i;1i ',(1 Il
1 1
1 (lVERSEAS C(lMMANDS t---~

1 illllft'd 1
1 1;II'/lfl 1
r
J
'-. _ ..... RAF
Middle East
Air Forces
in Indla
RAF
Far Eas.

r r 1 1
RAF UK Forces UK Forces RAF RAF RAF
Palestinel in Iraq in Aden Mediterraneao Greece East Africa
Jordan

1 1 1
Nurth :\frkan
No. 20. No. 202 No. 203 No. 252 No. 257
~~--
Recce Composite Fightcr/Bom ber Fightcr Bomber ( 'ulllllai~n
(;roup (;roup (;roup Wing Wing
• Chapter V

THE WESTERN DESERT: RATIONALISED AIR POWER

"A lesson is learned morefirmly when the application ofwhat has been learned turnsfailure inro success. "
Clauswitz

The wholesale change in leadership in the Middle East had immediate etTects on
Anny and RAF relations. Under the strong guidance of- and personal like between-
Auchinleck and Tedder_ positive measures were taken to ameliorate the relationship
between soldier and airman and to technically improve the system of communication~ the
methods of designating targets and the marking of friendly forces. Indeed. between the
month of June 1941 and the tennination of operation CRUSADER in January 1942 the
basis of RAF operations and air support to the Anny was fleshed out in committee_ tested
in the desert and then improved after batde. Tedder. to be known as one of the great
allied commanders of the war. possessed the confidence of the RAF-s top men_ Portal
and the VCAS. Air Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman. Further.. Tedder was not wed to a RAF
bomber doctrine and was prepared to be flexible and receptive in his approach to Anny
support. As Murray Williamson described Tedder in his survey. War in the Air 1914-
148
1945, ··He proved an apt student of the actual conditions of war:" Auchinleck. a highly
respected soldier. was able to see the need for change. Further, both men were ably
supported by .Mary' Coningham- an officer with no belief in the bomber doctrine. no
staff college training and not hesitant to embrace co-operation between his forward
Group and Cunningham"s Western Desert force. Coningham was a decorated fighter
pilot with deep experience in desert operations and one who had done stints in Coastal
and Bomber Commando Tedder considered Coningham to be the key reason for the
success of tactical air forces in the desert onwards. "Coningham soon had the soldiers
under his spell. and succeeded in rationalising the operations in the Western Desert:,1.. 9
This view of Coningham was supported by Liddell Hart_ and by Field Marshal Lord
Harding who had been in the desert in 1941. 150

• Personality and competence aside. the key to success came from Great Britain: a
political ruling on the duties and expectations of. and between.. the RAF and the Arroy.

49/127
•
The acrimony between the Army and the RAF in the Middle East had become so virulent
that it had spilled back to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff: General Sir Alan
Brooke. and to Air Chief Marshal Portal. Understood against a backdrop of bickering
between the Army and RAF in Great Britain over the proper role of the RAF. and
Admiral Mountbatten ~ sanger over RAF support in Greece and Crete. il became
necessary for Churchill to step in. The Anny view was quite simple: operations seem ta
indicate the need for the Army to control its own assets and the RAF must provide a
continuous combat air patroI over the ground forces for bath attack and defence. The
RAF took the position that support to the Anny meant first destroying the enemy"s air
torces in order to protect the battlefield from attack. Further. in tenns of an air umbrella.
the RAF could not get the Army to see that air power existed on a broad front and had to
be used at the most critical juncture and not dissipated on combat air patrols.
Coningham. when educating the senior leaders in French North Africa. stated the case
c1early: ··It often happens that an Anny fonnation at the front sees a good target which.
though reported. is not attacked. To take an instance: a front formation reports a
concentration of 200 M.T. (motor transport) and accompanying anus. hs request for air
attack is tumed down. 15 or 20 miles away. however. there is a concentration of 2.000 or
more. indicating an Annoured Division or even larger forces ... lt is this concentration
which is receiving aH the weight of air attack. and that is why the comparatively little
target on the front is ignored. The smaller formations of the Anny must understand that
penny packets of air are a luxury which can only be afforded al certain times:· 15l

The Inspector General of the RAF. Air Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt.
infonned London after a tour of the Middle East in the summer of 1941 that. .. the most
important problem of the lot is that of training the Anny to be self-contained in their
defence against air attack ... The idea that the Army must depend upon the Air Force to
protect it from air attack must be eradicated'~ and that ··to increase the power of the Anny
ta stand up to air attack is mainly a matter of leadership and training. ft tirst of aIl
requires a change of mental attitude." 152 White Ludlow-Hewitt was a fonner commander
within Bomber Commando which may have tainted his views on air support he does

• express the frustration within RAF circles over the Army ~ s constant quest for an air
umbrella.

50/127
•
The Churchill ruling, favouring the airmen~ (and perhaps in response to his
displeasure with the success of the ground forces in the desert) allowed Tedder and
Coningham to establish a doctrine of support not subordination to the Anny. Churchilrs
directive called for the Army Commander to specify his air needs during battle. The Air
Commander would supply air support before~ during and after operations commenced for
use against the enemy's air forces and rear areas. For the Army, Churchill clearly stated:

"Never more must the ground troops expect, as a matter of course. to be protected against
the air by aircraft. lfthis can be done. it must only be as a happy makeweight and a piece
of good luck. Above ail. the idea of keeping standing patrols of aircraft over moving
columns should be abandoned:'153

Armed with this kind of high level support. Tedder was able to create a broad view of air
power and one that would continue to meet the Army's needs based on the air situation
and the state of RAF aircraft and resources. Tedder would now be able to use any or aIl
aircraft for tactical air support~ as the disparate yet unified tasks involved required the
employment of a composite group of aircraft. By the time that tr.ese same air and land
torces were in operation in Italy, this provision of service had become the accepted noon.
'Operaliona/ Alemorandum NO.5.J: The Emp/oyment of Bombers and Fighrer-Bomhers in
Co-opera/ion wilh /he Army' summed up the Churchill"s ruling succinctly:

.. ft is the duty of the Army Commander to indicate to the Air Force Commander
the effect he wants achieved to further the operations of the land forces. and when he
wants that effect achieved. The method ofachieving it in the actual selection oftargets is
the responsibility of the Air Force Commander, who will make appropriate use of the
available expert advice and infonnation trom ground forces and other intelligence
sources. Success in a modem battle on land. however. involves a combined land air plan.
Anny and Air Force Commanders therefore must work in the closest possible
consultation throughout ail stages of the formulation and execution of the plan. to cnsure
that the land and air operations interact to the best advantage: to this end il may be
neccssary to adapt bath the timing and location of operations on the ground ta assist and
take full advantage of operations in the Air.'·,s4

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Prior to Churchill ~ s definitive statement~ the Army and RAF at the theatre level
were of necessity coming to terms with the need for improved relations and co-operation.
In Cairo, an inter-Service working group- the '''Air Support Committee~'- was created at
the end of June 1941 to study and rationalise ··air support~' to the Anny.'55 Meeting
throughout the summer. this committee~ including Army and RAF communications
experts, did much to work out the nuts and bolts of a proper system of joint
communication and to establish the nitty-gritty of co-operation between the RAF and
ground units.

The 'Minutes of Aleeting ofihe Air Support Commitlee ' dated 1 September 1941
laid out the findings that had taken a summer to create.'56 This document was a crucial
stcp in the examination of past operations and the future fonn of air support. ft was an
attempt to provide practical solutions for recognition. communications and equipnlent
needs. Specifically~ it y/as designed to:

a. examine methods of recognition for use between aircraft and Annoured and non-
Arrnoured units: (and, ifpossible to make one system applicable to both):

b. discuss whether it is feasible for Close Support to be called for from the Air:

c. evolve a system for indicating Targets to Close Support Aircraft from the air and
From the ground:

d. examine the organisation. establishment and transport required for a Close Support
Control with Infantry and Armoured Divisions (personnel. equipment. transport.
wireiess):

e. decide the number of Controls required for the Middle East: and.

f. consider arrangements for training personnel. including pilots.

Decisions were made as to the types of pyrotechnies. Iights or panels needed for
recognition or target indication. Attendant trials during the summer had ruled out sound
signais as too difficult for mechanised forces to hear and had found that the standard
Verey light bumed out too quickly. ·Sky writing~ was felt to be too difficult and. ·"ft is

•
considered that ail HQs (Headquarters) do\\'n ta Sqns. (Squadrons) and Coys. (Companies)
should have an Air Sentry whose sole duty should be to watch for our own and enemy

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•
aircraft." Red and Yellow "umbrellas~ eight feet in diameter were visible up ta 2500 feet~

"ground strips~ visible to 6000 feet and "smoke candles~ to 9000 feet. It was agreed that
ground indicators would indicate Army headquarters and that mechanised forces would
use umbrellas on the move. as they were easy to deploy. Infantry units and artillery units
would continue to use the ground indicators, such as "T' panels, already in the system. 157

[n the ali-important area of command and control and its attendant

communication system. both parties agreed on the parameters of "Close Support Control"
and the specifie communication equipment and personnel required. The Air Support
Committee created a highly detailed structure for air to ground. ground to air. headquarter
ta headquarter and Service rear link communications. While ""no alteration to the army
W/E (wireless) will be considered until practical experience has been obtained~~ a new
formalised structure for air support was proposed. This system~ which would be ratified
in a joint RAF-Army directive 30 September 1941. titled 'Direct Air Support '. called for
a system of "tentacles' and "Air Support Control'.

This 30 September directive required Air Support Controls to be created at Corps

level ta accept or reject calls for air strikes. The ground component of the system was to
possess a mobile two-way radio-equipped organisation consisting of seven forward links
of "tentacles' for communicating with the Control Headquarters. The RAF component
would have various constituent parts for command and control. ft would have eight radio
sets calied 'Forward Air Support Links' (FASLs) for the control of air support aircraft in
the air and for monitoring reconnaissance aircraft. The RAF component would aiso have
two wireless sets. known as -Reac Air Support Links~ (RASLs) for communicating
directly to the airfields. while the airfields would have four radio sets. The headquarters
of the Air Support Controis would be established as part of the headquarters of the
formation fighting a battle and under RAF control. The "tentacles' and "FASLs' would
be assigned to Infantry brigades to allow the forward most commanders to cali for direct
air support. Air Support Control headquarters would consuIt with the Anny and pass calls
that were accepted via the RAF signal system to an appropriate airfield for action. Air
Support Control headquarters would then inform the requesting "tentacle' of the

• estimated lime of arrivai and sortie strength so that the forward commander could be
ready to take advantage of il. The assigned aircraft ",,"hen in the battle zone would look for

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the target indication~ co-ordinate their own attacks. receive an update from the FASLs if
necessary and attack the target. 1S8 (See diagram on next page). Alan Cunningham expressed
uneasiness over this system. He wasn't altogether sure about an 'extra link~ in the chain
of support or the idea that 'Mary~ Coningham's headquarters would have control over the
acceptance. modification or rejeetion of requested missions. 159

While the directive was crucial to the establishment of a fonnalised system of

n
··doing business it was equally important in that it recognised the type and phasing of air
tasks for effective support. These missions reflected the Luftwaffe/Wehrmacht experience
in France and North Afriea and the lessons learned during COMPASS. BREVITY.
BATTLEAXE and. presumably. by Anny Co-operation Command in Great Britain.
Quite sirnply. the air plan called for the RAF to achieve air superiority; to interdict the
battle zone; and to provide close support to the ground forces. In retum. the Anny would
have to improve its anti-aircraft defenees and understand that the RAF's modus operandi
would leave them open to occasion attack. Now. in a fonnalised fashion. the RAF could
proceed to gain at least local air superiority so as to conduet tactical operations in the rear
area and at or near the forward edge ofbattle. For the RAF. the move towards a doctrine
of air support- at least at theatre level- was complete. '·The RAF in the Middle East gave
priority to tasks whieh the air staff had regarded with disdain throughout the interwar
period: first it would gain air superiority; second. it would attack Axis supply lines: and
third. it would support the anny in its ground battles with the Ajrikakorps:·160

The work of the Air Support Committee- and the 30 September directive- formed
the nascent foundations of the air support command and control system in the desert and
would he modified continuously through operations in the Western Desert and during
TORCH and HUSKY. It created the basis for a flexible and impromptu system of
support as weIl as pre-planned missions. However. there would be much work for both
Services to ensure that Churchill's directive and the framework for support worked.

In line with this idea. the Air Support Committee had recornmended that various
experiments. briefings and exercises oecur to practice commanders and test the proposed

•
system. 161 These trials. carried out in September and Oetober. were generally successful
and led to the implementation of the ·tentacle· system. As Tedder noted. ··On 5

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 • British Direct Air Support System (September 1941)
•

1- RecoDnaissance aireraft from advaneed strip spots enemy formation.

2- Reconnaissance aireraft informs Brigades and Division Fonvard Air Support Links (FASL).
3- Reconnaissance aireraft remains on station to provide updates.
4- Brigade and Division FASLs inform Corps HQ.
5- Corps BQ eoordinates with eo-Iocated Air Support Control HQ.
6- ASC BQ requests support from RAF Group BQ & alerts Rear Air Field of possible mission.
7- RAF Group HQ approves a strike and sends orders to Rear Air Field.
8- Airfield confirms strike witb ASC BQ which informs Corps BQ.
,. Corps informs Division and Brigade of mission.
10- Strike aireraft eoordinate witb Division and Brigade FASLs to reeeive updated information and targeting instructions.
•
September 1941 we had a combined exercise with the Army in which ail the senior
commanders from the Western Desert and Syria took part. The main problem was to
ensure effective co-operation between land and air. and we ail feh most strongly that by
far the most important contribution was that we should have good RAF liaison officers
living in each Army headquarters. at least down to the leve1 of divisions and. 1 hoped. to
the brigades of the annoured divisions.,·162 Conversely. Air Liaison Officers from the
Anny- likely with experience as part of Army Co-operation Command- would arrive in
the Middle East to explain air methods to the Anny and Anny methods to the RAF. 163

Ludlow-Hewin (Coningham's old boss in Bomber Command) on a visit to the

Middle East as this process was coming to fruition. transmitted a copy of the minutes of
the Air Support Committee to Portal and Freeman in London. He inc1uded his comments
based on visits and discussions with RAF commanders. Auchinleck and various Army
leaders. These observations. titled 'Sorne Notes on Army Co-operation in the Middle
East " remain interesting as they point to the difficulties that Tedder. Coningham.
Auchinleck and the rotating commander of the Western Desert Force would have in
putting paper into practice.l~ Ludlow-Hewin provided his impressions on the efficacy
and co-operation to date between the RAF and the Anny:

··It was generally agreed by ail with whom the matter was discussed that the
attachment of RAF officers to Corps and Division Headquarters. and in the case of
Armoured Brigades down to Brigade Headquarters. is essential if good co-operation is to
be realised. Il has been the general experience that subordinate Army commanders have
not known when to ask for air support nor what information would be of value to the air.
nor how best to use air action to relieve pressure on themselves and break down enemy
resistance. They are either over diffident about asking for assistance or go to the other
extreme and c1amour for air support and air protection when they can very weil do
without either:· 16s

Ludlow-Hewitt perceived there to be little interaction amongst soldiers and

ainnen in the Middle East. "There is linle inter-service hospitality and the two services
tend to segregate themselves from each other aImost completely"· Even more bluntly.
Ludlow-Hewitt felt that the Army had little understanding of the RAF and that no success

• would occur unless there was better interaction at the professional level. ··The degree of
ignorance in the Anny in the Middle East of everything connected with the RAF is quite

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 phenomenal and there can he no hope of better co-operation until the two services get
• together and educate each other to a much greater extent than is being done at present.·· 166
The various attachments to Ludlow-Hewitt's communication drew the Air Ministry ~ 5
attention to the efforts amongst air and ground commanders to solve their various
differences.

One of the major steps in creating a better environment occurred in September

1941. At that time. the RAF headquarters was five miles from that of the Army. [67
Coningham proposed and Cunningham accepted that a joint headquarters between the
RAF and the British 8lh Army (as the Western Desert Force was titled as of 18 September
1941) be created and co-located at Maaten Bagush. This idea was to allow the vine of
co-operation to grow. A constant and friendly interaction between Army and RAF
commanders would create an environment for the respective staffs to work in a co-
ordinated tàshion as would more infonnal interactions. Further. it would e1iminate
problems with the communication system, as the two headquarters would be combined.
Fewer signaIs would be lost due to poor ground position, vehicles running over cables or
enemy tighters knocking out overhead wires. Lastly~ in an effort to achieve parity \\'·ith
the glh Anny as ·co-equaIs· Coningham~s No. 202 Group was re-designated Air
Headquarters Western Desert on 9 October 1941. This move recognised the gro\\'th in
size and range of activity of the new Desert Air Force and the need by the ainnen to have
equal footing with their Army colleagues.

CRVSADER: Proving the New Svstem

Operation CRUSADER was the first test of the new approach ta warfare. For the
RAF. it was the first opportunity to implement and test the three-phase doctrine worked
out and fonnalised over the past several months and to show a still sceptical anny
leadership the benefits of a unified approach to the air war. For the Army. it was a
chance for ··the Auck··. Cunningham and his two Corps Commanders. the seasoned

• Lieutenant General William Gott of XIII Corps and Lieutenant General Willoughby
Nome (XXX Corps) to improve on their predecessors. particularly in the proper use of

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 annour. OveralL in teons of air support, the new system proved its worth and
• effectiveness, despite apparent problems.

The ground phase of this prolonged and 'costly exercise' commenced 18

November 1941 and lasted until the end of January 1942. Its aim was no different than
the previous campaign against the Italians or the two against the Axis: Relieve Tobruk,
re-take Cyrenaica and establish the conditions to complete the destruction of the enemy
in Libya. It would be a two corps attack with the main effort through the Halfaya Pass.
Nome's XXX Corps with the bulk of the annour was tasked to force the coast- while
Tobruk sallied in the Axis rear. XIII Corps would hold and fix the enemy forces and then
assist XXX Corps. The British had approximately 120,000 soldiers available for the
offensive as weil as 778 tanks of differing quality in the forward area. The combined
Axis force was comparably in manpower~ however~ two thirds of the force was made up
of the less effective Italian troops. The available Axis armour was approximately 400
tanks.

The tirst offensive through the Halfaya Pass failed with considerable loss of
annour. The muddle, confusion and evident distress of Cunningham in the face of local
counter-attack and his inability to understand mobile warfare cost him his job.
Auchinleck replaced him 26 November with the next victim. Lieutenant General Sir Neil
Ritchie. The second attack in December managed to relieve the garrison of Tobruk and
by the 17 January the 8th Anny had pushed the Axis forces to El Agheila on the
CyrenaicaITripolitania border. This advance and retreat was the model for the desert and
would continue for another year as each side took advantage of its tighter lines of
communication and re-organisation. However. for the 8 th Anny in January of 1941. with
over-extended supply lines. a heavy loss in tanks and general exhaustion. it crumpled in
the face of Rommel"s counter-offensive. As such. the British were forced back onto the
defensive at the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line. 35 miles west ofTobruk.

Air Support to CRUSADER commenced in mid-October 1941 with a prolonged

campaign to achieve air superiority and destroy the enemy's rear area supplies and
equipment. The Desert Air Force was also tasked to provide detailed infonnation on
168
• enemy formations. locations, supply routes, fortifications and airfields. Ail efforts

57/127
 would be intensified the week before D-Day, followed by a period of close air support in
• the irnrnediate battle area. Despite the initial ground push faltering, the Desert Air Force
had managed to achieve local air superiority and create the conditions for surprise.
Tedder noted. ·"By 20 November it was clear that for the time being we had attained air
superiority. The whole bomber force was therefore put at the disposai of the Army
commanders. Great difficulty was found in aUotting targets for the force. partly because
of rapid change in the battle situation. and partly for a lack of infonnation:,,169 The poor
weather. particularly to the west of the battle zone. hampered Lujiwaffè operations and
bogged down Axis tanks. The rain-soaked ground in the Axis sector allowed Coningham
to deploy Beaufighters, Blenheims and fighters against enemy annour and motorised
formations with sorne success. For the DAF. they felt that it had been ajob weil done: no
longer could the Army call them the" Royal Absent Force' .

CRUSADER Assessed

A balance sheet would hold many successes and failures for Auchinleck's
CRUSADER. On the positive side. the 8th Anny had relieved Tobruk and caused the
Axis significant casualties in men, materiel and. above aiL armour. Although the .Desert
Fox' had pushed the British back onto the defensive, the British Anny was still west of
Tobruk- the military. political and emotional fixture for many. including Churchill.
Further. CRUSADER was not a victory to be measured in kilometres. It was a much-
needed boost for the British forces in the Middle East and for the Allied side. lndirectly.
it was important as it displayed to the Americans thar the British were capable of victory
in the war against Germany. In a backhanded way. CRUSADER was also a victof)' in
that it continued to euH the [esser lights from the Arroy's ranks sa that by the time of
HUSKY and OVERLORD. the British Army leadership would have senior and middle
rank leaders with the skills and experience to succeed.

However. a balance sheet tor CRUSADER would also Iist 18.000 casualties and

•
the loss of the bulk of the armoured forces destroyed. broken or abandoned. It would also
highlight the Anny leadership's ineptness in the use of armour and the concept of mobile

58/127
 or manoeuvre warfare. Further, the Anny was still having difficulties with understanding
• and controlling the flow of battle. Rommel was highly critical of Cunningham, Ritchie
and Norrie's use of armour during CRUSADER. He felt that it was not a failure of
planning but of execution in which the continuous dispersion of annour and the failure to
concentrate was fatal. The British. simply, had not mastered the art of mechanised
warfare. '-Their unwieldy and rigidly methodical technique of commando their over-
systematic issuing of orders down to the last detai!. leaving little latitude to the junior
commander. and their poor adaptability to the changing course of the battle were also as
much to blame for the British failures:,l7o As such. after CRUSADER~ the Anny·s
balance sheet was in the red.

The Desert Air Force also had its achievements and misfortunes during
CRUSADER. However. it was implementing- in battle- a system that had not been used
outside of minor experimentation in Great Britain. one that ail users were inexperienced
with and one that the Army had imperfectly grasped. Further. the Anny was still
struggling with its own command and control system meaning that the RAF was still
dependent for information on an Anny unsure of unit locations. that had difficulty
identifying or indicating targets and still had not grasped the import of a bomb-line. With
the prevailing "fog of war' and swirling confusion impeding the Army's leadership. the
Desert Air Force had to contend \vith ilS own inherent difficulties as weil as those
resulting from combined operations. "But no matter how effective il was. air power
could not rnake up for the severe deficiencies in British Army doctrine. training and
intellectual preparation:,I?1 For the RAF. the shoe was now on the other foot. They felt
that the Anny had not done its job to the best of its ability, particularly after Rommel·s
counter-otTensive.

CRUSADER highlighted the Desert Air Force's continuing lack of mobility.

especially during fluid and mobile operations were it was imperative for the RAF to keep
pressuring forward to support the advance. Either ilS aircraft were out of range or they
took an overly long time to arrive in the mission area. Conversely. when the 8th Anny
rapidly fell back on the Gazala line~ the RAF was hard pressed to conduet operations and

• withdraw- sometimes while under shelling. l72 Tied into the question of mobility was the
RAF's diffieulty in keeping its logistics system functioning cffectively. Fuel. ammunition

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and spare parts were being supplied on an uneven basis. Squadrons operating from
advanced landing strips were out-running their mechanics, riggers and controllers.
'Tactical Bulletin No. 18 Army Co-operation Work in the Middle East '. elaborating on
experiences during mobile operations~ highlighted the problems of operating from
Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG), particularly the need for more and specialised
equipment. ··The Squadron always worked from an Advanced Landing Ground with base
sorne gO miles back. This entailed a greater number of specialised vehicles which (sic)
were not provided for in the establishment. At bath ALG and BLG the Squadron
occupied Landing Grounds alone ... this meant that two fire tenders and lwo ambulances
were necessary:,173 Just as seriously. the sole RAF radar system in the Western Desert
only possessed a range of sixty miles. In effect, the infrastructure was still too raw for
the DAF to provide the most effective support. As one writer of the time stated, uThe
RAF. in fine. must learn to be nomadic.,,174

The DAF also experienced a continuing problem with pilot training and level of
experience. As Coningham stated, "We have practically no marksmen ... because there is
no practical air-to...air firing done until they are thrown into the battle when they are aIl
worked up and do not know what they are doing. [t is then too lale. excepl for the lucky
and perhaps more experienced ones who survive." 175 The pilots were also having
difficulties~ as the most advanced aircraft. the Hurricane and the Kittyhawks. were no
match. except in superior numbers. for the Bf 109. During engagements- essentially to
achieve air superiority- they were at a serious disadvantage. They were also having
difficulties. as ground attaek operations were fundamentally different l'rom air-to-air
operations and not the foeus at the training schools or Operational Training Units.
"Ground attack bears little relation ta air fighting and it requires special training in very
low flying ta take advantage of natural cover in order ta deliver attacks on enemy
vehicles which are normally sighted for a brief period only:~ 176 Further. pilots were still
having difficulties with navigation and target recognition. The speed of the aircraft. the
sand and dust. the fluid nature of the battle and natural nervousness ail combined to make
it difficult for pilots to identify targets. However. in defence of RAF and Luftwaffe pilots.

• both the g[h Army and the Afrilca Korps were making free use of captured annour and
motorised transport. Rommel estimated that by the summer of 1942. 85% of his transport

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was captured. l77 Ludlow-Hewin in his 'Eastern Tour Paper No. Il . acknowledged the
difficulties of recognition for pilots, particularly as ail sides made indiscrirninate use of
anti-aircraft. 178 "'They aim to fly at only a few hundred feet but~ if the flak proves too
hot, they go up to about 3,000 feet which is, however, found to be too high to reeognise
our own transport. ,,179

CRUSADER as an Air Power Watershed

For the RAF. CRUSADER was a success and a watershed operation. To date. the
RAF had been limited in its methods of ground support- in France and in the desert- by
the available aireraft. Previous experience had shown that the use of such aircraft as the
Lysander for tactical reconnaissance was mortal to the pilots that flew them and that the
Hurricane was a bener platfonn in terms of survivability and speed of information
delivery. Light bombers. such as the Boston and the Maryland, had been used in the
desert against fortifications and massed transport but had linle effect in the forward area
on smaller targets while proving vulnerable to eoemy action. Their characteristics made
them suitable for medium level bombing but they were not accurate enough for close
tactical involvement. Further. they required substantial protection from enemy attack
leading the DAF to commit precious resources to top coyer and escort operations. As
such. while CRUSADER was the proving ground for formalised air support. it Was an
important step in the evolution of air power that saw the metamorphosis of the interceptor
into a ground attack aircraft. The doctrine of air support had becn established. the system
had been roughed out and DOW the final tool was in place. Fighters could no longer be
viewed as simply 100ls to achieve air superiority or prevent bomber attack. Pre-war
doctrine was immeasurably altered as fighter aircraft became the tool of ground attack.
"The era of the Allied fighter-bomber had arrived, and CRUSADER is memorable for
that introduction. ,·180

Experiments with modified interceptors had occurred in Great Britain. particularly

• with the Spitfires and Hurricanes of Fighter Commando While the RODEO and
RHUBARB operations over Europe were a good school for pilots. the conditions of War

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were highly different than in the desert. The Western Desert was a practicaI school of
operations and the only theatre where the Anny and the RAF were in action together. As
such~ it was a testing ground for new methods and new ideas- as the Air Support Control
system demonstrated. CRUSADER witnessed the first major use of the Curtiss
Kitttyhawk and the Hawker Hurricane as modified fighter-bombers. While the
Kittyhawk and Hurricane were inferior to the Bf 109 as a fighter~ they proved to be good.
fast and relatively accurate ground support weapons. Locally modified as the
'Kittybomber~ and ~Hurribomber.~ they could carry at first one 250-pound bomb under
each wing and while still possessing their direct tire weapons. Unfortunately. during
early 1942~ the DAF only had three modified squadrons of Kittyhawks but had requested
more American-made bomb racks. 181 The use of the interceptor in a close support role
closed the loop on air support capabilities. The moditied Kittyhawk and Hurricane-
including the pending Hurricane IID "tank destroyer'- would crystallise into the Typhoon
for the British and the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt for the Americans in western Europe.
Experimentation and development in the method of attack. types of payload or weaponry
delivery and annament would make the fighter-bomber an extremely effective and deadly
tool for close support. As Coningham confided to Tedder~s deputy. Air Marshal Peter
Drummond. ~'The most important lesson learned in the first round was the value of the
fighter-bomber. ~~ 182

For the Desert Air Force and the doctrine of air support. CRUSADER highlighted
the fact that the RAF was going in the right direction. The RAF in the Middle East had
fought for and attained an arrangement for providing support to the land forces that. on
balance. had proved its worth. lt had vindicated the system of achieving air superiority
first. then attacking the rear areas and lines of communication to isolate the battlefield
and then providing intimate support to the Army. Further. despite certain significant
breakdowns in communication and signalling with the Arroy. the concept of Air Support
Controls and 'tentacles' had proven its worth. The use of liaison officers. the placement
of wireless links and the co-location of air and anny headquarters had been tested in
battle and found effective. While CRUSADER had yet again witnessed the Army

• experiencing growing pains it proved that a system of air support was viable. The same

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system., with new wrinkles. better equipment and with more masterly handling would be
used by the RAF and adopted by the Americans for the rest of the war.

COMPASS, BREVITY. BATTLEAXE and CRUSADER display a progression,

uneven and muddled at times, in the use of air power. Scaree resources. inexperienee in
battle., gnawing ineompetenee, inter-Service bickering~ a harsh environment and, of
course, the enemy aIl had caused the Army and RAF to stumble along the way.
However. until operations ceased over Germany in 1945 the same basic system would be
introduced and used in other theatres~ however it was the Western Desert that saw the
true genesis of air support as a doctrine and as a system. As Air Marshal Sir Arthur
Coningham stated to a group of senior British and American officers in Tripoli in 1943:

"The doctrine that we have evolved by trial in war over a period of months
cou Id. 1 think. be stated in its simplest fonn as follows: The Soldier commands the land
forces. the Airman commands the air forces: both commanders work together and operate
their respective forces in accordance with a combined Army-Air plan. the whole
operations (sic) being directed by the Anny Commander... The Army fights on a front
that may be divided into sectors such as a Brigade. Division. Corps or an Anny front.
The Air front is indivisible. An Army has one battle to fight. the land battle. The Air has
t\\'o. It had first of ail to beat the enemy air. sa that it may go into the land battle against
the enemy land forces with the maximum possible hitting power... In conclusion. is it tao
much to suggest that we obey rules of simple logie and take success in Anny-Air
developments as reached in this thcatre as a model on wh ich further deve lopment can
take place? The Army had linle time to waste. for they have still only a tiny veteran
force- Eighth Army. We in the air have already taken the measure of our cnemy air
opponents. The potential air power that will be used against the enemy ground forces is
unbelievably great. but it must be used properly. and what better way as a beginning than
in accordance with the doctrine ... 1 have explained to youT 183

• 63/127
• Cbapter VI

THE DESERT 1942: TIGHTENING THE SYSTEM OF AIR SUPPORT

The summer of 1942 sa",' continued reverses for the British in the \\'estem Desert
as Rommel made crafty use of limited resources to break the Gazala line. capture Tobruk
and punish the British at the first battle of El Alamein. However. as the British Services
gained experience. received greater resources from Great Britain and the United States
and damaged the Axis supply routes. air power continued to evolve. By the time
Lieutenant General Bernard 'Monty' Montgomery. as the new glh Army Commander.
completed his victory at the second battle of El Alamein the system was weIl on its way
to achieving the praise of Coningham at Tripoli.

~·Many Rands and Minds"

Conceivably the greatest leap fOI'\vard in perfecting the system was as a result of
better leadership and specialised competence within the RAF Middle East Commando
The RAF. perhaps not to the extent of the Arroy. had suftèred from early problems of
leadership and expertise. In Tedder. the RAF had the consummate facilitator and leader.
In Coningham. the Desert Air Force possessed a strong leader with a c1ear sense of the
potential of air po\ver and an airman willing to compromise and co-operate. Owen
Roderic. in his biography Tedder. stated that Coningham was the genius behind tactical
air power. "Out in the desert Tedder had a man who \Vas without dispute the outstanding
Tactical Air Force Commander of the war. Il can almost be said. in facl. that he invented
the TacticaI Air Force. if one man can be ascribed what must. in the nature of this. be
fundamentally the product of many hands and minds:· 184 Credit indeed for many of the
achievements in the growth of RAF into an effective and flexible torce lie with lower
strata officers. These officers would take the framework of tactical air power and solve

• the logistic. maintenance and tactical employment questions.

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•
On Valentine's day 1942, post CRUSADER. ;,Mary' Coningham received a
welcome gift. Air Commodore Thomas '"Tommy' Elmhirst became the Desert Air
Force·s administration officer. Elrnhirst. previously responsible for the air defence of
Egypt and of the Canal Zone, was a highly experienced officer and a good friend of
Coningham's. Elmhirst was the key architect of the re-organisation and rationalisation
the Desert Air Force. ·;,He quickly created order where there had been disorder. supply
where there had been shortage. confidence were there had been doubt and. above aIl. a
belief amongst those doing the fighting that here was a man who understood what they
needed.,,185 Elmhirst. who would remain Coningham's deputy for the rest of the war.
was responsible for providing the DAF with a formalised Establishment rationalising the
purpose of units. the numbers of aircraft.. personnel and equipment and weaponry. More
importantly. at the sharp end. Elmhirst re-organised the squadrons into mobile fighter.
bomber and reconnaissance Wings. Further, he created an environment of mobility
within the DAF. Squadron support elements were split into an 'A' and 'B' party. The A
party would move by road or air to the next operational airfield or airstrip while the B
party maintained the aircraft at the existing field. When the A party had the new field
ready for operations. the entire force would shift. "Shortly after the break-through at El
Alamein. a scheme was devised whereby the Squadron \\i'ould be able to operate
uninterruptedly throughout its moves. The method is for a working flight of ground
personnel on a particular L.G. to maintain the aircraft of both Flights... the moment a
J86
new L.G. is nominated. the mobile Flight moves and established itself there:· As the
official historian of the Royal Air Force stated. ··Squadrons in the desert had obtained
practice in mobility ... to move their bases a hundred miles in a single day without
interfering in their ability to operate. It was accomplished by the theoretically simple. but
in practice. difficult. process of placing ail the ground organisation on wheels. so that il
could move backwards and forwards as circumstances demanded. It was more costly in
man-power and machines. in petrol and oil, than the earlier method of creating dumps.
But in a war where mobility counted as much as it did in the desert. the initially more
expensive method was in the long run probably cheaper.~,187 The American General

•
Lewis Brereton was deeply impressed with the mobility of the RAF in the desert such
188
that later in the war his motta for the American Ninth Air Force was ··Keep Mobile:·

65/127
 The talents of other officers addressed many deficiencies within RAF Middle
• East. Serviceability had hampered RAF operations. Air Vice Marshal Grahame Dawson.
Air Officer-in-Charge of Maintenance for RAF Middle East.. managed to rationalise the
entire system for aircraft modification. maintenance and repair and salvage. 189 This
improved logistical support. when coupled with Elmhirst ~ s measured re-organisation.
would aid the RAF in achieving air superiority. Coningham also benefited by having Air
Commodore Basil Embry as his tirst Senior Air Staff Officer. The -famous' and "fiery~

Embry, on whom the Germans had placed a "dead or alive' priee. arrived in the desert to
address the poor level of tactics and training, based on bis experiences in western
Europe. 19o Embry was replaced in January 1942 by a personal favourite ofConingham's-
Air Commodore George Beamish. Beamish, a famous sportsman within the RAF. was
one of the few leaders in the desert allowed to sec the ULTRA message traffic on
Rommel' s intentions. He. along with Embry. created a system for the rotation and
training of pilots in theatre. '''The pilots were by no means sifted down.. so that the
proportion of old hands to new hands was roughly in the ratio of 1:1. The resting period
was therefore useful in enabling these new pilots to settle do\\'n... the pilots were
thoroughly exercised in formation flying.. gunnery and combat tactics. A total of 380
hours were flown for these purposes.,,191 Lastly. at the sharp end. the Desert Air Force
benetited from the leadership of George Broadhurst and Kenneth Cross. Cross was an
outstanding fighter pilot who would take control of the fighter operations within the
Desert Air Force. Broadhurst would become a close support specialist who would in turn
take command of the Desert Air Force as weil as command No. 83 Group in Nonnandy.
As such. while praise is rightly given to Tedder and Coningham for their efforts in the
desert. much credit must go to the talented team assembled by Portal and Tedder.

Toois and Technology

Before Ieaving the Western Desert it must he re-emphasised that the struggIe

• towards improved support was an ongoing work-in-progress. Efforts to improve tactics,

training~ serviceability~ mobility and co-operation were constant concems. Like a rough-

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•
eut diamond the Desert Air Force needed constant finishing to improve munitions
delivery methods~ improve air response time and create a working environment with the
Army. Constant innovation and experimentation allowed the Desert Air Force to
continue to evolve and hone its skiIls. During CRUSADER the air response time to a
mission request had averaged between 2.5 and three hourS. 192 This time lag was the
result of the numerous factors covered including the communication links, briefings,
airfield location, munitions preparation and pilot and controller experience. By the time
of the first banle of El Alamein in May and June of 1942 the response time had been
substantially trimmed to thirty-five minutes.

Improved co-operation was a key to better air support. Not only were the issues
of co-operation and co-ordination being addressed at the higher levels, but also between
tactical elements. In particular. pilots were becoming more attuned to the flow of banle
and the soldiers' needs. "Several of the Squadron pilots were invited to join Artillery,
Infantry and Tank Units for a few days, so that they were able to watch on the ground the
various weapons used and the formation adopted by our own ground troops. This helps a
pilot pick up spot points by which various weapons may be identitied:,193 Further. joint
efforts at recognition had continued to improve 50 as to assist the DAF's pilots. "The
Army had at last accepted the principle that our own vehicles should be marked 50 as to
be recognisable from the air... since we (now) always have air superiority ... it is
therefore more important that we should be able to recognise our own transport and tanks
than that the enemy should not be able to do SO:,19..

The improved response lime 10 requests was also aided by more effective support
to requests. The Kinybomber and Hurribomber strengths slowly increased while the
increasing trickle of modem Spitfires addressed the issue of inferiority with the Bf 109;
however. the RAF in the Middle East also created the effective precursor to the Typhoon-
the Hurricane IID 'Tank Destroyer" .195 Early requirements for ground anack with direct
tire weapons included that "'The "tank buster" should be fast. light on the controls and
manoeuvrable. Il should be armed with 20mm or greater calibre guns and armoured
against fire from the ground and debris thrO\\11 up by the fighter ~ s 0\\11 shells:'196 Not

• only did experimentation with the Hurricane IID go along way towards meeting this
specification~ it aiso led to improvements in the Air Support Control system.

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 The Hurricane IID was armed with two
• 40mm Vickers ·S~ Cannons and four .303 calibre
197
machine guns in the wings. Further, it could
carry a 50D-pound bomber under each winge The
machine guns acted as spotting rounds, while each
of the •S' guns had 15 round of armour piercing
ammunition. The 40mm cannon (a bigger calibre than certain British tank models)
proved effective in penetrating Gennan armour. By the time of Montgomery's victory at
El Alamein the DAf was operating with eight squadrons of the Hurricane 110. No.7
(SAAF) squadron during the banle flew L407 sorties in a twelve-day period and claimed
79 tanks destroyed and 27 damaged as well as 34 half-tracks and 261 other vehicles for a
loss of 17 aircraft. Quite c1early~ against certain tank models this type of aircraft was an
extremely effective weapon. While future experience would prove the Hurricane 110 to
be too slow and too vulnerable. the use of a Hurricane with either multiple 40mm cannon
or bomb racks was an important step in matching needs and resources.

Date Hurricane IID Tank Destroyer 1 Tank Hils

Sorties Losses Loss/Sortie Claimed Per Sortie A/C Lost per Tank Hit
June 1942 407 7 .02 55 .14 .13
1
(7 day period)
18-30 Detober 1,407 17 .01 106 .08 .16
Totals: 1.814 24 .01 161 .09 .15
RAF DATA. North Africa 1942. As round in DH" 81/482

The banle use of the Hurricane HD was summarised in ?vfiddle East Tacticaf
Aifemorandum No.21: The Operational Employment ol the Hurricane /ID ,.198 This
extremely detailed report. issued just prior to the second battle of El Alamein. highlights
certain command and control adj ustments. specifie tactics used against annour and the
efTectiveness of air weaponry against armour. Il is a good example of the evolution of
practices after CRUSADER.

• 68/127
•
New practices to streamline the entire Air Support Control process are discussed,
including the locating of an eoemy, the rearward passage of infonnatio~ target

....----------------......
assessment and the assignment of
resources. It should he

~
ArmOUred Car
RecOUDaissance
remembered that the Air Support
Control system of FASLs and
4tentaeles' had been more fully
ArlDoured
Bripde
~
~"
established for Infantry divisions [Q] ~
than annoured forces. As such, as , ""'..
Î /'" Motoriud
Brigade
annoured fonnations at this time "4 /
were more than likely to be used
~
1 Cs 1 A~~~ured
DIVISIOn
against similar forces, it was vvv k"

I
ArmY/Ai~
necessary to adjust the system, as HQ G:iLJ (Air Support Control)
1

the Hurricane IID was primarily

an anti·tank weapon. 4'The old
~cRJ
An LO from the Armoured Division is located at the A.S.C.
method of reporting targets was
found to be too cumbersome for the effective operation of Hurricane 110 aircraft.
Various suggestions have therefore been put forward to cut down this time lag...one of
the chief difficulties had been the actual location of a given target... and here again
various suggestions for homing aircraft onto a target have been put forward." 199 The
report notes that., "Considerable time has been saved by installing a wireless set al
Anny/Air Headquarters which maintains a listening watch on the DivisionaJ net. An
Army Liaison Officer from the Armoured Division Headquarters is DOW located at the
A.S.C. (Air Support Control) at Army/Air Headquarters and can advise the Commanders
on the suitability of targets received from Annoured Division Headquarters. The order to
attack and relevant infonnation is then passed direct from Anny/Air Headquarters to the
Squadron on a rear one to one Wrr link. ,,200 Harold Macmillan, in The Royal Air Foree
in the World War 1940-1945, volume HI, commented on this improved system. "Over the
desert banle of Gazala the aircraft did not fly in the cab.. rank fashion of later days: to he

•
whistled up on radio-telephone from a combined anny-air force visual control post. At
Gazala annoured cars kept in close contact with tank engagements, and signalled back

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•
·gen~ on the best targets, watched the bombing and reported on its efficacy. The new
method at this stage. still somewhat crude, was nevertheless far more efficient that
anything which had proceeded it.,,201

The ·prope( tactics for the Hurricane IID are dealt with in detail including the use
of Spitfires for escort protection. tlying in ·~two loose Vics in line astem·' and the proper
speed (200 mph) for attack, the distance ta commence the attack (1000 yards) and the
altitude (15/20 feet).202 Proper weaponry use for aIl attacks was stressed such that. ··The
importance of accurate gun hannonisation cannot be over-emphasised.,,103 Further. pilot
experience indicated that tanks shouid only be attacked if separated from motorised
transport due to lessened flak. In terms of further improvements~ the bulletin cautions
that. ··It had been found in practice that the present shell will penetrate the thickest tank
armour. but though this will result in temporarily immobilising a tank. il might possibly
be capable of repair and would not necessarily cause its complete destruction. A shell
with a burster charge would ... probably have a greater change of destroying a tank. as
against only immobilising it:· As this report was onfy ·"compiled trom the operational
experience gained by No.6 Anti-Tank Squadron·· this kind of solid information was
crucial for dissemination as its wide distribution list demonstrates..204

Research in weaponry and ammunition was ongoing and would reaches its zenith
in France in 1944 with Operational Research Sections (ORS) in the fields assessing
weapon effects. Responding to a signal from the Air Ministry (X.493). concerning the
"EjJect ofAttack against A.F. V. 's" Coningham replied that ··ground straffing (sic) and
Hurricane bomber attacks are most successfuL and most economical when the target
attacked is moving. The noise of the vehicle's engine and the difficulty of taking shelter
l'rom a moving vehicle increase both the chances of achieving effective surprise and of
intlicting heavy casualties:' Concerning ammunition. Coningham states. ··[t is very
evident that the maximum possible damage has not been intlicted on the enemy either in
the air or on the ground by machine gun fire because of the inadequate suppl y of
incendiary and. in the heavier calibre guns. explosive ammunition. ~,205 He pen amended
this message by writing~ ··The excellence of aircraft. equipment. training and tactics are

• being nullified by this deficiency... Pilots note the contrast between themselves and the
enemy in this respect and the effect is had... 206

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•
Leaving the Desert

The Army and the RAF would continue to chaff and continue to improve their
relations in the desert after El Alamein and after the allied TORCH landings in Morocco
and Aigeria. It had taken three years for the will and tools to be in place in order that the
RAF could smoothly assist the British Army in the desert. By 1943~ the commander of
th
the 8 Army. Montgomery. had embraced the co-equaL partner approach to air support
and had further embraced the idea of centralised air control in the hands of an air
commander. 207 In his farewell speech on leaving the 8th Army he stated. "1 am also very
sad at parting from the Desert Air Force. This magnificent air striking force has fought
with the Eighth Army throughout the whole of its victorious progress~ every soldier in
this Anny is proud to acknowledge that the support of this strong and powerful air force
has been a battle-winning factor of the tirst importance.. ~208

No better judge of the effects of the Desert Air Force eould exist than the enemy
commander~ Field Marshal Rommel. "We learnt one important lesson during this
operation. a lesson whieh was to affect ail subsequent planning and. in faet. our entire
future conduet of the \var. This was that the possibilities of ground action. operational
and tacticaL becorne very limited if one's adversary eommands the air \\'ith a powerful air
209
toree:· Rommel had witnessed the effects of "incessant bomber attaeks··. had been
bombed by his own Stukas trying to escape British fighters and had \Nitnessed up close
the effects of what Galland ealled "Flying Shock Troops'~- the fighter-bornber.:!IO As the
Gennans gradually lost control of the skies throughout the war they would come to dread
the Allied Jagdbomber. or Jaho. For Rommel. when back in Europe. the fear of air
power- speci fically interdiction operations- would lead him to push for the concept of a
mobile reserve close to probable Allied landing sites.::! 11

• 71/127
• Chapter VII

1943: TORC" TO "USKYIBAYTOWN- BRiDGING T"E GAP TO OVERLORD

"Land power and air power are coequa/ and interdependentforces: neirher is an alL'tiliary ofthe other. ..

US War Department Manual 100-20

TORe": Creating an Allied Approach .0 Air Power

While operations continued in the desert against Rommel and his (talian cohorts.
the Allies launched operation TORCH into Vichy French Africa. On 8 November 1942.
the 1st Army commanded by the British General Kenneth Anderson went ashore in
Africa. The American Western Task Force under General Patton landed on the Atlantic
coast of Morocco. while the Centre Task Force sailing from Great Britain {General Lloyd
Frendenall} and the Eastern Task Force also from Britain (General Ryder) came ashore
in Aigeria at Oran and Aigiers. This landing of General Dwight Eisenhower" s force in
the Axis rear allowed the Allies to emplo)' the inexperienced American forces as weIl as
British forces deemed surplus as the threat of invasion to Great Britain had diminished..212
The battle of Africa- on two Fronts- would end in May 1943 with the destruction of the
greater part of the Italian Army and a defeat for the Gerrnans coming soon after their
stunning losses at Stalingrad. Il \vould be a difficult Allied victory.

For the allies. this campaign was one of deep acrimony over the use and role of
air power. During the initial stages of the campaign there was a complete breakdown of
113
air support to the ground forces. Commanders in French North Africa. both British
and American. had tàiled to draw on the experiences- or experienced leaders- of the
Western Desert where lessons in the use of air power had been so dearly bought. Despite
many senior American officers either visiting the Western Desert or actually servoing in
214
theatre. little use seems to have been made of their experience. As such. the
beginnings of the Allied effort were characterised by virulent bickering and sharp

•
disagreement ovec the use of air forces. There was poor co-operation between air and
ground commanders. between Allied commanders and between the RAF and USAAF.

721127
•
As this operation was American-dominated there were strong differences in opinion as to
the uses of air power- similar to earlier debates between the British Services. The
Americans pursued the system of ·penny-packets· that the British Anny had wanted in
Europe by pushing down air foonations to the Corps level. Further. commander and
soldier experience~ as witnessed by Rommers success against ill-trained American
divisions at the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia. exacerbated a difficult multi-Service. multi-
nation operation. The rapid expansion of the American forces and the lack of combat
experience of them and their British counterparts led to confusion and tactical
setbacks. 215 The haste with which TûRCH had been planned and mounted led to
problems of command structure. logistics and communications on the ground and in the
alr.

Quite clearly. the lessons learned in the desert- and the procedures worked out-
had not been disseminated weil enough to the forces preparing for TORCH in England
and the United States. In this new theatre. the use of air power was not centralised and
there was nothing similar to the partnership between airmen and soldiers as found in the
Western Desert. The air forces were seen as belonging to the ground forces such that a
unified and phased air effort. so successful in the desert. was not contemplated. 216 As the
historian of the Royal Air Force baldly understated~ ··The lessons which had been learned
in Egypt had not been assimilated sufficiently at home ta be applied immediately in
French North Africa:· 217 While the initial concept for TûRCH included an overall air
commander. Eisenhower accepted General Carl Spaatz's recommendation ta keep the
British and American air forces separate. By January 1943 it was abundantly clear that
the British Eastern Air Command of Air Marshal William Welsh and General J.H.
Doolittle's Twelfth Air Force needed centralised control. As such. Spaatz became the
218
Allied air commander with Air Marshal James Robb as his second-in-command.
Coningham- now an Air Marshal- along with Tedder arrived in Tunisia at the end of
January. Tedder became head of the large composite Allied air force knOMl as the
Mediterranean Air Commando with Spaatz head of the new Northwest Arrican Air
Forces. Coningham's speech in Tripoli, 16 February 1943, on the successes in the desert

• between the 8th Army and his Desert Air Force was undoubtedly designed to bolster the
need for co-operation and centralised air control by an air commander. In particular. his

731127
•
emphasis on the need for the ·specialisation~ of officers~ whether sailor~ soldier or aÏrman.
c1early was aimed at the American leadership that preferred an air force lied to the Anny.
""In plain language. no soldier is competent to operate the Air. just as no ainnan is
119
competent to operate the Anny.··-

With the arrivai of Tedder and Coningham- as weil as General Sir Harold
Alexander- from Egypt. the air plan assumed the characteristics of later operations in the
Western Desert. The establishment of unified and central air power. the introduction of
the tbree-phase approach to air support to the land battle and the use of the Air Support
Control system aIl led ta the rationalisation of air power in North Africa. However~ it was
a difficult and up-hill battle for Tedder~ despite strong support from Eisenhower. As one
observer in the desert stated. --Tedder told me that Anny-Air co-ordination had been far
from perfect in the North-African Theatre~ mainly because the campaign had not lasted
long enough for the lessons to be leamt- as they had been in the Western Desert:·220

Despite certain difficulties. particularly with Patton who felt that fighter-bombers
were nothing more than 'flying-tanks' meaning Anny control. there were cIear
accomplishments during TüRCH. 221 First. the RAF had managed to prevail- outside of
the limited theatre of the Western Oesert- in establishing a proven role for air forces in
aid of the ground forces. Air power could not be used in a narrow sense. Il needed to be
centralised to allow the air commander ta achieve tlexibility and it needed to be used in a
methodical manner: Defeat the enemy's air force. destroy his means of supply. then
destroy his combat forces. Secondly. the TûRCH campaign was the first real test of
Allied operations and co-operation. The efforts of Tedder and of Coningham in welding
together the British and American air forces were the tirst step to achieving cohesive
Allied commando Third. with ABied planning for a great cross-channel attack on
western Europe. the experiences of commanders in North Africa were crucial- when
coupled with future experiences in amphibious warfare in Italy- for the effective use of
air power in the lodgement. consolidation and support to the ground forces. The
preparations for such an invasion. and the gro\\'lh of theatre tactical air forces in
sophistication. led to the death of Army Co-operation Command in Great Britain and the

• creation of the Second Tactical Air

Anny Co-operation Command~
Force~ 1 January 1943. This putting down of the lame
and replacing it with the modem assets of Fighter

74/127
 Command and other Commands, cao be seen as the end result of a massive doctrinal shift
• based on the exigencies of war. ft was recognition that to support the ground forces it
was needed to provide a composite group of aircraft for direct support reconnaissance.
interdiction. air superiority and photography. After three years of conflict tactical air
power was accepted as a necessary form of air support not only in the overseas theatres
but also al home. Further. the experiences in the Western Desert and the pollination into
North Africa had convinced enough Americans that a similar system was the correct
approach to air support. From here on both the British and Americans would pursue the
perfection of air support but in differing ways that Brereton explained as the difference
between Santa Claus and Father Christmas. 222 As Eisenhower stated. "War is waged in
three elements but there is no separate land. air, or naval war. Unless a1l assets in aIl
elements are efficiently combined. their maximum potential power cannot be realised.. ·223
As preparations for what became OVERLORD increased. Eisenhower would continue on
to state that "'We had long ceased to refer to "air support of the ground forces' and
referred to our battles merely as ground-air·. ,,224

HUSKY and BAYTOWN: The ··Crucible" of Air Support.

Operation HUSKY. launched against Sicily 10 July 1943 was the beginning of the
Allied thrusts into the 'soft underbelly' of occupied Europe. Operation BAYTO\VN was
the British counterpart to the American AVALANCHE invasion of Italy commencing 3
and 9 September 1943 respective1y. The invasion of Sicily by Alexander's 15 th Army
Group was. in reality. the final clearance of the Axis from Africa and the securing of the
Mediterranean for the safe passage of Allied shipping. The Italian campaign was the first
step in relieving the Russians and the first direct attack on Nazi-controlled Europe. Each
campaign would see extensive air support to both the sea and land forces. Both
campaigns would highlight the trends and progression in tactical air power. both positive
and troubling. Il would also be the first test of Allied tactical air power against an enemy

• who possessed the advantage of better and shorter lines of communication.

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•
For HUSKY. Coningham's First Tactical Air Force (lTAF. as his composite
Allied taetical forces had been ealled since 18 February 1943) would deploy the Desert
Air Force under Broadhurst in support of Montgomery's 8 th Army and the Twelfth V.S.
Air Support Command with Patton's 7Ûl Army. Air Vice Marshal Sir Laurence Sinclair"s
Taetical Bomber Force would conduet bomber raids from ils North African bases using a
composite group of light and medium bombers. Prior to the aetual landings on the
southern coast of Sicily. the outlying Italian-held islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa
would be reduced and captured in order to act as forward air bases for the assault. and. to
minimise any interference to preparations for the invasion between Malta and Tunisia.

Pantelleria would be prepared for capture via a massive bombardment. including

the use the heavy bomber fleet (an indication alone of the built up of Allied resources).
This extraordinary ·over-kilr is interesting to note for several reasons relevant to air
support. Firs!. it acts as a signpost in the ·scientific" progression of warfare. A scientist.
Solly Zuckerman. who had investigated the effects of blast and weapon effects. designed
in large measure this preparatory assault. By using data from an experimental attack on
the Channel Island of Alderney, and from observations in the desert Zuckennan arrived
at a plan for suppressing the island's defences. He appears to have had an influence on
the certain air commanders. although Broadhurst and Coningham didn"t like him. 225

Operation CORKSCREW against Pantelleria highlights both a positive and a

negative. 226 On the positive side. the Allies were serious about operational research and
the measured cffects of weaponry against targets. Experiments with ammunition. \vith
rocket projectiles. bombs and their damage potential became increasingly important as
teehnology was applied to warfare. Further. Pantelleria was also a data gathering
exercise for what would become the Transportation. or Zuckennan Plan in Viestem
Europe- the interdiction of the enemy by massive attacks to disrupt his communication
system infrastructure (road and rail). On the negative side~ this use of the 'strategic'
bomber force demonstrated the inappropriate use of heavy bombers to support immediate
ground operations. Bombers had been used for a creeping barrage in Tunisia and would
be used again at Monte Cassino in (taly and at Caen in Nonnandy.227 White it possessed

• a marked effect on Allied morale to see sticks of bombs streaming down. it was a
fundamental misuse of strategie forces. It was an early indication of the troublesome

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Army "delusion" over air power and was tied into the same type of idea as with the air
umbrella- it was comforting to see. 228 Further. it led sorne exponents of air power to
believe that no ground formation or fortification could withstand continuous air
229
assauIt. However. as the tortuous Allied slog up Italy. and the determined German
resistance without the benefit of air support witnessed, air power was not a panacea.

As operations in the desert- east and west- had proved, the capture and use of
forward airfields was critical to the provision of tactical air support.. particularly by
single-seater models with a limited range or endurance. Even with Pantelleria..
Lampedusa and Malta in Allied possession.. the distances meant a need for the early
capture of landing grounds if momentum was to be retained. The choice of landing sites
in Sicily was in part predicated on the need for fighter coverage. the presence of suitable
airfields and the dangers of using aircraft carriers too near to hostile shores. 23o However.
HUSKY witnessed a tussle over airfields. Perhaps iIIustrating his increasingly poor
relations with Coningham.. Montgomery diverged from the necessity to capture and
operate airfields at the earliest possible date. Both Tedder and Admirai Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. supported the usual programme and
Alexander agreed. "'This now became Air Force doctrine.. and even so seemingly air-
minded a generaI as Montgomery found its implications hard to accept. ,,231 Operations
during BAYTOWN into the boot of Italy would again highlight the need tor airfields
close the battlefield in order to receive timely and etfective support. This Iesson would
be Ieamed and used in Normandy with the early establishment of Advanced Landing
Grounds for re-fuelling and would spark a great debate over Montgomery's conduct of
the battle and his inability to secure suitable Ianding grounds in Nonnandy.

In general. HUSKY and BA YTOWN operations witnessed a perfecting of the

now established system of air support. With almost complete air superiority a further
twist on the old plan was added by concentrating on the enemy's means of transport.
particularly the bridges. railways and marshalling yards that were missing in the African
campaigns. ·'The HUSKY plan exhibited in even more pertèct form than in the Tunisian
campaign the tour merging phases of air action: to neutralise the enemy air force. to

• destroy his communications. to isolate the expected battlefield and to give direct support

771127
•
to ground forces:~232 Air Superiority could no better be witnessed that during the actual
landing phases of HUSKY and BAYTOWN. 233

For the landings in Sicily~ the Allies put ashore 160..000 troops in the first \vave as
weil as 600 tanks, 14~000 vehicles and 2~000 guns. The invasion flotilla numbered sorne
2.600 vessels of ail sizes. 4300 aircrafi were involved in the initial bombing campaign
and for convoy protection.. direct support.. air-sea rescue.. reconnaissance and artillery
spotting. The use of 113 RAF squadrons and 146 American squadrons indicated the vast
nature of Allied air superiority and the diminished nature of the Luftwaffe and Regia
On D-Day~ Lujijlolte Il was down to 430 serviceable aircraft. including
234
Aeronautica.
only 250 fighters. 235 In the entire Mediterranean theatre the Axis at the time only
possessed 2374 aircraft ofwhich only 1276 were serviceable. 236 Kesselring admitted the
Luftwaffe 's inability ta intervene due to losses of aircraft and pilots in Africa and Russia
and that.. increasingly. the Luftwaffe was facing the same type of criticism from the anny
that the RAF had faced earlier in the war. 237 During the landings the ouly losses of large
ships to enemy action were the American destroyer USS Afaddox. a landing ship and the
British hospital ship Talamba. 238 Not only had the air forces provided significant and
disparate support to the land and naval forces it had done sa in a much more sophisticated
and rationalised way than al Dieppe. The Allied had created an air-naval version of the
air support system using headquarters ships for each sector and Fighter Direction Ships
tor the control of the beaches and their approaches. The same system would be used tor
üVERLüRO. Unmistakably as air support took root it was becorning increasingly
sophisticated in its operations and methods: The Allied air forces had c1early achieved the
first necessary step in air support. Their destruction of the enemy air forces in the air and
on their fields in Sicily and in Italy allowed the Allies a clear hand on the ground without
aerial interference.

Suffice to say that air power in both Sicily and in Italy was reasonably unitied and
centralised as could be expected during Aliied operations in rugged and mountainous
country. Further. the air plan ofprogressively wearing down the enemy's air forces. Hnes
of communication and supply were followed quite closely. including air assaults on rail

• marshalling years. key road networks and bridges. However. it was in applied direct

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 support that the later campaigns in Italy made this theatre the "crucible~~ of direct air
• support. 239

Impressive as the size and sophistication of the AIIied air efforts in Italy were~ it
was the great strides made in streamlining close air support that are of chief interest.
While the whole system of air support had made great leaps. in ItaJy the air support
control system was greatly improved in terms of communications~ tacties. weaponry.
response time and co-ordination: these operations highlight the vast rejinemenl of details.
A snapshot of the increased importance. sophistication and impact of tactical air power
can be found in "Tactical Bulletin No.36. Taclics of/he Desert Ai,. Force' commenting on
operations in support of Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese~s 8(h Army.:!40 Produced
and distributed in the spring of 1944. this bulletin outlines the specifie and multifarious
tactics to date of the Desert Air force. As tactical air forces had become large. complex
and composite organisations this report reviews in detail the methods of employment of
fighters. fighter-bombers. tactical reconnaissance aircraft. light bombers and night
fighters.

The key improvements were in weaponry and in communications. By late 1943

and early 1944 the OAf were operating the P-40N Kittyhawk as the mainstay of the
fighter-bomber fleet and were in the process of converting the interceptors into fighter-
bombers. --The present intention is to convert ail Spitfires VIHs and lXs into
fighterfbombers. and if the present Iight scale of opposition continues they will probably
be employed on the basis of three squadrons as tighter/bombers to one squadron as pure
tighters.~·2"1 The "'outstanding developmenf' was the use of the Kittyhawk (Mk IV) with
a rather massive bomb toad of 2,000 pounds slung under the belly (1000 pounds) and
under the wings (two 500-pound bombs). No escorting fighters were used considering
the state of air superiority. although the modified Kittyhawk must have been painfully
slow. Experienced pilots were also using the Kittyhawk as a dive-bomber with "excellent
results". The standard practice was for Kittyhawk pilots to commence their attack from
7.000 feet and release the bomb load at around 3.000 feet. ""If flak is intense they
continue the dive to ground Ievel and makc a slow jinking exit. It is customary also for
• pilots to tire their guns in short bursts during the dive as this deters the A.A. gunners and
causes damage to the target at the same time."

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•
One innovation in during operations in Italy by the Desert Air Force "worth study
and possible development for wider application" was a system of "path-finding" by
fighter-bombers. In effect, the lead aircraft of a flight would drop a bomb on a target.
The pilot would then adjust the subsequent attacks based on the position of his strike.
This technique, it was stated., had ··paid a high dividend" and would be greatly assisted by
the development of a smoke or smoke and flash bomb for ease of spotting. 242

Operational experience had shown, however, that machine guns and cannon were
more effective against vehicles than bombing, although ground "straffing" was avoided
in heavy flak areas as it was ""expensive" in aircraft. The bulletin stated that. "The
effectiveness of bombing compared with straffing of scattered M.T. is shown by the
following figures. During a period of nine days this month 118 tons of bombs were
dropped on M.T., resulting in 30 destroyed and 9 damaged. During the same period and
a similar number of attacks by straffing. 62 M.T. were destroyed and 26 damaged.. ,2·B As
a memorandum issued a week after Bulletin IVo.36 stated. ··It is generally true to say that
attacks on roads themselves are only profitable at bottlenecks. such as in villages, when
the resultant temporary barrier may create usefuI targets in the torro of a block of
vehicles. On the other hand the destruction of M.T. vehicles using the roads is an
essential supplement to action against rail communications... We have conclusive
evidence that fighter-bombers by day with cannon and bombs...can impose a rate of
wastage by destruction and damage of M.T. vehicles that is a factor of real importance in
any offensive against communications..·2014

However. Wing Leaders and Squadron Leaders deemed ground-to-ground firing

skills by pilots to be poor and feft that more emphasis should be placed on ground attack
training versus air-to-air training at the Operational Training Units (O.T.U·s). Before
arriving at their squadrons pilots received nineteen hours of gunnery of which only five
hours was dedicated to ground attack training. "Bearing in mind that 80-90% of the
fighter's role is spent on aIl forms of ground attack in both Tactical Air Forces as distinct
from air to air fighting and that as this proportion of the air effort is likely to increase
rather than decrease. it is difficult to reconcile these facts with the present Syllabus:,2-15

• However, even as late of April 1944 no fundamentai changes had been made to the
training. In a report titled 'Survey of Fighrer o. T. U. Training' it was stated that "no

801127
•
fundamental change in the training is ealled for at this time. but there is ample room for
considerable improvement and progress as to detail.·,246 Remarkably. by the time of
Normandy. the pilots in the Mediterranean would be eonsidered the ones 'experieneed' in
fighter-bomber operations.

Although a later development in the Italian carnpaign~ it is interesting to note

perhaps the tirst use of 'Fuel Tank Incendiary Bombs', also known as Napalm. in the
247
western theatre. Developed by the Amerieans in the Pacifie theatre and called the
'Blitz' this adaptation of the standard long-range jettisonable fuel-tanks into bombs was
deemed to be quite useful in reducing enemy positions while the need for aceuraey was
off-set by the considerable spread of burning fuel. ft was noted to have a particularly
impressive psyehologieal effeet on both friendly and enemy forces. "Ground
eommanders agree that a marked lowering of the enemy's morale is apparent when
subjected to this type of attaek.!,248

The Air Support Control admixture had been substantially refined since the desert
in the autumn of 1942. Better communication links, better liaison and improved cohesion
led to better ground support. The initial system of air control hubs and forward and rear
links to control or co-ordinate pre-planned or requested missions had made great strides.
Demonstrating the inter-Iocking nature of air-ground operations, the achievement of air
superiority ailowed small groups of aircraft to circle the batlle zone in "Cab Ranks"
waiting for request or targets of opportunity. These "Rover" operations. known as Rover
"David" or '·Paddy"' to the British and Rover "Joe" to the Americans. involved aircraft
arriving over a particular area of the battletield at intervals of approximately 30 minutes
and- as an innovation on the desert system- controlled from the ground by mobile control
24Q
postS. The pilots received detailed briefings by liaison officers prior to departure where
..the use of photographs tor briefing purposes was being used more and more" and was
"infinitely preferable to maps:~250 On arrivaI at an assigned location the pilots would fly
a 'race-track' pattern and wait for "Rover" to caH for support. If no request from the
ground had occurred after 15-20 minutes. the pilot shifted his attention to either a pre-
selected target or one of opportunity. 2.51 As the bulletin laid out in great detail:

• "A development of the Rover Control, known as ··Rover David" was

successfully employed in the Sangro banle. This consisted of a RAf controller with

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•
VHF control to the fighterlbombers. This controller was situated in an O.P. (Observation
Post) only a few yards away from the Corps Commander. The a.p. was such that it
overlaoked the whole valley in which the battle was taking place.

A tlight of six Kittybombers was sent up at intervals to orbit a previously

detennined point that was c1early marked on the ground with smoke and a letter. This
point was not far from the a.p. so that the aircraft could be seen or orbit by the controller.
The pilots had specially gridded maps which enabled the fighter controller to give them
an area accurate to within one mile in which the target was located. The aircraft were
told ta orbit tor fifteen minutes and if after this time the Corps Commander had no
specifie target he wanted attacked. then the fighterlbombers went for their alternative
target.

It happened frequently that the Army required specifie targets attacked where
they were being held up. and the RAF controller. having an excellent view of the
battlefield. couId describe the target in considerable detail and by this means he led the
tlghterlbombers into sorne successful and accurate bombing attacks:·2.5:!

Rover "Frank" was a further form of air support that had developed during the
campaigns in Italy. Considering the rugged and mountainous terrain~ the difficulty to
advance and the ability of the Wehrmacht to camoutlage areas and points. the use of
Rover '''Frank'· proved highly successful in the spotting of enemy locations~ the directing
of friendly counter-battery fire or in adjusting attacks called down by an Artillery
Counter-Battery Officer (CBO). 'Tactical Bulletin No. -13' on artillery reconnaissance
during operations in the Liri Valley highlighted the "tremendous value which can be
obtained From Artillery Reconnaissance when the maximum advantage is taken of an
exceptionally favourable situation in the air.,,253 Aircraft provided significant aid to the
ground by looking for "guns firing in any particular sector" or "good concentrations of
M.T. or tanks. or any good opportunity targets to be engaged at the discretion of the
guns:~25" Iwo examples of Rover --Frank" display the increased and effective interaction
between the air and the ground and between differing RAF tactical elements. [n tenus of
acting as an airbome controller for Rover '·David", the reconnaissance flights proved
quite effective. "Close co-operation existed between the ArtylR {Artillery

• Reconnaissance} pilot and the fighter bombers through the medium of the ground VHF

82/127
 set and Rover Tentacle. In one case aircraft attacked a target within five minutes of the
• flash being sent down by the Arty/R pilot. In this case.. the fighter bombers were in the
air at the time~ and were diverted ooto the target in question by the Tentacle.,~255 And, in
tenns of co-ordinating joint attacks~ the bulletin gave the following example: "A pilot
observed six tanks and four M.T. tum into wood (sic). He started to range onto them but
the target bolted from cover and departed up the road at speed. The pilot treated them as
a "Gunfire' target and put his rounds down in front of the moving convoy. The whole lot
swung round and went back to coyer in the original wood.. whereupon the guns got a
good concentration onto the area. causing severaI flamers:,256 Interestingly enough.
another memorandum of the day felt that fighter-bombers should concentrate on rear area
operations and not attack point targets in the battle zone." As a general rule. they should
not be used against gun positions. strong points or fighting troops on the hattlefield which
can be engaged by artillery.,,257

As such, having achieving air superiority. having grown accustomed to combined

operations and by having improved the communication and weaponry tools. the RAF had
nearly perfected the system of ground support. Pilot experience. controller experience.
anti-aircraft concentrations. weather. terrain and target type could and did affect the
success of specifie operations; however.. by the time of the main push. OVERLORD. the
RAF- and the Army- had resolved ail the key issues associated with the provision of
direct support. Operations in Sicily and Italy displayed in the inter-Iocking nature of the
battletield and the disparate air resourees that could be committed to aid the ground
forces. Fighters. fighter-bombers. light bombers- and even the heavy bomber- had ail
been used as part of the merged and phased system of air support. Operations in
Normandy would demonstrate the scale to which tactical air power had gro\\n.
Returning to France four years afters the weak and disorganised Expeditionary Force and
Air Component had been forced to withdraw would he the 21 st Anny Group with a
tactical air force in support.

• 83/127
• Cbapter VIII

CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK: AIR SUPPORT IN NORMANDY

Operations NEPTUNE and QVERLORD have received extensive scrutiny by

commanders_ participants and historians. Terry Copp of Sir Wilfrid Laurier University.
the late Robert Vogel of McGill University and such historians as John Terraineo
Brereton Greenhous_ Richard Hallion and Michael Bechtold have dealt in sorne detail
with aspects of the air campaign in Normandy. The enormity of the entire effort the
immense resources applied and the implications of success or tàilure has meant that the
operations in Normandy have received keen focus. Arguments as to the efticacy of close
support whether morale or destructiveness. indicate that the topic has sorne interest for
historians. Terraine and Greenhous are proponents of the decisiveness of tactical air
power in Nonnandy while others such as Copp and Bechtold see tactical air support as
258
being a significant but not decisive factor to success. As both the Second Tactical Air
Force and the Anny deployed their OWTI °Operational Researcho teams to assess the
efficacy of operations- each with their own goals- the debate cao also be split between the
Anny and the RAF. 259 Perhaps the availability of documentation for Nonnandy_ unlike
earlier operations_ has allo\ved students of histor)' to concentrate on the etforts of the
Second Tactical Air Force and the American Ninth Tactical Air Force during operations
such as TOTALIZE and SPRING. or of Bomber Command in operations near Caen. such
as CHARNWOOD or GOODWOOD. Regardless of this debate. any study of the
progression of RAF tactical air power must include the pinnacle of operations-
Normandy. Perhaps ·decisiveo. maybe ·crucial"_ nonetheless the use of tactical air power
in Nonnandy was more significant than in any previous carnpaign. [f the daims against
annoured forces were over-blo\\'TI_ the tactical air torces had a tremendous effect on
battlefield morale and were a key element in denying the enemy mobility into. or on. the
battlefield.

• 84/127
 • Command Relationships-
OVERLORD
•
Combined
Chiefs of Staff

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Foree

1 1
U.S. Strategie Allicd Expeditional1' Royal Allied Naval 21st ArnlY
Air Forces Air Force Air Force Expeditionary (;roup
Force

1
~ l 1 1

ItOth AF 1 lSth AF 1 Western Task Eastern Task

1 l Foree (US) Force (UK)
IX TAC 2TAF
(lJS) (lIK)
1 1
1
Coastal Air Defenee of Ist (CUN) 2nd (IIK)
Command Great Dritain
Army Army
Command

Bomber
Command

From: Historical Data Research on air interdiction, A report

•
Air Support in Normand!: Sue and Scope

The air campaign in support of the invasion of France was one of the most
complex. integrated and layered operations of the war. Benefiting from the experiences
of JUBILEE. CRUSADER. TORCH and HUSKY~ it harnessed the assets of the tactical
air forces~ the aircraft of various other Commands as weil as scientists and intelligence
agencies. It made use of ail types of bombers as weil as fighters and fighter-bombers to
create the necessary conditions for invasion and support as detailed in the Graham
Report. This report investigated "1:he problem of how to make the best use of ail the fire
power from Allied Naval and Air Forces that would be available to assist the assault on
the coast.~~260 Following the established and phased doctrine for air support- though on a
much larger scale- the Allied air forces would gain air superiority. disrupt the Gennan
lines of communication. assist the Annies in coming ashore and then provide direct
support to the battlefield.26 1 Further. in order to provide timely and effective support.
Advanced Landing Grounds in the Nonnandy area would be deployed in the beachhead
as soon as the Annies had secured sufficient and suitable ground. 262 As Eisenhower
described the Nonnandy air operations.. "The air plan. already in execution. called for the
progressive wearing down of the Luftwaffe and the destruction of critical points in the rail
and highway systems so as to isolate the coastal areas selected for the assault. For D-Day
the air forces were charged with the responsibility of demolishing selected targets in the
enemy's coastal defences. of providing overhead coyer and rendering general tighter-
bomber support as the troops progressed inland....263

Air Superiority l'rom late 1943 onwards was virtually complete as the Lujiwajjè's
losses on the Eastern Front and in the west precluded anything but isolated and infrequent
local air action. On D-Day. over the British sector. only 36 Luftwaffe aircraft were
observed. 2M "Nothing much had been seen of the GAF untiI the middle of the day and
the Allied Air Commanders were greatly puzzled by its non-appearance ... The Typhoons
helped to a partial solution of the mystery. As they penetrated inland behind Caen they
contacted enemy fighters... Enemy fighters were apparently being used to escort road
• convoys weil behind the battle:·265

85/127
• Army-Air Force RelatioDships-
Normandy
•
SHAEF
1
Air Sta"

1 ---···------·---------1--------1-----...------------,
\9AF 1 • • !12AGI ,IITAFI .... 16AG 1 12TAFI .... ~

jïX TAS'" .1 181 (US) 1 , IXII TACI ... .j7lh (US)I 183 GPI'" • pnd(UK)1

1XIX TACj... .13rd (Us)1 fI(F;)l

L:rÀi..J ... .:1 181 (Fr) 1 184 GP 1... .1 181 (Cdn) 1 .

§'IX TACI... ~91h (US)I 142 Wingl i~

!

Legend:
AF- Air Force
1
9BD 1
TAC- Tactical Air Command ~4 Wing!
BD- Bombardment Group
AG- Army Group
Fr- French
Cdn- Canadian Liaison/Coordination ~ ~
GP- RAF Group Air Chain of Command
WG- RAF Wing Land Chain of Command
•
In terms of sorties as an indication of air superiority. between 6 June and the end
of the month the Allied air forces flew 130.000 sorties in support of OVERLORD
compared to Lufiflotte nrs 14,,000 in aid of the Wehrmachl. 266 During the preparatory
phase" commencing at D-day minus 60. the Allied air forces conducted interdiction
operations against key rail centres as part of the Transportation or Rail Plan. 267 Using the
heavy bomber forces to cause massive disruptions in the French rail system. especially by
destroying marshalling yards" was the first step in preventing reinforcement of the
beachhead. particularly in the crucial first days of an invasion. Despite many in the
'bomber clique' seeing these operations as a misuse of resources" the use of the heavy
bomber in this 'strategic interdiction' role was both effective and judicious. At D-46. in
order to isolate the battlefield further. ail major bridges or roads leading into the
Normandy area were attacked by light bombers and by rocket firing Typhoons and
268
similar aircraft. [n particular" the Seine-Eure-Loire bridges were targeted. Gone were
the days of the Fairey Battle and Bristol Blenheim pilots sacrificing themselves in futile
attacks with poor or inadequate resources. In a display of the wealth of assets by the
Allies, the road and rail systems in the Calais area were similarly targeted as part of the
larger deception plan to conceal the actuallanding sites. Commencing at approximately
D-20. the German airfields within the radius of the beachhead were systematically and
continually pummelled to ensure that even the diminished Luftwafjè would have neither
the resources nor the stomach to take to the air. 269 For the actual cross-channel attack. the
AIIied air forces would utilise 171 squadrons of differing aircraft for air superiority
missions. convo)' protection. beach cover. the suppression of immediate fortifications and
local area interdiction. 270 As such. for OVERLORD the Supreme Allied Commander.
Eisenhower. had extensive air resources ta aid in the preparation. lodgement.
consolidation and breakout from the Normandy beaches.

For the invasion. Air Support stood on firm doctrinal ground: The experiences of
Africa and the Mediterranean had led to the codification of tactical air support based on
baule conditions. Despite the clashes between Tedder and Montgomery. Montgomery
and Coningham and Coningham and Leigh-Mallory on the use and emphasis of tactical

• air power (particularly with Montgomery over the early capture of airfields) il was
nonetheless a central part of ail planning considerations. 271 The underpinnings for the co-

861127
•
operation between the RAF and the ARMY were encapsulated in two manuals published
in 1944: "ArmylAil' Operations (No. 1) General Princip/es and Organization (1944)' and
·ArmylAir Opera/ions (No.2) Direct Support'. Later. in Holland. Montgomery would
also produce the pamphlet ·2 r' Army Group 'Sorne Notes on the Use of Air Power in
Support ofLand Operations and Direct Support'. These manuals were the direct result of
Coningham and Montgomery's experiences in the development and use of tacticaJ air
power. They described the principles or framework for co-operation as weil as the actual
methods of control and support: They were the road map tor air support to the land banle.
Montgomery wrote to Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey (2 nd Army) in May 1944 on
his concerns over the Army/RAF relationship for the upcoming campaign. (A
relationship that he would promptly fracture in Normandy). Echoing the inleol of the
manuals~ he stated that:

"From my own experiences ( am convinced that the following points are

important if real unity is to be achieved between an Army and its supporting Air Force or
Group:

(a) The two HO. Army and Air. must be side by side or adjacent.

(b) Army HQ may on occasions throw otT a Tac HQ: but Main Anny must always be
with Air HQ;

(c) Army HQ must never plan a move of HQ without first consulting Air HO. The
deciding factor in the location of Main Army will be whether it suits Air HQ.
There must be give and take on both sides: but the Anny staff must realise that
Air HO requires to have telephone communication to airfields. and this is often
the ruling factor in the location ofthese combined HQ.

(d) 8efore the Army staff initiates or takes action the first question must al ways be:
"How will th is afTect the air?".:!;.:!

In terms of the developrnent of tactical air power lhese documents are chiefly of
interest in that they display the progression and acceptance of air support in its known
forro by both Air and Land Commanders. They demonstrate the degree to which the
relalionship between the Anny and the RAF- both at the command leve1 and at the
forward edge of battle- had becorne formalised 'ArmylAir Operations (No.}) General

• Princip/es and Organisation' is a snapshot of the system of air support- so new in the
desert- and the accepted methods of co-operation and operation. Il possesses a detailed

87/l27
•
glossary of tenns used by each Service. describes the necessary relationships. the
composition of requisite organisations. administrative considerations and the
characteristics of air action. Considering the state of air support in early in the war. it is
interesting to look at the component parts of the actual system in Nonnandy to see the
progression of air support doctrine.

2TAF: Tbe Air Support System in Normandy

"They were the Lost Tribe ofrhe Air Force." Captain Charles Scot-Brown. CD.

The main air force dedicated to the support of the land forces was the sprawling
Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Grouped within Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-
Mallory's Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) were Coningham's Second Tactical
Air Force (2TAF) and the Ninth Tactical Air Force (IX TAC) under General Elwood
-Pete' Quesada and Air Marshal Roderic Hill"s re-named Fighter Command (Air Defence
of Great Britain). Further. as part of the slippery slope of injudicious use of air power
(outside of the Transportation Plan). Eisenhower would also receive support trom the
strategie forces of Bomber Command and the V.S. Eighth Air Force. l73 Under the now
understood system of joint commando 2TAF would he paired with Montgomery's 21 st
Anny Group while IX TAC would support the Americans. Further. Coningham would
command an Advanced Allied Expeditionary Air Force Headquarters to match the
advanced Army headquarters under Montgomery.

The Second Tactical Air Force. consisting of over 2000 aircraft and one hundred
squadrons. was the child of the Desert Air Force and the unlamented Anny Co-operation
Commando It was a composite and highly mobile force comprising several Groups. each
possessing a variety of aircrafi models. hs component parts were grouped by function
and not type of aircraft as one found in Fighter or Bomber Commando No.83 Group
under Broadhurst \\'ould be paired with Dempsey~s 20d Army while Air Marshal Brown's
mixed nationaJity No.84 Group would support the 1st Canadian Army. Other Groups

• would provide reconnaissance or light bomber support. 2TAF would operate both on
both a pre-planned and impromptu basis in support of 21 st Army Group. While

881127
•
acknowledging the disparate nature of a tactical air force, it is the ground attack mode
and tools that are of interest here.

\2TAFHQ 1
1

1 1 1 1

No. 2 No. 83 No. 84 No.8S

(Bomber)Gp (Composite) Gp (Composite) Gp (Base) Gp

The Component Parts: The Air Support Control System

The command and control system for the support of the land battle was based on
the system developed in the desert and in ltaly.274 It centred on communication hubs with
'tentacles' in the field or deployed with forward elements of the annies. Again, as with
the desert and Italy, decisions on the use of air power rested with the air commander
situated at a co..located headquarters; however, again as with earHer operations, the air
commander would work with his opposite to establish and prioritise missions. The heart
of this system of bringing tire to bear was a radio network solely designed and dedicated
for ground support. [t was both described and charted in the relevant manuals and weil as
tactical bulletins. 275

For air operations, the RAF Group Headquarters wouJd establish itself with, or
Dear, the Anny Headquarters. The control hub at No.83 and No.84 Group was a Group
Control Centre (GeC). The GCe was responsible for the direct control of air support. It
was not necessarily co·located or near the Army as it was a pure RAF control centre.
Through links with the airfields (at first in southem England and later on the continent)
and Advanced Landing Grounds, the GeC would assign resources to missions, both pre-
planned and impromptu. For Coningham, one the critical aspects for the location of any
• air headquarters was access to land communications. "1 consider that the provision of
speech and teleprinter communications for command and control within Groups of a

89/127
 • Conventional Layout of a Composite Group
Forming Part of a Tactical Air Force
•
- Ammunhion - Mobile &
- Servicing Commandos Anti-Aircraft Squadrons
- MT Repair Units - Deployed aeeording to
- Repair and Salvage the taetical situation
- Field Hospital
- etc
- Deployed to eonfonn to
Anny Logistieal Layout

- Dispersed Airfields

AIso aels as a
Forward Fighter
Director Post

Appendix "D" to Army/Air Operations (No.l) General Prindples & Organization. War Ornce, 1944
 Tactical Air Force and between the Headquarters of the Tactical Air Force and its
• formations under command is a vital necessity at aIl times. even during highly mobile
condition. ,,176

At the opposite or "sharp end· of the control system were the "tentacles' manned
by the Air Support Signais Units (ASSU). The
tentacle was. in reality, a small team positioned
in either a static position of observation or
vehicle-mounted. A junior Army officer.
typically a captain., with a team of signaIlers
and radios. commanded each tentacle. These
officers were Air Liaison Officers (ALO), first
used in action in the Western Desert during CRUSADER. The ALü would liase with his
assigned unit and advise the ground commander upon the use and effects of taetical air
power. The ALO. as a critical funetion. would also aet as the relay using the ASSU net
between the forward commander and the rear headquarters for requests for support. As
with earlier operations. by relaying the requests directly to the senior headquarters.
critical time would be saved. as intermediate headquarters (Sattalion! Regiment! Brigade/
Division) were by-passed. Further. as the request went directly to the controlling
headquarters. the air commander could take advantage of flexibility and centralised
control to assign assets. This ASSU tentacle. usually in a light scout car. was the "basic"
version of air support. Il was a requesting agency and did not have the communications
equipment to contact brief or direct aircraft either en route from an airfield or in a "cab-
rank',

There were several variations on the basic ASSU tentacle chietly. the FOf\vard
Control Post (Fep), the Visual Control Post (VCP) and the Contact Car. The FCP.
developed after operations at Caen. Falaise and the Scheldt. had greater resources than a
normal ASSU tentacle and was designed to focus and direct larger assets onto a critical
sector al a critical time. ft would normally not 'see' the enemy but was a system
designed to control the work of several ASSU tentacles. Allocated on the basis of one for

• each Army and RAF Group il had the ability to not only request air support like an ASSU
tentacle but it also possessed the necessary VHF radio links to communicate directly with

90/127
•
strike aircraft. The FCP used several vehicles. including a 3-ton wireless "R" vehicle.. for
command and control.277

The Visual Control Posts were a nonnal ASSU tentacle with one great ditTerence:
a VCP also had a RAF pilot who could.. through the VHF radio" communicate with the
overhead aircraft using a common "Service language". 80th the pilot in the air and the
controller had the same gridded map~ varying from in scaJe from 1:25.000 for in close
work or 1: 100,,000 for ease of reference. 278 Normally these RAF pilots were assigned to
a VCP as a "resf from air operations; however.. it proved a decidedly dangerous
279
occupation. Like the ASSU tentacle., the vep was to ""operate in the forward areas
from a point of vantage., so that targets could actually be seen and aircraft directed
visually.280 There were two variants of the VCP. The ""Type A'" VCP was housed in a
half-tracked White Scout Car (M.3) with ""a low power groundJAir VHF RIT station"". A
crew ofseven was typical for this type ofVCP.

A further development. for use with armoured units" was the ""Type B'· VCP
contained in a Sherman "'Command'" tame Initially requested for use after a month's
experiences in Nonnandy" the
281
original version was a nonnal Cali for Close Support- VCP Example

Sherman tank; however" as there From Anny Unit: ·'Tentacle. Tentaclc, Tentacle... Targe~
Targe~ Target.
Strongpoint at A-12345678"
was insufficient room. the
(Tentacle moves into a good observation/co-ordination
'·Command version without its position and prepares report for rearward transmission.)

75mm gun and machine guns" From VCP: "83 GCe, this is _ , Mission. over."
was used. The vep was an
....Strongpoint surrounded by wire at A-12345678. one pillbox
innovation introduced part way near center. Three MG in SE corner of position."

through the campalgn In .... Bomb-line 500 yards south of A-12345678. Troops
sheltered in prominent square-shaped wood. No yellow
Normandy in response to baule panel.'~

conditions. ""lt is important for it . . Target to be marked with red smoke. No smoke. no anack:~
to be a fully annoured vehicle
'''Plcase advise, over."
since otherwise il IS very
vulnerable and becomes an embarrassment to the formation with which il is

• operating:·282 The cre\vs for each vehicle included a controller (RAF), an ALü and a
wireless/mechanic and a driver. 283 A VCP could either cali for air for air support via the

91/127
 • F.C.P and Contact Car Communications-
Normandy Campaign (RAF)
•
.... _ ·,.1"_ ~

1- - - •. ~ .r- - - -- -.- - _. .-.

~
1
Bde~
Command Spare 1
Net 1 1
1
1 l "'" 1 ~ontrolll143 1 1

1I11III
~orward~--------
Tol/2 _ ,1 i 1

lm ", ;" o!JJ, :

Ode
RCVRS 1
~ \ ~ (Ifrequlred) 1 ," 9.9.933 1

Cor ~
1
\ / Div
~ ~ : 9 ,/
~
r
1
"A.S.S.U.
Fonvard Links ~

1 ..•. _. -.- -- -
---?----_:---ï ~.
r
1 ~~~
.. .."
J
" 33
1
.. ," t i: 1!
1
r;-l 1 Canadlan
, A.S.S.U
1
t
____ i
,
1 ~ C9Set
C.n.dl.n
1 Control ..--;;:l
~
C9 Sel ",Uh
1 ;,' : 1 RIe ~ Flick Freq RIT
1

:~~ rn~
-t~-I\-
/'

:rn ,,_ ... -.....

G.C.C.

û Hlgh Power
Rff

Source: DHUIAir 371332: Coningbam Report 1945

Rear Links
 Gec

•
or take advanlage of cab-rank aircraft. In order to receive the best possible
suppon~ il was imperative lhat a proper map reference and as much detailed information
as possible was passed back to the airfield or to the cab-rank. Key considerations were a
detailed description of the target. infonnation on friendly troops in the vicinity of the
target and the availability of attack aids such as smoke or ground indicator panels.
Coningham noted that the limitation with the VCP system was the amount of territory a
controller could effectively see~making this type of control useful only on a narrow front
and usetùl only when the vep was certain of the location of flanking units. 284

The Contact Car tentacle operated in the same manner as an ASSU tentacle with
one difference- it was completely manned by RAF personnel. Contact Cars- initially the
wheeled version of the White Scout Car but later using Jeeps, "Ducks' and Sherman
tanks- were normally manned by pilots with reconnaissance experience who could use
the vehicle's VHF radio to contact overhead aircraft. However. the aim of the Contact
Car was not to direct air missions~
although it possessed that capability. but to keep the
RAF in a particular sector apprised of the location of the Anny ~ s forward elements. 285 Il
was a control method to avoid or limit the not uncommon friendly-on-friendly tire in both
directions. Lieutenant General Horrocks. commander of XXX Corps~ \vitnessed several
serious incidents of inadvenent attacks on friendly forces. ""This was an especially
serious problem in the close and rugged countryside... where map reading proved very
difficult at speeds of 200-300 mph. The airman's task was complicated by misleading
and erroneous reports of the precise location of Allied troops who often either v/ere
uncenain of their whereabouts or found themselves sandwiched between German
tormations:'286 However. even with proper tools and control measures in place accidents
did occur. For example. during operations in Normandy a yello\v panel on the ground
marked a ground unit"s location- for RAF Bomber Command it was a bomb-aiming
marker. 287

The last link in the chain \-vas the strike aircraft painted in its unique two black
and three white recognition bands. 288 Early operations in the desert. as with No.6 Anti-
Tank Squadron. had focused on the squadron level. In line with Coningham and

• Elmhirsfs shift to greater formations, tactical air now centred on a collection of

squadrons known as a Wing. The greater centralisation allowed for improved response

921127
•
time and allowed resources to be applied al critical junctures. Wings were typically
located at a single airfield or a collection of nearby airfields. Wings comprised a
composite collection of aircraft thus adding to both flexibility and servicing concems.
Wings could have air superiority fighters (Spitfires). Typhoons armed with rocket
projectiles (RP) or Typhoons armed with bombs. At each airtield there was an Army
ALO who would monitor the ASSU network. keep abreast of Anny operations via the
Anny communications system and continuously brief the pilots up to takeoff. 289 Further.
with the advantage of air superiority and the availability of photo-reconnaissance aircraft.
such as the P-51 Mustang, an ALO had photographs of most of the possible area of
operations to use as briefing 1Ools. 290

In an attempt to re-create the conditions of the desert in order to keep up with an

Army" s advance, the rather large Group organisation had been practised in mobile
operations. Through the rationalisation of equipment, practice in England of "living
under canvas· and the possession of sufficient vehicle transport the RAF Groups had
become sufficiently mobile. Coningham. on his arrivai back in England. had transformed
the RAF squadrons- so used to statie air Stations- into organisations capable of operating
on "campaign·. 291 As such. the squadrons were able ta either deploy. as in the critical
early days on the continent from 10 June onwards. to Advanced Landing Grounds or Re-
fuelling and Re-anning strips in the beachhead or to airtields captured trom the
Luftwaffe. Quite clearly. the entire system had progressed trom the first early efforts at
air support in the tvliddle East.

Tvpes of Air Support

",Volhing arri\'edfrom the other side ofthe Seine and the Loire. We were on a transportation island. ..
General Fritz Bayerlein.

The campaign in Normandy witnessed the same types of air support as in Italy.
Air superiority missions. interdiction missions and air strikes in direct support of land
torces were ail essential elements of the air programme. Jn terms of mission types. the

•
Groups would conduct "Direct Support" operations and '"Indirect Support' operations.
Indirect support missions tended to be interdiction-related operations against the enemy' s

931127
•
lines of communication including railway locomotives, smaller bridges, ferries. canal
barges and shipping. Heavy and medium bombers were used to assist in these types of
operations. Indirect support operations tended to be pre-planned. Direct Support missions
were attacks on the enemy within the battle zone, usually in direct contact with Allied
forces. Standard targets included bunkers, artillery or mortar batteries and armoured
fonnations and troop concentrations. [nterestingly enough~ staffing planning prior to D-
Day had created a list of targets deemed ·suitable'. "unsuitable'. or "unsuitable to the
pilot' .

Direct Support missions were characterised as either pre-planned or impromptu.

Pre-planned operations spanned the entire planning cycle from the next day to several
weeks in the future. These operations were based on the flow of the battle. the projected
advance rate or targets of interest in the battle zone. These missions were planned at the
Anny/Group level via a daily conference. Impromptu missions took advantage of targets
of opportunity and were characterised by the need tor a quick response time- that varied
depending on ongoing operations. distance from the airfield, presence of a cab-rank and
whether the specialised FCP or VCP were in the area. While air support could be
provided extremely quickly if aircraft were nearby. it appears that the average response
time varied between 1.5 and 2 hours. "The delay seems to occur between the Army Unit
making the cali and the arrivaI of the operations order at the Group Control Centre. The
average sortie seemed to take between 20 minutes and 30 minutes to reach its target From
the word '"Go". so that one cao only assume that an hour to an hour and a half is
dissipated in deliberation on the ground ... 1 would suggest that you might consider
delegating greater responsibility to the Group Control Centres. ,,192

Impromptu missions could originate with the tentacle system~ by aircraft on

'armed reconnaissance" or by aircraft. typically a squadron or flight. waiting in a "cab-
rank'. ([t should be noted that the cab-rank system was really an intennediate step
bctween pre-planned and impromptu missions.) Aircraft assigned to a particular sector
tor a fixed period could wait tor a mission request (ASSUNCPIFCP) or shift to a pre-
selected targel. One pilot referred to the cab-rank. system as ..the ultimate in close-

• support operations: 00293 The available literature makes if difficult to establish the ratio of
pre-planned to impromptu missions. However. based on the RAF's general preference for

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•
interdiction missions as opposed to, say, "tank-busting' and that the staff process by
defmition leaned towards planning, it is safe to assume that a good portion of 2TAF
missions were pre·planned. Further, as the 'profligate' cab-rank system was used only
during important operations or during a crisis in the battle, it is further safe to assume that
more missions were pre-planned than impromptu.

The Hawker TyphooD

"It was the ultimate in close-support operations." Desmond Scott.

The outstanding development in the Normandy campaign was the use of the
Hawker Typhoon for close support operations. The Typhoon, like the P47 Thunderbolt
in use with IX TAC, proved to be a rugged and effective fighter-bomber, packing an
impressive arsenal. It has been
designed originaIly as an air
superiority fighter; however, when
it frrst flew experimentally in
February 1942 it proved a
disappointment due to structural
and mechanical problems. 294 When
accepted by Fighter Command in the autumn of 1942, "No sane pilot would have wanted
a posting to a Typhoon squadron" as it still had teething problems with the massive Sabre
engine. 29S As one ground crew member described the engine, "It was an ahortion of an
engine. The Merlin had six cylinders, the Sabre twenty-four, and none of the studs, nuts
and bolls were accessible- you couldn't even see them! You were feeling around corners
and you'd got weirdly contorted spanners to get at them... Oh, it was shocking.,,296 By
the time of OVERLORO, many of the "Tiffies" quirks had been sorted out; however,
problems with the engine persisted. The 15 June 1944 entry in the No. 440 (RCAF)
'Beaver' Squadron Operations Record Book indicated lbat four Typhoons were forced to
ahort missions out of Hampshire due to engine trouble and that at one point ail aircraft.
• were grounded. 297 The No. 439 (RCAf) 'Westmount' Squadron War Diary is filled with

95/127
•
similar references to engine trouble~ including broken hydraulic lines and coolant
298
problems. Just as deadly_ there were ''''instances of Typhoons exploding in the air on
pressing the bomb release or gun firing button.. .It transpires that this is due almost
certainly to a defect (i.e. petrol being ejected ioto the gun bay) ...and ... the Engineer
299
staffs are aware of the trouble and have remediaI action weil in hand.-- Finally. when
located at airfields in France~ the Typhoon needed modifications to its air tiher as the dust
300
in the bocage region choked the engine and other moving parts.

However. despite engine difficulties the Typhoon was robust enough and
powerful enough for a fighter-bomber as it could travel at 400 mph at low level and could
301
absorb a great deal ofpunishment, unlike the earlier and slower Hurricane IID. By the
time of OVERLORD. 2TAf was operating with 18 squadrons of Typhoons in the ground
support role. The Typhoon lA was equipped with twelve .303 calibre machine guns. The
later Typhoon lB was equipped with four 20mm Hispano cannon for self-defence or.
more commonly. for ground strafing. Each cannon had 145 rounds of ammunition. 302
·Rocke( Typhoons.. tirst created in 1943.. were fitted with four rocket launcher rails under
each wing and could fi re_ singly or in salvo. either a 25-pound or a 60-pound rocket
projectile_ whether high explosive or armoured-piercing. 303 ·"This fire po\ver had been
compared with that of a broadside from a cruiser and was sufficient to penetrate the most
heavily annoured tanks....304 Typhoons modified for bombing~ the Bombphoon. carried a
30S
2000 pound bomb load.. with brackets under each wing tor a 1000 pound bomb.

The Army loved the Typhoon. The RAF considered it a potent weapon. Pilots
were impressed by its punch but not its engine and_ while proud of their support to the
Army~ were less than happy with the hazards of ground attack. Air Marshal Broadhurst
stated that ··r suppose flying one of these aircraft was the most dangerous task the Air
Force has ever asked anybody to do:~J06 (He obviously didn -t remember the Fairey
Battle). One former pilot wrote that.. ··Ground attack missions were something between a
lottery and Russian roulette.-· 307 By the very nature of ground attack the Typhoon was
subjected to concentrations of flak. Many targets could not be anacked without pressing
home the mission in the face of anti-aircraft tire and_ due to the speed of the Typhoon and

• the fluid nature of the banle. flak could not always be spotted in time. Funher_ the
Gennans used counter measures such as decoy positions and fake locomotives in order to

96/127
•
J08
draw fighter-bombers into a kil 1 zone. During March_ April and May of 1944. the
losses due to collision with the ground during strafing operations were 3%. 5% and 20/0 of
a1l aircraft casualties. During the same months the losses of aircraft due to flak were
30%. 37% and 44%.309

The Tvphoon Pilot

While there were sufficient trained Typhoon pilots available during the initial
stages of the campaign_ a developing shortage of pilots_ despite the creation of a reserve,
U

led to the seeking of volunteers from the '''lucky bastards in the Spitfire squadrons- none
volunteered and many were forcibly converted to the Typhoon. In the lime leading up to
the invasion_ Leigh-Mallory_ the commander of the AEAF~ was weIl aware that his
fighter and tighter-bomber squadrons were not as proticient as the units in action in the
Mediterranean: However. action was necessary to close the gap. '''There is insufficient
time for training the Squadrons by passing them through Annament Practice camps_ 50

that the only practicable method is to train the Wing Leaders and Squadron Commanders
at a Central School and to rely on these Officers passing on their training to their Wings
and Squadrons:,310 New pilots would receive the standard training al the Operational
Training Units and would have to receive further experience on the job with the Groups
in the field. However_ poor training in ground attacK skills at the OTUs exacerbated the
311
pilot shortage as weil as the lack of a proper gunsight until late 1944. Pilots were
supposed to receive a three-week course in rocket firing as weIl as refresher training. 31 :!
Further_ pilots were to receive 20 hours of conversion tlying in the Typhoon which was
considered insufficient for effective combat tlying. J 13

Air Commanders were extremely worried over the level of training that the newly
arriving pilots had attained. Jl4 "The Wings consider that the new pilots were far from
proticient in RP shooting...There was complete agreement that it would be of great value
of the number of RP shoot carried out at Training Establishments could be increased:,315

• One French pilot in the RAF recorded•.;,( reached Aston

conversion course on Typhoons and Tempests.
DOWTI_ where ( was to do a quick
Wing Commander Shaw. the Station

97/127
•
Commander, when he saw my flying log-book. decided to skip the fonnalities and to
spare me the theory part of the course. '"AlI right. old boy. do a few circuits and bumps.
and offyou go to 83 Group Support Unit. If the weather is good you can be in Holland in
a week:~,316

The skiIls of the Typhoon pilot were of necessity different from that of "pure' or
air superiority fighter pilots. lt took great skills to either laya bomb load in the correct
place or manoeuvre into a good rocket position. The things that had to be right for a
successful target engagement included: cloud ceiling, angle of dive~ range~ air speed:
absence of ·'0·' forces~ no skid; and, a proper allowance for wind or target speed. 317 [n
particular. the angle of attack was effected by both the cloud ceiling and the
concentration of flak. While weaponry accuracy was a concern, the level of map reading
and target finding was generally good, perhaps as a result of the extensive operations
318
over France during the lead up to OVERLORD. While "very little study is being made
of the problems of the angle of dive, range and correction for drift'· there were certain
guidelines. 319 The bombing approach was at 5000 tèet with the load being released
during a dive down to 2000 feet. For rocket attacks. pilots were to commence their

l "rR 1~n21 T.crical Rull~rin SA!ii 1

Proper Approach Formation Proper Attack Formation

1 Target 1 1 Target 1

1000 feet
5000 feet

approach from 5000 feet and by using a thirty to fort y degree dive reach a launch height
of 1000 feet. 32o They were to release their salvo at the 'idear distance of 2200 yards.
This distance was perhaps '"ideal" l'rom a survivability point-of-view as experimentation

•
and operational research would find that greater accuracy was achieved by firing in
doser. One report. 'The Accuracy ofAttacks on Small Targels h.:v Fighter Bombers and

98/127
•
R.P. Fighlers', noted that there were three methods of increasing accuracy ·'at present":
improved training; ··increasing the zeal of the individual for attack on ground targets··:
and.. firing at doser range as '''this is the golden rule for increasing accuracy. ·.321 For road
targets the suggested tactic was to seal a convo)' in place by destroying the lead and rear
vehicles and then proceed to strafe or use rockets against the remaining vehicles. For
both bombing and rocket attacks the standard procedure was to tire the 20mm cannon
during descent to disconcert the enemy,

2TAF in Operation: Morale and Weapon Effects

"Armies traditional(l'Jêar an enemy air force more thon they respecrrheir own. ,. Richard P. Hallion

[ think that it is quite c1ear that the aircraft of the Second Tactical Air Force
played a signiticant part in the Allied advance out of Nonnandy. The achievement of air
superiority allowed ground forces unimpeded movement of men and materiel- including
the critical gasoline- throughout the campaign. Considering the many bottlenecks in the
logistics system From a lack of ports.. due to damaged railways. missing bridges and
rubbled streets. the ability to move by day and night without concem over air attack \vas
crucial in keeping the annies moving. Perhaps trying to draw attention to the
accomplishment of air superiority. Coningham had the camouflage nets within his
command retumed to depot. '''A noteworthy feature of the whole campaign was the way
in which the Anny accepted out state of air supremacy. Our own transport was allowed
to move head to tail closely packed along ail roads which were outside enemy artillery
range. Within Second Tactical Air Force l ordered the return of ail camouflage neuing to
the Base Depot... 322

Conversely. there is broad agreement that the aircraft of 2TAF did a convincing
job in disrupting the German lines of communication to the rear and immediate rear of
the battle zone. The movement of troops~ equipment and supplies was drastically
affected by the destruction ofbridges~ rail centres and the inability to move safely in good

•
weather and during daylight hours. Many German leaders. including Rommel. von
Rundstedt. Westphal. Bayerlein.. Kesselring. Speidel and von Vietinghoff. made comment

99/127
 on the difficulties of movement and re-supply during daylight hours with tighters and
• fighter-bombers making the roads into a via dolorossa. 323 ln a document prepared for the
V.S. Department of the Defence. 'German Evaluation ofAllied Air Interdiction in World
~Var If ~ countless examples of German difticulties are cited. "Evaluations of Gennan
officers. almost universally and most emphatically, credit Allied air power with their
defeat in Western Europe.,,324 As Liddell Hart described the German situation: "Air
superiority required a radical revision of the rules of ground operation. ,.325 Another
military assessment of the uses of tacticaI air power in Nonnandy states that. "Probably
the best example of how tactical air forces have been employed against reserve and
second echelon forces advancing in the combat area is the action of Ninth Air Force and
British 2TAF in June and July 1944. Allied fighter bombers. with air superiority. roamed
at will over the area. attacking Gennan troops which were trying to reach the beachhead
area and making movement by day virtually impossible. ~,326 Quite clearly then there is
liule controversy that the RAF- and USAAf- achieved the tirst two accepted goals of
tactical air support: the achievement of air superiority and the interdiction of enemy.
What of the third mission- close or direct support to the ground forces?

Close support operations. as crystallised in the use of rocket projectile Typhoons.

unquestionably had a signiticant impact on battlefield morale- both for the Allies and
against Gennan morale. Captain Charles Scot-Brown was a platoon commander in
Nonnandy with the Gordon Highlanders. 51 sl Highland Division. He used the Rover
system seven or eight times during the campaign and described it as "devastating:' Scot-
Bro\\J1l remembers using it in a place near Caen kno\\J1l as 'Karen's Woods' where the
Typhoon attacks were "fabulous for morale~' within the Company. "Suddenly the Titlies
J27
just banged them out and the Jocks were wild about il. They were our air force:· The
RAF was strongly aware of the psychological impact of RP Typhoons. Tactical Bulletin
No.56. 'Rocket Firing Typhoons in Close Support of A/iUtar)' Operations. . stated that
.othe effect in heartening our own troops. and in discouraging the enemy. has been
exeellent.·~328 The Many German accounts in existence aIl comment on the hated "Jahos'-
and the effect on morale of rocket attacks. The noise of the dive. the cannon tire. the

• ""horrible noise~' of the rockets in flight ail damaged morale. especially as they knew the
Luftwaffe could never proteet them or inflict the same punishment as they had in 1940.

100/127
•
·-It appears quite definite that it is the nature of the attack that upsets the Germans and not
the physical damage which it causes. None of the prisoners had seen any damage or
casuaIties eaused by the attack which had so scared them. ,,329

As mentioned. there has been significant debate as to the Typhoon as a ·tank-

buster' and the efficacy of RP against small targets. particularly armoured vehicles. The
Operational Research Section materials, close study of actions at Mortain or in the
Falaise Poeket. and claims by both the Army and RAF, have ail mudded the water.
Having examined many of the documents prepared by both the 21 st Army Group
Operational Research Section (ORS) as weil as those by 2TAF's ORS 1 think that the
RAF's daims against armoured vehides were over-stated. 330 The use of research teams
on the battlefield- perhaps as an extension of the undeclared war between Montgomery
and Coningham- provided sufficient material for reasonable conclusions. As such. the
debate over the efficacy of RP aireraft is rcally an extension of the long-running
argument between the Army and the RAF over support and control. Quite clearly the
ground support aireraft had a positive impact on the Allied soldier. while denying the
enemy freedom of movement on the battlefield and decent 10gistieaI support. Further.
2TAF did have sorne material effect on German armoured vehicles as weil as soft-
skinned ones. However. the evidence eollected. the RAF' s concern over the level of pilot
skill in flying and firing. the reluctance of converted Spittire pilots to embrace the nomos
of ground attack in their new Typhoons and the level of RP technology- let alone enemy
action- are ail indicators that the RP Typhoon was effective to only a certain level.
Further. while 2TAF was designed for taetical air support.. its commanders. leaders and
pilots still believed that interdiction and armed reconnaissance operations were more
damaging to the enemy that close support. Tedder stated that "1 felt that the limitations
of air support on the banle field were not sufficiently understood: neither was the full
scope of air power outside of the banle area sufficiently appreciated by the Army.. ·331
Copp and Vogel argued that such justifications only hid the RAF's deficieneies in ground
anack. ..lt is c1ear that the airforce's preference for '''armed recce" patrols. '1argets of
opportunity" and interdiction of enemy movement behind the battletield was based on the

• belief that it would perfonn these tasks much more effectively than close support
operations. [t was. however.. reluctant to tell the army about its difficulties and instead

1011127
•
argued that the tasks it wished to perform were more vital- a view which~ to put it
politely, the anny did not share:,332

The Final Stage

Regardless of where one places the emphasis, morale or mate ri aI. 2TAF provided
massive support during an extremely difficult operation. By the end of the campaign in
Normandy aIl of the elements and relationships for practical air power were in place. In
only thirty-six months- since BREVITY and BATTLEAXE- the RAF had created three
tactical air forces. These air forces~ like 2TAF. were not the reason for victory but a vital
element of that victory. Normandy was the triumph of combined arms where the Army.
the RAF and the Royal Navy used improved technology and command and control to
achieve success. 2TAF embodied the long road that the RAF had travelled in the
development of tactical air power- a circular and circuitous route that started in France.
moved to the desert and made its way back to Nonnandy. It was a long. tortured and
difficult journey that required much patience. compromise and ingenuity under the most
trying of conditions- war. The provision of effective tactical air support to the Anny had
not been an easy or a pleasant process~ particularly in the early days in France and in the
Western Desert. However. as the RAF and Anny grew in experience. as resources were
tèd into the process and as leaders understood the requirements and gained confidence in
the system~ air support became an integral part of ground operations. As Winston
Churchill wrote. "Now that Germany has been weil and tmly defeated l wish ta express
ta you. on behalf of His Majesty's Govemment. the deep sense of gratitude feh by ail our
people for the glorious part which has been played by the Second TacticaI Air force.
Their mastery of the skies above our armies. their ever vigilant reconnaissance. their
interventions in the land battles and their devastating attacks against the enemy's vital
communications. concentration areas and supply organisation have made the tasks of our
Armies easier and tàr less costly in casualties:,333

• 1021127
• ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION: Pages 1-4, Endnotes 1-7.

1 One of the most popular exhibitions at RAF Museum Hendon is an audio-visual presentation on
the Banle of Britain entitled. "Our Finest Hour.~~ RAF Museum Hendon Website:
www.rafmuseum.org.uk.
2ln the introduction to these several volumes it is made quite c1ear that~ due to the size of the air
force and the vast commitments and operations. certain topics would be glossed over. The Banle
of Britain and the Combined Bomber Offensive were not among the topics ignored. The RAF
Command 1939-1945 website (www.rafcommand) had detailed coverage of Fighter. Bomber and
Coastal Commands- and candidly states that Anny Co-operation and Air/Sea Rescue are not
included.
3 "Bert" to his friends: 'Butch' or ~Butcher' to his aircrews.
-t Re-named the Air Defence of Great Britain Command in November of 1943 until October of
1944 much to its constituent members chagrin as. despite the pedestrian truth of its name. it
lacked the flair of'Fighter' Commando
5 In particular~ the late Professor Robert Vogel of McGili University and Professor Terry Copp of
Sir Wifrid Laurier University investigated the efficacy of Tactical Air Power in support of the
land battle.
One of the consistent difficulties one encounters is the establishment ofa concise definition of
Il

air power that is understood by ail parties. both then and no'N. For our purposes. the term close
air support refers to operations or sorties in direct support of ground forces. either on cali. pre-
arranged or as targets of opportunity. Usually these missions were in visual sight of ground units.
Interdiction. as used here. it used to refer to missions behind the enemy's forward banle area that
will impact on the enemy's ability to deploy formations into the banle area or to supply
formations already in place.
7 The "firsf Tactical Air Force was 2TAF based in the United Kingdom. The forces at work in

the Mediterranean were considered "1 TAF·. In the Far East JTAf would eventually be fonned.

CHAPTER 1: Pages 5-13, Endnotes 8-46

IlAir Marshal Sir Arthur 'Mary' Coningham KeB. KBE, DSO. MC, DFC. AFC would come to
represent this RAF faction as weil as champion its necessity and etlicacy during WWII.
'JA tclling example of inter-Service rivalry was the development of the magnetic mine. As it was
to be air-delivered. the RAF c1aimed the right to develop it while the Royal Navy felt that. as it
concemed the sea. it was within their provenance to produce il. The result was a delay of bath
development and production.
10 Smith. Malcolm. British Strategy between the Wan. p.23.
As Marshal Tedder succinctly stated in his memoir. With Prejudice. The War Memoirs of

•
Il
the Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, The Ten Year Rule was '~ ... that ingenious
rule which had served as a perfect alibi for inaction:' p.3.

103/127
• 12 ln the United States. with its unique geo-political position. the debate went further as
discussions over the use of aircraft for the projection of maritime power were much discussed.
13 Howard. Michael. "The Concept of Air Power: An Historical Appraisal". Air Power
History, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Winter 1995), p.7.
1.. Each country had its proponents of mobile or annoured warfare. Along with Fuller and
Liddell Hart in Great Britain was Sir Gifford Martel: in France, General Etienne: in Germany.
Generais Guderian and Thoma: in the USSR., General Tukhachevski.
15 Lambert. A.P.N .. Group Captain. ··The Impact of Air Power in World War Two".
AIRPOWER magazine. 1996. p.15.
16 Spaight. J.M. Air Power can Disarm. p.9.
17 Williamson. Murray. Siraten for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945. p. XXIII.

18Certainly Douhet was influenced by the used of Mustard Gas during the Great War. In the
1930's. the use of gas by the Regia Aeronautica in Abyssinia against the local tribesmen perhaps
also influenced Douhet.
19 Murray. Williamson. War in the Air 1914-1945. p.82.
lD Gooch. John. editor. Decisive Batlles of the Second World War. p.69.
IISmith. p.l. This statement by Balfour was. in fact. taken from Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh
Trenchard.
l2 Overy. RJ. The Air War. p.1 .
l3 Overy. p.1 O.
-'.. S mit.
. h p.....
"8
-'5 Lam bert. p. 1:>.
-
l6 Ellis. John. Brute Force. p.181.
2' Orange. Vincent. Coningham: A Biography of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. p.34.
'80 very. p.l...
~ .,
19 At roughly the same time. the functional Commands of Reserve and Maintenance were created .
.~o The defeat during the Battle of Britain would continn for the Luftwaffe and the German
leadership that the tactical use of aireraft was the correct employment of an airforce.
-' 1 ln defence of the air planners and the uncertainty over doctrine. there was linle practical or
empirical experience as how types of aircrafi were ta be used- and would perform- in combat.
~:! Richards. Denis. Royal Air Force 1939-1945~ vol. l. p.19.
J:' Smith. Malcolm. British Strategy Between the Wars. p. 322.
~.J Hallion. Richard P. The Historv of Battlefield Air Attack 1911-1945. p.51.
'5 AIR 9/6 'GROUND ATf ACK" AIRCRAFT. NOTE BV RAF PLANS'. Dated 28 Feb 35.
AIR 9/6. p.l .

•
'6

3i AIR 9/6. p.2.

38 AIR 9/6. p.J.

1041127
• 39

-10

-II
AIR 9/6. pA.
AIR 9/6. pA.
AIR 9/6. p.s.
Tedder. Arthur William. Lord. With Prejudice. The War Memoin oftbe Marshal of the
-12

Royal Air Force Lord Tedder G.C.B. p.3.

The American air forces were strictly controlled by the 'Fundamental Principles of
-13

Employment of the Air Service' regulations of [926 which subordinated the needs of the air force
to the nceds of the surface forces. Later Manuals would retlect the RAF experiences.
-14 Harris. Arthur. Bomber Commando p.55-56.
.15 Winterbotham. F.W. The Ultra Secret. p.55.
.16 Terraine. John. The Right of the Line. p. 144.

CHAPTER Il: Pages 14-26, Endnotes 47-98

.n ln faimess to the RAF. the British Anny was also in a poor state at the commencement of
hostilities. When the war began, Great Britain had only four out of a planned field force of 19
divisions available for service in France. By May 1940. this number would rise to ten.
.18 Williamson. Murray. War in the Air 1914-1945. p.88.
.J9 Terraine. p.98.
50 Liddell Hart. Basil. The Other Side of the Hill. p.27.
,ï Douhet. p. 30.
52 Galland. Adolf. The Luftwaffe at War 1939-1945. p.140. Kesselring. an artillery officer-
against his wishes- was transferred into the Luftwaffe 1 Dctober 1933. (By that month. in fact.
228 officers had been transferred). Kesselring was one of the key shapers of the LuJiwaffe.
including the limiting of strategie forces in favour oftactical models.
5.' Murray Williamson. in his Strategy for Defeat, is one of the few authors that does not feel that
the Luftwaffe had a subservicnt or tactical raie. particularly before the Second World War. He
posits that the Luftwaffe pursued a complimentary role to that the Army. At the other end of the
spectrum. Correlli Bamett, as found in Hitler's Generais, is a strong proponent of the Luftwaffe
as a force.." .. for the specifie purpose of acting in close co-operation with the Anny in the field:'
p.270.
5.1 Kesselring. Albert Field Marshal. The Memoin of Field-Marsbal Kesselring. pAO,
55 Galland. Adolf. Tbe Firs. and the Last. The German Fighter Force in World War n.
p.67.
56 Luftwaffen Dienstvorschrift 16. (Air Force Regulation on the Conduct of the Air War). A good
summary of the basie tenets ofthis handbook.. from a senior German offieer perspective. ean be

•
found in DHU 82/1054. A.D.l. (K) Report No. 324/1945 THE GAF SHCLACHTFLEIGER
(GROUND ATTACK). An Historieal Review.

1051127
• 57 This tenn does not appear in the manual; however. the concept oftaclical air power in support
of the land banle is quite clear.
58 ln a conversation with Dr. Brereton Greenhous. at The Directorate of History. Department of
National Defence in 1994. he pointed out that the Germans had also leamed the lesson of the
importance of close support aircraft from having been on the receiving end in 1918.
59 DRH 82/1054. "GROUND ATTACK'. p.2.
DHU U 165 C652 No.2: Steadman. Kenneth A.• Lt Col. A Comparative Look at Air-
tlO
Ground SupPOrt Doctrine and Practice in World War O. p. 1.
61 Kesselring. pA 7.
61 DHU 82/1054. p.2.
63 Countryside deemed suitable for new airfields was driven over in cars at JO mph to test it for
proper surface conditions. Equipment. supplies and fuel were moved forward quickly using lu 52
transport aircraft.
6-l Andrews. Allen. The Air Marshals. The Air War in Western Europe. p.76.
65 Hallion. p. 147.
DHU 81/482. A Historieal Analysis ortbe Effectiveness or Taetical Air Operations
66
Agains•• and in SupPOrt of Armored Forces. p.20.
67 Kesselring. p.61. Kesselring would elaborate on his concept of co-operation as it developed on
the Russian Front. "'1 instructed my air force and tlak generals to consider the wishes of the anny
as my orders. without prejudice to their subordination to me. unless serious air interests made
compliance seem impracticable or detrimental:" p.89.
68 Westphal. Siegfried. General. The German Army in the West. p.86.
McFarland. Stephen L. and Newton. Wesley Phillips. Tu Command tbe Sky: The Battle for
69
Air Supremaey over Germany 1942-1944. p.30.
70 Steiger. Rudolf. Armour Tactics in the Second World War. p.66.
il For their operations in the West. the Luftwaffe committed 74% of ilS bomber force. 90°;(, of the
available dive-bombers and 70% of its modem fighters. The RAF used 416 aircraft in the
campaign to the French 1200 aircraft. Lambert. p.16.
71 Lambert. p.16.
i3 DHH 82/1054. p.ll.
":'~ Smith. Malcolm. Britisb Strategy between the Wars. p.23. On deployment bath the RAF
Component and the AASF operated separately from each other. In February of 1940. Air
Marshal Sir Arthur Barran became overall Commander-in-Chief of the British Air Forces in
France.
"15 Smith. p.91.
76 The Battles were 50 vulnerable ta air attack that pilots were ordered to fly extremely low sa that

German fighters could not anack from underneath: However. this left them mortalty open to the

•
extensive anti-aircraft of the Germans. Il is interesting to note that the French. despite an
acknowledged lack of modem aircraft, refused ta purchase the Banle.

106/127
• 77 In England. Winston Churchill took over as Prime Minister on the very day fighting began.
Lord Gort commanded the BEF while the other Generais included Brooke (II Corps)~ Alexander
(1 Division), Montgomery (III Division), Johnson (IV Division), Barker (10 Brigade) and
Dempsey (13 Brigade).
78 The History of 103 SquadroD iD France 1939-1940. Website: www.fortunecity.com/melting

potlmissile/423/france. p.l. (Another Lysander squadron was added later.)

79 The two squadrons of Blenheims were from No.2 Bomber Group.
80 Richards. Denis. Portal of Hungerford. p. 109.
81 Macmillan. Norman, Captain. The Royal Air Force in the World War. Volume II. p.9.
82 Hallion. p.38.
83 HI'· .
a lion. p.XIV.
84 Hams.
. p.~-6 .

85 Air9!137. 'ARMYCOOPERATION: MEETING & MEMüRANDA (1939-40)".

R6 Richards. p.13 1.
87 Macmillan. p.3 7.
88 Hallion. p.142.
89 Terraine. p.149.
90 The Historv of 103 SguadroD in France 1939... 1940. p.2.
'lI Wright. Gordon. The Ordeal of Tatal War. p.27.
9'- 0 enms.
. p. 14")_.

9:; Oeere. Alan. Group Captain. Nine Lives. p.8S.

9·1 Andrews. p.80-1.
95 Terraine. p.332.
96 Macmillan. p.94.
97Piekalkiewicz. Janus. The Air War 1939-1940. p.75. The RAF was not the only guilty party.
The French Air Force was even more 50 splintered into separate eommands. had extremely poor
communications and inadequate aircraft and doctrine.
Richards. p.12S. In faet. the RAF was so short of transport it borrowed 600 vehicles from the
9!l

French.

CHAPTER III: Pages 27-34.. Endnotes 99-IlS

AIR 217411. 'ROYAL ARMOURED CORPS AIR REQUIREMENTS·. Meeting of 6

<)<J

Novernber 1940.

• 100

101
AIR 217411.
Stead man. p..
6

107/127
• J02

103

104
AIR 16/552. 'GHQ DIRECTIVE ON TRAINING IN CO-OPERATION \VITH THE RAF'
Issued April 30. 1942.
AIR 13/941. 'EXERCISE DRYSHOD·. Dated September 9. 1942.
AIR 13/941.
IDS DHU Microfiche. '403 (RCAF) Squadron War Oiary~. Reel 122. Roll 1.
106 AIR 23/1281. "MIDDLE EAST TACTICAL MEMORANDUM NO. 3'. Reprinted

November 26. 1941.

107 AIR 23/1281. p.2.
108 AIR 23/1281. p.3.
109 Ta be more strictly correct. the experimentation of Fighter Command was matched by that of
the air forces in the Western Desert experimenting in the same fashion with Hurricane 110 "Tank
Destroyers" .
110 AIR 151721. "TACTICAL BULLETIN No. 18: ARMY CO-OPERATION WORK IN

MIDDLE EAST (September. 1942- January 1943)"

III AIR 371760 as found in Orange. Coningham. p.1 08-9.
112 AIR 39/129. 'COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ARMY CO-OPERATION

HEADQUARTERS AND EASTERN COMMAND·. Dated March 13. 1942.

113 AIR 161776. "AIR OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF TO GROUPS'. Dated January
24. 1942.
11-1 DHH Microfiche. '403 (RCAF) Squadron War Diary'. 1942. Reel 122. Roll 1
115 Harris. Stephen J. et al. The Crucible ofWar. See Chapter Seven: The Tuming of the Tide.

The Crucible of War has, perhaps. the most comprehensive and c1ear summary of the air
campaign in support of Operation JUBILEE extant. Possessing extreme detail- as the majority of
the troops involved were Canadian- The Crucible of War succinctly describes the difficulties in
the air as Fighter Command and not Anny Co-operation Command was in charge.

CHAPTER IV: Pages 35~48, Endnotes 116-147

1[0 Kcegan. John. The Second World War. p.327.

Il i Playfair. 1.5.0., Major General. The Mediterranean and the Middle East. p.32.
118 A new sealair route would be opened up for aircraft delivery. Aircraft would be crated and
shipped to Takoradi on the Gold Coast (Ghana). From there. they would be assembled. tested
and flown to Egypt- a distance of over SOOOkm. This routed was pioneered by Coningham. Sec
Orange. p.47/77/81.
1[9 Neillands, Robin. The Desert Rats ,Ih Armoured Division 1940~1945. p. 13/16/28.
120 Neillands. p.72.

• 121

122
Liddell Hart B.H. editaI'. The Rommel Papen p.147.
Playfair. p.1 16.

108/127
• 123 Macmillan. The Royal Air Force in the World War 194«).1945, Volume Ill. p.33.
124 AIR 217447. ·REPORT ON AIR CO-OPERATION WITH THE ARMY DURING
OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT AND LIBYA'. p.l.
125 AIR 2/7447. 'ROUGH NOTES ON R.A.F. CO-OPERATION WITH THE ARMY IN
DECEMBER OPERATIONS- WESTERN DESERT IN CONNECTlûN WITH AIR MINISTR y
SIGNAL X.S] 8 OF 22 ND DECEMBER 1940~. Dated 1 January 1941.
126 AIR 217447. p.2.
AIR 2/7447. "REPORT ON AIR CO-OPERATION WITH THE ARMY DURING
127
OPERATIONS lN THE WESTERN DESERT AND LIBYA'. p.2.
128 Lieutenant General Richard O'Connor as found in Playfair. p.272.
129 The Italian Tanks at World War Il. North Africa. June 1940-February 1941. Found at Website:
www.geocities.eom/Pentagon/QuarterslI97S/g_itawna.htm.
130 AIR 2/7447.
131 AIR 217447. p.l.
[32 Richards. p.24S.
1~3 The Afrika Korps would he reinforced and re-organised. The Slh Light Division wouId
beeome the 2] sI Panzer Division and the 90 th Division wouId be added.
[34 Keegan. p......
3"'9

[35 Auchinleck felt that Tobruk had little strategie value but was 'emotionally' important to
Churchill. Certainly, the possession of Tobruk was valuable From a logistics point ofview.
Politically. for the British. Tobruk was vital as the besieged troops were ANZAC and the British
Govemment wished to avoid any suggestion of the sacrificing of ANZAC troops along the lines
of the Dardenelles in 19]5.
136 Neilland. p.72.
137 0 range. p. 78 .
138 Playtàir. p.1 OS.
139 •
Haillon. p.IS4.
140 Tedder. p.116.
141 Playfair. p.28 1.
142 Macmillan. vol [II. p.lli.
143 Liddell Hart. p.116.
1.... Terraine. p.344.
1"5 Terraine. p.34S.
AIR 217447. "MINUTES OF MEETING Of THE AIR SUPPORT COMMITTEE' of
l"lI
10/1 ]/18/21/29 August 1941 (Middle East) Dated 1 September ]942. p.2.

• I-Iï Tedder. p.12?

109/127
• CHAPTER V: Pages 49-63, Endnotes 148-183
1"8

1..9
Williamson. p.147.
Tedder. p.162.
150 ft is interesting to note how different historians or military leaders view the influence of

Tedder and ofConingham. Ali believe Tedder to have been an excellent allied commander along
the lines of Eisenhower. However. there is a split in terros ofthose that view the successful
development oftactical air power as being Tedder~s achievement and those that tinnly believe the
bulk of the credit lies with Coningham. Supporters of Montgomery seem to favour Tedder while
those detractors of Monty see Coningham as the crucial character. Monty and Coningham.
eventually were not on speaking tenns as there was no room for both personaiities.
151 AIR 8/984. "TALK SY AIR VICE MARSHAL SIR A. CONINGHAM TO ASSEMBLED
BRITISH AND AMERICAN GENERAL AND SENIOR OFFICERS·. Dated 16 February 1943.
p.I-2.
151 AIR 217447. 'SOME NOTES ON ARMY CO-OPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST".
Dated 23 September 1941. p. 1.
153 AIR 41125. 'RAF NARRATIVE JUNE 1941-JUL y 1942"
15..AIR 217870. 'OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM No.54: THE EMPLOYMENT OF
BOMBERS AND FIGHTER-BOMBERS IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE ARMY.· Dated 6
May 1944. p.I-2.
IS5 Terrame.
. p.345 .
1% ArR 217447. "MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE AIR SUPPORT COMMITTEE" of
10/11118/21/29 August 1941 (Middle East).
15i Air 217447. p.J.
158 Air 217447. p.7-9.
[51) Tedder. p.175.
160 \Villiamson. p.147.
161 Air 217447. p.8.
16"'
- Tedder. p.163.
163 0 range. p. 83 .

lMAIR 2/7447. "SOME NOTES ON ARMY CO-OPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST'.

Dated 23 September 1941.
165 AIR 217447. p.1.
11>6 AIR 2/7447. p.2.
167
0 range. p.7 9 .
168
0 range. p. 84 .
Tedder. p.193 .

•
169

1iO Liddell Hart. p.184.

171 Williamson. p.147.

110/127
• 17'"
- Orange. p.88.
173 AIR 151721. -TACTICAL BULLETIN No.18: ARMY CO-OPERATION WORK IN
MIDDLE EAST~. p.2.
17" Guedalla, Phillip. Middle East 1940-1942 A Studv in Air Power. p.98.
175 AIR 41/25 as found in Orange p.87.
AIR 23/1861.9918. -FIGHTER ATI ACK OF ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES.· Dated
176

May 1942.
177 Liddell Hart. p.24S.
178 AIR 2174-47. 'INSPECTOR GENERAL'S VISIT TO THE EAST. EASTERN TOUR

PAPER NO.13·. Dated July 17 1942.

179
AIR 2174-47. p.l.
180 HaIl'Ion. p.l'-6 .
181
0 range. p.97.
18'
~ Orange. p.96.
183 AIR 8/984.

CHAPTER VI: Pages 64.71, Endnotes t84-211

IlW Owen. Roderic. Tedder. p.148.

185 Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Cross at found in Orange. p.89.
186 AIR 151721 p.1 O.
187 Macmillan vol III. p.IS!.
188 Brereton. Lewis. General. The Brereton Dianes. p.216/222.
1119 EII'IS. p._166 .
l'JO Johnson, J.E.• Group Captain. Wing Leader. p.131.
191
A IR 151721. p.7.
192 Hallion. p.IS8.
193 AIR 151721. p.9.
19.1 AIR 2174-47. p.1.
195 DHH 811482. p.56. The RAF also used other modified versions of the Hurricane- the

MkIlB. the MK IIC and the MK IV-in the ground support raie. The liB had t\Velve machine
guns in the wings. The IIC had four 20mm cannon in the wings. Bath could carry one 500 pound
bomb under each wing. The Mk IV was armed with either 40mm cannons and machine guns or
with three-inch rockets and machine guns.

• 196

197
AIR 23/1861-9918. p.l .
Terraine. p.373.

111/127
• 198 AIR 23/1281. 'MIDDLE EAST TACTICAL MEMORANDUM NO.21: THE

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE HURRICANE 110'. Dated September 1942.

11}t)

200
A IR23/1281. p.l.
AIR 23/1281. p.l.
201 Macmillan. vol III. p.IS2.
202 AIR 23/1281. p.2.
203 AIR 23/1861-9918. p.2.
The Distribution List for MEMORANDUM No.21 lists 89 copies to be delivered to 24
20.$

addresses in differing theatres or schools.

AIR 23.1762. "EFFECT OF BRITISH AIR ATTACKS ON FIELD TARGETS·. Dated 14
20;

February 1942.
206 AIR 23.1762. p.3.
207 It had been said that Montgomery's pamphlet on Air Support was a shameless borrowing of

Coningham's programme. Nevertheless. his thoughts would become doctrine in 1944 with the
publication of the 21 st Anny Group 'SOME NOTES ON THE USE OF AIR POWER lN
SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS AND DIRECT AIR SUPPORT.' Dated December 1944.
(AIR 91/157)
208 Montgomery, B.L. Field Marshal. The Memoin of Field Marshal the Viscount

Montgomery of Alamein. p. 185.

:!09 Liddell Hart. p.283.
110 Galland. p.90-91 and Liddell Hart. p. 221.
-"II EII'IS. p.36S.

CHAPTER VII: Pages 72-83, Endnotes 212-257

-'l''- K eegan. p.340.

213 Terraine. p.390
-"1-1 Brereton. p.14_.
.,

ll5Eisenhower. Dwight. General. Crusade in Eurone. p.2/1 O. In 1939. there were only three
under-strength infantry divisions and one half-strength cavalry division in the U.S.A. There was
no annoured corps until summer of 1940. By June 1941. the U.S. had 1.5 million soldiers.
116 More so the USAAF with its constitutional ties to the U.S. Army. The RAF. as usual. was
fiercely protective of its independence.
li; Macmillan. p.20S.
-" 18 0 range. p.130.

• 219

210
AIR 8/984. p.I-2.
Zuckerman. Solly. From Aoes to Warlords. p.181.

112/127
• ''lI
-- Orange. p.163.
~11 Brereton. p.230.
"3 E'Isen hower. p.210.
---
n~ E'Isen hower. p. 234.
--
225Zuckerman. p.156/166/169/l77/186. Spaatz was his biggest fan. Coningham thought the
attack to be a farce. Coningham thought Spaatz to be a farce as weil.
""""6 Fergusson, Bernard. Watery Maze. p.237.
--
127 AIR 15/721. 'TACTICAL BULLETIN No.42. NIGHT OPERATIONS BY BOMBER
COMMAND IN CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY. CAEN AREA 7-8 AUGUST 1944'. Also.
Andrews. p.260.
n8 T errame.
-- . p. 56 7.
Shepperd, G.A.. Colonel. The Italian Campaign 1943-45. A Political and Milita" Re-
229
assessment. p.23.
230Nicholson. G.W.L. Lt-Col. The Canadians in Italy 1943-1945. Volume Il orthe Official
Miston of the Canadian Anoy in the Second World War. p.1 1.
-'31 T errame.
. p.'-69 .
'"
--- Orange. p.163.
233Charleston, L.E.O., Air Commodore. Britain at War. The Roval Air Force and U.S.A.A.F.
From July 1943 to September 1944. p.62-65. However. this air support was not true of
A V ALANCHE at Salerno where the Allies didn't heed their previous success and were almost
pushed off the beaches ';,Iargely due to a lack of air support:' ft was too far away from the Allied
airfields.
23.J Nicholson. p.64.
'3<;-
-- N'IC h0 1son. p.'-3 .
136 Sh epperd . p._"3 .
--',7 K I nng.
esse ' p.197.
238 Linklater. Eric. The Campaign in Italv. p.:!7. Terraine stated that 12 ships were lost. p.573.
2.WTerraine. p.592. Shepperd points out that many of the improvement in air support to the V.S.
Anny were a result of the poor American air support to the th Anny during operations in Sicily.
p.ïO.
AIR 15/721. ;,TACTICAL BULLETIN No.36. TACTICS OF THE DESERT AIR FORCE
2.JO
DURING THE SPRING Of 1944.' Dated 29 April 1944.
~~I AIR 15/721.. 'TACTICAL BULLETIN No.36: p.2.
1.t~ AIR 15/721. CENTRAL FIGHTER ESTABLISHMENT. MINUTES Of lNAUGRAL
MEETING HELD AT WITTERING. DECEMBER ]4 TIl 1944, TO DISCUSS THE REPORTS
OF THE TACTICS BRANCH AND THE AIR SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT SQUADRON

•
BASED ON THEIR VISITS TO THE WESTERN FRONT AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
THEATRES. p.S.
:!.J3 AIR 15/721. 'TACTICAL BULLETIN No.36: p.2.

113/127
• ~44 AIR 217870. p.S.
245 AIR 151721. CENTRAL FIGHTER ESTABLISHMENT. p.9.
146 AIR 37/569. 'SURVEY OF FIGHTER O.T.U. TRAlNING', Dated 6 April 1944. p.l.
247 AIR 23/1458. 'NOTES ON NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN AIRIGROUND CO-
OPERATION'. Dated January 1945.
AIR 37/956. 'USE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NAPLAM FIRE BOMB: Dated 8 February
148
1945.
249 The Italian campaign saw great innovations in the air support system as perhaps the difficult
terrain forces ingenuity to be the mother of invention in terms of aiding the advance. Other than
Rover David, Paddy and Joe, there were ""Toby", "Timothy" and '"Dixie" operations. Ali were
fonns of air support. See AIR 23/1458.
250 AIR 151721. 'TACTICAL BULLETIN No.36.' p.2.
. p.:'>-96 ,
-"51 TerralOe.
151 AIR 151721. 'TACTICAL BULLETIN No.36.' p.J.
AIR 15/721. 'TACTICAL BULLETIN No.43. ARTILLERY RECONNAISSANCE DURING
153
THE BATf LE OF THE LIRI VALLEY- MAY 1944: Dated August 1994.
154 AIR 151721. 'TACTICAL BULLETIN No.43', p.:!.
155 AIR 151721. 'TACTICAL BULLETIN No.43'. pA.
156 AIR 151721. -TACTICAL BULLETIN NoA3'. p.5.
157 AIR 2/7870. p.6.

CHAPTER V(JI- Pages 84-102, Endnotes 258-333

158Two good papers summarising the ditTerent opinions on the effectiveness oftactical air power
are unpublished works. The first. Brereton Greenhous' 'EfTectiveness of Aircraft versus
Armour in the Hattie of Normandy, 1944' (DHU 89/334) lays out the groundwork for the
etTectiveness of close support efforts. He focuses primarily on the issue of morale and the
statements by German commanders concerning the etTectiveness of air power. Terry Copp and
Robert Vogel"s paper 'Anglo-Canadian Tactical Air Power in Normandy: A "Re-
assessment" focuses on Operational Research. This paper argues that 2TAF couldn 't hit the
broadside of a barn, unless by accident.
159AIR 37/1236. "2TAF/ORS REPORT No.l: ORS INVESTIGATIONS OF THE OPERATION
OF TAF AIRCRAFT IN THE MORTAIN AREA 7TH AUGUST 144' is a good example of the
RAF's spin on the efficacy oftactical air power, DUU 791705. OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
IN NORTHWEST EUROPE: The work ofNo.2 Operational Research Section \Vith 21 SI Army
Group' is the best summary of the etTectiveness oftactical air power From the Army's
perspective. Il pointedly does not look at the morale effect of air power.

•
DHH 83/471. "The Graham Report" 'EXTRACTS FROM RAF NARRATIVE (First Drafi)
160
THE LIBERATION OF NORTH WEST EUROPE VOLUME III, THE LANDINGS lN
NORMANDY'.

114/127
• ~bl ln point of fact. the doctrine had shifted somewhat to retlect the burgeoning nature and growth
of air-to-ground support. Doctrine now Iisted two further missions: Operations \Vith airbome
forces and operations cmploying the use of transport aircraft. However. as our interest lies with
2TAFS these l'oies are peripheral.
262The AEAF had designed an cntire system that took advantage of Luftwaffe airfields on the
continent- if the Army could capture them. TAF was also equipped to establish and service.
using Servicing Commandos, temporary fields. The early efforts in the beachhead. sometimes
under artillery or sniper tire, included Advanced Landing Grounds. Re-fuelling and Re-anning
Strips. and Emergency Landing Strips. The inability of the Army, as personitied by
Montgomery, to breakout and capture airfields was a source of bitter dispute within the air
community- it certainly didn't aid the already strained relations between Coningham and
Montgomery.
163 Eisenhower. p.24.
2M D'Este. Carlos. Decision in Normandy. p.146.
265 DHU 83/471. p.16.
266 Williamson. Murray. Strategy for Defest. The Luftwaffe 1933-1945. p.283.
267 Zuckerman. p.21 0/212/222. D'Este states that the single most important factor in achieving

success in Normandy was the Transportation Plan. p.147.

268 DHU 83/471. p.27.
269 Brereton. p.242. The Luftwaffe could operate From 164 airfields in France.
2iO Ellis. Lionel Frederic. Victorv in the West Volume f. p.75.
271 Perhaps the leitmotif for Air and Army co-operation concerns the location of Eisenhower's
SHAEF headquarters. Leigh-Mallory insisted. as pel' doctrine. that it should be located near his
HQ at Stanmore as there existed a suitable place at Bushey Heath. although the engineers would
nced to work on il. Unfortunately the signais became crossed and the engineers completely re-
designed a place called Bushey Park. After ail the effort. SHAEF wasn't moving. See Sir
Frederick Morgan's Overture to Overlord. p.256-7.
272 PRO (WO 285/2) Letter. Montgomery to Dempsey on Army/RAF Co-operation. Dated 4
May 1944. p.l.
273 DHH 83/471.
Not included in this discussion were the sophisticated command and communication systems
27-1
in place for the actual invasion. For example, the Allies used air control headquarters ships
during the assault phase.
DHU 87162. "ARMY/AIR OPERATIONS PAMPHLET No. I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
275
AND ORGAN[ZA TION~. THE WAR OFFICE. 1944.
AIR 37/876. 'REPORT SY AIR MARSHAL SIR ARTHUR CONINGHAM. KCB. DSO.
27tJ
MC. DFC. AFC. CONCERNING OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY SECOND TACTICAL
AIR FORCE BETWEEN 6 JUNE 1944 AND 9 MAY] 945: Dated November ]945. p.70.
AIR 37/332. 'WORK OF THE GROUP IN THE FIELD. ~ p.IO.

•
277

27R AIR 151721. 'CENTRAL FIGHTER ESTABLISHMENT. REPORT No.9: p.S.

'-'')
• J Johnson. p.204.

115/127
• 180 AIR 37/332. 'WORK OF THE GROUP IN THE FIELD. ~ Written by Air Marshal
Coningham. p.l. Undated. Either a draft or a portion of his final report on operations on the
continent.
181AIR 23/1861. 'NOTES ON CLOSE SUPPORT TARGETS FOR ROCKET TYPHOON
A Tf ACK.' P.3-4. Also. Captain (Retired) Charles Scot-Brown. CD. Can-Loan officer. Gordon
Highlanders. 51 st Highland Division. Capt Scot-Brown was a platoon commander in Normandy
and called for close air support 7-8 times. (lnt~rview. RCML Toronto. 10 January 2001.)
AIR 2/7870. 'REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORWARD DIRECTION OF
282
AIRCRAFT. ~ p.I-2.
283 AIR 2/7870. 'VISUAL CONTROL POSTS- TECHNICAL DATA.'
2~ AIR 37/332. 'WORK OF THE GROUP IN THE FIELD: p.IO.
285 AIR 2/7870. 'VISUAL CONTROL POSTS- TECHNICAL DATA.' p.J.
186 Horrocks. Brian. Sir. Corps Commander. p.46.
-'87 Terrame.
. p. 66 1•
288Macmillan. Norman. The Royal Air Force in the World War. p.161- 162. Vehicles were
painted with a white five-point star.
289AIR 2/7870. "VISIT TO 84 GROUP ON THE 28 TH JUL y 1944.' Air Commodore R.L.R
Atcherley. D.D.A.T.I.
AIR 23/1861. "NOTES ON CLOSE SUPPORT T ARGETS FOR ROCKET TYPHOON
290
AITACK: p.J.
11)1 AIR 37/332. 'WORK OF THE GROUP IN THE FIELD.~
AIR 217870. 'VISIT TO 84 GROUP ON THE 2S HI JULY 1944: Air Commodore R.L.R
1')2
Atcherley. D.D.A.T.I.
293 Scott. Desmond. Typhoon Pilot. p.IIS.
Golley. John. The Day orthe Typhoon: Flving with the RAF Tankbusters in Normandv.
19-1
p.7.
-"lJ5 Scott. p. 1.
2% Smithies. Edward. War in the Air. (an oral history). p.202.
297 DHU Microfiche. 440 <RCAf) Squadron War Dian. Excerpts. 1 Jan 44-26 Aug 45.
''J!I • •
- DHU Microfiche. 439 (RCAFl Sguadron War Dlarv. Excerpts. July 44-Aug 44.
AIR 2/5388. 'NOTES ON VISIT TO NORMANY BY C.ARM.O.. AEAF. JUL y 29/30
:!99

1944: p.2.
AIR 2/5388. 'NOTES ON VISIT TO NORMANY BY C.ARM.O.. AEAF. JUL y 29/30
:;00

1944: p.2. Golley. (p.61) points out that the lessons from North Africa and Italy in the use of
dirt airstrips was forgonen for Normandy.
DUU 81/482. . A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TACTICAL
.lOI

•
AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST. AND IN SUPPORT OF. ARMOU RED FORCES: p.92.
J02AIR 23/1861. "NOTES ON CLOSE SUPPORT TARGETS FOR ROCKET TYPHOON
A Tf ACK. p.1.

1161127
 AIR 151721. "T ACTICAL BULLETIN No.45. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ROCKET
303

PROJECTILES (EXPERIENCES UP TO OCTOBER 1944):

304 DHR 81/482. p.5?
305 HaIl'Ion. p._"0"...
306 Golley. p.ll.
107 Halliday. Hugh A. Typboon and Tempest: The Canadian Story. p.52.
308 Johnson. p.80.
309 McFarland. p.234.
310 Air 37/569. 'AIR TRAlNlNG FOR OVERLORD' AEAF/S.13223/AIR TRAINING.
3[[
A IR 217870. p.2.
311 DHR 81/482. p.95 .
.- 13 AIR 37/569. 'TYPHOON CONVERSION TRAINING OF REPLACEMENT PILOTS FOR

TYPHOON SQUADRON.' p.l.

~14 AIR 37/569. 'TRAINING TASK: SINGLE-ENGINED FIGHTERS AND FIGHTER-
BOMBER PILOTS.'
)15 AIR 151721. 'CENTRAL FIGHTER ESTABLISHMENT. REPORT No.9.' pA.
316 Clostennann. Pierre. The Big Show. Sorne Experiences ora French Fighter Pilot in the
RAF. p.154.
317 AIR 215388. 'AEAF MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF R/P: P.2.
_'18 AIR 217870. p.2.
319 AIR 37/569. 'SURVEY OF FIGHTER O.T.U. TRAINING: Dated 6 April 1944.
AIR 217870. 'REPORT lN ATTACKS ON ENEMY TANKS AND M.T. N THE MORTAIN
.'10
AREA- 7f11 AUGUST 1944. p.6-7.
AIR 16/498. 'THE ACCURACY OF ATTACKS ON SMALL TARGETS BV FIGHTER
.'11
BOMBERS AND R.P. FIGHTERS.· p.2.
31.:! AIR 371876. 'REPORT SY AIR MARS HAL CONINGHAM: Dated November 1945. p.32-3.
313 Seemingly every work on the campaign in Normandy has the requisite quotation from a

German general. The more cynical critics see the German leaders focusing on air power to
detlect from their problems commanding on the ground .
DHH. 'GERMAN EVALUATION OF ALLIED AIR INTERDICTION IN WORLD WAR
.n.J
li: Sub-study (( of Phase Il of Historical Data in Tactical Air Operations. October 1969.
325 Liddell Hart. The Rommel Papen. p.XV.
DUU 811482. •A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS Of THE EfFECTIVENESS OF TACTICAL
3!fJ
AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST. AND IN SUPPORT OF, ARMORED FORCES: Dated
Oclober 1980. p.65.

• 32i Interview with Captain (retired) Charles Scot-Brown. CD. ReMI. Toronto. 10 January 2001.
It is interesting to note that the Typhoon pilots came to wear Anny battledress uniforms. Various

117/127
• reasons are cited from trying to identify with the Anny, trying not to look like Germans if shot
down- or trying not to look Iike hated Jabo pilots if shot down over German lines.
328 AIR 151721. "TACTICAL BULLETIN No.56. ROCKET FIRING TYPHOONS IN CLOSE
SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.' p.l.
329 AIR 15/721. "TACTICAL BULLETIN No.56. pA.
330DHH 79170S. "OPERATIONAL RESEARCH IN NORTH WEST EUROPE. THE WORK
OF THE No.2 OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SECTION WITH 21 ST ARMY GROUP JUNE
1944-JULY 1945.~ Il AIR 16/498. 'THE ACCURACYOF ATTACKS ON SMALL TARGETS
SY FIGHTER BOMBERS AND R.P. FIGHTERS: Il AIR 37/1236. '2TAF/ORS. REPORT
No.l. ORS INVESTIGATIONS OF THE OPERATIONS OF 2TAF AIRCRAFT IN THE
MORTAIN AREA 7 AUGUST 1944.' Ali of the above documents are good examples of ORS
research into the efficacy of RP aircraft.
DI Tedder. With Prejudice. The War Memoirs orthe Marsha. orthe Kova. Air Force Lord
Tedder. p.559-60.
Dl Copp. Terry and Vogel. Robert. "Anglo-Canadian Tactical Air Power in Normandy: A Re-
assessment:' Paper prepared for the American Military Institute. April Il. 1987. p.9.
333 AIR 37/876. 'REPORT BY AIR MARSHAL CONINGHAM: Dated November 1945.
P.IOO Churchill: Message to Coningham 16 May 1945.

• 118/127
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