Guiguzi,

China’s First Treatise on Rhetoric

A Critical Translation and Commentary

Translated by Hui Wu
With Commentaries by Hui Wu and
C. Jan Swearingen
Landmarks in Rhetoric and Public Address
Guiguzi,
China’s First Treatise on Rhetoric

A Critical Translation and Commentary

Translated by Hui Wu
With Commentaries by Hui Wu and C. Jan Swearingen

Southern Illinois University Press   Carbondale

Southern Illinois University Press
www.siupress.com

Copyright © 2016 by the Board of Trustees,

Southern Illinois University
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America

19 18 17 16 4 3 2 1

Publication partially supported by a grant from the Confucius

Institute at Texas A&M University. The Confucius Institute exists to
enhance understanding of Chinese language and culture among a
global audience, and to support academic work that contributes to a
greater understanding of China.

Cover illustration: Guan Yuan dynasty (mid-fourteenth-century)

porcelain vase, the illustrations on which tell of Guiguzi traveling in
a carriage drawn by a tiger and a leopard to rescue his disciple Sun
Bin (孫臏), a military strategist and a descendant of the author of
The Art of War, imprisoned during the Warring States Period. Private
collection; photo copyright © Christie’s Images / Bridgeman Images.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Guiguzi, active 4th century B.C., author. | Wu, Hui, [date]
editor, translator. | Swearingen, C. Jan, editor.
Title: Guiguzi, China’s first treatise on rhetoric : a critical translation
and commentary / translated by Hui Wu ; with commentaries by
Hui Wu and C. Jan Swearingen.
Other titles: Guiguzi. English | China’s first treatise on rhetoric
Description: Carbondale : Southern Illinois University Press, 2016.
| Series: Landmarks in rhetoric and public address | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016001961| ISBN 9780809335268 (pbk.) |
ISBN 9780809335275 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Persuasion (Rhetoric)—Early works to 1800.
Classification: LCC B128.K8372 E54 2016 | DDC 808—dc23 LC
record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016001961

Printed on recycled paper.

To Mike and Ben, with thanks
Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric: Introducing Guiguzi 1

Hui Wu
Notes on the Translation 32
Hui Wu

Guiguzi: A Critical Translation

Hui Wu

Book I
1. Open-Shut (Bai He 捭闔) 39
2. Reflect-Respond (Fan Ying 反應) 43
3. Affect-Fortify (Nei Qian 内揵) 49
4. Mend-Break (Di Xi 抵巇) 53

Book II
5. Captivate-Capture (Fei Qian 飛箝) 56
6. Resist-Reconcile (Wu He 忤合) 59
7. Weighing (Chuai 揣) 63
8. Gauging (Mo 摩) 66
9. Assessing (Quan 權) 70
10. Deploying (Mou 謀) 74
11. Decision-Making (Jue 决) 80
12. Fundamental Principles (Fu Yan 符言) 83
13. Rotation of Small Shots (Zhuan Wan 轉丸) 88
14. Solution to Disorder (Qu Luan 胠亂) 88

Book III
1. The Primary Doctrine on the Seven Arts of the Yin
Mystique (Ben Jing Yin Fu Qi Pian 本經陰符七篇) 90
vii
Contents
2. Holding the Pivot (Chi Shu 持樞) 105
3. The Central Doctrine (Zhong Jing 中經) 106

Under Western Eyes: A Comparison of Guigucian

Rhetoric with the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle 113
C. Jan Swearingen

Glossary of Guiguzi’s Rhetorical Terms 155

Works Cited 159
Index 167

viii
 Acknowledgments

The study of Chinese rhetoric has seen substantial advances in the past fifteen
years. This could not have happened without the support and encouragement
of professional organizations whose conferences and journals now include
panels and publications in several different areas of comparative East-West
rhetorical studies. Xing Lu’s and Yameng Liu’s histories of these develop-
ments provide a concise outline of the obstacles that had to be overcome
in reaching the present state of scholarship in Chinese rhetoric. Measuring
Chinese rhetoric by the standard of Western Greco-Roman rhetoric is now a
thing of the past. Comparative studies now include nontraditional Western
rhetorics as well, enhancing our knowledge of previously excluded groups
and cultures. In this process the concept of rhetoric is undergoing extensive
consideration and revision. Should we even use “rhetoric” and “persuasion”
to name the processes of negotiation, discursive interlocution, dialogue, and
debate that we encounter in other cultures? Our commentary is indebted to
all those scholars whose work has contributed to these ongoing debates about
debate. We promote the continuing study of rhetoric even as we acknowledge
the pitfalls of looking at non-Western rhetorics using traditional terms and
concepts. An even larger context for this study resides in the longer history
of rhetoric as a field of study in academia. Thirty years ago the International
Society for the History of Rhetoric was founded to foster the study of rhetoric
in an international scholarly community that was not hospitable to the subject.
Even within classics the study of rhetoric was scorned. Speech Communica-
tion as a discipline had long been the most active in rhetorical scholarship; its
home base classical studies, such as George Kennedy’s many studies of Greek
and Roman Rhetoric. Robert Oliver’s Communication and Culture in Ancient
China and India was a landmark study in Speech Communication, widely cited
by scholars working in the field who acclaim his initial attempt but also note
the Eurocentric model he employs. “Discovering” that there are arguments
and tropes, ethos and pathos, in the rhetoric of non-Western cultures is no
longer the primary goal of scholarship in the field, but it was perhaps a neces-
sary starting point, as it has gradually revealed the limitations of the method.
ix
Acknowledgments
In the field of English several developments have provided contexts for the
study of rhetoric in non-Western cultures, and specifically of Chinese rhetoric.
Like the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, the Rhetoric Society
of America was founded thirty years ago by a cohort of scholars in Speech
Communication and English interested not only in the history of rhetoric but
also in its theories and definitions. Alongside the Conference on College Com-
position and Communication, the Rhetoric Society of America has fostered
increasing numbers of panels and journal articles in Chinese rhetorical studies
branching out into several different areas. Rhetoric Review and College Compo-
sition and Communication have expanded the journal venues provided by the
Quarterly Journal of Speech, Rhetorica, Rhetoric Society Quarterly, and College
English. The history of the teaching of English in China provides scholars and
teachers with insights into Chinese language and culture that are helpful in
teaching English as a foreign language (EFL) to students in China as well as in
the United States. The study of English in the United States by Chinese students
advancing to the PhD level has opened up the careful study of differences be-
tween Chinese and Western rhetoric, scholarship and scholarly conventions,
the teaching of writing, and the teaching and practices of speaking.
To all of these fields of scholarship, and the professional organizations that
support them, we owe a profound debt. As we mark the emergence of Chinese
rhetorical studies within mainstream English-language scholarship in several
fields—Speech Communication, English, and Linguistics—we want to recall
that it was not so long ago that rhetoric itself was a marginalized field, scorned
as “mere” pedagogy, or as a trivial subdivision of more important fields such
as literature and philosophy.
We are also indebted to the international scholars who have increasingly
participated in conference panels and published in English-language jour-
nals, providing valuable perspectives and corrections from within Chinese-
language scholarship on rhetoric. Rudong Chen convened in 2009 the First
Biennial Conference of the Chinese Rhetorical Society of the World and In-
ternational Conference on Rhetoric, a conference that continues to support
and encourage studies of Chinese rhetoric. The first volume of its journal,
International Rhetoric Studies, appeared in 2011 and included Chen’s Chi-
nese translations of papers written in English by Western scholars. We are
indebted to Chen alongside other international scholars who foster exchange
and collaboration in the field.
Xing Lu’s study of ancient Chinese rhetoric, Rhetoric in Ancient China.
Fifth to Third Century b.c.e.: A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric, pre-
sented substantial revisions in both the history and theory of Chinese rhetoric,
moving beyond a simple taxonomy of parallels to Greek rhetoric and noting
x
 Acknowledgments
important differences that bear further consideration. Yameng Liu’s Rhetoric
Review article, “To Capture the Essence of Chinese Rhetoric: An Anatomy
of a Paradigm in Comparative Rhetoric,” reviewed similar methodological
prospects and problems. LuMing Mao has devoted extensive energy and schol-
arship in organizing panels and special editions of journals on Chinese and
East-West rhetorical studies. His work in literary as well as rhetorical and
sociolinguistic studies encompasses a spectrum of fields engaged in rhetorical
studies, and provides an instructive array of methods and models. Roberta
Binkley and Carol Lipson have edited two groundbreaking studies of rhetoric
outside, beyond, and before the Greeks, collections of essays to which we owe
a debt for fine-tuning the methods of non-Western rhetorical studies.
Correspondence and conversations with colleagues in several fields has
provided valuable feedback and suggestions. In particular, LuMing Mao and
Megan Biesele contributed close readings of very early drafts of the concluding
commentary. To the anonymous readers of our manuscript we give thanks
for careful readings, suggestions, and corrections without which this study
would be much flawed. To Karl Kageff we owe thanks for superb patience and
detail work with a complicated manuscript that went through two separate
considerations by the Southern Illinois University Press. His attentiveness to
our frequent questions large and small has been a remarkable gift. We thank
the University of Texas at Tyler and the University of Central Arkansas for
research grants that helped with field work in China. Without the grants, some
Chinese scholarship and books on Guiguzi would be missing from our studies.
Last but not least, we would like to thank our families for their support,
encouragement, countless hours of reading drafts, and plentiful conversation
over more than two years. Endless and ongoing appreciation and affection
to Daoming Chen, Donna Chen, Mike Frink, Benjamin Jacobs-Swearingen,
and Audrey Frink, who was born halfway through the book’s completion.

xi
Guiguzi, China’s First Treatise on Rhetoric
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric:
Introducing Guiguzi

Hui Wu
The classical period from 500 to 200 b.c.e. in both China and Greece was
foundational in Eastern and Western rhetorical and academic traditions.
Both cultures were vibrant, pluralistic, and creative; both endured similar
periods of political and military upheaval; and in both rhetoric emerged as
a self-conscious method for addressing discord and negotiating compromise
(Swearingen, “Response,” 426). Just as classical Greek rhetoric has had a long-
term impact on Western academic and literary practices, so too has classical
Chinese rhetoric shaped Eastern discourse.1 In ancient Greece, Aristotle’s
On Rhetoric, the first theoretical codification of Western rhetoric, developed
following an emerging democracy in Athens and city-state rivalries. Dur-
ing the same classical period, China’s earliest treatise on persuasion named
after its alleged author, Guiguzi (Master of the Ghost Valley), evolved from
multiple warring states’ demands for persuaders and war strategists. Like
On Rhetoric, the Guiguzi has had immense impact on rhetorical practice in
ancient and contemporary China. Many of its concepts have evolved into
everyday rhetorical terms frequently applied to negotiations, persuasions,
decision making, or business planning. However, Guiguzi remains little
known to scholars and students in rhetoric, composition, and communica-
tion, leaving a critical gap in comparative studies of rhetoric. To this end,
this book offers a critically annotated rhetorical translation of Guiguzi, a
glossary of Guigucian rhetorical terms, and a comparison of Guiguzi with
early Greek rhetorical figures, including the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato,
and Aristotle. To contextualize, the introduction first maps the trajectory
of Western studies of Chinese rhetoric to foreground Guiguzi as an indig-
enous rhetorical theory that can significantly enhance comparative insight
and reflection. Next, it provides a careful reading of available sources on
its emergence in the pre-Qin Warring States period (475–221 b.c.e.). Af-
ter a critical review of Guiguzi’s controversial receptions in China and the
West, the introduction presents a preliminary guide to the fundamentals of
Guigucian rhetoric.

1
Hui Wu

Positioning Guiguzi in Western Studies of Chinese Rhetoric

To place Guiguzi on the map of world rhetorical traditions, it is necessary to
track the trajectory of studies of Chinese rhetoric and to understand the need
for a rhetorical translation. This overview will reveal that the availability of
Guiguzi as a rhetorical treatise supplements Western models as the sole tem-
plate in comparative methodology. Following Robert Oliver’s Communication
and Culture in Ancient India and China, published in 1971, Chinese rhetorical
studies have emerged as a subfield in rhetoric, composition, and communica-
tion. According to Xing Lu, Western studies of Chinese rhetoric have gone
through four stages—the deficiency stage, the recognition/emergence stage,
the native/emic construction stage, and the appreciation/appropriation stage
(“Studies,” 112). At the first stage most scholarship guided by a Eurocentric
orientation privileged linear logical development of discourse and concluded
that the Chinese did not have a rhetorical tradition and were not interested
in logic or reason (Oliver, Becker, and Matalene). In the second stage a few
communication scholars recognized the rich rhetorical practices in classical
China, for example Mary Garrett, Xing Lu, and George Kennedy. Garrett
conducted a series of studies of argumentation in classical China (“Pathos,”
“Wit,” “Classical”); Lu’s Rhetoric in Ancient China (1998) constructed Chinese
rhetorical notions from major philosophical and literary texts and compared
them with those in the Western classical tradition; and Kennedy’s Comparative
Rhetoric proposed a “General Theory” of rhetoric applicable to all cultures.
In the third stage scholars challenged earlier incomplete, biased Western as-
sumptions and drew more attention to Chinese primary sources on writing
and writing studies (Lu, “Studies,” 113–14). Drawing upon Kenneth Pike’s
linguistic theory of emics and etics (Pike, 37–97, 365–401; Peterson and Pike,
6–8), scholars started to contextualize the studies of Chinese rhetoric for fur-
ther considerations of comparative methodology.2 In the fourth stage scholars
realized that comparative insight can deepen the understanding of Western
rhetorical theory and practice (Lu, “Studies,” 114). Garrett studied Chinese
emotional appeals to the single-person audience (“Pathos,” “Wit”), and Steve
Combs applied Sunzi’s war strategies to persuasive communication and study
of the Dao in rhetoric (Dao of Rhetoric, 53–71) and others (Lu, “Studies,” 114;
Swearingen, “Response”).
The four stages of Chinese rhetorical studies synthesized by Lu comple-
ment the larger goal of present rhetorical studies to reclaim marginalized,
overlooked, or alienated alternative rhetorical traditions, theories, and prac-
tices as well as to recognize their implications for the interpretive frame-
work of the mainstream Western rhetorical tradition. Since the late 1990s,
2
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
a “recovery-and-recognition enterprise” (to borrow Hesford’s term, 793) has
emerged with a strong emphasis on reconstructing non-Western, nonwhite,
and non-middle-class rhetorics. Milestone works include those by Patricia
Bizzell, Cheryl Glenn, David Holms, Susan Jarratt, Carol Lipson and Roberta
Binkley, Shirley Logan, Andrea Lunsford, and Jacqueline Royster. Scholars
in rhetoric, communication, and composition “have had to contend with the
legacy of omission, and the field is still doing the necessary canon-building
work of expanding the rhetorical tradition to include women and minority-
group members and of mapping hierarchies of gender, class, race, sexuality,
and ability” (Hesford, 793). The translation and comparative study of Guiguzi
in this book join these efforts of remapping the rhetorical tradition by adding
a cross-cultural perspective.
Existing studies have enriched Western understandings of Chinese rheto-
ric in one way or another, even if with some imperfection or limitation. For
example, some key terminologies—ming (to name/define), bian (to argue/dis-
pute), yan (to speak/narrate), shui (to discuss/persuade), and shuo (to explain/
discuss)—have been reconstructed and identified (Garrett, “Classical,” 106; Lu,
Rhetoric, 68–93; Swearingen and Mao, “Introduction” W34–W35). Compara-
tive analysis of Chinese classics further shows that ancient Chinese speeches
fall generally into two categories: deliberative oratory and announcement.
Studies demonstrate that like the classical Western model, Chinese rhetori-
cal discourse also has four parts: proemium, narration, proof, and epilogue
(Kennedy, 146–51). Classical Chinese rhetoric teaches sequencing information
through first raising the topic and then discussing the details (Kirkpatrick,
“China’s First Treatise,” 133), as well as “proceeding from detail to conclusion,
from main point to detail, or from main point via detail to a restatement of
the main point” (Kirkpatrick, “China’s First Treatise,” 149). These steps share
the features of Western inductive and deductive reasoning. Scholars now
agree that traditional Chinese rhetoric does, indeed, share certain features
of Western rhetoric (You, “Conflation,” 150, 158–60).
Furthermore, scholarship has begun to challenge, through detailed study of
primary sources, the concept of rhetoric, and the history of writing, reductive
orientalized presumptions that Chinese rhetoric is indirect and nonlinear and
thus lacks logic. In response to the assertion that Chinese rhetoric tends to be
indirect, scholarship on pre-Qin rhetoric and modern composition textbooks
suggests that because of the autocratic and hierarchical nature of their society,
the Chinese prefer a form of chain-reasoning typically in sentence patterns
of “because—therefore” or “although—but” to lead to inductive conclusions,
though they are “perfectly able to reason deductively” (Kirkpatrick, “Chinese
Rhetoric,” 291; Kirkpatrick and Xu, “Chinese Rhetoric and Writing,” 107–42).
3
Hui Wu
As Kirkpatrick and Xu’s linguistic study of Chinese writing reveals, for de-
cades scholars in Chinese rhetoric have been puzzled by the questions of how
and why the Chinese relate rhetoric only to writing and rarely to oratory.
Research now demonstrates that the Chinese association of rhetoric solely
with written discourse is a modern development resulting from borrowing
Japanese terminologies for literary appreciation and translating selectively
figures of speech in English composition textbooks (Wu, “Lost and Found”).
Historicizing the influence of Western rhetoric on the teaching of English
composition in modern China suggests that bilingual writing instruction in
an East Asian country is hardly as monolingual as we used to believe (You,
Writing in the Devil’s Tongue). These studies have brought Chinese writing
theory and literacy to the West and have further globalized composition his-
tory and pedagogy.
Increased attention to Chinese rhetoric has also given rise to scholarship in
women’s rhetoric in both traditional and modern China (Garrett, “Women”;
Wang, “Breaking”; Wu, “Alternative” and “Historical Studies”). These studies
challenge not only male-dominated methodologies in rhetorical studies but
also Western-style feminist interpretive frameworks. These approaches have
revealed Chinese women’s innovative use of rhetorical strategies to criticize
patriarchal society and the Confucian orthodoxy of gender. On the other
hand, they warn that applying established Western feminist critical catego-
ries, such as the “self,” “body,” and “individual,” to the reading of modern
Chinese women’s writing displaces context-specific approaches in the study
of women’s rhetoric in other cultures (Wang, “Engaging Nüquanzhuyi”; Wu,
“Post-Mao”).
When remapping the rhetorical tradition, “the field does not yet have the
methodological foundation to study transnational rhetorical practices and
publics” (Hesford, 793). This lack of foundation, however, has provided space
for further contemplating methodological implications of Chinese rhetoric.
Some scholars have tried to develop critical methodology potentially applicable
across cultures. For example, after examining ancient Chinese philosophy
and historiography, as well as classics in other cultures, Kennedy made an
attempt to develop “a standard cross-cultural rhetorical terminology by modi-
fying Western concepts to describe what is found everywhere” (6, 141–67).
Steven Combs rereads the Daoist philosophy of Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Sunzi
and proposes to use Daoism as a “unique vantage point for rhetorical theory
and criticism” (Dao of Rhetoric, 87). He believes that Daoism could serve as a
critical methodology in rhetorical studies (Dao of Rhetoric, 73–84) and posits
“a communication theory, the yin and yang of rhetoric, and specific substan-
tive, strategic, and tactical elements of discourse” (Dao of Rhetoric, 150). This
4
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
is because persuasive approaches developed in both ancient Greece and China
still dominate in today’s business communication, as Yunxia Zhu and Herbert
Hildebrandt demonstrate. The study of rhetorical differences, therefore, can
be used “as a starting point for an in-depth analysis of cultural differences in
the use of effective discourse as well as marketing strategies across cultures”
(Zhu and Hildebrandt, 106). Finally, based on her rhetorical readings of an-
cient Chinese sages (Lyon, “Rhetorical Authority,” “Confucian Silence and
Remonstration”), Arabella Lyon proposes that Analects, Dao De Jing, and
Hanfeizi suggest that “even today, the disagreements among the classical texts
that informed his [Emperor Qin, or Qin Shi Huang’s] advisors are helpful to
understanding different rhetorical patterns, alternatives to Western rhetoric
and other cultural traditions” (“Writing an Empire,” 350).
Many now question the application of the Western model to Chinese rhe-
torical studies. Garrett maintains that “the study of Chinese rhetoric is pecu-
liarly vexed methodologically” (“Some,” 53). Cross-cultural studies are still
dominated by Romantic Hellenism tied to orientalism (Garrett, “Some,” 56).
Existing studies of Chinese rhetoric illustrate the limitations of analyzing
non-Western rhetoric primarily through the lens of the dominant Western
classical model (Lyon, “Confucian Silence”) and question the implication of
imposing Western frameworks onto non-Western texts (Lu, Rhetoric of the
Chinese Cultural Revolution). Moreover, reviewing the methodologies in major
studies from the 1960s to the end of 1990s, such as those by Kaplan, Oliver,
Garrett, Kennedy, and Lu, LuMing Mao reexamines the etic/emic linguistic
approach and proposes that it would enable scholars to start with concepts
close to home when primary sources were limited. They then could move on
to the emic approach to direct attention to materials and conditions native to a
specific rhetorical tradition. The etic/emic approach engages reflection on the
part of the scholar to avoid overgeneralizations or assumptions of “universal
rhetoric” (Mao, “Reflective Encounters,” 416–18). Mao critiques three method-
ological approaches that have influenced the U.S. study of Chinese rhetorical
tradition. The first method is a universal theory of rhetoric that is supposed to
be applicable to all cultures; the second is a piecemeal or selective approach in
search of a term in Chinese rhetorical tradition that may be equivalent to an
established Western rhetorical concept; and the third is an orientalist logic that
may essentialize Chinese rhetoric as deficient or unscientific (Mao, “Studying,”
216–21). Utilizing shu (恕), a Confucian notion that guides Chinese behaviors
and morals through the Dao, Mao illustrates an important aspect of Chinese
rhetoric—interconnectedness rooted in correlative thinking—to argue for an
interactive approach, an approach that recontextualizes the native point of
view to address the present inquiry (“Studying,” 233).
5
Hui Wu
In the wake of these cautions, controversies have emerged over comparative
methodology. Scott Stroud calls studies by Lu, Yameng Liu, and Mao a “de-
scriptive endeavor” (359). He recommends applying John Dewey’s pragmatism
to comparative rhetoric to correct the presupposition that “the purpose of
comparative work is the correct and accurate description of given traditions
of rhetoric” (359). Stroud believes that Dewey’s pragmatism enables rhetoric
scholars to add “the purpose of reconstruction or melioration” to rhetorical
criticism “to fix or change some aspect of the world (including us), not merely
to accurately describe it” (360, emphasis original). He continues to stipulate
that “comparative rhetoric, if it is to be informed by a pragmatist approach to
criticism and interpretation, will allow for differing approaches to comparing
and investigating Western and non-Western traditions” (362).
Stroud’s proposal for a balance between method and purpose through Dew-
eyan pragmatism actually confirms what scholars in Chinese rhetoric—for
example, Garrett, Lu, and Lyon—have discovered and recovered: comparative
rhetoric can reconstruct or meliorate the notion of rhetoric itself. Garrett has
pointed out that “rhetoric” is a contested word (“Some,” 53–54). Depending on
historical and cultural contexts, rhetoric can mean “the ability to persuade,”
persuasion of powerful people on the issues of public interest, interpersonal
persuasion, “an organized study of discourse,” or “symbolic inducement”
(“Some,” 54–55). These multiple definitions make it possible to define rhetoric
in a specific culture to discover or recover a rhetorical tradition on its own
terms and in its own right. Mao has conducted a search for what and where
Chinese rhetoric is to enrich comparative methodology. In the introduction
to a 2010 special issue of College English on Chinese rhetoric, he proposes
we “develop a dialogue between the what and the where in ways that can in
turn facilitate our search for the appropriate models of rhetorical conduct in
the study of Chinese rhetoric here and now” (“Searching,” 330). Using the
Chinese Dao as the key analogy, Mao emphasizes not only our reflectiveness
in studies of other rhetorical traditions but also our awareness of the way
these traditions interact with one another in global contact zone through the
methodology of interdependence-in-difference previously articulated in his
book Reading Chinese Fortune Cookie. To Mao, comparative methodology
is “a process where we learn to perpetually negotiate between developing a
localized narrative and searching for its broader significance without truing
it into a ‘super-narrative’” (“Searching,” 341).
Reexamining Mao’s and others’ “descriptive enterprise” reveals that Mao’s
criticism of super-narrative pinpoints some core issues of comparative rheto-
ric: How to assess and analyze alternative rhetorics to which we hardly have
equivalents in the Western framework? How to determine explanations for
6
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
the different units, if any? Therefore, it is no accident that the most notice-
able effort is discovering similarities and differences; Stroud proposes to pay
attention to both (373). Mao’s interdependence-in-difference and etic/emic
approaches exemplify the reality—scholars cannot help but compare similari-
ties and contrast differences. As Carol Lipson notices, “Comparative studies
of ancient cultures and their rhetorics inevitably depend on some degree of
comparison, since scholars cannot escape the frameworks of their cultural
makeups” (Rhetoric, 21). Scholarship consistently suggests that “We are alike
and different” (Swearingen, “Response,” 425). Even though it may be fraught
with imperfection and limitation, this method of “moving back and forth
between looking at differences and considering similarities,” Swearingen aptly
notes, is “a valued form of investigation, a way of looking at things, a dao, that
can improve understanding” (426). Through addressing similarities and dif-
ferences and debating about methodologies, Chinese rhetoric advances and
presents itself as a subarea in rhetorical studies.
However, studies of Chinese rhetoric are encountering two major draw-
backs—paucity of primary texts and inadequate translations. Very few pri-
mary texts devoted entirely to rhetoric are available to Western scholars in
rhetoric, communication, and composition. Lu notices that the void has be-
come one of the major challenges (“Comparative Studies,” 112); Liu believes
that Western scholars’ flawed perspectives of Chinese rhetoric stem from
limited textual evidence due to a small portion of translated classical texts
(“To Capture,” 323). In other words, scholars’ generalizations about Chinese
rhetoric rely on a relatively limited textual or experiential database (“To Cap-
ture,” 323). Coupled with paucity, inaccurate translation without careful cross-
examination of primary Chinese texts results in problematic interpretation
and methodology. David Hall points out that even with a number of different
translations of a given classical Chinese text at hand, a Western critic ignorant
of the Chinese language is “guaranteed to present a superficial and distorted
interpretation” (23). For instance, Stephen Mitchell’s translation of the Way
and the Power (Dao De Jing) may “leave something to be desired for some read-
ers, because he ‘translated’ this text without knowing any Classical Chinese
and arrived at his English-language version by dint of relying on other transla-
tions” (Garrett, “Some,” 62). Inaccurate interpretations result in misleading
comparative methodology. Kennedy’s Comparative Rhetoric is a milestone
work but relies heavily on various translations for the sociocultural context
of rhetoric and consequently fails to reconceptualize rhetoric’s fundamental
components beyond the Western paradigm.
The Guiguzi text serves as another example. Extant are two translations—
one by Michael Broschat and the other by Thomas Cleary. Broschat’s is part
7
Hui Wu
of an unpublished dissertation (1985), and Cleary’s is in the first section of
his book, Thunder in the Sky: Secrets on the Acquisition and Exercise of Power.
Broschat’s narrative of the archeological history of Guiguzi shows little at-
tention to its rhetorical theory. Cleary’s translation entitled “The Master of
Demon Valley” takes up 75 pages of his 165-page book and identifies Guiguzi
as a “classical Taoist text, following on the ancient philosophical tradition
but adapted specifically for secular leaders” (xiv), without relating it to the
teaching of rhetoric or offering any annotation. Moreover, an English reader
would not know that Guiguzi is the author of “The Master of Demon Valley,”
for the Chinese name of the primary author is not present in the translation.
Finally, Cleary’s reliance on some unnamed modern Chinese editions for
his translation, as his “Notes on the Translation” reiterate, may reinforce
misinterpretation of the Guiguzi text. Cleary’s translation omits phrases and
sentences in most chapters, resulting in an incomplete edition. The inadequate
translations have left the Guiguzi text largely unknown as an important trea-
tise of rhetoric.
Without Guiguzi on the map of rhetoric, we might easily assume that Chi-
nese rhetoric is exclusively a writing tradition, as Kirkpatrick’s work on Chen
Kui’s Rules of Writing suggests. We might not achieve a comprehensive and
balanced perception that the Chinese rhetorical tradition also includes oratory,
or persuasion, which Garrett, Lu, and others have proven to be active in the
pre-Qin Warring States period. Without reading Guiguzi, we might exclusively
focus on writing studies in the Chinese rhetorical tradition without knowing
that associating rhetoric solely with writing is a modern Chinese practice, a
practice that was only fully developed in the first half of the twentieth century
under Japanese and Anglo-American academic influences (Wu, “Lost and
Found”). Kirkpatrick’s claim that Chen’s Rules of Writing is China’s earliest
account of rhetoric has been modified by You’s examination of the court debate
recorded in Yan Tie Lun, or The Discourse of Salt and Iron,3 a court debate that
took place in 81 b.c.e. between Confucian literati and governmental officials
(You, “Building Empire,” 369–71). Oral debate is clearly part of the Chinese
rhetorical tradition. Without access to quality translations of primary texts,
scholars who cannot read Chinese but are interested in Chinese rhetoric have
had no choice but to rely largely on translated texts of philosophy, historiog-
raphy, or literature, resulting sometimes in what Mao calls “super-narrative.”
The addition of Guiguzi to the landscape of rhetoric helps define rhetoric in
the Chinese tradition and provides a direct access to an indigenous Chinese
rhetorical theory. It amplifies the search for rhetoric in the Chinese tradition,
the ongoing inquiry into what and where Chinese rhetoric exemplifies (Mao,
“Searching”). Further, the history of Guiguzi’s exclusion reminds us that
8
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
canonical membership and disciplinary recognition alone will not provide
a methodological basis for better understanding the emergence, history,
and rhetorical dynamics of transnational publics. But indispensable tools
for thinking through the role of rhetoric in shaping the course of global-
ization can be derived from critical studies of rhetorical history and from
interrogation of why certain rhetors and rhetorical communities were
excluded from the canon in the first place. (Hesford, 793)
Guiguzi offers such an opportunity for critical studies of an indigenous rhe-
torical theory and practice excluded from the rhetorical canon in both China
and the West. For this reason, the following sections present an introduction
to the sociocultural backdrop of the Guiguzi text, its controversial historical
receptions, and its theory of rhetoric.

Guiguzi and Its Sociopolitical Context

The Guiguzi text refers to the Master of the Ghost Valley and is named for its
author, who lived in Guigu (Ghost Valley)4 during the pre-Qin Warring States
period. Although his real name is said to have been Wang Xu, he is known as
Guiguizi, with the character zi (master) appended to the place, Guigu, to indicate
his honorific title as well as the text he allegedly authored. Guiguzi is recognized
as the first teacher specifically associated with the “art of persuasion” (Coyle,
1–2; Chen; Xu) and allegedly taught about five hundred students in 378–322
b.c.e.,5 including Sun Bin (孫臏 also called Sunzi 孫子), military strategist and
descendant of Sun Wu (孫武) or Sunzi (Sun Tzu 孫子), author of the Art of War
(Liu and Liu, 13–14; S. Zhang, 45).6 Guiguzi was also a contemporary of Aristotle
(384–322 b.c.e.) (Xu, Study, 158–59), whose On Rhetoric continues to influence
Western thinking modes, reasoning patterns, and spoken and written discourse
structures. Similarly, Guiguzi has had an enduring influence on ancient and
modern Chinese rhetorical practice, statecraft, diplomacy, business conduct,
communication, negotiation, ethics, and religion. Based on yin-yang philosophy,
Guiguzi teaches rhetoric as a related set of strategies, including open-shut (捭闔),
reflect-respond (反應), restrain-fortify (内揵), mend-break (抵巇), agitate-
arrest (飛箝), and oppose-ally (忤合), weighing (揣), gauging (摩), assessing
(權), deploying (謀), and decision-making (决). Most of these terms are still in
use in China to describe decisions and negotiations.
According to tradition, the corpus of Guiguzi was compiled into a single
text during the Tang Dynasty (618–907 c.e.), and book 3 was added at that time
(Chen, 162–64). However, whether Guiguzi, the master, existed, or whether
he authored the entire treatise himself, or whether his disciples compiled his
teaching notes, or whether the whole text is a counterfeit is debated.7 Scholars
9
Hui Wu
generally agree that “most pre-Qin classics worked like a loose-leaf binder into
which one inserted essays or notes by different hands, and added, removed, or
rearranged the material to suit the evolving interests of the complier” (Lewis,
55). Similarly, “Guiguzi exhibits the signs of a once oral tradition which so-
lidifies into an organic textual form” (Coyle, 144–45). The general consensus
is that the first eleven chapters were composed by one person, presumably
Guiguzi; chapter 12 might be adapted from Guanzi compiled by Liu Xiang, the
compiler of Zhan Guo Ce in the Han Dynasty (206 b.c.e.–188 c.e.). Chapter 13,
“Zhuanwan,” and chapter 14, “Quluan,” are missing. Book 3 might have been
composed later by unknown writers in the Tang Dynasty (Chen; Coyle, 145;
Graham, Disputers n. 216). There is also a widespread allegation that book 3
was compiled during the dynasties of Wei and Jin, or Southern and Northern
Dynasties (220–589 c.e.). Xu Fuhong compares the rhymes of characters in
book 1 and book 3 and concludes that all three chapters in book 3 might have
solidified during the pre-Qin period in 475–221 b.c.e. (Study, 35). His statis-
tics on rhyming characters and patterns lead to the conclusion that the first
chapter in book 3 might have been authored by Guiguzi, but Xu doubts if the
last two chapters are by Guiguzi, because their rhymes do not follow the same
pattern (Study, 35, 105–14, 135).
All Chinese editors follow the edition presumably annotated by Tao Hong­
jing (456–536 c.e.) in the Liang Dynasty (502–557 c.e.). However, the alleged
date of the solidification of Guiguzi is rightly contested. The Tang Dynasty
occurred over a hundred years after the Liang Dynasty when Tao’s alleged
edition came into being, and Guiguzi had already been arranged into three
books composed of fifteen chapters, with notes on the lost chapters 13 and
14. Yin Zhizhang in the Tang Dynasty is believed to have prepared another
edition. Somehow, by the Song Dynasty (960–1279), only Tao’s version sur-
vived in China.8 Some Chinese commentators also refer to the Daoist ver-
sion (Dao Cang Ben), a version for religious Daoism circulated during the
Ming Dynasty between 1368 and 1644 (Chen, 9; Ren and Bai, 194; Zong, 12).
It is said that Dao Cang Ben is the same as Tao’s, so Tao’s annotated edi-
tion is regarded as the most authoritative, and his commentaries remain
largely unchallenged.
The pre-Qin Warring States period, when Guiguzi allegedly taught rhetoric,
was a “most chaotic and stimulating time” in classical China (Lu, Rhetoric,
61). All of the states were on edge and on alert because they might have to
attack or counterattack their enemies at any moment. Kings had to weigh
possible moves, know the intent of other kings, and have retaliatory strategies
ready. Capable consultants were highly valued, respected, and rewarded. In
The Annuals of Lü Buwei (Lüshi chunqui) written near the end of the Warring
10
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
States period, Lü Buwei (?–about 235 b.c.e.) says, “Whether they [rulers] were
successful or not depended on one principle: without exception, every ruler
who obtained worthies [capable advisors] has a secure state and a glorious
reputation; and every ruler who lost worthies has an endangered state and
disgraceful reputation” (Knoblock and Riegel, 22/5.I 578). Like Greek Soph-
ists, Chinese learned men were eloquent persuaders ready to provide political
consultation to kings and also “frequently engaged in debate,” as Lü Buwei
describes (Knoblock and Riegel, 15/8.I 368). State rulers sought their political
consultation because their states were engaged in conflicts and wars, “each
wanting to conquer their enemy states and become the dominant power”
(Lu, Rhetoric, 62). The Warring States era created the need for traveling per-
suaders and warfare strategists to serve as advisers to kings who wanted to
adopt certain policies, to govern their people, to avoid wars, or to conquer
the neighboring states.9
More important, China’s earliest historiography, Shi Ji, or The Grand Scribe’s
Records (Ssu-Ma), and the military history Zhan Guo Ce, or Intrigues: Stud-
ies of the Chan-Kuo Ts’e (Crump), record that Guiguzi’s students include the
most famous traveling persuaders and political consultants, Su Qin (Su Zi
苏秦) and Zhang Yi (Zhang Zi 張儀).10 Su and Zhang earned high repute
for their rhetorical practices of zong-heng, or vertical and horizontal war
strategies in the Warring States period. Su and his counterparts practiced
zong to advocate he zong, or vertical alliance, while the heng school repre-
sented by Zhang advocated lian heng, or horizontal alliance. As Lu explains,
he zong is effective for uniting the weaker states to fight the strongest state,
while lian heng is effective for the strongest state to defeat the weakest states
(Rhetoric, 117). Su and Zhang are said to be able to convince kings to prac-
tice “vertical” and “horizontal” strategies for alliance and opposition to
save their states or defeat them. In The Literary Mind and the Carving of
Dragons (wenxin diaolong 文心雕籠), Liu Xie (Liu Hsieh 劉勰 465–522 c.e.),
renowned literary critic, recalls that these persuaders competed with the
long-short (chang duan 長短) and captivate-capture (fei qian 飛箝), tactics
taught by Guiguzi. He then concludes that “the eloquence of one man was
more weighty than the precious nine tripod; a tongue three inches long was
stronger than a million troops” (106). James Crump wonders if the practice
of the zong-heng persuaders represents an established rhetorical tradition. In
his Intrigues: Studies of the Chan-Kuo Ts’e, he suggests, “Suppose a Chinese
rhetorical tradition included some such device as the suasoria for train-
ing men in the art of persuasion, would that not explain much of what is
most baffling about the Intrigues [Zhan Guo Ce or Chan-Kuo Ts’e]?” (103).
Then he asks,
11
Hui Wu
Why, for example, do so many persuaders so often speak their entire
piece with no interruption from the ruler . . . ? Why are the pieces in the
Intrigues so beautifully polished? And how did the men in the Intrigues
invariably think of just the right things to say for the occasion? (103)
Evidently, in these rhetorical strategies, Su, Zhang, and others like them have
been compared to Sophists in ancient Greece and characterized as Chinese
sophists (Forke, 1–2).11
However, the audience of Chinese rhetoric was different from that of the
Western tradition. This understanding of the audience is important to the
understanding of Guiguzi’s rhetorical theory, which has been mistakenly in-
terpreted as anti-rhetoric, or manipulation, in the West. The Chinese rhetors
were not public speakers but persuaders primarily in a private setting, most
often talking to a one-person audience often assumed to be the ruler, or a su-
perior (Garret, “Pathos,” 23; Lu, Rhetoric 80; You, “Building Empire” 368–70).
Rhetoric to the single-person audience developed special features. The ruler,
though not elected, was “anxious to gain the support of the masses or their
compliance” (Garrett, “Pathos,” 22), and yet, at the same time, remained criti-
cal of his advisors’ words because traveling persuaders were not loyal to any
states. Lü Buwei, who served as an advisor to the king of Qin (Ch’in 秦) near
the end of the Warring States period, said that the rulers ought to understand
that “the grounds for judging the quality of advice cannot but be carefully
investigated. If it is not carefully investigated, then the good and the not-good
will not be properly characterized, and there is no greater disorder than when
the good and the not-good are not properly characterized” (Knoblock and
Riegel, 13/4.I 289). To this end, the ruler
must carefully think through his general principles of action and his spe-
cific standards for speeches. . . . Holding fast to these principles will also
enable him to avoid the temptation of the seductive powers of language, to
avoid the trap of “finding beauty in the sound of the style and the parallel
phrasing of arguments and persuasions.” (Garrett, “Pathos,” 28)
The ruler usually followed a general rule when seeking consultation. Lü Buwei
describes it as follows:
It is a general principle that when a ruler knows something, he does not
want to be the first to express it in words. “Others sing the lead, I provide
the harmony; others lead, I follow.” By what a man utters, you know what
he will contribute; by what he advises, you determine the title he should
possess; and by how he realizes what he has advised, you test whether
he has lived up to that title. The persuaders will not dare to make wild
12
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
claims, and the rulers will have a means to hold fast to what is essential.
(Knoblock and Riegel, 18/I.I 439)
The trained critical listener required that the persuader carefully craft his
speeches not only to win the ears of the audience and maintain a hierar-
chical relationship but also to protect him from the ruler’s persecution that
might result from dislikes, as a later analysis of Guiguzi will show. On the
one hand, the ruler was supposed to value the advisor’s straight talk because,
as Lü Buwei notices, “when the talk is straight, then the crooked is obvious”
(Knoblock and Riegel, 23/I.I 586). On the other, the rulers “like to hear lies
and detest straight talk,” writes Lü Buwei (Knoblock and Riegel, 23/I.I 586).
In the process of persuasion, “when words are extremely frank, they incite
anger in the listener. When the listener is angered, the speaker is threatened”
(Lü, Knoblock and Riegel, 23/I.I 590). To some degree, persuasion in classical
China was almost an issue of life or death, wealth or poverty. When discussing
dangers and difficulties of persuasion, Hanfeizi says,
Though the ruler himself has not yet divulged his plans, if you in your
discussions happen to hit upon his hidden motives, then you will be in
danger. If the ruler is ostensibly seeking one thing but actually is attempt-
ing to accomplish something quite different, and you perceive not only his
ostensible but the real motives behind his action as well, then you would
be likewise in danger. (Han Fei Tzu, 75)
A Chinese proverb also says, “Being close to a king is like being close to a ti-
ger,” meaning that in serving a king, one must carefully weigh situations and
measure his or her words for survival. Gaining the ruler’s favor, the persuader
would obtain power and wealth, suggests Garrett (“Pathos,” 23). When out of
favor, the persuader would jeopardize his or her life, lose all credentials for
the future, or live in poverty.
The following excerpt from Shi Ji (The Grand Scribe’s Records) provides
an example of classical Chinese persuasion, wherein Su Qin advises the king
of State Zhao (Chao) to form an alliance with the states of Han, Wei, Ch’i,
Ch’u, and Yen against the state of Qin (Ch’in). It is worth quoting part of this
lengthy speech on military deployment by Su Qin, who convinced the king
of Zhao in the end.
Your servant has heard that an enlightened ruler will sever all doubts
and remove all slander, close off the paths of idle rumor, block up the
gates of partisan squabbling; thus your vassals will be free to place your
plans for exalting the ruler, broadening his territory and strengthening
his army.
13
Hui Wu
This in planning for you, Great King, it would be best to unify Han,
Wei, Ch’i, Ch’u, Yen, and Chao into one alliance, and fight back against
Ch’in.
. . .
If Ch’in attacks Han and Wei, Ch’u will cut off its rear, Ch’i will send
out its best troops to assist them, Chao will ford the Ho [area] and Chang
[area], and Yen will hold the north of Mount Ch’ang.
If Ch’in attacks Ch’i, then Ch’u will cut off its rear, Han will hold
Ch’eng-kao 城皋 [town], Wei will block its road, Chao will ford the Ho
and Chang, and cross Po 博 Pass, and Yen will send out its best troops
to aid [Ch’i].
If Ch’in attacks Yen, the Chao will hold Mount Ch’ang, Ch’u will oc-
cupy the Wu 武 Pass, Ch’i will cross the Sea of Po-hai 渤海, and Han and
Wei will send out their best troops to aid [Yen].
If Ch’in attacks Chao, then Han will occupy Yi-yang, Ch’u will send
out its best troops to aid [Chao].
If one of the feudal lords fails to follow the pact, the forces of the five
states will jointly attack it.
If the Six States ally together and isolate Ch’in, the armored soldiers
of Ch’in will not dare to come out of the Han-ku 函谷 [pass] to harm the
lands East of the Mount (Tai). When this is done, the task of a Hegemon
King is complete.
The King of Chao said, “We are youthful, and have not held the throne
for long, so that we have never heard great plans for securing the altars of
grain and soil. Now you, our honored guest, desire to preserve the world
and secure the federal lords. We respectfully follow you with our state.”
(Ssu-Ma, 102, brackets in the original, parentheses added)

As an illustration of the previous discussion of the single-person audience,

this conversation can be divided into three parts. The first part is Su’s opening
remarks before introducing his plan, the second is his plan or military strate-
gies for alliance of six small kingdoms against Qin (Ch’in), the biggest, and
the last is the response of the king of Zhao (Chao) to Su’s speech. To illustrate
Su’s effective persuasion, emphasis must be placed on Su’s opening remarks
because the alliance plan Su presents cannot be accepted if the opening of his
speech does not connect him to the king emotionally and intellectually to win
his trust. Referring to himself as the king’s “servant,” Su follows the rites; that
is, subordinates must position themselves correctly and speak accordingly.
This self-deprecatory term attests to Garrett’s reading that the persuader must
follow his general principles of action and his specific standards for speeches
14
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
(“Pathos,” 28). The self-reference “your servant” also shows Su’s loyalty to the
king to dispel suspicions about his character, if any. At the same time, aware
of his skeptical single-person audience (the king) and the possibility of back-
stabbing, resistance, or jealousy of those who are close to the King, Su tries to
demonstrate his knowledge as an effective military advisor to clear his field
for persuasion. Instead of telling the king that he should “sever all doubts and
remove all slander, close off the paths of idle rumor, block up the gates of par-
tisan squabbling,” Su implicitly establishes his credibility as an informed and
knowledgeable advisor by saying that he “heard” what an enlightened ruler
would do. It reads as if Su purposely leaves his source open for interpretation.
For example, he could have heard from the high heavenly power or the sage
discussed constantly by Confucius, Guiguzi, and their contemporaries. This in-
direct measure helps Su build his credibility as a learned consultant and dispels
the king’s doubt about his character before offering his analysis of the situation
and alliance plans. Su then uses “an enlightened ruler” to address the king
indirectly, deferentially complimenting him for being benevolent and intelli-
gent to receive worthy consultation. The last sentence in the opening remarks
identifies the goals of Su’s recommendations—“exalting the ruler, broadening
his territory and strengthening his army,” which “happens” to resonate strongly
with the king’s goal of governance, because the king is “anxious to gain the
support of the masses or their compliance” (Garrett, “Pathos,” 22). Only by
connecting with the single-person audience and identifying his goals can the
rhetor safely present war strategies and successfully persuade those in power.
In the end, the king does not say if Su’s plans are acceptable or not but,
instead, commends him for the laudable goal of “preserving the world and
securing the lords.” The king’s compliment indicates his acceptance of Su as a
trustworthy consultant, a strategic move of the king to position Su favorably and
positively among his people who, Su is afraid, may circulate slanders, rumors,
and squabble about him. The king’s identification of Su’s goal in relation to the
world and other lords also purports to demonstrate that he is a king who cares
about his people and other kingdoms and not only about his own interests. By
doing this, the king of Zhao (Chao) implies that he is indeed a compassionate
“enlightened” honorable ruler. Then he gives Su “a hundred ornamented car-
riages, a thousand yi of gold, a hundred pairs of white jade-disks, and a thousand
ch’un of embroidered brocade” (Ssu-Ma, 103). With these gifts, Su goes on to
persuade another five states to form alliance against State Qin (Ch’in). After-
ward, Su becomes master of the oaths of alliance and serves as prime minister
to all of the states. Each king sends him so many carriages, horsemen, and carts
of supplies that he is mistaken for a king. (Ssu-Ma, 108). Su’s success exemplifies
the importance of rhetorical strategies in the pre-Qin Warring States period.
15
Hui Wu

Paradoxical Chinese Receptions of Guiguzi

However, as one of Guiguzi’s alleged students, Su Qin’s successful military strat-
egies have caused troublesome reception of Guiguzi, for Su Qin and Zhang Yi,
alleged zong-heng military strategists, were the assumed audience, or students,
of the teaching in Guiguzi. Zi Zhi Tong Jian (資治通鋻), a historiography of
pre-Qin through Tang China (403 b.c.e.–959 c.e.) by Sima Guang (1019–86),
records that studying under their master Guiguzi, Su and Zhang realized that
they could never reach their master’s level of rhetoric (Sima, 15). For centuries,
the alleged teacher-student association between Guiguzi and the zong-heng
practitioners has consequently, and unfortunately, misidentified Guiguzi as a
book on military strategy, resulting in centuries-long mystification, misreading,
and misrepresentation. Interestingly and ironically, it is exactly because of the
alleged zong-heng association that Guiguizi retains the magic power and the
bad name of a wicked book. Historically, this unsolved paradox has sustained
discrimination against Guiguzi, excluding it from China’s mainstream aca-
demic and political cultures and conventions established after Confucianism.
On the one hand, Guiguzi has widely circulated as a magic book, with its
rhetorical strategies deemed a powerful craft for political and commercial af-
fairs. Chinese politicians, diplomats, war strategists, and businessmen desire to
master the techniques in the Guiguzi text. In response, many stories and com-
mentaries project Guiguzi as a magic book that teaches unfathomably powerful
tactics in persuasion and military deployment that are supposedly exemplified
by the practice of Guiguzi’s students, Su, Zhang, and Sunzi. For example, The
Legacy of Guiguzi: The Invincible Strategist in the Warring States Period by Xiao
Yuhan, a Taiwanese fiction writer, presents Guiguzi as a superhero capable of
prophesying and applying witchcraft-like martial techniques to help people and
states in need. Other writings, such as “Ode to a Traveling Spirit” (youxian shi
遊仙詩), a poem by Guo Pu (郭璞 275–324 c.e.); A Record of Alternative Oth-
ers (luyi ji 錄异記) by Du Guangting (杜光庭 850–933 c.e.); and Stories about
States in the East Zhou Dynasty (dongzhou lieguo zhi 东周列國誌, chap. 87)
largely present Guiguzi as a supernatural being possessing magic power capable
of bringing justice to the world by protecting the wronged and punishing the
wrongdoer. In the mid-1990s, modern Chinese interest in Guiguzi was rekindled
by commercialization and business efficacy during the economic reform begun
in the early 1980s. A Comprehensive Guide to Guiguzi’s Pragmatic Schemas, a
best seller edited by Zhang Jianguo, presents thirty-six invisible supernatural
tactics to deceive, fool, and bait the audience. Zheng Jiewen’s study of Guiguzi
is purposely titled Divine Design and Miracles in Guiguzi (Guiguzi tainji miaoyi
鬼谷子天機妙意), shrouding the book with magic and mystery.
16
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
The legacy of Guiguzi as magic also has much to do with a story about Su
before he gained wealth and power as a traveling persuader. According to Shi
Ji (The Grand Scribe’s Records), Su had served as a disciple under the “Vener-
able” Guigu, but “after traveling for several years he returned home in dire
straits,” living in poverty and shame and being laughed at by his family mem-
bers (Ssu-Ma, 97). Feeling sorry for himself, Su confined himself in the house
and went over all the books he had. He then saw the book of Taigong Yin Fu
(Taigong’s Yin Mystique 太公阴符) by Jiang Taigong (姜太公),12 a consultant
to King Wen and King Wu on political, state, and military affairs in the Zhou
Dynasty (1046–2567 b.c.e.). Su studied Yin Fu (the Yin Mystique) day and
night, reciting it to internalize the tactics of weighing (chuai 揣) and deploying
(mou 謀). The story goes, “After a year gone by, he went out to plumb [men’s
intentions] and plan [his response]” (Ssu-Ma, 97, brackets original). Then Su
told himself, “With this I can advise the great lord of our times” (Ssu-Ma,
97), and he did. It happens that Guiguzi also discusses weighing (chuai 揣)
and deploying (mou 謀) in chapters 8 and 10 respectively, and the Yin Mys-
tique (yin fu 阴符) in book 3, “The Primary Doctrine,” which is specifically
on cultivating the mind and body to become an effective persuader. Modern
Chinese scholars sometimes add their own interpretations to the story. For
example, Zhao Kuifu says, “I believe Taigong Yin Fu Su Qin read was what his
teacher Master Guigu assigned him as the fundamental theory of persuasion”
(8). Compounded by other legacies and commentaries in history, the facets
of Su’s legacy—his reading of Yin Fu, which is said to endow upon him magic
power; his study under Master Guigu; and the appearances of chuai, mou,
and Yin Fu in the Guiguzi book—contribute to the concept of Guiguzi as a
magic book and, as a result, have created a myth of personal legacy, power,
and magic in the Chinese art of persuasion.13
On the other hand, Guiguzi was rejected as a wicked book. Liu Xie (Liu
Hsieh) writes, “For all works dealing with morals and government developed
out of the five classics, those which are pure conform to the classical patterns,
and those which are impure do not” (97). Guiguzi belongs to the latter cat-
egory, “speculative writings,” as Liu calls it, and is officially labeled morally
impure. Liu Zongyuan (柳宗元 773–819), famous essayist in the Tang Dynasty,
criticized scholars who studied the “extremely dangerous and unscrupulous”
Guiguzi but praised those who “appropriately did not discuss it” for fear of
“its grossly absurd expressions” (qtd. in Coyle 1; Chen, 249–50). Moreover, Li
Wenshu and Wang Yinglin, philologists in the Song Dynasty (960–1279), sug-
gested Guiguzi’s “deceptive intrigues” derived from “uncontrolled arrogance
and belligerence” (qtd. in Dictionary of Classical Chinese, 34 and in S. Zhang,
46). Since antiquity, only two historic figures have made positive comments
17
Hui Wu
(Zhao, 9). One is Liu Xiang (劉向), author of Zhan Guo Ce, who considered
Guiguzi a book for the good; the other is Gao Sixun (高似逊), author of Zi
Lue 子略 in the Song Dynasty (960–1279), who commended Guiguzi for its
exquisite style, articulate words, and sharp insight (Zhao, 9). However, their
positive comments have been overridden by the negative ones.
Consequently, no official collection of classics in China includes Guiguzi.
It was omitted from the Anthology of Ancient Classics (諸子集成), the most
authoritative publication in modern China, which presents twenty-six masters,
including Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Liezi, Mozi, Yanzi,
Guanzi, Shenzi, Hanfeizi, Sunzi, Wuzi, Yinwenzi, Huainanzi, and others.
In 2007, the fifty-volume Library of Chinese Classics was published with the
support of the Chinese government and collaboration among more than ten
publishers. Including one hundred classics ranging from the Warring States
period to modern times, it is said to “best represent Chinese history, philoso-
phy, religion, politics, military thought, science, technology, and literature.”
Again, Guiguzi was left out.
According to Zhao Kuifu, there are two reasons for the negative reception
of Guiguzi. First, the book primarily teaches the powerless, or subordinates,
how to overpower the powerful, or superiors (9–11). For example, Su “came
from the humblest of origins” but united six kingdoms in the amity of an al-
liance (Crump, 31). Rulers of ancient China were not pleased with a book that
would teach their subjects skills to analyze and control their kings’ minds. As
single-person audiences, they are critical and suspicious of any persuasion.
Second, Guiguzi does not support the Confucian orthodoxy (Zhao, 9–11). In
comparison with Confucius’s students, who sought to persuade the rulers to
act for a moral order rather than for profit, Guiguzi’s alleged students, the
zong-heng persuaders, traveled to sell their advisory services to states without
maintaining loyalty to a particular state or king. They followed mutual ben-
efits and interests instead of Confucian virtues (cf. Lu, Rhetoric, 81, 117–18).
Confucius (551–479 b.c.e.) is known for his criticism of “cunning eloquence”
(Analects, 17.17; Lewis, 84–86; G. Xu, 117). He suspected that “glib-tongued
talkers [would] bring down states and families” (Analects, 17.18). The suspicion
about skillful persuaders became prevalent near the end of the Warring States
period. Lü Buwei accused persuaders of conducting improper business, saying,

With expressions that are piercingly sharp and propositions that turn
reality upside down, they do not seek truth but strive to best one another,
considering victory their sole purpose. How would it be proper to adopt
the laws of the Former Kings? Even if it were proper, the results would be
the same as if it were improper. (Knoblock and Riegel, 15/8.I 368)
18
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
Yameng Liu sums up eighteen names of flawed yan (speech) present in clas-
sical Chinese texts, all associated with pejoratives—insincerity, glib-tongue,
fabrication, evasion, untruth, and so on (“Nothing,” 160). Consequently, the
success of the zong-heng persuaders and their probable study under Guiguzi,
became the basis for discrimination against not only themselves but also their
teacher and his book.
When Confucianism was established as the official orthodoxy in the Han
Dynasty (206 b.c.e.–188 c.e.), the eloquent traveling persuaders were denounced
as amoral and dangerous. For this reason, Guiguzi has been excluded from the
masters since pre-Qin dynasties, such as Laozi,14 Confucius, and Mencius,15
whose texts have been canonized and studied for centuries. The classical wis-
dom guiding China’s economic policy discussion in the Han Dynasty recorded
in Yan Tie Lun (The Discourse of Salt and Iron) by Huan Kuan left out students
of Guiguzi’s disciples because they were believed to challenge Confucianism
in practice (Wang and Wang, 2). Han Wudi, Empire Wu of the Han Dynasty,
announced that “all those who follow the teachings of Shen [Buhai 申不害],
Shang [Yang 商鞅], Han Fei [Hanfeizi], Su Qin, and Zhang Yi should not be
selected” (qtd. in Wang and Wang, 2). Shen, Shang, and Hangfeizi were politi-
cal philosophers advocating legal reforms, while Su and Zhang were zong-heng
persuaders believed to practice what Guiguzi had taught.
This discrimination has largely evolved from the dominant reading of
Guiguzi as part of the zong-heng theory based on the alleged teacher-student
relationship between Master Guigu and Su Qin and Zhang Yi. Although some
Chinese scholars have begun to study the Guiguzi as a classic of philosophy,
aesthetics, and rhetoric—for example, Xu Fuhong—none of them has offered
any alternative reading of the Guiguzi that challenges the teacher-student
theoretical association between Guiguzi and the zong-heng school. Instead,
they reinforce this interpretation. For instance, Xu’s study suggests that in
Guiguzi there are deliberate efforts to connect persuasion to Laozi’s Daoism in
order to legitimize zong-heng strategies, eventually establishing the terminolo-
gies of zong and heng (Study, 191–99). Chen Puqing connects each Guigucian
strategy to a certain tactic practiced by the zong-heng persuaders in Zhang
Guo Ce. Fang Lizhong emphasizes that the Guiguzi is the only book left by the
zong-heng school (521). He even names the second chapter of his commentary
“The Book of the Zong-Heng Family: Guiguzi.” Even Zhao, one of the most
respected authoritative figures in Chinese classics, connects Guiguzi to zong-
heng without further deliberations. Asking what kind of writing the zong-heng
school has left behind and what theoretical contributions it has made, Zhao
does not answer his own questions. Instead, he goes on to say, “I believe that
in order to understand the zong-heng school’s philosophical and theoretical
19
Hui Wu
contributions and achievements, we must conduct serious studies of Guiguzi”
(5). To date, the presumption that Guiguzi belongs to the zong-heng school
remains the major problem in assessing its academic, ethical, and social values.
In fact, Guiguzi is not about zong-heng, because the entire treatise hardly
develops any notions or terminologies directly related to the school’s war strate-
gies. The Chinese stipulations have relied solely on historical legacy for reading
the Guiguzi, since few texts by Chinese persuaders have survived to prove the
alleged theoretical association (Coyle, 170–71; Lu, Rhetoric 136). A book on
rhetoric, Guiguzi has hardly anything to do with military deployment. Daniel
Coyle rightly notes that in the Guiguzi, zong and heng never appear together as
a phrase to mean horizontal and vertical alliances (170). A close reading shows
that zong and heng only occur in chapters 1 and 6. In chapter 1, zong and heng
appear as antonyms to mean the world, regions, or directions. In chapter 6,
zong and heng, also as antonyms, symbolically represent opposite directions
without reference to military deployment. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that
given the chronological documentations, the zong-heng persuaders might have
studied under Guiguzi but might have developed their own war strategies and
theories, for example, Sun Bin’s practice of warfare and Su Qin’s and Zhang
Yi’s alliance. Therefore, “the Guiguzi text is by no means limited to what comes
under the retrospective ‘zong-heng’ label” (Coyle, 170). Even if the zong-heng
school’s rhetorical practice had been influenced by its teacher, Master Guigu,
its military consultations and theories would stand independent of the mas-
ter’s theory. Furthermore, the zong-heng label does not do justice to Guiguzi’s
profound theory of rhetoric, which is dominated by his philosophy of yin-yang,
the Dao, and moral doctrines, as well as his conceptualization of audience in
relation to the strategies of listening, analogy, and reflection for the purpose
of human relation building, as the last section of this introduction explains.
The stigmatizing association of Guiguzi with military strategy not only
reflects generations of consistently biased readings but has also led to an im-
pression that Guiguzi is about rhetorical manipulation without ethical consid-
erations. Some critics intentionally make Guiguzi mysterious, unfathomably
difficult, and enigmatic. Take the character 密 (mi) in chapter 1 for example
(Guiguzi, 1.3). Some commentators interpret it as “secretive” or “hidden,” fol-
lowing the interpretation of yinmi (隠秘, hidden in secret) in Dao Cang Ben
(道藏本). As a result, both Michael Broschat and Thomas Cleary translated mi
as “secrecy” in English (Broschat, 120; Cleary, 5). This interpretation is debat-
able. In Tao’s edition, after he uses yinmi, he explains that zhou (周 extensive,
comprehensive) in the first half of the sentence and mi in the second half
must dovetail to respond to the Dao. In an inserted note, Tao says that mi is
tied with wei (微 subtle or seamless) and then reasons that if the emphasis is
20
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
on wei, then the character, zhou, would have to be eliminated from the text.
However, he stops here, leaving the ambiguity behind.
On the other hand, misreading 密 (mi) as “secrecy” does not take into
consideration the meaning of “mi” along with 周 (zhou, extensive, comprehen-
sive), a character forming the antithesis and parallelism with “mi.” These two
stylistic features are typical, almost required, in classical prose. In this context,
zhou carries the sense of macro, and mi micro. Interpreted in the antithesis
with zhou (周), which means 周全 (zhou quan, comprehensive, extensive,
or thorough), 密 (mi) should mean 细密 (xi mi, meticulous and detailed) or
慎密 (shen mi, careful and detailed), instead of 秘密 (mi mi, secretive) or
隠秘 (yin mi, hidden in secret). Cao Shenggao and An Na’s reading supports
the reading of mi as meticulous or detailed; and the contextualization of mi in
the antithesis agrees with Tao Hongjing’s incomplete commentary (Guiguzi, 5).
Again, none of these critics explicitly argue against the skewed interpretation
derived from Guiguzi’s alleged association with zong-heng.
While secrecy is not necessarily ethically wrong, the readings that fore-
ground 玄秘 (xuan mi, mysterious, enigmatic, or unfathomable) reinforces
the idea that the Guiguzi encourages distrust and manipulation. The char-
acters—jie (結 tie), qi (其 one’s or somebody’s), cheng (誠 sincerity)—serve
as another example (Guiguzi, I.1.3). In an antithesis, the sentence means that
“those who employ the open strategy aim to understand the situation; those
who use the shut strategy invite sincere response from others” (emphasis added).
The reading in this translation agrees with Cao and An’s, Ren and Bai’s, and
Zong’s. However, Chen Puqing’s interpretation emphasizes that one should
“open up to detect if what the person on the other side says is true or false;
shut down to motivate him to collaborate sincerely” (8). This kind of Chinese
reading results in Cleary’s translation that “shutting down is to make sure of
their [other people’s] sincerity” (5). Readings like Cleary’s and Chen’s skew
the original meaning and create an impression that the Guiguzi is primarily
concerned with teaching the manipulation of the audience.
Deprived of objectivity at the outset of the reading, distorted as it is by the
association between Guiguzi and zong-heng, it is almost impossible to read the
Guiguzi as a treatise on rhetoric. In fact, whether or not Guiguzi’s students,
Su and Zhang, were ethical persuaders, their practice of zong-heng should not
affect the reading of the Guiguzi. Nor should the book be identified as part
of the zong-heng school. Given the bibliographical and historical records of
their association with Guiguzi, the master-disciple relationship might have
existed. However, given the minimal written remains of the zong-heng war
strategists, it is possible that the students themselves, Su and Zhang, might
have developed their own theories. Therefore, the reading of Guiguzi should
21
Hui Wu
be dissociated from the master’s students’ zong-heng military strategies and
assessed objectively to restore its significance in the study of Chinese rhetoric.

Dubious Western Receptions of Guiguzi

Regarded as a wicked book in China, Guiguzi has also been suspected in the
West as being a book on manipulation with little ethical consideration, but for
a different theoretical reason. Thomas Cleary says that the book is “ordinarily
associated with a relatively obscure school of thought known as Tsung-heng
hsueh [zong-heng school],” which, he believes, can be best rendered as “the
science of letting all hell break loose” (xii–xiii). His problematic translation
of Guiguzi resulted from this perspective. In addition, Guiguzi is said to teach
how to convince the audience to do what the persuader wants them to, but
under the presumption that they act on their own behalf. François Jullien is
astonished by its “absolute tone,” for the persuader’s behavior of leading the
single-person audience without being led by the rhetor to win power over
the ruler is not treated in the text as manipulation “but as normal—even the
ideal—course to follow. . . . Even our own Machiavelli never envisaged such a
state of affairs” (156–57). He declares that Guiguzi is “a treatise on antirhetoric”
that shows “little interest in the procedure of argumentation, the different
parts of discourse, and the figures of rhetoric” (154, 156).
Jullien’s criticism reveals a biased perception of Chinese rhetoric, com-
pounded by the lack of cognizance that Chinese rhetoric is not built on the
Greek tradition. As Lyon says, “What will constitute a healthy rhetoric in
China will not resemble Aristotle’s” (“Confucian Silence,” 142). Weighing
Chinese rhetoric heavily and precariously in the Western tradition, Jullien’s
reading illustrates the pitfalls of imposing Western meaning onto Chinese
rhetorical practices (cf. Coyle, 174), which were born out of classical China’s
own sociopolitical context primarily for the single-person audience.
The Guiguzi text, like other classical texts—for example, Dao De Jing and
Zhuangzi—indeed defies clear classification in Western terms. Scholars in
fields other than rhetoric identify the Guiguzi alternatively as an “esoteric text,”
“a paradigm example of za, mixed text” (Coyle, 168), “a treatise on efficacy”
(Jullien), and a sort of intelligence comparable to Greek métis (Raphals). Aware
of the tension between the names of “wisdom” and “cunning,” “virtuous and
vicious intelligence,” Lisa Raphals notices that as a human condition, this
mode of intelligence embraces “a set of skills and mental attitudes that range
from wisdom, forethought, keen attention, and resourcefulness to subtle in-
direction, craft, deception, and cunning” (xi, xii). The words used to describe
a person who possesses this intelligence affect how he or she is perceived.
Raphals continues to note,
22
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
In positive terms, we say someone is wise, knowledgeable, sagacious,
subtle, prescient, foresighted, or expert. The same individual may be nega-
tively described as cunning, crafty, slippery, underhanded, or devious.
. . . Yet for all their different nuances, these terms may all be applied to
the same type of individual. (xii)

A parallel criticism was directed at the Greek Sophists. Reputed for their
ability to argue from either side of a view, they were accused of manipulation.
Their intelligence and discourse, however, might well be stated positively as “an
alternative warrant for the conceptualization and practice of rhetoric” because
“they evinced a special interest in human perceptions as the only source of
knowledge in all fields, including nature, and emphasized the significance
of language in constructing that knowledge” (Jarratt, xviii). Arguing from a
philosophical point of view, A. C. Graham concludes,

The label “Sophist” does call attention to a configuration of tendencies at

the birth of rational discourse which is common to Greece and China.
In both traditions we meet thinkers who delight in propositions which
defy common sense, and consequently are derided as frivolous and irre-
sponsible. In both, these thinkers belong to the early period when reason
is a newly discovered tool not yet under control, seeming to give one the
power to prove or disprove anything. In both, the exuberance with which
they play with this astonishing new toy leads not only to “sophistries” but
to paradoxes of lasting philosophical significance. . . . Nothing could be
more disorientating, more disruptive, than reason first awakening to and
reveling it its powers. . . . The Greeks did get past this initial disorientation,
the Chinese never did. (Disputers, 75–76)

Following Graham’s reasoning, it may be said that current discussion of the

Guiguzi text in relation to the Chinese sophists in Zhan Guo Ce encoun-
ters again the same “disorientation,” the initial philosophical stage that the
Chinese are said to have yet to pass but with “the most ancient paradoxes
forever returning to plague it” (Disputers, 76). The “uninhibited reason” in
Chinese classical thought (Disputers, 76), including Guiguzi, may sound un-
comfortable to westerners, who naturally arrive at “absurd conclusions” (to
borrow Graham’s words) that this kind of uninhibited reason is illogical and
thus antirhetoric.
Yameng Liu suggests that “classical Chinese rhetoric is capable of being
reconstructed in a different yet equally legitimate way, the traditionally re-
ceived approaches to mapping this topic area remains trapped in its [sic] own
conceptual, theoretical, and interpretive myopia” (“Nothing,” 162). To conduct
23
Hui Wu
an objective discussion, we need “a nonpejorative language” (Raphals, xii)
in which to talk about wisdom, virtuous intelligence, human relations, and
persuasion. This language is rhetoric. Many Western readings seem unaware
of progress in the study of Chinese rhetoric, such as Coyle’s dissertation on
Guiguzi in 1999 and Jullien’s A Treatise on Efficacy in 2004. Uninformed, even
a culture-sensitive scholar like Coyle thinks that we lack proper terminologies
to classify Guigucian thought. He sees urgency “to find new terminologies and
categories in our own thought which can accommodate and appropriate the
richness of Chinese culture in a way that resonates with the Chinese world
view on its own terms” (179). This exigency has long been resolved by scholars
in Chinese rhetoric. They have generated key terminologies (Garrett, “Classi-
cal,” 106; Lu, Rhetoric 68–93); they have also theorized reasoning patterns and
argumentation. Echoing Kirkpatrick and Xu’s findings about the chainlike
sequence patterns in Chinese reasoning (107–42), Garrett rightly concludes
that a Chinese pattern of argumentation is “characterized by an exclusive use
of strict deductive reasoning, in the form of strict inferences from definitions
or of chains of reasoning and encourages testing the theses by establishing
and verifying logically necessary relations” (“Classical Chinese Conceptions,”
108). Karl Kao recognizes that yuyan (analogy), though with less force in ar-
gumentation than a syllogistic logic, is a vivid device of explanation to bring
together two disparate, incomparable things (7). Like Kao, David Hall and
Roger Ames identify analogy as a typical feature of classical Chinese rhetoric,
naming it “analogical reasoning” or “analogical argumentation” (137).
It is in the language of rhetoric that Guiguzi delivers an alternative warrant for
the conceptualization of Chinese rhetoric and draws quite a different rhetorical
landscape from those mapped by Confucius in China and by Aristotle in the
West. Guiguzi presents a systematic theory of rhetoric in China’s own tradition.

The Fundamentals of Guigucian Rhetoric

Guiguzi’s rhetorical theory is dominated by yin-yang philosophy, upon which
his major rhetorical strategies and concepts are built, particularly listening,
analogy, and reflection for the purpose of establishing human connection in
the process of persuasion. Yin-yang is a classical Chinese sensibility that ap-
plies correlative cosmology to manage situations in response to circumstances.
Yin and yang are generally believed to be corresponding energies germane to
the whole reality of a flexibly continuous process, in which the interactions
of heavenly and earthly things are at once complementary and opposed, but
eventually balanced and contained within the course of order. In Guiguzi,
yin and yang energies are inseparable and interactive to move and balance
the process of persuasion, hence yin-yang in translation. Guiguzi theorizes
24
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
yin-yang as complimentary and correlative energies, and not as polarities. The
best persuader must be a master of Dao (the Way), a sage who exists between
Heaven and Earth and is One united with Heaven and Earth (I.1.1, III.1.1),
to understand the world and observe the yin and yang dynamics (I.1.1). The
sagely rhetor develops omniscient intellectual conscience (shen ming 神明),
the virtue of rhetoric that upholds truths against untruths (III.1.1, III.1.6), ac-
cording to the open and shut of yin and yang (I.1.1). In the process of persua-
sion, yin-yang and open-shut are intertwined and correlated, interacting with
each other to respond to constantly changing situations. They are action and
inaction simultaneously, and accordingly flexible, adjustable, and responsive
at the disposal of the sage of rhetoric.
In Guiguzi, all yang references are called “beginning,” and those of yin are
“ending” (I.1.5), both controlling and responding to the open-shut rhetorical
strategy. The yang categories refer to growing or developing things or situa-
tions; for instance, longevity, happiness, wealth, honor, fame, hobby, fortune,
pride, and desire (I.1.5), all of which are regarded as the beginning of a situa-
tion. On the other hand, the yin categories stand for adverse or dead matters;
for example, death, anxiety, poverty, humiliation, loss, misfortune, harm,
punishment, and torment (I.1.5). In persuasion, Guiguzi teaches, “When yin
and yang are in harmony, the beginning and ending are set on course cor-
rectly” (I.1.5). This course follows the order of Heaven and the Dao. Moreover,
yin-yang also controls the open-shut mechanism in persuasion. As chapter 1
of Guiguzi reads, “open” means to deploy or speak up, and “shut” means to
keep silent. In persuasion, the rhetor is encouraged to “experiment with the
open-shut strategy through yin and yang” (I.1.6), because “speeches in the yang
category begin with lofty topics, while those in the yin category rely on low
and small matters” (I.1.6). Armed with the open-shut strategy and an under-
standing of how yin and yang work, a rhetor can persuade any person and the
whole world. Guiguzi believes that by operating the open-shut mechanism in
response to yin and yang, or “the gateway to Heaven and Earth,” the inspired
persuader, or the sage of rhetoric, is able to know answers to all issues, foresee
the development of all things, and understand the human mind and ways of
thinking (I.1.6). Guiguzi seems to believe that although personalities are dif-
ferent, topics abundant, and changes countless and endless, as long as speak-
ers are able to employ the open-shut tactic based on yin-yang rhythms, they
can build a solid ground to start all business, see all solutions, and ultimately
control the pathway to Heaven and Earth. As a result, they will find neither
limitation nor resistance to their persuasion.
Guiguzi’s teaching about yin-yang with regard to persuasion shows an affin-
ity to Laozi’s Daoism that emphasizes the power of nature, flexible responsive
25
Hui Wu
conduct, and the dialectics of action and inaction. For example, we can trace
Guiguzi’s gateway to Heaven and Earth to Laozi’s “gateway of the manifold of
mysteries” (Laozi, chap. 1). Laozi teaches that individuals or situations are taken
care of naturally by the harmony among Heaven, Earth, and human.16 Theoreti-
cally, the Guigucian rhetor may be read as the Daoist in Laozi’s Dao De Jing.
Furthermore, in book 3, the alleged doctrine of the Daoist religion (III.1.1, III.1.6),
Guiguzi concretizes Laozi’s concept by rationalizing the relationships among
the will, body, Qi (energy), spirit, Heaven, and Earth in relation to rhetorical
tactics. Guiguzi seems to even transcend his own theory on the sage of rhetoric
in association with the open and closing of yin and yang in chapter 1 of book 1
(I.1.1). He extends the notion of the sage of rhetoric to that of the true human
being, the One in unity with Heaven and Earth who names things by their cat-
egories (III.1.1, III.1.6), to remind us that “inseparable, the spirit and the Dao are
One, constantly evolving to address the myriad genera of things and countless
principles of doctrines” (III.1.3). The true human being, or maybe the ultimate
sage of rhetoric, is able to develop the “omniscient intellectual conscience,” the
highest level of judicious intellect, wisdom, and morality (II.12.3; III.1.1).
With yin-yang as his theoretical ground, Guiguzi emphasizes human connec-
tion through several major strategies, such as listening, analogy, and reflection.
Guiguzi teaches the art of persuasion not simply for the purpose of convincing
the audience but also for the purpose of connecting with them. Human connec-
tion prescribes the aim of rhetoric. Jullien recognizes that “it teaches the reader
to consider relations across this treatise, in particular the ruler, in terms of the
potential situation” (155). Indeed, aware of the intricate relationship with the
single-person audience, Guiguzi believes that if persuaders wish to maintain
their footing against different opinions, they must follow the will of others first
(I.1.2). Attuning their mindset to that of the audience, the persuaders should
not overpower their audience and miss what they have to say (III.3.7).
The most important tactic in persuasion, Guiguzi teaches, is listening,
which is critical to understanding the audience’s intentions in order to form
a relationship before persuasion happens. In other words, Guigucian rheto-
ric realizes its effectiveness through careful listening, and not only through
speaking. It is of interest that Guiguzi places this emphasis on listening, which
has been undervalued in Western rhetoric. Until recently when feminist and
ethnic inquiries of listening as a rhetorical concept appear, we did not pay
much attention to listening because “Aristotle’s theory never delves into how to
listen” (Ratcliffe, 20, emphasis original). In terms of ethos and pathos, Guiguzi’s
theory brings more complexities and sophistications to the study of rhetorical
listening, offering the possibility of an in-depth epistemological study of the
interaction between rhetorical listening and speaking.
26
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
Guiguzi defines listening as motionlessness and speech as motion, sug-
gesting that persuaders must listen closely before opening their mouths. He
emphasizes that “when the other person speaks, he is in motion; when you
listen, you are motionless. Hear what he says based on his speech” (I.2.2). Lis-
tening is primary; speaking is secondary, and mainly as a response. Guiguzi
teaches, “If you want to hear others’ utterances, remain quiet; if you want
others to open up, shut down. If you want to reach high, lower yourself first.
If you want to take, give first” (I.2.3). The purpose of taking these seemingly
opposite, even contradictory, actions is to know where to build the common
ground with the audience (II.8.4).
Since listening is a pivotal strategy, Guiguzi teaches how to listen. When
listening, the rhetor must hold tight to the word like “a magnet attracting
a needle and as if you were a tongue sticking to a well-cooked bone to suck
out its juice” (I.2.5). This analogy means that listening is not a passive act; it
is an active engagement of both the rhetor and the audience. For example,
Guiguzi says, “Try to remain calm and silent in order to hear what the other
person says and examine his activities . . . If you want to probe a person,
you must penetrate within him; evaluate his capability to target his intent
like an arrow” (I.2.4). At the same time, the rhetor should “remain form-
less [motionless] to seek spoken words; if the speech accords with what is
observed, truths are acquired from the other party” (I.2.2). Again, listening
is a primary step in persuasion, while speech serves as a secondary action, a
reaction to the audience’s words.
Speaking after careful listening enables the rhetor to study the informa-
tion at hand and to employ the strategy of “reflect-respond,” as illustrated by
Guiguzi in chapter 2 of book 1. It is about how to develop the relationship
between the rhetor and the audience and how to win affections and trust from
the audience by maintaining physical, emotional, and geographical closeness
and distance and by drawing upon proper classics on virtues, poetry, and rites
to test the audience’s likes and dislikes. Chapter 10 of book 2 shares insight
into human relations, instructing that “when two parties who share the same
feeling are close, both of them succeed. When two parties who share the same
desire estrange each other, both of them get hurt. . . . [P]‍eople who benefit one
another become close; people who cause losses to one another are estranged”
(II.10.1). Understanding human relations as such, the rhetor is able to listen
well and manage the rhetorical situation to his or her advantage.
In persuasion, Guiguzi offers a rationale for using analogical images to
appeal to the audience and examine their responses to build a relationship
(I.2.2). Analogy must be properly used at the right moment to connect with
the audience. “Analogical reasoning,” or “analogical argumentation,” is “a
27
Hui Wu
mode of correlative thinking” in Chinese rhetoric (Hall and Ames, Thinking,
137). In Guiguzi, the correlative thinking has correlative terms, for example,
yin-yang, Heaven-Earth, open-shut, respond-reflect, affect-fortify, mend-
break, captivate-capture, and resist-reconcile. Guiguzi teaches the correlative
meanings of paired terminologies as if they are naturally related. This type
of analogical reasoning demands sharp faculties to make quick and effec-
tive associations among things and ideas. It requires adept mental moves
from the abstract to the concrete, from a living thing to a lifeless object, from
subjectivity to objectivity, and vice versa. The purpose of using analogy is to
arouse the audience to respond and not merely to move them emotionally
as in Western rhetoric. Guiguzi says to the rhetor that “alternating images
in analogies can inspire the other person to respond in words, to which you
must listen” (I.2.3). Emphasizing the comparability and connectivity among
things, Guiguzi defines images as appearances of things and comparisons as
analogies that can be used to see similar or different meanings of the spoken
word. For example, he posits that “all spoken words reflect images of things;
all things are comparable. . . . [C]‍omparison means comparing words” (I.2.2).
Without the word, there is nothing to compare, so it is compelling that the
rhetor change analogies to invite responses (I.2.2).
Furthermore, building human connections requires persuaders to be reflec-
tive of others to collect information and reflective of themselves to relate to
the audience. Guiguzi suggests that a rhetor must follow what ancient sages
have practiced—to conform to the Dao for self-development, to examine his-
tory to foresee the future, to examine others for self-reflection (I.1.1). The
opening passage in chapter 2 of book 1 suggests that the rhetor must be im-
mensely knowledgeable and instantaneously reflective. In other words, the
rhetor should be able to analyze the present by utilizing his or her knowledge
of the past and should make associations between the current situation and
history, or the past, in order to understand things correctly and take proper
actions. The speaker should cultivate self-awareness to become sensitive to
others in order to understand them and see their perspectives. In response to
Laozi’s teaching that “those who understand others are knowledgeable; those
who understand themselves are astutely perceptive” (my translation, chap. 33),
Guiguzi himself uses analogies to illustrate the connection between the rhetor
and the audience, saying, “Understanding others starts from the understand-
ing of the self. Only by understanding one’s self can one understand others”
(I.2.5). In persuasion, self-reflection is the key to understanding the audience
and collecting information. For this reason, the relationship between the au-
dience and the rhetor, like that between listening and speaking, must also be
understood dialectically. It shifts constantly from acceptance to alienation
28
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
and vice versa. It is changeable, yet maintainable, depending on the rhetor’s
mindset and ability, as Guiguzi explains (I.3.2, I.3.1)
In turn, Guiguzi relates his rhetorical concepts to yin-yang, because listening,
speaking, and reflection are inseparable and coexist correlatively “as yin and
yang and as circle and square” (I.2.4). All these rhetorical tactics governed by
yin-yang must be correlated with the Dao for the rhetor to become One with
Heaven and Earth (I.2.5, III.1.1). After all, each strategy is based on the rhetor’s
analysis of the audience. Guiguzi recommends that in interacting with the
audience, the rhetor should “examine the spoken word of others without fail”
(I.2.5). However, no matter what the rhetor wants to do, be it listening, speak-
ing, or reflection, an important goal is to connect with the audience through a
thorough understanding of their background and motives or desires. No human
relations can be built if the rhetor does not respond to yin and yang. Persuasive
strategies fail if the rhetor cannot develop a relationship with the audience.
The above introduction to the major concepts in Guiguzi reveals that Chi-
nese rhetoric brings complexities and sophistications to studies of other rhe-
torical traditions. In both Western and Chinese cultures, Aristotelian and
Guigucian rhetorics have had tremendous impact on practices that persist
today. Guiguzi’s availability will allow for clarification in existing studies of
Chinese rhetoric and further detailed comparisons with Western rhetoric.
While Guiguzi can enhance westerners’ knowledge about Chinese tradition
and practice in politics, negotiation, business, ethics, and communication, it
may also redefine the concept of rhetoric itself, a term with contested meaning
as examined previously in this introduction. This critically annotated English
edition of Guiguzi comes out at a time when global interactions have become
frequent, normal in economy, marketing, travel, and business. Eastern cultures
have their indigenous rhetorical theories and practices, different from what is
known in the West as the norm. The implication and importance of Guiguzi
are not only to help us see these differences more clearly but also to become
more aware of significant similarities between the two cultures past and pre-
sent, especially in the cultural contexts that led to the emergence of rhetoric.

Notes
Cheryl Glenn has used the metaphors of remapping and landscape to refer to altering
the scope of rhetoric. I extend it further here to the case of early China, and Guiguzi.
1. C. Jan Swearingen and others in comparative rhetoric, such as LuMing Mao,
Xing Lu, and Arabella Lyon, have repeatedly pointed out the need for rhetorical
discourse in emerging states. See Swearingen and Mao, as well as Swearingen’s “Ren
Wen and Baguwen” and “Response.”
2. See studies by Xing Lu, LuMing Mao, and Arabella Lyon for examples.
29
Hui Wu
3. Esson M. Gale’s translation can be found in the University of Virginia Library’s
electronic sources.
4. It remains controversial whether the Ghost Valley is in Yingchuanyang City,
State Qi, now Dengfeng County, Henan Province, or Fufengchiyang, State Chu, now
Jingyang County, Sh’anxi Province, or another county (Xu, Study, 154–56; Du, 31,
Jiang and Zhang; Chen, 171–72).
5. A conjecture and estimate (Xu, Study, 157–59). No accurate record exists.
Guiguzi’s years of birth and death remain a mystery. His teaching years have been
calculated according to the chronology in The Cambridge History of Ancient China:
From the Origins of Civilization to 221 b.c. (Loewe and Shaughnessy, 22).
6. The author of the Art of War has been controversial. Some said the book was by
Sun Wu; some said it was by his descendant Sun Bin, both being referred to as Sunzi.
The years of Sunzi can only be estimated based on Shi Ji (The Grand Scribe’s Record),
which says that he provided consultation to King Hui (370–335 b.c.e.) (Ssu-Ma, 37–39).
7. The same is true of Aristotle’s works.
8. A few modern Japanese editions and commentaries of Guiguzi (Kikokushi)
that I was able to trace to the early 1900s are said to be based on Yin Zhizhang’s
edition, for example, those by Keishishi Bu (1920), Ohashi Takeo (1921), and Tsuka-
moro Tetsuzō (1925). The Japanese interest in Guiguzi, albeit possibly for different
reasons and in different directions, may well indicate the book’s pan–East Asian
influence. For example, Ōhashi Takeo’s Kikekushi: kokusai bōryaku no genten o
yomu (Guiguzi: A Reading of International Strategies in Classics) published in 1982
offers an interpretation in connection to Hanfeizi and Confucius.
9. I am thankful for Swearingen’s reminder in an email that
the pre-Qin Chinese persuaders were much like those in ancient Greece. The
Pre-Socratics were itinerants as well, traveling from city to city and teach-
ing for a fee, for example, Gorgias, Protagoras, Aristotle—all non-citizens
of Athens; Aristotle went on to become tutor to Alexander of Macedonia,
son of Philip, who conquered Athens.
10. Shi Ji records that both Su Qin (Su Ch’in) and Zhang Yi (Chang Yi) were
disciples of Guiguzi (Kuei-ku Tzu) and that Su was afraid that his skills were not as
good as Zhang’s (Ssu-Ma, 124). Su advised King Hui (惠 337–311 b.c.e.), son of Duke
Xiao (孝 361–338 b.c.e.) of State Qin (Ch’in 秦) (Ssu-Ma, 97). When Su left State
Qin for State Zhao (趙 approximately 368–321 b.c.e.), he still wanted State Qin to be
advised in order to stop it from attacking feudal lords. When he sent for Zhang, he
detained, humiliated, and angered the latter, who then determined to advise State
Qin against State Zhao under Su’s consultation (Ssu-Ma, 123). The deterioration of
their relationship resulted in the rivalry between the zong-heng schools.
11. Given the highly refined use of language, the speeches in Zhan Guo Ce, or the
Intrigues (Crump), may not be the actual speeches delivered and might have been
reconstructed years later, as many scholars notice.

30
 Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric
12. See Guiguzi II.6.3 for the reference to Jiang Taigong (姜太公), or Lü Shang
(呂尚), whose theory is recorded in Six Strategies (Liu Tao 六韜) translated as “T’ai
Kung’s Six Secret Teachings” (Sawyer, 19–106), which is probably a later renamed
version of Taigong’s Yin Mystique.
13. Much of this discussion can be compared to the association of rhetoric with
magic in ancient Egypt and Greece. See Edward Karshner’s and Jacqueline de
Romilly’s studies.
14. Laozi’s years of life are unknown. Shi Ji says that he was a contemporary of
Confucius (551–479 b.c.e.) and lived for 160 years or even 200 years. Confucius is
said to have sought his advice. Laozi’s Dao De Jing was allegedly written in the later
years of his life (Ssu-Ma, 21–22).
15. The name of Mencius, or Mengzi, was Meng Ke (孟軻). Shi Ji records no spe-
cific years of Mencius’s life but says that he was a student of Zisizi (子思子 483–402
b.c.e.), Master Zisi (Ssu-Ma, 179–80), who was the grandson of Confucius and the
author of Zhong Yong (中庸), which Roger Ames and David Hall have translated in
Focusing the Familiar (University of Hawaii Press, 2001). Mencius allegedly served
King Xüan (Hsüan 宣) of State Qi (Ch’i 齊 342–324 b.c.e.).
16. Laozi says,
The heavens are lasting and the earth enduring.
The reason the world is able to be lasting and enduring
Is because it does not live for itself.
Thus it is able to be long-lived.
It is on this model that the sages withdraw their persons from contention
yet find Themselves out in the front,
Put their own persons out of mind yet find themselves taken care of. . . .
 (Dao De Jing, chap. 7)

31
 Notes on the Translation

Hui Wu
The goal of this translation of Guiguzi is to represent rhetorical concepts and
effects in English without compromising readability or altering the meaning of
the primary text. This goal guided my selection of the basic text, my rendering
of the linguistic and stylistic features, textual structure, and chapter titles. In
addition, I have provided cross-references to alternate texts and translations
within and outside the primary text to facilitate the reader’s consultation of
available editions in both Chinese and English. This critical edition is prepared
primarily for Anglophone readers to provide ample contextualization for those
not familiar with Chinese works on rhetoric. It is my hope that bilingual
Chinese-English readers will also find materials here to advance the ongoing
scholarship on East-West rhetorics and their traditions.
Guiguzi’s long process of transmission from oral instruction to a writ-
ten text and its debatable authorship, as noted in “Redrawing the Map of
Rhetoric,” make it necessary to establish criteria for selecting the basic text
for translation. First, it must present the Guiguzi with care and note any miss-
ing passages. Second, if it is an annotated edition, it must sustain a textual
sophistication, such as the calligraphic style and arrangement. Third, it must
have been issued by a creditable publisher and prepared by a creditable com-
mentator. The edition annotated by Tao Hongjing (456–536) meets all of the
criteria and serves as the basis for this English translation. Deemed the most
authoritative, Tao’s annotations have guided almost all modern Chinese edi-
tions and critical studies.
I have obtained two versions of Tao’s annotated edition. One, prepared by
Wang Yunwu, was published by the Taiwan Commerce Press in 1968. It is
printed, however, in modern typography without showing textual sophistica-
tion of an early classic, and it serves, therefore, only as a reference. The other,
hand-transcribed by Qin Engfu, was reprinted by the Taiwan China Press in
1966, showing Qin’s script in the Song calligraphic style (song ti 宋軆) and list-
ing Tao as the commentator. Tao’s original notes, inserted between sentences,
remain throughout the text as well. Qin served as an editor in Hanlinyuan
(翰林院 the Academy) during the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912). At the end of his
32
 Notes on the Translation
preface is the date of his script—August 1 of the fifty-fourth year of Emperor
Qian Long (乾隆 1736–95), or the year 1790. One of his notes explains that
“the three books in Tao Hongjing’s annotated edition are similar to those in
Dao Cang Ben (道藏本) preserved in the Huayin Temple. Emperor Qian Long
has tasked Engfu [referring to himself] and Yuanru with an edited copy” (1).
Qin has also included Tao’s original preface, which traces the transmission
of Guiguzi up to his time.
The textual structure of this English translation follows that of Tao’s edi-
tion—three books of fifteen chapters. Book 1 includes four chapters: chapter
1 “Open-Shut (捭闔),” chapter 2 “Reflect-Respond (反應),” chapter 3 “Affect-
Fortify (内揵),” and chapter 4 “Mend-Break (抵巇).” Book 2 starts with chapter
5 “Captivate-Capture (飛箝),” followed by chapter 6 “Resist-Reconcile (忤
合),” chapter 7 “Weighing (揣),” chapter 8 “Gauging (摩),” chapter 9 “Assess-
ing (權),” chapter 10 “Deploying (謀),” chapter 11 “Decision-Making (决),”
and chapter 12 “Fundamental Principles [of Governance] (符言).” Chapter 12
serves as a transition from teaching rhetorical philosophy and strategies to
the rhetor to teaching the rhetoric of governance to the ruler, the assumed
audience of the rhetor. Book 2 ends with notes on missing chapters 13 and 14.
The last book, book 3, in Tao’s edition has no chapter numbers. It is said that
the numbers were intentionally eliminated to distinguish what is believed to
be Guiguzi’s work from what is believed to be the work of others (Xu, Studies,
140). Eliminating chapter numbers to indicate unauthentic texts is a common
practice in solidifying Chinese classics (Studies, 140). To show respect for the
basic text’s intention and to maintain a consistent structure of the translated
text, this edition restarts chapter numbers in book 3, including chapter 1 “The
Primary Doctrine on the Seven Arts of the Yin Mystique (本經阴符七篇),”
chapter 2 “Holding the Pivot (持樞),” and chapter 3 “The Central Doctrine
(中經).” To indicate and account for missing texts, I have provided notes.
Grammatical and stylistic features in classical Chinese differ significantly
from present-day English conventions. The Guiguzi text is composed of an-
titheses in parallel sentences constructed to resonate simultaneously in sound,
diction, form, and meaning. Rhythmic and sensual, the style amplifies visual
and vocal effects through repetition and brevity. To preserve these aesthetic
values, I have included repetition of parallel phrases, aware that they may
sound redundant in English. For the chapter titles, I have employed parallel
or antithetical verbs to replicate the meanings in the basic text.
Like many pieces of classical Chinese prose, Guiguzi contains no subject
in sentences, a pattern that is not only typical but also entirely grammatical
and stylistically elegant. This is also true of Tao’s commentary. This stylistic
feature, a deficiency in the English eye, creates challenges to identifying the
33
Hui Wu
addressee. For example, in passage 2 of chapter 1 in book 1 (I.1.2), Guiguzi
begins with a comment on sages’ rhetorical practice and follows with an ex-
position of the audience. Because the sentences do not have subjects, it is dif-
ficult to determine if Guiguzi continues to speak about the sages or stops to
give instructions to his audience. In cases like this, I have adopted the English
imperative sentence, which allows the omission of the subject, to maintain
the original tone. Furthermore, at his time, females were excluded from the
political arena. When the translation requires adding the subject, the male
pronoun is used.
Not only is there no subject in a sentence but also no punctuation in the
entire piece. In other words, Chinese classical prose typically contains no punc-
tuation to divide sentences or passages. For sentence division, I have cross-
examined several modern Chinese editions, such as those prepared by Cao
Shenggao and An Na (2007, China Press), Chen Puqing (2005, Yuelu Press),
Ren Hao and Bai Songqing (2007, Shanxi Classics Press), Xiao Dengfu (2001,
Wenjin Press, Taiwan), Xu Fuhong (2012, China Press), and Zong Qiong (1999,
Shanxi Classics Press). Though helpful, these editions reveal discrepancies as
well. For example, I found inconsistencies among the modern editions when
translating this sentence: “The open-shut strategy is the gateway to Heaven and
Earth. Open-shut transforms yin and yang in response to the four seasons to
nourish and influence all things, no matter if they are vertical or horizontal”
(I.1.3). Zong puts the period after “vertical and horizontal,” while Chen puts
this phrase in the next sentence. Examined against the basic text for transla-
tion, the sentences are broken by both Tao and Zong at the end of “vertical”
and “horizontal,” Tao with a note at the end of the sentence, and Zong with
a period. When necessary, I have added footnotes to explain my decisions.
Though Guiguzi’s original teaching may have been oral and he was teach-
ing oral speaking strategies, the text we have of Guiguzi is a typical example
of the classical Chinese prose that was composed for reading and writing, and
not for speaking. Its single-syllable character indicates varied meanings in
varied contexts. Modern Chinese have combined many characters in Guiguzi
into phrases and idioms, for example, 周密 (zhou mi), 反應 (fan ying), 揣摩
(chuai mo), 權謀 (quan mou), but in Guiguzi’s time, they were not phrases.
Each of the characters stands by itself for its independent meaning in a spe-
cific context and mostly cannot be combined with another character into a
phrase. Combining them into phrases may result in changing the meaning
of the text. In translation, I had to fight my instinct as a modern Chinese
reader and remind myself of each character’s meaning in a specific context.
For this reason, I have added footnotes whenever the possibility of modern
combination arises.
34
 Notes on the Translation
Footnotes throughout the translation, and the “Glossary of Guiguzi’s Rhe-
torical Terms” as well, provide cross-references to terms that appear in dif-
ferent chapters to help readers identify their specific meanings in different
contexts. For instance, the cross-references to xin (心) and its varied transla-
tions across time may help readers with understandings of the term’s cognitive,
philosophical, and rhetorical connotations in different contexts and periods.
Cross-references also direct readers’ attention to Western rhetorical classics
and existing scholarship on comparative rhetoric in hopes that they can de-
velop associations between Western and Chinese rhetorical traditions. For ex-
ample, note 30 in chapter 12 of book 2 explains the rhetorical translation of 名
(ming naming) by referring to Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, Ferdinand
de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, and Xing Lu’s Rhetoric of Ancient
China, Fifth to Third Century b.c.e. With regard to varied translations of
rhetorical terms, such as “persuasion,” “speech,” “eloquence,” “argument,” and
“debate,” I have provided footnotes and Chinese characters in the basic text.
This translation results not only from my cross-indexing of all the Chinese
editions listed previously but also from my attention to English translations
by Thomas Cleary in his Thunder in the Sky: Secrets on the Acquisition and
Exercise of Power (1994) and Michael Broschat in his unpublished disserta-
tion “‘Guiguzi’: A Textual Study and Translation” (1985). Cross-examining
the translations has afforded me various perspectives on the text and made
it compelling to address erroneous readings, if any, and to add footnotes to
clarify potential misinterpretations. For example, notes 6, 7, and 8 in chapter 1
compare my translation with Cleary’s to clarify the meanings of “密 (mi),” “情
(qing),” and “結 (jie) 其 (qi) 誠 (cheng)” in order to forestall possible misread-
ing of Guiguzi. A translation derived from inaccurate or erroneous modern
Chinese commentaries may lead to reading Guiguzi as a book on manipula-
tion. For this reason, the fact that Tao’s commentary is cited and trusted by
almost all modern classicists in and beyond China led me to provide ample
translations in the footnotes. Xu Fuhong’s recent study, annotation, and trans-
lation of Guiguzi into modern Chinese is presently the most comprehensive
and complete in China. Therefore, some of Xu’s comments, particularly those
that vary from Tao’s, are translated in the footnotes as well.
Guiguzi is arranged by rhetorical strategies in chapter titles containing a
number of invented or synthesized terms we now recognize as rhetorical in his
teaching. In consideration of their parallels to and differences from Western
rhetorical terminology, I have provided a glossary of these terms, which I hope
will be helpful to both Chinese and English readers. In some cases, the terms
indicate how late and how much later the emergence of Western rhetoric was
in comparison to earlier Chinese counterparts. The terms are arranged in an
35
Hui Wu
alphabetical order, according to the modern Chinese pronunciation system
(pin yin 拼音), and are not grouped together based on related meanings in
order to avoid unintentional suggestions of comparable correlations.
I have avoided paraphrasing not required by language differences while
trying to leave space for readers’ interpretation, an interpretation determined
largely by Guiguzi’s superposition, juxtaposition, and order of characters and
passages. The results depend not only on my translation but also on readers’
willingness to go along some complex curves in the text. Reading Guiguzi
with their own understanding, readers may achieve different results, but,
hopefully, their interpretation can fall along the same path of intellectual
truth embedded in my translation that aims to maintain Guiguzi’s aesthetic
sophistication and complex curve as an essential treatise of rhetoric. Un-
doubtedly, no text can be translated exactly in form and meaning across the
languages. Despite my cautiousness and carefulness, errors may occur, and
for them I am solely responsible.

36
Guiguzi: A Critical Translation

Hui Wu
 Book I

1. Open-Shut (Bai He 捭闔)

Situated between Heaven and Earth, sages study the past to guide people. I.1.1
They observe the opening and the closing of yin and yang to name things,
to know the gateway to life and death, to manage the beginning and the
ending of a myriad of things, and to understand the human heart1 and
ways of thinking. Able to detect signs of change, they guard the gateway
to the myriad of things. From the past to the present, the sages live among
people and always keep their Dao (道)2 consistent. Countless changes are
governed by their respective laws and purposes. They are all either yin
or yang, soft or hard, open or shut, loose or tight.
For these reasons, the sages always guard their gateways [mouth], ob- I.1.2
serve the sequence and order of things, weigh power and capability, and
examine weaknesses and strengths of their strategies. Humans may be
worthy or worthless, smart or slow, fearless or fearful, kind or unkind.3
They are different but can all be put in motion through the strategy of
open or shut, forward or backward, disrespect or respect. The end is
reached through inaction [wu-wei]. Carefully examine what people on

1. The original is “達人心之理 (da ren xin zhi li).” Ancients believe that the heart
controls thinking and spirit. In this context, 心 (xin, heart) refers to “mind,” but mind
and brain are not in the vocabulary of classical Chinese. For a detailed discussion,
see Judith Farquhar’s Knowing Practice: The Clinical Encounter of Chinese Medicine
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). Also see Y. C. Kong’s translation of Huangdi
Neijing (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2010), 420.
2. “Dao,” instead of “Way,” is chosen to keep a consistent translation of “道” through-
out the text.
3. After the first sentence, Guiguzi does not mention the sage in the rest of passage 2.
A possible reading is that he might be using the sage to illustrate the strategies and
then move on to teaching rhetoric. This interpretation contradicts many modern
Chinese translations, all of which follow Tao Hongjing’s commentary. The difference
is caused by the omitted subject in classical Chinese. Without a subject, it is difficult
to determine whether Guiguzi is lecturing on rhetorical theory or is talking about
practices of sages. Since no sage is mentioned after the first sentence, it is reasonable
to conclude that the rest of passage 2 is about Guiguzi’s own rhetorical theory and
not about the sage’s practice. 39
 Guiguzi
the other side hold to know truths and untruths about them. Learn about
their wishes and desires to understand their ambition and intent. Subtly
critique their statements to make them open up with disagreement and
seek the true meaning behind it to benefit from their point of view. Shut
down to open up others in order to understand what they seek. Open
up to demonstrate what to do, or shut down to keep others quiet. When
opening up for demonstration, respond to others’ emotions; when shut-
ting down to make others quiet, determine if they are sincere. Whether
fitting or not, examine and understand their plans and strategies to
clarify why they agree and disagree. Follow the will of others to hold
your footing against different opinions.4
I.1.3 When opening up, it is important to formulate a thorough, comprehen-
sive plan (zhou 周); when shutting down, it is important to implement a
meticulous, detailed5 plan (mi 密). These plans are invaluable because they
seamlessly dovetail with the Dao. Those who employ the open strategy
aim to understand the situation;6 those who use the shut strategy invite
sincere response from others.7 All these are deployed to understand how

4. Tao Hongjing explains that “though plans and strategies may differ, you should
hold the principle and reach the heart of others. By understanding them fully, you
then know if you will succeed or fail.” Page numbers of quotations in Tao’s edition
transcribed by Qin Engfu are purposely omitted due to their uselessness in reference.
Readers who wish to refer to Tao’s original comments in Chinese can find them in
many other editions by following the chapter numbers.
5. 周 (zhou) is interpreted as 周全 (comprehensive or thorough), hence “thorough,
comprehensive plan,” and 密 (mi) as 细密 (meticulous or detailed), and not 秘密
(secretive), which is the interpretation of almost all modern Chinese versions, as well
as that of Cleary. The interpretation of meticulous or detailed takes into consideration
the rhetorical meaning of Guiguzi as well as its stylistic practice of antithesis. In
classical prose, an antithesis must have the same number of words with opposite
meanings. Cao Shenggao and An Na’s reading confirms this reading of mi, and
the contextualization of mi in the antithesis agrees with an inserted note by Tao
Hongjing, a commentator in the Liang Dynasty (510–589 c.e.) (1966, 5). He says that
mi is tied with wei (微 subtle, seamless) and then reasons that if the emphasis is on
wei, then the character, zhou, would have to be eliminated from the text. However,
he stops here, leaving the ambiguity behind.
6. The original is 料其情也 (liao qi qing ye). Tao Hongjing notes, “qing contains truth
or falsehood” without unfolding qing (4). Chen Puqing (9) and Zong Qiong (10) both
interpret 情 (qing) as “reality” or “situation,” and not “feeling” or “emotion,” hence
“the situation” in the English translation, which differs from Cleary’s (5).
7. The phrase jie qi cheng (jie 結 connect or tie with qi 其 one’s or somebody’s cheng
誠 sincerity) literally means “to tie oneself with sincerity from others.” This read-
ing agrees with Cao and An’s, Ren and Bai’s, and Zong’s. However, Chen Puqing’s
40 interpretation becomes, “Open up to detect if what the person on the other side
 Book I
others weigh situations and prioritize things to make calculations. This
is the sages’ major concern for others. When the person on the other side
does not measure up to their calculations, the sages then would make it
a concern for themselves. Therefore, the open strategy can mean open-
ing up for the purpose of implementation (chu 出) or opening up for the
purpose of acquisition (na 納). The shut strategy can mean shutting down
for the purpose of acceptance or shutting down for the purpose of rejec-
tion. The open-shut strategy is the gateway to Heaven and Earth. Open-
shut transforms yin and yang in response to the four seasons to nourish
and influence all things, no matter if they are vertical or horizontal.8 It
is the fundamental principle that prescribes how to progress in response
to changes, how to overcome setbacks, and how to address objections.
The open-shut strategy represents the ultimate Daoist law of transforma- I.1.4
tion and different methods of persuasion (shui 說). Hence, it is important
to investigate changes. The mouth is the doorway of the heart, which is the
master of the spirit.9 Ambitions and ideas, preferences and desires, thoughts
and concerns, wisdom and strategies—all of them go in and out through
the doorway. For this reason, the open-shut strategy is employed to close
and control the doorway in response to the incoming and the outgoing.
Open means opening with speech (yan 言). It is yang. Shut means clos- I.1.5
ing in silence. It is yin. When yin and yang are in harmony, the beginning
and ending are set on course correctly. Therefore, it is said that longevity
and birth, peace and happiness, wealth and prestige, prominence and
glory, fame and honor, hobby and interest, fortune and benefit, pride and
ambition, and likes and desire are yang, which is called beginning. It is said
that death and destruction, worry and anxiety, poverty and disadvantage,
suffering and humiliation, abandonment and damage, loss, disappoint-
ment, harm, torment, and punishment are yin, which is called ending.

says is true or false; shut down to motivate him to collaborate sincerely” (8). From
this type of Chinese reading results Cleary’s translation that “shutting down is to
make sure of their [other people’s] sincerity” (5). The translation, “to invite sincere
responses from others,” attempts to keep Guiguzi’s proposition neutral without
connotation of ethics or manipulation.
8. Classical Chinese prose does not have punctuation. Modern Chinese commenta-
tors show some inconsistencies when punctuating sentences. For example, Zong
Qiong puts the period after “vertical or horizontal,” while Chen Puqing includes
this phrase in the next sentence. Tao Hongjing breaks the sentences at the end of
“vertical” and “horizontal” with a note, confirming Zong’s placement of the period.
Hence in the translation, “vertical” means falls and rises of all things, and “hori-
zontal” means progresses and setbacks.
9. See note 1 in this chapter for the explanation of heart (xin 心) in the Chinese tradi-
tion. Also see chapter 1 of book 3 for the relationship between the heart and spirit. 41
 Guiguzi
All speeches (yan 言) that employ yang are “beginning.” This sort of
speech (yan 言) talks about positive things and is used to launch business.
All speeches (yan 言) that employ yin are “ending.” This sort of speech
(yan 言) talks about negative things and is used to get a plan canceled.10
I.1.6 Experiment with the open-shut strategy through yin and yang. Speeches in
the yang category (yang yan zhe 陽言者) begin with lofty topics, while those
in the yin category (yin yan zhe 陰言者) rely on low and small matters. Bring
yourself11 down to accomplish small matters; elevate yourself to accomplish
lofty causes. By following these principles in speech, nothing is impossible to
get out, and nothing is impossible to get into; nothing is impossible (wu suo bu
ke 無所不可).12 You can persuade (shui 說) a person (ren 人),13 a lord (jia 家),14
or a king. You can persuade (shui 說) the whole world.15 Taking care of small
issues, you are not limited by interior boundaries; dealing with big issues, you
are not restricted by exterior boundaries. Whether they magnify or diminish,
whether they are going away or coming near, whether they are about disloyalty
or loyalty, manage all of them with yin and yang. When yang moves, take ac-
tion; when yin yields, hold still. When yang moves, reach out; when yin recedes,
yield to the inside. All yang ends in yin; all yin changes back to yang when it
reaches the end. Those that act according to yang profess virtues; those that hold
still according to yin shape situations. To acquire yin through yang, embrace
virtues; to acquire yang through yin, add force. Interactive and responsive, yin
and yang are results of the open-shut strategy. This is the Dao of yin and yang
in Heaven and Earth; this is the method to persuade (shui 說) people.16 This
is the beginning of all things and is called the gateway to Heaven and Earth.17

10. Tao makes no comment. Xu believes that “謀 (mou)” implies an action (Collec-
tion, 18). Hence, “謀 (mou)” is translated as “plan.” 謀 (mou), as in “謀 事(mou shi),”
in Guiguzi’s time meant mostly “consultation,” “idea,” “connection,” “pursuit,” or
on some occasions, “scheme.” In modern Chinese, “謀” has evolved to mean mostly
“scheme,” “plotting,” or “intriguing” with cunning strategies.
11. For readability and grammatical purposes, whenever proper, the subject omitted
in classical Chinese is added to sentences in translation.
12. Some modern editions show “無所不言可.” The translation follows Tao’s edition.
13. 人 (ren) stands for an ordinary person.
14. 家 (jia) refers to an area governed by a lord (諸侯, zhuhou).
15. The “world” is purposely separated from the previous line of nouns to show the
emphasis on the power of persuasion.
16. Tao emphasizes that “this means that Heaven and Earth are the causes of yin and
yang. Strategies based on their principles are effective in persuasion.”
17. The original is 圓方之門户 (yuan fang zhi men hu). 圓 (round) and 方 (square)
refer to Heaven and Earth, as in 天圓地方 (round Heaven and square Earth); hence
42 “gateway to Heaven and Earth” in translation.
 Book I

2. Reflect-Respond (Fan Ying 反應)18

I.2.119
The great ancient sages20 who served as teachers conformed to the form-
less Dao to develop themselves. Reflectively examining the past, they verified
the future (lai 來); studying the past over and again, they understood the
present. Critically examining others, they reflected upon themselves; when
motion (dong 動) and motionlessness (jing 靜‍),21 truth and untruth, did not
accord with the present (jin 今),22 they reexamined the past (gu 古)23 for
inquiry. They can transform matters that do not follow their plans to their
own advantage. This is the sage’s mind, which should be studied seriously.24
When the other person speaks (ren yan zhe 人言者), he25 is in motion; I.2.2
when you listen, you are motionless. Hear what he says (ci 辭) based on
his speech (yan 言).26 When his statements are inconsistent with what you

18. Tao Hongjing’s and the Daoist editions preserve fan-ying as reflect-respond.
However, Tao’s edition hand-scribed by Qin Engfu lists two other interpretations
of fan ying as fan fu meaning reflect-repeat. See also Xu Fuhong, A Collection of
Editorial Notes and Commentaries on Guiguzi, 23.
19. Tao places a commentary note before the first line of this chapter. It goes, “If a
statement does not sound true, it should be responded to with a refusal, which would
definitely make the other party rethink and react.”
20. Da hua zhe (大化者) is understood as a teacher of Dao, hence great ancient sages. Tao
explains, “Da hua zhe stands for the ancient sage, who shapes affairs according to the
Dao. Formless is the Dao. All motions [or changes] result from the Dao. Therefore, he
[da hua zhe] developed along with the Dao.” There is inconsistency between Tao’s edition
hand-transcribed by Qin and the quotation of Tao in other editions (e.g., Xu, Collection,
24; P. Chen, 14). Tao’s sentence reads, “圣人以物化大道也 (sheng ren yi su hua da dao ye
the sage shapes affairs according to the Dao),” but Xu’s quotation of Tao reads, “圣人以
大道化物也 (sheng ren yi da dao hua wu ye, the sage utilizes the Dao to shape affairs).”
This translation follows Tao’s edition hand-transcribed by Qin to keep consistency.
21. 動靜 (dong jing) can also mean action and inaction.
22. Only one edition has 來 (lai, things that are coming or the future) in the place
of 今 (jin, today, the present). The translation follows Tao’s edition.
23. 古 (gu, ancient) in the context may mean “the past” or “ancient wisdom.”
24. Tao makes the comment that “opportunities would be lost without careful
examinations; for this reason, attention must be emphasized.”
25. “He” is purposely chosen to indicate the gender connotation in the original text.
26. Tao’s comment is, “Remain still to watch motions in order to examine what one
sees; analyze the speech to understand its rhetoric (ci 辭) clearly.” Tao copies 辭
without unfolding it. In this context, 辭 has a wide range of meanings, including
expressions, meanings, prose, speech composition, eloquence, diction, and rhetoric.
It is translated into “what he says” to be inclusive. 43
Guiguzi
observe, inquire in response, and you surely can evoke a reaction.27 All
spoken words (yan 言) represent images of things; all things are compa-
rable. With images to compare, you can foresee what comes next. Images
are reflections of things; comparison means comparing words (ci 辭).28
Remain formless [motionless] to seek spoken words (you sheng 有聲)29;
if the speech accords with what is observed (shi 事),30 truths are acquired
from the other party.31 Inviting spoken words is like setting out a net
to capture animals. Use multiple nets in a location where animals tend
to gather in groups and watch the nets attentively. If what is observed
conforms to the Dao, the other person is expressing himself.32 This is

27. Tao explains, “If the speaker does not make sense, do not reject him outright but
respond by questioning him, who in turn would rethink. A reasonable agreement
would be reached.”
28. Tao notes, “When a response is brought forth, it is possible to phrase its image
[shape] to conduct comparisons. When one is able to compare what is revealed in
an image, it is possible to see what comes next. The comparison makes one speak
eloquently without difficulties.” Xu Fuhong’s interpretation is that
a speech can describe an image in words; the image then clarifies the purpose
of the speech. Accordingly, “image” has two meanings. One stands for the
status of the other person. The sentence that “All spoken words represent
images of things” implies that when things are articulated, they reveal infor-
mation. The other refers to oneself. In persuasion, to make the other person
understand one’s proposal, one can use images as analogies to explain oneself
in plain words. Comparison here means using a metaphor, a simile, or an
analogy, for example, a similar event in the past or in the present. Stories in
Zhan Guo Ce can be called analogies. But Guiguzi discusses the principles of
comparison theoretically. Interpretations may vary when practical situations
change. (Collection, 27)
29. Tao explains, “Reasons are inextricably nuanced and formless; unuttered words
are unrevealing. Therefore, formlessness is maintained to seek utterance of sound;
sounds result in speeches; comparison refers to analogy.” Therefore, “formless” could
also mean motionless, quiet, or silent here.
30. 事 (shi) can mean a thing, an event, an affair, or what is happening. It is trans-
lated into “what is observed” to punctuate response and convey the ambiguity in
the original.
31. Tao adds,
Fishing relies on how the bait is placed; seeking spoken words relies on how
the beginning goes. A good beginning surely leads to a response; good baits
catch fish. Hence catch the word [acquire the truth]. Words testify what is
observed, hence the accordance. Obviously, fishing purports to make the
other party open up with a speech and acquire the truth from him.
32. The original 彼自出之 (bi zi chu zhi) literally means the other person comes
44 out automatically.
 Book I
called the net to angle with people (diao ren zhi wang 釣人之網).33 Fre-
quently utilize the net to press the other party; if he still does not speak
a word (bu yan 不言), making comparisons then becomes impossible.34
At this, change your approaches for him.35 Draw analogical images to
appeal to him to attune (bao 報) his mindset (xin 心).36 Once his feel-
ings are manifest, examine them immediately. Repeat this method to
make him respond. When you can compare his words with images, you
can build a foundation.37 Repeat the comparisons over and over again;

33. 釣人之網 (diao ren zhi wang) literally means “a net to hook people,” hence “to angle
with people.” Tao adds, “Spread the net to wait and watch, and you can snare up an
animal. If what is observed agrees with the Dao, the reasons come to light naturally.
When the reasons (li 理) are apparent, the wise sage then conducts an analysis (bian
辨). Despite the other person’s effort to conceal his intent, he does not make sense be-
cause he violates the Dao; therefore, it is called ‘a net to hook people.’” Modern editions
contain discrepancies in Tao’s sentence starting with “when the reasons are apparent
(li ji zhang 理既彰).” Xu’s edition has yan (言 speech) before 理既彰 (Collection, 28),
but other editions do not contain yan, including Zhong Qiong’s, Chen Puqing’s, and
Tao’s hand-transcribed by Qin. This translation of Tao follows Qin’s transcription to
keep consistency.
34. Classical prose is not composed of paragraphs. Modern editors paragraph the
prose based on their own interpretations. Except for Xu’s edition, other editions
do not break the passage at this point. This English edition follows the common
approach for thematic coherence.
35. Tao inserts an explanation that says,
Hold your net to captivate the other person to make him do the things you
want to accomplish (zhi shi 職事 accomplish things). If the approach does
not work for him, then he would not utter any words for you to compare. At
this, you should make changes to move the net. Change means to alternate
images to appeal to him.
It is necessary to add Xu’s comment here, which says, “When the other party does
not speak or when his speech does not contain enough information for analysis or
analogy, change the way of discussion” (Collection, 30).
36. In this context, it is fitting to translate xin (心 heart) into “mindset.” Tao’s com-
ment goes,
bao (報) means to respond accordingly. It is called alternating methods to
use images to move the other person. If you respond properly to his state of
mind, you can see his feelings (qing 情). Then you show admirations for his
perceptions to cultivate and capture his feelings (qing 情).
The understanding of qing in Guiguzi can be related to Xunzi, who notes, “Tempera-
ments include like, dislike, happiness, anger, sadness, and pleasure, which are all
called feelings. Feelings develop from the heart (xin 心); the heart decides which
feeling to express. Making decisions is called consideration (lü 慮)” (Hui Wu’s trans-
lation, Xunzi, “Rectify Names,” 169). See also note 2 in chapter 1 of book 1.
37. Tao comments, 45
 Guiguzi
examine them back and forth from all perspectives, because nothing is
inextricable from the spoken word that signifies it. Ancient sages have
used this method confidently to appeal to the smart and the slow.38
I.2.3 A person good at reflecting on what he hears acts like a ghost or phan-
tom39 to capture the feelings of others. He makes adjustments to collect
information and examine it. Collecting (mu 牧) information without
examining it ends in clouded intelligence;40 clouded intelligence ends
in shaky interpretation. Alternating images in analogies can inspire the
other person to respond in words (fan ci 反辭), to which you must listen.41
If you want to hear others’ utterances (sheng 聲), remain quiet; if you want
others to open up, shut down. If you want to reach high, lower yourself
first. If you want to take, give first.42 If you want others to display their
feelings, use images as analogies to encourage them to speak up. Things

Repeat the method in order to see how the other person responds. Through
repetition, the method stays in your memory and results in magical strate-
gies. Therefore, it is said that by the moment it is possible to compare words
with images, it is impossible for a person to change his words. Thereby you
can identify the fundamental principles (ji 基) of the kingdom (bang 邦) and
the lord (jia 家).
Some commentators interpreted ji as scheme, tactic, or strategy. But “Tao said it was
far-fetched” (Xu, Collection, 31).
38. Tao suggests, “To appeal to the slow, the sage shut down to learn if the person
is sincere; to appeal to the smart, the sage inspired him to show his feelings to the
fullest extent. The sage was able to acquire the truth each time. Hence he ‘used this
method confidently.’”
39. Xu explains that “Acting like a ghost means being able to change oneself into
different shapes and forms like a ghost” (Collection, 32).
40. Tao adds, “Acute intelligence develops from studies of collected information;
hence ‘collecting information without examining it leads to clouded intelligence.’”
Some commentators interpret 牧 (mu) as “wait and watch” (Yin Tongyang qtd. in
Xu, Collection, 33) and “organize and manage” (Zhong, 29). Tao simply copied mu
without an explanation. The definitions of mu in the Dictionary of Classical Chinese
are to cultivate, gather, and organize. It is fitting to translate mu into “collecting.”
41. Tao interprets, “with regard to the speaker (yan zhe 言者) who changes images
for comparison, the other party would question him in reaction. At this moment
one should remain quiet to listen.”
42. Tao writes,
The response is the so-called Dao of listening (fan ting zhi dao 反聽之道).
Use it to inspire the other person in order to hear his utterance, while I [the
persuader] remain motionless and silent. Hence it is said that in order to let
the other person open up, I shut down instead. To make the other person look
high and lofty, I remain low and humble; when I know that the other person
wants to take, I give; only in this way can the things and feelings be known;
46 and the other person has no way to conceal himself.
 Book I
of the same genus echo one another in the same sound. The same reasons
are derived from the same truths.43
Sometimes you start with one approach; sometimes you start with I.2.4
another.44 You can speak about serving the superior; you can speak
about supervising subordinates. By doing this you are able to listen and
tell truth from untruth, similarity from dissimilarity, honesty from dis-
honesty (qing zha 情詐).45 Motion and action, speech and silence, all
evolve out of this (ci 此),46 from which the pattern of joy and anger can
be discerned47 and from which decisions on principles and methods are
reached.48 Turn to seek a response and then examine where true feelings
rest. This is the method to apply.49 Try to remain calm and silent in order
to hear what the other person says and examine his activities. You can
discuss myriad phenomena; you can make distinctions between male
and female. Although things under discussion may be of little value, the

43. Tao interprets,

In order to open up the feelings of others, draw images in comparison to
motivate him. When his emotions are stirred up, he begins to talk. Then you
encourage him step by step and lead him to speak about himself naturally.
This is like cranes whooping in search of their own kind, which whoops in
return. This means that the same genus echoes in the same sound. People
who agree with each other work the same way, because they share the same
rationale.
From this statement in Guiguzi derived Lü Buwei’s saying that “things belonging
to the same category naturally attract each other; things that share the same ethers
naturally join together” (Knoblock and Riegel, 15/8.I 368). Xu adds that the last sen-
tence means that “similar sounds echo each other, and people of the same outlooks
tend to be together” (Collection, 34).
44. Tao notes, “With regard to the topic under discussion, you can use one approach
to begin, or you can use another to begin.”
45. Xu’s commentary reads, “情 (qing)means sincerity or honesty, and 詐 (zha) dis-
semblance or dishonesty. A note in Zuozhuan says ‘If I am not dishonest (zha 詐)
to you, you do not treat me with deception (yu 虞)” (Collection, 35).
46. Note on the translation: “this” is chosen to maintain the ambiguity in the
original. 此 may refer to an approach, method, or emotion.
47. Tao comments, “It is said that speech and silence can never be severed from
feelings [qing 情]. They are determined by feelings, which predispose joy and anger.”
48. Tao writes, “The six listed above are all related to emotions (qing 情). Based
on them, one can decide which method and principle to apply.” Xu explains after-
ward, “Making decisions means that one must be prepared; this sentence echoes the
sentence below—‘understanding others starts with the understanding of oneself’”
(Collection, 36, see sentence one in I.2.5).
49. Tao’s commentary goes, “When one can observe where the other person’s emo-
tions rest, one can know the truth [xin 信].” 47
 Guiguzi
trivial helps you understand their genera (jian wei zhi lei 見微知纇).50 If
you want to probe a person, you must penetrate within him; evaluate his
capability to target his intent like an arrow (she qi yi 射其意).51 Respond
with this principle of the Dao, and you will never miss a target (fu ying
bus hi 符應不失).52 It is like a flying snake stalking its game;53 it is like
Yi (羿) shooting his arrow.54
I.2.5 Understanding others starts from the understanding of self. Only by
understanding one’s self can one understand others.55 These understand-
ings [of others and oneself] are as inseparable as halibuts;56 their shapes
are like shade against light. Examine the spoken word of others without

50. A translation emphasizing rhetorical connotations. See Aristotle’s instruction

on deliberative rhetoric (Kennedy, On Rhetoric, 20–21). Tao comments,
The so-called Dao of listening requires one to calm down first in order to
seek the spoken word from the other person and examine his behaviors [ac-
tivities]. You can either talk about orders of myriad things [wan wu 萬物] or
distinguish male and female [xiong ci 雄雌].
“Male and female” in this context are analogies to mean genera of things with little
emphasis on gender.
51. 射其意 (she qi yi) literally means to target his intent like an arrow. Tao’s com-
mentary goes, “Hearing a person’s spoken words leads to an understanding of his
feelings. Therefore, probing a person requires reaching within him. The causes for
feelings can then be discerned, hence the saying that ‘evaluate his capability to target
his intent like an arrow.’”
52. In this context, 符 (fu) may mean the Dao, the principle, or a proper way, while
應 (ying) means “accord” or “respond.”
53. Legend has it that a type of celestial flying snake (teng she 螣蛇 or 腾蛇) existed
in antiquity. Guo Pu (郭璞 scholar, 276–324 c.e.) is quoted saying that “腾蛇 [the
flying snake] is said to be a type of dragon. It is a centipede that looks like a locust
with an enormous belly and eats snake brains” (qtd. in Ci Hai, 辞海 the Chinese
Encyclopedia, 1521). Tao says that the predatory flying snake never misses its game
(teng she suo zhi huo fu bu cha 腾蛇所指禍福不差).
54. Yi (羿) or Hou Yi (后羿), allegedly a godlike archer, descended from Heaven to
aid mankind in the Xia Dynasty, China’s first dynasty (about 21–16 b.c.e.). Commis-
sioned by Emperor Yao (堯), Yi shot down nine of the ten Suns, whose extraordinary
scorching heat had brought drought to the land and deprived people of food and water.
55. Tao adds, “A person who knows others is wise; a person who knows himself
is astute. Wisdom is born from astuteness. Therefore, it is said that if you want to
understand others, you must understand yourself first.” Although not discussing
warfare, Guiguzi’s theory that understanding others starts from the understanding
of oneself corresponds to Sunzi, who says that “he who knows the enemy and himself
will never in a hundred battles be at risk” (Ames, Sunzi, 113).
56. The Chinese believe that halibuts must live in pairs to survive. Using this analogy,
Guiguzi implies that understanding others and oneself is a must. He emphasizes it
48 again in the next sentence, which means that wherever there is light, there is shade.
 Book I
fail as if you were a magnet attracting a needle and as if you were a tongue
sticking to a well-cooked bone to suck out its juice.57 Be subtle (wei 微)58
in dealing with people; be quick in sensing their feelings, like yin and
yang, like circle (yuan 圓‍) and square (fang 方).59 When you cannot
see the shape [situation], guide yourself with the Dao to move around.
When you can see the shape [situation], square it with principles. Use
this method to move forward or backward and to the right or the left.60
A lack of self-discipline leads to mismanagement of others. Rigidity is
“negligence at the loss of the Dao.” Discipline yourself before managing
others (mou ren 牧人).61 You can become a “heavenly god” if you can
keep your strategy formlessly flexible and your opening invisible.

3. Affect-Fortify (Nei Qian 内揵)62

With regard to the relationship between a king and an official or I.3.1
between a superior and a subordinate, keeping distance may lead to
closeness; being nearby may result in alienation.63 One may be ne-
glected, even if staying nearby; one may be wanted, even if staying afar.

57. Tao’s interpretation reads, “Act like a sage to discover empathy, and you will never
put anything at risk no matter what. Hence ‘as if you were a magnet attracting a
needle, as if you were a tongue sticking to a well-cooked bone to suck out its juice.’”
58. Some commentators read 微 (wei) as “secretly;” the Dictionary of Classical Chinese
gives more definitions, including careful, subtle, delicate, small, and weak.
59. Round and square (yuan fang 圓方) stand for Heaven and Earth. Tao explains,
When the sage and the wise meet, they are both subtle; they never manifest
their intent but react decisively when they discern the other’s feelings. The
way the king and his officials deal with each other should be as naturally
coordinated as body movements are; this is a recognized practice since the
antiquity. For this reason, their relationship is [as correlative] as yin and yang;
and their shapes are as round and square.
See further statements about round and square in III.1, “The Primary Doctrine on
Seven Arts of the Yin Mystique.”
60. Tao notes, “This statement can be applied to the appointment of officials with
regard to promotion or resignation, criticism or praise.”
61. 牧 (mou) meant “manage,” “lead,” or “organize” in Guiguzi’s time.
62. Tao explains, “揵 (Qian) means to hold something firmly to tie to it; building a
relationship between the superior and the subordinate depends on agreeable minds.
People in an established relationship tend to stay together.”
63. Tao notes, “People who share the same notion of Dao are close even in distance;
people who do not share the same sensibilities (qing 情) are separated even close
by.” Xu explains that the relationship refers to the superior’s trust in the subordinate
(Guiguzi, 36). 49
 Guiguzi
Daily presence may not lead to employment (yu 御); great reputation
can draw admiration from afar. All relationships can be affected and
fortified; basic relationships begin from the shared mindset.64 Some ties
are built on principles and virtues, some on partisanship and friend-
ship, some on money and material goods, and some on desire and lust
(cai se 采色).65 When utilizing the intent of others properly,66 you can
enter or exit at your will; you can stay close or afar as you wish. You
can make them pursue you; you can make them miss you like a mother
trapdoor spider (fu mu 蚨母) naturally close to her spiderlings. She can
move in and out at her will and retains her independence that nothing
can obstruct.67
I.3.2 Nei (内) means to deliver persuasive speeches (shui ci 說辭); qian (揵)
means to fortify approaches.68 Therefore, those who stay afar but are
missed are of some amicable character (yin de 阴德).69 Those who are
nearby but unwanted do not share the same values. Being nearby but

64. Tao’s annotation goes, “Some agreeable words heard from afar make the listener
miss and pursue the speaker. This is because they share some innermost sensibilities,
which sustain the relationship.”
65. 采色 is interpreted as a desire for entertainment by beautiful women, dances,
music, etc. (Xu, Collection, 48). 色 may not refer only to sex here.
66. All Chinese commentators interpret 其 (qi, somebody’s, a person’s) as a refer-
ence to a king’s or a superior’s, hence “the intent of others” to provide possibility
for broad readings.
67. Most Chinese commentators agree that 蚨 is a trapdoor spider (die dang 螲 蟷)
often seen in southern China. Tao comments,
Fu mu 蚨母 is 蚨 (trapdoor spider) that looks like a spider but lives in a cov-
ered burrow. It is said that the mother trapdoor spider covers the burrow in
order to raise her offspring. She closes and opens it as she wants. Nothing can
separate her from her babies. An official who wishes to nei qian his relation-
ship with the king obeys the latter by all means to fortify a seamless natural
relationship. This is what it [the sentence] means.
Xu Fuhong says that Tao’s interpretation of 蚨 as 螲 蟷 is inaccurate, but he does not
offer an alternative reading. Meanwhile, the lack of the subject in the last sentence
makes it difficult to determine if it continues to discuss the 蚨母 (fu mu) or address
a persuader. The English translation follows Tao’s interpretation.
68. Tao says, “To deliver a speech means to enter [the mind of a king] to establish an
emotional tie [nei jie 内结] with the king. Therefore, nei means to deliver speeches.
Affecting a king emotionally, you can definitely make him hold on to you; therefore,
qian means to develop strategies.” Xu says that Tao’s interpretation is not accurate,
believing that “qian means to use strategies to fortify or to plan how to clear away
obstructions” (Collection, 50).
69. Tao says that yin de means getting along as individuals; Xu explains that the
50 phrase means quietly complying with the king’s wishes (Guiguzi, 42).
 Book I
unwanted indicates what is proposed is perceived unbeneficial; being afar
but wanted means what is proposed is realized to be beneficial only after
the proposer is gone.70 Daily presence that does not lead to employment
(yu 御) indicates what is proposed does not sound agreeable. Reputation
that draws admiration from afar indicates what is heard sounds agreeable
and consultable. It is said, therefore, that you would encounter obstacles
when you address a matter without understanding its nature; you would
encounter rejections when you address a person without understanding
his situation (qing 情).71 When you understand the other person’s situ-
ation, you can adopt strategies to work with him. This approach can be
employed to exit or enter, to close (qian 揵)72 or open. Therefore, when
planning their achievements, the sages use this approach to foresee and
manage (qian 揵)73 the myriad things.74
Accordingly 75 (you fu 由夫), follow the doctrines on the Dao and I.3.3
virtues, compassion and loyalty, rites and rituals of entertainment, and
sincerity and integrity for plans and strategies. Start with the Book of
Poetry and the Book of History76 and alternately deliberate on advantages
and disadvantages to discuss what should be adopted and what should

70. Tao explains that “the proposal does not meet what the king has in mind but
proves to be truly beneficial only afterwards.” Xu follows that “being nearby but
unutilized means that the proposer’s predictions and strategies are not accepted;
being gone but sought after means that what happens is what the proposer has
foreseen” (Guiguzi, 42).
71. 情 means “situation” here and not “emotion,” “mind,” or “sensibility.”
72. 揵 here means “a latch” as a noun or “to close” as a verb. It does not mean “to
build” or “establish” as that in nei qian.
73. 揵 means “to build” or “establish” here. In reference to Xu’s interpretation as “to
control,” the character is translated as “manage.”
74. Most editions place this sentence in the following passage. Tao’s edition does not
indicate the separation, while Xu’s places it at the end of this passage. The English
translation follows Xu’s edition based on the reading that this sentence continues
discussing the approach by using the sage as an example.
75. Since there is no subject in the passage, there can be two types of reading. One,
this passage continues to discuss the sages’ approaches. Two, it shifts to the teaching
of how to begin to affect and establish a relationship. 由 (you) can be read as “because
of” or “from,” while 夫 (fu) can be read as “this, that, or it” or as a function word in
the beginning of a sentence to draw attention to the statements thereafter. The two
characters can be interpreted as “based on this approach, it is recommended. . . .”
Hence “accordingly” in English.
76. The translation is based on Tao’s commentary that “it means to refer to Book of
Poetry [shi 詩] and Book of History [shu 書] to support one’s own remarks.” 書 refers
to 尙書 (shang shu), a collection of documents and speeches of the periods of Xia
(夏), Shang (尚), and West Zhou (xi zhou 西周) or earlier. 51
Guiguzi
not. For connection (he 合), utilize the internal (nei 内); for removal
(qu 去), utilize the external (wai 外).77 Both the internal and external
should be grounded in the understanding of the principles of the Dao.78
When considering and planning future business (lai shi 來事), one can
address difficulties (yi 疑) to reach a decision.79 Make plans with flaw-
less strategies to establish accomplishments and virtues. When names
are appropriated (zhi ming 治名) and people are placed in production
and business, fortify approaches for affection from within.80 When high
offices are irresponsible in governance and subordinates become disor-
derly and conscienceless as a result, fortify approaches to effect changes.81
When a person is occupied by ego and disregards advice, deliver exalting
eloquence (fei 飛) to excite him (shui er fei zhi 說而飛之).82 If you are
summoned, accept the order to serve; if you think you must leave, excuse
yourself by pointing to potential jeopardy.83 Adjust yourself according to
77. Tao’s reading is that “内 means internal feelings, 外 means feelings about the
external. Winning affections leads to connection; losing affections leads to self-
removal. This is common sense (li zhi chang ye 理之常也).”
78. Tao notes, “It is said that when a person fully knows something inside out (nei
wai 内外), he then understands the principles of the Dao (dao shu 道数).”
79. 疑 may mean “doubt, question, issues, or difficulty.” Tao explains, “When one
can foresee the future, he can decide where the issues are.” This statement may
imply that if one can see the consequences of some action, he or she can make a
right recommendation.
80. Tao says that
rectifying names of the king and officials classifies them in order to place
them in business and to collect taxes. Then locations make no difference.
When the people above and below are placed orderly, they understand their
responsibilities. When a location makes no difference, labor is reduced. This
is the foundation of a state.
81. Commentaries on this sentence vary. Tao explains, “Without governance from the
above, the subordinates are in disorder. In this type of kingdom, those who abandon
their masters become ignorant. They can do whatever they want, but they do no good
to themselves. Therefore, it is said ‘[to] fortify approaches to effect changes.’” However,
Xu’s interpretation is that “when faced with an irresponsible king whose subordinates
are not conscientious, a persuader should withdraw his service” (Guiguzi, 45). The
difficulty lies in 反, which can be read as “to reverse the situation” or “to change” or
“to return (withdraw).” The translation follows Tao’s explanation.
82. Tao’s interpretation is that “when a person’s ego is inflated and does not listen,
exalt his greatness to make him happy.” Xu reads 飛 as “to beguile him with compli-
ments” (Guiguzi, 46), while Zong Qiong reads it as “delivering a lofty exciting speech”
(43). Chen Puqing’s reading is that 飛 is related to the 飛箝 (fei qian) strategies in
chapter 5, meaning “to excite a person by commending his reputation/fame” (42–43).
83. Tao adds, “When you want to leave because you have achieved many accomplish-
52 ments, use the excuse that your continuing service may pose jeopardy.”
 Book I
circumstances, and others will know nothing about your actions (mo zhi
suo wei 莫知所爲).84 Self-withdrawal is the most fundamental principle
(da yi 大儀).85

4. Mend-Break (Di Xi 抵巇)86

Matters follow their own laws; occurrences converge and diverge on I.4.1
their own course.87 One may not see what is happening nearby; yet one
may know what will happen in the future. Those who do not see what is
happening nearby are not listening to surrounding words (ci 辭); those
who know what will happen reflect on the past to examine the future.88
A xi (巇 crevice/break) develops into a xia (罅 rift), the xia (罅) to a
jian (澗 ravine), and the jian to an abyss.89 Before a fracture begins, it
shows some sign (zhen 朕). It can be filled in to mend; it can be with-
held to mend; it can be stopped to mend; it can be concealed to mend;

84. 莫知所爲 (mo zhi suo wei) literally means “not knowing about a person’s be-
havior.” As a pronoun, 所 can refer to either the audience or the persuader here.
Most commentators inherit Tao’s reading that the adviser (persuader) must adjust
himself according to circumstances to keep others unaware of his moves (Tao, 15; Xu,
Guiguzi, 46; Zong Qiong, 43). However, it must be pointed out that 莫知所爲 may
also mean that the persuader has no full knowledge of the advisee’s (king’s) inclina-
tion. So it could mean that when the other’s inclination is unknown, withdrawing
yourself is the fundamental approach. This English translation adopts the reading
of the majority. Indeed, controversial readings like this case may change the entire
meaning of the whole passage and effect the reading of Guiguzi either as a book on
manipulation or as a book on rhetoric (see more on this point in “Redrawing the
Map of Rhetoric” in this book).
85. All commentators agree that the last sentence encourages the persuader to pro-
tect himself.
86. In this text, 巇 (xi) serves sometimes as a noun and sometimes as a verb. Hence
“Mend-Break” to give it broader meanings.
87. Tao comments, “This sentence means that convergences and divergences are
like natural laws.”
88. Tao explains, “Listening to the word and observing the behavior provide insight
into what is happening nearby. Reflecting on the past to examine the future provides
insight into what will happen down the road.”
89. In Tao’s editions, character jian has “mountain” (山) on the left side, while other
editions have 澗, instead, both being pronounced as jian. The verb “develop” is
chosen to convey the common interpretation of Guiguzi’s reminder that a problem
may develop gradually from small to large. If not handled properly, the whole thing
may collapse entirely (Tao, 16; Xu, Guiguzi, 50; Zong, 48; Chen, 37–38). 53
 Guiguzi
it can be replaced to mend.90 These are the principles of mend-break
(Di Xi 抵巇).91
I.4.2 When they are aware of things in jeopardy, the sages independently guard
their practices.92 Speak to things according to their changes (yin hua shuo
shi 因化說事);93 thoroughly analyze plans and strategies to discern incon-
spicuous signs.94 Indiscernible motions of the tiny tip of autumn animal
fur may begin to shake the foot of Mountain Tai.95 When planning external
affairs, start subtly and detect inconspicuous emergent signs. All of these
can be accomplished through mend-break, which is a practice of the Dao.96
I.4.3 In an utterly deranged world, the king at the top lacks scruples, lords
and nobles disobey the Dao and virtues, petty greedy persons are looting,
honorable men are unemployed, and sages have to escape or hide them-
selves. Avarice and fraud are rampant; the king and officials suspect one

90. Tao says,

Zhen means the beginning of a crack, emphasizing its tininess. A break that
develops from within can be filled; a break that develops from without can be
withdrawn; a break that develops from under can be appeased; a break that
stays tiny can be concealed; a break that is not mendable should be replaced
with something new.
91. Xu explains that
these are the basic methods of di-xi. Guiguzi uses yin-yang to describe them.
The first four methods [filling in, withholding, closing, and concealing] are
about “filling in” to avoid further deterioration. The last resort is replacing.
Seeking reconciliation is the fundamental principle of mend-break. Among
the five methods, replacement is used as the final resort. This means filling
and closing dominate the method of mend-break. (Guiguzi, 50)
92. Editions have varied versions of the original. Tao’s edition hand-transcribed by Qin
has “聖人獨保其用 (sheng ren du bao qi yong),” while other editions replace “用 (yong,
practice, resources, management, or employment)” with “身 (shen self, body, or life).”
93. Again, the omission of the subject makes it difficult to decide if Guigizi is praising
the practice of the sage or addressing his disciples directly. The translation purposely
omits subjects in sentences to maintain the original ambiguity. Here 說 is pronounced
as shuo to mean “to discuss, speak to, or speak about,” and not “to persuade.”
94. Toa’s reading is, “Practice persuasion according to changes; utilize strategies
when opportunities arise. Map out your plan thoroughly to defend all sides; detect
subtle warning signs to take preventive measures.”
95. The original is “經起秋毫之末揮之於太山之本 (jing qi qiu hao zhi mo hui zhi
yu tai shan zhi ben).” Xu explains that “this sentence means that things are often
impaired by small issues. If not resolved right away, they would jeopardize the
foundation of a big mountain” (Collection, 69).
96. Tao’s explanation is that “once a break has begun, one can use the Daoist strategy.
Hence di xi (mend-break) is used as a Daoist strategy.” His interpretation seems
slightly different from modern readings that mending or breaking fractures is part
54 of the Dao and its practice (Ren and Bai, 208; Cao and An, 262; Zong, 50; Chen, 34).
 Book I
another; the state undergoes chaos and turmoil; civilians are forced into
bloodshed in a civil war; fathers and sons are estranged in separation and
hate each other. These are emergent breaks and rifts (xi xia 巇罅). When
the sages see them, they apply the method of “mend” (di 抵) to manage
them. In the event that a state is under control, fill in (sai 塞) to mend; in
the event that a state is completely out of control, apply replacement (de
得) to mend.97 Sometimes mend this way; sometimes mend that way.98
Sometimes mend to facilitate transformation; sometimes mend to execute
an overthrow. The states of the Five Emperors were mended through
filling in; those of the Three Kings were mended through replacement.99
There are countless instances where lords and nobles mend to resolve
issues. In the current time,100 the best method is mending.
Heaven and Earth come together and apart; they start somewhere I.4.4
and end somewhere. They are filled with breaks and rifts, which must
be investigated.101 Inspecting them and mending them with the method
of open-shut make a person a sage, who is the messenger of Heaven and
Earth. When the sages find nothing to mend, they seclude themselves
and await opportunity; when a chance of mending arises, they provide
service and recommend strategies. This method can be used to respond
to the superior and to manage the subordinate.102 If a person is able to
follow it and apply it, he can guard the divinity of Heaven and Earth.103

97. The general interpretation of sai (also pronounced as se) is to stop the problems
to put the state back on the right track, and the interpretation of de is to take it over
with a new order (Xu, Guiguzi, 54; Zong, 53; Chen, 37).
98. The general interpretation of this sentence is that “this” (ci 此) refers to filling
in a crack, while “that” (bi 彼) refers to replacing what currently exits. The original
reads “或抵如此或抵如彼 (huo di ru ci huo di ru bi).”
99. It is said that the pre-Qin Warring States period had five emperors—Huang Di (黄
帝), Zhuan Xu (颛頊), Di Ku (帝嚳), Di Yao (帝堯), and Di Shun (帝舜)—who solved
problems and peacefully inherited their empires. For example, Di Shun is recorded
to have served as Di Yao’s minister and helped Yao stabilize the state by controlling
the flood. The three kings were Xia Yu (夏禹), Shang Tang (商湯), and Zhou Wen
Wang (周文王), who allegedly overthrew the former kings and established their own
kingdoms. The general explanation is that Guiguzi uses these rulers as examples to
illustrate flexible uses of the method of di (mend) in various contexts.
100. The time of the Warring States period.
101. Tao comments, “Coming together and apart means prosperity and disorder.
The Dao of Heaven and Earth is used to illustrate the ultimate universe. Even the
universe cannot be saved from breaks and rifts, let alone humans.”
102. Tao adds, “Responding to the superior means to help him mend breaks to govern
the state; to discipline the subordinate means to take over the state.”
103. Tao explains, “It is said that if a person can follow this Daoist method, he can occupy
the top position and, therefore, can serve as the guard of the divine Heaven and Earth.” 55
 Book II

5. Captivate-Capture (Fei Qian 飛 箝)1

II.5.1 A person who aims to enhance his power and capacity reaches afar to
draw talents close to him.2 To establish authority (shi 勢)3 and manage
business, he must investigate difference and similarity, differentiate a
speech of truth from one of untruth (bie shi fei zhi yu 别是非之語),4 tell
the essence (nei 内) of a speech from its embellishment (wai 外), know

1. 飛 means “to excite a person by commending him for his reputation/fame” or

“an exciting speech.” 箝 means “to hold tightly with force,” hence the translation—
“Captivate-Capture”—for rhetorical connotations of these activities with regard
to language.
2. Tao explains that
whenever a person measures power and capacity to promote his reputation,
he should recruit talents from near and far. It does not matter whether the
wise good men are located close by or far away, recruit them for his cause. An
example is King Yan Zhao [‍‍燕昭王], who respectfully called back a veteran
official Guo Kui (郭隗) for service.
The legend about King Yan Zhao and Guo Kui is recorded in Shi Ji (The Grand Scribe’s
Records). It says that after Yan Zhao became the king (312–279 b.c.e.) of State Yan
upon its defeat by State Qi, he sought Guo Kui’s advice on how to empower the state.
Guo replied, “I hope you can start with me to recruit honorable wise men. Then those
who are better than me will come to you from near and far.” King Yan Zhao built a
palace for Guo and called Guo his master. Thereafter, many talents from different
states came to Yan for employment. Twenty-eight years later (284 b.c.e.), State Yan
became powerful and prosperous. It then formed allies with the other five states
and occupied over seventy of Qi’s townships (Shi Ji, 532).
3. 勢 can mean authority, momentum, power, a beginning, a situation, or a cir­
cum­stance.
4. Tao notes,
When talents have been drawn from near and far, it is a must to establish
a system of award and penalty in order to clarify what is allowed and what
is not. When authority and policies are established, it is necessary to know
the differences and similarities among parties involved and tell true words
from false ones.
Xu thinks that Tao believes that these sentences are meant to provide advice to the
56 ruler rather than to students (Guiguzi, 58).
 Book II
the principles of the haves (you 有) and have-nots (wu 無),5 decide which
plans are safe and which are risky, and settle intimate and distant rela-
tions.6 Afterward, he can test and evaluate the scale and scope.7 With the
ability to adjust and shape a mold, he can recruit, seek, or utilize a talent.8
Draw upon captivating words (gou qian zhi ci 鉤箝之辭) to appeal to II.5.2
an audience; excite him wildly to capture him.9 Captivating words (gou
qian zhi yu 鉤箝之語) mean persuasive speech (shui ci 說辭), which is to
be adjusted quickly to express agreement on one occasion or disagree-
ment on another.10 As for those who cannot be captivated with words (bu
ke shan 不可善),11 invite them and then encumber them with responsi-
bilities (zhong lei 重累). Or encumber them with responsibilities first and
then reveal their weaknesses (hui zhi 毁之); or reveal their weaknesses

5. Tao believes that 内 means real substances, and 外 empty words and that 有 and
無 refer to whether or not a person has enough knowledge to lay out plans supported
by strategies.
6. Tao says, “Once differences and similarities, truths and untruths, surface and
substance, haves and have-nots are known, one uses this knowledge to secure safety
and prevent dangers and to determine who can be allies. Then trustworthy good
men can be distinguished from those that cannot be trusted.”
7. The original is “然後乃權量之 [ran hou nai quan liang zhi].” 之 (zhi) may refer to
all the information and details described above or a potential advisor’s ability and
knowledge. The translation aims to maintain the original ambiguity.
8. Tao’s explanation of the sentences starting with “hereafter” is that
hold (quan 權) to understand the weight [significance or consequence]; mea-
sure to know the length and size [extent of significance or consequence].
When the weight and size of the shape are known, then you can make adjust-
ments and corrections (yin kuo 隠括) to shape the mold. Thereafter, you can
recruit, seek, or utilize a talent.
隠括 (or yin kuo 櫽括) in classical Chinese means a carpenter’s tools to shape a piece
of wood or bamboo. These are advice to a ruler.
9. Tao’s comments read that “鉤 (gou) is said to mean appealing to someone’s emo-
tions. It is believed that persons differ in talent, personality, and character. For this
reason, captivating words are classified into levels. Therefore, appealing to a person’s
internal feelings to understand his mindset is called hooking (gou 鉤); praising
him for his external reputation or fame to know his mindset is called to captivate
(fei 飛). When the mindset is understood, capture and hold him so that he cannot
leave or move around. This is called 鉤箝 (gou qian), or hooking and capturing”
However, Xu Fuhong says that Tao’s statements about varied characters and levels
of intriguing words only represent the readings of his time.
10. Tao comments, “It is said that captivating words can be opened (bei 捭) for agree-
ment or be shut (he 闔) for disagreement. Hence ‘express agreement on one occasion
or disagreement on another.’”
11. The lack of subjects in these sentences opens possibilities for varied interpretations.
It can be assumed that Guiguzi may be addressing the ruler or the persuader or both. 57
 Guiguzi
first and then encumber them with responsibilities.12 In implementa-
tion, sometimes assess their attitudes toward money and material goods,
jewelry and jade, silk and fabric, or entertainment and beautiful women.
Sometimes authorize them with power to assess their abilities and to put
them under control, or sometimes just wait for a rift (jian 澗) to fill,13
which calls for the approach of mend-break (di xi 抵巇).
II.5.3 Applying captivate-capture to state services (yong zhi tian xia
用之天下)14 requires strengthening power and capacity, knowing Heaven’s
timing of waxing and waning, understanding the breath and limit of the
terrain, recognizing difficulties of obstacles and the extent of risks, and
calculating the size of the population and the amount of material wealth.15
Relationships among lords and nobles are sometimes intimate and some-
times distant, sometimes of love and sometimes of hate.16 Know and con-
sider the minds and inclinations of others.17 Investigate their intent; learn
about their likes and dislikes, and then speak about what is most important
to them. Deliver captivating eloquence to appeal to them and capture them.
II.5.4 When applying this method to individuals,18 you must know their intel-
ligence and capability, measure their wealth and power, and understand

12. Interpretations of these statements vary among commentators and editors. Tao
says, “‍‍不可善 means unable to be moved by captivating words. For this kind of
people, summon them first. 重累 means that once summoned, a person’s skills
can be assessed, which in turn can show his ability. This process may transform a
person.” However, Xu disagrees, saying that 重累 stands for repeatedly flattering
the invitee through praises and then belaboring him with heavy responsibilities to
make him fail (hui 毁). Other editors follow Tao’s interpretation that 重累 means
encumbering with responsibility, and 毁 revealing weaknesses (Chen, 43; Zong,
62), hence the translation.
13. Most commentators interpret “wait for a rift to fill (jian jian er qian zhi 見澗而
箝之)” as “wait patiently for an opportunity and then seize it.”
14. As a pronoun, 之 in 用之天下 refers to the method of captivate-capture (fei qian
飛箝), according to Tao and other commenters.
15. Tao’s comments read, “Using this method, you must know if the king has the
right talent and ability to be assisted. Heaven has seasons of waxing and waning; the
terrain opens up somewhere and closes somewhere else; the population increases
and decreases. So you must master the timing of an event, geographical layout, and
degrees of civilians’ satisfaction.”
16. Tao says that knowing the relationship among lords and nobles helps estimate
the number of the king’s followers.
17. The absent subject makes it difficult to specify the audience of this sentence.
Many commentators think the audience may be the king.
18. All commentators believe that 之 (zhi), as a pronoun, refers to the method of
captivate-capture. But they disagree on what 人 (ren) refers to. Tao says it refers to
58 lords and nobles, while others believe it stands for audience in general.
 Book II
their influence and authority before you can find the key to an opportunity
(shu ji 樞機).19 Be proactive to respond to requests; capture individuals
to melt into harmony; understand their inclinations to appropriate their
ideas. This method is called making associations between captivate and
capture (ci fei qian zhi zhui ye 此飛箝之綴也).20 If you are able to apply it
to individual people, you can go out empty-handed (kong wang 空往) and
come back with a bounty (shi lai 實來).21 Closely study their utterances to
ensure that you make unerring associations between your methods and
your relations. You can capture them to make them follow you (cong 從);
you can capture them to move them horizontally (heng 横). You can guide
them to the east, you can guide them to the west, you can guide them to
the south, or you can guide them to the north. You can guide them into
reverse, or you can guide them to an overturn.22 In the event of a setback,
you can make a turnaround without impairing your reputation (du 度).23

6. Resist-Reconcile (Wu He 忤合)

Compliance and cooperation, resistance and opposition call for suit- II.6.1
able strategies of adjustment and reconciliation. Evolutions and con-
junctures, cycles and junctures have their own forms and tendencies.
19. Tao’s explanation of “樞” is “the axle of movements,” and his explanation of “機”
is “the part on the arch that controls the shooting of an arrow.”
20. Tao’s interpretation is that
you can step forward to reach out to them, or you can follow up to comply with
their requests. Analyze their feelings to bind into harmony with them, and
appropriate their ideas to put them at ease. With this approach in practice, you
can access and control the power of lords and nobles; you can win the trust
of the king to consolidate your authority. The association between captivate
and capture (fei qian zhi zhui 飛箝之綴), therefore, relates to methods of
connecting to individual people.
21. Tao posits that “空往 implies no real investment other than use of utterance to
excite and please individual people, who consequently show their true feelings, while
實來 implies their attachment to the speaker.”
22. The repetition of the same sentence structure is typical of classical prose. The
stylistic feature is used here to emphasize that an eloquent persuader should be able
to control situations or the progress of matters through working with the governing
body of a state. It must be noted that Guiguzi uses 從 (cong) along with 横 (heng)
here, instead of 緃横 (zong heng), to parallel them with east, west, south, and north.
His use of cong heng has little to do with the military theory of the zong-heng school
led by Su Qin and Zhang Yi, who were allegedly taught by Guiguzi.
23. 度 can also mean manners or dignity. Tao says that the ultimate goal of using
the method of capture is to maintain the composure or dignity. 59
 Guiguzi
Reverses and turnarounds respond to one another and regulate them-
selves according to circumstances.24 Therefore, dwell between Heaven
and Earth like the sages to establish oneself, serve the world, profess
education, promote the reputable, and practice intelligent (ming 明 )25
naming 名 (ming).26 Doing so, you are able to observe Heaven’s timing
to make use of opportunities afforded by events and matters and to make
predictions, turnarounds, and changes, accordingly to how much and
how little you know.27
II.6.2 In this world, all nobles do not enjoy their high positions forever;
all things do not happen in accordance with what is always taught.28

24. Tao’s interpretation focuses specifically on interpersonal relations. He com-

ments that
despite their differences, all interest, collaborative effort, resistance, and dis-
agreement can be transformed fluidly through suitable strategies. This is
the principle of adjustment and reconciliation. Also, it may be assumed that
dealing with resistance and opposition should take into account adjustment
to circumstances and associations between their changes and tendencies.
Naturally, they evolve and turn in their own directions. They are sometimes
in resistance and sometimes in opposition, according to their own needs, and
can regulate themselves under the influence of others.
25. 明 “intelligent” modifying 名, which means “to clarify, to define accurately, or
to make distinctions.”
26. Xing Lu’s research shows that 名 (ming, naming) is significant in the Chinese
philosophical debate over the relationship between 名 (naming) and 实 (shi, actual-
ity, truth, evidence, or essence) (Rhetoric, 272). 名 was conceptualized by Deng Xi
(546–501 b.c.e.) and Confucius (552–479 b.c.e.). While Deng used 名 in the political
and legal contexts in reference to words and concepts, Confucius made it function as
a code of stratification to establish social, family, and human relations, as Lu records
(Rhetoric, 128). Many Chinese scholars associate 名 (ming) with 辯 (bian, argue or
make distinctions) as an integrated part of philosophy and group activities of Mingjia
(名家 ming jia), a school emphasizing logic and argumentation represented by Mozi
and others. Lu suggests that to Mingjia, 名 (ming) meant a notion of rationality and
epistemology and was often associated with 辯 (bian debate or argue) to include
practices of eloquence, argumentation, and persuasion (Rhetoric, 90). Drawing on
historical evidence by Chinese scholars, Lu says that 名 (ming) 辯 (bian) became
a popular rhetorical practice in the Warring States Period as a result of the public
interest in political affairs in the fifth century b.c.e. (Rhetoric, 272).
27. Tao suggests that “how much and how little you know” implies “how much
knowledge a person has about a state’s orthodoxies before he knows what to increase
and what to decrease.” The last two characters in this passage are 轉化 (zhuan hua,
turnarounds and changes). Tao reads them as “making changes in order to comply.”
Xu, however, believes that Tao’s commentary on 轉化 is highly orthodox, but he
does not explain his criticism (Collection, 91–92).
60 28. Tao explains, “A noble must be empathetic enough to sustain his high position
 Book II
The sages were always engaged in action and, therefore, left nothing
unaccomplished; 29 they always listened and, therefore, left nothing
unheard.30 They successfully accomplished things because they recon-
ciled plans and strategies. This approach was their focus (yu zhi wei zhu
與之為主).31 Reconciliation with one side leads to alienation from the
other side. It is impossible to make plans and strategies loyal to both sides,
which necessitates converting to one (fan 反)32 and resisting the other
(wu 忤).33 Turning to one side (fan yu ci 反於是) means turning away
from the other side (wu yu bi 忤於彼); turning away from one side means
turning to the opposite side. This is the method (qi shu ye 其術也).34

and, therefore, may not be a noble forever. A teacher must be kind to model his
profession, and therefore, may not be a professional model to everybody.”
29. The wording of this sentence in different editions varies. In Xu’s edition, it is “
圣人无常舆无不舆 (sheng ren wu chang yu wu bu yu),” where 舆 (yu) stands for 為
(wei). But in Tao’s and other editions, it is “圣人常為無不為 (sheng ren shang wei
wu bu wei),” leaving out the first 無 (Tao, II.9; Zong, 73; Chen, 50; Ren and Bai, 216).
30. Interpretations of these sentences vary due to the different wording. Tao says, “A
kind person always gives, so he does not stop giving. The sages do not listen to non-
sense and therefore do not hear it.” Xu, however, suggests, “The sages do not always
give but still give. They do not listen to everything but do not reject anything worth
hearing” (Collection, 93). The translation follows Tao’s edition hand-transcribed by
Qin Enfu in wording but in interpretation takes into consideration other editions
(Zong, 73; Chen, 50; Ren and Bai, 216).
31. Tao’s comments read, “A person who accomplishes everything successfully must
have adopted right approaches. This type of person stands out among the crowd and
naturally becomes the leader.” However, Xu thinks that Tao’s last comment about
becoming the leader is inaccurate and agrees with some other commentators that “
與之為主” means “use this as the main approach” (Collection, 93; Zong, 74–75; Ren
and Bai, 216). Meanwhile, other scholars interpret “‍‍與之為主” as “select a master to
serve based on this approach” (Chen, 48; Cao and An, 272).
32. One of the meanings of 反 is to return or to go back, hence the translation and
the interpretation that “there must be compliance with one side and resistance to
the other” (Xu, Guiguzi, 70; Cao and An, 272). Some other Chinese commentators,
however, consider 反忤 synonyms to mean disloyalty and resistance to one side
(Tao, II.5; Zong, 74; Chen, 48; Ren and Bai, 216). The latter interpretation does not
make sense in the following sentences, where Guiguzi uses 反忤 as antonyms in an
analogy for opposite sides.
33. Tao explains that “reconciliation with one side definitely leads to separation from
the other side. Therefore, it is impossible to be allegiant to one side and contrive
schemes against it at the same time (zhong mou bu de liang si ye 忠謀不得兩施也).”
34. “The method” refers to 反忤 (fan wu, Reconcile-Resist) (Xu, Guiguzi, 70; Zong,
75). “Since it is impossible to be loyal to both sides,” Tao writes, “it is necessary to
practice the method of resist-reconcile.” 61
 Guiguzi
When applied to the service for the world (tian xia 天下35), this method
must be adapted to the reality of the world; when applied to the service
for a state (guo 國), it must be adapted to the reality of the state; when
applied to a royal family (jia 家), it must be adapted to the reality of the
family; when applied to individuals, it must be adapted to their charac-
ters, talents, capacities, energies, and influences. No matter big or small,
forward or backward, the principle remains the same. It is a must to have
a strategic plan for deliberation and then make a decision before taking
an action, which can be accomplished through the method of Captivate-
Capture (fei qian 飛箝).
II.6.3 Those in antiquity who excelled at applying the method of turning
back (bei 背) and forth (xiang 向) were able to exercise their authority
(xie 恊36) across the borders and accommodate lords and nobles; they could
create space to practice resist-reconcile and reshape it or turn it around for
the purpose of reconciliation and unity.37 This was why an officer named
Yi38 (Yi Yin 伊尹) provided five times of service for King Tang and five
times of service for King Jie but ultimately devoted himself entirely to King
Tang. Lü Shang (呂尚),39 who was unable to see his destiny after alternating

35. 天下 (tian xia) is often used in the classical and modern Chinese to refer to a
kingdom or a state.
36. Interpretations of 恊 vary. Some commentators think it means “harmony” or
“peace,” while others read it as “to control” or “to make others obey.”
37. Tao comments, “Drive people into a position where resistance and reconciliation
can happen to make them change their minds. When people follow you, then you
can find the real master to serve and make reconciliations.”
38. 伊, whose full name was allegedly Yi Zhi (伊摯), served King Tang (?–1588 b.c.e.)
in the Shang (商) Dynasty. A servant for a daughter of a royal family, he was transferred
as part of her dowry to King Tang (湯王) and later was appointed as a state admin-
istrator. He helped King Tang to conquer King Jie (桀王 1653–1600 b.c.e.) of the Xia
(夏) Dynasty. After the death of King Tang and his successors’ rejection to his rules,
Yi was exiled several times but was asked to return for service several times as well.
39. Lü Shang (呂尚, about 1156–1117 b.c.e.), also known as Jiang Ziya (姜子牙), Jiang
Taigong (姜太公), or Taigong Wang (太公望), was a real historical figure who became
advisor and teacher to King Wen (Zhou Wen Wang 周文王) and his son, King Wu
(Zhou Wu Wang 周武王), and supposedly helped them end the Shang Dynasty (商朝,
approximately 1700 b.c.e.–1045 b.c.e.) to establish the Zhou Dynasty (1045 b.c.e.–221
b.c.e.), when he himself became the first king of State Qi. His dialogues with King
Wen and King Wu on political, state, and military affairs are recorded in Six Strategies
(Liu Tao 六韜) translated as “T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings” (Sawyer, The Seven
Military Classics of Ancient China, 19–106). Su Qin, one of Guiguzi’s students, allegedly
read this book, possibly titled Taigong Yinfu (太公陰符) at the time, and became one
of the most eloquent persuaders in the Warring States Period (see also “Paradoxical
62 Chinese Receptions of Guiguzi” in “Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric” in this book).
 Book II
his service three times for King Wen and three times for King Yin, finally
reconciled himself with the former. This time he had no doubt about his
return, because he knew his destiny was in Heaven’s capture.40 Without
achieving the profoundness of the sages, you would never be able to serve
a state; without hard labor of your heart and hard thinking of your mind
(bu lao yin ku si 不勞心苦思), you would never be able to understand the
nature of things; without knowing the heart of others to understanding their
feelings, you would never be able to establish your name; without the gift
and talent for development, you would never be able to deploy troops; being
loyal and truthful without understanding reality, you would never be able to
know others. Therefore, the method of resist-reconcile relies on your own
evaluation of your intelligence and capacity to recognize the extent of your
knowledge. Assess your strengths and weaknesses, and your advantages
and disadvantages, against those of others. Then you will be able to move
at will forward or backward, horizontally or vertically (zong heng 縱横).41

7. Weighing (Chuai 揣)42

The ancients who were good at making use of the resources of the II.7.1
world would assess the capacities of all states to weigh the feelings of lords
and nobles. Assessing capacities without studying them results in missing
information about the powerful and the powerless, the consequential and
the inconsequential; weighing the feelings without carefully studying them
causes insensitivity to the hidden and the unobvious as well as moves and
motions. What is assessment of capacity? It means to calculate the big and
the small and to strategize in accord to the capacity.43 Weigh the size of
assets and the amount of money to know how much and how little is in
hand; estimate the number of people to know how large the population is,
40. Tao comments, “Yi Yin and Lü Shang reconciled themselves because they finally
dissolved their doubts. Believing that their destinies rested upon Heaven’s will, they
gained the trust from the kings they wanted to serve.”
41. 縱 and 横 refer to directions here. Tao’s note reads, “Applying the method of
resist-reconcile to people less capable than you, you really can make stride in all
directions as you wish, no matter forward, backward, horizontally, or vertically.”
42. Tao Hongjing thinks that “to weigh” means “to test” or “to measure” or “to in-
vestigate.” In modern Chinese, chuai (weighing) is often combined with “gauging”
(mo 摩) to form the phrase of chuai mo 揣摩 meaning “to consider carefully,” “to
think through,” or “to deliberate.” See chapter 8 for “Gauging (mo 摩).”
43. The original is 曰度於大小謀於衆寡 (yue du yu da xiao, mou yu zhong gua).
Here 大小 (da xiao) and 衆寡 (zhong gua) are paralleled to refer to the size and
amount or capacity. 63
 Guiguzi
where prosperity and paucity lie, and where surpluses and shortages are.
Analyze how treacherous and how regular the terrain is to know about
advantages and disadvantages; calculate and deliberate carefully to know
strengths and weaknesses; examine the king’s relationships with his of-
ficials to distinguish the worthy from the unworthy; approach consultants
and noble guests to measure how knowledgeable and how intelligent they
are; study fortunes and misfortunes against Heaven’s timing to prepare
for blessings and adversities; observe the relationships among lords and
nobles to know who get employed and who do not; understand the heart
of ordinary people and their patterns of migration to know if they live in
peace or in danger, in love or in hate. Then it is possible to know if there
is any sign of rebellion and what causes it. The capability of acquiring
knowledge to such an extent is called assessment of capacity.44
II.7.2 Those who weigh feelings (chuai qing zhe 揣情者) apply the method to
individuals at their45 happy moment, when their joy can be heightened to
reveal what they really want. Driven by strong desires, they are unable to
cover their feelings. This method can be applied at their moment of fear as
well, when their fears can be intensified to reveal what they really dislike.
Driven by dislikes, they are unable to cover their feelings either. Feelings
and desires propel changes in people.46 Individuals who are moved but
do not reveal any emotional change should be left as they are and not be
approached with a speech (wu yu yu 勿舆語). Instead, those close to them
should be approached to learn about where their feelings reside.47 It is
said that changes of innermost feelings (qing bian 情變) often manifest
through external signs, which are often used to detect a person’s feelings.
This method is called “probing depth to weigh feelings.”48
II.7.3 Those who plan state affairs should investigate power and capacity;
those who persuade the ruler of a people (ren zhu 人主) should thor-
oughly weigh feelings. Only subsequently can plans and deliberations,

44. Tao comments, “The situation of the world must be assessed by its capacity. A
person good at assessing the capacity will know the information, on which he bases
his judgment of if a strategy is proper or not.” This translation keeps the gendered
nature of Tao’s interpretation, which is not intended for the female reader.
45. The plural pronoun purports to keep the text gender neutral, even though the
original subject refers to a king. Guiguzi, like other Chinese classics, does not include
the female sex in its audience.
46. Tao notes, “Likes and dislikes often cause people to lose control of their feelings
and emotions.”
47. Tao adds, “Slowly approach the people close to him to know about what his feel-
ings are and what drives him to show them.”
48. Tao’s interpretation is that “the way to observe the other person’s body expres-
64 sions to know about his feelings is called probing depth to measure his feelings.”
 Book II
emotions and desires be revealed.49 Afterward it is possible to venerate
or deprecate, to emphasize or deemphasize, to benefit or hinder, and
to foresee success and failure. For all these, weighing is the method.50
Therefore, it is believed that even though well-directed by the principles
of the ancient kings and well-equipped with sagacious wisdom and tac-
tics, without weighing the feelings, one would not be able to gain insight
into the unobvious and the hidden. This is the fundamental principle of
a strategist and the key method of a persuader.51 Thoughts often occur
to people, but it is impossible to foresee them coming. Foresight is the
hardest to obtain. It is thus said that “weighing feelings is the most dif-
ficult method to master and apply,” since the moment to deliver a speech
must dovetail with the moment the ruler is planning (mou 謀) and de-
liberating (lü 慮).52 Observe the fluttering and wriggling of insects. Each
motion entails benefit or harm and may precipitate a big occurrence.53

49. Tao says, “Examining power and capacity helps plan national affairs, while weigh-
ing situations helps persuade leaders. As far as strategies, deliberations, emotions,
and drives are concerned, they should not appear prior to weighing.” Hence “only
subsequently can strategies, deliberations, emotions, and desires be revealed.”
50. Tao’s reading is that “it is said that investigation helps weighing the strategy.
Then you can venerate or deprecate, estimate success or failure as you like. It is all
about using the method of weighing. Therefore, this method is said to be the one.”
51. Tao adds, “Although the fundamental principles of the ancient kings are pro-
foundly enlightening and stimulate creativity, without being coupled with the abil-
ity to weigh feelings, how could you discover concealed feelings of other people?”
52. Readings of this passage vary. For example, Tao writes,
Human feelings are as inaccessible as steep mountains and deep rivers and
are as difficult to know as the Heaven. Therefore, weighing is the hardest ap-
proach to master. . . . Planning and deliberating stem from human feelings,
whose timing is part of the knowledge but is the hardest to obtain.
Xu says,
Nobody can beat you, if you apply the methods of “weighing the feelings” and
“measuring power” to other people. Before conducting business, you must
know in advance how to apply the method of weighing. Prior knowledge is
the hardest to obtain. Therefore, it is hard to weigh the feelings. Persuasion
requires deliberative planning and consideration to handle the situation deli-
cately. (Guiguzi, 83)
Zong Qiong’s interpretation reads, “People usually do not know beforehand what
thoughts would occur to the mind. Detecting the thoughts beforehand is the hard-
est. Hence, that weighing the feelings is the hardest to master means that accurate
timing is the hardest to master” (89). Chen Puqing comments that “it is impossible
to surpass a person good at weighing because he often collaborates with others to
make plans; he is able to plan ahead of time, which is the hardest thing to do” (60).
53. The original is 生事羙 (sheng shi mei), with 羙 meaning “big.” 65
 Guiguzi
Precipitators betray signs.54 Therefore, it is required to weigh feelings
(chuai qing 揣情), embellish a speech (shi yan 飾言, and compose a piece
of prose (cheng wen zhang 成文章) prior to any discussion (lun 論).55

8. Gauging (Mo 摩)56

II.8.1 Gauging means studying external signs57 for internal feelings (nei fu
内符),58 which are the subject of weighing. The effective way of gauging
is undetectable application. Subtly gauge the desires of others59 and mea-
sure their depth to probe them. What occurs internally in response will
show external signs. The response affords an opportunity to act upon,
while inconspicuousness necessitates a withdrawal (wei er qu zhi 微而
去之).60 These [ways] are called closing off the pit-hole (sai jiao 塞窌),

54. Tao notes,

The fluttering and wriggling of tiny bugs can indicate good or harmful mo-
tives. Going along with them result in pleasure; going against them arouses
fury and indignation, not to mention humans, ghosts, and gods. Therefore,
as for those who have the power to benefit or harm others but insist on their
own action and reaction, it is reasonable to assume that they would act in
that way anyway. Going along with them would result in a benefit and going
against them leads to harm. This is common sense. For this reason, watch-
ing the bugs helps detect signs of a big occurrence. Preparing for an event
demands the study of subtle signs. Hence the emphasis on observing pre-
cipitators’ subtle signs.
55. 論 here means tao lun (討論, to talk about it or to discuss it). It does not mean
“to argue.”
56. All commentators agree that 摩 (mo) means to study over and over again.
57. Editions show varied sentences. 摩之符也 (mo zhi fu ye) is in the hand-scribed
Tao’s edition this translation follows, while in editions by Cao and An, Ren and
Bai, and Zong, the sentence becomes “摩者符也 (mo zhe fu ye),” keeping the same
meaning with 者 (zhe) in place of 之 (zhi). The editions by Xu and Chen, instead,
show “摩者揣之术也 (mo zhe chuai zhi shu ye).”
58. Tao’s explanation of 内符 (nei fu) is the external manifestation of internal feelings
and desires. He says, “Feelings and desires reside inside, while signs and manifesta-
tions appear outside. Weighing means inferring the internal feelings from external
manifestations (fu yan 符验‍‍).”
59. Others (qi 其) stand for rulers or kings.
60. Commentaries on 微而去之 (wei er qu zhi ) vary. Tao’s reading is that “If the king
wishes to have a business accomplished, you follow his desire. As his subordinate,
carrying it through to the end is your accomplishment. Therefore, at no detectable
sign, you need to make a quiet withdrawal.” Xu’s interpretation is that “when you
66 accomplish your business, make a quiet departure” (Guiguzi, 88). Zong’s is “make
 Book II
erasing the trace (ni duan 匿端),61 ensconcing the presence (yin mao
隠貌), and eluding the feelings (tao qing 逃情).62 Keeping others in the
dark, you can accomplish business without risk. Here you are applying
gauging; there the other person is manifesting signs. Respond to the signs
accordingly and achieve whatever you want to accomplish.63
For the ancients who were good at gauging, it was like holding a fish- II.8.2
ing rod in deep water they stood over. They waited for fish to bite the bait
they had placed. Thus it is called accomplishing business consistently
day by day without being sensed by others. They manage troops to ad-
vance consistently to victory day by day without frightening others.64
The sages who deploy through yin are said to be omniscient (shen 神).
When they unveil accomplishments through yang, they are recognized
for their intellectual conscience (ming 明).65 Those who accomplish busi-
ness consistently day by day for the common good leave ordinary people
living in security oblivious to the cause of their welfare. They work for
the common good (ji de 积德) and guide people to the Dao without the

some elimination” (95); Chen’s is “keep some distance” (63). Ren and Bai’s is “de-
lineate signs and quietly eliminate some” (222), while Cao and An’s is that “when
the goal of gauging is achieved, depart quietly” (281).
61. 匿端 (ni duan) is commonly used in modern Chinese, meaning an incipient
beginning.
62. 逃 (tao) means “to conceal” or “to cover.” Contextually, it may mean that upon
detecting the ruler’s feelings, the persuader should leave the scene for his own safety.
Tao’s reading is that “eluding the feelings enables you to shut down openings. Then
how can other people know about your intent? Being in the dark, they would not
become jealous of you, while you could accomplish your business without any risk.”
63. Tao’s comments read, “This implies that gauging is so subtle that the other person
responds naturally as if out of his own intent. The observers only see his response
without being aware of your quiet work. This is called concentrating on others to
succeed in all endeavors.”
64. Tao adds,
An experienced fisher shows the bait but conceals the hook, which fish do
not see but bite. Wise strategists keep their eyes on success while quietly
engaged in gauging. Consequently, others are convinced without sensing the
gauging. This is the reason to say that “accomplish business consistently day
by day without being sensed by others.” Winning a war depends on good
gauging, which, being kept out of sight, threatens no one. For this reason,
it is said that they manage troops with constant success day by day without
frightening others.
65. Tao’s explanation is that “he who quietly plans strategies in secret and applies
them day by day without others’ knowledge resembles an omnipresent god. There-
fore, he is called omniscient. Honor and fame that come with accomplishment and
success indicate sagaciousness.” 67
 Guiguzi
need to explain why.66 The whole world honors their omniscience and
sagaciousness. They advance troops to consistent victory day by day and
win wars without fight, without cost. They subject people to compliance
without lecture, without coercion. The whole world considers them om-
niscient and sagacious.67
II.8.3 The so-called gauging includes allaying (ping 平), rectifying (zheng 正),
cheering (xi 喜), aggravating (nu 怒), eulogizing (ming 名), advancing
(xing 行), scrupling (lian 廉), examining (xin 信),68 benefitting (li 利),
and demeaning (bei 卑).69 Allaying effectuates70 tranquility (jing 静);
rectifying promotes uprightness (zhi 直); cheering affords delight (yue
悅); aggravating causes restlessness (dong 動); eulogizing enhances fame
(fa 發); advancing secures success (cheng 成);71 scrupling results in im-
maculacy (jie 潔); examining ends in lucidity (ming 明); benefitting ad-
vances pursuit (qiu 求); and demeaning contributes to flattery (chan 諂).72
66. Tao’s interpretation reads,
As a teacher, a sage embodies omniscience (shen 神) and intellectual conscience
(ming 明). He consults Heaven and Earth when offering help. His endeavor
looks effortless, and his success is traceless. He works quietly to contribute to
benevolence. Hence people who follow him live in peace and virtue without
being conscious of their safety. They follow the Dao without the need to know
why. This is called omniscient intellectual conscience (shen ming 神明).
67. Tao continues to explain that
he who is good at warfare offsets harms with his heart and eradicates evils
before they take shape. This is called a war without battles, without troops,
costing nothing to the state revenue. Virtue prevails throughout, like a fan
rotating along with the wind, to advance achievements. Civilians live in bliss
customarily without lectures or coercions. This is compared to omniscient
intellectual conscience (shen ming 神明).
Moreover, Xu Fuhong (Collection 119) relates this statement to Sunzi’s, saying that
“[to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence;] the
highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting at all” (Ames,
Sun-Tzu, 111).
68. No commentators provide a definition of 信, which likely means 明 (ming, to
clarify) or 审 (shen, to investigate or examine) in this context.
69. Tao says, “All the ten methods originate from gauging. Talents and traits of
persuaders differ; things and events change. For this reason, gauging depends on
the amount of information in hand and should be applied accordingly.”
70. The original repeats the zhe (者) . . . ye (也) structure as in “平者静也正者直也喜
者悅也怒者動也名者發也行者成也廉者潔也信者明也利者求也卑者諂也 (ping zhe
jing ye zheng zhe zhi ye zi zhe yue ye nu zhe dong ye ming zhe fa ye xing zhe cheng ye
lian zhe jie ye xin zhe ming ye li zhe qiu ye bei zhe chan ye).”
71. Tao explains that “Praising a person brings him fame, or fa (發); advancement
[or taking an action] aims at success, or cheng (成).”
68 72. Many of the terms have become fixed phrases in modern Chinese, for example,
 Book II
These ten feats that seem attributed only to the sages are endowed upon or-
dinary people. They, however, are unsuccessful due to flawed executions.73
In strategic planning, nothing is more difficult than mastering thor- II.8.4
ough (zhou 周) minute (mi 密) details; in persuasion (shui 說), nothing
is more difficult than being heard in entirety; in business, nothing is
more difficult than ensuring success. Only after gauging these three ap-
proaches can you secure success.74 Therefore, for your plan, you must
consider details thoroughly. Find those who most likely share your mind
to deliver your speech.75 This is called making seamless connections.76
Accomplishing endeavors depends on tactics (shu 数). To this end, the
approaches (dao 道), tactics, and timing must dovetail together perfectly.
A successful persuader can only be heard by those who hold the same
feelings (qing 情). Only those who hold the same sentiment (qing 情)
listen. It is said that species stay with their own genus. When an armload
of firewood is added to a bonfire, dry pieces burst into flames first. When
water is poured to the ground, wet spots show where it has been absorbed
first. Thus it is said that species of the same genus echo one another. This
analogy applies to the state of affairs (shi 勢). It also applies to the gauging
of external signs of internal feelings. When gauging is applied to appeal to
those of the same kind, how could they not respond accordingly? When
gauging is applied to cater to their desires, how could they not listen? If
you are able to execute your method (dao 道)77 independently,78 you will
never miss any opportunity and will never be confined by your achieve-
ments. It takes determined persistence to succeed.79

pingjing (平静, calm, peaceful), zhengzhi (正直, upright, righteous), dongnu (動怒,
irritated, agitated), lianjie (廉潔, ethical, immaculate), and beichan (卑諂, to lower
oneself to flatter the superior for self-agenda).
73. Tao adds his comment that “the sages apply gauging with the ten approaches
to accomplish their business. But ordinary people, despite their possession of these
feats, fail because they are unable to execute them perfectly.”
74. The original sentence is “此三者摩然後能之 (ci san mo zhe ran hou neng zhi).”
75. The original is “與通者說也 (yu tong zhe shui ye).”
76. Tao explains, “Persuasion of those who share your feelings takes mutual ac-
ceptance. It is like seeking water from a fountain from which water naturally flows
out. This why it is said the connection is seamless.”
77. This original reads, “故曰獨行其道 (gu yue du xing qi dao).” Here 道, like 道 in
“the approaches, tactics, and timing,” refers to method or strategy, and not the Dao.
78. Tao comments, “A person good at gauging is as consummate as a sage, who can
follow his own way.”
79. Tao’s explanation reads, “How can a person who seizes opportunities delay his
action? How can a person who is never confined by his own success be stopped?
Persistence in these two aspects leads to the conquest of the world.” 69
 Guiguzi

9. Assessing (Quan 權)
II.9.1 Persuaders are individuals who talk to convince others.80 Persuaders
extend assistance.81 Polished persuaders use citations.82 Those who cite
quotations must know how much and how little to borrow.83 Persuad-
ers who have to speak in response resort to brief pointed remarks that
are mild arguments.84 Those who purport to establish truth through
judicious reasoning clarify truths and untruths85 by verifying signs
(fu yan 符驗). Persuaders who find themselves involved in a difficult
speech (nan yan zhe 難言者) withdraw their argument;86 they yield to

80. Tao Hongjing explains that “a persuader’s task is to convince someone.” The
original reads, “說 [shui] 之者說 [shui] 之也.”
81. The sentence runs “說之者資之也 (shui zhi zhe zi zhi ye).” Interpretations of
“資之也 (zi zhi ye)” differ. Some commenters say it means “to seek help from others”
(Chen, 70; Cao and An, 287; Ren and Bai, 227), while others believe it means “to
assist others” (Xu, Guiguzi, 97; Zong, 105). Tao’s note reads, “A persuader seeks to
benefit from others or to gain resources [資取也 zi qü ye].”
82. The original is “飾言者假之也 (shi yan zhe jia zhi ye).” In ancient Chinese,
“假 (jia)” means mostly “to borrow” and “to quote,” hence the translation. In modern
Chinese, however, “‍‍假 (jia)” generally means falsehood.
83. Xu Fuhong’s explanation is that “this sentence is about polishing a persuasive
speech. The persuader sometimes needs to borrow sayings in antiquity or repeat
what the audience has said. The citation must be increased or decreased to the right
extent and cannot become copying without consideration” (Collection, 128).
84. Tao’s comment on the original “利辭者輕論也 (li ci zhe qing lun ye)” is that “when
the other person asks questions, you must answer them pointedly in efficacious words.
Thus what is said naturally comes to facile remarks for expediency and is not a sub-
stantiated well-reasoned speech.” However, Zong says, 利辭 means 巧辯之辭 (qiao-
bian zhi ci, clever persuasive speech) or 敷衍之辭 (fuyan zhi ci, expedient speech),
positing that this type of speech shows contempt for well-reasoned arguments (106).
85. Tao explains, “A person who wants to accomplish business employs rationalized
judicious reasoning to see what is true and what is false. When he has proofs, he can
tell truth from untruth. This is called clarification.” Xu challenges Tao by saying
that “a rationalized judicious speech purports to make someone understand the
reasons behind a matter. To this end, the speaker must provide evidence to support
his reasons” (Collection, 130).
86. 難言(nan yan) literally means “an accusatory speech,” “a speech of criticism,” or
“a counterargument.” In this context, it may also mean “a speech difficult to deliver”
or “a difficult speech” because it is to point out problems or criticize someone or some
matter. Therefore, the persuader withdraws himself from arguing (que lun 却論)
to investigate the matter. Commentators share different interpretations. Tao says,
“When seeing discomfort and difficulties during the conversation, the persuader
70 returns to what has been discussed before. A well-reasoned speech takes precise
 Book II
fish out subtleties.87 Persuaders who deliver obsequious eloquence (ning
yan zhe 佞言者) intend to fawn over someone for the recognition of
loyalty. Crafty speakers (xiao yan zhe 謏言者) show off their knowledge
for the recognition of intelligence. Plain speakers (ping yan zhe 平言者)
show decisiveness for the recognition of bravery. Speakers who talk about
concerns (qi yan zhe 戚言者) intend to share strategies for the recognition
of their trustworthiness. Speakers who talk in equilibrium (jing yan zhe
靜言者) appease the opposition for the purpose of winning.88 Eloquence
catering to someone’s wish based on the prior knowledge of his mind-
set is called fawning talk (chan 諂). Eloquence of frequent citations in
sophisticated words is called erudite talk (bo 博). Eloquence purporting
to affect policies and plans is called power talk (quan 權). Eloquence of
doubtless determination is called resolute talk (jue 決‍). Eloquence of
poor quality that aims to stop the opposing side through attacks is called
adverse talk (fan 反).89
The mouth is a mechanism,90 by means of which one can shut down or II.9.2
open up feelings and ideas. Ears and eyes lend aids to the heart (xin 心),91
by means of which one can sense and discern treachery and malevolence.
It is said that the three coordinate in response and move in harmony to
strengthen the Dao. This way, one is not confused when dealing with
sophisticated eloquence (fan yan 繁言); one is not lost when soaring
high and beyond; one does not become imperiled despite changes and

thinking and clarified evidence, and only by detecting subtleties can it be entirely
developed. To fish out subtleties, therefore, means to dig deep into the matter.” Xu
writes, “This sentence means that when the parties on both sides are involved in a
back-and-forth argument, it is advised that the persuader stop to discuss previous
topics. At this moment, the other party would reveal weakness, which could be
utilized to win the debate” (Collection, 130). Zong’s interpretation is that “an accu-
satory speech is an opposing argument, whose purpose is to make the other party
reveal his weakness” (107).
87. In the original “釣幾也 (diao ji ye),” ji means the hidden, unuttered, secret.
Hence “fish out subtleties.”
88. Interpretations of “靜言 (jing yan)” differ. For example, Xu believes it means a
strategic speech (Collection, 123), while Zong says it means an embellished clever
speech (106–7). Others, including the translator, read it as a composed calm speech
(Tao; Cao and An, 287). 靜 here means peaceful, calm, or tranquil.
89. For additional types of eloquence (yan 言) and their study, see Xing Lu (Rhetoric
72–77).
90. Tao’s explanation is that “the mouth is said to be a mechanism for it pours forth
speeches and words. . . . Ears and eyes are there to help the mind reason things out.
. . . The mind benefits from the ears and eyes to detect gaps, demons, and evils.”
91. See a detailed explanation of 心 in note 9 in I.1.4. 71
 Guiguzi
shifts because he understands what he senses by the principle. Thus, to
those who have no eyes, do not show colors (wu se 五色); to those who
have no ears, do not talk about music (wu yin 五音).92 For those who
are not reflective of the past (wang 往), there is no way to open them up;
for those who are not receptive to the future (lai 來), there is nothing to
offer.93 Things that are blocked cannot be done. An ancient once said,
“The mouth is for eating rather than for speaking.” There are taboos in
words.94 What the mass of people say could melt metals for there are
twists and nuances in the word.95
II.9.3 It is human nature that when people speak (chu yan 出言), they want
to be heard (yu ting 欲聽) and that when they embark on an endeavor
(ju shi 擧事), they want to succeed (yu cheng 欲成).96 For this reason,
do not employ a smart man with weaknesses but employ a slow man
with strengths.97 There will be no difficulties because the weaknesses of
the smart man are avoided and the skills of the slow man are utilized.
A speech that discusses the benefit of a matter stresses its advantages;
a speech that discusses the harm of a matter purports to avoid its dis-
advantages. This is why hard-shell insects defend themselves with their
strong heavy exoskeleton; this is why biting insects react with venomous
stings.98 Even beasts and animals understand that they should utilize

92. 五音 in classical Chinese music include five notes—宫商角徵羽 (gong shang jiao
zhi, and yu). See III.3.3 for more on the five musical notes.
93. 往 (wang) and 來 (lai) are interpreted as the past and the future. Tao’s reading
is that “he who is not open to persuasion is too slow to open his mind; he who does
not welcome other ideas is too shallow to be receptive.” Xu says, “If you do not go to
persuade a person, you are not able to open his mind to know the fact; if you do not
allow others to persuade you, you are unable to know others’ ideas. No persuasion,
no communication” (Collection, 137).
94. Tao says, “People use their mouths to feed their bodies, and their words could
cause trouble and disaster, hence ‘the mouth is for eating rather than for speak-
ing.’ It is easy to stumble upon a taboo when speaking, hence ‘there are taboos
in the word.’”
95. Tao explains, “Metals are hard material. If the words of the mass of people could
melt them, it means that behind their words there may be conspiracies, inaccura-
cies, and untold stories.”
96. Tao comments,
If you are heard, it means that your words appeal to your audience; if you
are successful in your endeavor, it means that you have taken advantage of
what is in your favor. This is the baseline to begin everything (ci wei xia qi
duan ye 此爲下起端也).
97. Tao says, “Shortcomings in a smart man are inferior to strengths in a slow man;
disservice of a smart man is more atrocious than the labor of a slow man.”
72 98. Tao adds his comment, saying that “what is said here means that the bugs hide
 Book II
their strengths. Then, evidently, persuaders should understand what can
be utilized to their advantage.
It is thus said that there are five types of speeches (ci yan 辭言) that II.9.4
convey affliction (bing 病), fear (kong 恐), anxiety (you 憂), anger (nu 怒),
and joy (xi 喜). A speech of affliction manifests no energy or spirit; a speech
of fear conveys neither hope nor idea; a speech of anxiety clogs up with-
out outlet; a speech of anger is reckless without order; a speech of joy is
overoptimistic without focus.99 The five types could only be learned when
they are useful and could only be practiced when they are advantageous.100
Therefore, when you speak to an intelligent person, show your knowledge.
When you speak to a knowledgeable person, employ judicious reasoning
(bian 辨). When you talk to a debater (bian zhe 辨者),101 stress key points.
When you talk to a person with power, speak about authority. When you
talk to a wealthy person, speak about loftiness. When you talk to a poor
person, speak about benefits. When you talk to a low-class person, apply
humility. When you talk to a brave person, speak about courage. When
you talk to a person who has made mistakes (guo zhe 過者),102 speak to the
point. These are the methods, but people often do the opposite.103 There-
fore, when speaking to intelligent people, use these methods to enlighten
them; when speaking to unintelligent people with the intent to teach the
methods, you would labor in difficulty. It is said that there are many types
of speeches and that there are many changes to a matter. Knowing this,
even if you talk all day long, you can adopt the right type of speech to

themselves in hard thick exoskeletons to protect themselves. Stinging bugs bite in

reaction to defend themselves. This analogy is used to say that you should use your
strengths to avoid harms.”
99. As Xu Fuhong points out, interpretations of the five speeches differ. All com-
mentators, however, agree that the statement about each type of speech focuses on
the end result. According to Xu,
A speech of affliction makes the audience weak and spiritless; a speech of fear
scares the audience out of their mind; a speech of anxiety depresses the audi-
ence who is then unable to converse; a speech of anger agitates the audience
who may react recklessly; a speech of joy makes the audience overexcited and
purposeless. (Collection, 143)
100. Tao explains, “All these five types of speech are abnormal. Therefore, they must
be well understood to be avoided or be used to the speaker’s advantage. If you are
not skillful enough to use them, avoid them.”
101. “辨者” is the same as 辯者 (bian zhe, debater or persuader) in classical Chinese.
102. Some editions have 愚者 (yu zhe, slow person), instead of 過者 (Xu, Guiguzi,
103, Collection, 141). The translation follows Tao’s edition hand-transcribed by Qin
Engfu in August 1789.
103. Tao says, “Appropriating the speech is the method. Those who have not mastered
it do the opposite. When they resist the principle, they suffer from the consequence.” 73
 Guiguzi
avoid disorder; even if you remain unchanged throughout the day, you
would not lose the principle.104 Remain intelligent and valuable without
random behaviors.105 Invaluable to listening is acuteness, to intelligence is
intellectual conscience, and to eloquence (ci 辭) is ingenuity.106

10. Deploying (Mou 謀)

II.10.1 Those who deploy a certain strategy for their endeavors107 must know
the rationale of a choice and acquire information accordingly.108 Seeking
and examining the information requires implementation of three ap-
proaches109 categorized as high, medium, and low.110 Refer to the three
categories to establish your approach and exercise ingenuity, which is in
nobody’s special possession. The ancients have employed this method
and followed its models ever since. It is exemplified by the people of State
Zheng (鄭),111 who uploaded mined jadestones to their compass-equipped
carriers to prevent their transport from getting lost. The compass for an
endeavor is evaluating abilities, assessing capacities, and weighing feel-
ings. When two parties who share the same feeling are close, both of them
succeed. When two parties who share the same desire estrange each other,
both of them get hurt.112 When two parties who share the same aversion
104. Tao’s comment is that “You keep the order to remain the same to undergo
changes. Unchanged, you exist in consistence with the essential.”
105. Tao says, “A person who remains unchanged to maintain consistency is intel-
ligent. He applies his intelligence to matters and therefore does not act randomly.”
106. The original is “聽貴聰智貴明辭貴奇 (ting gui cong zhi gui ming ci gui qi).”
Tao’s interpretation is that “acute listening ends in order; intelligence derived from
intellectual conscience gives a person accurate self-assessment; an ingenious speech
tells right from wrong with evidence.”
107. The original has two varied versions. Xu Fuhong’s edition shows “凡謀有道 (fan
mou you dao)” (Guiguzi, 108), while all other editions have “為人凡謀有道 (wei ren
fan mou you dao)” (Tao, 17; Chen, 80; Cao and An, 292; Ren, 232; Zong, 119). Qin
Engfu, the scribe of Tao’s edition, inserts a note, saying that “the other edition [Dao
Cang Ben] does not have the two characters of 為人 (wei ren)” (Tao, 17).
108. Tao notes, “When the reasons are known, then it is possible to acquire informa-
tion. With the information in hand, nothing is impossible to accomplish.”
109. The original reads “三儀 (san yi).” Some commentators say that san yi (three in
harmony) refers to Heaven, Earth, and human (Zong, 120).
110. The original Chinese version is “曰上曰中曰下 (yue shang, yue zhong, yue xia).”
Tao says that they represent high, average, and low intelligence. Most commenta-
tors follow Tao.
111. The state of Zheng (鄭國) was in today’s Henan Province.
74 112. Tao comments, “‘The same feeling’ refers to the same wish for the same endeavor,
 Book II
are close, both of them get hurt. When two parties who share the same
aversion estrange each other, one of them gets hurt.113 Therefore, people
who benefit one another become close; people who cause losses to one
another are estranged. This is the principle of the practice (qi shu xing
ye 其數行也‍‍).114 It also serves as a means to distinguish what unites and
divides people and where they agree and disagree. Thus it is said that
walls collapse at the seams and wood breaks at the knots, both implying
consequences of divide.115 It follows that change gives birth to business;
business calls for a plan; a plan calls for strategy; strategy is followed by
negotiation (yi 議); negotiation requires persuasion (shui 說); persuasion
advances business; advancement encounters setback; setback gives rise
to a system of rules (zhi 制‍‍), which are adopted to all business. Then all
business follows the same way (dao 道), while all rules (bai du 百度) are
developed from the same principle (shu 數).116

which, if successful, makes people close. At the same time, if only one party succeeds
and the other party fails, people tend to stay away from each other afterwards. This
is just common sense.”
113. Tao explains that “‘the same aversions’ means both being hated by someone (bi
彼). If they both fail, they would become close afterwards. If one party succeeds and
the other fails, they definitely estrange each other afterwards. This is common sense
(yi li zhi chang ye 亦理之常也).” Xu’s interpretation is that “if both parties who hold
the same hatred are close together, both of them would be hurt. If they are estranged,
one of them is hurt” (Collection, 151). Evidently, most Chinese commentators believe
that Guiguzi refers to parties on either side of the business.
114. Here 數 (shu) means the principle or baseline, while 行 (xing) means practice
or work.
115. Tao comments that these two analogies emphasize that “changes in things and
people result from their agreement and disagreement.”
116. The original is that “故變生於事事生謀謀生計計生議議生說說生進進生退退
生制因制於事故百事一道而百度一數也.” Tao explains,
Guiguzi means that all things share the same fundamental principle that is de-
rived from their own cause. For example, a plant blooms because it has roots,
stems, branches, and leaves. The cause gives rise to changes and openings,
out of which possibilities for business grow. People who undertake business
must make plans and implement them with strategy. Business planners engage
themselves in negotiation and persuasion. Negotiators and persuaders must
know what is appropriate and what is inappropriate. Then they move forward
and backward accordingly. Wherever there are setbacks and difficulties, there
is someone who sees the need for a governing system. Business then follows
it as law, from which all endeavors and rules develop.
Xu Fuhong adds, “Guiguzi meant to say that all types of things and rules were derived
from the same principle” (Collection, 152). 75
 Guiguzi
II.10.2 People who think lightly of wealth would not be lured by financial
gains but can be appropriated to contribute to expenditures. Brave people
who are not afraid of adversity would not be intimidated by dangers but
can be employed to manage perilous situations. Wise people who un-
derstand principles (li 理) would not be deceived by untruths but can be
persuaded with reason to accomplish tasks. These are the three types of
talents.117 Thus it is easy to fool the insensible (yu zhe 愚者), to intimidate
the unworthy, and to beguile the covetous. Deploy your approach accord-
ingly. Strength is built on solidarity of the weak;118 surplus is accumulated
from savings in shortage.119 This is the principle of the Dao.
II.10.3 Address internality in persuasion when you discern outward friendli-
ness but inward estrangement. Address externality in persuasion when
you discern inward friendliness but outward estrangement.120 When
the other person shows doubts, adjust your approach; when he expresses
viewpoints, encourage him; when he speaks out, generalize what he says.
Enhance his achievements based on what he has already accomplished.
Attain balance based on what he dislikes. Dispel worries based on what
distresses him.121 Deploy weighing to see what he fears; excite him highly
117. Tao says,
Ask those who think lightly of wealth to pay for expenditures, and you can
cover all the expenses; commission those who are not intimidated by perils
to guard safety, and you can transform dangers to security; let strategists ac-
complish tasks, and you will succeed. When you employ these three types of
talents, your glorious reputation would be spread across thousands of miles,
not to mention all the wealth that comes with it.
118. Note that there is a remark that “the straight point results from roundabouts”
only in Xu’s edition before “surplus.”
119. Some modern Chinese editions have “積曲可以爲直 (ji qu zhe ke yi wei zhi)”
or “爲直者積於曲 (wei zhi zhe ji yu qu)” afterward. But Tao’s edition of Guiguzi for
this translation has “積曲可以爲直” in his commentary but not in the Guiguzi text.
120. Tao’s comment is that “when a person appears friendly outward but unfriendly
inward, address his internal feelings to eliminate inner estrangement. When a person
appears unfriendly outward but friendly inward, address his external relations to
eliminate outward estrangement.”
121. Tao notes,
When doubted by the other party due to lack of internal and external connec-
tions, make adjustment and address his doubt. When he is changed, he would
express opinions, which you shall affirm. When the other person speaks out,
synthesize his main points. At this point, you should be able to see if it is pos-
sible to establish a connection with him. Then you should know if you want
to leave or stay. Afterwards, you can help advance his achievement based on
what he has accomplished. Once you decide to stay, you shall discover what
distresses him based on what he dislikes. Then you weigh and balance them.
76 If his distress comes from anxiety, alleviate it.
 Book II
to move him; subtly detect signs for evidence; respond to the signs he
manifests; set up a barrier to block out;122 analyze commotions to un-
derstand his befuddlement.123 These are called strategic deployment (ji
mou 計謀).124 Public discussion of a strategic plan is less effective than a
private talk. Private discussion is less effective than a relationship, which
must be formed seamlessly.125 A proper speech is less effective than an
ingenious one; ingenuity engenders endless succession of triumph.126

122. The original is “擁而塞之 (yong er sai zhi).” Tao’s edition copied by Qin replaces
擁 with 壅 (yong), which means “a barrier or block.”
123. The original is “亂而惑之 (luan er huo zhi).” Most commentators think that
this sentence means taking advantage of commotions or turmoil to befuddle the
single-person audience (Cao and An, 295; Chen, 88; Ren and Bai, 235; Zong, 126).
See next note for Tao’s explanation that leads to the translation.
124. Interpretations of the passage that begins with “applying” vary. Tao says,
He would be proud of himself when he comes to grips with problems. Then
you apply weighing to understand his fears. Elevate him to a risky height to
appeal to him. However, even though you now know his fears and feelings,
you still do not know if he has been changed. So you gently draw him further
out. Based on the signs he shows, you respond. When his signs do not con-
firm if he has been changed, you know that his befuddlement is too deep to
clear up. At this point, you shall analyze and block commotions surrounding
him. Commotion causes confusion. When you block it, you win him over. A
practice like this is called strategic deployment (ji mou 計謀).
Based on Tao’s explanation, 計謀 is translated into “strategic deployment,” and not
“strategic planning.”
125. Tao notes,
Public execution is announced at court. In the name of collecting public opinions,
it only witnesses people holding tightly to their own ideas and finding fault with
others. It is hard to accomplish anything. Private execution happens behind the
door, quietly done without a flaw to lead to accomplishment. Therefore, public
persuasion is not as effective as private persuasion. After double checking your
strategic deployment by yourself, it is better to form an alliance. Once two parties
bond in the heart without a gap, how can anybody break this seamless relationship?
Xu adds, “This passage means that deploying strategy needs discretion. Public dis-
cussion is less effective than a discussion among a small group of people. The latter
format, however, is less effective than that between two parties who are directly
involved in the business” (Collection, 157).
126. Tao says,
A proper speech (zheng zhe 正者) that follows the orthodox and defends the
convention can hardly speed up business; an ingenious speech (qi zhe 奇
者) that does not follow the orthodox but employs it in consideration of the
business at hand can make things happen when opportunity arises. Thus, it
is said that “A proper talk is less effective than an ingenious talk.” Ingenuity
then triumphs continuously. 77
 Guiguzi
Therefore, to persuade (shui 說) a king (ren zhu 人主), it is necessary to
exercise ingenuity; to persuade (shui 說) a minister (ren chen 人臣), it is
necessary to talk in private.127 Those who are on the inside but talk to
outsiders are ostracized. Outsiders who talk in depth to the insiders jeop-
ardize themselves.128 Do not force upon others what they do not want;129
do not teach others what they do not care to know. All individuals have
their likes; learn about them to adapt to each of them; all individuals have
dislikes, avoid speaking about them (hui 諱). This is called deploying the
way of yin to acquire the gain of yang.130
II.10.4 Indulge those whom you want to remove. Indulgence avails you of
opportunity.131 A person whose appearance is neither appealing nor
repulsive can be trusted with confidentiality.132 A person who can be
known is employed. A person who cannot be known is not employed
by a deployment strategist. Thus it is said that in any business (shi 事)
it is vital to control others and not vice versa. Those who control others
hold power; those who are controlled by others have their life controlled
by others (zhi ming 制命).133 For this reason, a sage follows the way of

127. Taos explains, “An ingenious speech to His Majesty results in achievements and
honors; a private speech to a lord is a way of self-protection.”
128. Tao’s commentary only repeats the original, while Xu notes, “This statement
means that an insider who talks mostly to outsiders will lose close friends and end
up being ostracized. An outsider whose talk interferes with insiders puts himself
in danger” (Collection, 158).
129. Tao’s edition shows “無以人之近所不欲 (wu yi ren zhi jin suo bu yu),” but Qin,
the scribe, inserts a note that says, “The other edition has ‘無以身之所不欲 (wu yi
shen zhi suo bu yu).’”
130. Tao adds,
Learn how to adapt to others’ likes and avoid their dislikes. This is a private
act that goes along with others, who would feel pleased consequently. An
appreciative speech should be delivered openly in response. For this reason,
it is said, “deploying the way of yin to acquire the gain of yang.”
131. Tao notes, “In order to invalidate someone, you should follow and indulge him
to make him let go to an extreme, which offers you opportunities and methods to
take control. Thus it is said, ‘Indulgence avails you of opportunities.’”
132. The original reads, “貌者不羙又不惡故致情託焉 (mao zhe bu mei you bu e gu
zhi qing tuo yan).” Tao’s explanation is that “貌者 (mao zhe) means to observe a
person’s expression and manners to acquire information. The person [under obser-
vation] should be at peace with a balanced temperament. He would not be beguiled
by superficial attractiveness or criticize unattractiveness. This type of person can
be trusted with confidentiality.”
133. Tao provides no explanation, while Xu quotes Yin Tongyang (尹桐陽, 1882–1950,
an authoritative commentator of Mozi), saying, “The statement comes from Zhong
78 Jing (中經), where 事 means 道 (Dao), and 制命 means 失命 [shi ming, lose control
 Book II
yin, while an insensible person follows the way of yang.134 A wise man
accomplishes business with ease, while an unwise man does it with dif-
ficulties. From this perspective, it is impossible to salvage a downfall; it
is impossible to transform dangers into safety. As such, no action other
than the esteem of wisdom (zhi 智) can help.135 What wisdom employs
to govern the populace is unknown to ordinary people; what wisdom
is capable of is invisible to them as well. When wisdom is in use, what
works becomes evident. Select and adopt what works for the purpose
of serving yourself. When you see what is not working, make a selec-
tion and adopt it as well for the purpose of serving others.136 The Dao

of one’s life]” (Xu, Collection, 161). According to Ci Hai (辭海 Chinese Encyclopedia),
Zhong Jing (中經) refers to classics that were only accessible to the emperor, for ex-
ample, Zhong Wu Jing (中武經) in the Han Dynasty that is now included in The Book
of Han: The Biography of Liu Xiang (Han Shu: Liu Xiang Zhuan 漢書—劉向傳 1408).
134. Yin here means being scrupulous or covert, and yang means being unscrupulous
or overt. Tao says, “The sage applies yang inwardly but yin outwardly. But a senseless
person does the opposite.”
135. Tao notes,
It is easy for a sensible man to accomplish things because he bears no malice,
while an insensible man cannot accomplish anything because he harbors mis-
givings. It is unfortunate that an unwise man often jeopardizes and destructs
himself. It is impossible for him to accomplish anything. When his plan is not
scrutinized wisely, his destruction is inevitable, and his danger is unavoidable.
By this point, it is too difficult to seek safety and to survive. No action can
salvage the destruction and guard against the danger. Only wisdom could help.
This is why it is said, “no action other than the esteem of wisdom can help.”
136. Tao explains,
Apply wisdom for yourself and then for others. When the applicability is obvious,
make your selection for adoption to serve yourself. When the inapplicability is
obvious, also make your selection for adoption to serve others. This is similar
to Bo Le’s (伯樂) selection of a horse that could run thousands of miles a day.
Bo Le, whose real name was said to be Sun Yang (孫陽), was known for his talent
of selecting war horses in the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 b.c.e.). Legend
has it that under the auspices of the king of State Chu (楚國), Bo Le traveled over
several surrounding states but failed to find a horse that was able to run a thousand
miles a day. On his return trip, he saw a weak skinny horse that remained unsold
for days. Bo Le purchased it from the owner, who was happy to be paid handsomely
for the useless horse. The king of Chu, however, was unhappy to see the horse. Bo
Le asked the king to wait before dismissing it. Well-fed for half a month, the horse’s
neigh became strong, his trots powerful, and his hair smooth and shiny. The king
rode it to win numerous battles. This tale is called “Bo Le’s Selection of Horse (Bo
Le shi ma 伯樂識馬),” which in modern Chinese implies seeing beyond a person’s
appearance to identify a talent. Bo Le’s tale in The Huainanzi reads, “A good horse
may be judged by his physique, countenance, sinews and bones. But in judging the 79
 Guiguzi
of the ancient kings was yin. A saying has it, “Changes of Heaven and
Earth transcend height and depth; the Dao of the sages is invisible and
circumspect. It requires not only loyalty (zhong 忠), trustfulness (xin
信), benevolence (ren 仁), and fidelity (yi 義) but also propriety (zhong
中) and flawlessness (zheng 正).”137 A person whose understanding and
thinking are developed from this principle is worth an audience. If a
person is capable of this achievement, it is possible for him to grow (gu
榖) relationships (yi 義 fidelity) far and near.138

11. Decision-Making ( Jue 决)

II.11.1 All decision-makers begin with questions. Prudent utilization of
questions brings about good fortune ( fu 福); improper utilization
brings about adversity (huan 患).139 When harms arise, provide guidance

best horse in the world, it seems ‘as if it is not there at all, as if it has disappeared, /
as if it had lost its singular identity . . .’” (12.25, 458).
137. 中 (zhong) means proper, fitting, precise, incisive, or right in the middle, while
正 (zheng) means accurate, normal, correct, or formal. In parallel, they emphasize
accurate perception in application of the principle and strategy. Tao says, “This
sentence means that the ancient kings esteemed the Dao of yin, quietly follow-
ing classical mottoes to guide their practices. . . . A discreet practitioner, who acts
properly and correctly, naturally follows the Dao, which demands more than loyalty,
trustfulness, benevolence, and fidelity.”
138. The wording and interpretations of the last sentence vary. Tao’s edition hand-
scribed by Qin shows 榖逺近之義 (gu yuan jin zhi yi, to grow faithful relationships
far and near). Many modern editors, such as Cao and An (295), Chen (85), Ren (236),
and Zong (129), follow Tao. The English translation follows Tao’s edition, which says,
“榖 [gu] means to grow [yang 飬]. If one can attain the fundamentals of this principle,
he can occupy a pivotal high office to support people far and near and attract them
to the land of benevolence and stability (shou 壽 long life).” However, Xu’s edition
shows 榖逺近之誘 (gu yuan jin zhi you, develop attractions in distance and nearby)
(Guiguzi, 118). Xu says, “榖 means to live. So this statement implies that if one under-
stands the basics of this principle, then he can stay above all sorts of enticements”
(Collection, 164). Varied from his own reading, Xu’s note in his edition of Guiguzi says,
“榖 means to appeal to people nearby and far away to gain their trust” (Guiguzi, 119).
139. Tao explains,
When you have questions, you need answers. You begin with questions. It is
common sense (fan ren zhi qing 凡人之情) that when you take advantage of
good fortune, you see good results. When there is harm, there is adversity.
When causes of the good fortune and adversity are unknown, questions arise.
However, if you can answer questions, you can provide directions by gaining
80 intelligent information and then decide if or not you can take actions.
 Book II
(you 誘).140 When there is no doubt (huo 惑) subsequently, benefits oc-
cur. Should benefits not be bestowed, there would be no acceptance.141
This is the foundation of ingenuity (qi zhi suo tuo 奇之所託). If benefits
to a benevolent person are concealed out of ill intent, there will be no
acceptance but estrangement.142 Thus those who cause loss of benefits
and inflict sufferings and harms precipitate failure to business.143
The sages accomplish business by adopting five approaches: the yang II.11.2
and virtuous (yang de 陽德), the yin and fatal (yin zei 陰賊),144 the
faithful and sincere (xin cheng 信誠), the circumspect and unheeded
(bi ni 蔽匿), and the plain and conventional (ping su 平素).145 Yang is

140. Tao’s hand-scribed version presents 害至於誘 (hai zhi yu you). 誘 here means
guidance or direction. However, Xu Fuhong says, “All editions contain 害, while it
should be 善 (shan benevolence)” (Collection, 170).
141. Tao notes, “Without seeing benefits, a skeptical person would not change his mind.
A decision should be adjusted accordingly. This is the foundation of ingenuity. Mak-
ing adjustments to what is unanticipated is ingenuity.” Xu adds, “Ingenuity contrasts
with properness to mean unconventional and unpredictable. . . . This sentence means
a decision should result in benefits. Without benefits, people cannot accept the deci-
sion. Each decision that results in benefits ought to follow ingenious perceptions about
unanticipated changes in order to bring about pleasant surprises” (Collection, 168–69).
142. Tao comments, “It means that the inquisitive person who understands his ben-
efits starts with good intent, but the decision-making assistant conceals the benefits.
This is a situation where the good intent encounters the ill intent. Then there will
be no acceptance but estrangement.” Xu offers a different reading, saying that “a
decision must be prefect without loopholes. A decision that is generally beneficial
but contains some disadvantages would not be accepted but cause estrangement as
a consequence” (Collection, 169).
143. Tao explains, “When the two parties gain no benefits due to the ill intent, the
person with questions will not change his decision. As a result, his action ends in
no success, causing loss of benefits and inflicting sufferings and harms. All these
are called failures in decision-making.”
144. 賊 means harmful, murderous, or brutal in classical Chinese. The meanings
have developed into stealthy, secret, or covert in modern Chinese.
145. Tao’s notes state,
The sages remain flexible to cope with changes and challenges; they take into
consideration all things and their causes (wu li 物理). Those whose success
of business depends on cause-effect reasoning adopt the yang and virtuous
approach. Those who do not utter their words and conceal untruths adopt the
yin and deadly approach. Those who speak honestly and forthrightly adopt the
faithful and sincere approach. Those who want to inflict on others small mis-
fortunes for small self-gains, adopt the underground and covered approach.
Those who follow the norm adopt the plain and conventional approach.
Xu adds, “Tao’s interpretation makes sense. The key is adopting tactics for decision
making” (Collection, 171). 81
 Guiguzi
recommended for the Single Speech (yi yan 一言). Yin is recommended
for the Double Speech (er yan 二言).146 In the use of the plain and con-
ventional approach, apply the other four approaches simultaneously with
subtle force to hold the pivot to opportunities.147 Thereby reflect on past
experiences to investigate future endeavors. Along with the deployment
of the plain and the conventional approach, a decision can be made.
Decisions concerning any business that may affect the reputations of
lords, kings (gong wang 公王), and very important people (da ren 大
人) should be made promptly; decisions concerning business that does
not take much effort should be made promptly; decisions concerning
business that takes effort and hard work but has to be done should be
made promptly; decisions to eliminate potential harms should be made
promptly; decisions that lead to good fortune should be made promptly.
II.11.3 Making informed decisions by identifying challenges is the key to
the myriad of things; building order out of chaos determines success or
failure. These are most difficult.148 For this reason, the ancient kings used
grass-turtle divination (shi gui 蓍龜) to help them make decisions.149

146. Tao notes,

Yang is the Dao for the king, so a Single Speech is recommended. 一 (yi one)
here means 無為 (wu wei inaction). Yin is the Dao for ministers, so the Double
Speech is recommended. 二 (er two) here means 有為 (you wei action). The
Dao for the king stands mainly for inaction, which focuses on the norm and
convention. The Dao for ministers stands for action, which centers on the
pivot to opportunities.
Some other commentators say that 一言 means the Way of Heaven and that 二言
means the Way of Earth (Yin Tongyang qtd. in Xu, Collection, 171). Still others hold
that 一言 means a clear consistent speech and 二言 means an ambiguous vague
speech. Yang is practiced to show virtues publicly. Therefore, the speech should be
consistent and sincere. Yin is practiced to conduct underground and covered stealthy
harmful actions. Therefore, the speech is purposely ambiguous and unclear (Xiao
Dengfu qtd. in Xu, Collection, 171–72). Xu Fuhong’s reading follows Xiao’s.
147. Tao’s comment reads, “The deployment of the four approaches is careful, deli-
cate, and seamless to accomplish business in an orderly fashion without barriers
(yong 壅).” Qin Enfu, the scribe, adds, “Dao Cang Ben [Daoist Edition] and Qianlong
Ben [Edition in Emperor Qianlong’s Period 1735–1796 c.e.] both have 難 (nan dif-
ficulty) instead.” Commentators believe that the four approaches refer to the yang
and virtuous, the yin and fatal, the faithful and sincere, and the underground and
circumspect (Xu, Collection, 171–72).
148. Tao says, “Resolving chaos to build order decides success and failure. If the judg-
ment is off by a fraction of an inch, the result is off by a thousand miles. Identifying
the pivot to opportunities would bring honors or humiliations to the king. For this
reason, it is most difficult.”
82 149. See III.1.2 and III.1.7 for Guiguzi’s discussion of the divine grass and turtle. Tao
 Book II

12. Fundamental Principles (Fu Yan 符言)150

Regions governed by the principles of stability, savior-faire, scrupu- II.12.1
losity, and serenity enjoy prosperity without exceptions.151 Be skillful in
diplomacy but cause uneasiness. Remain humble, mindful, calm, and
good-willed on the watch for conquest and demolishment.152 Hereby the
master’s position is explained (you zhu wei 有主位).153
Valued are eyes that are crystal-clear, ears that are acutely tuned, and II.12.2
the heart [mind]154 that stimulates astute intelligence. Those who watch
the world with Heaven’s eyes never lose sight of anything; those who
listen to the world with Heaven’s ears never miss any sound; those who
govern the world with Heaven’s heart never fail to be omniscient.155 When
notes, “Even ancient omniscient kings used grass-turtle divination to help them
make decisions. How can laymen be so self-conceited as not to learn from intelligent
knowledgeable people before making any plans?”
150. Almost all commentators read this chapter as advice to a king or a ruler. Tao’s
explanation of 符言 is “the proven word,” meaning that a person’s speech is proven
to be true like a prophecy. Xu adds, “符 refers to internal response. Emotions reside
inside to weigh external things, thereby expecting the other person’s feeling to be
shown as is. ‘符言’ means words signifying the internal feelings” (Collection, 175).
151. Tao notes, “This sentence means that if a ruler practices self-control, savior-faire,
scrupulosity, and serenity, the regions he rules doubtlessly experience prosperity
(qi bei jie wu bu rou 其被節無不肉).” The scribe, Qin Engfu, inserts a note, saying,
“Another edition has 先肉 [xian rou, becoming prosperous first] without the two
characters of 無不” (Guiguzi, 25).
152. Tao says, “It means that even if the states with which you have skillfully established
diplomatic relations are instable, you stay ‘humble, mindful, calm, and good-willed’ to
wait for the time of their conquest and demolishment.” Xu’s interpretation is that “when
dealing with a hostile state, you remain calm while making it restless. This sentence
means that a ruler of a region is to encourage instability in his enemy states, while he
himself stays calm and watches them being sabotaged and toppled” (Collection, 177).
153. Many editions show the ending sentence as “右 (yòu) 主位.” But Tao’s edition
hand-scribed by Qin Engfu has “有 (yŏu) 主位.”
154. See note 2 in I.1.1 for the explanation of 心 (xin, heart) as the mind in classical
Chinese.
155. Tao comments,
The ancient Emperor Yao (di yao 帝堯) adopted this principle. His smartness,
intelligence, knowledge, and way of thinking were shining across the world.
Therefore, clear eyes are valued for their vision; astuteness is used to hear;
intelligence is used in strategic deployment like a dragon that draws the clouds
and a tiger that is gathering the winds. They are invincible.
“The ancient Emperor Yao” in Tao’s explanation refers to one of the five emperors
before the Warring States Period. See more on the emperors in note 14 in I.1.3. 83
 Guiguzi
perfectly shaped wheels are turning in tune with their axles, the vision
of the road is never obstructed.156 Hereby the master’s intellectual con-
science is explained (you zhu ming 有主明).
II.12.3 The art of virtue mandates157 that “a strong will shall never resist
others.” Receptivity defends the stronghold; resistance shuts it off.158
The top of a high mountain can be seen when one looks up. The bottom
of a deep river can be measured when one fathoms it. The art of virtue
to develop omniscient intellectual conscience (shen ming 神明) relies
on the practice of scrupulosity and serenity.159 This omnipotent art is

156. The original is “輻 (fu, spoke) 輳 (cou, metal hub) 並進 (bin jin).” Tao notes,
“When the spokes and metal hubs are in tune with one another, the wheel is in
perfect shape. The analogy implies that it is impossible to stop the light from the sun
and the moon. Thus ‘the vision of the road is never blocked.’” Almost all modern
commentators read the analogy of spoke and metal hub as harmony between a ruler
and his subjects, who, like spokes, surround the metal hub, or the ruler, to move
the wagon, or the state, forward (Cao and An, 303; Chen, 104; Ren and Bai, 241; Xu,
Guiguzi, 131; Zong, 145).
157. The original is “德之術 (de zhi shu, the art of virtue).” Some editions have “聽之術
(ting zhi shu, the art of listening)” (Cao and An, 303; Zong, 146). However, both Tao
and Xu believe that it should be 德 (Tao, 24; Xu, Collection, 179). A reason for the
controversy might be that 德 is mistaken for 聽 due to the shared radical on the
right side of the two characters, or their similar shapes, when the text was passed
along. Tao also notes that
the art of virtue depends upon an open mind receptive of varied ideas. Moun-
tains never stop gathering soil. This is why they become high. Oceans never
stop gathering streams from all directions. This is why they become deep.
Sages have never resisted other people. This is why they have become great.
158. Tao explains,
Accommodating and allowing different expressions means welcoming oth-
ers, who then help with the defense in return. Rejecting other ideas means
resisting other people, who then shut up in opposition. Feeling welcome, they
support the defense against dangers; encountering resistance, they close up
to block the channel of operation. For this reason, safety and security cannot
be defended without embracing others.
159. In Huangdi Neijing, the translator, Y. C. Kong, explains 神 (shen) as “the spiritual
force” or “a supernatural power that is beyond the voluntary control of the mind”
and 明 (ming) as “the conscience,” the moral judgment, or the cognitive force. He
continues to say that “the compound term shenming describes a higher level of mental
activity, the psyche, which sustains life by constantly steering the body and mind
towards goodness” (Huangdi Neijing, 33–34, n. 1). However, in Guiguzi’s time, each
single character had its own meaning; the characters of shen ming did not become
a compound term or a fixed phrase until later prose writers combined them, prob-
ably in the Song Dynasty (960–1279 c.e.) when Chinese prose gained popularity.
84 The development of shen and ming is like that of 揣 (chuai), 摩 (mo), 權 (quan), and
 Book II
beyond measure.160 Hereby the master’s virtue is explained (you zhu de
有主德).161
The principle of reward is to keep the word; the principle of punish- II.12.4
ment is to uphold justice.162 In giving a reward to keep the word, what
has been seen and heard is the testimony. Without firsthand witness, one
unconsciously places oneself at the mercy of others.163 Practicing sincerity
and candor to govern the world is rewarded with omniscient intellectual
conscience (shen ming 神明), with which one deals with treacherous per-
sons and offenders of the king. Hereby the master’s reward is explained
(you zhu shang 有主賞‍‍).
First, learn about Heaven; second, learn about Earth; third, learn about II.12.5
Humanity.164 In all the four directions (si fang 四方), between the zenith

謀 (mou) in the previous chapters of Guiguzi. All of these characters developed into
compound terms or fixed phrases in later China as in 揣摩 (chuanmo) and 權謀
(quanmou). It is obvious that Guiguzi treated them as separate strategies with their
individual meanings; the phrase of “omniscient intellectual conscience” may sound
redundant or even tautological, but colloquialism may limit the original intent.
160. Tao says,
Nothing is higher than a mountain; nothing is deeper than the bottom of a
river. Both, however, can be measured. When a master possesses an omni-
scient mind, scrupulosity and serenity are his virtues. When you stand in front
of him, you cannot tell his expression. When you follow him, you cannot see
his trail. Of course, he is not measureable.
Xu adds, “神明 [shen ming] means omniscience [wu suo bu zhi 無所不知]. This
statement implies that with proper virtues, a master is proficient” (Collection, 180).
161. Tao comments, “The virtue of being the master resides in accommodating dif-
ferences without resistance.”
162. Tao says, “Using rewards to keep one’s word encourages people to make sac-
rifices. Using punishment to keep justice encourages people to accept the death
penalty without resentment.”
163. Tao notes,
Awards and rewards should be given to those who you have seen and heard
first hand. This way, you can test right and wrong information. Achievements
result from actions. Trust comes with the kept promise. Those who do not see
or hear in person are, with no exception, influenced by others.
Xu adds, “This statement means that rewards resulting in keeping one’s promise
are based on what one has seen and heard in person. Without first-hand witness,
one’s perception would be influenced by surrounding people whom one tends to
trust” (Collection, 181).
164. Tao says, “Heaven chronicles good and bad seasons; Earth contains isles and
hollows; people differ in whether they are open- or close-minded. A person who
rules the world must know all of the Three.” Xu comments, “This statement means
that the master must be inquisitive, seeks consultation and ideas, and considers the
seasons of Heaven, the position of Earth, and other people’s ideas” (Collection, 182). 85
 Guiguzi
and nadir (shang xia 上下),165 from the left to the right (zuo you 左右), in
the front and back (qian hou 前后), and under the constellation (ying huo
熒 惑), where is the being?166 Hereby the master’s inquiry is addressed
(you zhu wen 有主問).167
II.12.6 The heart controls the nine openings;168 the king governs the five of-
fices.169 Those who achieve good deeds are rewarded by the king; those
who perform bad deeds are punished by the king. A king that takes
actions in accord to what his administration wishes for is free of toil.170

Other commentators also think that Guiguzi addresses the three important aspects
which, the Chinese believe, must dovetail one another in order to achieve success: 天時
(tian shi, Heaven’s timing), 地利 (di li, an advantageous position on the Earth), and 人
和 (ren he, harmony among people) (Cao and An, 304; Ren and Bai, 243; Zong, 148–49).
165. 四方 (si fang) stands for the horizon or ground, 上下 (shang xia) for the sky
and the earth.
166. Tao explains,
The spaces around are coordinated by yin and yang for success or failure. It is not
allowed that those who are engaged in state affairs do not possess well-rounded
knowledge. 熒惑 (ying huo, constellation) represents Heaven’s law, which typi-
cally mandates disasters, eclipses, fortunes, and misfortunes. Hence the intel-
ligent Son of Heaven must understand the movement of the constellation.
However, Xu points out that “Tao’s interpretation focusing the astronomy is incor-
rect” and says that “熒惑 means questions and doubts. The sentence implies that
those who seek different ideas can get their questions answered” (Collection, 183).
167. Tao says, “When seeking answers, the master must be able to distinguish the
ways of the Three [Heaven, Earth, and Humanity].”
168. See note 2 in I.1.1 for the explanation of 心 (xin, heart) as the mind in classical
Chinese.
169. The original is “心爲九竅之治君爲 五官之長 (xin wei jiu qiao zhi zhi jun wei
wu guan zhi zhang).” 九竅 (jiu qiao) refers to nine openings—the mouth, two ears,
two eyes, two nostrils, the urethra, and the anus. 五官 (wu guan) refers to the five
offices of 司徒 (si tu), 司馬 (si ma), 司空 (si kong), 司士 (si shi), and 司寇 (si kou) in
the Shang Dynasty (1700–1046 b.c.e.) and the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 b.c.e.). The
rank above them was 冢宰 (zhong zai), which, however, was not included in the five
offices. Here 五官 (wu guan) means all officials.
170. Some Chinese modern editions have “因求而與悅莫大焉雖 無玉帛勸同賞矣
(yin qiu er yu yue mo da yan sui wu yu bo quan tong shang yi)” in the Guiguzi text
proper. But in Tao’s edition for this translation, the statement is made by Tao and
not by Guiguzi. In English, Tao’s statement means, “Reward those who achieve what
he [the king] seeks. When he acquires what he seeks, he is pleased. When what he
wishes for and what results do not synchronize, he knows how to respond accord-
ingly. Why does he have to toil when he can just follow the principle?” Xu adds his
interpretation that “if the king gives rewards and penalties based on what his officials
have done, they themselves actually decide on their own rewards and penalties. The
86 king himself then is free of distress and toil” (Collection, 185).
 Book II
The sages have practiced this principle and seen subsequent rewards. The
same principle, if followed, ensures longevity and stability.171 Hereby the
master’s rationality is explained (you zhu yin 有主因).
The master of people (ren zhu 人主) cannot be thorough enough. II.12.7
Without thoroughness, all officials become unruly.172 When a family
dysfunctions, its exterior and interior connections are broken. It does
not know if it is open.173 When the open-shut is in a chaotic condition,
it is impossible to see the basics.174 Hereby the master’s thoroughness is
explained (you zhu shou 有主周).
First, develop farseeing eyes; second, develop quick ears; third, develop II.12.8
an intellectual conscience.175 Remain attentively quiet and watch the
world beyond reach to gain insight. All evils make moves in the dark.176
Hereby the master’s authority is explained (you zhu gong 有主恭).177

171. Tao explains, “Award those who have achieved what he [the king] wishes for and
result in happiness. Even if the award does not come with jade and silk, an action
that goes against his wishes ends up with unhappiness. Hence follow this principle
of reward and punishment to achieve longevity and stability.”
172. Tao’s note reads, “Thoroughness is called being particularly knowledgeable of
laws of things. Should the laws be less than comprehensive, then officials would be
involved in trouble making.”
173. Tao says, “A family is like a business. When all officials are unruly, there is no
normal conduct of business. Coupled with broken exterior and interior communica-
tions, constant destructions are on the way. How is it possible to know if or not to
open business?” Xu adds, “This statement means that managing officials should be a
normal responsibility in order to make them comply with rules. If communications
within and without are broken, how to proceed?” (Collection, 187).
174. The original is “開閉不善不见原也 (kai bi bu shan bu jian yuan ye).” Tao reads
it, “開閉 [kai bi, open and close] is 捭闔 [bei he, open-shut]. If the approach of open-
shut is not applied, it is impossible to see the basics of benevolence.”
175. Tao explains that “the farseeing eyes (chang mu 長目) means seeing with Heaven’s
eyes. Quick ears (fei er 飛耳 acute ears) means listening with Heaven’s ears. Develop intel-
lectual conscience (shu ming 樹明) means taking care of the world with Heaven’s heart.”
176. Tao says,
This statement implies that taking care of the world with the Heaven’s heart
is rewarded with omniscience. Thereby one gains a paramount view of the
world beyond reach and discerns secrets and contemplative movements. These
insights enable one to abstain from evil. For this reason, one can remain
flexible when encountering unforeseeable changes.
177. There are varied interpretations of 恭 (gong), which can mean respect, service,
or responsibility. Tao says, “恭 relies on intelligence and intellect.” Xiao Dengfu says
that “主恭 should be 主参 (zhu can), meaning referring to opinions of others and
using them as one’s eyes and ears” (239). Xu adds, “恭 means respect, referring to
the way that the master makes his people respectful” (Collection, 189). 87
 Guiguzi
II.12.9 When an action is taken in accordance with its name, the reality is
peaceful and complete.178 When the name accurately signifies the real-
ity, their reciprocal relationship starts to evolve.179 Therefore, it is said: a
name is proper because it grows out of reality, which grows out of truth,
which grows out of virtuous naming of the reality. Virtue grows out of
harmony, which grows out of propriety.180 Hereby the master’s role in
naming is explained (you zhu ming 有主名).181

13. Rotation of Small Shots (Zhuan Wan 轉丸) and

14. Solution to Disorder (Qu Luan 胠亂)182
Editors’ note: Qin Engfu, the scribe of Tao’s edition, notes
that both chapters are missing (29). Xu Fuhong concludes
that chapter 13 survived the Nan Dynasty (南朝 420–589
c.e.), when Liu Hsieh (Liu Xie 刘勰) wrote The Literary
Mind and the Carving of Dragons (wen xin diao long
文心雕龙), in which he says that

178. Tao notes, “When the reality fits its name, peace and wholeness are ensured.” Xu
adds, “This sentence emphasizes the importance of proper naming” (Collection, 189).
179. The original is “名實相生反相爲情 (ming shi xiang sheng fan xiang wei qing).”
In classical Chinese, 名 (ming) can mean a name, naming, or definition, 實 (shi) an
object, evidence, fact, or reality, and 情 (qing) reasoning, a cause, sense, emotion,
or feeling. Tao’s reading is, “Follow the name to find out about the reality, which is
the source of naming. If the name and the reality match, there must be some logical
connection between them.”
  The rhetorical translation of Chinese classical naming embodies Saint Augustine’s
notion of signs in his On Christian Doctrine and Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic
notions of the signifier and the signified in his Course in General Linguistics. See more
on 名實 (ming shi) in Xing Lu’s Rhetoric of Ancient China, Fifth to Third Century
b.c.e. (145–53).
180. Tao’s comment reads, “A proper name is naturally born out of reality, which estab-
lishes itself on the corresponding relationship of the two. In other words, if nothing is
wrong with their relationship, the name and the reality embody virtues themselves.”
Xu notes, “德 (de, virtue) here refers to a reciprocal relationship” (Collection, 190).
181. Tao says, “The key to the master’s role in naming is to recognize the truth of
reality a name conveys.”
182. Chapters 13 and 14 are missing. Definitions of the characters in the chapter
titles are listed here as the context. 轉 (zhuan) means to rotate, cycle, turn, recycle,
and transfer, while 丸 (wan) means a small, rounded object, pellet, or shot. 胠 (qu)
means the upper right side of the body or reaching to an opening on the right side or
88 being obstructed, while 亂 (luan) means disorder, trouble, disaster, or misconduct.
 Book II
during the Warring States period [481–222 b.c.e.] sophists (bian
shi 辨士) rose like clouds. They indulged in the so-called “vertical
and horizontal intrigues,” and competed in what have been termed
the “long and short tactics.” The “Chuan-wan” [zhuan wan 轉丸]
charges forward with its clever phrases, and the “Fei-ch’ien” [fei
qian 飛箝] is the embodiment of tactical dexterity. (105–6)183
Xu believes that Liu has read chapter 13 轉丸 of Guiguzi to
make that comment.
As for chapter 14, Qin noted, in August 1789, that the
chapter was probably already missing by the Tang Dynasty
(618–907 c.e.). According to Tao Hongjing, there was a
writer who claimed that his quotation of 胠箧 (qu qie) was
from Guiguzi. Tao points out that this writer might have
quoted chapter 10 胠箧 (qu qie) in Zhuangzi instead. He
suspects that the aforementioned writer wanted to show off
his knowledge of an intriguing tactic in Guiguzi. Making a
contrast between Guiguzi and Zhuangzi, Tao says,
In Guiguzi, 胠亂 (qu luan) emphasizes sagely intellect and wis-
dom for strategic deployment, while in Zhuangzi, 胠箧 (qu qie)
is a satire about those who, in the name of the sage, rob others
and manipulate the sacred law to let those with power and those
in high offices get away with misconduct and corruption. What
Zhuangzi says is that the so-called sages are robbers and trouble-
makers. Therefore, the quotation is not from Guiguzi. (29)
The writer Tao has discussed is Zhao Rui (赵蕤 659–742
c.e.), a Tang scholar known for his book 長短經 (chang
duan jing, On Long and Short Tactics). According to Xu
Fuhong, Zhao quoted 胠箧 (qu qie), instead of 胠亂 (qu
luan), in his chapter 3 “On Flexible Tactics (fan jing 反經)”
(Xu, Guiguzi, 139). Xu also concludes that since Tao
Hongjing’s edition without chapters 13 and 14 had become
the authoritative version before the Tang Dynasty, it was
impossible for Zhao, a Tang scholar, to cite chapter 14 of
Guiguzi. In other words, chapters 13 and 14 were already
missing from Tao’s edition, which had been completed
prior to the Tang Dynasty. Therefore, it was impossible for
Zhao to read chapter 14 of Guiguzi in the Tang Dynasty
when he was composing his treatise.

183. Vincent Shih’s translation. 辨士 could also be translated as “persuader” or

“rhetor.” 89
 Book III 1

1. The Primary Doctrine on the Seven Arts of the Yin

Mystique (Ben Jing Yin Fu Qi Pian 本經陰符七篇)2
III.1.1 The Five-Dragon Art of Invigorating the Spirit
(Sheng Shen Fa Wu Long 盛神法五龍)

1. Unlike chapters in books 1 and 2, chapters in book 3 contain individually titled

passages, each seemingly standing by itself. The pagination restarts in book 3 as
well. To maintain the original textual intent and a consistent arrangement of the
book contents, this English edition restarts chapter numbers but not page numbers.
Book 3 of Guiguzi is said to be a key doctrine of the Daoist religion. This may be
a reason for the Daoist version (Dao Cang Ben), which is discussed in the section
“Fundamentals of Guigucian Rhetoric” of “Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric” in this
book. Many terms in book 3 indeed have become Daoist concepts, for example, 真
人 (zhen ren) or the true human being. As previously noted in “Redrawing the Map
of Rhetoric,” there is a widespread allegation that book 3 was compiled during the
dynasties of Wei and Jin, or Southern and Northern Dynasties (220–589 c.e.). It is
also said that book 3 might have been composed later by unknown writers in the
Tang Dynasty (Chen; Coyle, 145; Graham, 529). For example, Tao notes that “this
chapter and thereafter are about a topic not considered part of the Guiguzi.” Xu
Fuhong compares the theme in book 3 with those of books 1 and 2 and concludes
that although book 3 might have been edited later, the concepts of Heaven, Earth,
Dao, and omniscient intellectual conscience remain similar to those in books 1 and
2 allegedly compiled in the pre-Qin period during 475–221 b.c.e. (Study, 29–35). Ac-
cording to Xu, book 3 might have also solidified during the pre-Qin period (Study,
35, 135). His statistics on the rhyming characters and patterns lead to the conclusion
that the first chapter in book 3 might have been authored by Guiguzi, while the last
two chapters may not, because their rhymes do not follow the same pattern (Study,
105–14). See “Guiguzi and Its Sociopolitical Context” and “Fundamentals of Guigu-
cian Rhetoric” in “Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric” for more explanation.
2. 符 (fu) means a sign, proof, identification pass, sign of luck, mystic craft, the Dao,
or the law. Tao notes that
陰符 (yin fu) refers to an external sign of an internal thought. It means that
the private thought is signified by an external response. The signifier tells if
the internality and externality are synchronized. For this reason, it is recom-
mended to follow this book to learn about the source of the mind and thought.
90 It is thus called the primary doctrine (ben jing 本經).
 Book III
Within the invigorated spirit (sheng shen 盛神) are five energies (qi 氣).3
The spirit is the senior (zhang 長), the heart the abode (she 舍), and the
virtue the commander (da 大).4 The right way to nourish the spirit is to
follow the Dao.5 The Dao is the beginning of Heaven and Earth; the One
marks the epoch (qi ji 其纪). Those that produced things were born from
Heaven, accommodating all and formlessly generating Qi (energy 氣).6
In the beginning of Heaven and Earth, no shape could be seen, and no
name could be known. There were deities and immortal beings (shen
ling 神靈).7 Therefore, it is said that the Dao is the source of omniscient
intellectual conscience (shen ming 神明).8 It is united with the One. When
the virtue nourishes the five energies and enables the heart to embrace
the One, the art (shu 術) is attained.9 Those who have mastered the art

3. Qi in ancient China refers to air 氣 (qi) or 炁 (qi). Tao says, “The five types of
respirational energies that reside in the five organs [the heart, liver, spleen, lungs,
and kidneys] are called vitality (jing 精), spirit (shen 神), soul (hun 魂), character
(po 魄), and will (zhi 志).” Xu notes, “The five energies are the qi generated by the
heart, liver, spleen, lungs, and kidneys” (Collection, 199).
4. Tao explains, “The spirit is the center of the other four, hence the senior; the heart
provides accommodation, hence the abode; and the virtue exercises control and
disciplines, hence the commander.” 神 (shen) in 盛神 reads different from 明 in 神
明 (shen ming) which means the highest level of judicious intellect and knowledge.
Generally speaking, 神 (shen) can mean spirit or vigor, miracle, facial complexion,
energy, deity, or the almighty named Buddha that has created Heaven, Earth, and
a myriad things (Dictionary of Classical Chinese, 1387).
5. Tao says, “The most proper method to invigorate the spirit is to follow and return
to the Dao.”
6. Hereafter, 氣 is Qi in English unless it is in 五氣 (wu qi, five energies) or noted
otherwise.
7. Tao explains that
nameless was the beginning of Heaven and Earth. Therefore the Dao cre-
ated Heaven and Earth. When the Dao gave birth, it started with the One.
It is believed that Heaven and the Dao were in a mixed unity tempered and
produced through yin-yang, which shaped and created the myriad things to
give birth to the world. Accommodating and embracing, they were shapelessly
invisible. The Qi that gives birth to and nourishes lives came into being before
Heaven and Earth. Its shape is invisible, and its name is untraceable. When
talking about miracles of the myriad things, we have no choice but say that
they are deities and immortal beings.
Although 神 (shen) and 靈 (ling) here do not mean the Christian God and the Holy
Spirit, influenced by Christianity, modern Chinese often use 神靈 as a term to refer
to God and the Holy Spirit in addition to other immortal beings.
8. See note 10 in II.12.3 for the explanation of shen ming and the characters’ lexical
evolution.
9. Tao notes, 91
Guiguzi
can control the pathway between the heart and the energies and let the
spirit be their agent.10 The nine openings11 and twelve senses serve as the
doorway to the Qi that exercises the entire control of the heart.12
Those who have been born and endowed by Heaven are true human
beings. They are One with Heaven.13 Those who understand this14 and
cultivate themselves inwardly are called sages. Those who learn things
by the genus are called sages.15 Human beings are born in unity with
the One; after birth, they evolve along with their surroundings16 and
use their openings to classify things by the genus.17 For their questions

The spirit and omniscience are born in obedience to the Dao, hence the Dao
is the source of the spirit and omniscience. But their beginnings differ, some-
times formless, hence “united with the One.” Compliance with the law [li 理
principle] brings about success. The virtue of the five energies is the ability to
follow the law and succeed. Therefore, it is said that “the virtue nourishes the
five energies.” The One refers to inaction [wu-wei 無為‍‍] that develops itself.
The heart contented with inaction leads to the natural art.
10. Tao explains, “The heart and Qi that follow the Dao naturally give birth to the
art, which embodies the Dao with the spirit as its agent.”
11. See note 20 in II.12.6 for the explanation of the “nine openings (jiu qiao 九竅).”
12. Commentators agree that the twelve senses (shi’er she 十二舍) stand for the eyes,
ears, nose, tongue, body, knowledge, color, sound, smell, taste, touch, and mind or
thought (yi 意). Tao explains,
The eyes see the color; the ears hear the sound; the nose intakes the smell;
the mouth knows the taste; the body feels the touch; and the mind thinks
about things [yi si sh i意思事]. All senses come in and out of their abodes
when occasions of interactions among the twelve senses arise. The Qi and the
respiration are in and out of them and control the heart.
13. Tao notes that “the body of a true human being is one with Heaven.” Xu disagrees
and points out that “a true human being in Daoism means a person who has at-
tained the Dao by sustaining his/her natural being” (Collection, 202). He then quotes
Zhuangzi to say that “truth is born in the wake of the true human being. Zhuangzi
says ‘What is the true human being? The true human being in antiquity did not
oppress the powerless, did not compete for his own accomplishment, and did not
plan to serve office’” (Collection, 202 [Hui Wu’s translation of Zhuangzi]). For the
original, see chapter 6 in Zhaungzi, “The Venerable Master (da zong shi 大宗師).”
14. Here “this” is chosen to translate “之” (zhi) in “而知之者 (er zhi zhi zhe).” 之
refers to what has been stated previously.
15. Tao notes, “To enrich the self inwardly is to learn from others to acquire knowl-
edge. Sages are wise because they learn from others to acquire knowledge. Learning is
not an innate capability but a cultivated ability of classifying things by their genera.”
16. Tao explains, “This remark implies that humans exist between Heaven and Earth.
The three are the One. Immediately after the birth, humans evolve to fit their sur-
roundings and thus become different.”
92 17. “They are the nine openings,” says Tao, who continues to explain that “this means
 Book III
and bafflement, they resort to the art of the heart, which, is sometimes
blocked. To unblock it, the five energies must be nourished for the purpose
of holding the spirit (shen 神). This is called the process of development.18
Those who are engaged in the process to nourish the five energies de-
velop their will (zhi 志), mind (si 思), spirit (shen 神), and virtue (de 德),
with the spirit as the senior. Those who remain calm and peaceful cultivate
the Qi to achieve harmony. The four parts never decline, gaining ever-
present power and momentum. Inactive but alive, they provide the abode.
This is called the spiritual development of the body of the true human
being,19 who is One with Heaven to embody the Dao, persistently uphold-
ing it (zhi yi 執一) to develop and create the myriad types of things.20 The
true human being has Heaven’s heart to promote the virtue and develop
inaction for his will and deliberation. Those who give careful deliberations
to their ideas before taking actions retain power and strength.21 When all
that learning about things depends on the nine openings. When the openings raise
doubts, the heart and the art correspond and communicate with each other. When
the heart does not respond to the art, the latter does not work.” Xu states, “The
ancients believe that the heart generates thoughts. Thinking requires techniques.
Without them, the heart is blocked and does not learn” (Collection, 204).
18. Tao says, “When the heart and the art work together, the five energies develop
themselves to serve as the abode of the spirit. When the spirit has a home, it develops
itself in accord with the law [or principle].”
19. Tao comments,
Those who evolve along with their surroundings develop the five energies all
at once under the guidance of the spirit, the senior. Their will and mind act
together to support the senior. When the spirit is nourished, it calms down
in harmony with the growing Qi, which unites itself with the virtue. This
process involves four parts—the will (zhi 志), mind (si 思), spirit (shen 神),
and virtue (de 德), all of which must be kept from decline in order to develop
power and strength. Take no action to hold the spirit (shen 神), whereby the
Dao develops in turn to hold it. When the spirit evolves and returns to the
body, a true human being is born.
Xu believes that the five energies are the signs of the five organs (Collection, 204).
He adds,
The nourished five energies refer to their changes that bring about different ef-
fects to the will, mind, spirit, and virtue. The growing spirit is the most desirable.
When the five energies are in harmony as the One, the will, mind, spirit, and
virtue are developed. When the five organs hold the five energies, the process
spiritualizes the body. As a result, the true human being is born. (Collection, 205)
20. Tao notes, “‘一’ [yi, one] here means inaction [wu wei].”
21. Tao adds, “The sentence means that the true human being who develops and
recognizes myriad categories of things has a big heart like Heaven’s to promote the
virtue and educate others. He can accomplish all things with inaction.” Xu says,
“‘執一’ means upholding the Dao with inaction [wu wei]” (Collection, 205). 93
 Guiguzi
learners of books and military arts thoroughly master this art, they are
able to invigorate their spirit and develop their will.

III.1.2 The Divine-Turtle Art of Developing the Will 22

(Yang Zhi Fa Ling Gui 飬志法靈龜)
Those who are in need of developing their will suffer from the clogged
heart, Qi, and mind.23 A desire is harbored by the will and is considered
by the mind (you suo yu zhi cun er si zhi 有所欲志存而思之). The will
tends to satisfy desires, which, if too many, would distract the heart. The
distracted heart weakens the will, which subsequently slows the mind.24
Therefore, the heart and the Qi must be on the same course to keep the
desires under control. The controlled desires keep the will and mind from
deteriorating; the unfailing will and mind then encourage clear thinking
and disciplined reasoning.25 The disciplined reasoning allows harmony and
an unobstructed flow, which appeases restless Qi inside the chest.26 For this
reason, it is said that the will is empowered from the inside, and a person is
known from the outside. When the heart is unclogged, the will is energized;
when people are known, their responsibilities can be clearly classified.27
When applying this art to people, you must first know their way of
nurturing the Qi and the will. Knowing whether their Qi is stable or not
enables you to know how to nurture their Qi and will; examining whether
or not they feel secure enables you to know their capabilities.28 A will
22. 靈龜 (ling gui, divine or celestial turtle) refers to one of the four ancient divine
beasts. The other three are dragon, phoenix, and unicorn. The turtle symbolizes the
spirit, or the ghost of longevity. An appearance of the turtle is a sign of good luck or
success. Also see note 11 in II.11.3 for an explanation of the grass-turtle divination in
decision-making. The divine turtle was adopted also by the Japanese for the nengō
(title of the year 年號) and for the first two years of Empress Genshō (683–748), the
fifth empress of Japan ruling from 715 to 724 during the Nara period (710–794).
23. Tao repeats what is said in Guiguzi proper, while Xu asserts that “the ancients
believed that the heart thinks. The clogged heart, Qi, and mind mean blocked think-
ing” (Collection, 207).
24. Tao says, “Those who cater to their desires are unable to develop their will and,
therefore, cannot think well.” Xu follows that “this sentence means that a blocked
mind results from too many desires from the heart” (Collection, 207).
25. Tao explains, “It means that those who suppress their desires are able to empower
their will and, therefore, can develop clear thinking and reasoning.”
26. Tao’s comment is that “when harmony and a smooth flow are in place, the ir-
ritated Qi quiets down.”
27. Tao says, “An unclogged heart harmonizes the body, while clearly defined re-
sponsibilities keep a state peaceful.”
28. Tao says that this sentence teaches the method of how to hire people. He explains
94 that “energizing the will helps vitalize the Qi; otherwise it would deteriorate. When
 Book III
that is not being nurtured wobbles the heart and the Qi; a restless heart
with unstable Qi obliterates thinking and ideas, which undermine the
will. An undermined will is unable to bring forth a powerful response;
a powerless response indicates the confounded will that is draining the
heart and the Qi. As a result, the spirit is lost.29 The lost spirit takes the
shape of languishment (fang fu 髣髴) and incoordination.30 Cultivating
the will begins with being at peace with oneself. Self-security brings forth
a firm will and resolute mind, which then sustain the power and strength
to uphold the spirit that delivers distinct responses.31

The Flying-Snake Art of Empowering the Mind III.1.3

(Shi Yi Fa Teng She 實意法螣蛇)32
Those who wish to empower their minds shall clear up their Qi for
thinking.33 A peaceful heart establishes omniscient intellectual con-
science; profound thinking gives rise to successful plans and tactics.
Established omniscient intellectual conscience strengthens the will; suc-
cessful plans and tactics prevent disrupted art.34 When the mind and
thought are settled, the heart is at peace. The peaceful heart brings forth
precise actions. The spirit is then naturally attained and subsequently

one’s Qi shows an outward shape of vitality or deterioration, you can tell if or not
he is secure. This is why a person who is good at energizing his will chastens his
desires.”
29. Tao comments, “The point is that the loss of spirit begins with an uncultivated
will.”
30. Tao explains that “髣髴 means unintelligent appearance. The will, heart, and
spirit must be synergized for coordination. Unstable spirit causes frequent mistakes;
the consequence is, of course, ‘lack of coordination.’”
31. Tao notes that
a peaceful person who does not cater to desires rests his mind. Concentrated
willpower and strength sustain the spirit and omniscience. This way, the
strengthened power exercises a wide-spread impact. A divided higher ad-
ministration is called distribution of defeats, while a divided lower sector is
called exercises of willpower, because it can move others. This is why it is said
that to uphold the spirit is to give distinct responses.
“Distinct” is chosen to translate “分之” (fen zhi) to embody the meanings of distin-
guishing and being notable.
32. Tao explains that the flying snake symbolizes flexible applications of action
and inaction. A flying snake is allegedly a divine creature resembling the dragon.
33. Tao says, “A firm will brings forth peaceful Qi, which helps with deliberation
and examination, hence the statement.”
34. Tao adds, “Only undistracted intelligence can materialize plans and tactics;
only uninterrupted practice of the art can bring peace to a state and its neighbors.” 95
Guiguzi
emits focus.35 Should the heart and the Qi be occupied otherwise (shi qi ji
識氣寄), treacheries and evils would take hold of them and beguile them
with vicious schemes. Then it is impossible to speak from the heart.36
For this reason, believe in the art of the heart and safeguard where the
true One should be housed. When communicating with people about
thoughts and ideas, wait and listen to them.37
Plans and strategies are pivotal to survival and destruction. Unex-
amined thoughts result in insensitive listening that gains nothing. A
failed plan or strategy weakens confidence and the mind, which then
becomes blank.38 Take inaction in the pursuit; rest and appease the five
zang-organs (wu zang 五臟); harmonize and unclog the six fu-organs (liu
fu 六腑).39 Firmly safeguard the vitality (jing 精), spirit (shen 神), soul

35. Tao’s interpretation is that

a peaceful heart engages inaction in order to channel a coherent flow of
thoughts. Then a person can achieve transcendental world views naturally
without thinking. Therefore, when the heart is at home, no actions are mis-
conducted, and the spirit is naturally retained. The retained spirit makes
every effort a success. Successful persons are focused.
36. Tao reads “寄 (ji)” as guest quarters. He says that “this sentence means that the
Qi is considered untrue, if it is accommodated not by the heart but otherwise. . . .
Consequently, speeches from the chest tend to be superficial, because they are not
derived from the heart.”
37. Tao interprets it as
the art is to cultivate a sincere and pure heart diligently and to defend the true
One firmly. When you use this art to deal with other people, you would be
treated with sincerity and attention in return. As a result, intelligent persons
are enabled to conduct deliberations, wise persons are enabled to contribute
ideas, and people on upper and lower ranks are on the same course. This
is called the ability to exchange strategies and ideas. Listen to others with
Heaven’s ears to know about things and the climate.
Xu’s interpretation is that “you should believe in the art of pure heart. Guard the real
Qi without releasing it. Rest your spirit and purify your heart. Treat others with a
concentrated mind so as to listen to them and be ready for changes” (Collection, 213).
38. Tao explains that
successful plans mean survival, and unsuccessful strategies mean destruction.
. . . Deliberations that are not based on realities cause aimless listening, which
does not serve your purpose. This is called “insensitive listening.” When you
listen without sensitivity, what can you gain? Planned strategies, if gaining
nothing, are failures themselves. A failed plan gives no confidence to the
mind. What is left is only emptiness and falsehood. There is no sincerity and
honesty to speak of.
39. In Chinese medicine, the five zang-organs (wu zang 五臟) refer to the viscera
of the body—the heart, liver, spleen, kidneys, and lungs—and the six fu-organs
96 (liu fu 六腑) refer to the receptacles of digestion—the gall bladder, stomach, small
 Book III
(hun 魂), and character (po 魄) without budging. Thereafter it is possible
to look inward, to turn around to listen, and to anchor the will. Think
about the grand cosmos and await interactions with deities. Watch the
openings and separations of Heaven and Earth, understand creations
and evolutions of the myriad things, and discern the ending and the
beginning of yin-yang to know the politic and principles of human affairs.
Thereby you know the world without stepping out of the door; you behold
Heaven’s Dao without looking out of the window. This is the so-called
Dao that enables you to command with your eyes closed and reach the
destiny with your feet unmoved.40 Its understanding cultivates the om-
niscient intellectual conscience to allow you to respond with boundless
resources and find the abode for your spirit.41

intestines, large intestines, three burners (san jiao 三焦), and bladder. Representing
the heat (warm and hot qi), the three burners are composed of upper, middle, and
lower parts but do not stand for any specific organs. The upper burner usually refers
to the part around the chest, such as the heart and the lung; the middle burner the
part between the chest and the navel, such as the spleen and the stomach; and the
lower burner the part below the navel, such as the kidney, the bladder, the small
intestines, and the large intestines. The canon of Chinese medicine, Huangdi Neijing
(The Yellow Emperor’s Inner Canon), explains the functions of the five zang-organs
and six fu-organs as follows:
The heart is the commander who serves the king and his officers and is in
charge of the omniscient intellectual conscience. The lung is the assistant
whose job is administration. The liver is the general who is responsible for
plans and deliberations. The gall bladder is the judge who makes judicial deci-
sions [jue duan 决斷]. The pericardium is the courtier, who conveys joy and
happiness. The spleen and stomach are the guardians of the national granary
who makes distinctions among the five tastes [sweet, sour, bitter, spicy, and
salty]. The large intestines channel the Dao to display disorders and move-
ments. The small intestines are the officer in charge of receiving tributes and
transforming materials. The kidney is the most powerful officer who excises
tactics. The three burners are like the irrigation officer who channels waters.
The bladder is like local commissioners and lords who hold and transform
fluids and liquids. (Hui Wu’s translation, cf. Huangdi Neijing translated by
Y. C. Kong, 122)
40. Tao comments, “Only the deities who remain still and quiet can communicate
with Heaven to know the world. Therefore, they know without learning and see
without looking. Why do they need to step out of the door or look out of the window
to gain knowledge? This is why it is said ‘you command with your eyes closed and
reach the destiny with your feet unmoved.’”
41. Tao adds, “The Dao contains neither thought nor action. A person who mas-
ters the Dao does not need to apply knowledge to learning. With no perception to
achieve the omniscient intellectual conscience, he responds to nothing and nobody
to rest his spirit.” 97
 Guiguzi

III.1.4 The Crouching-Bear Art of Distributing Power

(Fen Wei Fa Fu Xiong 分威法伏熊)42
Those who distribute power are shrouded in the spirit. It is, therefore,
advised to calm down to fortify the will and the mind to provide the
abode for the spirit and to regenerate power.43 Shrouded in and rejuve-
nated by the power, the inner self is fortified. Internally fortified, you are
invincible. As such, you attain wondrous power that could strike others
like the thunderous sky above them and break their momentum.44 Use
the tangible to acquire the intangible and use what you have to acquire
what you have not as if you were to apply a pound (yi 鎰) against an ounce
(zhu 銖).45 Then when you move, others follow; when you sing, others
echo.46 Bending a finger, you can sense any moves others are about to
make and know the patterns of their actions. Nothing disrupts you.47
42. Commentators are not sure if 分威 (fen wei) means to exercise one’s power or
to dilute the power of the opposition. Tao’s comment is that “a predatory crouching
beast is forceful; its thundering roars on the attack distributes its power. A bear usually
crouches before attacking a prey. This is the crouching-bear art of distributing power.”
43. Tao say that “this sentence means that to acquire the omniscient Dao, you must
ease the mind and strengthen the will to return to your abode, where you are en-
veloped in the heightened spirit of power. The abode means the place where you
hold your will and mind.”
44. Tao adds, “Looking powerful outward adds strength to the will. When the ex-
ternal and internal are synchronized, who can defeat you? When invincible, you
can distribute power to enhance influence and dignity as if you were the revered
awe-inspiring Heaven.”
45. Weighing the measurable on a scale serves as a metaphor for the accuracy and
precision of the method. 銖 (zhu) and 鎰 (yi) are ancient units of measurement,
with zhu as the lightest. There are twenty-four zhus in a liang (兩) and twenty-four
liangs in a yi. Zhu and yi are translated respectively as ounce and pound for easy
reading. Commentators hold different interpretations of this sentence. Tao suggests
that “when you have gained respect and dignity, you hold what you have against
what others have not; hereby you beat others by using what you have. Undertaking
is accompanied by action, like counting zhus in a yi.” Xu Fuhong thinks that the
analogy of yi and zhu means employing heaviness to acquire lightness (Collection,
220), while Chen Puqing reads yi and zhu as the most powerful and the weakest
(128). Others believe that the units symbolize the easiness with which one applies
the art (Zong, 315; Cao and An, 173).
46. Tao notes, “This statement means that while the power is being employed and
the strength is being enhanced, all things are being done at the speed of a ravish-
ing hurricane. Hence ‘when you move, others follow; when you sing, others echo.’”
47. Tao’s reading is that
by this point, you only need to bend a finger of yours to let your reputation
98 make calls. When all things are falling into place, you observe their motions
 Book III
Examine those who sing along with you; observe openings to discern
disruptions; when the moves of others are obvious, you can defuse their
momentum.48 Before taking an action for change, it is imperative to
cultivate the will to keep all your intents unnoticed in order to discover
potential disruptions.49 Those who understand how solid their ground
is develop themselves. Those who make themselves deferential develop
others. It is said that the acquisition of the spirit deactivates armaments
and shapes the formation of a situation accordingly.50

The Preying-Bird Art of Dispersing Strength III.1.5

(San Shi Fa Zhi Niao 散勢法鷙鳥)51
Those who disperse strength put their spirit to use. The practice re-
quires calculated moves that follow the pattern of openings (jian 間).52
Reverence of the almighty power (wei su 威肅) enhances internal strength.
Calculate the timing of an opening prior to an action to disperse strength.53
Those whose strength is dispersed end up with an empty heart and over-
charged will. Mindless, their momentum, vitality, and spirit lose focus;
their speeches become impertinent and inconsistent.54 Therefore, it is

step by step. The mass of people are to follow you for their own pursuits and
gains. You make moves like swift winds and make changes at your will as if
you were shaping ceramics on the potter’s wheel. You can see the patterns of
all things. With your insight, the world is happy to promote you tirelessly.
Then who can disrupt you?
Xu adds that this statement implies the law of change and evolution (Collection, 220).
48. Tao says, “This remark states the principle of leadership. If you know who is able
to make divides, you know who is after you. When you know what forms a divide,
you can see a disruption, and you will not be disrupted at all.”
49. Tao’s comment is that “the ability to cultivate the will and keep thoughts private
helps you see potential disruptions and master the art of making changes and moves.”
50. Tao explains that “those who understand their own will and hold their intents
unheeded advance themselves. Those who practice rites to defer themselves set
models for others. This way, the internal spirit demilitarizes outside forces. Then
situations can be shaped for the good.”
51. Tao suggests that “the method makes others surrender by dispersing their veloc-
ity. It is like a bird preying on its game.” Xu believes that 散勢 (san shi) means to
disperse others’ strength. 勢 is translated alternately as strength, momentum, force,
or impetus, depending on the context.
52. Tao’s reading is that “when there is no opening, there is no way to disperse
strength.” Xu says that 間 (jian) means an opening, a crack, or a gap (Collection, 223).
53. “Disperse strength” here may mean breaking the momentum of others.
54. Tao says, “The deterioration of the mind and will causes scattered impetus,
which impoverishes the vitality and spirit. As a result, the speech becomes point-
less and out of order.” 99
 Guiguzi
advised to observe the will and the mind of others to measure the extent
of their force; apply gauging when speaking of business plans. Consider
all the scopes and shapes (yuan fang 圓方); compare shortcomings and
strengths (duan chang 短長).55 Without knowledge, strength cannot be
dispersed. Dispersion of strength takes an opening to happen. When it
happens, strength is dispersed. Those who are mindful of openings refine
the five energies inside to attend to outside emptiness and fullness; they
never divide and scatter their own fullness.56 All of their movements fol-
low their wills and minds based on their understandings of their plans
and strategies. Momentums determine advantages and disadvantages and
control power dynamics. A defeat is a result from the disrespect for the
spirit in the process of observation.57

III.1.6 The Charging-Beast Art of Effortless Rotation

(Zhuan Yuan Fa Meng Shou 轉圓法猛獸)58
Those whose operation seems effortless have endless resources of strat-
egy in store. To be tendlessly resourceful, it is necessary to have a sage’s
heart, which is the origin of unfathomable intellect. The unfathomable
intellect is the key to understanding the art of the heart (xin shu 心術).59

55. Tao explains:

Use your understanding of how strong and weak are the wills and minds of others
as your measurement. With your measurement established, you can return to
gauge your speech. With regard to efforts for business, it is imperative to follow
the principle of scope and space and compare shortcomings against strengths.
56. See the explanation of five energies in note 3 in “The Five-Dragon Method of
Invigorating the Spirit” (III.1.1). Tao says that “with five energies inside, you can
observe the principle of emptiness and fullness. Without losing the fullness, you
know that whenever force is dispersed, there is a gap. Therefore, you never lose when
you hold your fullness together.”
57. Tao notes, “Should you not use your spirit on your watch, you would lose your
momentum.”
58. Many commentators think 轉圓 (zhuan yuan) stands for revolving an object
in cycles. As Xu Fuhong explains, the phrase is used as a metaphor for an effort-
less operation or deployment (Collection, 226). Tao reads the title as a reference to
“boundless sagacious wisdom like never-ending cycles, which symbolize unsurpass-
able force of a charging beast.”
59. A literal translation of 心術 (xin shu), which means the mind and the psyche.
Tao notes, “A sage’s heart is like a mirror that reflects all things in its range. This
means that the origin of a resourceful mind can be known and that understand-
ing of the operation of the mind can be learned.” Xu adds, “This sentence implies
that tactics are like endless cycles that rotate constantly to renew themselves. This
type of operation requires a heart like the sage’s to generate endless wisdom and to
100 understand diverse thoughts and ideas” (Collection, 227).
 Book III
Inseparable, the spirit and the Dao are One, constantly evolving to ad-
dress the myriad genera of things and countless principles of doctrines.60
Wisdom (zhi 智), methods (lue 略), strategies (ji 計), and plans (mou
謀) all have their individual forms and capacities. They may look round
or square, yin or yang, auspicious or inauspicious in their representa-
tions of different matters.61 For this reason, sages have embraced this art
of effortless rotation to seek its match. Those who began creation and
transformation embodied the great Dao in all of their actions and efforts
in order to perceive the realm of omniscient intellectual conscience.62
Heaven and Earth are infinite; human affairs are countless, each of them
evolving into its own type. Seeing their types to know their plans and
strategies, you should be able to foresee if they would result in fortunes
or misfortunates and if they wind up in successes or failures.63 The art of

60. While Tao does not elaborate, Xu relates this sentence to Laozi’s saying that
“the Dao gave birth to one, one to two, two to three, and three to the myriad things
[dao sheng yi, yi sheng er, er sheng san, san sheng wan wu 道生一, 一生二, 二生三,
三生萬物]” (Collection, 228, Hui Wu’s translation, see chapter 42 in Dao De Jing).
Xu continues to explain that “both Guiguzi and Laozi mean that the spirit and the
Dao are One that engenders the myriad things from one and countless principles
of doctrines” (Collection, 228).
61. Tao comments,
Before you attend to business, you should work out a plan. When your plan
works, you accomplish the business. All business affairs are not anticipated
as they are; their forms and capacities differ. The round can turn itself into
endless cycles, while the square shows angles and lines. Yin requires stealthy
tactics to suppress signs, while yang calls for proper arts to take actions. Good
luck brings fortunes; bad luck ends with misfortunes. All things can change
for the better or worse; hence “different matters.”
62. Tao says,
The sages embrace the Dao in their employment. Their actions are guided by
the spirit. Heaven is the origin of the beginning of creation and evolution.
All actions and efforts must embody the principle of the Great Dao to shed
light on the realm of omniscient intellectual conscience. When you obey the
Dao in spirit, you can make demands and calls.
Xu adds, “This statement means that one should follow the sages in the very begin-
ning to make sure that all actions are guided by the Dao and to gain insight into the
realm of omniscient intellectual conscience” (Collection, 228–29).
63. Tao notes,
Heaven and Earth stand by themselves forever, hence “infinite.” Fortunes and
misfortunes constantly happen to people and business, hence “countless.”
Heaven and Earth determine the date and the month without interfering
with the vast valleys and land. They do not move themselves to follow the
ways people conduct their business. They exist forever to ensure the well-
being of the origin and accomplish their mission. Therefore, it instructs that 101
Guiguzi
effortless rotation may turn into good luck or bad luck. The sages adopt
the Dao to foretell survival and destruction and then to know how to ro-
tate effortlessly to square the circle.64 The round aims for a proper speech
(he yu 合語); the square aims to accomplish business. A transformer uses
them65 to inspect plans and strategies; a recipient uses them to discern
intentions behind forward and backward moves. Examine where they66
come across one another and synthesize their essentials to respond to
what others say.67

“Seeing their types to know their plans and strategies, you should be able to
foresee if they would result in fortunes or misfortunates and if they wind up
in successes or failures.”
64. Tao’s explanation is that
being round means being resourceful and flexible to deliver an appealing
speech (he bi ci zhi yu 合彼此之語). Being square means having directions
for business. An initiator of transformation can change a misfortune into a
fortune and foresee if his plans and strategies succeed or not. The recipient
(jie wu zhe 接物者) who understands human relations and emotions can see
intentions behind the action and the right and wrong in a matter.
Xu notes, “The round is a parallelism to the initiator of transformation, and the
square to the recipient. The round can turn around for transformation and engender
an appealing speech, while the square is used to place things and handle business
by making moves within the boundaries” (Collection, 230).
65. Translator’s note: here “them” refers to the arts of round and square.
66. “They” refers to the four approaches—the round, square, initiative transformer,
and recipient.
67. The original reads, “皆見其會乃為要以接其說也 (jie jian qi hui nai yao yi jie qi
shuo ye).” Tao’s comment is that “it is critical to remain flexible and use the four
approaches in accord to changes. The ability to synthesize their essentials is the key
102 to a proper speech in response to what others say.”
 Book III
The Prevising-Grass Art of Decrease and Increase III.1.7
(Sun Dui Fa Ling Shi 損兑法靈蓍)68
A decrease or an increase is a determining factor of opportunity and
peril.69 A matter may be suitable or unsuitable; a business may be suc-
cessful or unsuccessful. It is critical to examine signs of opportunity
and peril.70 For this reason, the sages take inaction to wait for virtuous
people. They use speech to examine if what is said matches what is done.71
Increase means to know; decrease means to practice (dui zhe zhi zhi ye
sun zhe xing zhi ye 兑者知之也損者行之也).72 Use decrease in persua-
sion (dui zhi shui zhi 兑者說之). If something is undoable, the sages do
not talk about it (bu wei ci 不爲辭).73 Thus wise persons do not speak

68. Commentators believe that 兑 (dui) refers to the mind’s eye (xin mu 心目). The
mind’s eye enables one to analyze and understand others well. Tao calls it the mind’s
sharp eye that sees the ins and outs of all matters. 損 (sun), according to Tao, means
decrease or reduction of worry and anxiety. Xu Fuhong suggests that 損兑 (sun dui)
are antonyms to mean decrease and increase. His reading is based on the phrase “
益之損之 (yi zhi sun zhi)” in the later part of this passage (Collection, 231–32). After
examining all the passage titles in this chapter, Xu adds that 兑 (dui) may also mean
upright and that 損兑 may mean to reduce issues and accomplish a task straightfor-
wardly. As for 蓍 (shi), commentators agree that it is a type of divine grass used in
fortune-telling, hence 靈 蓍 (ling shi, prevising grass or divine grass).
69. Tao explains that “a signal of an opportunity or a peril is so subtle that only the
mind’s eye can see it.” Xu says, “This sentence emphasizes the importance of careful
examination of insignificant subtle signs” (Collection, 233–34).
70. Tao’s note reads,
It means sometimes things are suitable and sometimes success occurs. An
opportunity or a peril falls because of trivial things that have happened before.
Unless there is a deep understanding and keen sense to take notice of the
surroundings, it is impossible to foresee any signs or impending situations.
Without seeing the imminence, it would be regretful to trace what has hap-
pened. Hence it is critical to examine signs.
71. Tao says, “The sages are engaged in constant pursuit of compassionate intel-
lectuals and often meet with officials and agents. They tend to take inaction to keep
waiting for virtuous persons. At the meetings, the sages usually speak first. Hence,
‘They use speech to examine if what is said matches what is done.’”
72. Tao explains, “Use the mind’s eye to learn; reduce worries when in practice.”
Other commentators think that 兑 (dui) means to speak or to talk about practice.
Xu, however, does not see any merit in these interpretations but does not offer his
own either (Collection, 234–35).
73. Tao’s interpretation is, “Speak less for decrease. When something under dis-
cussion cannot be reasoned out, the sages do not make an effort to speak about
it.” Xiao Dengfu’s reading is, “The whole sentence means when dealing with
an affair, you can use decrease to accomplish it; or you can use increase to ob-
serve what others have to say. The sages do not discuss difficulties that cannot 103
Guiguzi
to overpower others and miss their speech (shi zhe bu yi yan shi ren zhi
yan 智者不以言失人之言). A succinct speech represents a strong heart
(gu ci bu fan er xin bu xu 故辭不煩心不虚); a concentrated will does
not embrace evil intent.74 Encounters of hardships in the past instigate
plans and strategies for the future; their fulfillment, however, depends
on the natural order.75 It is a great achievement when the round does
not get practiced and the square does not come to a halt. Both increase
and decrease are used for speech.76 Use the arts of distributing power
and dispersing strength to assess (quan 權) if others are increasing their
stakes in opportunity and peril. Thereby decisions are made.77 It is thus
said that those who are good at decrease and increase practice the art
like surging floodwaters breaking through miles of riverbanks and like
a round boulder rolling down a bottomless abyss.78

be resolved by the methods of decrease and increase” (272). Xu agrees with Xiao
(Collection, 235).
74. Tao notes,
Wise people listen to proposals by others and take good ones. A debate in-
volves different topics, many of which are self-explanatory. So it is not rec-
ommended to disregard speeches by others simply because one is good at
eloquence. Willing to accept what others have to say, one can deliver proper
speeches without annoying others. The trust in the mass of people constructs
a sincere heart for truth, which gives rise to proper speeches. As such, the will
and mind do not have room for troubles and evils.
75. Tao’s reading is that
it often takes unexpected changes for people to come up with a measure to
keep their lives going. Frequent changes necessitate future plans. Therefore,
it is only after encountering hardships and difficulties that people start to
prepare for them. Should the natural course not be followed, nothing could be
accomplished, and no hard work could see outcomes. Therefore, the natural
course is critical to plans and strategies.
76. The original is “益之損之皆爲之辭 (yi zhi sun zhi jie wei zhi ci).” Tao says,
Those who are good at the art can transform a misfortune to a fortune and a
failure to a success. Follow others to accomplish your plan. If others apply a
round approach, they may not ask you to do anything; if they practice a square
approach, they may not stop your action. The reason is that the round is for
practice and the square stops it. When you practice your strategies, others
feel unchanged. This is a great accomplishment. As for decrease and increase,
they are used to compose speeches about losses and gains.
77. Tao suggest that this sentence means that “the art of 兑 (dui) can be employed
to distribute power and disperse strength because it comes from the mind’s eye.
The mind’s sharp eye can detect the sign of opportunity and peril. This knowledge
helps make a decision.”
78. Tao says, “This sentence means that those who decrease anxiety to keep the
104 mind’s eye focused examine affairs to know the principle of the matter. They make
 Book III

2. Holding the Pivot (Chi Shu 持樞)79

To hold the pivot is to understand that spring is the time for produc- III.2.1
tion, summer for growth, autumn for harvest, and winter for storage.
This is the order of Heaven, which should not be intruded or defied.80
Its antagonists inevitably set themselves up for failure even if they have
some success before. Kings and their subjects pivot with Heaven to repeat
the same order of production, growth, harvest, and storage. They should
not temper or resist it. All its opponents will surely experience decline,
even if they have thrived before.81 Heaven’s Dao is the essential guideline
for people and their kings.82

their minds without doubt; they act on their will without hesitation. Their deter-
mination is like gushing floodwaters and rolling boulders. Who can resist them?”
79. This chapter is incomplete because of missing pages. Tao notes, “It is regrettable
that the treatise on this art stops short and leaves out detailed discussions on its
principles.” Xu adds, “It is hard to understand the theme and structure of this pas-
sage. The remains here are about following Heaven’s Dao to govern the state. It is
suggested to the king that a state follow the natural course.” The chapter is incom-
plete because of the many missing pages. It is impossible to return it to its original
entirety (Collection, 239). To Tao, “樞 (shu) means the central location that controls
distant operations, or the center of a turning wheel. . . . Those who hold the pivot
are like holding the handle of a cycling matter to control it.”
80. Tao says, “It means that the four seasons that follow their own cycle are nature,
which requires inaction, which is nature itself. This is called normalcy.” Xu notes,
“Following the natural course of the seasons is the key to administration and state
governance” (Collection, 240).
81. Tao’s reading is that
kings and their subjects pivot with Heaven for their progress and advance-
ment. This is called Heaven’s pivot. Heaven’s Dao decides the cycle of produc-
tion, growth, maturity, and storage. Normally, human affairs do not deviate
from it. An old saying goes that interference with Heaven’s Dao causes abnor-
mal behaviors. It is no wonder that resistance will see decline as a consequence.
82. Tao repeats his regret about the missing leaves of this chapter. 105
 Guiguzi

3. The Central Doctrine (Zhong Jing 中經)83

III.3.1 The Central Doctrine is about those who deliver eloquent speeches out
of strong virtues to help people in need (zhen qiong 振窮) and attend to
emergencies (qü ji 趨急). They save despaired people from incarceration
and are remembered forever for their benevolence.84 Eloquent speakers
(neng yan zhe 能言者) are associated with virtuous friends to offer gen-
erous charity.85 Those who promulgate virtues follow the Dao.86 Those
who save people from incarceration nurture and employ ordinary people
(xiao ren 小人).87 In a chaotic society or a dangerous time, it is likely that
learned persons escape death, witness persecutions of eloquent speak-
ers, abandon virtues and become war heroes (po de wei xiong 破德爲
雄), are incarcerated for false charges, keep silence for self-protection, or
reestablish themselves after repeated setbacks.88 It is said that those who

83. In classical Chinese, 中 means inside, center, the mind, proper, or medium. Tao’s
interpretation is that “中經 (Zhong Jing, the ‘Central Doctrine’) implies executing
what is inside to influence the outside. This chapter addresses the engagement of
the heart for the purpose of filling an outside void.” Xu comments that as part of
the treatise, 中經 responds to 本經 (Ben Jing) “the Primary Doctrine on the Seven
Arts.” He comments that “the ‘Primary Doctrine of the Seven Arts’ centers on mak-
ing plans and strategies work, while the ‘Central Doctrine’ is on adjusting methods
to meet challenges and transform situations for peace and safety” (Collection, 243).
84. Tao notes,
振 means to help people rise above distress; 趨 means to provide protection.
When emergencies occur, it is critical to offer help and rescue. However, only
those who are able to deliver eloquent speeches and hold strong virtues have
the ability to do the favor. When they save people from being prisoned, they
are forever remembered for their benevolence.
Xu adds, “This sentence says that the ‘Central Doctrine’ can help people in distress
and in emergency. Only those who speak well and act flexibly can help. When you
save people from distress, they remember your kindness” (Collection, 244).
85. Tao’s interpretation is that “eloquent speakers (neng yan zhe 能言者) who help
others are considered benevolent people who offer generous charity.”
86. Tao says, “This remark means that benevolent people take actions based on
principles and thus never go astray from the Dao.”
87. Here 小人 does not mean the petty person considered sinister and dishonorable
in Confucius’s The Analects. Tao’s connotation is that “ordinary persons, if saved
from being prisoned, can be developed for employment.”
88. Tao says,
During wartimes, many people die in ditches. Occasionally, an educated
person may be fortunate to escape this type of death. Persecutions of eloquent
106 speakers (neng yan 能言) occur when they are discredited by slanders. This
 Book III
are valued rule others and those who are not are ruled by others. Rulers
hold power; being ruled means losing the control of life.89 With this in
mind, learn about the capability of describing the looks upon seeing
an appearance, knowing the shape upon seeing an image, and heeding
the tone upon hearing a sound. Dissolve enmity (jie chou 解仇),90 fight
animosity (dou xi 鬬郄), express farewell (zhui qu 缀去), avoid speech
(que yu 却語‍‍), capture the heart (she xin 攝心), and persevere in justice
(shou yi 守義). The Primary Doctrine is a description, a description of
the art of the Dao. Its adoption and essential points lie in the “Holding
the Pivot” and the “Central Doctrine.”91
Those who are able to describe the countenance upon seeing an ap- III.3.2
pearance and know the shape upon seeing an image employ symbols (yao
爻)92 as their guidelines (zhu 主),93 which make it possible to recollect

is why many eloquent speakers (neng yan zhi shi 能言之士) are persecuted.
Abandoning virtues to become a war hero means laying down books and
taking up the weapons to escape prison. It implies that it is unfortunate that
a good person’s education is interrupted. Keeping silence for self-protection
means that the war-torn world is hopeless. However, people who strongly
believe in goodwill stand by their faith firmly. They are like straight evergreen
pine trees that emerge from the ice and snow after a severe winter. Reestab-
lishment after repeated setbacks implies that a good person who can weather
dangers and drawbacks eventually reestablishes himself.
Xu comments, “These are typical unfortunate situations in wartimes. Some learned
people escape the death; some become persecutors of eloquent persuaders; some
abandon books to take up weapons and become war heroes; some are prisoned; some
quietly protect themselves; and some weather setbacks and dangers and eventually
reestablish themselves” (Collection, 246).
89. Tao explains that “higher-class people with valuable skills rule others; lower-class
people without skills are ruled by others.”
90. 仇 means enmity and hatred or friendship and companionship. Scholars’ inter-
pretations differ due to the opposite meanings.
91. Tao adds, “The ‘Primary Doctrine’ merely describes and records the art of the
Dao. The key to its flexible practice can be found in the ‘Holding the Pivot’ and the
‘Central Doctrine.’”
92. 爻 (yao) refers to the basic symbols in Zhou Yi (Yi Jing or Book of Changes 周易),
one of the oldest classics. In long and short straight lines, 爻 is used along with 卦 (gua)
to form sixty-four combinations of yao-gua to explain the cosmos, yin-yang, nature, or
climate and even tell fortunes. In the combination, each gua contains six yao (Diction-
ary of Classical Chinese, 1827). Also, there are three yao in a gua that can be combined
into an eight-gua (ba gua 八卦). Yao determines the transformations of gua and thus is
used to tell changes, ups and downs, or fortunes and misfortunes. This practice is called
爻 (yao) 卦 (gua) 占 (zhan, divine-grass’s prophecy) 卜 (bu, divine oracle’s prediction).
93. The English translation follows Tao’s edition hand-scribed by Qin, where the
sentence has 主 (zhu). Chen Puqing’s edition also has 主 (zhu), but other editions by 107
 Guiguzi
information by recalling the tones and voices, shapes and visages, and
behaviors and demeanors. Those who hold principles do not look for any-
thing improper; nor do they listen to unorthodoxies. Their speech always
draws upon the Poetry and the Book;94 their behaviors never show per-
versity or indecency. Follow the Dao as the guideline for the demeanor;
adhere to the virtue as the guideline for countenance. Somber demeanors
and amiable countenances make it unlikely to retrieve information from
the outward shape and visage. In this case, keep observations private,
eschew animosity, and take departure.95
III.3.3 As for attuning to the sound upon hearing it (wen sheng he yin
聞聲和音), it means that disharmony between the sound and Qi leads to
disconnection between benevolence and affection. When musical notes

Xu, Zong, and Gao and Ann all have 生 (sheng). 生 (sheng) does not make as much
sense as 主 (zhu) in the context. The difference might have been caused by scribes’
handwritings throughout the textual history.
Tao’s explanation is that “those who can describe people’s body constructions and
know their looks and countenances, when they first meet, use 爻卦占卜 [prediction
through the divine symbols, grass, and oracles] as their guidelines.”
94. The Poetry and the Book may refer to the Book of Poetry (shi jing 詩經) and Book
of History (shang shu 尚書). Qin, the scribe of Tao’s edition for this translation, notes
that “these two characters are missing from the other edition” without indicating
which or whose edition.
95. The missing subjects in these sentences make it difficult to reach a coherent
understanding of this passage. Tao notes,
People who hold principles are righteous and honest; they are not corrupted or
indecent. As a result, their state prospers and shines like the sun. In this situation,
a skillful persuader with a slick tongue cannot find an opening to develop his
career. He then has to conceal his intent, prevent animosity, retreat, and leave.
However, Xu Fuhong quotes other commentators to suggest that Tao’s reading is a
fundamental cause for the centuries-long misunderstanding of Guiguzi (Collection,
248–49). He draws upon a commentator named Yu Yan (俞棪) in the late Ming
Dynasty to suggest that
the character “去 [departure]” may be an error here. The original may be
“wait.” If it is about people who hold principles, then they do not need to be
moved by persuaders. It is apparent that what Tao says is not what Guiguzi
means. A thorough reading of the book helps understand it as a theory for the
wise persuader who can adapt tactics flexibly to any case and who would not
feel awkward in front of people who hold principles. Tao’s commentary has
misled later scholars to believe that Guiguzi’s theory is vicious and wicked.
What a wrongful accusation! (Collection, 248–49)
Xu then adds, “This sentence means that those who hold principles are disciplined
and cannot be moved by outside temptations. In this case, it is not feasible to gather
information from their demeanors and facial expressions. It is suggested to retreat
108 and leave” (Collection, 249).
 Book III
of Shang (商) and Jiao (角) are out of tune with each other, Zhi (徵) and
Yu (羽) are not in tune. The note that dominates all of the four is no other
but Gong (宫).96 Inharmonious tunes cause unhappiness. Disparate criti-
cal voices are unpleasant and harmful. Their speeches are unappealing
to the ears. If those who have reached laudable achievements and high
reputations cannot see eye to eye and dovetail together, their Qi ends in
disharmony and their voices in discordance.97
As for dissolving enmity and fighting animosity (jie chou dou xi III.3.4
解仇鬬郄), dissolving enmity means retaliation for small wins, while
fighting animosity is a fight against a strong power.98 When strong powers
in animosity are in a fight, the winner flamboyantly claims credit in order
to strengthen their momentum. The defeated grieve over their loss and
lower status, lamenting that their name is ruined and their ancestors are
dishonored. For this reason, winners fight for stature and momentum,
proceeding randomly without knowing when to withdraw, while the
defeated hear about the grief over the loss and witness the casualties.
Consequently, the latter fortify themselves with double forces to resist to
the death.99 Thus, enmity does not create limitless power; defense does
not build immense strength. Both are under the threat of conquest.100

96. There are five notes in classical Chinese music—Shang (商), Jiao (角), Zhi (徵), Yu
(‍‍‍羽), and Gong (宫). They represent five natural elements. Shang is gold, Jiao wood,
Zhi fire, Yu water, and Gong earth. Tao says, “Without being led by Gong, or earth,
which controls the four seasons, the other four notes that differ in their nature are
not automatically in tune with one another. The dominant Gong brings life to them
and thus is called the king of the four musical notes.”
97. Guiguzi uses the analogies of one-eyed halibut and co-wing birds to explain the
concept of harmonious relationship. The original is “不可比目合翼相須也此乃氣
不合音不調也 (bu ke bi mu he yi xiang xu ye ci nai qi bu he yin bu tiao ye).” Chinese
believe that a halibut and a one-eyed co-wing bird are unable to move or fly around
unless they are in a pair for double-sided vision.
98. Tao’s comment is that “The method of persuasion is like shooting an arrow. The
hand on the upper side presses down, while the other hand on the lower end holds
up. This is how enmity is resolved. Strong powers are often against one another and
engaged in fighting” Xu believes that “解仇鬬郄 [jie chou dou xi] means that the
weak are united to fight against a strong power” (Collection, 252). However, 仇 as
“companion” in use with 解 does not make sense, because none of the definitions
of 解 means “unite” or “connect.” Also see note 8 in this chapter.
99. Tao explains, “Forging ahead without knowing when to withdraw ends in deep
regret. The defeated who hear about the loss and casualties will strengthen themselves
and fight with a double force to the death. They will sacrifice everything for their fight.”
100. Tao notes,
This statement means that extremely intensified animosity is not necessarily
powerful. Its defense may not be strong enough. The state can still be under 109
 Guiguzi
III.3.5 As for expressing farewell (zhui qu 缀去), it means to reiterate what
has been said for the purpose of retaining reminiscence.101 Upon meeting
individuals who honestly and sincerely accept the relationship, commend
them for their deeds, encourage their aspirations, and speak about con-
tributions and reciprocal returns. Then future meetings are anticipated
with pleasure.102 Combine multiple viewpoints of other people with past
experiences to clarify and eliminate what is questionable.103
III.3.6 As for avoiding speech (que yu 卻語), it means reviewing a speech to
examine noticeable flaws.104 A speech overdone has feebleness in many
regards. Recognize its flaws and examine them.105 When in motion,106
eschew what others disapprove and detest. Show the current rules to
instruct them.107 Afterward, connect with them and build trust to put
their heart at peace. Withdraw what has been said (shou yu 收語) to
show how to enshroud and eradicate flaws and how to avoid them.108
the threat of attacks and be conquered. Both the winner and the loser are
threatened by war and can be conquered.
Xu’s interpretation agrees with Tao’s, reading, “Faced with a strong rival, the defense
will be strengthened accordingly and defeat the rival as a result” (Collection, 253).
101. Tao says, “It means that one is ready to take departure but would like to remind
people of what has been said in the past for the purpose of keeping the relationship
in the future.”
102. Tao explains that
if you want people to miss you when you leave, you should make friends
with sincere and honest people, commending them for their honorable deeds
and inspiring them to strength their willpower. Good deeds should become
regular manners and be returned as such. This understanding of people makes
future meetings pleasant.
103. Tao adds,
When people are encouraged and are happy with one another, they use others’
happiness as their guidelines and honor it in their action. The tested sincerity
and mutual friendship make the experience gratifying and memorable. It is
clear that there is no doubt about the sincerity. Upon separation, people tend
to miss one another.
104. Tao repeats the original text, while Xu notes that “the art of avoiding speech
implies a critical sensitivity to any weakness or loophole in any speech and the ability
to take advantage of them” (Collection, 256).
105. Tao says, “An overdone speech is definitely not flawless. When you notice a flaw,
make a mental note and put it to the test in order to know its basic cause.”
106. The original text is 動以忌諱 (dong yi ji hui). Here 動 means speaking. The
translation takes into account the correlation between yin-yang and motion in I.1.6.
107. Tao’s comment is that “once you have proven where others fault, avoid speaking
about it but show the current rules to instruct them.”
108. Tao explains,
110 People are fearful when they learn where they fault. They surrender and seek
 Book III
The scrutiny of shortcomings prevents their exposure to those who are
capable of many arts.109
As for capturing the heart (she xin 攝心), it means to praise those III.3.7
who are keen on learning the arts and crafts and promote their repu-
tation.110 Test them and show fascinations about their amazement to
tie their heart.111 Learn from them for proven evidence.112 Study their
background and put their past experiences in order (yan qu luan qu qi
qian 驗去亂其前). This is the way to win their heart.113 When dealing
with those addicted to sex and alcohol, if arts can be used to approach
them, have music played to move them. Use this method to make them
aware of the approaching death and worry about their shortened lives.114
Cheer them up with things they have not seen. Ultimately, they are able

help. This is the moment to appease their fear and win their heart by con-
necting with them through sincerity and trust. Then you can critique their
speech openly and show how to eradicate flaws. They would feel grateful and
solidify the relationship.
109. Tao notes, “Once you have shown the nature of the speech and the don’ts, you
also teach how to avoid exposing flaws to people capable of many arts.” Xu adds,
“This statement means to not let capable people know what you are not capable of”
(Collection, 257).
110. Tao says, “Speaking of winning the heart of others, when you notice that they
are willing to learn the arts and skills, you need to promote their reputations and
make them known all over the area.”
111. Tao notes, “Once you have decided to promote these individuals’ reputations,
you shall test their skills and arts against the Dao. Then you display your fascina-
tion about their remarkable wonders to appeal to them. This way, their heart is tied
to yours.”
112. The original text differs in varied editions. Tao’s edition has “効之於驗” (xiao
zhi yu yan). The scribe, Qin Engfu, inserted a note to say that “some editions have
人 [ren] instead of 驗 [yan] here” (17).
113. Tao continues to say,
Now that you have won their heart and tested their skills by imitating them,
you shall examine them against the ancient role models (wang xian 往賢).
Afterwards, you manage the information about their past and put it in order.
This is why it is said that “Those who reason well know others like themselves.”
Now you can capture the heart of good, honorable people and establish order
from disorder for management.
Here 亂 (luan) means to manage or to put something in order.
114. Tao’s interpretation is that
it means that if you want to speak to unwise people who are indulged in sex
and alcohol, the art you can apply is music, which can speak for you. Those
who are addicted to sex and alcohol are on a course to death and are short-
ening their lives. Use this cause and effect to make them worry about their
lives and move them. 111
 Guiguzi
to view their lives from a broader perspective and be happy to meet in
the future.115
III.3.8 As for guarding justice (shou yi 守義), it means to uphold the principles
of humanity and explore the heart of others to connect with them.116
Deep exploration into the heart reveals what rules it. Manage the inside
from the outside to discover the cause behind a matter for success.117
This is why petty persons (xiao ren 小人) who compete against one an-
other tend to adopt unprincipled approaches and get families broken and
states destroyed.118 Dishonorable persons are not capable of protecting
families according to justice; nor are they capable of defending their states
according to the Dao.119 The sages esteem the subtlety and miracles of the
Dao because it enables them to transform perils to safety and to rescue
the ravaged and help them survive.

115. Tao comments,

Along with music, you tell them in pleasant words about things they have
never seen to broaden their perspectives on life. Then they see no reason for
indulgence in sex and alcohol. When reconciled, they see a bright future in a
boundless view and want to live a long life. It means that foolish people can-
not be persuaded by speech, but their hearts can be reached through music.
116. While Tao thinks that 義 stands for 宜 (yi), which means to understand the
heart of others and render what pleases them to seek harmony, Xu believes that it
means “to see if others are complying with social and cultural conventions and to
explore their hearts in order to meet their needs” (Collection, 260).
117. Tao adds, “Once you have deeply explored the hearts of others, you understand
what controls them. This knowledge enables you to control the internal from the ex-
ternal. Now that you can control the inside of a person, what can’t you accomplish?”
More concrete, Xu’s comment reads, “This sentence means by way of poking into
somebody’s heart to understand his deeply harbored true intent, you can control
his heart from outside, tie him to you on all occasions, and make him follow you”
(Collection, 260).
118. Please note a different meaning of 小人 (xiao ren) here. Similar to the notion in
Confucius’s The Analects, Tao’s explanation is,
Petty persons often think that exemplary persons are the same as they are. So
they always go sinister ways to usurp power. The reason that injustices happen
is because petty persons go against the Dao and the right thing, consequently
having good persons persecuted and kind hearts killed. Dishonorable persons
are those who disobey commonly accepted justice. All over the state, there are
only disorder and ravages. Everything is in disorder, families and the state
being destroyed. What disharmony it is!
119. Tao concludes that here “Dao” means the guiding principle in the Central
Doctrine.

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 Under Western Eyes:
A Comparison of Guigucian Rhetoric with
the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle

C. Jan Swearingen

Warring States and Contact Zones:

The Perils and Prospects of Comparative Rhetoric
Guiguzi provides rich materials for revisiting the problems that have been
imposed upon studies of Chinese rhetoric by the use of a Greco-Roman bench-
mark. Instead, Guiguzi invites us to work in the opposite direction, to look
at how our assumptions about rhetoric become unstable as we learn more
about the range of concepts used in Chinese, and specifically, by Guiguzi
to represent and teach “rhetoric.” That there is no direct parallel in Chinese
to “persuasion” is interesting in and of itself; but there is a family of terms
referring to similar interactive processes, some good, some bad, a spectrum
that may lead us to reconsider the manifold meanings of “rhetoric” and “per-
suasion” in the Western rhetorical lexicon. The interactive contexts differ as
well. Because Guiguzi gives advice both to rulers and to advisors of rulers, his
characterizations of audience assume a one-on-one relationship, in contrast
to the single speaker-to-group audience more common in Western rhetorics.
Analogical and inductive logic prevails; not the deductive and proof-driven
structure of Western argumentation. Silence, incompleteness, and indirection
are also encouraged as ways of working around the difficulties of speaking
“up” to a superior.
Despite significant differences between Guiguzi and the early Greek rheto-
rics that emerged among the Pre-Socratics, Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, the
reputation and reception of rhetoric and rhetoricians presents striking simi-
larities. More than many of his counterparts, with the possible exception of
the logic-chopping legalists and Mohists, Guiguzi has long been excluded from
canonical Chinese literary and philosophical studies. Rebuked as a teacher
of military strategy and ignoble forms of manipulation, the saturation of his
teachings with Daoist philosophy has been little studied. Hui Wu’s translation

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C. Jan Swearingen
and commentary addresses these oversights with ample attention to recent
studies of Chinese rhetoric as well as to little-known variant editions of Guiguzi
in Chinese. The history of Guiguzi’s reception and repudiation is long over-
due, as is the emphasis upon Guiguzi as a teacher of spoken, and not written,
rhetoric. That his teachings in written form were abandoned by the Chinese
literary canon should not deter a recuperation and reappraisal. The present
translation not only corrects the incomplete, biased record of Guiguzi, it also
invites a reconsideration of the parallel rebukes of rhetoric as deception and
manipulation in Greece from the Sophists up through Aristotle’s time. The
similarity between the early Chinese sage-teachers, such as Guiguzi, and the
Greek Sophists and Pre-Socratics is as important as Guiguzi’s more obvious
parallel to Aristotle in the role he played advising rulers and those who advise
rulers. An additional contribution of Wu’s commentary is her detailed account
of his many adaptations of Daoist as well as Confucian teachings to the study
of the language arts.
Allegations of sophistry were well established when Aristotle answered
Plato’s repudiation of rhetoric as irreducibly sophistic by saying that what
makes a man a sophist is not rhetoric, but his own bad moral character. Yet
Plato himself addressed this point in the Gorgias when an interlocutor asks
analogically, “If the student of an excellent teacher of wrestling uses his skill
to kill a man is the teacher to blame?” (456d–457c).1 Bad men use language
badly; training in language use does not make men bad. Nonetheless it is
important to define bad uses of language so that they can be identified,
shunned, and avoided. Similar judgments appear in Guiguzi’s teachings.
“Persuaders who deliver obsequious eloquence intend to fawn over someone
for the recognition of loyalty. Crafty speakers show off their knowledge for
the recognition of intelligence” (II.9.1). These and numerous other examples
illustrate a similar source of misreadings of both Greek and Chinese rhe-
torical treatises. When the Sophists, or Aristotle, describe certain uses of
language that are already in use, they are not necessarily recommending
them. Much like anthropologists describing cultural practices, Aristotle and
Guiguzi observe what people actually do and present those practices to the
student for consideration and reflection. In some passages it is very clear
that what is being described is also being recommended. But in others it
is less clear, and therefore open to misreading. In many instances they do
not necessarily recommend manipulation, but they do describe it. The lines
dividing description, recommendation, and affirmation are sometimes even
less clear among the Pre-Socratics and Sophists, whose teachings resemble
Guiguzi’s in both form and content. Like Guiguzi’s incorporation of Daoist

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 Under Western Eyes
thought into his teachings regarding language, the Pre-Socratics preserve
traces of earlier wisdom traditions.
Guiguzi does not separate “subjects” or “disciplines” from one another,
a discursive practice that is unfamiliar to most Westerners, and one that
makes it difficult to locate the main points or subjects of any given section.
But if we turn to the period before Plato and Aristotle, the time of the Greek
warring states, including the wars with Persia and Sparta (c. 485–390 b.c.e.),
we find a Greek “philosophical” and religious tradition much more like the
advisor-sages in the Chinese Warring States period. Parmenides and Hera-
clitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Gorgias, among others, were peripa-
tetic teachers and wisdom figures. Their ideas, preserved only in fragments,
distill earlier unrecorded religious traditions that comprised a number of
complementary pairs: the One and the Many; the visible and the invisible
world; truth and opinion; reality and illusion; a hidden order or harmony in
the cosmos and in the human soul that relied upon balancing these pairs.
Parmenides narrates a journey to the Goddess who teaches him “the still heart
of well-rounded truth, the illusion of the opinions of mortals, and that the
interpreted world really does exist, unchanging throughout place and time”
(1).2 Parmenides’s teaching on the Way of Truth and the Way of Opinion
provides a particularly striking similarity to some of the Daoist pairs that
frame Guiguzi’s teachings. Guiguzi begins,
Situated between Heaven and Earth, sages study the past to guide people.
They observe the opening and the closing of yin and yang to name things,
to know the gateway to life and death, to manage the beginning and end-
ing of a myriad of things, and to understand the human heart and way
of thinking. Able to detect signs of change, they guard the gateway to the
myriad of things. From the past to the present the sages live among people
and always keep their Dao consistent. Countless changes are governed by
their own laws and purposes. (I.1.1)
Chinese and early Greek thought advance binaries that are expressed as har-
monic complementarities, and not oppositional contrasts.
There is ongoing controversy concerning the period of Guiguzi and the
Pre-Socratics in considerations of the Axial Age, a concept coined by Karl
Jaspers to define a period from 800 to 200 b.c.e. across many cultures in which
consciousness and inner reflection seems to have awakened in similar ways
(Bellah). The idea of an invisible and unspoken unity outside of all time and
place recurs among the Daoists and the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophers as
well as in the much earlier Sanskrit Vedas (c. 1300 b.c.e.).

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C. Jan Swearingen
When neither Being nor Not-Being was
Nor atmosphere, nor firmament, nor what is beyond.
. . . That One breathed, windless, by its own energy:
. . . Whatever was, the One, coming into being.
. . . In the beginning this [One] evolved,
Became desire, first seed of mind.
Wise seers, searching within their hearts.
(Rg Veda 129)3
Parallels can be seen in Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Laozi, and Guiguzi.
There is one god (theos) among gods and men the greatest, not at all like
mortals in body and mind. He sees as a whole, and hears as a whole.
Without toil he sets everything in motion, by the thought of his mind.
He always remains in the same place, not moving at all, nor is it fitting
for him to change his position at different times. For everything comes
from earth and everything goes back to earth at last. (Xenophanes, 24–27)
 
That which alone is wise in One; it is willing and unwilling to be called
by the name of Zeus. (Heraclitus, 32)
Book III of Guiguzi begins with a discussion of the Dao.
The right way to immortalize the spirit is to follow the Dao. Those that pro-
duced things were born from Heaven, accommodating all and formlessly
generating energy. In the beginning of Heaven and Earth no shape could
be seen, and no name could be known. There were deities and immortal
beings. Therefore it is said that the Dao is the source of omniscient intel-
lectual conscience. It is united with the One. When virtue nourishes the five
virtues and enables the heart to embrace the One, the art (shu) is attained.
Those who have mastered the art can control the pathways between the
heart and the energies and let the spirit be their agent. Those who have been
born and endowed by Heaven are true human beings. They are One with
Heaven. Those who understand this cultivate themselves inwardly. Those
who gain knowledge are called sages who learn things by genus. (III.I.1)4
Guiguzi’s formulations reflect Daoist concepts and formulations.
It is from the unnamed Dao
That Heaven and Earth sprang;
The named is but
The Mother of the ten thousand creatures.
(Dao De Jing, chap. 1)
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 Under Western Eyes
The concern with naming and pluralism, the One and a silent hidden wis-
dom or order in the universe, suggests an emergent insight that human lan-
guage somehow fragments a unitary whole in the universe, and in wisdom
itself. The similarities among these terms and the discourses in which they
appear should be of paramount interest to historians of rhetoric, and Wu’s
commentary on Guiguzi explains why. Easily located as early sagely religious
discourses or as prototypes for various branches of philosophy, these teachings
concern language as well, including the processes of naming, coming-into-
being through thinking and naming, seeking wisdom.
Debates about the Axial Age notwithstanding, ancient China, India, Persia,
and Greece produced a number of similar conceptions of language, thinking, and
speech as a “way” shaped by and obligated to honor a hidden order and harmony in
the universe (Ames and Hall, 2003; Mair, 1990). Mair’s etymological commentary
posits a Proto-Indo-European origin for dao, based upon cognates in a number of
Indo-European languages, and in semantically similar Arabic and Hebrew words:
The archaic pronunciation of dao sounded approximately like drog or dorg.
This links it to the Proto-Indo-European root drogh (to run along) and Indo-
European dhorg (way, movement). Related words in a few modern Indo-Eu-
ropean languages are Russian doroga (way, road), Polish droga (way, road),
Czech dráha (way, track), Serbo-Croatian draga (path through a valley),
and Norwegian dialect drog (trail of animals; valley). The nearest Sanskrit
(Old Indian) cognates to Dao (drog) are dhrajas (course, motion) and dhraj
(course). The most closely related English words are “track” and “trek,” while
“trail” and “tract” are derived from other cognate Indo-European roots.
Following the Way, then, is like going on a cosmic trek. “Even more unexpected
than the panoply of Indo-European cognates for Dao (drog) is the Hebrew root
d-r-g for the same word and Arabic t-r-q, which yields words meaning ‘track, path,
way, way of doing things’ and is important in Islamic philosophical discourse”
(132). In present-day Chinese translations of the New Testament, the Greek “ho-
dos,” for Way, as in Jesus’s “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life” is translated “tao,”
suggesting continuing associations among speaking, leading, and moving along
in a proper path. Far earlier than New Testament Greek, hodos was used for the
word-paths made by singer-poets, the aoidoi and their odes. LuMing Mao empha-
sizes that “the Chinese word dao has often been translated as a noun in English,
such as ‘way,’ ‘path,’ ‘pathway,’ or ‘effective method or approach.’ However, its basic
or primary meaning is more verb-like, conveying the idea of ‘moving ahead in
the world,’ of ‘forging forward,’ ‘road building,’ or ‘speaking’” (“Searching,” 230).
Ames and Hall have translated dao as “way-making” (Dao De Jing, 57–59). Of the
seventy-three times that dao appears in the Dao De Jing, “one meaning remains
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C. Jan Swearingen
constant and central. Dao is the mother of everything in the universe, and being
real, it never ceases its own movement” (Dao De Jing, 57; A. Yu, 165–87).
Chapter 42 of Dao De Jing begins,
Way-making (dao) gives rise to continuity,
Continuity gives rise to difference,
Difference gives rise to plurality,
And plurality gives rise to the manifold of everything that is
happening (wanwu).
Elsewhere Laozi describes dao as predecessor of everything, as life-giving, so
much so that “all things honor way-making” (chap. 51). Concerning language
and perception, he observes our processes of naming.
Looking and yet not seeing it
We thus call it “elusive.”
Listening and yet not hearing it
We thus call it “inaudible.”
Groping and yet not getting it
We thus call it “intangible.”
Because in sight, sound, and touch it is beyond determination
We construe it as inseparable one. (chap. 14)
Guiguzi often teaches precepts regarding “the master’s role in naming” (II.12.9).
His ideas reflect naming as a verb-like action of propriety and virtue.
When an action is taken in accordance with its name, the reality is peaceful
and complete. Therefore it is said: a name is proper because it grows out of
reality, which grows out of truth, which grows out of virtuous naming of
reality. Virtue grows out of harmony, which grows out of propriety. (II.12.9)
As we ask how the practices known now as argument, proof, logic, persua-
sion, and debate are named and understood outside Western and Euro-Amer-
ican languages, cultures, and practices, these and other examples illustrate
that the pairs same and different and the one and the many, long before they
became topoi in Aristotelian rhetoric, were no strangers in earlier Western
thinking about language and speech. Nor is propriety, the related idea of an
invisible order governing all things, and of an intangible love connecting all
things in harmony.
Contact zones along the Silk Road and at the court of Darius in fifth-
century b.c.e. Persia present additional evidence of exchange among the
“philosophers” of the ancient world, including their thoughts about what we
call rhetoric. That these contact zones developed along lines of commerce as
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 Under Western Eyes
well as across borders of combat and conquest should further illuminate our
thinking regarding the asymmetrical contact zones that have been theorized
in more recent scholarship. The first contacts between the “West,” represented
by the Ancient Near East and Greek city-states, China, and India do not fit the
paradigm of contact zones as early modern regions of European colonization.
Early modern attempts to colonize China failed, with the expulsion of Por-
tuguese Jesuit missionaries who took home with them among the first notes
on Chinese rhetorical theory and practice. One of these accounts, a record
of Matteo Ricci’s observations of Chinese men in 1585, includes Westerners’
perceptions of their “effeminate” traits, an orientalism that has marred many
studies of Chinese culture and language. In a letter to his superior Ricci writes,
I tell you the truth, whatever else I might write to your Honor about the
Chinese I would not say that they were men of war, because both in out-
ward appearance and in their inner hearts they are just like women: if one
shows them one’s teeth they will humble themselves, and whoever makes
them subject can put his foot on their necks. Each day the men take two
hours to do their hair and dress themselves. (Ricci, qtd. in Spence, 43)
Orientalism goes even further back, we now recognize, within the origins of
Greek, and specifically Athenian, rhetorical identity. Aristotle deemed Gor-
gias “Asiatic” in his elaborate ornamental style; rhetoric itself was repeatedly
castigated as an art of feminine wiles.
In the commentary on his translation of the Tao Te Ching, Victor Mair
provides the following synopsis of alternative hypotheses in debates about
contact between ancient China and India, in particular, the striking similari-
ties between the Tao Te Ching and the Bhagavad Gita. “(1) China borrowed
the Yogic system and its attendant practices from India; (2) India borrowed
Taoism and its attendant practices from China; (3) both India and China
were the recipients of inspiration from a third source” (xiv). He notes the
recent excavations in Sinkiang (Xingjiang), the area of China in Central Asia
through which the Silk Roads passed, and along the southeast coast of China,
where ships from India and Arabia regularly passed. “An Indian priority can
be traced back at least to the beginning of the first millennium b.c.” (xiv).5
Moving beyond speculation, continuing detail work with the early Guiguzi
texts upon which Wu bases her translation is helping to fill in the gaps and
resolve what were before conjectural disputes. But the task of explaining the
rhetoricality of these ancient terms remains. That task has been accomplished
in Wu’s translation and ample commentary on Guiguzi.
I turn next to a collateral exploration of the similarities and differences
among the concepts, genres, and terminology of Guiguzi’s thought and that
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C. Jan Swearingen
of the Sophists and Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle. This comparison em-
phasizes continuities among the Greek thinkers, who are in dialogue and
sometimes debate with one another, and identifies a number of concepts that
parallel Chinese rhetorical thought. The teachings of the Pre-Socratics and
Sophists, overlapping groups, were like Guiguzi’s not restricted to language
per se, and they do not yet use the word “rhetoric,” a term Plato coined as
a rebuke. Their most common word for language, speech, argument, logic,
and statement is logos, a word that can also encompass law, truth, and rule.
Empedocles refers to the always-backward-turning harmony of the universe
(palintropos harmonia) and observes, “But it is of great concern to the lower
orders to mistrust the powerful; however, as the trustworthy evidence of my
Muse commands, grasp (these things), when my reasoned argument has been
sifted in your innermost heart!” (4). He instructs his listeners to “listen to the
undeceitful progress of my arguments” (logoi) (17). Similarly, Parmenides
exhorts his auditors, “Listen to the true order of my words (logoi).” Human
opinion is contrasted with such truth-in-words, logos, but it is in understand-
ing the contrast that wisdom resides. When Heraclitus says that most men
trust only what they can see, taste, touch—the fleeting and fragmentary flux
of the visible world—he does not approve of that practice. He adds that (ac-
cording to this view) “those who step into the same river have different waters
flowing ever upon them” (12). But he also affirms, “That which is wise is one:
to understand the purpose which steers all things through all things” (41). He
further proclaims, “That which alone is wise is one; it is willing and unwilling
to be called by the name of Zeus” (32). While on the one hand enumerating
the many commonly held views of the “many,” Heraclitus creates a dialectic
between these erroneous views and his teachings about the One, the hidden
order, wisdom, and harmony in the universe. Teachings about the nature of
nature and the nature of language mingle with one another in discourses
clearly addressed to an interlocutor or listener.
The wisdom traditions represented by the Pre-Socratics and the Daoists
predate any formal conceptualization of rhetoric or, for that matter, philosophy.
They were transmitted by a sagely culture that differed from the existing formal
ceremonies of religion and worship and then adapted to form early rhetorical
teachings during a transitional period of cultural contact, warring states, and
contact zones.6 If we reconsider the ways in which the contrast between logos
and opinion develops during this period in Greece we can see a pattern that
would eventually result in a conceptualization of rhetoric that was unstable. The
ordinary perceptions and opinions of most people are unreliable, should not
be listened to, are based on illusions and common prejudices. Standing back
and observing patterns of interaction, relationship, and balance in the natural
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 Under Western Eyes
world and in the world of human interactions can bring about wisdom and
good judgment; hence, warnings against clever and cunning words, flattery,
deception, and recommendations for how to recognize these and why to avoid
them. The practice of rhetoric moved onward, shaped by an increasing vol-
ume of methods for its teaching. Because of Roman disdain for some of the
“sophistical” qualities of Greek rhetoric, for example, Cicero and Quintilian
reintegrated rhetoric with the study of philosophy, history, literature, and
ethics. Roman emphases upon civic virtue and propriety called for an ap-
proach that placed the development of character and ethics prior to any study
of oratory. The Chinese counterpart was marked by Guiguzi’s suppression
as unethical and unscrupulous under Confucianism, although his students’
writings remained well-known if not always admired.
It was in the Roman milieu that early Western rhetoric acquired its stron-
gest identification with legal discourse, through the work of Cicero and later
through the textbook tradition of Quintilian. Xing Lu provides the following
comparison:
(i). Western rhetoric has its origins in the rhetoric of the law courts. While
open to abuse, this presupposes a goal of discovering the facts or justice
of a case, and is dependent upon proof. The protagonists in these debates
were often equals, whose task was to persuade a third party. (ii) There
was no such forensic rhetoric in China. The official law always operated
in a vertical direction from the state upon the individual rather than on
a horizontal plane between equal individuals. (Rhetoric, 28–29)
It should be noted, however, that Aristotle’s three genres of rhetoric were re-
tained: forensic, deliberative, and epideictic. Among these, epideictic rhetoric
reflected the strongest continuity with earlier traditions of wisdom discourse
and praise ceremonies even as it came to be criticized as empty ceremony
and flattery.
It is a great irony that Cicero’s de Inventione, the youthful notes on Ar-
istotle’s Rhetoric that he later repudiated in de Oratore, became a standard
handbook in the Middle Ages. But these developments occurred far later than
the seminal Greek culture that spans from the Pre-Socratics and Sophists up
through Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the decline of the short-lived Greek democ-
racy in Athens. Recent studies have broadened histories of Western rhetoric
to include earlier and non-Athenian Greek and ancient Near Eastern rheto-
rics (Enos, Lipson and Binkley), a wider spectrum that permits even clearer
comparison with Guiguzi’s heritage of pre-Confucian origins and thought.7
Wu’s careful explanation of the Daoist elements in Guiguzi’s thinking and
terminology provides perhaps the strongest element in her rehabilitation of
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his importance as a rhetorical thinker. Noting the scholars who have recently
attended to this earlier period and its terminologies, she synthesizes a con-
sideration of Daoist terms and concepts as philosophical with the specifically
rhetorical meanings they acquire in Guiguzi’s usage. Like the Pre-Socratic
philosophers, the thinkers of Guiguzi’s time were beginning to think about
thinking, and to develop language about language, “reason first awakening to
and revealing its powers” (Graham, 76). These parallels, and the methods we
are developing for studying them, have been subjects of controversy for several
reasons. Some find the very idea of comparison fraught with Eurocentrism.
Others object to a form of intellectual colonization that accompanies any at-
tempt to bring the Other into a familiar line of vision. Even the translation
of early Greek terms such as logos can now be seen as distorted by layer upon
layer of Western philosophical traditions that emphasized logic and reason
over the “heart,” truth, and ethics. Despite these perils of comparative studies,
we should not entirely reject them. Comparison has long stood in a pairing
with contrast; placing the two studies together activates a dialectic between
sameness and difference that is compatible with both early Greek and early
Chinese methods of discussion and of reasoning.
Like those concerned about the syncretism in the Axial Age model of simul-
taneous “awakenings” across ancient cultures, critics of comparative studies in
literature and now in rhetoric have warned about the dangers of creating false
universals and new binaries by comparing all rhetorics to Western models, and
about the exclusions that are inevitable when the search for the One that is the
same and unites us ignores the Others that differ from us. Such problems in
comparative rhetoric, like similar problems in comparative literature, are now
well established (Kaplan, 2001; X. Lu, 1996; Y. Lu, 1998; Mao, 2003; Swearingen,
2011; Zhang, 1998).8 Yet the relentless race to establish alterity-based studies of
difference, drawing upon models of colonialist hegemony, has brought with
it another set of exclusions. Addressing this problem, recent studies have be-
gun to adapt a both-and approach to comparative and contrastive rhetorical
studies through developing methods of reading both ways, a double vision
(Lipson and Binkley, 2004; Mao, 2013; Swearingen, 2013). New approaches to
comparative studies in rhetoric have begun to construct new contact zones
(Mao, “Searching for the Way,” 338). This edition of Guiguzi is one of them.
The concern with naming and pluralism, the One and a silent hidden wis-
dom or order in the universe, suggests an emergent insight that human lan-
guage somehow fragments a unitary whole in the universe, and in wisdom
itself. The similarities among these terms and the discourses in which they
appear should be of paramount interest to historians of rhetoric, and Wu’s
commentary on Guiguzi explains why. These teachings are easily located as
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early sagely religious discourses or as prototypes for various branches of phi-
losophy, but it has often been overlooked that they concern language as well,
including the processes of naming, coming-into-being through thinking and
naming, seeking wisdom. Wu’s commentary provides detailed distinctions
among Daoist and Confucian concepts of language, naming, and knowing
that await further exploration. The sources Wu draws on in developing this
contextualization of Guiguzi are themselves a valuable contribution. Alternate
versions of the Guiguzi text and commentaries upon it comprise strongly
negative as well as positive understanding of the art (shu) that he teaches, as
well as the methods to be employed in that art, such as silence and listening.
Collectively, the resources and interpreters she includes in her introduction
and commentary present warnings about syncretism, overemphasizing ap-
parent similarities at the expense of ignoring important differences; a rich
resource for understanding not only Guiguzi’s reception but also the recent
methods that are emerging in the study of Chinese rhetorics. The following
sections employ Guiguzi to reassess comparable conceptions emerging among
the Sophists and Pre-Socratics, in Plato, and in Aristotle.

Sophists and Pre-Socratics:

The One and the Many, Truth and Opinion,
Straight Talk and Lies
One of the most striking similarities between Guiguzi’s teachings and the
proclamations of the Pre-Socratic philosophers is the repeated exhortation
to “Listen.” “Listen to the undeceitful order of my words.” “Listen to my true
utterance.” “Listen, reflect, consider, and be wise.” These are not phrases that
begin arguments or proofs. Instead, they define a teacher-student or teacher-
advisee relationship between speaker and spoken to. The recurrence of the
term “listen” indicates a spoken discourse in process, as well as a model or
script for how to speak such a discourse. There are important differences as
well. Empedocles begins,
But come, listen to my discourse! For be assured, learning will increase
your understanding. As I said before, revealing the aims of my discourse,
I shall tell you of a double process. At one time it increased so as to be a
single One out of Many; at another time it grew apart so as to be Many out
of One—Fire and Water and Earth and the boundless height of Air, and
also execrable Hate apart from these, of equal weight in all directions, and
Love in their midst, their equal in length and breadth. Observe her with
your mind, and do not sit with wondering eyes! She it is who is believed
to be implanted in mortal limbs also; through her they think friendly
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thoughts and perform harmonious actions, calling her Joy and Aphrodite.
No mortal man has perceived her as she moves in and out among them.
But you must listen to the undeceitful progress of my argument. (12)
Guiguzi advises methods of self-reflection, conforming to the Dao of the
ancient sages, studying history as a way of predicting the future, and observing
others carefully to gain insights into their probable reactions (Wu, “Redraw-
ing the Map of Rhetoric,” 26–27). He encourages the process of becoming
one with or standing between and uniting Heaven and Earth by balancing or
harmonizing opposites such as yin and yang. Among these objectives, several
themes resemble elements in the Pre-Socratics’ and Sophists’ terms, think-
ing, and forms of speaking. Up through the time of Gorgias (fl. 413 b.c.e.)
the word logos predominates in their linguistic and conceptual self-reference.
They say, “Listen to the order of my words (logoi), my true utterance, my argu-
ment (logos),” and often explicitly juxtapose their truth statements, much like
Guiguzi’s and Lü Buwei’s distinction between glib lies and straight talk, with
an example of the wrong kind of speech: the false (pseudos), the deceitful (ap-
ate). There are several kinds of pairings here; some of them to be harmonized,
and some of them to be used as a rule of exclusion, a rejection of bad or false
or unethical speaking.
Unlike the Greek philosophers who sometimes invoke a Muse, Goddess, or
God as the source of the wisdom they teach, Guiguzi invokes ancient sages and
particularly Daoist conceptions of balance and harmony among elements, be-
tween Heaven and Earth, and between people through the processes of listen-
ing, analogy, and reflection. There are many twos in these recommendations,
but, significantly, they are often not the oppositions of later Greek thinking,
pairs in which one side is better than the other, a contrast of different and often
unequal ideas or traits.9 Among the Pre-Socratics Empedocles presents one of
the least contrastive accounts of the relationship among “opposites.” Between
Heaven and Earth, as Guiguzi thinks of it, Empedocles envisions the goddess,
Love, uniting and harmonizing all things visible and invisible, reducing strife
and resolving discord. Empedocles’s model of cycling, creation, and decline
parallels Guiguzi’s discussions of yin and yang as principles of the natural
world that have counterparts in proper uses of language.
I shall tell of a double (process): at one time it increased so as to be a single
One out of Many; at another time again it grew apart so as to be Many
out of One. There is a double creation of mortals and a double decline:
the union of all things causes the birth and destruction of the one (race
of mortals), the other is reared as the elements grow apart, and then flies
asunder. And these (elements) never cease their continuous exchange,
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sometimes uniting under the influence of Love (Philia), so that all become
One, at other times again each moving apart through the hostile force of
Hate. Thus insofar as they have the power to grow into One out of Many,
and again, when the One grows apart and Many are formed, in this sense
they come into being and have no stable life; but insofar as they never cease
their continuous exchange, in this sense they remain always unmoved
(unaltered) as they follow the cyclic process. (12)

Empedocles’s discussion of “elements” bears a further resemblance to Gui­

guzi’s advice to the sagely speaker, that he come to understand categories and
kinds of people, things, qualities, and that he be able to recognize and properly
name these different sorts of things:

All these (Elements) are equal and of the same age in their creation; but
each presides over its own office, and each has its own character, and they
prevail in turn in the course of Time. And besides these, nothing else
comes into being, nor does anything cease. For if they had been perishing
continuously, they would Be no more; and what could increase the Whole?
And whence could it have come? In what direction could it perish, since
nothing is empty of these things? No, but these things alone exist, and
running through one another they become different things at different
times, and are ever continuously the same. (12)

The ever-turning and ever-changing elements, coming into creation and

departing from creation, in different combinations—transformations reminis-
cent of reincarnation in other religious traditions—were taught by Empedocles
as an ever backward-turning harmony in the order of the universe, but also as
a guide for human behavior. His Katharmoi, cleansing rituals, include related
teachings on the world of thought and speech, and are presented as parallel to
processes harmonizing the natural world. These intriguing fragments give us
only a glimpse of what were once probably longer groups of teachings; however,
some of them bear the marks of self-contained pithy maxims and proverbs
as well. Guiguzi uses example, analogy, and familiar bits of wisdom to advise
and instruct his students and auditors about a number of subjects. In contrast,
many Pre-Socratic teachings draw a firm line between the opinions of most
mortals and the timeless truth being taught.
In a strong contrast to the common belief in visible deities who can be
touched, Empedocles invokes another opposition, between the one God invis-
ible and the plurality of physical sense impressions, which provide one port of
entry for persuasion, linked implicitly here with deception or wrongheaded
opinion. “It is not possible to bring God near within reach of our eyes, nor to
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grasp him with our hands, by which route the broadest road of Persuasion
runs into the human mind” (133).
Empedocles’s conception of persuasion here hovers between the honorific
idea of Peitho, Aphrodite’s daughter, who “beguiles the mortal heart,” and the
more distrusted nominalization, peitho, that came to denote untrustworthy
or even sinister aspects of persuasion and rhetoric. Gorgias’s entirely negative
formulation provides a striking parallel to both Empedocles’s and Guiguzi’s
discussions of negative aspects of rhetoric as beguilement, flattery, and unnec-
essarily ornate language. “Their persuasions by means of fictions are innumer-
able; for if everyone had recollection of the past, knowledge of the present, and
foreknowledge of the future, the power of speech would not be so great” (11).
The forms of reflection that Guiguzi encourages among the wise sages and
kings that he teaches find an alter ego here in Gorgias’s firm assertion that
persuasion (of the bad sort?) is enabled by the incomplete knowledge of most
mortals. Guiguzi urges the sage to study the past and other people in order
better to understand the present and predict the future (I.1.1, I.2.1). Alternately,
Gorgias may be read as teaching a select group of rhetoricians who like him
will master these modes of knowledge and thereby be able to exercise their
powers of speech upon those less aware. A second point of resemblance among
these thinkers is that they do not directly refer to rhetoric but instead to a
range of speaking practices, to “speech,” to “harsh sounding slaughter,” or to
the many types of words such as “exalting eloquence” (Guiguzi, I.3.1) used to
denote negative aspects of persuasion within Guiguzi and other early Chinese
thinkers. A larger question introduced by these conceptions of persuasion is
whether and where there are any positive understandings of “persuasion” even
within Greek, Latin, and later English rhetorical usage. Many have proposed
that there is no direct counterpart to “persuasion” in Chinese, a problem in
itself.10 However, the Greek peitho and pisteuein merit some reconsideration
as well, particularly in terms of the directions they take as they move into
early Christian usage as positive elements in proclamation, belief, and faith.
Similar Latin cognates distinguish among persuasion, conviction, and proof.
English usage to the present, as often as not, stigmatizes “persuasion” and
even “rhetoric” itself with negative connotations. Belying any simple charac-
terization of Western rhetorical terms, these different shades of persuasion,
some good, some bad, imply as well a range of characters and characteristics
among the persuaders.
Well before Gorgias and Protagoras assumed the role of poster boys for later
images of rhetoric as sophistic and relativistic, Heraclitus and Epictetus for-
mulated questions that joined other early Greek conceptualizations of rhetoric.
Like Empedocles and Parmenides they expound harmonic relationships in
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the natural and human worlds; yet they also emphasize contrastive binaries
that were emerging in Greek thinking: between truth and opinion, the natu-
ral and the conceptual worlds, and the distinction between common beliefs
in the gods and the discovery of a universal law/logos/order invisible and
unchanging, sometimes and sometimes not called God. Epictetus’s thinking
about harmony and human relationships is strikingly unlike later emphases
upon individualism, the Socratic dictum “know thyself,” and the discordant,
win-lose models of debate that emerged in classical rhetorical models. Like
Guiguzi’s trinity of exhortations—self-reflect, adhere to the Dao, study history
and other people—Epictetus encourages methods for working in harmony and
partnership with others. While Socrates’s “know thyself” came increasingly
to mean “separate yourself from the Other” (Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony,
203), Epictetus understood the same enjoinder in an irreducibly collective
sense: “Bid a singer in the Chorus ‘know thyself’ and will he not turn for the
knowledge to the others, his fellows in the chorus, and to his harmony with
them?” (Meditations 3:14). Like Guiguzi’s many examples of how to observe
and understand the listener, and unlike many more divisive models of speaker-
listener interactions, Epictetus and the later Stoics present a minority position
in Greek rhetorical thinking.
Heraclitus expounds a group of related concepts that continue to provoke
controversy because they are cryptic—some think deliberately so. Like the
deliberate ambiguity and understatement that many find in Guiguzi’s teach-
ings and recommendations, Heraclitus seems to adhere to opposing ideas
about many things. However, with both Heraclitus and Guiguzi it may be that
their indirection or incompleteness is leaving room for consideration of and
reflection on the kinds of things being represented and whether or not they are
correct, true, advisable, or otherwise approved of by the speaker. As is the case
with Aristotle, the practices of language and thought, the descriptions of “the
way things are” are not necessarily being recommended by Heraclitus. Taken
together they form a dialectic and sometimes a group of antitheses. There is
much to be done in understanding the forms and purposes of these doubles,
pairs, and oppositions as they are articulated by Heraclitus and his other
Pre-Socratics and then in comparison with Guiguzi. Wu notes that Guiguzi
was widely rebuked as a book of magic, sorcery, secrecy, and manipulation.
Heraclitus reproaches a number of his contemporaries and predecessors for
similar reasons. “Pythagoras, son of Menesarchus, practiced research most of
all men, and making extracts from these treatises he compiled a wisdom of
his own, a harmful craft” (129). The ambiguity of this remark is tantalizing,
because Pythagoras, a rival teacher-philosopher, was also an early physicist
and mathematician.
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Additional fragments advance Heraclitus’s attack on magic and sorcery,
fiction, and lies. “Night-ramblers, magicians, Bacchants, Maenads, Mystics:
the rites accepted by mankind in the Mysteries are an unholy performance”
(14). “The most wise-seeming man knows, (that is), preserves, only what seems;
furthermore, retribution will seize the fabricators of lies and the (false) wit-
nesses” (28). The poets are given rebukes alongside errant pretenders to wis-
dom, indicating that there is underway a rejection of the earlier tradition of
poetic epics and wisdom traditions. “Much learning does not teach one to have
intelligence; for it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again, Xeno-
phanes and Hecataeus” (40). “Homer deserves to be flung out of the contests
and given a beating; and also Archilochus” (42). In contrast to these rebukes
of poets’ lies and mystery traditions Heraclitus proclaims his teachings about
truth, wisdom, and intelligence. “That which is wise is one: to understand
the purpose which steers all things through all things” (41). “When you have
listened, not to me but to the Law (Logos), it is wise to agree that all things
are one” (50). “They do not understand how that which differs with itself is in
agreement: harmony consists of opposing tension, like that of the bow and
the lyre” (51). “That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that
differ comes the most beautiful harmony” (8). The teaching for which he is
perhaps best known may be regarded as a verbal and conceptual illustration
of the dialectical harmonies that his teachings as a whole encourage: “In the
same river, we both step and do not step, we are and we are not” (49a).
Like the Dao, as expounded by Laozi and adapted by Guiguzi to describe
practices of language arts, the Heraclitean Logos propounds paradoxes, some
of them unknowable, all of them capable of encouraging harmonic comple-
mentarities. His self-presentation is teacherly as he invites attention to a
number of doctrines concerning proper mental and verbal practices. He
locates the content of his teaching as a “Law” external to him and governing
the coming-into-being of all things conceptual as well as physical. “When
you have listened, not to me but to the Law (Logos), it is wise to agree that
all things are one” (50).

The Law (of the universe) is as here explained; but men are always incapable
of understanding it, both before they hear it, and when they have heard
it for the first time. For though all things come into being in accordance
with this Law, men seem as if they had never met with it, when they meet
with words (theories) and actions (processes) such as I expound, separating
each thing according to its nature and explaining how it is made. As for
the rest of mankind, they are unaware of what they are doing after they
wake, just as they forget what they did while asleep. (1)11
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Like Empedocles, Heraclitus describes the logos as the intelligible law govern-
ing an interdependent, knowable, conceptual, and physical world through
which we can understand how things come into being, separate, change, and
recombine. His teachings are also examples of the intelligibility and expres-
sion of that law and its understanding. Fragments and aphorisms are all that
remain. Like the short length of the individual teachings in Guiguzi, Hera-
clitus’s and other Pre-Socratic teachings include some self-contained, brief,
memorable bits of maxims suggesting oral transmission or writing for easy
memorization and oral presentation. Alternately, such fragmentary remains,
sometimes fraught with apparent contradictions, may in both cases hint at on
original oral-narrative framework that has been lost, of the sort exemplified
in the Legends of the Warring States (Crump).
Gorgias holds a double place in the history of Greek Pre-Socratics and
Sophists, for he belongs to both groups, although he is most often identified
as a sophist. A contemporary of Socrates, he is not quite Pre-Socratic. His
language and thought bear traces of earlier poetics and philosophical teachings
alike. It is interesting that Plato treats him more kindly than does Aristotle,
who associates his style with “Asiatic” excess and embellishment, a lingering
trace of the “poetic” language that Aristotle discourages in rhetoric. Oddly
enough, in the dialogue Plato devotes to denouncing rhetoric, the Gorgias,
the character Gorgias is treated with relative respect as an interlocutor. It is
Callicles who delivers the “might makes right,” may the stronger man win
argument defending combative and manipulative rhetoric at the end of the
dialogue. Socrates fails to refute him, an interesting portrayal by Plato. Gor-
gias’s “Encomium of Helen” and “On Being” illustrate three different aspects
of his importance to the early history of rhetoric. The Helen displays an evi-
dent continuity with early origins in epitaphia, the praise songs and funeral
orations developed before and during the Peloponnesian War that included
a two-part proem establishing the nature and difficulty of the speech to fol-
low and a biographical account of the person being eulogized. Within the
Helen appears one of the earliest technical definitions of “rhetoric” as logos, a
definition that suggests common ancestry with the Pre-Socratics’ rebukes of
poets’ lies, poetic/rhetorical language as incantatory magic, superstition, and
the mistaken beliefs and limited knowledge of most men. “On Being” reflects
the taste for paradox and playful logic that was widely attributed to the Soph-
ists, particularly to Gorgias. Criticism of this display of logical play and logic
chopping invite comparison with similar accusations brought against Guiguzi.
Gorgias’s Helen begins as was customary in epitaphia with a group of
maxims, platitudes with which few would disagree, and then a direct self-
reference defining the thesis of the proof to follow. Of most interest regarding
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C. Jan Swearingen
comparisons of the Pre-Socratics and Sophists with Guiguzi is the section
defining the nature of “speech” (logos) that begins, “Speech is a great power.”
Some translations render this, “Speech is a powerful lord.” Plato’s version in
the Phaedrus is, “The function of speech is to influence the soul.” Remem-
bering that the Greek psyche denotes both soul or spirit and mind clarifies
Gorgias’s meaning: he has not split off logic or reason from appeals to emotion,
an integrated reference that becomes clear in the examples and definitions
that follow. Guiguzi’s references to mind, heart, and spirit in chapter 3 invite
comparison with Gorgias’s, for the Chinese names for “emotion” and “heart”
also encompass larger unities of mind, spirit, psyche.

(8) If it was speech that persuaded her and deceived her soul, her defense
remains easy. Speech is a great power, which achieves the most divine works
by means of the smallest and least visible form; for it can even put a stop
to fear, remove grief, create joy, and increase pity. This I shall now prove:
(9) All poetry can be called speech in metre. Its hearers shudder with
terror, shed tears of pity, and yearn with sad longing; the soul, affected by
the words, feels as its own an emotion aroused by the good and ill fortunes
of other people’s actions and lives.
(10) The inspired incantations of words can induce pleasure and avert
grief; for the power of the incantations, uniting with the feeling in the
soul, soothes and persuades and transports by means of its wizardry. Two
types of wizardry and magic have been invented, which are errors in the
soul and deceptions in the mind.
(11) Their persuasions by means of fictions are innumerable; for if ev-
eryone had recollection of the past, knowledge of the present, and fore-
knowledge of the future, the power of speech would not be so great. But
as it is, when men can neither remember the past nor observe the present
nor prophesy the future, deception is easy; so that most men offer opinion
as advice to the soul. But opinion, being unreliable, involves those who
accept it in equally uncertain fortunes.
(12) (Text corrupt) Thus, persuasion by speech is equivalent to abduction
by force, as she was compelled to agree to what was said, and consent to
what was done. It was therefore the persuader, not Helen, who did wrong
and should be blamed.
(13) That Persuasion, when added to speech, can also make any impres-
sion it wishes on the soul, can be shown, firstly, from the arguments of the
meteorologists, who by removing one opinion and implanting another,
cause what is incredible and invisible to appear before the eyes of the mind;
secondly, from legal contests, in which a speech can sway and persuade a
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crowd, by the skill of its composition, not by the truth of its statements;
thirdly, from the philosophical debates, in which quickness of thought is
shown easily altering opinion.
(14) The power of speech over the constitution of the soul can be com-
pared with the effect of drugs on the bodily state: just as drugs by driving
out different humours from the body can put an end either to the disease
or to life, so with speech., different words can induce grief, pleasure or
fear; or again, by means of a harmful kind of persuasion, words can drug
and bewitch the soul. (11)
Here are preserved many of the themes used in rebukes of poets’ lies and
magic and sorcery elaborated by the Pre-Socratics, a group of rebukes that
were coming to be directed at rhetoric, as well.
“On Being” illustrates a different aspect of Gorgias as sophist, a use of an-
tithesis that many found annoying, and a logic favoring reductio ad absurdum.
Like the Helen and despite objections to Gorgias, “On Being” continued to be
used as a classroom exercise in memorization, declamation, and analysis well
into the first century c.e. Its outline form is preserved by Sextus Empiricus:

I. Nothing exists.
(a) Not-Being does not exist.
(b) Being does not exist.
i. as everlasting.
ii. as created.
iii. as both.
iv. as One.
v. as Many.
(c) A mixture of Being and Not-Being does not exist.
II. If anything exists, it is incomprehensible.
III. If it is comprehensible, it is incommunicable. (3)

Socrates was fond of similar reductions in his exchanges with enemies. Well
known for wielding definitional syllogisms like a razor, it is not surprising
that his more combative exchanges are preserved by Plato. Further, Socrates
was associated with the Sophists by more than one contemporary, and was
annoying enough to earn a verdict of guilt by the Athenian Assembly, con-
demning him to death. Plato was instrumental in preserving the range of
Socrates’s teachings and teaching styles, including uses of a dialogue form that
bears comparison with both Guiguzi and Confucius. Yet among Plato’s rep-
resentations of Socrates there remains evidence that he resembled the alleged

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malpractices of the sophists in several ways. What, then, are the elements in
the charges of sophistry leveled at the Greek sophists, including Gorgias and
Socrates, that resemble the charges brought against the practices of Guiguzi?
Guiguzi’s overstated association with zong-heng war strategy is one of the
misrepresentations that gave it the reputation as a book of magical power, a
wicked book (Wu, “Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric,” 16). Note the parallel
to Heraclitus’s rebuke of Pythagoras, a founder of early mathematics and
astrology: “He practiced research, a harmful craft” (129). The much-rebuked
Guiguzi to the present day is regarded as developing rhetorical strategies that
are considered a “powerful craft for political and commercial affairs” (“Re-
drawing the Map of Rhetoric,” 16). A number of different stories, fictional
or not, emphasize Guiguzi’s powerful and mysterious rhetorical strategies
used not only in military deployment but also in other kinds of persuasion,
such as bringing justice to the world by protecting the wronged and punish-
ing the wrongdoer. Guiguzi has become newly popular in the current era
of economic reform (“Redrawing the Map of Rhetoric,” 29). Many of these
conflicted characterizations of Guiguzi resemble early Greek debates about
rhetoric’s neutrality as a skill and as a subject of study. On one side of this argu-
ment is the view that to study language strategies, or strategically, necessarily
corrupts its use. According to this view, the very idea of targeting a specific
audience after having studied their characteristics is unethical because it is
manipulative. The other side of the argument, the view advanced by Gorgias
in Plato’s dialogue and by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, is that rhetorical skill can
be used for good or evil. Aristotle puts it bluntly: what makes a man a sophist
is his moral character and not the fact that he uses rhetoric. Aristotle agrees
that sophists and sophistry are to be denounced and avoided. The numerous
references in Guiguzi to improper forms of speech and uses of language or
those to be avoided would seem to place him on this side of the argument as
well. Yet in another parallel to Aristotle, Guiguzi often describes unethical or
devious uses of language without explicitly denouncing them.
Wu provides a useful range of contemporary sources defining sophistry
for both the Greek and Chinese cases. Wisdom and cunning are two sides of
the same coin (Raphals). In the Iliad, “cunning Odysseus” is simultaneously
respected and reviled for his persuasive powers. Gorgias’s encomium of the
powers of speech encompasses all the powers of speech and the many attributes
accorded them, yet his early anticipation of later definitions of rhetoric has
been obscured by numerous denunciations of his frivolity. Modern views of the
Sophists have provided different recuperations. Some have rehabilitated them
as wrongly maligned when regarded as manipulators; instead, they should
be seen as forward-looking thinkers because of their views that all truth and
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knowledge is relative, a construction of human thought and language. But
this is not entirely accurate; many Sophists and Pre-Socratics distinguished
between what is true and what is conventional, in a dialectical group of state-
ments. As with rehabilitations of Guiguzi, such as the present work, these
defenses of earlier Sophists against misreading and misinterpretation on issues
of their philosophical views of language should encourage us to pay closer at-
tention to the passages recommending how to shape language for effects on
particular audiences. These are the passages most likely to indict them. Even in
Aristotle, as in Guiguzi, some of these passages may be the result of transmis-
sion through sketchy or fragmentary student notes, or by hostile historians.
Wu explores Graham’s suggestion concerning the rebuke of similar figures
in early Greek and Chinese thought as sophists.
The label “Sophist” does call attention to a configuration of tendencies at
the birth of rational discourse which is common to Greece and China.
In both traditions we meet thinkers who delight in propositions which
defy common sense, and consequently are derided as frivolous and irre-
sponsible. In both, these thinkers belong to the early period when reason
is a newly discovered tool not yet under control, seeming to give one the
power to prove or disprove anything. In both, the exuberance with which
they play with this astonishing new toy leads not only to “sophistries” but
to paradoxes of lasting philosophical significance. . . . Nothing could be
more disorientating, more disruptive, than reason first awakening to and
reveling it its powers. . . . The Greeks did get past this initial disorientation,
the Chinese never did. (Graham, Disputers, 75–76)
Yet in his study of late Mohist logic Graham observes the simplicity and beauty
of classical Chinese, and disputes the then-common notion that Chinese was
incapable of abstractions (Graham, Later Mohist).
Graham’s characterization resembles those of scholars working on the Axial
Age who observe in widely separated cultures that “reason is a newly discov-
ered tool, not yet under control, seeming to give one the power to prove or
disprove anything” (Graham, Disputers, 76). Crump notes a number of tropes
in Chinese sayings and fables that reflect the probabilistic and contingent na-
ture of truth, the “theme song of sophists East and West: ‘We are not searching
for the truth, we are concerned only with influencing others’ opinion of the
truth—and anything else’” (Crump, Legends, 7). These portraits fit some of the
Greek Sophists but not others, Gorgias, certainly, but not the Stoics, dedicated
antirelativists who developed paradoxes as logical exercises along Pre-Socratic
lines begun by Heraclitus and Parmenides. “Defy common sense” is not the
only purpose of paradoxical riddles, and the common sense challenged by
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early Greek and Chinese philosophers was often developed in proposing a
new cosmology, the Dao, the Heraclitean Logos, in the face of superstitious
mystery religions and dogmatic relativists alike. Nonetheless, Graham’s por-
trait presents a provocative contrast. Is it correct to say that while the Greeks
moved beyond this initial “disorientation,” the Chinese did not? The perceived
“failure” of Chinese philosophy to advance in some of the ways that Western
philosophy did persists as a familiar axiom of orientalism. Between seeing
early Chinese rhetoric as, on the one hand, evidence of universals East and
West and, on the other, as the end point in the development of Western-style
philosophy, there remains much room for further exploration.

Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in the Pursuit of Truth

Plato’s representations of Socrates in dialogue were written after the time of the
Pre-Socratics and Sophists, and before the codification of rhetoric developed
by his student Aristotle. Wu’s commentary on Guiguzi invites us to consider
parallels between the suppression and rebukes of Guiguzi by the Confucians
and Plato’s representations of Socrates’s rebukes of the Sophists. In the Phae­
drus, Socrates’s contempt for rhetoric is directed primarily at the probabilis-
tic argumentation practiced by lawyers who are taught to prefer appearance
over truth, a direct reference to Protagoras’s eikos, the argument based upon
apparent truth and probabilistic logic that was later shunned by Aristotle as
well. In Plato’s Gorgias, the discussion between Socrates and Gorgias is more
philosophical, a consideration of the ethics of rhetoric, of the difference be-
tween persuasion and teaching, and the difference between belief and truth.
Similar topics concerning the nature and practice of rhetoric recur in Guiguzi’s
writings and among other Chinese thinkers as well. Like Guiguzi, Plato rep-
resents dialogues, people speaking to one another, although in Guiguzi the
interlocutor’s responses are not provided. Where is Plato in the dialogues on
rhetoric? Does he agree with all of Socrates’s views and teachings? He repre-
sents Socrates as an opponent of rhetoric, and of poetry for that matter, but
his dialogues are full of rhetorical and literary masterpieces, specious as well
as serious argumentation, and numerous myths and stories that remain well
known, such as the Allegory of the Cave. Similarly, Guiguzi’s views about the
views he is representing often remain unstated. The short maxims, stories, and
arguments he represents are episodic rather than cumulative. Locating Guiguzi
in relationship to Plato requires some backtracking as well as some foreground-
ing, because the more common comparison has been with Confucius.
Many historical studies of East-West rhetorics have drawn a parallel be-
tween Plato and Aristotle, Confucius and Mencius, as disciple and student.
There are several grounds for this comparison. First, the elder scholar in each
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case was more the philosopher poet and less the systematizer. Confucius’s
Analects compile sayings and exchanges between kings and sages, sages and
disciples. The exchanges are between very particular individuals, and in speak-
ing to different interlocutors, Confucius gives very different answers. Confu-
cian sayings resemble the aphorisms of the Pre-Socratic philosophers as much
as they resemble the longer dialogues that Plato crafted to preserve Socrates’s
teachings. Socrates’s exchanges with his contemporaries include some allusions
to the Pre-Socratics, particularly “father” Parmenides, who first divided Truth
from Illusion and sense perception; and Protagoras, who advanced the view
that probability is the best persuader. Like Confucius, Socrates, as represented
by Plato, “teaches” by saying and discussion, by question and inference. Too
often, we have not noticed that Socrates’s teachings, as preserved by Plato,
present an example that teaches a “way” of thinking and discussing as much
as he teaches a set of doctrines.
Nonetheless, followers and disciples of both Confucius and Plato have ex-
tracted doctrines from their teachings. For this reason, Aristotle and Mencius
have been seen as the systematizers of the earlier thinker, providing a com-
mentary and application of the teachings of the sage. It is easier to discern,
as I. A. Richards did, Mencius’s concept of “mind” than it is to extract such a
concept from the Analects of Confucius. And therein lies a lesson. When we
try to extract or compile any individual’s “theory of X”—Plato’s theory of forms
or Guiguzi’s teaching on the Dao—we are doing a severe injustice to the form
as well as the content of the teaching, the discourse, the tradition, because we
tend to condense into monologue form an entire universe of interactions and
dialogues, a host of particularities that cannot and should not be condensed
and itemized as a list of topics.
In the 1920s, I. A. Richards explored several of these questions in “Through
the Looking Glass” and Mencius on Mind.
Can we in attempting to understand and translate a work which belongs
to a very different tradition from our own do more than read our own
conceptions into it? Can we make it more than a mirror of our minds,
or are we inevitably in this undertaking trying to be on both sides of
the looking glass at once? . . . The problem seems to become even more
formidable as we realize that it concerns not only incommensurable con-
cepts but also comparisons between concepts and items that may not be
concepts at all. (86–88)
Without ever mentioning rhetoric (although he does so elsewhere, in The
Philosophy of Rhetoric), Richards here addresses several points relevant to com-
parative rhetorical studies. He urges us to back up a good bit and reexamine
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what we mean by a concept, a thing referred to, an intention, and a purpose.
He examines the interplay of meaning, thought, and feelings (in our terms)
within a number of passages from Mencius that vex the Western mind because
of fundamentally different understandings of what we call psychology and
physics. Much of what he suggests may be applied to Guiguzi as well:
Psychology and Physics are not two separated studies for early Chinese
thought, or for later, . . . however metaphysically abhorrent it may be to us,
the mind and its objects are not set over against one another for Mencius.
This non-separation of human and external Nature—elaborated in Sung
times by Chu Hsi, with Buddhistic speculations that seem to verge on an
idealism, may be connected with the fact that (except for Mozi and his
followers) there seems to have been no problem of knowledge for Chinese
thought. (Mencius, 5)
Inner and outer, human nature and physical nature, are not divided or antithe­
sized in Chinese thinking, which, Richards suggests, is not even “thinking”
in the Western sense, as it is deeply imbedded through ritual practices in
sustaining the parallel and interrelated order, the harmony of the heavenly
and physical and moral universes.
Some of Richards’s thinking may now be seen as orientalist and overstated,
but his emphases on the lack of separation of the fields that we call psychology
and physics, and on the absence of antitheses in Chinese thought provide a
useful framework for moving from Confucius to Guiguzi in a comparison
with Plato. Plato’s Socrates, Confucius, and Guiguzi keep the questions going,
prodding thought, leading to insight. For Confucius, as for Guiguzi, there is
no counterpart to Plato, no known third party who is observing and recording
the dialogue. There continues to be much debate about the authorship of their
works as there is regarding Aristotle’s Rhetoric: are they compilations of stu-
dent notes? Despite Plato’s better established authorship of the Dialogues, his
representations of Socrates are manifold; he appears in many guises, not all of
them pleasant. He does not win every argument. In fact, in many dialogues the
evening’s conversation winds down with no conclusion, the clear implication
being that the question is undecided and the inquiry to be continued. Some
doctrines are explicitly identified, such as Parmenides’s teaching on Being,
Not-Being, and Becoming. “Therefore all things that mortals have established,
believing in their truth, are just a name: Becoming and Perishing, Being and
Not Being” (7–8). Socrates invokes Parmenides’s warning,
For this can never predominate, that That Which Is Not exists. You must
debar your thought from this way of search, nor let ordinary experience

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in its infinite variety force you along this way (allowing) the eye, sightless
as it is, and the ear, full of sound, and the tongue, to rule; but Judge by
means of Reason (Logos) the much contested proof which is expounded
by me. (7, 8)
Plato, representing Socrates’s speaking in dialogues, was writing within the
lifetimes of those who knew Socrates, both his predecessors, such as Par-
menides, and his contemporaries that appear in the dialogues. Even though
there are many Socrateses across the dialogues, none of them could have been
completely “wrong” because there were living eyewitnesses, or rather earwit-
nesses, who could challenge the erroneous portrait. With this in mind we
should perhaps reconsider the negative portraits that Plato includes. What is
he illustrating through the way the discussion proceeds, when Socrates loses
an argument, or for that matter when he wins? And how does this way cor-
respond to or differ from Guiguzi’s teachings on similar points?
A passage in book 3 of Guiguzi describes the art of the Dao in speaking/
thinking.
Learn about the capability of describing the looks upon seeing an appear-
ance, knowing the shape upon seeing an image, and heeding the one upon
hearing a sound. Dissolve enmity, fight animosity, express farewell, avoid
speech, capture the heart, and persevere in justice (III.3.1). . . . Dissolving
enmity means retaliation for small wins, while fighting animosity is a
fight against a strong power. When strong powers in animosity are in a
fight, the winner flamboyantly claims credit in order to strengthen the
momentum. The defeated grieve over their loss and lower status, lament-
ing that their name is ruined and their ancestors are dishonored. For this
reason, winners fight for stature and momentum, proceeding randomly
without knowing when to withdraw, while the defeated hear about the
grief over the loss and witness the casualties. Consequently, the latter
fortify themselves with double forces to resist to the death. Both are under
the threat of conquest. (III.3.1)
Guiguzi emphasizes that a victory may temporarily boost the winner, but
because of it the loser may come back with double force to defeat the win-
ner—there is no absolute win or loss.12 Like Plato’s Socrates, the debaters rep-
resented by Guiguzi are engaged in ongoing and ever-incomplete sequences of
discussion. More like Aristotle than Plato, however, Guiguzi, instead of simply
representing dialogues as Plato does, comments on them, assigning character-
istics to speakers and kinds of arguments. In this he also resembles Socrates.
Plato’s many representations of Socrates in dialogue, sometimes losing,

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make it clear why the Athenians found him more than annoying; they found
him blasphemous and a threat to their political, social, and religious order.
Too many questions, too many arguments, and this in a self-professed fol-
lower of Parmenides who forbade the pursuit of What Is Not. While in the
end Plato’s objective may have been to redeem Socrates from the charges
brought against him, a task that many see completed in the Apology, many
of the dialogues present the perils as much as the profits of interlocutionary
dialogue and debate. It is human psychology of the sort Guiguzi describes that
is put into play in many of the dialogues; some of them, like the Laws and the
Sophist, very dark indeed. Without advancing any theoretical view of human
psychology, as Guiguzi does, as Aristotle does, Plato’s dialogue form presents
numerous enactments of the dynamics of that psychology. It is Socrates who
begins to define the “types of human soul” while at the same time questioning
the certainty of such knowledge.
Guiguzi speaks in implicit dialogue, narrated by an unknown hearer or
scribe. His addressee is often unclear. Is he providing an example of how to
speak to a ruler? Is he speaking directly to an unnamed ruler? Is he instructing
students on principles of language, speech, order, harmony, human interaction,
history? Taken as a whole, Guiguzi’s teachings most resemble the rhetorical
instructions and principles first codified by Aristotle, as well as the teachings
on harmony and balance in the human soul, mind, and spirit as a counter-
part to the Dao in the natural world. There is no practice of dialectic in the
way that Socrates uses it, in sharp question-and-answer sessions pursuing a
definition or understanding of something, or perfecting a truth through de-
liberation. Adversarial debate is not in keeping with Guiguzi’s teachings, but
he recognizes it and defines its pitfalls, just as other thinkers in the Warring
States periods came to renounce the Mohists. Was Guiguzi implicated in that
denunciation, or was he wrongly charged with teaching war strategies of a
different kind? Wu’s commentaries suggest both possibilities. Book 3 provides
engaging encouragement for highly virtuous uses of rhetoric following the
Dao, to preserve justice and capture the heart through dissolving enmity and
animosity. Is there a virtuous rhetoric defined by Plato?
The Phaedrus and the Gorgias, the two dialogues most concerned with
rhetoric, define different aspects of rhetoric that Socrates (and implicitly Plato?)
questions. The Phaedrus develops an argument in favor of “true rhetoric” as
dialectic: interlocutionary inquiry directed at discovering truth. As a heuristic
the method is ongoing and never concludes, because the highest truths, like the
hidden order and harmony in the universe affirmed by the Pre-Socratics, like
the un-nameable Dao, are beyond human understanding even though worthy
of ongoing consideration. One version of Socrates’s “know thyself” is perfectly
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consonant with Guiguzi’s goals of self-reflection, study of history, and observa-
tion of others. In the Phaedrus he develops a doctrine that Empedocles would
recognize, the principle that only words spoken in the presence of the hearer,
“written on the soul of the hearer,” can have any meaning or positive effect.
Responding to the speech of Lysias that is read or performed by Phaedrus, a
student of Socrates and fan of Lysias, Socrates objects that reading from a text
cannot be true rhetoric. As admirable as it may be, the text has become an
object of imitation and adulation, not a living word spoken within an ongoing
relationship. The larger issue identified here is that rhetoric was beginning to
be taught, as early as Gorgias, with sample speeches written down, memorized,
and performed by students, a practice that would be continued for the next
two thousand years in Western rhetorical education. Socrates objects, because
he believes that if a speech, or anything else, is written down and circulates
apart from its author, it becomes an orphan, with the parent unable to come
to its assistance to clarify its meaning. Further illustrating his preference for
spoken rather than written exchanges, learning, and language, Socrates then
composes extempore a speech extolling the nature and importance of love,
the subject of Lysias’s speech. Enthralled, Phaedrus praises Socrates’s speech
only to have Socrates chide him for letting his emotions get the best of him;
speeches in themselves are flawed because they do not invite interlocution.
Socrates’s insistence upon ongoing two-way interlocution between and among
individuals is both like and unlike the Guigucian model. Guiguzi’s model does
not suggest a single speaker speaking to a large group, the audience for which
most Greek rhetoric was intended. However, it does imply a one-to-one model,
but is the direction of the exchange one-way, either “up” or “down”? There
seem to be few suggestions of interlocutionary give-and-take among equals.
Much more can be done in exploring the parallels between Guiguzi and
Plato as teachers and practitioners of dialogical rhetoric. Unlike Plato, however,
Guiguzi was not himself a writer. If it is true that one outcome of the Axial
Age in many cultures was to “wake up” consciousness about consciousness
and language about language, a consideration of the “interiorization” some
claim is fostered by reading and writing may be at play in the roles portrayed
by a written text of Guiguzi and Plato in their respective milieu.13 Was the
self-reflection that Guiguzi encourages inaugurated within his teachings on
the skillful and knowledgeable uses of language, or did he draw on earlier,
nonwritten philosophical teachings that he then distilled into an ethics of
character and rhetoric for the sagely persuader? Conversely, was the circula-
tion of Guiguzi’s teachings as writings beginning to provoke concern because
the self-reflection and observation of history and of others would challenge
the hierarchy of Confucianism?
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The section of the Phaedrus most directly critical of rhetoric provides a
technical definition of rhetoric that is arguably a deliberate overstatement
emphasizing the impossibility of mastering the subject. Socrates presents the
following summary to Phaedrus and asks if this is an accurate portrait of
what he has learned.
Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be
an orator has to learn the differences of human souls—they are so many
and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man
and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide
speeches into their different classes:—“Such and such persons,” he will
say, “are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way,” and he
will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them
first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able
to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond
the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are
persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was
speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and
can say to himself, this is the man or this is the character who ought to
have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a
certain opinion;—he who knows all this, and knows also when he should
speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings,
pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech
which he has learned; when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all
these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art. (265d)
The outline of objectives Socrates describes here would be codified by Ar-
istotle: know all classes of speeches (arguments, rhetorical genres), know all
types of human souls (audiences), and through experience of them predict
which audiences will be influenced by what arguments, know when to speak
and when to be silent, know which styles and appeals to use through employ-
ing pithy sayings and other modes of speech he has learned . . . then and only
then will he be a master of his art. Plato begins his short definition of rhetoric
with a spiritual emphasis that he shares with Gorgias and Guiguzi: the func-
tion of speech is to influence the soul. Aristotle shifts the emphasis: rhetoric
is the art of persuasion as well as the study of that art. Plato’s point in this
passage and throughout the Phaedrus is that because speech influences the
soul, and can enchant, as Gorgias emphasizes, we must be very careful and
very ethical with how we use it. Second, the art of rhetoric as currently defined
is an impossible art to master. Who can possibly know all the types of human
soul, all the types of speech, and the exact match of each type of soul to the
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most effective kind of speech? And who can possibly have memorized a vast
storehouse of quotations for use at just the right place and time? And yet this
was exactly the curriculum already in place and developed into a three part
treatise in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Guiguzi presents several synopses of the entire
art, passages with a strategic, how-to emphasis.
A person who aims to enhance his power and capacity reaches afar to draw
talents close to him. To establish authority and manage business he must
investigate difference and similarity, differentiate a speech of truth from
a speech of untruth, tell the essence of a speech from its embellishment,
know the principles of the haves and have-nots, decide which plans are safe
and which are risky, and settle intimate and distant relations. Afterwards,
he can test and evaluate the scale and scope. With the ability to adjust and
shape a mold, he can recruit, seek, or utilize a talent. (II.5.1)
Guiguzi’s uses of similarity and difference, investigating changes and trans-
formation, along with the lists of types of speeches and the identification of
topoi, present significant parallels to the curriculum circulating in Plato’s
time and summarized in the Phaedrus, with the exception that Plato accuses
the rhetoricians of practicing and encouraging probability over truth, espe-
cially in courts of law. This common rebuke of the sophists seems not to fit
Guiguzi’s teachings, for discerning truth is one of the goals he sets for the
sagely rhetorician. In addition to the methods of observing similarity and
difference and investigating changes, he identifies five types of speeches: those
that convey affliction, fear, anxiety, anger, and joy. The five types could only
be learned when they are useful and could only be practiced when they are
advantageous. Therefore,
when you speak to an intelligent person, show your knowledge. When you
speak to a knowledgeable person, employ judicious reasoning. When you
talk to a debater stress key points. When you talk to a person with power,
speak about authority. When you talk to a wealthy person, speak about
loftiness. When you speak to a poor person, speak about benefits. (II.9.4)
Strategic topical themes are here combined with a characterization of types
of speeches classified by purpose or aim, aims that more than qualify as “in-
fluencing the soul.”
Methods, classifications of types of speeches by effect, and topics of speeches
appropriate for different audiences had different characterizations in Plato’s
time, but the shape of an individual speech was already fixed in the outlines
for argument taught in the schools. Plato’s version in the Phaedrus emphasizes
the adversarial contours of legal speeches: introduction, statement of the facts
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supported by evidence, testimony, and witnesses, positive proofs, arguments
from probability, proof and supplementary proof, refutation and further refu-
tation, insinuation, indirect compliments and indirect blame (267a). Here is
yet another taxonomical representation of “types of speeches,” this time as
subsets within a legal speech. Just as Gorgias’s “Encomium of Helen” had be-
come a classroom template for organizing epideictic as well as legal speeches,
the technical outlines of the kind Plato represents further subdivided each
kind of speech—forensic, epideictic, deliberative—into additional subsections.
Guiguzi’s five types of speech are identified by emotional affect and then exem-
plified by pairs of topic with audience type. Greek rhetoric defined rhetorical
“appeals” generically: ethos, pathos, logos. Following his enumeration of the
five goals of the sagely rhetorician—dissolve enmity, fight animosity, express
farewell, avoid speech, capture the heart, and preserve justice—Guiguzi re-
peats that the speaker must develop the capacities to describe the looks of
something upon seeing an appearance, know the shape upon seeing an im-
age, and heed the tone upon hearing a sound. What follows is an expansion
of each of the five goals, using the capacities as a group of speaker types and
purposes. “Those who are able to describe the countenance upon seeing an
appearance and know the shape upon seeing an image employ symbols as their
guidelines, which make it possible to recollect information by recalling the
tones and voices, shapes and visages, behaviors and demeanors” (III.3.2). The
expanded characterization of each of the speaker types and purposes forms a
group of topoi arranged by the five sagely goals.
Plato would probably have approved of Guiguzi’s system for its ethical and
substantive goals and definitions, for its attention to malpractices in rhetoric
and other modes of discourse, for its encouragement of knowing the nature
of things and people through study and reflection before engaging in any
talk. He might not have liked the strategic passages of advice-giving, if you
want to accomplish X, do Y, for this was what he disliked in the technical
handbooks of his day. The continuity of Pre-Socratic thought in Plato’s dia-
logues and in the rhetorical handbooks is comparable on several points to
Guiguzi’s teaching. Plato liked the idea of the One, a whole, harmony uniting
all things, including all things in language and meaning. He presented a sys-
tem of dialectical inquiry that used many of the tools of Pre-Socratic think-
ing to advance deliberative dialogue. Some of these tools are close cousins to
Guiguzi’s: Same and Different, Being and Not Being, True and Not True, and,
what Guiguzi calls “change” and “transformation” is couched in the terms
of “always-changing” (Empedocles), coming-into-being and passing away
(Parmenides), and finally cause and effect. At least three of the common topics
taught in rhetorical argumentation to this day are present in all three of these
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traditions. Description and definition, naming what is and is not, similarity
and difference, comparison and contrast, and cause and effect—each of these
in turn has subsections and subparts but the general contours are all there, and
recognizable, in Guiguzi. Much debate currently surrounds the study of such
direct parallels between Chinese and Greek rhetorics, and with good reason.
The terms we use for these kinds and purposes of rhetoric are direct descen-
dants of the outlines Aristotle codified in the Rhetoric. Therefore, to “apply”
them to Chinese rhetoric seems the worst kind of cultural colonization. But
what if we begin turning the looking glass in the other direction, and ask the
Chinese text, and Chinese reader, to see the parallels from within their culture
and its lexicon? That is one of the tasks undertaken in this edition of Guiguzi.

Aristotle: Sophist or Statesman?

The differences between Mencius and Aristotle as students and disciples of
Confucius and Plato have particular interest for rhetorical scholars, differ-
ences we have only begun to explore. Aristotle both built upon and diverged
from Plato’s ideas as he constructed a theory to guide the practice of rhetoric;
Guiguzi adapted certain elements of Laozi to create a collection of principles
that could be used by persuasive speakers and advisors. Laozi’s Daoist teach-
ings present a direct challenge to Confucianism, which in turn challenged
Daoism’s promotion of silence, inaction, and retreat from society into nature.
The many schools of Chinese philosophy by the 220s b.c.e. were themselves a
group of warring states, in dialogue with one another; sometimes in debate,
even at times participating in “cross talk” (Lyon, “Writing,” 363). Daoist views
of the natural world and of human nature resemble those of the Pre-Socratics:
they formed an alternative to state Confucianism, a context different from the
Pre-Socratics widely circulating in a number of Greek-speaking areas and city-
states. Yet there were wandering sages in the Chinese warring states. Before
Confucianism solidified the debates, multiple teachings regarding propriety,
ethics, and the cosmos circulated, including teachings about human language
and its uses in the political sphere. The emerging thinking about politics and
ethics that surrounded Aristotle was codified by him in ways that sometimes
resemble Confucianism. He emphasizes propriety, prudence, social order, and
civic virtue. His codification of forensic, deliberative, and epideictic rhetoric
shaped concepts of legal, political, and ceremonial oratory. As had Plato with
Dion of Syracuse, Aristotle became a failed advisor, to King Philip of Mace-
don while tutor to his son Alexander. After Alexander’s death, Aristotle died
in exile from Athens where he had, like Socrates, been convicted of impiety.
Because the Rhetoric has for so long been the universal benchmark for defin-
ing and teaching rhetoric as forensic and argument-based, it is instructive to
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revisit Aristotle’s several resources and predecessors among the Pre-Socratics,
particularly regarding what has come to be called epideictic or ceremonial
rhetoric, and then to consider its parallels in Guiguzi’s teachings.
Although they had common objects of criticism—common opinion, the
erroneous views and beliefs of most people—the Pre-Socratics do not by and
large associate these errors with any particular religion or political order. “The
poets’ lies” and “inquiry” receive equal rebukes, alongside the vulnerabilities in-
duced in gullible auditors by such discourses. They challenge each other’s views
as well, in cross talk that resembles the disputes among the Chinese schools.
Aristotle’s work on rhetoric, then, can be reviewed not only as a distillation of
Plato’s work, itself representing Socrates in dialogues with Pre-Socratics and
Sophists, correcting some of the faults that Plato had identified, but also as
a direct refinement of those views.14 Guiguzi created what was received as a
handbook, and as such not always admired. In both cases an unprecedented
attention to audience drew admiration from some and condemnation from
others. Aristotle’s accounts of audience psychology are recognized in the West
as among the earliest, and as forerunners to the study of psychology, which
did not emerge until much later. Guiguzi’s focus on the prediction of audience
reactions was one of the grounds for his dismissal from the Chinese classics.
At the center of the focus on audience psychology, and objections to it,
is the question of how emotion is defined and valued. Aristotle’s ethos and
pathos form a pair. The character, perceived or projected, of the speaker, has
a powerful influence upon the audience’s acceptance of what he says. Many
of Guiguzi’s descriptions of rhetorical intentions and interactions focus on
precisely this dynamic. “If you want to appear X, do Y.” It is in the context
of describing the delicacy of talking “up” to superiors that he often promotes
understatement and even silence. He seems in some passages to be advising
rulers to adopt the same strategy, to let their courtiers do the fighting and stay
above the fray themselves. In a possible challenge to the Confucian emphasis
upon propriety, Guiguzi teaches that “a proper speech is less effective than an
ingenious one; ingenuity engenders endless succession of triumph. Therefore,
to persuade a king, it is necessary to exercise ingenuity; to persuade a minister,
it is necessary to talk in private” (II.10.3). Of a piece with the speaker’s aware-
ness of self-presentation is his astute reading of his audience’s state of mind.
These must match seamlessly for a speech to be effective. Guiguzi teaches,
“Private discussion is less effective than a relationship; which must be formed
seamlessly” (II.10.2). Aristotle observes, “Men do not praise the same things
in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beauti-
ful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient” (Rhetoric, 1399a). Aris-
totle’s explorations of irony as a literary and rhetorical trope bear further
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consideration alongside Daoist, Confucian, and Guiguzi’s encouragement of
restraint and silence. Aristotle encourages irony as a trait of character in the
gentleman, who should speak in candor to his equals, but with irony to the
“vulgar” underclasses. He equates eironeia (irony) and litotes (understatement)
with restraint, deference, and sometimes condescension toward a low-born or
ignorant audience (Rhetoric, 1419b). Parallels to this advice recur in Guiguzi’s
teachings; however, he also advises strategic silence and understatement when
talking “up” to a superior who may present a threat.
The observation of speaker-audience roles and interactions is the point
of emphasis that led to criticism of rhetoric as manipulative, underhanded,
and unethical in both Chinese and Western traditions. At the center of the
objection was the equation of rhetoric with persuasion and of persuasion with
“emotional” appeals. Aristotle’s discussion of pathos, the emotion instilled
or targeted to be instilled in the audience, is defined in the Poetics in discus-
sions of the emotions provoked or inspired by epic poetry and drama: pity
and awe. The transition from earlier Greek meanings of Peitho, a positive
representation of persuasion as “Aphrodite’s daughter,” to peitho, the word
for persuasion with largely negative connotations (outside of New Testament
usage) bears repeating. The “ceremonial” and “Epideictic” functions of the
earliest epitaphia, embodied in praise songs and funeral orations, emerged
directly out of religious songs of worship composed and performed largely by
women (Swearingen, “Song”). Gorgias’s Helen (11), an “Encomium” (Praise),
mimics this genre and includes some early legal rhetoric as well. The Helen
identifies the emotions stirred by the “powers of speech (logos)” more generally,
with examples that include the emotional effects of poetry, drama, epic, and
rhetoric: “Put a stop to fear, remove grief, create joy, and increase pity” (11, 8).
Gorgias’s characterizations are a transitional definition, hovering between the
more honorific definitions of emotion in earlier Greek poetry and religious
discourse and the increasingly negative connotations that emotional appeals
were acquiring in rhetorical theory and practice.

(9) All poetry can be called speech in metre. Its hearers shudder with
terror, shed tears of pity, and yearn with sad longing; the soul, affected by
the words, feels as its own an emotion aroused by the good and ill fortunes
of other people’s actions and lives.
(10) The inspired incantations of words can induce pleasure and avert
grief; for the power of the incantations, uniting with the feeling in the
soul, soothes and persuades and transports by means of its wizardry. Two
types of wizardry and magic have been invented, which are errors in the
soul and deceptions in the mind. (Gorgias, “Helen,” 11, 8–10)
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C. Jan Swearingen
Both Plato and Aristotle draw on these earlier characterizations of emotion
in rhetorical exchanges long before rhetoric had been conceptualized. These
views were commonplaces by the time they wrote and marked a widespread
suspicion of certain uses of language, including rhetoric and “poetry,” the
generic term for all literary genres, and for priestly discourses as well.
How do treatments of the “heart” and of feelings figure in Guiguzi’s dis-
cussions? “Weighing the feelings without carefully studying them causes
inattention to the hidden and the unobvious. . . . [U]‍nderstand the heart of
ordinary people to know if they live in peace or danger, in love or in hate”
(II.7.1). Is there a transition here from older to newer understandings of heart
and emotion? Did Guiguzi’s repeated advice to observe and analyze threaten
an established order or group of beliefs? Safeguards against the wrong kind of
emotional “appeal,” or pathos, were provided by different methods, including
the Daoist and Guiguzian emphasis upon restraint and silence. Daoism and
Stoicism encouraged the achievement of harmony in the soul through self-
transformational reflection and observation of nature. Both saw emotion as
a dangerous force that could disrupt this harmony.15 But unlike Daoism, the
Greek traditions that merged in Stoicism emphasized rationality as an ideal
and logic as a method of transcending the dangers of emotion. Unlike Daoists,
Plato, and Aristotle, the Stoics saw virtue as an achievement that could and
should be achieved through rationality only within social order and social
life. In this view they differed from the Daoist rejection of social conventions,
moral systems, and laws as prone to forming dichotomies and then favoring
one side, much like the Greek binaries and oppositions used in rhetoric and
dialectic alike (J. Yu, 6–8). Instead, they taught that the natural state requires
getting rid of and discarding analytic reasoning and intellectual knowledge,
a “post-rational” view that favors going back to a “presocialized” nature (J.
Yu, 7). It is easy to see why some Confucians teasingly rebuke the Daoists for
being antisocial proponents of social chaos, “reclusive, anti-worldly” (Analects,
18: 5–7; Lyon, 355). By the same token, it is clear that the Daoists were having
a go at Confucian doctrines of propriety, moral codes and laws, and proper
“naming” (Lyon, 356–57). Unlike Stoicism and the earlier Greek traditions
embodied in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Daoism does not invoke reason
as the principle of order that should govern the human spirit. Despite their
very different ideas about reason, emotion, nature, and what the Stoics called
natural law, both traditions have very similar ideas of social harmony based
upon minimizing discord and too many rules (J. Yu, 14).
Inheritors of negative views of emotion, and of emotion-stimulating uses
of language, Aristotle and Guiguzi lay the groundwork for more positive un-
derstandings of how certain kinds of emotion, the “heart” and its observation,
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 Under Western Eyes
can give momentum to will and virtue. Guiguzi teaches: “Those who have
mastered the art can control the pathway between the heart and the ener-
gies and let the spirit be their agent” (III.1.1). An alternative to “persuasion,”
“inspiring” language can promote virtue in the individual and society alike,
hence, the compilation of classical canons in both Chinese and Greek cultures.
Literature, history, poetry, letters, published speeches can provide models of
correct behavior and language use alike. Within the traditions of literary and
written works on rhetoric, the writings of Aristotle and Guiguzi preserve an
interest in what Westerners call predicational logic, definition, and dialectic in
search of truth. In the Chinese formulations of Laozi, “naming” is discussed
in a playful (?) antithesis to the emphasis upon “proper names/naming” in
Confucian thinking.
A tao that can be spoken about;
Is not the constant Tao.
A name that can be named.
Is not the constant name.
Non-being names;
Ten thousand things beginning;
Being names Ten thousand things, mother.
Therefore, constantly be desireless;
Whereby to observe its minutiae;
Constantly be desirous,
Whereby to observe where it ends.
(Huang, II.1, 31)
Guiguzi represents a similar view of the Dao and naming in book 3. “The Dao
is the beginning of Heaven and Earth. In the beginning of Heaven and Earth
no shape could be seen, and no name could be known. Therefore it is said
that the Dao is the source of the omniscient intellectual conscience” (III.1.1).
Much work remains to be done on the meanings of “name” and “nam-
ing” in Chinese traditions, particularly because “name,” like “logos,” conveys
meanings ranging from properly identify, speak truth, state a powerful argu-
ment, and accurately represent. Confucian and Daoist discussions differ from
one another; Guiguzi incorporates both at different points. In Stoic logic the
smallest unit of meaning was the sentence, not the single term or word. The
word for “word” that predominates in Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric is not
logos but “onoma,” or “name,” for “word,” a term that conveyed Aristotle’s
emphasis upon rhetoric as the art of commonly understood, conventional,
and therefore successful communication. Plato’s logos is very different from
Aristotle’s logos and logike. Aristotle’s logos often means simply, technically,
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C. Jan Swearingen
and conventionally, “sentence,” and “proposition” respectively. These are logi-
cally true by structure and proof. In this shift in usage and meaning, logos, as
it had existed from the Pre-Socratics through Plato, broadly denoting truth-
bearing philosophical discourse, is replaced by a method defined by tagmemic
technical terms defining relationships among parts of speech and relationships
between words within and in a sequence of sentences: the syllogism. Aris-
totle’s system of rhetoric presents a logic of terms and a rhetoric of motives.
His terms for terms and for persuasive sequences of sentences deserve much
more attention than they have received, especially in an East-West conversa-
tion where we are only beginning to name what “name” and “naming” mean
in Chinese usage. What of “proof,” “demonstration,” and “refutation”; and of
“convince” or “affect” in contrast to “persuade”? Is proper naming equivalent
to stating a propositional truth, or giving a correct identification of a thing
or person in one word?
To return to a larger question: Is Mencius more a Confucian than Aristotle
is a Platonist? Yes. Is Guiguzi the transmitter of a Daoist tradition regarding
language and rhetoric that has been suppressed? Wu’s commentary and his-
tory of Guiguzi’s reception would suggest so, particularly her commentary
on the Daoist teachings in book 3. What can this tell us about the different
directions that Chinese and Greek rhetoric took after their initial codifications,
particularly in the case of Guiguzi? Aristotle was certainly a student of Plato,
but he was not a disciple in the same way that Mencius was, continuing the
traditions and teachings of his master. Aristotle codified rhetoric for the first
time, but as a discipline separate from logic, ethics, and metaphysics. Aristotle
termed the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic an antistrope, a “coun-
terpart,” using a binary that implied the inferiority or perceived inferiority of
rhetoric to dialectic. According to Aristotle, rhetoric deals with commonplaces
and commonly held opinions, dialectic with general truths discoverable and
defined through dialectic and syllogistic logic. It is not always clear whether
he approves of the practices of rhetoric that he describes. Referring to earlier
figures such as Protagoras and Gorgias, Aristotle constructs one of the earli-
est histories of rhetoric and rhetoricians, one that would be expanded upon
by Cicero in the Brutus and Orator. Aristotle as often as not speaks against
these earlier figures and their legacy. For example, Gorgias is denounced for
his “Asiatic” flourishes, including excessive antitheses, while Protagoras is
denounced as the originator of the eikos, the argument of probability, based
on an apparent semblance of truth that had come to be associated with the
worst excesses and relativisms of the Sophists. Aristotle’s list of logical fallacies
identifies the malpractices of the Sophists, in a list of paradoxes and logical
dead ends that Cicero would preserve and add to in his Sophistical Refutations.
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Aristotle resembles Guiguzi in some other ways as well. The compilation we
know as the Rhetoric has some redundancies and rough spots, leading many
scholars to guess that it may be a compilation of a variety of student notes or
alternate versions. The same conjecture has been directed at Guiguzi’s text,
especially book 3. There is ambiguity in many passages which seem to de-
scribe more than advise the would-be speaker. In these they seem to be like
observers and anthropologists, not evaluators, teachers, and advice-givers.
Wu’s commentary on Guiguzi’s text singles out many of these passages and
the alternate interpretations produced by earlier commentators and transla-
tors. Aristotle is speaking more consistently to students of rhetoric, Guiguzi
to individuals who may be students, advisors in training, or even rulers. The
sayings and teachings he preserves bear the marks of transmission through
earlier oral genres (Coyle; Crump, Legends).
Considerations of names and naming present additional questions regard-
ing translation and cross-cultural understanding. Stephen Owen, writing
many decades after I. A. Richards, provides a characterization of the difficulty
of crossing borders in translating the ideas of a very different culture, or even
beginning to understand what might be at work in the mind of a culture that
does not name mind or culture in the same ways that we do. In Readings in
Chinese Literary Thought, Owen, like Richards in Through the Looking Glass,
has much to say about concepts of literature and literary interpretation. We
can add to these our rhetorical insights. Commenting on his approach to
canonical Chinese “literary thought” (5–6), Owen provides a comparison of
the process in reverse.

When I was undertaking this work, there was a moment when I imagined
myself translating Aristotle’s Poetics, with explanatory discussions, into
classical Chinese for a premodern audience. It would be quite easy to of-
fer a simple and elegant translation of the Poetics, recasting its terms and
arguments in familiar Chinese terms. The result would be a pleasant, at
times incomprehensible and at times naive version of a Chinese argument
on literary structure. One might go beyond that, attempting to explain the
original Greek words and how they differed from the Chinese concepts;
here we would have a problem because the precise force of the Greek words
is in many cases a matter of great scholarly debate and ultimately insepa-
rable from the history of the interpretation of these words in Latin and
the vernaculars [as well as being inseparable from the transformations of
those words as they were naturalized within the literary traditions of the
vernaculars]. I can imagine some of the moments: “For poetry is both more
philosophical and more serious than history.” I would translate—Greek
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C. Jan Swearingen
into English into Chinese back into English: “As for poetry’s relation to
history, it excels in natural principle and is [the] serious [one].” Such a
statement would be virtually nonsensical to my premodern readers of
classical Chinese: after all, history perfectly embodies li (principle), but
the role of “natural principle” in poetry is decidedly problematic. It would
take a good deal of space to explain what Aristotle meant by “poetry,”
“philosophy,” and “history”; in each case the understanding of those terms
would be radically different in the Chinese version. (Owen, 5–6)

Like Richards, Owen focuses on the literary elements of poetics but we can
see the rhetorical aspects as well. In Confucian China, as in classical Greece,
history was a branch of “rhetoric,” and poetics the study not just of literature
but of all things composed, including rhetoric. Much of what Owen has to say
about Aristotle’s Poetics can and should be said about his Rhetoric as well. How
have we and are we using Aristotle’s and other Western rhetorics to “read”
and “understand” Chinese rhetoric and vice versa? How could we, following
Richards’s and Owen’s suggestion, engage in an exercise in multiple defini-
tions: if it is not appropriate or clarifying to name “rhetoric” as such in Chinese
contexts, what should we call it? How might these alternate definitions begin
to help us explore once again what we name when we call rhetoric “rhetoric”?
J. I. Crump provides additional encouragement to dispense with Western
categories, and with categories altogether as a methodology appropriate to
studying Chinese rhetorical genres. “It has been my experience that dissect-
ing or explaining rhetorical forms in the abstract to demonstrate what care
and manipulation of language was practiced by the persuaders, often leaves
the listener with glazed eyes and a less than satisfactory comprehension of
the process” (Legends, 3). Instead, he proposes, we should always read the
individual speeches, some of them about speech, in their restored historical,
literary, and rhetorical contexts. There is a tradition of sayings and maxims
that becomes incorporated into the canonical speeches of both Chinese and
Greek exemplars. The teachings and sayings of Guiguzi distill these much as
do the speeches of Gorgias and Pericles that became part of the Western canon.
In the case of Guiguzi, as Wu’s commentary illuminates, there are repeated
references to kinds of speakers, kinds of speech, their purposes, and their ef-
fects. However, each of these is contextualized within an implicit or sometimes
explicit dialogue as advice, or as a teacherly admonition. In Guiguzi’s work we
can see the extent to which sayings about sayings and speeches about speeches
became part of the canonical rhetorical literature in the East and West alike.
In his pattern of representing a number of exchanges among interlocutors,
some of them concerning speech itself, Guiguzi’s specificities resemble Plato’s
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 Under Western Eyes
Dialogues more than Aristotle’s Rhetoric. It may be that the best way to teach
and study rhetoric is to observe its practice, not to theorize its general contours,
even though there are within Guiguzi’s representations many emerging names
for kinds of speech, speakers, and interlocutors or audiences. But did anyone,
as Aristotle did for Greek tradition, draw together all of these individual pas-
sages into an entirely theoretical work on rhetoric? Would it be useful to have
such a compilation? If Isocrates is an intermediate figure between Plato and
Aristotle, might Guiguzi be seen as a similarly intermediate figure between
the persuasions, romances, and stories of the Warring States compiled in
Chan-kuo Ts’e and the more formal considerations of language developed by
the Mohists, legalists, and other schools of that period? The stories and legends
about the persuaders present an important context for understanding the
self-representation of Confucius and then Mencius as exemplars of the right
kind of language use. In this translation and Wu’s commentary, Guiguzi has
been rightly restored to visibility as a primary participant if not instigator in
the earliest Chinese dialogues about rhetoric.

Notes
1. Here and throughout in citing Plato’s works I use the standard Stephanus page
numbers to permit consultation of alternate editions.
2. All quotations from the Pre-Socratics are noted by fragment number and
taken from Kathleen Freeman’s translation, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers.
3. R. C. Zaehner, trans. Hindu Scriptures.
4. Wu includes Tao’s commentary that “learning is not an innate capability but
a cultivated activity of classifying things by their genera.” This emphasis presents
striking similarities to Pre-Socratic discussions of the One and the Many, but also
to Aristotle’s later emphasis upon taxonomies and naming of parts.
5. A companion to Mair’s synopsis is developed in Gore Vidal’s historical novel
Creation, which depicts Chinese-Greek contact at the court of Darius in the period
that immediately preceded the Greek-Persian wars. Narrated by the grandson of
Zoroaster in 445 b.c.e. the novel provides numerous allusions to Persian-Chinese
and Greek-Chinese exchanges. Among these Socrates appears in conversation with
a proponent of Daoism, exchanging ideas about the plurality of the physical and
conceptual worlds.
6. For a further consideration of the parallel contexts of warring states as contact
zones that surrounded the emergence of rhetoric in Greece and China, see Swear-
ingen, “Response,” and “Ren, Wen, Baguwen,” including the related proposal that
rhetoric entailed an explicit conceptualization of negotiating differences.
7. For an ample discussion of the ongoing exchanges and sometimes jesting cross
talk among early Chinese philosophical schools in this period, see Arabella Lyon,
“Relationships,” and J. I. Crump, Legends.
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C. Jan Swearingen
8. See for example the special issues of Rhetoric Society Quarterly (43:3, 2013),
College English (72:4, 2010), and College Composition and Communication (60:4,
2009) on East-West comparative rhetorical studies.
9. See Swearingen and Mao, “Double Trouble,” for an extended discussion of the
difference between Chinese and early Greek twos, binaries, and dialectics.
10. There have been increasingly refined considerations of Chinese cognates for
“persuasion” and “rhetoric.” Wu’s introduction and notes on translation throughout
this edition reflect the growing body of research in this area, including Garrett,
“Some Elementary Methodological Reflections” (2000), “Pathos Reconsidered”
(1993), and “Classical Chinese Conceptualization of Argumentation and Persua-
sion” (1993); Y. Liu, “To Capture” (1996); X. Lu, “Studies and Development of Com-
parative Rhetoric” (2006); Mao, “Searching for the Way” (2010); and Wu “Lost and
Found” (2009).
11. Freeman explains briefly the double senses of Heraclitus’s logos in this pas-
sage: “Logos, the intelligible Law of the universe, and its reasoned statement by
Heracleitus.” On the continuities among Daoist, Pre-Socratic, and Stoic doctrines,
see Frank Dance, “The Tao of Speech,” and Jiyuan Yu, “Living with Nature.”
12. I am indebted to Hui Wu’s comments illuminating this issue.
13. The much-debated theory advanced by Walter Ong as well as by Axial Age
proponents, that literacy fosters interiority and self-awareness within and across
many times and cultures continues to be explored, alongside studies of cultures
that develop a writing system used only for business and letter writing purposes,
and cultures that have developed a rich abstract and self-reflective lexicon, and
elaborate conventions of oral contention, without a written language. Ong discusses
interiorization in several works, most often cited, Orality and Literacy, 77–94. For a
synopsis of research challenging the “alphabetic literacy hypothesis” see Raymond
W. K. Lau, “Chinese Writing and Abstract Thought.”
14. Additional studies could be developed on the rhetorical schools of Rhodes,
as Richard Enos has begun, Sparta, where women received rhetorical education
(Calame), and Asia Minor. Alexander’s campaigns brought the Hellenistic world
into contact with India and near China, another point of cultural contact. The dif-
ferences among Aristotle, Plato, and Isocrates belie any uniform characterization
even of Athenian rhetorical schools.
15. For an extended comparison of Daoism and Stoicism on the subjects of na-
ture, social life, and the emotions, see J. Yu, “Living with Nature,” and Dance, “The
Tao of Speech.”

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Glossary of Guiguzi’s Rhetorical Terms
Works Cited
Index
 Glossary of Guiguzi’s Rhetorical Terms

bi zhe 比者. Comparison of words (ci 辭) or images (xiang 象) (I.2.2, I.2.3).

bian 辨. Judicious reasoning in a speech to a knowledgeable person; to conduct
an analysis; to make a distinction.
bian zhe 辨者. A debater, same as 辯者 (bian zhe, debater or persuader) in
classical Chinese.
bo 博. Erudite talk or eloquence with frequent citations in sophisticated words.
chan 諂. Fawning talk or eloquence catering to someone’s wish based on the
prior knowledge of his mindset (II.9.1).
cheng wen zhang 成文章. To compose prose (II.7.3).
chu yan 出言. To speak (II.9.3).
chuai qing 揣情. To weigh, to detect, the audience’s emotions or feelings.
ci 辭. Rhetoric, speech, words, what is said. 辭 has a wide range of meanings,
such as expressions, meanings, prose, speech composition, eloquence,
diction, and rhetoric.
ci yan [you] wu 辭言[有]五. Five types of flawed eloquence or speeches:
bing 病. A speech of affliction that manifests no energy or spirit.
kong 恐. A speech of fear that conveys neither hope nor idea.
nu 怒. A speech of anger that is reckless without order.
xi 喜. A speech of joy that is overoptimistic without focus.
you 憂. A speech of anxiety that clogs up without outlet (II.9.3).
er yan 二言. Double speech of action (you wei 有為); practicing yin, it may
mean the Way of Earth or an ambiguous vague speech (II.11.2). In
modern Chinese, it means to change one’s mind or withdraw a previ-
ous agreement.
fan 反. Adverse talk or eloquence of poor quality that aims to stop the oppos-
ing side through attacks.
fan ci 反辭. A speech as a response or a response in spoken words.
fan ting 反聽. To reflect on what has been heard to know about the feelings of
one’s audience; reflective listening.
fan yan 繁言. A sophisticated or complicated speech (II.9.2).

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Glossary of Guiguzi’s Rhetorical Terms
fei er 飛耳. Quick, acute ears, an integral part of the art of persuasion, mean-
ing to listen to the audience with Heaven’s ears to detect the audience’s
subtle moves or motions (II.12.9).
fei qian zhi ci 飛箝之辭. Captivating words or captivating eloquence. 飛 (fei)
means to excite a person by commending him for his reputation or
fame, or an exciting speech. 箝 means to hold tightly with force (II.5.1).
fu 符. A sign, proof, identification pass, sign of luck, mystic craft, the Dao, or
the law. An example is 陰符 (yin fu) that refers to an external sign of a
thought revealed by an audience (III.1.1).
gou qian zhi ci 鉤箝之辭 or gou qian zhi yu 鉤箝之語. Also see fei qian zhi ci
飛箝之辭 (II.5.1).
he yu 合語. A proper speech to a proper audience (III.1.6).
jia 假. Borrowing words, quoting, or citing sources; a rhetorical technique to
decide how and when to borrow words to polish a speech (II.9.1).
jian 見. To see, discern, observe, or detect the surroundings, the audience,
the mood, shapes, images of other persons before speaking; an integral
part of the art of persuasion.
jin shui ci 進說辭. To deliver a persuasive speech to a superior.
jing yan zhe 靜言者. A composed calm speech, a speech of equilibrium to ap-
pease the opposition for the purpose of winning (II.9.1).
jue 決. Resolute talk or eloquence of doubtless determination.
li 理. The principle [of Dao], a reason.
li ci zhe 利辭者. A person who has no choice but to speak in response (II.9.1).
lun 論. Sometimes it means discussion as in tao lun (討論, to talk about it or
to discuss it); sometimes an argument or a comment depending on the
context (II.7.3).
ming 明. Intelligent, wise, or clear-minded. It appears in shen ming (神明) to
mean omniscient intellectual conscience, the most desirable character
of a persuader. See also shen ming (神明) (II.12.3, II.12.4).
ming 名. Naming, to clarify, to define accurately, or to make distinctions
(II.12.9). In antiquity, it is often associated with 辯 (bian, argue, debate,
or make distinctions), as in 名辯 (ming bian), to refer to a rhetorical
practice in the political arena.
ming ming 明名. To name or clarify things intelligently (II.6.1).
nan yan 難言. A difficult speech, an accusatory speech, a speech of criticism,
or a counterargument (II.9.1).
nei ci 内辭. The substance of a speech.
neng yan zhe 能言者. Eloquent speaker, who has mastered the Central Doctrine
and can use a speech to help people and attend to an emergency (III.3.1).

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 Glossary of Guiguzi’s Rhetorical Terms
ning yan zhe 佞言. An obsequious eloquence for the purpose of fawning over
someone for the recognition of loyalty (II.9.1).
ping yan zhe 平言. A plain speech for the purpose of showing decisiveness for
recognition of bravery (II.9.1).
qi [yan] 奇[言]. An ingenious speech that does not follow the orthodox but
employs it to make things happen when opportunities arise (II.10.4).
qi yan zhe 戚言. A speech about concerns with the intent to share strategies
for recognition of trustworthiness (II.9.1).
qing 情. Feelings or emotions developed from and controlled by the heart (xin
心), which decides how to express feelings (I.1.4).
qing lun 輕論. A pointed, efficacious comment (II.9.1).
quan 權. Power talk or eloquence purporting to affect policies and plans. It is
not the same as 權 in the title of chapter 9 (II.9.1).
que lun 却論. An argument or a critical comment (II.9.1, note 7).
ren yan zhe 人言者. A speaker, another person who is speaking.
shen ming 神明. Omniscient intellectual conscience, a quality of the sage who
consults Heaven and Earth and follows the Dao (II.8.2, II.12.3, II.12.4,
III.1.1, III.1.3)
sheng ren 圣人. A sage of rhetoric (I.1.1, III.1.1).
shi fei zhi yu 是非之語. True or false words as in bie shi fei zhi yu 别是非之語.
Bie 别 means “to distinguish, to differentiate, or to tell” (II.5.1). In mod-
ern Chinese, 是非之語 means words that stir up trouble or cause politics.
shi yan 飾言. An embellished or polished speech (II.7.3).
shi yan zhe 飾言者. A person who embellishes a speech with citations (II.9.1).
shu 術. The art to invigorate a rhetor’s spirit and will (III.1.1, III.1.3).
shui 說. To persuade, convince, deliver a persuasive speech (II.9.1).
shui ci 說辭. A persuasive speech or oral eloquence.
ting 聽. Listening, an art of studying the audience or to gather information
before delivering a speech (II.9.4).
wai ci 外辭. Embellishment of a speech, a superficial speech.
xiao yan 謏言. A crafty speech to show off knowledge for recognition of intel-
ligence.
xin 心. Heart. Ancients believe that the heart controls thinking, feelings, and
spirit, like the “mind” in the Western context.
xin shu 心術. The art of the heart, meaning functions of the mind and the
psyche (III.1.6).
yan 言. A speech, spoken words.
yan zhe 言者. Speaker, rhetor, or persuader.
yang yan 陽言. A speech in the yang category that begins with a lofty topic.

157
Glossary of Guiguzi’s Rhetorical Terms
yi yan 一言. A single speech of inaction (wu-wei 無為); practicing yang, it may
mean the Way of Heaven or a clear consistent speech (II.11.2).
yin yan 陰言. A speech in the yin category whose topic is about low and small
matters.
yu 語. A speech or spoken words.
yu yu 與語. To speak to someone, to deliver a speech to someone.
zheng 正. Flawlessness, propriety, a quality of persuasion (II.10.4).
zheng [yan] 正[言]. A proper speech that follows the orthodox and defends
the convention (II.10.4).
zhi ming 治名. To appropriate names.
zhi zhe 智者. A wise man who has mastered the art of rhetoric.
zhong 中. Precision, propriety, a quality of persuasion.

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 Index
acting like a ghost, 46n39. See also
listening
advice: ego and, 52; qualities of, 12, 125,
150; for rulers, 57n8, 83n150. See also
Guiguzi (text); persuasion
advisors: in Chinese rhetorical tradi-
tion, 5, 11–13, 15, 31nn14–15, 56n2,
62n39; in Greco-Roman rhetoric,
30n9, 143; qualities of, 57n7. See also
Guiguzi (teacher); sages of rhetoric
(sheng ren 圣人)
affect-fortify (nei qian 内揵), 49–53
agitate-arrest. See captivate-capture (fei
qian 飛箝)
ambiguity, 20–21, 54n93, 127, 149
Ames, Roger T., 24, 31n15, 117
amicable character (yin de 阴德), 50.
See also Dao 道 (the Way)
An Na, 21, 34, 40n5
Analects (Confucius), 5, 106n87, 112n118,
135. See also Confucius
analogy, 24–28, 44nn28–29. See also
animal metaphors; logic; reasoning;
specific analogies
animal metaphors, 48n53, 48n56,
50n67, 79n136, 83n155, 90–102, 95n32.
See also bear analogy; bird analogy;
dragon analogy; flying snake; grass-
turtle divination; halibut analogy
The Annuals of Lü Buwei (Lüshi chun-
qui), 10–11
Anthology of Ancient Classics (諸子集
成), 18
argumentation (bian 辯), 3, 8, 60n26
Aristotle, 143–51; On Rhetoric, 1, 9, 121,
132, 136, 143–45, 149; as political advi-
sor, 30n9, 143; three genres of rhetoric
by, 121, 140–41
The Art of War (Sunzi), 11, 31n15. See
also Sunzi
assessing (quan 權), 70–74
assessment of capacity, 63–64, 65n49
audience: of Guiguzi, 43n25, 48n50,
58n17, 64nn44–45; of rhetorical
speech, 12–16, 18, 22, 26–29, 57, 73,
73n99, 113
authority (shi 勢), 56, 69
Axial Age, 115–16, 122, 133, 139
bai he 捭闔 (open-shut), 25, 39–42, 87
Bai Songqing and Ren Hao, 34
bao 報 (respond accordingly), 45n36
bear analogy, 98–99. See also animal
metaphors
Ben Jing Yin Fu Qi Pian 本經陰符七篇
(Primary Doctrine on the Seven Arts
of the Yin Mystique), 17, 90–105
bi zhe 比者 (comparison of words or
images), 28, 44–46. See also analogy
bi zi chu zhi 彼自出之 (other person
expresses himself), 44n32
bian zhe 辨者 or 辯者 (debater, per-
suader), 73, 73n101
bian 辯 (to argue, debate, dispute,
reason), 3, 8, 60n26, 73, 155. See also
argumentation (bian 辯); reasoning
bie shi fei zhi yu 别是非之語 (to distin-
guish truth-untruth), 56
167
Index
bie 别 (to distinguish, differentiate, or
to tell), 56–57
binary opposites, 27–28. See also specific
binary concepts
bing 病 (speech of affliction), 73, 155
Binkley, Roberta A., 3
bird analogy, 99–100. See also animal
metaphors
Bizzell, Patricia, 3
Bo Le 伯樂, 79n136
bo 博 (erudite talk), 71, 155
Book of Changes (Yi Jing 周易), 107n92
Book of History (shu 書), 51
Book of Poetry (shi 詩), 51
Broschat, Michael R., 7–8, 20, 35
bu ke shan 不可善 (those not capti-
vated by words), 57, 58n12
business principles, 42, 52, 67, 75, 78–81.
See also Dao 道 (the Way)
cai se 采色 (desire for entertainment),
50
Cao Shenggao, 21, 34, 40n5
captivate-capture (fei qian 飛箝), 11,
56–59, 62
captivating words (gou qian zhi yu 鉤箝
之語), 57
“To Capture the Essence of Chinese
Rhetoric: An Anatomy of a Paradigm
in Comparative Rhetoric” (Yameng
Liu), xi. See also Liu, Yameng
Central Doctrine (Zhong Jing 中經),
106–12. See also Primary Doctrine on
the Seven Arts of the Yin Mystique
(Ben Jing Yin Fu Qi Pian 本經陰符
七篇)
chain-reasoning in Chinese rhetoric, 3,
24. See also reasoning
chan 諂 (flattery, fawning talk), 52, 68,
71
The Charging-Beast Art of Effortless
Rotation (Zhuan Yuan Fa Meng Shou
轉圓法猛獸), 100–102
168
Chen, Puqing, 19, 21, 34, 65n52
Chen, Rudong, x
cheng wen zhang 成文章 (to compose
prose), 66
cheng 誠 (sincerity), 21, 35, 40n7
chi shu 持樞 (holding the pivot), 105
Chinese medicine, 96n39. See also
Huangdi Neijing (The Yellow Em-
peror’s Inner Canon)
Chinese rhetorical tradition, x–xi, 1–4;
comparative methodology and, 5–7,
23–24, 113–23; Daoism and, 4–5,
25–26, 115–16, 143; feminist frame-
works and, 4; human connection
and, 24–28, 52; oral debate and, 8;
single vs. public audience in, 11–12,
14. See also Greco-Roman rhetoric;
Guiguzi (text); Western rhetoric;
specific scholars and works on
chu yan 出言 (to speak), 72
chuai mo 揣摩 (to consider care-
fully), 63n42, 84n159. See also mo 摩
(gauging)
chuai qing 揣情 (to weigh feelings), 64,
66
chuai 揣 (weighing), 9, 17, 63–66
ci fei qian zhi zhui ye 此飛箝之綴也
(association between captivate and
capture), 59
ci yan 辭言 (types of speeches), 73–74
ci 辭 (rhetoric), 43–44, 43n26, 47, 74.
See also rhetoric; specific terms for
Cicero, 121, 148
circle (yuan 圓), 49, 101–2
Cleary, Thomas, 7–8, 20, 21, 22, 35
closeness/distance in relationships,
49–51
collecting (mu 牧), 46
College English (journal), x, 6
colonization, 119, 122, 143
Combs, Steven, 2, 4
Communication and Culture in Ancient
China and India (Oliver), ix, 2

Comparative Rhetoric (Kennedy), 2, 7.
See also Kennedy, George
A Comprehensive Guide to Guiguzi’s
Pragmatic Schemas (ed. Zhang), 16
Confucianism, 143
Confucius, 15, 18, 24, 31n14, 134; Ana-
lects, 5, 106n87, 112n118, 135
connection (he 合), 52
conquest, 69n79, 83, 109, 118–19, 137
contact zones, 4–5, 118–19, 151nn5–6,
152n14
correlative thinking, 27–28. See also
Ames, Roger T.
Coyle, Daniel, 20, 24
Creation (Vidal), 151n5
The Crouching-Bear Art of Distributing
Power (Fen Wei Fa Fu Xiong 分威法
伏熊), 98–99
Crump, James I., Jr., 11–12, 129, 133, 150
da hua zhe 大化者 (teacher of Dao),
43n20
da yi 大儀 (self-withdrawal), 52–53
Dao Cang Ben 道藏本, 10. See also
under Guiguzi (text)
Dao De Jing (Laozi), 5, 7, 22, 26, 31n14,
31n16, 116–18. See also Laozi
Dao 道 (the Way): art of effortless rota-
tion and, 100–102; dao as term, 39,
117–18; invigorating the spirit and,
90–96, 97n41; mend-break (di xi 抵
巇), 9, 53–55; reflective listening
(fan ting zhi dao 反聽之道), 46n42,
48n50. See also Heaven and Earth
Daoism and rhetorical tradition, 4–5,
25–26, 115–16, 143. See also Chinese
rhetorical tradition
de Oratore (Cicero), 121, 148
de 得 (replace), 55
debate (bian 辯), 3, 8, 60n26
debater (bian zhe 辨者), 73
decision-making (jue 决), 9, 71, 80–82
deliberating (lü 慮), 65
Index
deploying (mou 謀), 9, 17, 74–80
desire (cai se 采色), 50
Di Ku 帝嚳, 55n99
Di Shun 帝舜, 55n99
di xi 抵巇 (mend-break), 9, 53–55
Di Yao 帝堯, 55n99
dialectic. See Aristotle; Chinese rhetori-
cal tradition; Plato; Sophists and Pre-
Socratics on rhetoric
diao ji ye 釣幾也 (hidden, unuttered,
secret), 70–71
diao ren zhi wang 釣人之網 (to angle
with people), 44–45
Dictionary of Classical Chinese, 46n40,
49n58
The Discourse of Salt and Iron (Huan
Kuan), 8, 19
discussion (lun 論), 66
dispersion of strength, 99–100, 104
divine animals. See animal metaphors
Divine Design and Miracles in Guiguzi
(Guiguzi tainji miaoyi 鬼谷子天機
妙意), 16
The Divine-Turtle Art of Developing the
Will (Yang Zhi Fa Ling Gui 飬志法
靈龜), 94–95. See also grass-turtle
divination
dong 動 (in motion, restlessness), 43, 68
dragon analogy, 90–94. See also animal
metaphors
Du Guangting 杜光庭, 16
ego, 52
eikos, 134, 148
elegance, 33–34, 149
eloquence: in Chinese rhetorical tradition,
11, 18–19; deliver exalting eloquence
(fei 飛), 52, 56n1, 57n9, 58; qualities of,
59n22; translation of, 35, 44n26
eloquent speakers (neng yan zhe 能言
者), 106, 137
emotion, 144–47
Empedocles, 115, 120, 123–26, 139
169
Index
“Encomium of Helen” (Gorgias), 129–31,
142, 145
energy (qi 氣), 91, 94–95
Epictetus, 126–27
er yan 二言 (double speech), 82
essay, 10, 17
ethos/pathos, ix, 26, 142, 144–45
excitement by exalted eloquence (shui er
fei zhi 說而飛之), 52
external feelings (wai 外), 52, 56, 57n5
family strategies, 87–88. See also
relationships
fan 反 (adversarial, attacking speech
attempt­ing to stop the opposing side),
61, 71
fan ci 反辭 (response), 46
fan ting zhi dao 反聽之道 (reflective
listening), 46n42, 48n50. See also
listening
fan wu 反忤 (reconcile-resist), 61–62
fan yan 繁言 (sophisticated speech), 71
fan ying 反應 (reflect-respond), 43–49
fancy talk, 18–19, 71, 124–25, 155
Fang, Lizhong, 19
fang 方 (square), 49, 101–2
fear (kong 恐), 73
feelings (qing 情), 45n36, 47, 49n63
fei 飛 (deliver exalting eloquence), 52,
56n1, 57n9, 58
fei er 飛耳 (quick, acute listening), 87n175
fei qian 飛箝 (captivate-capture), 11, 52,
56–59, 62
fei qian zhi ci 飛箝之辭 (captivating
words or eloquence, to excite by com-
pliments), 56–59
Fen Wei Fa Fu Xiong 分威法伏熊 (The
Crouching-Bear Art of Distributing
Power), 98–99
fill in (sai 塞), 55, 66
The Five-Dragon Art of Invigorating the
Spirit (Sheng Shen Fa Wu Long 盛神
法五龍), 90–94
170
five energies (wu qi 五氣), 91–93, 93n19,
100
five types of speeches, 73–74
five zang-organs (wu zang 五臟), 96n39
flattery (chan 諂), 52, 68, 71
flying snake, 48n53, 95n32. See also
animal metaphors
The Flying-Snake Art of Empowering the
Mind (Shi Yi Fa Teng She 實意法螣
蛇), 95–97
Focusing the Familiar (Ames and Hall),
31n15
formlessness, 44n29. See also motion-
lessness (jing 靜)
four seasons, 105
Freeman, Kathleen, 152n11
fu 符 (a sign or proof, a talisman, sign
of luck, mystic craft, Dao, law),
48n52, 83n150, 90n2. See also sign
fu mu 蚨母(trapdoor spider), 50n67
fu yan 符言 (fundamental principles),
83–88
fu ying bus hi 符應不失 (miss a target),
48
fundamental principles (fu yan 符言),
83–88
future (lai 來), 43
Gao Sixun 高似逊, 18
Garrett, Mary, 2, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 24
gauging (mo 摩), 9, 63, 66–69, 84n159
gendered audience, 43n25, 48n50,
64nn44–45. See also audience
genre, 119–20, 145–46, 149–50
genres of rhetoric (Aristotle), 121,
140–41
Ghost Valley (Guigu), 30n4
Glenn, Cheryl, 3, 29
glib-tongued talk, 18–19, 124–25
glossary, 155–58
Gorgias, 30, 114, 126, 140; “Encomium of
Helen,” 129–31, 142, 145; “On Being,”
129, 131

Gorgias (Plato), 114, 129, 134, 138
gou qian zhi ci 鉤箝之辭 or gou qian
zhi yu 鉤箝之語(captivating words),
57
governance, 52, 105. See also military
strategies
Graham, A. C., 23, 133–34
The Grand Scribe’s Records (Ssu-Ma), 11,
13–15, 17, 31nn14–15, 56n2
grass-turtle divination, 82, 83n149,
94n22. See also The Divine-Turtle Art
of Developing the Will (Yang Zhi Fa
Ling Gui 飬志法靈龜)
Greco-Roman rhetoric: Aristotle and,
143–51; comparative methodology
and, 5–7, 23–24, 113–23; contact
zones and early rhetoric, 4–5, 118–19,
151nn5–6; on emotion, 144–47; influ-
enced by Sophists and Pre-Socratics,
123–34; overview of, 1, 119–23; Plato
and, 134–43. See also Chinese rhetori-
cal tradition; Western rhetoric
gu 古 (past), 43
gua 卦, 107n92
Guanzi (Liu), 10
guarding justice (shou yi 守義), 112
Guigu (Ghost Valley), 30n4
Guiguzi (teacher): biographical infor-
mation on, 9, 30n5; disciples of, 9, 11,
30n10; reception of, 113–14; zong-
heng schools and, 16, 19–20. See also
teacher of rhetoric
Guiguzi (text): Book I, 39–55; Book II,
56–89; Book III, 90–112, 116, 137–38;
on affect-fortify (nei qian 内揵),
49–53; on assessing (quan 權), 70–74;
authoritative version of, 10, 21, 32–33;
on captivate-capture (fei qian 飛箝),
11, 56–59, 62; on The Charging-Beast
Art of Effortless Rotation (Zhuan
Yuan Fa Meng Shou 轉圓法猛獸),
100–102; Chinese reception of, 16–22,
132, 144; comparison with Aristotle,
Index
143–51; comparison with Plato,
134–43; comparison with Sophists
and Pre-Socratics, 123–34; com-
parison with Greco-Roman rhetoric,
113–23; on The Crouching-Bear Art of
Distributing Power (Fen Wei Fa Fu
Xiong 分威法伏熊), 98–99; debatable
authorship of, 9–10, 32; on decision-
making (jue 决), 9, 71, 80–82; on
deploying (mou 謀), 9, 17, 42n10,
74–80; on The Divine-Turtle Art of
Developing the Will (Yang Zhi Fa
Ling Gui 飬志法靈龜), 94–95; on The
Five-Dragon Art of Invigorating the
Spirit (Sheng Shen Fa Wu Long 盛神
法五龍), 90–94; on The Flying-Snake
Art of Empowering the Mind (Shi Yi
Fa Teng She 實意法螣蛇), 95–97; on
fundamental principles (fu yan 符
言), 83–88; fundamentals of rhetoric
in, 24–29; on gauging (mo 摩), 9, 63,
66–69; inadequate translations of,
7–8; Japanese interest in, 30n8; on
mend-break (di xi 抵巇), 9, 53–55;
missing chapters 13 & 14, 88–89; on
open-shut (bai he 捭闔), 25, 39–42;
on The Preying-Bird Art of Dispersing
Strength (San Shi Fa Zhi Niao 散勢法
鷙鳥), 99–100; punctuation in trans-
lations, 34, 41n8; on reflect-respond
(fan ying 反應), 43–49; on resist-rec-
oncile (wu he 忤合), 59–63; socio-
political context of, 9–15; structure
of, 33–36, 138; on weighing (chuai
揣), 9, 17, 63–66; Western reception
of, 22–24; on yin-yang principles,
24–29, 124; vs. Zhuangzi, 89. See also
Chinese rhetorical tradition
“Guiguzi 鬼谷子: On the Cosmological
Axes of Chinese Persuasion” (Coyle),
24
Guo Kui 郭隗, 56n2
Guo Po 郭璞, 16, 48n53
171
Index
halibut analogy, 48n56. See also animal
metaphors
Hall, David L., 7, 24, 31n15, 117
Han Wudi, 19
Hanfeizi (Han Fei Tzu), 5, 13, 18, 19, 30
he yu 合語 (proper speech to proper
audience), 102
he zong, 11. See also zong-heng schools
he 合 (connection), 52
heart (xin 心), 39, 41, 45
Heaven and Earth, 24–26, 42, 49n59, 91.
See also Dao 道 (the Way)
heng 横 (to move horizontally), 59
Heraclitus, 116, 120, 126–29, 132, 152n11
Hildebrandt, Herbert, 5
holding the pivot (chi shu 持樞), 105
Holms, David, 3
honesty-dishonesty (qing zha 情詐), 47
horizontal alliance (lian heng), 11, 20,
34, 41n8, 59, 63. See also zong-heng
schools
horse analogy, 79n136. See also animal
metaphors
Hou Yi 后羿, 48
Hsüan 宣, 31n15
Huan, Kuan, 8, 19
Huang Di 黄帝, 55n99
Huangdi Neijing (The Yellow Emperor’s
Inner Canon), 84n159, 97n39. See also
Chinese medicine
hui zhi 毁之 (revealing weaknesses), 57
human connection and rhetoric, 24–28,
52
Iliad (Homer), 132
imagery, 27–28, 44–47, 47n43, 107. See
also music
India, 117, 119, 152n14
indirectness in rhetoric, 3, 15, 113, 127, 142
insect analogy, 72–73, 72n98. See also
animal metaphors
inspiration, 46, 130, 145, 147. See also
analogy; imagery
172
intellect. See omniscient intellectual
conscience (shen ming 神明)
intelligence (ming 明), 60, 67, 68
internal feelings (nei 内), 52, 56, 57n5, 66
Intrigues: Studies of the Chan-Kuo Ts’e
(Crump), 10, 11–12, 30n11. See also
Zhan Guo Ce (Liu)
de Inventione (Cicero), 121
invigorating the spirit, 90–94
irony, 144–45
Japan, 4, 8, 30n8, 94n22
Jarratt, Susan, 3
Jaspers, Karl, 115
ji mou 計謀 (strategic deployment), 76–77
jia 假 (to borrow, quote), 70n82
jian wei zhi lei 見微知纇 (genera of
things), 47–48
jian 澗 (ravine), 53, 58, 99
jian 見 (to see, discern, observe the
surroundings of the audience before
speaking), 47, 48, 58n13, 76, 99
Jiang Taigong 姜太公, 17, 62n39
jie qi cheng 結其誠 (to tie oneself to
sincerity from others), 21, 35, 40n7
jie 結 (tie, connect), 21, 35, 40n7
jin shui ci 進說辭 (to deliver a persua-
sive speech to a superior), 55, 113, 144
jin 今 (present), 43
jing yan zhe 靜言者 (a composed, calm
speech of equilibrium), 71
jing 靜 (motionlessness, tranquility),
43–44, 68
jiu qiao 九竅 (nine openings), 86n169,
92–93, 92n17
jue 决 (decision-making), 9, 80–82
jue 決 (a resolute talk, eloquence of
undoubted determination), 71
Jullien, François, 22, 24, 26
Kao, Karl, 24
Keishishi Bu, 30n8
Kennedy, George, ix, 2, 4, 7

Kikokushi. See Guiguzi (text)
King Hui 惠, 17, 30n10
King Jie 桀王, 62
King Tang 湯王, 62
King Wen 周文王 (Zhou Wen Wang),
19, 62n39
King Wu 周武王 (Zhou Wu Wang),
62n39
King Xüan (Hsüan 宣), 31n15
King Yan Zhao 燕昭王, 56n2
kingdom (tian xia 天下), 62
Kirkpatrick, Andy, 3–4, 8, 24
knowledge of others and oneself, 48–49
kong wang 空往 (empty-handed), 59
lai 來 (future), 43
Laozi: biographical information of,
31n14; on birth of myriad things,
101n60; Dao De Jing, 5, 7, 22, 26,
31n14, 31n16, 116–18; on naming, 147
law. See also Dao 道 (the Way); Daoism
and rhetorical tradition; legalists; logos
learning, 116, 151n4
The Legacy of Guiguzi (Xiao), 16
legalists, 113, 151
Legends of the Warring States (Crump),
129, 150. See also Zhan Guo Ce (Liu)
Li, Wenshu, 17
li ci zhe 利辭者 (a person who must
respond), 70n84
li 理 (principle of Dao, a reason), 45n33,
76, 92n9
lian heng (horizontal alliance), 11, 20,
34, 41n8, 59, 59n22, 63. See also zong-
heng schools
Library of Chinese Classics, 18
Lipson, Carol S., xi, 3, 7
listening: acting like a ghost, 46n39;
quick, acute listening (fei er 飛耳),
87n175; reflective listening (fan ting
zhi dao 反聽之道), 46n42, 48n50;
speaking and, 26–29, 123–24; in yin-
yang principles, 29
Index
The Literary Mind and the Carving of
the Dragon (wenxin diaolong 文心雕
籠, Liu), 11, 88
Liu, Tao, 21n12
Liu, Xiang 劉向, 10, 18
Liu, Xie (Liu Hsieh 劉勰), 11, 17. See also
The Literary Mind and the Carving of
the Dragon (wenxin diaolong 文心雕
籠, Liu)
Liu, Yameng, xi, 6, 7, 19, 23
Liu, Zongyuan 柳宗元, 17
liu fu 六腑 (six fu-organs), 96n39
Logan, Shirley, 3
logic: in Chinese rhetorical tradition,
2, 3, 5, 23–24, 60n26; in Western
rhetorical tradition, 2, 113–14, 118,
122, 129–31, 133–34, 147–48. See also
analogy; chain-reasoning; logos;
reasoning
logos, 120, 122, 124, 127–30, 147–48,
152n11. See also reasoning
lord (jia 家), 42, 58, 62
Lü, Buwei, 10–11, 12–13, 18, 124
Lu, Xing, x–xi, 2, 7, 121
Lü Shang 呂尚, 31n12, 62–63
lü 慮 (deliberating), 65
lun 論 (to talk about, discuss), 66
Lunsford, Andrea, 3
Lyon, Arabella, 5, 22
Mair, Victor, 117, 119
managing others (mou ren 牧人), 49
Mao, LuMing, xi, 5, 6, 117
“Master of the Demon Valley” (Cleary),
8
meaning: in Chinese rhetorical tradi-
tion, 22, 28–29, 33–36; in Guiguzi, 40,
44n26; in Western rhetorical tradi-
tion, 122, 136, 142, 148
Mencius on Mind (Richards), 135–36
Mencius 孟軻 (Meng Ke), 31n15, 134,
135, 143
mend-break (di xi 抵巇), 9, 53–55
173
Index
metaphor. See analogy; animal
metaphors
mi mi 秘密 (secretive), 21
mi 密, 20–21, 40
military strategies, 10–11, 13–15,
56–59. See also persuasion; zong-heng
schools
mind. See xin 心 (heart)
mindset. See xin 心 (heart)
ming jia 名家 (Mingjia school), 60n26
ming 名 (to name, define), 3, 60
ming 明 (intelligence, lucidity), 60, 67,
68. See also omniscient intellectual
conscience (shen ming 神明)
Mitchell, Stephen, 7
mo zhi suo wei 莫知所爲 (not knowing
about a person’s behavior), 52–53,
53n84
mo 摩 (gauging), 9, 63, 66–69. See also
chuai mo 揣摩 (to consider carefully)
Mohists, 113, 133, 138, 151
motion (dong 動), 43
motionlessness (jing 靜), 43–44
mou ren 牧人 (managing others), 49
mou 謀 (deploying), 9, 17, 42n10, 74–80
mu 牧 (collecting), 46
music, Chinese classical, 72, 108–9,
109n96, 111, 112n115. See also imagery
naming principles, 60, 88nn179–81,
116–18, 122–23, 147. See also ming 名
(to name, define)
nan yan 難言(an accusatory, critical
speech, a counterargument, a difficult
speech), 70n86
narrative rhetoric, 6–8, 129. See also
genres of rhetoric
negotiation (yi 議), 75
nei ci 内辭 (substance of a speech),
50–51, 57n5
nei fu 内符 (external signs for internal
feelings), 52n77, 66
nei qian 内揵 (affect-fortify), 49–53
174
nei 内 (deliver a speech), 50, 56
nei 内 (internal feelings), 52, 56, 57n5,
66
neng yan zhe 能言者 (eloquent speaker),
106, 137
nine openings (jiu qiao 九竅), 86n169,
92–93, 92n17
ning yan zhe 佞言者 (eloquent fawning
or flattery speech), 71
nobles, 58, 60–62
nu 怒 (aggravating, anger), 68, 73
“Ode to a Traveling Spirit” (youxian shi
遊仙詩), 16
Ohashi Takeo, 30n8
Oliver, Robert, ix, 2
omniscient intellectual conscience
(shen ming 神明), 25, 84, 85n160,
95–97
“On Being” (Gorgias), 129, 131
One and many, 123–34
one’s or somebody’s (qi 其), 21, 35, 40n7,
50n66, 66n59
Ong, Walter, 152n13
On Rhetoric (Aristotle), 1, 9, 121, 132,
136, 143–45, 149
open-shut (bai he 捭闔), 25, 39–42, 87.
See also yin-yang
opportunity (shu ji 樞機), 59
oppose-ally. See resist-reconcile (wu he
忤合‍)
opposites, 27–28. See also yin-yang
oral discourse/literature, 8, 149
oral tradition, 8, 10, 32, 149
orator, 140
oratory, 3, 4, 140
ordinary persons (xiao ren 小人), 106,
112n118
Orientalism, 118–19
Owen, Stephen, 149–50
Parmenides, 115, 120, 126–27, 133, 135,
136, 138

past (gu 古), 43
pathos/ethos, ix, 26, 142, 144–45
persuasion: as an art, 26, 76, 84n157,
90–96; challenges to, 69, 72; difficulty
in translating term, 113; persuaders
of ancient Greece, 30n9; qualities of
political persuaders, 10–11; reception
of, 13; techniques of, 44n28, 65n52,
70–71. See also advice; advisors;
eloquence; five types of speeches;
Guiguzi (text); military strategies; Su
Qin 苏秦 (Su Zi); Zhang, Yi 張儀
(Zhang Zi)
persuasive speech (shui ci 說辭), 50, 57
Phaedrus (Plato), 130, 134, 138–41
Pike, Kenneth, 2
ping yan zhe 平言者 (plain speaker), 71
Plato, 134–43; on divisions of speech,
142–43; Gorgias, 114, 129, 134, 138;
Phaedrus, 130, 134, 138–41; on
Socrates as sophist, 131–32; term
‘rhetoric’ by, 120, 140–41
pluralism, 116–17, 122–23
poetry, 51, 108, 128–29, 130, 145, 149–50
political consultation. See military
strategies; persuasion
present (jin 今), 43
The Prevising-Grass Art of Decrease and
Increase (Sun Dui Fa Ling Shi 損兑法
靈蓍), 103–4
The Preying-Bird Art of Dispersing
Strength (San Shi Fa Zhi Niao 散勢法
鷙鳥), 99–100
Primary Doctrine on the Seven Arts of
the Yin Mystique (Ben Jing Yin Fu Qi
Pian 本經陰符七篇), 17, 90–105, 116.
See also Central Doctrine (Zhong Jing
中經)
‘probing depth to weigh feelings’
method, 64–65
Protagoras, 30, 126, 134, 135, 148
punctuation, 34, 41n8
Pythagoras, 127–28, 132
Index
qi 氣 (energy), 91, 94–95, 96, 96nn36–37
qi 其 (one’s or somebody’s), 21, 35, 40n7,
50n66, 66n59
qi shu xing ye 其數行也 (principle of
mou), 74–75
qi shu ye 其術也 (reconcile-resist),
61–62
qi [yan] 奇[言] (ingenious and unorth-
odox speech), 78
qi yan 戚言 (speech about concerns), 71
Qian Long, Emperor, 33
qian 揵 (hold something firmly, latch),
49n62, 50n68, 51
Qin Engfu, 32–33. See also Guiguzi
(text)
qing 情 (emotion, feelings, sensibility),
45n36, 47, 49n63, 64, 69
qing 情 (reality, situation), 40n6, 51
qing lun 輕論 (a pointed, efficacious
argument), 70
qing zha 情詐 (honesty-dishonesty), 47
qu 去 (removal, departure), 52, 108n95
qu luan 胠亂 (solution to disorder),
88–89
quan 權 (assessing), 70–74
quan 權 (power talk), 71
que lun 却論 (an argument or a critical
comment), 70–71, 114
Raphals, Lisa, 22–23
rationality, 23, 26–27, 47n43, 70n85,
86–87, 146
ravine (jian 澗), 53
Reading Chinese Fortune Cookie (Mao),
6
Readings in Chinese Literary Thought
(Owen), 149–50
reasoning: in Chinese rhetoric, 3, 24,
27–28, 45n33, 60n26, 70, 73, 94; in
Western rhetoric, 23, 122, 133. See also
analogy; bian 辯 (to argue, debate,
dispute, reason); logic; logos
reconcile-resist (fan wu 反忤), 61–62
175
Index
A Record of Alternative Others (luyi ji
錄异記), 16
reflect-respond (fan ying 反應), 43–49
relational, 15, 20, 59–60, 82n152
relationships, 26, 49–51, 58, 109–11,
110nn102–3. See also family
strategies
removal (qu 去), 52
Ren Hao and Bao Songqing, 34
ren yan zhe 人言者 (speaker), 43, 71
replace (de 得), 55
reputation (du 度), 59
resist-reconcile (wu he 忤合), 59–63
response (fan ci 反辭), 46
restrain-fortify. See affect-fortify (nei
qian 内揵)
rhetoric: Aristotle’s rhetorical genres,
121, 140–41; comparative methodol-
ogy of, 5–7, 113–23; contact zones,
4–5, 118–19, 151nn5–6, 152n14; history
of, ix–xi; Plato’s role in defining, 134,
139–40; “rhetoric” as term, 6, 120.
See also Chinese rhetorical tradition;
Greco-Roman rhetoric; Western rhet-
oric; specific scholars and works on
rhetoric (ci 辭), 43–44, 43n26, 47, 74
Rhetoric in Ancient China (Xing), 2
Ricci, Matteo, 119
Richards, I. A., 135–36
rift (xia 罅), 53
rotation of small shots (zhuan wan 轉
丸), 88–89
round and square (yuan fang 圓方),
49n59, 101–2
Royster, Jacqueline Jones, 3
Rules of Writing (Chen), 8
sages of rhetoric (sheng ren 圣人),
25–26, 39, 43, 61, 92, 100n59, 102.
See also advisors; Dao 道 (the Way);
wisdom; zhi zhe 智者 (a master of the
art of rhetoric, a wise person)
sai 塞 (fill in), 55, 66
176
Saint Augustine, 88n179
San Shi Fa Zhi Niao 散勢法鷙鳥
(The Preying-Bird Art of Dispersing
Strength), 99–100
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 88n179
seasonal changes, 105
self-reflection, 28, 124, 127, 139, 152n13
self-withdrawal (da yi 大儀), 52–53
shang shu 尙書 (collection of speeches),
51n76
Shang Tang 商湯, 55n99
she qi yi 射其意 (target his intent like
an arrow), 48
shen mi 慎密 (careful, detailed), 21
shen ming 神明 (omniscient intellectual
conscience), 25, 84, 85n160, 91
sheng ren 圣人 (sage of rhetoric), 25–26,
39, 43, 61. See also specific persons
Sheng Shen Fa Wu Long 盛神法五龍
(The Five-Dragon Art of Invigorating
the Spirit), 90–94
sheng shen 盛神 (invigorated spirit),
90–94
Shi Ji. See The Grand Scribe’s Records
(Ssu-Ma)
shi yan 飾言 (an embellished or pol-
ished speech), 64–66
shi yan zhe 飾言者 (a person who
embellishes a speech with citations),
70n82
Shi Yi Fa Teng She 實意法螣蛇 (The
Flying-Snake Art of Empowering the
Mind), 95–97. See also flying snake
shi 事 (what is observed), 44
shi 勢 (authority), 56, 69
shi 实 (actuality, truth, evidence, or es-
sence), 60n26
shi 詩 (Book of Poetry), 51
shi’er she 十二舍 (twelve senses), 92
shou yi 守義 (guarding justice), 112
shu 書 (Book of History), 51
shu 術 (art of rhetoric as a technique,
an art), 26, 84n157, 90–96

shui 說 (to discuss, persuade, convince,
deliver a persuasive speech), 3, 41, 42,
69, 70n80, 78
shui ci 說辭 (a persuasive speech, oral
eloquence), 50, 57
shui er fei zhi 說而飛之 (excitement by
exalted eloquence), 52
shuo 說 (to explain, discuss), 3, 54n93
shutting down. See open-shut (bai he
捭闔)
sign, 77, 88, 88n179, 90n2. See also fu 符
Silk Road, 118–19
Si-Ma, Guang, 16
six fu-organs (liu fu 六腑), 96n39
Six Strategies (Liu Tao 六韜), 31n12,
62n39
snake analogy, 95–97. See also animal
metaphors
Socrates, 131–32, 136–37. See also Plato
solution to disorder (qu luan 胠亂),
88–89
Song calligraphic style (song ti 宋軆), 32
Sophists and Pre-Socratics on rhetoric,
123–34. See also Greco-Roman rheto-
ric; Western rhetoric
speaking-listening, 26–29, 123–24
speaking-thinking, 137
spider analogy, 50n67. See also animal
metaphors
spirit: Aristotle on, 138; Daoism on,
26, 146; Greeks on, 130; in Guiguzi,
90–95, 98–101, 116, 130, 146–47; heart
and, 39n1; speech and, 41, 73. See also
Dao 道 (the Way)
square (fang 方), 49, 101–2
Ssu Ma, Chi’en. See The Grand Scribe’s
Records (Ssu-Ma)
state (tian xia 天下), 62
Stoics, 127, 133, 146, 147
Stories about States in the East Zhou
Dynasty (dongzhou lieguo zhi 东周列
國誌), 16
straight talk, 12–13, 124–25
Index
strategic deployment (ji mou 計謀),
76–77
Stroud, Scott, 6, 7
Su Qin 苏秦 (Su Zi), 11, 13–15, 17, 30n10,
62n39
subtle, seamless (wei 微), 20–21, 40, 49
Sun Bin 孫臏, 9, 11, 30n6
Sun Dui Fa Ling Shi 損兑法靈蓍 (The
Prevising-Grass Art of Decrease and
Increase), 103–4
Sun Yang 孫陽, 79n136
Sunzi 孫子 (Sun Tzu), 11, 30n6, 31n15,
48n55
“T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings” (Liu
Tao), 31n12
Taigong Yin Fu (Taigong’s Yin Mystique
太公阴符), 17, 31n12, 62n39
talking up, 144–45
Tao, Hongjing, 10, 21, 32–33. See also
Guiguzi (text)
Tao Te Ching (trans. Mair), 119. See also
Dao De Jing (Laozi)
teacher of rhetoric, 9, 20; in Greco-Ro-
man rhetoric, 115, 127, 139; qualities
of, 61n28, 68n66; relationship with
student/advisee, 16, 19, 123. See also
Guiguzi (teacher)
Thunder in the Sky (Cleary), 8, 35
tian xia 天下 (world, kingdom, state),
62
topoi, 118, 141, 142
translation notes, 32–36
trapdoor spider (fu mu 蚨母), 50n67
A Treatise on Efficacy (Jullien), 24
trope, ix, 133, 144–45
true human being (zhen ren 真人), 26,
90n1, 92–93, 116
truth-untruth (shi fei zhi yu 是非之
語), 56
Tsukamoro Tetsuzō, 30n8
Tsung-heng hsueh. See zong-heng
schools
177
Index
turtle analogy. See grass-turtle
divination
twelve senses (shi’er she 十二舍), 92
Vedic tradition, 115–16
Vidal, Gore, 151n5
wai 外 (external feelings), 52, 56, 57n5
wai ci 外辭 (embellishment of a
speech, a superficial speech), 57,
71n88, 141
Wang, Bo, 4
Wang, Xu, 9. See also Guiguzi (teacher)
Wang, Yinglin, 17
Wang, Yunwu, 32
war strategies. See military strategies
Warring States era, 10–15
Way of the Power. See Dao De Jing
(Laozi)
wei 微 (subtle, seamless), 20–21, 40, 49
weighing (chuai 揣), 9, 17, 63–66. See
also chuai mo 揣摩 (to consider
carefully)
Western rhetoric: on Chinese rheto-
ric, overview, ix–xi, 1; comparative
methodology and, 5–7, 23–24, 113–23;
contact zones and early rhetoric, 4–5,
118–19, 151nn5–6, 152n14; on Guiguzi,
22–24; logic in, 2, 113–14, 118, 122,
129–31, 133–34, 147–48; origin of, 121.
See also Chinese rhetorical tradition;
Greco-Roman rhetoric
will (zhi 志), 26, 40, 50, 84, 91n3, 93–95,
97–100
wisdom: in Chinese rhetorical tradi-
tion, 22, 24, 26, 41, 48n55, 79, 100–101;
in Western rhetorical tradition, 115,
117, 120–23, 127–28. See also sages of
rhetoric (sheng ren 圣人)
world (tian xia 天下), 62
Wu, Hui, 1–36, 4. See also Guiguzi (text)
wu he 忤合 (resist-reconcile), 59–63
178
wu qi 五氣 (five energies), 91–93, 93n19,
100
wu zang 五臟 (five zang-organs),
96n39
Xenophanes, 116
xi mi 细密 (meticulous, detailed), 21
xi xia 巇罅 (emergent breaks and rifts),
55
xi 喜 (joyful speech), 68, 73
xi 巇 (crevice, break), 53
Xia, Yu 夏禹, 55n99
xia 罅 (rift), 53
xiang 象 (imagery), 27–28, 44–46,
47n43, 107
Xiao, Dengfu, 34, 103n73
Xiao, Yuhan, 16
xiao ren 小人 (as ordinary person), 106,
112n118
xiao yan 謏言 (crafty speech), 71
xie 恊 (authority, harmony, control),
62
xin 心 (heart), 39, 39n1, 41, 45
xin shu 心術 (art of the heart), 100–101
Xu, Fuhong, 4, 10, 19, 34, 35. See also
Guiguzi (text)
Xu, Zhichang, 3–4, 24
xuan mi 玄秘 (mysterious, enigmatic,
unfathomable), 21
Xunzi, 45n36
yan 言 (speech, spoken word, narra-
tion), 3, 41–44
Yan Tie Lun (The Discourse of Salt and
Iron), 8, 19
yan zhe 言者 (speaker, rhetor, per-
suader), 46n41, 70–71
yang yan zhe 陽言者 (a speech with a
lofty topic), 42
Yang Zhi Fa Ling Gui 飬志法靈龜 (The
Divine-Turtle Art of Developing the
Will), 94–95

yao 爻 (symbols), 107n92
Yi 羿, 48
yi 議 (negotiation), 75
Yi Jing 周易 (Book of Changes), 107n92
yi yan 一言 (single speech of inaction),
81–82
Yi Yin 伊尹, 62, 63
Yin, Zhizhang, 10
yin de 阴德 (amicable character), 50,
50n69
Yin Fu (Yin Mystique 阴符), 17, 90–105
yin fu 陰符 (external sign of internal
thought), 90n2
yin hua shuo shi 因化說事 (speak ac-
cording to changes), 54
yin yan 陰言者(a speech whose topic is
a small matter), 42
yinmi 隠秘 (hidden in secret), 20–21
yin-yang, 24–29, 78–80, 124. See also
Dao 道 (the Way); motion (dong 動);
motionlessness (jing 靜); open-shut
(bai he 捭闔)
yong zhi tian xia 用之天下 (employed
for state services), 58
You, Xiaoye, 8
you sheng 有聲 (spoken words), 44
you zhu ming 有主名 (explanation),
84, 88
you 憂 (speech of anxiety), 73
yu 御 (employment), 50–51
yu 語 (a speech or spoken words), 3,
41–44
yu yu 與語 (to deliver a speech to some-
one, to speak), 64
yu zhi wei zhu 與之為主 (sage’s ap-
proach as the focus), 61
yuan fang 圓方 (round and square,
Heaven and Earth), 49n59, 101–2
yuan fang zhi men hu 圓方之門户
(gateway to Heaven and Earth), 42
yuan 圓 (circle, round), 49
yuyan (analogy), 24, 27–28
Index
Zhan Guo Ce (Liu), 10, 11, 18, 30n11,
44n28. See also Intrigues: Studies of
the Chan-Kuo Ts’e (Crump)
Zhang, Jianguo, 16
Zhang, Yi 張儀 (Zhang Zi), 11
Zhao, Kuifu, 17, 18, 19
Zhao, Rui 赵蕤, 89
zhen 朕 (beginning of a crack), 53–54
zhen ren 真人 (true human being), 26,
90n1, 92–93, 116
Zheng, Jiewen, 16
zheng 正 (flawlessness, propriety as ef-
fective persuasion), 80
zheng [yan] 正[言] (a proper orthodox
speech), 77n126, 78–79
zhi 志 (will), 26, 40, 50, 84, 91n3, 93–95,
97–100
zhi 智 (wisdom), 22, 24, 26, 41, 48n55,
79, 100–101
zhi ming 治名 (to name appropriately
or put in order), 52
zhi zhe 智者 (a master of the art of
rhetoric, a wise person), 23, 48n55, 76,
79. See also sages of rhetoric (sheng
ren 圣人)
zhong 中 (precision, quality of persua-
sion), 80
Zhong Jing 中經 (Central Doctrine),
106–12
zhong lei 重累 (encumbering with
responsibilities), 57–58
Zhong Yong (Master Zisi, Zisizi), 31n15
zhou 周 (extensive, comprehensive
plan), 20–21, 40, 69
zhou quan 周全 (comprehensive, exten-
sive, thorough), 21
Zhou Wen Wang 周文王, 55n99
Zhou Yi (Yi Jing 周易), 107n92
Zhu, Yunxia, 5
Zhuan, Xu 颛頊, 55n99
zhuan hua 轉化 (turnarounds,
changes), 60
179
Index
zhuan wan 轉丸 (rotation of small
shots), 88–89
Zhuan Yuan Fa Meng Shou 轉圓法猛
獸 (The Charging-Beast Art of Effort-
less Rotation), 100–102
Zhuangzi (teacher), 18
Zhuangzi (text), 22, 89, 92
Zi Lue 子略, 18
Zi Zhi Tong Jian 資治通鋻, 16
180
Zisizi, 31n15
Zong, Qiong, 34
zong-heng 縱横 (vertical and horizontal
alliance), 11, 20, 34, 41n8, 59, 63
zong-heng schools: captivate-capture
and, 59n22; Guiguzi and, 16, 19–20;
rivalry of, 30n10; tradition of, 11. See
also military strategies; Su Qin 苏秦
(Su Zi); Zhang, Yi 張儀 (Zhang Zi)
Hui Wu is a professor of English and the chair of the Department of Literature
and Languages at the University of Texas at Tyler. Her research encompasses
the history of rhetoric and composition, comparative rhetoric, and global
feminist rhetorics. One of her articles, “Lost and Found in Transnation: Mod-
ern Conceptualization of Chinese Rhetoric,” won Rhetoric Review’s 2009 Best
Article Award. Her books include the Chinese translation of C. Jan Swearin-
gen’s Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies; Once Iron Girls:
Essays on Gender by Post-Mao Literary Women; and Reading and Writing about
the Disciplines: A Rhetorical Approach (coauthored with Emily Standridge).

C. Jan Swearingen is a professor of English emerita at Texas A&M University

and a former president of the Rhetoric Society of America. She was awarded
a year-long fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities for
her study of rhetoric and religion in colonial Virginia and has been a fellow at
the University of Cape Town Centre for Rhetoric Studies and the University
of Edinburgh Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities. Her keynote
address to the First Biennial Conference of the Chinese Rhetorical Society
of the World and International Conference on Rhetoric in Qufu, China, the
home of Confucius, introduced her explorations of parallels and contrasts
between classical Greek and early Chinese rhetorics. Her recent articles include
several studies of Chinese rhetoric and proposals for developing appropriate
methods for its study. Her books include Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy
and Western Lies and Rhetoric, the Polis, and the Global Village.
 Landmarks in Rhetoric and Public Address

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“Guiguzi is a challenging and difficult text even for native Chinese readers. Hui Wu did a
fabulous job of translating it into English without losing the original meaning of the text
while making it comprehensible to the English reader. Jan Swearingen’s comparative chapter
sheds light on both Western and Chinese rhetorical traditions.”
—Xing Lu, author of Rhetoric in Ancient China, Fifth to Third
Century b.c.e.: A Comparison with Classical Greek Rhetoric

“How wonderful to have, at last, a crucial Chinese rhetoric text from the same era as Plato and
Aristotle. ‘Guiguzi,’ China’s First Treatise on Rhetoric brings back to life, with careful scholar-
ship, a foundational text and tradition. Hui Wu and C. Jan Swearingen together have wrought
a work that promises to become a classic in the study of both Western and Chinese rhetoric.”
—Roberta Binkley, coeditor of Ancient Non-Greek Rhetorics

When Gorgias, Plato, and Aristotle were discussing and defining rhetoric in ancient Greece,
many students in China, including Sun Bin, a descendant of Sun Tzu, who wrote The Art of
War, were learning the techniques of persuasion from Guiguzi, “the Master of the Ghost Valley.”
This pre–Qin dynasty recluse provided the basis for what is considered the earliest Chinese
treatise devoted entirely to the art of persuasion. Called Guiguzi after its author, this translation
of the received text provides an indigenous rhetorical theory and key persuasive strategies,
some of which are still used by those involved in decision making and negotiations in China
today. In “Guiguzi,” China’s First Treatise on Rhetoric, Hui Wu and C. Jan Swearingen present
a new critical translation of this foundational work, which has great historical significance for
the study of Chinese rhetoric and communication and yet is little known to Western readers.

Hui Wu is a professor of English and the chair of the Department of Literature and Languages
at the University of Texas at Tyler, and the Distinguished Guest Professor of English at Shang-
hai Lixin University of Commerce, China. She is the editor and translator of Once Iron Girls:
Essays on Gender by Post-Mao Chinese Literary Women. Her translation into Chinese of C. Jan
Swearingen’s Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies was published in 2004.
C. Jan Swearingen, a professor of English emerita at Texas A&M University, is the author
of Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies and the editor of Rhetoric, the Polis,
and the Global Village. She coedited and contributed to a special symposium issue of College
Composition and Communication titled “Double Trouble: Seeing Chinese Rhetoric through
Its Own Lens” and has published widely on classical and religious rhetoric. She received
a year-long fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities for her study of
rhetoric and religion in colonial Virginia.

landmarks in rhetoric and public address

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