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Vaccine For SARS MERS
Vaccine For SARS MERS
DHULIKHEL, KAVRE
Submitted to:
Department Of Biotechnology
Kathmandu University
Submitted By:
The emergence of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) that resulted in a pandemic in
2003 and MERS in 2012 spurred a flurry of interest in the development of vaccines to prevent
and treat the potentially deadly viral infection. Researchers around the world pooled their
scientific resources and shared early data in an unprecedented manner in light of the impending
public health crisis. There are still large gaps in knowledge about the pathogenesis of the corona
viruses. While significant advances have been made in the development of animal models, the
practicality of their use may be hampered by a lack of pathological similarity with human
disease. Described here are issues related to progress in vaccine development and the obstacles
that lie ahead for both researchers and regulatory agencies.
The Vaccine design process
Among the3 various classes of beta corona virus that infect humans, notably three beta-
CoVs (SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, andSARS-CoV-2) are life-threatening. Till date, no clinically
effective prophylactics or therapeutics are available for the prevention or treatment which
creates the urgency for the development of a vaccine against these infective viruses.
1) Inactivated SARS-CoV
2) Full-length S protein
After the signal peptide, the extracellular domain consists of 2 subunits, S1 and S2.
The S1 subunit is responsible for virus binding to the receptor, angiotensin-
converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) for SARS- cov whereas, MERS-CoV uses human CD26
(also known as human dipeptidyl peptidase 4)
Infection by SARS-CoV is initiated by binding of RBD in the viral S protein S1 subunit
to ACE2 on target cells. The S2 subunit, which contains a putative fusion peptide
and 2 heptad repeats (HR1 and HR2), is responsible for fusion between the viral and
target cell membranes. Infection by SARS-CoV is initiated by binding of RBD in the
viral S protein S1 subunit to ACE2 on target cells. This forms a fusogenic core
between the HR1 and HR2 regions in the S2 domain that brings the viral and target
cell membranes into close proximity, which results in virus fusion and entry.
All of this scenario indicates that the S protein may be used as a vaccine to induce
antibodies for blocking virus binding and fusion.
All of these data suggest that the S protein can induce neutralizing antibodies and
protective responses in immunized animals
So far, most of potent neutralizing monoclonal anti-bodies are against CoV RBD.
RBD contains the major neutralizing epitopes in the S protein. The recombinant RBD
may be used as an efficacious and safe vaccine for preventing infection by SARS-CoV
strains with distinct genotypes. Therefore, RBD is an attractive vaccine target
because it can focus the immune response on interferenceof receptor binding
because unlike full-length S protein, RBD does not contain immunodominant sites
that induce nonneutralizing antibodies. RBD sequences are relatively conserved.
Thus, recombinant RBD or vectors encoding RBD may be used as safe and
efficacious vaccines. To date, a number of RBD-basedvaccines have been reported in
development against MERS and SARS
However, RBD-based subunit vaccines may face some important challenges, mostly
arising from their relatively low immunogenicity, which must be combined with
appropriate adjuvants.
A Universal Design of Betacoronavirus Vaccines against COVID-19, MERS, and SARS
For the process of human challenge studies, there are a lot of ethical factors that need to be considered.
Some of the factors are explained below:
The use of human challenge studies in the development of vaccines for SARS is likely to have several
benefits, including the opportunity to directly compare the efficacy of multiple vaccine candidates when
doing multiple field trials might be less efficient or unfeasible. The benefits are likely to be higher when
estimates of vaccine efficacy derived from such studies are generalisable to relevant populations and
there is a clear pathway from human challenge studies to further testing and the timely regulatory
approval, manufacture, and distribution of a novel vaccine. Furthermore, in interepidemic or
interpandemic periods when field trials are unfeasible, human challenge studies might be the only way
to test vaccine efficacy.
However, potential direct benefits of being infected with SARS in the course of human challenge studies
would include participants being exposed to less infection-related risk than if they are infected in the
community (eg, because of early diagnosis and medical care) and gaining immunity to future infection in
the context of a high background risk (although more data are needed to clarify the degree and duration
of immunity to SARS).
Participants might also benefit if they receive an experimental vaccine that turns out to be effective.
Participants' immunity, whether the immunity results from challenge infection or an experimental
vaccine, might also benefit third parties, especially if health-care workers are recruited to participate in
the studies, because this immunity might prevent health-care workers from becoming infected and
subsequently infecting others.
3. Risks to participants
Participants in human challenge studies might face risks associated with the challenge infection and, in
some cases, the experimental vaccine (or other intervention). Such risks should be minimized eg, via the
restriction of participation in initial studies to healthy young adults and the provision of high-quality
medical care, including intensive care, if required.
More data are needed for more accurate estimates; however, these values include young adults with
co-morbidities who would be excluded from human challenge studies. There might nevertheless be rare
severe outcomes (eg, potentially fatal respiratory failure requiring ventilation) or lasting harms (eg, long-
term respiratory deficits) among participants in human challenge studies.
Although these risks might be higher than those associated with many modern human challenge
studies, such risks might be considered acceptable if human challenge studies have considerable
expected benefits, the risks in question do not entail a major net increase in risk (in light of background
risks of infection), and there is long-term follow-up of participants and full compensation for any
research-related harms. SARS challenge studies might thus be ethically acceptable (especially when
participants already face a high background probability of infection), even in the absence of specific or
curative treatment. The use of attenuated strains that could provide data equally as useful as the data
provided by wild-type strains and the use of proven specific treatments (if developed) could further
reduce risks to participants, but developing such strains or treatments could take a long time and thus
detract from the acceleration of vaccine development that is enabled by challenge studies.
4. Self experimentation
It is conceivable that researchers might volunteer for human challenge studies during the current
pandemic alongside other volunteers. This occurrence raises questions regarding the degree to which
self-experimentation increases the permissibility of high-risk human challenge studies. The Nuremberg
Code posits that high-risk studies might be more acceptable when researchers themselves serve as
volunteers. However, this suggestion, which was appealed to in vindication of early yellow fever
studies, might be controversial, in part because clinical and research staff might feel pressure to
participate. Whether the willingness of researchers to undergo the risks of challenge infection would
justify exposing other research participants to higher risks is also unclear.
In any case, so long as all participants provide adequate informed consent and other research ethics
criteria are met, high-risk human challenge studies might be justified whether or not they include self-
experimenting researchers.
Despite the usefulness of these animal models, many challenges lie ahead. First, animal models of SARS-
CoV infection do not mimic human disease. In mice, the virus is cleared in less than 1 week and minor
pathology in the lung is observed. Histopathology performed on necropsy samples suggests that lung
epithelial cells are involved, although the absence of pneumonia and infiltrating macrophages is
disappointing. Stat1-deficient mice may prove promising as an animal model that most similarly mimics
human disease.
While there has been no observation of ADE during SARS infection, it is worth noting that one
coronavirus, FIPV, is capable of eliciting ADE and in the evaluation of vaccines, we may want to consider
this possible outcome.
5. Short lived mucosal immune response
Achieving sterilizing immunity at mucosal surfaces is a major challenge to prevent virus shedding and
mucosal immunity is often short-lived, requiring multiple booster vaccine doses. A possible scenario is
that vaccines will prevent severe disease and deaths, but may not eliminate nasal shedding, allowing
continued transmission.
As part of normal immune responses, lymphocytes and other cells produce immune signalling chemicals
called cytokines. These co-ordinate and stimulate immune responses. But if these responses are
excessive, they can cause inflammation, which in extreme cases can result in the shut-down of vital
organs including the lungs, heart and kidneys. In the case of the SARS virus, there is evidence that this
may be responsible for some of the late complications of the disease. In a small percentage of those
infected with SARS-CoV-2, an overactive immune response may make an important contribution to the
late complications of COVID-19. However, this is not known yet for certain and is an important area for
research.
Economic analysis
Corona virus family have had major economic impact over the years. A lot of time, effort and money
have been invested in research and development of vaccine for corona virus family including SARS,
MERS and SARS-CoV-2.
Till date no commercial vaccine have been produced for these viruses. But according to Moderna
Pharmaceuticals, a price range of 32$- 37$ per dose have been speculated so far which is very expensive
considering the fact that we still do not know how many booster doses are required to achieve full
immunity. If this price range is true for when the vaccine finally comes out, underdeveloped and
developing countries will not be able to afford it for its entire population.
Conclusion
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