CPH 210: Philosophy of Religion

CPH 210: Philosophy of Religion
CONSOLATA INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES
UNIT CODE: CPH 210 UNIT NAME: Philosophy of Religion
LECTURER: Dr. Opiyo Ogutu, PhD. TEL. NO: 0720696083 Email:

opiyoogutu@gmail.com
JUNE 2020
All copyright to Dr. Anthony Opiyo Ogutu, PhD.

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Course Purpose: The introduce students to the main themes and issues in the study of
philosophy of religion with a view to subjecting our religious concepts and beliefs to a rational,
critical philosophical inquiry.
Expected Leaning outcomes

Upon the completion of the course, each student must be able to:
a) Discuss the distinction that exits between philosophy of religion and theology
b) Explain why there is no specific universally accepted definition of religion
c) Reconcile the problem of suffering or evil in the world with the idea that our God is a just
God
d) Explicate whether we can be ethical without being religious
e) Asses the various arguments for the proof of God’s existence
f) Examine the role that myths play in religion
g) Explicate the object of religion
h) Analyze the various disciplines of religion
i) Asses a variety of religious experience
Course Content
What is Religion? Why is there no specific universally accepted definition of religion? What is
philosophy of religion? The purpose of studying philosophy of religion; The history of philosophy
of religion; The scope of the various disciplines of religion; The object of religion: man and the
sacred; Philosophy of religion in the modern thought; From religious experiences to the religious
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act; the religious value of myth, rite and symbol; Arguments for the proof of God’s existence:
ontological, cosmological and teleological; The problem of suffering; The relationship of ethics to
religion;
Assessment
The final exam grade will be based on the following:
Sitting Cat: 30%
Final Exam: 70%
Total: 100%
Topic 1. Religion
Topic Objectives
In this topic, we will address the following questions:
a. What is religion?
b. Why is there no specific universally accepted definition of religion?
c. What are the various disciplines of religion?
What is religion?
The concept of religion like many other important but complex concepts, is hard to define. Things
would undoubtedly be simpler if we could go along with the definition offered by Thwackum in
Henry Fielding’s novel Tom Jones:
When I mention religion I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the
protestant religion; and not only the protestant religion, but the Church of England.
However Thwackum’s definition is useful only as a warning against defining religion too
narrowly, in a way that reflects particular cultural heritage. It is especially easy for people steeped
in the tradition of Judaism, Christianity or Islam to fall into the assumption that religion has to
involve belief in a single, personal God. But even a slight acquaintance with other religious
traditions reveals that there are religions that do not fit this description. Some religions are
polytheistic; others, like Buddhism or Taoism, do not posit a divine being equipped with
intelligence, feelings or personality.
For this reason most proposed definitions of religion tend to be extremely general to the point of
being uninformative. The American pragmatist philosopher William James, for instance, defines
religion as ‘the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they consider the divine’. But even this
definition perhaps unwittingly reflects an individualism that is not present on those religious
traditions where the primary focus is the community rather than the individual. A well-known
contemporary philosopher, Paul Tillich, offered a famous and even more general definition.
‘Religion’, he said, ‘is ultimate concern’. Tillich communicated an appreciation of religion as
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humanity’s universal ultimate concern. This captures the idea that religion has to do with the most
basic and important issues in a person’s life- it is what anchors their lives and their belief (hope)
that what they do is of genuine and lasting significance. But it is also so general as to cover things
that are usually viewed as secular rather than religious: for instance, a deeply held commitment to
a particular political system and its ideology.
Is religion a matter of feeling? What part does feeling play in religion? Probably the most
thoroughgoing case for the interpretation of religion as feeling was set forth by Schleiermacher, a
German theologian of the 19th century. For him pure religion was pure feeling, a feeling of
absolute dependence on God.
In a nutshell, we should state from the offset that ‘the nature of religion is a vast and complex
subject that can be approached from a bewildering variety of viewpoints…. As a result there are a
great variety of anthropological, sociological, psychological, naturalistic and religious theories of
the nature of religion. There is, consequently, no universally accepted definition of religion, and
quite possibly there never will be’ (J. H. Hick, 1973)
Coming up with a comprehensive or a good definition of religion is thus not easy, and the reasons
for this are fairly obvious. As we have already noted, there is the great diversity of actual religions
that are or have been practiced by different peoples. These differences manifest themselves most
obviously in the different rituals and ceremonies associated with each religion. But they also
concern the most fundamental doctrinal questions, such as:
a) How many gods are there?
b) What is the nature of the divine?
c) Can there be more than one true religion?
A second reason for the difficulty is that the concept of religion is very broad; metaphysical beliefs,
moral teachings, psychological attitudes, legends, traditions, written scriptures, habitual practices,
ceremonies, poetry, song, music, art, dance and theatre can all be constitutive elements of religion.
In other words, they can all be elements or components constituting religion. Finally, scholars
disagree over whether certain so-called religions really should be thought of as religions.
Confucianism, for instance, is sometimes said to be not a religion but a moral code. Certain small,
culturally, marginal, historically unsuccessful forms of life or systems of belief that contain many
religious elements are classified by some as ‘cults’ rather than as religions. But how are we to draw
a sharp distinction between a cult and a religion? And should we even try to do so?
One thing that nearly all religions, however, defined, seem to have in common is a soteriological
interest. The term ‘soteriological’ is derived from the Greek word soteria meaning salvation. The
salvation in question may not necessarily be that of the individual, nor need it involve an afterlife.
In the Hebrew bible, for instance, what is at stake most of the time is the future well-being of the
community, not the everlasting happiness of particular people. But most religions embody the idea
that subscribing to or participating in a certain way of thinking and behaving moves us towards a
better state than the one we enjoy at present.
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One would hesitate, though, to write this concern with salvation into the definition of religion. The
underlying idea of some religions- for instance, some of the indigenous tribal religions of Africa
and the Americas- is not so much to secure salvation as to ensure the continuation of things as they
are through good harvests, good hunting, success in battle, fertility and so on. Moreover, certain
secular enterprises, particularly political movements, could also be viewed as aiming at our
salvation in the sense that they seek to lead us from our present less than ideal state toward a
‘promised land’ of affluence, security and justice. In the end, therefore, we may be forced to
conclude that the concept of religion, like many other important concepts, cannot be clearly
defined. But this realization should not inhibit the study of religion or the philosophical
examination of religious beliefs. Philosophy of religion is therefore the philosophical study of
religion. The fact that a concept has blurred edges does not necessarily make it useless or even
suspect; after all, it is only occasionally that we are unsure as to whether the predicate ‘religious’
should be applied to some belief or practice. But the difficulty of defining religion does bring home
the diversity and the complexity of the phenomenon we are dealing with.
This is to say that “religion has been variously defined depending on the particular philosophy of
religion advancing the definition” (Hunnex, Milton D. (1961). Literally the word religion is
derived from the Latin religio meaning “to bind together” that which might otherwise fall apart.
Most observers will agree that religion works for personal and social integration of values and for
a general orientation of personal human existence. Some equate religion with ignorance or with
primitive modes of thought.
In a nutshell, along with art, philosophy and science, religion has been one of the dominant
interests of humanity. Religion is not easy to define or describe because it takes many different
forms among the peoples and nations of the world. Although there is no specific universally
accepted definition of religion, throughout history, humanity has exhibited a sense of the sacred
and religion has to do with the sacred. Someone attempted to define religion as “ a faith in (that is,
beliefs about and commitment to) a sacred ultimate; a faith often organized around community,
leadership and continuity, integrated with daily living, frequently expressed in and nurtured by
ritual. It is worth noting that this definition is also tentative. Other responsible definitions are
available. Most religions address the metaphysical questions concerning the origin and nature of
the cosmos (universe), the meaning of human nature and ultimate reality and the presence of
purpose in the universe. Theories about the sources, nature and validity of religious knowledge ate
germane to epistemological inquiries. Norms of morality offered by religions can be studies by
people interested in value theory.
The Origin and Growth of Religion
What has fostered our sense of the sacred? Numerous explanations have been given- fear, owe, an
instinct, a faculty of some kind; two merit attention here.
1) Religion grew out of human, social and psychological needs. It is part of the struggle for a
fuller life and a more adequate adjustment to the world. Religion is part of the ever- present quest
for life that expresses itself in the search for food, shelter and safety, and in the search for social,
intellectual and spiritual values.
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2) Religion grew out of humanity’s awareness or recognition of a ‘more’ that gives meaning
and significance to life. Religion is the response to the presence and appeal of an unseen world
that evokes awe, reverence and confidence. Stated theologically, religion grew out of our response
to God. The search may be a complementary one, in which we are searching for God and God is
seeking our voluntary commitment.
Phenomenology of Religion
The Historical Phenomenology of religion: Scope and method
Every scientific study of religion has its subject matter religious facts and their manifestations. Its
material is drawn from the observation of man`s religious life and behavior, as he manifests his
religious attitude in acts like prayer, rites like sacrifice and sacraments, his religious conceptions
as contained in myths and symbols, his beliefs about the sacred, supernatural beings, gods etc.
Within this scientific study of the religious phenomena, there are various specific disciplines which
although they treat of the same subject matter still view them under specific aspects that are proper
to their intent and scope.
What is exactly the historical phenomenology of religion? It is the systematic treatment of the
history of religions whose task is to classify and group the numerous and widely divergent data in
such a way that an overall-view can be obtained of their religious content and the religious meaning
they contain. Religious acts and beliefs within each religion do exhibit a certain similarity to those
of other religions. A history of a particular religion leads only to the consideration of the particular
whereas the phenomenology of religion presents the systematic view of the religious phenomena.
Phenomenology of religion does not try to compare religions with one another as large units- but
takes out similar facts and phenomena which it encounters in different religions, brings them
together and studies them in groups. The purpose is to gain a deeper and more accurate insight, for
considered together as a group, the data shed light upon one another. In phenomenology we
consider the religious phenomena not only in their historical context but also in their structural
connection. Hence, we have to make a distinction between the history of religions and the history
of a particular religion. Many historians of religions, in as far as they specialize in one particular
religion and at times in only one aspect or period of that religion, are called historians because they
accept historical methods and work on historical presuppositions. Their works are valuable and
sometimes even indispensable to build up an allgemeine Religionswissenschaft.
But the history of religions which does not limit itself to one single religion or to one single aspect
of religion but studies at least a few religions in order to be able to compare them, try to understand
the modalities of religious behaviors, institutions and beliefs contained in myths, rituals,
conceptions of High Gods etc.
Evidently it is in the second sense of the history of religions that we take it here and can be called
historical phenomenology of religions in order to distinguish it from the history of particular
religions. The material is drawn from the history of particular religions but arranged from a
systematic point of view rather than from the point of view of genetic development of the
phenomenon. For instance, when one asks: What do the various religions believe about God? The
answer of particular religions will be to present the belief in God in its various historical stages of
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origin and development of this idea in a religion like Hinduism or Islam. The answer of the
historical phenomenology of religion will be to present the ideas of various religions in a
systematic way in order to get at the meaning of the conception of God through the use of
comparative method.
There is another usage of the term phenomenology of religion in a different sense; namely for the
study of a particular religion as an organic structure within a certain period, disregarding the
historical origin of the various beliefs and practices while concentrating on their meaning to the
believer. This sense of the term is not intended by us in our case. What we call historical
phenomenology of religion is sometimes called history of religions or phenomenology of religion
or comparative religion or comparative study of religion, depending on the point of view and
emphasis of individual authors.
In order not to confuse our discipline with the history of religions understood in the sense of the
historical study of particular religions and with the phenomenology of religion understood in the
sense of the Husserlian philosophy, we have preferred to use the term, historical phenomenology
of religion. Historical phenomenology of religion is the term preferred by us in order to signify the
close connection between the history of religious phenomena and their structural meaning.
Scope of the Various Disciplines of Religion
1. Sociology of Religion. Sociology of religion is defined broadly as a study of “the
interrelation of religion and society and the forms of interaction which take place between them”
(wash J. (1943). See also Nottingham E.K., 1954. Sociologists of course assume rightly that
religious impulses, ideas and institutions influence and in turn are influenced by social forces,
social organization and stratification. The sociologist of religion then studies the ways in which
society, culture and personality influence religion as well as the ways in which religion itself
affects them. Under the heading of sociology of religion are treated general group influences on
religion, functions of ritual for societies, typologies of religious institutions and of religious
responses to the secular order, the direct and indirect interactions between religious systems and
society etc.
2. Anthropology. Anthropology has been defined by E. Evans Pritchard as a branch of
sociological studies, that branch which devotes itself to primitive societies (E. Evans Pritchard,
Social Anthropology, London, 1951). Hence social anthropology of religion has to do with those
rites, beliefs, actions, behavior patterns in pre-literate societies that refer to what is regarded as
being the sacred and the supernatural. m The present day trends indicate that anthropologist apply
anthropological methods to the study of religion not only in pre-literate societies but also in
complex and literate societies, analyze symbolism in religion and myth and attempt to develop
new and precise methods for the study of religion and myth. As is evident from these accounts of
the scope of the anthropology of religion, religion is viewed as a cultural phenomenon in its many
manifestations in this discipline which studies the cultural dimension of the religious phenomena.
This mode of analysis is restricted to examining the role of religion, with emphasis on custom, rite
and belief, in social relations. Anthropologists of religion as a rule accept that they are analyzing
religion in only one of its dimensions and that other dimensions have to be analyzed by other types
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of discipline, using different techniques and even perhaps examining other types of data. NB:
Some scholars use the term anthropology of religion to denote the comparative or
phenomenological study of beliefs and practices that are related to the nature and destiny of man.
Ethnology is the science that deals with the cultures of human groups and religious ethnology
studies religious phenomena of a society as cultural manifestations. By culture, we understand the
sum-total of what an individual acquires from his society- those beliefs, customs, artistic norms,
food, habits and crafts which come to him not by his own creative activity, but as a legacy from
the past conveyed by the formal or informal education.
3. Psychology of Religion. Psychology of religion is the study of the psychological aspect of
religion; that is to say, the study of the religious function of the mind, partly dealing with the
problem of the function of the individual mind in religious contexts (the individuo-psychological
aspect) and partly with the problem of the impact of the social religious life on its participants
(socio-psychological aspect). The main area of reference in this discipline is taken to be the
religious experience of the individual or social unit. It is now commonly agreed that psychology
of religion is not concerned with the uniqueness of any one particular religion (though certain
religions convey a higher degree of reality than others), nor with the validity of any particular set
of beliefs. Psychology studies the reactions of the human psyche, its responses collective and
individual, to that reality, in whatever way it be described and experienced; which is the source of
all religious experience as well as that ultimate satisfaction for which the human soul craves. This
craving may be described as an aspiration for the sacred or divine, a re-orientation of personality
and purpose, the urge to individuation or the quest for some form of mystical union. The basic
assumption of the psychology of religion is that psychological motivations and responses are
common to all known forms of religion whether primitive, highly developed or historical, and that
it is with these motivations and their related activities that psychology of religion has to deal. In a
nutshell, we can say that psychology of religion is that branch of psychology which investigates
the psychological origin and nature of the religious attitude or religious experience, and various
phenomena in the individual arising from or accompanying such attitude and experience (see G.
Stephens Spinks, 1965; Drever, James, 1968
4. Philosophy of Religion. Philosophy of religion is the philosophical reflection on of
religion by applying systematically the philosophical method or philosophizing about religious
belief. Philosophy of religion examines critically the truth-value of the immense material of
myths, symbols and rites that come from the history of religions; the philosophy of religion
discovers their meaning, verifies their interrelationships and affirms their foundation. Philosophy
of religion brings a kind of rational justification to the spontaneous and existential movement of
religion. Analyzing the main contents of the history of religions like the sacred, God, salvation,
worship, sacrifice, prayer, ritual and symbol, the philosophy of religion determines the nature of
religion and of religious experience and expression. Historical phenomenology of religion does
not make judgment regarding the truth-value of various religious manifestations and in this sense
is not normative, whereas philosophy of religion is. In other words, philosophy of religion does
not take for granted any claim made about religion. Neither does philosophy of religion take for
granted our religious concepts and beliefs. On the contrary philosophy of religion subjects our
religious beliefs and concepts to a critical rational philosophical inquiry. That is why it is worth
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noting that there is nothing in the universe that does not interest or concern philosophy for
philosophical enterprise is essentially the application of reasoning to a wide variety of topics.
5. Theology of World Religions. This is a new field of study, just beginning to interest
Christian thinkers who wish to carry on a fruitful dialogue with non-Christian religions and to
contribute towards a better understanding of world religions. For instance, how are other world
religions related to Christianity? Can Christianity any longer claim to be unique, given the fact that
other religions propose themselves as means of ultimate salvation of man? What is the theological
basis for Christianity`s rapport with other great religions? Is it possible to be both evangelical and
completely open to what Karl Jaspers calls “boundless communion” with Hinduism, Buddhism,
Mohammedanism? Historical phenomenology is an empirical human science, making use of
historical and phenomenological method: The essence of the religious phenomena which it tries to
elucidate is not philosophical but empirical. Its criteria of judgment are not derived from principles
of faith or revelation. It does not make value-judgment of the phenomena it studies from the point
of view of truth and supernatural efficacy; hence it is not a normative science- It compares the
religious phenomena of different religions not at all with the aim of proposing any exclusivism or
syncretivism. Religious exclisivism refuses to acknowledge what is of value and good in other
religions. Religious syncretism on the other hand confuses what is general with the supreme or
universal, what is common with what is proper to each religion, and effaces the differences under
the pretext that different ways lead to the same goal in religion. In the historical phenomenology
of religion similarities are as much important as differences between religions and the proper and
specific character of each religion is to be upheld. It compares only to deepen the meaning of the
religious phenomena studied.
6. Theology. Theology being a normative science judges in the light of faith and validity of
the results of the history of religions. The method of theology uses categories that are strictly
theological; i.e. derived from a distinctly Christian revelation. Notwithstanding this, a theologian
can and must make use of the results of the history of religions. The importance of this use is
proved by the fact that not only it renders the theologian capable of avoiding religious relativism
and syncretism but it also permits him positively to deepen and enlarge his understanding of views,
experiences and norms on which theology is based. Theology is made living when the concrete
religious experience and practice of religious men is taken into account in the explanation and
elucidation of the revealed truth, worship and practice. As is evident from the above descriptions
of the scope of various disciplines which treat of the same religious phenomena, the historical
phenomenology of religion is empirical and is not normative in the sense that by comparing
various religions, it does not try to show that one religion is better than or superior to the other.
Though distinct in scope from other disciplines like sociology, anthropology, psychology which
study the same religious phenomena, the history of religions has benefited by these sciences which
have brought and continue to bring important contributions to the study of religion and certainly
their date and conclusions help the historian of religions to understand the living context of his
sources, for there is no such thing as a pure religious fact; every religious fact is also social,
psychological and cultural. However, confusion of the scope and method of these sciences will
only lead to reductionism, namely, the theory which reduces religion to a kind of epiphenomenon
of social, psychological or cultural structure. Such reductionist theories have been proposed by
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sociologists like Durkheim, by psychologists like Freud and by some ethnologists of both
evolutionist and diffusionist type. The historians of religions consider the religious phenomena as
religious, specifically and concentrate on the religious signification of the phenomena presented
by these sciences.
Reading Materials Required for topic One
1. Drever, James (1968). A Dictionary of Psychology, London.
2. Hick, John (1973). Philosophy of Religion, Jew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
3. Horner Chris and Westacott Emrys (2000). Thinking through Philosophy: An Introduction,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Hunnex, Milton (1961). Philosophies and Philosophers, San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing Company.
5. Nottingham, E.K. (1954). Religion and Society, New York.
6. Spinks, Stephens (1965). Psychology and Religion
7. Wash J. (1943). Sociology of Religion, Chicago.
Topic 2. Philosophy of Religion

Topic Objectives
1. What is philosophy of Religion?
2. What is the purpose of studying philosophy of religion?
3. What is the relationship among religion, philosophy and science?
4. What is philosophy of religion in the modern thought?
What is Philosophy of Religion?

The task to define philosophy of religion is not an easy one. We could say that it is philosophy
applied to religious belief. But we would then need to recognize that definitions of philosophy and
religion vary. What is philosophy and what is religion are questions to which different people give
surprisingly different answers. Yet philosophy of religion is now a thriving branch of philosophy.
Even if it is hard to say what philosophy of religion is exactly, there is no denying that it is currently
very big business-every bit as big as, for instance, philosophy of mind, philosophy of logic,
philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of education, philosophy of science, philosophy of history,
philosophy of language (phrases which also defy swift definition). Reference: Davis Brian,
Philosophy of religion: A guide and anthology (part IV: Morality and Religion: St. Thomas:
Religion as Moral Virtue
Nobody would deny that philosophers of religion are people who try to philosophize about
religion. Philosophers are people who try to think clearly. They typically seek to argue on the basis
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of reason. They also have a habit of trying to evaluate premises. Does it make sense to say this?
Is it reasonable to believe that? These are just the sort of questions which one can expect
philosophers to raise. But questions have a habit of leading to further questions: What is sense?
What is the difference between the reasonable und the unreasonable? These too are questions
which philosophers ask of religion.
If philosophers of religion are those people who try to philosophize about religion, what should
we mean by religion? In Henry Fielding´s novel Tom Jones, Mr. Thwackum declares: When I
mention religion I mean the Christian religion and not only the Christian religion but the protestant
religion and not only the protestant religion, but the Church of England. Yet there is surely more
to be included under the rubric of religion than Mr. Thwackum allows. There is alas no simple
way to explain what philosophy of religion is. The notion that there is a branch of philosophy to
be called “philosophy of religion” first clearly emerged in the writings of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-
1831). But philosophy of religion has been around for as long as there have been philosophers.
Almost all the great western philosophers have things to Say on matters that are recognizably
religious. In this sense, almost all of them are philosophers of religion.
One could say that philosophy of religion is a worldwide phenomenon which has been around ever
since there were human beings. Understood in this way, its story is part of the history of many
countries and peoples. Understood in this way, its story is part of the history of many countries
and peoples, and it is long. But philosophy of religion considered as a distinct branch of
philosophy is an essentially western phenomenon, and its story is not vastly different from that of
the history of western philosophy in general.
This is often said to have started with Plato (c. 428-348 B.C.) and to have continued to what can
be found in recently published journals and books devoted to philosophy. And much the same
could be said of the history of philosophy of religion. For that can be thought of as something
which starts with Plato and ends on the shelves of your university library.
There was significant reflection on religious matters prior to that of Plato. Xenophanes (c. 570-
c.475 B.C.) taught about one God who causes all. And Diogenes of Apollonia (5th century BC)
spoke of an intelligence regulating the ways in which nature behaves. But it is in Plato´s works
that ancient Greek thinking rises to the level of a sustained philosophical treatment of matters
recognizably religious. In Plato´s Phaedo, we find him debating the issue of life after death. In
other works, Plato is concerned with the notion of divinity and the role of divine in the world of
our experience. Is reality confined only to what we can discover by our senses? Is the world an
effect of an intelligent cause or principle? Can philosophical inquiry lead us to some kind of final
happiness in relation to what lies beyond what we normally encounter? Plato has things to say on
all these questions, and his answers had a big influence on later thinkers, especially one´s within
the Christian tradition. All scholars would agree that Plato marks the start of sustained
philosophical thinking on the subject, namely philosophy of religion or on matters that are
recognizably religious. They would also agree that the next major exponent of such thinking is
Aristotle 8384-322 BC).
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Philosophy of religion is very different from religion itself, just as philosophy of science is quite
distinct from actual science. The same thing can be said of philosophy education which is distinct
from actual education. The goal of philosophy of religion is not to preach, or convert, or comfort,
or save, or take over any of the functions of religion. On the contrary, the goal of philosophy of
religion is to deepen our understanding of a certain sphere or a certain dimension of human
existence- namely religion, and particularly religious concepts and beliefs- through philosophical
inquiry. (Horner Chris and Westacott Emrys, 2000). It also subjects these concepts and beliefs to
rational criticism.
As we have pointed out previously is the philosophical thinking about religion, just as philosophy
of art is the philosophical thinking about art, just as philosophy of education is the philosophical
thinking about education which must be distinguished from the scientific thinking about education.
The study of philosophy of religion need not be undertaken from a religious standpoint. The atheist
and the agnostic as well as the person with religious conviction can and do study philosophy of
religion. This explains why philosophy of religion must be distinguished from theology.
Scholars examine several topics including the various concepts of the sacred ultimate or God, the
origin and growth of religion, religious experience, religious knowledge and language,
explanations of evil and survival after death understood as immortality. It is therefore of paramount
importance to distinguish between philosophy of religion and theology, though the two can overlap
in places.
The theology accompanying a particular religion consists of the theoretical elaboration of that
religious essential premises and what they imply. Hindu theologians, for instance, might discuss
the question of how soon after the death of the body the soul is reincarnated. Jewish theologians
might discuss the exact meaning of and reasons for the injunction in the Torah (the first five books
of the Bible) against boiling a young goat in its mother’s milk. This is to say that theologians tend
to conduct their inquiries with a ‘circle of faith’; they accept the basic tenets of a religion and
proceed to work out their full meaning and implications. Philosophers of religion, by contrast, do
not take any religious claims for granted but evaluate such claims in the same way that they
evaluate any other claims that might be made about the world, using the usual methods of rational
enquiry. This explains why we maintain that philosophical enterprise is essentially the application
of reasoning to a wide variety of topics und in our case the topic of religion. Naturally, therefore,
they devote most attention to the basic questions raised by religious belief, questions such as:
1. Is there God?
2. Can the existence of God be proved or disproved?
3. Is religious faith reasonable or unreasonable?
4. What difference does the existence or non-existence of God make to our lives?
5. The problem of knowledge of God: is natural theology possible, or must God disclose
Himself through revelation as in supernatural theology?
6. The relation of God to the world: Is God identical or coextensive with the world as in
Spinoza’s pantheism or transcendent as a creator apart from the world as in St. Augustine
supernaturalism and theism
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According to some philosophers, this is all that philosophy of religion can or should do- analyze
religious concepts and evaluate particular religious claims. Others, however, allow it to include a
discussion of matters that overlap with (critics would say properly belong to) questions raised by
anthropological, historical, sociological and psychological to religion. For instance:
i. What social functions has religion served in the past?
ii. What functions does religion serve today?
iii. Why is some sort of religious belief found in all known cultures?
iv. What psychological needs does religion satisfy?
v. Can human beings flourish, psychologically and socially, without religion?
There is no doubt that there are innumerable interesting and important issues that the philosophy
of religion can address. In our case, the primary focus will be on those issues that have traditionally
been central to this area of specialization in philosophy.
The Purpose of Studying Philosophy of Religion
What is the purpose of studying philosophy of religion? Perhaps it is easy to begin with what such
study is not about. The purpose of studying the philosophy of religion is not designed to:
1. Transform you into an atheist or agnostic
2. Convert you from being an atheist or agnostic to a belief in God or gods
3. Undermine your religious beliefs or “convert” you to another religion
4. Engage you in emotional arguments with classmates over which is the one “true” religion
Instead the philosophy of religion is designed to:
1. Develop your ability to think philosophically regarding the religious dimension of
experience
2. Critically evaluate the reasons, evidence and arguments with respect to religion, both pro
and con
3. Expand, enrich and deepen your understanding of other religions in the world
4. Encourage you to reflect on the nature and foundation of your own religious beliefs
NB. It is possible to assess religious beliefs rationally. In this respect, it runs against a belief that
is very popular in our culture, namely that matters of religion are simply private affairs concerning
how you feel about big things. This is a false belief.
Philosophy and religion have had a volatile and at times contentious relationship with each other.
During the time of pre-Socratic thinkers, religion was a precursor of philosophy as well as
organized science. Early religions tended to be rooted in mythology and superstition, encouraging
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a world-view that initially inhibited the development of philosophy and science as independent
disciplines based on reason, systematic inquiry and empirical/logical validation. This was in
western culture, the beginning of a long and uneasy relationship among philosophy, science and
religion, a competition over what each considered to be their legitimate domains of expertise. Over
the centuries, the “highlight” reel of the mutual tension would include:
1. The execution of Socrates for allegedly not believing in the conventional gods of the time
(in addition to “corrupting” the youth of Athens)
2. The threatened execution of Galileo for asserting the same “Blasphemous” truth as
Copernicus. Because he publicly recanted this belief announcing that the earth (“and symbolically
human kind” formed the Centre of the solar system, he was able to have his death sentence
commuted to 20 years house arrest. However, he was reported to have muttered on leaving the
inquisition tribunal, (“But still the earth circles the sun”).
3. The uproar over the publication and subsequent dissemination of Charles Darwin`s origin
of species which contended that all life forms on earth have evolved from simpler origins through
a process of “natural selection”
But seen through a modern lens many people believe that there is in principle no necessary and
compelling reason philosophy, science and religion can`t coexist (relatively) peacefully. It is only
when one of the three disciplines intentionally encroaches on one or both of the other areas that
problems may arise. For instance:
1. If philosophy decrees as the logical positivists did that religious statements have no “truth-
value” because they cannot be verified empirically.
2. If science proclaims as scientific materialists have, that only physical matter exists in the
universe:, entities such as souls, spirits or gods are simply concocted fantasies
3. If religion announces as many religions have that the conclusions of philosophy and science
should be automatically dismissed if they appear to conflict with religious truths.
A solid group of serious reflective and informed philosophers, scientists and religious leaders
believe that we should be using these three frameworks to achieve a more integrated, synthesized
and enlightened view of the entirety of human experience. Many philosophers have had strong
religious convictions including Immanuel Kant, Rene Descartes, William James and Sören
Kierkegaard. And many scientists have likewise believed in the compatibility of science and
religion including Charles Darwin and Albert Einstein as he reveals in his essay Religion and
Science.
Philosophy of religion in the Modern Thought: Kierkegaard, Hegel and Schleiermacher
1. KIERKEGAARD. Are Kant and Hegel Truly Religious Thinkers? According to one
of their most famous critics, they are hardly religious at all. For in the judgment of
Sören Kierkegaard (1813-1855), true religious belief is different from what you might
assent to by means of philosophical reflection (especially like that of Hegel). Like Kant
Kierkegaard argues that reason is limited when it comes to religious matters. Unlike
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Kant, however, Kierkegaard holds that reason is totally limited when it comes to
religious matters. Reason says Kierkegaard can lead us only to the “unknown”, beyond
the range of knowledge and it must give way to faith, which he described as a species
of subjectivity and which he conceived of as a passionate commitment and a way of
life rather than as a speculative assent to a list of propositions. In developing this idea
Kierkegaard lays much stress on the importance of human freedom. Kierkegaard holds
that religious faith is something we chose, not something to which our minds conform
of necessity. His stress on freedom has led him to be labeled as an “existentialist” a
title he shares with later philosophers most notably jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Yet
Sartre finds no truth in religion.
As a Danish religious thinker, Kierkegaard, is considered by many persons to be the
founder of modern existentialism. He was brought up in a home where he acquired a
deeply emotional faith. At the University of Copenhagen, he studied Hegelian
philosophy and reacted strongly to against it. Abstract speculation, he believed,
depersonalizes human beings in that it emphasizes thought and reason, and tends to
disregard the thinker as well as personal faith and convictions. He reacted against the
Danish Lutheran Church of his day as well as against efforts to make Christianity
reasonable. His writings are often autobiographical and make use of irony and paradox;
he stresses the gulf between God and humans and God and the world.
True faith, he thought involved accepting what is ‘absurd’. His writings include
‘Either-Or (1843), The Sickness Unto Death (1849), and Fear and Trembling (1843).
He has had considerable influence in philosophy and literature, as well as on religious
thought, in the twentieth century.
As we have said, Kierkegaard is usually considered as the founder of Modern
existentialism. The writings of this Danish thinker furnished the stimulus for later
members of the movement. Kierkegaard is difficult to interpret. He never intended to
be a systematic thinker, and he glorified in paradoxes. His writings are made more
difficult by his use of indirect communication, irony and pseudonyms. As for almost
all existential thinkers, Kierkegaard’s biography acts as an important clue to
understanding his philosophy. His melancholy, the Lutheran orthodoxy under which
he was reared, and his broken engagement undoubtedly were responsible to a great
extent for his existential emphasis.
For Kierkegaard, the central issue in life is what it means to be a Christian. He is
concerned not with ‘being’ in general, but with individual existence. He wants us to
come to an understanding of authentic Christianity. He believes that there are two great
enemies of Christianity. One is the Hegelian philosophy so prevalent in his day.
Abstract speculation, he believes, whether in the Cartesian or Hegelian form,
depersonalizes humans and leads to the impoverishment of life. He attacks Hegel for
writing about ‘pure thought’; pure thought is comical, says Kierkegaard, for it is
thought without a thinker. He is particularly scornful of all attempts to make
Christianity ‘reasonable’ or any defense of Christianity that employs objective
arguments.
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The second enemy of Christianity is convention, especially the conventional

churchgoer. Unreflective or perfunctory church members may be good functionaries,
but they do not live their faith. Instead, they have a depersonalized religion, and
probably do not know what it means to become or be a Christian. He is highly critical
of much in ‘Christendom’ especially the established church, its clergy, and rituals. In
other words, he is opposed to any mediating factor- minister, sacrament, church- that
comes between the individual of faith and God, the absolute sovereign.
According to Kierkegaard, there is an ‘unbridgeable a gulf’ between God and the world,
the Creator and the creature. God stands above all social and ethical standards. How
are humans to overcome this gap? To be suspended in doubt is to experience existential
anguish. ‘Every man who has not tasted the bitterness of despair has missed the
significance of life of life, however, beautiful and joyous his life might be’
(Kierkegaard, S., 1946). When people are in anguish, they must abandon reason and
embrace faith. In the agonized ‘leap of faith’, we embrace the absurd and the
paradoxical. ‘Christianity takes a prodigious giant stride… a stride into the absurd-
there Christianity begins… how extraordinarily stupid it is to defend Christianity.’
(Kierkegaard, S., 1954). To Kierkegaard, faith is everything. There must be either
wholehearted obedience to God or open rebellion. One is either for or against Christ,
for or against Truth; Christianity is absolutely true or absolutely false. Kierkegaard
says, ‘what our age lacks, however, is not reflection but passion’. Factual knowledge
simply cannot overcome a defect of motive and will.
For Kierkegaard, he took the position that religion is was a personal experience. Using
Kant’s idea that the only thing we can’ know’ is experience as a stepping- off place,
Kierkegaard evolved a philosophical system which divided existence into three
categories; that is, he claimed that experience may be of three kinds: aesthetic, ethical
and religious. The child is an example of the individual who lives almost exclusively
at the aesthetic level. For the child all choices are made in terms of pleasure and pain,
and experience is ephemeral, having no continuity, no meaning, but being merely a
connection of isolated, non-related moments. The ethical level of experience involves
choice; whenever conscious choice is made, one lives at the ethical level. At the
religious level, one experiences a commitment to oneself, and an awareness of one’s
uniqueness and singleness. To live at the religious level means to make any sacrifice,
any antisocial gesture that is required by being true to oneself. Clearly, these levels are
not entirely separable, but may coexist: when one choses the aesthetic level of
existence, the very act of choice involved ethical experience; and when one makes
choices at the ethical level, and these choices are true to one’s own singleness, one lives
at the religious level.
Kierkegaard believed that man, proceeding from one level of experience to another,
would ultimately choose suffering and pain, and a constant awareness of the difference
between ephemeral, temporal existence and ultimate truth. He concluded that only
when man experiences the suffering of firm commitment to the religious level of
experience can he be considered to be truly religious and further, that the suffering
endured by God is greater than that endured by any man.
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If religion, then, is a purely personal matter, truth is clearly subjective, quite separate
from the ‘truth’ of religious doctrine, for the truth of man’s experience must emerge
from his faithfulness to his own unique identity. Kierkegaard recognized this difference
between the objective, universal truth, and the subjective, personal truth. Objective
truth, such as that of geometry, is acquired by the intellect; subjective truth must be
experienced by the total individual. One may have objective truth, but one must be
religious truth.
2. SCHLEIERMACHER. Is religion largely a matter of feeling? What part does feeling play
in religion? Probably the most thoroughgoing case for the interpretation of religion as feeling was
set forth by Schleiermacher, a German theologian of the 19th century. For him, pure religion was
pure feeling, a feeling of absolute dependence on God. Another “feeling” aspect of religion is the
exhilaration from rituals intensely praising God. We know from history and from contemporary
life that the emotional element has been evident in religion; yet some people say that emotions are
not enough, that emotions can lead us astray unless they are accompanied and guided by intellect.
In a nutshell, for Schleiermacher (liberalism), religion is a feeling of creaturely dependence on
God.
3. HEGEL. Hegelianism interprets God as the Absolute, World spirit or world
consciousness. Hegel developed some kind of pantheism whereby God is identified with the world,
spirit and with nature. In fact, although the term spirit has a religious or divine connotation in
Hegel, the term spirit (Geist) is essentially a human spirit, the spirit of humanity. Because Hegel
studies the philosophy of Kant and was enormously influenced by him, religion and morality are
postulates of the practical reason. Kant discussed morality and religion not in the critique of pure
reason but in the critique of practical reason. According to Hegel an event is rational if it serves
some purpose or goal for man. In this regard, religion is rational if it helps man to be moral and
morality is rational if it helps human beings to be together rather than tearing them apart. This
implies that according to Hegel, religion is in the service of man and not man in the service of
God.
Hegel as Humanist
“One may have all sorts of ideas about the kingdom of God; but it is always a realm of spirit to be
realized and brought about in man” (Hegel, Reason in History). Hegel is strictly secular, virulently
anti-theological and more or less anti-Christian philosopher, not at all the Christian apologist or
the theological heretic. Hegel sees religion in the service of humanity, not humanity in the service
of God, He sees God (in so far as we should use that word at all) as nothing more than human
spirit. Writ large or what Hegel calls Geist. For him, religion (is) only a function and vehicle of
morality and what might blandly be called “being a good person” and that it has no other reason
or justification. The phenomenology is a grand treatise in cosmic humanism; humanity is
everything, in the guise of Geist, or spirit and the purpose of Hegel’s philosophy is to get us
appreciate ourselves as a unity, as all-embracing humanity, and bring about the “self-realization
of spirit”. Hegel’s spirit is human spirit and if it includes much more than just humanity (namely
everything), it is nonetheless a belligerently humanist demonstration that this is a human world in
which all is but a stage for our own self-realization.
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Theory of reality- Absolute idealism

Reality is the realization or the unfolding of spirit (Geist). Reality is a process analogous to
thought, dialectic (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) in which spirit objectifies itself as the world and
develops a knowledge of itself in the world. Hegel`s own system is built on the great triad: idea-
nature-spirit. The idea in itself (thesis) is that which develops, the dynamic reality of and behind-
or before- the world. Its antithesis, idea-outside-of-itself, namely space, is nature- nature
develops… into man, in whose conscious the idea becomes conscious of itself. This self-
consciousness of the idea is spirit, the antithesis of idea and nature, and the development of this
consciousness is history… History is… “the autobiography of God… the reality of God”
(Hartman) Through history, that is the life of man and his institutions, spirit achieves its goal of
self-consciousness and freedom. In and through man and his growing self-consciousness and
freedom, spirit achieves its own realization as freedom- the idea which understands itself. Spirit is
the dialectical process taken as a whole. What is rational is real and what is real is rational (Hegel).
Particular entities or events are real only as aspects of the life of spirit. The nature of God as
supreme Idea, Reason or Mind (Spirit) - Hegel.
Reading Materials Required for topic Two
1. Brian Davis, (2000). Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
3. Kierkegaard, Soren (1946). Either Or, Vol 2, Trans. D.F. Swenson and L.M. Swenson,
Princeton: Princeton University Press
Topic Three. From Religious Experiences to the Religious Act
Topic Objectives
1. What is religious experience?
2. What are the various forms of religious experiences?
3. What is the distinction between the sacred and the profane?
Religious Experience: The Experience of the Holy
The goal of many religions is to achieve some kind of ultimate transformation through a direct
encounter with the Holy, divine, sacred or transcendent spiritual reality. This kind of direct
encounter can take a variety of forms mirroring the varieties of religious experience. But the most
intense form of encounter is mystical in nature. Virtually every religion has at least one dimension
of it that aspires to a personal encounter with the Holy through a mystical experience including:
1. Indigenous religions. The spiritual encounters of shamans, priests and priestesses with the
spirit world
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2. Hinduism. The goal of attaining spiritual realization through yogic practices and
meditation
3. Buddhism. The quest for transcending the self and ultimately achieving Nirvana through
right meditation and other steps.
4. Taoism. The goal of becoming ultimately attuned to the natural energies of the cosmos
through meditation
5. Christianity. The goal of “communal mysticism” in which God, Jesus or the Holy Spirit
enters yourself and transforms you
6. Judaism. The mystical traditions of kabbalah
7. Islam. The mystical traditions of the sufis who use asceticism, fasting and dancing to
achieve unity of being.
NB: Although such mystical experiences are intensely personal, participants generally claim to
have experienced a loss of self-identity, a merging with the holy, a transcendence of space and
time, a spiritual impact that changes them in profound ways. Reference: William James (1902),
The Varieties of Religious Experience
The word religion is used in a variety of ways; the expression religious experience is also difficult
to define. There are varieties of experience that persons call religious and they differ in
interpretation and content. We shall consider three contrasting types.
1. Mystical Experience. Mystical experience has been defined as the condition of being
overwhelmingly aware of the presence of the ultimate real (Steer D.V. “Mysticism” in Halverson
and Cohen, A Handbook of Christian Theology, pp. 236-238. See also Price, J.R. “Mysticism” in
Musser and Price, A New Handbook of Christian Theology, pp. 318-320. It would be convenient
if all interpretations of mysticism were identical but they are not.
2. Union. A form of mystical experience found among some Hindus and others is the
shedding of one`s ego and self-awareness so that the true spiritual self is united with the sacred,
non-personal ultimate unity. Through contemplation and self-surrender, a person´s true self, the
impersonal soul, is absorbed in a void. Like a non-conscious “dreamless sleep” the experience is
inaccessible to reason and beyond words or thoughts. Indirect communication such as poetry,
paradoxes or riddles is often used by this type of mystic, in an attempt to describe or point to the
ineffable (that which cannot be spoken or written). However, mystical experiences of this type
logically should conclude in silence. Mystics are said to be enlightened by their world-denying
moments, which unite them with the “wholly other”. They also believe that in what is called
“death” their souls will eventually fuse with the sacred ultimate, somewhat the way a drop of water
merges with the sea.
3. Communion. This is another form of mystical experience found among some Jews,
Christians and Muslims. It is characterized by a sense of the immediate loving presence of God.
God is self-disclosing or revelatory to the individual and the individual is self-disclosing and
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receptive to God. Primarily an encounter of divine love between God and a mortal in which the
distinction between creator and creature is retained, the experience enhances one`s conscious
awareness of the divine. These mystics are said to be nurtured or empowered by their communal
moments with God. Although some mystics of the west have been world-denying, others have
been world-affirming, emphasizing strengthened human activity. Their silence or inability to
express their experiences may be an indication of the poverty of any language to describe true
love. Those who believe in mystical union and mystical communion share the conviction that the
experience is in touch with ultimate reality but their interpretations of the relationship with the
sacred, of enlightenment, loving self-disclosure between creator and creature and of the
consequences for daily living are quite different-
4. Prayer. Another form of religious experience is prayer to a personal God. A theologian
views prayer in this manner: Prayer is the intentional opening of human lives to, the alignment of
human wills with and the direction of human desiring toward the cosmic love that is deepest and
highest in the world… Public prayer or church worship is the way in which we unite with others
in expressing dependence on this Love, opening ourselves to it and willing cooperation with it as
fellow workers with God. Private prayer is the way we do this in our own particular ways
(Pittenger, W.N. Praying Today, Grand rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1974, p. 27). This form of
religious experience includes a “communion”, a sense of the immediate presence if the divine; it
is marked by a personal I-Thou relationship between God and persons, privately and in groups.
NB: A common characteristic: Although there is diversity among religious experiences, there
appears to be one common element. Each person interprets the experience as a feeling or
conviction of a momentous disclosure, a disclosure that true reality; the sacred ultimate, has been
revealed as it “really” is.
The Object of Religion: Man and the Sacred
The Sacred and the Profane
Sacred is somewhat poetic word referring to or whoever is regarded as holy, spiritually distinct
from human initiatives, worthy of reverence, wondrous, respectful and awesome. For example, in
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the God of Abraham, Jesus and Mohammed is sacred in an
ultimate sense; no one or thing is more holy than God, the “sacred ultimate”. Sacred scriptures are
revered writings of religions and sacred places or objects are worthy of reverence; but neither
scriptures nor places or objects are sacred in the ultimate sense reserved for deity alone. Religious
individuals feel that they have an unconditional commitment to whatever they regard as the “sacred
ultimate”, that is, the source and basis of existence, the supreme foundation of all truth, reality and
goodness.
However, it is worth clarifying the use of the term sacred in broader sense and in the stricter sense
of the term. In a broader sense, the sacred is that which is protected from violation, intrusion or
defilement; the sacred is that which is respected, venerated and inviolable. The sacred, understood
in this sense, is not limited to religion alone. Thus a great many religious and non-religious objects,
practices, places, customs and ideas may become sacred. In the stricter sense, the sacred is that
which is protected specifically by religion against violation, intrusion or defilement. It is that which
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is holy, sacrosanct. It is the opposite of the profane. The profane is that which is ordinary, common,
unconsecrated, temporal or in brief outside the religious. “The sacred is par excellence that which
the profane should not and cannot touch with impunity” (The elementary forms of religious life,
Trans. By J. W. Swain, p. 40). There is general agreement among scholars that a distinction
between the sacred and the profane is fundamental to an analysis of religion. Religious behavior
is marked off from other complexes by a certain particular attitude of the participants. What is it
that is characteristic of religion or of the behavior of men towards the sacred? Do we a priori
impose the category of the sacred to a set of beliefs and practices so that they become religious?
Or they are interpreted as sacred or pertaining to the religious purely from the subjective point of
view without any objective foundation? To answer this problem in a satisfactory way, we have to
analyze what the religious themselves teach on the idea and experience of the sacred.
The externals that characterize the sacred and distinguish it from the profane such as silence,
specified positions, exclusion of other non-sacred activities, insistence on completion in spite of
rain etc. are symbols of the religious meaning of the activity. The characteristic if the sacred are:
being set apart, imbued with awe and reverence, taboos connected with it. An object, an
experience, a phenomenon which is profane becomes a sacred object, a sacred experience, a sacred
phenomenon by virtue of the special relationship which an individual or group of men or members
of a society has towards that object, experience or phenomenon by means of which relationship a
phenomenon is charged with sacredness, with religious meaning is made symbolic. The sacred is
intrinsic to both belief and ritual, for belief, gives meaning to the ritual and ritual is the symbol of
what is embodied in the belief.
Israelite Idea of the Sacred
The standard word in the Old Testament for the specifically sacred or divine quality of Yahweh is
holiness. Any experience which a man will possess on meeting Yahweh will be one of feeling on
the part of man of his nothingness, frailty and sinfulness. We are also told in the Bible of the
terrifying nearness and immense of the transcendental holiness of Yahweh.
Islamic Idea of the sacred
The God of Islam (Allah) in the religious experience of a Muslim is described as the most
sovereign of gods. The one God to whom man owes his entire being and on whom he depends
completely. The image of God as the Supreme Lord, omnipotent and omniscient is clearly
portrayed. Allah is also merciful and compassionate, forgiving and forbearing
The Structure of the Sacred
In the structure of the primitive experience of the sacred, there are various elements that indicate
the meaning of the sacred: untouchableness, a sense of precaution and care and attention more than
what is necessary in the experience of the profane, exclusion from the ordinary or profane, a sense
of awe and reverence, silence and thrill, use of sacred words, all in the perspective of the Holy
Extraordinary supernatural
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For the Hindus, the sacred is the divine (God or Absolute), which is really real, the light, the
immortal, the Eternal, which is immanent in the world and in man. It is the ultimate nature of all
that exists and the innermost of self, of objective and subjective universe.
The Buddhist structure of the sacred is not related to the divine in the sense of either God or the
Absolute but to the state of freedom from mortality and suffering, of peace and super
consciousness. The profane is the realm of bondage to rebirth and of suffering due to passion and
desire.
The Israelite structure of the sacred is based on the conception of Yahweh as the powerful Lord
and of man as his servant. Man´s duty is to serve God and love him. The holy is a profoundly
religious ides which indicates that which belongs to the divine sphere and is therefore inviolable.
Holiness is a quality which by its very structure is rooted in the deity; positively it signifies purity
and blessing and negatively it signifies curse.
The Islamic structure of the sacred is expressed by a profound sense of man´s dependence on God
and of the need consequently of man`s submission to God`s command. The implementation of this
need in life is called precisely service to God.
Sacred Places
Sacred Places are commonly found in all world religions. Some places are dedicated to God and
therefore set apart from ordinary and profane activities. They are the sacred grounds, consecrated
places in which the religious man behaves differently from what he does in profane places. What
is it that makes a place sacred? What is the special relation between God and his dwelling place?
NB: It is in the sacred places that the divine manifest itself and enters in communion and
communication with man and the world. By opening communication between the divine and man,
it makes it possible for man to pass from one mode of being (profane) to that of the sacred. Thus,
the sacred place becomes for the religious man the Centre of the world (See Eliade, Mircea, 1957).
Reading Materials Required for Topic Three
1. Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Trans. Swain J.W.
2. Eliade, Mircea (1957). The Sacred and the Profane, New York.
3. Price J.R. “Mysticism” in Musser and Price, A New Handbook of Christian Theology,
pp.318-320.
4. Pittinger W.N. (1974). Praying Today, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.
5. Steer D.V., “Mysticism” in Halverson and Cohen, A Handbook of Christian Theology, pp.
236-238.
Topic Four. The Religious Value of Myth, Rite and Symbol
Topic Objectives
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1. Does Myth have an important role in sacred literature?

2. What distinctions exist between the sacred and the profane?
3. What role do myths play in religion
Myth in sacred Literature (The Religious Meaning of Myth)
We tend to use “myth” or “mythical” as a negative value judgment about a belief or report.
However, it can be used in a purely descriptive manner without negative connotations.
Myth can refer to:
1. Fables
2. Literary forms that describe spiritual matters in everyday terms and
3. A method of thinking about ultimate truths
The first form of myth is often an allegorical tale with animal characters. Its purpose is to convey
a moral or principle of behavior and not to report the details of a historical event. The second form
of myth may include, but reaches beyond a moral intent. By referring to heaven as “above” in the
sky somewhere. The specific meaning would depend on its religious context; the majority of
religious philosophers and theologians of the world`s traditions do not teach that every word in
their respective scriptures is to be understood literally (Islam is a notable exception)- The existence
of the poetic element in myth does not denigrate sacred literature; on the contrary, it enlivens
expression and point to profound beliefs.
The third use of myth is a form of thinking and expressing ultimate truths, and of awakening and
nurturing in people a sense of wonder and participation in the mystery of the universe.
The word “Myth” is derived from the Greek word muthos which literally means a tale or something
one utters, in a wide range of senses: a statement, a story, the plot of a play. The word mythology
in English denotes either the study of myths or their content or a particular set of myths. B.
Malinowski distinguished myth from legend and fairy-tale. According to him, legends were told
and believed as if they were history, although the narrator intended by the legend to support the
claims of his own group. But legends do not contain any miraculous or sacred element. On the
other hand, fairy-tales narrate miraculous happenings but are not in any way linked with ritual; nor
are they supposed to be true; they belong to the realm of entertainment. Myth is “a statement of a
higher and a more important truth, of a primeval reality, which is still regarded as the pattern and
the foundation of primitive life.
NB: Human language is thought to be an inadequate way to express all ultimate truths. Words are
limited in their capacity to capture the essential meaning of “God”, “Love”, “purpose” or whatever
else a particular religion views as being ultimate. Myths often are intended as expressions of
ultimate “beginnings” and ultimate “endings” of the universe, of life and of human existence.
Scholars continue to wrestle with the sacred literatures of the world to understand the functions of
myth in the various religions; myth has different roles and purposes among the traditions.
Simultaneously, scholars are attempting to understand better those sacred writings that claim to be
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historical and literal. During the current century, such inquiry into sacred writings has been
undertaken extensively. These analysis enrich our understanding of the world`s religions.
Myths and the Profane Stories
It is not always easy to separate the sacred stories (myths) from the profane ones. In the myth as a
sacred story “the words or the characters in the tale or the act of telling in itself are regarded as
having some force or power or some meaningful value of their own. Some tales are sacred clearly
and explicitly, for they deal with supernatural beings, powerful spirits and it is dangerous to tell
them in any other than the prescribed way; but at the same time, we notice that the same
supernatural beings appear also in fairy-tales or entertainment stories. We can indicate a
characteristic by which myths can be distinguished from other tales: sacredness and a close
connection with ritual.
In societies where myths are still alive and meaningful, the people carefully distinguish myths,
true stories from fables, false stories. In the true stories we have to deal with the holy and the
supernatural while in the “false ones” on the other hand are of profane content. It therefore
becomes clear how for the primitive man myths are of primary importance, whereas legends and
tales are not. By living the myths by means of the ritual, the religious man is able to imitate and
reproduce the divine beings and their activities, to commune with the divine by symbolically
participating in the original state of beings as created and ordained by the divine and supernatural
beings. To know the myths is to learn the secret of the origin of things, to enter into living relation
with the origin of things, to be able to reproduce the original order of things when they gradually
degenerate or to make it reappear when they disappear (See Eliade, Mircea “Myth” in
Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15, 1969 pp. 1134-1135)
Function of Myths
What is important in the structure of myth in its relation to religion is not simply the fact that it
contains miraculous happenings or events of supernatural beings but it has existential functions
for man. B. Malinowski insists on this: “in anthropological jargon, this means that myth or sacred
story has to be defined by its functions. It is a story which is told in order to establish a belief, to
serve as a precedent in ceremony or ritual or to rank as a pattern of moral or religious conduct.
Mythology therefore or the sacred tradition of a society, is a body of narratives woven into their
culture, dictating their belief, defining their ritual, acting as the chart of their social order and the
pattern of their moral behavior. Every myth naturally has a literary content since it is always a
narrative but this narrative is not merely a piece of entertaining fiction or explanatory statement to
the believer. It is a true account of sensational events which have shaped the constitution of the
world, the essence of moral conduct and determines the ritual contact between man and his maker
or other powers that be (Eliade, Mircea “Myth” in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15, pp. 1134-
1135).
If myth supplies the character for ritual, belief, moral conduct and social organization, it means
that myth is neither primitive science nor philosophic allegory nor a strange garbled story. The
primary function of myth is neither to explain nor to recount past historical events nor to express
the fantasies of dreams of a community. 2The main object of sacred tradition is not to serve as a
23
chronicle of past events; it is to lay down the effective president of a glorified past for respective
action in the present” (Mircea Eliade, “Myth” in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15, p. 287)
The indispensable function which myth fulfils in primitive culture is to “express, enhance and
codify belief, to safeguard and enforce morality, to vouch for the efficiency of ritual and to contain
practical rules for the guidance of man” (B. Malinowski, “Myth in Primitive psychology” in
Magic, Science and Religion, New York, 1954), p. 101)
Thus according to the functionalist anthropology, myth is a force that helps to maintain society;
Myth and religion as a whole continue to play an important part in social life. The generalized
indispensability of myth as presented by Malinowski can be questioned because myth does not
reflect the totality of the social structure as myth is always selective- myth can be a charter of
selective features of social reality; but not always is myth an integrative force in society; it can and
may be a divisive force as well (See Annemarie de Waal Malefitjt, Religion and Culture, New
York, pp. 181-182)
Besides, not all myths are charters of specific actions. They do answer questions such as why must
we die, what has happened to the Land without Evil, how earth was separated from heaven etc.
Myths do convey a certain meaning for the religious man besides providing a charter for social
action and religious belief. That is myths do have relation to cosmology for they explain how
things came to be, besides explaining why what is done today is the right thing to do.
The religious dimension of myths becomes clearer when we consider myths as factors that re-
create or transform those to whom they are communicated and alter the capacity of the recipient
to perform the tasks of the new status ahead of him. Hence it is not merely a ritual legitimizing of
the individual to a new social status. Rather, myths are thought to have a certain salvific power,
without which he would be lost or unable to perform the duties of his new status. When we consider
the supposedly moral character of myths which abound in direct or figurative transgressions of the
moral codes that hold good in secular life, as for instance, human sacrifice, human flesh-eating,
incestuous unions of brother-sister or mother-son gods or their human representatives, we have to
understand them as not describing what ought to be done but expressing what must be. That is to
say, these mythologies are neither positive nor negative models, in the sense that we should imitate
them in secular life or should avoid them. As Victor Turner observes, they are not to be treated as
models for secular life. But they are felt to be deep mysteries which put the religious man, the
initiand temporarily into close rapport with the primary or primordial generative powers of the
cosmos, the acts of which transcend rather than transgress the norms of human secular society (see
Victor W. Turner, “Myth and Symbol” in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 10)
Reading Materials Required for Topic Four
1. Eliade Mircea (1969). “Myth” in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15, pp. 1134-1135.
2. Malinowski B. (1954). “Myth in Primitive Psychology” in Magic Science and Religion,
New York.
3. Turner, Victor W., “Myth and Symbol” in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,
Vol 1.
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Topic 5. Ethics and Religion

Topic Objectives
In this section, we will address the following questions:
i. Does morality depend on religion?
ii. Are religious ethics essentially different from secular ethics?
iii. Why does Aquinas conceive religion as moral virtue?
Can we be ethical without being religious? Does ethics require religion? Does morality depend on
religion or is ethics autonomous so much so that even God is subject to the moral order? For
Western civilization as for most humanity throughout the ages, morality has been identified with
adherence to religion, immorality with sin and the moral law with the command of God, so that
the moral life is seen as a personal relationship with a heavenly parent.
Greek philosophers contemplated morality independent of religion. But for the most part
throughout most of our history, most people have identified morality with religion, with the
command of God. The question remains whether the equation is a valid one. Is morality essentially
tied to religion so that the term secular ethic is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms? Can morality
survive without religion? Is it the case as Tolstoy declares that to separate morality from religion
is like cutting a flower from its roots and transplanting it rootless into the ground? Is Dostoevsky’s
character Ivan Karamazov correct when he proclaims that ‘If God does not exist, everything is
permissible?
Does Morality Depend on Religion?
To begin with the first question whether moral standards themselves depend on God for their
validity or whether there is an autonomy of ethics so that even God is subject to the moral order.
Based on the divine command theory (DCT) that ethical principles are simply the commands of
God hence without God, there would be no universally valid morality. So what are the implications
of this theory? In other words, we can summarize the divine command theory this way: Morality
not only originates with God, but moral rightness simply means ‘willed by God’ and moral
wrongness means ‘being against the will of God’ (Pojman Luis, 2006).
This is to say that an act is right in virtue of being permitted by the will of God and an act is wrong
in virtue of being against the will of God. Since morality is essentially based on divine will, not
on independently existing reasons for action, no further reasons for action are necessary. Is Ivan
Karamazov correct when he asserts, ‘If God does not exist, everything is permissible’. ‘If so
nothing is forbidden or required. Without God, we have moral nihilism. If there is no God, then
nothing is ethically wrong, required or permitted’ (Pojman uis.., 2006).
In a nutshell, we can analyze the divine command theory (DCT) into three separate thesis:
1. Morality (i.e. rightness and wrongness originates with God)
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2. Moral rightness simply means ‘willed by God’ and moral wrongness means ‘being against
the will of God’
3. Since morality essentially is based on divine will, not on independently existing reasons
for action, no further reasons for action is necessary
The opposing viewpoint, call it autonomy thesis (standing for the independence of ethics) denies
the theses of the Divine Command Theory (DCT) asserting to the contrary the following:
1. Morality does not originate with God (although the way God created us may affect the
specific nature of morality)
2. Rightness and wrongness are not based simply on God’s will
3. Essentially there are reasons for acting one way or the other, which may be known
independent of God’s will.
In sum, ethics is autonomous, and even God must obey the moral, which exists independent of
himself- as the laws of mathematics and logic do. Just as even God cannot make a three-sided
square or make it the case that he never existed, so even God cannot make what is intrinsically evil
good or make what is good evil.
Theists who espouse the autonomy thesis may well admit some epistemological advantage to God:
God knows what right- is better than we do. And since he is good, we can always learn from
consulting him. But, in principle, we act morally for the same reasons that God does: We both
follow moral reasons that are independent of God. We are against torturing the innocent because
it is cruel and unjust, just as God is against torturing the innocent because it is cruel and unjust. By
this account, if there is no God, then nothing is changed; morality is left intact, and both theists
and nontheists have the very same moral duties.
Are Religious Ethics Essentially Different from Secular Ethics?
The second problem related to the matter of religion and morality has to do with the relationship
between religion and secular morality. Are they essentially compatible or incompatible? We can
divide this question into two subquestions:
1. Does religion actually do moral harm and detract from deep morality?
2. Does religion provide, and do secular systems fail to provide, ethics with the necessary
motivation to be deeply moral?
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who held to the autonomy thesis, that that there could be no difference
between valid religious ethics and valid philosophical ethics. God and humanity both have to obey
the same rational principles, and reason is sufficient to guide us to these principles:
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{Christianity} has enriched philosophy with far more definite and purer concepts than it had been
able to furnish before; but which once they are there, are freely assented to by reason and are
assumed as concepts to which it could well have come of itself and which it could and should have
introduced… Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral
perfection, before we can recognize him as such (Kant Immanuel, 1951)
Kant’s system exalts ethics to an intrinsic good; indeed, doing one’s duty for no other reason but
that it is one’s duty is the highest good there is. As such it is related to religion; it is our duty to
God. God loves the virtuous and, finally, will reward them with happiness in proportion to their
virtue. In fact, God and immortality are necessary postulates of ethics. Immortality is necessary in
this way: According to Kant, we are commanded by the moral law to be morally perfect. Since
ought implies can, we must be able to reach moral perfection. But we cannot attain perfection in
this life, for the task is an infinite one. So there must be an afterlife in which we continue to make
progress toward this ideal.
God is a necessary postulate in that there must be someone to enforce the moral law. That is, for
the moral law to be completely justified there must finally be a just recompense of happiness in
accordance with virtue. The good must be rewarded by happiness in proportion to their virtue and
the evil punished in proportion to their vice. This harmonious correlation of virtue and happiness
does not happen in this life, so it must happen in the next life. Thus, there must be a God, acting
as judge and enforcer of the moral law, without which the moral law would be unjustified.
Kant is not saying that we can prove that God exists or that we ought to be moral in order to be
happy. Rather the idea of God serves as a completion of our ordinary ideas of ethics.
For Kant, we have strong reason to resist any claim which looks remotely like saying ‘X is morally
good because God wills X’. For Kant, moral truths are independent of God. On his account, God
is significant when it comes to morality only as ensuring that requirements of morality are met. He
says nothing to suggest that ‘X is morally good’ or ‘X is morally obligatory’ should be construed
as meaning ‘X is what it is because of God’ or ‘X is what it is because it is willed by God’. And
many philosophers have agreed with Kant in this respect.
Not all Christians would think of there being an opposition between duty and the ethical in the
manner of Kierkegaard and Philips. Why? Mostly because they would deny that there could be
any conflict between right moral thinking and right religious thinking. According, for example, to
Augustine, God is perfectly good and is intrinsically incapable of willing evil. ‘True inward
justice’, he argues judges by the most righteous law of almighty God’ and is unchanging (St.
Augustine, Confessions III. Vii.13). According to Aquinas, the goodness for which we should
always be aiming is nothing less than God himself:
‘The object of the will, that is the human appetite, is the Good without reserve, just as the object
of the mind is the True without reserve. Clearly then, nothing can satisfy our will except such
goodness, which is found, not in anything created, but in God alone. Everything created is a
derivative good’ (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae.2.8)
27
For Aquinas as for Augustine, all right moral thinking accords with what God is all about. On this
basis, he famously maintains that human moral goodness is action in accord with an ‘Eternal Law’,
namely God:
Law is nothing but a dictate of practical reason issued by a sovereign who governs a complete
community. Granted that the world is ruled by divine providence… it is evident that the whole
community of the universe is governed by God’s mind. Therefore, the ruling idea of things which
exist in God as the effective sovereign of them all has the nature of law. Then since God’s mind
does not conceive in time, but has an eternal concept … it follows that this law should be called
eternal…Through his wisdom God is the founded of the universe of things, and …. In relation to
them he is like an artist with regard to the things he makes… {Also} he is the governor of all acts
and motions to be found in each and every creature. And so, as being the principle through which
the universe is created, divine wisdom means art, exemplar, or idea, and likewise it also means
law, as moving all things to their due ends. Accordingly, the Eternal Law is nothing other than the
exemplar of divine wisdom as directing the motions and acts of everything (St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae.91.1 and 91.3)
On Aquinas’s Account, all things are subject to God and his will. And with this thought in mind,
he maintains that there is a sense in which rational agents with freedom can participate in God’s
will for them in a way that non-rational things cannot.
Since all things are regulated and measured by Eternal Law…it is evident that all somehow share
in it, in that their tendencies to their own proper acts and ends are from its impression. Among
them intelligent creatures are ranked under divine providence the more nobly because they take
part in providence by their own providing for themselves and others. Thus they join in and make
their own the Eternal Reason through which they have their natural aptitudes for their due activity
and purpose. Now this sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures is what we call ‘natural
law’ (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae.91.2)
Reading Materials Required for Topic Five
Mitchell, Basil (1980). Morality: Religious and Secular. Oxford University Press. Mouw, Richard
(1990): The God Who Commands, Notre Dame Press.
Nielsen, Kai (1973). Ethics without God, Pemberton Books
Pojman L.P. (2006). Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, Clare Hall: Cambridge University.
Pojman L.P and Rea M., (2008). Philosophy of Religion: Anthology
Thomson Wadsworth. ‘Ethics: Religious and Secular’ in Modern Schoolman LXX: 1-30
(November 1992)
Topic 6. Arguments for the Proof of God’s Existence
Topic Objectives
1. What are the three arguments for the proof of God’s existence?
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2. What are the various versions cosmological and teleological arguments

3. What are the criticisms levelled against each argument?
4. Isn’t the fact that there is so much suffering in the world good evidence that God does not
exist?
5. What are the three theodicies?
The Nature and Existence of God
Is there God? This is one of the most fundamental questions we can ask. How we answer it depends
ultimately on the way we view the world and our place in it. But as is so often the case in
philosophy, before we can tackle the question, we need to clarify what it means. In other words,
there is need to clarify what we mean by the term ‘God’.
Obviously, there are different conceptions of God. Taoists conceive of ultimate reality, the ground
of being, as a single unchanging, non-personal, dynamic principle that gives rise to and contains
everything that exists, even things that we think of as opposites or as contradicting one another.
Christians have usually thought of God in highly personal terms as a being who is in some ways
like us, capable of thought and feeling, but who differs from us in having no limitations or
imperfections. Given that we cannot deal separately with all these different conceptions of God,
we will restrict ourselves to the conception of God that has been dominant in Western civilization
for more than two millennia. This is the idea of God with which many readers will be most familiar.
The conception of God in question is one that arose within ancient Judaism roughly three thousand
years ago and was embraced later by Christians and Muslims. Orthodox adherents of all three
religions would thus describe God in very similar terms. All would see the following attributes as
being essential to God:
i) Uniqueness: There is only one God
ii) Omnipotence: God is all-powerful
iii) Omniscience: God is all-knowing
iv) Moral perfection: God is loving, benevolent, merciful and just
v) Necessary existent: Unlike the world and everything in it, God did not come into existence;
nor could he cease to exist
vi) Creativity: God created the world and sustains it in its existence
vii) Personality: God is not a mere abstract force or source of energy; he has intelligence,
understanding and a will.
The overwhelming majority of believing Jews, Christians and Muslims would agree that the
qualities listed above are defining attributes of God.
However, the God of the philosophers- that is the God whose existence philosophers of religion
have sought to prove – is generally conceived in more abstract terms. Nor does he necessarily have
all the listed attributes. Some proofs of God’s existence, for instance, only try to prove that the
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world must have been created by an intelligent being; other arguments merely try to show that the
‘first cause’ of the world must be very powerful indeed and must depend for its own existence and
nothing other than itself (that is, it must exist necessarily. Therefore we must pay attention to the
kind of God under consideration in our attempt to look at the main arguments for God’s existence.
It is an interesting feature of the Bible that none of its authors ever try to prove the existence of
God; his existence is simply assumed throughout. The idea that our beliefs should be justified by
logically structured arguments is one that comes from the Greeks. These two tributaries of Western
Civilization- the Hebrew and the Greek- eventually came together in the Middle Ages as Christian
thinkers, benefiting from the work of Arabic scholars, became interested in Greek culture,
particularly Greek philosophy. The result was a flowering of philosophy and theology that sought
to work out ways in which the claims of the Bible could be harmonized with the truths arrived at
by rational reflection. It is during this period that we first encounter sustained and sophisticated
attempts to prove God’s existence.
We shall consider three of the arguments to prove God’s existence, each of which still has its
defenders among contemporary philosophers.
1. The Ontological Argument (St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and in modified form in Duns
Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Royce and others)
This argument was first developed by Anselm (1033-1109), an Italian monk who eventually
became Archbishop Canterbury. It is called the ‘ontological’ argument for rather unobvious
reasons: ontology is the branch of metaphysics concerned with the ultimate nature of being. This
is to say that ontology is the philosophical study of ‘being’ or whatever is. According to
philosophers, all things both living and non-living, have one thing in common: being. Despite this
common element, all things or beings participate in ‘being’ in different ways; accordingly,
minerals are different from plants, animals are different from human beings. To examine the
meaning of ‘being’ is the primary task of ontology. Recently, the philosophy of man has developed
out of ontology as an area of specialization, which concentrates on ‘man’, that is on the meaning
of human existence, of being human.
The ontological argument tries to show that it is part of God’s essential nature to exist. This is to
say that the ontological argument is an ‘a priori argument that the very idea of God implies his
existence’ (Hunnex Milton D., (1961), Philosophies and Philosophers, San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing Company, p. 28). Anselm asks us to compare two kinds of idea:
1) The idea of a thing that actually exists;
2) The idea of the same kind of thing, except that in this case it does not exist.
Clearly, he argues, the first idea contains something that the second idea lacks: namely, existence.
For this reason, the first idea is of something greater or more perfect. Now the concept of God is
the concept of a being who is infinitely great: in other words, a being who is so great that it is
impossible to think of anything greater (that is, more perfect). This is part of the very definition of
30
the word ‘God’. Suppose we try to conceive of such a being. The ‘fool sayeth in his heart that there
is no God’ thinks it is possible to think of God while at the same time denying that God exists, just
as it is impossible to think of a unicorn while denying that unicorn exists. According to Anselm,
the fool is fooling himself, for you cannot coherently think of God as not existing. If your idea is
of a being that does not actually exist, then you have not really formed the idea of the greatest or
most perfect being possible. That idea, as we established above, would be of a being that, in
addition to all its other qualities, actually exists. In short, if you try to think of God and think of
him as not existing, then you have not really thought of God. And if you do think of God in the
correct way, then you will be thinking of a being who necessarily exists. Thus God cannot exist
merely as an idea in our minds; he must exist in reality too.
This is to say that the ontological argument attempts to prove the existence of God by moving from
a human mental concept of God to a knowledge of his actual existence; this rationalistic proof
seeks to establish that we already know the independent reality of God form the idea of God. He
therefore proposed that God is ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived, the human idea
of perfection. However, a God who only exists as a human idea is inferior to one who exists both
in the mind and in reality. St. Anselm was convinced that it is necessary for God to exist (God
exists necessarily).
A somewhat simpler version of this argument was later defended \by Descartes in his fifth
meditation. Pared to its essentials, Descartes version could be laid out as follows:
1) God, by definition, has all the perfections.
2) Necessary existence is a perfection.
3) Therefore, God necessarily exists.
What are we to make of this famous argument? Firstly, it is worth noting that the argument can be
presented in two forms. One version leads to the conclusion that God exists, the other to the
conclusion that God exists necessarily (that is, it is impossible for him to not to exist). In either
case, the argument is a remarkable attempt to deduce a claim about what exists from premises that
are supposed to be a priori truths (necessary truths that can be known independent of any
experience).
To think of a thing, and to think of that thing existing, is to form the same idea. In other words, if
you first think of a thing- say a house- and then think of that thing existing, you are not altering
the idea that that you began with. Existence does not belong to the content of the idea. The
ontological argument starts out analyzing the idea of God and concludes, on the basis of this
analysis that the idea stands in a certain relation to something outside itself (namely God himself).
The ontological argument still has its defenders, among them some very well-known contemporary
philosophers of religion such as Charles Hartshorne and Alvin Plantinga. One interesting feature
of these more recent proponents of the argument is that, like Descartes, they focus on the idea of
God’s necessary existence and seeks to explicate what this means and what it implies.
One argument that has emerged from these reflections runs as follows. The contrary of necessary
existence is contingent existence. A contingent being is a being who could either exist or not exist.
31
In other words, one can imagine a possible world in which it did not exist. This is not true of a
necessary being. A necessary being, by definition, would exist in every possible world. From this
a surprising conclusion follows. If there is even one possible world that contains a necessary being,
then that being must exist in every possible world (which includes, of course, the actual world we
inhabit). Since we can easily enough imagine a world in which God exists, such a world is
presumably possible. But in that case, God must exist in every possible world: In other words, he
exists necessarily.
Criticisms of the Argument
Objection: The ontological argument has had many critics. Gaunilon, a French monk, claimed that
Anselm’s reasoning led to absurd conclusions; Gaunilon then produced a parallel ontological
argument for the most perfect island. Given the idea of such an island, we can argue that unless it
exists in reality it cannot be the most perfect conceivable island. We cannot deduce the existence
of a being from the idea of that being.
Descartes and Kant both centered their criticism on the same point, as do most of the modern
discussions of the ontological argument: the assumption that existence is a predicate. Kant
contends that existence is not a property or a predicate. He maintained that to predicate existence
of anything adds nothing to the idea of the thing; e.g. our idea of a mermaid is not altered by saying
that it exists. Frege would say that existence is not a property of an object. The discussion was
continued by Bertrand Russell in his analysis of the word exists (See R. Descartes, ‘Meditations’
in The Religion of Science Library, Vol. 5, No. 51, trans. J. Veitch (La Salle, III: Open Court,
1941, pp. 75-83.
By God is meant that than which nothing greater can be thought; since that which exists in fact (in
res- in thing) as well as in idea (in mente- in mind) is greater than that which exists in idea alone,
God must exist. (OR) God would be less perfect as idea alone, but He is perfect, hence must exist
(St. Augustine, St. Anselm). The Descartes version is that the idea of a perfect\t God necessarily
requires the existence of God as the cause of this idea. Objection: Even if existence were included
in the idea of perfection, it would not follow that existence were actually the case. It would only
mean that in order to think perfection, one must also think existence.
2. The Cosmological (or Causal) Argument
The representatives of this position are: (Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and
others).
There is clearly something fishy about trying to prove the existence of God simply by unpacking
the definition of God, which is what the ontological argument tries to do. Surely, a more plausible
approach is to argue that the mere existence of the world is evidence for there being a creator. In
other words, if God didn’t exist, we wouldn’t be here.
This form of argument- from the existence of the world (or of something in the world) to the
existence of a being causally responsible for it- is known as the cosmological argument. In other
words, the argument is from a First or Uncaused cause because the infinite regression of causes is
impossible or inconceivable. This is to say that often the cosmological argument is referred to as
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the first-cause argument. It is a deductive argument that states that everything that happens has a
cause, and this cause in turn has a cause, and so on in a series that must either be infinite or have
its starting point in a first cause. However, as it has been explained before, Aquinas excludes the
possibility of an infinite regress of causes and so concludes that there must be a first cause, which
we call God. The cosmological argument has been put forward in many different forms, most
famously by the great medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas. A simple version of the cosmological
argument runs as follows:
1) The world exists
2) Everything that exists has a cause
3) Causes precede their effects
4) The chain of cause and effect cannot go back in time indefinitely
5) Therefore, there must be a ‘first cause’ that is not itself an effect
6) Since everything has a cause, this first cause must be the cause of itself (the uncaused
cause)
7) This self-caused first cause is God
8) Therefore God exists
There are probably many people who accept something like this as a reasonable justification for
belief in God. Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that the existence of motion and change in our
present world indicates that there must be a ‘first mover’, by which he means some being that is
ultimately responsible for the phenomena in question. Reason also tells us that this first mover
must itself be unmoved (and hence unchanging), otherwise it would not bring the regress of
explanations to an end. Reason thus leads us to posit what Aristotle termed an ‘unmoved mover’,
and Aquinas naturally identifies this being with God. This is one of the five ways in which Aquinas
thinks the existence of God can be demonstrated. But for those who are either not acquainted with
or unable to follow this sort of reasoning, belief in God can be based on the revelation provided
by the Bible. Moreover, scripture fills out our knowledge of God by revealing some things that
reason is not able to prove: for instance, the fact that God created the world at a point in time or
that there are three persons in one God (God is three persons in one- The Holy Trinity). Although
Aquinas held that the ultimate end of philosophy is to attain knowledge of God, his philosophical
system is comprehensive, offering a fully worked out metaphysics, epistemology (theory of
knowledge), philosophy of mind, ethics and political philosophy.
The more sophisticated versions of the cosmological argument that have been advanced rest on
what is known as the principle of sufficient reason. This principle asserts that there is a reason for
anything being the way it is. Included within this idea is the principle that there is a reason for the
existence of anything. The principle of sufficient reason is assumed all the time in science and in
everyday life. Why is the earth tilted on its axis? Why did my tomatoes flourish? We assume that
all such questions have answers. In other words, we always assume that every state of affairs has
an explanation. If the principle of sufficient reason applies to everything, then it applies not only
33
to every entity in the world but also to the world as a whole. In other words, if there is a complete
explanation for the existence of anything, then there is a complete explanation for the existence of
everything. It would be odd to say that the principle is true of everything with one exception: the
whole world. But is it really so odd? Why should we expect that what applies to every particular
thing in the world must also apply to the totality? Every physical object exists in space, but the
whole universe does not exist in space.
Most metaphysicians subscribe to a principle known as Occam’s razor which urges us to avoid
making our theories unnecessarily complicated. Occam’s razor does not say that everything has a
simple explanation. On the contrary it says that if we have to choose between two theories that are
equal in other respects (such as consistency with the data, predictive power, coherence with our
other beliefs and so on) we should prefer the simpler theory. Occam’s razor is a methodological
principle which is employed in natural, social sciences as well as in philosophy and it is named
after the medieval thinker William of Occam. Basically it is the principle of economy. It says that
we should try to make our theories simple, avoiding needless complexity.
Objection: David Hume and others criticized this argument. They ask, ‘what was the cause of the
First Cause?’ and they suggest that the series of causes may have had no beginning. If every event
must have a cause, why, it is asked, do we stop with God? If there can be uncaused events, then is
a concept of God necessary? To these criticisms, some have replied that this argument is not just
a temporal argument from effect to cause but an argument in the ‘order of being’ and, as such, he
is the ‘uncaused cause’ of whatever exists, including, for example, an endless series of events.
3. Teleological Argument (or Argument from Design) (St. Thomas Aquinas, Paley, and
many others)
The ontological argument and the more sophisticated versions of the cosmological argument have
been much discussed by professional philosophers and theologians, but it is probably fair to say
that to most lay people they are less interesting and less persuasive than a third ‘proof’ of God’s
existence usually referred to as the argument from design or purpose in the world.
Teleological argument is among the most popular theistic arguments. The order and the progress
in the universe exhibit or disclose an immanent intelligence and purpose.
Like the cosmological argument, the design argument comes in more than one form. In all
versions, the starting point is not the mere existence of the world but its character, or the character
of certain things in it such as living organisms. The basic thrust of the argument is that the world,
or parts of it, exhibit evidence of intelligent design. In other words, the design of things implies
the necessity of a designer
One version of the design argument might be labeled the ‘argument from the interconnectedness
of things’. It takes as its datum the marvelous way in which the different elements within nature
work in harmony to produce a simple, glorious system. The laws of physics; the position and angle
of the earth relative to the sun; the succession of the seasons; the geography of the continents and
the oceans; the earth’s meteorological patterns; and countless other such variables all work
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together to produce the wonderful, varied and complex carnival of life that we witness all around
us and in which we participate. How likely is that such harmony and organization could arise by
pure chance? Certainly, much smaller and simpler productions staged by human beings require a
great deal or rational planning beforehand. On these grounds, there are many who would echo the
psalmist’s words:
The heavens tell the glory of God and the firmament proclaims his handwork.
The second version of the design argument might be called the ‘argument from organism. It
focuses not on the whole of nature but on its most peculiar and interesting parts: namely,
organisms. Organisms are remarkable systems of interconnected parts, each part functioning in
cooperation with the others to enable the whole being to live, grow and reproduce in its
environment. For instance, a cat’s retractable claws, its specially adapted eyes that enables it to
see in the dark, its incisive teeth, acute hearing, padded paws, speed, strength and balance, all
combine to make the animal a highly effective hunter.
The way the parts are so perfectly suited to the ends of the whole organism is analogous to the
relation between parts and whole in a human artifact like a car or a washing machine. Since we
know that artifacts like these came into existence as a result of intelligent design and purposive
activity, it is surely reasonable to believe that this is also true of organisms.
Both versions of the design argument assert an analogy between the world, or a part of the world,
and things we know to be the product of purposive design. For this reason, the argument is
sometimes called the argument from analogy. In both versions, the key claim is that it is highly
improbable that the natural phenomenon in question – whether an entire ecosystem or an individual
organism- was produced by chance. If one accepts this premise, then it seems reasonable to
conclude that behind nature, there lies some sort of intelligence which is, at the very least, very
powerful and ingenious. The design argument has always been one of the most popular proofs of
God’s existence. Perhaps one reason for this is that it charms with the view of nature shared by
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In Genesis, God gives man ‘dominion over the fish of the see,
and over the birds of the air and over the cattle, and over every living thing that moves upon the
earth; he goes on to say, I have given you every plant yielding seed in its fruit; and you shall have
them for food; on this view, nature clearly exists for our benefit. To anyone inclined to this
tradition, it is therefore natural to view the workings of nature as purposive. This is especially true
in the case of organisms. Even today, scientists still describe organisms using purposive language,
talking about the ‘function’ of the liver or the ‘job’ performed by the lymphatic system.
The teleological argument was elaborated by William Paley (1743-1805). He argued, for example,
that the human eye must represent an intelligent creator’s design; it would be absurd to attribute
the biological development of the eye to ‘chance’. His analogy of watch conveys the argument
well: I may explain the existence of a rock lying on the ground by reference to natural forces such
as volcanic action, wind and rain. However, if I see a watch lying on the ground, I cannot explain
its existence in the same way; the complex arrangement of the watch’s wheels springs and other
parts, all operating together accurately, requires the postulate of an intelligent mind responsible
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for its being. Paley argued for the existence of God based on the complex and orderly functioning
of the world; there must be a Creator just as there must be a watchmaker.
Objections: The teleological argument has had many able supporters who argue from the presence
of order and design in the world to the source of that order in a purposeful God. Kant pointed out
that at most the argument from design points to a designer who is not necessarily an omnipotent
creator of the world. He argues that nothing in nature requires us to assume that this intelligent
designer is all-knowing (omniscient), all-powerful (omnipotent) or morally perfect because after
all avalanches, forest fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, plaques, droughts and the extinction of entire
species all occur naturally.
Kant argues that the teleological argument leans on the cosmological argument which in turn
depends on the ontological argument (which presupposes that what we are obliged to think is in
some sense real). The teleological argument is a tenuous) from analogy as we have pointed out
before. (AND) Facts may be found to support and to refute it.
Other critics have thought that the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection has weakened the force
of the teleological argument.
Another more severe criticism is that the argument assumes an order and design. The position can
be offered that there is disorder, chance or even chaos; human perceptions of reality are generally
unaware of fundamental disorder in the universe. However, even if it could be proven that order
exists, a problem of inferring a Transcendent God as its creator would remain.
The Five Arguments from St. Thomas Aquinas (The Five Ways)
Though they are not exhaustive or conclusive, the arguments of St. Thomas Aquinas are classic.
He infers the existence of God:
a) From movement to Uunmoved mover
b) From Causation to a First Cause
c) From the ‘may be’ to the ‘must be’ (contingency)
d) From the ‘more’ to the ‘most’ (perfection)
e) From design to the designer (teleology)
The Problem of Suffering
Perhaps it is easier to disprove rather than prove the existence of God. Isn’t the fact that there is so
much suffering in the world good evidence that God does not exist?
Although the problem is often called the ‘problem of evil’ a better label is the problem of suffering.
In other words, the term evil can be used in a general sense to refer to anything that is harmful, but
its more common and specific meaning is that of moral depravity (moral deprivation). An evil
person is one who intentionally prefers the bad to the good. The existence of this sort of evil
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certainly presents a difficulty for some religious outlooks. (If God created the world, is he not
ultimately responsible for the presence of evil in it? But the occurrence of physical pain or
emotional distress which in many cases neither afflicts nor is caused by those who are morally
depraved, poses a yet more obvious difficulty for the traditional view of God. The problem for
anyone who accepts the traditional Judeo-Christian idea of God is how to reconcile the following
statements, namely
1) There is widespread suffering
2) God is omnipotent
3) God is omniscient
4) God is morally perfect.
This is obviously not a problem for an atheist who will simply respond by saying that unpleasant
things happen to people because human beings are not powerful enough to prevent them from
happening and there is no other force that is trying to do so. Nor is it a problem for religious
believers whose conception of the divine differs significantly from the orthodox Judeo- Christian
conception. For instance, it did not arise for the ancient Greeks since they did not consider the
Olympian gods to be either omnipotent or morally perfect.
For the orthodox believer, however, the problem is a pressing one. Because the history of Western
philosophy is entwined with Christianity there have been many attempts to solve it. Any such
attempt is known as theodicy, since it typically defends the idea that, appearances notwithstanding,
God is just. (The word ‘theodicy’ is derived from the Greek terms for a god (theos) and justice
(dike). Theodicy therefore, is the attempt to reconcile the goodness of God with the existence of
evil in the world. In our case, we shall discuss or examine three lines of argument:
1) It does not really heart
2) It is our own fault
3) It is good for us
Concerning the first theodicy as an attempt to reconcile the goodness of God with the existence of
evil in the world, Cleanthes develops a very simple theodicy in Hume’s Dialogues concerning
Natural Religion:
The only method of supporting divine benevolence… is to deny absolutely the misery and
wickedness of man…. Health is more common than sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than
misery; and for one vexation we meet with, we attain upon computation, a hundred enjoyments.
This is to say that we do not suffer really- at least not very much. However, the philosophical
problem of evil does not go away if it turns out that there are fewer evils than we supposed.
A more supplicated attempt to deny the reality of suffering was developed by Saint Augustine
(354-430. He argued that the evils of the world have no positive existence; on the contrary, they
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are privations. For instance, blindness is the absence of sight; sickness is the absence of health;
poverty is the absence of wealth. In other words, everything created by God is good, just as the
account of creation in Genesis explicitly affirms. In this regard, since evils are merely privations,
they have no real existence and God cannot be held responsible for them.
Regarding the second theodicy: It is our own fault, it says that human beings are responsible
for their sufferings. Because God made us in his own image and intended us to live on a higher
plane than all other creatures, he endowed us with free will. In other words, God has created us
with full freedom even to go against his will. This is a genuine blessing; it allows our lives to have
genuine significance and value. But the blessing comes at a price. Since we are not morally perfect,
and since we do make free choices, we sometimes make mistakes and must then suffer the
consequences. The idea is to extend moral responsibility so that every individual can be held
responsible for whatever happens to them. The idea that prosperity must, at some level, be a reward
for virtue while suffering must be a punishment for some kind of failing goes back a long way.
Perhaps the most radical extension of the concept of responsibility, however, is the doctrine of
original sin developed by Christian theologians like Augustine. According to this doctrine, no
human being is ever perfectly innocent. A mythological explanation of this idea has it that when
Adam and Eve disobeyed God in the Garden of Eden, they rendered not only themselves guilty,
but all their descendants too, ‘the sins of the fathers’ being passed on to later generations. A more
abstract version holds that it is simply part of the human condition to be in some way contaminated
with sin; this is part and parcel of having a physical body and a partially animal nature. In either
case, the conclusion to be drawn is that since every human being is sinful, no suffering is ever
entirely undeserved.
Theodicy 3: It is good for us!
This line of argument also comes in more than one flavor. What has been called the ‘cosmic
harmony’ defense calls attention to the fact that our perspective on the universe is extremely
limited. If, however, we could see the big picture the way God sees it, then we would understand
how what we call evil plays an important and valuable role in the great scheme of things. To
complain about these so called evils is to be like children who complain about the rain that prevents
them from playing, not recognizing how valuable it is in other respects. To wish that life were full
of pleasures and completely free from pain is as misguided as wishing that we could have only
days and no nights, forgetting that we are part of an ecosystem that requires the alternation of day
and night. This way of dealing with the problem approaches the outlook characteristic of Taoism,
an ancient Chinese philosophy, which views the light and the dark, the negative and the positive,
as equally essential to a basically harmonious universe in which they balance each other out. The
idea that our perspective of the world is necessarily partial and limited is undeniably true. It follows
that our understanding of particular things or events and how they relate to the whole is also bound
to be imperfect. To be reminded of this is surely healthy. In the book of Job, God himself responds
to Job’s complaints by providing just such a reminder:
Where was thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? / declare if thou hast understanding
Who has laid the measures thereof, of thou knowest? /or who hath stretched upon it?
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God’s magnificent catalogue of things that the creator alone could possibly understand is sufficient
to silence job.
Explanations of Evil and Objections
The problem of evil has perplexed many generations of philosophers. Epicurus is supposed to have
given it the classic formulation that follows:
Either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or He can, and will not; or he has
neither the power nor will; or lastly, He has both the power and will. If he has the will, and not the
power, this shows weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God. If He has the power, and not
the will, this is malignity, and is no less contrary to His nature. If He is neither able nor willing,
He is both impotent and malignant, and consequently cannot be God. If He is both willing and able
(which alone is consonant to the nature of God) then whence comes evil, or why does He not
prevent evil?
1) Evil is the result of man’s wickedness. Objections: what of nonhuman evils? What of
plagues and the like? Are suffering children evil?
2) Good can come of evil. Objection: Doesn’t evil breed more evil?
3) Evil brings good in the long run. Objection: Men must live in the short run.
4) Evil is a moral exercise. Objection: For innocent people who suffer?
5) Evil is undesirable but unavoidable aspect of the best of possible worlds. Objection: Is not
God responsible for the design of the world.
6) What we call evil is not really evil but good. Objection: ‘Even if everything we think evil
is really good, we still think it an evil, and … this error… would be at least one evil’ (Hospers).
7) Evil is necessary to highlight the good. Objection: Is not good able to recommend itself?
The Religious Problem as the Problem of the Whole Man
Man as a Problem
Classical philosophers might just as well face the unpalatable fact that modern man is no longer
interested in metaphysics. This does not indicate in any sense at all, the invalidity of the
metaphysical approach. This has and will always have the profoundest appeal to men who still
believe in reason and universals. But metaphysics is unpopular today partly because of the
irrationality of modern man. Despite the fact that he uses the word “reason” it does not follow that
his reason leads him to metaphysics; for the “reason” the modern uses is not the classical reason
which discovers ends und purposes and goals; it is a diminution or pervasion of that reason. For
historical liberalism, reason was used to discover the happiness and pleasure of the individual; for
capitalism it became a technical reason which was concerned only with the means of production
and the acquisition of profit. For the totalitarians, it meant a planning reason which attempted to
organize the chaos created by capitalism and a liberalism divorced from purpose.
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Now that the philosopher has perspective in which he may contrast the modern distortions of
reason with the classical reason, there arises the surprising paradox that reason is strongest in the
days of faith, not the faith of superstition or blind credulity, but the faith which admits a life above
that of reason. Rationalism was strongest in the thirteen century. Just as our senses work better
when perfected by reason, so too our reason works better when perfected by faith. A man
temporarily devoid of reason, such as drunkard, has the same senses that he had before, but they
do not function as well as they did when he was under rational direction and government. What
the senses are without reason, reason is without faith. Though reason can still function, it very
quickly reaches the end of its rope. It follows that metaphysical reason is unpopular today because
we live in a state of world confusion. Philosophy functions best in days of relative peace. As soon
as a time of trouble comes, men turn to nonrational solutions, such as astrology in pre-Christian
times, or to a queer kind of mysticism, such as one finds in contemporary thinkers like Aldous
Huxley.
Metaphysics being the abstract universal science, has little appeal to the concrete practical man.
For those who still retain a taste of metaphysics, there are some, like Berdyaev, who would
substitute as the universal object a philosophy of freedom for a philosophy of being. To fill the
void caused by the rejection of metaphysics, there has been substituted a worship of epistemology,
which attempts to find out how much you can know before you actually start knowing. There are
many philosophers in this field who have made the problem of knowledge very much like the
problem of discovering how you go to sleep, forgetting that we are already a sleep before we know
that we are a sleep. We have to wake up before we know that we were a sleep, and we have to
know before we can know that we knew. St. Thomas says we know the stone before we know the
idea of the stone (i.e. before we know what something is (its essence), it is (its existence). Another
reason for the contempt of the metaphysical approach to reality is the contemporary idea that
philosophy is nothing more than a syncretism of the experimental sciences. This view owes its
success to the material triumphs of the last century. Because science solved so many technical
problems, it was felt that it could solve all other problems.
With particular relation to the subject of God and religion, regardless of how much we may stress
the primacy of metaphysics, it is obvious that the contemporary mind is not concerned with going
to God from nature, but from God to man. By nature here, we mean not only the physical nature
endowed with movement, uniformity, contingency, finality and dependence revealed in the Five
Ways of St. Thomas, but also what Aristotle called the first physics, or the science of being. Nature
in either one of these senses, will always remain the best approach to God and religion, though it
may not always be the most popular. Today, it is unpopular because nature seems to be turning
against man, particularly since the invention of atomic bomb. So long as men use their reason in
order to discover the over-all purpose of life, nature assists them as a kind of earthly sacrament to
reveal Divinity. But as soon as nature is made autonomous- as it was by Descartes, who separated
man from God as a basis of rationality; and by Rousseau, who separated man from the community;
and by Kant who separated man from God as the basis of morality- then it becomes meaningless.
Man can then only love nature as a lover loves his mistress, knowing that his love will not last and
that tomorrow may be the last day. As a result man finally becomes enslaved by the external world
and therefore, is in slavery to himself.
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The man with whom philosophy is concerned today is not the dignified man if the Renaissance
who still breathed the atmosphere of Christianity, but rather a Man isolated from himself and the
community and from God. His value increasingly diminishes as generations of philosophers
interpreted science so as to devaluate personality. The Copernican revolution was interpreted so
as to remind man of his unimportance for now the earth was no longer the Centre of the universe.
The astronomical blow against human dignity was followed by a biological blow, in which
philosophers interpreted Darwinism to mean that man is not divided from the animal world and
therefore has no transcendence to it. Finally came the psychological blow when Freud said “the
ego is not master in his own house”. Insult was added to injury as Freud declared “than man´s
superiority over animals may come down to his capacity for neurosis”. Human freedom was denied
as man was declared to be determined either biologically, as with the Freudians, or economically
as with the Marxists. Just as the Marxists interpreted history in terms of different techniques of
production (history is a movement of conflict in the material order), so Freud interpreted culture
and thought as the different ways in which men sought to compensate for the sacrifices they had
to make while living in society.
Reading Materials Required for topic Six.

2. Hunnex, Milton (1961). Philosophies and Philosophers, San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing Company.
3. Titus H.H., Smith M.S. and Nolan R.T. (1995). Living Issues in Philosophy, New York:
Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Bibliography
Cahn, Steve M. (2003). Philosophy for the 21st century: A Comprehensive Reader, New York:
Oxford University Press.
Davies, Brian (1998). Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject, Washington: Georgetown
University Press, 1998.
-------------- (2000). Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Dhavamony Maria susai, Phenomenology of religion, Rome: Gregorian University Press
Drever, James (1968). A Dictionary of Psychology, London.
Eliade, Mircea (1957). The Sacred and the Profane, New York.
……………… (1969). “Myth” in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15, pp. 1134-1135.
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Evans C. Stephen (1985).Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about faith, Illinois Intervarsity Press,
1985
Hick, John (1973). Philosophy of Religion, Jew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Horner Chris and Westacott Emrys (2000). Thinking through Philosophy: An Introduction,
Hunnex, Milton (1961). Philosophies and Philosophers, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Company.
Kant, Immanuel, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, trans. T.K. Abbott
(Longmans, Green, 1898)
------------------, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. Bernard (Haefner, 1951)
--------------------, Kant, Immanuel (1956). Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck.
Bobbs-Merrill.
-------------------, Lectures on Ethics, Trans. Louis Infield, Harper Torchbooks, 1963.
Kierkegaard, Soren (1946). Either Or, Vol 2, Trans. D.F. Swenson and L.M. Swenson, Princeton:
Princeton University Press
…………………….. (1954). The Sickness Unto Death, Trans. Walter Lowrie, New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books.
Malefitjt Annemarie de Waal, Religion and Culture, New York.
Malinowski B. (1954). “Myth in Primitive Psychology” in Magic Science and Religion, New York.
Mitchell, Basil (1980). Morality: Religious and Secular. Oxford University Press. Mouw, Richard
(1990): The God Who Commands, Notre Dame Press.
Nielsen, Kai (1973). Ethics without God, Pemberton Books
Nottingham, E.K. (1954). Religion and Society, New York.
Ogutu, Anthony, (2017). ‘Ethics in the Educational Curriculum in Africa’ in Tangaza Journal of
Theology and Mission, Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa.
Pittinger W.N. (1974). Praying Today, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.
Pojman Louis (1992). ‘Ethics: Religious and Secular’ in Modern Schoolman LXX: 1-30
……………….. (2006). Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, Clare Hall: Cambridge University.
Pojman L.P and Rea M., (2008). Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Thomson Wadsworth.
Price J.R. “Mysticism” in Musser and Price, A New Handbook of Christian Theology, pp.318-320.
Sheen J. Fulton, Philosophy of Religion: The Impact of Modern Knowledge on Religion, London:
Browne and Nolan ltd. 1952.
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Spinks, Stephens (1965). Psychology and Religion

Steer D.V., “Mysticism” in Halverson and Cohen, A Handbook of Christian Theology, pp. 236-
238.
Titus H.H., Smith M.S. and Nolan R.T. (1995). Living Issues in Philosophy, New York:
Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Turner, Victor W., “Myth and Symbol” in International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol 1.
Wash J. (1943). Sociology of Religion, Chicago.
Sample Cat Questions

1. Why is it not easy to come up with a good and comprehensive definition of religion? (10
marks)
2. Distinguish between philosophy of Religion and theology (10 marks)
3. What is Psychology of Religion? (10 marks)
4. Can we be ethical without being religious? (10 marks)
5. What has been the relationship among religion, philosophy and science? (10 marks)
Sample Exam Questions
1. Discuss why there is no universally accepted definition of Religion? (20 marks)
2. Citing relevant examples, examine the distinction between the sacred in the broader and
in the stricter sense (20 marks)
3. Assess the various forms of religious experiences (20 marks)
4. Explicate the three arguments for the proof of God’s existence (20 marks)
5. Examine the religious value of myths (20 marks)
6. What are the central points in the following positions:
a). Sociology of religion (5 marks)
b). Theology of world religions (5 marks)
c). Anthropology of religion (5 marks)
d). Philosophy of religion (5 marks)
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CPH 210: Philosophy of Religion

CONSOLATA INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES

UNIT CODE: CPH 210 UNIT NAME: Philosophy of Religion

LECTURER: Dr. Opiyo Ogutu, PhD. TEL. NO: 0720696083 Email:

All copyright to Dr. Anthony Opiyo Ogutu, PhD.

Expected Leaning outcomes

Topic 2. Philosophy of Religion

What is Philosophy of Religion?

The second enemy of Christianity is convention, especially the conventional

Theory of reality- Absolute idealism

1. Does Myth have an important role in sacred literature?

Topic 5. Ethics and Religion

2. What are the various versions cosmological and teleological arguments

Reading Materials Required for topic Six.

Spinks, Stephens (1965). Psychology and Religion

Sample Cat Questions

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