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Republic of the Philippines The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on
the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law
as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using
a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose,
is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions .
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become

involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part
of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one
or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot
to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be
allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
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involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit .
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging
in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to
the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on
Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who
are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with
the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer .
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
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firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." ( Ibid.). these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
intelligent decision-making.

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. ( Ibid.).
making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
flowing therefrom.
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
has become a vital necessity.
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by
a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a
staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be
more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law
firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is
an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go
to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice"
in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining
the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as
well into the intertwining modern management issues.
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Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to
the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation
is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles . Often
these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional
forms of seeking to influence governmental policies . And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged . Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates
of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now
make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases . (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may
be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a
major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial
law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or
similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change
to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory
of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make
a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office . The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough
to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not
the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
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least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to
grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires
next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? ( Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions

with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer
(such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer  (such as
an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the
team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the
law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program .
For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session
on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973).
( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement
drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan
agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical
support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
6
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years .
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power  and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide . (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to
the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law . ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
 7

reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
No blade shall touch his skin;
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the No blood shall flow from his veins.
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger,
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly SO ORDERED.
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the

Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540               September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. 2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; 8 and
"the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that
he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
8
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject
to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant
why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination
of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I
have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice
of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully
admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner
strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima
facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office, 18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National
Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral
fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
 9

characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
honest error of judgment."22 with severely by this Court.

We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences
of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. 25 Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of
this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as country.
a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the
SO ORDERED.
act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he
chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect
contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from
making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has
been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates.
As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot
suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this
Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we
likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is
warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC 
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and
his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993
issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two
(2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his
then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's
oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his
probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three
(3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality
10
of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts
which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent
to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina,
and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name
which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself
as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer . He is sought as
counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926)
191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations
to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive
at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as
to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to
the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very
source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has
pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more

difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted
for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen , as
in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar
privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it
on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery
has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate
the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair
private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination
into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they
may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to
assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of
good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which
they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law ,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not
such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have
fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.]
288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit
no person to the practice of the law unless he covered
an upright moral character. The possession of this by
the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice than
legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after
years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the
11
bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his
character will remain bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament to his great
calling  — a curse instead of a benefit to his
community  — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of
a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for
his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding,  and the court
may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general morality,  and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to
the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members
of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into
the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of
such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their
courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who
inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty
to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would
not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged
and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that
the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged

himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly,
at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia,
of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly
since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court
how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit
relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a
copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
12
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6593               February 4, 2010
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit 1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for disbarment
against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia
(Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline
charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June
23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr.
Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely,
Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and
Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my
daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an
unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I
ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my
daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at
the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a child
who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona
Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the
Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their
daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia
were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed
financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of
financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same
affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only
mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and imputations. By way of
defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to
Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea
after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades
and understood his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew
apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became
close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed
to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children
were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who
finished a special secondary course.4 Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been
employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of
the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on
December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a
lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between
them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between
her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept
silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty.
Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia
alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent
when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had
no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings 6 in view of the criminal
complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
13
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute
nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that
she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that
they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a
widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion. 9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the
respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is
the father of her six (6) children.10 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this
motion.11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents’
disbarment.12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of
Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No.
XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of
morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross
immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He
submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would
warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP
rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright
and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-
Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She
recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view
that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility
for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his
bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been
filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against
Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public.15 The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party
whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; 16 effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the
filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he
applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of
the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were
committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre
v. Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper
complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he
became a lawyer.18 Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the
applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar. 19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority
of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power
to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional
authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for,
among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required
to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the
effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is
more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her
affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now
available for the Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her
desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to
disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and,
impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with
Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.20 Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
14
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.21 We make these distinctions as
the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an
unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and
subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondent’s pattern of
misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family – institutions that this society
looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole.
In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with
his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondent’s act of contracting the second
marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral
character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 25 where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the
respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage – a sacred institution that demands respect
and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.
Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and
during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to
represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and
the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already
married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into
a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the
subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but
of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional
implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his
second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not
then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not
"valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in
an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in
place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had
sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led
a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the
position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his
responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to
escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present
complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the
profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to
the Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath,28 Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 30 all of which commonly require
him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as
he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He
openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would
set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated
the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited
the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience
that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he
also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
15
Professional Responsibility.31 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 32 Lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. 33 Needless to state, those
whose conduct – both public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should
be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they
got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is
required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private
life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve
respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was
subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which
lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar.35
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. 36 To have
good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not
enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a
person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is
known.37 The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients;
and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia
already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and
that he already had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was under the moral
duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for
about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty.
Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances,
to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a
lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by
another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would not aggravate the situation by
entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the
other person’s feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void,
the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children.
Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a
married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she
should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with
Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship
with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and
willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with
her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law. 1avvphi1
 16

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in
the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty.
Garrido’s marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the
country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty.
Garrido’s second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage,
contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his
capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in
Hongkong39 leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the
added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia
afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her "husband."
Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her
under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty.
Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear
demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions grossly
immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man
who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions
were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido,
she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the
subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct could
not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the community’s sense of decency;
while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house
prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the
woman of his second marriage.
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an
officer of the Court.42
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of
them. The records show the parties’ pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that
demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for
the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his
demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates
a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without
undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the
administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the
circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents
crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She
simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only
be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to
live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member
of the legal profession.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and
Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.
Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

Conclusion

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances
concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve
to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this
reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
January 10, 2018
A.C. No. 9000
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant
vs.
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint 1 filed by Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
(complainant) against Atty. Haide V. Gumba (respondent), and for which respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six months. The issues now ripe for resolution arc: a)
whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order of the Court: by not abiding by the order of her
suspension; and b) whether respondent deserves a stiffer penalty for such violation.
Factual Antecedents
According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from him a ₱350,000.00 loan
with 12% interest per annum. Incidental thereto, respondent executed in favor of complainant
an undated Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105- square meter lot located in Naga City, and
covered by Transfor Certificate of Title No. 20553 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio
Vista. Attached to said Deed was a Special Power of Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent's
parents authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be secured by the subject property.
Complainant and respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter failed to pay the loan in or
before August 2000, complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of
Deeds (RD).5
Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite repeated demands, she failed to
settle her obligation. Complainant attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD
of Naga City but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered the authority of respondent
to mortgage the property to a bank, and not to sell it.6
Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, he would not have approved
her loan. He added that respondent committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and
her moral ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that respondent be
sanctioned for her infraction.7
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated February 9, 2009; Commissioner Jose I. de la Rama, Jr.
(Commissioner de la Rama) faulted respondent for failing to file an answer, and participate in
the mandatory conference, He further declared that the SPA specifically authorized respondent
to mortgage the property with a bank. He stressed that for selling t.lie property, and not just
mortgaging it to complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent acted beyond her
authority. Having done so, she committed gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon
17
1,9 Rule 1.01,10 and Canon 711 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-44612 dated August 28, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines - Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner de la Rama.
Action of the Supreme Court
Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution13 dated October 5, 2011, which sustained the findings
and conclusion of the IBP. The Court nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper,
pursuant to its sound judicial discretion and on the facts of the case. Accordingly, it suspended
respondent from the practice of law for six months, effective immediately, with a warning that a
repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5, 2011 Resolution upon
respondent because its previous copy sent to her was returned unserved.14 In its August 13,
2012 Resolution,15 the Court considered .the October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been served
upon respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution was also returned unserved. In the same
resolution, the Court also denied with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on the
October 5, 2011 Resolution.
Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Naga City, Branch 2 wrote1 a letter16 inquiring from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
whether respondent could continue representing her clients and appear in courts. She also
asked the OCA if the decision relating to respondent's suspension, which was downloaded from
the inten1et, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in courts for the period of
her suspension.
According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent represented a party in a case
pending in her court; and, the counsel of the opposing party called Judge Arrr1ea's attention
regarding the legal standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea added that
respondent denied that she was suspended to practice law since she (respondent) had not yet
received a copy of the Court's resolution on the matter.
In her Answer/Comment17 to the query of Judge Armea, respondent countered that by reason of
such downloaded decision, Judge Armea and Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III
(Judge Formaran III) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her appearance
in their courts. She insisted that service of any pleading or judgment cannot be made through
the inte1net. She further claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's.
October 5, 2011 Resolution.
On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the October 5, 2011
Resolution to the OCA for circulation to all courts.18 In response, on January 30, 2013, the OCA
issued OCA Circular No. 14-201319 addressed to the courts.20 the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), and the IBP informing them of the October 5,
2011 and August 13, 2012 Resolutions of the Court.
IBP’s Report and Recommendation

Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No XX-2013-35921 dated March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation 22 of Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero (Comrnissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint against respondent. According
to Commissioner Cachapero. there is no rule allowing the service of judgements through the
internet; and. Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead of time when they
implemented the suspension of respondent even before the actual service upon her of the
resolution concerning her suspension.
Statement and Report of the OBC
In its November 22, 2013 .Statement.23 the OBC stressed that respondent received the August
13, 2012 Resolution (denying her motion, for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution) on November 12, 2012 per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus, the effectivity
of respondent's suspension was from November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013. The OBC also
pointed out that suspension is not automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of
suspension. It is necessary that an order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension to enable
the concerned lawyer to resume practice of law.
The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report24 that respondent has no authority
to practice law and appear in court as counsel during her suspension, and until such time that
the Court has lifted the order of her suspension. Thus, the OBC made these recommendations:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to lift order of her
suspension, attaching therewith certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court
where she practices [h]er profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she
has ceased and desisted from the practice of law from 12 November 2012 to 12 May 2013,
immediately: and 2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not be
sanctioned for disciplinary action for issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359, dated
21 March 2013, purportedly dismissing this case for lack of merit. 25
On February 19, 2014, the Court noted26 the OBC Report, and directed respondent to comply
with the guidelines relating to the lifting of the order of her suspension as enunciated
in Maniago v.Atty. De Dios.27
Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC issued a Certification, 28 which
stated that respondent had been ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months,
and as of the issuance of said certification, the order of her suspension had not yet been lifted.
Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso
On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified Complaint 29 for nullity of
clearance, damages, and preliminary injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining
order against the OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso (Atty. Paraiso). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2015-0007.
18
Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending her from the practice of
law even if the administrative case against her was still pending with the IBP. She likewise
faulted the OBC for requiring her to submit a clearance from its office before she resumes her
practice of law after the suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty. Paraiso benefited from this
supposed "bogus suspension" by publicly announcing the disqualification of respondent to
practice law.
In its Answer,30 the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, which seeks
reversal, modification or enjoinment of a directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that
respondent should raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration in the administrative
case, instead of filing a complaint with the RIC. It also stated that the instance of OCA Circular
No. 14-2013 was in compliance with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the PAO,
and the IBP of the suspension of respondent.
For its pmt, the OBC declared in a Report31 dated March 24, 2015 that during and after the
period of her suspension, without the same having been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and
appeared in courts in the following cases:
x x x (l) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City Assessor of Naga City, et. al.),
(2) Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063 (Sps. Jaime M. Kalaw et. al. v. Fausto David, et al.), (3) Other
Spec. Proc. No. RTC 2012-0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
21128 of the Registry of Deeds of Naga City v. Danilo O. Laborado). 32
The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24, 2015 Report, the Court
had not yet lifted the order of suspension against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to
comply with the order of her suspension, respondent deliberately refi1sed to obey a lawful order
of the Court. Thus, it recommended that a stiffer penalty be imposed against respondent.
On June 4, 2015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 2015-0007 for lack of
jurisdiction, and pending resolution was respondent's motion for reconsideration. 33
Issue
Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during the period of her
suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?
Our Ruling
Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the practice of law is not a right but
a mere privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory power of the [Court],"34 It is a "privilege
burdened with conditions."35 As such, lawyers must comply with its 1igid standards, which
include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level of morality, and full compliance with the
rules of the legal profession.36
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios,37 The Court laid down
the guidelines for the lifting of an order of suspension, to wit:

l) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with
the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted
from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her
suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with the order
of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer tmder oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. 38
Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution dated October 5, 2011
suspending respondent from the practice of law for six months effective immediately.
Respondent filed her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she received the
notice of the denial of such motion per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.
While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only personally or by registered
mail,39 and that mere showing of a downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to
respondent is not a valid service, the fact, however, that respondent was duly informed of her
suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a motion for reconsideration
on the October 5, 2011 Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of said motion.
It thus follows that respondent's six months suspension commenced from the notice of the
denial of her motion for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
In lbana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya,40 despite having received the Resolution anent her
suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to practice law. She filed pleadings and she appeared as
counsel in courts. For which reason, the Court suspended her from the practice of law for six
months in addition to her initial one month suspension, or a total of seven months.
Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,41 respondent therein, Atty. Lozada, appeared and
signed as counsel, for and in behalf of her husband, during the period of her suspension from
the practice of law. For having done so, the Court ruled that she engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. The Court did not give weight to Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith as she was
very well aware that when she represented her husband, she was still serving her suspension
order. The Court also noted that Atty. Lozada did not seek any clearance or clarification from the
Court if she can represent her husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended Atty.
Lozada for six months for her willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.
19
Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension. However, she continued
to engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the
period of her suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of
law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions which require the application of legal
knowledge witl1in the period of his or her suspension.42 To stress, by practice of law, we refer to
"any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the
legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.''43 In fine, it will amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful
order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law during the pendency of
his or her suspension.44
As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and even after the period of
her suspension and without filing a sworn statement for the lifting of her suspension,
respondent signed pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of respondent
are in violation of the order of her suspension to practice law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is necessary that there is an
order from the Court lifting the suspension of a lawyer to practice law. 1âwphi1 To note,
in Maniago, the Court explicitly stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the expiration of
one’s suspension, file a sworn statement with the Court, and that such statement shall be
considered proof of the lawyer's compliance 1Nith the order of suspension.
In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to comply with the guidelines
for the lifting of the suspension order against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter.
However, respondent did not comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007)
against the OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so,
respondent violated a lawful order of the Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the
lifting of the order of suspension against her.
To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court is two-fold: 1) she filed
pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during the period of her suspension, and prior to t1e
lifting of such order of her suspension: and 2) she did not comply with the Court's directive for
her to file a sworn statement in compliance with the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension
order.
Under Section 27,45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
among other grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to
comply with the order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive to observe the guidelines
for the lifting thereof. Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months
from the practice of law against respondent is in order. 46
WIIEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an
additional period of six (6) months (from her original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
 20

Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to infom1 the Court of the date of her receipt of this Republic of the Philippines
Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect. SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. 'The Office of the Bar EN BANC
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to the record of respondent as
member of the Bar.
A.C. No. 7481               April 24, 2012

SO ORDERED.
LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D.

Brennisen against respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for deceit and gross misconduct in
violation of his lawyer's oath.

The Facts

Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 211762 of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal. Being a resident of the United States of America (USA), he entrusted the
administration of the subject property to respondent, together with the corresponding owner's
duplicate title.

Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious Special Power of

Attorney (SPA)3 dated February 22, 1989, mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property
to one Roberto Ho ("Ho"), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated November 15, 2001.
As a result, TCT No. 21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 150814 5 issued in favor of
Ho.

Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent for having violated his oath as a lawyer, causing him damage and prejudice.

In his counter-affidavit,6 respondent denied any formal lawyer-client relationship between him

and the complainant, claiming to have merely extended his services for free. He also denied
receiving money from the complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate taxes on the
property. Further, he averred that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque
("Roque") and one Danilo Diaz ("Diaz"), who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for
a loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to having confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor
already annotated at the back of TCT No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and
because he was also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage
and received his proportionate share of ₱130,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan, which he
asserted to have fully settled.

Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it
was a forgery. Nonetheless, he sought complainant's forgiveness and promised to repay the
value of the subject property.
In the Resolution7 dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
During the mandatory conference held on October 21, 2008, the parties stipulated on the
following matters:
1. That complainant is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of
the Register of Deeds of Parañaque;
2. Respondent was in possession of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of the property
of the complainant;
3. The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a certain Roberto Ho;
4. The title to the property of complainant was cancelled in year 2000 and a new one,
TCT No. 150814 was issued in favor of Mr. Roberto Ho;
5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February 1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U.
Contawi is spurious and was not signed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;
6. That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the mortgage loan secured by the
mortgagee on the aforementioned property of complainant;
7. That respondent did not inform the complainant about the unauthorized mortgage
and sale of his property;
8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto Ho;
9. That respondent has not yet filed any case against the person whom he claims to
have falsified his signature;
10. That respondent did not notify the complainant that the owner's copy of TCT No.
21176 was stolen and was taken out from his office. 8
In its Report9 dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through
Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold
the property of his client without the latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of a
falsified SPA. Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD
deduced that respondent violated various provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility
21
and accordingly recommended that he be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of
Commissioner De Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-2011-248 10 as follows:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of
falsification; making or using falsified documents; and for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his
dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is hereby DISBARRED."
The Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he
mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which was entrusted to him, without the latter's
consent.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors that respondent
acted with deceit when, through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized
mortgage and sale of his client's property for his personal benefit.
Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge or consent,
and partook of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. His contention that he merely
accommodated the request of his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the
spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature
reflected thereon was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
transactions involving the subject property were effected using the owner's duplicate title, which
was in respondent's safekeeping and custody during complainant's absence.
Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors correctly recommended
his disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client which may come
into his possession.
 22

Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath
client. and the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful
conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
SO ORDERED.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag,11 the Court disbarred one of the respondent lawyers and ordered his
name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of serious dishonesty and professional
misconduct. The respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false and simulated transaction
not only by notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also – and even worse – sharing in the
profits of the specious transaction by acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of Sale.

In Flores v. Chua,12 the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for having deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared personally before him when he notarized a forged
deed of sale. He was found guilty of grave misconduct.

In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge
the bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of
the privilege to practice law and to live up to the exacting standards demanded of the members
of the bar. It bears to stress that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet
the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes
the lawyer to administrative liability."13

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship between
him and complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether
the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may
not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 14 1âwphi1

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this
case, as recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. Section 27,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office , xxx or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice xxx" (emphasis
supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
is required.15 Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that
the standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before
be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent
and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that
respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July
1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they
were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant
when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual
congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born
on December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent
first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship
continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He
gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship
ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by
deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss the case citing  complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking
to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her
comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On
June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss
was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988, respondent repeated
23
his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from
1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as
well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as
a lawyer.4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant
to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to
take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. 5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her
after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion
of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension
or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man
and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid
of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant
the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child
was born out of wedlock. 9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had
given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations
refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was
then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent
young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of
love, not for any other reason.
 24

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter SECOND DIVISION
and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming
ADM. CASE No. 3319               June 8, 2000
that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented
from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to
be no other indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, LESLIE UI, complainant,
should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath. vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees. DE LEON, JR., J.:

SO ORDERED. Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly
carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely,
Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however,
complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they
had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited
respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and
alleged, however; that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed
the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that
the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband,
Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March
1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no
avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11,
1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in
1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos
Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged.
She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her
and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent
did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills

residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and
accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her
trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she
was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of
Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in
March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to
work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the
wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been
communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil
status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her
in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L.
Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds. 6 By way of
counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and
groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the
start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give
birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged
her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still
living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents
started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal
home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the
same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship,
illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's
evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of
respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos
25
St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least
create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant,
worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and
Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their
respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be
dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of
Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to
Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making
false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and
intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and
attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii
State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent
in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was
within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of
Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and
that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which
make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she
did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on
what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether
or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred
from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2)
grounds, namely:
 26

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good
moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated that complainant miserably
failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the
allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of
marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a
married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this
and Recommendation, finding that:
case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that
upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated
that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui,
of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18 the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim
too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible
for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to
the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason
make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted
respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further,
The records will show that when respondent became aware the ( sic) true civil status
respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person
of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts
responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and
with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each
other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a together.
child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light
colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic)
evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private
anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without
security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent
cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life,
presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the
a dream cherished by every single girl.
complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause
for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to
bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her x x x           x x x          x x x
relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with
Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of
shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with
him.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
In the Memorandum  filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
22 
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for
Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully
complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that
Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed
disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an We agree with the findings aforequoted.
intercalated date.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice
of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates
of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held —
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the
legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that
what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and
27
as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not
only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from
what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps
respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised
prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background
prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions.
For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from
Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui
and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never
lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible
considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just
that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we
find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy
of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a
marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is
difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year
when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
 28

contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense Republic of the Philippines
of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand. SUPREME COURT
Manila
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.1avvphi1 The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called FIRST DIVISION
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest
A.C. No. 6672               September 4, 2009
degree of morality.

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
vs.
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
RESOLUTION
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a
more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future. CORONA, J.:

SO ORDERED. This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance 3 and
expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
 29

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
Tel: 362-7820 recommended penalty.
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm.
Fax: (632) 362-
M-01
7821
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
Cel.: (0926)
Grace Park, Caloocan City professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
2701719
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.

Back Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by
which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts.

SERVICES OFFERED:
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

1avvphi1 RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.16
(emphasis supplied)
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
Hence, this complaint.
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
of the said calling card.7
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 8 protect the community from barratry and champerty.18

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through
paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD
recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would
merit a heavier penalty.
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during
the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent
never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s
"referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office. 21 Respondent
committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a
matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of
his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the
case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer
lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an
interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or
to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the
exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious
sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on
lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
30
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on
his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services
by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This
crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is
not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No, 6854            April 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]
JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,  J.:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by
Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01,1 6.02,2 and 7.033 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:
Complainant’s wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the
construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she
failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a
September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building
Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows, quoted verbatim:
xxxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David
Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his
relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the
abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned and his family, and those other
families mentioned above are respective owners of the residential houses adjoining that of the
high-rise building under construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to
mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and
his above referred to clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to their properties,
health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a regular and
with standard height building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the same would show
31
otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of
the undersigned’s residential house in particular, which readily poses danger to their residential
house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of life and for the
protection of the safety of all the people concerned, they are immediately requesting for your
appropriate action on the matter please at your earliest opportune time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of Meycauayan who is the Chief
Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481
of the Local Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was already full compliance on
the part of the owner of the Building under construction with the requirements provided for in
Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the National Building Code and on the part of your good office,
your compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited
Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-compliance with said
Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code by all the parties concerned.
(Which are not confined only to penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x x x x4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)
By complainant’s claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a
personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to respondent’s marrying her first cousin
Imelda Soriano, respondent’s marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting. 5
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit 6 he filed against
respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) 7 of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c) 8 of
Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees).9
By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,10 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint
in light of the following findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the application
of his wife for a building permit for the construction of their commercial building. One of the
reason[s] stated by the complainant was that his wife was not in favor of Imelda’s relationship
with respondent who is a married man. And the other reason is that respondent was not
authorized to represent his neighbors in opposing the construction of his building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily answered all
the charges and accusations of complainant. We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence
to warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is
proved. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and
establish his charges by a clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required
evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint

against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64
SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.11 (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,12 the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review13 filed by complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second
marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton,
which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer
of Meycauayan to oppose his wife’s application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.
To his Comment,14 respondent attached the July 29, 200515 Joint Resolution of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainant’s complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
RA 3019 and Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution
reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty.
Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of
complainant’s building permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to whether
compliance with the requirements for the construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the
Office of the Building Official after conducting an investigation found out that there was [a]
violation of the Building Code for constructing without a building permit committed by herein
complainant’s wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose
fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia
applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the same is being
processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of the Municipal Zoning
Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that respondent was engaged in
the private practice of his law profession despite being employed in the government as
Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into consideration
the explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside
from the bare allegations of herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate
the complaints against the respondent.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating
Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to
advance his own personal interest against complainant and his wife.
32
As for respondent’s September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the
application for building permit. He just inquired whether complainant’s wife fully complied with
the requirements provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns
about "the danger and damages to their properties, health and safety" occasioned by the
construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28,
2004,17 whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and received on
September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered
an inspection and issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to comply with
th[e] notice shall cause this office to instate proper legal action against you." 18
Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 200519 from the Office of the Municipal Engineer
showed, complainant’s wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured
clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building
was to be constructed.
Respecting complainant’s charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice of
law while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of
the appointing authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his private
practice is not prohibited.20
It is, however, with respect to respondent’s admitted contracting of a second marriage while his
first marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada,
USA,21 when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken effect. 22 He invokes good
faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time
was Article 83 of the Civil Code.23 For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the
Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community." 24 Gross
immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.25
In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz,26 this Court declared that the
therein respondent’s act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still
subsisting constituted immoral conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the
mitigating following circumstances were considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of
almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife,
whom he described to be very intelligent person;
 33

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his
wife;
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of
mother and child went to Australia;
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year.
He is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. 27
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
In respondent’s case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when he
contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him,
SO ORDERED.
an allegation which was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no
showing that he was romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first
wife has remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case.

As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The
community in which they have been living in fact elected him and served as President of the
IBP-Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases.

Respondent’s misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he
contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential
community towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage while the
first marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. 28

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.

Respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3,
1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the
Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith."

Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:29

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to
be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN
ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand,
the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other,
its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. 1 It was later
found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega
loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977,
wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying
for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
34
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family
and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting
and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan
Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo,
Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto
B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing
and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc.,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings
and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc.,
Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. 7 After the
filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases,
respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case
Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK,
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central
Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as
counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila
and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It
found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the
Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken
on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that
respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-

year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be
Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee
from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with
within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did
not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11,
2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in
Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in
its resolution dated December 5, 2001.17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG
alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule
is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s
appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was
interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the
import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession
and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble
modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly
were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards
the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in
litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were
35
at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of
falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties
-- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor --
originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not
differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes,
judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from
England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in
England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American
regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations
had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving
gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly
characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary
period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United
States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David
Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of
uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties
became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time,
legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal
ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's
duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code,
governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath
and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic
duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to
confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had
some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these
standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties.
The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties,
and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed
ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of
ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association
codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the
academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur
of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that
states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was
the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically
during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late
nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial
predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State
Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive
standards of conduct for their members.22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics.
The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the
foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. 23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to
attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year,
the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that
the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and
former are adverse.26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are
unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. 27 For several
years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual
amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon
36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that
the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to
take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties
who might later become private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should
not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons
46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
36
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification
of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct
to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the
applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates
approved the Model Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct standards
were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the
black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the
emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. 37 In particular, the
ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of
impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s
indefinite nature.38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this
Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and
practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court
promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph
2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive
phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore,
properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there
remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former
government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz:40
The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in
issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising
the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition
for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson,
then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor
Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio
T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of
GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised
that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be
permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank
and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision
to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.
37
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where
it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to
GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29,
1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23,
1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments;
and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in
then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine,
the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule
6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265,
section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition
of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be
disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board
may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its
assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer
the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public
interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the
court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do
all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or
sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in
the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of
the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of
the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall
be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which
shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of
the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the
petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in
the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic
commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a
receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of
any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007,
1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
38
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot
disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may,
the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts
speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision
of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in
filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to
but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on
the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock
of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution
and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others,
to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule
6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall,
or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance
or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same
city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) 41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests
of others.42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first
interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene"
only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. 44 We
hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be

remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be
considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36
provided that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment
in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated
or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969
Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in
which the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The
1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer
shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number
of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the
petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a
court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors.
In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the
usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable
effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As
aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-
101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation
and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other
values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on
government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for
government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that
government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only
card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in
return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private
practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service
would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in
the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm
39
with which they become associated to be disqualified. 46 Indeed, "to make government service
more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter."47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its
choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so
prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of
Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In the case at bar,
the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many
years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza.
For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme
Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan  and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in
the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that
granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. 52 The effects of
this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of
the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According
to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private
employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions
when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An
employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He
adds: "Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job
and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence."54 The case at bar involves
the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot
be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great
degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to
recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse
to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the
independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government
lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.
 40

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a
highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward results.57 No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have
any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety
theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and
some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual
conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger
that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act
of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no
question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship
rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified
or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in
order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism." 68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza
was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court,
and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose
length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to
the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that.
Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee
on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December
5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of SO ORDERED.
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still
in government service.61 The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer
who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might
be tempted to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar
Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably
excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding
someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the government. Interviews with
lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who
were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates." 65 But again, this
particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against
respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in
later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the
interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the "excessive influence of former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns
against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of
what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her
position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x." 67 More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
 
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply
to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.
41
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded.
The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter
referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was
integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal
of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article
Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for
is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of
the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all
persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of
his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force
and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues
that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate
the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the
exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the
Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered
all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos  to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar
have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an
important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an
officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to
"adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's
avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress
42
in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire
to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public
welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams,
70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all
freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration
in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by
Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the
Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the
power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established
by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of
his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation,
he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
 43

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him
to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule
is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. 11
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name
of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a
power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty.
It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed.
It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The
very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power
to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles
the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. 12

SECOND DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 4749           January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the
matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he
only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as
shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997:
(originals available).
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil
Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC.
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM.
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP ( not Civil Case) No.
42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its
Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
44
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be
done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787,
RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995
denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what
appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP
Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for
violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to
cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996
and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no
longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar
who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
 45

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a
Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a
light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his
dues.
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent,
he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example.
xxx     xxx     xxx

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna. the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992,
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly of the Philippines.
believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about
by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote
his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least
and be voted upon.
six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if
only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues
paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest
membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a
senior citizen since 1992.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent
Rule 139-A provides:
guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he
pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied
by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
suspension for three months. Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No.
7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes:  provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, 8 we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision
be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
46
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.
Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar
Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%,
65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that
the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.).
This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.
Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there
are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects
also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note
that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar
candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal
motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion
therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some
candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered

'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en
banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate
with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that
the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate,
who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%,  respectively. He passed in the 1971
bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements
on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the
five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to
him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise
resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.).
The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.).
while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on
August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May
18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
47
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who
re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law
and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo
Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the
correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to
meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon.
Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in
Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by
the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the
change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz
and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one
Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L.
Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries
in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the
same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp.
20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of
this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on
October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda.
Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November
14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence
only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as
their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The
same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in
the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the
circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in
question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting
the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me
that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he
finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject
and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade ;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back
to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because
according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I
was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is
numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers
were based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of
all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was
reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No.
8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered
as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of
the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at
5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No.
951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution
of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said
Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
48
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about
October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo
and myself had developed to the point that with respect
to the correction of the examination booklets of bar
candidates I have always followed him and considered
his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same;
that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and
policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother
any more to get the consent and permission of the
Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I
was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme
Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee
for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for
such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate
one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who
made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain
from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code
numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5,
1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen
panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar
confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661,
and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to
review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the
examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant,
the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest
of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law .
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I
was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified
or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed.
The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case
present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and
that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to
said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to
me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading
of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer,
and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout
the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee
deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar
Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me
that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded
and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the
notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the
same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10)
on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent
Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier
sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and
international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I
do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the
present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make
such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was
authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the
name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed.
The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to
be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines
given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman,  as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in
the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority
with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by
two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me
of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see
me:
xxx xxx xxx
49
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition
as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook
code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it
entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation
of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in
other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law , if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant
knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was
increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee
did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to
make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had
passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's
first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely
no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in
office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of
contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the present
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the
books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the
papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1)
paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the
general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a
raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark
and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of
the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the
examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did
I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my
house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words
"we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He
explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but
that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in
Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo
remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades
I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion .
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant
to address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I,
in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each
and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of
the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in
other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I
recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had
given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still
short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of
his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
50
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the
total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to
74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could
be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of
Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first
time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature
of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request
was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in
view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in
that particular subject that the said examine failed ,
herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in
reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by
the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17,
1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after
the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee
passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-
evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in
the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that
I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the
agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner
concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate
concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and
that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all
the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the
basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to
the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight
should then be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation and/or re-checking.
51
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of
the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of
the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would
copy their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually
some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-
evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which
we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they
have to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is
final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated
me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in
his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it
was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar
confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that
neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners'
decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made
the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below
50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent
brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby
raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers
right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la
Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir
such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he
did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects,
the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted

to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that
they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified
and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-
a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them
entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the
early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the
office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a
sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that
the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from
any object and the first number that comes into my
sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that
moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly
printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme
Court building from San Marcelino street and almost
adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954',
the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
the post to which it is attached is identified and marked
as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-
a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza
Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then
bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954".
This number became doubly impressive to me because
the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27", a number that is so significant to me that
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to
everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or
either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee
connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus
during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the
even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of
respective examines, namely:
examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either
started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with
said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked
as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning
of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as
Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning
of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as
Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning
of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master
List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end
of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
52
The significance to me of this number (27) was born
out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On
November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at
the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will
be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December
8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our
camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From
then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been saved from
the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On
February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army
byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children
the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after
buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time
was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus
checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office
code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into
the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity
of the writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all
good faith on the basis of the aforementioned
Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-
a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them
aside and later on took them back to the respective
examiners for possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the
matter to their discretion and judgment.
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in
Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh.
9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing
the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of
4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline
general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60%

(57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data
thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh.
10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661
with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after
re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in
Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated,
that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and
International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made
known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized
the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to
review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told
the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in
grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the
outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story
is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set
of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he
stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required
by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the
bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it
now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the
respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met
only once in the ordinary course of official business?
53
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly
manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in
the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor,
had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant
Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First,
was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was
done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant
Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence
per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo
to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect
because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result
of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences
are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or
consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident
imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the
performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-
examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the

corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter
was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects
of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one
subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the
notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-
56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in
said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average .
Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's
grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with
Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee
at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including
Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain
the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972 , respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to
review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and
representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was
short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he
thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself
clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent
Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a
test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
54
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further
believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in
the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his
signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his
affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing
grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination
papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who
owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and
Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be
increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself
from respondent that this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is
the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent
Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-
evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent
Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the
charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below
the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back
to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the
latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International
Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject —
Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of
respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one
causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to
75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list
and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office
Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo
when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo

declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in
one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's
notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the
Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent
Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the
revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the
last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination
Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was
informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile
Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who
were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-
evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%.
Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially
brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to
make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise
added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal
records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report,
referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was
around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because , according
to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent
Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of
the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has
55
number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias
ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing
grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled
Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the
passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any
subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no
authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation
of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang
failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent
Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51,
Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination
Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned;
and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the
examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian —
whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by
respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and
hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent
likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and
 56

confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as evaluation made.
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his ————————————
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus
deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the
five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25%
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-
was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and
studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five
prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other
examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or
examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were
examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated
made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his
for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and
general average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be
Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In
fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-
evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-
Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark
before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows: before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual
grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average.
BAI
That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and
failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on
1. Political Law Public the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc.
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume
or 30 weighted points the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the
over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court,
BAI
which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself
to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
evaluation made.
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly
invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages
or 33 weighted points. ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which
could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Taxation 74% 74% = no re- Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners
evaluation made. for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang,
there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts. respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar
or 30 weighted points. examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of
respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the
22 weighted points. same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) = His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of
11 pts. or 44 weighted points. Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his
actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-
Legal Ethics and Practical evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
 57

agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation
with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It
only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support.
Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973
or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures
47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-
a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an
examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one
and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject
in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is
certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not
aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade
below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

B Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return
it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO
with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he
RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR
Galang.
RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57%
TO 66%.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was
taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks
V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to
on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to
the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in
the Examiners concerned.
Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members
and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others,
these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first
the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook
meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners
(Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-
concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo
No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a
record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred
VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as,
according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went
Labor Laws 3%
on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however,
that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. Taxation 69%
VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Mercantile Law 68%
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook
in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in
file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code Political Law are as follows:
number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It
appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was
changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is BA
authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and
 58

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
weighted points evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
Civil Law 75% 75% = " evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
the corresponding investigation conducted.

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
III

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing
grades. These are:
A
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72% The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of
his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971,
which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3)
a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan —
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of
whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed
of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as
examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of
liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual
members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy
clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with
the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court.
With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation
indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent
Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo
without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent
Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity.

The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an
examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of
such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a
privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to
the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with
the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant
for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar
applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good
moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before
the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable
the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of
laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme
Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he
has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang
when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment
and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records
before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it
could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or
terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took
the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court
for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral
turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang
took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for
use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral
turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare
that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other
officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.).
Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his
criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court
of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to
take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
59
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing
and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963,
1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury
when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was
allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed
to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of
his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this
court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious
a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court
(cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to
whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither
the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to
the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys
(p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion
of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should
be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character
of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he
comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been
submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence
respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165
NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted
by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about
thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of
the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring
him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent
Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his
pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the
Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the
striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of
its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized
member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case
is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past
nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the
grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the
requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme
Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the
findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23,
1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re:
Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs.
Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found
that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-
correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant
Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks;
and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records
clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-
examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.
60
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to
the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater
care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of
respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination
Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the
respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to
have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances.
This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been
avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under
oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades;
and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers
in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they
increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You
brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if
he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because
I did not wish to be the one causing his failure . ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations
3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject
except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the
mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked
him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said
'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to
go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers
which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it
was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to
correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the
increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain
extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo.
Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-
evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own
accord in the absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report
at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh.
B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19,
1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-
41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back
to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because
according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said
Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-
34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and
giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee
failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84%
in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
61
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the
herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim
that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their
conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after
the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners,
which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to
remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to
the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of
the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in
the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue
assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal
to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar
Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show,
did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late
Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute
Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not
make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred
the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho
before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be
misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case
on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not
impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who
also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent
Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian
for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee.
Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-
evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec).
Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of
the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who
should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to
impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence  that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
A a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his
salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or
less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5,
1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however,
respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the
said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of
P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of
instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second
mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.].
Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of
the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000)
[Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00
loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in
respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he  filed on
January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank
deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank
deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows
therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement
under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The
amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement  was not realized because the transaction therein involved
did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent
Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said
amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities  filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note
which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200
62
was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And
according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan,
his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of
payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the
address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out
by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has
of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of
respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is
inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF
Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No.
4992: August 14, 1972  — date of instrument; August 23, 1972  — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently,
or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the
mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's
house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization
of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he
was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities ,
which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement
(filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets,
were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in
the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00  (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities  is
a 1956 VW  car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact
that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that
his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was
P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed
total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said
1956 VW car  worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends
to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination
papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo
of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential

Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on
the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or
resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation
before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said
irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to
January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00.
He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his
BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an
act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of
the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer
once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets
and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined
as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program
of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law
63
studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to
1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which
is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the
implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising
Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No.
1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was
approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also
the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to
the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking
up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang
was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in
the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the
investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp.
12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of
respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon
E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the
location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to
submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the
GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans
Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he
investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and
disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as
veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him
(Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating
at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war  (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49,
rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged.
During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does
not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol.
VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when
their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn
statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member
thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached
and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at
Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of
recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the
Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior
authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS
HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E.
GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.
64
EN BANC
May 31, 2016
A.C. No. 5179
DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent Atty. Rene 0.
Medina on December 10, 1999.2
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped
respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City.3 Respondent alighted from his car and
confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila
sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and then left. 4
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's
car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial
board member of Surigao del Norte.6
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated." 7 Respondent's act
showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that
this act constituted gross misconduct. 8
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit, 9 Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit, 10 and a
letter11 dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League
of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that
respondent slapped complainant and caused him great humiliation. 12 Thus, respondent should
be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao City,
committed by Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.
The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a tricycle driver,
causing great humiliation on the person. We believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an
elected official. Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted
that appropriate action be taken on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross
misconduct and abuse of authority.

Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the Municipal
Mayors League of Surigao del Norte.
Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of
different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.14 In his Comment, 15 respondent denied slapping
complainant. He alleged that the incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to
school. 16 He further alleged that complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's tricycle to
bump the fender of respondent's car.17 When respondent alighted from his car to check the
damage, complainant approached him in an unfriendly manner. 18 Respondent pushed
complainant on the chest to defend himself. 19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not
making a move against his son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle
suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic officer. 20 Both parties agreed that they
were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch. 21 No traffic officer
was present during the incident.22
Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio
programs by the Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver. 23 He
alleged that complainant's Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it
was prepared in the English language, which was unknown to complainant.24 Respondent was
identified with those who politically opposed the Provincial Governor. 25
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out
of the incident during the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of
Barangay Washington, Surigao City. 26 During the proceedings, respondent explained that he
pushed complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a weapon, as he assumed
tricycle drivers did.27 On the other hand, complainant explained that he went near respondent to
check if there was damage to respondent's car.28 As part of the settlement, respondent agreed
to no longer demand any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car. 29
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification 30 dated October 27, 2006 of the
Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating that the case had already been mediated by Punong
Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably settled by the parties. 31
On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation.32
65
Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted the Certification from Barangay Washington,
Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already been settled. 34
Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason why the
complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]"35 The Mandatory Conference was reset to
September 21, 2007.36
In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent
appeared.37 Hence, the Commission proceeded with the case exparte.38
In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of
Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the suspension
of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the practice of law for a period of sixty ( 60) days from notice
hereof due to misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to discredit the legal profession. 40 (Emphasis
in the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a
slapping incident.41 The slapping incident was witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1)
the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit attached to complainant's complaint; 42 and (2) the
signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao Mayors who
believed that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and should be
held administratively liable. 43
On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the
Resolution 44 adopting and approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's
recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A "; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation of Canon 7. 03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O. Medina is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty (30) days.45 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration 46 of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008 Resolution.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution 47 dated
March 22, 2014.
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively liable.
There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened. 48 He stresses
complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack of participation throughout the case and hints that
this administrative case is politically motivated. 49
It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to
harass its officers with baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against
its officers only if allegations of misconduct are established. 50 A lawyer is presumed to be
innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption that his or her
acts are consistent with his or her oath.51 Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant
to prove his or her claim.52
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of
evidence, 53 or evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the
other."54
In this case, complainant discharged this burden.
During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors also adoptedfound that the slapping incident actually occurred. 55
The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized
Affidavit;56 complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit 57 of
a traffic aide present during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant
of respondent's plate number.58
In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De La Rama gave
weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal
profession eroded"60 because of respondent's act of slapping complainant. 61 The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.
The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's
allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case,
the letter reinforced complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures
only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects the public's reaction to
respondent's display of arrogance.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers
who are no longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the
arrogance of and harassment committed by its officers.
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
66
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a
character that disregards the human dignity of another.1awp++i1 Respondent's question to
complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?"
("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a
tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.
This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that
is unreflective of the nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers
are granted the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to submission.
Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. 62 This Court has the power to impose
disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private
capacity if the acts show them unworthy to remain officers of the court. 63
This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis. 64 They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the
parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a means to
determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court officer. In Tiaya
v. Gacott:65
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 66
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses.
They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of
administrative liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings. 67
Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are ADOPTED and
APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as attorney, and
be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5768               March 26, 2010
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon
another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-
affidavit 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a
reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and
improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified
document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for
alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a
notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon
was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a
signatory to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet
before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon
saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya.
Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay
mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without
bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross
ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be
genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
67
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his
unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office
secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of
lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily
time record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer
repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty.
Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came
about because Atty. Ferrer’s clients filed a case for falsification of public document
against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her
thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty.
Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that the court did
not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his
behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer
was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter
had received various citations that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer
were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty.
Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to
the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that
on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his son’s taxi, it
figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle’s passengers. 3 But
neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police
investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk.
Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities. 4
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He
belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, 5 the
IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes,
Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the qualifications, integrity, intelligence,
industry and character of a trial judge" and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of
lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD
submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer.

The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s
violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to
Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite
the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon
was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the
threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and
litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, 6 adopting and
approving the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the penalty of
suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution 7 of
October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court.
On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of
Atty. Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration.8 On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation 9 of the Investigating Commissioner that denied
Atty. Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration.10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors’ IBP Notice of
Resolution No. XVIII-2008.11 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer’s
comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon
filed his comment,12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified
copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing
in court drunk.13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against
him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Court’s Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability.14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
68
Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to
Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He
made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been
falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without
using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said
in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION"
of documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave
responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the
court, for presenting a grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath of office as a
government employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA
PALATOLON, has never executed the "SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been
falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative defenses, there being
no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par.
(15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one
responsible for said falsification and distortions."15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite
the adversarial nature of our legal system. 16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03
of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon
shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to
support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police
that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon
presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against
Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala
na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he uttered
these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence
of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These
language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it.

Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 17 Atty. Ferrer ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public
estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was
negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. 1avvphi1
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer’s allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. 18 So long as the parties are given the
opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied
with.19 Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file
countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to
maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly.20 Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in
the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and
the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from
the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer’s personal record as an attorney with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
69
FIRST DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 6290             July 14, 2004
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a
former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the
latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to
be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were
able to obtain a false marriage contract,1 which states that they were married on 10 February
1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila 2 and the National Statistics Office
(NSO)3 prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of
marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel
Tenorio4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III.5 But in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver
Tenorio6 and John Cedric Tenorio,7 another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12
February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora
Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and
her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent
(1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the
Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to the
filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24
January 2000 with the statement "Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's
illegal activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit,
she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12
February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil
Registry of Quezon City.8 Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the
dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary,

it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the
pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of
Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of
Business Name.9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same
had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the
complainant with the words "Isang bala ka lang" on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to
get even with her. She terminated complainant's employment after receiving numerous
complaints that the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of
processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise.
Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire
the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did and for
which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous
awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then prayed
for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a
Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The
parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as
the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal
practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office12 where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a
Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card 13 signed by the respondent as Chairperson
where her husband is identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's
husband even appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her
husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that
her husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead
submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her
law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office  bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a
lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as
senior partners because they have investments in her law office. 14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February
1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not
registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a
certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and
70
authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to
the place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight.15
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing
that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts.
Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the
IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of
cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and
Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior
partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr.," signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 – 20734, wherein Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal
of the cases for failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to
prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be
reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.
The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the
practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt
with more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and adopted
with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is
not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
 71

Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed
accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not
substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case
by convincing evidence.17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof.
In Gerona vs. Datingaling,18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act
must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent
himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record as attorney in
this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.

The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding
one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law. 19 Such acts constitute unauthorized
practice of law.

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife,
the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal
profession.

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She
admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of
her law office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office. 20 That is a
blatant misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the respondent
assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably,
the identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears the signature of the
respondent as Chairperson of the Group.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 5624               January 20, 2004
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a
lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order."1
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate
spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living
separately from each other. They have two children – namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five
years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old – both of whom are in
complainant’s custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage
which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled,
"James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant’s residence in
Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the
Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. 2 Complainant
called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for
temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution
closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing
something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully
take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be
clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the
72
Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate court’s resolution/order. 3 In order to diffuse the tension, complainant
agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would
not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of
Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived
at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until
later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31,
a verified petition4 for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of
the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals’ resolution. In the meantime,
complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January
18, 20025 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to
surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not
appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney’s
oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals’ Resolution in and
outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to
him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning
that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment.6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission
with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for
his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied
by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by
the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at
least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as
Special Proc. Case No. 3898,7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City;
and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City
to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used
the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. 1âwphi1 The burden cast on the judiciary
would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that
will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be

imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in
the defense of a client’s cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. 8 Thus, the Code of
professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.9 The lawyer’s arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentlemen to another.10 By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a
"vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a
lawyer.
Respondent’s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find
that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of
two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on
respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
73
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6198             September 15, 2006
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge
of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case
No. Q-99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya,
a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military
officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002
hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant
Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if
we withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So,
with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving
pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a
number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in
writing and "file the appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such
pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla
with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of
justice,"5 was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the
investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his
lawsuits.7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and
explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement. 8 Later he
explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among
comrades in arms without going to trial"9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in
addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on
the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant. 11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and
recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 12 and recommending that he be

"suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three
months."13 This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30,
2003.14
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court,
participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth
and honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak
the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the
lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10
and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." 17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this
administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing
wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having
admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather
than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived
attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the
information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a
"pending proposal" to settle the case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, 19 cannot
absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate
plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a
presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse
as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle
the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not
unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the
misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even
if that had been so, it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is
nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it
necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A
lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
honor22 forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the
doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably,
we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
in part declares:
74
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice
of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's
suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this
administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession,
not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to
order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from
employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment
as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the
practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his
professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to
do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the
practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty.
Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability
somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the
investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second,
the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.23 And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some
measure of forbearance.24
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us
that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away
from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion
that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate
General's Service.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J.,  concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5482               February 10, 2015
JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present.
Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged.
Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty.
Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita) are brother- and sister-in-
law.1 Complainants and Jimmy’s brothers and sister co-own a 4,446-square-meter parcel of land
located in Sison, Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
69244.2 Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and Juanita.
He was admitted to the bar in 1996. He practices law and provides services as notary public in
the Municipality of Sison, Pangasinan.3
On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale4 over a land covered by TCT
No. 69244. The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso), Benita Anudon-
Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as vendors, while the name of
Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the vendee. 5
Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified. They alleged that they
did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra. 6 The
National Bureau of Investigation’s Questioned Documents Division certified that Jimmy and
Juanita’s signatures were forged.7 This is contrary to Atty. Cefra’s acknowledgment over the
document, which states:
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Municipality of Sison, personally appeared JOHNNY
ANUDON, ALFONSO ANUDON, BENITA ESGUERRA, JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON,
who exhibited to me their respective Community Tax Certificates as above-indicated, known to
me and known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing Deed of Absolute Sale and
acknowledged to me that the same is their free act and voluntary deed.
This instrument, which refers to a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of lot, consists of two
pages and have [sic] been signed by the parties and the respective witnesses on each and every
page thereof.
75
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1998.
(Sgd.)
ARTURO B. CEFRA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1999
PTR NO. 2461164; 1-7-98
SISON, PANGASINAN8
In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was physically
impossible for their brothers and sister, Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Johnny and Benita were in the United States on the day the Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite.9
Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with Jimmy
and Juanita as witnesses, filed a case of falsification of public document against Atty. Cefra and
Paran.10
Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint 11 with this court on
August 6, 2001 questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra’s conduct as lawyer and notary public.
In the Resolution12 dated September 19, 2001, this court required Atty. Cefra to comment on the
administrative complaint. Atty. Cefra filed multiple Motions for Extension of Time, 13 which this
court granted.14 Despite the allowance for extension of time, Atty. Cefra did not comply with this
court’s order to file a Comment. This court fined Atty. Cefra in the Resolutions dated March 12,
200315 and November 17, 2003.16 In both Resolutions, this court directed Atty. Cefra to file his
Comment.17
Atty. Cefra’s continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court to order his arrest and
commitment.18 Thus, the National Bureau of Investigation’s agents arrested Atty. Cefra at his
residence on January 14, 2007.19
Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment 20 on January 15, 2008.
In his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the sale of the property
covered by TCT No. 69244. He narrated that on July 10, 1998, Juanita and Jimmy’s wife Helen
Anudon went to his residence to consult him on how they could sell the land covered by TCT No.
69244 to Paran.21 Atty. Cefra claimed that he assisted in the preparation of the documents for
the sale, which included the deed of sale and the acknowledgment receipts for payment. 22 On
August 13, 1998, Paran’s relatives, Viola Carantes and Lita Paran, brought the Deed of Absolute
Sale tothe residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnny’s son, Loejan Anudon (Loejan) to have the
document signed.23 Viola Carantes and Lita Paran informed Atty. Cefra that they witnessed

Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign the document.24 Loejan affixed the signatures for his father,
Johnny, and his uncleand aunt, Alfonso and Benita.25
Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita
"with the full knowledge and permission of the three[.]"26 He allowed this on the basis of his
belief that this was justified since Loejan needed the proceeds of the sale for the amputation of
his mother’s leg.27 It clearly appeared that Loejan forged the three (3) signatures. Loejan did not
have formal authorization to sign on behalf of his father, uncle, and aunt.
According to Atty. Cefra, he "notarized the questioned document in good faith, trusting in
[complainants’] words and pronouncements; with the only purpose of helping them out legally
and financially[.]"28
After receiving Atty. Cefra’s Comment, this court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.29
During the investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Juanita appeared without any
counsel and manifested her intention to solicit the services of the Public Attorney’s Office. 30 She
also informed the Investigating Commissioner that her co-complainant, Jimmy, had already
passed away.31 The mandatory conference was held on February 20, 2009.32 On the same day,
the Investigating Commissioner issued an Order33 terminating the mandatory conference and
requiring the parties to submit their respective Position Papers.
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefra’s conduct in notarizing the Deed of
Absolute Sale violated the Notarial Law.34 In addition, Atty. Cefra violated Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility,35 which requires that "[a]lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Hence, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty. Cefra’s notarial commission
and the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from reappointment as notary public for two (2) years.
The Investigating Commissioner also recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six (6) months.36
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-249  dated May 14, 2011, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
37
Bar of the Philippines resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.38 However, they recommended that the penalty imposed on Atty. Cefra be
modifed:
Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission and Perpetual Disqualification from re-
appointment as Notary Public.39 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Cefra filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 40 asking the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
temper the recommended penalty against him.41 In Resolution No. XXI-2014-9342 dated March
21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines proposed to lower its
original penalty against Atty. Cefra:
Atty. Arturo B. Cefra [is] SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, his notarial
practice, if presently existing, immediately REVOKED and his notarial practice SUSPENDED for
two (2) years.43 (Emphasis in the original)
76
On September 9, 2014, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that both parties no longer filed
a Petition for Review of Resolution No. XXI-2014-93.44
We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent Atty.
Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility in
notarizing a document without requiring the presence of the affiants.
The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this
court previously explained:
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public
and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it
engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing
upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally. 45 (Citation omitted)
The earliest law on notarization is Act No. 2103.46 This law refers specifically to the
acknowledgment and authentication of instruments and documents. Section 1(a) of this law
states that an acknowledgment "shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done."
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to
appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete
instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document
was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document,
declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary
act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the
authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—. . .

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document—
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document
voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be
able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons
Officials,47 we stated that "[i]t is obvious that the party acknowledging must . . . appear before
the notary public[.]"48 Furthermore, this court pronounced that:
[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very
same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be
present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify
the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or
spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for
notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal
deeds.49 (Citations omitted)
Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the
true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the
integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing
in the document are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties
are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document.
Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy
and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed
of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed
Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance
and not just relied on the representations of the vendee.
It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the
document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery
became real.
In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50 Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51 Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,52 and Bautista v.
Atty. Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the
presence of the parties. In Linco, Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents
even if the persons executing those documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In
Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of
another despite lack of authorization.54 In these cases, this court imposed the penalty of
disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.
In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit, 55 the respondent lawyer notarized 22
public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.56 This court
77
suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually
disqualified her from being a notary public.57
Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of
violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "[a] lawyer [to]
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment. As
early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the
Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested
by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008,
more than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for
legal processes.
The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 11 58 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts[.]"
Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, "wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not
explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful
and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this infraction.
In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this
court’s directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation. 61 The
lawyer complied with the order to file a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National
Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.62 Likewise, she complied with the order to comment
through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her delay. 63 This court
found that the lawyer’s "conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate
refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it
also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof.’"64
We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into
account all his acts of misconduct.
WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to comply
with an order from this court. Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
two (2) years, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY
WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5332               July 29, 2003
JOHNNY K.H. UY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. REYNALDO C. DEPASUCAT, WILLIAM O. SU, and CELSO DE LAS
ALAS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint filed by Johnny K.H. Uy against respondents lawyers, Reynaldo
C. Depasucat, William O. Su and Celso delas Alas, for gross misconduct.
Complainant Uy together with UBS Marketing Corporation (UBS) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City (Branch 43) an action for reconveyance of real property, cancellation of
titles and recovery of ownership and possession, with damages against SK Realty, Inc. and Uy’s
sisters, Ban Hua U. Flores and Ban Ha U. Chua, together with their children, namely: Leonardo
U. Flores, Gloria U. Chan, Lily Uy, Lilian Uy, Lilen Uy, Stephanie Chua, Melody Chua, Wee Kiat Y.
Tan, Theresa Regalado and Yolanda Kilayko, all clients of herein respondents. Upon filing of the
said case, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-9051, complainant Uy and UBS caused the annotation
of the notice of lis pendens at the back of the certificates of title of defendant SK Realty with the
Register of Deeds of Bacolod City. Subsequently, in a resolution dated November 9, 1995, the
trial court dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. Defendants moved for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens which the trial court granted in a resolution dated
December 8, 1995.1
Complainants Uy and UBS filed their appeal before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 57171. After the parties had filed their respective briefs with the Court of Appeals
and before the latter’s resolution submitting the case for decision was released on March 10,
1999, respondents filed a pleading dated March 1, 1999, entitled, "Manifestation of Usurpation
of Authority of the Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-Confessed Briber of Judges" which
contains the following statement:
10. That, Plaintiff-Appellant Johnny KH Uy had, in fact, confessed to "Bribery and Telling On" of
judges, after the judges allegedly refused to give in to their "demands", by using illegally taped
conversations – both actual and by telephone, copies of the decision of the court -
a. in case no. A.M. No. RTJ-92-863, against the Hon. Judge Renato Abastillas, hereto
attached as Annex "C", and also
b. in case no. A.M. RTJ-92-880, against the Hon. Judge Bethel K. Moscardon, hereto
attached as Annex "D".2
In the instant administrative complaint, Uy alleges: Respondents, as members of the Bar are
sworn not to do falsehood or consent to the doing of any in court, nor should they mislead the
appellate court by their false, malicious and libelous imputations against him. Respondents’ filing
78
of the subject Manifestation was for the purpose of putting him in a bad light so as to obtain a
favorable judgment for their clients. Respondents without any provocation, reason and
justification and completely unmindful of his honor and feelings submitted such Manifestation
and furnished copies of the same to persons not even parties to the case. The subject
Manifestation contains groundless and false imputations which are totally immaterial, irrelevant
and impertinent to the appealed case.
In their joint supplemental verified comment with counter motion to cite petitioner for contempt
of court, respondents Su and Depasucat contend: Uy’s admission that he negotiated for a
favorable outcome of a criminal case formed part of the decision in Lee vs. Abastillas, docketed
as Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 which led to the dismissal of Judge Abastillas from the service.
The bribery imputation is true. The "bribe and tell scenario" covered by the said Manifestation
was already of public knowledge as it already formed part of the said administrative decision.
There was no indiscriminate distribution of such Manifestation to strangers just to malign the
complainant. Assuming that the allegations in the Manifestation had painted complainant in a
bad light, the same is considered as an absolute privileged communication. The Manifestation is
relevant as it was filed primarily in response to the extra-judicial, illegal and improper attempt of
Uy to reinstate a lis pendens. Uy had tried so many times to annotate a lis pendens on the
subject properties and filed so many cases involving the same properties and therefore, all his
mischiefs are relevant and material to the appealed case.
In his Comment, respondent delas Alas contends: He appeared as counsel of Uy’s siblings in
other cases. He signed the Manifestation as a collaborating counsel after he had read the
transcript of the proceeding where Uy admitted having bribed Judge Abastillas. He is convinced
that Uy does not hesitate to corrupt or destroy the character of persons to suit his needs, thus
he must be exposed. Uy has predilections to file cases against opposing lawyers and to seek
inhibition of judges and justices whenever adverse rulings were rendered against him, thus, his
active participation in bribing a judge is not totally immaterial and irrelevant to the appealed
case.
Acting on the pleadings of the parties, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 3
On April 6, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline through Investigating Commissioner
Julio C. Elamparo, submitted its report, to wit:
Accordingly, the issue may be simply stated as follows: Should the respondents be disciplined
for having authored and filed the said manifestation.
....
The undersigned commissioner fully agrees with the respondents that the allegations in their
manifestation with respect to the fact that the complainant is a briber of judges are true and
correct. In fact, records show that complainant’s former counsel has been disbarred by the
Supreme Court because of the bribing incident referred to in the said manifestation. It cannot
therefore be said that the respondents did falsehood or misled the Court of Appeals when they
filed their manifestation.
Does the privilege of filing of a pleading with correct and truthful allegations carries with it the
license to use abusive, offensive, menacing or otherwise improper language?

In this jurisdiction, it cannot be doubted that communications either written or oral made in the
course of judicial proceeding are classified as absolutely privilege communications. However, this
doctrine applies only in such cases where the statement is relevant or pertinent or material to
the case. In this respect, respondents failed to convincingly demonstrate the materiality or
relevance of such statement like "… Johnny Kh Uy has a track record of making a mockery of
our judicial system …had, in fact confessed to "Bribery and Telling On" of judges, after the
judges allegedly refused to give in to their "demands", by using illegally taped conversation both
actual and/or by telephone…" in the appealed case involving recovery of property and
cancellation of title. Furthermore, if such fact is relevant, why did the respondents make such
fact known to the Court of Appeals only when the appealed case has already been submitted for
decision. Respondents’ timing makes their claim of good intention a doubtful claim. It seems
that the real intention is to influence the Court of Appeals in an improper way.
It cannot be doubted that as an advocate, a lawyer has the right to be zealous in the
prosecution or defense of his client’s cause. In fact, it is incumbent upon him to point out errors,
arbitrariness or injustices. He is allowed sufficient latitude of remark in furtherance of the causes
he advocates for his client. But in the exercise of this right, it is incumbent upon him to act with
justice and to give everyone his due.
It is settled that a lawyer who uses abusive or abrasive language shows disrespect to the court
and disgraces the Bar. He then invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power as
respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the respondents, for having used offensive and
abusive language in their "MANIFESTATION OF USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS FROM A SELF-CONFESSED BRIBER OF JUDGES" which has no relevance in
the factual and legal issues then pending resolution before the Court of Appeals be warned that
a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. 4
On June 29, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. 5
We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondents have used offensive and abusive
language but instead of mere admonition respondents should be reprimanded.
The statement made by respondents that complainant Uy had bribed a judge in A.M. No. RTJ
92-863 was duly proven. Uy who appeared as witness in the said administrative case filed
against Judge Renato Abastillas of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Branch 50), 6 testified
that he gave money to the Judge in consideration of the dismissal of a case in which he had an
interest. This admission was lifted from the transcript of the stenographic notes of the
proceedings therein submitted by the respondents and quoted in the Abastillas decision which
was promulgated in 1994.
However, we find nothing on record that supports the statement of the respondents that Uy had
also bribed a judge in Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation vs. Katalbas-Moscardon,
docketed as AM RTJ 92-880 which we have decided in 1995.7 Notably, in their joint affidavit filed
before the Commission, respondents Depasucat and Su stated that "the pattern of corruption
and illegal wire tapping was repeated by the complainant’s disbarred lawyer Enrique S. Chua, in
A.M. RTJ-92-880, in re Hon. Judge Bethel K. Moscardon, thus institutionalizing the malevolent
practice". However, there was nothing that showed Uy’s participation therein. In fact, a reading
79
of the court’s decision in the Moscardon case revealed that it was Atty. Enrique Chua, the lawyer
of Uy, who was involved in the said case as a witness in the corruption of Judge Moscardon and
the name of Uy was never mentioned at all. Moreover, during the hearing, the investigating
commissioner took note that there was no copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes of
A.M. RTJ 92-880 presented. Respondents were not able to substantiate their statement that Uy
was involved in two bribing incidents to be branded as "briber of judges". Respondents have
partly made a false imputation against Uy. Half-truths are equally if not more pernicious than
outright lies.
Uy claims that assuming arguendo that he had bribed a judge, the same is irrelevant and
impertinent to the appealed case where the subject Manifestation was filed. On the other hand,
respondents contend that the filing of the subject Manifestation was not attended by malice;
that it falls under the protective mantle of an absolute privileged communication.
The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of
communications that are absolutely privileged has been enunciated in a long line of cases. 8 Said
doctrine rests upon public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice,
though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed
and malignant slanderer.9 The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those
engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the
promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of
courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages.10 Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, 11 and for the felicity of their clients, they
may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase.12 However, such remarks or comments should not
trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety. 13
We have stated the test of relevancy, thus:
xxx. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters
privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privileged does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a
pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the
pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial xxx 14
Applying the above rule to the subject Manifestation, we find that the statement that Uy is a
briber of judges is not relevant to the issues presented before the appellate court. Although Uy
was shown to have admitted bribing a judge, the incident did not happen in the case appealed
to the Court of Appeals where the assailed Manifestation was filed. It was not at all pertinent to
Uy’s action for reconveyance of real property, cancellation of titles and recovery of ownership
and possession, with damages. Moreover, if respondents truly believe in the relevancy of the
bribing incident to the appealed case, they could have stated the same in their pleading filed in
the trial court in 1995 or in their appellees’ brief filed before the appellate court considering that
the Abastillas case had already been decided in 1994.
 80

Respondents claim that the subject Manifestation was filed primarily in response to the extra- grave enough so as to warrant the exercise of contempt powers of the Court. There was no
judicial, illegal and improper attempt of the complainant to reinstate a cancelled lis pendens sufficient showing of bad faith in Uy’s filing of the present administrative complaint against
which is subject of the appealed case. While the notice to annotate a cancelled lis pendens was respondents.
filed by Uy’s counsel with the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on October 26, 1998, the same
was denied by the Register of Deeds on January 25, 1999 for the reason that the cancelled
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the respondents are hereby REPRIMANDED for
notice of lis pendens can only be re-annotated by a court order. Undoubtedly, the action taken
MISCONDUCT in using offensive and abusive language in their Manifestation and WARNED that
by Uy was improper since the propriety of the cancellation of the notice was one of the issues
a repetition of the same in the future will be dealt with more severely.
raised by Uy before the appellate court. Thus, respondents who had knowledge of the same
have the duty to inform the appellate court, which respondents have done by filing the subject
Manifestation. However, respondents went overboard by further stating in the Manifestation that The motion of respondents to cite complainant in contempt is hereby DENIED.
complainant "had in fact confessed to Bribery and Telling On of judges, after the judges
allegedly refused to give in to their demands, by using illegally taped conversations-both actual SO ORDERED.
and/or by telephone". It belied their good intention and exceeded the bounds of propriety,
hence not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it
offends the court before which it is made.15 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.16 It must be remembered that the language
vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.17 It has been said that a lawyer’s language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 18

It is the duty of the respondents as members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. 19

The IBP aptly observed that the Manifestation was filed only after the appealed case had already
been submitted for decision which made respondents’ claim of good intention in filing the same
a doubtful claim. While the records show that the subject Manifestation was filed with the Court
of Appeals on March 1, 1999 and the appellate court’s resolution submitting the case for
decision was dated March 10, 1999, we agree with the IBP’s conclusion that the filing of the
Manifestation was a clear attempt on the part of the respondents to influence the mind of the
court against complainant Uy and to decide the appeal in favor of their clients.

We find respondents to be at fault and therefore they should be reprimanded for having done
so.1âwphi1 A higher penalty is not called for considering that it is clear that respondents were
merely over-zealous in ensuring the victory of their clients and, that they honestly thought,
although erroneously, that by branding complainant as a "briber of judges", they were justifying
their allegation in the Manifestation that complainant "has a track record of making a mockery of
our judicial system".

In their Comment, respondents Su and Depasucat pray that complainant be cited for contempt
of court for denying under oath that he is a confessed briber of judges and of accusing
respondents of indiscriminately furnishing copies of the subject Manifestation to strangers in the
appealed case.

We find nothing contemptuous on Uy’s desire to protect his honor from what he perceived to be
defamatory imputation against him since it is within his right to do so. While he may have
denied the established fact that he bribed Judge Abastillas, however, his denial as to the other
bribing incident was proven to be true since respondents failed to substantiate the same.
Furthermore, although Uy failed to prove his allegation that respondents indiscriminately
furnished copies of the subject Manifestation to strangers to the appealed case, the same is not

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152072             January 31, 2006
ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Petitioners,
vs.
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER,
ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES,
TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Respondents.
x----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 152104             January 31, 2006
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER,
ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES,
TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H. PEDROSA, ROMEO G. ROXAS and
SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us are two petitions for review on certiorari1 which were consolidated per Resolution2 of
this Court dated 27 November 2002. The petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, Attys. Romeo G. Roxas
and Santiago N. Pastor, seek the reversal and annulment of the Decision 3 and Resolution4 of the
Court of Appeals dated 25 June 2001 and 06 February 2002, respectively. The petitioners in
G.R. No. 152104, the Zuzuarreguis, on the other hand, pray that the said Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals be modified. Said Decision and Resolution reversed and set
aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 98, Quezon City, dated 03 January
1994.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed
expropriation proceedings against the Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152104, for parcels
of land belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal, with a total land area of 1,790,570.36
square meters, more or less. This case was lodged before the RTC, Branch 141, Municipality of
Makati,5 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 26804 entitled, "National Housing Authority v. Pilar
Ibañez Vda. De Zuzuarregui, et al."
On 25 May 1983, said case was ordered archived 6 by Branch 141.
About a month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the Zuzuarreguis engaged the
legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in Civil Case
81
No. 26804. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement dated 22 April 1983, which is partly
reproduced hereunder:
April 22, 1983
Mr. Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.
Mrs. Pacita Javier (as heir to the late Jose de Zuzuarregui)
Mr. Antonio de Zuzuarregui ( as heir to the late Pilar Y. vda. De Zuzuarregui)
Dear Sir and Madam:
This is to confirm in writing our verbal negotiations for us to represent you in the
expropriation proceedings filed by the National Housing Authority against your
goodselves before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now the Regional Trial Court)
and docketed as Civil Case No. 26804. Our representation shall also include the areas
taken over by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways which now formed part of
the Marcos Highway at Antipolo, Rizal.
The areas affected are the following:
xxxx
We shall endeavor to secure the just compensation with the National Housing
Authority and other governmental agencies at a price of ELEVEN PESOS (P11.00) or
more per square meter. Any lower amount shall not entitle us to any attorney’s fees.
At such price of P11.00 per square meter or more our contingent fee[s] is THIRTY
PERCENT (30%) of the just compensation.
The other terms and conditions of our proposal are:
xxxx
5. You are willing to accept NHA 5-year bonds as part payment up to 75% of the total
compensation. In the event of your desire to discount the bonds, we shall assist to
have them discounted at 75% of its face value.
6. Our lawyer’s fees shall be in the proportion of the cash/bonds ratio of the just
compensation. Likewise our fees are subject to 10% withholding tax.
xxxx
Should the above proposal be acceptable to your goodselves, kindly signify your
formal acceptance as (sic) the space hereunder provided.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
 82

SANTIAGO N. PASTOR ROMEO G. ROXAS

Lawyer Lawyer
CONFORME:
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR. PACITA JAVIER settlement of the just compensation of our
In my behalf and properties payable in cash or in bonds;
as heir to the late Jose De
as heir to the late Pilar Y. vda. De Zuzuarregui
Zuzuarregui7 (4) To sign and prepare all papers relative to the
preparation of a Compromise Agreement or any
papers and communications which shall eventually
A Motion to Set Case for Hearing,8 dated 14 February 1984, was filed by Attys. Roxas and Pastor
bear our signatures; and
in Civil Case No. 26804, praying that the case be revived and be set for hearing by the court at
the earliest date available in its calendar.
(5) That this Special Power of Attorney is enforce
(sic) as long as ATTYS. ROMEO G. ROXAS AND
The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. On 29 October 1984, a Partial Decision was
SANTIAGO PASTOR are our lawyers in Civil Case
rendered by Branch 141 in Civil Case No. 26804 fixing the just compensation to be paid to the
No. 26804 before the Regional Trial Court, Makati,
Zuzuarreguis at P30.00 per square meter.
Branch CXLI.

The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated 23 November 1984 praying that the Partial
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorneys full
Decision be reconsidered and set aside, and a new one rendered lowering the amount of just
power and authority whatsoever requisite or necessary or
compensation in accordance with applicable laws. Pending resolution thereof, a Joint Special
proper to be done in or about the premises, as fully to all
Power of Attorney was executed by Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., Enrique De Zuzuarregui and
intents and purposes as we might or could lawfully do if
Pacita Javier, in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, viz:
personally present, and hereby ratifying and confirming all
that our said attorneys shall do or cause to be done under and
by virtue of these presents.

JOINT SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto set our hands this
26th day of August, 1985, in Makati, M. M., Philippines.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

(Sgd.)
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.1avvph!l.ne+
That We, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE
ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA JAVIER, all of legal age, …, do
hereby appoint, name and constitute ATTYS. ROMEO G. (Sgd.)
ROXAS and SANTIAGO PASTOR, to be our true and lawful ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI
attorneys to act in our names and on our behalves to do and
execute all or any of the following acts and deeds subject to (Sgd.)
our approval: PACITA JAVIER10

xxxx

(2) To represent us in the negotiations for a

On 22 November 1985, a Special Power of Attorney was executed by Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda.
compromise with the National Housing Authority for
De Reyes in favor of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas, Santiago Pastor and Basilio H. Toquero, quoted as
our properties subject of the above case;
follows:

(3) To negotiate for and in our behalves for the

 83

On 10 December 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between Antonio Zuzuarregui,

Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the one hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago Pastor, on the other. The said Letter-Agreement reads:
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
December 10, 1985
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas
That I, BEATRIZ ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES, Filipino, of Atty. Santiago Pastor
legal age, widow, and a resident of E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon Makati Executive Center
City, Philippines do hereby appoint, name and constitute Salcedo Village, Makati
ATTYS. ROMEO G. ROXAS, SANTIAGO PASTOR and BASILIO
H. TOQUERO, to be my true and lawful attorneys … :
Dear Atty. Roxas & Atty. Pastor:

1. To represent me in the negotiation for a

This will confirm an amendment to our agreement regarding your attorney’s fees as our lawyers
Compromise with the National Housing Authority for
and counsels for the Zuzuarregui’s properties expropriated by National Housing Authority
my properties subject to my approval in CIVIL CASE
covering ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE (179) HECTARES, more or less, covered by TCT Nos.
No. 26804, entitled "National Housing Authority vs.
138340, 85633 and 85634 and filed as Civil Case No. 26804.
Pilar Ibañez de Zuzuarregui, et al., before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch CXLI;
We hereby confirm and agree that we are willing to accept as final and complete settlement for
our 179 hectares expropriated by NHA a price of SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter,
2. To negotiate for and in my behalf for the
or for a total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P30.4 Million), all
settlement of the just compensation of my
payable in NHA Bonds.
properties payable in cash or in bond, subject to my
approval;
We also agree and confirm that for and in consideration of your services as our lawyers and
counsels in the said expropriation case, we commit and bind ourselves to pay to you, your heirs
3. To sign and prepare all papers relative to the
or assignees-in-interest, as your contingent attorney’s fees any and all amount in excess of the
preparation of a Compromise Agreement or any
SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds as mentioned above.
papers and communications which shall eventually
bear my signature;
This Letter Agreement serves also as your authority to collect directly from NHA the amount
pertaining to you as your contingent attorney’s fees.
4. To accept for and in my behalf payments for my
properties after the Compromise Agreement is duly
approved by the Court, the actual receipts of which This Letter Agreement hereby amends and supersedes our previous agreement regarding your
payments shall be signed by me. attorney’s fees as our lawyers and counsels in the above-mentioned expropriation case.

HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said attorneys full Very truly yours,
power and authority whatsoever requisite, necessary or
proper … to be done under and by virtue of these presents.
(Sgd.) ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
In my behalf as heir to the late Pilar I. vda. de Zuzuarregui
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
22nd day of November 1985, in the City of Manila, Philippines.
(Sgd.)PACITA JAVIER
As heir to the late Jose De Zuzuarregui
(Sgd.)
BEATRIZ ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES11
(Sgd.)
ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI

CONFORME:

(Sgd.)ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS
(Sgd.)ATTY. SANTIAGO PASTOR12
Resolution No. 117413 dated 16 December 1985 was issued by the NHA stating that the
Zuzuarregui property would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter; that the
Zuzuarreguis would be paid in NHA Bonds, subject to the availability of funds; and that the yield
on the bonds to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis shall be based on the Central Bank rate at the time
of payment.
As a result of the aforesaid NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement was executed between
the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA in Civil Case No. 26804. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated
among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at
P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the
RTC, Branch 141, Makati, approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
On 27 December 1985, the NHA Legal Department, through Atty. Jose B. H. Pedrosa, released
to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA
Bearer Bonds as "partial payment for several parcels of land with a total area of 1,790,570.36
square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal."14 On even date, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas delivered NHA
Bonds to Antonio De Zuzuarregui in the amount of P15,000,000.00.15 On 04 February 1986, the
amount of P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was again released by the NHA to Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis.16 On 14 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued a
receipt17 for receiving the amount of P30,070,000.00. This receipt included the P15,000,000.00
given to them last 27 December 1985. Again on 17 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis, through
Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes, issued another receipt for the amount of P450,000.00 in
NHA bonds.18 The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the
Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the
amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 in NHA
bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the
Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by
the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on
the bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter19 was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield
corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of
administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter dated 21 September 1987 explaining their side of
the story. They stated therein, among other things, that the amount that they got seems huge
from the surface, but it just actually passed their hands, as it did not really go to them. 20
On 29 September 1987, a letter21 was sent by the Zuzuarreguis through Antonio De Zuzuarregui,
Jr., to Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, informing the latter that their services as
counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the expropriation proceedings filed by the NHA,
docketed as Civil Case No. 26804, was being formally terminated.
84
Apparently unsatisfied with the explanation of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, the Zuzuarreguis filed a
civil action for Sum of Money and Damages on 14 November 1989 before the RTC, Quezon City,
Branch 98, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-4013, against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty.
Romeo G. Roxas and Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the
NHA bonds be turned over to them.
After due hearing, a Decision22 in Civil Case No. Q-89-4013 was rendered on 03 January 1994,
dismissing the Complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration[s], judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the dismissal of the complaint against all the defendants; and, further ordering plaintiffs, jointly
and solidarily, to:
1. Pay each of the defendants Romeo G. Roxas, Santiago Pastor and Jose B. H.
Perdosa, the amount of P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, as
moral damages;
2. Pay each of the defendants Roxas, Pastor and Pedrosa, the amount of P50,000.00,
P50,000.00, and P25,000.00, respectively as exemplary damages;
3. Pay attorney’s fees to defendants Roxas and Pastor in the amount of P20,000.00;
and
4. Pay the costs of this suit.
A Notice of Appeal23 dated 10 February 1994 was filed by the Zuzuarreguis. Subsequently, on 26
April 1995, the Zuzuarreguis filed their appeal brief with the Court of Appeals. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45732.
A Decision24 was eventually promulgated by the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals on 25
June 2001, reversing and setting aside the ruling of Branch 98, viz:
Therefore, We find that the amount of P4,476,426.275 is, in the opinion of this Court,
commensurate to the services rendered by defendants-appellees. This amount has been arrived
at by giving to defendants-appellees P2.50 per square meter of the 1,790,570.51 square meter
expropriated properties of herein plaintiffs-appellants.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision dated January 3, 1994 of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 98, Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-4013
entitled "Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. versus National Housing Authority, et al." for "Sum of
Money and Damages," is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-Appellees Roxas and
Pastor are hereby ordered to return to plaintiffs-appellants the amount of P12,596,696.425, the
balance from the P17,073,122.70, received as yield from NHA bonds after deducting the
reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P4,476,426.275.25
Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion for Reconsideration 26 on 25 July 2001. The Zuzuarreguis
also filed a Motion for Reconsideration 27 on 30 July 2001, not having been satisfied with the
award, while the NHA and Pedrosa filed their Motions for Reconsideration 28 on 03 August 2001.

In a Resolution dated 06 February 2002, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit all the
Motions for Reconsideration.
On 05 March 2002, Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 29 assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 152072. Likewise, on 21 March 2002,
the Zuzuarreguis filed their own Petition for Review on Certiorari 30 assailing the same Decision,
docketed as G.R. No. 152104.1avvph!l.ne+
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, assign as errors the following:
I Zuzuarreguis are only entitled to the amount of P17.00 per square meter for the 1,790,570.36
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT THE LETTER-AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 1985 CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND
AS THE LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES; and
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, HEREIN PETITIONERS, CONCEALED TO THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES, HEREIN RESPONDENTS, THE YIELD OF THE NHA BONDS 31
The Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152101, on the other hand, assign as errors the
following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING TO PETITIONERS THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF
ONLY P12,596,696.425 AND NOT P17,073,122.70 MAKING A DIFFERENCE OF P4,476,426.28
II
THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING
OF THE COMPLAINT UNTIL FULLY PAID
III
THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE HELD LIABE FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES
IV
THE RESPONDENTS NHA AND JOSE B.H. PEDROSA ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH RESPONDENTS ROXAS AND PASTOR32
85
ISSUE FOR RESOLUTION
Drawn from the above assignment of errors, it is patent that the principal issue that must be
addressed by this Court is:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LETTER-AGREEMENT DATED 10 DECEMBER 1985, EXECUTED BY THE
ZUZUARREGUIS, AND ATTYS. ROXAS AND PASTOR, FIXING THE EXACT AMOUNT THAT MUST
GO TO THE FORMER, SHOULD STAND AS LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
THE COURT’S RULING
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, contend in the main that the
square meters expropriated by the government. This was, according to them, embodied in the
Letter-Agreement dated 10 December 1985, wherein the Zuzuarreguis agreed to accept the
price of P17.00 per square meter. Besides, Attys. Roxas and Pastor contend that the price
of P17.00 was even way above the P11.00 that the Zuzuarreguis were willing to accept for their
properties under the Letter of Engagement executed by the parties earlier on 22 April 1983.
Computed at P17.00 per square meter, they stress that the amount that should go to the
Zuzuarreguis for their 1,790,570.36 square meters property should be P30,439,696.10, and that
in fact the Zuzuarreguis have received P30,520,000.00. The Letter-Agreement dated 10
December 1985 should thus stand as law between the parties. Since this Letter-Agreement,
which was "as plain and simple as can be such that there is no need for any further
construction," already fixed the amount that would go to the Zuzuarreguis (P17.00 per square
meter), then it should be so.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor further assert that the receipts issued by the Zuzuarreguis dated 14
February 1986 and 17 February 1986 indicated that the amounts received by the latter were in
"full and final payment" for the subject properties.
The NHA, for its part, insists that there was no conspiracy between Attys. Roxas and Pastor on
the one hand, and the NHA and Atty. Pedrosa on the other, on the application of yields from
NHA bonds.33 The Zuzuarreguis, according to the NHA, "miserably failed to substantiate and
establish conspiracy" between them.
The Zuzuarreguis, for their part, though they were triumphant in the Court of Appeals, insist
that the amounts awarded them were not enough. According to them, the P12,596,696.425
awarded by the Court of Appeals was not correct. They should have been awarded the amount
of P17,073,122.70. Quoting the Zuzuarreguis:
Respondents Roxas and Pastor retained for themselves the amount of P3,980,000.00 which
represented the agreed attorney’s fees of Roxas and Pastor at P2.50 per square meter. The
amount of P20,000,000.00 representing the yield of all the bearer bonds was, in the words of
the Court of Appeals, "deliberately hidden" by respondents Roxas and Pastor from petitioners.
By mathematical computation, the P20,000,000.00 yield should be proportionately divided at the
ratio of P17.00 (petitioners’) and P2.50 (share of respondents Roxas and Pastor). Following this
ratio of division, of the P20,000,000.00 yield, P17,073,122.70 should pertain to petitioners and
the balance of P2,926,877.30 to respondents Roxas and Pastor. Add this amount to the total of
P3,980,000.00 at the agreed rate of P2.50 per square meter, the total attorney’s fees of

respondents Roxas and Pastor should be P6,906,877.30, not bad, again in the words of the
Court of Appeals, for handling "a simple expropriation case which ended up in a compromise
agreement." It was, therefore, in error to still deduct the amount of P4,476,426.28 from
petitioners share in the yield in the amount of P17,073,122.70 leaving then only
P12,596,696.42.
What was done, however, is that the product of 1,790,570.36 sq m. (area of the expropriated
land of petitioners) and P2.50 which is 4,476,426.28 was again deducted from the
P17,073,122.70 which is the corresponding share of the petitioners out of the total yield
of P20,000,000.00. If this were a criminal case, petitioners were being sentenced twice for the
same offense.34
The Zuzuarreguis further insist that legal interest on the amount of P17,073,122.70 be imposed
from the date of the filing of the complaint, including moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
We sustain the Court of Appeals, but with modification in the computation.
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.35 Contracts shall be
obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present.36
Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, there are three essential requisites which must concur in
order to give rise to a binding contract: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established.37
All these requisites were present in the execution of the Letter-Agreement.
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract.38 The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-
Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent
the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matters which
they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody was
forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution and contents
were admitted by the Zuzuarreguis themselves.39
The second requisite is the object certain. The objects in this case are twofold. One is the
money that will go to the Zuzuarreguis (P17.00 per square meter), and two, the money that will
go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor (any and all amount in excess of P17.00 per square meter). There
was certainty as to the amount that will go to the Zuzuarreguis, and there was likewise certainty
as to what amount will go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The cause is the legal service that was provided by Attys. Roxas and Pastor. In general, cause is
the why of the contract or the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into
the contract.40
86
It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties.41 Obligations arising from contracts
have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith. Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties. 42
In Licudan v. Court of Appeals,43 we did not allow the Contract for Professional Services between
the counsel and his client to stand as the law between them as the stipulation for the lawyer’s
compensation was unconscionable and unreasonable. We said:
Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was apparently
voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter,
petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested
in open court that they gave their free and willing consent to the said contract, we cannot allow
the said contract to stand as the law between the parties involved considering that the rule that
in the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the
same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception – that
the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or
public order.44
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees 45 for their
professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by
law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz:
13. Contingent Fees. –
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 46 viz:
CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
 87

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be
divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other.
The division must be pro rata. The amount of P17.00 that should go to the Zuzuarreguis
represents 87.18% of the P19.50 per square meter just compensation, The P2.50 per square
meter that was to go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, represents 12.82%.

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
The Zuzuarreguis are entitled to the yield equal to 87.18% of the P19,583,878.00, while Attys.
Roxas and Pastor are entitled to 12.82% of said amount. The amount corresponding to 87.17%
of P19,583,878.00 is P17,073,224.84. This is the yield that the Zuzuarreguis are entitled to.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, are entitled to P2,510,653.16.

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a
court, as to its reasonableness,47 such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this
Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and
unconscionable.48 Thus, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court partly states:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with
a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness.49 It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness
or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling
within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.50
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for
they would still be earning or actually earned attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75
(P4,476,425.59 + P2,510,653.16).
The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor to the
Zuzuarreguis. They can take this out from the yield in the amount of P19,583,878.00 which they
have appropriated for themselves.
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was no
direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier,
contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary that it be reduced when
excessive and unconscionable, which we have already done.
We likewise cannot hold the NHA and Atty. Pedrosa jointly and severally liable to the
Zuzuarreguis for there is no evidence to show conspiracy between them.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 25 June 2001 and 06 February 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED but
with the MODIFICATION that Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor are hereby ordered
to return to the Zuzuarreguis the amount of P17,073,224.84. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four
percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to
the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00.
Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a
Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the
circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order. This is in accordance with our ruling in the
earlier case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo51, where we reduced the amount of attorney’s fees from
sixty percent (60%) to fifteen percent (15%), for being excessive and unreasonable.

It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably
reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the
Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be
returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.1avvph!l.ne+

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9259               August 23, 2012
JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY. EDWIN M. ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M.
ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERLAS-BERNABE,**
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons." 1
This is a Complaint2 for disbarment filed by Jasper Junno F. Rodica (Rodica) against Atty. Manuel
"Lolong" M. Lazaro (Atty. Manuel), Atty. Edwin M. Espejo (Atty. Espejo), Atty. Abel M. Almario,
(Atty. Almario), Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro (Atty. Michelle), and Atty. Joseph C. Tan (Atty. Tan) for
gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct, and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Factual Antecedents
On May 5, 2011, William Strong (Strong), an American, was arrested and detained by the
operatives of the Bureau of Immigration. Strong sought the assistance of Philip 3 G. Apostol
(Apostol), a friend and neighbor, to secure the services of a lawyer. Apostol referred him to Atty.
Manuel, who is a partner at the M.M. Lazaro and Associates Law Office (Lazaro Law Office).
Atty. Manuel initially declined because his law office only handles cases of its retained clients
and those known to him or any of the associate lawyers. 4 However, he was eventually prevailed
upon by Apostol who would consider it as a special favor if Atty. Manuel would handle Strong’s
case. Hence, Atty. Manuel, together with Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo, senior and junior
associates, respectively, at the Lazaro Law Office, agreed to meet Strong at the Taguig
Detention Center of the Bureau of Immigration.5
During the meeting, Atty. Manuel explained to Strong the terms of the Lazaro Law Office’s
engagement as well as the fees. Strong assured him of his capacity to pay and offered to pay a
88
success fee of US$100,000.00 should the said law office be able to expedite his release from
detention as well as his departure from the Philippines. 6 Finding Strong to be believable and
trustworthy, Atty. Manuel agreed to handle his case. 7
During the course of their meeting, Strong casually mentioned that he has a property in Boracay
and that he suspected his neighbors as the persons who caused his arrest. According to Strong,
his live-in partner Rodica filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
Aklan, for recovery of possession and damages 8 (against Hillview Marketing
Corporation9 (Hillview), Stephanie Dornau (Dornau) as President of Hillview, the Alargo Park
Neighborhood Association, Inc. and spouses Robert and Judy Gregoire) in connection with the
353-square meter property they bought in Boracay. He disclosed that he and Rodica had been
trying to sell the Boracay property to rid themselves of the problems but could not find buyers
because of the said case. They even offered the property to Apostol but the latter was hesitant
because of the said pending case. Atty. Manuel averred that towards the end of the interview
with Strong, Rodica arrived. Strong described Rodica as his "handyman" who will act as his
liaison in the case.
Upon inquiry with the Bureau of Immigration, it was discovered that Strong’s arrest was made
pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; and that Strong is wanted in Brazil for Conspiracy to Commit
Fraud, Setting Up a Gang and Other Related Crimes. Specifically, Strong is being indicted for his
alleged involvement in "an international gang involved in shares fraud which led to the creation
of hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal securities."10 Strong denied any participation in the
alleged crime. Strong then pleaded with Atty. Manuel to expedite his deportation to any country
except Brazil and reiterated his willingness to pay the success fee of US$100,000.00.
In her Complaint, Rodica alleged that in one of her meetings with the lawyers of the Lazaro Law
Office, she hinted that Atty. Tan, a senior partner at the Marcos Ochoa Serapio Tan and
Associates (MOST Law) and who is also the lawyer of Hillview and Dornau, was instrumental in
the immigration case of Strong. According to Rodica, Atty. Manuel called up Atty. Tan.
Thereafter, Atty. Manuel allegedly informed Rodica that Atty. Tan admitted having initiated the
immigration case resulting in the detention of Strong; that Atty. Tan threatened to do something
bad against Rodica and her family; and that Atty. Tan demanded for Rodica to withdraw the
RTC case as part of a settlement package.
On May 25, 2011, the Bureau of Immigration, rendered its Judgment 11 granting the motion of
Strong to voluntarily leave the country. On May 31, 2011, Strong left the Philippines.
Subsequently, or on June 6, 2011, Rodica filed with the RTC a motion effectively withdrawing
her complaint.
Rodica alleged that after the deportation of Strong and the withdrawal of the RTC case, she
heard nothing from the Lazaro Law Office. She also claimed that contrary to her expectations,
there was no "simultaneous over-all settlement of her grievances x x x [with] the defendants [in
the RTC] case.12 Thinking that she was deceived, Rodica filed the instant administrative case. In
sum, she claimed that:
21. RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS (MANUEL, MICHELLE, EDWIN and ABEL) of M.M. LAZARO &
ASSOCIATES, furthermore, committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT & DECEIT to complainant and the
courts when (among other things):

(a.) they mis-represented to complainant that the withdrawal of her case at the
Regional Trial Court at Kalibo (Branch VI-Civil Case No. 8987) was only the first step
in an over-all settlement package of all her differences with her legal adversaries (i.e.
Hillview Marketing Corporation and the latter’s officials / Stephanie Dornau / Atty.
Joseph Tan etc.), which respondent Manuel M. Lazaro had allegedly already taken
care of ;
(b.) they extorted from her more than ₱ 7 MILLION for alleged professional / legal
fees and PENALTIES involved in William Strong’s immigration case, when what
actually happened was -
(c.) as complainant came to know later, almost all of said amount was allegedly used
as "pay-off" to immigration, police and Malaca[ñ]ang officials as well as Atty. Joseph
Tan, and as ‘graft money’/ ‘kotong’ / ‘lagay’ / "tong-pats", for the expeditious approval
of Mr. William Strong’s voluntary deportation plea with the Bureau of Immigration ;
(d.) they even shamelessly denied the status of the complainant as their client, just so
that they can evade their responsibility to her ;
(e.) they even submitted concocted stories (re Mr. Apostol’s purchase bid for the
Boracay villa of complainant; Atty. Espejo’s attempt to cover-up for Lolong Lazaro and
accept sole responsibility for signing the questioned manifestation and withdrawal
documents last May 24, 2011, and many others) with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo (Branch VI) just so that they can hide the truth, hide their crimes and go scot
free ;
22. RESPONDENT Atty. JOSEPH C. TAN on the other hand performed as a willing partner of
ATTY. MANUEL M. LAZARO by acting as ‘conduit’ to his Malacañang patron ("JOHN DOE") in
causing the arrest of William Strong last May 5, 2011, and in packaging with Lolong Lazaro of
the ‘magic formula’ regarding William Strong’s voluntary deportation bid and the conditions
attached thereto as sufficiently explained ;
xxxx
23. RESPONDENTS also violated THEIR OATH AS x x x ATTORNEYS, especially with the phrases
". . . I will obey the laws . . . I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court ; . .
. I will delay no man for money or malice . . . with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients . . . " ;13
Otherwise stated, Rodica claimed that she is a client of the Lazaro Law Office and that she was
deceived into causing the withdrawal of the RTC case. Further, she claimed that the Lazaro Law
Office collected exorbitant fees from her.
In their Comment, Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo admitted being present in the May 13, 2011
meeting with Rodica. They denied, however, that Atty. Manuel talked with Atty. Tan during the
said meeting, or conveyed the information that Atty. Tan and the group of Dornau were the
ones behind Strong’s arrest and detention.
89
Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo disputed Rodica’s assertion that the withdrawal of the RTC case
was a condition sine qua non to Strong’s departure from the country. They pointed out that the
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed only on June 3,
2011,15 or nine days after the May 25, 2011 Judgment of the Bureau of Immigration was issued,
and three days after Strong left the country on May 31, 2011. They insisted that Rodica
withdrew the RTC case because it was one of the conditions set by Apostol before buying the
Boracay property.
As to the preparation of Rodica’s Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration relative to the
RTC case, Atty. Espejo claimed that the former begged him to prepare the said motion. Since
the two already became close friends, Atty. Espejo accommodated Rodica’s request. He
admitted to acceding to Rodica’s requests to put the name of the Lazaro Law Office, the names
of its partners, as well as his name, in the motion and into signing the same, without the prior
knowledge and consent of the other senior lawyers of the firm. Atty. Espejo claimed that he did
all of these out of his good intention to help and assist Rodica in making the Boracay property
more saleable by freeing it from any pending claims.
In his Comment,16 Atty. Manuel contended that none of the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office
communicated with Atty. Tan relative to the deportation proceedings or the RTC case. He
claimed that it was highly improbable for the Lazaro Law Office to impress upon Rodica that it
will coordinate with Atty. Tan for the withdrawal of the RTC case to expedite the deportation
proceedings as the RTC case was already dismissed as early as March 29, 2011 for failure to
state a cause of action. Atty. Manuel averred that the two cases are incongruous with each
other and one cannot be used to compromise the other.
Atty. Joseph Tan’s Arguments
For his part, Atty. Tan asserted that the allegations against him are "double hearsay" because
the same were based on information allegedly relayed to Rodica by Atty. Manuel, who, in turn,
allegedly heard it from Atty. Tan.17 He denied any participation in the withdrawal of the RTC case
and the arrest and deportation of Strong.
Atty. Tan stressed that Strong was deported on May 31, 2011. Three days thereafter, or on June
3, 2011, Rodica, with the assistance of her counsel of record, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-Ibutnande
(Atty. Ibutnande), filed the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration.
He averred that if it is indeed true, as Rodica alleged, that the filing of the said motion was a
pre-condition to Strong’s voluntary deportation, then the filing of the same should have
preceded Strong’s deportation. However, it was the reverse in this case.
Atty. Tan also pointed out that it would be inconceivable for him to participate in Strong’s arrest
as he had already obtained a favorable ruling "on the merits" for his clients in the RTC case
even before Strong was arrested and incarcerated. Besides, Strong is not a party and had
nothing to do with the RTC case. Atty. Tan likewise denied having any dealings with the rest of
the respondents insofar as the arrest and voluntary deportation of Strong are concerned.
Neither did he receive any phone call or message from his co-respondents nor did he
communicate with them in any manner regarding Strong’s case.
Issue

The sole issue to be resolved is whether the allegations in Rodica’s Complaint merit the
disbarment or suspension of respondents.
Our Ruling
In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,18 this Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in suspension
or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence.
Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court declared thus:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence,
the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number. (Citations omitted.)
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer continues
and the complaint against him must be dismissed. 19
In the present case, the totality of evidence presented by Rodica failed to overcome the said
presumption of innocence.
Rodica’s claim of "settlement package"
is devoid of merit.
Rodica’s assertions that Atty. Tan orchestrated Strong’s arrest and that Atty. Manuel proposed
the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the deportation of Strong, are mere allegations
without proof and belied by the records of the case. "The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence, and is not equivalent to proof." 20 Aside from her bare assertions, Rodica failed to
present even an iota of evidence to prove her allegations. In fact, the records belie her claims.
The documents issued by the Bureau of Immigration showed that Strong was the subject of the
Interpol Red Notice for being a fugitive from justice wanted for crimes allegedly committed in
Brazil.21 His warrant of arrest was issued sometime in February 2008. Significantly, even before
Strong was arrested and eventually deported, Atty. Tan had already obtained a favorable
judgment for his clients.
We also agree that it is highly inconceivable for Atty. Tan and the Lazaro Law Office to concoct
the scheme of "pressuring" Rodica to withdraw the RTC case for the purpose of expediting the
deportation proceedings of Strong. The following facts are undisputed: (1) Rodica’s counsel of
record in the RTC is Atty. Ibutnande; (2) the RTC case was already dismissed in the Order 22 of
March 29, 2011 for failure to state a cause of action; (3) on April 18, 2011, Rodica through her
counsel of record filed a Motion for Reconsideration; (4) on May 5, 2011, Strong was arrested
and detained pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; (5) Strong hired the Lazaro Law Office to
90
handle his deportation case; (6) on May 19, 2011 Strong filed a Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion to voluntarily leave the country; (7) the Bureau of Immigration rendered a
Judgment23 dated May 25, 2011 granting Strong’s motion to voluntarily leave the country; (8)
Strong left the country on May 31, 2011; (9) Rodica’s Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the
Motion for Reconsideration was filed on June 6, 2011; and, (8) acting on the said Manifestation
with Motion, the RTC on June 14, 2011 issued an Order24 granting the same.
Given the chronology of events, there appears no relation between the deportation case and the
withdrawal of the RTC case. Thus, it would be specious if not far-fetched to conclude that the
withdrawal of the RTC case was a pre-condition to Strong’s deportation.
As regards the alleged participation of Atty. Manuel in the "settlement package" theory of
Rodica, suffice it to say that Atty. Manuel has in his favor "the presumption that, as an officer of
the court, he regularly performs the duties imposed upon him by his oath as a lawyer and by the
Code of Professional Responsibility."25 Hence, absent any competent evidence to the contrary,
Atty. Manuel, as Strong’s counsel, is presumed to have worked out the release and subsequent
deportation of his client in accordance with the proper procedures.
Preponderance of evidence shows that
Rodica caused the withdrawal of the
RTC case to facilitate the sale of the
Boracay property to Apostol.
We cannot lend credence to Rodica’s allegation that she was deceived by Atty. Manuel, Atty.
Espejo, Atty. Almario and Atty. Michelle, another senior associate at the Lazaro Law Office, into
believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was part of a settlement package to settle her
differences with her legal adversaries. We accord more credence to the explanation of the
respondents, particularly Atty. Espejo, that in the course of rendering legal services to Strong,
he had become close to Rodica so much so that he accommodated Rodica’s request to cause
the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the sale of the Boracay property to Apostol.
In their Joint Comment,26 respondents Attys. Almario, Espejo and Michelle debunked the opinion
of Rodica’s "well-meaning lawyer friends" that the withdrawal of the RTC case "absolve[d] all
defendants from any wrong-doing" and made "the contents of her original complaint practically
meaningless." Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo opined that since the dismissal of Rodica’s
complaint was based on her failure to state a cause of action and without prejudice, the same
may simply be re-filed by revising her complaint and ensuring that it states a cause of action.
As argued by Atty. Manuel, he and his lawyers only acted in the best interest of their client
Strong and rendered services in accordance with the latter’s objective of leaving the country and
not being deported to Brazil. The Lazaro Law Office cannot be faulted for the dismissal of the
RTC case because it had already been dismissed even before the Lazaro Law Office was
engaged to handle Strong’s immigration case. Besides, Rodica admittedly agreed to withdraw
her RTC case to meet Apostol’s condition and to make the property marketable.
Apostol corroborated Atty. Manuel’s statement in his Affidavit 27 of July 21, 2011. He affirmed that
he told Rodica that he would only consider purchasing the Boracay property if it is cleared of
any pending case so that he can protect himself, as a buyer, from any possible issues that may
crop up involving the said property. According to him, Rodica assured him that she would work

for the termination of the RTC case and consult her lawyers in Boracay on the matter so she
could already sell the property.
It is difficult to imagine that Rodica was deceived by some of the respondent lawyers into
believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was only the initial step in the settlement of her
differences with her adversaries.28 We went over the said Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw
the Motion for Reconsideration29 and we note that paragraph 6 thereof specifically states:
6. However, the Plaintiff respectfully manifests that after much serious thought and deliberation,
and considering the anxieties caused by the pendency of the instant case, Plaintiff is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully moves for the withdrawal of
the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 14, 2011 of the Order dated March 29, 2011
dismissing the instant Complaint filed on April 18, 2011.30
As already noted by the RTC, Branch 6, Kalibo, Aklan in its Order 31 dated April 4, 2011, in the
case for recovery of possession with damages: 32
This Manifestation was signed by plaintiff, her Manila lawyers and Atty. Joan Ibutnande,
plaintiff’s counsel on record. From the statements made by plaintiff in her Manifestation to
Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration that she had made serious thoughts and deliberation she
cannot now say that she was manipulated and forced in signing the same. The Court perceives
plaintiff to be an intelligent woman not to be swayed of her principles and beliefs and
manipulated by others, she may have a fickle mind when it comes to other things but definitely
it can not be applied to the Court.
The Court does not see the connection between the instant case and that of William Strong as
alleged by the plaintiff. Mr. Strong is not a party in this case, even plaintiff’s counsel thought so
too. From the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Joan Ibutnande, it was stated in
paragraph 5: "That the undersigned counsel was baffled as she did not see any connection
[between] the incident surrounding the arrest of Mr. William Strong and the above-entitled case
filed by the [plaintiff], and told the plaintiff about it x x x." As Mr. Strong is not a party in the
instance case, his affairs whatever they are can not dictate the outcome of this case. 33
Moreover, it would appear from her own narration that Rodica is not someone who is naïve or
ignorant. In her complaint, she claimed to be an astute businesswoman who even has some
business in Barcelona, Spain.34 Thus, the more reason we cannot lend credence to her claim that
she was tricked into believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was only preliminary to the
complete settlement of all her differences with her perceived adversaries. If such had been the
agreement, then a Compromise Agreement enumerating all the terms and conditions should
have been filed instead of the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for
Reconsideration. In addition, the withdrawal should not have been limited to the RTC case as it
appears that there are other cases pending with other tribunals and agencies 35 involving the
same parties. If Rodica is to be believed, then these cases should likewise have been dismissed
in order to achieve the full and complete settlement of her concerns with her adversaries.
From the above and by preponderance of evidence, it is clear that Rodica’s purpose in
withdrawing the RTC case is to pave the way for Apostol to purchase the Boracay property. In
fact, Rodica eventually executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Apostol over the Boracay
property.36
91
Rodica’s claim of paying more than ₱ 7
million to the Lazaro Law Office is not
substantiated.
There is likewise no merit in Rodica’s allegation that the Lazaro Law Office extorted from her
more than ₱ 7 million for alleged professional and legal fees and penalties relative to Strong’s
immigration case. To support her claim, Rodica attached four statements of account issued by
the Lazaro Law Office for US$2,650.00 under Statement of Account No. 13837, 37 US$2,400.00
under Statement of Account No. 13838,38 US$1,550.00 under Statement of Account No.
1383939 and US$8,650.00 under Statement of Account No. 13835,40 or for a total amount of
US$15,250.00. She likewise presented photocopies of portions of her dollar savings account
passbook to show where the aforesaid funds came from.
Considering the prevailing exchange rate at that time, the Court notes that the sum total of the
abovementioned figures in its peso equivalent is far less than ₱ 7 million. In fact, the statements
of account even support the contention of Atty. Manuel that Strong failed to fully pay the
amount of US$100,000.00 as success fee. Anent the alleged withdrawals from Rodica’s dollar
savings account, the same merely established that she made those withdrawals. They do not
constitute as competent proof that the amounts so withdrawn were indeed paid to Lazaro Law
Office.
Rodica was not the client of the Lazaro
Law Office.
Rodica also faulted the Lazaro Law Office lawyers for disclaiming that she is their client.
However, Rodica admitted in paragraph 5 of her unnotarized Sworn Affidavit 41 that Atty. Manuel
and his lawyer-assistants were "engaged by William Strong to handle his case with the Philippine
immigration authorities." Thus, this Court is more inclined to believe that the Lazaro Law Office
agreed to handle only the deportation case of Strong and such acceptance cannot be construed
as to include the RTC case. In fact, all the billings of Lazaro Law Office pertained to the
immigration case, and not to the RTC case. To reiterate, the RTC case has nothing to do with
Strong’s deportation case. Records also show that the RTC case was filed long before Strong
was arrested and detained. In fact, it had already been dismissed by the trial court long before
Strong engaged the legal services of the Lazaro Law Office. More importantly, Strong is not a
party to the RTC case. Also, the counsel of record of Rodica in the RTC case is Atty. Ibutnande,
and not the Lazaro Law Office. There is nothing on record that would show that respondent
Attys. Manuel, Michelle, and Almario had any participation therein.
Atty. Espejo’s participation in the RTC
case.
However, we cannot say the same as regards Atty. Espejo. He admitted drafting Rodica’s
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration indicating therein the firm
name of the Lazaro Law Office as well as his name and the names of Atty. Manuel and Atty.
Michelle without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, and in likewise affixing his
signature thereon.
Atty. Espejo acknowledged committing the abovementioned acts as a way of assisting Rodica
who had already become his close friend. Atty. Espejo’s admissions are as follows:
 92

11. Atty. Espejo further recounts that after being advised to simply withdraw her Motion for
Reconsideration ("MR"), Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to prepare the documents required to
be filed with the RTC x x x to spare her Boracay lawyers from preparing the same. Atty. Espejo
accommodated Jasper and drafted the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Reconsideration ("Motion to Withdraw MR") to be given to Rodica’s Boracay counsel, Atty. Joan
I. Tabanar-Ibutnande, who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the withdrawal of the
MR.
11.1. Upon seeing Atty. Espejo’s initial draft, Rodica requested Atty. Espejo to include x x x the
name of the Lazaro Law Office as signatory allegedly to give more credence and weight to the
pleading and to show the defendants in the RTC case her sincere intention to terminate the
case.
to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not been
represented by any lawyer, which, however, is not the case.
Moreover, the Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their law
firm’s client and without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, gave in to Rodica’s request
for him to indicate in the said motion the names of his law firm, Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle
for the purpose of "giving more weight and credit to the pleading." As a member of the bar,
Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in courts are acted upon in
accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the lawyer
filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so doing, he was actually
assisting Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being represented by the said
law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not.

Due to Rodica’s pleas and insistence, Atty. Espejo, who among all lawyers of the Lazaro Law
Office, became the most familiar and "chummy" with Rodica, agreed to include the Lazaro Law
Office and put his name as the signatory for the Office. Still not satisfied, Rodica pleaded with
Atty. Espejo to further revise the Motion to Withdraw MR to include the names of Atty. Manuel
and Atty. Michelle as signatories and represented that she herself will cause them to sign it.
Relying on Rodica’s representations that she would speak to Atty. Manuel about the matter,
Atty. Espejo obliged to include the name of Atty. Michelle and Atty. Manuel. Rodica repeatedly
reminded Atty. Espejo not to bother Atty. Manuel on the matter and that she herself will take it
up with Atty. Manuel at the proper time.
11.2 Atty. Espejo has a soft heart. He signed the pleading only with good intentions of helping
and assisting Rodica, the common law wife of a client, whom he had learned to fancy because
of being constantly together and attending to her. He never thought ill of Rodica and believed
her when she said she would speak to Atty. Lazaro about the matter as represented. Atty.
Espejo only agreed to sign the pleading for purposes of withdrawing Rodica’s MR to attain
Rodica’s purpose or desired result and objective – to convince or facilitate the sale to Apostol
and/or to make the property more marketable to interested buyers and to attain peace with the
defendants in the RTC case. Evidently, Rodica took advantage of Atty. Espejo’s youth and
naivete and manipulated him to do things on her behalf, and deliberately excluded Atty. Almario
the senior lawyer. Rodica preferred to discuss matters with Atty. Espejo than with Atty. Almario
as the latter often contradicts her views. Atty. Espejo apologized to Atty. Manuel for allowing
himself to be manipulated by Rodica.42
It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an
officer of the court.43 Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair
dealings and must conduct himself beyond reproach at all times.44 He must likewise ensure that
he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument
of truth and justice.45 As shown by his actuations. Atty. Espejo fell short of what is expected of
him. Under the circumstances, Atty. Espejo should have exercised prudence by first diligently
studying the soundness of Rodica’s pleas and the repercussions of his acts.
We note that on August 5, 2011, or even before the filing of the disbarment complaint, Atty.
Espejo already caused the filing of his Motion to Withdraw Appearance46 before the RTC.
Therein, Atty. Espejo already expressed remorse and sincere apologies to the RTC for wrongly
employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office. Considering that Atty. Espejo is newly admitted to
the Bar (2010), we deem it proper to warm him to be more circumspect and prudent in his
actuations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against respondents
Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M. Almario, Atty. Michelle B.
Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C. Tan is DISMISSED. Atty. Edwin M. Espejo is WARNED to be more
circumspect and prudent in his actuations.
SO ORDERED.

At the outset, Atty. Espejo was well aware that Rodica was represented by another counsel in
the RTC case. As a practicing lawyer, he should know that it is the said counsel, Atty.
Ibutnande, who has the duty to prepare the said motion. In fact, he himself stated that it is
Atty. Ibutnande who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the withdrawal of the Motion
for Reconsideration.

Atty. Espejo’s claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend assistance to Rodica
deserves scant consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01 and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed, and in such cases, even if he does not accept a case, shall not
refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to
safeguard the latter’s right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be considered as defenseless
or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel in the RTC case. Needless

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5174               February 28, 2002
ERNESTO M. RAMOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO A. DAJOYAG, JR., respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Ernesto M. Ramos against Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr. for
negligence in failing to appeal a ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission, 1 which
affirmed the dismissal by the Labor Arbiter of a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
complainant against DCCD Engineering Corporation. In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice,
dated November 15, 1999, complainant stated:
As a result of the dismissal by the NLRC of my complaint, I have been physically and emotionally
affected. Considering my status in the community of the respondents and where I live as a Civil
Engineer, now 73 1/2 years of age, the illegal termination of my employment continuously
caused me sleepless nights, mental anguish and torture, social humiliation and besmirch[ed]
reputation. These have been compounded by the failure of my lawyer, Atty. MARIANO A.
DAJOYAG, Jr. to file on time the petition for certiorari, which [the] Honorable Supreme Court
dismissed with finality . . . To lessen the impact of my sufferings and mental torture, which I
could no longer bear for nearly six years since I received the notice of termination of my
services in December 1993, I finally decided to report my lawyer’s failure to perfect an appeal
within the prescribed period which constitutes negligence and malpractice . . .
This fact arose out of case G.R. 125244 (Ernesto Ramos vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, DCCD Engineering Corp., et al.) Our motion for last extension of time within which
to file [a] petition for review on certiorari [was] DENIED, "petitioner having been previously
warned in the resolution of July 24, 1996 that no further extension will be given" per resolution
of the First Division of [the] Honorable Court dated August 26, 1996. Our petition for certiorari
filed on August 14, 1996 was dismissed per resolution of the First Division of [the] Honorable
Court dated December 2, 1996 for having [been] filed out of time. Our motion for
reconsideration [of] the resolution [dated] December 2, 1996, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari, was likewise denied with finality per resolution dated February 19, 1997 of the First
Division of [the] Honorable Court. Machine [copies] of the above-mentioned resolutions [are]
attached hereto.
Because it was not my fault or shortcoming but that of my lawyer, Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr.,
for his failure [in] his devotion to his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his client’s rights,
it is requested that said erring lawyer be duly sanctioned and my petition for certiorari be
reconsidered and accepted. Or through another counsel, I be allowed to file another petition for
certiorari with [an] important addendum, which my said former lawyer failed to mention due to
time constraint in filing [the] petition for certiorari.2Respondent denied the allegations against
him. Commenting on the complaint, he said:
93
1. The records will show that complainant filed a complaint against DCCD Engineering
Corp. on May 1994 before the National Labor Relations Commission docketed under
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-03667-94 for illegal lay-off, illegal deduction, overtime pay,
service incentive leave pay, and related claims;
2. Complainant approached me being a "kababayan" from our hometown of Calaca,
Batangas. He said that he was a friend of my late father, Atty. Mariano Dajoyag, Sr.,
and knew also my mother, Atty. Aurora Ampil Dajoyag, who is still living but in her
middle eighties. After appealing to our common regional origin, complainant urged me
to accept his case;
3. Being a kabayan, I was hesitant to secure a contract for legal services and that as it
usually goes with such situation, it was "bahala na lang pag natapos ang kaso,";
...
5. That before the Labor Arbiter, I filed the following:
a) Amended Complaint to implead proper parties and to include changes in
the causes of action for a more plausible plea;
b) Position Paper consisting of 15 pages with annexes consisting of 11
pages;
c) Reply to Respondent’s Position Paper consisting of 16 pages and annexes
consisting of 24 pages;
d) Memorandum for Complainant consisting of 22 pages and annexes
consisting of 4 pages;
6. That after the case was submitted for resolution, the Honorable Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint in a decision dated April 3, 1995. Said decision in a nutshell
concluded that: Complainant was a managerial employee with a field assignment for
which he was not entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave pursuant to the
Labor Code, and that complainant’s term of employment was [for] a fixed duration
which already expired. . . .
To this decision, I prepared a Memorandum of Appeal in behalf of Complainant
consisting of 18 pages which I also filed within the reglementary period at my own
expense except the appeal fee and legal research fee which complainant had to pay
being the party-litigant;
7. After the filing of this Memorandum of Appeal, and the respondent Company had
filed its opposition, the NLRC ruled to affirm the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The NLRC
found that complainant was engaged as a consultant for a fixed period of time for
which the termination of employment depended upon the termination of the
agreement; and that complainant had also waived his right to file the complaint
because he had executed a waiver and release wherein he expressly declared that his

separation was legally valid. And there was no evidence that complainant was forced
to sign this release which was held to be valid.
8. That in the face of this adverse ruling, I still filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was duly verified by complainant. This Motion for Reconsideration was
thereafter denied in a Resolution, to wit:
"After due consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the complainant on
February 9, 1996, from the Decision of January 22, 1996 of the Commission (Second
Division) [the Court] RESOLVED to deny the same for lack of merit."
9. That despite another adverse ruling and even as I have to attend to daily hearings
of my other cases or attend to other paper work, I still prepare[d] a Petition for
Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
10. Thus on June 25th, 1996, I filed a Motion for Extension of time to file a Petition
for Certiorari asking for 30 days which was up to July 25, 1996. Note: This Motion for
Extension was granted through a Resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 24th
1996 - but which I only received on August 28, 1996. However, as July 25th 1996 was
fast approaching, and I was still saddled with heavy workload aside from the fact that
I needed numerous xerox copies of documents as well as [c]ertified [t]rue [c]opies
also of certain crucial documents which had to be secured from the NLRC, I was really
constrained to ask for a second extension of time FOR ONLY 20 DAYS OR UP TO
AUGUST 14th, 1996 to file the aforesaid Petition;
....
12. That to my utter surprise and sadness, the Resolution of the Honorable Court
granting my first Motion for Extension from June 25th to July 25th contained a
warning that it should be the last but which I ONLY received on August 28th after I
have already filed the second Motion for Extension for only 20 days and also the basic
Petition for Certiorari.
To summarize:
A) Motion for First Extension 30 days from June 25th, 1996 to July 25th -
filed on June 25th;
B) Motion for Second Extension for 20 days or from July 25, 1996 to August
14th - filed July 25th;
C) Resolution dated July 24th granting First Motion for Extension from June
25th to July 25th with warning that no further extension shall be given-
received ONLY on August 28th;
D) Petition for Certiorari filed on August 14th - exactly within the period of
the request [for] second extension had this second extension for only 20
days been granted.
94
13. That as mentioned above, the July 24th, 1996 Resolution reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, DCCD
Engineering Corp., et al.). The motion of petitioner for extension of thirty (30) days
from June 25, 1996 within which to file petition for certiorari is GRANTED WITH
WARNING THAT THE SAME SHALL BE THE LAST AND THAT NO FURTHER
EXTENSION will be given."
14. That on August 26th 1996, a resolution was promulgated by the Honorable Court
which was received by respondent counsel on October 5, 1996, to wit:
"G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, DCCD
Engineering Corp., et al.,). The motion of petitioner for a second extension of twenty
(20) days from July 25, 1996 within which to file petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED, petitioner having been previously warned in the resolution of July 25, 1996
that no further extension will be given."
15. That to this denial I filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 18, 1996 of this
August 26th 1996 denial order.
16. That prior to the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of the
second Motion for Extension of Time to file petition, the Honorable Court issued a
Resolution dated October 9, 1996 directing respondents to file Comment - which was
received on Nov. 5, 1996;
17. That pursuant to this Resolution, private respondent filed its Comment and the
Solicitor General requested for extension of time to file his Comment. But after the
Comment of private respondent, the Honorable Court issued a Resolution dated
December 2, 1996, to wit:
"G.R. No. 124244 (Ernesto Ramos v. National Labor Relations Commission, DCCD
Engineering Corp., et al.). - Considering the private respondent’s Comment/Opposition
to the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for having
been filed out of time.
The motion of the Solicitor General for an extension of thirty (30) days from
November 8, 1996 within which to file Comment on the petition for Certiorari is
further NOTED in view of the dismissal of the petition."
18. That from the said Resolution dated December 2, 1996, the undersigned
respondent counsel in behalf of complainant still filed a Motion for Reconsideration
pleading for the reinstatement of the Petition[.] But inspite of my earnest and sincere
efforts, the Honorable Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration with finality;
19. That complainant was properly informed of this adverse ruling. He insisted that I
file another Motion for Reconsideration. I did not accede to his desire and I told him
that the dismissal was with finality and we might be cited for contempt for filing such
pleading. He was unhappy about it and that was the last time we saw each other.

....
It appears that the Resolution granting my request for 1st extension contained a warning that
no further extension would be given. BUT I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS BECAUSE WHEN I FILED
MY MOTION FOR LAST EXTENSION FOR ONLY 20 DAYS, I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE COPY
OF SAID RESOLUTION. And in fact, even at the time I filed the basic Petition for Certiorari, I
HAVE NOT YET STILL received said July 24, 1996 Resolution.
I RELIED IN GOOD FAITH AND IN THE HONEST BELIEF THAT THE FIRST MOTION FOR
EXTENSION FOR 30 DAYS WOULD BE GRANTED - WITHOUT THE WARNING - SINCE IT WAS
MERELY A FIRST EXTENSION. Then even as I was terribly saddled with heavy load and at times
had some difficulty in getting in touch with complainant, I dropped everything to be able to beat
the supposed deadline of August 14th, 1996.
I am sorry if I had to rely in good faith that my Motion for 1st Extension of 30 days would be
granted without the warning - as this was a first extension only; and also that I request for a
second and last extension of 20 days for which I complied with the filing of the Petition for
Certiorari on the last day of the supposed extended period.
....
And even assuming there could be a charge of negligence, still this is excusable under existing
jurisprudence. The Honorable Court declared in a case:
"Negligence is excusable where it is caused by failure to receive notice of the action or the trial,
x x x" Fernandez vs Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138; underscoring supplied).
In this case, there was failure on my part to receive notice of the action of the Honorable Court
on my first motion for extension before I filed the second and last motion for extension of time
to file petition as well as the basic petition for certiorari itself. 3
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation. On October 27, 2001, the IBP approved the report and recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca that respondent be reprimanded and warned
that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties would be dealt with more severely.
Acknowledging respondent’s efforts in prosecuting complainant’s case before the Labor Arbiter
and the National Labor Relations Commission, the investigating commissioner found that
respondent was not guilty of willful breach of professional duty but only of simple neglect of
duty and accordingly recommended that he be given a mere reprimand. Thus, the investigating
commissioner reasoned:
Respondent has failed to show that he exercised that degree of competence and diligence
required of him in prosecuting complainant’s petition for certiorari before the Honorable
Supreme Court. His reliance on good faith cannot be credited fully in his favor. Lawyers should
not presume that the courts would grant their motion for extension of time to file the required
pleading or brief nor expect that the extension that may be granted shall be counted from
notice. They should file their brief or pleadings within the extended period requested. Failing in
95
this, they have only themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed (Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals, 156 SCRA 252). Neither would the fact that he has not been paid his fees exonerate
him from liability. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
(Santiago, et al. vs. Atty. Amado R. Fojas, A.C. No. 4103, September 7, 1995). 4
We find the investigating commissioner’s report and recommendation well taken.
First.  Respondent pleads good faith and excusable neglect of duty. He stresses the fact that he
filed the petition for certiorari within the 20-day period of extension that he sought in his second
motion for extension and claims that he learned that the period of extension granted in his first
motion for extension was inextendible only after the expiration of the two periods of extension
that he prayed for.
Respondent’s contentions have no merit. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission affirming the Labor Arbiter’s dismissal of complainant’s claims against his former
employers was promulgated on January 22, 1996. Respondent was notified of the decision on
February 8, 1996 and he filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period. His
motion was denied on March 12, 1996 and respondent was notified thereof on March 25, 1996.
On June 25, 1996, the last day of the 90-day period allowed at that time for filing a special civil
action for certiorari,5 he filed with this Court a motion seeking an extension of thirty (30) days
for filing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground that because of pressure of work
he was prevented him from filing the same earlier. On July 25, 1996, the last day of the period
he asked for in his first motion for extension, respondent filed a motion praying for another
extension of twenty (20) days for filing the petition for certiorari. On the last day of the second
period of extension that he asked for, August 14, 1996, respondent finally filed the petition for
certiorari.
Meanwhile, on July 24, 1996, this Court issued a resolution granting respondent’s first motion
for extension, with a warning that no further extension would be granted. Respondent received
a copy of the resolution on August 28, 1996. On August 26, 1996, the Court denied the petition
for certiorari for being filed out of time. Respondent received a copy of the resolution, dated
August 26, 1996, denying his petition on October 5, 1996. On October 18, 1996, respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court in its resolution of
December 2, 1996.
To begin with, motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or
postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length of time they pray for. Due
diligence requires that they should conduct a timely inquiry with the division clerks of court of
the action on their motions and the lack of notice thereof will not make them any less
accountable for their omission.6 Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda of briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Regardless of the agreement he had with complainant with respect to the payment of his fees,
respondent owed it to complainant to do his utmost to ensure that every remedy allowed by law
is availed of.7 Rule 14.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins every lawyer to
devote his full attention, diligence, skills, and competence to every case that he accepts.
 96

Pressure and large volume of legal work do not excuse respondent for filing the petition for courts and warned that repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt
certiorari out of time.8 with.

Respondent cites the ruling in Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick,9 in support of his claim that his Complainant’s prayer that the petition for certiorari filed by respondent be considered and given
negligence is excusable. Such reliance is misplaced. In Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, the due course despite its denial for having been filed out of time is DENIED for lack of merit.
appellant cited in support of his petition for the reopening of his case the failure of his former
counsel to inform him of the status of his case. He argued that his own failure to inquire from
SO ORDERED.
his former counsel the status of his case was excusable. This Court rejected the contention:

Negligence is excusable where it is caused by failure to receive notice of the action or the trial,
by a genuine and excusable mistake or miscalculation, by reliance upon assurances given by
those upon whom the party had a right to depend, as the adverse party or counsel retained in
the case, or a competent adviser, that it would not be necessary for him to take an active part in
the case, or that the suit would not be prosecuted, by relying on another person to attend to the
case for him, when such other person promised to do so, or was chargeable with that duty or by
a well-founded belief that the case would not be reached for trial as it was in fact reached, or by
other circumstances not involving fault of the moving party. . . .

The Court pointed out that appellant’s counsel was duly notified of the proceedings in the case,
and appellant was bound by his counsel’s conduct and handling of his case.

In the case at bar, respondent was ill-informed about the disposition of his first motion for
extension not by reason of genuine and excusable mistake or miscalculation but by his sheer
negligence. It is noteworthy that the motions for extension, and even the petition for certiorari,
were all filed at the last moment. Respondent had 120 days within which he could have filed the
petition for certiorari. However, because of his cavalier attitude toward deadlines for the filing of
pleadings, including the one set by himself in his first motion for extension, respondent lost the
opportunity for filing the petition for review.

Nevertheless, having said this, it ought to be remembered, on the other hand, that respondent
exerted efforts to protect the rights and interests of complainant, including trying to secure a
reconsideration of the denial of his petition for certiorari in this Court. For this reason, we are
inclined to adopt the investigating commissioner’s recommendation that respondent be merely
reprimanded for his simple neglect of duty.

Second. Complainant prays that we admit and consider the merits of the petition for certiorari
filed by respondent, or that he be allowed to file anew a separate petition for
certiorari.1âwphi1 We understand the plight of the complainant, but we cannot grant his plea.
This is an administrative case, separate from G.R. No. 125244 in which the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari was made. The resolution of the Court in that case operated as a judgment
on the merits and is now final.10 Indeed, public policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, the judgments of courts should become final at some definite date
fixed by law,11 and that every party be bound by his counsel’s decision regarding the conduct of
the case, including his mistakes, save only when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless,
and inexcusable as to amount to a deprivation of the client’s day in court. 12 This is not the
situation in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr. is REPRIMANDED. He is admonished henceforth to

exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients and the
 97

EN BANC documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our several follow-ups, Atty.
Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in their
house, and that he could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00)
A.C. No. 6424             March 4, 2005
because he has no money;

CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, Complainant,
"Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon
vs.
Edison Batacan, IBP President of Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the
Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent.
Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline;

DECISION
x x x       x x x       x x x."

PANGANIBAN,  J.:
Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latter’s money or other property coming into the
former’s possession should be deemed to be held in trust and should not under any
circumstance be commingled with the lawyers’ own; much less, used by them. Failure to
observe these ethical principles constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions.
The Case and the Facts
In an Order dated March 12, 2002,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Director Victor C. Fernandez, directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The
same directive was reiterated in the CBD’s May 31, 2002 Order3 issued through Commissioner
Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any answer despite his receipt of the Orders. 4
Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD proceeded with the investigation
ex parte. Its Order5 dated November 11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required
complainant to submit her position paper within ten days from receipt thereof, after which the
case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the The CBD received complainant’s Position Paper6 on December 10, 2002.
Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The
Affidavit 1 submitted by complainant alleges the following:
Report of the Investigating Commissioner

"Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together
In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Acerey
with my son, Freddie Rollon, to seek his assistance in a case filed against me before
C. Pacheco recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled ‘Rosita Julaton vs.
year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Consorcia S. Rollon’ for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment;
Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows:

"After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case, Atty.
"Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I was required to pay the amount of Eight
client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee, which amount
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him
was paid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached
administratively liable x x x.
as Annex ‘A’ to form part hereof;

"In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to
"As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the
the complainant that he will render legal services to her, and after receiving certain
following week to make follow-up on said case. However, I was informed later by my
amount from the latter as payment for ‘filing fee and service fee’ did nothing in return,
son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case because the latter was
has caused unnecessary dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the
so busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was
community to the legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been tarnished.
no action done on our case;

"Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty.
Naraval, because of the latter’s failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he
will assist me in the above-mentioned case;
"My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naraval’s office that same day to inform Atty.
Naraval of our decision to withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my
xxx   xxx   xxx
"In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he
failed to properly appraised her of the status of her case which she later on found to
have become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton
and the complainant have been decided against the latter and which judgment has
long become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge by the respondent

of such finality based on the documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such
vital information and did not properly appraise the complainant. Thus, respondent
violated the mandate in Canon 15 x x x."7
IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding
the above-quoted Report. The Board recommended the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for two (2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the restitution of complainant’s P8,000.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who
may wish to become their client.8 They may decline employment and refuse to accept
representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively or competently. 9 But once
they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility
to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. 10
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to
the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.11 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. 12 The Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently
handle.13 Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case,
they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any less, then they fail their
lawyer’s oath.14
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as
filing and partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case
of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated followups from her reveals his cavalier
98
attitude and appalling indifference toward his client’s cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as
a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to
her the files of the case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she
had likewise entrusted to him.
Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid,
honest opinion on the merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between
Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had
long become final and executory. But he withheld such vital information from complainant.
Instead, he demanded P8,000 as "filing and service fee" and thereby gave her hope that her
case would be acted upon.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and
best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor
understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of
success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. 15 If they find that
their client’s cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce
and submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible. 16 The failure of respondent to fulfill this
basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to "observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with his clients."17
Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of
complainant despite her repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity
and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that did not belong to him, and that he
absolutely had no right to keep or use.18
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client’s money and property that may come into their
possession.19 As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she
had given -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office -- was never applied to the
filing fee. His failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he
had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in him. 20 His
failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.21
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the
courts,22 but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the
moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. 23 Respondent clearly fell short
of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his
duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal
profession, and to the general public.24 Given the crucial importance of his role in the
administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity
and dignity of the profession.25
WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY  of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED  from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he
is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE,  within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainant’s
eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum, from
October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office
 99

of the Bar Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Republic of the Philippines
Bar of the Philippines. SUPREME COURT
Manila
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10378               June 9, 2014

JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio
(respondent), for violation of Canons 15,1 17,2 183 and Rule 18.034 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), commenced thru a complaint-affidavit 5 filed before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Jose Francisco T. Baens
(complainant).

This legal battle stemmed when the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to
represent him and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Lourdes V.
Mendiola-Baens. In his complaint-affidavit dated March 15, 2010, the complainant alleged,
among others, that the respondent: (1) despite receiving the sum of 250,000.00 to cover for the
expenses in the said case,6 failed to file the corresponding petition, and it was the complainant’s
wife who successfully instituted Civil Case No. 2463-08,7 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
December 8, 2008; (2) even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons dated
December 15, 2008,8 belatedly filed an Answer9 and was able to file it only on March 13, 2009
which was after the 15-day period stated in the Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on
the petition on the ground of improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and
are residents of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of the case and thus
failed to discover and attend all the hearings set for the case; and (5) as a result, Civil Case No.
2463-08 was decided 10 on October 27, 2009 without the complainant being able to present his
evidence.

In his Answer,11 the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and explained that: (1)
after a meeting with the complainant, he drafted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and asked the complainant to go over said draft after which he proceeded to file the
same with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City; (2) the complainant was aware that
said petition will be filed in Malabon City as the latter had signed the verification and certification
of the petition; (3) the case became pending and was later on withdrawn because of the
complainant’s refusal to testify; (4) what contributed to the delay in filing the Answer was the
fact that he still had to let the complainant go over the same and sign the verification thereof;
(5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the case because he did not receive any notice
from the trial court; and (6) it was only on December 2, 2009 when he found out that the trial
court has already rendered its decision and that the complainant had changed counsels.

In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD on October 29, 2010, only the
complainant appeared; thus, the respondent was declared as having waived his right to further
participate in the IBP proceedings. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were
required to submit their respective position papers.12
The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report and Recommendation 13 dated October 22,
2011, finding the respondent guilty of violation of the Code and recommended that the
respondent be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Specifically, the
Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent failed to diligently attend to the case and
was grossly negligent in discharging his responsibilities considering the fact that he has already
been fully compensated. The Investigating Commissioner said that the respondent should have
manifested or made known to the trial court that he was not receiving any notice at all since it
behoves upon him to make a follow-up on the developments of the cases he is handling.
As to the respondent’s argument that he indeed filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage for the complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that it cannot betaken at
face value absent the presentation of the pleading itself which by a perusal of the records of the
case was not submitted to the IBP-CBD. Moreso, the veracity of the Certification attached to the
respondent’s answer was highly questionable because it failed to state when the said petition
was filed. Lastly, the Investigating Commissioner faulted the respondent for not sufficiently
explaining to the complainant the consequences of the petition being filed in the RTC of
Malabon City since it was the respondent’s duty and responsibility to explain the complexities of
the same to his client for he is the one tasked with the technical know-how in the field of law.
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Investigating
Commissioner’s report but deemed it proper to increase the recommended period of suspension
from six (6) months to one (1) year.14 On February 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the
notice of the resolution and the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court.15
The Court finds it fitting to sustain the IBP’s findings and the recommended sanction of
suspension from the practice of law since the attendant facts of the case show substantial
evidence to support the respondent’s delinquency.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his
part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to
devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.16 Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in
which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration. 17
It is beyond dispute that the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to handle his
case. The records, however, definitively bear out that the respondent was completely remiss and
negligent in handling the complainant’s case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of
₱250,000.00 for the total expenses to be incurred in the said case.
The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or notices from the
trial court is highly intolerable. 1âwphi1 In the first place, securing a copy of such notices, orders
and case records was within the respondent’s control and is a task that a lawyer undertakes.
100
Moreso, the preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter of procedure that fully fell
within the exclusive control and responsibility of the respondent. It was incumbent upon him to
execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental to the advancement of his client’s
cause of action.
Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of the progress of his
client’s case with the trial court, and neither did he resort to available legal remedies that might
have protected his client’s interest. Although a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal
strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within
the authority of law to support his client’s interest. When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s
cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. 18
Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness, and
loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.19
In this case, the respondent’s reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his client of due
process and his actions were evidently prejudicial to his clients’ interests. A lawyer’s duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court
or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
even without prodding from the client or the court.20
Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon
18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." 21
It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the complainant’s case, he
became duty-bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to champion his
cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law, the respondent fell short of what is expected of him as an officer of the
Court.22
Thus, for the respondent’s negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s case, the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent from the practice of law is well-taken.
While the IBP Board of Governors increased the period of suspension to one year, the Court
finds the period of six months as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner
commensurate to the facts of the case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 10-2673. The Court
hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS
effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
 101

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio as a FIRST DIVISION
member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
A.C. No. 4354      April 22, 2002
country.

LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant,
SO ORDERED.
vs.
ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the
suspension from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six
(6) months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.1

By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,2 respondent now comes before this Court to challenge
the basis of the IBP's resolution, and prays for its reversal.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of
December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana
St., Mandaue City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by
a Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his brother-in-
law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita
Artezuela.3

The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her

small business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and
due to financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. 4

Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia,
Villapez and one Bernardo Sia.5 Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed,
impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant. 6 For his
services, complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as
attorney's fees and Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) as filing fee.7 However, the case was
dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her husband. 8

Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for damages
against the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001. 9

On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment
against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer
and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case
No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its

postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant's persistent
and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew
as counsel without obtaining complainant's consent. 10
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While
acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The
said document was even printed in respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was
respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the
dismissal was with her consent.11
Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his
part as the complainant's lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the
complainant was uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to
the complainant and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as
counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference,
decided to grant respondent's manifestation and advised the complainant to secure the services
of a new lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case. 12
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on
August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the
document and having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him
to prepare Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office and
asked respondent's secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated that the complainant
and Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay the amount of
₱500,000.00.13
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-Visayas
Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the
disbarment complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year.14 Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the findings
of the Committee with modification only as to the penalty.
Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent contends that the Investigating
Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses
against him. He argues that the Investigating Committee's finding that he represented Echavia is
contrary to court records and the complainant's own testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts
doubt on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render just and fair recommendations
considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are counsel-adversaries in
another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month
suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only source
of income.15
102
After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the
matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the IBP's resolution. 1âwphi1.nêt
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings, as "actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when
there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies."16 Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.17
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the
hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainant's evidence ex
parte  and to set the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective
memorandum. Hence:
"The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent
namely December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.
The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing and can no longer
tolerate any further postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for
(sic) April 22, 1996 at 2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan
Echavia, also affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had
executed the same and understood the contents thereof." 18
It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-
examine the complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial
after he has squandered his opportunity to exercise his right.
Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the
records and the complainant's own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty.
Aviola was Echavia's counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification
from the clerk of court,19 and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
"ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q:       Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the
counsel of Allan Echavia as early as August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first
time of this fact when you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the
counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that
what you mean?
A:       What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the
case before Judge Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to
admit that Atty. Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be the one to
coordinate with Allan's case.

Q:       So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of
Allan Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated by you now?
A:       Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who
was the counsel of record of Allan Echavia."20
Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-of-
record of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of
Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also
be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the
counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting
interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof
of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original
client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the
most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the
circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with
the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
Canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the
clients, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose." (emphasis supplied)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that
of his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring
lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.21 The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions
are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:
"The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice." 22
The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his client's
cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently
103
disadvantageous to his client's cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests
requires disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:
"CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his clients.
xxx
Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the
same. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of
evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or
that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. 23
A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts with the
complainant's claims. It reads:
"1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as
it pertains to the personal circumstance and residence of the answering defendant.
The rest of the allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph
Two (2) , THREE (3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and
FOURTEEN (14), of the Complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of such allegations." 24
By way of prayer, Echavia states:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered
dismissing plaintiff's complaint."25
Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating
Committee found the testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to
respondent's bare denial. As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo,
introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the latter's office, asked him to
return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent did not bother to
present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he
offered a convenient excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavia's Answer to
the Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of
the complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who
prepared the document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.

With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find
any reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law.
He does not stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education, we can not see how
she could have prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal
maneuver as complicated as the present case.
Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an
impartial decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to
grant new trial. This is the first time that respondent questions the membership of
Commissioner Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith
that Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the latter's
inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of irregularity, bias or
prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that would lead us to set it aside.
Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. 26 The suspension of the respondent's
privilege to practice law may result to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal
profession, we are constrained to balance this concern with the injury he caused to the very
same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness. 1âwphi1.nêt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
with a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
104
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 9094               August 15, 2012
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., represented by GABRIEL H.
ABAD, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This is a disbarment case against a lawyer who sued a former client in representation of a new
one.
The Facts and the Case
Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (Hocorma Foundation) filed a complaint
for disbarment against respondent Atty. Richard Funk. It alleged that Atty. Funk used to work as
corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the foundation from 1983 to
1985.1 He also served as its counsel in several criminal and civil cases.
Hocorma Foundation further alleged that on November 25, 2006 Atty. Funk filed an action for
quieting of title and damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute, Inc.
(Mabalacat Institute). Atty. Funk did so, according to the foundation, using information that he
acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and in breach of attorney-client relationship.2
In his answer, Atty. Funk averred that Don Teodoro V. Santos (Santos) organized Mabalacat
Institute in 1950 and Hocorma Foundation in 1979. Santos hired him in January 1982 to assist
Santos and the organizations he established, including the Mabalacat Institute, in its legal
problems. In 1983 the Mabalacat Institute made Atty. Funk serve as a director and legal
counsel.3
Subsequently, according to Atty. Funk, when Santos got involved in various litigations, he sold
or donated substantial portions of his real and personal properties to the Hocorma Foundation.
Santos hired Atty. Funk for this purpose. The latter emphasized that, in all these, the attorney-
client relationship was always between Santos and him. He was more of Santos' personal lawyer
than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation.4
Atty. Funk claimed that before Santos left for America in August 1983 for medical treatment, he
entered into a retainer agreement with him. They agreed that Atty. Funk would be paid for his
 105

legal services out of the properties that he donated or sold to the Hocorma Foundation. The
foundation approved that compensation agreement on December 13, 1983. But it reneged and
would not pay Atty. Funk's legal fees.5
Atty. Funk also claimed that Santos executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in his favor on
August 13, 1983. The SPA authorized him to advise Hocorma Foundation and follow up with it
Santos' sale or donation of a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat Institute, covered by
TCT 19989-R. Out of these, two hectares already comprised its school site. The remaining three
hectares were for campus expansion.
Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer from Hocorma Foundation out of
funds that Santos provided. It was Santos' intention since 1950 to give the land to Mabalacat
Institute free of rent and expenses. The SPA also authorized Atty. Funk to register the 5-hectare
land in the name of Mabalacat Institute so a new title could be issued to it, separate from the
properties of Hocorma Foundation.6 When Santos issued the SPA, Atty. Funk was Mabalacat
Institute's director and counsel. He was not yet Hocorma Foundation's counsel. 7 When Santos
executed the deeds of conveyances, Atty. Funk's clients were only Santos and Mabalacat
Institute.8
According to Atty. Funk, on August 15, 1983 Santos suggested to Hocorma Foundation's Board
of Trustees the inclusion of Atty. Funk in that board, a suggestion that the foundation
followed.9 After Santos died on September 14, 1983, Atty. Funk was elected President of
Mabalacat Institute, a position he had since held. 10
Atty. Funk claims that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation refused to pay his attorney's fees, he
severed his professional relationship with it. On November 9, 1989, four years later, he filed a
complaint against the foundation for collection of his attorney's fees. The trial court, the Court of
Appeals (CA), and the Supreme Court decided the claim in his favor. 11
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties.1âwphi1 An attorney may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the
erring lawyer's part does not make it inoperative. 15
The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client's doings, whether
documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and
confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It would simply be
impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision
or lock the same into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one.
Here, the evidence shows that Hocorma Foundation availed itself of the legal services of Atty.
Funk in connection with, among others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of the
several suits that the lawyer subsequently filed against the foundation. Indeed, Atty. Funk
collected attorney's fees from the foundation for such services. Thus, he had an obligation not
to use any knowledge he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property
under litigation existed at all, when he sued the foundation.
The Court finds it fitting ti adopt the CBD's recommendation as well as the IBP Board of
Governor's resolution respecting the case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines dated April 16, 2010 and June 26, 2011 and SUSPENDS Atty. Richard
Funk from the practice of law for one year effective immediately. Serve copies of this decision
upon the Office of the Court Administration for dissemination, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant so the latter may attach its copy to his record.

After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon SO ORDERED.
15, Rule 15.0312 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating
circumstance of a pattern of misconduct consisting of four court appearances against his former
client, the Hocorma Foundation. The CBD recommended Atty. Funk's suspension from the
practice of law for one year.13 On April 16, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the CBD's report and recommendation.14 Atty. Funk moved for reconsideration but the
IBP Board of Governors denied it on June 26, 2011.

The Issue Presented

The issue here is whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client
in violation of the CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.

The Court's Ruling

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is
undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after
terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of
another client, the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written consent.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
ADM. CASE NO. 6542 September 30, 2005
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1053)
MARIA CIELO B. SUZUKI, represented by her sister Maria Teresa B.
Gabuco, Complainant,
vs.
vs.
ATTY. ERWIN L. TIAMSON, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an Administrative Complaint 1 dated January 7, 2003 filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Maria Cielo B.
Suzuki, represented by her sister, Maria Teresa B. Gabuco, charged Atty. Erwin L.
Tiamson with fraud, dishonesty and misrepresentation and for violation of Canons 1
and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Praying for the disbarment of herein respondent, complainant alleges that on August
31, 2002, she entered into contracts of sale and real estate mortgage with several
persons, namely Arthur Tumilty, Benjamin Commandante, Jr., Mark S.
Commandante, and Mary Jane S. Commandante, wherein she bought from them a
house and lot located at No. 2002, Purple Road, Camella Homes II, Talon 2, Las
Piñas City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-83217, issued by
the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City, and subsequently mortgaged the same
property in favor of the sellers as security for the payment of the said property; the
sale and mortgage transactions were facilitated by respondent who is the counsel of
Mr. Tumilty; the sellers executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing respondent
as their attorney-in-fact and empowering him to receive payments from
complainant; respondent received in behalf of the sellers the amount of ₱500,000.00
as partial consideration for the contract of sale; respondent committed to register
the documents of sale and mortgage with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City but
asked from and was given by complainant ₱80,000.00 as the latter’s share in the
expenses for registration; with the end in view of having the subject documents
registered and the title to the property transferred in the name of complainant,
respondent retained in his possession the subject deeds of absolute sale and
mortgage as well as the owner’s copy of the title; however, respondent never
registered the said documents and did not cause the transfer of the title over the
subject property in the name of complainant; respondent is guilty of fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and estafa which are grounds for his disbarment. 2
106
In his Answer dated February 18, 2003, respondent denied the allegations of
complainant. He put up affirmative defenses contending that sometime in August
2002, he was engaged by Mr. Tumilty, his friend and neighbor, to help him in the
documentation of the sale of his house and lot to complainant; Mr. Tumilty informed
respondent that he and the complainant agreed that the payment of the purchase
price for the property shall be made through installment; respondent was also
informed that complainant, at that time, was residing in Japan and that she was
being represented by her agent, a certain Jenny Matira; when respondent
communicated with Ms. Matira to discuss the documentation of the contract, the
latter referred him to their lawyer, Atty. Lorenzo Tejada; respondent and Atty.
Tejada met and subsequently arrived at a compromise wherein it was agreed that
complainant will execute a promissory note in favor of Mr. Tumilty covering her
obligation under the contract of sale; thereafter, Mr. Tumilty will execute a deed of
sale in favor of complainant; complainant, in turn, will execute a real estate
mortgage contract in favor of Mr. Tumilty as security for the payment of her
obligation; it was further agreed that after the new TCT in the name of complainant
is released, the latter shall execute another contract of real estate mortgage
covering the same property; subsequently, the above-mentioned documents were
executed with the exception of the second real estate mortgage contract;
respondent admits having received ₱250,000.00 in cash and ₱250,000.00 in check
from the representatives of complainant but he does not admit that this is part of
the partial payment for the real property sold; instead, he contends that the said
amount was part of an internal agreement between complainant and a certain Ms.
Suzuki, who is her agent’s mother-in-law residing in Japan; respondent also admits
receipt of ₱80,000.00 as complainant’s share in the expenses for registration;
respondent contends that immediately after the sale, he submitted the sale
documents to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and paid the capital gains tax,
documentary stamp tax and other taxes which enabled him to get from the BIR a
Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR); sometime in September 2002,
representatives of complainant approached respondent asking him to give them the
new TCT covering the subject property in the name of complainant; respondent
informed them that the transfer of the property in complainant’s name is still being
processed and even if respondent secures a new TCT in the name of complainant, he
cannot give complainant the owner’s duplicate copy until and unless the purchase
price for the subject property has been fully paid and the real estate mortgage
cancelled; several days after, the same persons returned to respondent’s office and
insisted on getting the owner’s duplicate copy of the new TCT but respondent
refused for the same reasons mentioned above; nonetheless, respondent handed to
herein complainant’s representative Gabuco the documents evidencing the sale, real
estate mortgage, a special power of attorney dated August 31, 2002 as well as the
keys to the house subject of the sale; respondent was later informed by
complainant’s agent, Jenny Matira that she is now unsure if complainant will
execute a new real estate mortgage contract much less pay the remaining balance of
the purchase price; sometime in October 2002, respondent received a letter from a
certain Atty. Federico Ricafort demanding rescission of the sale with damages on the
ground that he defrauded complainant; respondent was also asked to release the
owner’s copy of the new TCT; as a consequence, respondent deferred the processing
of a new title over the subject property in the name of complainant because he has
no longer any assurance that complainant will comply with her obligation to pay the
remaining balance of the purchase price; respondent contends that he is merely
performing his duty to protect the interest of his client by refusing to register the
contract of sale with the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas. 3

Complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment contending that she was not,
in fact, represented by a lawyer during the transaction and documentation of the
subject contracts of sale and real estate mortgage; the partial payments she made in
the amount of ₱1,352,500.00 were not deducted and reflected in the deeds of sale
and mortgage; respondent does not acknowledge these payments and insists on the
payment of the original purchase price of ₱2,150,000.00.4
In an order dated February 10, 2004, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP-CBD
required the parties to submit their respective verified position papers attaching
thereto documentary evidence and duly verified affidavits of witnesses, if any, after
which the case shall be submitted for resolution. 5
Complainant and respondent submitted their Position Papers, respectively. 6 Both
parties also submitted their Reply to the opposing party’s Position Paper. 7
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 18, 2004, Commissioner Navarro
found that respondent has no intention of defrauding complainant; instead, he is
only performing his duty of protecting his client’s interest when he held in abeyance
the processing of the papers for the transfer of the title over the property in
complainant’s name. Consequently, Commissioner Navarro recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against respondent. 8
On June 26, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-
2004-260 finding the recommendation of Commissioner Navarro fully supported by
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and, considering that the
complaint lacks merit, resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Navarro. 9
On October 6, 2004, this Court issued a Resolution which noted Resolution No. XVI-
2004-260 of the Board of Governors of the IBP and considered the instant case
closed and terminated.10
On September 8, 2004, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of IBP
Resolution No. XVI-2004-260.
In its Resolution dated October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors denied
complainant’s motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Board has no more
jurisdiction to consider and resolve said motion as it has already endorsed the case
to this Court.11
On March 30, 2005, this Court issued another Resolution requiring respondent to file
his Comment on complainant’s motion for reconsideration. 12 Respondent filed his
comment on May 3, 2005.13
The issue in the present case is whether respondent is guilty of fraud,
misrepresentation and dishonesty or of any improper act or conduct which violates
his sworn duty as a lawyer in connection with his dealings with herein complainant
or with any of the latter’s representatives relative to the sale of the subject
properties.
107
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and misconduct for
two main reasons. First, despite having received the amount of ₱80,000.00 from
complainant as the latter’s share in the registration of the deed of sale of the subject
property, respondent failed to register the same; worse, he did not pay the capital
gains tax, documentary stamp tax and all other taxes or fees due thereon. Second,
respondent does not want to recognize and deduct from the original purchase price
the advance payments made by complainant amounting to more than
₱1,000,000.00.
As to the first charge, this Court notes that respondent has submitted a photocopy of
a CAR issued by the BIR to prove that he already paid the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax due on the sale of the subject property, amounting to a total
sum of ₱177,980.83; and that the BIR had already authorized the concerned
Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the said property. 14
However, despite such authority, respondent did not register the deed of sale over
the subject property. Respondent asserts that his only motive in refusing to register
the deed of sale is to protect the interest of his client. Nonetheless, this Court notes
that his client’s interest is amply protected by the real estate mortgage executed by
complainant. In fact, contrary to what respondent insists, we see no need to execute
anew a different mortgage contract after the title over the property has been
transferred in the name of complainant since the original contract of mortgage
contains provisions stating that said contract shall be annotated at the back of the
new TCT covering the subject property which shall be issued in the name of
complainant.15 The same mortgage contract also states that it shall not be affected
by the cancellation of the existing TCT in the name of Mr. Tumilty and the other co-
owners.16 We find these provisions as sufficient security to protect the interest of
respondent’s client.
Besides, respondent himself admitted that based on their agreement with
complainant, the condition for the transfer of title over the subject property in the
name of complainant is for the latter to execute a real estate mortgage and a
promissory note.17 Complainant had already complied with these conditions. 18 Hence,
it is only fair and just that respondent register the deed of sale over the subject
property and have the title to this property transferred in the name of complainant.
As to the second charge, complainant presented documents to prove her contention
that respondent’s client received certain amounts from complainant which have
been considered as partial payments for the subject properties sold. Except for the
payment made in September 5, 2003,19 all the other payments were given prior to
the execution of the deed of sale on August 31, 2002.20 Complainant contends that
all the advance payments she made should have been credited in her favor by
deducting the same from the purchase price agreed upon as appearing in the deeds
of sale and mortgage.
In his Comment to complainant’s motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVI-
2004-260 of the IBP-CBD, respondent claims that the amount of ₱500,000.00 he
received from complainant, as evidenced by Annex "D"21 of the complaint, does not
form part of the agreed purchase price for the subject properties and, therefore,
should not be deducted therefrom.22 Respondent contends that this amount

(₱500,000.00) was paid by complainant as part of an internal arrangement or
agreement between her and a certain Milet Wakatsuki who appears to be her
agent’s mother-in-law residing in Japan. 23 As to the other amounts which
complainant claims to have paid, respondent insists that he has no knowledge of
these payments as evidence shows that these sums have been given directly to his
client, Mr. Tumilty.
We are not fully convinced by respondent’s explanations.
With respect to the photocopies of receipts for a total amount of ₱724,990.00,
representative of the alleged partial payments of the purchase price for the subject
property marked as Annexes "C-1," "C-2," "C-3," "D-1" and "D-2" of the complaint,
we find that complainant failed to prove that respondent intervened or had
knowledge of these payments as to render him liable for fraud, dishonesty or
misrepresentation for his failure to deduct these payments from the deeds of sale
and mortgage over the subject property. As stated earlier, all these payments,
except that evidenced by Annex "C-1," were made prior to the execution of the
deeds of sale and mortgage over the subject property. There is no showing that
respondent had knowledge of these payments at the time of the execution of the
deeds of sale and mortgage that could have prompted him to reflect these payments
on the said deed. In addition, respondent was not the one who received these
payments. Annexes "C-1," "C-2" and "C-3" show that the payments were received by
Ms. Wakatsuki while Annexes "D-1" and "D-2" show that the sums of money were
received by respondent’s client, Mr. Tumilty. Moreover, Annexes "C-2" and "C-3" did
not specifically state if the payments were indeed given as consideration for the
subject property. Hence, respondent cannot be faulted if he refuses to consider the
amounts of money evidenced by the above-cited documents as partial payments for
the subject property.
However, as to the amount of ₱500,000.00, it is clear from the acknowledgment
receipt marked as Annex "D" of the complaint that the sum of money was given to
respondent as payment for the subject property. As stated earlier, respondent
admits having received the money from complainant but claims that the said amount
does not form part of the purchase price; instead, it was paid by complainant in
consideration of her arrangement or agreement with Ms. Wakatsuki. However,
respondent did not substantiate his allegation. He did not even explain or elaborate
his assertion. If there is indeed an arrangement, what kind of arrangement was it?
And if the arrangement is between complainant and Wakatsuki, why did respondent
receive the money? There is no showing that he is authorized by Wakatsuki to act as
her attorney. On the contrary, respondent received the money and he does not deny
that he signed the acknowledgment receipt for and in behalf of his client, Mr.
Tumilty. Hence, based on the evidence presented in the instant case, respondent’s
refusal to acknowledge complainant’s payment of ₱500,000.00 as part of the
purchase price for the subject property is simply not warranted.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his
client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyer’s performance of
his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the
same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges
lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the principle of
108
fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of
the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state – the
administration of justice.24 While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that
they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.25 Respondent failed to
live up to this expectation.
Complainant prays for the disbarment of respondent. However, it must be stressed
that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar.26 Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less
severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end
desired.27 Considering that there is no evidence to prove that respondent
misappropriated the sum of ₱500,000.00 he received from complainant as partial
payment for the subject property, as well as the ₱80,000.00 complainant gave him
as her share in the expenses for the registration of the subject deed of sale, we find
it fit to reprimand respondent for his acts of unfairly dealing with complainant.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the issues of whether or not complainant had
indeed made payments amounting to an aggregate sum of ₱1,352,500.00; if these
payments were made, whether they were intended as part of the purchase price for
the subject property; and, whether these payments should be properly deducted
from the original purchase price of ₱2,150,000.00, are matters that should be
properly resolved in a judicial proceeding separate and distinct from the present
case. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably
govern the third and vice versa.28 In this light, we refer to this Court’s ruling
in Berbano vs. Barcelona,29 citing In re Almacen,30 where it was held that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 31
Hence, our only concern in the instant case is the determination of respondent’s
administrative liability and our findings herein should not in any way be treated as
having any material bearing on any other judicial action which the parties may
choose to file against each other.
 109

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for violating Rule 19.01, Canon THIRD DIVISION

19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a WARNING that a commission of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
[A.C. NO. 5554 : June 29, 2004]

SO ORDERED.
LUIS DE GUZMAN, represented by his son Rodrigo C. de
Guzman, Complainant, v. ATTY. EMMANUEL M. BASA, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he undertakes to
give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance. Thus, his
client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently
and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (clients) cause with
reasonable dispatch.Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative liability as
a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people
in the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned.

On August 14, 2000, Luis de Guzman, represented by his son Rodrigo C. de Guzman, filed with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa for
disbarment for having committed misrepresentation and gross negligence in his duties as
counsel.

The complaint, docketed as CBD Case No. 00-756, alleges that complainant was the defendant
in Civil Case No. 535-M-90 for rescission and recovery of possession of two lots and damages
filed by Roxas Realty Corporation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XI, Malolos,
Bulacan. His counsel was Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa, herein respondent.

On September 2, 1992, the RTC issued an Order adverse to complainant.Desiring to challenge

the Order through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, he agreed to pay
respondent P15,000.00 for his legal services. Thereupon, respondent collected and received
from complainant a down payment of P5,000.00.1 However, no such petition was filed by
respondent, in violation of their agreement.

On September 20, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 535-M-90 against
complainant. He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated December
28, 1994.2 ςrνll

Complainant, through respondent, appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 49928.Respondent then filed successively three motions for extension of time
to submit the appellants brief, or a total of 135 days from March 11, 1996 until July 25, 1996.
The motions were granted, but with a warning that no further extension would be allowed. 3 ςrνll

Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals warning, respondent still failed to file the appellants brief.
Instead, he filed two more motions for extension on July 24, 1996 and August 3, 1996, or a total
of 15 days.

Expectedly, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated September 17, 1996, denied
respondents motions and ordered the appellants brief filed on August 8, 1996 expunged from
the records.4 Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration.In a Resolution dated
November 29, 1996,5 the Appellate Court denied his motion and dismissed the appeal.
Consequently, complainant, through respondent, filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 17, 1996 and November
29, 1996, docketed as G.R. No. 127190.
However, this Court, in a Resolution dated February 26, 1997, dismissed complainants petition
for his failure to submit a certification of non-forum shopping duly executed by him.
Respondent rectified the error by filing with this Court a motion for reconsideration, attaching
thereto the required certification signed by the complainant himself. Still, the motion was denied
on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in dismissing
complainants appeal.6 ςrνll
On September 19, 1997, the dismissal of complainants petition in G.R. No. 127190 became final
and executory.7 ςrνll
Complainant claims that he lost his case before the Court of Appeals and this Court, not on the
merits, but due to technicality caused by respondents dereliction of his duty as counsel. 8 In
effect, he adds, it totally dissipated his quest for justice and thereby deprived him of all the
remedies that may be availed of.9 Complainant thus prayed that respondent be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law.
In his answer to the complaint before the IBP, respondent admitted the following material
facts: (1) he received from complainant P5,000.00 as expenses to be incurred in filing the
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals; (2) he was granted by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 49928 three extensions of time to file the appellants brief, but he filed it beyond
the extended period due to his illness, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal; and (3) he signed
the certification of non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for Review filed with this Court
in G.R. No. 127190 because complainant was ill. 10 Respondent thus prayed that the complaint be
dismissed.11 ςrνll
During the scheduled hearing of the instant case before the IBP, the parties agreed to submit it
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and other documents filed.
In its Report dated March 7, 2001,12 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, found respondent negligent in the performance of his
professional duty to his client, herein complainant, and recommended
that:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1.The respondent be REPRIMANDED and warned that any similar or other complaint in the
future for breach of his professional duties will be dealt with more severely; andcralawlibrary
2.To return to the complainant, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order, the
collected amount of P5,000.00.
110
Commissioner Cimafrancas Report was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in
its Resolution No. XV-2001-259 dated October 27, 2001.13 ςrνll
The IBP then forwarded the records of CBD Case No. 00-756 to this Court.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 of the same Canon mandates that A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Also, Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the same Code requires that A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
In his lawyers sacred oath, respondent imposed upon himself the duty, among others, that he
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients, x x x.
We sustain the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent was negligent in the
performance of his professional duty towards complainant. Clearly, he violated the above
Canons14 and his lawyers oath.
Firstly, respondent admitted that he did not seasonably file with the Court of Appeals the
required appellants brief in CA-G.R. CV No. 49928 resulting in the dismissal of the complainants
appeal. Despite several extensions to file the appellants brief, respondent failed to do so.
Instead, he filed two more motions for extension. While he eventually filed the appellants brief,
however, it was late, being beyond the last extension granted by the Appellate Court. His excuse
that his illness caused such delay is flimsy and deserves no consideration. A motion for
extension of time to file an appellants brief carries with it the presumption that the applicant-
lawyer will file the same within the period granted. As aptly stated in the IBP-CBD
Report:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Respondent failed to show in his Answer and other pleadings that he exercised that degree of
competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting particularly the appeal of his client
(now complainant) which resulted in its dismissal. If respondent really believed that his physical
condition was the cause why he was not able to submit the requisite appellants brief
seasonably, resulting in its being expunged from the record, he should have excused himself
from the case. A lawyer may withdraw his services when his mental or physical condition
renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively (see Rule 22.01 (d), Canon
22, Code of Professional Responsibility). That could have spared him and complainant from the
undue strictness shown by the Honorable Court of Appeals which expunged from the record the
belated appellants brief that he filed in the case.15 ςrνll
Secondly, respondents contention that he signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 127190 because the complainant was ill lacks merit.We quote
with approval the IBP-CBDs finding on this matter, thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Furthermore, respondent failed to show that he exercised that degree of competence and
diligence required of him in prosecuting the appeal of complainant when he himself signed
 111

(instead of complainant) the certification of non-forum shopping, resulting in the dismissal of the
Petition for Review on Certiorari . He should know, as all lawyers are presumed to know, that it
should be the petitioner (not the counsel) who should sign the certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition. The explanation offered to justify such non-compliance that
complainant was too old, weak and ill to sign the said certification is too flimsy and, therefore,
untenable. If in the motion for reconsideration that he (respondent) subsequently filed, he was
able to submit a certification duly signed by complainant, there is no reason why it could not be
submitted earlier at the time that the Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed.16 ςrνll
Thirdly, despite receipt from complainant the sum of P5,000.00 for the filing of a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, respondent did not file the same. Thus, he should have
returned the amount to complainant who, incidentally, is now deceased.17 In Lothar Schulz v.
Atty. Marcelo G. Flores  ,18 we held that where a client gives money to his lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as to file an action or appeal an adverse judgment, the lawyer should, upon
failure to take such step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money to his client.
Respondents unjustified withholding of complainants money is a gross violation of the general
morality and professional ethics warranting the imposition of disciplinary action. 19 Again, as
correctly found by the IBP-CBD:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The undersigned likewise finds respondents failure to file a petition for certiorari despite having
collected the initial amount of P5,000.00 for attorneys fees reprehensible. There is no doubt
whatsoever that in the contract dated January 10, 1993 (Annex A, complaint) respondent
committed to file said petition for complainant. His explanation as to why he failed to do so is
gratuitous. It should not even be given any probative value as it would tend to violate the parol
evidence rule.
A lawyer may be disciplined for refusing to return to his client what he collected as payment for
his professional services which he never rendered (see Espere v. Santos, 96 Phil. 987). 20 ςrνll
To our mind, respondents dereliction of duty amounts to gross misconduct. Certainly, he
misused the judicial processes and abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by
complainant. We have consistently held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty subjects him to disciplinary
action.22 Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. 23 We have been
exacting in our expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence of the public.24 ςrνll
Hence, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors recommendation that respondent should
only be reprimanded. For violating Rule 12.03, Canon 12, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, as well as his lawyers oath,
he should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.25 ςrνll
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct
in violation of Canons 12 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his lawyers oath.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice and is
WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is further
ordered to RETURN, within five (5) days, also from notice, the sum of P5,000.00 directly to the
heirs of complainant and submit to this Court the proof of his compliance within three (3) days
therefrom.
A copy of this Decision shall be entered in the record of respondent as a member of the Bar.
Further, let copies of this Decision be served on the IBP as well as the Court Administrator, who
is directed to circulate these to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court may disbar or suspend a
lawyer for committing any gross misconduct specified therein,
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor . A member

of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party in a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr  .,21 we explained
the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on
the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights
of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by
a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6281               September 26, 2011
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda. 1
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890
square meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant
initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration of the
aforesaid property. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch
275. During the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured
in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay
respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand
Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as
evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent
demanded the additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of
a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus
twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for his
services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement.
Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have
agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of
his co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter
became furious and their relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition for
registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998.
On March 24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter
addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City, which transmitted the decree of
registration and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
112
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same had
already been claimed by and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000,
complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's
duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and
authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20%
share in the property equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which, respondent would
deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand, for not
having been agreed upon.
In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's
duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent
over the telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous demand and angrily told complainant to
comply, and threatened to have the OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse
claim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal
services was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not
returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite
repeated demands to effect the same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon respondent,
complainant invokes the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x
In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over to complainant the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's refusal, notwithstanding repeated
demands, to complete payment of his agreed professional fee consisting of 20% of the total
area of the property covered by the title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square meters, or
its equivalent market value at the rate of PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum of
PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter portion and that he was ready and willing to
turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should complainant pay him completely the
aforesaid professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the
amount earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the current value of the subject
lot. He alleged that the agreement was not reduced into writing, because the parties believed
each other based on their mutual trust. He denied that he demanded the payment of
PhP10,000.00 for the preparation of a memorandum, since he considered the same
unnecessary.

In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the payment of the 20%
professional fees, respondent invoked the principle of "quantum meruit" to justify the amount
being demanded by him.
In its Report and Recommendation 4 dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for unjustly withholding from complainant the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution
No. XVII-2005-173,5 dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
adopting the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the resolution of his motion
for reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for review 6 with this Court. The Court, in a
Resolution7 dated August 16, 2006, directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper
disposition, pursuant to this Court's resolution in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.8
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17, 2005, with modification
that respondent is ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within
fifteen days from receipt of notice. Hence, the present petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed with
modification the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim for his
unpaid professional fees that would legally give him the right to retain the property of his client
until he receives what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until
his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his
claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client
and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees
and disbursements.
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur:
(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers;
and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.9 Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general
lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the
documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney's possession in the course
of his employment.10
113
In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the payment of
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that
their agreement was only for the payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the
complainant and the respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee
consisting of 20% of the total area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the
parties only shows that respondent will be paid the acceptance fee and the appearance fees,
which the respondent has duly received. Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's
fees that would entitle respondent to retain his client's property. Hence, respondent could not
validly withhold the title of his client absence a clear and justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by
respondent of the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an absolute
right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client
when due or upon demand.11
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to
deliver the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged
entitlement to additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule
16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees." It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon
his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his
services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or
possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near
conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the
financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional
fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning
`as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the

absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client." 12 The principle of quantum
meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a
case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has
earned.13 In the present case, the parties had already entered into an agreement as to the
attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find
application because the respondent is already compensated by such agreement.
The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the one to secure
the owner's duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to immediately inform complainant that
the title was already in his possession. Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las
Piñas City to get the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be surprised that the said title
had already been claimed by, and released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer must
conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is
beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree
of good faith and fairness.14 By keeping secret with the client his acquisition of the title,
respondent was not fair in his dealing with his client. Respondent could have easily informed the
complainant immediately of his receipt of the owner's duplicate of the OCT on March 29, 2000,
in order to save his client the time and effort in going to the RD to get the title.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and imposing
unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary
sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors, adopting and approving with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be ordered to return
the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-
day period from notice given to respondent within which to return the title should be modified
and, instead, respondent should return the same immediately upon receipt of the Court's
decision.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant
the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the personal record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
114
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6656             May 4, 2006
[Formerly CBD-98-591]
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARMELITA S. BAUTISTA-LOZADA,* Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeks reconsideration of our December 13, 2005
resolution finding her guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals
and suspending her from the practice of law for two years.
Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complaint against her
was already barred by prescription. She also asserts that her December 7, 1990 loan agreement
with complainant complied with Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainant was fully
protected.
Respondent’s contentions have no merit.
Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides:
SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys
prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct.
However, as early as 1967, we have held that the defense of prescription does not lie in
administrative proceedings against lawyers.1 And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos,2 we
declared that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath
they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the
integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining
arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the
bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. x x x

Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the
institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a
lawyer….3 (emphasis supplied)
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints against
lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the
practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain
administrative complaints against lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and
principles laid down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the
settled ruling of this Court. It should therefore be struck down as void and of no legal effect for
being ultra vires.
Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid defense, respondent raised it only at this late
stage. We presume she was familiar with that rule yet she failed to invoke it at the earliest
opportunity. Instead she opted to insist on her innocence.
On the other ground raised by respondent, we have sufficiently discussed the implications of her
loan agreement with complainant in relation to Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in our December 13, 2005 resolution. Considering the fiduciary character of
respondent’s relationship with complainant, the nature of their agreement and complainant’s
lack of independent advice when she entered into it, there is neither sufficient ground nor
compelling reason to reconsider our earlier resolution.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby declared null and void.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
115
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10164               March 10, 2014
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a
complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the
titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a
fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it
was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty.
Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that
Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy
of the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation,
survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for
additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997
to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that
the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they
demanded the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same
provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his
professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship
between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before
the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00,
but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed,
however, that he received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was
that the case would be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he
did not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax
declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in
a case filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in
behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner
found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted
the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his
obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty.
Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written
consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the
practice of law for three (3) months only.
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty.
Guaren, except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.3
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial
payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for
the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to
serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that
a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
116
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in
which the former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the
engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he
is naturally expected to perform during his professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent)
with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services.
She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her
in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the
respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00; 1 that she had
gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told her
that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that
she had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal
separation, not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would
have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage; 2 that she subsequently
withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he
refused to do the same as he had already started working on the case;3 that she had sent him a
letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever
amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed; 4 that the respondent did
not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal services to
her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an
administrative complaint against him6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20,
2007.
In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British
fiancee sought his legal services to bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that
based on his evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal
separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and her British
fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with
the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt; 8 that for purposes
of the petition for legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of her marriage
contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as well as for her to submit
to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later on
communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly

respond to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the
money that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June
2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation
essentially requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the
action for the annulment of her marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that
he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is
noted that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand
letter the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005
(Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on
an unverified information furnished him, to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve
its rightful purpose.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory
conference on August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and her counsel attended the
conference. On his part, the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to
reiterate his answer.11 Due to his non-appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on
the same day, but required the complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days.
She did not submit the position paper in the end.
In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De
La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for
legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was
sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal
separation; that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to
receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00
being the value of the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and that,
accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's statement in
the last part of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf
of the complainant should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed "to
the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and
improper; and he opined that such offensive and improper language uttered by the respondent
against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.0113 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following:
(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000.00 which he
received for the purpose of preparing a petition for legal separation. Undersigned believes
that considering the degree of professional services he has extended, the amount of
P40,000.00 he received on March 10, 2005 would be sufficient payment for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and annulment of
marriage, respondent should be sanctioned.
117
(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues and for
using offensive or improper language in his pleading, which was filed right before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid
repetition of the said misconduct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00
which the former received as payment for his services because it is excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months for failure to show his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using
offensive and improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008,14 the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified
the recommendation of the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering respondent's failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for
showing offensive and improper words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is
hereby WARNED and Ordered to Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to
complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. 15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 16 which the IBP Board of Governors denied
through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014.17
Issues
The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the respondent should
be held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to
return the attorney's fees paid.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but
modify the recommended penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire
amount received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite
professional competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment of marriage for her. He
required her to pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and his
appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the complainant as
his client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating

Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between the respondent
and the complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship.
The respondent agreed to accept the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee
was agreed upon to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of
appearance fee, filing fee and other legal documentation.
That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for the
filing of the annulment case or legal separation?
In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as to what
action he is going to file in court. The intention of the British national and the complainant was
to get married. At that time and maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a
certain Jovencio C. Sanchez. That considering that the two are intending to get married, we can
safely assume that the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of
marriage in order to free her from the marriage bond with her husband. It is only then, granting
that the petition will be granted, that the complainant will be free to marry the British subject.
The legal separation is but a separation of husband and wife from board and bed and the
marriage bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted, one is
not free to marry another person.
A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is not well versed in
the grounds for legal separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital obligations developed
or of their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds
are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. Petition-
(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the
husband or the wife, as the case may be, within five years from the time of the occurrence of
any of the following causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside
118
the Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or
(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the complainant, is not one
of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal separation.
Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a
ground for the purpose of filing a petition for legal separation.
On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose of filing a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that " a marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal
education program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent
repetition of such kind of advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise,
he should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for
annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed
up with the basic provisions of the law.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the
complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the
grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been
basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of
action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation
should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his
services was engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage
with her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They did not contemplate
legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-marry. That
the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation,
and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment
was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify
his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He
thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the
matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services
performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the attorney is in good
faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a
reasonable compensation for such services. 19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and
the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. 20 The underlying theory is that
the retainer's agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the
arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid
agreement, his compensation is determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed. 21 In
the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum
meruit, which means "as much as he deserved."22 The determination of attorney's fees on the
basis of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able
to finish the case to its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery
of compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will
be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation based on
the obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is
reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees  - An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with
a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion
of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not only for
the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also
for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. 25cralawred
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it
was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a
consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's fees from the complainant.
He did not even begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant
because it was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the action for legal
separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the
petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or
his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he had
already received.
The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received P70,000.00 as
acceptance fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of
having already completed the first phase of the preparation of the petition for legal separation
after having held conferences with the complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP
Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of
119
the P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered some legal services to the complainant,
specifically: (a) having the complainant undergo further interviews towards establishing the
ground for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds discussed during the
interviews based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he could not
understand the written statement prepared for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c) requiring
her to submit her marriage contract with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the
certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all
surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal separation
(Annex 8) in the later part of April, 2007.
The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too
generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not
really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare
the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney
who fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his
professional engagement does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty
toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned
according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to
the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the professional engagement,
subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.
Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation
of his professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of
P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
date of this decision until full payment.
2.
Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleague
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." 26 This duty of lawyers is
further emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8
specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers
to use strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients.27 However, as
members of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their
clients' cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal
but that should not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In
maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in
his pleadings - must be dignified. 28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as
an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his
clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal Profession.
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be
treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the

urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple
misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper
language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He
explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated
as a mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse
the offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been respectful and
proper in responding to the letter.
As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a
repetition of the offense will be severely punished.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20,
2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with
the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for
misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use
of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a
repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30)
days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
date of this decision until full payment.
Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
120
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8158               February 24, 2010
ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In a verified complaint1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP Commission on Bar Discipline), Atty. Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon) sought the
disbarment of Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations of Rule 16.01, 2 Rule
18.03,3 and Rule 18.044 of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving negligence in
handling a case.
The Facts
Atty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Regional Office 8, Tacloban City. Although he is in public service, the DENR
Secretary has given him the authority to engage in the practice of law.
While on official visit to Eastern Samar in October 2005, Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty.
Solidon by a mutual acquaintance, Flordeliz Cabo-Borata ( Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked
Atty. Macalalad to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in Borongan, Eastern
Samar and owned by Atty. Solidon’s relatives. For a consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos
(₱80,000.00), Atty. Macalalad accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight (8)
months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as initial payment; the
remaining balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) was to be paid when Atty. Solidon
received the certificate of title to the property.
Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up
to the present time.
In the Complaint, Position Papers5 and documentary evidence submitted, Atty. Solidon claimed
that he tried to contact Atty. Macalalad to follow-up on the status of the case six (6) months
after he paid the initial legal fees. He did this through phone calls and text messages to their
known acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through a letter sent by courier to Atty.
Macalalad. However, he did not receive any communication from Atty. Macalalad.
In the Answer,6 Position Paper,7 and affidavits of witnesses, Atty. Macalalad posited that the
delay in the filing of the petition for the titling of the property was caused by his clients’ failure
to communicate with him. He also explained that he had no intention of reneging on his
obligation, as he had already prepared the draft of the petition. He failed to file the petition
simply because he still lacked the needed documentary evidence that his clients should have
furnished him. Lastly, Atty. Macalalad denied that Atty. Solidon tried to communicate with him.

The Findings of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 25, 2008, Investigating Commissioner Randall C.
Tabayoyong made the following finding of negligence against Atty. Macalalad:
…complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of Flordeliz Cabo-Borata, the mutual
acquaintance of both complainant and respondent. In the said affidavit, Mrs. Cabo-Borata
described how she repeatedly followed-up the matter with respondent and how respondent
turned a deaf ear towards the same. There is nothing on record which would prompt this Office
to view the allegations therein with caution. In fact, considering that the allegations corroborate
the undisputed facts of the instant case...
As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of the
application despite the lapse of about a year from the time his services were engaged, it is plain
that his negligence in filing the application remains uncontroverted. And such negligence is
contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. In fact,
Rule 18.03 even provides that his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Acting on this recommendation, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008, holding that:
RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution … and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent’s violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Ramil E.
Macalalad is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered to
Return the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) with 12% interest per annum to
complainant …
The case is now before this Court for our final action pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, considering that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline imposed the penalty
of suspension on Atty. Macalalad.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the IBP’s factual findings and legal conclusions.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge.8 We fully considered the evidence
presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainant’s evidence, as outlined above, fully
satisfies the required quantum of proof in proving Atty. Macalalad’s negligence.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on
negligence and states:
121
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to
perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.
Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,9 we held that a lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to
protect his client’s interest after receiving his acceptance fee. In In Re: Atty. Briones, 10 we ruled
that the failure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period (to the
prejudice of his client who languished in jail for more than a year) is an offense that warrants
disciplinary action. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, we penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the
client of the status of the case, among other matters. 11
Subsequently, in Reyes v. Vitan,12 we reiterated that the act of receiving money as acceptance
fee for legal services in handling the complainant’s case and, subsequently, in failing to render
the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We made
the same conclusion in Canoy v. Ortiz13 where we emphatically stated that the lawyer’s failure to
file the position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for
his negligence in handling a case. In Canoy, we accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot
shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyer’s duty
to inform his client of the status of the case. 14 Our rulings in Macarilay v. Seriña,15 in Heirs
of  Ballesteros v. Apiag,16 and in Villaflores v. Limos17 were of the same tenor. In Villaflores, we
opined that even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main
responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the
required information. We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the latter has more
control in handling the case.
All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyer’s duty to his client once an
engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the
responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence.18 The lawyer bears the
duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect,
within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client.19 Accordingly, competence, not
only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases
appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. 201avvphi1
The records in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he committed when he failed
to file the required petition. He cannot now shift the blame to his clients since it was his duty as
a lawyer to communicate with them. At any rate, we reject Atty. Macalalad’s defense that it was
his clients who failed to contact him. Although no previous communication transpired between
Atty. Macalalad and his clients, the records nevertheless show that Atty. Solidon, who contracted
Atty. Macalalad’s services in behalf of his relatives, tried his best to reach him prior to the filing
of the present disbarment case. Atty. Solidon even enlisted the aid of Ms. Cabo-Borata to follow-
up on the status of the registration application with Atty. Macalalad.
As narrated by Ms. Cabo-Borata in her affidavit, 21 she succeeded several times in getting in
touch with Atty. Macalalad and on those occasions asked him about the progress of the case. To
use Ms. Cabo-Borata’s own words, she received "no clear-cut answers from him"; he just
 122

informed her that everything was "on process." We give credence to these narrations
considering Atty. Macalalad’s failure to contradict them or deny their veracity, in marked
contrast with his vigorous denial of Atty. Solidon’s allegations.

We consider, too, that other motivating factors – specifically, the monetary consideration and
the fixed period of performance – should have made it more imperative for Atty. Macalalad to
promptly take action and initiate communication with his clients. He had been given initial
payment and should have at least undertaken initial delivery of his part of the engagement.

We further find that Atty. Macalalad’s conduct refutes his claim of willingness to perform his
obligations. If Atty. Macalalad truly wanted to file the petition, he could have acquired the
necessary information from Atty. Solidon to enable him to file the petition even pending the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline investigation. As matters now stand, he did not take any action to
initiate communication. These omissions unequivocally point to Atty. Macalalad’s lack of due
care that now warrants disciplinary action.

In addition to the above finding of negligence, we also find Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all
the money received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not immediately account
for and promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render
any legal service within the contracted time of the engagement. 22

The Penalty

Based on these considerations, we modify the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommended
penalty by increasing the period of Atty. Macalalad’s suspension from the practice of law from
three (3) months, to six (6) months.23 In this regard, we follow the Court’s lead in Pariñas v.
Paguinto24 where we imposed on the respondent lawyer suspension of six (6) months from the
practice of law for violations of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION Resolution

No. XVIII-2008-336 dated July 17, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline. We impose on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.03 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, effective upon finality of this Decision. Atty. Macalalad is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Macalalad is also ORDERED to RETURN to Atty. Elmer C. Solidon the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of
promulgation of this Decision until the full amount is returned.
EN BANC
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty.
Macalalad’s record as a member of the Bar. A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507), February 23, 2016

SO ORDERED. ANGELITO RAMISCAL AND MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR S.

ORRO, Respondent.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client requires him to conscientiously act in
advancing and safeguarding the latter's interest. His failure or neglect to do so constitutes a
serious breach of his Lawyer's Oath and the canons of professional ethics, and renders him
liable for gross misconduct that may warrant his suspension from the practice of law.
Antecedents
Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the legal
services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants
seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in the Province of
Isabela.1 Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the
trial of the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor. As expected, the
plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants' brief.
Upon receipt of the appellants' brief, the respondent requested from the complainants an
additional amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their appellees' brief in
the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested.2
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the Ramiscals
of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their neighbors. They
endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially in vain. When
they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a
motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would already be
belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later discovered
that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality,
eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth
of P3,391,600.00.3
Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent. The
Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate
evaluation, report and recommendation.4
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the respondent did not appear during the scheduled
mandatory conferences set by the IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence.
IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings to the effect that the respondent had
violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice law for one year.5
On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-
829,6 whereby it adopted the report of IBP Commissioner Almeyda but modified his
recommendation of the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to two years, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED with modification  the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A, " and
123
for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility aggravated by his disregard
of the notices from the Commission and considering the extent of the damage suffered by
Complainant, Atty. Edgar S. Orro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years.
Ruling of the Court
We agree with the IBP's findings that the respondent did not competently and diligently
discharge his duties as the lawyer of the Ramiscals.
Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer's Oath,
by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he contravenes
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18, viz.:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes
imbued with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship
commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to
attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. 7 To accord with this highly
fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause
and to be diligent in handling the former's legal affairs. 8 As an essential part of their highly
fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on
the developments of the case.9 The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.10
As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of
his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up
their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein.
Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he
reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration
in their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He
further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse
result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against
their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling
them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in
that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions

manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.
We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession
of the Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the
members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the
IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his misconduct revealed his
irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He thereby exposed a
character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. 11 He should always
bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the
highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. 12 He should
never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with
it the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in general. 13
There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension
or disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved in his official
oath and is found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the
members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties.14 Based on all the
circumstances in this case, we approve the recommendation of the IBP for the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. Although the Court imposed a six-
month suspension from the practice of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility,15 the recommended penalty is condign and proportionate to the
offense charged and established because his display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of
the IBP aggravated his misconduct.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S.
ORRO guilty of violating Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS
EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all
courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No.7054               November 11, 2014
124
CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency 1 filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine
Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of
law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions
and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before
the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members
of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the
practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally
recommendedpenalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate
action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and
from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a
continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense
of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of
justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of
the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that
he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of
incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of
the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated
December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board
of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon
8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent
should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion 3 praying
that his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court
En Bancresolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained
that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he
committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also
attempted to pass the blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager
of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that one of the
charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s
compassion and mercy.6 He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has learned his
lesson; but at the same time, questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He
appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE
compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a
Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc
once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that
for more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been
involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter
Parish and Shrine, CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular
monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has participated
as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to
no longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was also denied
on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing
repentance and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed
that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for
its proper observance and implementation. He also stated that for almost three years of being
disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and
immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal proficiency,
morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance
with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
125
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his
previousrequests for reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011,
July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with
finality.16 On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has
already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had been
diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly.
He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of law, he
devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and
a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to
be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind.
Heexpressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a
member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical
Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification 19 from St. Peter
Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. 20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in
moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those
who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the
Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred
attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure
that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice. 22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant
shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the
Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had
demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and church activities by
joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to
the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free

legal assistance to his townmates who were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the
respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance
to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through
the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and
President from 1982 to 1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and
claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision.
According to him, he has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to
reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity
of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated
his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that significantly contributed to his
character reformation.He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has
been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus;
and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs in his parish
as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage
Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown
by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved
moral reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to
reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas
disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The
Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long
repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a significant contribution
by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the religious
organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind."
Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he
was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and
considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that
he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred
lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of
malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in
court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court
considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an
126
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous
civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after
his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and
acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is
sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found
guilty of gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v.
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr., 29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing
willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of
law – mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2)
years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review
by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already
reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature
and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to
consider the respondent’s reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his
guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-
denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also
failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus
entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical
condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law,
the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement
was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our
decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 127

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
November 23, 20091 and the February 11, 20102 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Manila (RTC), in Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled "Loreta A. Chong v. Sps. Pedro and Rosita de
Guzman," denying the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by the petitioner.

The Facts

Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman)
engaged the legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in
the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract and
recovery of possession with damages involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1292, with an area of 266 square meters, more or less.
Petitioner’s legal services commenced from the RTC and ended up in this Court.3 Spouses de
Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the case was pending
before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they were
substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de
Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman (respondents).4

On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees 5 before the RTC.
He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de
Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed
against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully
represented them, respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted
attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent
of the value of the subject land on the basis of quantum meruit.

On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying petitioner’s motion on the
ground that it was filed out of time. The RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the
judgment rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by this Court, had long become final and
executory on October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote that considering that the motion was filed too
late, it had already lost jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be amended
or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a variance of the judgment
rendered if his claim for attorney’s fees would still be included.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
THIRD DIVISION
The Issues
G.R. No. 191247               July 10, 2013
This petition is anchored on the following grounds:
FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner,
vs. I
LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, and
ROSELLA DE GUZMANBAUTISTA, Respondents. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DETERMINE ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE GROUND THAT IT LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE
DECISION CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;

II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES WOULD RESULT IN A VARIANCE OF THE JUDGMENT THAT HAS LONG
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION DID
NOT BAR PETITIONER FROM FILING THE MOTION TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY’S FEES. 6
Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal services and orally agreed to pay
him 25% of the market value of the subject land. He argues that a motion to recover attorney’s
fees can be filed and entertained by the court before and after the judgment becomes final.
Moreover, his oral contract with the deceased spouses can be considered a quasi-contract upon
which an action can be commenced within six (6) years, pursuant to Article 1145 of the Civil
Code. Because his motion was filed on September 8, 2009, he insists that it was not yet barred
by prescription.7
For their part, respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no
longer be granted. In addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue when it awarded the
amount of ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Respondents further assert that the law, specifically
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorney’s fees under a written agreement.
The alleged understanding between their deceased parents and petitioner, however, was never
put in writing. They also aver that they did not have any knowledge or information about the
existence of an oral contract, contrary to petitioner’s claims. At any rate, the respondents
believe that the amount of 25% of the market value of the lot is excessive and unconscionable. 8
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the denial of his motion to determine attorney’s fees by
the RTC. Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong remedy. Instead of a petition for review
under Rule 45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because this case
involves an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to
this Court unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.9 In this
case, petitioner should have first elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which has
concurrent jurisdiction, together with this Court, over special civil actions for certiorari. 10 Even
so, this principle is not absolute and admits of certain exceptions, such as in this case, when it is
demanded by the broader interest of justice.11
Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed a petition to prosper despite the utilization
of an improper remedy with the reasoning that the inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the
rules of procedure must give way to serve the higher ends of justice. The strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the
128
merits.12 Thus, this Court deems it expedient to consider this petition as having been filed under
Rule 65.
With respect to the merits of the case, the Court finds in favor of petitioner.
In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of
attorney’s fees – ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary
concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as
indemnity for damages.13 Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ from
each other, as further explained below:
The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly
speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s
professional services. However, the two concepts have many things in common that a treatment
of the subject is necessary. The award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of
attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending,
through counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in
any of the instances authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays
his counsel refers to the compensation for the latter’s services. The losing party against whom
damages by way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not bound by, nor is his liability
dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The amount
stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by the court in fixing
the amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.
The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part
of his judgment recoveries against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may, however,
agree that whatever attorney’s fee as an element of damages the court may award shall pertain
to the lawyer as his compensation or as part thereof. In such a case, the court upon proper
motion may require the losing party to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the prevailing
party.
The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a
prerequisite to their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a
lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never
rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in favor
of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both
fees are subject to judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination
of their reasonable amount are applicable in one as in the other. 14 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the
compensation for professional services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. He is
demanding payment from respondents for having successfully handled the civil case filed by
Chong against Spouses de Guzman. The award of attorney’s fees by the RTC in the amount of
₱10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and this
Court, is of no moment. The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for
damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to be paid
directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to petitioner. Thus, to
grant petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result in a double award of
 129

attorney’s fees. And, contrary to the RTC ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in the complaint that petitioners refused to
executory decision or variance in judgment. sign the contract for legal services in October 1978, and his filing of the complaint only on
November 23, 1987 or more than nine years after his cause of action arising from the breach of
the oral contract between him and petitioners point to the conclusion that the six-year
The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorney’s fees for
prescriptive period within which to file an action based on such oral contract under Article 1145
professional services be recovered? (2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for professional
of the Civil Code had already lapsed.
services be filed? The case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC 15 is
instructive:
As a lawyer, private respondent should have known that he only had six years from the time
petitioners refused to sign the contract for legal services and to acknowledge that they had
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR
engaged his services for the settlement of their parents’ estate within which to file his complaint
Certified Case No. 0466, private respondent’s present claim for attorney’s fees may be filed
for collection of legal fees for the services which he rendered in their favor. [Emphases supplied]
before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision had been
reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted
either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate At this juncture, having established that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and that he filed
action. his claim well within the prescribed period, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the RTC
for the determination of the correct amount of attorney’s fees. Such a procedural route,
however, would only contribute to the delay of the final disposition of the controversy as any
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the
ruling by the trial court on the matter would still be open for questioning before the CA and this
main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot
Court. In the interest of justice, this Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and simply
be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is
resolve the matter at this level. The Court has previously exercised its discretion in the same
at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has
way in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay: 18
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in
the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered, taking into account the
abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has
facts determinative thereof. Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the attorney’s fees on
become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of
quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. However, it will be just and
course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is
equitable to now assess and fix the attorney’s fees of both attorneys in order that the resolution
satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
of "a comparatively simple controversy," as Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank
Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, would not be needlessly prolonged, by taking into due
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the
claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made records.19 [Emphasis supplied]
his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing
it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in
With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s
the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of
considered view that he is deserving of it and that the amount should be based on quantum
his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
meruit.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]

Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining
In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is
an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of
permitted by the rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned
attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client
motion to determine attorney’s fees was seasonably filed.
from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also
avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is
The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision became final and executory on October entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into
31, 2007.1âwphi1 There is no dispute that petitioner filed his Motion to Determine Attorney’s account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.20
Fees on September 8, 2009, which was only about one (1) year and eleven (11) months from
the finality of the RTC decision. Because petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the
attorney’s fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the Civil Code 16 allows him a period of
proper amount of attorney fees, to wit:
six (6) years within which to file an action to recover professional fees for services rendered.
Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused
petitioner’s legal representation. For this reason, petitioner’s cause of action began to run only Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorney’s fees, as similarly held in the
case of Anido v. Negado:17
 130

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a
lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just
fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not
only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his
client he himself would not get his due.22
The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's
fees based on the value of the property subject of litigation because petitioner failed to clearly
substantiate the details of his oral agreement with Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable
amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the property.

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to Determine
Attorney's Fees filed by petitioner Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based on quantum meruit, the
amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15% of the market value of the parcel of land,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for respondents’ deceased parents in the civil
case for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages. He successfully
represented Spouses de Guzman from the trial court level in 1990 up to this Court in 2007, for a
lengthy period of 17 years. After their tragic death in 2003, petitioner filed a notice of death and
a motion for substitution of parties with entry of appearance and motion to resolve the case
before this Court.21 As a consequence of his efforts, the respondents were substituted in the
place of their parents and were benefited by the favorable outcome of the case. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman
and respondents for almost seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was not an easy
task for petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for such a long period of time, considering the EN BANC
heavy and demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the research and preparation
of pleadings, the gathering of documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various legal A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
work necessary to the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner
devoted much time and energy in handling the case for respondents. Given the considerable
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the quality of work shown by
vs.
him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be
Leyte, respondent.
paid his professional fee based on quantum meruit.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as
a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much MAKASIAR, J:
entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge
Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate
Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint
for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against
Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the
deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and
defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among
other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the
deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were
defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of
Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were
the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c)
the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the
latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by
the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be
made, those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts,
and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of
the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the
share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in
Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Court, upon a preponderance of evidence, finds and so
holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the
plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate
child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of
Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras;
(4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as
belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and
Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that
1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the
deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the
131
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal
and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the
exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474,
4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the
remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-
half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as
belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7)
Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner of
one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-
half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2)
of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the
division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene
Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a
hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to
Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining
portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that
the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or
each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983,
New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal
shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G.
[3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty
days after this judgment shall have become final to
submit to this court, for approval a project of partition
of the hereditary estate in the proportion above
indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by
agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them
taking into consideration the location, kind, quality,
nature and value of the properties involved; (10)
Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in
the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and
two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1)
Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of
Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on
October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion
which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of
partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it

in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels,
presented to this Court for approval the following
project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the
above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court
respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall
belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49
square meters along the eastern part of the lot shall be
awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to
Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55
square meters along the western part of the lot shall
likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally
among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No.
3416 after taking the portions awarded under item (2)
and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided,
however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416
shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project
of Partition indicated above which is made in
accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be
approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant
Tacloban City
132
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff
Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the
parties to have signed this Project of Partition,
nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the
respective parties to this Court that the Project of
Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a
conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the
defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and
that both lawyers had represented to the Court that
they are given full authority to sign by themselves the
Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the
above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance
with law, hereby approves the same. The parties,
therefore, are directed to execute such papers,
documents or instrument sufficient in form and
substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and
participations which were adjudicated to the respective
parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the
delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to
each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to
perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to
effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11,
1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title
to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition
(see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or
rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which
according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs
Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal
shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court
the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge
Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area
of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon
(Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register
of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot
1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his
wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared
by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their
respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the
stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia
Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife,
Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation
of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall
henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August
6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated
Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No.
1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2]
that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3,
paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by
associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder
and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that
respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by
closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised
himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls
of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable
defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed
on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred
this case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report
and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated
May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in
connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of
action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to
engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that
respondent Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.),
complainant herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled
"Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was
133
docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made
pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge
approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with
damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one,
the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in
interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a
portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to
the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant
Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at
the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her
and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants
Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios
Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who
was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice
and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234,
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the
Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C-
3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant
Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P400,000.00] for moral damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00]
for nominal damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for
Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE
HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and
the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the
heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela
R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto
O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO
RAMO —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of
the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of
Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under
her first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491,
paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which
was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration
134
of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution
before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property
which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that
"... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency  of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88
SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965  a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963  was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the
lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March
6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963  and the amended order dated November
11, 1963  approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8,
1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July
31, 1964  Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz
R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot
1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and
the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated,
Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by
the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to
respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The
subsequent sale on August 31, 1966  by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their
respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took
aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968  an action
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the
project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate
and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E
from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8,
1963  in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and
November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter,
change or affect the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court

of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid
decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over
one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders
approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme
to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration
for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the
Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or
not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the
subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent
was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the
Order of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the
transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E,
and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr.
Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and
his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the
record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of
respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon
appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere,
and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith
and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention
of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the
project of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the
findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the
signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the
project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error
was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as
according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the
counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to
submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20,
1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not
presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
135
corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one
that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs.
Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the
project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I
refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the
Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a
"1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated November
11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and
registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by
Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector
Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154.
In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of
said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her
share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed
of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in
the project of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by
respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on
November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs.
Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr.
Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the
project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her
one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and
not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd
because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of
Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half
of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in
other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of
Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant
became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of
the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154
on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen
aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as per
Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola
admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in
connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November
28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept
ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of
partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her
the properties adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least
valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive
evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and
distribution of the real properties when she could have easily done so by
presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market
value of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the
record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the
properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his
court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should
be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet
on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that
was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of
which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an
exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust
of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his
administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the
transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and
distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his
court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the
litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a
corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that
his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The
conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in
his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the
integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge
violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself
with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking
officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or
by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or
financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits
of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of
public prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to
mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those
136
who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or
prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in
commerce in a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the
nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain
public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization
and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with
the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled
that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law
including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the
conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence,
political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de
Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and
took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs  (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to
another, either following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are
political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion,
Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the,
laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or
affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int.
Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior
sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the
new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare
by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress
in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L.

Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of
Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never
been held that the relations of the inhabitants with
each other undergo any change. Their relations with
their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations
are created between them and the government which
has acquired their territory. The same act which
transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those
who remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although
that which regulates the intercourse and general
conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by
the newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto  (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations
of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of
the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no
showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official  capacity in the business or
transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the
business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where
respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As
137
was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which
has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in
any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a
public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to
intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts
or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs.
Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code,
p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue
advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or
that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It
is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No.
4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.,"  wherein the
complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be
noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided
on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer
connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in
both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly
prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of
said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice
of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in
commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the
purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they
perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to
him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders
approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil
Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department,
the same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by
the Constitution or law  on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by
a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or
employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission
from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil
Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the
members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly
in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of
Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is
covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948
and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the
President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme
Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary
(now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid
section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can
discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ...
violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the
interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote
him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not
exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for
disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject
to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the
Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised
Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is
the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the
1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1,
Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as
a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to
them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section
67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious
misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil
Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty
days, after submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and employees
in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon
their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines
and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no
question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as
a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have
138
already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that
only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA
710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not
violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly
unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises
which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his
accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously
made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them
without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably
possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his
impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn
on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third
parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case
filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual
withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by
respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of
the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore
deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation
and before it became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was
guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was
culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the
recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the
aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report
which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that
respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan
who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see
Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan
does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the
Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
 139

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an

"impostor" and claims that all the time he believed that the latter was
a bona fide  member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this
assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador
Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent
of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law"
(Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent
and any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face
value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is
guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting
his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1),
that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon
of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and
family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons
were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein
respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan
or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations
with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges
of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as

much as possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising
attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or
business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does
have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for
disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be
clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends
(pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his
court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as
judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his
private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only
be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
Republic of the Philippines
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY SUPREME COURT
REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES. Manila

SO ORDERED. EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
 140

RESOLUTION the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against

complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936;

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to

complainant who was his client;
PER CURIAM:

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A.
complaints without legal basis before the Court of First
Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath.
Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a
motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by
making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted 8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance
respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, and the Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts
complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent in his pleadings;
committed the following acts:
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, does not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the
namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha truth either."
Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados]
to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the
1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on
property in litigation.
December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No.

In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the
defendants and, without said case being terminated,
Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to
acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case
"PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to
No. Q-15490;
"11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of

the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the
litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was
still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to
enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for
the development into a residential subdivision of the
land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by
TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the
Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said
property was already sold at a public auction on June
30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte
and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that
the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the
Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that
the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement
of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their
respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent
filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated
January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that
respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:

a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the

5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon
pendency of the case where the properties were involved;
City falsified documents purporting to be true copies of
"Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated
August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document
to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with

b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their
land development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior
to the execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document
where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox
copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and
Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally,
on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP,
containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is
respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the
case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint
against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of
Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present
Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases
pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for
investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases
where the investigation has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's
claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578,
October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-
B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP
by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the
investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its
final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating
official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule
139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been
substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General
was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his
motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986,
141
the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record,
p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by
the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has
lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral
of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The
record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than
eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the
complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the
acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant
the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half
(1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650
sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his
legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the
abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing
the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent
violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest
involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New
Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest
in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states
that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which
he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He
therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art.
1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the
new Code of Professional Responsibility.

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules
of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system.
The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which
the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as
with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has
failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding
the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the
abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the
prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation
constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against
him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded,
is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the
properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land
development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill,
New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by
these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights
and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the
improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28;
Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to
respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land
development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the
time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-
1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed
on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
142
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon
the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that
since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the
land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover,
the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves
as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the
complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land
development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of
ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous
conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt
respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land
which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement,
respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so
that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly
undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his
private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v.
Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document
filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the
addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T.
Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista—were made to
appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters
(SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and
complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties,
Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith
and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on
May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it back
to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover,
respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign,
but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973
[Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23,
1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he
knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith
Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty
as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek
to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was
committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report
 143

and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement
between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you
[respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including
court fees.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that
there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned
cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above
discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.

[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may
not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04,
Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses
of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent
and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation
expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp.
324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the
attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain
to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F.
242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the
law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in
the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to
the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892,
July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering
the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the
case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious
misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be
circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.

The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel
for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados
against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the
record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by
respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and
consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly
states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr.
[Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions
to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent
to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].

Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of
First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.

The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case SECOND DIVISION
No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the
complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the G.R. No. 155224 August 23, 2006
City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and
Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for
holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,
complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the vs.
Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUEL
to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was MARIANO, Respondents.
left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for review is the April 30, 2002 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 which modified the order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D. Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against
petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568.
Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and
Emmanuel Mariano.
During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her
visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was
accepted by petitioner and both parties subsequently filed a motion for approval of their
agreement. This was approved by the trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage between
petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated. 3 They, including
their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioner’s
dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting
to P16.5 million4 which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them
several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full payment for settlement."6
Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court7 a motion
for payment of lawyers’ fees for P50 million.8
On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million
to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de
Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.
The issues raised in this petition are:
(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees
and
(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.
144
First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of
the main action in which his services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client.
The former is preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.9
The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed,
had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents sought to
collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties awarded to
petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was additional payment for
legal services rendered in the same case.
Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by the
principle of quantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves."10 The recovery of
attorney’s fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where there is no express agreement
for the payment of attorney’s fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents an
unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without
paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed
only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.11
In the case at bar, respondents’ motion for payment of their lawyers’ fees was not meant to
collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them was an
act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable profession,
the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents’ despicable behavior which gives
lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The vernacular has a word for
it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade.
Compensation should be but a mere incident.12
Respondents’ claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a
fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in
cash, checks, free products and services from petitioner’s business — all of which were not
denied by respondents — more than sufficed for the work they did. The "full payment for
settlement"13 should have discharged petitioner’s obligation to them.
The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys’ fees cannot be denied.
Lawyers are officers of the Court and they participate in the fundamental function of
administering justice.14 When they took their oath, they submitted themselves to the authority of
the Court and subjected their professional fees to judicial control. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in CA–G.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of
additional attorney’s fees in favor of respondents is hereby DELETED.
 145

SO ORDERED. BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD, respondents.

Delgado, Dizon and Flores for petitioner.

Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim
Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese
occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.

On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant;
and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as
counsel for the plaintiff. On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including
Jacob Assad as party defendant.

On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the
defendant in substitution for Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the
case.

On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to
discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him
about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney
Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion,
Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the
court, wherein the case was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.

Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, is in full as
follows:

VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila

July 13, 1945.

Republic of the Philippines Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado

SUPREME COURT Manila, Philippines
Manila
My dear Mrs. Hilado:
EN BANC
From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the
G.R. No. L-961            September 21, 1949 Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," I

find that the basic facts which brought about the controversy between you and the
defendant therein are as follows:
(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the complaint, as
the same was purchased and/or built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is
to say, the houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;
(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr.
Serafin P. Hilado; and
(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the aforesaid
date of May 3, 1943.
Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will
not ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the
legal right to dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his
name. Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943,
does not quite strike me as so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the
sale. I believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was
made during the Japanese occupation, nor on the simple allegation that the real
purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On his last point, furthermore, I expect
that you will have great difficulty in proving that the real purchaser was other than Mr.
Assad, considering that death has already sealed your husband's lips and he cannot
now testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I cannot appear in the
proceedings in your behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith
returned.
Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about May,
1945, a real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman
who had been deserted by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a pending
suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the
deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this
woman asked him if he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he
told the woman that the sales of real property during the Japanese regime were valid even
though it was paid for in Japanese military notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor
he would have no objection to defending the Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted against
a certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that
146
according to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to
take it away from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not
hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker;
that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her action was not that the money paid her husband
was Japanese military notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive property; that
she requested him to read the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit;
that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered
yes, in the name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in
her husband's favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was informed by
Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that
when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he attended to her
and requested her to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and she did; that he told
Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the
papers, calling Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter
which had been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado;
that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought
it more proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he
forthwith signed the letter without reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his
possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado since their last meeting until she talked to him at the
Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating that his
American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that
he accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court of
Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than that
already alleged in plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco,
and concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the
point of creating the relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That Attorney
Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of
her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office;
that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services. Granting the facts to be no more than these, we agree with petitioner's
counsel that the relation of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado
ensued. The following rules accord with the ethics of the legal profession and meet with our
approval:
In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not
merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give
advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to

prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like.
(Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which
the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of
any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded
as established. . . . (5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer
or counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's
pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open court. (Denver Tramway Co. vs.
Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract
may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the
attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance
of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his
client in pursuance of a request by the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros.
and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127
imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court
prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy
whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the
injunctions above quoted. (In re  De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition derives
validity from sources higher than written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in In re  Merron,
22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so received is sacred to the employment to
which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the
interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of,
and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that,
this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary
the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and
private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that
the mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by
him from his first client.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client
from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even
147
though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature
was revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30
Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the
litigation, the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired
from his former during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to
represent the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client,
it is unnecessary that the ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's
affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on
the attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51
Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly that it has been held an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general
matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge
which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S,
181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry
of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters
that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive
of other un salutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition
precedent; i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the
knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance
the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what
they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in
conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney,
lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceedings, if an investigation be held, the court should
accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him. "Now the abstinence
from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice." (John H. Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client
as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n,
183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as
to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
 148

encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves scant
administration of justice. attention. The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the
public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of the justice. The
summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his taking up
money collected by them but embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts
the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm;
may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts from the
this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the
general principles of equity and policy, will always look into the dealings between attorneys and
honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct
clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which
as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly in
they may stand unequal. The courts acts on the same principles whether the undertaking is to
expedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member,
appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S., 1005.)
"into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice."
This summary remedy against attorneys flows from the facts that they are officers of the court
where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice
There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the courts and to its orders and directions
realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients. (Charest vs. Bishop, 137
given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorney stand on the same footing as
contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney sheriffs and other court officers in respect of matters just mentioned.
resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for
consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so ordered,
given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act
without costs.
for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one
party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and
the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ.,  concur.
made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the
obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to
perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)

The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did not
take the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was
written under the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its
contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from
which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds
and estop him in the same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An
information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule;
for such member or assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm,
but his information, by the nature of his connection with the firm is available to his associates or
employers. The rule is all the more to be adhered to where, as in the present instance, the
opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials intended to convey
the impression that it was dictated by him personally. No progress could be hoped for in "the
public policy that the client in consulting his legal adviser ought to be free from apprehension of
disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition were not extended to the attorney's partners,
employers or assistants.

The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date Attorney
Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for
his disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an attorney was allowed even Republic of the Philippines
on appeal as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which throughout the SUPREME COURT
conduct of the cause in the court below the attorney had been suffered so to act without Manila
objection, the court said: "We are all of the one mind, that the right of the appellee to make his
objection has not lapsed by reason of failure to make it sooner; that professional confidence SECOND DIVISION
once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment." (Nickels vs.
Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A. L. R. 1316.)

A.C. No. 5239               November 18, 2013
SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER and AURORA R. WARRINER, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the administrative Complaint 1 filed on March 14, 2000 by complainant-spouses
George Arthur Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R. Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M.
Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, complainants
alleged that they secured the services of respondent in the filing of a Complaint for damages
captioned as Aurora M Del Rio-Warriner and her spouse-husband George Arthur Warriner,
plaintiffs, versus E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and docketed as Civil Case No. 23,396-95
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16; that during the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 23,396-95, respondent requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to
submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested
period, respondent did not submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent
did not file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. s motion to declare complainants
to have waived their right to file Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent
belatedly filed a Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that respondent
did not oppose or file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.’s move to dismiss the
Complaint; and that the RTC eventually dismissed Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of
herein complainants. In a Resolution2 dated June 26, 2000, we directed respondent to file his
Comment to this administrative Complaint. Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24,
2000,3 respondent requested for an extension of 30 days which was granted. 4
However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years, respondent had not yet
filed his Comment. Thus, we resolved to require respondent to "show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution
requiring said comment, both within ten (10) days from notice." 5 Respondent received our
directive but chose to ignore the same.6 In another Resolution7 dated August 4, 2003, we
imposed a fine of ₱1,000.00 on respondent and reiterated our directives requiring him to file his
Comment and to submit an explanation on his failure to file the same. However, respondent
again ignored this Court’s directive. Thus, on February 15, 2006, we increased the fine to
₱2,000.00 but respondent continued to ignore our Resolutions.8 Consequently, on March 10,
2008, we resolved to order respondent’s arrest and detention until he complies with our
Resolutions.9
This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his Compliance 10 and
Comment.11 Respondent claimed that he failed to file his Comment to the instant administrative
case because he lost the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 and that he tried to get a copy
from the RTC to no avail.
149
In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period, respondent averred that
complainant Warriner is an Australian national who married his Filipino spouse as a convenient
scheme to stay in the country; that he rendered his services in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of
charge; that he accepted the case because he was challenged by Warriner’s criticism of the
Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of Warriner’s claim that the construction
being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil
towards his property; that Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of
other witnesses to testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion of the veracity of Warriner’s
claim; that upon inquiries, he discovered that the bits of evidence presented by Warriner were
fabricated; that the barangay officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme of
Warriner; that he visited Warriner’s property and saw that Warriner authored the damage to his
property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd.; that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with
a disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to submit his Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence; that complainants no longer saw him or inquired about the
status of the case; that he did not withdraw from the case because complainants no longer
visited him at his law office; that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to
perpetrate his fraudulent scheme; and that he could not be held administratively liable for filing
a belated Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence as he only did the same to protect the legal
profession and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.
In a Resolution12 dated July 16, 2008, we found respondent’s explanation for failing to comply
with our directives not fully satisfactory hence, we admonished him to be more circumspect in
his dealings with the Court. At the same time, we referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline.
In their Position Paper,13 complainants insisted that respondent mishandled their case before the
RTC by filing a motion to admit the formal exhibits almost three months after the prescribed
period; that respondent did not present complainants’ Marriage Contract and General Power of
Attorney that would have allowed Warriner to represent his wife while the latter is out of the
country; that complainants’ marriage is not for convenience; that complainants have a son out
of said marriage; that respondent was paid for his services; that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd. did not secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the
construction; that Warriner was not the sole witness for the prosecution; that the records of Civil
Case No. 23,396-95 would show that a representative from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these
witnesses proved that Warriner’s claim was not a fabrication.
In his Position Paper,14 respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his Comment filed before
the Court that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 by claiming this time
that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a
representative from DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed failed to
secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not prove that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
did not institute corrective measures to prevent soil erosion and damages to neighboring houses
such as Warriner’s. He insisted that it is the natural topography of the place which caused the
soil erosion which again contradicted his earlier allegation in his Comment before this Court that
it was Warriner who caused the soil erosion by destroying the ditches constructed by the
developer. Moreover, he alleged that the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden

which he offered as an exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication as there is no such
entity in Laurel St., Davao City.
In their Supplemental Position Paper,15 complainants argued, among others, that since more
than eight years have lapsed, it is possible that Bening’s Garden relocated to another address
but it does not mean that it never existed.
In his Report and Recommendation,16 the Investigating Commissioner17 found respondent guilty
of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95 in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and thus recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-442 18 dated August 28, 2010, approved
with modification the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP
Board of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants, respondent
also showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus it recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBP’s Resolution is not supported by
facts. He maintained that his actuations did not amount to a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence,
although belated, exculpated him from any liability. He asserted that the exhibits were
fabricated thus he deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence in the
hope that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. He denied defying lawful orders of
the RTC or this Court. He insisted that defiance of lawful orders connotes total, complete or
absolute refusal and not mere belated filing. He argued that he did not oppose or file comment
to the Motion to Dismiss as he deemed the same proper considering the fabricated allegations of
his clients. Respondent argued that the penalty recommended by the IBP is not commensurate
to his infractions. He alleged that the records of this case would show that he did not utterly
disregard the orders or processes of the Court or the IBP. He claimed that this Court should
have deemed his failure to timely file a Comment as a waiver on his part to file the same, and
not as defiance of this Court’s orders. Besides, he insisted that the only issue to be resolved by
the IBP was the alleged mishandling of Civil Case No. 23,396-95; the IBP should not have
delved on whether he disregarded or was disrespectful of the Court’s orders because he was not
given any opportunity to rebut the same.
Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and disproportionate. He
argued that with his suspension, the other cases he is handling would be affected.
Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent should be
disbarred or suspended for five years from the practice of law. To this, respondent filed his
Comment asserting that the Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he
stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the
complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence and
until the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23,396-95, he had no occasion to meet the complainants. He
maintained that he had nothing to be remorseful about and that there is absolutely no evidence
that would justify his suspension. He maintained that "being basic and elementary in any legal
procedure, a failure or refusal to submit comment is but a waiver to so comment and puts the
controversy submitted for resolution based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is
150
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not consider respondent’s failure or omission as having
such effects, but such failure cannot be considered as a contemptuous act x x x."
The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte Manifestation (Not a Motion for
Reconsideration)19 insisting that his failure to timely file comment on the administrative case
does not constitute defiance of the Court’s directives but is only "a natural human expression of
frustration, distraught and disappointment" when this Court and the IBP entertained a clearly
unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he averred that on April 12, 2013, the IBP Davao City
Chapter presented him with a Certificate of Appreciation for his invaluable support to the local
chapter. He claims that –
x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious and comical that the
[IBP] National Office condemns undersigned for his acts allegedly inimical to the profession but
will be ‘praised to the heavens’, so to speak, by the local chapter of the same organization for
his invaluable support to that same organization whose object, among others, is to discipline its
members to be respectful and [subservient] to the rule of law by serving justice in an orderly
and dignified manner. Weight and credence must be accorded the recognition and appreciation
by this local chapter being logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus,
the personal knowledge of undersigned’s personal character, integrity, uprightness, reputation
and sacrifices in the practice of his legal profession.
As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the reconsideration and setting
aside of that resolution adopted by the Honorable Board of Governors suspending him from the
practice of law for one (1) year, erroneous, disproportionate and harsh as it may be.
Undersigned only prays that, by way of protecting the prestigious image of the [IBP], measures
be adopted to prevent it from becoming a laughing stock of professional organizations in the
Philippines worthy for the books of wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory
stance of disciplining its members exemplified by the predicament of respondent in this instant
proceeding on the one hand but on the other hand is extolled by its local chapter to high
heavens for his "invaluable support" of the tenets and foundation of that very same organization
that condemns him. THIS IS HILARIOUSLY COMICAL AND ABSURDLY ODD.
Our Ruling
Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-
day period given to respondent to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant to
the RTC Order dated November 11, 1997 lapsed without any compliance from the respondent.
Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent to have waived the
submission of his formal offer of exhibits. Instead of asking the RTC to set aside the above
Order, respondent filed on February 3, 1998 a Motion to Admit the Belated Formal Exhibits in
Evidence. As to be expected, the RTC denied the motion. At the same time, it directed E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss by way of Demurrer to Evidence. Again,
respondent failed to comment or oppose the Motion to Dismiss despite the opportunity given by
the RTC. As a result, Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was dismissed.
 151

Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and "shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
Rule 18.03 which provide: allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."24

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished respondent and had
him arrested for his adamant refusal to obey our directives, we find the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six months, as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner,
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
and as we similarly imposed in Hernandez v. Padilla 25 and Pesto v. Millo,26 commensurate to
connection therewith shall render him liable.
respondent’s infractions. Besides, we wish to emphasize that "suspension is not primarily
intended as a punishment but a means to protect the public and the legal profession." 27
Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the
prejudice of herein complainants. Culled from the pleadings respondent submitted before this
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months
Court and the IBP, respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of
effective upon receipt of this Resolution with a WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt
exhibits because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same
with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this
would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If respondent truly believes that the
Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to
withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such
as "[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of
handling"20 or "[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons the Bar and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of the
and rules."21 Respondent adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden as a Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City. Unfortunately, respondent
anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph C.
SO ORDERED.
Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-time gardener. Complainants refuted this allegation
by claiming that Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that more than
eight years have passed since the estimate was secured. Complainants also pointed out that
since the filing of this case, respondent has thrice relocated his office but this does not mean
that his practice has ceased to exist.

We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect court
orders and processes.1âwphi1 Note that we required respondent to submit his Comment to this
administrative Complaint as early as year 2000. However, he was only able to file his Comment
eight years later, or in 2008 and only after we ordered his arrest. "As an officer of the court,
respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an
order which should be complied with promptly and completely. 22

Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to resorting to contradictions
in his effort to exculpate himself. In his Comment filed before this Court, respondent claimed
that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95. However, in his Position Paper
filed before the IBP, he admitted that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a
former barangay official and a representative from DENR. Next, he claimed in his Comment filed
before this Court that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter
threatened him with a disbarment suit. The Investigating Commissioner took this into account
when he submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly, respondent claimed in his
Comment to complainant's Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP that the Investigating
Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that
respondent had a heated argument with the complainants. Moreover, respondent claimed in his
Comment before this Court that Warriner authored the damage to his property by draining the
soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. However, he again
contradicted himself when he claimed in his Position Paper that the natural topography of the
place was the cause of the erosion. At this juncture, respondent must be reminded that as a
lawyer and an officer of the Court, he "owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court." 23 He