1082 European Journal of Political Research 46: 1082–1095, 2007

doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00754.x

Romania

LAVINIA STAN1 & RAZVAN ZAHARIA2

1
Concordia University, Canada; 2Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania

Background

According to the 1991 Constitution and its 2003 amendments, Romania is a

semi-presidential republic with a bicameral parliament whose 332 deputies
and 137 senators are elected for four-year terms according to a system of
proportional representation with closed party lists and a national threshold of
5 per cent for individual political parties and 8 per cent for multiparty coali-
tions. A total of 18 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are set aside for repre-
sentatives of national minorities other than Transylvanian Hungarians. The
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have identical responsibilities – a con-
stitutional oversight making for a lengthy legislative process, low efficiency
and high levels of popular distrust toward the house and its members. The
President is directly elected for a maximum of two five-year terms in a French-
inspired runoff system. Except for the 1990 elections, all other presidential
polls were won in the second round with a majority of the national vote. As
well as assuming the role of commander-in-chief, the President can dismiss
prime ministers and ministers, veto laws adopted by the legislature, call for
national referenda, and dissolve a deadlocked Parliament and call for early
elections (Articles 91–94).
The country has a multiparty system with a better organized left and a
chronically fragmented right. Nationalist, chauvinistic and antisemitic
members of the former Communist Party and its repressive state security
service, the notorious Securitate, have gathered around the Party for
Romanian National Unity (PUNR, now defunct) and the Greater Romania
Party (PRM), led by charismatic poet Corneliu Vadim Tudor – an ardent
supporter of Ceausescu and his nationalist policies. The political left has been
represented primarily by the two wings of the National Salvation Front, suc-
cessor to the Communist Party. In the early 1990s, the Front split into the
conservative Party of Social Democracy (later renamed the Social Democratic
Party, or PSD), part of the European Socialist group and the reformist Demo-
cratic Party (PD, a member of the European People’s Party since 2004). The
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,
MA 02148, USA
 Table 1. Elections to the Chamber of Deputies

Date of election: 28 November 2004

Total number of seats: 314 (elected)* + 18 assigned to ethnic minorities other than the Hungarians = 332
Electorate: 18,449,344 voters
Total votes cast: 10,787,747 (58.49%)
Total valid votes: 10,188,106 (94.44%)

Number and Percentage change Number and Change since

Party percentage of votes since 2000 percentage of seats 2000

Uniunea Nationala PSD+PUR – National Union PSD+PUR1,2 3,730,352 (36.6) 0.03 132 (39.7) -233
Alianta Dreptate si Adevar – Justice and Truth Alliance (DA)4 3,191,546 (31.3) +17.45 112 (33.8) +515
Partidul Romania Mare – Greater Romania Party (PRM) 1,316,751 (12.9) -6.5 48 (14.5) -36
Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania – 628,125 (6.2) -0.6 22 (6.6) -5
Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania (UDMR)
Partidul Noua Generatie – New Generation Party (PNG) 227,443 (2.2) +2.0 – –
Partidul National Taranesc Crestin Democrat – National 188,268 (1.8) -3.2 – –
Christian Democrat Peasant Party (PNTCD)6,7
romania

Others2 905,621 (8.9) -9.2 – –

Ethnic minorities other than the Hungarians – – 18 (5.4) –

Notes: * The size of the lower chamber is established according to a ‘representation quota’ of 1 deputy for every 70,000 inhabitants. Following a population decrease,
the number of elected seats for the Chamber of Deputies was adjusted from 327 to 314. 1 The National Union is an electoral coalition of the Partidul Social Democrat
– Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Partidul Umanist din Romania – Humanist Party of Romania (PUR). Of the coalition’s 132 seats, 113 were allocated to
the PSD and 19 to the PUR. 2 On 7 May 2005, the Humanist Party of Romania (PUR) changed its name to the Conservative Party (PC). 3 In the 2000 elections, the
PSD (back then named Partidul Democratiei Sociale din Romania – Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR)) contested the elections together with Partidul
Social Democrat Roman – Romanian Social Democrat Party (PSDR and the PUR) as the Polul Democrat Social din Romania – Social Democrat Pole (or Bloc)
of Romania (PDSR). After the 2000 elections, the PSDR was incorporated into the PDSR, which changed its name to PSD in the process. The PUR contested both
2000 and 2004 elections together with PDSR/PSD. The results of the PSD/PUR coalition in the 2004 elections have been compared with those of the PDSR in 2000.
4
The Justice and Truth Alliance (DA) is an electoral coalition of the Partidul National Liberal – National Liberal Party (PNL) and Partidul Democrat – Democratic
Party (PD). Of the coalition’s 112 seats, 64 were allocated to the PNL and 48 to the PD. 5 Compared to the combined result of the PNL and PD in 2000. 6 In the 2000
elections, the PNCTD ran with some smaller parties as the Conventia Democrata Romana – Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR2000). 7 Votes obtained by
political formations unable to win parliamentary representation because of the 5 per cent national threshold. Includes votes obtained by parties and associations
representing the 18 ethnic minorities.
1083

© 2007 The Author(s)

Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
Sources: Biroul Electoral Central (www.bec2004.ro); Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (www.essex.ac.uk/elections).
 1084

Table 2. Elections to the Senate

Date of election: 28 November 2004

© 2007 The Author(s)

Total number of seats: 137*
Electorate: 18,449,344 voters
Total votes cast: 10,794,653 (58.51%)
Total valid votes: 10,231,476 (94.78%)

Number and Percentage change Number and Change

Party** percentage of votes since 2000 percentage of seats since 2000

Uniunea Nationala PSD+PUR – National Union PSD+PUR1 3,798,607 (37.2) +0.1 57 (41.6) -8
Alianta Dreptate si Adevar – Justice and Truth Alliance (DA)2 3,250,663 (31.8) +16.7 49 (35.8) +23
Partidul Romania Mare – Greater Romania Party (PRM) 1,394,698 (13.6) -7.4 21 (15.3) -16
Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania – 637,109 (6.2) -0.7 10 (7.3) -2

Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)

Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania (UDMR)
Partidul Noua Generatie – New Generation Party (PNG) 241,486 (2.3) +2.0 – –
Partidul National Taranesc Crestin Democrat – 196,027 (1.9) n/a – –
lavinia stan & razvan zaharia

National Christian Democrat Peasant Party (PNTCD)

Others 712,886 (7.0) n/a – –

Notes: * The size of the upper chamber is established according to a ‘representation quota’ of 1 deputy for every 160,000 inhabitants. Following
a population decrease, the number of seats for the Senate was adjusted from 140 to 137. ** See notes to Table 1. 1 Of the 57 seats for the National
Union, 46 were allocated to the PSD and 11 to the PUR. 2 Of the 49 seats for the DA, 28 were allocated to the PNL and 21 to the PD.
Sources: Biroul Electoral Central (www.bec2004.ro); Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe
(www.essex.ac.uk/elections).
 Table 3. Results of the presidential elections

First Round Second Round

Date of election: 28 November 2004 12 December 2004

Electorate: 18,449,676 18,449,676
Total votes cast: 10,794,653 (58.51%) 10,112, 262 (54.81%)
Total valid votes: 10,452,205 (96.83%) 10,008,314 (98.97%)

First Round Second Round

Number and Number and

Candidate Party percentage of votes percentage of votes

Adrian Nastase Partidul Social Democrat – Social Democratic Party (PSD) 4,278,864 (40.94) 4,881,520 (48.77)
Traian Basescu Alianta Dreptate si Adevar – Justice and Truth Alliance (DA) 3,545,236 (33.92) 5,126,794 (51.23)
Corneliu Vadim Tudor Partidul Romania Mare – Greater Romania Party (PRM) 1,313,714 (12.57)
Marko Bela Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din Romania – Democratic 533,446 (5.10)
romania

Union of Magyars in Romania (UDMR)

Gheorghe Coriolan Partidul National Taranesc Crestin Democrat – National Peasant 198,394 (1.90)
Ciuhandru Christian-Democrat Party (PNTCD)
George Becali Partidul Noua Generatie – New Generation Party (PNG) 184,560 (1.77)
Petre Roman Forta Democrata – Democratic Force (FD) 140,702 (1.35)
Gheorghe Dinu Independent 113,321 (1.08)
Marian Petre Milut Actiunea Populara – Popular Action (AP) 43,378 (0.42)
Ovidiu Tudorici Uniunea pentru Reconstructia Romaniei – Union for Romania’s 37,910 (0.36)
Reconstruction (URR)
Aurelian Radulescu Alianta Populara Crestin Democrata – Christian Democrat 35,455 (0.34)
People’s Alliance (APCD)
Alexandru Raj Tunaru Partidul Tineretului Democrat – Democratic Youth Party (PTD) 27,225 (0.26)
1085

© 2007 The Author(s)

Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
Source: Biroul Electoral Central (www.bec2004.ro).
1086 lavinia stan & razvan zaharia

Table 4. Cabinet composition of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu I

A. The party composition of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu I:

Date of investiture: 29 December 2004

Number and Number and

percentage of percentage of
Party parliamentary seats cabinet posts

Partidul National Liberal – National 64 (19.2) 10 (40.0)

Liberal Party (PNL)
Partidul Democrat – Democratic Party (PD) 48 (14.5) 8 (32.0)*
Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din 22 (6.6) 4 (16.0)
Romania – Democratic Union of
Magyars in Romania (UDMR)
Partidul Umanist din Romania – 19 (5.7) 3 (12.0)
Humanist Party of Romania (PUR)

B. Cabinet members of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu:

Prime Minister/Primul Ministru: Calin Popescu-Tariceanu (1951 male, PNL)
State Minister for Coordinating Economic Activity/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea
activitatilor economice: Adriean Videanu (1962 male, PD)
State Minister for Coordinating Cultural, Educational and European Integration
Activities/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea activitatilor din domeniile culturii,
invatamantului si integrarii europene: Bela Marko (1951 male, UDMR)
State Minister for Coordinating Business Activities and Small and Medium-size
Enterprises/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea activitatilor din domeniile mediului
de afaceri si intreprinderilor mici si mijlocii: Gheorghe Copos (1953 male, PUR)
Minister of Justice/Ministrul justitiei: Monica Luisa Macovei (1960 female, Ind)
Minister of Public Finance/Ministrul finantelor publice: Ionut Popescu (1964 male, PNL)
Minister of Labour, Social Solidarity and Family/Ministrul muncii, solidaritatii sociale si
familiei: Gheorghe Barbu (1951 male, PD)
Minister of European Integration/Ministrul integrarii europene: Ene Dinga (1958 male,
PD)
Minister of External Affairs/Ministrul afacerilor externe: Mihai Razvan Ungureanu
(1968 male, PNL)
Minister of Public Administration and Interior/Ministrul administratiei si internelor:
Vasile Blaga (1956 male, PD)
Minister of Economy and Trade/Ministrul economiei si comertului: Codrut Ioan Seres
(1969 male, PUR)
Minister of National Defense/Ministrul apararii nationale: Teodor Atanasiu (1962 male,
PNL)
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development/Ministrul agriculturii,
padurilor si dezvoltarii rurale: Gheorghe Flutur (1960 male, PNL)

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 romania 1087

Table 4. Continued.

Minister of Transportation, Construction and Tourism/Ministrul transporturilor,

constructiilor si turismului: Gheorghe Dobre (1948 male, PD)
Minister of Education and Research/Ministrul educatiei si cercetarii: Mircea Miclea
(1963 male, PD)
Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs/Ministrul culturii si cultelor: Monica Octavia
Musca (1949 female, PNL)
Minister of Health/Ministrul sanatatii: Mircea Cinteza (1950 male, PNL)
Minister of Communications and Information Technology/Ministrul comunicatiilor si
tehnologiei informatiei: Zsolt Nagy (1971 male, UDMR)
Minister of Environment and Water Management/Ministrul mediului si gospodaririi
apelor: Sulfina Barbu (1967 female, PD)
Minister Delegate for Coordination of the General Secretariat of Government/
Ministrul delegat pentru coordinarea Secretariatului General al Guvernului: Mihai
Alexandru Voicu (1968 male, PNL)
Minister Delegate for Controlling Implementation of Internationally-financed
Programs and Monitoring the Application of the Acquis Communautaire/Ministru
delegat pentru controlul implementarii programelor cu finantare internationala si
urmarirea aplicarii acquisului comunitar: Cristian David (1967 male, PNL)
Minister Delegate for Coordination of the Financial Guard/Ministrul delegat pentru
coordonarea autoritatilor de control: Sorin Vicol (1970 male, PUR)
Minister Delegate for the Relationship with Parliament/Ministrul delegat pentru relatia
cu Parlamentul: Bogdan Olteanu (1971 male, PNL)
Minister Delegate for Public Works and Land Management/Ministrul delegat pentru
lucrari publice si amenajarea teritoriului: Laszlo Borbely (1954 male, UDMR)
Minister Delegate for Commerce/Ministrul delegat pentru comert: Iuliu Winkler (1964
male, UDMR)

Note: * Including Minister Monica Macovei, an independent occupying a position reserved-

for the Democratic Party.

right has been represented primarily by the reconstituted pre-communist

Christian-Democrat Peasant Party (PNTCD) and the National Liberal Party
(PNL). The Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania (UDMR) – an
umbrella organization including a number of parties and civic groups – cham-
pions the interests of the Transylvanian Hungarians.
The constitution recognizes Romania as a unitary state with no autono-
mous regions, divided into the city of Bucharest and 41 counties situated in the
historical regions of Transylvania, Walachia and Moldova. Local administra-
tion is formed of elected mayors, deputy mayors and local councils at village,
town and city levels, and elected councils and appointed prefects at county
level. This structure has become progressively more decentralized since the
early 1990s, but remains overstaffed, wasteful and corrupt. Villages with barely
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
1088 lavinia stan & razvan zaharia

Table 5. Cabinet composition of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu I

Changes during 2005:

Minister Delegate for Coordination of the Financial Guard/Ministrul delegat pentru
coordonarea autoritatilor de control: Sorin Vicol (1970 male, PUR) resigned on 21 January
State Minister for Coordinating Economic Activity/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea
activitatilor economice: Adriean Videanu (1962 male, PD), resigned and was replaced by
Gheorghe Seculici (1953 male, PD), on 20 March
Minister of Culture and Religious Affairs/Ministrul culturii si cultelor: Monica Octavia
Musca (1949 female, PNL) resigned and was replaced by Adrian Iorgulescu (1951 male,
PNL) on 28 July
Minister of Health/Ministrul sanatatii: Mircea Cinteza (1950 male, PNL) resigned and was
replaced by Eugen Gheorghe Nicolaescu (1955 male, PNL) on 3 August
Minister of Public Finance/Ministrul finantelor publice: Ionut Popescu (1964 male, PNL)
resigned and was replaced by Sebastian Vladescu (1958 male, PNL) on 3 August
Minister of European Integration/Ministrul integrarii europene: Ene Dinga (1958 male, PD)
resigned and was replaced by Anca Daniela Boagiu (1968 female, PD) on 3 August
State Minister for Coordinating Economic Activity/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea
activitatilor economice: Gheorghe Seculici (1953 male, PD), resigned and was replaced by
Gheorghe Pogea (1955 male, PD) on 21 August
Minister of Education and Research/Ministrul educatiei si cercetarii: Mircea Miclea (1963
male, PD) resigned and was replaced by Mihail Hardau (1947 male, PD) on 11 October
Changes during 2006:
Minister Delegate for the Relationship with Parliament/Ministrul delegat pentru relatia cu
Parlamentul: Bogdan Olteanu (1971 male, PNL) resigned and was replaced by Mihai
Alexandru Voicu (1968 male, PNL) on 20 March
State Minister for Coordinating Business Activities and Small and Medium-size
Enterprises/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea activitatilor din domeniile mediului de
afaceri si intreprinderilor mici si mijlocii: Gheorghe Copos (1953 male, PUR), resigned and
was replaced by Bogdan Pascu (1967 male, PUR) on 1 June; Pascu resigned on 4
December
Minister Delegate for Coordination of the General Secretariat of Government/Ministrul
delegat pentru coordinarea Secretariatului General al Guvernului: Mihai Alexandru Voicu
(1968 male, PNL) resigned and was replaced by Radu Stroe (1949 male, PNL) on 2 June
State Minister for Coordinating Economic Activity/Ministrul de stat pentru coordonarea
activitatilor economice: Gheorghe Pogea (1955 male, PD) resigned on 12 June
Minister of Transportation, Constructions and Tourism/Ministrul transporturilor, constructiilor
si turismului: Gheorghe Dobre (1948 male, PD) resigned and was replaced by Radu Mircea
Berceanu (1953 male, PD) on 13 June
Minister of National Defense/Ministrul apararii nationale: Teodor Atanasiu (1962 male, PNL)
resigned and was replaced by Sorin Frunzaverde (1960 male, PD) on 26 October
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development/Ministrul agriculturii, padurilor si
dezvoltarii rurale: Gheorghe Flutur (1960 male, PNL) resigned and was replaced by Dan
Motreanu (1970 male, PNL) on 6 December
Minister of Economy and Trade/Ministrul economiei si comertului: Codrut Ioan Seres (1969
male, PUR) resigned and was replaced by Varujan Vosganian (1958 male, PNL) on 11
December

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 romania 1089

10,000 inhabitants are represented by as many as 17 council members, while

the smallest county is represented by as many as 31 council members. The
functions and responsibilities of the appointed prefect and of the elected
county council president overlap significantly. Public opinion polls show
that ordinary citizens feel disconnected from an administration they perceive
as corrupt, inefficient, arrogant and largely working for its own group and
personal interests.
Parliamentary and presidential elections were organized simultaneously in
1990, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, and were (with the exception of the 1990 poll)
largely perceived as free and fair. Ion Iliescu, a former communist official
sidelined by dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, acted as president from 1990 to 1996,
and then again from 2000 to 2004. University of Bucharest geology professor
Emil Constantinescu occupied that position from 1996 to 2000. In 2004, former
ship captain Traian Basescu won the presidential election.
All post-1991 parliamentary polls allowed for alternation between govern-
ment and opposition. Although Romania experienced strict communist rule
under Nicolae Ceausescu and its exit from communism was the bloodiest in
the region, Iliescu and his Salvation Front won the 1990 elections. Fragmented,
cash-strapped and poorly organized, the newly constituted pro-democratic
political parties failed to win the 1992 election. They did win parliamentary
representation, which they used to challenge the half-hearted reforms pro-
moted by the Social Democrat cabinet of Nicolae Vacaroiu. The 1996 elections
allowed the PNTCD and the PNL (united as the Democratic Convention) to
form the government, together with the PD and the UDMR, but dissension
within the Convention and between governmental partners led to political
instability, unfulfilled electoral promises and over-bureaucratization. From
1996 to 2000, Romania had three different premiers: Victor Ciorbea (1996–
1998), Radu Vasile (1998–2000) and Mugur Isarescu (2000). The convention’s
eroded popularity allowed the PSD to make a comeback in 2000, and form a
government with the help of the UDMR and the tiny PUR.
Post-communist Romania has struggled to bridge the gap that separates it
from Central Europe, but its record is patchy. Politically, the country remains
unstable, divided and uncivil. It consistently ranks among the most corrupt
countries in Europe (according to Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index). Economically, it has resisted reforms needed to transform
its command, planned, communist economy into a functional free market
economy, yet surprised many by registering unprecedented economic growth
after 2000. Instead of benefiting the larger population, privatization allowed
communist leaders and Securitate officers to assert control over the country’s
most valuable assets. A number of high-ranking politicians have been tainted
by corruption scandals revolving around shady privatization deals, preferential
© 2007 The Author(s)
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1090 lavinia stan & razvan zaharia

tenders and the use of public funds for private gain. In terms of foreign policy,
Romania stayed clear of the war that gripped neighboring Yugoslavia in the
1990s, and proved itself an important player in the Black Sea region, but its
accession to the European Union (EU) occurred later than Central Europe’s
and was arguably due less to its own ability to fulfill pre-accession require-
ments and more to the EU’s goodwill.

Romania’s political priorities and problems

From the late 2004 elections to December 2006, the country’s political prio-
rities and problems revolved around three major themes: reconsidering the
communist past, intra-governmental dissensions, and accession to the EU.
These are discussed in turn.

The communist past

Romania is a laggard in terms of transitional justice, the process of coming to

terms with its repressive past, although it has many more reasons than its
neighboring countries to reassess that past. Thousands of pre-communist
politicians, anticommunist critics, landowners and independent intellectuals
were imprisoned in the 1950s. President Nicolae Ceausescu’s sultanism-
cum-totalitarianism included a shameless cult of personality, personal rule by
Ceausescu’s family and friends, and thorough penetration of society by full-
time officers and part-time informers of the Securitate. While Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic could claim to have gone some way towards elimi-
nating former communist officials from post-communist politics, lustration
made less progress in Romania. While Central Europe tried to replace the
communist elite with untainted politicians, Romania allowed communist offi-
cials to become its political leaders and wealthiest businessmen. Failure to
tackle the past is believed to be the root cause for pervading corruption.
Since 1989, the country has been deeply divided regarding its past, with
some people extolling the virtue of communist rule and arguing that
communist officials and secret agents have the right to shape the country’s
democracy, and others decrying communist repression and contending that
communist decision makers and spies should be banned from politics. The
communist past decided the outcome of the 2004 presidential election. In a
televised confrontation with Social Democrat Adrian Nastase, Basescu
admitted membership of the Communist Party, but emphasized that the
country ‘could not share the mentality of the communist regime fifteen years
after its collapse’ (Stan 2005: 10), thereby convincing voters of his sincerity
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 romania 1091

with regard to his own tainted past and his willingness to tackle one of the
most sensitive issues dividing the country.
After assuming the presidency, Basescu was expected to make good on his
promise to unblock transitional justice. In an unprecedented step, in early
2006, he ordered the Romanian Intelligence Service to surrender the bulk of
the secret archive to the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives
(NCSSA), the legal custodian of the Securitate files. Some were files of top-
ranking politicians sealed by the Constantinescu administration. The transfer
allowed the Council to resume its main functions: granting citizens access to
secret files compiled on them; and verifying the ties to the Securitate of
politicians, journalists, public university rectors and heads of economic units,
among others. The file opening led to spectacular surprises when well known
or respected luminaries were unmasked as former agents.
In August 2006, Romania’s second most popular politician after Basescu,
Liberal Mona Musca, admitted to having spied on students while teaching at
the University of Timisoara in the 1970s. Her downfall was disappointing
because she had championed the lustration law and repeatedly called on
politicians to reveal their past. She first appealed the verdict and then turned
to the courts when the NCSSA upheld its decision. A former Minister of
Culture, Musca retained her seat in the Chamber of Deputies while waiting for
the courts to hear her case. The wave of revelations spared no one. Former
PSD head of Prime Minister’s Office Serban Mihailescu, former PSD Minister
of Justice Rodica Stanoiu, PC leader Dan Voiculescu, former Minister for
Economic Reform Mircea Cosea, PNL Mayor of Brasov Ioan Ghise, former
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugen Uricaru, Central European Univer-
sity vice-president Sorin Antohi, and journalists Valentin Hossu-Longin, Carol
Sebastian and Dan Ciachir were publicly unmasked as former spies. Even
Basescu came under suspicion for representing Navrom (one of communist
Romania’s shipping companies) in Belgium – a position allegedly involving
reporting to the Securitate.
Responding to pressure from civil society led by the Group for Social
Dialogue, in May 2006 Basescu set up the Presidential Commission for the
Study of Communist Dictatorship in Romania under the leadership of
Vladimir Tismaneanu – a University of Maryland political scientist. The
Commission was similar to the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions set up
in post-authoritarian South Africa, Argentina, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Sierra
Leone. Its final report, posted on the website of the Romanian presidency and
summarized before Parliament by Basescu himself on 18 December 2006,
outlined the repressive role of the Communist Party and the Securitate, and
named some tortured and torturers. Based on the report, Basescu officially
condemned the communist regime, thus aligning Romania with other Eastern
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1092 lavinia stan & razvan zaharia

European countries. The report was contested bitterly by the opposition PRM
and the PSD for failing to include their pro-communist viewpoint. In an effort
to rewrite history, the predominant Orthodox Church pledged to set up its own
commission to ‘impartially’ analyze its persecution at the hands of the com-
munists. Since 1989, the Church has recast its collaboration with the party-state
as hidden opposition.
Other transitional justice efforts held the first page of Romanian news-
papers, but with one exception, they failed to inspire legislation. In 2005, the
Liberals drafted a lustration law, which the Chamber of Deputies refused to
vote on after the Senate approved it. Also that year, the tiny New Initiative
Party drafted an anti-nomenclatura law directed against top Communist Party
leaders. That initiative was also set aside. The only headway made was on
amending Law 187/1999, which allowed the NCSSA to verify the past of
elected and nominated politicians, but did not require individuals unmasked as
former secret agents to resign their public positions. Emergency Ordinance
16/2006 provided for a mild lustration process similar to the one Hungary
launched in 1994. It allowed the NCSSA to petition the Prosecutor General if
politicians with a proven tainted past failed to disclose their ties in confidential
declarations signed at the beginning of their mandate. In such cases, the courts
could charge public officials with providing false official data and sentence
them to up to two years in jail. As in Hungary, it will be difficult for the courts
to establish intent and prove that individuals knowingly lied in their signed
statements when all unmasked former spies have alleged they were not guilty
of any wrongdoing, their actions did not harm others or they did not believe
that their past activity amounted to secret collaboration.

Intra-governmental dissension

The first two years of the Justice and Truth Alliance rule proved difficult as the
executive was often deadlocked by dissensions between the President and the
Premier, and the legislative majority was increasingly fragmented by disputes
between main alliance partners, the PD and the PNL. Disagreement partly
stemmed from Basescu’s antagonistic style of conducting politics, evidenced as
early as 1998 when he provoked the fall of the Ciorbea cabinet with the help of
his fellow PD ministers (Basescu was then Minister of Transportation). His
criticism of Prime Minister Calin PopescuTariceanu reflected a tendency to feed
his political career off conflict, but also his personal dislike of the Premier. The
President’s unmatched popularity rests on his charisma, candid honesty, and an
unassuming and personable character.To Basescu’s unpredictability,Tariceanu
has opposed predictability, patience and a business-like management style.
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 romania 1093

The uneasy cohabitation was also partly due to the slim and uncommitted
parliamentary majority supporting the cabinet. After Basescu won the poll
with the help of the Justice and Truth Alliance, he denied the right to form the
government to the PSD and the PUR (together commanding a plurality of
seats in Parliament) and instead called on the PNL and the PD to nominate
the premier. The alliance designated Liberal Tariceanu as Prime Minister.
Tariceanu formed the government only after securing the support of the
UDMR and the PUR (renamed the Conservative Party in May 2005). Accord-
ing to the Constitution, premiers are appointed by presidents and confirmed
by Parliament (Article 85). Thus, the candidate must gain the support of a
majority of parliamentarians, but the majority might include the party with a
plurality of seats. The cabinet’s survival has depended on the support of the
UDMR and the Conservative Party – both part of the PSD-dominated
Government of 2000–2004.
The slim parliamentary majority became even slimmer as several legisla-
tors crossed the floor. The Romanian Parliament allows legislators to leave the
party on whose list they secured a mandate in order to join another party
represented in Parliament or to continue as independent deputies or senators.
From 28 November 2004 to 31 December 2006, the legislators’ party affiliation
changed as follows. On 15 February 2005, three young PD deputies formed the
National Initiative Party (Partidul Initiativa Nationala, or PIN). On 19 Decem-
ber 2006, 15 Liberal deputies and nine Liberal senators joined former Liberal
Party leader Theodor Stolojan to form the party close to President Basescu.
Stolojan was interim premier from late 1991 to late 1992. The opposition PRM
was also affected by the trend, as in 2005 alone the party lost a total of 14
deputies. Six of these remained independent, five joined the PD, two the PSD
and one the PC. Thus, on 31 December 2006 there were 13 independent
senators and 33 independent deputies. Most affected was the PNL, which saw
its number of deputies drop from 64 to 52, and the number of its senators from
28 to 21; and the PRM, whose numbers dropped from 21 to 18 for senators and
from 48 to 30 for deputies.
Tariceanu awarded his partners ministerial, deputy ministerial and prefect
positions, but subsequent events revealed a fragile ruling coalition. Months
after the 2004 elections and weeks after accepting the Tariceanu cabinet,
Basescu suggested that early elections would allow the alliance to secure the
parliamentary majority needed to form the government by itself. Opinion polls
showed that a majority of voters supported Basescu and the alliance, but it was
unclear whether the alliance could win an election disconnected from the
presidential ballot. In the 2004 simultaneous presidential and parliamentary
elections, many Romanians voted for Basescu and his alliance, but, if early
elections were called, some pro-Basescu voters might not support the alliance.
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
1094 lavinia stan & razvan zaharia

The President ignored such arguments and repeatedly called for early elec-
tions in 2005 and 2006. In doing so, he distanced himself from the Premier, and
effectively gave Tariceanu a public vote of no-confidence. Apart from Basescu,
Tariceanu’s most vocal critics were not the opposition, but his Democrat and
Conservative partners. As 2005 drew to a close, the Conservatives withdrew
their support after Codrut Seres resigned his ministerial portfolio. In the battle
of words pitting the President against the Premier, Democratic ministers
openly defied Tariceanu and sided with the President, without resigning their
posts. As the PD and the PNL grew colder and the cabinet became a minority
cabinet, the opposition, supported by the Conservatives, began to set the
legislative agenda. The trend is likely to continue in 2007.

European Union accession

Arguably the country’s most notable accomplishment since its unification in

1918, the accession into the EU was supported keenly by the political elite, civil
society and the general public, who embraced the process as a long-overdue
recognition of Romania’s rightful place among European states from a
geographic, historic, political and cultural point of view. The small group of
eurosceptics, led by the PRM and the dominant Orthodox Church, remained
marginalized until December 2006, but could enlarge if the benefits of acces-
sion fail to materialize.
Romanians believe that their country’s accession was the result of its
efforts to comply with (sometimes unreasonable and always difficult) EU
political and economic requirements. By contrast, Western analysts point to
the EU’s pledge to accept all candidates, even those unable to adequately
address their systemic problems by the accession date. Unwavering commit-
ment to accession was not sufficient to allow Romania to join the EU in 2004
with other post-communist candidate states. Instead, Romania and Bulgaria
were accepted in January 2007. It was believed that the three more years would
give these candidates a chance to align their institutional structures and prac-
tices to EU standards.
The Tariceanu cabinet was responsible for managing the accession process
during its last, and arguably most crucial, stage. Because the country had
difficulty closing the Justice and Home Affairs chapter, politically independent
lawyer and human rights activist Monica Macovei was appointed Minister of
Justice with the support of the PD. Macovei launched extensive reforms of the
judiciary, but came under fire for burning bridges with Parliament, for propos-
ing legislation extending permits for phone-tapping and for pressuring the
Supreme Council of Magistrates, which decides on the appointment and pro-
motion of judges. Because many of its members were appointed by the PSD,
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
 romania 1095

the Council was criticized for opposing reforms that would remove corrupt
judges subservient to political interests and promote younger judges with
untainted records. The council should be ‘the guarantor of judicial inde-
pendence’ (Article 133 of the Constitution), but Macovei’s reforms were
denounced as undue pressure from a ‘politically appointed’ minister on an
‘independent’ judicial body. She also tried to revive the fight against political
corruption by giving protection to prosecutors researching cases involving
high-ranking politicians, but throughout the country, politicians of all ideologi-
cal persuasions continue to ignore the Anti-Corruption Law 503/2002 with
impunity by refusing to declare the income of their immediate family.
Romania will have to accord its legislation, political institutions and politi-
cal culture with the EU even after its acceptance as a full member. In the near
future, much depends on the ability of the ruling coalition of coalitions to
remain united around the government.

Sources and further information

Publication:

Stan, L. (2005). The opposition takes charge: The Romanian General Elections of 2004.
Problems of Post-Communism 52(3): 3–15.

On the Internet:

Biroul Electoral Central (election statistics): www.bec2004.ro

Permanent Electoral Authority: www.roaep.ro
President of Romania website: www.presidency.ro
Romanian Government website: www.guv.ro
Romanian Parliament website: www.cdep.ro

© 2007 The Author(s)

Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)