The guns were their standards 

: losing them to an enemy was a disgrace, and the bouches à feu had a
personality all their own, and were treated as comrades in action.

The Frenchmen Eble, Senarmont, Drouot, Lariboisière, Songis, Ruty, Marmont

Britons such as Frazer, Dickson, Ramsay, Ross and Mercer; Austrian Smola, Russians Kutusaiv and
Arakcheev, Prussian von Holtzendorf.

Theorists and inventors such as Gribeauval, Lichtenstein, Congreve and Schrapnel. The horse-drawn
artillery came of age.

For the first time in military history they are artillery generals who command artillery organizations at the
corps and army level, and who command artillery units larger than a single company or battery.
They take their just place on the battlefield, mobile dealers of death and destruction, the operational
equals of their infantry and cavalry brethren.
For the first time there are artillery battles that decide the fate of kingdoms.

Pour la rpz de l’artilleur : the one-legged French Captain Brechtel commanding his artillery battery
supporting the river crossing (Berezina, 1812). Drouot leading his gunners in a hell-for-leather artillery
charge at Lützen in 1813 when he unlimbered as close as possible to the allied line and blew out its
center whit point-blank canister. And the most important artillery action of the period: the wild artillery
chevauchee at the Batlle of Friedland in 1807, where Senarmont led his men in front of the infantry,
turning his gunners and their well-served guns into the main attack while he assaulted the Russian
center, and in twenty minutes knocking 4k of them over, blowing a hole in the Russian center.

With their high deeds, the artillerymen of the period set a milestone in military history and saw their arm
grow in strength and prestige an become a force to reckon with on the modern battlefield.

It should be noted that what is now called field artillery was usually referred to as light artillery during
the Napoleonic period. This included both foot artillery and horse artillery.

Quote from Napoleon: “I don’t attach importance to the loss of cannon if the risk of their being taken is
compensated for by the chance of success”.

Partie 1

CH1

Leurs canons étaient leur fierté, et ils les défendaient comme on défend un drapeau ou un étendard.
Napoleon called his 12-pounders his favorite, his “pretty girls. One French company commander in Spain
during the Peninsular War, when urged to abandon his guns during a desperate retreat, proudly
proclaimed that the guns of his company “were our flag." Thiebault later remarked, after they had
reached safety, that the exertions of Hulot and his artillerymen were “superhuman." Another French
artillery officer would remark that his gunners “loved their guns like their sweethearts.”

The French developed more than artillery doctrine for the fighting of their guns: they also developed a
definite com mand structure for artillery that mirrored the tactical and grand tactical developments with
the infantry and cavalry. They undoubtedly had the most highly developed artillery command structure,
as well as the most flexible tactical system of the period.
With the Gribeauval system, pieces are standardized (4-,8-,12-pounders) and were used for all three
functions (field, siege, fortress).
Then we have the Lichtenstein’s reforms in Austria (proceed the standardization on carriage, wheels, …).
The Lichtenstein system stayed in service until 1859, while in France the more modern Gribeauval System
underwent changes in 1803 and was completely replaced in 1827– 29.
The system he devised served through the Napoleonic period and was partially adopted by the fledgling
United States Army in 1809. Gribeauval completely revamped and reorganized the French artillery. He
standardized ev ery piece of equipment, invented or developed new artillery tools and sights, logically
reorga nized the gunners into companies and regiments, and even changed the uniforms. No artillery
system up to that time, including the Lichtenstein system, underwent such a radical improve. ment in
effectiveness and equipment.”
Further, he made a distinction between field and siege artillery. While the same calibers, such as 8- and
12-pounders, were used in both field and siege artillery, they were not the same gun tubes, those for
siege and garrison artillery being longer and heavier, and designated “battering pieces.”

Horse artillery was a relatively new arm, slowly developed from the middle of the eighteenth century. It
was a novel approach to the problem of mobility, and theoretically every gunner was individually
mounted on his own horse. The use of wurst wagon isn’t true horse artillery.

Guns were aimed by pointing the entire piece in the appropriate direction. There were three different
types of firing: at random (à toute volée), direct shot (a plein fouet), and ricochet.
CH2

Prior to the Napoleonic period, and specifi. cally prior to the introduction of the “new school" of artillery
tactics introduced by French artillery General Senarmont at the Battle of Friedland in June 1807, the
artillery was consid. ered a supporting arm, there merely to help the infantry and cavalry of the all armies
on the battlefield.

The first French artillery school dates from 1720.

For the Russians, the greatest innovator for the artillery during the period was Alexei Andreevich
Arakcheev (1769–1834), also known as the Grand Vizier of the Russian Empire -> development of the
artillery system of 1805, which made the Russian artillery a player on the battlefields of the Napoleonic
period, notably at Eylau in 1807.

CH3

NOTE IMPORTANTE: si on s’intéresse à la rpz du canon pour les soldats fr, est-ce le canon qu’ils
affrontent ou qu’ils possèdent ? les deux sûrement (un chapitre sur la peur des canons adverses et un
sur l’amour de ses canons, ou alors un même chapitre)

CH4

Let that general dread my displeasure—he who leaves his pieces behind; that is contrary to military
honor; one ought to leave everything but his cannon. Napoléon

In the 1790s some armies started to militarize their artillery trains. The British were the first in 1794,
forming the Royal Corps of Drivers. Next came the French, whose well organized and trained Train
d'Artillerie was formed in January 1800.

Artillerymen on the battlefield could be helpless without their gun teams, especially in defeat and rout,
and consequently many guns were lost that could have been saved. Militarizing the train put the drivers
in the same category as the artillerymen they supported, and subject to the same discipline and
penalties.

Napoleon consul: One of the first reforms that he initiated was the militarization of the Train d'Artillerie.
Napoleon organized battalions of artillery train troops, whose companies would “brigade” themselves
with an artillery company, providing the artillery, foot or horse, with horse teams and drivers to move its
guns and other vehicles. The experiment proved most satisfactory, the train drivers demonstrating on the
battlefields of the Consulate and Empire a stoic courage, having to endure fire without the satisfaction of
being able to shoot back, and a skill in horsemanship that was generally above reproach.

The French Train d'Artillerie was ordered to be formed by First Consul Bonaparte on 3 January 1800 by a
decree of the Consuls. It consisted of twenty-one articles and it laid out the organization, chain of
command, uniform, and responsibilities, as well as establishing the coun cils of administration for the
train battalions. Each train battalion was to have five companies. The battalion's elite company, with the
best men and horses, was assigned to the horse artil lery. Three of the companies went to the foot
artillery or to the parks at corps or army level. The fifth company would form the depot which would train
recruits and the remounts for the companies assigned to the artillery. Company commanders were
maréchal des logis chefs. Each company was assigned a trumpeter. Battalions were commanded by
captains. After the campaigns in 1800, the train was reorganized in order to repair noted deficiencies.
At the battalion level, there was a veterinarian, a master saddler, and a master armorer. The companies
had two blacksmiths as well as two harness makers. In wartime, each battalion “doubled itself," sending a
cadre from the parent battalion to organize a new one. The officers, men, and horses for these battalions
were carefully selected and well trained. By 1810 there were fourteen artillery train battalions, and the
first thirteen had “doubled" themselves for the campaigns of 1809, 1812, and 1813.

An order went out that all infantrymen or cavalrymen who had been wounded in the hand and were no
longer capable of service with those arms were to be transferred to the artillery train. Depots for them
were established in Dresden and Magdeburg.

The corps park consisted of spare guns, vehicles, and equipment maintained there to replace matériel
lost in action. Usually there was one spare gun for every ten assigned to the infantry divisions or the
corps artillery. The army artillery park, known as the Grand Parc, was divided into a mobile park, which
accompanied the army in the field, and the fixed park, which established depots and arsenals in the rear
of the army, along its line of communications.

Train personnel were not artillerymen: they were drivers and horse handlers. Their mission was to drive
and take care of the horses that pulled the artillery's guns and vehicles. They were also responsible for
the considerable amount of horse harness that equipped the horse teams. Four horse teams were
assigned to the 4-, 6-, and 8-pounders, as they were to the battery wagons, field forges, and caissons. The
12-pounders rated a six-horse team, as did one of the 12 pounder caissons.

The number of caissons assigned to a French artillery company depended on the caliber of gun the
company was using. Each 4-pounder required two caissons, each 6 and 8-pounder was assigned three,
and each howitzer and 12-pounder five. Additionally, every company had a field forge, and three wagons
which carried “supplies, forage, and spare parts.” Artillery companies that were assigned to infantry
divisions also were issued four additional caissons to carry musket cartridges to resupply the infantry.
Almost every vehicle, be it gun, caisson, or wagon, used a four-horse team to pull it. The exceptions were
field forges, 12-pounders, and one 12 pounder caisson, which were issued six-horse teams.
-> The reason for so many caissons assigned per battery was that Napoleon required that there always be
a double “approvisionment" (standard load) of ammunition per gun with the army— 300 to 350 rounds
per gun. The system worked very well, and the Grande Armée never ran out of ammunition.

1Source: Wilhelm Faber du Faur, a Württemberg artillery officer attached to Ney's III Corps in Russia in
1812

Some of the best French artillery commanders, such as Eble and Desvaux de St Maurice, who was killed
in action at Waterloo, came out of the horse artillery (qui est apparue tard en France, en 1792).

1source: the famous author and battery commander Cavalie Mercer, who first saw action at Waterloo,
did more than his assigned duty and had the presence of mind to write about it. His memoirs of the
Waterloo campaign are a vivid, first-hand account of what it was like to be an artilleryman on a
Napoleonic battlefield.
In conclusion, the horse was just as important, if not more so, to the artilleryman as to the cavalryman.
Napoleon, after the heavy losses in Russia, ensured his artillery were given ad equate remounts before
the cavalry received them. Horse artillery was a relatively new and elite arm that enhanced the
battlefield response time of artillery units, and allowed cavalry to have attached artillery that could move
and fight with it.

CH5

Napoleon organized a ninth regi ment of foot artillery, and increased the companies in each regiment to
27 or 28 companies per regiment. A company of foot artillery was composed of five officers, six NCOs,
one drummer, and 81 enlisted men. There were six regiments of horse artillery, each of eight companies
by 1814. Each regiment was given a depot company in 1807. A horse artillery company was composed of
four officers, five NCOs, two trumpeters and 65 enlisted men. Each horse artilleryman was armed with a
sabre and two pistols.

The French had five types of troops that were considered to be artillerymen. These were the horse and
foot artillery (artillerie à cheval and artillerie à pied), pontonniers, artificers (ouvriers), and armorers
(armuriers).

Napoleon also tried to assign as much horse artillery to the different corps of the Grande Armée as
possible, usually one per corps. Having all personnel individually mounted gave the horse artillery an
immense advantage over the foot artillery in mobility, and they could be used in more fluid situations or
react to emergencies much more quickly.

The crew for the new 5.5-inch howitzer remained the same when it was introduced with the new AN XI
guns, and the 6-pounder had a crew of thirteen, the same as for the 8-pounder it replaced.

Pontonneers (pontonniers) belonged to the artillery and not to the engineers during this period. They
were commanded by artillerymen, such as Eble, and not only were able to “throw” a pontoon bridge
across a water obstacle, but also were capable of building trestle bridges.

Ouvriers d'artillery were the artificers—skilled workmen who built and repaired the artillery's vehicles
and gun carriages. They were assigned to the arsenals and the parks, though some of them got into
action.
The Grande Armée had no permanently organized units of mountain artillery, though it was certainly
used when required (comprised light guns and carriages, usually specially designed to be broken down
into mule loads.)
Captured Austrian pieces were used as mountain artillery, mounted on specially designed carriages, as
well as Piedmontese 3-pounders.

French artillery doctrine can be neatly summed up in this passage from Tousard:

P.117/118

One of the problems in the Revolutionary campaigns was that the French were many times outnumbered
in artillery by the excellent Austrian artillery, and were many times outshot, as at Neerwinden in 1793.
Napoleon's coming to power in 1799 gradually changed all that. The artillery arm was enlarged, and more
guns were manufactured and issued to the gun companies. The Grande Armée of 1805, the best
Napoleon ever led, was short of horse transport (which is an indication that Napoleon's actual intention
was to invade England), and the artillery was short of horses when it moved east to face the Austrian
invasion of Bavaria.

After the Austerlitz campaign and subsequent peace treaty, Napoleon reorganized his artil lery in a more
logical manner. New guns of the Système ANXI, of which the 6-pounder, a new 12-pounder, and a 5.5-
inch howitzer were being produced, and now were issued as soon as they were manufactured. What
Napoleon wanted to do was issue every infantry division in the Grande Armée with two artillery
companies. He also wanted one of them to be a horse artillery company if there were enough to go
around. One horse artillery company would be assigned to every light cavalry division, and the heavy
cavalry divisions would get two each, and all divi. sional artillery companies would be equipped with 6-
pounders and 5.5-inch howitzers. An army artillery reserve would be formed, where most of the 12-
pounders would be held. Addi tionally, corps artillery reserve companies would be held by the corps
commanders. The 4- and 8-pounder Gribeauval guns would either be placed in the arsenals for storage as
they were replaced by the new ordnance, or assigned to armies in secondary theaters, such as Italy and
Spain.

The addition of the new 6-pounder into the French artillery simplified many issues, such as ammunition
resupply and the number of calibers used by the field armies. However, the Système AN XI was not fully
implemented, only the 6-pounder and 5.5-inch howitzer being issued in large numbers. Furthermore, as
has been noted, the new carriage for the 6-pounder was unsuit able and fell apart after hard
campaigning, so the 6-pounder had to be remounted on the older Gribeauval carriages taken from the
armories. On campaign, French artillery was organized by company, the companies being assigned to a
separate corps under a corps artillery chief who was usually a general officer. Companies of the same
regiment did not necessarily serve together, or even in the same corps, though some times it was
specified that they should. There was no battalion-level organization in the artillery regiments

By 1813, the Guard had six companies of horse artillery, and six of foot artillery, both classed as Old
Guard; one company of horse artillery; and fifteen compa nies of foot artillery classed as Young Guard.
The artillery train had become a regiment of twelve companies, and there was a company of ouvriers and
pontonniers, and a Young Guard artillery train regiment was formed as an adjunct for the Young Guard
artillery companies. When the Guard artillery was being overhauled and rebuilt after heavy losses in
Russia, some of the troops were drawn into it from the excellent and well-trained Artillerie de la Ma rine,
who also served as infantry, forming four large regiments assigned to Marmont's VI Corps. They were
issued dark blue overcoats like those of the Imperial Guard, and fought so stoutly at Lützen that the Allies
thought them to be Guard infantry. The Guard artillery served as the army artillery reserve from 1809
until the end of the Empire.

One officer of the Guard artillery, Major Boulart (general, mémoires pas à la BIS), left an interesting
memoir of his service in the Grande Armée.

French artillery tactics and employment stemmed from the doctrine taught in the excellent artillery
school system developed after 1763. Artillerymen were taught to cooperate closely and support infantry.
That being so, and the army in 1792 being organized in permanent divisions in the field, each with its
own attached artillery, the principles of combined-arms tactics be: tween the infantry and artillery was
employed, experimented with, and developed. Artillery companies were used to support both troops in
formation as well as in open and skirmish order. Attacks delivered in column or line, with large bodies of
skirmishers deployed in front, were also supported by artillery, sometimes as far forward as the skirmish
line itself and not just on the flanks of the units. Whenever possible, artillerymen massed their fire,
employing at least two batteries to gain either local fire superiority or to destroy opposing infantry.

Würtemberg artillery ?

Citation de Cervantes sur le déshonneur de l’artillerie : Blessed be those happy ages that were strangers
to the dreadful fury of these devilish instruments of artillery, whose inventor I am satisfied is now in hell,
receiving the reward of his cursed invention, which is the cause that very often a cowardly base hand
takes away the life of the bravest gentleman.

The Napoleonic Wars were the age of the artillery battle. Increasingly after 1805, artillery organization,
employment, and command and control was consistently improved among the major belligerents. The
number of guns assigned to the armies also greatly increased, and the artillery organization at division
and corps level increased in efficiency.

Ex d’un moment où la psychologie du soldat fr serait importante : Colonel Josef Smola, still the young,
aggressive Austrian artillery lieutenant of 1793 at heart, and who would mass almost 200 guns against
the French at Essling in 1809 and dominate the field, smashing the outnumbered and outgunned French
artillery.

Lauriston, the artillery specialist among Napoleon's generals' aides-de-camp, and who had defended
Ragusa in 1806 against the Russians and native tribesmen, was a corps commander in 1813, as was
Marengo into victories. Marmont also commanded independently in the Illyrian provinces and in Spain,
though his activities on the latter country ended in defeat and a crippling wound. Then, especially after
1808, there were the increasing numbers and professionalism of the artillery of the Imperial Guard that
became the army artillery reserve and that was committed under its own generals by order of the
Emperor. As Senarmont had expertly done at Friedland , the French now specialized in artillery
maneuver, the artillery sometimes becoming the main attack in battles. If not, such as at Ocana in Spain
(and with Senarmont again commanding the artillery there), the French artillery proved to be decisive in
the outcome of the battle. Time and again throughout the period, French artillery commanders led large
batteries to the deci sive time and place either directly to support the main effort or itself lead the main
attack. This happened at Wagram in 1809. Lauriston took a 102-gun battery first to fill a gap left by the
maneuver of Massena's IV Corps, and then to pave the way for MacDonald's supporting attack against
the Austrian line. At Lützen in 1813, Druout led a 72-gun wild chevauchée up into slingshot range of the
Allied line, then blowing out their center with point-blank canister, the massed Young Guard attacking
behind the bombardment into the wreckage. At Hanau later that year, Druout again led his artillerymen
against the Austro-Bavarians under Wrede, pulver. ized their center, and beat off a cavalry counterattack
against his gun line, fighting alongside his gunners who were defending their “pretty girls" against the
Allied horsemen with handspike, rammer, and bayonet until the grenadiers à cheval rode to their rescue.

Hanau, Drouot defend les “pretty girls”.

Saint Barbara -> sainte des canons, regarder ce qu’ils disent à ce propos
P.176 -> plan de la bataille de Eylau et rôle de l’artillerie pendant (Chapitre sur Sénarmont), puis pareil
pour Friedland !

Bataille d’Essling p.194 pour la prise de Vienne

Chapitres sur Eblé (celui qui se charge de construire les 2 ponts) et Drouot -où il y a un plan de la bataille
de Lutzen).

Appendice 15 sur les règles de base de l’artillerie en bataille.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE IMPORTANTE !!!