Utilitarianism

#笔记/书评/ContPP

1. Background
Rawls’s theory would be a natural place to begin a survey of contemporary theories of
justice;
Rawls developed his theory by responding utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism is both a comprehensive moral theory and a specifically political philosophy
theory.
Two Attractions
1. The pursuit of human welfare or utility
The goal which utilitarians seek to promote does not depend on the existence of God;
Happiness, welfare or well-being is something that we all pursue in our own lives.
2. Utilitarianism's 'consequentialism'
Utilitarianism provides a test to ensure that such rules serve some useful function.
Consequentialism is also attractive because it conforms to our intuitions about the
difference between morality and other spheres.
Consequentialism also seems to provide a straightforward method for resolving moral
questions.
3. Two parts
An account of human welfare, or 'utility';
An instruction to maximise utility, so defined, giving equal weight to each person's utility.

Define Utility
Welfare hedonism
1. the experience or sensation of pleasure is the chief human good
an end-in-itself, to which all other goods are means;
'pushpin is as good as poetry';
Seemingly pain: happiness lies precisely in these apparently unpleasant sensations.
2. Nozick’s argument
A machine creating the most pleasurable conscious states imaginable;
If pleasure were our greatest good, we would all volunteer to be hooked to this machine;
But surely very few people would volunteer. Far from being the best life we can lead, it
hardly counts as leading a life at all.
And while we hope we will be happy in doing them, we would not give them up, even for
guaranteed happiness.
 Non-hedonistic mental-state utility
1. Diversified values
Utilitarianism is concerned with all valuable experiences, whatever form they take.
But this does not avoid Nozick's objection;
What we want in life is something more than, or other than, the acquisition of any kind of
mental state, any kind of 'inner glow'.
Preference satisfaction
1. Leaves too much in
Satisfaction of our preferences isn’t a good parameter for our welfare;
It is more accurate to say that our preferences are predictions about our good;
What’s worth doing doesn’t equal what we currently prefer;
Having the preference does not make it valuable-on the contrary, its being valuable is a
good reason for preferring it (not a good measurement).
2. Adaptive preferences
The more difficult it is for people to imagine changing, the more likely they will adapt their
preferences so as to desire only those things which are consistent with these roles.
This raises a serious problem for evaluating political institutions in terms of their ability to
satisfy people's preferences.
Informed preferences
1. How to know what preferences are informed and how to make comparisons?
The two goods may be 'incommensurable'-not measurable on any single scale;
Our utility increased on this fourth account, without it ever affecting our conscious
experiences (drop out the experience requirement);
How about the dead?
This is the problem of the 'interpersonal comparability' of utility.
2. Is it failed?
After all, these difficulties of identifying and balancing informed preferences arise not only
in utilitarian moral reasoning;
It would require an extreme form of solipsism to assume that we cannot make rational
judgements comparing utility across lives.
3. Indirect ways
The government can deal with the problem of irrational or adaptive preferences by trying
to ensure the appropriate conditions for the genesis of those preferences.
We can ignore the details of individuals' preferences and focus instead on the all-purpose
goods like liberties and resources which are useful to people whatever their more specific
preferences.
As we will see, this 'resourcist' solution to the problem of interpersonal comparability is
adopted by most liberal theories of justice;
If we are to reject utilitarianism, then, it will have to be because of the second part of the
 theory.

Maximising Utility
1. A brief introduction
Utilitarianism provides an oversimplified account of our commitment to consequentialism.
Our intuitions do not tell us that equal amounts of utility should always have the same
weight.
2. Some important differences
‘We’: is-on one view, all of us are obliged to act according to utilitarian principles, even in
our personal conduct (comprehensive moral utilitarianism);
On the other view, it is the major social institutions which are specifically obliged to act
according to utilitarian principles (political utilitarianism).
how different actions would affect the satisfaction of informed preferences (direct
utilitarianism);
Morally right actions are those that maximise utility, but agents are more likely to maximize
utility by following non-utilitarian rules (indirect utilitarianism)
Special relationships
It seems that the objection towards utilitarianism by arguing that it neglects some specific
kinds of values or obligations is using intuition, but we may apply virtue ethics to solve it.
You yourself may be some kind of indirect utilitarianist.
It would also be important to add social customs into our consideration.
1. The seemingly ultimate value of our obligations
Utilitarian reasoning disregard any backward-looking entitlements, at least in a direct way.
It is of no interest of a U-agent that he has any kinds of common obligations.
In our intuition, the past circumstances or actions of people can create differential
entitlement or deserts to things.
Utilitarianism could argue with the resentment or some kind of predictions.
But, as the author mentions, this still denies the specific value of our obligations.
Utilitarianism tries to repress obligations but this seems counter-intuitive.
2. The importance of commitment
Utilitarianism asks in effect that I be no more attached to my commitments than to other
people’s.
We never consider others’ projects as having an equal claim on our own time.
The author tries to debate with utilitarianism in both empirical and normative ways.
A valuable human life, on just about anyone's account of it, is one filled with attachments
that structure one's life, that give some direction to it.
It is the prospect of subsequent achievement or progress in such a commitment that
makes our current actions meaningful.
 The problem in all of these cases is the U-agent's assumption that each person has an
equal claim to benefit from all of his actions.
Our intuitive commitment to the general idea of consequentialism never included a
commitment to the continuous impartial determination
Illegitimate preferences
Rule-utilitarianism seems to follow Kant’s procedure of universal formula.
There may exist different interpretations of our duty when considering different
dimensions. But why do different dimensions exist?
1. Some illegitimate source of utility
Some unreasonable preferences regarded as justice are not necessarily irrational from the
point of view of an individual’s utility.
In our intuition, the violation to unpopular minorities has some intrinsic wrongness
regardless of its possible utility.
But for utilitarians there’s no standard of what ‘rightfully’ belongs to anyone prior to the
calculation of utility.
2. Rule-utilitarianism and its variables
We should apple the reset of utility to rules and then perform whichever act is endorsed
by the best rules.
Some commentators argue that rule-utilitarianism collapses into act-utilitarianism.
How could we be so sure that the rules will always protect the rights of weak and
unpopular minorities?
The responses of utilitarianism doesn’t answer for the right reasons. The wrongness is
present whatever the long-term effects on others.
The recognition of special obligations are not subject to the maximisation of utility.
The rule utilitarian is still committed to including all preferences, no matter how morally
illegitimate they may appear.
3. A standard of rightness
We should be non-utilitarianism in our moral reasoning.
We should measure different kinds of decision-making procedure to decide which could
maximise our utility.
But indirect utilitarismes could be ‘self-defeating’.
‘Government House’ utilitarianism and its objections.
We may share the same two-level moral outlook.
Even if the utilitarian standard of rightness can justify our procedure, how could the
justification itself be justified?
Isn't it more plausible to say that the reason why we use non-utilitarian procedures is
simply that we accept a non-utilitarian standard of rightness?
This problem stems directly from the utilitarian standard of rightness.
 Two Arguments for Utility Maximisation
Equal consideration of interests
1. The first interpretation
We need a standard that specifies the morally right trade-offs among people’s
preferences.
Utilitarianism argues that each person’s interest should be given equal consideration.
To do this we count everyone for one.
The byproduct of this is the maximisation of utility.
Teleological utilitarianism
1. Primary value
People are just locations of utilities, the basic bearer of value for utilitarianism is the state
of affairs.
Our primary duty is to maximise utility and equal consideration for individuals is a mere
consequence.
In this interpretation we may accept the doubling of population although non-existent
people do not have claims.
Thomas Nagel’s ‘deontological’ constraint of equal treatment onto utilitarianism.
2. Two interpretations and their weaknesses
Morality matters because humanity matters, and it’s not quite should why to maximise
utility is our duty;
Maximising utility isn’t a moral ideal but an aesthetic ideal, as one person would be
dropped out if they’re not useful contributors to respect the good.
But what does it mean by ‘drop out’? How about the tyranny of the majority?
One of utilitarianism's attractions was its secular nature.
If we view utilitarianism as an egalitarian doctrine, as the maximising standard opposes our
intuition, then the maximising standard is just a consequence if and only if it’s the best way
to treat people as equals.
But that interpretation leads to a number of results which conflict with our sense of what it
is to treat people as equals.

Inadequate Conception of Equality

1. A brief introduction
Utilitarianism seek to treat people as equals though it may have unequal effects on
people;
Utilitarianism has misinterpreted the ideal of equal consideration for each person's
interests,
And, as a result, it allows some people to be treated as less than equals, as means to other
people's ends.
 An adequate account of equal consideration must distinguish different kinds of
preferences, only some of which have legitimate moral weight.
External preferences
Should external preferences be counted as a moral reason for denying others ‘own
interest’? What if the one whose welfare is influenced agree with that preference?
1. Personal and external preferences
Indirect utilitarians argue that we could exclude external preferences from our everyday
decision-procedure if they make us worse off.
But could we exclude them off wholly from our standard of rightness despite their
content?
Utilitarianism must reject the [external] preferences of those who passionately accept that
false theory.
But isn’t this claim itself be an external preference? Or we could they that what we hope to
do is to better ‘treat people as equals’.
Selfish preferences
1. Hare and John Mackie
Utilitarians deny that a fair share could exist independently of utilitarian calculations.
But we may find justification from utilitarian’s own deepest principle for adopting a theory
of fair shares.
Hare, like most utilitarians, believes that all rational preferences should be included in
utility aggregation.
For Hare, we should choose actions that are best for ‘we’s, which is a vivid description of
aggregation.
But as Mackie notes, we could accept an egalitarian one of distribution as the abstract
notion of equality.
Utilitarians point out that their view may also lead to an egalitarian distribution of
resources.
On Mackie’s view, the state should secure each person’s share of resources, but Hare
argues that proviso for taking away my share is required by the same value that led the
government initially to give it to me.
2. Justice and utility
It’s interesting that why Kymlicka’s argument using our intuition seems vague is that there’s
no conception to describe something like justice in the utilitarian theory.
Hare thinks that to secure my share is in fact treating others wronged and not equal.
This is interesting which reminds us of the tyranny of the majority and the edge of public
sphere.
But through our intuition we can say that I still respect them as equals since I make no
claim on the resources they have to lead their lives. But they do not respect me as an
equal.
 In our common sense we should not expect others to subsidise our projects at the
expense of their own.
But what is ‘our own’? How about those jobs?
Hare’s reasoning isn’t a bad one, but to promote his ends we should know how much by
way of resources we have to pursue our projects, and how much is rightfully left for others.
According to Rawls, Justice 'limits the admissible conceptions of the good, so that those
conceptions the pursuit of which violate the principles of justice are ruled out absolutely:
the claims to pursue inadmissible conceptions have no weight at all’;
For utilitarians, on the other hand, 'no restrictions founded on right and justice are
imposed on the ends through which satisfaction is to be achieved.
What does ‘rightfully’ mean? And what if two people’s preferences, both take equality into
whose formation, conflict? Is there any prior procedure to deal with this?
3. The failure of utilitarianism
Utilitarianism tells us that equality means to take the aggregation of pre-existing
preferences into equal consideration.
But our intuition tells is to take equality into the very formation of our preferences, building
concern for consequences at a different and indeed earlier stage.
We should exclude prejudiced or selfish preferences that ignore the rightful claims of
others but allow for the kind of special commitments that are partof our very idea of
leading a life.
It’s not a balance between the values of utility and equality, but rather the modifications of
utilitarianism’s principle from its deepest understanding of equality.
4. The essence of political arguments
Political theorizing is a matter of correctly deducing specific principles from this shared
premiss of moral equality.
Each theory of justice is not deduced from the ideal of equality, but rather aspires to it, and
each theory can be judged by how well it succeeds in that aspiration.
‘That is not the same thing, of course, as granting them a discretion to act as they like; it
sets a standard which they must try-and may fail-to meet, because it assumes that one
conception is superior to another.'
Any attempt to spell out and defend our beliefs about the principles which should govern
the political community will take this form of comparing different conceptions of the
concept of equality.

The Politics of Utilitarianism

1. The current situation of utilitarianism
Utilitarianism, as a self-conscious political and philosophical movement, arose as a radical
critique of English society.
Contemporary utilitarians, on the other hand, are 'surprisingly conformists’.
It’s now widely acknowledged that there are good utilitarian reasons to defer to everyday
morality which has passed the test of cultural evolution;
Williams claims that this sort of utilitarianism which no one ever reason in an explicitly
utilitarian point of view is self-defeating-it argues for its own disappearance.
Utilitarianism, on some modern views of it, leaves everything as it is-it stands above, rather
than competes with, everyday political decision-making.
The majority has long since acquired its basic civil and political rights which once once
oppressed by a elitist minority.
Many of the burning political questions have centred on the rights of historically
oppressed minorities, and the answer utilitarianism gives is vague, considering the short
term and long term.
Nowadays we need to define the scale when doing calculations and measure the reliability
of our calculations.
Not all kinds of utility are measurable or commensurable, and that it is not always
appropriate even to try to measure these utilities.