Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Examquestions 1
Examquestions 1
Theory Instructor: Michał Lewandowski, PhD
Problem 1
Agnieszka Radwanska plays tennis with Caroline Wozniacki. Agnieszka may choose to aim at
Wozniacki’s backhand or Wozniacki’s forehand. If Wozniacki predicts correctly, which side will
Radwanska choose, she will return the ball with higher probability. The payoff table in terms of
probabilities of scoring a point is given below:
a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game and calculate equilibrium payoffs of both tennis players.
Nash equilibria: …………………..……………………………………………………………………………..…………………..
Equilibrium payoffs:…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
b) Determine the Best response correspondences of both tennis players and draw them on the
diagram below:
Best response correspondences:
………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………
Problem 2
The following game is given:
a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game
…………………………………………………………………………………….
b) Find security levels of both Mr Raw and Mrs Column (payoffs that they can guarantee
themselves) – first write the payoffs of Mr Raw and Mrs Column game:
Security levels: Mr Raw’s:………………………., Mrs Column:……………………………
c) Draw the payoff polygon for the original game and mark the Status Quo point (given by
players’ security levels) and the negotiation set.
d) Find the Nash arbitration solution
……………………………………………………………………………………………
Problem 3
Consider the following duopoly game. We have two firms, producing an identical good. Each firm
chooses its production quantity (x1 and x2). The price of the good is given by the inverse demand
function p(x1,x2)=60‐3(x1+x2) (or 0 if the sum of production quantities exceeds 20). Marginal cost is
constant and is 12 for both firms. Both players want to maximize profit, which is the difference
between revenue and cost.
a) (Cournot) Assume that the players make their choices of x1 and x2 simultaneously. Find the
Nash equilibria and equilibrium profits
…..………………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
b) (Stackelberg) Assume that player 1 makes his choice first, and then after that player 2 is making
her choice after observing player 1’s choice. Timing of the game, payoffs and possible actions –
all these elements are common knowledge in this game. Determine the equilibrium and
equilibrium payoffs.
………..………………………………….……..…………………………………………..…………………
……………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Problem 4
Consider the following game in extensive form:
a) Transform this game into strategic form.
b) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria.
……………………………………………………………………
c) Are there Nash equilibria, which are not Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in this game?
……………………
d) How many subgames are there in the game tree above (the whole game is also a subgame)?
……………........
Problem 5
Consider the following game:
Player 2
X Y
A 4,2 0,2
Player 1 B 1,1 4,2
C 2,3 2,1
a) Solve the game by iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Each time, indicate what
strategy dominates a given strategy. Determine the Nash equilibrium which is the solution of
this process.
………………..…………………………………….…………………………………………………………………
b) Did we loose some Nash equilibria by using procedure of iterative elimination of dominated
strategies? If yes, write which one.
…………………….…………………………………….…………………………………………………………..
Problem 6
Consider the following ultimatum game.
a) How many strategies does Player 1 have? How many strategies does Player 2 have?
Player 1:………….., Player 2:…………….
b) Find all Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria of this game
……………………………………………………………………………………………….
c) Is the following strategy: “accept 3 and reject everything else” for Player 2 and “offer 3” for Player 1 a
Nash equilibrium? If yes, why?
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
Problem 7
Find all Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the following game:
Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Zadanie 8
Consider the following game from the lecture (Bank run game)
a) Is there a separating equilibrium in this game in which a good type withdraws money and a bad type
does not withdraw money from the bank?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
b) Check the following strategies: Player 1: Does not withdraw; Player 2: good type: does not withdraw,
bad type: Withdraw. Is it a Bayesian Nash equilibrium? If yes, for what beliefs of Player 1?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Problem 9 (EXTRA)
Alice, Beatrice, Cecil and Dylan, Ernie and Felix are classmates from the same school. After long discussions the
boys agreed that the most important criterion to evaluate a given girl is that a blond girl has blue eyes and a
brunette has dark eyes. The girls on the other hand agreed similarly that the most important criterion to
evaluate a given boy is his height: the taller the better. The second criterion (less important) for both girls and
boys turned out to be the hair color: any given girl wants the boy with a different hair color than her own and
any given boy wants the girl with the same hair color as his own. The characteristics of both girls and boys is
given in the following tables:
a) Determine the rankings of both girls (concerning boys) and boys (concerning girls):
…………………………………………….
…………………………………………….
…………………………………………….
d) Can you gain by reporting false preferences? Hint: Use a Gale‐Shapley algorithm with boys proposing, when
Alice lies about her true ranking and tells that she prefers Felix to Dylan. What will be the stable matching
then?
…………………………………………….
…………………………………………….
…………………………………………….