1,800 5.

Failure to accomplish the intended function is

-
l=::J Operating time, % CJ SU and SD time, % c:::J Total risk-operating 70 HYDROCARBON PROCESSING I MAY 2001
1,600 E.:lTotal risk-SU and SD -
mEil Relative risk during operation
1,400 , c:::::J Relative risk-SU and SD -

1,200 ,_I

1,000 -
800 -
-
600

!
400 -
200
:
: I -
.... . _... .:·:·
0 n IL.Wm : n Case B
Case A

f ig. 1. Safety or environmental incidents are more likely

during startup.

the design intent.4 This is accomplished at Rohm and

Haas using the following approach :
1. A process description is prepared that summa
rizes the information available about the process .
This includes information on chemicals handled and
pro cess conditions as well as detailed process
information such as P&IDs and equipment
specifications.
2. After the process has been subdivided into
logical segments for analysis, the operating intention
of each process segment is written. The
segmentation can be based on unit operations, major
functions in the process or steps in the operating
instructions. For each segment or function, the
intended operation is written to describe what is
being done and the related process parameters (e.g.,
temperature, pressure, feed rates, times, etc.). It is
important to fully specify the intention to be able to
identify as many deviations as possible.
3. A multidisciplined team is convened to perform
the HAZOP analysjs. This team must include a
facili tator knowledgeable inHAZOP methodology,
plus some one with direct operating experience. (At
Rohm and Haas, we require participation of a
process operator in all HAZOPs, since he or she
knows how th ngs are actu ally done in the field.
OSHA 1910.119 requires this for covered processes
.) The owner representative role is generally filled
by the process engineer on the project, who usually
has led preparation of the p:rocess descrip tion and
intention documentation . Other participants can
include a chemist, process control engineer, other
project team engineers, maintenance engineer, plant
mechanic , operating foreman, industrial hygienist or
anyone else possessing expertise that would benefit
the team. Obviously, participants can contribute in
any field they have some confidence in. A team can
be as small as three members or as many as a dozen;
five to seven is considered ideal.
4. The team reviews the process description and
the intention, and agrees that the plant is safe if
operated as intended.
referred to as a deviation. Deviations are developed
by applying guide word s to the process parameters.
Exam ples of guide words are: NO, MORE, LESS,
AS WELL AS, PART OF, REVERSE and OTHER
THAN. The
parameters include flow, temperature, pressure,
time, level, pH, composition, mixing, quantity and
sequence. Other parameters are used if appropriate
. The team brainstorms deviations from the intention
. 9. The risk tolerability must be assessed. Risk is a
6. Causes of the deviation are then identified
and listed. Causes include:
• Operating error
• Instrument/control system failure
• Equipment failures
411 Utility problems
411 Other (e.g., site-specific).
Causes should be specific, e.g., forget to close
valve. When an operating error is identified, the team
should look for conditions that contribute to the
likelihood of the error. This allows you to get into
root causes of the error.
7. Next, consequences of the deviation are deter
mined . It is assumed that no safeguards are in
place. Each cause can have a different consequence
or even multiple consequences ; the numbering
system of the record relates causes and
consequences. A deviation may have a consequence
in a downstream equipment item or a step later
than the one in the intention, so the consequence
must be developed to its ultimate con sequence
without safeguard s. For example, the conse quence
of high pressure in a vessel is a potential explo sion,
not triggering a high-pressure shutdmvn interlock.
8. Existing safeguard s must be listed.
- Copyright © 2001AlTR ights Reserved
Safeguards are engineeri ng features (interlocks,
rupture disks, abatement devices, fire protection
systems, etc.), admh1- istrative features (operating
procedures, preventive maintenance, etc.) or
consequence mitigation features (dikes, sprinkler
systems, emergency response plans, etc.) that reduce
likelihood of the deviation or seveYity of the
consequences . Safeguards are also numbered to
match their cause and consequence.
function of the expected consequence severity and
like lihood of the deviation . At Rohm and Haas, we
gener ally use an order of magnitude approach based
on the experiences of the HAZOP team.
10. Comments or recommendations are recorded. A
HAZOP is intended to identify issues. It is not intended
that the recommendations wili be summary; often they
recommend additional work or analysis to reach a sum
mary recommendation .
This classica1 approach to HAZOP can
legitimately be described as a failure modes and
effects analysis (FMEA) directed by guide words.
The HAZOP inten tion is equivalent to the function
definition in an FMEA; the deviation is the
functional failure. A HAZOP cause is equivalent to a
failure mode; the consequences are equivalent to
failure effects . Guide words help keep the focus of
the analysis high, at the overall process level, to help
ensure that system interactions are properly
explored. This correspondence between HAZOP and
FMEA will be very important when we look at com
bining hazards and reliability analyses.
Variations on the HAZOP theme. HAZOP
methodologies vary somewhat. Sometimes the focus is