Use of Force Analysis

related to the death of

Jamal Sutherland
in the

Sheriff Al Cannon Detention Center

Charleston County Sheriff’s Office

Charleston, South Carolina

July 24, 2021

July 24, 2021

Solicitor Scarlett Wilson

Ninth Circuit Solicitor’s Office
Charleston, South Carolina

Solicitor Wilson:

You have asked for opinions on generally accepted jail practices as they pertain to the tragic death
of Jamal Sutherland. There was ample evidence in this case for me to confidently form those
opinions and reach conclusions as to whether the actions, policy, training, supervision and general
practice of the Sheriff Al Cannon Detention Center (SACDC), and its employees, conformed to
standards and generally accepted jail policy, training and practices regarding the death of Jamal
Sutherland. Additionally, there was ample evidence regarding the effect of these matters on the
involved deputies.

I have relied upon my education, training and experience to form these opinions, which includes:

• 31 years in a career with the Ada County Sheriff’s Office in Boise, Idaho where the jail
was similarly sized to the SACDC.
• 10 years as the elected sheriff Ada County, Idaho.
• 7 years serving as a US Attorney General’s appointment to the National Institute of
Corrections – the leading federal agency in corrections policy and practice.
• Appointments by two federal courts to monitor Consent Decrees in jails regarding the
unreasonable use of force.
• Master’s degree in criminal justice administration from Boise State University
• Graduate of the FBI National Academy, FBI National Executive Institute, FBI Law
Enforcement Education and Development Seminar, FBI Command College, Northwestern
University School of Police Staff & Command, National Sheriffs Institute and others.
• Analysis and review of over 50 controversial incidents across the United States, mostly
involving the use of force and in-custody deaths.

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It is important to know that beyond the statutes and codes, there are no compulsory standards for
jails in the United States. For this analysis, I have, first and foremost, relied upon US Supreme
Court decisions that have helped define reasonable, and unreasonable, force in jails. Beyond that,
I have most often relied upon generally accepted jail practices, or those practices that are
established and accepted as proper within the jail industry. Also, where applicable, this analysis
incorporates accreditation standards and best practices from organizations like the American Jail
Association, American Correctional Association and National Commission on Correctional Health
Care.

As with most states, South Carolina has “Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities in
South Carolina”; however, also like most states, those standards are mostly administrative and
discuss living conditions, reporting procedures and the requirement to have policies, but not what
those policies should say. There are no South Carolina Jail Standards for compelling court
appearances, de-escalation and force avoidance practices, cell extractions or the proper use of
chemical agents, the TASER device or other use of force tactics and practices. Unfortunately, this
absence of guidance is common.

Training standards, especially those from a manufacturer, are additional considerations for whether
the use of a weapon was appropriate or not. For example, Axon Enterprises Inc., the company that
produced the TASER, provided limited guidance as to the frequency, duration and risks of
simultaneous TASER exposure. Those are also incorporated in this analysis.

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 Summary

In about 2008, the Charleston County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO) made the decision to contract
tactical training for the jail to a vendor who taught highly aggressive tactics. The evidence shows
the CCSO believed they were having too many staff and inmate injuries during forcible cell
extractions with their existing tactical team and the vendor promised to reduce those.

The vendor renamed the SACDC tactical team the Special Operations Group (SOG) and brought
them tactics that emphasized the use of weapons and intimidation to gain compliance from
detainees.

The SOG operated under this outsourced training until about the end of 2018 when the SACDC
became unsatisfied with the vendor’s practices and behaviors. The training contract ended and in
2019 the SACDC began providing the training with internal instructors. The aggressive tactics
and the presence of weapons continued.

By the time of the event with Sutherland, the practice of the SACDC was that only SOG members
were to be involved in forcible cell extractions. However, the number of SOG members had
dwindled and there were often only one or two people available each shift.

Additionally, the custom and practice of the SACDC was to forcibly compel a detainee’s
attendance at any Bond Court hearing even though that violated SACDC policy.

On January 4, 2021, Jamal Sutherland was arrested at the Palmetto Lowcountry Behavior Health
facility in North Charleston for striking a staff member. Sutherland was taken to the SACDC for
booking but was uncooperative. He was placed into an isolation cell in the Behavioral Management
Unit.

On January 5, 2021, at about 9:00 AM Sutherland was scheduled to appear in Bond Court but he
refused to cooperate. The on-duty jail commander followed the long-standing custom and practice
that Sutherland should be forced to appear in Bond Court in person. Deputy Brian Houle was the
only SOG member on duty so he was summoned to help. Houle asked Sergeant Lindsay Fickett
to help because she had several years of experience in SOG, even though she had left the team
when she was transferred to a housing assignment in about October 2020.

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Sutherland continued to refuse to submit to handcuffing, so Fickett and Houle eventually used
oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray), their electronic control weapons (commonly referred to as a
TASER) and physical force to help gain control of Sutherland. After an intense struggle, Fickett
and Houle were able to control Sutherland, handcuff him and bring him out of the cell. As they
began putting him into an emergency restraint chair, they noticed he was unresponsive. Medical
staff were present and provided treatment, but Sutherland died.

This analysis relied upon evidence obtained from the CCSO, the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division (SLED), the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Axon (TASER).

It is worth noting that the CCSO apparently had great difficulty locating and producing much of
the evidence in this case, causing significant delays. Additionally, there was a considerable
amount of evidence that would have been available and considered in most cases but was
apparently not retained and available from the CCSO.

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 Summary of Major Conclusions

Fickett and Houle’s actions contributed to the death of Sutherland. However, the SACDC customs,
practices, training, and lack of policy and capable supervision were significantly responsible for
the situation itself and the actions the deputies took. The most tragic finding is that this event was
unnecessary and only happened because of the failures of leadership in the SACDC.

Specific findings:

1. The SACDC had adopted dangerous and unproven tactics for cell extractions.
2. The SACDC failed to adequately train staff in mental health awareness and practices.
3. The SACDC failed to provide a sufficient number of deputies to safely conduct a cell
extraction.
4. The SACDC failed to train and reinforce de-escalation techniques to avoid the use of force.
5. The SACDC commander ordered Sutherland to be forcibly taken to Bond Court without
cause and in violation of SACDC policy.
6. The SACDC failed to adequately train staff on waiting periods after the use of OC.
7. The SACDC failed to adequately train staff on limiting the number of TASER deployments
by a single individual and precautions against simultaneous deployments.
8. The SACDC failed to adequately train staff on the precautions against compressional and
positional asphyxia.
9. The SACDC had an unreasonable custom and practice of always putting a spit hood over
the head of someone who had been the subject of force.
10. The SACDC ranking staff failed to adequately supervise the line staff, allowing customs
and practices that were dangerous and in violation of SACDC policies.
11. The SACDC failed to establish proper policies that governed weapons and uses of force.

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 History of SACDC’s Tactical Response Team

The contemplation of criminal charges against Fickett or Houle should consider how the deputies
were trained, supervised and governed by policy. While the following does not directly relate to
the events of January 5, 2021, it is very relevant as to how Fickett and Houle came to be in the
incident and what the SACDC custom and practice was.

Lieutenant Tyrone Shaw had long been involved in SOG and was one of the key leaders throughout
the vendor’s contract and then when the SACDC took charge of their own training. He said that
prior to about 2008, the SACDC used five-person deputy teams for forcible cell extractions, but
staff and detainee injuries were frequent. There was no evidence in the record that showed the
numbers of injuries SACDC was experiencing. There was also no evidence of their tactics to know
if poor training may have contributed to the injuries. Four to six person teams are common for
jails the size of the SACDC and most operate with only a minimal frequency of injuries to staff or
detainees.

Contract with Untested Vendor

In about 2008, SACDC Chief Willis Beatty contracted with a private vendor, to redesign the
training and tactics for the SACDC tactical response team. There was no evidence as to why the
vendor was chosen or what his qualifications were. The vendor renamed the Emergency Response
Team the Special Operations Group (SOG). The training sought to form a specialized group of
deputies that would serve as a full-time tactical team within the jail. SOG members were called
“operators” rather than deputies and wore tactical clothing, including loadbearing vests. They also
adopted a practice, unheard of in most jails, that the SOG members routinely carried tactical 12-
gauge shotguns loaded with less lethal munitions, regardless of whether there was an immediate
need for them or not. Probably most significant to this event, the vendor changed the number of
deputies involved in an extraction to only two, and sometimes one.

It is highly unusual for a jail the size of Charleston County to have a full-time tactical team and it
is virtually unheard of for anyone to routinely carry firearms inside a jail. The SACDC website
reports a physical capacity of 1,693 detainees. Most jails of this size have a tactical team but call
on them as needed from the ranks of deputies who are otherwise involved in routine duties such

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as supervising housing units, intake processing, transportation, etc. When called upon, those
deputies often don protective gear and obtain equipment and weapons as needed. The only
evidence about the frequency of violence or resistance in the SACDC was that on average there
was a cell extraction every few weeks to few months. This is consistent with similarly sized jails
and does not explain the need for the SOG.

The vendor began teaching aggressive tactics, emphasizing the use of weapons and physical force.
The evidence included verbal and printed statements emphasizing humane treatment, force
avoidance and similar practices, but the evidence did not show that those practices were part of
the curriculum. In fact, the evidence suggests just the opposite – that the SOG was taught
aggression and intimidation as a way to avoid resistance.

The SACDC did not possess or retain any of the training objectives or lesson plans for the SOG
training. In fact, it appears the only written materials used for training was a schedule and
PowerPoint slides, but the students were not given copies of the slides. According to Shaw, the
vendor claimed his training materials were “classified”. Furthermore, there was no policy, written
procedure or testing to select and certify SOG deputies. Certification was solely at the discretion
of the vendor.

Failing to review, approve and retain records of training, especially high-liability training, violates
generally accepted law enforcement practices. It is critical for an agency to know what their
deputies are being taught and as will be explained in more detail, the absence of that in the CCSO
is shocking. It is also important to provide reference material to trainees and the SACDC failed to
do so.

As evidence of the SOG training trickled in from the CCSO for this analysis, the SACDC practices
became more and more concerning. Three videos emerged, likely from around 2011 of the vendor
leading training sessions where two deputies, one being Fickett, were the subject of what can only
be called hazing. Six other SACDC deputies were also present and appeared to be the existing
SOG team, or part of it. In the first video the vendor refers to himself as a “Senior Team Leader”
and appears to narrate for the benefit of the video camera saying they were going to test the
candidate’s ability to deal with stress. He went on to explain that there would be an oleoresin
capsicum (OC), commonly known as pepper spray, exposure to simulate a potential event in the

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jail when a SOG operator may not be able to don their gas mask. The vendor said it was to make
sure the candidate would be able to have good use of force decision-making and to see if they
could maintain their mental composure and professionalism under stress.

The second video clip (a screenshot

shown at right) began about 45 minutes
later and showed Fickett, already
doused in OC, as the vendor shouted
questions and “whooped” loudly while
emptying two riot control-sized
canisters of OC at her. During this, there
was nothing that would demonstrate any
test of her use of force decision making
or anything other than the tolerance of unnecessary pain and discomfort. This excessive OC
exposure did not meet any legitimate jail training objective, nor did it accomplish what the vendor
said it was intended for.

The third video clip started a few

minutes later with someone narrating
that each of the two candidates (Fickett
and another) had by then been exposed
to two grenades (presumably OC), and
six cannisters of OC. Both candidates
were then brought back before the
group. It is clear that both were in
distress from the immense amount of
OC to which they had been exposed.
Some of the deputies present told the candidates they should quit, but they refused. Again, this
was clearly a hazing exercise and had no legitimate training purpose. The vendor gave each of the
two a fresh canister of OC and had them face off at each other. He then asked them a series of
questions and, per his instructions, they replied by yelling, “No, I will not!” while discharging the

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OC canister into the other candidate’s face. Once those canisters were empty, the vendor sprayed
three more canisters into the faces of the candidates.

I do not have sufficient words to describe how ridiculous this was. The unnecessary and excessive
exposure to OC can cause respiratory, skin, eye and other medical issues. I am not versed in South
Carolina’s hazing, torture, assault and similar statutes, but the vendor’s actions may have
amounted to criminal conduct.

While some of the vendor’s verbalizations and written statements emphasized force avoidance,
there was no evidence of meaningful de-escalation or avoidance training in the SOG training.
Fickett later said SOG training was a lot of physical work – carrying things, lifting things, running,
tactics, weapons manipulation and some “combatives.” She said they were pepper sprayed once
a week or more when the vendor ran the training. She was also clear that there was no meaningful
SOG training on de-escalation techniques, even when she later became an SOG instructor. A
training flyer from the vendor’s company for a 5-day SOG course listed 17 training topics but none
were related to de-escalation or force avoidance.

Two documents in the evidence appeared to be PowerPoint slide printouts from the vendor’s
training. There was no indication of the timeframe the slides were created or used – or if they were
even used to train SACDC deputies. When compared against generally accepted jail training
practices, the PowerPoint slides were seriously insufficient to instruct and direct deputies how to
avoid the use of force, judge when and how much force to use, or how to recognize unreasonable
force, etc. Examples include:

• The slides included broad, sometimes confusing statements, like “However, operational
pause should be given when consideration about using the necessary force on in [sic]
inmate.”
• In the slides addressing mentally ill detainees, the instruction discussed various weapons
to use but failed to address when they are appropriate.
• Some slides provided clinical explanations or behavioral patterns of mental health
disorders, while another slide entitled “Profiling Inmates” seemed to suggest deputies
should identify whether a detainee is bipolar, schizophrenic, has “manic depressive
disorders” or is “mentally retarded.” I am not qualified to evaluate the psychological

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 accuracy of the vendor’s slides, but generally accepted correctional training recognizes that
deputies are not qualified to differentiate these disorders. Moreover, the terminology used
is clearly inappropriate.

At the same time, there were elements of the PowerPoints that were applicable to the event
involving Sutherland. Examples include:

• Instruction to know the mental health history of inmates.

o “When dealing with the mentally ill, we do not resort to using an ECD (Taser)
without first offering options, issuing commands and when safe or reasonable,
attempting physical skills.”
o Regarding mentally ill detainees: “Extreme caution should be given when
attempting to use physical control techniques. Mentally ill inmates have a tendency
of posing a high level of pain tolerance and have demonstrated extra human
strength.”
• Instruction to be aware of an inmate’s situation.
o “Reframe [sic] from using OC to gain compliance as it will only exacerbate the
situations further.”
o “Inmates that have been exposed to OC have a propensity not to listen to verbal
instructions as they are pushed further into a mental state.”
• Direction for conducting dynamic cell extractions.
o “Have multiple plans worked out.”
o “Don’t be afraid to reset, close the door and re-access [sic].”

In the document, there were about 17 pages labeled Student Handout & Study Guide however
many of the pages contained no instructional information and the testimonial evidence showed the
students were not provided any handout materials.

In-house SOG Training and Tactics

By 2018 the vendor’s reputation and business practices had come into question. Four SOG
members wrote statements about the training. The complaints centered on the vendor’s bias, poor
training of new recruits, use of CCSO time and personnel for personal marketing materials and

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serious inconsistencies in training. A senior SOG leader wrote, “The command staff have been
aware of all these issues with trainings, his uncontrollable canines attacking officers, his language
etc. for some years now. It has placed a serious drop in morale on the SOG team. It has even
hindered the amount of new officers willing to come out to training because they know that they
will have to bear the burden of dealing with the inconsistencies that come with [the vendor] and
SOG training.” Another deputy wrote, “Many of the command staff who would stay in the
trainings for minutes, we felt would not stay or attend for long because many of the trainings did
not fit the policy of this detention center. So why then, where [sic] the staff of this detention center
being placed under such a strain? Placed under a training program that would not be utilized and
went against the policy of the detention center.” The deputy went on to say, “SOG operators were
basically told by command staff after [the vendor’s] trainings were over, forget what he has trained
and stick to policy. That has placed a strain on Operators…. [the vendor] is known for directing
an operator to go tactical one-way and five minutes to an hour later he will tell another operator
that’s not the way he wants it done.”

The contract between the CCSO and the vendor ended sometime in early 2019 and CCSO brought
the training in-house. By this time, Shaw had been promoted to lieutenant and Fickett had been
promoted to sergeant, and they took primary responsibility for revising and delivering the new, in-
house, SOG training. Much of the philosophy and confrontational tactics carried over into the new
training; however, Fickett said that much of the vendor’s training “…was more extreme than what
our policy allows” so they aligned it more closely with CCSO and SACDC policy. Still, no one
created any standardized objectives, lesson plans or training handouts that documented what was
taught and ensured consistency between SOG members. Fickett said that when policies changed
that affected SOG operation, they would simply adopt them by word-of-mouth.

When recently asked about de-escalation training, Fickett said, “From the amount of time that we
had and the amount of stuff that we had to cover, and none of us are really de-escalation trainers,
and we just didn’t even think to add it in. It was like, we have so much time for this much topics,
it wouldn’t — didn’t even cross our mind at all.”

The training practices used by the SACDC seriously failed to conform with generally accepted jail
practices. While more will be discussed on the topic later in this report, the evidence shows

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significant deficiencies for dealing with the mentally ill, de-escalation practices, tactics and safety
and the actual applications of force. While it appears the SACDC envisioned a highly trained and
competent tactical team, the evidence in this case demonstrates insufficient staffing, training and
supervision and a fundamental lack of competency. SACDC sanctioned and continued rogue
practices with the SOG training and failed to address policy violations and poor practices. This is
indefensible and a fundamental cause of why the events unfolded prior to Sutherland’s death.

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 Analysis and Opinions Specific to the Death of Sutherland

In June 2021, Fickett cooperated with the Ninth Circuit Solicitor’s Office and submitted to an
interview wherein she provided significant details about these events. The purpose of the interview
was to gain information that was otherwise not included in the interviews and reports. Her
statements are not admissible in a criminal prosecution but are included here as they are critical
to understanding the actions and decisions of January 5, 2021.

Some statements have been edited for readability, such as removing verbal pauses, but the context
has not been changed.

Arrest and Bond Court

On January 4, 2021, Sutherland and another person were arrested after an assault incident at The
Palmetto Lowcountry Behavioral Health facility. The evidence showed that the officers of the
North Charleston Police Department wisely tried to avoid the physical arrest of Sutherland but the
Palmetto Lowcountry Behavioral Health staff “were adamant” that Sutherland be arrested. It is not
unusual for behavioral health patients to become assaultive but contemporary police practices seek
to avoid the incarceration of a mentally ill person. In this instance it appears the arrests could not
be avoided.

During intake, Sutherland was continuing to demonstrate noncompliant behaviors and a mental
health request was made at 10:23 PM. The intake process was not completed at that time and
Sutherland was placed in the Behavioral Management Unit, a housing unit of individual cells
typically used for disciplinary isolation.

In the early morning hours of January 5, 2021, Sutherland was given his breakfast tray and spoon.
After breakfast, he refused to return the tray and spoon to jail staff.

At about 9:00 AM, Sutherland was scheduled to appear in Bond Court. Bond Court was held via
videoconferencing with the detainee remaining within the jail but appearing from a room
specifically configured with the audio/video connection. Sutherland refused to voluntarily submit
to handcuffing so he could be taken there. Lieutenant Bryan Duvall and Sergeant Christopher
Fennel learned of Sutherland’s refusal and went to the Behavioral Management Unit. Duvall later

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reported that Sutherland was verbalizing conspiracies and “random stuff”. Each time they asked
Sutherland to come to the door, he would refuse and challenge them.

SACDC staff, mostly Sergeant Fennel, spent 10 to 15 minutes trying to gain Sutherland’s
cooperation to appear in Bond Court. Fennell said Sutherland was saying a lot of things that did
not make sense and appeared to be mentally ill. He also said Sutherland was saying, “Kill me, I
want to die.” during their conversation and he saw Sutherland holding the plastic spoon that
Fennell thought may have been filed down to make a weapon. Toward the end of the conversation,
when Sutherland was ordered to come to the door, he walked to the back of the cell and said, “Pop
the pin.”

Brian Houle was the only SOG member on duty and was summoned in anticipation of a forcible
cell extraction. After learning of the situation, Houle called Fickett and asked if she could assist
him because Fickett had been a member of SOG for several years but had been reassigned to be a
housing sergeant in October 2020.

Houle later reported that there had been instances of a detainee being rescheduled for Bond Court
appearance when it appeared they were going to be violent. Houle said that he voiced his concern
to Duvall about using force on Sutherland to compel the attendance and he overheard Duvall
having conversations to try to delay Sutherland’s Bond Court appearance.

In Houle’s interview by SLED on January 15, 2021, he was questioned:

• Q: So, for the Sutherland extraction, you've voiced your concern to your chain of command?
Houle: “Absolutely.”
• Q: Okay. And, to your knowledge, they followed up with court and voiced—and relayed
your concerns? Houle: “Yes.”
• Q: And they relayed back, basically, you still got to get him to Bond Court? Houle: “Yes.
That's when my lieutenant called the captain, the commanding—the CDO who was on that
week, which was Captain Greathouse, and briefed her on what was going on. And, from
what—basically, like in a nutshell, what I gathered is she said, ’Judge wants to see him, so
bring him down there. Whichever way you have to.’"

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During his interview, Lieutenant Shaw said there had been many times when SOG deputies had
pushed back on performing cell extractions when it may have been unsafe. Shaw’s personal
practice was to ask the captain on duty to come to the cell block to see the situation. There were
many times the captain would then call the judge and get the hearing rescheduled.

Deputy Tamisha James was the Bond Court deputy on January 5. She said Duvall contacted her
and asked if Sutherland had to attend a bond hearing. James said that, per Captain Emma Salters’
directive, all inmates had to appear before the judge. She was aware of this from both Captain
Salters verbal orders and her knowledge of an email from 2017 that directed it. She even recalled
a separate incident in December 2020 when she had postponed an appearance to avoid the use of
force and Captain Salters told her that all inmates must attend Bond Court in person.

The CCSO Office of Professional Standards (OPS) later reported that Houle, “spoke with
Lieutenant Duvall about his concerns for performing a cell extraction with inmate Sutherland.
Lieutenant Duvall stated Deputy Houle did speak with him and brought up several issues.
Lieutenant Duvall explained Deputy Houle was the only Special Operations Group team member
working that day and inmate Sutherland was combative. Lieutenant Duvall also stated Deputy
Houle advised inmate Sutherland was a big man and had access to weapons (spoon/spork and
breakfast tray) in his cell.” Lieutenant Duvall contacted the Bond Court deputy who told him that
Sutherland’s appearance in front of the judge was mandatory. Lieutenant Duvall made a second
call to determine the origin of the order and Deputy James told him it was Captain Salters. Duvall
then tried to call Captain Salters but was unable to reach her. He then contacted Captain Kerry
Lynn Greathouse who was the Command Duty Officer (highest ranking on-duty staff member)
that day. Duvall later said in his interview, “When I contacted Bond Hearing, they said they were
operating under Captain Salters’ directive to bring the subject before the judge to refuse Bond
Hearing in front of the judge. And when I called Captain Greathouse I told her what the scenario
was and she suggested you should bring him down in ERC, emergency restraint chair. I knew
there was no other option but to do a cell extraction.”

On the body-worn-camera recording, Duvall briefed Fickett and Houle, saying that Greathouse
had been notified, the judge had been notified and Sutherland needed to be in court.

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Captain Greathouse later reported that she was contacted by Lieutenant Duvall at 9:28 AM and
again at 9:57 AM. Captain Greathouse reported that Lieutenant Duvall told her that Sutherland
had to go to bond hearing, a slight variation from Duvall’s version. However, Captain Greathouse
acknowledged that the custom and practice in the SACDC was to force detainees to physically
appear in Bond Court based on the April 2017 email Salters authored at the direction of then Chief
Deputy Willis Beatty. It read:

“From this moment forward, when an inmate refuses to go to Bond Hearing, the first time, you
are instructed to notify your supervisors and contact SOG. They will place subject in the ERC, if
necessary, and bring him/her before the Judge to refuse in person. You will write an information
incident report in JMS (Jail Management System) and notify us when it is done.”

During the interview that followed Sutherland’s death, Captain Greathouse was asked, “Before
this incident, there was really no alternative to when an inmate had to go to bond hearing, via
remotely or refuse. There was nothing that was available as an alternative, is that fair?”
Greathouse responded, “That’s correct.” The next question was, “So, as policy/standing directive,
nothing from—from the cell extraction—idea of the cell extraction, the order of the cell extraction
was outside the norm, it had taken place for years that way, correct?” Greathouse responded,
“Correct.” Salters said it had been the custom and practice since 2017, even though the directive
violated SACDC policy. Salters said the email directive was rescinded shortly after Sutherland’s
death.

This policy that contradicted the email was SACDC policy 9-14.4 regarding Video Bond Hearing
that was dated July 22, 2019, and reviewed October 28, 2020. That policy read:

“The judge will be notified of all inmate refusals to sign the Consent to Video Conferencing Form.
Inmates refusing to sign the Consent to Video Conferencing Form will not continue in the
videoconferencing process. Inmates will not be coerced into signing the Consent to Video
Conferencing Form; signature is strictly voluntary. The Court may request the inmate to make the
refusal via video; the Court will reschedule the inmate’s court appearance. The Bond Hearing
Detention Deputy will follow-up with the inmate regarding participation in Bond Hearing at each
Bond Court Session. If the inmate refuses again, the Judge shall be notified of the refusal. If the

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Judge orders that the inmate be brought in front of him/her, the inmate shall be escorted to Bond
Court by the Special Operations Group (SOG).”

Magistrate Mel Coleman was the judge presiding over bond hearings on January 5, 2021. He said
there was no communication with the SACDC regarding Sutherland and he did not give an order
for Sutherland to attend. In fact, he had never ordered an inmate be brought to Bond Court.
Magistrate Amanda Haselden, another Bond Court judge, said she too had never required an
inmate to attend their bond hearing and added that they had the legal right to refuse.

The policy and Magistrate Coleman’s statements show that there was no legitimate mandate in
effect to force Sutherland’s physical appearance in court. In other words, the fundamental premise
for requiring Sutherland’s cell extraction was based on false assumptions, making all the ensuing
use of force unnecessary. Both Captain Salters and Captain Greathouse should have been familiar
with SACDC policy and known that the 2017 email – also the custom and practice of the jail –
violated it. As captains, they had an obligation to rectify the conflict long before Sutherland ever
came into custody. The evidence did not show if any higher-ranking member of the CCSO was
aware of this conflict, but the 2019 policy should have superseded the 2017 email. If there was a
reason to revisit the policy and change it, someone in SACDC should have brought it forward
rather than simply continuing to violate it.

Generally accepted criminal justice practices, not just jail practices, recognize when someone
suffering from mental illness is experiencing a crisis, all reasonable steps should be made to avoid
worsening it. The evidence shows Sutherland was in crisis when he entered the behavioral health
facility. That crisis continued as he acted out and struck a staff member there. It is widely known
that the destabilization of an arrest, admission into a jail environment and then isolation are all
contributing factors to further mental health destabilization. Houle and Duvall both properly
questioned their orders, recognizing that the impending force on Sutherland was likely pointless
and dangerous. Greathouse, as the Command Duty Officer, should have listened, known the policy
and tried to have the hearing rescheduled. If there is an underlying event that could have avoided
the force used on Sutherland, it was this. One of the fundamental tests when evaluating a use of
force is to ask, “Was the force necessary?” It was not, but Houle and Fickett were ordered to
extract Sutherland and they reasonably believed the order was lawful.

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What is also clear is that the SACDC had used unnecessary force to compel Bond Court
appearances since the April 2017 email, likely causing dozens of other unnecessary force events.
The SACDC policy was supposedly revised in 2019 and reviewed in 2020, yet the custom and
practice continued. The purpose of a policy review is to ensure policy and practice are congruent.
Clearly, this did not happen. It was an utter failure of CCSO leadership to allow this practice to
exist, especially when it was contradictory to the court’s intentions.

Cell Extraction

Poor Preparation

While the actual applications of force are disturbing, insufficient staffing and preparation laid the
foundation for the chaos that followed. Generally accepted jail practices use four to six deputies
to participate in a forcible cell extraction. Fundamentally, this allows for one deputy to enter
through the door with a shield, followed by additional deputies to control each of the detainee’s
extremities. The SOG training had reduced that number to two deputies, and sometimes even one,
to complete a cell extraction. While the reasoning for limiting the number of staff is not in
evidence, the SACDC clearly bought into the vendor’s idea of an elite squad of deputies that would
handle all dangerous situations. When asked why staff outside the cell would not come in to help,
Fickett said, “They’ve been instructed to stay out of the way.” When pressed further, Fickett said,
“Like, we — we, as SOG, are supposed to be able to handle anything. So, unless we are asking for
help, they’re instructed to keep their distance.” That practice is dangerous for both the detainee
and staff. As demonstrated in this case, two staff members often cannot control a strong detainee
who is actively resisting. With insufficient staff, greater force is often required to subdue and
restrain them. At the height of Sutherland’s resistance, Fickett and Houle could not control him
without resorting to dangerous tactics like repeated Taser deployments and a knee on the back and
shoulder.

Had sufficient staff been involved in the extraction, it is doubtful these extreme measures would
have been needed. What is especially frustrating in this case is that there were four other deputies
outside the cell who could have assisted in safely controlling Sutherland, but because of the
bravado culture of the SOG training, those deputies could not assist because they were not SOG

19
members. In fact, during the fracas, Fennell went inside the cell but it appeared Duvall pulled him
out by the arm.

Cell extractions are commonly referred to as planned use of force events. The operative word in
this phrase is “planned” so that each staff member knows their role, what force is anticipated, who
will be responsible for communication, restraints, etc. Fickett described Sutherland’s behavior,
saying, “Well, my assessment is, I — I saw where he was in the room. I saw, you know, his size,
his stature, and his actions, what he was doing. He was bleating off. He had an object in his hand,
and, you know, it seemed like he was extremely agitated, and wasn't — he wasn't listening to
Fennel at all.” Houle said, “When we were trying to talk to—when we first initially made contact,
he had a breakfast tray in his cell and when we made contact, he had his spoon in his hand like he
was holding it, you know—he was holding it, you know, like this, like he wanted to use it as a
weapon.” The video evidence shows that Sutherland was repeatedly yelling “hallelujah” as they
prepared for the extraction. Fickett said she was never told that Sutherland had a mental illness but
also said, “Some people try to play crazy, and but they’re not really.” Houle said he was aware of
a mental health concern with Sutherland but could not remember how he knew that. Regardless,
Fickett and Houle should have anticipated active, if not assaultive, resistance and created a plan
for the extraction that included calling for additional staff, using a cautious escalation of weapons
and otherwise anticipating how they could minimize the force necessary to subdue Sutherland and
take him to court.

The Use of Force policy required the SOG supervisor to:

a) “Provide direction to staff identifying the force options and security equipment that will be
used to accomplish the objective;
b) Direct application of the force needed to gain and maintain control;
c) Ensure that another Detention Deputy will operate the video recording equipment to
provide complete coverage of the incident.”

The problem in this event is that there was no SOG supervisor. Fickett was no longer in SOG and
the designated SOG lieutenant, Duvall, was not SOG trained so according to SACDC custom and
practice, he had no role in supervising the extraction.

20
Fickett later said, “We really don’t need to do a plan.” She explained, “And, you know, being more
experienced, I can just feed off of him [Houle], his actions, and I don't really need to — we don't
really need to do a plan, you know. We might communicate while we're — while we're working,
but beforehand, we know what we're gonna do.” Obviously in this case they did not know what
was going to happen, did not have a plan for how to control Sutherland and did not communicate
while they were working. Fickett’s interview suggests an arrogance, or ignorance, that contributed
to the chaos that ensued during this event. Fickett had many years of SOG experience, and her
statement shows that the SACDC had failed to properly train and supervise her. This lack of
preparation had been allowed to become their custom and practice.

Sutherland had already been involved in outbursts at the behavioral health facility and the jail. He
had demonstrated he would resist. His body language, as shown in the video footage, indicated he
was angry and physically tense. The inadequate staffing to properly and safely conduct the
extraction fundamentally set the two deputies up for potential, and in this case foreseeable, failure.

More importantly, one of the most critical steps in a planned use of force event like a cell extraction
is to avoid the use of force through effective de-escalation techniques. While there was some
documentation of de-escalation attempts by Fennell and Duvall before Fickett and Houle arrived,
the efforts were not captured on body-worn cameras or documented in reports. The body worn
camera video showed Houle made only superficial attempts at de-escalation before he and Fickett
resorted to loud commands and SOG intimidation tactics. Shaw later said de-escalation was
“integrated” in the SOG training and included instruction in not shouting, using a calming tone,
building a conversation with the detainee – and that de-escalation was even more important with
mentally ill detainees. None of these techniques existed with Sutherland and the evidence suggests
they likely did not happen in other SOG use of force situations.

Oleoresin Capsicum (Pepper Spray)

As Fickett and Houle began to take action, Fickett looked into Sutherland’s cell and commented
that he still had the spoon in his hand. A short while later Fickett yelled, “Drop the spoon and
come to the door.” Fickett then opened the food port and Houle gave two commands for
Sutherland to drop the spoon and come to the door.

21
Houle then sprayed OC vapor into the cell for about six seconds, creating a fog effect. Sutherland
appeared to have a reaction, once lowering his Covid mask and spitting, then wrapping his blanket
around his head, a common tactic by detainees to try to minimize the effect of the OC. Fickett and
Houle continued to occasionally yell commands and Sutherland said, “What do you want from
me?” Houle told him to come to the door and Sutherland asked, “For what?” Houle told him to
take the blanket off his head and come to the door. Neither Fickett nor Houle used the
opportunities of Sutherland’s questions to engage him in dialogue and try to de-escalate the
situation.

Moments later, Sutherland had the blanket draped around the back of his neck, but not his head,
and was repeatedly saying “hallelujah” when Houle unlocked the door. Sutherland then reached
to his table and picked up his food tray as if he may throw it. Fickett sprayed Sutherland with OC
stream, causing him to pull the blanket back up to his face, set the tray back down and move toward
his bunk. This second OC deployment was about 3 minutes 51 seconds after the first OC
deployment. Unlike the vapor, the OC stream is designed for direct skin contact and causes a
burning sensation, watery eyes, a runny nose and mild respiratory distress, among other things.
Fickett later said she knew the OC stream made contact with the top of Sutherland’s head and his
arm.

Generally accepted jail practices and most manufacturer’s guidelines recommend providing at
least five, and more often 10, minutes of time between deployments for the OC to have its desired
effect.

The SACDC policy for OC failed to give adequate instruction as to what a reasonable waiting
period should be. It read only:

“After an inmate is sprayed, staff should wait for the OC to take effect. A normal person will react
to the chemical agent by ceasing resistance, possibly falling to the ground, with the inability to
open their eyes, irritated skin, coughing, difficulty breathing, and in some instances, vomiting.
These symptoms generally last between five (5) and ten (10) minutes.”

Shaw said there was no policy or training directive on a waiting period after an OC deployment
and Fickett, who was an OC instructor, was unaware of any recommendation to provide a waiting

22
period. She later said that 9/10 times detainee would comply within one minute after the first
application of OC. As an OC instructor, she taught that deputies should “give them a chance to
have a measurable effect. You don’t just move on to other things right away.” but there was no
specific timeframe associated with that instruction.

The 3 minutes 51 seconds waiting period between OC deployments on Sutherland was insufficient
and did not meet generally accepted jail practices. However, the SACDC’s OC policy is so vague,
saying only “wait for the OC to take effect,” that I cannot assert that it was a violation of agency
policy. Fickett said she did not see any effects on Sutherland before she discharged her TASER.
The lack of knowledge on the fundamentals of OC use is yet another example of the inadequate
training and supervision that the SACDC provided their deputies, and even their instructors.

First TASER Deployment

In a more standard application of OC, there should be a waiting period of at least five minutes
after each OC deployment to see if it has an effect. However, Fickett only waited about 51 seconds
after the second OC spray before firing her TASER into Sutherland. Fickett and Houle may have
reasonably believed the judge who ordered Sutherland’s appearance was waiting for him to appear,
causing a false urgency to the situation, but a pause of less than one minute before escalating to
the TASER was a serious breach of generally accepted jail training and practice.

Fickett discharged her TASER into Sutherland

for about five seconds, causing him to tense and
slide to the floor. At the moment Fickett fired the
TASER, Sutherland had taken the blanket from
around his neck, walked to his bunk and was
laying it down (as can be seen in the screenshot
at right). It appeared Sutherland may have been
complying at this time and when asked to explain
it, Fickett said they had initially ordered
Sutherland to take the blanket off his head and
come to the door. However, after they opened the
door their commands changed to instructing him

23
to get down on the floor. At the time she discharged the TASER, she perceived that Sutherland
was still noncompliant because he refused to get down on the floor. When asked why she could
not have waited longer, Fickett replied, “No. Um, you know, we’re not trained to sit there with the
door open, especially with an OC filled room you know, for an extended period of time waiting
for somebody to comply. It’s — you know, once we’re at that point, it’s compliance or not. We
gave several orders for him to get down and he wasn’t complying with it.”

At a separate time, Fickett was asked why she escalated to the TASER and she replied, “The OC
wasn’t having the desired effect. He would not follow commands; he wouldn’t come out of the
room; he wouldn’t come up to the door.” When asked if she thought she waited an adequate time,
Fickett said, “I think it was more I had an opportunity to use the TASER instead of waiting for the
OC to take effect. I wanted to take the opportunity that I had.” Fickett then said, “He didn’t seem
like he had any change in behavior from the time I administered it till the time I use the TASER at
all. Usually, you know, they start trying to wipe stuff off or, you know, they at least try to come to
the sink and, you know, get water on. He was just still pacing around. It didn’t seem like it had
changed anything at all.”

The SACDC policy that applied to the TASER authorized its use as follows:

“EMDT devices may be used when a violent or potentially violent person is:

a. Actively resisting
b. Aggressively resisting
c. Displaying aggravated aggressive resistance
d. Displaying actions indicating an attempt to self-injure or commit suicide
e. Other emergency situations where the use of an EMDT would be considered objectively
reasonable under the circumstances.”

One problem with this policy is the lack of a definition for the above terms. Without definition,
there can be varying interpretations as to the different levels of resistance. Some may believe that
it was only passive resistance since Sutherland took no physical action against the deputies and
was only refusing to comply. It appears the policy did not intend to allow the use of a TASER if
this were the case. Others may believe that his grabbing of the spoon and tray, his verbal challenges

24
and his efforts to defeat the OC constituted active resistance or even aggressive resistance. A
second policy issue is that the SACDC used a catch-all phrase, “Other emergency situations where
the use of an EMDT would be considered objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” These
types of policy phrases only add to the confusion because they effectively say, “Whenever you
think it’s necessary.” This policy was poorly promulgated and offered insufficient guidance to the
deputies.

Passive resistance, meaning resistance that does not include physical actions against the deputy’s
efforts, was not authorized in the SACDC TASER policy at the time of this event. However, the
evidence showed the SACDC had, at one time, sanctioned the vendor’s training of using a TASER
against passive resistance. Shaw said in 2013 or 2014 the SACDC authorized SOG to use the
TASER “in situations with verbal non-compliance.” Previously, the minimum standard had been
active resistance. The use of a TASER on someone offering only passive resistance has always
violated generally accepted jail practices, yet some jails still allow it. In an undated video of the
vendor leading SOG training, with Fickett in the training, he emphasized not to ask or advise, only
to give clear commands, and discussed “the intimidation factor”. He also demonstrated techniques
involving the use of the TASER including on someone who was only passively resisting and, in a
separate example, someone who had only made a verbal threat. CCSO Major Smith [first name
unknown] was watching the training but said nothing about the tactics or potential policy
violations. At one point the vendor said, “For a bunch of brave guys, we’re cowering behind
somebody’s policy or we’re cowering behind words….” The vendor repeatedly referred to the
need for force to be “objectively reasonable”, even though his demonstrations were not.

In a separate video of similar training, the vendor again taught the SOG members to use a TASER
to overcome passive and verbal resistance. Major Smith was present and watching again. The
vendor asked each person, including Smith, if they were comfortable with it. When Smith spoke
the audio of the camera was intentionally covered, muffling his response; however, he was smiling
and appeared to be approving of it. Using a TASER on passive subjects was no longer acceptable
in SACDC policy by 2021, but the evidence did not show if that policy had become the custom
and practice.

25
Fickett did not have a history of excessive TASER use. The frequency of her deployments was
reasonable for what might be expected in the SOG role, with only about four prior deployments.
There was a previous instance when she used a TASER and the detainee was injured but that act
was not directly related to the TASER concerns in this case.

Some of the decisions in this case should be reviewed based on what was in the deputy’s mind at
the time of the event. Officers can have legitimate perceptions of threat that are not visible on a
video recording. In Fickett’s mind, this was an urgent situation because they had been ordered by
a lieutenant to forcibly take Sutherland to Bond Court. In an interview, Fickett said, “Any bond
hearing you wanna get them there as quickly as possible because the judge will be waiting for
them.” Lastly, in her interviews, Fickett said she was contemplating the worst-case scenarios, like
Sutherland attacking them, if she did not deploy the TASER when she did. This “worst case
scenario” mentality is not unheard of in law enforcement and sometimes referred to as
catastrophizing. Law enforcement officers are often taught to be prepared for the worst and can
therefore develop thought patterns that overemphasize the preparedness mentality, sometimes
causing them to take action sooner than what may be necessary. This general mentality, combined
with the SOG emphasis on aggressive tactics and lack of de-escalation training help explain
Fickett’s state of mind.

This aside, the TASER discharge was effective. Sutherland tensed and slid to the floor, then stayed
there.

Verbal Commands

After the TASER discharge, Fickett and Houle were

simultaneously yelling, and sometimes
contradicting, each other in their commands. Houle
was telling Sutherland to turn on his stomach while
Fickett was telling him to slide to the door. When
Fickett took charge of the commands, Sutherland
began to voluntarily comply and slide across the
floor on his buttocks, toward them. While sliding
across the floor, Houle again began yelling orders

26
simultaneous to Fickett, but they were at least similar. While Sutherland was nearing them, he
calmly asked to get up but complied when they told him not to. He then asked, “What is the
meaning of this?” The deputies did not respond to his question. Sutherland slid toward them until
his feet were outside of the threshold of the door. Then the deputies began ordering him to turn
onto his stomach, and Sutherland asked, “For what?” They again did not answer his question but
kept telling him to turn on his stomach. As they continued to yell at him Sutherland pulled his
knees to the side, turned his back partially toward them, put his hands behind his back and said
that was as far as he was turning.

A glaring concern up to this point was the continued failure of Fickett or Houle to employ de-
escalation techniques. There were many opportunities when they should have engaged Sutherland
in calm conversation to lessen the anxiety and hopefully gain his voluntary compliance. Most
importantly during their first contact and after the TASER deployment when Sutherland calmly
asked to get up and questioned “What is the meaning of this?” The audio/video recording shows
he could interact verbally, and the deputies could have engaged him in dialogue rather than just
ordering commands. Unfortunately, they did nothing of the sort. They continued to yell
commands at him even though jail practices involving mentally ill detainees encourage calm pace,
tone and pitch of the voice. The deputies should have used reassurance by calling him by his
preferred name, likely Jamal, and encouraging him. Once again though, the evidence shows they
were never properly trained in these techniques, nor expected to do them by the SACDC.

Fickett’s training file consisted of 613 pages of documentation. It showed that she completed
Interpersonal Communication Courses but there was no evidence of any meaningful training on
de-escalation or dealing with the mentally ill. Houle’s training file consisted of 334 pages and also
showed no evidence of any meaningful training on de-escalation or dealing with the mentally ill.
When Fickett was asked about training on mental illness, Fickett said, “Just, you know, slideshow,
classroom stuff, you know, maybe once every couple of years.” And went on to say, “You know,
it's — it's you, you might interact with them a little differently. You might have to try different
things with a mental health person versus somebody that's not mental health.” She followed up by
describing her training in cell extractions, regardless of mental illness, and saying, “No. I mean,
that's with — with cell extractions, you know, loud verbal commands are the name of the game,
you know, no matter what subject it is.”

27
Generally accepted jail practices and training emphasize clear and calm verbal techniques with the
mentally ill as opposed to “loud verbal commands.” That said, the evidence was also clear that
Fickett and Houle were not fully briefed about Sutherland’s mental illness although Fickett said it
was “absolutely” an important thing for them to know.

First Handcuffing Attempt

Sutherland was near the cell door and had placed his hands behind his back but still had his legs
in front of him toward the front of the cell. Fickett said, “We wanted him to get on his stomach at
that point instead of, you know, staying on his butt, but he wouldn’t turn on his stomach so he, you
know, he said, ‘This is as far as I’m turning.’ Just take what you can get pretty much and we can
work from there.” When asked why it was important for Sutherland to be on his stomach, Fickett
said it was a safer technique because it would have been “harder to get up and turn around and
fight us if you are on your stomach versus on your butt or standing up.” Fickett later said, “He
ended up stopping, but that’s a closer position to the outside of the room and my partner is just
stepping inside the threshold and I still had coverage on him, so you know, we — I took that risk.
I told him just to go put him in handcuffs. He had — ‘cause he seemed like he was compliant. He
put his hands behind his back and he was just sitting there. He’s like, ’I’m not turning any further.’
Okay.”

Fickett created a dangerous situation when she directed Houle to move into the cell and handcuff
Sutherland. This positioning effectively trapped Houle inside the cell. She explained, “So, I made
that decision because we weren’t getting anything else from Sutherland. He wouldn’t come any
further, or he wouldn’t get on his stomach. He — he just stopped complying from that point. He
still had TASER probes in him, so if he wanted — if he wanted to get up and fight my partner, I
could engage the TASER again.”

Later, in an interview, Fickett said, “We try not to be inside the room, but you know, circumstances
we ended up in there.” Question: And why wouldn't you wanna be in there? Answer: “It's
dangerous for everybody involved. It's dangerous for us to be in that environment. It’s dangerous
for us to be in there with the inmate in that — with that environment. It's more dangerous for the
inmate to be with us in that environment, so…”

28
When asked whether she considered a second TASER discharge to force Sutherland to turn on his
stomach, Fickett said she did not deploy the TASER, “Because he started to comply. He started to
come out and at that point, you know, I wanted to give him a chance. Um, you know, he was
complying. He was coming out of the room.”

Shaw said SOG deputies were taught to handcuff from a “tactically dominate position” but did not
require a detainee to be on their stomach. More importantly, SOG deputies were also taught to
remain between the detainee and the cell door during an extraction.

If Sutherland was not coming out farther into the doorway, the deputies should have had him turn
his back more to the door to be handcuffed, allowing Houle an escape route should Sutherland
become violent. Instead, Houle went into the cell, mostly on the far side of Sutherland, effectively
trapping himself.

Second TASER Deployment

Houle said, “I went inside I was able to place one cuff on him. And when I was trying to,
attempting to place the second cuff on, he was tightening his arm—pulling away—resisting, ah,
for me to be able to secure him. I told him, I directed him to stop resisting so I could put a cuff
on. [The video shows Houle said, “loosen up” twice.] He continued, so I placed him on his stomach
so I could easier—more easily place cuffs on him—secure him. And when I took him down, ah,
to place him on his stomach, Fickett administered the second TASER cycle.”

Houle began handcuffing Sutherland before he had physical control of Sutherland. Houle placed
one handcuff on Sutherland’s left wrist but then struggled to control his right arm. During this
time, Houle had his shotgun slung across the front of his body and dangling in front of him.
Although it is unheard of in other jails to take a loose weapon into a cell when making contact with
a detainee, the more significant matter is that it appeared the shotgun may have partially interfered
with Houle’s vision and grasp during the handcuffing as it swung back and forth. The evidence on
this was inconclusive though.

29
 Another consideration not addressed
in the evidence but clearly visible in
the screenshot to the left is the high
placement of the handcuff on
SUTHERLAND’S LEFT
HAND HOLDING HIS RIGHT Sutherland’s left wrist. The
screenshot was taken toward the end
of the struggle before Sutherland
HANDCUFF BLADE
was rolled onto his stomach and the
second TASER charge deployed. It appears probable that Houle placed the handcuff too high and
too tight on Sutherland’s left wrist for the other handcuff to reach his right wrist. It is not
uncommon for people with large or muscular physiques to have difficulty bringing their wrists
together behind their back and if the handcuff was placed too high, it would have made it even
more challenging to reach the other wrist. The most common way of dealing with this situation is
to attach two pair of handcuffs together, allowing more space between the wrists. This could have
been accomplished if more staff were involved in the handcuffing, but since Houle was alone in
the cell, it would have been difficult for him to get a second pair of handcuffs while still attempting
to control Sutherland.

The evidence did not explore the possibility that the handcuffing of Sutherland was difficult
because of limited dexterity and poor handcuff placement. If Sutherland was truly resisting, as
Houle believed, it was reasonable that Houle roll him to a prone position. As he did though, he
should have been verbalizing what has happening so Fickett would know. “Loosen up” is not a
proper instruction and did not help Fickett know that the rollover was Houle’s intention.
Contemporary training instructs deputies to say “stop resisting.” Fickett misperceived what was
happening as resistance and discharged the TASER a second time. In her later interview Fickett
said, “I don’t understand why Houle would wanna roll him over. I just told him to put him in
handcuffs.” And she said, “Because that would push him further into the room, into that OC-filled
room, and that’s definitely not where we wanna end up at all.” Fickett then said, “All I’m hearing
is, “Loosen up. Loosen up.” And he’s not letting him put him in handcuffs and then he turns and
you know, we all go into the room.”

30
A moment prior to Sutherland being rolled onto his stomach, Sutherland seemed to be starting a
sentence by calmly saying, “Officer,…” but then a second TASER deployment cut off anything
more that he was going to say.

The Melee

When Sutherland was rolled onto his stomach and the TASER was deployed the second time, he
lay prone for the remainder of the five second TASER discharge. But when it ended, the situation
went out of control. Sutherland became frantic and grabbed Houle’s legs. Houle was backed
against the wall and bunk, with no immediate ability to retreat. Houle would later describe it
saying, “I basically tried to get ahold of the cuff
SUTHERLAND’S RIGHT
ARM WRAPPED AROUND
and waited for that cycle to be done so I could
HOULE’S LEG (9:36:02 AM)
cuff him real quick. Once that was done, he
tried to get up and rush, and he grabbed my legs
(as shown in the screenshot). At one point, he
had both of his arms around—or his arms
around both of my legs. And I was—like I said,
I was inside the cell, so I had no way to get out
except to go over him and through Fickett.”

Houle described the events that followed. “So,

once that second one stopped and he tried to get up, and he grabbed my legs, so we tried to keep
him down on the ground. I'm not sure how many times Fickett tased him, but when he rolled over
and began fighting us, I thought that her TASER could've—the wires could've broke because
they're very easy—if you just take them and give a little bit of pressure, they will break. So, I
wasn't sure if they were still connected, so I drew my TASER and give him a directive, fired it,
and got him in the upper back, and then that took effect. And once that first one—that first cycle
was done, he kept fighting and then—and so, once he started getting a little bit of leverage and
was getting up, I cycled it again, and I don't know if he had wires connected to him or my leg, but
I got jolted with it, so I got, I don't know, a second or two of it. And I don't remember if I did two
or three cycles, but we were finally able to—basically he just went on his—on his—like his chest
and he put his arms like this, like just laying on them basically. So, I—Fickett got over his hips to

31
try to get an arm behind him.” In other interviews Houle reiterated that he believed Fickett’s
TASER was not making an effective connection. This poor connection was later confirmed by the
Axon/TASER analysis.

The audio/video recording shows Sutherland in highly active resistance and after he initially
grabbed Houle’s legs, it is clear that he was raising up, climbing higher on Houle’s body. This
mostly occurred right after Houle’s first TASER deployment.

The screenshots show Sutherland’s head as he rose up toward Houle’s upper legs/waist

Fickett said, “And then ah, you know, we, we were trying to get him secured on the floor—but he
kept trying roll, kept trying to get up, kicking, you know. Just a, just a fight on the floor.” “During
the fight, both of--both he and I had TASERS out. I know, I cycled at least one more time—just
to try to get him under control. I know Sergeant [Fennell] was behind me; I think he put leg irons
on. It was just a…tussle to get both arms back behind him and get him in handcuffs.” “So my
concern was, we are in an altercation inside an OC filled room, you know, which is difficult in
itself. And, we're also — it's Houle and I. Houle’s not the biggest guy in the world. I'm definitely
not, you know, large at all. And we're fighting, you know, somebody that's a lot larger than us, and
seems very, very agitated and very motivated to — to get — get after us, so that's — that's my
concern.” When asked whether she felt the lockup effect of the TASER was occurring, she said,
“No.”

• Q: Then you deployed — or re-energized it more throughout the fight? Fickett: “I don't
know.” “Yeah, I don't know. I know I did at least once, but I don't know of any more.”
• Q: Do you even remember how many times you pulled the trigger on your TASER?
Fickett: “No.”

32
In describing the events, Fickett said she and Houle were just trying to keep Sutherland down. She
said, “He was trying to turn around on us, trying to get up, trying to spin, trying to push himself
off the ground.” And when asked how he was trying to get off the ground, she said, “Just by turning
around kicking his feet so he can spin. You know, putting his hands underneath him so he would
push off.”

Fickett said, “And an open handcuff on his arm can be used as a weapon. If he swings that around
and hooks one of us or you know, hits us with the metal, um, you know, we’re trained not to let
go of the handcuffs at all if we can help it, ‘cause it’s a weapon.” Houle lost control of the loose
handcuff on Sutherland’s left wrist when Fickett fired the second TASER deployment, but he then
regained control of it and held it, even as he drew his own TASER and discharged it. However,
whether from his TASER, Fickett’s, or something else, he again let go of the handcuff. The
struggle continued and it was not until they were getting control of Sutherland that his left wrist
came into view from underneath the right side of his body. Fickett reached across and grabbed it,
but now there was nothing she could do to keep Sutherland controlled and move his left arm out
from under him to bring the handcuff behind his back. The deputies handcuffed Sutherland’s right
wrist with a different set of handcuffs and shortly afterward got his left arm out from under his
body. At this point there was a set of handcuffs on each wrist.

Generally accepted law enforcement training emphasizes that a handcuff that is only attached to
one uncontrolled wrist can be a dangerous weapon if the person begins swinging it. This was
clearly a dangerous situation for Fickett, Houle and Sutherland too.

In yet another example of a fundamental flaw in the SOG concept, as soon as Houle chose to use
his TASER, the deputies were not physically capable of safely handcuffing Sutherland. Each
deputy had one hand occupied with their TASER and at least one of their other hands occupied
holding the loose handcuff. That left only one free hand between them, making it impractical for
them to control his loose arm and get the handcuff on it. Eventually, Houle had to lay his TASER
down on the floor to complete the handcuffing but doing so was also unsafe.

33
Total TASER Deployments

Axon, the company that manufactures the TASER, provided an analysis based on the data from
Fickett’s and Houle’s TASERs. The TASER used by Fickett had seven trigger activations for a
cumulative total of 35 seconds. It lost connection for 4.6 of those seconds, had a poor connection
for 28.4 seconds and had a good connection for 2 seconds. The TASER used by Houle had three
trigger activations, all with good connections, for a cumulative total of 15 seconds. In other words,
there were ten activations, with varying degrees of connectivity, for cumulative total of 45.4
seconds. 17 of those seconds had good connectivity. Also, some of Fickett and Houle’s discharges
were concurrent. In interviews, Fickett consistently and repeatedly said she thought she activated
her TASER about three times, maybe four.

The TASER literature used during the TASER certification course that both Fickett and Houle
attended read:

In some individuals, the risk of death or serious injury may increase with cumulative CEW
[conducted energy weapon] exposure. Repeated, prolonged, or continuous CEW applications may
contribute to cumulative exhaustion, stress, cardiac, physiologic, metabolic, respiratory, and
associated medical risks which could increase the risk of death or serious injury. Minimize
repeated, continuous, or simultaneous exposures.

CEW use causes physiologic and/or metabolic effects that may increase the risk of death or serious
injury. These effects include changes in blood chemistry, blood pressure, respiration, heart rate
and rhythm, and adrenaline and stress hormones, among others. In human studies of electrical
discharge from a single CEW of up to 15 seconds, the effects on acid/base balance, creatine kinase,
electrolytes, stress hormones, and vital signs were comparable to or less than changes expected
from physical exertion similar to struggling, resistance, fighting, fleeing, or from the application
of some other force tools or techniques. Some individuals may be particularly susceptible to the
effects of CEW use.

Most human CEW lab testing has not exceeded 15 seconds of CEW application, and none has
exceeded 45 seconds. Use the shortest duration of CEW exposure objectively reasonable to
accomplish lawful objectives, and reassess the subject's behavior, reaction, and resistance before

34
initiating or continuing the exposure. If a CEW deployment is ineffective in incapacitating a
subject or achieving compliance, consider alternative control measures in conjunction with or
separate from the CEW.

Do not use multiple CEWs or multiple completed circuits at the same time without justification.
Multiple CEWs or multiple completed circuits at the same time could have cumulative effects and
result in increased risks.

Law enforcement professionals have interpreted this to mean there should be a general limit of
TASER deployments to three cycles for a cumulative total of 15 seconds. As with most weapons,
the greater the resistance and potential for injury to the deputies, the more acceptable additional
uses become.

In their 2011 publication Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines, the Police Executive Research
Forum in Washington DC wrote, “Although causation factors are not clear, the most common
factors that appear to be associated with fatal and other serious outcomes include 1) repeated and
multiple applications, 2) cycling time that exceeds 15 seconds in duration, whether the time is
consecutive or cumulative, and 3) simultaneous applications by more than one ECW. Officers
must be trained to understand that repeated applications and continuous cycling of ECWs may
increase the risk of death or serious injury and should be avoided.”

The training records showed that on January 30, 2019, and again on February 19, 2021 (after this
event), both Fickett and Houle completed TASER certification tests. One True-False question
read, “As with any use of force, the longer the CEW exposure the greater the risk of potential
cumulative physiologic, metabolic and other effects.” Both accurately marked “True” for the tests
in both years.

In her interview, Fickett said she had seen the 15 second caution previously, but added, “You
know, we've always been trained you use your TASER to gain control and if the subject is not
under control, and you can justify using the TASER, you can.” She went on to add, “So, like —
like I said, I'm only — I only intentionally pulled the trigger for those three times. The struggle in
the room, I wasn't in, you know, paying attention. I wasn't intentionally pulling the trigger on that
TASER. I was just trying to keep him on the floor. You know, I'm trying to fight this man, and

35
keep him secured on this ground in this OC-filled room. You know, I wasn't consciously pulling
the trigger over and over and over again.” At another time Fickett restated that there was no training
as to the maximum number of times that someone can discharge a TASER but “It was
recommended that you limit as — as much as you can, but if you needed to use the TASER to
control the threat, then there was no set number that you needed to stop at.”

As stated, an important consideration with the application of the law, policy, training and generally
accepted jail practices is the state of mind, perceptions, and intent of the deputies. Throughout her
interviews, including the last one in June 2021, Fickett consistently believed that she had
discharged her TASER at least three times but had no recollection of it being seven. Additionally,
Fickett was unaware that Houle was deploying his TASER. This phenomenon, commonly referred
to as “tunnel vision” is not unusual in highly tense situations.

When Fickett was again asked whether she recalled anything particular about warnings, best
practices or maximum/minimum exposures to the TASER, she said, “No.” Houle said he had been
taught not to do more than three or four cycles.

Two portions of the SACDC policy related to the TASER read:

• The EMDT is programmed to give one five second burst. The duration of the burst may be
shortened by depressing the safety lever at the Detention Deputy’s discretion. Additional
bursts may be administered by pulling the trigger if the targeted subject is not controlled
by the initial burst.
• Upon firing the device, the Detention Deputy shall energize the subject the fewest times
and no longer than necessary to accomplish the legitimate operational objective.

The SACDC policy did not restrict deputies as to the number of times a TASER could or should
be discharged. The wording is vague and failed to properly direct deputies as to the precautions
that should be taken about the number of discharges and/or the cumulative discharge time and to
avoid simultaneous discharges. The SACDC has since modified their policy to restrict more than
three discharges.

The vendor was not a TASER instructor but taught the tactical application of the TASER. He said
he followed the guidelines from TASER and taught the SOG members to limit the use of the
36
TASER to two or three discharges. The vendor said there was no instruction about avoiding
simultaneous TASER discharges.

A typical TASER discharge is five seconds, but a deputy can shorten that by manually interrupting
it. In another example of the poor training that Fickett received, she was asked about reducing the
discharge time and said, “So, it's the same for everybody. If you, you know, tase this person for
three seconds and this person for five seconds, then they can come back and say, well, you're
giving preferential treatment to this one, not that one. So, it was our practice to do the full five
seconds for everybody.” So, as a sergeant and force instructor in the SACDC, Fickett somehow
came to believe that lessening an application of force on a person may be discriminatory. It is
unreasonable to continue a TASER discharge if the deputy knows it is no longer necessary. This
practice seemingly reflected her training.

A final note on the use of a TASER that is worth mentioning is whether the deputies could have
handcuffed Sutherland while he was incapacitated by the TASER discharge (the roughly five
seconds). The goal of a TASER discharge using probes is referred to as neuromuscular
incapacitation (NMI). This refers to the involuntary effect of tensing the person’s muscles,
preventing them from making intentional movements to strike, run or otherwise use their
extremities. If a deputy engages the person while the TASER is discharging and NMI is occurring,
there is a strong likelihood the deputy will become part of the electrical current flow and suffer the
effects of the discharge. Therefore, handcuffing or control techniques are rarely used while the
TASER discharge is occurring.

During Fennell’s interview with the OPS he said that it seemed like Fickett and Houle were doing
everything they could to control Sutherland. Fennell said Sutherland was extremely strong and he
could tell that Sutherland had the “upper hand”, so he stepped in to help Fickett and Houle by
putting the leg shackles on Sutherland.

Second Handcuffing Attempt

As Sutherland was being controlled, he now had one set of handcuffs on each wrist. Houle was
going to connect the two handcuffs together, but Fickett directed that he use only one pair. When
asked why, Fickett said, “Because if you put two handcuffs on somebody, they have a lot of

37
freedom of movement and they have a lot more chance to fight if they have more freedom to go,
so I made the decision to put just one handcuff on instead of two.” As with the initial effort to
handcuff Sutherland, it is difficult to determine whether one or two sets of handcuffs was the right
decision. Based only on the audio/video recording it appears Sutherland would have been
adequately secured with two pair of handcuffs linked together.

The decision to use only one pair caused the

Houle’s knee deputies to take the additional time to remove
(9:37:36 AM)
the second pair. When asked if she had ever
heard anything about people being in a prone
position for too long, Fickett said, “I mean,
yeah, but it didn’t cross my mind at this point.”
The video evidence shows Houle’s knee
across Sutherland’s back during this time. The
video is incomplete and Fickett’s video (of
Houle) was very poor quality. However, it
appeared Houle had his knee/leg somewhere
on Sutherland’s upper back/shoulder for about 1 minute 50 seconds, with 1 minute 15 seconds of
that time mostly on Sutherland’s center back, as shown in the screen capture. When asked whether
Sutherland was doing anything to cause the deputies to stay on top of him, Fickett replied, “We
were just making sure if he wanted to turn over and start resisting again that, we were in a good
position, in case that happened.” During this time, Sutherland said “I can’t breathe” but Fickett
said she did not hear him say it. She said if she had heard that, she would have checked his position
and whether they were putting too much pressure on his body, but it would not have changed the
tactics that she had been trained on.

Shaw said the SOG training was that one knee could go across a detainee’s shoulder blade area to
control them. Generally accepted jail practices do not acknowledge this as a sufficient precaution
against compressional asphyxia.

Once Sutherland was restrained and still on his stomach, the deputies put what is commonly
referred to as a “spit hood” over his head. When asked why, Fickett said, “Um, because we had to

38
fight him so much and it’s a precaution thing for us so they can’t spit on us or bite us and that’s a
— that’s a normal procedure thing for us if, you know, we have a combative person that we’ve
had to use force on, we put a spit mask on them as a precaution.” The evidence did not contain a
written policy on using a spit hood but Fickett seemed confident in her statement. Also, Houle said
the Covid concerns were a consideration. If it was true that they always put a spit hood on someone
after they used force, it was yet another misguided and unnecessary custom and practice by the
SACDC. Spit hoods are an important tool to prevent biological contamination if a person is
intentionally spitting on others. However, they have also been associated with breathing
restrictions and generally accepted correctional practices do not support the SACDC’s custom and
practice of placing a spit hood on any person that they have used force on. It is unnecessary.

Fickett was asked about positional asphyxia or compression awareness and training and said only
“they touch on it”. She said it was not on her mind with Sutherland because Houle was across his
shoulder blade and “we don’t have our whole body weight on top of him and, you know, he’s not
going to be in that position for very long.” This statement is concerning and indicates another area
of inadequate training by the SACDC. Weight in the inner shoulder blade area can restrict
breathing, it does not require full body weight to restrict breathing and the person should be moved
off their stomach as soon as practical. Fickett said the Academy instruction taught, “…us not to
leave somebody in the prone position for an extended period of time and um, not to put the — your
knee on their head or their neck, or you know, it’s across the shoulder blade.” As to what an
“extended period of time” meant, Fickett said, “Um, anything longer than what’s necessary. If we
just put him in handcuffs in a prone position and walk away, you know, that would be an extended
period of time.”

Fickett and Houle pulled Sutherland from the cell and medical staff who were present removed
the TASER probes. They placed him into the emergency restraint chair and began to strap him in,
but then realized he was unresponsive. Sutherland was on his stomach for about five minutes from
the time the deputies knelt on him to the time he was lifted into the restraint chair. During this
time though, he moved and verbalized inaudible sounds. The medical staff took over Sutherland’s
care when he became unresponsive. While not relevant to my opinion, it is noteworthy that medical
staff took an inordinate amount of time to begin providing resuscitation efforts on Sutherland.

39
The evidence again showed the policy, training and supervision of the deputies regarding asphyxia
concerns was severely lacking. There are times when body weight is necessary to control a violent
person, but that weight should be removed as soon as is practical. Fickett and Houle failed to do
that and perceived their actions were acceptable.

Investigation and Personnel Action

After the event, Fickett and Houle were placed on administrative leave for a short time and when
they returned to duty they were sent to TASER and OC training. Fickett returned to an
administrative position, but the evidence did not show what happened with Houle, other than he
had to attend the TASER and OC training as well.

The OPS conducted an inquiry and reviewed the SACDC policy. They wrote, “While applying
the video bond hearing policy to Inmate Sutherland’s incident, it is clear to see procedures were
violated. However, during this investigation, the Office of Professional Standards exposed a
custom and practice related to bond hearing refusals. Almost every employee interviewed stated
that it was common knowledge an inmate refusing bond hearing must do so in front of a judge.”
The report went on to explain that this custom and practice was in violation of the written SACDC
policy and recommended the policy be rewritten.

The OPS investigators also wrote, “Fickett and Deputy Houle gave both applications of OC ample
time to take effect in hopes inmate Sutherland would comply.” OPS concluded this element of
their analysis with the statement, “The Office of Professional Standards concluded the use of OC
by Fickett and Deputy Houle was justified and within the confines of policy.” The fact that the
OPS investigators believed Fickett gave “ample time” for the OC to take effect further supports
the evidence that the training and supervision in the SACDC was insufficient.

The next section of the report addressed Fickett’s use of the TASER, however the end of that
section, likely containing the conclusions, was redacted from the evidence. [Compulsory
statements made during an administrative investigation cannot be used in a criminal prosecution.]

Regarding the compressional asphyxia concern of Houle’s knee in Sutherland’s back, the OPS
report read, “In Fickett’s body-worn footage, Deputy Houle can be seen placing his left knee on
Inmate Sutherland’s back. The knee appears to be on the muscle mass between the shoulder blade

40
and spine. The audio portion of the video is not clear, but it does sound like Inmate Sutherland
says, “I can’t breathe.” Within five seconds of Inmate Sutherland’s statement, Deputy Houle
removed his left knee from Inmate Sutherland’s back. Deputy Houle, while struggling to apply
handcuffs, then placed his right knee on inmate Sutherland’s back between the shoulder blade and
spine. In his second interview, Deputy Houle was very clear he intentionally placed his knee on
the muscle mass next to the shoulder blade to avoid contact with inmate Sutherland’s neck and
spine. Deputy Houle again confirmed his knee was on inmate Sutherland’s back for about one
minute.”

Similar to the concerns with the OPS review of OC use, the OPS report seems to dismiss the
compressional asphyxia concerns because Houle’s knee was not on Sutherland’s spine or neck.
Compressional asphyxia is known to occur when weight is placed on someone’s back in the very
place where Houle had his knee. Deputies should be taught to keep pressure to the side of the
torso or on the arms if it is necessary to control someone, but pressure between the shoulder blade
and spine is dangerous.

The OPS report claimed to have uncovered “glaring issues” with the TASER policy. There were
missing cross-references between the TASER policy and the use of force policy and, as discussed,
the TASER policy did not clearly define when it was acceptable and unacceptable to use a TASER.
This, combined with the catch-all phrase allowing its use when it “would be considered objectively
reasonable under the circumstances” make the value of the TASER policy rather meaningless.

The OPS report concluded with the following:

On January 5, 2021, Fickett and Deputy Houle were ordered to escort Inmate Sutherland to Bond
Court. The lawful order conflicted with policy, but arose from a long-standing custom and
practice. Fickett and Deputy Houle followed the Use of Force policy in that they utilized a
reasonable amount of force to bring the incident under control. Fickett and Deputy Houle began
in their use of force by simply arriving on scene. Their attire and equipment was a warning to
Inmate Sutherland the situation had risen to an elevated level. Fickett and Deputy Houle then
attempted to resolve the situation through verbal commands. On multiple occasions, both
employees ordered Inmate Sutherland to comply with the handcuffing process. Fickett and Deputy
Houle then deployed two applications of OC while they continued to plead with Inmate Sutherland

41
to exit the cell. Finally, Fickett and Deputy Houle deployed their assigned tasers. The use of the
taser in this situation is within the confines of policy; however, the number of times the taser was
deployed must be addressed, The EMDT Policy does not address a maximum number of times a
resistive subject can be tased. The EMDT Policy does state, "Upon firing the device, the Detention
Deputy shall energize the subject the fewest times and no longer than necessary to accomplish the
legitimate operational objective. "

Inmate Sutherland continued to resist Fickett and Deputy Houle throughout the entire event; even
after he was handcuffed. Fickett and Deputy Houle continued to utilize the taser instead of
resorting to hard empty hand tactics/control.

Al Cannon Detention Center Policy and Procedure 5-33.5, Use of Force, defines hard empty hand
tactics as:

Techniques that are impact oriented and include knee strikes, punches, and kicks. Control strikes
are used to get a subject under control. Defensive strikes are used by a Detention Deputy to protect
them from an attack.

The South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy defines hard empty hand control as:

Techniques that have the probability of injury. Examples: leg strikes, hand strikes, and neck
restraints.

According to policy, any application of force by a Detention Deputy must be reviewed by a

"reasonableness" standard. Without the guidance of the Use of Force Continuum, Fickett and
Deputy Houle had to immediately apply a "reasonable" standard while fighting with Inmate
Sutherland and feeling the effects of the OC. Aside from deadly force, Fickett and Deputy Houle
only had one other option which would have been hard empty hand tactics. Therefore, the Office
of Professional Standards concluded the use of force utilized by Fickett and Deputy Houle during
the incident involving Inmate Sutherland was reasonable and within the confines of current policy.
Therefore, they are exonerated.

42
The Office of Professional Standards suggest a review of the Use of Force Policy. This policy
should identify and describe the different levels of resistance. The Use of Force Policy should also
contain language describing the appropriate response to each level of resistance.

The Office of Professional Standards also suggest a review of the EMDT Policy. This policy should
identify and describe the different levels of resistance. The EMDT Policy should also contain
language describing the level of resistance in which a taser can be utilized. Additionally, language
should be added to policy giving employees direction as to the number of times a laser can/should
be utilized in a single event.

On May 16, 2021, Fickett and Houle were called to meet the Sheriff whereupon they were each
given termination letters. In the letters, the Sheriff acknowledged that Lieutenant Duvall ordered
Fickett and Houle to use force to complete the cell extraction but then cited two policies that
required force to be reasonable and that the deputies must act objectively. The Sheriff went on to
write, “Again, while you acted within the scope of your training and the practices and policy in
place at the time of this extraction, there was an opportunity to disengage contact and reverse
course. Policy and procedure aside, any personnel ordered into using force in a situation like this
have an obligation to use sound judgment and make independent assessment on the decision to
continue to use force.” She did not explain when she thought they should have done something
different. She then cited a third policy quoting, “[W]hen determining when to apply any level of
force and evaluating whether a detention deputy has used reasonable force, a number of factors
should be taken into consideration.” The Sheriff then went on to write, “There were numerous
factors that should have been taken into consideration such as the fact that Sutherland was brought
from Palmetto Behavioral Health Center and suffered from mental illness or the fact that it
appeared that Sutherland did not understand the commands given to him at that time.” Fickett and
Houle were unaware of Sutherland’s mental health history. In the letter, the Sheriff also cited a
policy that read, “Employees will conduct themselves at all times, both on and off duty, in such a
manner to reflect most favorably on the Charleston County Sheriff’s Office and Detention Center.
Conduct unbecoming of an employee shall include that which brings the Detention Center into
disrepute or reflects discredit upon the employee as a member of the Detention Center or that
which impairs the operation or efficiency of the Detention Center.” The letter then documented
that Fickett and Houle were being terminated.

43
Fickett and Houle were escorted to gather their belongings and then taken out of the facility. In
her interview, Fickett explained, “Get all our stuff, get walked out the building. A couple of hours
later, they were like wait, ’Don’t release the termination letter right now. We wanna do some other
things.’ or give them more time to investigate because the investigations weren’t anywhere close
to being done. So they were like we can get you, ’You guys can go on FMLA (Family Medical
Leave Act) and—' Fickett then said “they” suggested Fickett and Houle go to a doctor and be put
on FMLA time. They completed that on May 17 but the media reported later that day that the
Sheriff’s office had terminated their employment.

A second termination letter, dated May 17th, read in part, “Although our findings and conclusions
are not yet final as the investigation is ongoing, it has become evident that your continued
employment at the jail at this time has resulted in extreme disruption of operations which has to
[sic] potential to jeopardize other residents, personnel and citizens.” The letter went on to say that
the Sheriff had decided she must terminate their employment and if “compelling evidence come
[sic] to light that would definitely exonerate you of any wrongdoing related to the incident”, she
would consider reinstatement. Fickett said she received the letter about May 20 th.

44
 Conclusions

The SACDC policy was insufficient to guide SOG practices. Generally accepted correctional
practices balance the threat of potential resistance or violence by the detainee with a preparation
of the potential force necessary to meet the jail’s objective, in this case an appearance in Bond
Court. For example, less lethal weapons are often prohibited when a detainee is only offering
passive resistance. Conversely, de-escalation techniques are not required when a detainee is
violently attacking another detainee. The SACDC use of force policy uses the general terms of
“reasonableness” and “least amount of force reasonably necessary” but fails to provide sufficient
direction in areas like when to use, or not use, empty hand control techniques, OC or a TASER.
The TASER policy was insufficient on directing when it could be used, how many times and
whether it could be used simultaneous to another TASER.

The SACDC had no policies or procedures on cell extractions. Generally accepted jail practices
do not specifically require a cell extraction policy, but they do require a combination of policies
and procedures that guide staffing, tactics, use of force and risk avoidance. The SACDC failed to
provide adequate policy in all of these areas.

The SACDC also had no meaningful policies on the selection, training, operation or tactics of the
SOG members. The vendor had broad authority to do as he wanted and the evidence shows the
SACDC leadership turned a blind eye to concerns they should have addressed.

Training and supervision are the greatest influences on deputy’s behavior and for all topics related
to the use of force in this event, the SACDC’s training was seriously insufficient. Even worse, the
culture of the SACDC leadership was to look the other way when policy violations occurred and
to sanction training that preferred the use of force over avoidance and de-escalation techniques.

There are important investigations that should occur after an in-custody death. The first is a
criminal inquiry. These are most often done by another law enforcement agency, in this case, the
SLED. As with most investigations by an associated agency, they often lack the scrutiny that a
similar case would receive if it did not involve another law enforcement officer. The SLED
investigation did not establish intent or state of mind for Fickett or Houle – important elements in
determining whether there were criminal acts. It is fortunate that Fickett submitted to an interview

45
in June 2021 to help answer those questions, but as noted, those statements cannot be used against
her in criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, they helped paint the full picture of what happened on
January 5 and filled in many gaps left by the previous investigations.

Secondly, there should be an internal investigation to determine if any policies were violated, and
if there were any policy, training or supervision concerns. The internal OPS report discussed some
of the glaring issues like the longstanding disconnect between Bond Court policy and practice.
However, the investigation focused only on Fickett and Houle, when the most obvious policy
violations were committed by Salters and Greathouse when they furthered the practice of
compulsory attendance at Bond Court. Neither were disciplined. The inquiry also failed to address
the inadequacies of the SOG training that contributed to this event. Still, the OPS report found
that Fickett and Houle acted within policy and noted that they were ordered to complete the cell
extraction. In her termination letters, the Sheriff later said she disagreed with OPS findings but
did not explain why.

Other inquiries should have been made and were not. Whenever there is an in-custody death, a
jail should conduct a morbidity review to determine if there was anything that should have been
done differently, mostly by healthcare staff. The evidence did not establish why Fickett and Houle
were not told more about Sutherland’s mental health issues or why the healthcare staff seemed so
reticent to begin resuscitation efforts after the use of force, but those matters are mostly beyond
the scope of this report.

Chronological Review of Use of Force Concerns

This analysis must consider the underlying fact that the entire situation did not need to occur, and
only did occur because of the ongoing failures of leadership in the SACDC. While Salter and
Greathouse own the direct responsibility for creating this situation, the evidence is clear that the
compulsory attendance in Bond Count was a long-standing practice, and the policy violation was
openly ignored by CCSO command and executive staff. This practice was the most unreasonable
part of this whole incident. A thorough internal review should not only have considered the policy
violations but also the harm that had been caused to prior detainees. The OPS report was silent on
that matter. Nothing in the SACDC documentation took this into account and maybe most
glaringly, the Sheriff terminated Fickett and Houle for vague policy violations of conduct and

46
discrediting the agency, while nothing was done for the direct policy violations by Salters and
Greathouse.

The insufficient staffing of the extraction, that followed the misguided SOG training, also lies at
the feet of the CCSO administration. There is no objective research or generally accepted jail
practice that recommends only two deputies should perform an extraction in a jail of this size. An
unanswered question of this review is how and why the CCSO utilized SOG training that is
inherently dangerous for both staff and detainees and substituted weapons and commands for
communication and de-escalation. An adequately staffed extraction team could have controlled
Sutherland without having to resort to the measures Fickett and Houle used. While the tactics,
such as Houle entering the cell behind Sutherland, were poor, even two or three deputies being
able to control his arms and legs would have likely eliminated the need for the second and
subsequent TASER deployments as well as the compressional asphyxia concerns. It is also likely
that Sutherland could have been controlled more quickly and the length of time on his stomach
could have been lessened. Similar to the false premise of Sutherland having to personally appear
in Bond Court, the failures of the SACDC to use staffing and tactics that conform with generally
accepted jail practices was causal to the uses of force that followed.

De-escalation, or the lack thereof, is a consideration in use of force reviews. The evidence shows
there were de-escalation efforts made prior to Fickett and Houle being summoned. That does not
lessen the importance of them trying additional techniques before they engaged in force. They
should have first attempted to calmly and clearly speak with Sutherland, understand his mental
state and seek his cooperation. The most obvious concerns are the aggressive and confusing
commands to Sutherland. They yelled contradictory commands in a volume and tone that was
likely to worsen Sutherland’s mental state. They missed several opportunities to engage him in
dialogue when he calmly and rationally asked questions. In recent years, the most important
conversations in law enforcement are about the avoidance of force. The SACDC did not listen.

Maybe most of all, this analysis has to consider one thing – the way Fickett and Houle were trained.
The videos of training show the SOG was taught aggression and intimidation but not effective
communication and force avoidance. The SACDC bought into the vendor’s misguided concepts
of tactical training and allowed him to teach unreasonable force that violated SACDC policy. It is

47
telling that the SACDC sanctioned the hazing of their own employees for what can only be
described as the sadistic pleasure of the vendor since there were no legitimate jail objectives
accomplished through the agony of SOG candidates. The jail administration should have
recognized the fear-instilling tactics of the SOG may be effective with many detainees, but it was
inevitable that something would go wrong, most likely with a mentally ill detainee, and someone
would be hurt or killed.

The actual use of OC to gain compliance was within generally accepted jail practices. OC use on
the mentally ill has been debated, but because of the failures of the SACDC process, Fickett and
Houle did not fully know of Sutherland’s mental illness. OC can cause negative reactions with
some, but with the way the SOG operated, any alternative would have likely been more harmful.
The greatest fault in the use of OC force was the failure to provide a longer waiting period,
especially after the second OC deployment. Even with the perception that they were operating
under a court order and the judge was waiting, 51 seconds is an inadequate amount of time to allow
the OC to have full effect. The SACDC had no waiting period established in policy or training –
another failure.

Much could be said about the poor tactics used in this situation, but the most significant factor is
Fickett directing Houle into the interior of the cell where he was effectively trapped once the
violence began. There were options to try safer handcuffing positions, most notably with
Sutherland’s back turned more toward the door. Fickett took ownership for ordering Houle into
the cell and, while a poor tactic, her decision did not rise to the level of violating generally accepted
jail practices.

The first TASER deployment was premature as discussed. By generally accepted jail practices
Fickett should have waited to see if Sutherland was complying. She did not wait and later said she
was seeking an opportunity to use the TASER, believing Sutherland was not going to comply. The
videos of her training show that she was, at least at one point, trained to do exactly what she did.
She was taught, at least at one time, to use a TASER against lesser levels of resistance than what
Sutherland was demonstrating. Some SACDC staff said the policy had been changed to remove
passive resistance from the list of authorized TASER deployments. The failure of the policy and
the lack of training documents do not show what the SACDC defined as active resistance though,

48
so it cannot be established that Fickett violated policy or training when she discharged the first
TASER shot. Most similarly situated jails would not authorize the use of a TASER under similar
circumstances but some do, and I cannot assert that it violated generally accepted practices.

The precipitating event of the major force was the resistance that Houle perceived while trying to
handcuff Sutherland. I cannot establish whether Sutherland was actually resisting, whether he had
limited dexterity that caused Houle to perceive he was resisting or whether the high handcuff
placement on Sutherland’s left wrist made it physically difficult to bring the other handcuff loop
to Sutherland’s right wrist.

Nonetheless, it was Houle’s perceived resistance that caused Fickett to discharge her TASER for
the second time. Poor communication between Fickett and Houle led to Fickett making the
assumption that Sutherland was resisting by rolling over, when in fact, Houle meant to roll
Sutherland over. While another example of the poor training of the deputies, Fickett’s decision
was not unreasonable given that Houle did not communicate and tell her his intentions.

The most serious events occurred after the second TASER deployment. When that cycle ended,
Sutherland became frantic and his resistance was active and assaultive. With Houle trapped in the
cell, Sutherland grabbing his legs and trying to raise up with the loose handcuff on one wrist, the
situation was very dangerous for the deputies. Because it was dangerous for them, it became
dangerous for Sutherland. What options did the deputies have given the situation at that moment?

• Empty hand control techniques like wrist locks and arm bar holds – It is highly doubtful
two deputies could have controlled a strong detainee like Sutherland with these.
• Additional OC – OC is not designed or recommended for use in close contact. It would
likely have had only marginal effect on Sutherland, while now effecting the deputies.
• Less lethal munitions – Despite the absurdity of having shotguns slung around their bodies
in this situation, they were too close to Sutherland to safely prepare for a less lethal
deployment and too close for the recommended range to use the ammunition.
• Higher levels of force, such as a neck restraint or strikes – The evidence did not indicate
whether the SACDC authorized neck restraints, but the deputies were not in a position to
use one. Hand or foot strikes may have been effective but are generally considered more
harmful than a TASER.

49
 • TASER – The number of deployments aside, the use of the TASER was a reasonable
option. With the other options being impractical, the TASER could be used in close
quarters and was likely to have the most immediate incapacitating effect with a low
likelihood of causing harm.

A key question revolves around the frequency of TASER use and the simultaneous applications.
Generally accepted jail practices restrict the use of a TASER to three applications for a cumulative
fifteen seconds under normal circumstances. The most common exception is when there is an
imminent risk of serious bodily injury to the deputies and, as used here, serious bodily injury
includes fractures, lacerations and more serious injuries. When Sutherland became assaultive
toward Houle, and had a loose handcuff on his wrist, there was a legitimate risk of Houle suffering
serious bodily injury. Fickett described the events later when she said, “It means we’ve completely
lost control and we’re in the middle of an OC-filled room and fighting. It’s a bad situation. This is
what we didn’t want to happen type of thing.” With the lack of additional personnel to control
Sutherland and protect Houle from being injured, both deputies were justified in using the TASERs
to protect Houle and subdue Sutherland.

It is a challenging fact that Fickett consistently and firmly believed that she did not discharge the
TASER more than three or four times. Certainly not seven. However, in the heat of an intense
struggle like this it is not uncommon for a misperception like that to occur. It is most frequently
seen in officer-involved shootings when the officer greatly misjudges the number of shots they
fired. The evidence also showed that Fickett did not have any pattern or practice of excessive
TASER use in her roughly eight years on SOG.

While there are generally accepted jail practices for the TASER in standard situations, there are
none that specifically guide the frequency and cumulative exposure against a real or perceived risk
of serious bodily injury. It is recognized that the more instances and the longer the exposure, the
greater the risk. While shocking to watch, nothing can definitively establish that Fickett’s use was
unreasonable or violated generally accepted jail practices when her perceptions are considered.

Handcuffing is a use of force and in this matter, it is worth noting that the delay in completing the
handcuffing on Sutherland caused additional exposure to compressional and positional asphyxia
concerns. Compressional asphyxia refers to the pressure that was placed on Sutherland’s torso by

50
the weight of the deputies. Positional asphyxia refers to the time he was left on his stomach. It
was clear that Houle’s knee/leg was on Sutherland’s back for a concerning length of time. His
statements showed his poor training when he said he was taught that it was acceptable to use
pressure, so long as it was not on the spine. Even the OPS report validated this perception. That
idea is dangerous because pressure anywhere in the center mass of the back is known to be a risk
for asphyxia. This situation was worsened when Sutherland told them he could not breathe. That
said, Sutherland was responsive for some time after the pressure was removed, lessening the
likelihood that it contributed to his death.

Dr. Kim Collins, the forensic pathologist, wrote, “The combination of the schizophrenia,
medications administered, absence of medications, and the deputies’ actions killed Sutherland.”
The “deputies’ actions” included Sutherland’s positioning, the use of the spit hood and the use of
the TASERs. His medication changes, excitement and agitation also contributed to what Dr.
Collins believes was a cardiac event.

The custom and practice of the SACDC to always use a spit hood after a use of force is
unreasonable. Not only are there physical impacts from it like keeping OC inside the hood, but it
is known to have detrimental psychological effects too, especially on the mentally ill. While Covid
was a legitimate concern and a Covid mask would have been reasonable, there was no legitimate
jail objective accomplished by putting a spit hood over every person who had been the subject of
force. Again though, it is not only the use of the spit hood itself but putting it on took additional
time that Sutherland was left on his stomach.

Totality of the Uses of Force

The events preceding Sutherland’s death are disturbing to say the least. Most of all, his death was
preventable because the cell extraction never needed to happen. After that, the seriously flawed
policies, training, supervision, custom and practices of the SACDC combined to create a situation
that would have been foreseeable had the CCSO leadership been paying attention. This situation
was a domino effect of mistakes. One led to another that led to another.

As I understand it, the key decision for a prosecution is whether Fickett and/or Houle had a
“reckless disregard for the safety” of Sutherland. In my opinion, they did not. While their tactics,

51
decisions and actions violate many generally accepted jail training practices, they did not violate
the policy, training and supervision in the SACDC. In my opinion, they were not reckless because
they were either doing what they were trained to do or, in the absence of training, they were doing
what had become the custom and practice in the SACDC. They were put in an untenable position
from the beginning. If criminal liability could be attached to an organization rather than an
individual, the CCSO should be charged. As we know though, that cannot happen. The SACDC
actively chose to allow the rogue training of SOG and failed to intercede when leadership should
have. This event turned out tragically, but the responsibility cannot be solely put on Fickett and
Houle. When I was the sheriff of my county and I had to decide disciplinary matters, I would often
ask myself, “Has this been an ongoing practice and this deputy just happened to get caught?” As
evidenced by the Sheriff’s inability to specifically reference an act or omission as cause for Fickett
and Houle’s terminations, it is clear this was not an anomaly, only the death was.

Sutherland’s death could have been avoided if he was never taken to jail. It could have been
avoided if Fickett and Houle were not ordered to take him to Bond Court. It may have been
avoided if the staffing, tactics and force applications would have been different. While the actions
of Fickett and Houle appear to have contributed to his death, their reasons for those actions were
based on the failures of policy, training and supervision by the SACDC.

As a former sheriff who made mistakes, my greatest hope is that Sheriff Graziano takes this
opportunity to welcome informed perspectives, based on research and best practices, and reform
the SACDC jail practices to prevent a future death. There are many resources available to help
improve practices in mental health, de-escalation, reduction of force, etc. These practices save
lives and can prevent a future event like this.

Respectfully Submitted:

Gary Raney, President

52
 

Ninth Circuit Solicitor’s Office

Scarlett A. Wilson
Solicitor

REPORT ON JAMAL SUTHERLAND’S DEATH

AT CHARLESTON COUNTY’S DETENTION CENTER
Jamal Sutherland died on January 5, 2021, after being extracted from a cell within
Charleston County’s detention center (Sheriff Al Cannon Detention Center - SACDC). Sutherland
should not have died the way he did and he was not at fault. Sutherland was mentally ill and he did
exactly what we ask of those who suffer from mental illness: he sought professional help when he
needed it. Sutherland checked himself into a mental health facility and decompensated while he was
there. He was concerned about his treatment there and knew he was not getting better. Sutherland
attempted to check himself out the day before he died. The heartbreaking fact is that Mr. Sutherland’s
death was entirely avoidable. With better treatment, care and concern by all the institutions involved,
Jamal Sutherland would not have died the way he did on January 5.
This report contains the factual and legal conclusions of the Ninth Circuit Solicitor’s Office
regarding Jamal Sutherland’s death. Nothing in this document should be construed to imply that Jamal
Sutherland is to blame for his death.
This report should be read in conjunction with the Raney Report and with the deeply
disturbing body worn camera (BWC) videos in mind.
 https://bit.ly/RANEYREPORT

CONTEXT OF THE ANALYSIS & DECISION

The Investigation and the Role of the Solicitor
Jamal Sutherland died on January 5, 2021 after detention deputies extracted him from a jail
cell at the SACDC. Immediately thereafter, the Charleston County Sheriff’s Office called in the South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) to investigate. The investigation showed that
immediately after deputies extracted Mr. Sutherland from his cell, medical personnel contracted to
provide health care at the jail began assessing him and eventually attempted unsuccessful life-saving
measures. Because of this, the scene was not entirely secure until after medical personnel pronounced
Mr. Sutherland’s death and they left area. Nevertheless, SLED was able to photograph and collect
most relevant physical evidence from the scene.
SLED agents collected body worn cameras from the involved deputies and other
surveillance video from the jail. They interviewed witnesses to the removal of Mr. Sutherland from
the jail cell and witnesses to staff training, policies and procedures of the jail. SLED agents also
obtained hundreds of pages of Mr. Sutherland’s medical records and other relevant documents. In
addition to the electronic evidence, SLED generated reports totaling nearly 600 pages. All of the
materials and electronic evidence gathered by SLED will be available to the public with extremely
limited redaction.
As the Solicitor, I do not normally make arrest decisions. SLED, however, has asked that
Solicitors across the state make the decisions to prosecute or not at the outset of Officer Involved

  1 
 

Critical Incidents when SLED does not see fit to make a probable cause arrest. I agreed to SLED’s
request, it is now my task to determine whether anyone involved in Sutherland’s death should be
criminally prosecuted under state law. On April 29, 2021, I requested that the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) review Mr. Sutherland’s death to determine if law enforcement officers
violated Mr. Sutherland’s civil rights while acting under color of law. The DOJ accepted and their
investigation continues.
It is neither my role nor do I have the expertise to critique police training and procedures
generally or to determine whether there is a basis for a civil lawsuit and recovery of damages from
anyone. My only role is to determine if state criminal charges are viable. Therefore, I must decide
whether to prosecute charges, based on the legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for
each and every element of the crime charged. Prosecutors’ professional organizations and the
American Bar agree that a prosecutor should only file those charges that she/he reasonably believes
will be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and that will support a criminal conviction.

 https://www.apainc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Attachment-2-APAs-21st-
Century-Principles-of-Prosecution-Officer-Use-of-Force-Cases-2017.pdf
 https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunction
FourthEdition/
 https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-w-Revised-Commentary.pdf

Some states provide for a grand jury that can investigate a case by calling witnesses before
the grand jury. Unlike those states, South Carolina does not have an investigative grand jury for
these matters. Charging decisions in criminal matters are not based on whether or not law
enforcement handled the incident appropriately from an administrative or tactical standpoint.
Furthermore, the fact that an in-custody death is controversial; the fact a death was avoidable, or
that law enforcement did not follow proper policy or procedure does not necessarily make it a
criminal matter. As the public has seen in this and other cases, administrative and civil remedies
are often options.
I thoroughly reviewed the evidence gathered by SLED and the Charleston County Coroner,
Bobbi Jo O’Neal. The Coroner’s pathologist, Dr. J.C. Upshaw Downs, determined that the
extrication process did not reveal any “unusual or excessive interactions or areas of direct concern.”
Furthermore, immediately after Jamal Sutherland’s death, a certified medical assistant (CMA) who
observed the incident opined that the deputies did not act excessively and only tried to restrain
Sutherland.1 In order to move forward with a prosecution in any death case, the State must prove
“proximate cause.” Because of the disturbing nature of the body worn camera video and my own
experience that Sutherland’s death seemed at least medically, a homicide, I felt it necessary to have
another qualified pathologist review the autopsy. I retained Dr. Kim Collins, a renowned and board
certified forensic pathologist. To aid Dr. Collins, I also retained Dr. Laura Labay. Dr. Labay is a
board certified forensic toxicologist who holds both a Master’s degree and Ph.D. in Toxicology. I
believed both the community and the Sutherland family deserved a second look at Dr. Downs’
findings in order to determine whether the State could prove the deputies were a proximate cause
of Sutherland’s death, the first hurdle in a criminal prosecution.
SLED did not opine as to the propriety of the deputies’ use of force, nor did SLED’s
interviews delve into the key issue: each deputy’s state of mind and how each was trained. Again,
because Dr. Downs was the only person to opine as to use of force, and he stated that he saw nothing
unusual or excessive or of direct concern, I felt it necessary to seek an opinion from a qualified expert
on the use of force. Whether or not Dr. Downs was entirely correct, it was imperative to have a
well-qualified expert witness who is trained on these issues weigh-in. To that end, I relied on an
                                                           
1
The CMA, however, did not observe the number of taser deployments.
  2 
 

experienced use of force expert, former Ada County Idaho Sheriff Gary Raney. Raney has been
involved in law enforcement reform at the national level and currently serves as a United States
District Courts’ expert under two Use of Force Consent Decrees, one in the Northern District of
California and one in the Central District of California. United States Attorney General Eric Holder
(of the President Obama administration) appointed Raney to the National Institute of Corrections, the
federal agency that guides best practices for jails and prisons and Raney later was elected vice-chair
of that organization. Raney has worked as a retained expert for both victims of excessive force and
law enforcement accused of using excessive force. I came to Raney after I first approached
University of South Carolina Associate Professor Seth W. Stoughton, a use of force expert, for a
consultation in this matter. I was familiar with Professor Stoughton from his testimony before the
South Carolina Legislature, his presentation for a South Carolina for Justice Reform forum, and his
testimony in the Derek Chauvin / George Floyd murder trial. Professor Stoughton advised that he
believed an expert who specializes in detention and correction would be a better resource in this case
than he. Because I knew of no one who had those credentials, Professor Stoughton helped me find
Raney so that I would have a qualified, independent individual to review the use of force in this
incident and provide an expert opinion. Professor Stoughton had not worked with Raney but knew
him by reputation and felt comfortable making the introduction.

Timeliness of the Solicitor’s Report

The Ninth Circuit Solicitor’s Office, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED),
and local law enforcement have agreed to follow the Officer Involved Critical Incident Policy located
at https://www.scsolicitor9.org/files/OICI-Policy.pdf. Through this policy, I created self-imposed,
aspirational goals for making prosecutorial decisions. At page 22, the policy states:

The Solicitor will complete a review of the investigation within 60 days of

receipt of the completed investigative case file barring unusual circumstances
that require additional time. If at any time during the process, the Solicitor
believes further investigation is needed she will notify [SLED] and request the
necessary investigative action be taken. If the Solicitor requires additional time
to make a decision, she will make a public statement disclosing the need for an
extension of time, and the reason for the extension, if appropriate.

As promised, I publicly outlined the nature of the materials upon which we were waiting in order to
meet the arbitrary, self-imposed deadline.
In order to evaluate a case for trial and to determine if we could prove any charges beyond a
reasonable doubt, many aspects of Jamal Sutherland’s death had to be more thoroughly investigated
and analyzed. Key among them were the proximate cause of his death and any information that bore
on the deputies’ states of mind, i.e., their training, experience and explanations for what they did.
The finding of proximate cause is inextricably tied to the autopsy report and the toxicology
findings. The taser findings from the deputies’ tasers are relevant to proximate cause and the
deputies’ state of mind. The following dates are highlights of our receipt of pertinent information:

 March 10 Received Axon Report

 March 22 Received Final Autopsy Report (which turned out not to be final, at all)
 April 15 Met with Pathologist Downs and Coroner
 April 20 Met with Pathologist Downs, Coroner and Sutherland Family Attorneys
 April 30 Received SLED Report

  3 
 

 May 19 Received SLED Addendum 1

 June 8 Met (virtually) with Pathologist, Coroner and forensic toxicologist Demi Garvin
 June 10 Conference call with Coroner and forensic toxicologist Demi Garvin
 June 29 Received SLED Addendum 2
 June 30: Received Downs’ Amended Final Autopsy Report
 May 17 Met with SLED regarding Axon Report
 May 21 Received Amended Axon Report
 July 8 Received Labay Toxicology Report
 July 14 Received Collins Autopsy Review
 July 24 Received Raney Report (Final)

As stated earlier, SLED did not opine as to the use of force, nor did the Sheriff’s Office initially
provide all the training materials that factored into Raney’s review. In this case and under these facts,
proving and understanding the deputies’ training was critical. Due to matters beyond our control,
Raney’s review, analysis and report took much longer than he or I anticipated. Unfortunately, the
Sheriff’s Office did not provide pertinent training information in a timely manner to either SLED or
my office. Likewise, one of the principal vendor trainers for the SOG ceased cooperation with my
office. It is wholly unacceptable that the Sheriff’s Office informed us of evidentiary discoveries as
late as July 7, six months into this investigation and despite repeated requests from SLED and my
office. In order for the Sutherlands and the community at large to have confidence in our review, they
have to know that we performed our work with all due diligence. We could not assure them that we
had conducted a thorough review until we finally gained confidence in July that the Sheriff’s Office
had provided us enough information to have a clear picture of the state of SOG training before January
5, 2021. As you will see, Mr. Raney’s report is comprehensive.

Framework of Analyzing South Carolina Law When a Law Enforcement Officer is

Involved in the Death of Another
South Carolina has neither an excessive force nor a use of force statute. We are one of only eight
states in the country where the legislature has declined to enact any special or specific criteria for
officer involved force. That omission affects the State’s ability to hold officers accountable for
excessive uses of force. In South Carolina, to prove that an officer is criminally liable for the death of
a civilian, the State must prove that the officer 1) caused the death, 2) with a criminal mindset (known
as mens rea), and 3) that their actions were unlawful. Beyond this, the State must prove each element
of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Officers are legally permitted to use force, including deadly force, under certain
circumstances. In other states and in some federal contexts, the reasonableness of an officer’s use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. That is an objective
inquiry: the question is whether the officers' actions were “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting them, without regard to the officer’s underlying intent or
motivation. In those other jurisdictions, the use of unreasonable force exceeds police authority,
potentially exposing an officer to criminal liability.
In South Carolina, on the other hand, an officer facing prosecution is held to the standards
required of any other citizen, not that of a reasonable officer on the scene. The officer is viewed as a
civilian. The officer's mental state is subjective, contained entirely within her/his own mind. The
officer’s personal underlying intent and motivation is the critical issue.

The Impact of a Detention Center Cell Extraction on the Evaluation of Evidence and Law
  4 
 

Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a detention center, the purpose of the facility is to detain
but their walls do not form a barrier separating inmates from the protections of the Constitution. Most
importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less
“maliciously and sadistically.” With that acknowledgment, however, it is critical to recognize that
inmates cannot be permitted to decide which orders they will obey and when they will obey them.
Detention deputies are allowed to act in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline not only
when they confront immediate risks to physical safety, but also when they attempt to “preserve
internal order” by compelling compliance with detention rules and procedures. Courts have given
officers “wide-ranging deference” in their determinations that force is required to induce compliance
with policies important to institutional security. Deputies cross the line when they use force
maliciously and for the very purpose of causing harm or when they inflict pain not to induce
compliance, but to punish an inmate for stubbornness or to retaliate for insubordination.
American jurisprudence is well settled on premises that running a detention center is an
inordinately difficult undertaking and that safety and order at these institutions require the expertise
of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the
problems they face. Like other officers, detention deputies facing disturbances are often forced to
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.
Management by a few guards of large numbers of prisoners in an institution may require and justify
the occasional use of a degree of intentional force. An officer’s decision regarding how much force
to use is made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance. The
perfection of hindsight’s 20/20 vision cannot require criminal liability for every use of force that
proves to be unnecessary in retrospect.
Correctional officers and jailers have one of the highest rates of injuries and illnesses of all
occupations, often resulting from confrontations with inmates. Officers work in shifts that cover all
hours of the day and night, including weekends and holidays. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, Correctional Officers and Bailiffs,
at https://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/correctional-officers.htm. Prisons and detention
centers are dangerous places to work. Officers are tasked with staying a step ahead of inmates and
their creativity. Officers are keenly aware that objects taken for granted and used in everyday life
are often transformed into weapons. Toothbrushes, hairbrushes and eating utensils have all been
used by inmates to attack other inmates or guards. Plastic can be particularly dangerous when melted
or chewed into a sharp shape.

 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2563516/;
 https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/shanks-lesser-known-prison-weapons-
article-1.2508679;
 https://m.magnoliastatelive.com/2020/12/14/officer-stabbed-with-shank-made-of-
plastic-spoons-and-blanket-during-escape-attempt/

A “cell extraction” is a detention deputy’s (or corrections officer’s) forceful removal of

an inmate who refuses to come out of a cell or other enclosed area of a detention or corrections facility.
When undertaken properly, the extraction is a necessary method of maintaining order and security
within the detention facility. By definition, however, cell extractions involve force. Inmates who do
not want to comply with orders and/or leave their cells often are unpredictable. Cell extraction
situations can be combustible. Even when perfectly executed, cell extractions carry risks. See
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/us/when-cell-door-opens-tough-tactics-and-risk.html. At the
SACDC, a small squad of detention deputies were trained and designated as the Special Operations
Group (SOG). SOG Operators were supposed to attend multiple trainings per year and were to be
utilized in high-risk situations, including cell extractions. Specific “rules,” i.e., policies, procedures
and directives, of the Sheriff Al Cannon Detention Center (SACDC) in effect on January 5, 2021, will
  5 
 

be discussed in other sections of this report, and more thoroughly in the Raney Report. Some of the
SACDC edicts had a devastating impact on the way events unfolded that morning.
On January 5, 2021, the Bond Court summoned Jamal Sutherland via detention deputies
for Sutherland’s 9:00 a.m. bond hearing. Sutherland refused to leave his cell voluntarily, and
SOG Operator Deputy Houle was called to perform a cell extraction. Houle had been told that
Sutherland was in jail on an assault and battery charge and that he was combative and had mental
health issues. Houle did not know Sutherland’s specific history or diagnosis. Houle sought
permission to delay the extraction because of his concerns but due to a 2017 directive, his
superiors denied his request.2
Houle was the only SOG Operator on duty at the time but he knew that Deputy Fickett, a
former SOG Operator, was working as well. Since she was SOG trained, Houle asked Fickett to
help him perform the extraction. Before the extraction began, Houle told Sutherland they would
have to use force if he would not allow himself to be handcuffed. Sutherland repeatedly stated to
Houle, “I’m warning you. I’m warning you.” Both Houle and Fickett observed Sutherland with a
plastic spoon, acting as if he would use it as a weapon. Fickett was not briefed on Sutherland’s
mental health issues.
Every decision the deputies made during this incident, in response to their assignment,
must be interpreted in light of the context of a detention center cell extraction, the deputies’ prior
training and the information the deputies had at that time.

EVIDENTIARY OVERVIEW

The Sheriff’s Office Policies, Directives and Training Information

Because the State must prove each deputy’s state of mind and her/his intentions, it is
important to have as much information as possible regarding what each deputy was informed
and what each deputy understood regarding the Sheriff’s Office’s policies and directives related
to uses of force. Again, a deputy’s state of mind is subjective. This means that unlike many
other jurisdictions, the “objectively reasonable officer” standard does not apply. The State has
to prove what these individuals personally knew, believed and felt as they were interacting with
Jamal Sutherland on January 5, 2021. The trajectory of the interaction between the deputies and
Jamal Sutherland began with these policies and directives and ended with the deputies’ training.
The pertinent written policies are linked below while their training is more thoroughly addressed
in the Raney Report:
 https://bit.ly/5-036-Special-Management-Unit-82218-Beatty
 https://bit.ly/5-0411-Behavioral-Management-Unit-13019-Beatty
 https://bit.ly/5-316-SOG-111920-Beatty
 https://bit.ly/5-335-Use-of-Force-42717-Beatty
 https://bit.ly/5-354-Use-of-Restraints-and-Seclusion-100518-Beatty
 https://bit.ly/5-365-EMDT-43018-Beatty
 https://bit.ly/5-374-OC-110816-Beatty
 https://bit.ly/5-425-Emergency-Restraint-Chair-102320-Beatty
 https://bit.ly/9-144-Video-Bond-Hearing-72219-Beatty
                                                           
2
Houle’s requests were to his chain of command. Bond court judges were not consulted or otherwise involved.
https://bit.ly/MOI-Judge-Mel-Coleman-Rev-by-Ghent

  6 
 

 https://bit.ly/9-144-Video-Contra-Bond-Court-Directive-42017-Salters

Sutherland’s Required Appearance at Bond Court

Had the Video Bond Hearing Policy 9-14.4 been followed, the tragic death of Jamal
Sutherland may never have occurred. The policy allowed inmates to refuse to appear without
force being used. It provided that a detention deputy would follow-up with the inmate regarding
participation in a bond hearing at each bond court session. If the inmate continued to refuse, the
deputies were to notify the bond court judge. The bond court judge would then decide which
course to take, including ordering that the inmate be brought before the judge. In that instance,
the Special Operations Group (SOG) was to escort the inmate to bond court. By allowing
refusals before skipping to the extreme of a cell extraction, the detention center and the court
had options such as mental evaluations and attempts of de-escalation. Had superiors honored
his request for a postponement, a cell extraction likely would not have happened and Houle and
Fickett likely would have never interacted with Sutherland.
Unfortunately, in April 2017, Policy 9-14.4 was pre-empted by a directive from the upper
ranks of the detention center. This directive stated that from that moment forward, when an
inmate refused to go to his bond hearing “the first time”, deputies were instructed to notify
supervisors and contact the SOG for use of an Emergency Restraint Chair (ERC) 3. Per Policy
5-42.5, an ERC is used when an inmate is exhibiting uncontrollable or violent behavior. It is
intended to assist in the control of combative, self-destructive or potentially violent inmates.
Use of the ERC is considered a “Use of Force.” If an inmate, like Sutherland, were to refuse to
come out of his cell, a cell extraction would be used to get the inmate in an ERC. Because of
this directive, detention deputies summoned the SOG, which is considered under Policy 5-31.6
a “last resort in resolving a situation.” There appear to have been no policies or procedures
specifically related to executing a cell extraction. Likewise, there did not appear to be any
retained training materials related to properly executing a cell extraction. Earlier this month,
however, some 7 months after Sutherland’s death, CCSO provided me with a mélange of SOG
training videos and materials that include videos of cell extraction training. To date, it does not
appear CCSO provided reference materials to SOG Operators for their use as a resource. In fact,
it appears providing such written materials was discouraged.

Statements from the Command Staff

Raney outlines the important facets of the Sheriff’s Command Staff interviews regarding
bond court practices in his report. The recorded interviews of key CCSO command staff can be
found at these links:
 https://bit.ly/Lt-Brian-Duvall-SLED-Interview-1
 https://bit.ly/SLED-MOI-of-2nd-Interview-with-Lt-Duvall
 https://bit.ly/Cpt-Greathouse-SLED-Interview
 https://bit.ly/Deputy-James-SLED-Interview
 https://bit.ly/SaltersE-041621-Audio

Uses of Force Policies v. Training

Policies
                                                           
3
To her credit, Sheriff Kristin Graziano quickly implemented changes to bond hearing policy and procedures which
should remedy the grave error of the former administration.
  7 
 

As previously discussed, a cell extraction by nature involves the planned use of force and
Policy 5-33.5 governed force within the detention center. The Policy provides that force may
be used to enforce compliance with rules, regulations and orders when other methods of control
have proven insufficient. Both the use of oleoresin capsicum (OC) Spray and electro-muscular
disruption technology devices (EMDTs / tasers) are allowed. The policy recognizes that while
various levels of force exist, only the level of force which is reasonably appropriate under the
circumstances to “successfully accomplish a legitimate correctional purpose” should be used.
Factors to be considered are the resources available, the conduct of the inmate, the level of
resistance and the relative age, size, strength, skill level of the deputies and inmates.
Policy 5-37.4 regarding OC Spray provides that it may be used during any planned use of
force, to include cell extractions. While the policy directs that staff should wait for the OC to
take effect, it gives no direction as to how long a deputy should wait for the OC to take effect—
only that symptoms usually last 5 to 10 minutes. The application of a “spit mask” is briefly
referenced in the Emergency Restraint Chair Policy 5-42.5 but does not appear to be addressed
in any detail in the policies and procedures in place on January 5, 2021.
Policy 5-36.5 governs Taser use. Tasers are considered “less lethal weapons” and are
designed to incapacitate a subject and when used properly, are less likely to result in death or
serious injury than uses of what is commonly referred to as deadly force. Tasers are allowed to
be used when the amount of force is objectively reasonable given the facts and circumstances to
effectively bring a violent or potentially violent individual under control, including when the
violent or potentially violent person is actively resisting, aggressively resisting or displaying
aggravated active resistance.
Tasers are designed to give five second bursts of shock. Policy 5-36.5 allows that
“additional bursts may be administered by pulling the trigger if the targeted subject is not
controlled by the initial burst.” The policy also allows that “if necessary additional five second
bursts may be used to control the subject.” There is no direction in the policy as to how many
Taser bursts are too many. There is no direction in the policy prohibiting simultaneous Taser
bursts. All uses of Tasers are required by CCSO to be “objectively reasonable.”

Training
Training materials from the Charleston County Sheriff’s Office were scant. It is clear that
in the last several years, training of the SOG was in flux. Joseph Garcia previously operated
United States Correction-Special Operations Group (US C-SOG).4 Garcia conducted the
SACDC SOG training from around 2008 through 2019. He eventually fell in disfavor with
some at SACDC and his contract was terminated. The Sheriff’s Office decided to bring training
“in house”. The SOG leadership still subscribes to the substance of Garcia’s training but
disavows his personal approach. We are informed that much of the substance of what Garcia
taught is still used to train SOG Operators.
It was known that SOG training differed in some respects to Detention Center Policies
and Procedures. In fact, on more than one occasion, members of the SOG were asked to
memorialize these differences for the Sheriff’s Office of Professional Standards. Deputy Fickett
made reference to this in a 2018 deposition and Lieutenant Shaw confirmed these events in an
interview. When requested by the Solicitor’s Office to provide these memoranda, Shaw was not
able to find copies, but he did find a report where he outlined some of the problems with Garcia’s
training. https://bit.ly/2018-Shaw-Stmt-on-Garcia-Training
My Chief Investigator, Ray Haupt, spoke to and emailed with Garcia on a number of
occasions. Garcia has made many claims as to his training superiority though his credibility is
                                                           
4
Garcia now operates the Corrections Special Applications Unit (CSAU).
  8 
 

in question5. Despite our requests for his training materials, Garcia has provided little
documentation. During our investigation, SLED and we requested copies of these materials
from the Sheriff’s Office to no avail. Only in the past month were we provided copies of a hard
drive containing 162 gigabytes of information.6 In digging through the numerous files, we
discovered pertinent memoranda. As discussed in the Raney Report, we also discovered training
videos regarding the use of tasers on passively resisting inmates.

The Video Evidence

Video and audio recordings can be imperfect. Video may be unsteady and low quality
and often is limited by the angle from which it is taken. Audio may be garbled, muffled, or
indecipherable based on the distance of the recording device from the sounds or the chaos of the
situation. Even law enforcement’s body cameras may be of limited usefulness in some scenarios,
especially when struggles are at close quarters or in lower light.
Unlike too many other cases of officer involved force, Houle and Fickett ensured that their
body worn cameras were activated and operational. The detention center also utilized overhead
video in the common area of the BMU and it was operational. It was not situated in a way to
capture the scene inside Sutherland’s cell, but it does corroborate the deputies’ descriptions of
what happened before the extraction began. Although the audio and video from this incident are
not perfect, they are extremely valuable, important evidence. Still, none captures every move of
anyone involved. Most of those following this investigation are familiar with the BWC cell
extraction videos. The BWC videos along with others that provide context are linked below.

 Overhead Camera Videos:

o https://bit.ly/BMU-Overhead-Fisheye-Camera---Video-1
o https://bit.ly/BMU-Overhead-Fisheye-Camera---Video-2
 These videos do not contain audio but document the deputies talking to
Sutherland before the extraction begins. At approximately 9:29:077 on the
video, Houle speaks to Sutherland and this appears to coincide with Houle’s
first BWC activation.
 Shortly after 9:29:45, Sgt. Fennell begins speaking to Sutherland. They talk
for roughly 12 minutes. https://bit.ly/Fennell-Incident-Report
 Later, Deputy Fickett’s BWC video captures Fennell saying to Sutherland,
““Do you want me to cuff you? Do you want me to cuff you? Put your hands
through I’ll cuff you? Come on. Come on. I got you. We’ll take you down
there. We’ll go down there together.”
                                                           
5
Articles referencing Joseph Garcia and his training methods:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/city-probes-contract-to-train-rikers-officers-1472566643
https://nypost.com/2016/09/19/rikers-island-vendor-under-fire-has-gone-mia/
https://flaglerlive.com/26604/corrections-special-ops-flagler/
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2017/mar/9/rikers-island-guard-trainers-lose-lawsuit-failure-repay-loan/
 
6
CCSO’s Mike Stanley recently informed superiors that the SOG had a computer that the entire team uses that
potentially contained pertinent information. At CCSO’s request, the County’s IT department then searched the
computer for relevant files which were found and then reviewed by CCSO leadership and later provided to my
office.
7
The cameras recording each video in this matter did not have synchronized clocks and therefore show different
timestamps for the same events. Likewise, the time clocks on the deputies’ tasers are not synchronized with each
other or with any of the video timestamps.
  9 
 

 Houle Body Worn Camera Video 1:

o https://bit.ly/Houle-1st-BWC-Video-with-Subtitles
o https://bit.ly/Houle-1st-BWC-video
o This video was activated approximately 14 minutes before the cell extraction begins
and captures Deputy Houle’s interaction with Sutherland.
o Lt. Duvall first tells Sutherland that he needs to go see the judge so he can “get this
thing over with.” He tells Sutherland he has to go down and see the judge.
o Houle is with Sutherland for almost a minute and Houle tries to convince Sutherland
to allow Houle to handcuff him to go to bond court.
o Lt. Duvall warns Houle that Sutherland has a spoon in his hand, as if he is going to
use it as a weapon.
o Houle directs Sutherland to put his hands through the flap so they can put handcuffs
on him and take him to bond court. Some of Sutherland’s responses are inaudible but
he clearly states several times, “I’m warning you.”

 Fickett Body Worn Camera Video 1:

o https://bit.ly/Fickett-1st-BWC-Video-with-Subtitles;
o https://bit.ly/Fickett-1st-BWC-video
o This video is only 41 seconds long and documents Fickett’s approach to Sutherland’s
cell.
o As Fickett and Houle approach Sutherland’s cell, Deputy Fennell can be heard stating,
“Do you want me to cuff you? Do you want me to cuff you? Put your hands through
I’ll cuff you? Come on. Come on. I got you. We’ll take you down there. We’ll go
down there together. Last chance.”
 Houle Body Worn Camera Video 2 & Fickett Body Worn Camera Video 2:
o https://bit.ly/Side-by-Side-Video-with-Subtitles
o https://bit.ly/Fickett2ndBWCvideo
o https://bit.ly/Houle-2nd-BWC-video
o These videos have been the most viewed and discussed publicly. My office combined
and synchronized the videos so they can be viewed side-by-side. We also added
subtitles to the precursor conversations.
 These are the most important pieces of evidence that show most of the
deputies’ actions and chronicle the pain of Jamal Sutherland, as well as his
statements that he cannot breathe.

Involved Deputies’ Statements

In today’s justice climate, many officers who are involved in critical incidents refuse to
give statements to the independent investigators. When they do offer statements, many officers
seek legal representation first. In this investigation, Deputy Houle submitted to two interviews
with SLED. The first was on the date of Sutherland’s death (January 5) and the follow-up was
on January 15. Deputy Fickett submitted to three interviews with SLED. The first was on the
date of Sutherland’s death (January 5) with follow-ups on January 15 and February 8. On June
23, 2021, Fickett was represented by counsel for a fourth interview under a proffer agreement
  10 
 

with my office.
The recorded or memorialized interviews are linked at:

 https://bit.ly/Fickett-SLED-Interview-1
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-SLED-Interview-2
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-SLED-Interview-3-MOI
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-SLED-Interview-3
 https://bit.ly/4-21-2021-Fickett-OPS-Interview
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-Proffer-Recording-1
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-Proffer-Recording-2

 https://bit.ly/Houle-SLED-interview-1
 https://bit.ly/Houle-SLED-Interview-2

Axon Taser Report

https://bit.ly/REVISED-Axon-Report-5-20-2021
Tasers are designed to cause neuro-muscular incapacitation (NMI). There are different
levels of NMI ranging from limited area effects to significant body lockup. The greater the probe
spread, the higher likelihood of NMI. Subjects may maintain muscle control, particularly in arms
and legs, depending on many factors including probe locations. While Axon Enterprise gives
much advice and many disclaimers, they acknowledge repeatedly that they do not set policy for
law enforcement.
Both Houle’s and Fickett’s tasers recorded information into “Trilogy Logs”, which are
explained in the above linked report. Both Houle and Fickett were trained that their tasers
contained computer chips that recorded their taser use. Many factors affect the effectiveness of a
taser including, but not limited to: the spread between the probes, the location of the probes on
the subject’s body, clothing and movement.
Before reviewing their BWC footage or having access to the Axon Taser Report, Houle
described his belief that Fickett’s taser was not working properly, with his surmising the prongs
were not connected. Though the video shows clearly that Sutherland was receiving some amount
of electrical shock, the Axon Report shows that he was not receiving the full charge of Fickett’s
taser. The BWC videos do not show the actual spread of Fickett’s taser probes, and puncture
wounds from her taser were not observed at autopsy. Sutherland’s jail suit was cut and torn to
make way for medical treatment. SLED’s crime scene examiners were unable to locate any of
the small holes left from where Fickett’s taser probe penetrated. Fickett activated her taser 7
times. For 4.6 seconds, the taser lost connection. For 28.4 seconds cumulative of Fickett’s taser
activation, the taser appears to have had a partial or poor connection. For 2 seconds, it appears the
charge was into flesh (versus into the muscle, which is more effective).
As for Houle’s taser, the spread of the taser probes was not optimum and did not bring
Sutherland to NMI. This is not to say that the taser had no effect. The video shows clearly that
the probes inflicted pain on Sutherland and caused him to be combative and agitated. It appears
from the Axon report that Houle’s taser had a constant connection although it appears Houle’s
probes also were discharged into flesh (as opposed to muscle, which is more effective).

  11 
 

304/864
566/384

EVIDENTIARY ANALYSIS
As SLED’s investigative file and witness statements will be public, I will not rehash what
each witness revealed. I have considered all the statements in the context of what happened to
Jamal Sutherland and in light of the accounts of other witnesses, the video evidence, the physical
evidence, and all other relevant materials obtained during the course of the investigation.
Bear in mind that, as with all investigations involving multiple witnesses, the accounts are
not all consistent. This is not unusual. Witnesses and the people directly involved in disturbing
or controversial incidents often have some variance in their accounts. In fact, prosecutors and
defense attorneys alike expect this. Reasons for variances are not necessarily nefarious. They
include how the mind responds to stress, the witness’ vantage point and opportunity to see and
hear the event, whether the witness was influenced by bias including implicit bias or bias arising
from that person’s personal involvement in the event or a relationship with someone involved. In
determining why Jamal Sutherland died the way he did, I considered these limitations and gave
the most weight to statements that are corroborated by other evidence.
Every real trial lawyer knows that I cannot look at the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State or in the light most favorable to a conviction. Instead, to decide whether criminal
charges are viable, I must consider how the evidence will be presented and then will be attacked
by a competent defense. I must consider the evidence knowing that the State’s burden is to prove
each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt and to understanding that a jury must resolve
any doubts in favor of a defendant.
With that in mind, the evidence strongly supports the following series of events:

Events Occurring Before the Cell Extraction and Use of Force

 Jamal Sutherland should not have died in the custody of Charleston
County.
o Sutherland had a long history of schizophrenia.
o Sutherland had difficulty in managing his schizophrenia in
late 2020.
o Sutherland committed himself to Palmetto Lowcountry
Behavioral Health on December 31, 2020.
o Sutherland requested and was denied a discharge from
Palmetto on the morning of January 4, 2021. He complained
  12 
 

that he was doing worse than when he committed himself.

https://bit.ly/AMA-Discharge
o Sutherland damaged property and assaulted a staff member
at Palmetto shortly before 6:50 pm on January 4. He was
arrested by North Charleston Police Department for
misdemeanor assault and taken to the SACDC.
o Sutherland appeared to remain in an excited state after his
arrest. Because of this, the booking process was not
completed and Sutherland was taken to the Behavioral
Management Unit (BMU) at SACDC. The Special
Management Unit (SMU), which houses mental health
patients was full.
o Palmetto did not contact SACDC with any of Sutherland’s
history. Palmetto did not send or notify SACDC of
Sutherland’s medication needs.
o Sutherland was never evaluated by medical or mental health
care professionals at SACDC (except after he was
incapacitated).
 On January 5, 2021, Bond Court summoned Jamal Sutherland via
detention deputies for Sutherland’s 9:00 a.m. bond hearing.
 Sutherland refused to leave his cell voluntarily, and SOG Operator
Deputy Houle was summoned to perform a cell extraction.
 Before Houle (and Fickett) engaged with Sutherland, detention deputies
attempted to convince him to voluntarily go to bond court.
 For roughly 12 minutes, Sgt. Fennell talked with Sutherland in an effort
to convince him to let them take him to bond court. Fennel noted that
Sutherland was agitated and believed he had a sharpened spoon.
 Sgt. Fennell advised Sutherland that the SOG team would remove him
by force for him to go to bond court.
 Lt. Duvall spoke with Sutherland on occasion as well, trying to convince
him to come out for bond court.
 When told that force would have to be used, Sutherland responded to
Sgt. Fennell by walking to the back of the cell and stating, “Pop the pin.”
 Houle was told that Sutherland was in jail on an assault and battery
charge and that he was combative and had mental health issues.
o Houle did not know Sutherland’s specific history or
diagnosis.
o Fickett was not briefed on Sutherland’s mental health issues.
 Because of his concerns, Houle sought permission to delay the
extraction but due to a 2017 directive, his superiors denied his request.
Despite no consultation with any bond court judge, Houle’s superior led
him to believe a Judge had ordered Sutherland’s appearance.
 Houle was the only SOG Operator on duty at the time but he knew that
Deputy Fickett, a former SOG Operator, was working as well. Since
she was SOG trained, he asked Fickett to help him perform the
extraction.

  13 
 

 Before the extraction began, Houle told Sutherland they would have to
use force if he would not allow himself to be handcuffed.
 Sutherland repeatedly stated to Houle, “I’m warning you. I’m warning
you.”
 Before the extraction began, Houle and Fickett confirmed to Lt. Duvall
that their body worn cameras were activated and that a medical team
was present.
 Both Houle and Fickett observed Sutherland with a plastic spoon, and
they were concerned he would use it as a weapon.

Use of Force During the Extraction

 Gary Raney outlines the use of force during the cell extraction in great
detail. He includes a detailed analysis of the negligence that permeated
the process. https://bit.ly/RANEYREPORT
o Both Fickett and Houle made tactical errors that compounded the
danger to Sutherland (and themselves) in an already volatile
situation.

Events Occurring After Sutherland Was Subdued

Some have questioned the medical care given Sutherland immediately after he was
subdued. The involved deputies were assured that the medical team was present during the
extraction. Deputy Fickett asked for their help as soon as Sutherland was pulled from the cell.
Fickett requested that the nurse remove the taser prongs. One minute later, she asked if the
nurses could “check him” and the medical team began their care for Sutherland.
While the way Sutherland’s medical distress was addressed is an issue, courts have
recognized that lay people are not qualified to determine medical fitness, whether physical or
mental, and that is why prisons in detention centers employ independent medical experts.
Detention center deputies are not trained medical personnel and they are entitled to rely on the
opinions, judgment, and expertise of medical personnel concerning the course of treatment
which the medical personnel deem necessary and appropriate for the inmate.8

LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Law of Criminal Responsibility for the Death of Another

Proximate Cause
To prove any of the criminal offenses outlined below, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant’s act was the proximate cause of death. Proximate cause is the
immediate cause. It is the cause without which the death of the victim would not have resulted.
There may be more than one proximate cause and the acts of two or more people may combine to
be a proximate cause of the death of a person. A defendant’s act need not be the sole cause of the
death, but it must be a proximate cause.

                                                           
8
See Griffin v. Cellman, No. CV 0:17-152-MGL-PJG, 2018 WL 3104285, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 20, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. CV 0:17-00152-MGL, 2018 WL 1443948 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2018), aff'd, 748 F. App'x
521 (4th Cir. 2019). The cited case is instructive in addressing any claim that the deputies were derelict in their
reliance on the detention center’s chosen medical team.
 
  14 
 

While many lay people believe that the BWC video speaks for itself and is the only
evidence that matters in this investigation, seasoned trial attorneys, judges and investigators know
that in order to prosecute the involved deputies, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the deputies were the proximate cause of Jamal Sutherland’s death. The video alone would not
suffice. The first autopsy report in and of itself provided reasonable doubt as to the deputies’ hand
in Sutherland’s death. While I am not a medical doctor, I was concerned by the pathologist’s
statements that the video of the extrication did not reveal any “unusual or excessive interactions
or areas of direct concern.” I certainly was concerned by what I saw on the videos.
On the other hand, I was not alarmed by the pathologist’s decision to label the manner
of death as “undetermined.” The word “homicide” is not equal to or synonymous with any
crime in South Carolina. Many prosecutions move forward when a manner of death is
“undetermined,” and sometimes cases deemed a “homicide” are not a crime. In fact, the
National Association of Medical Examiners notes that the term “homicide” with regard to a
death certificate is a “neutral” term that does not indicate or imply criminal intent, a
determination within the authority of legal processes. (For reference, see the National
Association of Medical Examiners, A Guide for Manner of Death Classification (1 st ed. 2002).
I sought a review from board certified pathologist Dr. Kimberly Collins. Because Dr.
Collins was not allowed to meet with or speak to the forensic toxicologist involved in the case,
I also had to retain the services of Dr. Laura Labay. Their reports are linked here:
o https://bit.ly/Collins-Opinion-71421
o https://bit.ly/Labay-Expert-Report-NMS-Labs
Not surprisingly to me, Dr. Collins deemed Jamal Sutherland’s death a “homicide”, as did
the original pathologist in a later report. She explained the basis of her opinion as follows:

While Mr. Sutherland was at the Charleston County Detention Center, he was very
agitated, delusional, and paranoid, and showing signs of his underlying diagnosis
of schizophrenia. As witnessed and seen on video, these signs and symptoms were
magnified during the extraction process. While Mr. Sutherland’s position during
extraction and the deputies’ use of a spit cap may have contributed to his excitement
or agitation, he did not die from suffocation or asphyxiation. Likewise, while the
deputies’ use of conducted electrical weapons (tasers) may have contributed to Mr.
Sutherland’s excitement or agitation, he did not die from the taser applications
themselves. The deputies’ actions (taser, spit cap, positioning) alone were unlikely
to have killed him. The combination of the schizophrenia, medications
administered, absence of medications, and the deputies’ actions killed Sutherland.

It is my opinion that the absence of the aforementioned prescribed and needed

antipsychotic, antianxiety, and antidepressant medications increased his psychotic
behavior at this time. This resulted in an extremely agitated psychotic
schizophrenic individual who was attempted to be extracted.

The medications that were present in his system also played a role in his
death. Specifically, chlorpromazine and olanzapine. Both of these drugs are
antipsychotic agents. When taken they can prolong the QT interval of the heart,
cause dysrhythmia (or bad heart rhythm), and can lead to sudden death.
Olanzapine can affect the blood pressure and heart rate, and in some patients
compounding the effects of chlorpromazine. On top of this, diphenhydramine can
cause dose related cardiac adverse attacks including dysrhythmia.

  15 
 

Mr. Sutherland did not have the proper prescribed medications in his system to
control his psychotic, schizophrenic, and anxious behavior. Therefore, he was in a
highly agitated state at the Charleston Detention Center especially upon extraction.
Such an agitated state can result in increased heart rate, increased blood pressure,
and dysrhythmia. In addition, the drugs that were present in his blood are known
to have the potential to lead to adverse cardiac effects including dysrhythmia. The
medications administered, and not administered, coupled with his schizophrenia
could have killed him even without the deputies’ involvement.

It is my opinion that the mechanism of death is dysrhythmia due to adverse drug

reactions, lack of proper antipsychotic medication, underlying schizophrenia, and
deputies’ actions. The manner of death is homicide.

While the physical evidence discovered at autopsy is not definitive, I have no doubt that the
State could prove the deputies were one of the proximate causes of Sutherland’s death. In addition
to Dr. Collins’ and Dr. Labay’s findings, the video evidence is compelling. Proving proximate
cause, however, does not necessarily mean proof of a crime under South Carolina law.
Without question, if we were to proceed to trial, the defense would have fodder to challenge
this assertion. A seasoned defense attorney would begin by stressing the original pathologist’s
assertion that, “a visual review of the extrication process fails to document any unusual or
excessive interactions or other areas of direct concern” along with the CMA’s observation.
https://bit.ly/CMA-Burch
Even though proximate cause would be challenged, I am convinced the State could prove
the deputies were a proximate cause to Sutherland’s death and for purposes of this analysis, I am
presuming as much. Sutherland came into distress during the subdual process. The deputies pepper
sprayed him, tased him, utilized a spit mask, handcuffed him and placed him in the prone position.
He died immediately after the deputies ceased their interactions with him. The actions of others in
administering various drugs combined with the deputies’ actions exacerbated Sutherland’s excited
state which led to an adverse pharmacotherapeutic effect causing Sutherland’s death. 9

Houle’s & Fickett’s Intent

As explained earlier, an officer facing prosecution in South Carolina is held to the same
standards as any other citizen, not that of a reasonable officer on the scene. The officer is viewed
as a civilian. The officer's mental state is subjective, contained entirely within her/his own mind. In
determining whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the jury would be instructed that a
belief might be reasonable even though it is mistaken; the standard is what a person of ordinary
intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant's position under the circumstances
that existed at the time of the alleged offense. The reasonableness of the deputy's beliefs must be
determined from the standpoint of the deputy at the time of the deputy's acts and not from the
viewpoint of the public now.
The events leading to Jamal Sutherland’s death are well established by the evidence:
Fickett’s and Houle’s actions are very well documented in their body worn camera videos and in
the Axon taser report. The issue in this matter is not what the deputies did; it is the state of mind
of each of them, individually. The question is what the State can prove regarding what each knew,
felt and believed. As in any case, we look to all of the circumstances surrounding a suspect’s actions
to help determine her/his state of mind. Each of the crimes below has a different element of proof
for a suspect’s state of mind.
                                                           
9
South Carolina’s criminal law allows for a combination of actions to culminate in the proximate cause of death.
There may be more than one proximate cause.
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Murder
In South Carolina, murder is defined as an unlawful killing of another with
malice aforethought. The State must prove the defendant killed another person with
malice aforethought. “Malice” is hatred, ill will, or hostility towards another
person. “Malice” is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse and with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances showing an
evil intent; malice need not exist for any particular time before the act is committed.

Voluntary Manslaughter
Voluntary manslaughter requires proof of two elements, a sudden heat of
passion and sufficient legal provocation: Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful
killing of a human being in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal
provocation. Heat of passion alone will not suffice to reduce murder
to voluntary manslaughter. Both heat of passion and sufficient legal provocation
must be present at the time of the killing. The sudden heat of passion, upon
sufficient legal provocation, which mitigates murder to manslaughter, while it need
not dethrone reason entirely, or shut out knowledge and volition, must be such as
would naturally disturb the sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary
person incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human
experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.

Involuntary Manslaughter
To establish Involuntary Manslaughter, the State must show the defendant
killed another person without malice and unintentionally while the defendant was
engaged in either (1) an unlawful activity not amounting to a felony and not
naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) a lawful activity with
a reckless disregard of the safety of others. S.C. Code Ann §16-3-60. See State v.
Collins, 409 S.C. 524 (2014). Reckless disregard for the safety of others means the
actor is not interested in the consequences of his or her acts or the rights and safety
of others.

These crimes are the available options for holding someone responsible for another’s
death in this context (as opposed to vehicular homicides, child homicides, etc.) On these facts,
the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either Deputy Fickett or Deputy Houle
acted with malice or in the heat of passion or with a conscious disregard of the risk of Sutherland’s
death. There is no evidence that either acted out of hatred or anger. There is no evidence that
either had an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Finally, the evidence does not show that
either of the deputies was uninterested in the consequences of his or her actions and that they
simply did not care about Sutherland’s safety. Similarly, the State cannot disprove beyond a
reasonable doubt that after Fickett’s second taser use, the deputies believed they were acting in
their own defense or in defense of each other. The fact that they likely were mistaken does not
convert their actions into a crime.

Key Factors in determining the deputies individual and subjective states of mind are as
follows:

 Deputy Houle’s expressed and confirmed concern over performing a cell extraction to
take Jamal Sutherland to bond court and his confirmed attempt to postpone the bond
hearing.
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 Deputy Fickett’s and Deputy Houle’s legitimate belief that a judge had given them lawful
orders to produce Jamal Sutherland for bond court and that their superiors authorized a
cell extraction.
 Expert Gary Raney’s report on training, policy, patterns and practice within the SACDC
had a tremendous impact on the deputies’ states of mind. Specifically:
o The SACDC policy was insufficient to guide SOG practices.
o The SACDC had no policies or procedures on cell extractions.
o Training and supervision are the greatest influences on deputy’s behavior and for
all topics related to the use of force in this event, the SACDC’s training was
seriously insufficient. Even worse, the culture of the SACDC leadership was to
look the other way when policy violations occurred and to sanction training that
preferred the use of force over avoidance and de-escalation techniques.
o The insufficient staffing of the extraction that followed the misguided SOG
training, was the responsibility of the CCSO administration.
o Videos of Fickett’s training show that she was, at least at one point, trained to use
a taser on passively resisting inmates. Most similarly situated jails would not
authorize the use of a taser under similar circumstances but some do, so Raney
cannot assert that the use violated generally accepted practices.
o While there are generally accepted jail practices for the taser in standard situations,
there are none that specifically guide the frequency and cumulative exposure
against a real or perceived risk of serious bodily injury. It is recognized that the
more instances and the longer the exposure, the greater the risk. While shocking
to watch, nothing can definitively establish that Fickett’s use was unreasonable or
violated generally accepted jail practices when her perceptions are considered.
o The frequency of taser use and the simultaneous applications are damning for the
deputies. Generally accepted jail practices restrict the use of a taser to three
applications for a cumulative fifteen seconds under normal circumstances. The
most common exception is when there is an imminent risk of serious bodily injury
to the deputies and, as used here, serious bodily injury includes fractures,
lacerations and more serious injuries. When Sutherland (understandably) became
agitated and frantic from the taser shocks while having a loose handcuff on his
wrist, there was a legitimate risk of Houle suffering serious bodily injury.
o The deputies had (and have) erroneous perceptions regarding positional and
compressional asphyxia. Even the Sheriff’s Office of Professional Standards
validated their misperceptions.
 Deputy Fickett and Deputy Houle ensured that their BWCs were activated before the cell
extraction began.
 Deputy Fickett and Deputy Houle’s documented concern over the appearance that
Sutherland may use a spoon or tray as a weapon.
 Deputy Fickett’s statement to Sutherland after the pepper spray that, if he will come to the
door, they will get him out of there.
 Deputy Houle’s pleas to Sutherland in an effort to convince Sutherland to cooperate.
These include statements like:
o “Hey, if you don't comply, we're going to use force.
o {After pepper pray} “Hey, it's going to feel better if you come to the door and get
out of there.”
 Deputy Fickett’s statements to Houle before the first taser that if Sutherland turns the other
way, she is going to “hit him with the taser.”
o Fickett later explained that she did not want Sutherland to climb on anything

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because that would eliminate the safer taser opportunity. If Sutherland, who was
behaving erratically, were on top of something, the risk of him falling and
seriously hurting himself would be too great. She wanted to tase him while his
feet were on the ground. (Fickett was trained to use taser on passively resisting
inmates.)
 Deputy Fickett’s proffer statements explaining that she used her taser because the taser is
viewed as a safer, less dangerous use of force in the detention center than use of “hard
empty hand control.”
 Deputy Fickett’s statements to Sutherland in an effort to convince Sutherland to cooperate
so that she would not have to tase him again.
o Fickett to Sutherland, “Stop, stop, stop, stop. You still got probes in you.”
 Deputy Fickett’s proffer statement explaining that after her first taser deployment, she did
not tase Sutherland when she believed he was complying enough for Houle to get him
handcuffed. It was only when she (mistakenly) believed that Sutherland was trying to
turn to get up, that she deployed her taser the second time.
 Deputy Fickett and Deputy Houle’s reporting that Sutherland would not comply and
continued to try to get up.10 11

                                                           
10
Naturally, Sutherland being mentally ill and experiencing the shock of tasers caused this frantic behavior.
Sutherland should not have been placed in this predicament and he was not the author of his own demise.
11
The “freeze frames” from the deputies’ BWC video clips are captured at approximately 25 frames per second.
The human eye likely captures information much faster. https://azretina.sites.arizona.edu/index.php/node/837
  19 
 

 Deputy Fickett and Deputy Houle’s reported concern over Sutherland resisting by his
grabbing Houle’s leg:

 A handcuff that is only attached to one uncontrolled wrist is known to be a potentially

dangerous weapon. For the period of time when Sutherland was frantic, and no doubt in
pain from the taser, everyone was in danger.
 Despite some claims, Deputy Fickett and Deputy Houle did not deploy their tasers after
Sutherland is handcuffed and subdued and they did not stand on Sutherland.
 Neither Deputy Fickett nor Deputy Houle use profanity or slurs directed toward
Sutherland.
 Deputy Fickett made an effort to get Sutherland medical care.
o Fickett informed the nurse that Sutherland had “two probes in the front if [she]
can get them.”
o Deputy Fickett requested that a nurse (a minute after the probes are removed) to
check on Sutherland.

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Many people may still adamantly (and understandably) believe that the deputies’
actions during the cell extraction was “excessive force” but that is not the standard. The
standard is whether the State can prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that each deputy acted either
with malice aforethought or in the heat of passion or with conscious disregard for Sutherland’s
risk of death. The deputies’ tactics during the cell extraction were flawed. They were negligent
but they also complied with much of their training, policy and procedures. As a policy matter,
Sheriff’s Office training at the detention center must change. For now, in this case, it would be
impossible for any prosecutor to argue in a courtroom that the deputies acted with the requisite
criminal intent by following their training.

BASIS OF DECISION
My decision whether or not to pursue criminal charges is based on my almost 30 years of
experience as a prosecutor. I approached this case and applied the same standard based on the
facts and the law as I would when considering criminal charges in any matter. I am guided and
informed by the ethical duties suggested by the American Bar Association and other professional
organizations. As noted previously, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the
Prosecution Function, Standard 3-4.3 provides in part that “[a] prosecutor should seek or file
criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes…that admissible evidence will be
sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Where I do not have expertise, I sought out those who do. I met with Dr. J.C. Upshaw
Downs, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on three occasions. I spoke with Demetra
Garvin, the forensic toxicologist retained by the Coroner. I retained board certified and renowned
pathologist Dr. Kimberly Collins and forensic toxicologist Dr. Laura Labay. All of their insights
were important for establishing whether or not the State could prove the proximate cause of death.
On the critical issue, I sought a specialist. Renowned use of force expert Seth Stoughton
recognized the impact that the detention setting would have on this analysis and knew this was a
specialized area of expertise. Because of this, I sought the aid of Gary Raney, a recognized expert
in use of force in the detention setting. Raney is eminently qualified for this role was able to
evaluate this case impartially. The Raney Report alone demonstrates why the State could not
prove criminal charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

IN CONCLUSION

Based on the facts and the law, I know that the evidence would not support convictions of
Lindsey Fickett or Brian Houle. I evaluate evidence in any matter using nearly 30 years of
experience, prosecuting and trying cases in both federal and state courts. I have helped convict a
sheriff, an ex-sheriff, a mayor and other police officers of criminal offenses. I understand more
than many the intricacies of prosecuting someone from law enforcement. I know the importance
of holding those who have sworn to protect us accountable for their bad behavior. It is the issue
of our time.
As a citizen of this great state having watched the gut wrenching video of Jamal
Sutherland dying, this was a difficult decision. As an experienced trial attorney, however, I know
I had no real choice. The drip, drip of information that we needed from various entities was
maddening; the lack of any sense of urgency, exasperating. I could have declined to prosecute

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this case solely on the original pathologist’s autopsy report. Many believe the original autopsy
report alone made it ethically impossible for me to seek an indictment. I agreed, but I pushed
forward to determine if the pathologist’s far-reaching conclusions in areas arguably beyond his
expertise were correct. I believed Jamal Sutherland, his family, our community and deserved to
know more about how and why he died. This report and the materials that support it will help do
that. Equally important, I hope this report and the underlying investigation will bring about much
needed change in how our detention center operates and in how mentally ill citizens are treated
in our community. I hope the public will join me in applauding Sheriff Graziano for the changes
she already has implemented to address some of these issues and in demanding more
comprehensive changes in the County’s detention center operations.
I know that I cannot imagine what it must be like to watch your own child die, much less
at the hands of another. I know that I cannot imagine what it feels like to watch people who look
just like me killed due to unnecessary and excessive police violence. I know that some of my
friends and constituents will feel disappointment and outrage at my decision. People in this state
and in this country may be angry, but I am sworn to make prosecutive decisions based on the facts
and law, not on emotion or political pressure. Justice is not borne of a prosecution based on public
outrage or a prosecution designed to calm critics.

Dated this 26th day of July, 2021. Solicitor Scarlett A. Wilson

Ninth Judicial Circuit

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APPENDIX
Prior Training Hyperlinks:
 https://bit.ly/CELL-EXTRACTION-USE-OF-TASER-MAJOR-SMITH-PRESENT
 https://bit.ly/TASER-USAGE-MAJOR-SMITH-PRESENT
 https://bit.ly/Training-One
 https://bit.ly/Training-Two
 https://bit.ly/Training-Three
 https://bit.ly/Training-Four
 https://bit.ly/Fishburne-Concerns-Redacted

BWC Freeze Frames (best viewed after downloading):

 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-1-Sutherland-on-ground-after-tasing
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-2---Sutherland-on-hip-with-hands-behind-back
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-3---Houle-hand-to-neck-Fickett-Taser-Sutherland-to-
ground
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-4---Fickett-Tasers-3-7
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-5---Fickett-Drive-Stun-to-right-hip-thigh
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-6-Sutherland-hand-on-ground-pushing-up
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-7-Houle-Knee
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-8-Sutherland-head-moving-probes-in-back
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-9---Sutherland-arm-moving-Hey-stop
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-10-Sutherland-arm-moving
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-BWC-Clip-11-Probe-removal

 https://bit.ly/Houle-BWC-Clip-1-Sutherland-with-spoon
 https://bit.ly/Houle-BWC-Clip-2-Sutherland-reaching-for-tray
 https://bit.ly/Houle-BWC-Clip-6-Fickett-Taser-1
 https://bit.ly/Houle-BWC-Clip-3-Fickett-Taser-2-Houle-Taking-Sutherland-to-ground
 https://bit.ly/Houle-BWC-Clip-4-Houle-Tasers-1-3
 https://bit.ly/Houle-BWC-Clip-5-Sutherland-probes-in-back

CCSO Professional Standards:

 https://bit.ly/Fickett-First-Termination-Letter
 https://bit.ly/Fickett-Second-Termination-Letter
 https://bit.ly/Houle-First-Termination-Letter
 https://bit.ly/Houle-Second-Termination-Letter
 https://bit.ly/OPS-Report-Redacted

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