G.R. No. 192571. July 23, 2013.
* Same; Same; Same; Forum shopping takes place when a litigant
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A.
TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T.
YABUTMISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN
G. ALMAZAR, petitioners, vs. PEARLIE ANN F.
ALCARAZ, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Certification
Against Forum Shopping; The prohibition against forum shopping is
different from a violation of the certification requirement under
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.—At the outset, it is noteworthy
to mention that the prohibition against forum shopping is different
from a violation of the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule
7 of the Rules of Court. In Sps. Ong v. CA, 384 SCRA 139
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
(2002), the Court explained that: x x x The distinction between
the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification
requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To
reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is
separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum
shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure
to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable
sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former
constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice [to the
filing] of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after
hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and
for direct contempt.
files multiple suits involving the same parties, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment.—Forum shopping takes
place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties,
either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2)
cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete
statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter
involves the same issues as the one that was filed.—Section 5(b), Rule
7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files a case should
provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending case
if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed. If there
is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of the same rule provides
that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
Labor Law; Probationary Employees; A probationary employee,
like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases
of
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68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of
termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 295 of the
Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated
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for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at
the time of the engagement.—A probationary employee, like a regular
employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary
employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an
additional ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor
Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for
failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at
the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of an employee who
has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of
the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he
fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards prescribed by the employer.
Same; Same; If the employer fails to inform the probationary
employee of the reasonable standards upon which the regularization
would be based on at the time of the engagement, then the said
employee shall be deemed a regular employee.—Section 6(d), Rule I,
Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides that if
the employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the
reasonable standards upon which the regularization would be based on
at the time of the engagement, then the said employee shall be deemed
a regular employee, viz.: (d) In all cases of probationary employment,
the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under
which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his
engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at
that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. In other words, the
employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when dealing
with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate
the regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second,
the employer must make such communication at the time of the
probationary employee’s engagement. If the employer fails to comply
with either, the employee is deemed as a regular and not a
probationary employee.
Same; Same; An employer is deemed to have made known the
standards that would qualify a probationary employee to be a regular
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the
employee of what he is expected to do or accomplish during the trial
period of probation.—An employer is deemed to have made known
the standards that would qualify a probationary employee to be a
regular employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the
employee of what he is expected to do or accomplish during the trial
period of probation. This goes without saying that the employee is
sufficiently made aware of his probationary status as well as the length
of time of the probation. The exception to the foregoing is when the
job is self-descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids,
cooks, drivers, or messengers. Also, in Aberdeen Court, Inc. v.
Agustin, 456 SCRA 32 (2005), it has been held that the rule on
notifying a probationary employee of the standards of regularization
should not be used to exculpate an employee who acts in a manner
contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard to which
there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met. In the same
light, an employee’s failure to perform the duties and responsibilities
which have been clearly made known to him constitutes a justifiable
basis for a probationary employee’s nonregularization.
Same; Same; Basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the
adequate performance of one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent
and implied standard for a probationary employee to be regularized;
such is a regularization standard which need not be literally spelled
out or mapped into technical indicators in every case.—Verily, basic
knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate performance
of one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard for
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a probationary employee to be regularized; such is a regularization
standard which need not be literally spelled out or mapped into
technical indicators in every case. In this regard, it must be observed
that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the nature of a
management prerogative which when reasonably exercised — as
Abbott did in this case — should be respected. This is especially true
of a managerial employee like Alcaraz who was tasked with the vital
responsibility of handling the personnel and important matters of her
department.
Same; Same; If the termination is brought about by the failure of
an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of
probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is
served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
of termination.—A different procedure is applied when
terminating a probationary employee; the usual two-notice rule does
not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of
the Labor Code states that “[i]f the termination is brought about by the
x x x failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in
case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written
notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the
effective date of termination.”
Same; Company Policy; A company policy partakes of the nature
of an implied contract between the employer and employee.— A
company policy partakes of the nature of an implied contract between
the employer and employee. In Parts Depot, Inc. v. Beiswenger, 170
S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2005), it has been held that: [E]mployer statements
of policy . . . can give rise to contractual rights in employees without
evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements
would create contractual rights in the employee, and, hence, although
the statement of policy is signed by neither party, can be unilaterally
amended by the employer without notice to the employee, and contains
no reference to a specific employee, his job description or
compensation, and although no reference was made to the policy
statement in pre-employment interviews and the employee does not
learn of its existence until after his hiring. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at
892. The principle is akin to estoppel. Once an employer establishes
an express personnel policy and the employee continues to work
while the policy remains in effect, the policy is deemed an implied
contract for so long as it remains in effect. If the employer
unilaterally changes the policy, the terms of the implied contract
are also thereby changed.
Same; Termination of Employment; Nominal Damages; Case law
has settled that an employer who terminates an employee for a valid
cause but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter
nominal damages.—Case law has settled that an employer who
terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages. In Agabon v.
NLRC (Agabon), 442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Court pronounced that
where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process
should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual.
However, the employer should indemnify the
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employee for the violation of his statutory rights. Thus, in
Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the employee nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
Same; Same; If the dismissal is based on a just cause under
Article 282 of the Labor Code (now Article 296) but the employer
failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be
imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process
was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the
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dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now
Article 297) but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal
process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
prerogative.—It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code (now Article 296) but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to
be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal
process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if
the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now
Article 297) but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal
process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
prerogative. Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an
authorized cause of retrenchment — as contradistinguished from the
employee in Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of neglect of
duty — the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal
damages at the higher amount of P50,000.00.
Corporation Law; Liability of Corporate Directors; Requisites to
Hold Corporate Directors, Trustees or Officers Personally Liable for
Corporate Acts.—It is hornbook principle that personal liability of
corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches only when: (a) they
assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are
guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when
there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its
stockholders or other persons; (b) they consent to the issuance of
watered down stocks or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do
not forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written objection;
(c) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with
the corporation; or (d) they are made by specific provision of law
personally answerable for their corporate action.688
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Civil Law; Bad Faith; It is a well-settled rule that bad faith
cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of
proving it.—A judicious perusal of the records show that other than
her unfounded assertions on the matter, there is no evidence to support
the fact that the individual petitioners herein, in their capacity as
Abbott’s officers and employees, acted in bad faith or were motivated
by ill will in terminating Alcaraz’s services. The fact that Alcaraz was
made to resign and not allowed to enter the workplace does not
necessarily indicate bad faith on Abbott’s part since a sufficient
ground existed for the latter to actually proceed with her termination.
On the alleged loss of her personal belongings, records are bereft of
any showing that the same could be attributed to Abbott or any of its
officers. It is a well-settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed and
he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. All told, since
Alcaraz failed to prove any malicious act on the part of Abbott or any
of its officers, the Court finds the award of moral or exemplary
damages unwarranted.
BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Labor Law; Appeals; View that a labor case finds its way into the
judicial system from the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) whose decision is final and executory; When an
administrative ruling (or any ruling for that matter) is already final
and unappealable, the only recourse open under the Rules of Court is
through a limited review on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65.—A
labor case finds its way into the judicial system from the NLRC whose
decision is final and executory. Finality simply means that the NLRC
ruling is no longer appealable; the legal intent is to confine
adjudication of labor cases to labor tribunals with the expertise in these
cases and thereby bring the resolution of the case to a close at the
soonest possible time. When an administrative ruling (or any ruling for
that matter) is already final and unappealable, the only recourse open
Page 4 of 46
under the Rules of Court is through a limited review on jurisdictional
grounds under Rule 65. This has been the mode of review followed
since the Labor Code took effect in November 1974; labor cases were
directly brought to this Court but only on jurisdictional grounds under
Rule 65.
Same; Same; View that under Section 65 of the Rules of Court,
the sole ground or issue allowed is jurisdictional — the presence or
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in ruling on the case; whereas,
a Rule 45 review the Supreme Court simply determines whether the
legal correctness of the Court of Appeal’s finding that the NLRC
ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in law.—Under
the Rule 65 review by the CA, Montoya reiterates that the sole ground
or issue allowed is jurisdictional – the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling on the case. To
state the obvious, this kind of review would have made it easier for the
CA to handle the case; in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion, it
can dismiss labor cases for lack of grave abuse of discretion as we do
in this Court. From the CA, further recourse is through a Rule 45
review by this Court on questions of law in accordance with
prevailing rulings. The office of a petition for review on certiorari is
not to examine and settle factual questions already ruled upon below.
In this review, the Court simply determines whether the legal
correctness of the CA’s finding that the NLRC ruling of illegal
dismissal had basis in fact and in law.
Same; Probationary Employees; View that while the respondent
might have been hired as a probationary employee, the petitioner’s
evidence did not establish the employers’ compliance with the
probationary employment requirements under Article 281 of the Labor
Code (as amended) and Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code (as amended). Thus, the respondent
should be considered a regular employee and the case should be
reviewed on this basis.—While the respondent might have been hired
as a probationary employee, the petitioners’ evidence did not
establish the employers’ compliance with the probationary
employment requirements under Article 281 of the Labor Code (as
amended) and Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI,
Rule I of the Labor Code (as amended). Thus, the respondent should
be considered a regular employee and the case should be reviewed on
this basis. Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: ART.
281. Probationary employment.—Probationary employment shall not
exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working,
unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a
longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a
probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails
to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a
probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours] Further, Section 6(d) of the Implementing
Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, as amended, states: Sec.
6. Probationary employment.—There is probationary employment
where the employee, upon his engagement, is made to undergo a trial
period during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for
regular employment, based on reasonable standards made known to
him at the time of engagement. [emphasis supplied]
Same; Same; View that a valid probationary employment
requires the concurrence of two requirements; Failing in one or both,
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the employee, even if initially hired as a probationary employee,
should be viewed and considered a regular employee.—A valid
probationary employment requires the concurrence of two
requirements. First, the employer shall make known the reasonable
standard (performance standard) whose compliance will render the
employee qualified to be a regular employee. Second, the employer
shall inform the employee of the applicable performance standard at
the time of his/her engagement. Failing in one or both, the employee,
even if initially hired as a probationary employee, should be viewed
and considered a regular employee. The ponencia apparently fully
agrees with the above statement of the applicable law as it
substantially recites the same requirements, including the consequence
that upon failure to comply with these same requirements, “the
employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee.” It
continues, however, with a twist that effectively negates what it has
stated and admitted about the need to communicate the regularization
standards to the employee.
Same; Termination of Employment; View that to justify the
dismissal of an employee, the employer carries the burden of proving
that the dismissal was for a just cause and with the observance of due
process prior to dismissal.—To justify the dismissal of an employee,
the employer carries the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a
just cause and with the observance of due process prior to dismissal.
The employer has to discharge this burden by clear, accurate,
consistent and convincing evidence; in case of doubt, the presumption
in the employee’s favor under Article 4 of the Labor Code should
apply.691
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
Same; Same; View that a probationary employee does not have
lesser rights than a regular employee under the Labor Code in terms
of the just cause for the termination of an employment.—An important
legal point that should not be lost in considering this case is that a
probationary employee does not have lesser rights than a regular
employee under the Labor Code in terms of the just cause for the
termination of an employment. While the strict application of Article
282 of the Labor Code may be relaxed because the employee is still
under probation (so that analogous probationary status rules may
apply), the same essential just cause for dismissal must be present and
must be proven. In other words, probationary employment does not
mean that the employee is under an “employment at will”  situation as
that phrase is understood in American jurisprudence. To reiterate, the
fact that the respondent was still in her probationary period of
employment did not lessen the burden of proof that the law imposed
on the petitioners to prove the just cause for her dismissal.
Probationary employees are protected by the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution and they cannot be removed from their
position except only for cause.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Laguesma, Magsalin, Consulta & Gastardo for
petitioner.
  Jimenez, Baroque and Salazar for respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  are the 1
Decision  dated December 10, 2009 and Resolution  dated
2 3
June 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No.
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 14-58.
2 Id., at pp. 1040-1054. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with
Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 1139-1140.
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692
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
101045 which pronounced that the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it ruled that respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz
(Alcaraz) was illegally dismissed from her employment.
The Facts
On June 27, 2004, petitioner Abbott Laboratories,
Philippines (Abbott) caused the publication in a major
broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Medical and
Regulatory Affairs Manager (Regulatory Affairs Manager)
who would: (a) be responsible for drug safety surveillance
operations, staffing, and budget; (b) lead the development
and implementation of standard operating
procedures/policies for drug safety surveillance and
vigilance; and (c) act as the primary interface with internal
and external customers regarding safety operations and
queries.  Alcaraz — who was then a Regulatory Affairs and
4 contract which stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on
Information Manager at Aventis Pasteur Philippines,
Incorporated (another pharmaceutical company like Abbott)
— showed interest and submitted her application on October
4, 2004.5
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz
the abovementioned position which was an item under the
company’s Hospira Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit
(ALSU) department.  In Abbott’s offer sheet,  it was stated
6 7
that Alcaraz
_______________
4 Id., at p. 74.
5 Id., at pp. 75-76.
6 Id., at pp. 51-52. Based on Abbott’s organizational structure, the Regulatory
Affairs Manager was under the umbrella of Hospira ALSU, a sub-department in
Abbott’s Hospital Care Division. ALSU serves as a transition body of Hospira, Inc.,
a corporation based in the United States of America, while it is in the process of
organization in the Philippines. Abbott intended to cede the qualified employees
under ALSU to Hospira once the latter obtained its own legal personality to engage
in business in the Philippines.
7 Id., at pp. 165-168. Abbott sent Alcaraz an initial offer sheet on December 1,
2004. The compensation contained therein was re-
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
was to be employed on a probationary basis.  Later that day, 8
she accepted the said offer and received an electronic mail
(e-mail) from Abbott’s Recruitment Officer, petitioner
Teresita C. Bernardo (Bernardo), confirming the same.
Attached to Bernardo’s e-mail were Abbott’s organizational
chart and a job description of Alcaraz’s work. 9
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment
probation for a period of six (6) months beginning February
15, 2005 to August 14, 2005. The said contract was also
signed by Abbott’s General Manager, petitioner Edwin Feist
(Feist): 10
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
Dear Pearl,
After having successfully passed the pre-employment
requirements, you are hereby appointed as follows:
Position Title       : Regulatory Affairs
                                               Manager
Department       : Hospira
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 The terms of your employment are: Manager, briefed her on her duties and responsibilities as
Nature of Employment   : Probationary Regulatory Affairs Manager, stating that: (a) she will handle
Effectivity       :  February 15, 2005 to
the staff of Hospira ALSU and will directly report to
                                               August 14, 2005
Basic Salary      : P110,000.00/ month Almazar on matters regarding Hopira’s local operations,
It is understood that you agree to abide by all existing policies, operational budget, and performance evaluation of the
rules and regulations of the company, as well as those, which Hospira ALSU Staff who are on probationary status; (b) she
may be hereinafter promulgated. must implement Abbott’s Code of Good Corporate Conduct
_______________
negotiated and thus, the increased offer as per the offer sheet dated December 7,
(Code of Conduct), office policies on human resources and
2004. finance, and ensure that Abbott will hire people who are fit
8  Id., at pp. 167-168. in the organizational discipline; (c) petitioner Kelly Walsh
9  Id., at pp. 127, 169-172.
10 Id., at p. 174. (Walsh), Manager of the Literature Drug Surveillance Drug
694 Safety of Hospira, will be her immediate supervisor; (d) she
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED should always coordinate with Abbott’s human resource
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz officers in the management and discipline of the staff; (e)
 
Hospira ALSU will spin off from Abbott in early 2006 and
Unless renewed, probationary appointment expires on the date
indicated subject to earlier termination by the Company for any
will be officially incorporated and known as Hospira,
justifiable reason. Philippines. In the interim, Hospira ALSU operations will
If you agree to the terms and conditions of your employment, still be under Abbott’s management, excluding the technical
please signify your conformity below and return a copy to HRD. aspects of the operations which is under the
Welcome to Abbott! 695
Very truly yours, VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 695
Sgd. Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
EDWIN D. FEIST control and supervision of Walsh; and (f) the processing of
General Manager
information and/or raw material data subject of Hospira
CONFORME:
Sgd.
ALSU operations will be strictly confined and controlled
PEARLIE ANN FERRER- under the computer system and network being maintained
ALCARAZ and operated from the United States. For this purpose, all
 During Alcaraz’s pre-employment orientation, petitioner those involved in Hospira ALSU are required to use two
Allan G. Almazar (Almazar), Hospira’s Country Transition identification cards: one, to identify them as Abbott’s
Page 8 of 46
employees and another, to identify them as Hospira
employees. 11
On March 3, 2005, petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa
(Misa), Abbott’s Human Resources (HR) Director, sent
Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an explanation of the
procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary
employees and further indicated that Abbott had only one
evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also
given copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Probationary
Performance Standards and Evaluation (PPSE) and
Performance Excellence Orientation Modules (Performance
Modules) which she had to apply in line with her task of
evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff.12
Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates that the job
performance of a probationary employee should be formally
reviewed and discussed with the employee at least twice:
first on the third month and second on the fifth month from
the date of employment. The necessary Performance
Improvement Plan should also be made during the third-
month review in case of a gap between the employee’s
performance and the standards set. These performance
standards should be discussed in detail with the employee
within the first two (2) weeks on the job. It was equally
required that a signed copy of the PPSE form must be
submitted to Abbott’s Human Resources Department (HRD)
and shall serve as documentation of the employee’s
performance during his/her probationary period.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 127-128.
12 Id., at pp. 1042-1043.
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
This shall form the basis for recommending the confirmation
or termination of the probationary employment. 13
During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed
that some of the staff had disciplinary problems. Thus, she
would reprimand them for their unprofessional behavior
such as non-observance of the dress code, moonlighting, and
disrespect of Abbott officers. However, Alcaraz’s method of
management was considered by Walsh to be “too
strict.”  Alcaraz approached Misa to discuss these concerns
14
and was told to “lie low” and let Walsh handle the matter.
Misa even assured her that Abbott’s HRD would support her
in all her management decisions.15
On April 12, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa
requesting immediate action on the staff’s performance
evaluation as their probationary periods were about to end.
This Alcaraz eventually submitted. 16
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with petitioner
Cecille Terrible (Terrible), Abbott’s former HR Director, to
discuss certain issues regarding staff performance standards.
In the course thereof, Alcaraz accidentally saw a printed
copy of an e-mail sent by Walsh to some staff members
which essentially contained queries regarding the former’s
job performance. Alcaraz asked if Walsh’s action was the
normal process of evaluation. Terrible said that it was not.17
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 On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with
Walsh and Terrible where she was informed that she failed
to meet the regularization standards for the position of
Regulatory Affairs Manager.  Thereafter, Walsh and
18
Terrible requested Alcaraz to tender her resignation, else
they be forced
_______________
13 Id.
14 Id., at p. 1044.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id., at pp. 1044-1045.
18 Id., at p. 1045.
697
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 697
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
to terminate her services. She was also told that, regardless
of her choice, she should no longer report for work and was
asked to surrender her office identification cards. She
requested to be given one week to decide on the same, but to
no avail. 19
On May 17, 2005, Alcaraz told her administrative
assistant, Claude Gonzales (Gonzales), that she would be on
leave for that day. However, Gonzales told her that Walsh
and Terrible already announced to the whole Hospira ALSU
staff that Alcaraz already resigned due to health reasons.20
On May 23, 2005, Walsh, Almazar, and Bernardo
personally handed to Alcaraz a letter stating that her services
had been terminated effective May 19, 2005.  The letter
21
detailed the reasons for Alcaraz’s termination —
particularly, that Alcaraz: (a) did not manage her time
effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to
build an effective rapport with them; (c) failed to train her
staff effectively; and (d) was not able to obtain the
knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case
processing and article review which were necessary for the
proper performance of her duties.  On May 27, 2005,
22
Alcaraz received another copy of the said termination
letter via registered mail. 23
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her
employment and thus, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and damages against Abbott and its officers, namely, Misa,
Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh, Terrible, and Feist.  She claimed 24
that she should have already been considered as a regular
and not a probationary employee given Abbott’s failure to
_______________
19 Id.
20 Id., at p. 1046.
21 Id., at p. 1047.
22 Id., at pp. 19-21, 78, and 80-81.
23 Id., at p. 1047.
24 Id., at p. 255. See Labor Arbiter (LA) Decision dated March 30, 2006.
698
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
inform her of the reasonable standards for her regularization
upon her engagement as required under Article 295  of the 25
Labor Code. In this relation, she contended that while her
employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a
probationary status, the same did not indicate the standards
on which her regularization would be based.  She further 26
averred that the individual petitioners maliciously connived
Page 10 of 46
to illegally dismiss her when: (a) they threatened her with evaluating all types of Abbott employees.  As Alcaraz was 31

termination; (b) she was ordered not to enter company unable to meet the standards set by Abbott as per her
premises even if she was still an employee thereof; and (c) performance evaluation, the LA ruled that the termination of
they publicly announced that she already resigned in order to her probationary employment was justified.  Lastly, the LA 32

humiliate her. 27
found that there was no evidence to conclude that Abbott’s
On the contrary, petitioners maintained that Alcaraz was officers and employees acted in bad faith in terminating
validly terminated from her probationary employment given Alcaraz’s employment. 33

her failure to satisfy the prescribed standards for her Displeased with the LA’s ruling, Alcaraz filed an appeal
regularization which were made known to her at the time of with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
her engagement. 28
The NLRC Ruling
The LA Ruling On September 15, 2006, the NLRC rendered a
In a Decision dated March 30, 2006,  the LA dismissed
29
Decision,  annulling and setting aside the LA’s ruling, the
34

Alcaraz’s complaint for lack of merit. dispositive portion of which reads:

The LA rejected Alcaraz’s argument that she was not WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 31
informed of the reasonable standards to qualify as a regular March 2006 [sic] is hereby reversed, annulled and set aside and
judgment is hereby rendered:
employee considering her admissions that she was briefed
1. Finding respondents Abbot [sic] and individual
by Almazar on her work during her preemployment respondents to have committed illegal dismissal;
orientation meeting  and that she received copies of
30
2. Respondents are ordered to immediately reinstate
Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance Modules which complainant to her former position without loss of seniority
were used for rights immediately upon receipt hereof;
_______________ 3. To jointly and severally pay complainant backwages
25 Formerly, Article 281 of the Labor Code; renumbered pursuant to Republic computed from 16 May 2005 until finality of this decision. As of
Act No. 10151. the date hereof the backwages is computed at
26 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 267.
a. Backwages for 15 months - PhP 1,650,000.00
27 Id., at pp. 261-262.
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 263-267.
31 Id., at p. 270.
29 Id., at pp. 255-274. Penned by Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
32 Id., at pp. 271-272.
30 Id., at p. 269.
33 Id., at p. 273.
699
34 Id., at pp. 356-378. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 699 Commissioners Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. (on leave) and Perlita B. Velasco,
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz concurring.
Page 11 of 46
 700 37 Id., at p. 368.
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 38 Id., at p. 369.
39 Id., at pp. 370-373.
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz 40 Id., at pp. 413-416. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Presiding
  Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco,
b. 13th month pay         -          110,000.00 concurring.
TOTAL     PhP 1,760,000.00 701
4. Respondents are ordered to pay complainant moral VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 701
damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00. Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
5. Respondents are also ordered to pay attorney’s fees of Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition
10% of the total award. for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
6. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
SO ORDERED. 35

docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 101045 (First CA Petition),

The NLRC reversed the findings of the LA and ruled that
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC when
there was no evidence showing that Alcaraz had been
it ruled that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. 41

apprised of her probationary status and the requirements

Pending resolution of the First CA Petition, Alcaraz
which she should have complied with in order to be a
moved for the execution of the NLRC’s Decision before the
regular employee.  It held that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job
36

LA, which petitioners strongly opposed. The LA denied the

description and Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance
said motion in an Order dated July 8, 2008 which was,
Modules was not equivalent to her being actually informed
however, eventually reversed on appeal by the NLRC.  Due 42

of the performance standards upon which she should have

to the foregoing, petitioners filed another Petition
been evaluated on.  It further observed that Abbott did not
37

for Certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP No.

comply with its own standard operating procedure in
111318 (Second CA Petition), assailing the propriety of the
evaluating probationary employees.  The NLRC was also
38

execution of the NLRC decision. 43

not convinced that Alcaraz was terminated for a valid cause

The CA Ruling
given that petitioners’ allegation of Alcaraz’s “poor
With regard to the First CA Petition, the CA, in a
performance” remained unsubstantiated. 39

Decision  dated December 10, 2009, affirmed the ruling of

44

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was

the NLRC and held that the latter did not commit any grave
denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated July 31, 2007. 40

_______________ abuse of discretion in finding that Alcaraz was illegally

35 Id., at pp. 377-378. dismissed.
36 Id., at p. 367.
Page 12 of 46
 It observed that Alcaraz was not apprised at the start of
her employment of the reasonable standards under which she
could qualify as a regular employee.  This was based on its
45
examination of the employment contract which showed that
the same did not contain any standard of performance or any
stipulation that Alcaraz shall undergo a performance
evaluation before she could qualify as a regular
On June 7, 2010, petitioners received the LA’s order
granting Alcaraz’s motion for execution which they in turn
appealed to the NLRC — through a Memorandum of Appeal
dated June 16, 2010 (June 16, 2010 Memorandum of
Appeal) — on the ground that the implementation of the
LA’s order would render its motion for reconsideration moot
and academic. 50

employee.  It also

46
Meanwhile, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
_______________ CA’s May 18, 2010 Resolution in the Second CA Petition
41 Id., at pp. 417-450.
42 Id., at p. 1403. was denied via a Resolution dated October 4, 2010.  This51

43 Id. attained finality on January 10, 2011 for petitioners’ failure

44 Id., at pp. 1040-1054.
to timely appeal the same.  Hence, as it stands, only the
52

45 Id., at p. 1052.
46 Id. issues in the First CA petition are left to be resolved.
702 Incidentally, in her Comment dated November 15, 2010,
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Alcaraz also alleges that petitioners were guilty of forum
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz shopping when they filed the Second CA Petition pending
found that Abbott was unable to prove that there was any
the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the
reasonable ground to terminate Alcaraz’s
CA’s De-
employment.  Abbott moved for the reconsideration of the
47
_______________
aforementioned ruling which was, however, denied by the 47 Id., at p. 1053.
48 Id., at pp. 1139-1140.
CA in a Resolution  dated June 9, 2010.
48
49 Id., at p. 1218.
The CA likewise denied the Second CA Petition in a 50 Id.
Resolution dated May 18, 2010 (May 18, 2010 Resolution) 51 Id., at p. 1219.
52 Rollo (G.R. No. 193976), p. 30.
and ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the 703
execution of the NLRC Decision.  Thus, petitioners filed a
49
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 703
motion for reconsideration. Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
While the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the cember 10, 2009 Decision i.e., the decision in the First CA
CA’s May 18, 2010 Resolution was pending, Alcaraz again Petition.  She also contends that petitioners have not
53

moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the LA. complied with the certification requirement under Section 5,
Page 13 of 46
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court when they failed to disclose in 704

the instant petition the filing of the June 16, 2010
Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC. 54
The Issues Before the Court
The following issues have been raised for the Court’s
resolution: (a) whether or not petitioners are guilty of forum
shopping and have violated the certification requirement
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; (b) whether or
not Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable
standards to qualify her as a regular employee; (c) whether
or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment;
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of
the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the
treatment between failure to comply with the certification
requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum
shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the
manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient
cause for the dismissal without prejudice [to the filing] of the
complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing,
while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and
for direct contempt. x x x.
56

and (d) whether or not the individual petitioners herein are As to the first, forum shopping takes place when a litigant
liable. files multiple suits involving the same parties, either
The Court’s Ruling simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
A. Forum Shopping and Violation judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
of Court. parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
prohibition against forum shopping is different from a being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with
violation of the certification requirement under Section 5, respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In Sps. Ong v. CA,  the Court 55
is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
explained that: pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
x x x The distinction between the prohibition against forum amount to res judicata in the other case. 57

shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too

elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with
the certification against forum
_______________
53 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 1223-1228.
54 Id., at p. 1224.
55 433 Phil. 490, 501-502; 384 SCRA 139, 148 (2002).
In this case, records show that, except for the element of
identity of parties, the elements of forum shopping do not
exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to
question the ruling of the NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally
dismissed. On the other hand, the Second CA Petition
Page 14 of 46
pertains to the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment
award pending the resolution of the First CA Petition and the
finality of the decision in the labor dispute between Alcaraz
and
_______________
56 Id., at pp. 501-502; p. 148. (Citations omitted)
57 Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505, 173355-56, 173401,
173563-64, 178779 & 178894, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 360, 428, citing NBI-
Microsoft Corporation v. Hwang, 499 Phil. 423, 435-436; 460 SCRA 428, 440-441
(2005).
705
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 705
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
the petitioners. Based on the foregoing, a judgment in the
Second CA Petition will not constitute res judicata insofar
as the First CA Petition is concerned. Thus, considering that
the two petitions clearly cover different subject matters and
causes of action, there exists no forum shopping.
As to the second, Alcaraz further imputes that the
petitioners violated the certification requirement under
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court  by not disclosing
58
the fact that it filed the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of
Appeal before the NLRC in the instant petition.
In this regard, Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a
complete statement of the present status of any pending case
if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was
filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of
the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare
under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending.
Records show that the issues raised in the instant petition
and those in the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal filed
with the NLRC likewise cover different subject matters and
causes of action. In this case, the validity of Alcaraz’s dis-
_______________
58 Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
 x x x x
706
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
missal is at issue whereas in the said Memorandum of
Appeal, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution
was in question. Thus, given the dissimilar issues,
petitioners did not have to disclose in the present petition the
filing of their June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal with
the NLRC. In any event, considering that the issue on the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution had been
resolved in the Second CA Petition — which in fact had
already attained finality — the matter of disclosing the June
16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal is now moot and
academic.
Page 15 of 46
 Having settled the foregoing procedural matter, the Court
now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues.
B. Probationary employment;
grounds for termination.
A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys
security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary
employment, aside from just or authorized causes of
termination, an additional ground is provided under Article
295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may
also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made
known by the employer to the employee at the time of the
engagement.  Thus, the services of an employee who has
59
been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for
any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause;
and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the
employer. 60
Corollary thereto, Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides that if the
employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the
rea-
_______________
59 Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation v. Ranchez, G.R.
No. 177937, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 135, 142.
60 Id.
707
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 707
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
sonable standards upon which the regularization would be
based on at the time of the engagement, then the said
employee shall be deemed a regular employee, viz.:
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer
shall make known to the employee the standards under which he
will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement.
Where no standards are made known to the employee at that
time, he shall be deemed a regular employee.
In other words, the employer is made to comply with two
(2) requirements when dealing with a probationary
employee: first, the employer must communicate the
regularization standards to the probationary employee;
and second, the employer must make such communication at
the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. If the
employer fails to comply with either, the employee is
deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee.
Keeping with these rules, an employer is deemed to have
made known the standards that would qualify a probationary
employee to be a regular employee when it has exerted
reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what he is
expected to do or accomplish during the trial period of
probation. This goes without saying that the employee is
sufficiently made aware of his probationary status as well as
the length of time of the probation.
The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-
descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids,
cooks, drivers, or messengers.  Also, in Aberdeen Court,
61
Inc. v. Agustin,  it has been held that the rule on notifying a
62
probationary employee of the standards of regularization
Page 16 of 46
should not be used to exculpate an employee who acts in a
manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in
regard to
_______________
61 Id., at p. 145.
62 495 Phil. 706, 716-717; 456 SCRA 32, 43 (2005).
708
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
which there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be
met. In the same light, an employee’s failure to perform the
duties and responsibilities which have been clearly made
known to him constitutes a justifiable basis for a
probationary employee’s nonregularization.
In this case, petitioners contend that Alcaraz was
terminated because she failed to qualify as a regular
employee according to Abbott’s standards which were made
known to her at the time of her engagement. Contrarily,
Alcaraz claims that Abbott never apprised her of these
standards and thus, maintains that she is a regular and not a
mere probationary employee.
The Court finds petitioners’ assertions to be well-taken.
A punctilious examination of the records reveals that
Abbott had indeed complied with the above-stated
requirements. This conclusion is largely impelled by the fact
that Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and
responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to,
during the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages
of her employment. On this score, the Court finds it apt to
detail not only the incidents which point out to the efforts
made by Abbott but also those circumstances which would
show that Alcaraz was well-apprised of her employer’s
expectations that would, in turn, determine her
regularization:
(a) On June 27, 2004, Abbott caused the publication in
a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Regulatory
Affairs Manager, indicating therein the job description for as
well as the duties and responsibilities attendant to the
aforesaid position; this prompted Alcaraz to submit her
application to Abbott on October 4, 2004;
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was
stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary
status;
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an
employment contract which specifically stated, inter alia,
that she was to
709
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 709
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months
beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005;
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment
offer, Bernardo sent her copies of Abbott’s organizational
structure and her job description through e-mail;
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment
orientation where Almazar informed her that she had to
implement Abbott’s Code of Conduct and office policies on
Page 17 of 46
human resources and finance and that she would be
reporting directly to Walsh;
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training
program as part of her orientation;
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbott’s Code of
Conduct and Performance Modules from Misa who
explained to her the procedure for evaluating the
performance of probationary employees; she was further
notified that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all
of its employees; and
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for
another pharmaceutical company and had admitted to have
an “extensive training and background” to acquire the
necessary skills for her job. 63
Considering the totality of the above-stated
circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be doubted that Alcaraz
was well-aware that her regularization would depend on her
ability and capacity to fulfill the requirements of her position
as Regulatory Affairs Manager and that her failure to
perform such would give Abbott a valid cause to terminate
her probationary employment.
Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that
the adequate performance of one’s duties is, by and of itself,
an inherent and implied standard for a probationary
employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard
which need
_______________
63 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 1201.
710
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
not be literally spelled out or mapped into technical
indicators in every case. In this regard, it must be observed
that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the
nature of a management prerogative which when reasonably
exercised — as Abbott did in this case — should be
respected. This is especially true of a managerial employee
like Alcaraz who was tasked with the vital responsibility of
handling the personnel and important matters of her
department.
In fine, the Court rules that Alcaraz’s status as a
probationary employee and her consequent dismissal must
stand. Consequently, in holding that Alcaraz was illegally
dismissed due to her status as a regular and not a
probationary employee, the Court finds that the NLRC
committed a grave abuse of discretion.
To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its
decision on the premise that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job
description and Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance
Modules was not equivalent to being actually informed of
the performance standards upon which she should have been
evaluated on.  It, however, overlooked the legal implication
64
of the other attendant circumstances as detailed herein which
should have warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz was
indeed a probationary and not a regular employee — more
particularly the fact that she was well-aware of her duties
and responsibilities and that her failure to adequately
Page 18 of 46
perform the same would lead
eventually, her termination.
Accordingly, by affirming
which is tainted with grave
committed a reversible error
the reversal of its decision.
_______________
64 Id., at pp. 367-368, 370.
711
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
 
to her non-regularization and x x x x
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of
due process shall be substantially observed:
the NLRC’s pronouncement For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282
[now, Article 296] of the Labor Code:
abuse of discretion, the CA (i)  A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground
which, perforce, necessitates or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii)  A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned,
with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence
presented against him.
711 (iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee,
indicating that upon due consideration of all the
712

C. Probationary employment; 712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

termination procedure. Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the
A different procedure is applied when terminating a
Labor Code states that “[i]f the termination is brought about
probationary employee; the usual two-notice rule does not
by the x x x failure of an employee to meet the standards of
govern. 65

_______________ the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be

65 Refers to the procedure stated in Article 291(b) of the Labor Code, as
renumbered pursuant to Republic Act No. 10151, viz.:
Article 291. Miscellaneous Provisions.—
x x x x
(b)  Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their
right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and
without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the
employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a
written notice containing a statement of the cause for termination and shall afford the
latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment.
x x x x
This procedure is also found in Section 2(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
sufficient that a written notice is served the employee, within
a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.”
As the records show, Alcaraz’s dismissal was effected
through a letter dated May 19, 2005 which she received on
May 23, 2005 and again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein
were the reasons for her termination, i.e., that after proper
evaluation, Abbott determined that she failed to meet the
reasonable standards for her regularization considering her
lack of time and people management and decision-making
skills, which are necessary in the performance of her
functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager.  Undeniably, this 66

Implementing the Labor Code which state:

written notice sufficiently meets the criteria set forth above,
Page 19 of 46
thereby legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcaraz’s
dismissal as a probationary employee under the parameters
set by the Labor Code. 67
D. Employer’s violation of company
policy and procedure.
Nonetheless, despite the existence of a sufficient ground
to terminate Alcaraz’s employment and Abbott’s compliance
with the Labor Code termination procedure, it is readily
apparent that Abbott breached its contractual obligation to
Alcaraz when it failed to abide by its own procedure in
evaluating the performance of a probationary employee.
Veritably, a company policy partakes of the nature of an
implied contract between the employer and employee.
In Parts Depot, Inc. v. Beiswenger,  it has been held that:
68
_______________
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
66 Rollo, pp. 78-81.
67 Id., at p. 1047.
68 170 S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2005).
713
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 713
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
[E]mployer statements of policy . . . can give rise to contractual
rights in employees without evidence that the parties mutually
agreed that the policy statements would create contractual rights
in the employee, and, hence, although the statement of policy is
signed by neither party, can be unilaterally amended by the
employer without notice to the employee, and contains no
reference to a specific employee, his job description or
compensation, and although no reference was made to the policy
statement in pre-employment interviews and the employee does
not learn of its existence until after his hiring. Toussaint, 292
N.W.2d at 892. The principle is akin to estoppel. Once an
employer establishes an express personnel policy and the
employee continues to work while the policy remains in
effect, the policy is deemed an implied contract for so long as
it remains in effect. If the employer unilaterally changes the
policy, the terms of the implied contract are also thereby
changed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Hence, given such nature, company personnel policies
create an obligation on the part of both the employee and the
employer to abide by the same.
Records show that Abbott’s PPSE procedure
mandates, inter alia, that the job performance of a
probationary employee should be formally reviewed and
discussed with the employee at least twice: first on the third
month and second on the fifth month from the date of
employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a
Performance Improvement Plan during the third month
review to bridge the gap between the employee’s
performance and the standards set, if any.  In addition, a
69
signed copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to
Abbott’s HRD as the same would serve as basis for
recommending the confirmation or termination of the
probationary employment. 70
_______________
69 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 1052.
70 Id., at p. 1043.
714
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
Page 20 of 46
 In this case, it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the
above-stated procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there
lies a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of Alcaraz’s
PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not even
shown that a PPSE form was completed to formally assess
her performance. Neither was the performance evaluation
discussed with her during the third and fifth months of her
employment. Nor did Abbott come up with the necessary
Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcaraz’s
performance with the set company standards.
While it is Abbott’s management prerogative to
promulgate its own company rules and even subsequently
amend them, this right equally demands that when it does
create its own policies and thereafter notify its employee of
the same, it accords upon itself the obligation to faithfully
implement them. Indeed, a contrary interpretation would
entail a disharmonious relationship in the work place for the
laborer should never be mired by the uncertainty of flimsy
rules in which the latter’s labor rights and duties would, to
some extent, depend.
In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate
Alcaraz’s probationary employment for her failure to meet
the standards required for her regularization, and while it
must be further pointed out that Abbott had satisfied its
statutory duty to serve a written notice of termination, the
fact that it violated its own company procedure renders the
termination of Alcaraz’s employment procedurally infirm,
warranting the payment of nominal damages. A further
exposition is apropos.
Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an
employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.
In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon),  the Court pronounced that
71
where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory
_______________
71 G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573.
715
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 715
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it
illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights.  Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay
72
the employee nominal damages in the amount of
P30,000.00. 73
Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court
modified Agabon in the case of Jaka Food Processing
Corporation v. Pacot (Jaka)  where it created a distinction
74
between procedurally defective dismissals due to a just
cause, on one hand, and those due to an authorized cause, on
the other.
It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code (now Article
296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should
be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect,
Page 21 of 46
initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the
dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283
(now Article 297) but the employer failed to comply with
the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because
the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s
exercise of his management prerogative.  Hence, in Jaka, 75
where the employee was dismissed for an authorized cause
of retrenchment  — as contradistinguished from the
76
employee in Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of
neglect of duty  — the Court ordered the employer to pay
77
the employee nominal damages at the higher amount of
P50,000.00.
Evidently, the sanctions imposed in
both Agabon and Jaka proceed from the necessity to deter
employers from future  appropriate to fix the amount of nominal damages at the
_______________
72 Id., at p. 616.
73 Id., at p. 620.
74 494 Phil. 114, 119-121; 454 SCRA 119, 125 (2005).
75 Id., at p. 121; p. 126.
76 Id., at p. 122; p. 127.
77 Supra note 71, at p. 605.
716
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
violations of the statutory due process rights of
employees.  In similar regard, the Court deems it proper to
78
apply the same principle to the case at bar for the reason that
an employer’s contractual breach of its own company
procedure — albeit not statutory in source — has the parallel
effect of violating the laborer’s rights. Suffice it to state, the
contract is the law between the parties and thus, breaches of
the same impel recompense to vindicate a right that has been
violated. Consequently, while the Court is wont to uphold
the dismissal of Alcaraz because a valid cause exists, the
payment of nominal damages on account of Abbott’s
contractual breach is warranted in accordance with Article
2221 of the Civil Code. 79
Anent the proper amount of damages to be awarded, the
Court observes that Alcaraz’s dismissal proceeded from her
failure to comply with the standards required for her
regularization. As such, it is undeniable that the dismissal
process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the
employee, akin to dismissals due to just causes under Article
296 of the Labor Code. Therefore, the Court deems it
amount of P30,000.00, consistent with its rulings in
both Agabon and Jaka.
E. Liability of individual peti-
tioners as corporate officers.
It is hornbook principle that personal liability of corporate
directors, trustees or officers attaches only when: (a) they
assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when
they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing
its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other
persons;
_______________
78 Id., at p. 617.
Page 22 of 46
 79 Article  2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the termination. On the alleged loss of her personal belongings,
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss records are bereft of any showing that the same could be
suffered by him. attributed to Abbott or any of its officers. It is a well-settled
717
rule that bad faith cannot be presumed and he who alleges
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 717 bad faith has the onus of proving it. All told, since Alcaraz
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
failed to prove any malicious act on the part of Abbott or
(b) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or
any of its officers, the Court finds the award of moral or
when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith
exemplary damages unwarranted.
file with the corporate secretary their written objection; (c)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily
Decision dated December 10, 2009 and Resolution dated
liable with the corporation; or (d) they are made by specific
June 9, 2010
provision of law personally answerable for their corporate _______________
action. 80
80 Carag v. NLRC, 548 Phil. 581, 605; 520 SCRA 28, 53 (2007), citing McLeod
In this case, Alcaraz alleges that the individual petitioners v. NLRC, 541 Phil. 214, 242; 512 SCRA 222, 249 (2007).
81 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 262, 1046. 
acted in bad faith with regard to the supposed crude manner 718
by which her probationary employment was terminated and 718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
thus, should be held liable together with Abbott. In the same Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
vein, she further attributes the loss of some of her remaining of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101045 are
belongings to them. 81
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Alcaraz’s contention fails to persuade. Decision dated March 30, 2006 of the Labor Arbiter
A judicious perusal of the records show that other than is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that
her unfounded assertions on the matter, there is no evidence petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines
to support the fact that the individual petitioners herein, in be ORDERED to pay respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz
their capacity as Abbott’s officers and employees, acted in nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 on account of
bad faith or were motivated by ill will in terminating its breach of its own company procedure.
Alcaraz’s services. The fact that Alcaraz was made to resign SO ORDERED.
and not allowed to enter the workplace does not necessarily Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
indicate bad faith on Abbott’s part since a sufficient ground Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
existed for the latter to actually proceed with her Jr., Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Page 23 of 46
 Brion, J., See Dissent.
Mendoza, J., But concurs with J. Brion in his views on
the procedural aspect.
Leonen, J., I join J. Brion in his dissent.
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The Case
The case in caption was a Second Division illegal
dismissal case that the Court en banc accepted for decision
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court.
A. The Issues Posed
The case posed two issues to the Court for resolution.
The first is the manner of review that the Court should
undertake. This is an issue that underlies all the Court’s
decision making in light of the various modes of review and
essentials that the Rules of Court require. The second and
core issue relates to the merits of the legality or illegality of
the dismissal: whether the Labor Code requirements
governing the
719
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 719
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
dismissal of a probationary employee had been complied
with, considered from the prism of the mode of review and
the nature of the decision under review.
B. The Factual Highlights
To briefly summarize the highlights of the case, Abbott
Laboratories, Phils. (petitioner), Cecille A. Terrible, Edwin
D. Feist, Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa, Teresita C. Bernardo,
and Allan G. Almazar (individual petitioners) are the
employer and its senior officials who dismissed respondent
Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz from employment within three (3)
months from her engagement. The respondent complained
against the petitioners on the ground that she had been
illegally dismissed: (1) she was not informed of the
standards that would govern her as a probationary employee,
as required by the law (the Labor Code) and its
implementing rules; (2) the petitioners even violated the
company’s own internal rules on the manner of dismissing
probationary employees; (3) substantively, her dismissal was
without the required just cause as required by the law and
the rules; and (4) her dismissal was done oppressively and in
bad faith.
C. The Rulings Below
The Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal had been
valid but the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the Labor Arbiter; found the
dismissal illegal; and damages and attorney’s fees because
of the manner the dismissal was effected. The Court of
Appeals (CA) found no grave abuse of discretion and
accordingly denied the Rule 65 petition that the petitioner
Abbott brought.
D. The Current Court Rulings
Page 24 of 46
 The Ponencia. In the present Rule 45 petition for review
on certiorari before this Court, the ponencia undertook
a weighing of the evidence in light of her own view of how
720
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
the evidence should be interpreted, and came out with her
own ruling for the grant of the petition.
This Dissent. I vote to dismiss the petition before us as I
agree with the decision of the CA that the NLRC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in concluding that
respondent had been illegally dismissed from
employment.
Discussion of the Issues
I. The Procedural Issue
A. The Preliminary Issue: Manner of Review
A labor case finds its way into the judicial system from
the NLRC whose decision is final and executory. Finality
simply means that the NLRC ruling is no longer appealable;
the legal intent is to confine adjudication of labor cases to
labor tribunals with the expertise in these cases and thereby
bring the resolution of the case to a close at the soonest
possible time.
When an administrative ruling (or any ruling for that
matter) is already final and unappealable, the only recourse
open under the Rules of Court is through a limited review
on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65. This has been the
mode of review followed since the Labor Code took effect in
November 1974; labor cases were directly brought to this
Court but only on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65. 1
_______________
1 The following explanation was made in my Rejoinder to Reply (On the
manner of reviewing a Court of Appeals Labor Ruling) that was submitted to the
Court En Banc in the course of the exchanges on this aspect of the case. The
explanation distinguished between appealable cases and those that, while not
appealable, can still be reviewed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
“For a full understanding of these distinctions, it must be kept in mind that
several levels of review may exist for rulings emanating from the lowest levels of
adjudication before they reach the Supreme
721
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 721
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
In 1998, the Court — in lieu of directly acting on labor
cases under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court — opted to
change the
_______________
Court. The ruling of an inferior court or tribunal (for example, the Regional Trial
Court [RTC]) is first reviewed by an appellate court (the CA) on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law; the CA decision may then in turn be reviewed by
the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
Generally, two types of decisions or rulings may be brought to the appellate
courts for review and decision; the appellate courts’ decisions are in turn subject to
review by the Supreme Court.
The first type relates to cases that come to the appellate court by way
of appeal (e.g., the ruling of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction that is
appealed to the CA on issues of facts and law under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).
The second type involves the review by the CA of decisions of inferior courts or
tribunals whose rulings, by law, are final and executory (e.g., the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC] that under the Labor Code is final
and executory). This is the review of rulings that, by law, is not appealable and thus
can only be made on limited jurisdictional grounds.
 A CA ruling under the first type can be challenged by the aggrieved party before
the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Under Rule 45, the review is only on questions of law unless a
review of questions of fact is allowed under the terms established by jurisprudence.
Page 25 of 46
This is the case in the example given above — an RTC ruling that is appealed to the Montoya v. Transmed the CourtMontoya
3

CA on both factual and legal grounds and which CA decision on appeal is now
_______________
before the Supreme Court for further review. This may be the model of a Supreme
ated when it is considered that the decision can immediately be implemented
Court review that the ponente might have had in mind in asserting that the Supreme
unless a temporary restraining order or injunction is issued by the CA; the Rule 65
Court should be able to undertake a review of the full range of legal issues before it.
mode of review is rendered necessary because the decision or ruling under review,
 In the second type as exemplified above, a ruling by the NLRC, although final
by law, is already final. Finality1 means that the decision is no longer appealable1
and executory, may be brought to the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
and may be reviewed only when the ruling is void because of jurisdictional defects.”
on a petition for certiorari, limited to jurisdictional grounds, usually for grave abuse
2 356 Phil. 811; 295 SCRA 494 (1998).
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The final and executory
3 G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334.
nature of the NLRC decision under review can best be appreci-
723
722
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 723
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
 
procedure of review through its ruling in St. Martin
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the
Funeral Homes, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for
Commission,  taking into account the judicial hierarchy of
2
jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65.
courts and the growing number of labor cases elevated to the Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of
Supreme Court under Rule 65. The Court resolved that the law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal
proper recourse from the NLRC’s final and executory ruling correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
is to assail the ruling before the CA under Rule 65. Thus,
presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the
the unappealable character of the NLRC ruling (as declared prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
by substantive law) did not change; only the process of absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision
review changed in terms of the court (from the Supreme before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on
Court to the Court of Appeals) to which the labor case can the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to
initially be brought. be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a
review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.
From the CA ruling, a dissatisfied party has the option to
This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of
file an appeal with the Supreme Court through a petition a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC
This mode of appeal limits the review to questions of law. committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?
B. Standard of Review of a Labor Case under Rule 45 of 4
 [emphases and italics supplied; citations omitted]
the Rules of Court Thus, under the Rule 65 review by the
CA, Montoya reiterates that the sole ground or issue allowed
Page 26 of 46
is jurisdictional — the presence or absence of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling on the case.
To state the obvious, this kind of review would have made it
easier for the CA to handle the case; in the absence of a
grave abuse of discretion, it can dismiss labor cases for lack
of grave abuse of discretion as we do in this Court.
From the CA, further recourse is through a Rule 45
review by this Court on questions of law in accordance with
prevailing rulings. The office of a petition for review
on certiorari is not to examine and settle factual
questions already ruled upon below. In this review, the
Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of
the CA’s finding that the
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 342-343.
724
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in
law.
This manner of review is effectively a supervisory
review by the courts that bears two significant
characteristics: first, it respects the mandate of the law that
the decision below is final and is not for the courts to
review on appeal for its legal and factual merits;
and second, review by the courts (particularly by the
Supreme Court) in the exercise of their supervisory
certiorari jurisdiction is mandated no less than by the
Constitution and is intended to ensure that the deciding
entity stayed within the due bounds of its authority or
jurisdiction. 5
Specifically, in reviewing a CA labor ruling under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the Court’s review is limited to:
(1) Ascertaining the correctness of the CA’s decision
in finding the presence or absence of a grave abuse of
discretion. This is done by examining, on the basis of the
parties’ presentations, whether the CA correctly determined
that at the NLRC level, all the adduced pieces of evidence
were considered; no evidence which should not have been
considered was considered; and the evidence presented
supports the NLRC findings; and
(2) Deciding any other jurisdictional error that
attended the CA’s interpretation or application of the law.
In this kind of limited review, the Court avoids reviewing
a labor case by re-weighing the evidence or re-evaluating its
sufficiency; the task of weighing or evaluation, as a rule, lies
within the NLRC’s jurisdiction as an administrative
appellate body.
If the NLRC ruling has basis in the evidence and the
applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of
discretion exists and the CA should so declare and,
accordingly, dismiss the petition. If grave abuse of discretion
exists, then the CA
_______________
5 Rejoinder to Reply, supra, at Note 1.
725
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 725
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
Page 27 of 46
must grant the petition and nullify the NLRC ruling, entering
at the same time the ruling that is justified under the
evidence and the governing law, rules and jurisprudence. In
our Rule 45 review, this Court must deny the petition if it
finds that the CA correctly acted.
In the context of the present case, the CA found no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC; hence,
the CA dismissed the Rule 65 petition before it. In our own
ruling on the Rule 45 petition before us, we should
evaluate the petition in this light, not in the manner that
the ponencia did in concluding for the grant of the petition
and ruling in favor of the petitioners.
By so doing, the ponencia undertook a factual appellate
review that laid the whole case open for the detailed
examination of every piece of evidence adduced in the case
and for the evaluation of the correctness of the application of
the law to the evidence found. This is a review that a Rule
45 petition does not allow.
II. The Substantive Issues
A. The Respondent’s Status of Employment
II.A.1. Standards to determine probationary
      employment
While the respondent might have been hired as a
probationary employee, the petitioners’ evidence did not
establish the employers’ compliance with the probationary
employment requirements under Article 281 of the Labor
Code (as amended) and Section 6(d) of the Implementing
Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code (as amended).
Thus, the respondent should be considered a regular
employee and the case should be reviewed on this basis.726
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
 
Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 281. Probationary employment.—Probationary
employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the
employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The
services of an employee who has been engaged on a
probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he
fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered
a regular employee. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
Further, Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book
VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, as amended, states:
Sec. 6. Probationary employment.—There is probationary
employment where the employee, upon his engagement, is made
to undergo a trial period during which the employer determines
his fitness to qualify for regular employment, based
on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of
engagement.  [emphasis supplied]
Probationary employment shall be governed by the following
rules:
x x x x
(d)  In all cases of probationary employment, the
employer shall make known to the employee the standards
under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time
of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to
Page 28 of 46
 the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular
employee. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
To sum up these provisions, a valid probationary
employment requires the concurrence of two
requirements. First, the
727
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 727
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
employer shall make known the reasonable
standard (performance standard) whose compliance will
render the employee qualified to be a regular
employee. Second, the employer shall inform the employee
of the applicable performance standard at the time of
his/her engagement. Failing in one or both, the employee,
even if initially hired as a probationary employee, should be
viewed and considered a regular employee.
The ponencia apparently fully agrees with the above
statement of the applicable law as it substantially recites the
same requirements, including the consequence that upon
failure to comply with these same requirements, “the
employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary
employee.”  It continues, however, with a twist that
6 human resource specialist, she should have known what was
effectively negates what it has stated and admitted about the
need to communicate the regularization standards to the
employee, thus:
Keeping with these rules, an employees is deemed to have
made known the standards that would qualify a probationary
employee to be a regular employee when it has exerted
reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what he is
expected to do to accomplish during the trial of probation. This
goes without saying that the employee is sufficiently made
aware of his probationary status as well as the length of time of
the probation.
The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-
descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids, cooks,
drivers, or messengers. Also in Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin,
it has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary
employee of the standards of regularization should not be used
to exculpate an employee in a manner contrary to basic
knowledge and common sense in regard to which there is no
need to spell out a policy or standard to be met. In the same
light, an employee’s failure to perform the duties and
responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him
consti-
6 Decision, at page 12. 
728
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
tutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s non-
regularization. [footnotes from the original, omitted]
Based on these premises, the ponencia then deftly argues
that because the duties and responsibilities of the position
have been explained to the respondent, an experienced
expected for her to attain regular status.
The ponencia’s reasoning, however, is badly flawed.
1st. The law and the rules require that there performance
standards communicated at the time of engagement to the
probationary employee. The performance standards to be
met are the employer’s specific expectations of how the
probationary employee should perform.
Page 29 of 46
 The ponencia impliedly admits that no performance
standards were expressly given but argues that because the
respondent had been informed of her duties and
responsibilities (a fact that was and is not disputed), she
should be deemed to know what was expected of her for
purposes of regularization.
This is a major flaw that the ponencia satisfies only via an
assumption. The ponencia apparently forgets that knowledge
of duties and responsibilities is different from the measure of
how these duties and responsibilities should be delivered.
They are separate elements and the latter element is missing
in the present case.
2 . The ponencia glosses over the communication aspect.
nd
Not only must there be express performance standards
(except in specific instances defined in the implementing
rules, discussed below); there must be effective
communication. If no standards were provided, what would
be communicated?
3 . The ponencia badly contradicts itself in claiming that
rd
actual communication of specific standards might not be
necessary “when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for
instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or
messengers.” The re-
729
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 729
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
spondent, in the first place, was never a maid, cook, driver
or a messenger and cannot be placed under this
classification; she was hired and employed as a human
resources manager, in short, a managerial employee. Plain
and common sense reasoning by one who ever had been in
an employment situation dictates that the job of a managerial
employee cannot be self-explanatory, in the way
the ponencia implied; the complexity of a managerial job
must necessarily require that the level of performance to be
delivered must be specified and cannot simply be assumed
based on the communication of the manager’s duties and
responsibilities.
4th. The ponencia also forgets that what these
“performance standards” or measures cannot simply be
assumed because they are critically important in this case, or
for that matter, in any case involving jobs whose duties and
responsibilities are not simple or self-descriptive. If the
respondent had been evaluated or assessed in the manner
that the company’s internal rules require, these standards
would have been the basis for her performance or lack of it.
Last but not the least, the respondent’s services were
terminated on the basis of the performance standards that, by
law, the employer set or prescribed at the time of the
employee’s engagement. If none had been prescribed in the
first place, under what basis could the employee then be
assessed for purposes of termination or regularization?
From these preliminary take-off points in
the ponencia’s premises, it can already be discerned that
something is badly amiss and skewed in its appreciation
and review of the rulings of the NLRC and the CA. It is
an appreciation that goes beyond what a determination
Page 30 of 46
of grave abuse of discretion requires. It is an evaluation
of the adduced evidence based on externalities beyond
the face value of the presented evidence.
In this case, the ponencia simply disregarded the plain
import of the evidence or the lack of it, and ventured into
the realm of assumptions to justify its de-
730
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
sired conclusions. In the mathematical realm of problem
solving, it appears to have started from the conclusion
and solved the problem backwards so that the conclusion
would fit into its stretched reading of the evidence.
II.A.2. The respondent should be deemed a
      regular employee
In the context of this case, an initial determination of how
the respondent’s employment started and of her legal status
at that point is the best starting point in determining the
validity of her dismissal.
The respondent was indisputably initially hired as a
probationary employee. This is not a contested point. The
established facts and the applicable law, however, dictate
otherwise from the perspective of law as the petitioners
failed to show compliance with the two requirements of
Article 281 of the Labor Code (as amended) and of Section
6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the
Labor Code (as amended).
This was what the NLRC found, leading the CA to
conclude that no grave abuse of discretion intervened in
the NLRC’s ruling because its findings were supported
by the evidence on record and by the correctly-chosen
applicable law. In stark contrast, the ponencia’s reading,
although based on the same legal premises, was based on
shaky assumptions, not on the hard evidence that the
tribunals below appreciated.
II.A.2(a). No specific employment standard on
          record.
As the NLRC found (and as confirmed by the CA), no
term or provision exists in the respondent’s Employment
Contract 7
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 174.
731
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 731
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
relating to the performance standard that the respondent
was expected to observe. The Employment Contract, duly
presented as evidence, only proved the terms and conditions
of the respondent’s employment as therein indicated, i.e.,
the position title, the assigned department, the status of
employment, and the period of employment. Beyond these,
the Employment Contract did not say anything more. To be
sure, nothing more can be extracted from this piece of
evidence except the facts stated and the inferences by
implication from the expressly disclosed information.
Significantly, none of these can be characterized or inferred
by implication as performance standards.
Page 31 of 46
 The best evidence of what the ponencia did when it saw
matters otherwise, is its own statement: its basis is not what
the submitted evidence state but on what she was “largely
impelled” to recognize. To quote the ponencia’s own words:
A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott
had indeed complied with the above requirements. This
conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that Abbott
clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as
Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to, during the time of her
engagement, and the incipient states of her employment. On this
score, the Court finds it apt to detail not only of the incidents
which point out to the efforts made by Abbott but also those
circumstances which would show that Alcaraz was well-
apprised of her employer’s expectations that would, in turn
determine her regularization:” [emphasis supplied]
The petitioner’s other pieces of evidence that
the ponencia cited and used to support its conclusion do not
and cannot, however, satisfy the requirement for
performance standards that must be communicated at the
time of engagement.
Specifically, these were the Offer Sheet dated December
7, 2004, and the pre-employment orientation on the
respondent’s duty to implement the petitioner’s Code of
Conduct, office policies and training program.732
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
 
The Offer Sheet was designed to inform the respondent of
the compensation and benefits package offered to her by the
petitioner and can in no way be read as a statement of the
applicable probationary employment standard.  It was 8
communicated even prior to engagement when the parties
were negotiating, not at the point of engagement as the law
requires.
The pre-employment orientation on the respondent’s duty
to implement the petitioner’s Code of Conduct, office
policies and training program likewise cannot be
characterized as performance standards; they simply related
to activities aimed at acquainting and training the respondent
on her duties and not for the purpose of informing her of the
performance standards applicable to her. What stands out is
that they do not pertain specifically to the respondent and
the required performance standard applicable for her
qualification for regular employment; they related to the
staff the respondent managed and supervised. Additionally,
these were all relayed prior to or after the respondent was
engaged by the petitioner.
An important distinction to remember at this point is that
the respondent’s knowledge of the duties that her work
entailed, and her knowledge of the employer’s performance
standard, are two distinct matters separately requiring the
presentation of independent proof.
The requirement of independent proof is found under
Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, and its
implementing rule that deem an employee to be regular if
he/she was not informed of the performance standard for
regularization. Independent proof is likewise necessary as
the law provides an additional ground for terminating a
Page 32 of 46
probationary employment, i.e., when the employee “fails to
qualify as a
_______________
8Id. at p. 77.
733
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 733
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
regular employee in accordance with the reasonable
standards made known by the employer[.]” 9
The performance standard contemplated in law may be
proven by evidence of how the employee’s performance was
intended to be or was, in fact, measured by the employer.
The performance standard may be in the form of a clear set
of the employer’s expectations, or by a system of feedbacks
(e.g., comment cards) and document evaluation or
performance evaluation and appraisals conducted by the
employer.
These were the pieces of evidence that the NLRC, as
confirmed by the CA, did not see in the evidence or in the
petitioners’ presented case. The ponencia, unfortunately,
glossed over these gaps and omissions in the petitioners’
case and chose to believe, even without evidentiary basis
that—
Considering the  totality of the above-stated circumstances, it
cannot, therefore, be doubted that Alcaraz was well-aware that
her regularization would depend on her ability and capacity to
fulfill the requirements of her position as Regulatory Affairs
Manager and that her failure to perform such would give Abbott
a valid cause to terminate her probationary employment.
[emphasis supplied]
From this strained and stretched reading that magically saw
the required prescribed performance standards that — by the
factual findings of the NLRC and the CA — never existed,
the ponencia went on to conclude:
Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the
adequate performance of one’s duties is, by and of itself, an
inherent and implied standard for a probationary employee to be
regularized; such is a regularization standard which need not be
literally spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every
case. In this
_______________
9 See Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended.
734
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
regard, it must be observed that the assessment of adequate duty
performance is in the nature of a management prerogative which
when reasonably exercised — as Abbott did in this case —
should be respected. This is especially true of a managerial
employee like Alcaraz who was tasked with the vital
responsibility of handling personnel and important matters of
her department.
This conclusion, of course, simply extends the magic by
using “basic knowledge and common sense” to dictate the
existence of “inherent and implied standards” of a
probationary employee, and even offers a view of
“management prerogative” that is unusual in the given facts
of this case. This approach eloquently exemplifies what I
mentioned above as the “solving backwards” approach that
the ponencia used.
Page 33 of 46
 II.A.2(b). No specific performance standard
          communicated to the respondent.
Complementing the requirement for the existence of
performance standards is the required communication of the
performance standard to the respondent. Again, nothing in
the records shows that the petitioner ever communicated any
performance standard to the respondent.
The ponencia, in building up a case contrary to what the
NLRC and the CA found, cites the evidence the petitioners
point to — the respondent’s receipt of copies of the
petitioner’s Code of Conduct, Probationary Performance
Standards and Evaluation, and Performance Excellence
Orientation Modules. The NLRC and the CA, looking at the
same pieces of evidence, saw these in a different light as
they did not only examine the documents themselves but
went to the extent of examining and appreciating the
circumstances surrounding the respondent’s receipt of
these documents.
The evidence on record suggests, as the respondent
directly testified to, that the cited documents were not given
to her for the purpose of complying with the petitioner’s
obligation to
736
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
inform her of the performance standards applicable to her.
The documents were, in fact, given by the petitioner to
assist her in monitoring the employees assigned to her
department, i.e., as the documents she must rely on in
conducting the performance evaluations of the staff
assigned to her department. In short, the respondent
received the documents because they were necessary in the
discharge of her functions.
From the point of law, compliance with the first
requirement is not also satisfied by the petitioner’s assertion
that the respondent knew that only one performance standard
applied to all employees. Notably, the law requires proof
that the employer specifically made known to her the
performance standards applicable to her to enable her to
qualify for regular employment. The required
communication must be an effective one if the law were
to be given meaningful substance, not a mere
perfunctory transmission of information.
Faced with these opposing claims, the CA apparently
weighed matters in the respondent’s (and effectively in the
NLRC’s) favor. In this situation of possible equipoise, the
CA did not rule incorrectly from the point of law when it
acted as it did.
Two factors tilt the balance in favor of the legal
correctness of the CA’s ruling. The first is that the
respondent’s position (found by the NLRC to be
meritorious) was not without any basis in fact and in law.
The second is from the latter perspective; Article 4 of the
Labor Code and established jurisprudence hold that any
doubt in a labor situation must be resolved in the employee’s
favor.
Page 34 of 46
 Thus, again, the ponencia’s case and its conclusion
must fail.
II.A.2(c). Performance standards and the
           internal procedures for their
            evaluation were not applied to the
            respondent.736
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
 
I can only agree with one aspect of the ponencia — its
admission that Abbott’s internal procedures were not applied
to the respondent. I cannot dispute and I fully agree with the
following passages of the ponencia:
Records show that Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates, inter
alia, that the job performance of a probationary employee
should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at
least twice: first on the third month and second on the fifth
month from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to
come up with a Performance Improvement Plan during the third
month review to bridge the gap between the employee’s
performance and the standards set, if any. In addition, a signed
copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to Abbott’s HRD as
the same would serve as basis for recommending the
confirmation or termination of the probationary employment.
In this case, as it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the
above-stated procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies
a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of Alcaraz PPSE form
was submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a PPSE
form was completed to formally assess her performance. Neither
was the performance evaluation discussed with her during the
third and fifth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott come
up with the necessary Performance Improvement Plan to
properly gauge Alcaraz performance with the set company
standards.
While it is Abbott’s management prerogative to promulgate
its own company rules and even subsequently amend them, this
right equally demands that when it does create its own policies
and thereafter notify its employees of the same, it accords upon
itself the obligation to faithfully implement them. Indeed, a
contrary interpretation would entail a disharmonious relationship
in the work place for the laborer should never be mired by the
uncertainty of flimsy rules in which the latter’s
737
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 737
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
labor rights and duties would, to some extent,
depend.  [footnotes in the original omitted]
10
 Internal processes, however, cannot be dissociated from
the substance that the processes seek to achieve. This is the
essence of due process. There is the requirement for the
observance of proper procedures, hand in hand with the
substance of what the law seeks – to level the playing field
between the all-powerful employer and the vulnerable
employee who lies at the mercy of the employer if he or she
can be dismissed on the basis of the latter’s whim. This
attempt at leveling is the reason for the requirements for
duly disclosed performance standards and their
communication to the probationary employee at the very
beginning of the relationship. Reason, experience and
common sense dictate that the substance of the law carry
more weight than the process component so that any
Page 35 of 46
violation of the substantive portion is a transgression that
mere obeisance to the process or the recognition of the
failure of process, cannot cure. From this perspective, the
laudable quotation above loses its luster.
Lusterless or otherwise, the ponencia’s admission of
Abbott’s procedural inadequacies is not without significance
in terms of the present case as a whole. Notably, the above
quotation expressly and impliedly admits that no effort at all
was ever made for the conduct of an assessment or
evaluation of the respondent’s performance; in fact, no
performance evaluation forms appear to have been
submitted by the company. The dearth of evidence on this
point (described by the ponencia as a “hiatus of evidence”)
is completely consistent with what the ponencia explicitly
and impliedly admits from the very beginning: there was no
evidence of any performance standard furnished the
respondent so that the ponencia could only deduce the
existence of performance standards from its assumptions
and stretched rationalizations; much less was there any
communica-
_______________
10 Decision, at pp. 16-17.
738
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
tion of performance standards qua performance standards,
as this is a matter that was also assumed.
I draw attention, too, to another unusual feature of this
case indicating, not only the omissions that the ponencia
already cited, but the implication as well that the respondent
had been singled out for special treatment by the petitioner
officers. At the very least, this incident indicates that the
petitioner did not apply the same standards and processes to
the respondent’s work. The petitioner’s prescribed procedure
was narrated in an earlier version of the ponencia in this
wise:
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with petitioner
Cecille Terrible (Terrible), Abbott’s former HR Director, to
discuss certain issues regarding staff performance standards. In
the course x x x thereof, Alcaraz accidentally saw a printed copy
of an e-mail sent by Walsh to some staff members which
essentially contained queries regarding the former’s job
performance. Alcaraz asked if Walsh’s action was the normal
process of evaluation. Terrible said that it was
not.  (emphasis ours)
11
This allegation by the respondent in this regard in her
pleadings was impliedly admitted by the petitioner when it
failed to offer any refutation. Interestingly, the above
allegation was included in the narration of facts of
the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, the CA  and an earlier
version of the ponencia, although they arrived at two (2)
different conclusions.
The respondent’s unrefuted allegation was not considered
at all in the conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and of
the ponencia.  On the other hand, the NLRC and the CA
12
concluded that a different performance standard and
evaluation process
_______________
11 Pages 4-5 of the ponencia.
Page 36 of 46
 12 Ibid.; Rollo, pp. 260 and 271.
739
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 739
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
was applied to the respondent in light of the circumstances
of the case, gleaned from the evidence submitted. 13
In my view, the NLRC and the CA were not without basis
in making their conclusion as the incident, taken together
with the facts supported by the available evidence, is vital in
appreciating the nature of the respondent’s employment.
Since the respondent, as the incident suggests, was bound
by a different set of standards and procedures, and since no
evidence of record existed showing what these standards
were or that the required procedures were observed, the
petitioners’ theory that the respondent was informed of, and
was evaluated pursuant to, the performance standards
applicable to her position, is effectively negated. This leads
to the conclusion that the respondent, from the beginning,
had been a regular employee as a result of the failure of
Abbott’s HR processes. A much simpler view, related this
time to the manner of her termination, is that the respondent
was simply differently treated.
B. “Just Cause” for Dismissal Must Exist
To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer
carries the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just
cause and with the observance of due process prior to
dismissal.  The employer has to discharge this burden by
14
clear, accurate, consistent and convincing evidence;  in case
15
of doubt, the presumption in the employee’s favor under
Article 4 of the Labor Code should apply.
II.B.1. The petitioner had no valid cause to
      dismiss the respondent’s employment
_______________
13 Rollo, pp. 1044-1045.
14 Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186, 205.
15 Ibid.
740
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
 
The respondent was dismissed as she “failed to qualify as
regular employee in accordance with the prescribed
standards set by the Company.”  Even granting for the sake
16
of argument that the petitioner had apprised the respondent
of an applicable performance standard, the evidence failed to
show that the respondent did not meet this standard in a
manner and to the extent equivalent to the “just cause” that
the law requires.
II.B.1(a). Just cause requirement for
          employees, whether
          probationary or regular.
An important legal point that should not be lost in
considering this case is that a probationary employee does
not have lesser rights than a regular employee under the
Labor Code in terms of the just cause for the termination
of an employment. While the strict application of Article
282 of the Labor Code may be relaxed because the employee
is still under probation (so that analogous probationary status
Page 37 of 46
rules may apply), the same essential just cause for dismissal
must be present and must be proven. In other words,
probationary employment does not mean that the employee
is under an “employment at will” situation as that phrase is
understood in American jurisprudence. To reiterate, the fact
that the respondent was still in her probationary period of
employment did not lessen the burden of proof that the law
imposed on the petitioners to prove the just cause for her
dismissal.  Probationary employees are protected by the
17
security of tenure provision of the Constitution and they
cannot be removed from their position except only for
cause. 18
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 78.
17 Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr., 495 Phil. 706, 712; 456 SCRA 32, 38
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
On the contrary, the records disclose that the respondent
performed her duties under the guidance of the petitioner’s
management and worked in line with the tasks assigned to
her.  The petitioner’s allegation of the respondent’s “poor
19

(2005). performance” could not have been substantiated considering

18 Ibid.
the lack of any clear performance standard in evaluating the
741
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 741 respondent’s work.
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz II.B.2. The petitioner violated its own
II.B.1(b). The evidentiary status of the        procedural requirements in the
                  just cause for dismissal        performance evaluation
In the present case, the evidence did not show the just A first instance when the discussion related to “process”
cause that Article 282 of the Labor Code requires. No was with respect to the communication of performance
_______________
evidence on record showed the commission by the 19 See page 4 of the ponencia.
respondent of any of the following acts or omissions: 742
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the 742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
representative in connection with his work; standards. This topic also relates to process, but this time
on the matter of the procedure to be taken in performance
Page 38 of 46
evaluation: the petitioner failed to observe its
own procedural requirements in evaluating the respondent’s
probationary employment.
The petitioner’s prescribed procedure gives probationary
employees two (2) opportunities to meet and qualify for
regularization. As mentioned before, the reviews were aimed
at informing the employees of their work performance based
on the petitioner’s standard and on how they can improve it
to qualify for regularization. For reasons not disclosed in the
records, the prescribed procedure was not followed by the
petitioner in the respondent’s case. She was immediately
terminated from employment without having been evaluated
and without undergoing the evaluation process under the
petitioner’s prescribed procedure.
While the petitioner’s failure to observe its own
procedures is not disputed in the ponencia, the implication
of Abbott’s failure cannot simply be glossed over. Abbott’s
non-compliance should be viewed from the point of fairness
or lack of it, that attended the respondent’s dismissal. This
circumstance should be considered together with the other
circumstances of the case, if only because the petitioner’s
basic unfairness rendered doubtful the real cause in the
termination of her employment.
In other words, any deviation from the prescribed
procedures must be sufficiently explained to remove doubts
on the genuineness of the cause of dismissal. In this case,
not only did the petitioner fail to observe its own prescribed
procedure; more importantly, it also failed to provide an
explanation on why the prescribed procedure was not
followed in the respondent’s case.
Significantly, the NLRC appreciated all these in this
case and this appreciation was duly noted and evaluated
by the CA. As there was in fact basis in fact and in law in
the NLRC’s findings on this aspect of the case,
743
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 743
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
again the CA correctly found no grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC’s actions.
II.B.3. Violation of the Labor Code’s
       procedural requirements
 Additionally, the petitioner failed to comply with the
procedural due process of the Labor Code when it
terminated the respondent’s employment. The two-written
notice requirement under Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended, was never observed. To quote this provision:
Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.
—In all cases of termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying
the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his
side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so
Page 39 of 46
 desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstance[s], grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on
the employee’s last known address. [emphasis supplied]
744
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
The first notice is complied with when the employee is
properly apprised of the charges brought against him/her so
that he/she can properly prepare for his/her
defense.  The second notice is complied with when the
20
employee is informed of the employer’s intention to
terminate the employment.  A formal “trial-type” hearing,
21
although preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the
employee’s right to be heard. In Perez v. Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company,  the Court laid down
22
the following guiding principles in connection with the
hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any
meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the
employee to answer the charges against him and
submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a
hearing, conference or some other fair, just and
reasonable way.
b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory
only when requested by the employee in writing or
substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule
or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances
justify it.
c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the
Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or conference”
requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.
From the records, the respondent received only one
notice and was not given ample opportunity to be
heard before her employment was terminated. The
respondent was not served a first written notice indicating:
(1) the grounds for terminating her employment; and (2) a
directive giving her the opportunity to submit a written
explanation within a
_______________
20 Dolores T. Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club, Inc., et al., G.R. No.
173012, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 177.
21 Ibid.
22 G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110, 127.
745
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 745
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
reasonable period. Neither was the respondent given the
ample opportunity to be heard as required by law. There was
only compliance with the second notice requirement through
the petitioner’s letter dated May 19, 2005 which was already
a written notice of termination of employment. 23
In defense of Abbott’s failure to observe the two-notice
requirement, the ponencia argues that a different procedure
applies when terminating a probationary employee; the usual
two-notice requirement does not govern, citing for this
Page 40 of 46
purpose Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
Rules of the Labor Code. exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The CA and the
The ponencia, however, forgets that the single notice rule NLRC also correctly held that the individual petitioners (i.e.,
applies only if the employee is validly on probationary the corporate officers of the petitioner) should be solidarily
basis; it does not apply where the employee is deemed a liable with the petitioner for the respondent’s monetary
regular employee for the company’s failure to provide and awards.
to communicate a prescribed performance standard II.C.1. The recoverable reliefs
applicable to the probationary employee. Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the
The ponencia itself admits that in such a case, the employee following awards to an illegally dismissed employee:
would then be a regular employee. Since the petitioner Art. 279. Security of tenure.—In cases of regular
utterly failed to support by evidence its compliance with the employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
legal requirements on performance standards, the two-notice
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
requirement for regular employees must perforce fully be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
apply. other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
C. The Consequences of the Respondent’s allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
Illegal Dismissal equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
The above analysis shows that the respondent had been withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

illegally dismissed from her employment. The petitioner “By jurisprudence derived from [the above] provision,
failed to show that her dismissal was for a valid cause. The separation pay may be awarded to an illegally dismissed
petitioner also failed to respect the respondent’s procedural employee in lieu of reinstatement.”  Under Section 4(b),
24

due process rights under the law. Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book VI of the Labor
As a consequence, the NLRC and the CA, thereafter, Code, separation pay is awarded, in lieu of reinstatement, to
correctly ordered the respondent’s reinstatement and the an illegally dismissed employee when reinstatement is no
payment of the monetary awards of backwages, moral longer possible, i.e., when the dismissed employee’s
damages, position is no longer available, or the continued relationship
_______________ between the employer and the employee would no longer be
23 Rollo, p. 78. viable due to the strained relations between them, or when
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746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Page 41 of 46
the dismissed employee opts not to be reinstated, or when
the payment of sepa-
_______________
24 Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division), G.R. No. 172149, February 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 10, 25, citing Mt. Carmel
College v. Resuena, G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 518, 541.
 
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VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013 747
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
ration benefits would be for the best interest of the parties
involved.
“Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two
reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs
provided are separate and distinct. In instances where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained
relations between the employee and the employer, separation
pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.” 25
II.C.2. Other awards as a consequence of the
      damages suffered
In addition to these basic awards, an illegally dismissed
employee may also be awarded moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. Jurisprudence holds that moral
and exemplary damages are awarded when the illegal
dismissal is attended by bad faith.  The Court has also ruled
26
that corporate officers are solidarily liable with the employer
company for the employees’ termination of employment
done with malice or bad faith. 27
A review of the facts of the case shows ample evidence
supporting the petitioner’s bad faith, as shown by the
manner in which the respondent’s employment was
terminated. The NLRC, in its decision, exhaustively
discussed the petitioner’s bad faith, as demonstrated by the
actions of the individual petitioners:
_______________
25 Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, G.R. No. 178524,
January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 500, 507.
26 Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, G.R. No. 177795, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA
110, 141-142. See also Civil Code, Articles 2208, 2217, 2219 and 2232.
27 MAM Realty Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114787, June 2,
1995, 244 SCRA 797, 803.
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748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
 
The records show that complainant-appellant’s dismissal was
effected by individual respondents-appellees in a capricious and
high-handed manner, anti-social and oppressive, fraudulent and
in bad faith, and contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy. Bad faith and fraud are shown in the acts committed by
respondents-appellees before, during and after complainant-
appellant’s dismissal in addition to the manner by which she was
dismissed. First, complainant-appellant was pressured to resign:
(1) she was threatened with termination, which will surely
damage her reputation in the pharmaceutical industry; (2) she
was asked to evacuate her Commission and ordered not to enter
the Company’s premises even if she was still an Abbott
employee; and (3) individual respondents Ms. Terrible and Ms.
Walsh made a public announcement to the staff that
complainant-appellant already resigned even if in reality she did
Page 42 of 46
 not. All of which caused complainant-appellant much
humiliation, serious anxiety and besmirched reputation. 28
The CA also described in detail the abrupt and oppressive
manner in which the respondent’s employment was
dismissed by the petitioner:
On May 23, 2005, the private respondent still reported for work
since petitioner Abbott had not yet handed the termination notice
to her. However, the security guard did not allow her to enter the
Hospira ALSU office pursuant to Ms. Walsh[‘s] instruction. She
requested Ms. Walsh that she be allowed to enter the company
premises to retrieve her last remaining things in her office which
are mostly her personal belongings. She was allowed to enter.
However, she was surprised to see her drawers already unlocked
and, when she opened the same, she discovered that her small
brown envelope x x x, white pouch containing the duplicate
keys, and the staff’s final evaluation sheets were missing. The
private respondent informed Ms. Bernardo about the incident.
The latter re-
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 375-376.
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
sponded by saying she was no longer an employee of the
company since May 19, 2005.
The private respondent reported the matter to the Pasig
Police Station and asked for help regarding the theft of her
properties. The Pasig Police incident report stated as follows:
x x x x
When confronted by the suspect, in the presence of one
SOCO officer and staff, named Christian Perez. Kelly
Walsh allegedly admitted that she was the one who
opened the drawer and got the green folders containing the
staff evaluations. The Reportee, was told by Kelly Walsh
that her Rolex wristwatch will be returned to her provided
that she will immediately vacate her office.
On the same date, the private respondent’s termination letter
dated May 19, 2005 was handed to her by Ms. Walsh, Mr.
Almazar and Ms. Bernardo. On May 27, 2005, the private
respondent received another copy of the said termination notice
via registered mail. 29
These explanations for the actions taken show that the
NLRC’s recognition of the bad faith was not without
basis and was in fact supplemented by the CA in the
appellate court’s own confirmatory explanation.
D. Application of the Rule 45 Standard of Review
Under the evidentiary situation that prevailed in this case
as described above in some detail, an expression of wonder
cannot be helped, particularly on how the ponencia could
conclude that the CA committed a reversible error when it
found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC’s actions on
the case. In contrast with the findings of the Labor Arbiter,
the findings and conclusions of the NLRC, as affirmed on a
Rule 65 review by the CA, were based on the law and juris-
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 1046-1047.
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
prudence as properly applied to the established set of facts
and evidence.
First, while the respondent, from the petitioner’s
standpoint, was hired as a probationary employee, she was
Page 43 of 46
deemed a regular employee pursuant to the clear provisions
of Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended and Section
6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the
Labor Code, as amended. The evidence adduced failed to
show that the petitioner ever apprised the respondent at the
time of her engagement of the standards she must meet to
qualify for regular employment.
Second, the respondent’s termination from employment
had no basis in fact and in law. Since the records failed to
support the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent’s
alleged poor performance and tardiness were proven by
evidence and, in fact, fell within the enumeration in Article
281 and Article 282 of the Labor Code, reason dictates that
the present petition be denied.
At the risk of repetition, the adduced evidence, in the first
place, did not prove that the respondent’s work failed to
comply with the petitioner’s performance standard as no
proof of the performance standard applied to the
respondent’s work was actually presented. The respondent’s
employment was also terminated without undergoing any
performance evaluation.
The evidence adduced did not also prove any act of
omission under Article 282 of the Labor Code committed by
the respondent. No evidence was presented on the
respondent’s actual work so as to determine whether her
acts/omissions constituted a just cause for termination, such
as serious misconduct or gross or habitual neglect of duty or
any other analogous cause to the just causes mentioned in
the law.
As the records show, neither was there compliance with
the respondent’s own internal procedures nor with the law’s
procedural due process. The respondent was not served the
two-
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
notice required by law before her employment was
terminated by the petitioner.
Third, the NLRC’s monetary awards, as affirmed by the
CA, were appropriate consequences of the respondent’s
illegal dismissal from employment. The payment of the
respondent’s backwages and the order of reinstatement were
consistent with the provisions of Article 279 of the Labor
Code. Jurisprudence also provides the award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, when bad
faith is proven in the termination of employment.
In this case, the bad faith exhibited by the individual
petitioners was clearly established in the records. The
individual petitioners’ bad faith was demonstrated by the
evidence of how they unfairly effected the termination of the
respondent’s employment.
 The narration of facts of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC
and the CA shows, among others, that: (1) the individual
petitioners did not follow the petitioner’s prescribed
procedure performance evaluation as, in fact, the
respondent’s work was not evaluated; (2) the individual
Page 44 of 46
petitioners, through their concerted actions, ganged up on
the respondent in forcing her to resign from employment; (3)
the individual petitioners pressured the respondent to resign
by announcing her resignation to the office staff, thereby
subjecting her to unwarranted humiliation; and (4) they
blackmailed the respondent by withholding her personal
possessions until she resigned from employment.
Bad faith can also be inferred from the lack of fairness
and underhandedness employed by the individual petitioners
on how they informed the respondent of the termination of
her employment. The records disclose that the respondent
was lured into a meeting on the pretext that her work
performance was to be evaluated; she was caught off-guard
when she was informed that her employment had been
terminated. Aside from the abrupt notification, bad faith can
also be deduced from the fact that the termination was made
immedi-
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752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
ately effective; the respondent was immediately banned
from the petitioner’s premises after she was informed that
her employment had been terminated.
To my mind, the NLRC correctly ruled that the individual
petitioners were solidarily liable, together with the
petitioner, to pay the monetary awards. The cited
circumstances constitute sufficient evidence of their bad
faith in terminating the respondent’s employment. Verily,
corporate officers are solidarily liable with the corporation to
pay monetary awards in illegal dismissal cases when their
bad faith is established in the termination of the
employment.
III. Conclusion
I close this Dissent with the note that the constitutional
protection of security of tenure is a right enjoyed by every
employee. Employment, regardless of the employment
status, may only be terminated for cause and within the
procedure prescribed by law and jurisprudence. A review of
the records shows that no reversible error was committed by
the CA in finding the NLRC free from any taint of grave
abuse of discretion in ruling on the respondent’s illegal
dismissal. This conclusion is what the Court should reflect in
its Decision if it is to discharge in good faith its duty to
adjudicate.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and
set aside.
Notes.—A person whose right to remain in peaceful
possession of his property is violated by another person’s
fraudulent registration of such property in her name is
entitled to nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil
Code. (Reyes vs. Montemayor, 598 SCRA 61 [2009])
The filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory so much so that non-compliance could only be
tolerated by special circumstances and compelling reasons;
This Court has held that when there are several petitioners,
all of them
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
must execute and sign the certification against forum
shopping; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped
as parties to the case. (Pigcaulan vs. Security and Credit
Investigation, Inc., 663 SCRA 1 [2012])

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