REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
PART VI-VIII contents of the document. This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule
Case Digests
1. Republic v. Sps. Gimenez (Sel)
2016 | Leonen | Original Document Rule
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Sps. Gimenez
SUMMARY: The Republic, thru the PCGG, instituted a complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Sps.
Gimenez before the Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten
wealth acquired by the Gimenez Spouses as dummies, agents, or nominees of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos. During trial, the
Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.
The Republic eventually manifested that it was ―no longer presenting further
evidence.‖Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until
March 29, 2006 ―to file its formal offer of evidence.‖ After this, the Republic
kept moving for an extension to file its formal offer of evidence. In the first
assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the
Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated
extensions. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence. Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence. He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no
evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of failure to prosecute. the Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal
Offer of Evidence. In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006,
the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and
granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss. ISSUE: WON the
Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the petitioner’s evidence has no probative
value? Yes. The evidence presented by the Republic before the Sandiganbayan
deserves better treatment. For instance, the nature and classification of the
documents should have been ruled upon. Save for certain cases, the original
document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the
130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. In case of unavailability of the original
document, secondary evidence may be presented as provided for under Sections
5 to 7 of the same Rule.
DOCTRINE: The best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more
extensively explained thus — But even with respect to documentary evidence,
the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding
its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without
need for accounting for the original. Thus, when a document is presented to
prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real,
evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed.
FACTS:
1. The Republic, thru the PCGG, instituted a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Sps. Gimenez before
the Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth
acquired by the Gimenez Spouses as dummies, agents, or nominees of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos.
2. During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the
positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the
Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso
Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of Danilo
R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of
PCGG. Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or
controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.
3. The Republic eventually manifested that it was ―no longer presenting
further evidence.‖Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30
days or until March 29, 2006 ―to file its formal offer of evidence.‖
4. On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved ―for an extension of thirty (30)
days or until April 28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of
evidence.‖ This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
of the same date. On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional
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15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of
Evidence. This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution
dated May 8, 2006. Following this, no additional Motion for extension was
filed by the Republic.
5. In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date
it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.
6. Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He
argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence
to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she
joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.
7. On June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the
first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.
The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary exhibits
attached to the Motion: EXHIBITS A TO G (and series consist of the
Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld On
Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest
Income, Royalties and Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities &
Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his legitimate
income during said period) among others.
8. In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and
granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss. According to the
Sandiganbayan: While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities
and that the higher ends of substantial justice militate against dismissal of
cases purely on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that
the ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton
disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of
procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases.
9. The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by the
Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies. However, the persons
who certified the documents as copies of the original were not presented.
Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
10. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of
Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer
to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by
defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is then DISMISSED.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the petitioner’s evidence has
no probative value? Yes
RATIO:
1. The Republic claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to
the PCGG's functions prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3
(b), and form part of the official records of the PCGG: "Certifications as to
the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her salaries
and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax
Returns and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared
income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of various
corporations showing spouses Gimenezes' interests on various corporations;
and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that
they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds.
2. On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner's
documents are not "official issuances of the Philippine government." They
are mostly notarized private documents. Petitioner's evidence has no
probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper.
Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
holding that the majority of petitioner's documentary evidence has no
probative value, considering that most of these documents are only
photocopies.
3. The evidence presented by the Republic before the Sandiganbayan deserves
better treatment.
4. For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have
been ruled upon. Save for certain cases, the original document must be
presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the
document. This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section
3 of the Rules of Court.
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a. SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c)
When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.
5. In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may
be presented as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule.
a. SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
b. SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. — If the document is in the custody or under the control of
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in
the case of its loss.
c. SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. — When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof
6. In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano, citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto, this court
clarified the applicability of the Best Evidence Rule:
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
a. As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies
only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the
document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus
— But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best
evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is
the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether
such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.
b. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without
need for accounting for the original. Thus, when a document is
presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as
documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of
execution of the documents is allowed.
c. In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that — It is
true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of
the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however,
violate the best evidence rule.
d. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that: "Production of the
original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring production.
3

2. Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez (2013)
FACTS:
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, the
respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses Maximo S.
Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila; that their parents had been in possession of the property during their
lifetime; that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the
property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they could not
locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT
No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original
copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by
Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did
not exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be
adjudged liable for damages.
In her answer, Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on
September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been
registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six months from September 9, 1975 within
which to repurchase the property; and that she had then become the absolute owner
of the property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period. During
trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds
of Manila.
On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, finding untenable the plaintiffs’
contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not exist. It opined that
although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its contents
could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the
cause of its unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant had
established the execution and existence of the deed.
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, reversing the RTC,
and ruling as follows:
In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not have been admitted
because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence of the original deed of sale
and to establish its loss.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
MR denied. Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to the
Court through petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale with right to repurchase executed by the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. did in fact exist? No.
RATIO:
1. Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to
address and determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites
for the presentation of secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon’s
evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
"existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence. Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the
existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the
presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of
Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first
proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.
2. Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish
and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed,
although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for
quieting of title. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need
for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be
secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not
required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to
which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for
presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show
the lossor (sic) explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation
of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the
original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not
anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from
4

his heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the original
from among Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or
representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been
secured from Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in
that direction.
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the existence
of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his
residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the
sale of the property in question, and the second on September 9, 1975, to execute the
deed of sale with right to repurchase.
Camilon's testimony could not be credible for the purpose of proving the due
execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase for three reasons.
The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of the hospital around the time that the deed of sale
with right to repurchase had been supposedly executed on September 9, 1975. The
records manifested that he had been admitted to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in
Quezon City on several occasions, and had then been diagnosed with the serious
ailments or conditions.
The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly improbable for him to travel
from Manila all the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were
then residing in order only to negotiate and consummate the sale of the property.
This high improbability was fully confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr., who attested
that his father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of the hospital in 1975.
The medical records revealed, too, that on September 12, 1975, or three days prior to
his final admission to the hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had suffered from
"[h]igh grade fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and cough productive of
whitish sticky sputum;" had been observed to be "conscious" but "weak" and
"bedridden" with his heart having "faint" sounds, irregular rhythm, but no murmurs;
and his left upper extremity and left lower extremity had suffered 90% motor loss.
Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been
executed on September 9, 1975 could not command belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did not
themselves establish the existence of the deed. They proved at best that a document
purporting to be a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been registered with the
Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the deed was not conclusive proof
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner of the property, which
was precisely the issue in this case. The explanation for this is that registration, being
a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is inscribed in
the records of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the dorsal side of the
certificate of title covering the land subject of the instrument. It is relevant to
mention that the law on land registration does not require that only valid instruments
be registered, because the purpose of registration is only to give notice.
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public Razon could
only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been notarized by him,
but did not establish the due execution of the deed.
The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the peaceful possession of the
property was further convincing evidence demonstrating that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase. Otherwise,
Prodon would have herself asserted and exercised her right to take over the property,
legally and physically speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the repurchase period
stipulated under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her name and paying the
real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an index of the falsity of
her claim against the respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the respondents
preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to repurchase executed by the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 18, 2005
by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs of Maximo S.
Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita
Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners
to pay the costs of suit.
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3. Treyes vs. Larlar (Mika ℅ Jay-em)
Sept. 8, 2020 | Caguioa | Documentary Evidence
Petitioner: Nixon Treyes
Respondents: Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne Larlar et
al.
Summary: Rosie Treyes died without any will. She was survived by her husband
Dr. Treyes (petitioner) and her siblings (respondents) Antonio, Emilio, Heddy,
Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne. Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication wherein he transferred the estate of Rosie unto himself. The siblings
of Rose filed before the RTC for annulment of the Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication, reconveyance of ownership and possession, partition, and for
damages. Treyes filed a Motion to Dismissbased on the following: (1) improper
venue; (2) prescription; and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. RTC
and CA both denied the motion to dismiss. The siblings of Rose did not file their
complaint to establish their filiation with Rose or apply for the determination of
their right as intestate heirs, considering that the law already vested in them as
siblings of the decedent, their status as intestate heirs of Rose. Rather the siblings
sought to enforce their established right over the property which had been
allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of Treyes.
Issue: Whether RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
Motion to Dismiss of Treyes./ WON the birth certificates of the siblings of
Rose are enough proof to establish filiation. - YES.
Ruling: In substantiating the fact that the private respondents are siblings of
Rosie, and thus intestate heirs of the latter by operation of law, they attached
their respective birth certificates proving that they are indeed siblings of
Rosie. (see doctrine)
To be sure, upon meticulous perusal of the petitioner Treyes' pleadings, it is clear
that the status of the private respondents as siblings of Rosie was not even
seriously refuted by him. He also does not make any allegation that the birth
certificates of the private respondents are fake, spurious, or manufactured.
All he says is that there must first be a declaration of the private respondents'
heirship in a special proceeding. Clearly, therefore, it cannot be said in the
instant case that the private respondents were not able to present evidence as
to their status as heirs and that the determination of their status as heirs was
seriously contested by petitioner Treyes.
DOCTRINE: Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules states that documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of
filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of
truth contained in such public document.
There is no necessity of a prior determination of heirship in a separate special
proceeding. The rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the
compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare
the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other
action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of
their status as such. The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the
cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or
instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding
only between and among the parties.
Facts:
1. On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of petitioner Dr.
Nixon Treyes, passed away. Rosie, who did not bear any children with
Treyes, died without any will. She left behind seven siblings, i.e., the
private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and
Yvonne.
2. Subsequently, petitioner Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication wherein he transferred the estate of Rosie unto himself,
claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse, Rosie.
3. The siblings of Rose filed before the RTC for 1) annulment of the
Affidavits of Self- Adjudication, 2) reconveyance of ownership and
possession, 3) partition, and 4) damages against Treyes, the RD of
Marikina, the RD of the Province of Rizal, and the RD of the City of San
Carlos, Negros Occidental.
a. They alleged that Treyes fraudulently caused the transfer of the
subject properties to himself by executing the two Affidavits of
Self-Adjudication and refused to reconvey their shares who, being
the brothers and sisters of Rosie, are legal heirs of the deceased.
4. Treyes then filed another Motion to Dismiss based on the following: (1)
improper venue; (2) prescription; and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
6

Issues Whether RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion
to Dismiss of Treyes.
WON the birth certificates of the siblings of Rose are enough proof to establish
filiation. - YES.
[EVID PART]
1. The siblings of Rose did not file their complaint to establish their filiation
with Rose or apply for the determination of their right as intestate heirs,
considering that the law already vested in them as siblings of the decedent,
their status as intestate heirs of Rose. Rather the siblings sought to enforce
their established right over the property which had been allegedly violated
by the fraudulent acts of Treyes.
2. Treyes argues that the cases of Marquez v. Court of Appeals, Baranda, et al.
v. Baranda, et al., and Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. DBP find no application
in the instant case because the parties in the aforesaid cases were able to
present evidence as to their status as heirs and that the determination of their
status as heirs was not contested.
3. SC disagrees with Treyes. In substantiating the fact that the private
respondents are siblings of Rosie, and thus intestate heirs of the latter
by operation of law, they attached their respective birth certificates
proving that they are indeed siblings of Rosie.
4. Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules states that documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
5. A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie
evidence of filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow
the presumption of truth contained in such public document. This is
pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.
6. To be sure, upon meticulous perusal of the petitioner Treyes' pleadings, it is
clear that the status of the private respondents as siblings of Rosie was
not even seriously refuted by him. He also does not make any allegation
that the birth certificates of the private respondents are fake, spurious,
or manufactured. All he says is that there must first be a declaration of
the private respondents' heirship in a special proceeding. Clearly,
therefore, it cannot be said in the instant case that the private
respondents were not able to present evidence as to their status as heirs
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
and that the determination of their status as heirs was seriously
contested by petitioner Treyes.
7. In relation to the foregoing, considering that the private respondents'
action is founded on their birth certificates, the genuineness and due
execution of the birth certificates shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what
he claims to be the facts. In the instant case, the records show that there
was no specific denial under oath on the part of petitioner Treyes contesting
the birth certificates. Therefore, the genuineness and due execution of the
subject birth certificates are deemed admitted.
8. Improper Venue
a. Treyes: the correct venue for the settlement of a decedent's estate is the
residence of the decedent at the time of her death (Rule 73), which was
Quezon City and not at San Carlos City, Negros Occidental.
b. SC: The Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of improper venue
on the basis of Rule 73 because such Rule refers exclusively to the special
proceeding of settlement of estates and NOT to ordinary civil actions.
Moreover, the Court finds that improper venue as a ground for the
dismissal of the Complaint was already deemed waived in accordance
with the Omnibus Motion Rule.
9. Prescription
a. Treyes: the Complaint is already barred by prescription under Rule 74,
Section 4 which states that an heir or other persons unduly deprived of
lawful participation in the estate may compel the settlement of the estate in
the courts at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution
of an estate
b. SC: Rule 74 pertains exclusively to the settlement of estates, which is a
special proceeding and NOT an ordinary civil action.
i. The provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or heirs
from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of
two years from such extrajudicial partition is applicable only:
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice
of the extrajudicial partition, and (2) when the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with.
ii. Both requirements are absent here as it is evident that not all the
legal heirs of Rosie participated in the extrajudicial settlement of
her estate as indeed, it was only petitioner Treyes who executed
the Affidavits of Self- Adjudication.
7

iii. The prescriptive period for an action of reconveyance based on
implied and constructive trust and if there is fraud is 10 years.
Hence, complaint was within the period.
10. Necessity of a prior determination of heirship in a separate special
proceeding
Argument of Treyes: RTC has no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the subject
matter of the private respondents' Complaint because the determination of the status
of the legal heirs in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary suit
for recovery of ownership and possession of property instituted by the legal heirs.
SC held the following:
a. RE: Jurisdiction over subject matter. RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the Complaint, considering that the law confers upon the RTC jurisdiction over civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00 for
civil actions outside Metro Manila, or where the assessed value exceeds P50,000.00
for civil actions in Metro Manila.
11. RE: Ordinary action vs. special proceedings. The main point of differentiation
between a civil action and a special proceeding is that in the former, a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right which the party claims he/she is
entitled to, such as when a party-litigant seeks to recover property from another,
while in the latter, a party merely seeks to have a right established in his/her favor.
a. Applying the foregoing to ordinary civil actions for the cancellation of a
deed or instrument and reconveyance of property on the basis of
relationship with the decedent, i.e., compulsory or intestate succession, the
plaintiff does not really seek to establish his/her right as an heir. In truth,
the plaintiff seeks the enforcement of his/her right brought about by
his/her being an heir by operation of law.
12. RE: Necessity of a prior determination of heirship in a separate special proceeding
a. Cases of Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes (all Division cases only)
upheld the rule that a prior determination of heirship in a special
proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action involving heirs.
However, there’s also a long line of cases that hold otherwise and these
are both division and en banc cases. A plurality of decisions promulgated
by both the Court En Banc and its Divisions firmly hold that the legal
heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary civil
actions arising out of their rights of succession, without the need for a
separate prior judicial declaration of their heirship, provided only that
there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's
estate. No Division case can overturn an En banc case.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
i. The rule laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, Heirs
of Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, and other similar cases, which
requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate special
proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil
action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession, is abandoned.
b. Hence, even assuming arguendo that the Rules strictly provide
that a separate judicial determination of heirship in a special
proceeding is a precondition in an ordinary civil action
wherein heirship is already established by compulsory
succession or intestacy and is only sought to be enforced,
which, as already discussed at length, is not the case, the Rules
must still yield to the specific provisions of the Civil Code
(substantive law) that certain relatives of the decedent attain
their status as either compulsory or intestate heirs and that
their successional rights are transmitted and enforceable at the
very moment of death without the need of such separate
judicial determination.
Henceforth, the rule is:unless there is a pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the
compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare
the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other
action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of
their status as such. The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the
cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or
instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding
only between and among the parties.
8

4. Capital Shoes Factory, Ltd. v. Traveler Kids, Inc. (Charlie)
September 24, 2014 | Mendoza, J. | Original Document (Rule 130, Sec. 4)
PETITIONER: CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD.
RESPONDENTS: TRAVELER KIDS, INC.
SUMMARY: Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL) and Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI)
entered into an agreement wherein TKI would import the shoes and sandals
made by CSFL from its China factory. After TKI placed numerous purchase
orders, CSFL began manufacturing the goods pursuant to the special designs and
specifications of TKI and later shipped the goods to them. For the first three
years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and the shipments made by CSFL.
In 2004, however, TKI started to default on its payments. The total unpaid
accounts of TKI amounted to U.S. $325,451.39, and CSFL had manufactured
$92,000.00 worth of children's shoes and sandals. To protect its interest, CSFL
filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against TKI
before the RTC. During the trial, CSFL, through its witness, identified several
sales invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI.
The latter objected to the identification pointing out that the documents being
presented were mere photocopies. The RTC issued the Order admitting all the
exhibits offered by CFSL. TKI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA in
which it reiterated its argument regarding the inadmissibility of the photocopied
evidence.
The issue is WON the exhibits offered by CSFL should be admitted. SC held
YES. It stressed that duplicate originals were admissible as evidence. The
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Ms. Susan Chiu,
CSFL’s officer and principal witness, convincingly explained that CSFL usually
prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy
to a client and retaining the other copy. The subject invoices were duplicate
originals as they were prepared at the same time.
DOCTRINE: When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about
the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
FACTS:
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
1. Sometime in 2000, Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL), a foreign
corporation engaged in the manufacturing and trading of children's shoes
and similar products, and Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI), a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing, importing and distributing shoes,
sandals and other footwear entered into an agreement, wherein they agreed
that TKI would import the shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its China
factory. After TKI placed numerous purchase orders, CSFL began
manufacturing the goods pursuant to the special designs and specifications
of TKI. CSFL then shipped the goods to TKI.
2. It was their arrangement that TKI would pay thirty (30%) percent of the
purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and the balance of
seventy (70%) percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty (30) days from
the date of delivery of the goods.
3. For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and the
shipments made by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to default in its
payments. CSFL granted numerous concessions and extensions to TKI.
Thereafter, TKI was able to make a partial payment on its unpaid accounts.
4. As of July 10, 2005, the total unpaid accounts of TKI amounted to U.S.
$325,451.39, exclusive of the interest accruing thereto. In addition, CSFL
also manufactured $92,000.00 worth of children's shoes and sandals
pursuant to the design and specifications of TKI in its purchase orders. Both
verbal and written demand letters were made by CSFL to TKI for the
payment of its unpaid accounts, but to no avail.
5. To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money and damages against TKI before the RTC. During the trial, CSFL,
through its witness, identified several sales invoices and order slips it issued
as evidence of its transactions with TKI. The latter objected to the
identification pointing out that the documents being presented were mere
photocopies. TKI also objected to the evidence presented by CSFL to prove
the amount of attorney’s fees on the ground that it was not an issue raised
during the pre-trial. The RTC noted the objections.
6. After the presentation of its last witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer of
Exhibits seeking the admission of, among others, the sales invoices and
order slips earlier objected to by TKI. The latter objected to the admission
of the documents offered, contending that several of the sales invoices and
order slips should not be admitted because they were merely photocopies.
9

TKI also objected to the admission of documents by which CSFL sought to
prove its claim for attorney’s fees.
7. On May 13, 2011, the RTC issued the Order admitting all the exhibits
offered by CFSL. The Order reads:
a. Acting on Plaintiff’s Formal Offer of Exhibits as well as
Defendant’s Comment/Opposition on/thereto and finding the said
offer to be well-taken and in order – despite the objections made to
the admission of said exhibits by defendant, Exhibits “A” to ZZZ-
1-A,” inclusive, are all admitted for the purposes for which the
same are offered and as part of the testimony of the witness who
testified thereon.
8. Not in conformity, TKI filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the
exhibits formally offered by CSFL were inadmissible in evidence for being
mere photocopies. TKI also argued that the evidence relating to the claimed
―legal fees‖ were erroneously admitted because the matter was not raised as
an issue during the pre-trial.
9. On June 23, 2011, the RTC issued the order denying TKI’s motion for
reconsideration, ruling that the sales invoices and order slips could be
admitted because the duplicate originals of the invoices were already
sufficiently established by the testimony of CSFL’s officer and principal
witness, Ms. Susan Chiu (Chiu). Regarding the documents offered by CSFL
to prove its claim for attorney’s fees, the RTC stated that the demand for
attorney’s fees was impliedly included in the issue of whether or not TKI
was liable to CSFL for the entire amount claimed.
10. Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition for certiorari
with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the CA in which it reiterated its argument
regarding the inadmissibility of the photocopied evidence and the erroneous
inclusion of those documents proving entitlement to attorney’s fees which
matter was not raised during the pre-trial.
11. As there was no injunction order issued by the CA, the RTC continued the
proceedings and directed TKI to present evidence. TKI refused, citing the
petition for certiorari it filed with the CA. Because of its refusal, the RTC
considered TKI’s right to adduce countervailing evidence as waived and
ordered CSFL to submit its memorandum.
12. The CA rendered a decision partially granting TKI’s petition.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated
May 13, 2011 and June 23, 2011 of public respondent judge are
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that Exhibits “D” to
“GG-1” and “HH” to “KK-1” should be denied admission for
being merely photocopies. As such, they are inadmissible for
failure of private respondent to prove any of the exceptions
provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
13. Applying Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the CA explained that
while it was true that the original copies of the sales invoices were the best
evidence to prove TKI’s obligation, CSFL merely presented photocopies of
the questioned exhibits. It stated that Chiu’s testimony merely established
the existence or due execution of the original invoices. CSFL, however, did
not present the original invoices, only the photocopies, contrary to Section
5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, the CA agreed with the
RTC’s admission of CSFL’s evidence proving attorney’s fees, quoting
verbatim its logic and reasoning. CSFL filed a motion for partial
reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
14. CSFL argues that the excluded documents are admissible in evidence
because it was duly established during the trial that the said documents were
duplicate originals, and not mere photocopies, considering that they were
prepared at the same time as the originals.
15. On the other hand, TKI counters that CSFL’s claim that the photocopied
documents were duplicate originals was just a unilateral and self-serving
statement without any supportive evidence.
ISSUES:
1. WON the exhibits offered by CSFL should be admitted - YES
RATIO:
1. After a review of the RTC and the CA records, which were ordered
elevated, the Court is of the considered view that the CA erred in not
admitting the invoices and order slips denominated as Exhibits ―D‖ to ―GG-
1‖ and ―HH‖ to ―KK-1,‖ which were duplicate originals. Section 4(b), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document. —
10

xxxx
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded
as originals.
2. In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The Court of Appeals and Associated
Bank, it was stressed that duplicate originals were admissible as evidence.
Pertinent portions of the said decision read:
a. ―Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must be
construed to mean the original copy of the document evidencing
the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
i. ... [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private
document evidencing a credit, it must be construed as
referring to the original. In this case, appellees (Trans-
Pacific) presented, not the originals but the duplicates of
the three promissory notes.
b. The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly
groundless. It is undisputed that the documents presented were
duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence.
Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother
to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by
petitioner. In People vs. Tan, we said:
i. When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more
sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract
upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the
party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the
sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by
the same stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as
duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced
in evidence as such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others.
3. Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, was able to
satisfactorily explain that Exhibits ―D‖ to ―GG-1‖ and ―HH‖ to ―KK-1‖
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
were duplicate originals of invoices and order slips, and not mere
photocopies.
4. The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu
convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of
invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and
retaining the other copy. The Court combed through her testimony and
found nothing that would indicate that the documents offered were mere
photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her statement that the
subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were prepared at the same
time. The Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part
of the testimony of Chiu.
5. The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found that,
contrary to the assertion of TKI, the duplicate originals were produced in
court and compared with their photocopies during the hearing before the
trial court. The transcripts bare all of these but were missed by the appellate
court, which believed the assertion of TKI that what were produced in court
and offered in evidence were mere photocopies. The TSNs further reveal
that after the comparison, the photocopies were the ones retained in the
records.
6. After the admission of CSFL’s exhibits as evidence, TKI should have let
trial proceed in due course instead of immediately resorting to certiorari, by
presenting its own testimonial and documentary evidence and in case of an
unfavorable decision, appeal the same in accordance with law. After all, the
RTC stated that, granting that the questioned exhibits were not admissible,
―there still remained enough evidence to substantiate plaintiff’s claim on
which the Court can validly render judgment upon application of the
pertinent law and/or jurisprudence.‖ In the case of Johnson Lee v. People of
the Philippines, it was written:
a. In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the cases filed by the public respondent against the petitioner for
estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of the
charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction.
b. Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the
original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the conditions
11
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a factual issue
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is
shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of
the trial court admitting secondary evidence must be sustained.
c. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the
photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce
his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the
decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may
be properly raised.

12

5. Northern Mindanao Power Corp v. CIR (¥)
February 18, 2015 | Sereno, CJ.| Rule 130 - What is original document
PETITIONER: Northern Mindanao Power Corporation
RESPONDENT: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
SUMMARY: NMPC allegedly incurred input VAT for the taxable years
of 1999 and 2000 It then filed an administrative claim for refund on 2000
for the 1999 TY and on 2001 for the 2000 taxable year. It later filed a
petition with the CTA upon the alleged inaction of CIR as to their
administrative claims. The CTA Division, and later the En Banc, denied
their petitions after having failed to substantiate its claims and failing to
comply with the invoicing requirement of the law and tax regulations.
NMPC company invoices in lieu of official receipts to substantiate its
claims. Moreover, the invoices submitted did not imprint the term ―zero-
rated‖ in them. NMPC appealed to the SC.
Issue: W/N company invoices are sufficient to establish actual amount
of sale of electric power services to the NPC and therefore sufficient to
substantiate NMPC’s claim for refund - No. Sec. 113 of the 1997 NIRC
provides that a VAT invoice is necessary for ever sale, Carter or exchange
of goods or properties, while a VA official receipt properly pertains to
every lease of goods or properties; as well as to every sale, barter or
exchange of services. A VAT invoice is the seller's best proof of
the sale of goods or services to the buyer, while a VAT receipt
is the buyer's best evidence of the payment of goods or services
received from the seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should
not be confused and made to refer to one and the same thing.
Certainly, neither does the law intend the two to be used
alternatively.
DOCTRINE: The Court has distinguished an invoice from a receipt in
CIR v. Manila Mining Corp:
● A "sales or commercial invoice" is a written account of
goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices charged
therefor or a list by whatever name it is known which is
used in the ordinary course of business evidencing sale and
transfer or agreement to sell or transfer goods and services.
● A "receipt" on the other hand is a written acknowledgment
of the fact of payment in money or other settlement between
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
seller and buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or person
rendering services and client or customer.
FACTS:
1. Northern Mindanao Power Corp (NMPC) is engaged in the production
sale of electricty as an independent power producer and sells electricty to
National Power Corporation (NPC).
2. NMPC allegedly incurred input VAT on its domestic purchases of goods
and services that were used in its production and sale of electricty to
NPC. For the 3rd and 4th quarters of taxable year 1999, NMPC’s input
VAT tolled around P2.4M while that incurred for all the quarters of
taxable year 2000 amounted to around P3.9M.
3. NMPC filed an administrative claim for a refund on 20 June 2000 for the
3rd and 4th quarters of taxable year 1999 and on 25 July 2001 for taxable
year 2000.
4. Alleging inaction of CIR on the admin claims, NMPC filed a Petition
with the CTA on 28 September 2001.
a. CTA 1st Division denied the petition and the subsequent MR for
lack of merit. CTA fund that the term ―zero-rated‖ was not
imprinted on the receipts or invoices presented by NMPC in
violation of Revenue Rgulations No. 7-95.
b. NMPC failed to substantiate its claim for a refund and to strictly
comply with the invoicing requirement of the law and tax
regulations.
c. Presiding Justices Acosta’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,
however, opined that the Tax Code does not require the
inclusion of the word ―zero-rated‖. He further pointed out that
the absence of the term did not affect the admissibility and
competence of the receipt or invoice as evidence to support the
clam for a refund.
5. On appeal to the CTA En Banc, the petition was also denied.
a. CTA ruled that for every sale of services, VAT shall be
computed on the basis of gross receipts. Moreover, official
receipts are proofs of sale of services and cannot be
interchanged with sales invoices as the latter are used for the
sale of goods. Further, the requirement of issuing duly
registered VAT official receipts with the term ―zero-rated‖
imprinted is mandatory under the law and cannot be substituted.
6. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
13
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

1. W/N RR No. 7-95 which expanded the statutory requirements for the which is used in the ordinary course of business evidencing
issuance of official receipts and invoices by providing for the additional sale and transfer or agreement to sell or transfer goods and
requirement of the imprinting of the term ―zero-rated‖ is services.
unconstitutional. - No. b. A "receipt" on the other hand is a written acknowledgment
2. W/N company invoices are sufficient to establish actual amount of of the fact of payment in money or other settlement
sale of electric power services to the NPC and therefore sufficient to between seller and buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or
substantiate NMPC’s claim for refund. No. person rendering services and client or customer.
4. A VAT invoice is the seller's best proof of the sale of goods or
RULING: Petition DENIED. services to the buyer, while a VAT receipt is the buyer's best
evidence of the payment of goods or services received from the
RATIO: seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be confused
and made to refer to one and the same thing. Certainly, neither
On the constitutionality of RR No. 7-95 does the law intend the two to be used alternatively.
1. The issue of the requirement of imprinting the word "zero-rated"
has already been settled by this Court in a number of cases. In
Western Mindanao Power Corporation v. CIR, it was held that RR 7-
95, which took effect on 1 January 1996, proceeds from the rule-
making authority granted to the Secretary of Finance by the NIRC
for the efficient enforcement of the same Tax Code and its
amendments. In earlier cases, it was ruled that this provision is
"reasonable and is in accord with the efficient collection of VAT
from the covered sales of goods and services." Moreover, the
subsequent incorporation of Section 4.108-1 of RR 795 in Section
113 (B) (2) (c) of R.A. 9337 actually confirmed the validity of the
imprinting requirement on VAT invoices or official receipts — a
case falling under the principle of legislative approval of
administrative interpretation by reenactment. In fact, this Court has
consistently held as fatal the failure to print the word "zero-rated"
on the VAT invoices or official receipts in claims for a refund or
credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales, even if the claims were
made prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9337.

On the sufficiency of a company invoice to prove the sales of service to NPC.

2. The SC found NMPC’s claim to be without sufficient legal basis. Sec.
113 of the 1997 NIRC provides that a VAT invoice is necessary for ever
sale, Carter or exchange of goods or properties, while a VA official
receipt properly pertains to every lease of goods or properties; as well as
to every sale, barter or exchange of services.
3. The Court has in fact distinguished an invoice from a receipt in CIR v.
Manila Mining Corp:
a. A "sales or commercial invoice" is a written account of
goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices
charged therefor or a list by whatever name it is known
14

6. Dimaguila v. Sps. Monteiro (Jen)
January 27, 2014 | Mendoza, J | When original may be dispensed with
PETITIONERS: THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and
GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA
RESPONDENT: JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO
SUMMARY:
Spouses Monteiro, etc. filed their complaint for partition and damages
before the RTC against the Dimaguilas and others. The complaint
alleged that all parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed
of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila. In their
Answer, the defendants countered that there was no co-ownership because
the property then owned by Maria Buenaseda had long been partitioned
between her two sons Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila through a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition. They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano
and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were
not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano. Spouses Monteiro filed their
Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint.The RTC
granted their motion. The amended complaint abandoned the original claim
for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of
the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants,
specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro. In
amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas'
admission in their original answer that the subject property had already
been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, and that during their lifetime, the brothers agreed
that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-half portion and
Vitaliano of the northern-half portion. Spouses Monteiro further averred
that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro, who had
divided the southern-half portion equally amongst themselves and Pedro’s
shares were sold by his heirs to them. In their Answer to the amended
complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was inherited
by, and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the
admission in their original answer that it had been actually divided into
southern and northern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial
Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two and
share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-
ownership, contrary to their original position. One of the Dimaguilas,
Asuncion, was the sole witness for the defendants. She testified that their
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that
the property had already been partitioned into northern and southern
portions. An employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor,
presented a certified true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of
claimants/owners. A record officer of the DENR, testified that as part of her
duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land, including
cadastral maps from the region. The petitioners argue that they timely
objected to the cadastral map and the list of claimants presented by the
respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and
the best evidence rule.
ISSUE: Whether the certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw
and the corresponding list of claimants fall under the exception to the
best evidence rule. - Yes (see doctrine #1) Certified true copies of the
cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area
covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was
Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a
repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a
DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records
of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list
of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under
the exception to the best evidence rule. (see doctrine #2) Cadastral maps are
the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is,
therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of
claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the
DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
DOCTRINE:
1. Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section
7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the
15

record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody or the record.
2. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an
exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance
as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course
of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
FACTS:
1. The respondent spouses, (Spouses Monteiro), along with Jose,
Gerasmo, Elisa, and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for
Partition and Damages before the RTC, against the petitioners,
Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria Dimaguila
(The Dimaguilas), together with Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus,
Enrique, Nina, Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The
complaint alleged that all the paries were co-owners and prayed for
the partition of a residential house and lot lcovered by Tax
Declaration No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a
deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila
(Pedro).
2. In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered
that there was no co-ownership to speak of in the first place. They
alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio
Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons,
Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the
northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the
heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with
the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
3. During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated.
4. The proceedings resumed after the promulgation by the CA of its
April 5, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. No. SP 52833, which upheld the
assailed RTC orders.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
5. Upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their
Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint.The
RTC granted their motion. The amended complaint abandoned the
original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of
possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the
Dimaguilas and other defendants, specifically, the portion sold to the
couple by the heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro
were retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.
6. In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the
Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that the subject
propety had already been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano,
through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, and that during their
lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of
the southern-half portion and Vitaliano of the northern-half portion,
which division was observed and respected by them as well as their
heirs and successors-in-interest.
7. Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by
Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro, who had divided the southern-half
portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1 /3 shares;
that Pedro's share pertains to the 1 /3 of the southern-half
immediately adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the
Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano; Pedro's share was sold by his heirs
to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with
the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearing in
an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted
to take possession of the share of Pedro, they discovered that the
subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.
8. In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted
that the subject property was inherited by, and divided equally
between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their
original answer that it had been actually divided into southern and
northern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition
mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two and
share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-
ownership, contrary to their original position. The Dimaguilas further
argued that the Bilihan did not specify the metes and bounds of the
property sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Even
assuming that such had been specified, they averred that the sale of a
definite portion of a property owned in common was void since a co-
owner could only sell his undivided share in the property.
16

9. During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother
of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia), who testified that Perfecto was his
grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto's death, he had two
properties, one of which was the subject property in Liliw, Laguna,
which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro
was survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco, and Luis,
who, in turn, sold their rights over the subject property to Sonia.
10. Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedro's son, Francisco,
and was asked if she was interested in purchasing Pedro's 1/3 share of
the southern portion of the Bahay na Sato, and that he showed her a
deed of extrajudicial partition executed by and between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, as well as the tax declaration of the property to prove that
the property had already been partitioned between the two brothers.
11. Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic
engineer hired by Spouses Monteiro to survey the property in Liliw,
and recounted that he checked the boundary of the subject property,
subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey plan.
12. Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal
Assessor, presented a certified true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw
and a list of claimants/owners.
13. Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testified that as part of
her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land,
including cadastral maps from the region.
14. One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the
defendants. She testified that their first counsel made a mistake when
he alleged in their original answer that the property had already been
partitioned into northern and southern portions between the two
brothers, as the original answer had been rushed and they were never
given a copy of it.
15. the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the
Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of
the southern-half of the property.
16. The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a
preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, the cadastral map and the municipal assessor's
records.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was a partition of the subject property - Yes.
2. Whether the certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw
and the corresponding list of claimants fall under the exception to
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
the best evidence rule. - Yes
3. Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the subject property
was sold to the respondent spouses. - Yes
RATIO:
Partition of the Subject Property
3. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of
proof to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence.
4. To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses presented
the following: (1) the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, executed by and
between the brothers Perfecto and Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of
Liliw Cadm-484, showing that the subject property had been divided
into southern and northern portions, registered as Lot Nos. 876 and
877; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's records showing that the said
lots were respectively claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.
5. It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that
Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed "to divide between them into two and
share and share alike" the subject property, including the house
situated thereon. It appears, however, that the property was actually
partitioned into definite portions, namely, southern and northern
halves, as reflected in the cadastral map of Liliw, which were
respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and Perfecto himself. It,
thus, appears that the subject property had already been partitioned
into definite portions more than 20 years prior to the original
complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that such division had been
observed by the brothers' heirs. As earlier pointed out, the petitioners
themselves admitted to this very fact in their original answer.
6. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners
argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former
counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not
provided to them.
7. Petitioner Asuncion testified:
Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?
A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the
same without giving us a copy ...
8. This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim
unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
17

Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was adopted by the
petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their original answer was
filed, in response to the amended complaint of the respondent
spouses. In their original answer to the complaint for partition, their
claim that there was already a partition into northern-half and
southern-half portions, was the very essence of their defense. It was
precisely this admission which moved the respondent spouses to
amend their complaint. The petitioners cannot now insist that the very
foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake.
9. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an
admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners'
admission and so amended their original complaint for partition to
one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property.
Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to
prove that there was no partition of the property.
10. Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission
of the petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove the partition
even without the documents presented by the respondent spouses. If
anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to
corroborate the petitioners' admission.
11. The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map
and the list of claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the
ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence
rule.
12. Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except when the original is a
public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody or the record.
13. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the map
were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository
of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR
employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records
of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps
and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public
records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
14. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to
the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this
rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness
consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.
15. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the
department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of
cadastral surveys.It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the
corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as
they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they
are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are primafacie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
16. Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they
presented no evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent
spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the petitioners, the
respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of evidence that there
had indeed been a partition of the subject property.
Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern-half
17. The petitioners argue that the Bilihan should not have been admitted
into evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax required
by Section 201 of the NIRC.
18. the petitioners filed a motion for the production and/or inspection of
documents, praying that Spouses Monteiro be ordered to produce the
deed of sale, which they cited as the source of their rights as co-
owners. On November 20, 1995, Spouses Monteiro submitted their
compliance, furnishing the RTC and the petitioners with a copy of the
Bilihan. On January 3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of
consignation, manifesting that they had attempted to exercise their
18
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

right of redemption as co-owners of the 1/3 portion of the southern

half of the property under Article 1623 of the Civil Code by sending
and tendering payment of redemption to Spouses Monteiro, which
was, however, returned.
19. By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their payment for
the redemption of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property,
the petitioners, in effect, admitted the existence, due execution and
validity of the Bilihan. Consequently, they are now estopped from
questioning its admissiblity in evidence for relying on such for their
right of redemption. Additionally, the Court notes that the copy of the
Bilihan which was originally submitted by Spouses Monteiro with its
compliance filed on November 20, 1995, does in fact bear a
documentary stamp tax. It could only mean that the documentary
stamp tax on the sale was properly paid. The Bilihan was, therefore,
properly admitted into evidence and considered by the RTC.
20. In any case, as correctly held by the lower courts, the petitioners, as
heirs of Vitaliano, who inherited the northern-half portion of the
subject property, do not possess the necessary personality to assail the
sale of the southern-half portion between Spouses Monteiro and the
heirs of Pedro. They are not real parties-in-interest who stand to be
1âwphi1

benefited or injured by the sale of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half

over which they have absolutely no right. As correctly ruled by the
courts below, only fellow co-owners have the personality to assail the
sale, namely, the heirs of Pedro's siblings, Esperanza and Leandro.
They have, however, expressly aquiesced to the sale and waived their
right to the property in the affidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro.
As such, the petitioners have no right to their counterclaims of
demolition of improvements and payment of damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 15, 2011 Decision and
the March 15, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G .R. CV No.
92707 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that:a. The award of rent at
the rate of ₱500.00 per month shall be reckoned from January 2, 2001 until
the property is vacated; and b. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be
imposed on the total amount of rent due from finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

19
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

7. Bunagan-Bansig v. Celera (Feli) member of the Bar.

January 14, 2014 | Per Curiam | Rule 130 - WHEN THE ORIGINAL MAY BE
DISPENSED WITH DOCTRINE: Rule 130, Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original
document is a public record. — When the original of a document is in the
PETITIONER: Rose Bunagan-Bansig custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
RESPONDENT: Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.
SUMMARY: On May 8, 1997, Atty. Celera and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified
FACTS:
xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry
1. On May 8, 1997, Atty. Celera and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan),
of Manila. Notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan,
entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox
respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain
copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy
Manila.
of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San
2. Notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent
Juan, Manila. Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and
contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo
Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his
Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been
certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San
annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority, which constitutes
Juan, Manila.
grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar and
3. Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second
marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled
WON the xerox copies of the marriage certificates may be used as
or rendered void by any lawful authority. Bansig alleged that
evidence against Atty. Celera - YES
respondent's act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is
still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public
member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership
officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their
in the Bar.
contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates,
ISSUES: WON the xerox copies of the marriage certificates may be used as
other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that
evidence against Atty. Celera - YES
respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is
subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates
RATIO:
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two
marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
1. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
20
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the

administrative penalty.
2. The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their
contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.

— When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
3. Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other
than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent
contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By
itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages
entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue
as a member of the Bar.

21

8. EDSA Shangri-la Hotel and Resort v. BF Corp (Lex)
June 27, 2008 | Velasco, Jr. | When original may be dispensed with-
Rule 130, Section 3
PETITIONER: EDSA Shangri-la Hotel and Resort Inc., Rufo B. Colayco,
Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen
RESPONDENT: BF Corporation
SUMMARY: ESHRI and BF Corp. executed an agreement for the construction
of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel. The contract stipulated for the payment of the
contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the monthly
progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress
billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished and
prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month's progress billing. ESHRI
also laid out in a MOA the collection procedure BF was to follow. According to
BF for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, ESHRI did not re-measure the work done,
did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for
the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into
working continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about
the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed. After several futile
attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed a suit for a sum of money and
damages.
Issue: WoN the presentation of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19
were admissible as secondary evidence? YES.
The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes is the rule requiring
that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced and
secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original
cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best
evidence rule.1 Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130. 2
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to
1 monthly progress billings.
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b)
When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice
2 progress billing to ESHRI's Engineering Department; (2) following-up of
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. - If the
document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails
to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
evidence other than the original instrument or document itself. A party may
present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the
control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations
must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied
documents in question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to
lay the required basis for presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14
to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed.
BF complied with the requirements based four factual premises which are
readily deducible from stenographic notes of exchanges between BF and ESRI's
counsel, to wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had
possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3)
ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not
inclined to produce them. Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall
under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130.
DOCTRINE: In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the
presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as
secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the
original document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of
the original document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.
FACTS:
1. Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (ESHRI) and BF Corporation
(BF) executed an Agreement for the Execution of Builder's Work for the
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project for the construction of the EDSA
Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991.
2. Among other things, the contract stipulated for the payment of the
contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the
3. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to
ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare
a Progress Payment Certificate for that month's progress billing.
4. In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out
the collection procedure BF was to follow, to wit: (1) submission of the
the preparation of the Progress Payment Certificate with the Head of the
Quantity Surveying Department; and (3) following-up of the release of
22

the payment with one Evelyn San Pascual. BF adhered to the procedures
agreed upon in all its billings for the period from May 1, 1991 to June 30,
1992, submitting for the purpose the required Builders Work Summary,
the monthly progress billings, including an evaluation of the work in
accordance with the Project Manager's Instructions (PMIs) and the
detailed valuations contained in the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for
final re-measurement under the PMIs. BF said that the values of the
WVOs were contained in the progress billings under the section "Change
Orders."
5. From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress
billings following the procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing
Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05.
6. According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19,
did not re-measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment
Certificates, let alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In
this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working continuously on
the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress
Payment Certificates already being processed.
7. After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on
July 26, 1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages.
8. In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing
Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF
be ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged BF with
incurring delay and turning up with inferior work accomplishment.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the presentation of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14
to 19 were admissible as secondary evidence? YES.
RATIO:
1. We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term "best evidence"
denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a
general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents
is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
2. Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. - If the document is in the custody or under control of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of loss.
3. Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document
refers to evidence other than the original instrument or document itself.
4. A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not
only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the
custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance,
however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to
secondary evidence.
5. In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the
photocopied documents in question as secondary evidence. Any
suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals
has to be dismissed. The stenographic notes of the following exchanges
between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF and ESHRI,
respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements:
a. ATTY. ANDRES: During the previous hearing of this case,
your Honor, likewise, the witness testified that certain exhibits
namely, the Progress Payment Certificates and the Progress
Billings the originals of these documents were transmitted to
ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of ESHRI since
these are internal documents and I am referring specifically to
the Progress Payment Certificates. We requested your Honor,
that in order that plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present
secondary original, that opposing counsel first be given
opportunity to present the originals which are in their
possession. May we know if they have brought the originals and
whether they will present the originals in court, Your Honor.
ATTY. AUTEA: We have already informed our client about the
situation, your Honor, that it has been claimed by plaintiff that
some of the originals are in their possession and our client
assured that, they will try to check. Unfortunately, we have not
heard from our client, Your Honor.
6. Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to
wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had
possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the
23
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and
(4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
7. Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception
under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non
for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original
document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is
proof of the original document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof
of the cause of the original document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror
is in good faith.
8. While perhaps not on all fours because it involved a check, what the
Court said in Magdayao v. People, is very much apt, thus:

x x x To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when

the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse
party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to
produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory
proof of its existence.

xxxx

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or
control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant
the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove
that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The
notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the
original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse
party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same.
When such party has the original of the writing and does not
voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.

24

10. MCMP Construction Corp. v. Monark Equipment Corp (JackJack)
November 10, 2014 | Velasco Jr. | Rule 130, Sec. 3
PETITIONER: MCMP Construction Corp.
RESPONDENT: Monark Equipment Corp
SUMMARY: (very short case)
DOCTRINE: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the
fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.
FACTS:
1. MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from
Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark) for various periods in 2000,
the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract).
2. Thus, Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project
site of MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the delivery
evidenced by invoices as well as Documents and acknowledgment
receipts received and signed by representatives of MCMP, namely, Jorge
Samonte on December 5, 2000 and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001,
respectively. The latter failed to pay rental fees for the use of five (5)
pieces of heavy equipment as stated in their Rental Equipment Contract,
as started in the agreement and so, SUIT FOR SUM MONEY was filed
against MCMP.
3. During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo
Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account Manager. Peregrino testified
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
that there were two (2) original copies of the Contract, one retained by
Monark, while the other was given to MCMP. He further testified that
Monark's copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy
proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract
which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the Contract arguing that
there were no diligent efforts to search for the original copy. Notably,
MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract notwithstanding the
directive of the trial court to produce the same.
4. The lower court ruled in favor of Monark, on appeal, CA affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presentation of the secondary evidence should not be
allowed? - NO
RATIO:
1. The petition has been denied by the SC.
2. The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the
original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is
contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
provides:"
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control
of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
25
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a

public officer or is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis
supplied)"
3. In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are
present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of
Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been
lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail.
Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly
held by this Court, "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses are matters best left to the trial court." Hence, the Court will
respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.

26

11. Spouses Paras vs. Kimwa Construction Development Corp (Liz)
April 8, 2015 | Leonen, J | Parol Evidence
Petitioner: Spouses Bonifacio and Lucia Paras
Respondent: Kimwa Construction and Development Corp
Summary: Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel
permit at Toledo City. Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete
aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu. On December 6, 1994, Lucia and
Kimwa entered into a contract denominated "Agreement for Supply of
Aggregates" (Agreement) where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were
"allotted" by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa was to pick up the allotted
aggregates at Lucia's permitted area in Toledo City at P240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates.
Sometime after this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates. Claiming
that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia, joined by her husband,
Bonifacio, filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages that is now
subject of this Petition. In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to
obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates from Lucia. Also, it asserted that the
Agreement articulated the parties' true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a
maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking
the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were barred from
introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
Issue: WON Kimwa's contention is correct that parol evidence of the Spouses
Paras is barred? Ruling: NO Petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint
they filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as
well as the Agreement's failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further,
respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to petitioner Spouses
Paras' pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing
admission of parol evidence.
Doctrine: Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for
the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing. This, however,
is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any
of the four (4) items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section
9, "a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
agreement." Raising any of these items as an issue in a pleading such that it
falls under the exception is not limited to the party initiating an action. Apart
from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence
sought to be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief in the
existence" of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by
the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.
FACTS:
Lucia Paras was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at
Kabulihan, Toledo City. Kimwa is a construction firm that sells concrete
aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu.Lucia and Kimwa entered into a
contract denominated "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates" where 40,000 cubic
meters of aggregates were allotted by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa was to
pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia's permitted area in Toledo City at P240.00
per truckload.Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. However, after this Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates and allegedly
transferred to the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in
violation of their Agreement.
Spouses Paras sent demand letters to Kimwa. As these went unheeded,
Spouses Paras filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against
Kimwa.In its Answer,Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates. It argued that the 40,000 cubic meters represented is
only the maximum quantity that it could haul.Kimwa asserted that the May 15,
1995 which was the expiration of the Special Permit of Lucia was never set as a
deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were
barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed
differently.
The RTC rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. On appeal,
CA reversed the RTC's Decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred for basing its findings on the basis of
evidence presented in violation of the parol evidence rule? - NO
2. Whether or not Kimwa is liable to petitioners Spouses Paras for Breach
of Contract? - YES
RULING:
27
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

(1) No. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides
that "When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; (d) The existence of other terms agreed
to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agree.
There are 2 things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted:
first, that the existence of any of the 4 exceptions has been put in issue in a party's
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the
parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.
In the present case petitioners pleaded in the Complaint they filed before
the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the
Agreement's failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent
Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading
of these issues. This is , thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol
evidence.
Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit,
respondent Kimwa was well aware that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters
of aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia from the permitted area, and
that petitioner Lucia Paras' operations cannot extend beyond May 15, 1995, when
the Special Permit expires.
The condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6)
months from November 14, 1994 lends credence to petitioners Spouses Paras'
assertion that, in entering into the Agreement with respondent Kimwa, petitioner
Lucia Paras did so because of respondent Kimwa's promise that hauling can be
completed by May 15, 1995. Bound as she was by the Special Permit, petitioner
Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently clear to any party she was transacting
with that she could supply aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and that the other
party's hauling must be completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely acting with
due diligence, for otherwise, any contract she would enter into would be negated;
any commitment she would make beyond May 15, 1995 would make her guilty of
misrepresentation, and any prospective income for her would be rendered
illusory.

Proof of how petitioners Spouses Paras successfully pleaded and put this
in issue in their Complaint is how respondent Kimwa felt it necessary to respond
to it or address it in its Answer. Thus, the testimonial and documentary parol
evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to
these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the parties' true intent, may
be admitted and considered.

(2) Yes. Petitioners have established that respondent Kimwa was obliged
to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. Considering
its admission that it did not haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates, respondent
Kimwa is liable to petitioners.

28

12. Heirs of Ureta vs. Heirs of Ureta (Jestine edited by Kara)
Sept. 14, 2011| Mendoza, J. | Parol Evidence
PETITIONER: Heirs of Policronio Ureta
RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Liberato Ureta
SUMMARY: Alfonso Ureta had multiple children, including Policronio and
Liberato. In order to avoid payment of inheritance tax, Alfonso, while alive,
made it appear that he sold parcels of land to his children. Pursuant to this, a
deed of sale for 6 parcels of land was executed between Policronio and Alfonso.
However, no consideration was given. RTC and CA declared the deed of sale
void. The testimony of Amparo Castillo, as to the circumstances surrounding the
actual arrangement and agreement between the parties prior to the execution of
the four (4) Deeds of Sale, was found by the CA to be unrebutted. The RTC’s
assessment of the credibility of her testimony was accorded respect, and the
intention of the parties was given the primary consideration in determining the
true nature of the contract. Heirs of Policronio argued that based on the parol
evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and, specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not
in a position to prove the terms outside of the contract because they were not
parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in question. Thus, it is
argued that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence rule.
SC ruled that in this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object to the
testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have waived the
benefit of the parol evidence rule. Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely
objected to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, their argument would still fail.
The parol evidence rule excluding evidence aliunde still cannot apply because
the present case falls under two exceptions to the rule (see doctrine).
The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties was clearly put in issue in the Answer of the Heirs of Alfonso to the
Complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the
payment of estate and inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer ownership. The
exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true
intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the
document appears to be on its face. As the true intent of the parties was duly
proven in the present case, it now prevails over what appears on the Deed of
Sale.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was
precisely one of the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution. The operation of
the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid written agreement. It is,
thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the validity of such agreement is the
fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be void for lack of consideration.
Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being
absolutely simulated and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not
precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement
DOCTRINE: When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
FACTS:
1. Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children, including Policronio and
Liberato.
2. Alfonso was rich. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso
who failed to finish schooling and instead worked on his father’s lands.
3. Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, (
Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco) met at the house of
Liberato where executed 4 Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of
land in favor of his children and his common-law wife to avoid paying
29

inheritance tax. The Deed of Sale in favor of Policronio, covered 6
parcels of land.
4. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary
consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy
the lands and their produce.
5. When Alfonso died, Liberato acted as the administrator of his father’s
estate. He was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her
daughter, Carmencita Perlas.
6. Then Policronio died.
7. Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which
included all the lands that were covered by the 4 deeds of sale. Conrado,
Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his siblings.
8. Subsequently, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name
covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy
of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of
Policronio. Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio
allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition when it was
published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter.
9. Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as
such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of
Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso.
Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of
Documents, Partition, and Damages .
10. RTC: Dismissed the complaint.
11. CA: Modified RTC Decision. Declared of Extra-Judicial Partition
ANNULLED and REMANDED the case to RTC for the proper partition.
ISSUE: W/N the rules on parol evidence were violated in ruling that the Deed
of Sale is void?
RATIO:
1. The Heirs of Policronio aver that the rules on parol evidence and hearsay
were violated by the CA in ruling that the Deed of Sale was void.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
2. They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso
and, specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a position to prove the
terms outside of the contract because they were not parties nor
successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in question. Thus, it is argued
that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence rule.
3. Stemming from the presumption that the Heirs of Alfonso were not
parties to the contract, it is also argued that the parol evidence rule may
not be properly invoked by either party in the litigation against the other,
where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a
party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on
the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the
relation established thereby.
4. Their arguments are untenable.
5. The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the
proper time, as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent,
and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived. In the case
of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the
objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such
answer. In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object to the
testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have waived
the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
6. Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the testimony of
Amparo Castillo, their argument would still fail.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
7. Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
30
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. two exceptions to the rule, as discussed above
8. The term "agreement" includes wills.
9. Paragraphs (b) and (c) are applicable in the case at bench.
10. The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties was clearly put in issue in the Answer of the Heirs of SEPARATE OPINIONS: NONE
Alfonso to the Complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only CONCURRING: NONE
made to lessen the payment of estate and inheritance taxes and not meant
to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to
enable the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the
intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears to be on its
face. As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case,
it now prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale.
11. The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and
was precisely one of the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution. The
operation of the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid
written agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the
validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract
may be void for lack of consideration. Considering that the Deed of Sale
has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lack of
consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement.
12. The Heirs of Policronio must be in a state of confusion in arguing that
the Heirs of Alfonso may not question the Deed of Sale for not being
parties or successors-in-interest therein on the basis that the parol
evidence rule may not be properly invoked in a proceeding or litigation
where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a
party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on
the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the
relation established thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then
the Heirs of Policronio would themselves be precluded from invoking the
parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso.
13. Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires that the case
be between parties and their successors-in-interest. In this case, both the
Heirs of Alfonso and the Heirs of Policronio are successors-in-interest of
the parties to the Deed of Sale as they claim rights under Alfonso and
Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding evidence

31

13. Financial Bldg Corp v. Rudlin Intl Corp (Maye)
4 October 2010 | Villarama, Jr., J. | Parol Evidence
PETITIONERS: Financial Building Corporation
RESPONDENTS: Rudlin Intl Corporation, Bloomfeld Educational Foundation,
Inc., Rodolfo J. Lagera, Ma. Erlinda J. Lagera, Josaphat R. Bravante
SUMMARY: Rudlin Corp. executed a construction agreement with FBC
whereby the latter would construct a school building for the price of P6,933,268.
The construction was not finished on said date. On June 5, 1986, the parties
made amendments to their construction agreement. On June 15, 1986, the
subject school building ―Bloomfield Academy‖ was inaugurated and utilized by
Rudlin Corp.. FBC demanded payment of the balance but it was not heeded by
Rudlin Corp. FBC filed the current case against Rudling to collect the balance of
the contract price. Rudlin alleged that the construction agreement did not reflect
the true contract price agreed upon. The execution of said document was made
with the understanding between FBC and Rudlin Corp. that the contract price
stated therein would be decreased to a mutually acceptable contract price.
However, due to inadvertence, the parties forgot to sign an agreement fixing the
true contract price.
WON the amount in the construction agreement is the contract price. YES
The SC held that Rudlin failed to substantiate its claim that the contract price
stated in the Construction Agreement was not the true contract price. Under
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement
were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is considered as containing all terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract. However, Sec. 9 of Rule 130 provides for exceptions. Rudlin cannot
invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of Rule 130, Sec. 9. Such exception obtains
only where ―the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the
contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of
the instrument.‖ In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the
contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and
circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be
received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.
Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlin’s evidence is admissible to show
the existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of
the contract.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
DOCTRINE: Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it
is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms
can be admitted other than the contents thereof.
FACTS:
1. On Nov. 22, 1985, Rudlin Corp. executed a construction agreement with
FBC for a 3-storey school building for the price of P6,933,268.00, with a
provision in Sec. 12 that time is of the essence in the agreement and the
contractor shall be liable for 0.1% of the total contract price for every
calendar day of delay. The contract provided for completion date not
later than Apr. 30, 1986.
2. The construction was not finished on said date. On June 5, 1986, the
parties made amendments to their construction agreement whereby FBC
shall complete the project on or before June 10, 1986, payment of the
balance due on the contract price shall be made after the parties have
reconciled their accounts, and that Sec. 12 of the original agreement is
hereby waived.
3. On June 15, 1986, the subject school building ―Bloomfield Academy‖
was inaugurated and utilized by Rudlin Corp.. FBC demanded payment
of the balance but it was not heeded by Rudlin Corp..
4. On Mar. 10, 1987, FBC filed in the RTC a suit for a sum of money
(P2,449,208.30 balance) with prayer for preliminary attachment, and
legal interest.
5. In their Answer with Counterclaim, defendants denied the allegations
and averred that the construction agreement did not reflect the true
contract price agreed upon (P6,006,965.00). The amount of
P6,933,268.00, which is FBC’s bid price, was indicated in the agreement
solely for the purpose of obtaining a higher amount of loan from BPI.
6. The execution of said document was made with the understanding
between FBC and Rudlin Corp. that the contract price stated therein
would be decreased to a mutually acceptable contract price. However,
due to inadvertence, the parties forgot to sign an agreement fixing the
true contract price.
7. Rudlin Corp. also denied that the construction of the project was
completed by FBC. Rudlin Corp. likewise claimed that many portions of
the work performed by FBC are incomplete and/or faulty, defective and
deficient.
8. Rudlin averred that it had already paid FBC the total amount of
P5,564,219.58. After considering the 10% retention money and the value
of additives and deductives, Rudlin had actually overpaid FBC by
P415,701.34.
32

9. By agreement of the parties, the trial court appointed 3 Commissioners to
resolve factual issues pertaining to the construction of the subject
building.
10. RTC: In its decision, the RTC concluded that as shown by the
Commissioners’ Report, the subject school building had several defects.
The trial court decreed the complaint and the counterclaim both
dismissed.CA
11. CA: The CA found that FBC was able to substantiate its claim against
Rudlin Corp. for the unpaid balance of the contract price of
P6,933,268.00, which after considering the additives and deductives, the
direct payment made by Rudlin, cost of chargeable materials and rebates,
would still leave the amount of P1,508,464.84.
12. According to the CA, if not for the alleged construction defects and
supposed additives and deductives, Rudlin Corp. could have considered
the building ―complete,‖ as in fact the school building is already being
used as such by Rudlin Corp..
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the amount in the construction agreement is the contract
price. YES.
2. WON FBC is liable for the defects in the construction of the subject
school building and delay in the completion of the works. YES
RATIO:
[Issue 1 – topic]
1. YES. The amount in the construction agreement is the contract price.
2. On the issue of the correct total contract price, we hold that Rudlin failed
to substantiate its claim that the contract price stated in the Construction
Agreement (P6,933,268.00) was not the true contract price because it had
an understanding with FBC that they would decrease said amount to a
mutually acceptable amount.
 FBC, and the testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent
3. Under Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an
agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is considered as
containing all terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills.
4. Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement
if it is put in issue in the pleading, ―[t]he failure of the written agreement
to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto.‖
5. Assuming as true Rudlin’s claim that Exhibit ―7‖ failed to accurately
reflect an intent of the parties to fix the total contract price at
P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to seek the reformation
of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.
6. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally
not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract. However, Sec. 9 of Rule 130 provides for exceptions.
7. Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of Rule 130, Sec. 9.
Such exception obtains only where ―the written contract is so ambiguous
or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be
understood from a mere reading of the instrument.‖
8. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the
contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts
and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the
contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper
interpretation of the instrument.
9. Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlin’s evidence is admissible to
show the existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the
execution of the contract.
a. But apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by
evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of
P6,006,965.00 stated therein as contract price was the actual
decreased amount that FBC and Rudlin found mutually
acceptable.
b. As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon and his
associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as
competent proof of the purported actual contract price as they
did not testify thereon.
10. Significantly, the June 5, 1986 Letter-Agreement did not at all mention
the total contract price. Likewise, there is nothing in the various letters
sent by Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even
subsequent to the execution of the said Letter-Agreement indicating that
33
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

Rudlin corrected the contract price of P6,933,268.00 which FBC had Wherefore, the petition in G.R. No. 164186 is DENIED while the petition in G.R.
repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents. No. 164347 is PARTLY GRANTED.

[Issue 2 – not important]

11. YES. FBC is liable for the defects in the construction of the subject
school building and delay in the completion of the works.
12. Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, we hold that the facts on
record clearly established FBC’s liability for the defects and deficiencies
so numerous that it took several days for the court-appointed
commissioners to complete the ocular inspection.
13. The CA tried to minimize the impact of such findings by declaring that
the Commissioners’ Report cannot be the sole basis for determining
whether FBC faithfully complied with all its undertakings and
obligations under the Construction Agreement.
14. However, the glaring fact remains that there were construction defects
which have been described in detail under each inspection date. While it
is true that the commissioners who testified gave different opinions as to
whether the noted defects and deficiencies were due to substandard
materials and poor workmanship or the same was just the result of
ordinary wear and tear and even lack of maintenance, the court can
properly evaluate the common findings and conclusions reflected in the
Commissioners’ Report based on the totality of evidence.
15. The purported minutes of meetings, wherein the modifications to the
original plans and specifications, particularly the change of
waterproofing were allegedly discussed and approved by Rudlin's
representative in the person of Josaphat Bravante were not given
credence by the trial court as these actually showed that not all such
modifications have been approved. Moreover, the trial court held that
FBC failed to prove their due execution and authenticity.
16. Even assuming arguendo that the change in waterproofing brand was
indeed taken up during a meeting in the presence of Rudlin's
representative, we cannot agree with the CA's position that the alleged
verbal assent by Josaphat Bravante in the purported minutes of meetings
was sufficient evidence of the Owner's approval of the modifications in
the original plans and specifications. Likewise, the letter dated July 7,
1986 of FBC's project engineer Alexander E. Reyes informing Architect
Quezon that the change in waterproofing brand was approved by
Bravante is at best, self-serving, and the same does not bind Rudlin.
17. FBC therefore cannot escape liability for the poor quality of
waterproofing on the ground that Rudlin's representative was present
during the meeting when the change in brand to be used was allegedly
discussed with his concurrence.

34

14. Marquez v. Espejo (Pau)
Aug 25 2010 | Vitug, J. | Part of the Res Gestae
PETITIONER: Salun-At Marquez
RESPONDENTS: Eloisa Espejo
SUMMARY:
After two properties of Espejo were foreclosed by Rural Bank of Bayombong,
(RBBI) Espejo repurchased one of the lots evidenced by a Deed of Sale which
referred to the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 (Murong property). RBBI
subsequently executed a Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) in favor of Marquez,
which referred to the same Murong property, evidenced by a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA).
Espejo filed a complaint before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator for
cancellation of the CLOA covering the Murong property. Espejo bases her
claim on the Deed of Sale executed with RBBI to prove that she was the owner
of the Murong property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals applied the Best Evidence Rule to determine
that since the Deed of Sale between Espejo and RBBI explicitly referred to the
Murong property covered by TCT No. 62096, then it is indeed that property
that was sold to Espejo by RBBI. Thus, RBBI could not have subsequently
transferred the same property to Marquez.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine
the subject property of the contracts?
Ratio:
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence
Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is
admitted by the parties that the respondents’ Deed of Sale referred to TCT No.
T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as
FACTS:
located in Barangay Murong.
Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually
applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
―When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.‖
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party
seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement
or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed
Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the
Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave
primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other
evidence that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the
case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed
between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule
130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
"between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule
may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or
a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his
claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an
examination of the parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to determine the
true intent of the parties.
DOCTRINE:
When the parties admit the contents of written documents (meaning the best
evidence rule won’t apply) but put in issue whether these documents adequately
and correctly express the true intention of the parties (meaning the parol
evidence rule won’t apply), the deciding body is authorized to look beyond
these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the
parties in order to determine such intent.
1. Espejo was the original registered owner of two parcels of agricultural
land, with an area of two hectares each. Espejo mortgaged both parcels of
land to Rural Bank of Bayombong (RBBI). Espejo defaulted on the loan
payment and the properties were foreclosed.
2. In the meantime, petitioner Marquez remained as a tenant of one of the
aforementioned properties located in Barangay Murong, Nueva Vizcaya
(Murong property).
35

3. Espejo subsequently repurchased one of the lots from RBBI, which was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale, which in turn referred to the property
covered by TCT No. T-62096. There was no evidence to show that
Espejo took possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease
rentals from Marquez, who remained as tenant therein.
4. RBBI, pursuant to RA 6657, executed deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLT) in favor of Marquez, who were the present tenants of the Murong
property. The VLT described the subject land as agricultural.
5. The Department of Agrarian Reform issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) to Marquez. The CLOA was registered in the
registry of deeds.
6. More than 10 years after the Deed of Sale was executed and 7 years after
the VLTs were executed, Espejo filed a complaint before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator for cancellation of the CLOA covering the
Murong property. Espejo bases her claim on the Deed of Sale executed
with RBBI to prove that she was the owner of the Murong property.
7. The Region office of the DAR ruled in favor of Espejo, since the TCT
number appearing on the Deed of Sale (which came first) and VLT
(which came second) clearly referred to the Murong property.
8. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the DAR regional office and declared
that there was no justification to the question of authenticity and validity
of the CLOAs in favor of Marquez.
9. On further appeal to the CA, the CA reveres the DARAB. It held that the
Deed of Sale was the best evidence of its contents, particularly as to the
description of the land which was the object of the sale - the Murong
property covered by TCT No. T-62096. Thus, since the Deed of Sale
expressed that the subject land is covered by TCT. No. T-62096, the
Murong property, then it is indeed that property that Espejo purchased
from RBBI.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the
subject property of the contracts? - Yes. What the CA actually applied was
the Parol Evidence Rule, which was also erroneous in application.
RATIO:
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
1. Marquez argues that the CA erred in using the Best Evidence Rule
(BER) to determine the subject of the Deed of Sale. They maintain that
the issue is not the contents of the contracts but rather, the intention of
the parties that was not adequately expressed in the contracts.
2. The CA erred in applying the BER. The Best Evidence Rule states that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best
evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a
reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule.
The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected
tampering with the document
3. In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best
Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the
documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents’ Deed of
Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’
Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its
subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.
4. The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the
documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the
actual intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best
Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol
Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
―When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.‖
5. The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a
party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a
valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually
applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words
of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence
Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two
contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict
such terms.
6. However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in
the case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs
executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written
36
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence

rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-
interest." The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one
of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written
document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument
7. Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an
examination of the parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to
determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in
case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails,
for the intention is the soul of a contract,not its wording which is prone to
mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give
life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the
very purpose of agreements.
.

37
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

15. Uniwide Sales Realty vs. Titan-Ikeda (2006) arbitrators, (2) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
FACTS: the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process.
Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation (Titan) filed a sum of It is important to note that E.O. No. 1008 introduced an arbitration facility which
money case against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation (Uniwide) Philippine construction industries can settle their disputes. Therefore, the court
for non-payment of claims. There were three projects covered by agreements will not participate in any act which will defeat the purpose of the arbitration.
between the Titan and Uniwide. Uniwide filed a motion to dismiss as the parties Because the parties chose their arbitrator, they must have confidence in such
entered into arbitration under the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission arbitrators. It will not review factual findings unless such body committed an error
(CIAC). This motion was granted. CIAC ruled against Uniwide for Projects 2 and which will prejudice a party’s rights.
3. Uniwide filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. This was affirmed
by the CA. Hence, a petition for review was filed with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Uniwide is liable – YES, Uniwide is liable for its failure
to discharge the burden required by law
RATIO:
Uniwide failed to establish the burden required by the law so the SC denied their
petition. Uniwide was not able prove that it mistakenly paid Titan which would
entitle the former to reimbursement. Furthermore, it failed to introduce evidence
that will sustain its argument of fraudulent conspiracy
In this case, the SC emphasized that factual findings of administrative agencies
and quasi- judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the CA.
However, there are exceptions. Factual findings of construction arbitrators may be
reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was
evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to
act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained
from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.
Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party
was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral
Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of
16. Landingin v. People

38

FACTS:
Landingin was a citizen of the USA, of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam.
He filed a petition for adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos who are natural children of Manuel Ramos,
Landingin’s brother. Landingin alleged that when her brother died, the children
were left to their paternal grandmother since their mother went to Italy and was
remarried there and now has two children by her second marriage; the mother no
longer communicated with her children nor with her inlaws. Landingin claims that
she financially supports the children. When the grandmother died, Landingin
desired to adopt the children and that the children had given their consent.
Landingin says she is qualified as she is a 57-year-old widow who had children of
her own who were already married and have their respective families. She lives
alone in her home in Guam and works as a restaurant server. Landingin’s children
also gave written consent for the adoption. Landingin’s brother, Mariano,
signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in
Landingin’s custody. The court ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study and to
submut a report. The OSG entered its appearance. Her petition was unopposed
and was allowed to present evidence ex parte. Landingin testified on her behalf
and presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest, to testify on the written consent of her
and her siblings. The DSWD officer, Pagbilao, submitted the recommendation
that the children are eligible for adoption. However, Landingin failed to present
Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of the mother nor
any documentary evidence to prove the mother’s assent. The lower court granted
the petition. But the OSG appealed the decision. The CA reversed the RTC ruling
and held that Landingin failed toa dduce in evidence the voluntary consent of the
mother and that the affidavit of consent of Landingin’s children couldn’t be
admitted as it was executed in Guam and was not authenticated or acknowledged
before the Philippine consular office. Landingin filed an MR which was denied.
Thus, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Landingin is entitled to adopt the children without the consent
of their mother. No. Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed
by Landingin’s children complies with the law. No
RATIO: The court had ruled that discretion to approve adoption proceedings is
not to be anchored solely on the best interests of the child but also with regard to
natural rights of the parents over the child. This explains the general requirement
of consent and notice to the natural parents of the child. This written consent of
the parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. But in this
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
case, Landingin failed to submit the written consent of the mother. Pagbilao
declared that she was able to interview the mother and the court finds it incredible
that the consent of the mother was not acquired even when she came home to the
Philippines. Neither did Landingin present the mother as a witness in support of
the petition. Even though the mother’s consent was not acquired, the law allows
the written consent of the legal guardian.
But Landingin claims that the mother had abandoned the children then she should
have adduced the written consent of the legal guardian. In this case, the court said
that the children were not abandoned by the mother since the mother sends money
to her children despite being in Italy. The Rules of court provides that the Court
hall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer of
evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact
and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless
and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which
such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative
weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do
not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered. In this
case, Landingin failed to offer Pagbilao’s report and joint affidavit of consent
exeuted by the children and neither was the latter’s authenticity proved. This was
notarized in Guam and for it to be treated in the same way as a document
notarized here, it needs to be complied with Sec. 2 of Act No. 2103. This was not
complied with. No further proof was introduced to authenticate the written
consent either and the same is inadmissible in evidence.
39

17. Pasag vs. Parocha (2007)
FACTS:
The instant case arose from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents
and Titles, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Reconveyance, Partition and
Damages. Petitioners Pasag et al. alleged a share over three (3) properties owned
by respondents, which formed part of the estate of petitioners' deceased
grandparents. They averred that their grandparents died intestate, thus, leaving
behind all their properties to their eight (8) children Pedro, Isidro, Basilio,
Severino, Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita, and Fortunata.
However, Severino, the predecessor of respondents, claimed in an affidavit of
self-adjudication that he is the sole, legal, and compulsory heir of Benito and
Florentina Pasag. Consequently, he was able to appropriate to himself the
properties covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. 2983 and 1887.
Thereafter, Severino executed a deed of absolute sale over the said properties in
favor of his daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha. Moreover, petitioners
alleged that Severino used the same affidavit of self-adjudication to secure a free
patent over an agricultural land that had long been under the possession of Benito
and Florentina Pasag.
On April 19, 1999, petitioners asked the trial court to give them until May 11,
1999 to submit their offer of evidence; and it subsequently granted their motion.
However, on May 11, 1999, they again failed to submit their offer of evidence and
moved for another extension of five (5) days. Unfortunately, petitioners still failed
to submit their formal offer of evidence within the extended period. Consequently,
in its June 17, 1999 Order, the trial court deemed waived petitioners’ right to
make their formal offer of evidence.
On July 27, 1999, petitioners moved for the admission of their offer of evidence.
On September 1, 1999, however, the trial court issued an Order denying
petitioners' formal offer of evidence for their ―consistent failure‖ to submit it. On
October 28, 1999, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence.
On February 24, 2000, the trial court granted respondents’ demurrer to evidence
and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint. Petitioners’ MR was denied for lack
of merit. Affirming the ruling of the trial court, the CA held that petitioners failed
to prove their claim by a preponderance of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver of petitioners’ offer of documentary evidence
is proper
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
RATIO:
YES. The trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had
waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence.
Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to
comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before
finally submitting it. Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility
of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of
justice.
Under the Rule on guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of
court in the conduct of pre-trial and case of deposition and discovery measures:
On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal
offer of evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party
is required to immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter the judge
shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court.
On the other hand, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that
―documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a
party's testimonial evidence.‖
The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made
clear that the party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral
offer of evidence on the very day the party presented the last witness. Otherwise,
the court may consider the party's documentary or object evidence waived.
Also, no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in
support of a party’s evidence-in-chief other than those that had been identified
below and pre-marked during the pre-trial. Both parties should obtain, gather,
collate, and list all their respective pieces of evidence whether testimonial,
documentary, or object even prior to the preliminary conference before the clerk
of court or at the latest before the scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise,
pieces of evidence not identified or marked during the pre-trial proceedings are
deemed waived and rendered inutile.
The trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and
exclude the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified
and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally
offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. It must be
stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of
documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the
pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit;
while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a
40
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it
has already been offered as part of the evidence.
Note: This case was decided before the effectivity of the 2019 Revised Rules on
Evidence. Under the latter, evidence can now only be offered orally. Hence, in
this digest, the procedure for an offer in writing has been removed.

41

18. Ramos vs. Spouses Dizon (2006)
FACTS:
Ramos alleged that Sps. Dizon were the owners of an undivided one-half portion
of a parcel of land with an area of about 89.35 square meters located in Tondo,
Manila, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 172510 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila. Sp. Domingo Dizon executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) authorizing Elpidio Domingo to sell one-half portion of said
parcel of land. Domingo failed to redeem or repurchase the disputed land within
the five-month period provided for under the Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro,
thus, ownership over the subject land was consolidated in for petitioner Ramos,
buyer.
Sps. Dizon filed an Answer/Opposition to the Petition alleging that the SPA was
executed for the purpose of enabling Elpidio Domingo to secure a loan of
P150,000.00 by using Domingo’s share in the land covered by TCT No. 172510
as security. The proceeds of the loan was supposed to be used for the construction
of a duplex residential house to be supervised by Elpidio. However, Elpidio
obtained a loan of P350,000.00 and used a substantial portion thereof for his
personal advantage and benefit. As Elpidio had exceeded his authority, Sps. Dizon
claimed that he revoked the SPA through several letters and by a formal notice of
revocation sent by his counsel. As for the pacto de retro sale, Sps. Dizon
maintains that the same was simulated as Elpidio had already obtained a loan
totaling P350,000.00 from Ramos as evidenced by a Real Estate Mortgage
executed by the two of them. In any case, he claims that the pacto de retro sale
should be treated as an equitable mortgage which cannot be enforced
through a petition for consolidation of ownership.
During the trial of the case, Ramos herself took the witness stand and testified
Elpidio sold to her, with a right to repurchase, one-half of a parcel of land which
was owned by Sps. Domingo. Ramos presented Elpidio as her second witness and
he essentially reiterated what Ramos had stated in her testimony. After the
conclusion of Elpidio’s testimony, Ramos offered into evidence Exhibits "A," or
the TCT "B," or the SPA and "C,‖ or the Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro all of
which were admitted by the trial court. RTC decided in favor of Sps. Dizon.
Sps. Dizon’s counsel manifested before the trial court that he was no longer
presenting testimonial evidence; instead, he requested that the following
documents be marked in evidence: Exhibits "6" - Decision dated March 20, 1992,
"6-A" - Dispositive portion thereto, "7" - TCT No. 172510 – entry thereon, and
"7-A" - Registered owners. Also, Sps. Dizon’s counsel was given ten days to
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
submit his formal offer of evidence in writing and Ramoswas given the same
period of time to file her comment or opposition thereto after which the case
would be submitted for resolution. The trial court, however, prior to the
submission of Sps. Dizon’s formal offer of evidence, rendered a holding that the
contract between Ramos and Elpidio was actually one of equitable mortgage and
not a pacto de retro sale. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule enunciated in the case of
Vda. De Oñate v. Court of Appeals pertaining to the admission and consideration
of evidence not formally offered.
RATIO:
Ramos argues that it is axiomatic that the court shall not consider evidence which
has not been formally offered. In this regard, they argue that Exhibits "1" to "7,"
inclusive of sub-markings, should not have been considered by the trial court in its
Decision considering that the same were not formally offered in evidence.
The applicable provision of the Rules of Court on this matter is Sec. 34, Rule 132.
It reads: SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.
The case of Vda. De Oñate, which was relied upon by the Court of Appeals,
reiterated our previous rulings in People v. Napat-a and People v. Mate relative to
the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered
during the trial. We declared in Vda. De Oñate that – From the foregoing
provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document to identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that is has already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we
had the occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary
evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the
course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an
exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before.
A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will
advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the
trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v. Mate we relaxed the foregoing
rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by
the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same
42
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied. The
exhibits in question were presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case
thus, they have been incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself
explained the contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by Sps. Dizon’s
counsel.
To our mind, this exchange between Elpidio and Sps. Dizon’s counsel sufficiently
described the contents of the above-mentioned exhibits presented by Sps. Dizon
particularly the promissory notes and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. Nor can
Ramos be heard to complain now that she was deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine Elpidio. It bears stressing that Sps. Dizon’s Exhibits were
presented during Elpidio’s cross-examination and in the presence of Ramos’
counsel.
But what further defeats Ramos’ cause on this issue is that Sps. Dizon’s exhibits
were marked and admitted during the pre-trial stage as shown by the Pre-Trial
Order quoted earlier. On this point, Section 2, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides: "Section 2. Judicial Admissions. - Admission made by the parties
in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require
proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made
through palpable mistake." Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that Sps.Dizon’s
exhibits were not formally offered prior to the rendition of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 93-66439 by the court a quo, the trial court judge committed no error
when he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case. After all, the
pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt with therein may not be
brushed aside in the process of decision- making. Otherwise, the real essence of
compulsory pre-trial would be inconsequential and worthless.

43
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

19. Arevalo vs. Dimayuga, 49 Phil. 894 (1927) Dimayuga’s testimony was deemed of little bearing by the SC. However,
FACTS: whatever the testimony was and whatever bearing it might have had upon the
This action was to recover the possession of property located at the City of questions presented, the same should not have been admitted and was properly
Manila, together with rent for 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1925. Dimayuga interposed a stricken out by the trial court.
general and special defense: A party to an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased person,
- that the property in question was his sole and separate property; upon a claim against the estate of the latter, is absolutely prohibited by law from
- that he had given said property to the deceased Catalino Arevalo as a giving testimony concerning such claim or demand, as to anything that occurred
guaranty for the payment of a loan of P20,000 on the 12th day of before the death of the person against whose estate the action is presented. Death
October, 1920; has closed the lips of one party and the law has closed the lips of the other.
- that the document executed while in form was a pacto de retro, was a
mere loan and that the promise to pay rent in said contract was a mere
promise to pay interest on said loan at 12 per cent per annum
- that several contracts were in fact fictitious and were signed by him by
virtue of a verbal agreement to extend payment that the contracts were in
violation of the usury law
Dimayuga prayed that he be absolved from liability and the contracts be declared
null and void, which the court did not grant. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor
ofRamon Arevalo (judicial administrator of Catalino’s estate) and ordered
Dimayuga to pay the rent due. Hence, this appeal.
Dimayuga contends that the lower court erred in exlcuding his testimony as to
conversations held between him and Catalino during his lifetime. He argues that
inasmuch as there was no objection presented to the admissibility of said
testimony at the time it was presented, Arevalo’s motion to have the same
excluded was too late. Hence, the lower court erred in granting the motion to
strike the said testimony.

ISSUE: whether or not lower court committed error in excluding testimony of

defendant (conversation with Catalino Arevalo during his lifetime)

RATIO:
The court held in the negative. The rule of evidence is well established, that the
protest or objection against the admission of evidence should be presented at the
time the evidence is offered and that the proper time to make protest or objection
to the admissibility of evidence is when the question is presented to the witness or
at the time the answer thereto is given. Also, the court may, in its discretion, strike
out incompetent evidence although such evidence was given without objection
and although the motion to strike out is not made until the evidence is already in.|||

44

20. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, Tantoco (2014)
FACTS:
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Governance
(PCGG), commenced a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. (Tantoco), Dominador
R. Santiago (Santiago), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R.
Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda.
Respondents Tantoco and Santiago filed a Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of
the Complaint and for Bill of Particulars which were both denied for lack of bases.
On 27 July 1989, Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff." A month later, they filed both an
"Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" and a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents. This time, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Interrogatories and granted the Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents. The Supreme Court affirmed the Orders of the Sandiganbayan.
During the pre-trial, PCGG produced documents pre-marked as Exhibit "A" to
"LLL". On September 1996, the temporary markings of Exhibits "A" to "LLL,"
together with their sub- markings, were adopted. However, over the objections of
respondents Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced and caused the pre-
marking of additional documents, Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA." Tantoco
and Santiago filed a motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court, claiming that the
additional documents were never produced at the discovery proceedings and that
the petitioner be sanctioned for contempt. Sandiganbyan denied the motion on
February 17, 1997 (First Resolution). New documents not shown at discovery
were still being marked. Respondents then filed "Motion to Ban Plaintiff from
Offering Exhibits Not Earlier Marked During the Discovery Proceedings."
Petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on March 16, 2007. On January 15,
2008, Sandiganbayan ruled that with the exception of some documents, all
Exhibits are denied admission. On petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the
Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" (Second Resolution).
Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration. Sandiganbayan ruled that
exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" be excluded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in excluding the documents due to petitioner's own failure to produce them at the
pre-trial
RATIO:
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
The Court held that in excluding Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA," the
Sandiganbayan properly exercised its discretion over evidence formally offered by
the prosecution. The First Resolution merely disposed of respondents' Motion to
cite petitioner in contempt. It does not constitute an irrevocable stamp of
admissibility. Petitioner conveniently disregards the basic rule of evidence,
namely, that the issue of the admissibility of documentary evidence arises only
upon formal offer thereof. This is why objection to the documentary evidence
must be made at the time it is formally offered, and not earlier.
Seasonable objection to the subject exhibits can only be properly made upon
formal offer. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Tantoco and Santiago had
been consistent in reiterating their objections. The court even clarified in its First
Resolution that their "Motion Filed Under Rule 29," was but in pursuance of their
continuing objection to the marking of evidence not produced at discovery.
Hence, nothing in the said Resolution can be read as a ruling on its admissibility.
The Second Resolution, while issued after petitioner had submitted its Formal
Offer of Evidence, noted that all the documents contained therein were
photocopies. It stated that a mere certification from the Clerk of Court that they
"appear to be the original copy" would not suffice. The Sandiganbayan still
admitted them as evidence, yet the only reason cited for doing so was liberality,
viz.: "There is nothing in the rules which categorically prohibits the admission of
additional documentary evidence when called for as a case progress. What is clear
is that it is the Court's discretion to allow or disallow its reception." Thus, the
Sandiganbayan fittingly corrected itself when it excluded the photocopies in its
latest Resolution.
When the subject of inquiry is the content of a document, submission of a certified
true copy is justified only in clearly delineated instances such as the following:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
45
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

Nothing on record shows that the Exhibits fall under any of the exceptions to the
Best Evidence rule. Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on
the theory that the original cannot be produced by the party who offers the
evidence within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Even
then, the general rule is that secondary evidence is still not admissible until the
non-production of the primary evidence has been sufficiently accounted for.

46

21. Heirs of Margarita vs. Heirs of Alvarez, (2013)
FACTS:
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, the
respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses Maximo S.
Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds
of Manila; that their parents had been in possession of the property during their
lifetime; that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the
property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they could not
locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of
TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the
original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to
defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been
maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase
covering the property did not exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be
cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
In her answer, Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on
September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had
been registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six months from September 9, 1975
within which to repurchase the property; and that she had then become the
absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month
period. During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the
copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of
the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, finding untenable the
plaintiffs’ contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not exist. It
opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its
contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence
and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the
defendant had established the execution and existence of the deed.
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, reversing the
RTC, and ruling as follows:
In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not have been admitted
because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence of the original deed of sale
and to establish its loss.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
MR denied. Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to
the Court through petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale with right to repurchase executed by the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did in fact exist? No.
RATIO:
1. Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to
address and determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites
for the presentation of secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon’s
evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
"existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence. Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the
existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the
presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of
Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without
first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.
2. Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish
and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the
deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this
action for quieting of title. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise
to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that
could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however,
it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict
standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a
precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to
show the lossor (sic) explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the
presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that
he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he
(Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao had
been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the
inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by
47

himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a
duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no
effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the
existence of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
twice gone to his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5,
1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in question, and the second on
September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase.
Camilon's testimony could not be credible for the purpose of proving the due
execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase for three reasons.
The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of the hospital around the time that the deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been supposedly executed on September 9, 1975.
The records manifested that he had been admitted to the Veterans Memorial
Hospital in Quezon City on several occasions, and had then been diagnosed with
the serious ailments or conditions.
The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly improbable for him to
travel from Manila all the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where Prodon and
Camilon were then residing in order only to negotiate and consummate the sale of
the property. This high improbability was fully confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr.,
who attested that his father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of the
hospital in 1975. The medical records revealed, too, that on September 12, 1975,
or three days prior to his final admission to the hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. had suffered from "[h]igh grade fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and
cough productive of whitish sticky sputum;" had been observed to be "conscious"
but "weak" and "bedridden" with his heart having "faint" sounds, irregular
rhythm, but no murmurs; and his left upper extremity and left lower extremity had
suffered 90% motor loss. Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of sale with
right to repurchase had been executed on September 9, 1975 could not command
belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did
not themselves establish the existence of the deed. They proved at best that a
document purporting to be a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been
registered with the Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the deed
was not conclusive proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
owner of the property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The explanation
for this is that registration, being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by
which an instrument is inscribed in the records of the Register of Deeds and
annotated on the dorsal side of the certificate of title covering the land subject of
the instrument. It is relevant to mention that the law on land registration does not
require that only valid instruments be registered, because the purpose of
registration is only to give notice.
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public Razon could
only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been notarized by
him, but did not establish the due execution of the deed.
The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the peaceful possession of the
property was further convincing evidence demonstrating that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase. Otherwise,
Prodon would have herself asserted and exercised her right to take over the
property, legally and physically speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the
repurchase period stipulated under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her
name and paying the real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an
index of the falsity of her claim against the respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the
respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to repurchase
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 18,
2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs of
Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez,
Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City Manila; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
48

22. People vs. Wagas (2013)
FACTS:
Wagas was charged with estafa in the RTC. Ligaray testified that Wagas placed
an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he accepted the order
because of Wagas’ assurance; that he released the goods to Wagas and received
BPI Check No. 0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May 8,
1997; that he deposited the check with Solid Bank, but the check was dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds; that he called Wagas ,who told him that he would
pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not
pay him. On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet
Wagas because they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200
bags of rice directly to Cañada, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the
rice. Wagas testified that he issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Cañada, his
brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or
any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment
for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not
push through. On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a
letter apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he
admitted owing Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received. Wagas admitted the
letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray, and that he
had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged
him to assume the responsibility. The Prosecution subsequently offered and the
RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence. The RTC convicted Wagas of estafa.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, arguing that the
Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had transacted with Ligaray and
who had negotiated the check to the latter and also sought the reopening of the
case based on newly discovered evidence. The RTC denied the motion for new
trial and/or reconsideration. Wagas appealed directly to the SC by notice of
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime?
RATIO: No, In order to constitute estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. In other words, the
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would
not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the
check by the offender. The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a
check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c)
damage to the payee thereof. It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a
check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. The Prosecution
established that Ligaray released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated
check that was given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented
for payment because of In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the
offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. In this case,
Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was
transacting over the telephone. That the check delivered to Ligaray was made
payable to cash rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to
Ligaray, but to somebody else. Ligaray also admitted that it was Cañada who
received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him.
Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the
telephone is not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the
person with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he
had not yet met or known before then. A telephone conversation should be
authenticated before it can be received in evidence. Among others, the person
with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily
identified by voice recognition or any other means. The identity of the caller may
be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. In this case, the Prosecution
did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish
that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone.
In this case, it was evident from Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not even an
acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, there is no factual basis
that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas. The letter of Wagas did not establish that
he was the person who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the
order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal
evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any
transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated
49
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence
solely for the purpose for which it is offered and not for any other purpose.

An identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot

be accorded any evidentiary force. Thus, the guilt of Wagas was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases.the insufficiency of funds.

50

23. People vs Enojas, 2014
FACTS:
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) and P02 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2
Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall
when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked. The officers approached
the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as Enojas, for his documents. The
latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents
shown them, they asked him to come with them to the police station in their
mobile car for further questioning.
Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On
reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they
stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he
approached the store’s door, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out
with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still
managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man
whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from
the Jollibee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2
Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and escape.
PO2 Gregorio on returning to his mobile car, he realized that Enojas, had fled.
Suspecting that Enojas, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. The
officers monitored its incoming messages and posed as Enojas, communicated
with the other accused.
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify
in the case, Enojas opted to instead file a trial memorandum for their defense.
They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all
illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible,
not having been properly identified.
The RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused (Enojas, Gomez, Santos, and
Jalandoni) guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed
men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
Upon review, the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of
the accused. The accused appealed from the CA to this Court.
ISSUE: 1. W/N the text messages are admissible in evidence - YES
2. W/N circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction – YES
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
3. W/N arrest without a valid warrant is a ground for the accused to be acquitted –
NO
RATIO:
First issue:
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.
Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
Second issue:
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the
prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the
accused.
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified Enojas as the driver of the taxicab
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop who was to be brought
to the police station because of the questionable documents he showed.
Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained
messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were
also taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the
police station, tending to show that he had something to hide. He certainly did not
go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified Gomez as one of the men he saw running
away from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2
Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one
who was hit in such shootout and later died. These messages linked the other
accused.
51
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in

entrapping Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text
messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas
clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin,"
one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an
organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones
with call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on
the mobile phone that Enojas left in his taxicab.

Third issue:
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But,
assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime
charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after
an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in
issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2
Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text messages
to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by Enojas provided strong leads on
the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in
an entrapment using this knowledge.

52

24. Sps. Aguinaldo v. Torres (2017)
FACTS:
Spouses Aguinaldo filed a complaint for annulment of sale, cancellation of title,
and damages against Artemio Torres before the RTC. The spouses argue that they
are the registered owners of three lots covered with TCTs under their name. They
discovered in December 2000 that the titles to the subject properties were
transferred to Torres who, in bad faith, and through fraud, deceit, and stealth,
caused the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated in July 21, 1979, selling
the subject properties to him and were also issued TCTs.
Torres denies participation with the execution of the 1979 deed of sale and argues
that the properties were validly sold by the spouses to him through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1991. On Torres’ motion, a copy of the 1991 deed
of sale was transmitted to the NBI Questioned Documents Department for
examination and determination of its genuineness. The NBI reported that the
spouses’ signatures on the document and their sample signatures were written by
the same persons. Hence, the RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that spouses
Aguinaldo failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence. The
subject properties were also held to be validly sold, evidenced by petitioners’
admission of the sale in her letter dated November 12, 1998 to Torres.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA Decision ruled that the 1979
deed of sale was spurious after conducting its own examination of the signatures,
thus, did not transfer title over the subject properties to Torres, the court still
upheld a valid sale to him. First, petitioners failed to rebut the authenticity and due
execution of the 1991 deed of sale on account of their genuine signatures as
reported by the NBI and the CA’s own independent examination of their
signatures on various documents submitted to the court. Second, petitioner
admitted the existence of the sasle of the subject properties in her 1998 letter to
Torres. Third, Torres’ religious payments of real property taxes on the subject
properties from 1993 to 2003 supports his claim of ownership. However, the CA
noted that the 1991 deed of sale was improperly notarized as it was signed by
Torres and a witness in Makati City, petitioners in the USA, but notarized in
Tanza, Cavite. As such, the same could not be properly registered by the Register
of Deeds. Therefore, the CA found it equitable to compel spouses Aguinaldo to
execute a registrable deed of conveyance in favor of Torres within thirty days
from finality of the Decision, in accordance with the Civil Code.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling the valid conveyance of
the subject properties to Torres and directing spouses Aguinaldo to execute a
registrable deed of conveyance in his favor within thirty days from the
finality of the Decision.
RATIO:
The Supreme Court held that the CA’s conclusion was correct and that a valid
conveyance of the subject properties to Torres was established. However, the CA
failed to nullify the subject TCTs issued pursuant to the 1979 deed of sale,
considering that it held the document to be spurious. The rule stands that a forged
deed of sale is null and void and conveys no title. The CA’s ruling must be
modified to reflect the cancellation of the TCTs reflecting the 1979 deed of sale.
Moving to the main issue, the center of this is the determination of the authenticity
of the 1991 deed of sale. This is a question of fact and not of law, hence, the
Supreme Court does not function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective
sets of evidence of the parties, absent a showing that they fall under the exception
recognized by law. The Court held that none of the exceptions fall in this case.
Clearly, the 1991 deed of sale was improperly notarized, being signed by Torres
in Makati City, petitioners in the USA, but also being notarized in Tanza, Cavite.
This is in violation of a notarial officer’s duty to demand that the party
acknowledging the document must appear before him, sign the document in his
presence, and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Spouses
Aguinaldo could not have been in the Philippines at the time the notarial act was
done.
The improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale stripped the document of its
public character and reduced it to a private instrument. Thus, must be examined
based on Rule 132, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court. This means that the document’s
due execution and authenticity must be proved before it can be received in
evidence. In this case, the CA made an independent examination of petitioners’
signatures on the 1991 deed of sale and concluded that they are the same
signatures found on other pertinent documents. This is the same conclusion as the
NBI. Hence, the due execution and authenticity of the 1991 deed of sale has been
ostensibly established by finding that the signatures of petitioners were genuine.
The claim of forgery by spouses Aguinaldo was ruled out by a comparison of their
signatures between the documents and their sample signatures. They failed to
present any other evidence to corroborate any act of forgery made by Torres.
53
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

The improper notarization did not affect the validity of the sale of the subject
properties to Torres, only rendered the deed unregistrable, since notarization is an
essential element to the registrability of deeds and conveyances. The CA was
correct in ordering the execution of a registrable deed of conveyance in favor of
Torres to remedy the 1991 deed of sale. A directive to execute a registrable deed
of conveyance, even if not specifically prayed for in the Answer with
counterclaim, is but a necessary consequence of the judgment upholding the
validity of the sale to him, and an essential measure to place title and ownership to
the proper owner, which is Torres.

54

25. Mercantile Insurance v. Yi (2019)
FACTS:
Young C. Chun and Young H. Chun (the Chuns) owned and operated FAM
MART Co., Inc. (FAM MART) which was secured by Mercantile Insurance
Company, Inc. (MIC) through its California surplus lines broker, Great Republic
Insurance Agency.
Sara Yi (Yi) met an accident inside the premises of FAM MART, located in El
Cajon, California. As a result, her right finger was severed. Yi then filed a
personal injury action against the Chuns. Upon receipt of the summons, FAM
MART tendered the claim of Yi to MIC. At first, MIC defended FAM MART but
it eventually withdrew its representation. Thereafter, the Superior Court of
California issued a judgment in favor of Yi.
Yi, together with the Chuns, also filed a complaint for breach of insurance
contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud and negligent
misrepresentation and negligence against MIC. Despite the service of summons,
MIC did not file any pleading. Hence, a judgment by default was issued by the
Superior Court of California. Said judgment became final and executory.
As Yi was not able to enforce the judgment in California, she filed an action for
enforcement of judgment before the RTC. MIC filed an Answer wherein it denied
the claims of Yi and its alleged liability since it has no privity of contract with Yi
and FAM MART and its operations are within the Philippines.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit since Yi was not able to prove her
claim for failure to present the insurance policy. On appeal, the CA reversed the
ruling of the RTC and ordered MIC to pay the amount adjudged in the judgment
rendered by the Superior Court of California. Hence, the current petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment issued by the Superior Court of California
may be enforced in our jurisdiction.
RATIO:
Yes, the judgment can be enforced. A judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal
creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is the cause of action by which a
suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides for the conditions for the recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment.
In the case of Mijares v. Rañada, the Court held that in an action to enforce a
foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not
the facts from which it prescinds.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
What is indispensable in an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is
the presentation of the foreign judgment itself as it comprises both the evidence
and the derivation of the cause of action. Further, Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides that a foreign judgment against a person, i.e., an action in
personam, as in this case, is merely a presumptive evidence of rights between the
parties. Such judgment may be attacked by proving lack of jurisdiction, lack of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law. Thus, contrary
to MIC's position, the burden is upon MIC to prove its allegations against the
validity of the foreign judgment sought to be enforced.
In disputing the foreign judgment, MIC argues that there was want of notice to it
as there was no proper service of summons in the trial before the California court.
On this note, the SC highlight that matters of remedy and procedure such as those
relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or
the internal law of the forum, which is the State of California in this case. This
Court is well aware that foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proven, as provided in Sec. 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
An exception to Sec. 24, Rule 132, however, is recognized in the cases of
Willamette Iron & Steel Works v. Muzzal, and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
v. Guerrero, wherein the Court emphatically ruled that the testimony under oath of
an attorney-at-law of a foreign state, who quoted verbatim the applicable law and
who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted,
was sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. In Manufacturers
Hanover Trust, the Court stated that it is necessary to state the specific law on
which the claim was based.
In this case, Atty. Robert G. Dyer (Atty. Dyer), member of the bar of the State of
California for more than 30 years, testified as to the applicable law related to
summons. In detail, he stated the exact pertinent provision, Sec. 415.40 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, pursuant to the proven law in the State of California, the service of
summons by mail to MIC, an entity outside its state, was valid. As such law was
sufficiently alleged and proven, it is beyond the province of the SC's authority to
pass upon the issue as to the factual circumstances relating to the proper service of
summons upon MIC in the case before the State of California.
55
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

Therefore, what the SC will do is to recognize the foreign judgment as a fact and
enforce the same as such foreign judgment creates a right of action in favor of Yi.
Relevantly, MIC's failure to satisfy the terms of the foreign judgment engenders a
cause of action as to Yi, who becomes clothed with requisite interest to institute
an action for enforcement.

56

26. PACASUM v. PEOPLE (tin)
Apr. 16, 2009 | Chico - Nazario, J. | Documentary Evidence
PETITIONER: NORMALLAH A. PACASUM
RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
SUMMARY: Sandiganbayan found petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of
Falsification under Article 171(1) of the RPC. The Sandiganbayan found the
signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in the
Employees Clearance of Pacasum to have been falsified/forged. Pacasum argued
that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no probative value in
proving its contents and was inadmissible because the original thereof was not
presented by the prosecution. Sandiganbayan did not agree and still convicted
Pacasum. Hence, this petition. Pacasum assails her conviction arguing that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of
the allegedly forged Employee's Clearance, in favor of the innocence of the
accused. The issue is whether the photocopy of the Employee Clearance is
inadmissible -- NO. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself. As long as the original
evidence can be had, the Court should not receive in evidence that which is
substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear
showing that the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and
barren of probative weight. The foregoing rule, however, admits of several
exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130, secondary evidence of a writing
may be admitted "when the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice". Still, for this exception to apply, the offeror must prove that
he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the
said party to produce the document which may be in the form of a motion for the
production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse
party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the
original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the
original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
Here, Pacasum admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the
possession of her assistant secretary. So the prosecution in its effort to produce
the original copy of the said Employees Clearance of Pacasum sent thru the
COA Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas addressed to
accused Normallah Pacasum and her assistant secretary ordering them to submit
to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the original of the Employees' Clearance
in the name of Normallah Alonto Lucman- Pacasum for the release of her
August and September 2000 salary as DOT Regional Secretary. Notwithstanding
receipt of the said telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her
residence, the accused did not appear before or submit to Assistant Special
Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the original of the said Employees
Clearance, much less offered to produce the same. Under the circumstances, the
presentation and admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the
questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the contents
thereof was justified.
DOCTRINE: Even though the original of an alleged falsified document is not,
or may no longer be produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may still
prosper if the person wishing to establish the contents of said document via
secondary evidence or substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the
best or primary evidence — the original of the document — is not available for
any of the causes mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
FACTS:
1. Pacasum was charged before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of
Public Documents, defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Pre-trial conference was held and the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial
Order. The parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of facts, and
agreed that the issues to be resolved were as follows:
a. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City,
falsified her Employee Clearance, which she submitted to the
Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in
57

Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y.
Pangilan, the Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes
of claiming her salary for the months of August and September
2000;
b. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official
position in order to commit the crime charged.
3.
4. Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan)--a retired government employee and
formerly a Human Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM--
testified that:
a. In the year 2000, Pacasum submitted the original of an
Employees Clearance to her office in compliance with the
memorandum issued by Governor Nur Misuari, directing all
officers and employees to clear themselves of property and
money accountabilities before their salaries for August and
September 2000 would be paid.
b. Upon inspection of the Employees Clearance, she noticed that
the signature of Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said
document was not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her
daughter-in-law, and that the latter's signature was very familiar
to her. Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied the original
Employees Clearance with the intention of sending the same to
her daughter-in-law for the purpose of having the latter confirm
if the signature on top of her name in the Employees Clearance
was hers.
c. There being no messenger available, she instead called up Laura
to come to her office to verify the signature. Laura, whose office
was only a walking distance away, came and inspected the
clearance, and denied signing the same. After she denied that
she signed the clearance, and while they were conversing, the
bearer of the Employees Clearance took said document and left.
5. The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person
whose signature was allegedly imitated.
a. Laura recounted that an officemate and niece of Pacasum, went
to her house with the Employees Clearance of Pacasum.
b. Laura was requested her to sign in order to clear Pacasum of all
property accountabilities. Laura refused to sign the clearance
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
because at that time, Pacasum had not yet turned over all the
office properties issued to her.
c. Laura revealed she issued a certification with a memorandum
receipt. The certification attested she did not sign Pacasum’s
Employees Clearance because all the office properties issued to
Pacasum had not been turned over or returned to the Supply
Officer of the DOT — ARMM.
d. Finally, she said on her last day as Supply Officer, Pacasum had
not returned anything.
6. For her defense, Pacasum testified that she was appointed by ARMM
Regional Governor Nur Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of
the DOT of the ARMM in 1999.
a. At first, she said the memorandum applied to her, she being a
cabinet secretary, but later she said the same did not apply to her
because she had no cash advances. Only those with cash
advances were required to get an Employees Clearance before
they could receive their salaries. She then instructed her staff to
work on her salary.
b. Pacasum said she did not know where the original of her
Employees Clearance was. Neither did she know if the signature
of Laura Pangilan therein had been imitated or forged. She
likewise said that although the Employee Clearance was in her
name, she did not cause Laura's signature to be affixed thereto.
c. Pacasum explained that she has not seen the original of the
subject Employees Clearance. When she first saw the
photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the signature of Laura
was not there.
7. On cross-examination, Pacasum said that prior to her receipt of her
salary, she believed that an Employees Clearance was necessary, and for
this reason she had this document prepared by her staff.
8. The Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision convicting Pacasum
of the crime charged in the information.
a. The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply
Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in the Employees
Clearance of petitioner to have been falsified/forged.
b. It did not give much weight on Pacasum’s defense denying she
was the one who actually falsified her Employees Clearance by
58

imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no
idea about the alleged falsification, because it was her assistant
secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her clearance
and the one who submitted the said clearance to the Office of
the Regional Governor of the ARMM.
c. The trial court found said denial unsubstantiated and ruled that
while there was no direct evidence to show that Pacasum herself
"actually" falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, there
were circumstances that indicated she was the one who
committed the falsification/forgery, or who asked somebody
else to falsify/forge the subject signature in her Employees
Clearance. The Sandiganbayan added that considering it was
Pacasum who took advantage of and profited from the use of the
falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the
material author of the falsification. Despite full opportunity, she
was not able to rebut said presumption, failing to show that it
was another person who falsified/forged the signature of Laura
Pangilan, or that another person had the reason or motive to
commit the falsification/forgery or could have benefited from
the same.
9. Pacasum argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had
no probative value in proving its contents and was inadmissible
because the original thereof was not presented by the prosecution.
The Sandiganbayan did not agree. It said that the presentation and
admission of secondary evidence, like a photocopy of her Employees
Clearance, was justified to prove the contents thereof, because despite
reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the prosecution to petitioner and
her assistant secretary to produce the original of her Employees
Clearance, they ignored the notice and refused to present the original of
said document.
10. Pacasum filed a motion for reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan issued
its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
11. Hence, the instant petition was filed.
12. Pacasum assails her conviction arguing, among others, that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, in not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
the photocopy of the allegedly forged Employee's Clearance, in favor of
the innocence of the Accused.
ISSUE: Whether the photocopy of the Employee Clearance is inadmissible --
NO.
RATIO:
1. The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the
Employees Clearance.
2. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself.
3. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best
evidence if the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of
such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary
evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is
withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious
purpose which its production would expose and defeat.
4. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be had, the Court should not
receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as
photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original has
been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies
must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of
probative weight.
5. The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under
Section 3(b) of Rule 130, secondary evidence of a writing may be
admitted "when the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice".
6. And to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original
of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of
Rule 130 provides as follows:
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. — If the document is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he
59
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be for falsification may still prosper if the person wishing to establish the
presented as in the case of loss. contents of said document via secondary evidence or substitutionary
7. Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the evidence can adequately show that the best or primary evidence — the
adverse party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission original of the document — is not available for any of the causes
of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his mentioned in Section 3, 66 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to
produce the document which may be in the form of a motion for the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan and its
production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. SEPARATE OPINIONS: --
8. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily CONCURRING: --
offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be
admitted.
9. Here, Pacasum admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the
possession of her assistant secretary. So the prosecution in its effort to
produce the original copy of the said Employees Clearance of Pacasum
sent thru the COA Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram
subpoenas addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum and her assistant
secretary ordering them to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor
the original of the Employees' Clearance in the name of Normallah
Alonto Lucman- Pacasum for the release of her August and September
2000 salary as DOT Regional Secretary.
10. Notwithstanding receipt of the said telegram subpoena by her uncle
Manso Alonto in her residence, the accused did not appear before or
submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the
original of the said Employees Clearance, much less offered to produce
the same.
11. Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the
Employees Clearance as evidenced by the photocopy thereof, and despite
the reasonable notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her
assistant secretary to produce the original of said employees clearance
they ignored the notice and refused to produce the original document, the
presentation and admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the
questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the
contents thereof was justified.
12. This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified
document is not, or may no longer be produced in court, a criminal case

60

27. Security Bank vs. Triumph Lumber, (Patrick)
January 21, 1999 (Case list says 2009, but I think it’s a typo since this is the only
case with this title)| DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: | On Documentary Evidence
PETITIONER: Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC)
RESPONDENTS: Triumph Lumber And Construction Corporation
SUMMARY: Triumph Lumber is a depositor in good standing of Security Bank
& Trust Company (SBTC). On March 23 and 24, 1987, 3 checks all payable to
cash and all drawn against its current account were presented for encashment at
SBTC’s Sucat Parañaque branch totaling P300K. Triumph Lumber claims that
due to SBTC’s gross negligence and inexcusable negligence in exercising
ordinary diligence in verifying from Triumph Lumber the encashment of checks
whose amount exceed P10K and in determining the forgery of drawer's
signatures, the three (3) checks were encashed by unauthorized persons to the
damage and prejudice of Triumph Lumber. Triumph Lumber then requested
SBTC to credit back the value of the checks which were wrongfully encashed
but despite due demand SBTC failed to pay its liability. SBTC claims that the
savings account pass book and the check booklets were kept by Triumph
Lumber in its filing cabinet but on March 23, 1987 the Triumph Lumber
discovered that the door of his office was forced open including that of the filing
cabinet where the check booklets and other bank documents were being kept.
SBTC further claims that the incident was not reported to the police authorities
by the Triumph Lumber nor was there any advise given to SBTC bank and that
on the same day of the discovery of the burglary, Triumph Lumber made three
separate deposits in a total amount of P374,554.10. Immediately after the said
deposit, 3 checks totaling to P300,000 which [were] all payable to cash were
successively presented to SBTC bank for encashment which was given due
course by SBTC after said checks have passed through the standard bank
procedure for verification the check signatures and the regularity of the material
particular of said checks. Triumph Lumber filed a complaint for collection of the
said amount again SBTC, however, the RTC found no preponderance of
evidence to support Triumph Lumber’s complaint. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered SBTC to reimburse
Triumph Lumber the said amount.
ISSUE: WON the forgery of the 3 checks were duly established – NO
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
RATIO: The Court of Appeals erred in holding that forgery was duly
established. First, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not complied
with by Triumph Lumber. The originals of the alleged forged check has to be
produced since it was never shown that any of these exceptions was present.
[See Doctrine] What the Triumph Lumber offered were mere photocopies of the
checks in question. It never explained the reason why it could not produce the
originals of the checks. It is true that the photocopies of the questioned checks
were all identified by Triumph Lumber’s witness without objection on the part
of SBTC’s counsel. The latter even cross-examined the wintess, and, at the
formal offer of said exhibits, he objected to their admission solely on the
grounds that they were "irrelevant, immaterial and self-serving." The
photocopies of the checks may therefore be admitted for failure of SBTC to
tender an appropriate objection to their admission. Nevertheless, their
probative value is nil.
DOCTRINE: Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself. This is what is known as the
"best evidence" rule. The exceptions are as follows:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
FACTS:
1. Triumph Lumber And Construction Corporation’s (Triumph Lumber) is
a depositor in good standing of Security Bank & Trust Company
(SBTC)’s branch at Sucat, Parañaque.
2. Triumph Lumber claims that on March 23 and 24, 1987, three (3) checks
all payable to cash and all drawn against its current account were
61

presented for encashment at SBTC’s Sucat Parañaque branch in the
amounts of P150,000.00, P130,000.00, and P20,000.00.
3. Triumph Lumber claims that due to SBTC’s gross negligence and
inexcusable negligence in exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from
Triumph Lumber the encashment of checks whose amount exceed
P10,000.00 and in determining the forgery of drawer's signatures, the
three (3) checks were encashed by unauthorized persons to the damage
and prejudice of Triumph Lumber.
4. Triumph Lumber then requested the SBTC to credit back and restore to
its account the value of the checks which were wrongfully encashed in
the amount of P300,000.00 but despite due demand SBTC failed to pay
its liability.
5. SBTC claims that on June 19, 1985, Triumph Lumber opened savings
account and current account with its branch in Sucat, Parañaque.
6. In order to make the said current and savings account operational,
Triumph Lumber provided the SBTC with the requisite specimen
signature cards which in effect authorized SBTC to honor withdrawals
on the basis of any two of three signatures affixed thereon, specifically
those of Mr. Dee Kong, Mr. Co Yok Teng and Mr. Chun Yun Kit, the
president, treasurer and general manager, respectively, of Triumph
Lumber.
7. SBTC also claims that the savings account pass book and the check
booklets were kept by Triumph Lumber in its filing cabinet but on March
23, 1987 the Triumph Lumber discovered that the door of his office was
forced open including that of the filing cabinet where the check booklets
and other bank documents were being kept.
8. SBTC further claims that the incident was not reported to the police
authorities by the Triumph Lumber nor was there any advise given to
SBTC bank and that on the same day of the discovery by Triumph
Lumber of the burglary, Triumph Lumber said nevertheless made three
separate deposits in a total amount of P374,554.10.
9. SBTC also claims that immediately after the said deposit of P374,554.10
has been made by Triumph Lumber, 3 checks totaling to P300,000 which
[were] all payable to cash were successively presented to SBTC bank for
encashment which was given due course by SBTC after said checks have
passed through the standard bank procedure for verification the check
signatures and the regularity of the material particular of said checks.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
10. Triumph Lumber filed a complaint for collection of the said amount
again SBTC, however, the RTC dismissed the complaint since it found
no preponderance of evidence to support Triumph Lumber’s complaint.
11. According to the RTC:
a. Triumph Lumber failed to show that the signatures on the
subject checks were forged. It did not even present in court the
originals of the checks. Neither did it bother to explain its
failure to do so. Thus, it could be presumed that the original
checks were willfully suppressed and would be adverse to
Triumph Lumber’s case if produced.
b. SBTC bank had exercised due care and diligence in determining
the authenticity of the checks in question before they were
encashed. It was rather Triumph Lumber that had been negligent
in the care and custody of the corporate checks. After the
incident in question occurred, the Triumph Lumber should have
reported the matter to the police authorities or to the bank in
order that the latter could "undertake stringent measure to
counteract any attempt to forge the corporate checks." But
Triumph Lumber did not. Hence, Triumph Lumber should be
the one to bear the loss.
12. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
ordered SBTC to reimburse to Triumph Lumber the sum of P300,000,
plus interest at the rate of 21/2 % per month. The Court of appeals held
that it was not necessary for the Triumph Lumber to prove that the
signatures on the three checks in question were forged of the following
admissions set forth in SBTC’s answer.
13. According to the Court of Appeals, the expert witness, contrary to the
trial court's finding, was able to examine the signatures on the original
checks and compared them with the standard signatures of the
signatories. The photographic enlargements of the questioned checks,
which she identified in court, were in fact taken from the original checks.
14. The Court of Appeals likewise held that SBTC must be the one to bear
the consequences of its failure to detect the fogery. Besides, SBTC was
"less than prudent" in the treatment of Triumph Lumber’s account. It did
not observe its arrangement that it would inform the latter whenever a
check of more than P10,000 would be presented for encashment.
62

15. After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, SBTC filed
this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the forgery of the 3 checks were duly established – NO
2. WON Security Bank was negligent and that Triumph Lumber exercised
due care in the custody of its checks and other related documents -NO
HELD: Petition is GRANTED the challenged decision of the CA is hereby
REVERSED, and the decision of the RTC of Makati is hereby
REINSTATED.
RATIO:
Issue#1
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that forgery was duly
established. First, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not
complied with by Triumph Lumber. The Section explicitly provides
that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.
This is what is known as the "best evidence" rule. The exceptions are
as follows:
a. 1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
b. 2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c. 3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time, and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
d. 4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
2. The originals of the alleged forged check has to be produced since it
was never shown that any of these exceptions was present. What the
Triumph Lumber offered were mere photocopies of the checks in
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
question. It never explained the reason why it could not produce the
originals of the checks.
3. It is true that the photocopies of the questioned checks were all identified
by Triumph Lumber’s witness Yu Chun Kit during his direct testimony
without objection on the part of SBTC’s counsel. The latter even cross-
examined Yu Chun Kit, and, at the formal offer of said exhibits, he
objected to their admission solely on the grounds that they were
"irrelevant, immaterial and self-serving."
4. The photocopies of the checks may therefore be admitted for failure
of SBTC to tender an appropriate objection to their admission.
Nevertheless, their probative value is nil.
5. The proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed handwriting was
not observed. The initial step in such investigation is the introduction of
the genuine handwriting of the party sought to be charged with the
disputed writing, which is to serve as a standard of comparison. The
standard or the exemplar must therefore be proved to be genuine. For the
purpose of proving the genuineness of a handwriting Section 22, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court provides:
a. Sec. 22. How the genuineness of handwriting is proved. — The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.
6. In BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion to rule that the
genuineness of a standard writing may be established by any of the
following: (1) by the admission of the person sought to be charged with
the disputed writing made at or for the purposes of the trial, or by his
63

testimony; (2) by witnesses who saw the standards written or to whom or
in whose hearing the person sought to be charged acknowledged the
writing thereof; (3) by evidence showing that the reputed writer of the
standard has acquiesced in or recognized the same, or that it has been
adopted and acted upon by him in his business transactions or other
concerns.
7. We find in the records only photocopies, not the originals, of the "long
bond papers" containing the alleged specimen signatures. Nobody was
presented to prove that the specimen signatures were in fact signatures
affixed by Yu Chun Kit and Co Yok Teng. Although the former took the
witness stand, he was never called to identify or authenticate his
signatures on the said photocopy. Clearly then, Section 22 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court and the guidelines set forth in BA Finance v. Court of
Appeals were not complied with.
8. The specimen signatures on the bond paper were not directly turned over
to the expert witness, Crispina V. Tabo, Senior Document Examiner of
the PC Crime Laboratory by those who purportedly wrote them. They,
together with the questioned checks, were first submitted to the
Administration Branch of the PC Crime Laboratory, then endorsed to the
Questioned Document Branch. The chief of the latter branch thereafter
referred them to Tabo. Tabo never saw the parties write the specimen
signatures. She just presumed the specimen signatures to be genuine
signatures of the parties concerned.
9. Tabo could by no yardstick be considered to have adequate knowledge of
the genuine signatures of the parties whose signatures on the questioned
checks were claimed to be forged. That knowledge could be obtained
either by (a) seeing the person write some other documents or signatures
(ex visu scriptionis); (b) seeing documents otherwise known to him to
have been written by the person in question (ex scriptis olim visis); or (c)
examining, in or out of court, for the express purpose of obtaining such
knowledge, the documents said to have been written by the person in
question (ex comparatione scriptorum).
10. Tabo could not be a witness under the first and the second. She tried to
be under the third. But under the third, it is essential that (a) certain
specimens of handwriting were seen and considered by her and (b) they
were genuinely written by the person in question. As stated above, Tabo
had no adequate basis for concluding that the alleged specimen
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
signatures in the long bond paper were indeed the signatures of the
parties whose signatures in the checks were claimed to have been forged.
11. Given the fact that Mrs. Tabo's testimony cannot inspire a conclusion
that she was an expert, it was error to rely on her representation. It is
settled that the relative weight of the opinions of experts by and large
depends on the value of assistance and guidance they furnish the court in
the determination of the issue involved.
ISSUE #2
12. The questioned checks, which were payable to "cash," appeared regular
on their face and the bank found nothing unusual in the transaction, as
Triumph Lumber usually issued checks in big amounts made payable to
cash or to a particular person or to a company, the SBTC cannot be
faulted in paying the value of the disputed checks.
13. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, Triumph Lumber is the
one which stands to be blamed for its predicament. Chun Yun Kit
testified that in the morning of 23 March 1987, he and some employees
found the doors of their office and the filing cabinets containing the
company's check booklet to have been forcibly opened. They also found
the documents in disarray. Under these circumstances, a prudent and
reasonable man would simply have to go over the check booklet to find
out whether a check was missing. But, apparently, Triumph Lumber’s
officers and employees did not bother to do so. If they did examine the
booklet they could have readily discovered whether a check was taken.
14. Neither did any of Triumph Lumbers officers or employees report the
incident to the police authorities, nor did anyone advise SBTC of such
incident so that the latter could adopt necessary measures to prevent
unauthorized encashments of checks. Hence, as correctly held by the
RTC, it is the Triumph Lumber, not the SBTC bank, which must bear the
loss.
SEPARATE OPINIONS: NONE
CONCURRING:
64
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

28. Sibal v. Buquel

Citation: GR No. 197825
Prepared by: GALINDEZ, Dannah

Facts: Respondents Buquel inherited from their parents Santiago and Faustina
Buquel a parcel of land covered by an OCT. In 1999, Sibal and Mangoba took a
portion of the property which belonged to Santiago, Sr. The Buquels made several
demands against Sibal and Mangoba to vacate and turn over the property, but the
latter refused. Hence, a complaint before the RTC was filed for recovery of
possession and damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the Buquels. This ruling
became final and executory hence the court issued a writ of execution.

On August 2008, Sibal filed a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision before
the CA, raising as a grounds lack of jurisdiction and extrinstic fraud. This petition
was dismissed, hence the matter before the Supreme Court.

Issue/s: Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Decision of the Court: The RTC acquired jurisdiction.

Sibal contends that the RTC Decision should be annulled on the ground that the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case as the complaint filed merely
alleged that the value of the subject property is P51,190.00, without, however,
categorically- mentioning its assessed value, and only the real property tax order
of payment was attached to the complaint and not the tax declaration that would
determine the assessed value of the property. But, upon review of the records, the
Court notes that the Real Property Tax Order of Payment dated November 24,
2002, or "Exhibit C," shows that the amount of P51,190.00 is truly the assessed
value of the property, which fact Sibal failed to refute.

65
 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

29. People v. Abenes provide a clear identification of the illegal drug seized from Abenes’ possession
Citation: G.R. No. 210878 after the sale. The police officer who could identify the drug was not presented in
Prepared by: GONZALES, Cyria Ellaine court. With the material omission to indubitably show the identity of the
dangerous drug, the evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubt as to the guilt
Facts: of Abenes for it has not proven the indispensable element of corpus delicti. Thus,
Abenes was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of the Abenes was acquitted of illegal possession of dangerous drug.
dangerous drug. According to the prosecution, Abenes was caught in flagrante
delicto in selling dangerous drug and when Abenes was frisked, another plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance was found in her possession.
Abenes, on the other hand, argued that she was a victim of frame up. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Abenes guilty for the crimes charged. Abenes
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), raising the prosecution’s failure to comply
with Republic Act No. 9165 with respect to the proper marking, inventory and
taking of photograph of the seized dangerous drugs. The CA, however, affirmed
the RTC decision. Abenes now appeals before the Supreme Court, contesting the
admissibility of the seized evidence for failure to comply with the procedure laid
down in the law.

Issues:
1. Whether the seized dangerous drugs are admissible in evidence
2. Whether the prosecution was able to prove Abenes’ guilt beyond reasonable
doubt

Decision of the Court:

1. Yes. Objections to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised on the first
time on appeal. Abenes raised the police operative’s alleged non-compliance with
Section 21 of RA No. 9165 for the first time on appeal before the CA. In any
event, an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully
observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of RA No. 9165, for as long
as the chain of custody remains unbroken.

2. The prosecution was able to prove Abenes’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt only
in the sale of the dangerous drug, not in the possession of the dangerous drug. The
prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody in the
specimen subjec of the sale from the moment it was seized from Abenes, the
delivery of the same to the crime laboratory up to the time it was presented during
trial as proof of the corpus delicti. However, the prosecution was not able to

66

VIII. Conduct Evidence (Rule 130, Sections 35 and 36, as amended)
1. People v. Pineda (Lei)
May 24, 2007 | Carpio | Character Evidence
PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENT: ROLANDO PINEDA y MANALO, CELSO SISON y
LLOREN (at large), VICTOR EMMANUEL GONZALES COLET alias
"VICTOR COLET" (acquitted), TOTIE JACOB alias "TOTIE" (at large), JOHN
DOE and PETER DOE (at large)
SUMMARY: Rolando Pineda with several others allegedly staged a hold-up
while on board a bus. Pineda claimed that when the hold-up was happening, he
was not in the scene of the crime. He said that from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
accused was in the house of one VICTOR "INTING" VILLENA in Gumamela
St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City where he installed the electrical wiring per
contract with contractor LILLIAN TAN. He never left his said place of work on
that particular day and as a matter of fact LILLIAN TAN even served him lunch
and snacks in the morning and afternoon. After finishing his work he was paid
₱500 by his contractor and at 5:00 p.m. he went home which is only one hundred
meters away or a five minutes [sic] walk from VICTOR VILLENA’S house.
Upon arriving home he rested for 5 minutes then took a bath and at around 6:00
p.m. he went to the nearby house of his contractor LILLIAN TAN where he
talked with her and drunk [sic] some beer until 9:00 p.m. when he went home
and ate dinner then retired to bed at around 10:00 p.m..
During trial, in its attempt to pin the crime on accused, the prosecution dug up
other criminal cases filed against appellant. Accused was previously charged
with robbery and illegal possession of a deadly weapon, concealing a deadly
weapon, and assault, for which he was released after posting bond. Section 34,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is instructive on this point:
SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. ─ Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and
the like.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
Issue is WON the fact that he had previously been charged of an offense may be
received in evidence against him? NO.
DOCTRINE AND RATIO: Evidence is not admissible when it shows, or tends
to show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime independent
from the offense for which he is on trial. A man may be a notorious criminal,
and may have committed many crimes, and still be innocent of the crime
charged on trial.
FACTS:
1. Prosecution’s Version: At around 7:00 p.m. of 15 October 1997 while
bus driver Camilo Ferrer (Ferrer for short) was driving his assigned
passenger bus, the "Dreamline Aircon Bus" bearing Plate No. PWZ-208
with around fifty (50) passengers on board and heading for Tungko, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan, accused Rolando Pineda (Accused Pineda for
short) and his five (5) companions boarded the bus along Quirino
Highway near Lagro. Thence after the bus conductor Jimmy Ramos
(Ramos for short) had collected the passenger’s individual fares, he
posted himself at the front door of the bus when suddenly accused Pineda
who was seated behind Ramos rose from his seat, prompting Ramos to
turn his head and look at Pineda.
2. Forthwith the latter held driver Ferrer by the neck while poking a gun at
his nape and shouted to his companion: "TOTIE, IKUHA MO AKO NG
SAPATOS DIYAN PARA MAUMPISAHAN NA ANG LARO," and
then announced a hold-up. While Ferrer was looking at accused Pineda
through the rear-view mirror in front of the driver’s seat, Pineda warned
the former, "AYUSIN MO ANG PAGMAMANEHO KUNG AYAW
MONG MAMATAY" with additional warning to maintain the same
speed as the vehicles preceding them. Thence accused Pineda instructed
his companions to close all the windows and bus curtains and
commanded the passengers to bow down their heads. Irked by Ferrer’s
act of stepping on the brake too often accused Pineda pressed the gun on
his nape telling him "PUTANG INA MO KUNG GUSTO MONG
MABUHAY AYUSIN MO ANG PAGMAMANEHO MO" and then
followed by another instruction to his cohorts: "SAMSAMIN NINYO
LAHAT ANG MASASAMSAM NINYO DIYAN" or words of similar
import. At this juncture, Ramos, who was at a distance of one-half (1/2)
67

meter from accused Pineda was ordered by the latter to surrender to him
his collections which out of fear he readily obeyed by handing over to
Pineda the day’s earnings of ₱5,700. It was at that point while Ramos
was giving the money to Pineda when he took a glance at the left side of
Pineda’s face. Thence while his cohorts were divesting the passengers of
their cash and valuables accused Pineda was continuously poking his gun
at Ferrer’s neck and would press it harder whenever he stepped on the
brake.
3. Thence after Ferrer was divested by the robbers of his wallet containing
his driver’s license and cash in the amount of ₱1,000 which incidentally
he borrowed earlier from a loan shark in EDSA and while the bus was
somewhere in Malaria, Caloocan City, a commotion ensued inside the
bus when one passenger later identified as Victim SPO1 Arnel
Fuensalida grappled with one of the hold-uppers for the possession of his
clutch bag containing his service firearm. In the course thereof the
concerned malefactor shouted: "BOSS INAGAW ANG BARIL KO"
prompting accused Pineda to shout back "TIRAHIN NA, PATAYIN NA,
PAG LUMABAN, PATAYIN NA." Immediately thereafter and while
the bus was in Pangarap Village, Caloocan City, six (6) shots rang out.
Apparently fearing that the gunfire would catch the attention of the
highway patrol, accused Pineda commanded his cohorts to check through
the window if any patrol car was following them and uttered: "HUWAG
KAYONG MAGPAPAPUTOK."
4. Not long afterwards accused Pineda remarked: "MALAPIT NA TAYO"
and again ordered Ferrer: "DIRETSO MO LANG." As directed, Ferrer
kept on driving until accused Pineda ordered him to stop the bus upon
reaching Sampaguita Street, Caloocan City where all the malefactors
alighted with their loot including victim Fuensalida’s service firearm i.e.
a caliber .38 Smith and Wesson revolver bearing Serial No. 47840.
Thereafter the passengers started crying and some even lost
consciousness. As suggested by one passenger, they all alighted at the
Tungko Police Station, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where a lady
passenger screamed: "PATAY NA, PATAY NA," referring to the victim
whose body was lying face down on the bus flooring. However for lack
of jurisdiction the police officers thereat referred Ferrer, Ramos and the
crying lady to Malaria Police Station, Caloocan City. The police officers
after looking at the victim’s cadaver and conducting an initial
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
investigation referred them to the Urduja Police Station. At the Urduja
Police Station, police investigators PO3 Celerino Susano and SPO1
Ernesto Mandanas of the Investigation Section were dispatched to
Malaria, Caloocan City where subject bus bearing Plate No. PWZ-208
and body no. 2657 was found parked in front of the Kababayan Center.
5. An ocular inspection of the bus disclosed the lifeless body of victim
lying facedown on the flooring. Recovered inside the bus were two (2)
slugs (Exhs. "I" and "I-1") and two (2) empty shells (Exhs. "J" and "J-
1"). Thereafter the body was brought to El Ruaro Funeral Parlor where
the same was subsequently identified by victim’s widow Mrs. Amalia
Fuensalida. Meanwhile the police investigators took down on the same
day the sworn statements of Ferrer (Exh. "E") and Ramos ("Exh. "H"
with submarkings "H-1" and "H-2") as well as that of the private
complainant Amalia Fuensalida (Private Complainant for short) (Exh.
"B" with submarking "B-1").
6. Defense’s Version (will just put Accused Pineda’s alibi; only his alibi
is pertinent to the case): On that day of 15 October 1997 from 8:00 a.m.
to 5:00 p.m., accused was in the house of one VICTOR "INTING"
VILLENA in Gumamela St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City where he
installed the electrical wiring per contract with contractor LILLIAN
TAN. He never left his said place of work on that particular day and as a
matter of fact LILLIAN TAN even served him lunch and snacks in the
morning and afternoon. After finishing his work he was paid ₱500 by his
contractor and at 5:00 p.m. he went home which is only one hundred
meters away or a five minutes [sic] walk from VICTOR VILLENA’S
house.
7. Upon arriving home he rested for 5 minutes then took a bath and at
around 6:00 p.m. he went to the nearby house of his contractor LILLIAN
TAN where he talked with her and drunk [sic] some beer until 9:00 p.m.
when he went home and ate dinner then retired to bed at around 10:00
p.m..
8. He further testified that he does not know anything about the shooting
incident in question; that his house in Gumamela St., Malaria, Tala,
Caloocan City is about 30 to 45 minutes ride to or from Lagro, Quezon
City and a distance of around 4 to 5 kilometers to Quirino Highway,
Malaria, this City where according to prosecution witnesses CAMILO
FERRER and JIMMY RAMOS the shooting incident in question
68

occurred; that he had no previous encounter or quarrel with these
FERRER and RAMOS and did not know them prior to the incident; and
that he saw for the first time police investigator PO3 CELERINO
SUSANO in court; that [the] instant charge against him was fabricated as
he was just implicated by his co-accused VICTOR COLET, who is a
brother of a policeman, and CELSO SISON @ BOYET TARTARO, an
asset of the police which arose from the rivalry over a woman he had
with CELSO SISON who is a good friend of VICTOR COLET. On 1
September 1999, the Defense Counsel recalled Accused PINEDA (TSN
– 1 September 1999) to the witness stand who testified that he
remembered an event which occurred on 15 August 1997 when he
figured in a rumble and the unnamed male person who was seriously
wounded as a result of his punches turned out to be the nephew of police
officer TITO ALAS who was the one who arrested him in connection
with instant case and whose house was a distance of around 300 meters
away from his house; that subsequently his sister informed him that after
he stepped out of the house, police officer TITO ALAS came looking for
him and had he found him then he could have been killed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Court should give weight to accused’s defense of alibi? NO.
RATIO:
1. The defense of denial and alibi is futile in the face of positive
identification of the accused. Courts look with disfavor on the
defense of alibi. However, we explained in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals: Judges seem disposed more readily to credit the
veracity and reliability of eyewitnesses than any amount of
contrary evidence by or on behalf of the accused, whether by
way of alibi, insufficient identification, or other testimony. They
are unmindful that in some cases the emotional balance of the
eyewitness is disturbed by her experience that her powers of
perception become distorted and her identification frequently
most untrustworthy. Into the identification, enter other motives,
not necessarily stimulated originally by the accused personally –
the desire to requite a crime, to find a scapegoat, or to support,
consciously or unconsciously, an identification already made by
another.
REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO
2. The defense of alibi assumes importance where the evidence for
the prosecution is weak and there is no positive identification of
the accused, as in this case. The rule that the accused must
satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change the
burden of proof in criminal cases. Otherwise, we will have the
absurdity of the accused being put to a greater burden if the
prosecution’s evidence is weak than if it were strong.
3. While it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the
scene of the crime, corroboration of his alibi comes from three
separate sources: Tan, Quiton, and Colet. Tan corroborated
appellant’s testimony on his whereabouts at the time of the
crime. Quiton testified that a day after the crime, he was asked
by SPO4 Mario Larenas ("SPO4 Larenas") of the San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan police force if he had knowledge of the
whereabouts of "Boyet Tartaro, Kulit and Tito." SPO4 Larenas
approached Quiton because he knew that Quiton was acquainted
with the three. SPO4 Larenas did not mention appellant’s name
as one of the suspects
4. Colet, on the other hand, claimed to have knowledge of the
crime and the perpetrators as he was a bus passenger at the time
of the crime. Colet testified that accused was not a perpetrator in
the crime and absolved him from liability. Colet knows the
names and faces of the perpetrators of the crime, as they all live
near each other. Colet asserted that he was an eyewitness and
that he remembers the perpetrators and even the weapons used.
5. The prosecution asks this Court to ignore Colet’s testimony that
appellant was not at the crime scene and did not participate in
the criminal act. The prosecution considers Colet’s testimony as
polluted, coming from a co-accused. The flaw in this argument
is that Colet is not a discharged co-accused. The trial court
acquitted Colet when it granted his Demurrer to Evidence,
which the prosecution did not even oppose. The defense
presented Colet who testified that neither he nor accused
participated in the crime. Colet’s testimony corroborates those
of Ferrer and Ramos on the number of perpetrators and the
manner of commission of the crime. Colet gave his testimony in
an unhesitating and straightforward manner.
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 REMREV EVIDENCE | JUDGE BOOM RODOLFO

6. Accused even believed that Colet falsely implicated him in the

crime at the beginning. Accused and Colet had a previous
rivalry over a woman and Colet is known in their area as
someone with influence, being a police informer. Unless he
simply wanted to tell the truth, Colet was unlikely to testify on
appellant’s innocence when he himself is charged with the same
crime and was present at the crime scene. Appellant also
attributes the motive of revenge to SPO1 Alas, as appellant
previously beat up SPO1 Alas’ nephew during a brawl.47 The
prosecution did not present evidence to rebut this statement.
7. In its attempt to pin the crime on accused, the prosecution dug
up other criminal cases filed against appellant. Accused was
previously charged with robbery and illegal possession of a
deadly weapon, concealing a deadly weapon, and assault, for
which he was released after posting bond. Section 34, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court is instructive on this point:
8. SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. ─ Evidence that one did or
did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like.
9. Evidence is not admissible when it shows, or tends to show, that
the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime
independent from the offense for which he is on trial. A man
may be a notorious criminal, and may have committed many
crimes, and still be innocent of the crime charged on trial.
10. Section 14, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." An accused is
entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of
proof. We hold that appellant is entitled to a mandatory
acquittal.

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