POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93891. March 11, 1991.

PETITION for review from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Feliciano

FACTS
 Pollution Adjudication Board filed for a petition to review the decision and resolution of the CA
reversing the order of the RTC and dismissing the respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation’s
(“Solar”) petition
 September 1988, Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte order directing Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations
because they were discharging untreated water directly to the canal leading to the Tullahan-
Tinejeros River.
 Solar Textile Finishing Corporation’s plant in Malabon was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing
textiles
 In the inspection of the National Pollution Control Commission and DENR, Solar’s Wastewater
Treatment Plant was noted unoperational.
 he combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of
the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the TullahanTinejeros
River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant’s existing
Wastewater Treatment Plant
 Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the bypass showed that the wastewater is highly
pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others
 Solar then violated Sec 8, Presidential Decree 984 and Section 103 of its IRR
 Solar filed for a motion for reconsideration. Board allowed Solar to operate temporarily and to
enable the Board to conduct another inspection.
 Solar filed a petition for certiorari and preliminary injunction in RTC-QC but was dismissed by the
trial court. Solar appealed in CA. CA reversed the decision of the RTC and remanded the case to the
court for further proceedings. CA ruled that certiorari was a proper remedy and the orders of the
Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar
 Even if the Board has allowed Solar to operate, CA demanded that the issue of due process be
settled.

ISSUE
WON CA erred in reversing the RTC on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board

SC Ruling
 The decision of the CA was set aside and the decision of the RTC was reinstated wthout prejudice to
the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board’s Order and Writ of Execution
at a public hearing before the Board
 Polllution Board claims that PD No 984 has the legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend
the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
standards set by the NPCC
 Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board’s own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an “immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life.”
 According to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar’s wastewater
discharged posed such a threat.
  SC held that the Board is authorized under PD No. 984 to issue ex parte cease and desist order
whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an “immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or whenever such discharges or wastes exceed
“the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].
 The inspection and analysis of the results of the water samples taken from showed that the
untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources.
 There was prima facie evidence showing that effluents emanating from Solar’s plant exceeded the
maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly
there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board
 It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility—Fine Touch Finishing Corporation
—had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from
carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational.
 Solar, the new owner, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive
effluents into the Tullahan-Tinerejos River.
 A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to
seek nullification of the Board’s Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of
Appeals.
 Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full
course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of
course may take several years
 The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power
 Ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.

RURAL BANK OF BUHI, INC vs CA

No. L-61689. June 20, 1988
PETITION for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction to review the orders of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Paras

FACTS
 Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc started its operations only on December 26, 1975
 In 1980, an examination of the books and affairs of Buhi was ordered conducted by the Rural Banks
and Savings and Loan Association (DRBSLA), Central Bank of the Philippines
 Buhi refused to be examined and as a result, financial assistance was suspended
 On January 10, 1980, a general examination of the bank’s affairs and operations was conducted.
 DRBSLA, represented by Consolacion V. Odra, Director of DRBSLA, among others, massive
irregularities in its operations consisting of loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers, where the
sum of P1,704,782.00 was past due and another sum of P1,130,000.00 was also past due in favor of
the Central Bank
 The promissory notes evidencing these loans were rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a
result, the bank became insolvent and prejudiced its depositors and creditors
 In a report submitted to the Monetary Board of the Central bank, Buhi was recommended to be
placed under receivership in accordance with Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265
 On March 28, 1980, the Monetary Board, finding the report to be true, adopted Resolution No. 583
placing Buhi, under receivership and designated Consolacion V. Odra, as Receiver
 In a letter dated April 8, 1980, Consolacion V. Odra, as receiver, implemented and carried out said
Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 by authorizing deputies of the receiver to take control,
possession and charge of Buhi, its assets and liabilities
 Imelda del Rosario, Manager of Buhi, filed a petition for injunction with Restraining Order against
Consolacion V. Odra and DRBSLA deputies in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII,
Iriga City
 Buhi alleged that Odra et. al. have violated the due process clause of the Constitution
 On August 22, 1980, the Central Bank Monetary Board issued a Resolution No. 1514 ordering the
liquidation of the Rural Bank of Buhi
 On October 16, 1981, petitioners herein filed their amended complaint alleging that the issuance of
Monetary Board was plainly arbitrary and in bad faith
 On March 9, 1982, herein petitioner Judge Buenviaje, issued an order denying the respondents’
motion to dismiss, supplemental motion to dismiss and granting a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondents from further managing and administering the Rural Bank of Buhi
 Judge Buenviaje issued the writ of execution directing the Acting Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur
to implement the Court’s order.
 Complying with the said order of the Court, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went to the Buhi premises
to implement the writ of execution but the vault of the petitioner bank was locked and no inventory
was made
 On March 19, 1982, the CA s issued a Resolution restraining the Hon. Judge Carlos R. Buenviaje, from
enforcing his order of March 9, 1982 and suspending further proceedings
 petitioners did not comply with the Court of Appeals’ order of March 19, 1982, but filed instead
motion for reconsideration, claiming that the lower court’s order
 In view of petitioners’ refusal to obey the Court of Appeals’ Order, CA required BUhi and RTC judge
to show cause why they should not be held in contempt in court. CA rendered its decision setting
aside the lower court’s decision and ordered the dismissal of civil case.
 Rosalia Guevarra, Buhi’s manager, refused to surrender the premises. She was held in contempt of
the court and was detained.
 Guevarra filed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and was granted liberty after hearing that
she was no longer the manager.
ISSUES
WON the Monetary Board of the CB can place a rural bank under receivership without prior notice to the
Rural Bank
WON the conduct of the Monetary Board-Central bank can be subject to judicial review

SC Ruling
 Buhi claimed that it was not given the chance to deny and disprove such claim of insolvency and/or
any other ground which the Monetary Board used in justification of its action
 RA 265 has no requirement whether express or implied, that a hearing be first conducted before a
banking institution may be placed under receivership.
 The law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the
institution to do business in the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of
the bank’s assets and liabilities. Conditions:
a. an examination made by the examining department of the Central Bank;
b. report by said department to the Monetary Board; and
c. prima facie showing that the bank is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors
 Closure and liquidation of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. Such exercise
may, however, be subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious,
discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust or a denial of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution
 The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the appointment of a receiver may be made by
the Monetary Board without notice and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry to insure
the protection of the banking institution.
 Due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
may be subsequent to the closure.
 SC held that resolutions of the Monetary Board under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, such as:
forbidding bank institutions to do business on account of a “condition of insolvency” or because its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors or creditors; or appointing a
receiver to take charge of the bank’s assets and liabilities, or determining whether the bank may be
rehabilitated or should be liquidated and appointing a liquidator for that purpose, are under the law
“final and executory” and may be set aside only on one ground, that is “if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith”
 SC modified the decision of the CA. The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings but
the TRO issued by the RTC is lifted.

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS'
BROTHERHOOD vs THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC
No. 46496. February 27, 1940

DECISION on motion for reconsideration on motion for new trial.

J. Laurel

FACTS
 Toribio Teodoro, proprietor of Ang Tibay claimed that there was a shortage of leather soles making it
necessary to temporarily lay-off members of the National Labor Union, Inc.
 The National Labor Union, Inc. claimed that the supposed lack of leather materials was a scheme to
systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc. from work. No members
of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood were laid off.
 In fact, Teodoro wrote to the Philippine Army informing them of the delay of the leather soles from
the states. But the Union alleged that this was also part of the scheme in order to prevent the
forfeiture of its bond with the army regarding his contract.
 The Union accused Teodoro of unfair labor practices or discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
 The Union has new evidence evidence/ exhibits were inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the CR. The also stated that the documents were very important/ crucial and may affect
the judgment rendered.

ISSUE
WON the workers were deprived of due process by the Court of Industrial Relations

SC Ruling
 SC observed that no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was
due to their union affiliation or activity.
 The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103).
 The Court of Industrial Relations is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. The function of the Court of Industrial Relations does not only exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees
 The Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting,
employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or f arm-laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 103
 It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the
parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement
 It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute
or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
 However, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
 Cardinal primary rights which must be respected
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be "substantial." Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it
 SC held that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue
 SC granted the motion for new trial and the case was remanded to the Court of Industrial relations
with the instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.