43. Commissioner of Customs vs.

Eastern Sea Trading

3 SCRA 351

FACTS:
Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at
the Port of Manila. Inasmuch as none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central
Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and
subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of section 1363(f) of the Revised
Administrative Code, in relation to the aforementioned circulars of the Central Bank.

Respondent argues that the seizure and forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan cannot be
justified under EO No. 328, not only because the same seeks to implement an executive
agreement — extending the effectivity of our Trades and Financial Agreements with Japan —
which, it believed, is of dubious validity, but, also, because there is no governmental agency
authorized to issue the import license required by the aforementioned executive order. The
Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to
be implemented by EO No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the
making of said executive agreement. The concurrence of the Senate is required by our
fundamental law in the making of "treaties" (Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are, however,
distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into without
such concurrence.

ISSUE/S:
WON Philippines recognizes the binding effect of executive agreements even without the
concurrence of the Senate or Congress.

HELD:
YES. In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even
without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. The right of the Executive to enter into
binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered into executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation
rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements
and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.

The Supreme Court held that treaties (which will require Senate concurrence for validity)
generally refer to basic political issues, changes in national policy and permanent international
arrangements; while executive agreements (which do not require such concurrence) refer to
adjustments of detail carrying out-well established national policies, and temporary
arrangements.
 
44. Qatar vs. Bahrain, Jurisdiction, First Phase
ICJ Rep. 1994 112

FACTS:
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar filed in the registry of the Court an
Application instituting proceedings against the State of Bahrain in respect of certain disputes
between the two states relating to the sovereignty over the Hawar island, sovereign rights over
the shoals of DIbal and Qit’at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two
states.

Qatar contented that the court had jurisdiction to decide on affairs between the Qatar and
Bahrain over Maritime Delimitation and Territorial questions. The basis of Qatar are the two
agreements between Qatar and Bahrain, proposed by the King of Saudi Arabia on the decision
concluded in December 1987 and December 1990. The two agreements stated: “All the
disputed matters shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, at The Hague, for a final
ruling binding upon both parties, who shall have to execute its terms” and “A formation of a
tripartite committee composed of representatives of the state of Bahrain and Qatar and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for the purpose of approaching the International Court of Justice, and
satisfying the necessary requirement to have the dispute submitted to the Court in accordance
with its regulations and instructions so that a final ruling, binding upon both parties, be issued.
Bahrain contested the basis of jurisdiction invoked by Qatar, stating that the agreements were
only a meeting.

ISSUE/S:
WON the two States should be bound by the signing and exchange of Minutes between the two
heads of state with the binding force of an international agreement.

HELD:
YES. To ascertain whether it can be considered as an international agreement, the Court must
have regard for its actual terms and the particular circumstances in which it was drawn. The
Minutes had included a reaffirmation of the obligations they entered into, and were not, thus, a
simple record of the meeting but enumerate the commitments to which the parties have
consented, thus creating rights and obligations in international law for the parties and validly
constitute an international agreement. When it was contended that there was no intention to
be bound by the Minutes, the Court deemed it unnecessary to have to look into intentions
because of the signatures of the two ministers. Therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to decide
on the disputes of Qatar and Bahrain.
45. USAFFE Veternas Asso., Inc. vs. The Treasurer of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-10500
June 30, 1959

FACTS:
In October 1954, the USAFFE Veterans prayed in its complaint before the CFI Manila that the
Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950) be annulled, that payments thereunder be declared illegal
and that defendants be restrained from disbursing any funds in the National Treasury in
pursuance od said agreement. The Agreement is where the Philippine Government undertook
to return to the US Government in ten annual installments, a total of about 35-million dollars
advanced by the United States to, but unexpended by, the National Defense Forces of the
Philippines. The complaint rested on plaintiff's three propositions: first, that the funds to be
"returned" under the Agreement were funds appropriated by the American Congress for the
Philippine Army, actually delivered to the Philippine Government and actually owned by the
said Government; second, that U. S. Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to
retake such funds from the Government; and third, that Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos P.
Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through
the so-called Romulo-Snyder Agreement.

The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging Governmental immunity from suit. But the court
required an answer, and then heard the case on the merits. Thereafter, it dismissed the
complaint, upheld the validity of the Agreement and dissolved the preliminary injunction it had
previously issued. The plaintiff appealed. In this appeal, the USAFFE Veterans reiterated with
extended arguments, their basic propositions. They insist: first, the money delivered by the U.
S. to the Armed Forces of the Philippine Island were straight payments for military services;
ownership thereof vested in the Philippine Government upon delivery, and consequently, there
was nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; and second, the Romulo-Snyder
Agreement was void because there was no loan to be repaid and because it was not binding on
the Philippine
Government for lack of authority of the officers who concluded the same.

ISSUE/S:
WON the Romulo-Snyder Agreement is valid even without the concurrence of the Senate.

HELD:
YES. The agreement is not a "treaty" as the term used in the constitution. The agreement was
never submitted to the Senate for concurrence. However, it must be noted that a treaty is not
the only form that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of the treatymaking
power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of the government over
international relations. Consequently, executive agreements may be entered into with other
states and are effective even without the concurrence of the Senate. It is observed in this
connection that from the point of view of international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. The distinction between
"executive agreements" and "treaties" is purely a constitutional one and has no international
legal significance.

Executive agreement falls into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as executive acts
affecting externalrelations and independent of or without legislative authorization, and (2)
agreements entered into in pursuant of acts of Congress. The Romula-Snyder agreement fall
under any of these two classes. Precisely, on September 18, 1946, the Congress specifically
authorized the President to obtain such loans with the US. Assuming that there was no
legislative authorization, the agreement was legally entered into to conform with the first
category which does not need the ratification of the Senate. This category usually includes
money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said that
this method of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters of this
kind. Furthermore, the acts of Congress appropriating funds for the yearly installments
necessary to comply with such Agreements constitute a ratification thereof, which places the
question of validity out of the Court's reach, no constitutional principle having been invoked to
restrict Congress' plenary power to appropriate funds—loan or no loan.
46. Bayan vs. Zamora
G.R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the
Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence
of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides
for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued that the VFA between the USA and Philippines is not binding since the VFA is
not a treaty. Under Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, (a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

ISSUE/S:
WON the Visiting Forces Agreement is binding upon the Philippines and the USA seeing that it is
only an executive agreement instead of a treaty.

HELD:
YES. The Court is of the view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the USA in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. It is
inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty. A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
is "an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments, and whatever its particular designation." Thus, in international law, there is no
difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states
concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements:
they are equally binding obligations upon nations.
47. Abaya vs. Ebdane
G.R. No. 167919
February 14, 2007

FACTS:
The Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines based on the Exchange of
Notes through their respective representatives have reached an understanding concerning
Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our
country’s economic stabilization and development efforts. In accordance with the agreement
reached by the Government of Japan and the Philippine Government, the Philippines obtained
from and was granted a loan by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).

On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH Acting
Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to China Road & Bridge
Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP
I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga
road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.

Petitioner now seeks to set aside and nullify Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 on the ground that
the loan agreement entered into by the Philippines and JBIC is neither a treaty nor an executive
agreement. They point out that in order for an agreement to be considered a treaty or an
executive agreement, the parties must be two sovereigns or states. It is also, accordingly,
violative of the non-impairment clause set forth in the Constitution. What should therefore
apply to the loan, is not what was set forth by the JBIC, but RA 9184 of the Philippine
Procurement Act. However, the respondents characterize foreign loan agreements, including
the one at bar, as executive agreements and should be complied with pursuant to the
fundamental principle in international law of pacta sunt servanda. They also maintain that
executive agreements are essentially contracts governing the rights and obligations of parties,
such that, being the law among parties, it must be faithfully adhered to by them. Thus, it is but
incumbent upon the Philippine government to perform in good faith the obligations set forth in
the loan agreement in question.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the procurement loan extended by the JBIC is an executive agreement or treaty.

HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated
December 27, 1999, between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government, is an
executive agreement. Under the circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an adjunct of
the Japanese Government. Further, Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 is indubitably an integral part
of the Exchange of Notes. It forms part of the Exchange of Notes such that it cannot be properly
taken independent thereof. An exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive
agreement, which becomes binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
Senate or Congress. It is stated that “treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols,
declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes” all refer to
“international instruments binding at international law.” Although these instruments differ
from each other by title, they all have common features and international law has applied
basically the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long practice
among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations.
Therefore, they are regarded as international customary law.

Under the fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is, in fact,
embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184, the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects financed
by the Loan Agreement, rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works
for the CP I project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation.
48. Akbayan vs. Aquino
G.R. No. 170516
July 16, 2008

FACTS:
The petitioners, non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers seek
via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the: 1) full
text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine
and 2) Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments
and annexes thereto.

According to the petitioner, the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing
on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public concern and
contravenes other constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. They also argued that non-
disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable
participation in all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making.

ISSUE/S:
WON the offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiation process and all pertinent attachments
and annexes thereto should be disclosed to the public.

HELD:
NO. The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters of
diplomatic character and under negotiation and review. The documents on the proposed JPEPA
as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the
exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public concern and policy of
public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege. At the time when the
Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as
they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change.
Considering the status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently
covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and settled
jurisprudence. Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well
as of Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the
same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict
confidentiality.

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
“information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.” In PMPF
v. Manglapus, SC stressed that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of
the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access
to information.” Applying these principles, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential—since there should be “ample opportunity or discussion
before [a treaty] is approved”—the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.
49. Pimentel vs. Office of the Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 158088
July 6, 2005

FACTS:
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern and
shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the
Statute. The Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998, and had
remained open for signature until December 31, 2000, at the United Nations Headquarters in
New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000, through Charge d Affairs
Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions require that it
be subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners filed the
instant petition to compel the respondents (the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs) to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the
Philippines for ratification.

ISSUE/S:
WON the executive department has the duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
ratification.

HELD:
NO. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign
nations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with
other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter
into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of
2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. The
participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. However, the power to ratify
treaties does not belong to the Senate.

Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two
separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. The signature does not signify the final
consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions
thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the
states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is
the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State.
After the treaty is signed by the state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the
people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the
treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the
President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative
whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not
contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states.

The SC has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his
official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
50. Tañada vs. Angara
G.R. No. 118295
May 2, 1997

FACTS:
Secretary Navarro of the Department of Trade and Industry, representing the Philippines,
signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.
As a result, the Philippines agreed to submit the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement
for approval with the authorities of the country and adoption of the same. The President of the
Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption a resolution for the ratification of
the WTO. On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97, thereby
concurring in the ratification by the President of the WTO Agreement.

Petitioners filed the petition questioning the constitutionality of the ratification by the Senate.
They allege that the WTO Agreement contravenes the mandate of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically Art. XI, Sec. 19 and Art. X!!, Sec. 10. They contended that the agreement places
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products
in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy.

ISSUE/S:
WON the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO unduly limit, restrict and impair
Philippine sovereignty.

HELD:
NO. The WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty,
particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting
in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to
be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in
good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on
the parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in
exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states,
like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and
benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. The
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality, be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in
the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
51. Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines
210 SCRA 256

FACTS:
Petitioner, Augusto Benedicto Santos III, represented by his father, is a minor and a resident of
the Philippines. Private respondent, Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation
with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A., and licensed to do business and maintain a branch
office in the Philippines. Sometime in October 1986, Santos purchased from NOA a round-trip
ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back.
The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for
his return to San Francisco.

One day before his scheduled departure, Santos checked in at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila.
He therefore had to be wait-listed.

Santos sued NOA for damages in the RTC of Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction citing Article 28(1) of Warsaw Convention. The lower court
granted the motion and dismissed the case. Santos appealed to the CA, which affirmed the
decision of the lower court. Santos filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Santos then came to the SC.

Santos claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention
is inapplicable because of a fundamental change in the circumstances that served as its basis
(rebus sic stantibus).

ISSUE/S:
WON the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is applicable to reject or terminate the Warsaw
Convention, rendering it inapplicable.

HELD:
NO. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a contracting
State’s obligations under a treaty terminates when a vital or fundamental change of
circumstances occurs, thus allowing a state to unilaterally withdraw from a treaty, because of
the “disappearance of the foundation upon which it rests.” The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
does not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a
formal act of rejection, usually made by the head of State, with a statement of the reasons why
compliance with the treaty is no longer required. Thus, the contention that the Warsaw
Convention should not apply because of the present change in circumstances as compared with
the 1933 situation, is not tenable.
52. Agustin vs. Edu
G.R. No. L-49112
February 2, 1979

FACTS:
Agustin, a private citizen and owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, filed a petition before the
Supreme Court assailing the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 providing an early
warning device proceeding as being arbitrary, oppressive and violates the constitutional
guarantee of due process and insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are
concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be
suspended for a period of 6 months.

President Marcos, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or
limited access roads issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 (amended by LOI No. 479) as
recommended by the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices by which requires all owners,
users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars
acquired from any source depending on the owner’s choice. Since statistics show that one of
the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled,
stalled, or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early
warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence.

Respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the
implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction. Petitioner argued that being the
owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out
from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early
warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as
amended. He contended that they are “infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public;” and are “one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and
immoral because they will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense
of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device.

ISSUE/S:
WON Letter of Instruction No. 229 is valid and constitutional pursuant to the 1968 Vienna
Convention of Road Signs and Signals.

HELD:
YES. The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word.
The concept of pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover,
at war with the principle of international morality. The hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety. The 1968
Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices. It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
possesses relevance. The SC ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The assailed Letter of
Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of
legislative power on the part of the respondent Romeo Edu.
53. Eremes Kookooritchkin vs. Solicitor General
G.R. No. L-1812
August 27, 1948

FACTS:
Kookooritchkin, a former Russian citizen, filed a petition for naturalization, accompanied with
supporting affidavits of 2 citizens, copy of a sworn declaration of intention and proper notice of
the hearing. He grew up as a citizen of the defunct Imperial Russian Government under the
Czars. World War I found him in the military service of this Government. When revolution broke
out, he refused to join the regime and fled by sea from to Shanghai and from this Chinese port
he found his way to Manila then moved to Olongapo and from this place he went to Iriga,
Camarines Sur, where he established his permanent residence. The applicant is married to a
Filipino woman with whom he has one son. Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of
Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia. He is,
therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State, much less to the present
Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed. Due to Japanese
invasion, the case was suspended, and the documents presented were destroyed. The case was
reconstituted after the war and a resolution was eventually issued granting the petition. Hence
this appeal.

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding appellee, stateless and not a Russian
citizen, and in not finding that he has failed to establish that he is not disqualified for Philippine
citizenship under section 4 (h) of the Revised Naturalization Law. It is contended that petitioner
failed to show that under the laws of Russia, appellee has lost his Russian citizenship and failed
to show that Russia grants to Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.

ISSUE/S:
WON the petitioner, Kookooritchin, is a stateless person.

HELD:
YES. Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no
citizenship. His testimony supports the lower court’s pronouncement that petitioner is a
stateless refugee in this country. Petitioner disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet
Government established after the overthrow of the Czarist Government. Kookooritchin’s
testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the wellknown fact that the
ruthlessness of modern dictatorships has scattered throughout the world a large number of
stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical
intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly
oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-
fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of
attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland’s. Petitioner belongs to that group
of stateless refugees.
Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history, nature and
character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity and civilization,
it would be technically fastidious to require further evidence of petitioner’s claim that he is
stateless than his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian Communist government
and, because he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the
Philippines.
54. Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
41 SCRA 292

FACTS:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant. She was permitted to stay in the Philippines for one month or until April 13
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on
or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as
in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed
to stay in the Philippines until February 13, 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage
with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil
Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung
appealed.

ISSUE/S:
WON Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.

HELD:
YES. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen
of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an
alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section. Section 9(g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens
who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino
citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them
the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to
reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.
True it is that the Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed
by aliens to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in
circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision however, the court cannot
see any reason why an alien who has been residing as a temporary visitor but who has
meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign
country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is
entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestable as a necessary
concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been
conferred upon him. Lau Yuen Yeung was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and
by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on
25 January 1962.
55. USA vs. Purganan & Crespo
G.R. No. 148571
September 24, 2002

FACTS:
This petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered
to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant
the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on
motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr.
Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the
issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before
it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant
be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered
his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before warrant for his arrest can be issued.
2. WON the Constitutional right to bail apply to extradition proceedings.

HELD:
1.) NO. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to
its intent. Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
“immediate.” The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the
whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In connection with the matter of immediate
arrest, however, the word “hearing” is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the
holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also
bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. Verily, as
argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity
to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that
consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.

2.) NO. The Constitutional Right to Bail (Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution) applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. That
the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not
an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who,
instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not
be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection
or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or
escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision—in the Constitution, the law or the
treaty—expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the
practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives
from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors. The denial of bail as a
matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the
requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the
resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition
Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
56. Asylum Case (Colombia vs. Peru) (Haya de la Torre Case)

FACTS:
On October 3rd, 1948, a military rebellion broke out in Peru; it was suppressed the same day.
On the following day, a decree was published charging a political party, the American People’s
Revolutionary Party, with having prepared and directed the rebellion. The head of the Party,
Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, was denounced as being responsible. With other members of the
party, he was prosecuted on a charge of military rebellion.

On January 4th, 1949, the Colombian Ambassador in Lima informed the Peruvian Government
of the asylum granted to Haya de la Torre, at the same time he asked that a safe-conduct be
issued to enable the refugee to leave the country. On January 14th, he further stated that the
refugee had been qualified as a political refugee. The Peruvian Government disputed this
qualification and refused to grant a safe-conduct.

A diplomatic correspondence ensued which terminated in the signature, in Lima, on August

31st, 1949, of an Act by which the two Governments agreed to submit the case to the
International Court of Justice.

ISSUE/S:
WON Colombia’s unilateral and definitive qualification that de la Torre is a political refugee is
binding on Peru making it under legal obligation to provide safe passage for him to leave Peru.

HELD:
NO. The Court held that there was no expressed or implied right of unilateral and definitive
qualification of the State that grants asylum under the Havana Convention or relevant
principles of international law. The Montevideo Convention of 1933, which accepts the right of
unilateral qualification, and on which Colombia relied to justify its unilateral qualification, was
not ratified by Peru. The Convention, per se, was not binding on Peru and considering the low
numbers of ratifications the provisions of the latter Convention cannot be said to reflect
customary international law. Colombia also argued that regional or local customs support the
qualification. The court held that the burden of proof on the existence of an alleged customary
law rests with the party making the allegation. The Court held that Colombia did not establish
the existence of a regional custom because it failed to prove consistent and uniform usage of
the alleged custom by relevant States. The court also reiterated that the fact that a particular
State practice was followed because of political expediency and not because of a belief that the
said practice is binding on the State by way of a legal obligation (opinio juris) is detrimental to
the formation of a customary law. Thus, the Court concluded that Colombia, as the State
granting asylum, is not competent to qualify the offence by a unilateral and definitive decision,
binding on Peru. The Court held that there was no legal obligation on Peru to grant safe passage
either because of the Havana Convention or customary law.
57. US (North American Dredging Co) vs. Mexico
General Claims Commission
1926

FACTS:
A motion to dismiss was filed by the Mexican Agent against claims filed by the United States of
America on behalf of North American Dredging Company of Texas for the recovery of
$233,523.30 with interest thereon for losses and damages alleged to have been suffered by said
company for breach of contract.

On November 23, 1912, the North American Dredging Company of Texas, an American
corporation, entered into a contract with the Government of Mexico for dredging at the port of
Salina Cruz. Article 18 (termed as the Calvo clause) of the subject contract states:
“The contractor and all persons who, as employees or in any other capacity, may be engaged in
the execution of the work under this contract either directly or indirectly, shall be considered as
Mexicans in all matters, within the Republic of Mexico, concerning the execution of such work
and the fulfilment of this contract. They shall not claim, nor shall they have, with regard to the
interests and the business connected with this contract, any other rights or means to enforce
the same than those granted by the laws of the Republic to Mexicans, nor shall they enjoy any
other rights than those established in favor of Mexicans. They are consequently deprived of any
rights as aliens, and under no conditions shall the intervention of foreign diplomatic agents be
permitted, in any matter related to this contract."

The company, inconsistent with the Calvo clause, sought the aid of the American government
instead of enforcing their claim in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Mexico.

ISSUE/S:
WON the Calvo clause precludes a state from exercising its sovereign right to protect its citizens
which may be found on a foreign state.

HELD:
NO. It is evident that its purpose of the Calvo clause was to bind the claimant to be governed by
the laws of Mexico and to use the remedies existing under such laws. But this provision did not,
and could not, deprive the claimant of his American citizenship and all that that implies. It did
not take from him his undoubted right to apply to his own Government for protection if his
resort to the Mexican tribunals or other authorities available to him resulted in a denial or delay
of justice as that term is used in international law. In such a case the claimant's complaint
would be not that his contract was violated but that he had been denied justice.

The commission does not hesitate to declare that there exists no international rule prohibiting
the sovereign right of a nation to protect its citizens abroad from being subject to any limitation
whatsoever under any circumstances. The right of protection has been limited by treaties
between nations in provisions related to the Calvo clause. Under the rules of international law,
an alien may lawfully make a promise not to call directly upon their own government to
intervene when the means of enforcing his rights under a contract afforded by the national law
are wide open to him, but at the same time he cannot deprive the government of his nation of
its undoubted right of applying international remedies to violations of international law
committed to his damage. Such government frequently has a larger interest in maintaining the
principles of international law than in recovering damage for one of its citizens in a particular
case, and manifestly such citizen cannot by contract tie in this respect the hands of his
government. But while any attempt to so bind his government is void, the Commission has not
found any generally recognized rule of positive international law which would give to his
government the right to intervene to strike down a lawful contract entered into by its citizen.
58. Count Folke Bernadotte
1949 ICJ Rep. 147

FACTS:
Folke Bernadotte was a Swedish diplomat and nobleman noted for his negotiation of the
release of about 31,000 prisoners from German concentration camps during World War II,
including many Jews released on 14 April 1945. After the war, Bernadotte was unanimously
chosen to be the United Nations Security Council Mediator in the Arab–Israeli conflict of 1947–
1948, with Israel fighting for independence. With his first partition plan, Bernadotte angered
many extremist forces within Israel. He came to be seen as an enemy of Israel and was
assassinated in Jerusalem in 1948 by the militant Zionist group LEHI while pursuing his official
duties. This group included Yitzhak Shamir, who would become Prime Minister of Israel in the
1980s.

After the assassination of Folke Bernadotte, the General Assembly sought the opinion of the ICJ
on whether UN had the capacity to bring an international claim against the State responsible
with a view to obtaining reparation for damage caused to the victim.

Normally, when a diplomat is injured in the line of duty, his or her government can demand
that damages be paid by the government of the state where the attack occurred, but in this
case, Bernadotte was there working for the United Nations. When the UN contacted the Israeli
government, the Israelis argued that the UN did not have the competence to demand
reparation, as this competence is not explicitly listed in the UN Charter.

ISSUE/S:
WON the UN has the capacity to make an international claim to demand reparation for
damages when a state is responsible for injuries to one of its agents in the performance of its
duties.

HELD:
YES. The UN’s function is charged with political tasks of an important character such as
maintenance of international peace and security, development of friendly relations among
nations, international cooperation for in the solution of economic, social, humanitarian
problems. The UN was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying,
functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large
measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane.
International personality is thus identified with the possession of rights and has come to be
recognized in relation to Member states. In the case, the ICJ held that the UN had legal
personality based on the notion of functional necessity. This theory implied that the UN did in
fact have some degree of international legal personality, though this personality did not rise to
the level of a State. The recognition of functional necessity as the basis for UN capacity has
allowed for significant expansion of the roles which the UN may undertake so much so that the
UN arguably behaves as a State more so than an international organization. Therefore, the
court stated that the international personality of the UN was found to be necessary in achieving
the objectives assigned to the organization.
59. Government of Hong Kong vs. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.
G.R. No. 153675
April 19, 2007

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and Hong Kong signed an agreement for the surrender of
Accused and Convicted Person, it took effect on June 20, 1997. Private respondent Muñoz was
charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of “accepting an
advantage as agent,” and seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of
arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from the Hong Kong DOJ a request for the
provisional arrest of Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the NBI which, in turn, filed
with the RTC an application for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. RTC thereafter issued an Order
of Arrest and that same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed with the
CA a petition questioning the validity of the arrest. The CA rendered the arrest void. The DOJ
filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, which granted the petition and sustained
the validity of the arrest.

Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for the
extradition of Muñoz. Private respondent filed in the same case a petition for bail which was
opposed by petitioner; RTC initially denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high “flight risk”. Muñoz then
filed a motion for reconsideration and bail was granted by respondent Judge Olalia Jr. subject to
some conditions. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the order, but it was denied by respondent
judge. Hence the petition to the SC. Petitioner contends that the right to bail is solely in criminal
proceeding, and that there is nothing in the constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail.

ISSUE/S:
WON the right of bail is allowed in extradition proceedings in light of public international law.

HELD:
YES. Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing (1)
that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In view of recent developments, the following in
international law trends cannot be ignored, such as: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international
sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of the Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable
doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically
eroded towards the second half of the past century. On a more positive note, both
international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus,
on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty, and all the other fundamental
rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said
Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, the Court, in granting bail to a prospective
deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in the said Declaration are
part of the law of the land. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence
or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to
apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of
the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see
to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by
our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
60. Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corp.
G.R. No. L-554
April 9, 1948

FACTS:
Haw Pia (plaintiff) instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the China
Banking Corporation (defendant), to compel the latter to execute a deed of cancellation of the
mortgage on the property described in the complaint, and to deliver to the said plaintiff the TCT
No. 47634 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, with the mortgage annotated therein already
cancelled. The cause of action is that the plaintiff's indebtedness to the respondent in the sum
of P5,103.35 by way of overdraft in current account payable on demand together with its
interests, has been completely paid to the defendant China Banking Corporation through the
defendant Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., that was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as
liquidator of the China Banking Corporation. Having not recognized such payment, defendant,
in its answer, made a demand for the plaintiff to pay the balance within 90 days from and after
the date Executive Order No. 32 on moratorium, series of 1945, has been repealed.

The lower court ruled that there was no evidence that the defendant authorized the Bank of
Taiwan to accept the payment of the plaintiff of the loan, nor evidence that such Bank of
Taiwan was an agency of the Japanese invading army. The Bank of Taiwan was not authorized
under the international law to liquidate the business of the defendant; thus, the payment of the
plaintiff has not extinguished the indebtedness of the plaintiff to the said defendant under
Article 1162 of the Civil Code. The lower court then ordered the plaintiff to pay the said
amounts, under the threat of the mortgaged properties being sold at auction, the proceeds
thereof to be applied to the obligation of the plaintiff.

ISSUE/S:
WON the Japanese Military Administration had authority to order the liquidation or winding up
of the business of China Banking Corporation, and to appoint the Bank of Taiwan as liquidator
authorized as such to accept the payment by Haw Pia.

HELD:
YES. The Japanese military authorities had power, under the international law, to order the
liquidation of the China Banking Corporation and to appoint and authorize the Bank of Taiwan
as liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such liquidation is not a confiscation
of the properties of the bank appellee, but a mere sequestration of its assets which required
the liquidation or winding up of the business of said bank.

The provisions of the Hague Regulations, section III, on Military Authority over Hostile Territory,
which is a part of the Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land, are
intended to serve as a general rule of conduct for the belligerents in their relations with each
other and with the inhabitants. Section III of the Hague Regulations only prohibits the
confiscation of private property by order of the military authorities (article 46), and pillage or
stealing and thievery thereof by individuals (article 47); and as regards public property, article
53 provides that cash funds, and property liable to requisition and all other movable property
belonging to the State susceptible of military use or operation, may be confiscated or taken
possession of as a booty and utilized for the benefit of the invader's government.

The belligerents in their effort to control enemy property within their jurisdiction or in
territories occupied by their armed forces in order to avoid their use in aid of the enemy and to
increase their own resources, after the Hague Convention and specially during the first World
War, had to resort to such measures of prevention which do not amount to a straight
confiscation, as freezing, blocking, placing under custody and sequestrating the enemy private
property. Such acts are recognized as not repugnant to the provisions of Article 46 or any other
article of the Hague Regulations by well-known writers on International Law and are authorized
in the Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs not only of the United
States, but also in similar manuals of Army and Navy of other civilized countries, as well as in
the Trading with the Enemy Acts of said countries.

The provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Acts enacted by the United States and almost all
the principal nations since the first World War, including England, Germany, France, and other
European countries, as well as Japan, confirms that the assets of enemy corporations, specially
banks incorporated under the laws of the country at war with the occupant and doing business
in the occupied territory, may be legally sequestrated, and the business thereof wound up or
liquidated. Such sequestration or seizure of properties is not an act for the confiscation of
enemy property, but for the conservation of it, subject to further disposition by treaty between
the belligerents at the end of the war.

In this case, China Banking Corporation comes within the meaning of the word "enemy" as used
in the Trading with the Enemy Acts of civilized countries, because not only it was controlled by
Japan's enemies, but it was, besides, incorporated under the laws of a country with which Japan
was at war. The liquidation or winding up of the business of the China Banking Corporation and
other enemy banks did not constitute a confiscation or appropriation of their properties or of
the debts due them from their debtors, but a mere sequestration of their assets during the
duration of the war.
61. Brownell vs. Sun Life
G.R. No. L-5731
June 22, 1954

FACTS:
This is a petition instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila under the provisions of the
Philippine Property Act of the United States against the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada,
to compel the latter to comply with the demand of the former to pay him the sum of P310.10,
which represents one-half of the proceeds of an endowment policy which is payable to Aihara
and Gayapan.

The respondent contends that the operation of the law after independence could not have
taken because both Republic Act No. 8 and 477 do not contain any specific provisions whereby
the Philippine Property Act of 1946 or its provisions is made applicable to the Philippines. It is
also contended that in the absence of such express provision in any of the laws passed by the
Philippine Congress, said Philippine Property Act of 1946 does not form part of our laws and is
not binding upon the courts and inhabitants of the country. The respondent also argues that
the Philippine Congress impliedly accepted the benefits of the operation of the United States
Law (Philippine Property Act of 1946), no provision in the said acts of the Philippine Congress
makes United States law expressly applicable.

ISSUE/S:
WON a foreign law has extraterritorial effect in the Philippines despite the complete
independence from the US government.

HELD:
YES. Foreign law may have extraterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin
provided it is made operative and gives consent thereto. To answer to the respondent’s
contentions, the consent of a State to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does
not need to be express, it is enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from its
authorized officers. In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for
the extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the
President of the Philippines and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment
of Republic Act Nos 7, 8, and 477. The application of said law in the Philippines is based
concurrently on said act (Philippine Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and
the conduct of the Philippine Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.
62. Techt vs. Hughes
229 NY 222

FACTS:
James J. Hannigan, a citizen of the United States, died intestate on December 27, 1917, seized
in fee simple of real estate in the city of New York. Two daughters, plaintiff, Sara E. Techt, and
defendant, Elizabeth L. Hughes, survived him. In November 1911, plaintiff Sara married
Frederick E. Techt, a resident of the United States, but a citizen of Austria-Hungary. On
December 7, 1917, twenty days before the death of plaintiff's father, war was declared
between Austria-Hungary and the United States. Congress has enacted that "any American
woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband". Marriage to an alien
is voluntary expatriation. She is without capacity to inherit unless statute or treaty has removed
the disability. The statute says that "a citizen of the United States is capable of holding real
property within this state, and of taking the same by descent, devise or purchase," and that
"alien friends are empowered to take, hold, transmit and dispose of real property within this
state in the same manner as native-born citizens, and their heirs and devisees take in the same
manner as citizens". Defendant argued that Techt was not entitled to take real property
because Techt was an “alien enemy” and not an “alien friend” due to the war between the two
countries in 1919. However, plaintiff argued that she could still take the property because of
the 1848 treaty between the United States and Austria which provided that nationals of either
state could take real property by descent. Her claim depended entirely on whether the treaty
was still in force after the outbreak of war.

ISSUE/S:
WON treaties between two states ipso facto end in time of war.

HELD:
NO. Where a treaty between belligerents at war has not been denounced, the court must
decide whether the provision involved in a controversy is inconsistent with national policy or
safety. A treaty, if in force, is the supreme law of the land. There is nothing incompatible with
the policy of the government, the safety of the nation, or the maintenance of the war in the
enforcement of this treaty. The court noted that the effect of war on the existing treaties of
belligerents is an unsettled area of the law. Some have said that treaties end ipso facto at time
of war. Those duties of which the exercise is not necessarily suspended by the war, subsist in
their full force. The obligation of keeping faith is so far from ceasing in time of war, that its
efficacy becomes increased, from the increased necessity of it. That, also, more recently, is the
conclusion embodied by the Institute of International Law in the rules voted at Christiania in
1912 which defined the effects of war on International Conventions. In these rules, some
classes of treaties are dealt with specially and apart. Treaties of alliance, those which establish a
protectorate or a sphere of influence, and generally treaties of a political nature, are, it is said,
dissolved. Dissolved, too, are treaties which have relation to the cause of war. But the general
principle is declared that treaties which it is reasonably practicable to execute after the
outbreak of hostilities, must be observed then as in the past. The belligerents are at liberty to
disregard them only to the extent and for the time required by the necessities of war. The court
here found that treaties end only to the extent that their execution is incompatible with the
war. In the case at bar, the court ruled in affirmative. The title of Sara Techt is sustained.
63. Filipinas Compania de Seguros vs. Christern, Huenefeld & Co., Inc.
G.R. No. L-2294
May 25, 1951

FACTS:
Sometime in October 1941, the respondent corporation, Christern, Huenefeld & Co., Inc., after
payment of corresponding premium, obtained from the petitioner, Filipinas Cía. de Seguros, fire
policy No. 29333 in the sum of P100,000, covering merchandise contained in a building located
at Binondo, Manila. In February 1942, or during the Japanese military occupation, the building
and insured merchandise were burned. In due time, the respondent submitted to the petitioner
its claim under the policy. The salvaged goods were sold at public auction and, after deducting
their value, the total loss suffered by the respondent was fixed at P92,650. The petitioner
refused to pay the claim on the ground that the policy in favor of respondent had ceased to be
in force on the date the United States declared war against Germany, the respondent
corporation (though organized under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines) being
controlled by German subjects and the petitioner being a company under American jurisdiction
when said policy was issued on October 1941. The petitioner, however, in pursuance of the
order of the Director of the Bureau of Financing, Philippine Executive Commission, paid to the
respondent the sum of P92,650.

The present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the purpose of
recovering from the respondent the sum of P92,650. The theory of the petitioner is that the
insured merchandise was burned after the policy issued in 1941 in favor of the respondent
corporation had ceased to be effective because of the outbreak of the war between the United
States and Germany, and that the payment made by the petitioner to the respondent
corporation during the Japanese military occupation was under pressure. The CFI dismissed the
action. Upon appeal to the CA, the judgment of the CFI was affirmed. Hence, this appeal by
certiorari.

ISSUE/S:
WON the fire policy became null and void upon the declaration of war between the United
States and Germany.

HELD:
YES. It is stated in the Effects of Outbreak of War that corporations and other judicial persons
are considered enemies where the controlling stockholders are nationals of the other
belligerent, or if incorporated in the territory or under the laws of the other belligerent and
may not be allowed to continue operations. In the case at bar, Huenefeld & Co., Inc., the
respondent corporation, controlled by German citizens, although organized in the Philippines,
became an enemy corporation upon the outbreak of the war, and thus could not recover under
an insurance policy.
It results that Filipinas Compania de Seguros is entitled to recover what was paid to Huenefeld
& Co., Inc. under the circumstances of this case. However, Filipinas Compania de Seguros will be
entitled to recover only the equivalent, in actual Philippine currency, of P92,650 paid on April
19, 1943, in accordance with the rate fixed in the Ballantyne scale.
64. Laurel vs. Misa
77 Phil 856

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel, charged with treason, filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by Article 114
of the RPC, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE/S:
WON the allegiance of the Filipino people is suspended during enemy occupation thereby also
abrogating the law on treason.

HELD:
NO. A citizen or subject owes absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists of fidelity and
obedience, to his government or sovereign. This kind of allegiance should not be confused with
the qualified and temporary allegiance whom a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign
of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he
receives. This absolute and permanent allegiance of citizens is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier. Sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during
enemy occupation; what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, the
same being passed temporarily to the occupant. In effect, the allegiance of the citizens to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, hence, there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance as theorized by Laurel.

Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government,
in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to
Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed
during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that: "The government
established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation
of Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known
as the Republic of the Philippines."
65. Republic vs. Lara
96 Phil 170
November 29, 1954

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines as well as defendants Enrique Lara, et al, are appealing from the
decision of the CFI of Batangas, in its Civil Case No. 43, filed by the Republic for the
expropriation of a large area of land (covering 187 parcels) located in Lipa City, upon which the
Armed Forces of the Philippines constructed and now operates and maintains the Fernando Air
Base.

The land in question was, during the later part (1943) of the Japanese occupation, occupied by
the enemy forces and converted into a campsite and airfield. The houses along the National
Highway and the provincial roads were destroyed, and the fruit trees, orchards, and sugar crops
cut down; in place thereof, the Japanese forces built concrete airstrips, concrete taxi-ways, dug-
outs, canals, concrete ramps, ditches, gravel roads, and air raid shelters. The battle for the
liberation added to the devastation of the area in question. Upon liberation, the United States
Army took possession of the airfield; and on July 4, 1946, the air base was handed over by the
US government to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Philippine Army then took steps to
negotiate for the purchase of the area for the purpose of constructing thereat a permanent air
base. Several landowners sold their properties to the government at the prices fixed by the
Appraisal Committee. The greater majority of the landowners did not want to accept the prices
offered by the government; hence, steps were taken towards the filing of the complaint for
expropriation.

ISSUE/S:
WON the Philippine Republic is the legitimate successor to the properties owned by the enemy
occupant.

HELD:
YES. When the Japanese Army had built a concrete airstrip, runway, and taxiway, the Court
agrees that these improvements should be excluded as an element of appreciation or damage,
on the ground that "the Republic of the Philippines as victor in the last war should be
considered the legitimate successor to the properties owned by the Japanese in the
Philippines".

Defendants-appellants insist that a belligerent occupant could not take private property
without compensation; that the Japanese forces were possessors of their lands in bad faith; and
that therefore, the improvements constructed thereon by them should, under our civil law,
belong to the owners of the lands to which they are attached. This argument is untenable. In
the first place, the rules of Civil Code concerning industrial accession were not designed to
regulate relations between private persons and a sovereign belligerent, nor intended to apply
to constructions made exclusively for prosecuting a war, when military necessity is temporarily
paramount. In the second place, while art. 46 of the Hague Regulations provide that "private
property may not be confiscated", confiscation differs from the temporary use by the enemy
occupant of private land and buildings for all kinds of purposes demanded by the necessities of
war.

Consequently, the Japanese occupant is not regarded as a possessor in bad faith of the lands
taken from the defendants-appellants and converted into an airfield and campsite; its use
thereof was merely temporary, demanded by war necessities and exigencies. But while the
defendants-appellants remained the owners of their respective lands, the Republic of the
Philippines succeeded to the ownership or possession of the constructions made thereon by
the enemy occupant for war purposes, unless the treaty of peace should otherwise provide;
and it is under no obligation to pay indemnity for such constructions and improvements in
these expropriation proceedings.
66. Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh
G.R. No. L-5
September 17, 1945

FACTS:
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, the appointed
Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under martial law over the
districts occupied by the Army” providing that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all
the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall
continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in
their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before." A civil government or central
administrative organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission" was
organized. The Chairman of the Executive Commission also issued Executive Orders, in which
the courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction.

On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and General MacArthur, on
behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and
responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here re-
established as provided by law."

Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying that the respondent judge be ordered to
continue the proceedings in civil case no. 3012, which was initiated under the regime of the so-
called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the
islands. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings on
the following grounds: (1) the proclamation issued by Gen. Mac Arthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines
under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic established during the Japanese
occupation; (2) the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic in the absence of enabling law
granting such authority; (3) the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation was not a de facto government.

ISSUE/S:
WON the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts were valid under the government of the
Philippine Executive Commission during the Japanese occupation.

HELD:
YES. There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a
proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force
or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the
will of the latter. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force. And the third is that established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state. It
is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized and issued by the
Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, necessarily follows that
the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments were good and
valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international
law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces. The fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy
comes again into the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty, "does not, except in a
very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or
another it is within his competence to do. Thus, judicial acts done under his control, when they
are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect
during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by
private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good." And when the occupation
and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case,
postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time
substituted his own sovereignty, as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting
independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
67. Ognir vs. Director of Prisons
80 Phil 401

FACTS:
The petitioner was convicted by the General Court Martial appointed or convened during the
year 1943 in Lanao by Colonel Wendel W. Fertig, Commanding Officer of the 10th Military
District of Mindanao, and sentenced to life imprisonment, for violation of the 93rd Article of
War of the Philippine Army. He now claims that his imprisonment is null and void because the
said General Court Martial was not legally constituted, inasmuch as District Commander that
appointed or convened it had no authority to do so, and therefore the judgment of said court is
null and void for want of jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:
WON the General Court-Martial which sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment, was
legally appointed or convened.

HELD:
NO. It is a well-established rule that a judgment rendered by a military court which is not legally
constituted is treated not only as voidable but void and subject to collateral attack. According to
the Article 8 of CA No. 408, the only officers who have such inherent power by virtue of their
position are the President of the Commonwealth and the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army.
All other officers such as the Provost Marshal and Commanding Officer of a separate brigade or
body of troops, and Colonel Fertig who may come within the latter category, cannot appoint a
General Court Martial unless expressly empowered by the President to do so. While courts-
martial, not being 'inferior courts' to the Supreme Court under the Constitution, cannot be
appealed from to any civil court, or controlled or directed by the decree or mandate of such a
court, yet in the U. S. Courts, similarly as in the English tribunals, the writ of habeas corpus may
be availed of by a prisoner claiming to be illegally detained under trial or sentence of court-
martial, and in this proceeding the legality of the action of the court—as whether it was legally
constituted, or had jurisdiction, or its sentence was authorized by the code—may be inquired
into. Thus, the judgment rendered by the General Court Martial that sentenced the petitioner
to life imprisonment is null and void, because said court was not duly convened or appointed in
accordance with law and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to render said sentence.