Global Governance 17 (2011), 375–397

Notes on the Evolution of

Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy


Gelson Fonseca Jr.

The article describes the evolution of Brazilian multilateralism since the

First Pan American Conference in 1889. The impact of the domestic and in-
ternational spheres are examined to understand the continuities and
changes in Brazil multilateral attitudes. In our days, the increasing influ-
ence of Brazil international presence, especially in multilateral forums, is
evident. The open question is how the emerging countries will influence
the new international order. KEYWORDS: Brazil, foreign policy, United Na-
tions, multilateralism.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT, AS A RESULT OF THEIR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL

maturation, a number of countries once cast as merely “developing” have
emerged over the past two decades as consequential international actors.
Among the most prominent are Brazil, India, China, Turkey, South Africa, and
Indonesia. A restored Russia, emerging from the wreckage of the Soviet
Union, is generally seen and sees itself as a member of this cohort. Collec-
tively, they promise to play a progressively more important role in determin-
ing the shape of global governance.
It is equally evident that effective and sustainable responses to the great
transnational challenges of our time, including climate change, armed conflict,
terrorism, gross violations of human rights, and uneven and unstable economic
globalization, have to be universal in breadth and broadly perceived as legiti-
mate. Multilateralism in some form is the natural and necessary means for
confronting these challenges.
The difficulties and precariousness of extant multilateral institutions are
well known. With their newly acquired influence, will the emerging powers
move the world order in a better direction? Can we reasonably hope for
stronger multilateral institutions? These questions require long and necessar-
ily speculative answers. To the end of throwing some light on present prob-
lems and prospects for addressing them, this essay focuses on only one of the
moving parts that is shaping the future; namely, Brazil. Specifically, I inquire
how the Brazilian attitude toward multilateralism has evolved in the face of its
own internal challenges and those that engage the entire world.
To cope with today’s complex realities, Brazil has participated in the cre-
ation of new multilateral forums: Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC); India,

375
376 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

Brazil, and South Africa Forum (IBSA); and Group of 20 (G-20). But in
Brazil’s view of the world, regional and other limited number forums are not a
substitute for the universal forum that is the United Nations. It remains the pre-
eminent multilateral institution. This view of the UN could be called the core
of Brazilian multilateral ideology. And while it may not be unique to Brazil, it
is nevertheless a key to understanding Brazil’s multilateral diplomacy.

Seminal Moments in the Making

of Brazil’s Multilateral Principles
The multilateral focus was a constant in Brazilian diplomacy even before the
creation of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations. To be precise, that
focus first appeared in 1889 when Brazil attended a meeting of Western Hemi-
sphere countries in Washington, DC, convened by President Grover Cleve-
land. The meeting turned out to be the embryo of the Organization of
American States (OAS). By participating in this meeting, Brazil implicitly ac-
cepted multilateralism as a useful means for advancing its national interests.
At the same time, however, it demonstrated its determination to resist multi-
lateral commitments inconsistent with its perceived self-interest by joining
with other Latin American countries in rejecting the US government’s pro-
posal of a continental free-trade zone.1
While opposing that particular US initiative, Brazil regarded amiable re-
lations with the United States as very much in the national interest. Consistent
with that view, in 1906 it consolidated what both sides perceived to be an “un-
written alliance” with the United States. The essence of the understanding at
the heart of that alliance was that the United States would help Brazil defend
itself from European threats and would also support Brazil in the event that it
encountered diplomatic problems with its neighbors. In exchange, Brazil
would generally support the United States with respect to issues that arose be-
tween it and other Latin American states. A case in point was the controversy
over the so-called Drago Doctrine, which purported to bar the use of military
means by one state to force payment of its debts (normally to foreign bond-
holders) by another, a doctrine strongly supported by most other Latin states
and particularly by Brazil’s principal neighbors.
Overall, while as noted above Brazil was not hostile to multilateral diplo-
macy, it approached with great caution any proposals of a multilateral charac-
ter; in particular, proposals that would commit Brazil indefinitely to a system
of obligatory arbitration of disputes and proposals for various disarmament
schemes. This caution reflected a still relatively weak state’s sense of risks to
its national sovereignty, a sovereignty achieved a little later (in 1822) than in
the case of other Latin states after Brazil’s short period as part of the United
Kingdom of Portugal and Algarves (1815–1822).
Throughout the twentieth century, Brazilian diplomacy was informed by
a sense that it was not yet one of the major powers that at any given time could
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 377

define the rules constraining state behavior in a way to advance their interests
as they saw them, whether or not the rules coincidentally advance the general
interest of the international community. Remaining aloof from the norm-mak-
ing process was seen as a bad option. At the same time, however, Brazil’s for-
eign policy elite believed that an optimal diplomacy meant participating
actively in the norm-making process while being careful to avoid potentially
dangerous constraints. Manifest even trumpeted sensitivity about threats to its
sovereign discretion was seen as part of a strategy of participation in multilat-
eral fora. The defense of sovereignty and its consequences for international
order, as equality of states, was one of the traits of that balancing act between
multilateral commitment and a permanent effort for preserving and strength-
ening political autonomy.
Brazil’s behavior at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 illustrates this
strategic approach to multilateral diplomacy. Despite the overall alignment of
their foreign policies, on certain key issues at the conference the Brazilian and
US positions diverged. The latter strongly supported the creation of the Inter-
national Prize Court and the Court of Arbitral Justice.2 Brazil did not object to
the creation of the two institutions, but was concerned about the unbalanced
manner by which the major powers intended to define the composition of the
courts. The debate ended up going beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to the
fundamental question for the international order: how to decide on who de-
cides in international institutions. The choice was clear: the control of the de-
cision process was based either on a country’s power or on international law,
which dictates that every country is juridicially equal.
According to former foreign minister Celso Lafer, that Hague moment co-
incided with the beginning of Brazil’s “questioning the exclusive management
of the world order by the major powers,” an attitude that became even more
pronounced during the Versailles Conference of 1919. At the outset of the con-
ference, Brazil successfully opposed a procedural rule that distinguished be-
tween countries with general interests (the United States, France, Great
Britain, Italy, and Japan) and countries with limited interests, which would
have allowed the latter to participate only in sessions that dealt with their di-
rect interests. Lafer posits, “The affirmation that Brazil has general interests,
that is, a view of the world and how it should be organized and that this view
is important to preserve . . . the specific interests of the country, became a
defining trait of the Brazilian identity in the 20th century.”3
A third seminal moment of Brazilian multilateralism occurred during the
negotiation on the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice es-
tablished by the League of Nations Covenant. One of the contentious issues
was the jurisdictional consequences of becoming a member of the court.
Would adhesion imply an obligation for a state to submit all of its judicial dis-
putes to the court? The issue was divisive and some countries rejected peremp-
torily any possibility of accepting mandatory rulings by the court. Brazil’s
proposed compromise, which in the end enabled the establishment of the new
378 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

court, was the so-called optional clause that allowed each state party to the
treaty creating the court to decide whether to accept compulsory jurisdiction
to some greater or lesser degree, if at all. That clause is now embodied in the
Statute of the Permanent Court’s successor, the International Court of Justice.
As Lafer explains, “the principle of equality of States was preserved and the
interests of major or minor powers were safeguarded.”4 This episode began to
delineate a possible role for Brazil in multilateral forums; namely, mediating
and creating bridges between highly contentious positions.
Another seminal moment took place in the 1920s, when Brazil tried to ob-
tain a permanent seat on the council of the League of Nations, the UN’s pred-
ecessor. In 1926, its effort was thwarted by a decision of the European powers
to award the seat to Germany as part of the process of reintegrating Germany
into the established order. So Brazil decided within the following year to with-
draw entirely from the League. This episode evidences a point when Brazil
was still a young and relatively weak state with an aspiration to become an im-
portant actor in the international arena and a readiness to pay significant diplo-
matic costs in order to make that aspiration become a reality.5

Brazil in San Francisco

The negotiations to create the United Nations were dominated by the victors of
World War II. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain became
the de facto owners of the plans for the new organization since the other par-
ticipants had only the barest of opportunities to influence the directives drawn
up in Yalta. Nevertheless, Brazilian participation was not entirely marginal.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggested
that Brazil could occupy the “sixth permanent seat” in the Security Council.
That move was a way to compensate Brazil for its early entry into World War
II on the Allied side and its substantial contribution of bases and troops.
For a moment, it appeared that Brazil would realize its aspiration even
while its economy was in a developmental stage. But aspiration remained just
that because both Britain and the Soviet Union objected to President Roo-
sevelt’s proposal, the latter because it viewed Brazil as a likely US ally in the
Security Council and the former on the grounds that the expansion of the num-
ber of permanent members would dilute the Council’s decisionmaking capac-
ity. Following Roosevelt’s death, the proposal was withdrawn.

The Evolution of Brazilian Attitudes at the United Nations

It is possible to distinguish four broad periods in the evolution of Brazilian
multilateral positions. The differences from one period to another could be at-
tributed to internal changes in the political system (democracy vs. authoritar-
ian regime and closed vs. open economy) and to the external transformation of
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 379

the international system (decolonization was decisive for the “modernization”

of Brazil’s foreign policy).

Loyalty to the Western World and Institutional Criticism (1947–1960)

After fifteen years of authoritarian rule (1930–1945), Brazil turned to
democratic governance following the end of World War II before submitting
again to authoritarian control in 1964 when a military coup, backed by the
United States, ousted President João Goulart. During the democratic
interregnum Brazilian foreign policy was strongly influenced by its alliance
with the United States, in part because official and unofficial elites perceived
the country’s identity as Western and Christian. As a consequence, Brazil
generally endorsed US positions in the UN General Assembly and in the
Security Council. In doing so it was often at odds, diplomatically, with its
Latin neighbors.6
As a member of the Western bloc, Brazil voted for the Uniting for Peace
resolution, which sanctioned the UN’s institutional participation in the Korean
War of 1949–1953. This position did not amount to reflexive support for US
policy. An equal motive behind the vote was Brazilian desire to strengthen the
influence of the General Assembly in security matters. Brazil, did not, how-
ever, send troops to Korea, despite strong appeals from the United States. To
engage Brazilian troops in foreign countries, even under a UN mandate, was
deemed politically imprudent particularly for a government that at the time
was losing its political support.
While seeing itself as an influential actor in the General Assembly and
therefore being an advocate, as noted above, of maximizing the Assembly’s
authority, Brazil was elected to the Security Council three times during this
democratic era. One author characterizes Brazilian presence on the Council as
“prestige multilateralism” because it was not linked to concrete and specific
national interests that could be secured through Council membership in that
era.7 While seeking to avoid antagonizing the United States, Brazil tried, as a
rule, to facilitate peaceful settlement by having the UN foster negotiation of
inflammatory international issues while upholding the principle of noninter-
vention in domestic affairs, a principle that Brazil construed broadly.
The 1956 Middle East crisis stemming from the joint Anglo-French-
Israeli attack on Egypt precipitated strong Brazilian support for UN involve-
ment in actively maintaining the peace. Specifically, it became a champion of
UN peacekeeping.8 More generally it could be said that, by virtue of being
elected multiple times to the Security Council, Brazil felt a greater interest in
and responsibility for the success of the UN as the keystone institution of
global order. Unlike the UN’s authorization for military operations in Korea by
the United States and its allies, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) established
in the wake of the Middle East war to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces was
clearly identified with the office initiative of the Secretary General. It was,
380 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

moreover, an instantiation of the Uniting for Peace resolution and, hence, of

the importance of the General Assembly. Moreover, the peacekeeping opera-
tion appeared as a new door open to middle powers to contribute to the solu-
tion of global security problems. Through that door came Brazil, which
assigned a battalion to UNEF that remained in Suez until, on the threshold of
a new Middle East war, the Secretary-General ordered the entire peacekeeping
force withdrawn. Subsequently Brazil provided troops for the UN Operation
in the Congo and United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea–West
Irian (UNSF).9
Despite a shared hostility to the Soviet bloc and communism generally,
during the years of democratic government, Brazil’s overall alliance with the
United States experienced a process of gradual attrition. This was in part the re-
sult of the disappointed expectations of the Brazilian elite about economic as-
sistance from the United States. Aggravating that disappointment was a gradual
intensification of Brazilian nationalism and determination to accelerate and
deepen economic growth and to be an important actor in world affairs.10 The
foundations of the alliance remained, but the Brazilian attitude became more
ambiguous and frictions with the United States began to multiply. Emblematic
of a certain ambivalence was the coincidence in 1952 of a military assistance
treaty with the United States, which practically made the two armed forces part-
ners, and the Brazilian Congress’s approval, despite opposition from US oil
companies, of the nationalization of the country’s oil industry.
The unfulfilled potential from the Brazilian perspective of the alliance
with the United States and the need for economic development led to a sub-
stantial adjustment of Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil needed greater auton-
omy and strengthening multilateralism began to be seen clearly as a means to
that end.
An emphasis on institutional issues became a recurring theme of Brazil’s
speeches in the General Assembly’s annual general debate. The reason for this
emphasis is simple: except for the Security Council, UN institutions have been
based on the equality of nations and, in theory, a middle power can signifi-
cantly affect their decisions. Brazil’s speeches were mainly about the need for
a more influential General Assembly or a more vigorous Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). They were also quite critical of the way that the perma-
nent members were damaging the Security Council’s legitimacy by using the
Council as an East-West battleground rather than as an instrument for promot-
ing friendly relations among member states.
An independent line also characterized Brazil’s discourse about the struc-
ture of the international economy. Brazil played a major role in the creation of
the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA), which would become,
under Raul Prebisch, a source of heterodox theories of international trade. And
at an early point in global trade negotiations, Brazil began to support the no-
tion that a country’s underdevelopment should be taken into account in the
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 381

trade negotiations promoted by the United States to produce a progressively

more open international trading system. Opposing the liberal orthodoxy cham-
pioned by the United States, Brazil contended that absolute reciprocity should
not be required from poor countries. This position became sharper when, in the
mid-1950s, Brazil began to add “underdeveloped” to its hitherto established
identities as Western, Christian, and Latin American. This new status some-
how universalized Brazilian identity, broadening the scope of its potential
diplomatic linkages. The expansion of identity led to support for the idea of
“collective economic security” and, later, to support for the establishment of
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which became in
a sense the anti–General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the forum for and
research arm of third world countries striving for increased economic growth
and dubious about Washington, DC’s pursuit of free trade.
The mid-1950s, the period in which these policy inflections became pro-
nounced, coincided with one of the most innovative moments in Brazilian his-
tory. The inauguration of the country’s new capital: Brasilia; the emergence of
an extraordinary cultural dynamism (exemplified by the rhythms of bossa
nova); and the first stages of modern industrialization all happened in this pe-
riod. The country became more aware of its potential and acted accordingly.
In 1956, President Juscelino Kubitschek launched the Pan-American Opera-
tion (OPA). It was the first time that Brazil tried to rally its neighbors to cre-
ate instruments and goals in order to collectively negotiated economic
cooperation with the United States. The core of Kubitschek’s position was as
follows: without growth, democracy itself would be threatened in the region,
so that the anticommunist struggle could not be reduced to its strategic di-
mension. The United States rejected the transformation of the OPA into an in-
stitution that could organize hemispheric cooperation policies but not the idea
behind it, which became one of the tenets for the Alliance for Progress. But be-
fore that, the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1960 was
certainly motivated by the new concepts proposed by Kubitschek.
Another important theme that entered Brazilian discourse at the UN was
the promotion of tolerance and the condemnation of racial discrimination. But
in terms of aligning Brazil with the growing ranks of the third world, there re-
mained through the 1950s and 1960s an omission, an ambiguity with regard to
colonialism. This anomaly grew out of the country’s special relationship with
Portugal and was not unrelated to the settlement in Brazil of a vocal and
wealthy Portuguese community. Brazil would not join in a vote against its
“mother country” until the years of the independent foreign policy. After that
intermission, the anomaly endured until Portugal’s 1973 revolution spelled the
end of its colonial vocation and the imminent independence of the so-called
ultramarine provinces.
During the Cold War, it was difficult for peripheral countries to take
unique positions collectively. Peppering the Security Council with vetoes, the
382 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

two superpowers generally constrained UN action in the majority of cases

where concerns with peace and security seemed to demand it. They also lim-
ited the authority and activity of the General Assembly to the best of their abil-
ity. But in the case of decolonization, the developing world tried with some
success to make space in UN political discourse and even, occasionally, action
for an issue deemed to be isolable from the East-West struggle.

A Universal and Independent Foreign Policy (1960–1964)

The election of Janio Quadros in 1960 led to deep changes in Brazilian foreign
policy—changes that were not entirely unexpected, to be sure, since Brazil’s
desire for greater autonomy was already apparent during the Kubitschek ad-
ministration. The new president wanted to broaden Brazil’s international scope
while maintaining its connection to the Western world. This meant deeper re-
lationships with African and socialist countries, and also a more active role in
economic and disarmament negotiations. This heightened global “activism”
was naturally reflected in Brazil’s positions on issues at the UN. Quadros’s
resignation a mere two-thirds of the way through his first year in office did not
halt the effort to mark out an independent foreign policy. His successor, João
Goulart (1961–1964), a president with a leftist and labor background, shared
Quadros’s general approach to foreign policy. In retrospect, one can say that
this brief era before the coup d’état against the democratic regime augured the
long-term course of Brazilian diplomacy.
It should be noted that this period was rife with internal problems, starting
with Quadros’s resignation and followed almost immediately by the signs of
military resistance to what most senior officers (and the United States) consid-
ered Goulart’s lunge to the left. There followed in rapid and stunning succession
of events: first, the political system was changed from a presidential democracy
to a parliamentary system; then, after a referendum, it changed back to a presi-
dential system; then came the military coup suspending democracy of any kind.
At the same time (and not unrelated to the military coup), relations with the
United States became increasingly conflictive once President Goulart an-
nounced in 1962 his opposition to the economic blockade of Cuba. Coinciden-
tally, the decolonization process picked up speed and the developing countries
created groups to increase their leverage in multilateral forums, groups such as
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77). In this new
world where the rift between the North and the South became structural, the
expansion of the Brazilian diplomatic presence and the country’s readiness,
according to Quadros, to act as a “bridge” between the rich and the poor con-
tributed to the sense internally, and also to a considerable degree externally,
that Brazil was charting for itself a position that was unique. On the one hand,
it refrained from joining the NAM and thus waived an opportunity to become
an across-the-board leader of the developing world. But as one of the main
proponents of UNCTAD, it did assume a leadership role in the economic
sphere. And even in the political sphere, Brazil was far from silent. The su-
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 383

perpower restraints on the UN were sharply criticized; and, at the General As-
sembly, the Brazilian representatives began to speak against what many saw
as “an invisible veto” on progress toward a more equitable economic order.
The Western group, especially the United States, would systematically block
the acceptance of international instruments that could promote growth for the
underdeveloped countries, as commodity agreements that could guarantee eq-
uitable prices for their exports, increase in the levels of financial and technical
assistance, nonreciprocal tariff preferences, and so on. Brazilian criticism of
the superpower nuclear arms race became more direct and vehement. Araujo
Castro, the last of Goulart’s foreign ministers, summarized the goals of the in-
dependent foreign policy era in terms of the prominence of the three Ds:
development, disarmament, and decolonization.
The disarmament issue provided a convenient vehicle for Brazil to insert
itself into global security discussions since it had a record on the issue that was
difficult to assail. It had no nuclear weapons, was not involved in an arms race,
was at peace with its neighbors, and it was a consistent supporter of an effec-
tive UN. Because of these assets and its size and influence in Latin America,
Brazil was invited as one of the eighteen neutral nations to serve on the UN
Disarmament Committee in Geneva. In that forum, Brazil indicted closed de-
cision processes, such as the one that characterized the treaty on the partial
freezing of nuclear tests—a treaty directly negotiated by the United States, the
USSR, and Great Britain—and then presented to the committee as a fait ac-
compli. Years later, Brazil would voice a similar criticism of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The support for decolonization was stronger and, with respect to Por-
tuguese colonies, a remarkable change occurred. Despite its close relations
with Portugal, Brazil changed its vote from negative to abstention on the Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions dealing with Portuguese problems, and, in 1963,
voted for two Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 180 and 183) declar-
ing that keeping the colonies in Africa was a threat to peace and demanding
that Portugal accept self-determination.
This period marked, as mentioned above, the origins of Brazilian modern
diplomacy. The ideas of autonomy, universal diplomatic relations, and a strong
multilateral presence corresponded to a sort of ideal foreign policy for the coun-
try, which continues somehow to serve as a guide for Brazilian foreign policy.

The Military Government: Alliance and Conflict

Within the Western Bloc (1964–1985)
The authoritarian period was not uniform in terms of foreign policy, and even
less so in its multilateral positions. Broadly speaking, there were two distinct
moments. The first one, from 1964 to 1968, is characterized by the return to
close alliance with the United States and a clearly pro-Western position in
Cold War matters (the 1964 coup was partly justified by the need to stop a “so-
cialist republic” from being installed in Brazil). Two examples of this rap-
384 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

prochement include the break of diplomatic relations with Cuba and Brazilian
participation in, indeed nominal leadership of, the Inter-American Force,
which served as an after-the-fact veil over the US invasion of the Dominican
Republic in 1965. Replacing Goulart’s independent foreign policy was a de-
clared commitment to a close alliance with the United States and the shared
defense of Western values. In an increasingly interdependent world divided by
“ideological frontiers,” the notion of an “independent foreign policy” was
senseless in the military government view.
The military regime also drew back from any hint of criticism of Por-
tuguese colonialism, diminished its presence in multilateral forums, and aligned
its votes with those of the United States and the Western countries, except on
some economic North-South issues. The inevitable result was isolation from the
third world movement and, hence, a reluctance to compete for electoral posi-
tions in the UN and termination altogether from the now obviously unattainable
pursuit of a seat on the Security Council.11 Brazil’s twenty-year failure to par-
ticipate in UN peacekeeping operations after the withdrawal from Sinai in 1967
is another sign of the country’s retrenchment at the very outset of the military
regime from any sort of prominent role in global multilateral diplomacy.
This attitude began to change by the end of the 1960s, when the country
became less dependent on the United States (due to the Brazilian economic
“miracle”). A conceptual alternative to interdependence emerged in elite dis-
course, especially the military elite, characterized by the traditional aspiration
to become a significant power, but with new features as well. Multilateralism
was still a relevant option, but its potential was limited by Brazil’s isolation
from third world countries. The course Brazil then took was to begin staking
out a place for itself as an autonomous power, a country consequential not for
its bloc leadership but for its own capabilities. Some of the government’s
decisions—for example, extending Brazil’s territorial sea to 200 nautical miles
and entering into a nuclear energy development pact with West Germany—led
to quarrels with the United States. They sharpened when the administration of
US president Jimmy Carter criticized human rights practices in Brazil, and the
government decided to abrogate the 1952 military cooperation agreement be-
tween the two countries. During the same period (specifically in 1969), Brazil
refused to sign the NPT, claiming that it unfairly perpetuated a division be-
tween nuclear and non-nuclear countries.
In multilateral forums, the first and most important objective of the new
move in Brazilian foreign policy was limiting the creation of any formal ob-
stacles to the expansion of Brazilian potential. Wayne A. Selcher mentions

the vigor and competitiveness with which the Foreign Ministry led the domes-
tic and international attack against any emerging international consensus
spawned by developed states and perceived as a contrived or arbitrary obstacle
to full development of national potential, such as criticism of the development
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 385

of the Amazon, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the birth control issue, interna-
tional pollution standards, an arbitrary twelve-mile limit on coastal sovereignty
and potential restrictions on use of water resources shared by many states.12

Autonomy was thus to be maintained by avoiding multilateral “restric-

tive” engagement. While unilaterally warding off any perceived restraint on
national development and autonomy, the military government was more than
ready to use multilateral diplomacy when it served what were perceived to be
Brazil’s interests. The main interests it served were in the economic field
where Brazil’s position coincided with those of other developing states of the
Global South. Within UNCTAD the government opted for a very vocal, high-
profile style. Relatedly, in 1968 Brazil presided over the G-77, and in 1976 it
led the group’s meeting in Geneva. Brazil’s activism in commercial and eco-
nomic issues is easily explainable. The country, in the view of its elite, needed
all of the things that the Global South was demanding, including raw material
price floors, nonreciprocity in commercial agreements, tariff concessions from
the developed states, and capital investment on favorable terms. Then came
the 1973 oil crisis and the related emergence of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel as a powerful actor on the international
scene. At that point, Brazil concluded that an alliance with third world coun-
tries was more than useful—it was necessary.
On the political front, however, Brazilian leadership in multilateral forums
remained constrained by the government’s timidity about Portuguese colonial-
ism and also about Palestinian rights, which were rapidly becoming a major
issue on the third world agenda. This timidity became unsustainable when it
faced two problems that revealed how vulnerable the Brazilian position was in
multilateral forums. The first was a dispute with Argentina over the construc-
tion of the Itaipu hydroelectric plant. The issue surfaced in the 1972 Conference
on Human Environment in Stockholm, then called Principle 20, but it did not
come up for a vote; instead, it was brought up in the General Assembly.13 Brazil
found it difficult to contain the pressure from Argentina. Its newly returned
president, Juan Peron, had immediately placed Argentina within the Non-
Aligned Movement. Then, Argentina set about using its position in the move-
ment to advance the principle of previous consultation for the construction of
dams in rivers that traverse several countries. In the 1973 and 1974 General As-
semblies, Brazil failed to defeat resolutions calling for previous consultation.
This was arguably the only occasion when Brazil had to adopt a multilateral de-
fensive stand in order to deal with a specific bilateral issue.
The 1973 oil crisis induced Brazil, reliant as it was on oil imports, to
strengthen its relationship with the Arab countries and to adopt a pro-Palestine
position. However, even as it worked a rapprochement with the third world, it
sought to maintain close ties with the West primarily through energetic bilat-
eral relations. Though, as noted above, after President Carter’s election, the
386 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

country’s authoritarianism and its nuclear pact with Germany began to strain
the bilateral relationship with the United States.
The combination of the two crises (Argentina and energy) clearly effected
an adjustment in Brazilian strategy. The government accepted unreservedly
the proposition that a good relationship with the third world was essential for
the promotion of the country’s global interests. It was evident that any multi-
lateral action could be compromised if it did not have the support particularly
of the African countries, which made up more than one-third of the General
Assembly.14 The greatest difficulty in executing this plan was conciliating
Brazil’s desire for deeper relationships with Africa and its tacit support for
Portuguese colonialism. This contradiction was only resolved in 1975, when
Brazil became the first government to recognize the legitimacy of Angola’s
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) government.
In the Arab case, there were already signs in 1973 that Brazil was aban-
doning its neutral stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict and was starting to support
Palestinian positions. The “dramatic” turning point happened when Brazil
voted in favor of the resolution that equated Zionism with racism in 1974. It
probably was one of the most controversial and internally disputed decisions
(as was the recognition of the MPLA government) of Brazilian diplomacy in
the 1970s.
Ambassador Araujo Castro’s writings best describe Brazil’s new aspira-
tions for autonomy.15 Castro, Goulart’s last chancellor and permanent repre-
sentative at the UN from 1968 to 1971, detailed the conceptual framework of
the independent foreign policy. The starting point was the idea that Brazil is a
country “condemned to greatness” and, to fulfill its destiny, autonomy was
crucial. Castro realized that, to achieve it, the international order had to change
since it often acted as an obstacle to Brazil’s efforts. For Castro, the funda-
mental working concept to understand the international order is the notion of
the “freezing of global power.”16 After analyzing the consequences of détente
and using the NPT as a model, Castro showed how the major powers used the
multilateral system to secure an advantaged power position, which constrained
Brazil’s possibilities for ascension and its maneuvering capability. Castro did
not propose that Brazil acquire nuclear weapons, but he pointed out how frag-
ile were the disarmament commitments made by nuclear nations, in contrast
with the obligations of those states that had no weapons. Another problem
mentioned by Castro was the association of power with “responsibility” in the
international order. As chair of the Security Council during the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, he made the following remark:

In the precise moment non-nuclear nations are asked to blindly trust the ac-
tions or moderation of the nuclear powers, one of them, the USSR, utilizes
brute force to achieve its political objective of domination. The curious po-
litical assumption that power is synonymous with moderation, prudence, and
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 387

responsibility was disproved. By invading Czechoslovakia, one of the per-

manent members of the Security Council ripped, in a single night, several ar-
ticles of the UN Charter, and shockingly justified this violation by invoking
a strange “limited sovereignty” theory, which, if accepted, would create a
doctrine of spheres of influence, perhaps even spheres of domination.17

Following Castro’s ideas, the possibility that multilateral institutions were an

instrument for major powers to advance their own interests became again a
constant concern to Brazilian diplomacy.
With regard to human rights, Brazil’s attitude was extremely restrictive
and any hypothesis of international cooperation was overruled by sovereignty.
There was no dialogue with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), viewed
as an instrument of Western powers. In 1977, Brazil was elected to the Human
Rights Commission, with a goal of self-defense to avoid, from the inside, any
investigations on human rights violations in Brazil. Despite that motivation,
Brazil did not adopt an obstructionist stance while in the commission.18
In 1982, for the first time, a Brazilian head of state, General João Baptista
de Oliveira Figueiredo, attended the opening of the general debate of the Gen-
eral Assembly. The decision could be linked to the reshaping of the Brazilian
image abroad. The democratic opening was in motion and the country was re-
gaining self-confidence.

Democratization and the New Tendencies

of Brazil’s Multilateral Behavior (1985–2011)
Brazil once again became a democratic nation in 1985, through the indirect
election by Congress of the first civilian president since 1964. President Tan-
credo Neves, however, became ill and died within a few months. His vice pres-
ident Jose Sarney assumed the presidency and completed his mandate in 1990,
initiating a period of institutional stability that lasts yet today. A new constitu-
tion was approved in 1988, and one year later, direct presidential elections
were reestablished. Besides the return to institutional democracy (e.g., direct
elections, protection of rights and freedoms), there was a simultaneous de-
mocratization of Brazilian society, with a growing number of NGOs and so-
cial movements becoming participants in the political scene.
With democracy, the foundations of Brazil’s multilateral politics has
been clearly altered. It was not a sudden change, but a gradual one. It is curi-
ous that, in the first years of democracy, continuity in foreign policy was
viewed as positive. President Neves used to say that the Itamaraty’s foreign
policy is an area for consensus, and it should be preserved as such, as Rubens
Ricupero observes.19
Not surprisingly, democracy first affected Brazil’s self-image. Its new and
essential objective was to “recover its international status” and, to achieve this
goal, an assertive multilateral attitude would be crucial.20 As early as 1985, Sar-
388 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

ney’s speech in the general debate delineates the aspiration that will guide
Brazilian diplomacy: “I’m here to say that Brazil does not wish anymore to have
a timid voice. We wish to be heard, but we have no desire to be hegemonic.”21
From the mid-1980s on, the country faced two distinct challenges. First,
it had to transform its negative image, a legacy from the authoritarian years.
Brazilians were viewed as enemies of the environment, human rights viola-
tors, timid in commitment to multilateralism due to a reluctance to engage in
peace missions, and distant from the disarmament struggle because the gov-
ernment did not sign the NPT. The “accusers” were mostly the NGOs (inter-
national and Brazilian), but the way to respond to their concerns passed
through multilateral forums—a place where the voice of the social movements
was being heard with increasing repercussion. Brazil began to simultaneously
change its internal institutions and its international conduct, getting closer to
the principles of international legitimacy in environmental matters, human
rights, and disarmament. Additionally, with the newly gained margins for ma-
neuvering. Brazilian diplomacy had possibilities to influence the new design
in the pattern of international legitimacy, with an active role in the UN global
conferences of the 1990s.
The second challenge is more complex and remains today: how can Brazil
use the political capital it gained from democratization—and later on, from eco-
nomic stability—to explore new ways to project the country internationally?
The process to recover the international status began in the first phase of
democratization, during the Sarney administration (1985–1990). There was a
movement of aggiornamento (updating), notably in the area of human rights.
The adhesion to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on
Social and Economic Rights, the Convention on Torture (in 1985), and, in the
inter-American arena, the signature of the San Jose Pact (in 1986) made Brazil
compliant with the new standards of international legitimacy. After the solu-
tion of the Itaipu problem (1979), the relationship with Argentina was deep-
ened through the establishment of a gradual process of economic integration
in 1988 (the origin of Mercosul), the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Ac-
counting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) agreement between
Brazil, Argentina, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which
established a mutual nuclear facility inspection process and, consequently, the
dissolution of the two countries’ “strategic rivalry.” Brazil gave a concrete and
tangible demonstration of a new disposition in disarmament matters.
In this context, it was natural that Brazil ran for a Security Council seat
after a twenty-year absence and, in 1989, it was elected to a nonpermanent
seat. Brazil could again be innovative in the General Assembly, presenting in
1986 a proposal for a South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.
Brazilian officials began to mention democracy in their speeches, unusual
as a matter of course for the military. In the general debate of 1985, President
Sarney said that “war and democracy, war and liberty are incompatible . . .
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 389

when nations have freedom, democracy, permanent institutions, a functioning

government, and popular participation, pacific and consensual solutions will
prevail.”22 Brazilian diplomacy had finally discovered Kant.
Another problem was the Brazilian attitude toward environmental issues.
The style of development pursued by the military government (e.g., roads in
the middle of forests, giant hydroelectric dams) did not jibe with the new en-
vironmental consciousness of Brazil and the world. The arguments against in-
ternational cooperation did not work anymore. Brazil acknowledged this shift
and offered to host the UN Earth Summit in 1992. This was a way, on one
hand, to reinforce through the UN a national awareness of environmental
problems and, on the other, to show that the country was open to international
cooperation in this area. It became clear, then, that autonomy could be
strengthened by integration in legitimacy mainstream, not by repudiating the
social and international pressures to cooperation.
An important factor in molding Brazilian foreign policy was the new con-
stitution, promulgated in 1988, which lists in Article 5, the principles that
should guide the conduct of foreign policy, including traditional concepts like
sovereignty and peaceful conflict resolution as well as new ones such as pro-
tection of human rights and regional integration. It also forbids, in Article 21,
the production of nuclear weapons.
Since 1990, the Brazilian preference for multilateralism became stronger
due to internal changes and the subsequent growing importance of the country
in the international order. Internally, the institutional democracy was
consolidated when the country experienced a constitutional crisis that resulted
in the impeachment of the first democratically (directly) elected president. The
government followed the constitutional process and the crisis was resolved
according to the constitution. In 1992, inflation was reined in and the process
of economic opening and privatization continued. Social indicators, though
still revealing dramatic social inequalities, started improving when inflation
(which penalizes mainly the lower classes) was controlled. During the Sarney
administration, the country’s first massive social assistance programs were
launched and these were later improved under Presidents Fernando Henrique
Cardoso (1995–2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010). Both, in
their own ways, had an important international presence. The sum of the
consolidation of democracy, economic stability, and social improvement had
positive international repercussions. The stature of the country obviously
changed.
The first sign of a greater international prestige (or soft power) is a more
active multilateral presence. Brazil continued shifting its foreign policy closer
to the mainstream of international legitimacy, especially in the areas of
human rights, disarmament, and the environment. The second was a more
significant participation in peace missions and a deeper engagement in
international security issues. Brazil’s participation in the 1990s global
390 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

conferences also brought about changes in the way foreign policy was
formulated. The Brazilian positions for these global conferences were
prepared by commissions composed of representatives from the government
and NGOs (and NGO representatives also participated in the conferences as
delegates). Foreign policy became more democratic, more linked to the
society aspirations.
The goal of this article was not to delve into all aspects of the evolution
of Brazilian diplomacy in the past few years, nor discuss the differences be-
tween President Fernando Henrique and President Lula’s diplomacy, which
share meaningful similarities in UN issues.23 It should be noted, however, that
Lula was able to take advantage of the spaces created by the retreat of the
major powers (such as the United States, which had its legitimacy undermined
after the use of torture in the war on terror as well as the failures in Iraq and
Afghanistan). The space for proposals broadened and, in this connection, Lula
promoted several multilateral initiatives: the BRIC grouping, IBAS, G-20,
Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), and the South America–Arab
Countries Summit, to mention a few.
Yet the continuities are also worth discussing. Take, for example, the case
of human rights. According to Jose Augusto Lindgren Alves, there are two dis-
tinct periods: the adhesion to international procedures (1990–1994) and the val-
orization of the system, which is still going on today, even though after 2006,
Brazil manifested some apprehension about the way that the international
human rights system was performing. After ratifying the covenants on civil and
political rights and economic and social rights, as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, in 1998 Brazil signed the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. Following through with the treaties, Brazil opened its borders
to human rights inspectors, sent the reports required by the various covenants,
created a national human rights plan, created a reparation mechanism for those
who suffered violations, and approved a law dealing with the “disappeared.” In
the Conference of Vienna, in 1993, the head of the Brazilian delegation, Am-
bassador Gilberto Saboia, presided at the drafting committee and played a sig-
nificant role in achieving consensus over the final text.
In the recent phase, the valorization continues, but to Lindgren Alves, it
was approached with a certain grain of caution. Brazilian diplomacy promotes
the human rights ideals and is an active participant in UN institutions, being
elected for the first composition of the Council of Human Rights. At the same
time, the need to improve the UN mechanisms became another aspect of the
Brazilian attitude. Brazil is worried about the system’s greatest vice, politiciza-
tion, which weakens its foundation and leads sometimes to inertia when faced
with the gross violations by major powers, as in the case of the Iraq War (e.g.,
illegal imprisonment, and torture). To correct the selectivity problem, the Brazil-
ian reaction has been twofold. First, Brazilian diplomacy defends the idea that
selectivity can be neutralized with the universalization of human rights review
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 391

systems and, second, insisting that specific violations be dealt with in a discreet
fashion and that enforcement instruments be used only as a last resort.24
A similar movement toward mainstream legitimacy has occurred in disar-
mament issues. A combination of national and international circumstances ul-
timately sealed the decision to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998.
On one hand, NPT membership was almost universal and Brazilian motivation
not to adhere became somehow dysfunctional. There were no political or
strategic reasons to remain in the company of the few countries (India, Pak-
istan, Israel) that rejected the treaty. Brazilian nuclear policies were unre-
servedly peaceful and so quite different from those of the nonsignatories.
Additionally, the 1995 review conference had decided to extend the treaty’s
validity, strengthening its legitimacy. A clear provision in the 1988 constitu-
tion prohibiting use of nuclear energy for nonmilitary purposes is another fac-
tor to explain the decision taken by Brazil to sign the NPT.
In order to complete the reshaping of the disarmament policy, Brazil
signed the Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and adhered to
informal mechanisms such as the Nuclear Supplier’s Group and the Missile
Technology Control Regime. Furthermore, Brazil participated actively in the
conferences for the revision of the NPT, forming in 1998 a negotiating group
dubbed the Coalition for a New Agenda that brought together countries from
the North and South (Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, Egypt,
and Slovenia). Perhaps the coalition’s most important contribution was the in-
troduction at the revision conference held in 2000 of the thirteen-step proposal
offering “an alternative to the maximalist disarmament proposals, insisting on
the adoption of realistic and practical measures.”25 This is a remarkable ex-
ample of Brazil’s effort to serve as a bridge in multilateral forums.
At any rate, the Brazilian attitude did not come without a good measure
of frustration due to the limited relevance of multilateral forums at the helm of
a process which, by definition, should be broad and global.26 Progress was
achieved, however mostly beyond the boundaries of UN multilateralism.
Also worthy of mention are two other developments within the realm of se-
curity and peace. The first is with respect to participation in peacekeeping mis-
sions and the second has to do with significant interventions as a nonpermanent
member in the UN Security Council (Brazil held a seat at the Council several
times: 1988–1989, 1993–1994, 1998–1999, 2004–2005, and 2010–2011).
Even before democratization in the 1990s, Brazil had a long-running tra-
dition in peacekeeping missions that began in 1956 with the Suez. Recently,
the most important contributions were in Angola (UN Angola Verification
Mission ), East Timor, and, now, Haiti and Lebanon. Brazil’s role as head of
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti has a special meaning, not
only due to the dimension of this engagement in material and human terms,
but also because it signals a willingness to more incisively assume a position
of command in the solution of regional crises.
392 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

Brazil’s participation in the Security Council especially stands out when is-
sues important to it, such as Angola, Mozambique, Haiti, or East Timor, are at
stake. Nonetheless, these are not the only ones. In many of its votes, Brazil had
explicit concerns with the institutional limits of Council’s action. In 1994,
Brazil abstained in four of the thirteen resolutions adopted on the Haiti ques-
tion and in one of them, Resolution 948, it acted alone. In Brazilian diplomacy,
the Haitian situation was not characterized at that time as a threat to peace and
so it was not deemed to be within the Council’s competence. In a similar vein,
Brazil did not approve the demarcation of the frontiers between Kuwait and
Iraq by the Council or the attempts to extend the Council’s jurisdiction to deal
with issues such as drug trafficking or the environment.27 Another area for ex-
panding the Council’s agenda had to do with the humanitarian agenda, as in the
case of the responsibility to protect. As Antonio Patriota indicated,28 Brazilian
reactions were cautious for two main reasons: first, the conceptual difficulties
involved in defining new areas for the Council’s action, which sometimes can-
not be characterized as “security problems”; and, second, the problem of effi-
caciousness of interventions that tend to deal with domestic matters.
It is important to emphasize that, for Brazilian diplomacy, the nonperma-
nent status does not imply any restriction as to how to act or vote. Brazil is
there to represent the international community and, insofar as it has opinions
and proposals, it must act with the incisiveness that is called for. Permanent
members have the prerogative of the veto, but not necessarily a monopoly over
political wisdom. Evidently, opportunities for full-fledged action in the Coun-
cil, in its current format, are limited but can be useful nonetheless. A notewor-
thy example took place in the late 1990s when, following US missile strikes,
Iraq prohibited the entry of nuclear inspectors. This impasse undermined the
Council’s prestige and created doubts concerning the possession (or not) of
weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. At the time, January 1999,
Brazilian permanent representative, Ambassador Celso Amorim, presided the
Security Council. He was assigned the task of organizing panels aiming at as-
sessing the manifold dimensions of the Iraqi situation (e.g., disarmament, hu-
manitarian conditions, and indemnities). In addition to the impeccable
assessment carried out (none of the contents of the final report were ever re-
futed), the panel proposed a framework for the return of inspection that guided
the negotiations that led to the resolution creating the UN Monitoring, Verifi-
cation, and Inpsection Commission in 1999.29 At that point in time, Brazil
fully exercised its ability to build bridges; in this case, bringing together per-
manent members in a direction that restored the authority of the Security
Council in one of the most controversial issues on the international agenda.
In 2010, after rotating back into the Council, Brazil, with Celso Amorim
now acting as minister of foreign relations, attempted a similar move in view
of the impasse holding back nuclear energy negotiations with Iran. It is beyond
the scope of this article to discuss why the Brazilian and Turkish formula for
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 393

enrichment of Iranian uranium in a third world country was not even brought
up in the Security Council, which days later imposed a new round of sanctions
on Iran. Brazil and Turkey voted against that resolution. Differently than what
occurred in 1999, there was no mandate to act on behalf of the Council and,
hence, the initiative was ignored by the permanent members. On the other
hand, the Brazilian attitude was broadly discussed internally. The criticism
concentrated on the idea that Brazil does not have specific strategic interests
in Iran and so its capacity to influence events in the region is modest.
Another revealing sign of Brazil’s multilateral stance was the Initiative
Against Hunger proposal, launched in 2004 by the presidents of Brazil, Spain,
France, and Chile. The stated goal consists of reducing in half the number of
people in the world suffering and dying as a result of poverty and hunger by
the year 2015.
A mention of Brazil’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the
Security Council is in order. The Brazilian credentials are indisputable given,
for instance, its commitment to the values and practices of the United Nations.
Brazil has cultivated excellent relations in its region and a good reputation at
the global level. Its candidacy thus seems “natural” and, domestically, the ef-
fort to become a permanent member of the Security Councial has achieved a
reasonable consensus. But some controversy remains regarding the “costs” of
the candidacy and the strategy adopted in its pursuance. Is the hypothesis one
of causing harm to or enhancing Brazil’s regional presence? What is the ef-
fective cost of garnering more votes? Is Brazil prepared for global diplomacy?
Answers have been varied. But during President Lula’s term in office, the dis-
position to pursue alongside Germany, India, and Japan, the Group of 4 (G4),
a reform proposal establishing new permanent members, gained momentum.
Two important issues in which Brazil’s profile has been increasing must
be summarily mentioned: trade and the environment. As I indicated above, the
traditional attitude in matters related to the environment was that sovereignty
was the sole factor defining Brazil’s choices. After the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development (Rio 92), this attitude evolved to
admit international cooperation. Brazil was a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol.
Nowadays, one of the “emblematic” concerns consists of defining shares of re-
sponsibility for global warming.30 This item is crucial since curbing global
warming implies costs that affect economic potential. The ensuing clash be-
tween rich countries (traditional polluters) and emerging countries (recent pol-
luters) was more than expected. The Brazilian emphasis—and that of many
other developing countries—on “differentiated” responsibilities was germane
to the idea of “sharing” costs. They go hand in hand. The negotiating processes
must strike a balance between a careful (and painful) sharing of costs incur-
ring on the short run and the need for a global environmental solidarity. The
greatest risk is mutual demonizing of negotiating positions, which is always a
possibility when issues that are at the same time highly technical and emo-
394 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

tional are at stake. The Brazilian attitude, if we look back at the United Na-
tions Climate Change Conference meetings, have evolved to a willingness to
accept greater responsibilities for the costs of attenuating the effects of climate
change, without abandoning the need to find a balanced and just solution for
developing countries.
The Doha Round negotiations are advancing slowly; many believe that
they are entering a terminal stage. This is not how Brazil sees it because the
country is always motivated by a belief in universal solutions for trade, not
least because several issues in this realm (e.g., subsidies) are intrinsically
global. The complexity of the Brazilian economy is crucial in understanding
Brazil’s stance. In a nutshell, the demands of the developed countries are con-
centrated in modernized sectors (e.g., greater access to industrialized products
and services markets) in which the developing countries are not always inter-
nationally competitive and little is offered in sectors where they are competi-
tive like agriculture. Often, developed countries are the ones with an illiberal
attitude only to protect the more traditional sectors of their economies. They
have the economic and financial conditions to subsidize their agricultural sec-
tors, but Brazil does not. The road ahead is not yet clear. But again, Brazil is
a fair partner in the game. It has legitimate interests to protect, and its view of
the future conforms to the tenets of its multilateral vision.

Conclusion
My examination of the evolution of Brazil’s multilateral attitude was naturally
quite selective. But I think it may be sufficient to demonstrate one simple
point: Brazil has had a consistent and clear multilateral vocation, characterized
by a balanced view of the possibilities and limitations of the United Nations.
A sort of utopian realism marks Brazil’s attitude. We need a stronger multilat-
eralism because the multilateral forums are the ideal stage for the middle pow-
ers to influence global questions. On the other hand, multilateralism is seldom
a clear path. Ideals and principles define the goals of the institutions, but the
hard game of politics is the necessary means to realize those goals. Vocation
and caution go together.
Brazil has expended a large amount of political capital in the United Na-
tions. This capital is translated, physically, into missions with considerable
staffs and, morally, into the acceptance of the legitimacy of the decisions made
by the organization. This constitutes a natural path for Brazil’s projection into
the decisionmaking arena of the international order. If it is to accept the notion
that universal forums, especially the UN, are ultimately becoming irrelevant,
would it be worthwhile to maintain its engagement or would it be preferable
to pursue partial solutions according to specific interests and selected partners;
for example as in the Group of 8 (G8) model?31 Thus far, the diagnosis made
by Brazilian diplomacy is that partial movements are quite distant to under-
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 395

mine the need for a strong, legitimate, and universal forum. Brazilian diplo-
macy firmly sustains the belief that the solutions to the problems Brazil faces
in several fields, from disarmament to the environment, must be universal. The
challenge is not to abandon the UN, but rather to strengthen it and to ensure
that partial movements converge toward the universal forum. More than ever,
there is a need for countries that know how to build bridges in a world in
which clear consensus and easily convergent interests are difficult to find.
Indeed, Brazil’s presence in the world is essentially diplomatic. It does not
aspire to be a military power; it is not promoting an ideological agenda; and it
is still a developing country. So Brazil has, perforce, been relating to the world
primarily through diplomacy. And diplomacy should be the domain of
tolerance—of the ability to deal with differences—which is a product that the
world needs with urgency. So, if Brazil were to become a member of the Secu-
rity Council, its multilateral orientation would be an asset that could help to
generate more diverse ways of facing conflict resolution and the issues of se-
curity than those that have tended to resonate with the present permanent mem-
bers. Brazilian diplomats believe that the country’s settled commitment to
multilateralism is the trump card in its bid for a permanent seat.

Notes
Gelson Fonseca Jr. served as permanent representative to the United Nations from 1999
to 2003, as ambassador to Santiago from 2003 to 2006, and as consul general (Madrid)
from 2006 to 2009. Presently, he is inspector general of the Foreign Service (since
2009) and professor at Instituto Rio Branco, Brasilia, Brazil.
This article was translated by Jose Pedro Londres Fonseca. The author wishes to
thank Tom Farer for his perceptive observations and his careful, intelligent, and sensi-
tive editing of the text. He also thanks Celso Lafer, Rubens Ricupero, Breno Hermann,
Benoni Belli, Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa, and Gisela Padovan for their rich comments.
Alexandra Barahona reviewed the text with care and intelligence. While the author is
a member of the Brazilian diplomatic service, this article reflects only his personal
views.
1. The motives behind Brazil’s approving the bureau can be found in the report on
the US invitation issued by the State Council on 7 November 1888, O Conselho de Es-
tado e a política externa do Império, 1975–1889 (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2000).
2. Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa, O Brasil nas Nações Unidas (Brasilia: FUNAG,
2007).
3. Celso Lafer, A Identidade Nacional do Brasil e a Política Externa Brasileira
(São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2009), p. 73.
4. Ibid., p. 78.
5. E. V. Garcia, O Brasil na Liga das Nações: Vencer ou Não Perder, 1919–1926
(Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS, 2000).
6. See Wayne A. Selcher, Brazil’s Multilateral Relations (Boulder: Westview,
1978), p. 38.
7. Eduardo Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança e a Inserção do Brasil no Mecanismo
de Segurança Coletiva das Nações Unidas (Brasília: FUNAG, 2010), p. 82.
8. Ibid.
396 Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

9. Ibid., p. 84.
10. As Selcher (Brazil’s Multilateral Relations) explains, starting with Kubistchek,
“the chief national goal became industrialization. Foreign policy ceased being merely
expressive (declarative of what Brazil represents in the world) and became instrumen-
tal to concrete national programs,” p. 39.
11. Selcher (Brazil’s Multilateral Relations) correctly states that “Brazil has kept a
low profile in not showing great interest in election to a Security Council seat at the
present time, because that would tend to over-accentuate some political vulnerabilities
in areas not immediately tied to the national interest,” p. 45.
12. Selcher, Brazil’s Multilateral Relations, p. 23.
13. Andre A. Correa do Lago, Estocolmo, Rio, Joanesburgo: o Brasisl e as três
conferências ambientais das Nações Unidas (Brasília: FUNAG, 2007), p. 138.
14. In a 1968 telegram, Ambassador Araujo Castro, permanent representative to the
UN, was explicit: “I see great difficulty ahead for any Brazilian aspiration to higher po-
sitions in the UN, given how irritated and disappointed a number of African nations,
who do not hide their hostility.” The telegram can be found in J. A. Costa Vargas, Uma
Esplêndida Tradição: João Augusto Araujo Castro e a Política Exterior do Brasil
(Brasilia: Instituto Rio Branco, 2008), p. 50
15. Rodrigo Amado, Araujo Castro (Brasilia: Editora Universidade de Brasilia,
1982).
16. Ibid., p. 219.
17. Vargas, Uma Esplêndida Tradição, p. 80.
18. See J. A. Lindgren Alves, “Human Rights and the Role of Brazil,” in Alexan-
dre de Gusmão, ed., O Brasil e a ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2008), p. 190.
19. Rubens Ricupero, Diário de Bordo (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial), p. 38.
20. Seixas Correa, O Brasil nas Nações Unidas, p. 441.
21. Ibid., p. 447.
22. Ibid., p. 457.
23. Some differences are meaningful. For instance, despite the same goals, the
campaign to obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council led to very different diplo-
matic mobilization efforts, much more forceful during Lula’s government.
24. Brazilian president Dilma Roussef, whose mandate began 1 January 2011, sig-
naled that some changes will be introduced in human rights policies. A different atti-
tude in regard to the Iranian problems was the first movement, and Brazil voted in favor
of a Council of Human Rights resolution that designated a special rapporteur for Iran.
25. See Carlos S. Duarte, “Por um mundo livre de armas de destruição em massa:
desarmamento e não proliferação,” in O Brasil e a ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2008), p. 75.
26. Ibid., p. 81.
27. See Uziel, O Conselho de Segurança e a Inserção do Brasil no Mecanismo de
Segurança Coletiva das Nações Unidas, p. 164. The author mentions that, during his
2004–2005 mandate, Brazil abstained only in three votes in the Security Council: Res-
olution 1559 (Lebanon), because it disagreed with the characterization of the situation
as a threat to peace; Resolution 1593 (Sudan), because it defended the notion that the
Security Council could impose restrictions on the International Criminal Court; and
Resolution 1646 (Human Rights Council), because it opposed the existence of perma-
nent seats for the P5 on the Council.
28. Ver Antonio Patriota, O Conselho de Segurança após a Guerra do Golfo, 2nd
ed. (Brasília: FUNAG, 2010). Patriota is now the Brazilian foreign minister and, as
many of his predecessors, has a strong multilateral background.
29. See A. Patriota, G. Padovan, and L. Gorgulho, “Os Três Painèis sobre o Iraque
nas Nações Unidas,” in Alexandre de Gusmão, ed., O Brasil na ONU (Brasilia:
FUNAG, 2008), pp. 231–249.
 Gelson Fonseca Jr. 397

30. There are several other issues, but global warming is perhaps the most reveal-
ing of the interests being negotiated.
31. In trade matters, a similar criticism is also raised. It is said that Brazil should
have engaged more consistently in bilateral free-trade agreements instead of waiting
for the dubious possibility of success of the Doha Round. The government defense says
that there are areas, such as intellectual property, agricultural subsidies, and others, that
necessarily require a universal treatment or the results will be meaningless. Moreover,
the diversified (in terms of products and international partners) Brazilian economy
tends to gain in absolute terms only with global negotiations. For a summary of the dis-
cussion on trade policies, see Lia Valls Pereira, “A pauta do comércio exterior brasileiro
e os acordos comerciais,” Conjuntura Econômica (June 2010); Pedro Motta Veiga and
Sandra Polonio Rios, “A Política Externa do Governo Lula: o fim do consenso de
Brasília,” Breves Cindes (August 2010).
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