SECOND DIVISION (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum; to pay a
fine of P5,000.00; and to pay the cost.
G.R. No. 113218            November 22, 2001
ALEJANDRO TECSON, petitioner,  US dollar notes subject of the offense.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on appeal by certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. No. 11744 promulgated on August 31, 1993, and its Resolution dated
December 23, 1993, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
This case stemmed from a charge of illegal possession and use of counterfeit US
dollar notes, as defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code, against herein petitioner Alejandro Tecson y Florencio. The Information
reads:
That on or about April 28, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control,
with intent to use and pass, as in fact he did use and pass ten (10)
pieces of 100-US dollar notes of the Federal Reserve Note, or a sum of
$1,000.00 (US Dollar) to Pedro C. Labita, a confidential assistant of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, which bills were in the resemblance
and similitude of the dollar bills issued by the United States
Government, the said accused knowing, as he did, that the said US
dollar bills were forged and falsified.
Contrary to law.
Upon being arraigned on July 20, 1990, the petitioner entered the plea of "Not
guilty" to the charge.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision 2 dated May 6, 1991,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares accused ALEJANDRO F.
TECSON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in
Art. 168 and penalized in Art. 166 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code; and hereby sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium
period as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to burn the ten (10) pieces of 100
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the petitioner filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court in toto on
August 31, 1993. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the decision of the
appellate court but it was denied on December 23, 1993. 3
Hence, the instant petition.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that a civilian
informer personally informed the Cash Department of the Central Bank of the
Philippines that a certain Mang Andy was involved in a syndicate engaging in
the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. On April 26, 1990 a test-buy
operation was ordered by Atty. Pio Chan, Jr., Chief of the Investigation Staff of
the Central Bank, which resulted in the purchase from Mang Andy of one (1) US
dollar note for Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) that was found to be counterfeit
by the Currency Analysis and Redemption Division of the Central Bank.
Consequently, Atty. Chan formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
composed of prosecution witnesses Pedro Labita, Confidential Assistant of the
Investigation Staff of the Central Bank, and Cpl. Johnny Marqueta, a
representative of the US Secret Service, together with William Pasive, Warren
Castillo and Carlos Toralde, Jr. also of the Investigation Staff of the Central
Bank.4
On April 28, 1990, at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, the team proceeded to
the Jollibee restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila. Three (3) members of the
team namely: William Pasive, Carlos Toralde, Jr., and Warren Castillo positioned
themselves outside the Jollibee restaurant while Pedro Labita and Johnny
Marqueta proceeded inside. Subsequently, the civilian informer arrived inside
the restaurant and approached a man who was seated two (2) tables away from
where Labita and Marqueta were positioned. The informer introduced to Mang
Andy the said Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta as the persons interested in
buying US dollar notes. Apparently convinced, the man drew ten (10) pieces of
US $100 dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment, and upon a pre-arranged
signal from the informer, Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central
Bank operatives and apprehended the man called Mang Andy whom they later
identified as the herein petitioner Alejandro Tecson. 5
During the investigation at the Central Bank, the petitioner affixed his initial on
the dorsal portion of each of the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes 6 and
signed the corresponding receipt 7 for the said US dollar notes seized from him.
He also executed a "Pagpapatunay" 8 attesting to the proper conduct of the
investigation by the Central Bank operatives on the petitioner. Subsequent
examination by the Currency Analysis and Redemption Division of the Central
Bank shows that the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes confiscated from
the petitioner are indeed counterfeit.9
The defense denied any liability of the petitioner for the crime of illegal
possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes. Petitioner testified that he
was inside the Jollibee restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila on April 28, 1990 to meet
a certain Nora Dizon, wife of his friend, Reynaldo de Guzman, who previously
sought his assistance in securing insurance payment bond. After Nora's arrival
at the restaurant, she handed to him a sealed envelope which he accepted
thinking that it contained the documents pertaining to the insurance payment
bond. Upon receipt of the sealed envelope, however, two (2) male persons
approached and immediately handcuffed him. They dragged him outside the
restaurant where three (3) other persons were waiting. After boarding a taxi,
they blindfolded the petitioner and took him to the Central Bank building in F. B.
Harrison St., Manila where he was investigated.10
The investigators inquired from the petitioner about the source of the fake US
dollar notes. Petitioner vehemently denied having possession nor any
knowledge as to the source of the fake US dollar notes and claimed that the
same were merely planted by the arresting officers. Petitioner also claimed that
he was tortured into initialing the dorsal portions of the ten (10) counterfeit US
$100 dollar notes and into signing the Receipt and Inventory for
Property/Articles Seized as well as the ''Pagpapatunay". 11
The instant appeal by certiorari12 reveals the following assignment of errors:
I petitioner during his custodial investigation are inadmissible in evidence for
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO FIND THAT THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PETITIONER'S
CONVICTION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN
LAW.
In essence, petitioner claimed that no buy-bust operation took place inside the
Jollibee restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila on April 28, 1990 inasmuch as
there was no haggling as to the price between him and the poseur buyers, and
that no money changed hands. He was merely framed up by the Central Bank
operatives by planting fake US dollar notes inside the envelope which was
handed to him by the wife of his friend who earlier asked for his assistance
regarding insurance payment bond. He accepted the envelope thinking that it
contained the documents pertaining to the insurance payment bond.
Assuming arguendo that a buy-bust operation was conducted, the petitioner
claimed that the testimony of prosecution witness Pedro Labita to the effect that
the civilian informer had to convince the petitioner negated any alleged intent
on his part to sell counterfeit US dollar notes to the poseur buyers. In addition,
he averred that prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta had no personal
knowledge as to petitioner's alleged possession of counterfeit US dollar notes as
they merely relied on the predetermined signal of the civilian informer before
making the arrest. Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes allegedly
confiscated from him (petitioner) incidental to his arrest are inadmissible in
evidence. Likewise, his initial on the dorsal portion of the said US dollar notes
and his signature on the "Pagpapatunay" are inadmissible for having been
obtained without the aid of counsel. That is the version of the petitioner.
The respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
countered in their Comment that the absence of haggling among the parties to
the buy-bust operation did not negate petitioner's actual possession and use of
the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes, which fact of possession is
punishable by law. Prosecution witnesses Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta,
who acted as poseur buyers, testified that they saw the petitioner drew the
subject fake US dollar notes from his wallet13 in order to sell the same to them.
While respondents, through counsel, conceded that the "Pagpapatunay" and the
"Receipt and Inventory for Property/Articles Seized" which were signed by the
having been obtained in the absence of his counsel, they maintained that there
are sufficient independent evidence on record to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.14
By way of reply,15 the petitioner, who is now 70 years of age, 16 contends that
possession should be coupled with intent to use the counterfeit US dollar bills in
order to hold him liable under the provision of Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
 ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and
other instruments of credit. — Unless the act be one of those coming
under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who
shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of
the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
The elements of the crime charged for violation of Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: 1 ) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other
obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or
other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another
person; 2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or
falsified; and 3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such
forged or falsified instruments.17 Hence, possession of fake dollar notes must be
coupled with the act of using or at least with intent to use the same as shown by
a clear and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime, 18 as was
sufficiently proven in the case at bar.  (10) pieces of fake US $100 dollar notes to show the same to the supposed
We find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the case at bar. The
prosecution established, through the testimonies of Pedro Labita and Johnny
Marqueta, that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the combined agents of
the Central Bank of the Philippines and the US Secret Service, and that the
petitioner was therein caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of and in the
act of offering to sell counterfeit US dollar notes. During the buy-bust operation,
prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta were introduced by the civilian
informer to the petitioner as interested buyers of fake US dollar notes. When the
petitioner was in the act of drawing the ten (10) pieces of fake US $100 dollar
notes from his wallet, he was immediately placed under arrest by Labita and his
team.
The testimony of Pedro Labita which was corroborated by Johnny Marqueta and
the presentation during the trial of the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar
notes, which were confiscated from the petitioner when he was arrested,
proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of
illegal possession and use of fake US dollar notes under Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code. The trial court in its decision characterized the respective
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta as "clear,
straightforward, impartial and (thus) convincing". 19 We fail to discern any ill
motive on the part of the said prosecution witnesses in testifying against the
petitioner whom they met for the first time only on April 28, 1990. Petitioner
himself admitted during the trial that he was not aware of any ill motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses to implicate him in the crime of counterfeiting
US dollar notes.20 The settled rule is that the testimony of even a lone
prosecution witness as long as it is positive and clear and not arising from an
improper motive to impute a serious offense to the accused, deserves full
credit.21
The absence of haggling as to the price of the subject fake US dollar notes
between the petitioner and the poseur buyers did not negate the fact of the buy-
bust operation. Significantly, the transaction for the purchase of fake US dollar
notes was only at its inception when the Central Bank operatives at that point
decided to apprehend the petitioner. Mere possession coupled with intent to
use the counterfeit US dollar notes, as proven in the case at bar, is sufficient to
constitute the crime under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts, as established by the evidence adduced, show that the civilian
informer introduced prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta to the
petitioner as the persons interested in buying fake US dollar notes. Having been
thus convinced, petitioner removed his wallet from his pocket and drew the ten
buyers. Petitioner's natural reaction to the seeming interest of the poseur
buyers to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly showed
his intention to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. In any event, what we
have here is a case of entrapment which is allowed, and not instigation.
Petitioner cannot validly claim that he had no intention of committing the crime
by citing the testimony of Pedro Labita to the effect that he (petitioner) was
merely convinced by the civilian informer that Labita and Marqueta were
interested to buy fake US dollar notes. The pertinent portion of Labita's
testimony reads, thus:
ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR:
Q:       All right, let me clarify this, Mr. Witness. This informant or
informer that you mentioned, he also arrived there at the Jollibee
Restaurant, Mr. Witness?
A:       Yes, sir, but he arrived late.
Q:       So, he arrived late. Now, after the arrival of this informant at the
Jollibee Restaurant, what did this informant do inside the Jollibee
restaurant while you were there, Mr. Witness?
A:       Our informer tried to convince the accused and after convincing
that we are the buyers of said counterfeit notes, he immediately draws
(sic) from his wallet that (sic) counterfeit notes, and upon pre-signal of
our informer, we immediately apprehended the accused, sir. 22
The above-quoted testimony of prosecution witness Labita negates the
petitioner's claim that he was merely instigated into committing the crime by
the civilian informer. It appears that prior to the buy-bust operation, the
petitioner already had the intention to sell counterfeit US dollar notes as he, in
fact, had an agreement with the civilian informer to arrange for a meeting with
interested buyers. In other words, the civilian informer did not have to convince
the petitioner to sell fake US dollar notes during the buy-bust operation on April
28, 1990 inside the Jollibee restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta Cruz, Manila. What the
informer actually did during the buy-bust operation was simply to convince the
petitioner that prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta were interested
buyers of counterfeit US dollar notes.
The petitioner cannot validly impugn the admissibility of the subject ten (10)
counterfeit US $100 dollar notes confiscated from him when he was thus
arrested. It is clear from the testimony of prosecution witness Pedro Labita that
he saw the petitioner drew several pieces of fake US dollar notes from his wallet
to show to them after they were introduced by the civilian informer as the
interested buyers while they were inside the Jollibee restaurant, thus:
ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR:
Q:       Now, Mr. Witness, after this Johnny Marqueta and you were
introduced to the accused, what did the accused do after the
introduction?
A:       He immediately drew his counterfeit dollar notes from his wallet
and right after that we identified ourselves as agents of the Central
Bank, sir.23
When the arrest of the petitioner was made, Labita did not have to rely on the
prearranged signal of the informer inasmuch as he (Labita) had unhindered
view and appreciation of what was then taking place right before his eyes.
Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes are admissible in evidence
for the reason that the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto by the
prosecution witnesses during the said buy-bust operation. In other words, this
is a case of a legally valid warrantless arrest and seizure of the evidence of the
crime.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's allegation that he was framed-up by the
Central Bank agents does not deserve any consideration. This hackneyed
defense of alleged frame-up of the accused caught in flagrante delicto during a
buy-bust operation has been viewed with disdain by the courts for it is easy to
concoct and difficult to prove. 24Besides, there is a legal presumption that public
officers, including arresting officers, regularly perform their official
duties.25 That legal presumption was not overcome by any credible evidence to
the contrary.
Apparently clutching at the last straws, as it were, petitioner also alleged that he
was tortured into signing the dorsal portions of the fake ten (10) US $100 dollar
notes confiscated from him by the arresting officers and the "i". Other than his
self-serving testimony, the petitioner failed to prove his allegation of torture.
Also, he did not file any criminal or administrative action against his alleged
tormentors. Suffice it to state that petitioner's conviction for the crime charged
in the information is not anchored on the evidence obtained during his custodial
investigation which were disregarded by respondent appellate court for having
been obtained without the assistance of his counsel.
In sum, there is no reversible error in the subject Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11744 is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 241164, August 14, 2019
CRIZALINA B. TORRES, PETITIONER, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
A. REYES, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Crizalina B. Torres (petitioner)
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Decision 2 dated
February 22, 2018 and Resolution3 dated August 1, 2018, both issued by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39386.
The Factual Antecedents
The case stemmed from six (6) criminal cases for Falsification of Documents
punishable under paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) filed against the petitioner, an Intelligence Agent I of the
National Bureau of investigation Western Mindanao Regional Office (NBI-
WEMRO). The Informations, as quoted by the CA, read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13-300681
That in or about the month of August 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, CRIZALINA B. TORRES, a low ranking
public officer, being then an Intelligence Agent I of the National Bureau of
Investigation-Western Mindanao Regional Office (NBI-WERMO) (sic) with
Salary Grade 10, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in
relation to office, did then and there willingly, unlawfully and feloniously
falsified or caused to be falsified her Daily Time Record (DTR) for the
month of August 2010, a public document, by counterfeiting or imitating
NBI-WENRO (sic) Assistant Regional Director (ARD) Embido's signature
thereby making it appear that ARD Embido verified her DTR as to the
prescribed office hours, when in truth and in fact accused knew fully well
that ARD Embido did not verify and sign her DTR, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.
4
Contrary to law.  (Emphasis in the original)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13-300682
That in or about the month of September 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, CRIZALINA B. TORRES, a low ranking
public officer, being then an Intelligence Agent I of the National Bureau of
Investigation-Western Mindanao Regional Office (NBI-WERMO) (sic) with
Salary Grade 10, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in
relation to office, did then and there willingly, unlawfully and feloniously
falsified or caused to be falsified her Daily Time Record (DTR) for the
month of September 2010, a public document, by making it appear that
she. reported at the NBI-WENRO (sic) for all working days of September,
when in truth and in fact, accused knew fully well that on 21 September
2010 she left the office and never reported back to work and by falsifying
the signature of NBI-WEMRO Assistant Regional Director (ARD) Oscar L.
Embido, accused made it appear that ARD Embido verified her DTR as to
the prescribed office hours when in truth and in fact he did not, to the
dama1e and prejudice of public interest.
Contrary to law.5 (Emphasis in the original)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13-300683
That in or about the month of October 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, CRIZALINA B. TORRES, a low ranking
public officer, being then an Intelligence Agent I of the National Bureau of
Investigation-Western Mindanao Regional Office (NBI-WERMO) (sic) with
Salary Grade 10, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in
relation to office, did then and there willingly, unlawfully and feloniously
falsified or caused to be falsified her Daily Time Record (DTR) for the
month of October 2010, a public document, by making it appear that she
reported at the NBI-WENRO (sic) for all working days of October, when in
truth and in fact, accused knew fully well that on 21 September 2010 she
left the office and never reported back to work and by counterfeiting or
imitating the signature of NBI-WEMRO EX-O Vicente Essex E. Minguez,
accused made it appear that EX-O Minguez verified her DTR as to the
prescribed office hours for and in behalf of NBI-WEMRO Regional Director
Manuel A. Almendares when in truth and in fact he did not, to the damage
and prejudice of public interest.
Contrary to law.6 (Emphasis in the original) 
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13-300684
That in or about the month of January 2011 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, CRIZALINA B. TORRES, a low ranking
public officer, being then an Intelligence Agent I of the National Bureau of
Investigation-Western Mindanao Regional Office (NBI-WERMO) (sic) with
Salary Grade 10, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in
relation to office, did then and there willingly, unlawfully and feloniously
falsified or. caused to be falsified her Application for Leave for 4 to 29
October 2010, a public document, by altering the true date of said
application, thereby making it appear that she applied for a leave of
absence on 17 September 2010, when in truth and in fact, accused knew
fully well that she only applied and submitted her application for leave on
18 January 2011 or after she took her absences and by falsifying the
signature of NBI-WEMRO Assistant Regional Director (ARD) Oscar L.
Embido, accused made it appear that ARD Embido approved said
application for leave when in truth and in fact he did not, to the damage
and prejudice of public interest.
Contrary to law.7 (Emphasis in the original) 
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13-300685

That in or about the month of November 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, CRIZALINA B. TORRES, a low ranking
public officer, being then an Intelligence Agent I of the National Bureau of
Investigation-Western Mindanao Regional Office (NBI-WERMO) (sic) with
Salary Grade 10, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in
relation to office, did then and there willingly, unlawfully and feloniously
falsified or caused to be falsified her Daily Time Record (DTR) for the
month of November 2010, a public document, by making it appear that she
reported at the NBIWENRO (sic) for all working days of November, when in
truth and in fact, accused knew fully well that on 21 September 2010 she
left the office and never reported back to work and by counterfeiting or
imitating the signature of NBI-WEMRO EX-O Vicente Essex E. Minguez,
accused made it appear that EX-O Minguez verified her DTR as to the
prescribed office hours for and in behalf of NBI-WEMRO Regional Director
Manuel A. Almendares when in truth and in fact he did not, to the damage
and prejudice of public interest.
Contrary to law.8 (Emphasis in the original)  2010, respectively. In both DTRs, NBI-WEMRO Assistant' Regional Director Atty.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13-300686
That in or about the month of January 2011 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, CRIZALINA B. TORRES, a low ranking
public officer, being then an Intelligence Agent I of the National Bureau of
Investigation-Western Mindanao Regional Office (NBI-WERMO) (sic) with
Salary Grade 10, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in
relation to office, did then and there willingly, unlawfully and feloniously
falsified or caused to be falsified her Application for Leave for 8 November
to 10 December 2010, a public document, by altering the true date of said
application, thereby making it appear that she applied for a leave of
absence on 17 September 2010, when in truth and in fact, accused knew
fully well that she only applied and submitted her application for leave on
18 January 2011 or after she took her absences and by falsifying the
signature of NBI-WEMRO Assistant Regional Director (ARD) Oscar L.
Embido, accused made it appear that ARD Embido approved said
application for leave when in truth and in fact he did not, to the damage
and prejudice of public interest.
Contrary to law.9 (Emphasis in the original)
The charges involved the petitioner's alleged falsification of the following: (1)
August 2010 Daily Time Record (DTR); (2) September 2010 DTR; (3) October
2010 DTR; (4) November 2010 DTR; (5) Application for Leave for October4 to
29, 201 0; (6) and Application for Leave for November 8 to December 10, 2010.
She allegedly falsified the respective signatures of officers on her DTRs, making
it appear that they verified the same and that she reported for work despite not
doing so. Also, she supposedly altered the date of filing of her Applications for
Leave, making it appear that they were filed on September 17, 2010 instead of
January 18, 2011.10 The petitioner pleaded not guilty during her arraignment
and after the termination of the pretrial conference, trial on the merits ensued. 11
Prompted by a request made by then NBI-WEMRO Regional Director Atty.
Manuel A. Almendares (Almendares), the NBI-Internal Affairs Division (NBI-
IAD) conducted an investigation on petitioner's continuous absence from work
without leave in 2010. Allegedly, she last reported for work on September 21,
2010 where she left the office at 4:14 p.m. and had not reported back since. The
NBI-IAD then procured copies of petitioner's records with the NBI-Personnel
Division (Personnel) in Manila, among them included the abovementioned
documents.12
Petitioner appeared to have two (2) DTRs on file with Personnel for the month
of August 2010, which were received on November 3, 2010 and December 23,
Oscar Embido (Embido) appeared to be the signatory as the authorized officer.
Meanwhile, the DTRs for the months of October and November 2010 bore the
purported signatures of Executive Officer Vicente Essex Minguez (Minguez) for
and in behalf of Almendares. 13 Also, as certified by the Chief of the Personnel
Division, petitioner had no application for leave of absence for the period of
September 21, 2010 to December 2010. Petitioner's Applications for Leave were
also received by Personnel on January 18, 2011 and not September 17, 2010. 14
Upon verification, NBI-WEMRO Acting Administrative Officer George S. Perez
(Perez) certified that petitioner's DTRs for October and November 2010 were
not filed with his office, as they should have been, before they were forwarded
to the head office.15 As a matter of procedure, WEMRO employees prepare their
respective DTRs within the first five (days) of each month and submitted to him
for counter-checking. Thereafter, he signs his initials on the DTRs before they
are signed by Almendares and forwarded to the head office in Manila.
Almendares, Embido, and Minguez, whose names and/or signatures appeared
on the subject DTRs, also denied having signed the same. 16
A comparative examination was also conducted by the NBI-Questioned
Document Division between Embido and Minquez's signatures on the subject
DTRs and their twelve (12) sample signatures. It revealed that the signatures on
the subject DTRs and the sample signatures of Embido and Minguez were not
written by the same person.17
A notice to explain was sent to petitioner, but she did not respond. Upon the
recommendation of the NBI-Legal and Evaluation Division, petitioner was
officially dropped from the rolls effective November 2, 2010. 18
As the lone witness for the defense, Minguez attested that he was directly in
charge of supervision over petitioner and with respect to DTRs, he signs them in
the absence of the regional director. However, Minguez admitted that he has not
seen the subject DTRs or has signed any DTR of petitioner for October and
November 2010. There is likewise no copy of the subject DTRs on file with their
office where they are normally kept. He has not seen petitioner report to work
for six (6) months. He also denied his signatures appearing on the DTRs. 19
The RTC's Ruling
After the conduct of due proceedings, the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC)
rendered its Decision20 dated October 26, 2016, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Crizalina B. Torres, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of Falsification of Public Document under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant herein and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 13-300681 - TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00), without costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. 13-300682 - TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00), without costs;
3. In Criminal Case No. 13-300683 - TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00), without costs;
4. In Criminal Case No. 13-300684 - TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00), without costs;
5. In Criminal Case No. 13-300685 - TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a tine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00), without costs; and
6. In Criminal Case No. 13-300686 - TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00), without costs.
SO ORDERED.21
The petitioner subsequently appealed the RTC 's Decision, arguing that there
was no direct evidence presented by the prosecution that she authored and
submitted the subject DTRs and applications for leave.
The CA's Ruling
In the assailed Decision dated February 22, 2018, the CA denied the petitioner's
appeal, holding that direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt and in the absence thereof,
circumstantial evidence may be resorted to. The CA affirmed the RTC's findings
that the totality of evidence presented by the prosecution established
petitioner's guilt of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and
the assailed Decision dated 26 October 2016 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the assailed Decision, but the same was
denied in assailed Resolution dated August 1, 2018.
Hence, the present petition where the petitioner raises the lone issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT RENDERED THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION, THE SAME
NOT BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE
Maintaining that the decision of the CA, along with the RTC, was made contrary
to existing laws and jurisprudence, the petitioner argues that there is no direct
evidence presented by the prosecution showing she caused the falsification and
submission of the subject documents. She reiterates that none of the witnesses
for the prosecution was able to categorically state that it was petitioner who
submitted the subject DTRs and Applications for Leave with the NBI Personnel
Division. The foregoing thus casts serious doubts as to the identity of the true
perpetrator and her guilt for the crimes charged. 1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
In their Comment,23 the public respondent People of the Philippines, through when they did not in fact so participate;
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), submits that the petition should be x x x x
dismissed as the petitioner failed to show any special or compelling reason that 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
would necessitate the exercise of this Court's review and appellate jurisdiction, 5. Altering true dates;
as the petitioner merely reiterated her contentions before the CA. The public xxx
respondent also points out that the instant petition merely raises questions of The elements of falsification under the aforesaid provision are as follows: (1)
fact, which are not proper subjects for review in a Rule 45 petition. The public the offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public; (2) the offender
respondent also maintains that the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the takes advantage of his or her official position; and (3) The offender falsifies a
evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently established the existence of document by committing any of the acts of falsification under Article 171 of the
all the elements of the crime charged and the guilt of the petitioner. RPC.26

The Ruling of the Court As to the first element, it is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the petitioner was a public officer serving as Intelligence Agent I at the
We deny the petition. NBI-WEMRO.

First, Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that direct evidence is not a
condition sine qua non to prove guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The rationale for this rule is further reiterated in Dungo, et al. v. People of the
Philippines,24 thus:
x x x Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions
where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under
all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes
in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove. x x x 25
Certainly, in crimes involving the falsification of a public document, it is possible
that secrecy and other surreptitious means may have been employed by the
perpetrator precisely to conceal the true nature of a document he claims to be
legitimate. In such a case, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to
resort to the presentation of circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused.
Second, all the elements of the crimes charged were sufficiently established by
the prosecution. Petitioner was charged with six (6) counts of falsification of
public documents punishable under Article 171 of the RPC, particularly
paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 thereof, to wit:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
As to the second element, an offender is considered to have taken advantage of
his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to
intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of
the document which he falsifies. 27 Here, the testimony of NBI-WEMRO Acting
Administrative Officer George S. Perez established that petitioner, as an
employee of the NBI-WEMRO, has the duty to make or prepare the subject
DTRs.
As to the third element, as correctly found by the CA, evidence presented by the
prosecution established that petitioner's continuous absence since September
21, 2010 prompted an investigation against her which led to the discovery of
the subject DTRs and Applications for Leave. The subject DTRs included the
purported signatures of Embido and Minguez. However, both officers certified
that the signatures appearing on the subject DTRs are not theirs. 28Furthermore,
the Questioned Document Report No. 69-211, 29 or the results of the handwriting
examination conducted by the NBI Questioned Documents Division, shows that
the signatures on the subject DTRs and the sample signatures of Embido and
Minguez were not written by the same person. Additionally, the testimony of
Minguez established that he had not seen petitioner report for work for six (6)
months.
Anent the Applications for Leave, a Certification from Corazon A. Villas, Chief of
the NBI - Personnel Division indicates that the said division has not received any
application for any leave of absence from petitioner for the period of September
21, 2010 to December 8, 2010.30 The Application for Leave for the period of
October 4 to 29, 201031 further indicates that the same was received by the
Personnel Division on January 18, 2011, establishing that the same was not filed
on September 17, 2010 as written thereon.
Verily, the totality of evidence presented by the prosecution established that
petitioner, a public officer, has taken advantage of her official position and
falsified her DTRs and Applications for Leave by counterfeiting or imitating the
signatures of Embido and Minguez, making it appear that the said officers
verified her DTRs. Through the subject DTRs, petitioner likewise made
untruthful statements in making it appear that she regularly reported for work
in September, October, and November, when she actually stopped showing up
for work after September 21, 2010. Petitioner likewise altered true dates on her
Applications for Leave, making it appear that she had tiled the same on
September 17, 2010 when they were actually filed on January 18, 2011.

It is noteworthy to add that the foregoing findings of fact, as sustained by the

CA, binds this Court. Barring the application of recognized exceptions, the SECOND DIVISION
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties
and are not subject to review by the Supreme Court. 32 July 29, 2019
Third and lastly, as previously mentioned, the penalty for falsification of public
G.R. No. 205260
documents is imprisonment of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P5,000.00. In the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 C/INSP. RUBEN LIWANAG, SR. y SALVADOR, Petitioner 
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner is entitled to a vs.
minimum term which shall be taken within the range of the penalty next lower PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
to what is prescribed by law which is prision correccional, the range of which is
6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Meanwhile, the maximum term of the penalty DECISION
shall be that which is imposed by law considering any attending
circumstances.33 In view of the penalties imposed by the RTC in the instant case, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
as affirmed by the CA, such penalties are likewise correct.
The Case
All told, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the
conviction of the petitioner for the crimes charged and rendering the assailed
This Petition for Review assails the dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Decision and Resolution.
G.R. CR No. 25943 entitled "People of the Philippines v. C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag,
Sr. y Salvador":
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated February 22, 2018 and the Resolution dated August 1, 2018
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39386 are AFFIRMED. 1) Decision1 dated June 27, 2011, affirming petitioner C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag's
conviction for falsification of public document; and
SO ORDERED.
2) Resolution2 dated October 21, 2011, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The Proceedings Before the Trial Court

The Charge
By Information3 dated November 15, 1996, petitioner C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag, a
police officer of the Western Police District Command, was indicted for
falsification of public document, as defined and penalized by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz:
That on or about June 10, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused being then a police officer of the Western .Police District Command, this
City, and therefore, a public officer, with intent to cause damage, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and felomously commit acts of falsification of a public
document, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused having somehow
obtained possession of a Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP) No. 02774452-A
of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Quezon City, an instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, a public document which was
originally issued to C/Insp[.] Antonio D. Salas of the said Western Police District
Cornman( d), this City, prepared, forged and falsified the said Temporary
Operator's Permit (TOP) No. 02774452-A, by then and there filling up or caused
to be filled up the blank spaces thereon, among others, by writing the date , "10
June 94"; the name of the accused's son "RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG, JR."; the
entry pertaining to the badge no. of the accused which was misdeclared from
04580 to 50480 and leaving the space blank intended for the
permit/registration number which should reflect to the driver's license of said
RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG, [JR.] thereby making it appear, as it did appear, that
said TOP No. 02774452-A dated June 19, 1994 was issued to the latter, when it
(sic) truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew that the said
Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP) is spurious as the same was not duly
authorized to issue the said TOP to RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG, JR. neither did the
said LTO nor Chief Inspector Antonio D. Salas to whom the said TOP booklet
containing the said serial number was issued, participate or intervene in the
preparation and execution of the said document, thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts which the said accused has the legal obligation
to disclose the truth; that once the said document has been forged and falsified
in the manner above setforth (sic), the son of the accused, said RUBEN RUBIO
LIWANAG[,] JR. while driving a car, Kia Pride with Plate No. PSX 844 was
involved in a vehicular accident with Nelia E. Enoc and Noel Agcopra,
introduced and presented the said TOP No. 02774452-A to the PNCC guards,
knowing the same to be spurious, to the damage and prejudice of the said Nelia
E. Enoc and Noel Agcopra and/or public interest.
Contrary to law.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila. On
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. 4
Prosecution's Version
On July 3, 1994, a vehicular accident occurred in Bifian, Laguna. Petitioner's son,
Ruben Liwanag, Jr. drove a Kia Pride car which collided with a military jeep
driven by Noel Agcopra. Ruben Liwanag, Jr. was not able to present a valid
driver's license but showed Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP) No. 02774452-
A instead to the investigating officer, Conrado Tamayo of the Philippine National
Construction Company (PNCC). The TOP showed that it was issued on June 10,
1994 to "Ruben Rubio Liwanag" who was purportedly born on June 27, 1974. It
also appeared that petitioner issued the TOP to his own son. 5
During the investigation, it was discovered that per certification by the Land
Transportation Office (LTO), Ruben Liwanag, Jr. indeed did not have a driver's
license. At the time of the accident, Ruben Liwanag, Jr., who was born on June
27, 1977 according to his birth certificate, was still a minor and was not eligible
to hold a driver's license. His birth date on the TOP, however, was "June 27,
1974."6
In view of the dubious entries on the TOP, Nelia Enoc and Noel Agcopra, owners
of the military jeep, filed an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public
document against petitioner, which led to his indictment therefor in court. 7
C/Insp. Antonio Salas, who was also a police officer at the Western Police
District Command, testified that when a driver commits a traffic violation and
his driver's license is confiscated by the apprehending officer, a TOP is issued.
TOP permits the violator to drive for the period that his actual license is not in
his possession. The TOP is valid for fifteen days.8
C/Insp. Salas further stated that TOP No. 02774452-A was part of the booklet
issued to him by the LTO. He denied ever issuing the TOP in question and he
only came to know of its issuance when the same was traced to have come from
him. In truth, the TOP in question was among the other TOPs which were
detached from the LTO booklet issued to him. He also confirmed that petitioner
was a fellow officer at the Western Police District Traffic Command. He and
petitioner used to share a room together at their headquarters and he
sometimes forgot to secure his locker where he kept his TOP booklet.9
The prosecution submitted the following documentary evidence: a) LTO
Certification dated November 4, 1994, certifying that petitioner was not a
deputized agent; b) LTO Certification dated August 4, 1994, certifying that TOP
No. 02774452-A was issued to C/Insp. Salas; c) LTO Certification dated August
16, 1994, certifying that Ruben Liwanag, Jr. who was born on June 29, 1974, was
not a licensed driver; and d) Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr.'s certificate of live
birth. 10
The Defense's Version
Petitioner admitted that he filled out the TOP but denied issuing it to his son. He
only used the TOP as part of his instructional materials when he lectured on the
duties and functions of traffic aides. He was deputized to issue TOPs, including
the one subject of the case. His son had his own driver's license and the TOP was
only recovered from his son's car during the accident. 11
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision dated August 24, 2001, the trial court found petitioner guilty as
charged. It took into account petitioner's admission that it was his handwriting
and signature which appeared on the TOP. Also, per LTO certification, petitioner
was not authorized to issue TOPs. The TOP in question formed part of the LTO
booklet issued to C/Insp. Salas. Further, petitioner's son was issued a driver's
license only on June 13, 1994, three (3) days after the accident. PNCC
investigator Conrado Tamayo categorically testified that petitioner's son
himself showed what he claimed was his TOP in lieu of his supposed driver's
license. 12 The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused C/INSP. RUBEN
LIWANAG, SR. Y SALVADOR GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY TO SIX (6)YEARS.
SO ORDERED.13
The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal, petitioner faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of
conviction despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to formally offer the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. There was no evidence that he
illegally obtained and issued the TOP to his son. The certifications presented by
the prosecution were not identified by the persons who issued them. 14
In refutation, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioner
failed to object, hence, was deemed to have waived any objection to the
presentation of Nelia Enoc, Antonio Salas, Noel Ag copra, and Conrado Tamayo
as prosecution witnesses. Besides, through its Order dated May 5, 1999, the trial
court had admitted the prosecution's documentary exhibits and testimonial
evidence. 15
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
By its assailed Decision dated June 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It
noted that although the transcript of stenographic notes reveal that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not formally offered, the defense
did not object to their presentation. In fact, the defense counsel even cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses. 16
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied
through its assailed Resolution dated October 21, 2011.
The Present Petition
Petitioner now implores the court to exercise its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction to review and reverse the assailed dispositions of the Court of
Appeals. He asserts that he never had any malicious or wrongful intent to injure
a third person, which is an essential element of the offense. His son Ruben Rubio
Liwanag, Jr. never used the TOP which was merely recovered from his car. He
merely filled out the TOP on June 10, 1994 only as a visual aid or educational
tool when he gives lectures to traffic enforcers. 17
On the other hand, the OSG submits that the petition raises a factual, not a legal
issue. In any event. the trial court's factual findings, especially affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court. 18
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the verdict of conviction for
falsification of public document against petitioner?
Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Falsification of a public document is defined and penalized under Article
171 19 of the Revised Penal Code. It requires the following elements: 1) the
offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of
his official position; and 3) he falsifies a document by committing any of the
aforementioned acts.20
In falsification of public or official documents, the presence of intent to gain or
intent to injure a third person is not necessary.1awp++i1 For what is punished is
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed.21
Here, petitioner was indicted for and convicted of falsification of public
document under Article 171 (par. 4) of the Revised Penal Code because when he
issued TOP No. 02774452-A he made untruthful statements in a narration of
facts, i.e. a) he entered his son's name "Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr." on the TOP; b)
he made a false entry pertaining to his son's birthdate i.e. June 27, 1974 instead
of June 27, 1977 (his son's true birthdate); and c) he altered his badge number
from "04580" to "50480," thus, making it appear that he had authority to issue
the subject TOP.22
To be convicted under Article 171(par. 4) of the Revised Penal Code, the
following elements must concur: 1) the offender makes in a public document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and 3) the facts narrated by him
are absolutely false. 23
Petitioner does not deny the presence of these elements here. He, nonetheless,
insists on his plea that he had no malicious or wrongful intent to injure a third
person. On this score, suffice it to state that intent to gain or intent to injure is
not an element of the crime of falsification of public document. Nor is it a valid
defense. Typoco, Jr. v. People24 is apropos:
In addition, petitioners argue that damage to the government should have been
proven considering that this was alleged in the Information. We do not agree. In
falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third
person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public
document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or
official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction
of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents,
therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document;
and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent
to cause such damage becomes immaterial.
So must it be.
Indeed, absent any showing of any glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts or unsupported conclusions, the trial court's findings are accorded the
highest respect and conclusiveness especially if affirmed in full by the Court of
Appeals, 25 as in this case.
Lastly, we modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. The trial court imposed the
penalty of "FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO SIX (6)
YEARS." This is not correct. Goma v. Court of Appeals26 dictates what the
imposable indeterminate penalty is for the crime of falsification of public
document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code if there are no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, thus:
Finally, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is proper. Art.
171 of the RPC provides for a single divisible penalty of prision mayor to public
officers or employees who, taking advantage of their official positions, shall
cause it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact participate. And where neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance attended the execution of the offense, as here, the imposable
penalty is, according to Art. 64 of the RPC, that of the medium period provided.
The medium period for prision mayor is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable would be that
of a degree lower than the medium period of prision mayor as minimum, and the
maximum is any period included in the medium period of prision mayor. The
degree lower than the medium period of prision mayor is the medium period
of prision correccional which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months, and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Applying Goma, we sentence petitioner to two (2) years, four (4) months, and
one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 27,
2011 and Resolution dated October 21, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 25943 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner
C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag, Sr. to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139857             September 15, 2006
 LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,  loan, never received the same, and never signed the cash/check
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with modification the April 15, 1993
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in
Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of
estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed
Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She
was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of
the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning
the release of loans were discovered. 4
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:  Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan, received the loan of P4,000.00
Criminal Case No. 3625
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of
Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then the
manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI),
entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out
loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao
by then and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda
Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine Currency, and by
signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda
Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that
the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and received the amount
of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted a
voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent
and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there
release to herself the same and received the loan of P4,160 and
thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the
said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute
the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned
amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency. 5
Criminal Case No. 3626
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being then
the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI),
entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out
loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent to
prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda
Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that the said
Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on
the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said
when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never
received the same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in
her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent
design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to
herself the same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter
misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said
amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the
same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned
amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 3453
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI),
entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collection of the same and paying out loans
to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the
PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the
ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of
P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed
deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI
when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and
was never granted loan and after the document was so falsified in the
manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the
Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by
signing therein the signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear
that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine
Currency, when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received
the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent
design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to
herself the same, and received the amount of P3,500, and thereafter,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate
and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and
despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the
damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of
P3,500, Philippine Currency.
7 Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI)
entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and paying out loans
to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the
PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the
ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of
P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed
deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI
when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit
and was never granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in
the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the
Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis
Batulanon by signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus
making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of
P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never
received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there
release to herself the same and receive the loan of P5,000, and
thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the
said amount, and [despite] demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627. 
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and
 
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation
of cash vouchers9 testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released
four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four different individuals
as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A 10 for P4,160.00 was released
to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A 11 for
P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda 12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher
No. 276A13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on
December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash
Voucher No. 374A.14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible
to apply for loan because they were not bona fide members of the
cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the
cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in
1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983. 16 Medallo stated
that pursuant to the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must
have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.17
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion
and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the records
that they were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein. 18 As to the
signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was
actually the handwriting of appellant.19
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of
directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallo's testimony that Omadlao,
Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that
Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was
only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not
open to minors.20
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before
becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to
Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the
cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening
purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is
Batulanon's handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans
taken, only that in Arroyo's name was settled.22
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was
presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.  from the institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was
asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After
certifying that the said document reflected all the financial transactions of the
cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the Journal
with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash
Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the
other vouchers because the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one
who prepared the entries.23
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign
the vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were
signed by the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she
personally released the money to them; 24 that the three were members of the
cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board
of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the
correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted
practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with the
approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence; 25 that she signed the loan
application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor
but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents
to avoid suspicion of irregularity; 26 that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr.,
minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are
children of regular members. 
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no
longer qualified for another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that
she had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative refused to accept
her payments after the cases were filed in court. 27 She also declared that one
automatically becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the
cooperative did not have by-laws yet.29
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because
the cooperative had been registered since 1967. 30
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila
Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled
case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO
MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to
indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest
SO ORDERED.31
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant
LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayormaximum, AS
MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit ,
Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus
legal interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus
costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. 
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person
whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have
presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of
relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as
Medallo.33 She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires
as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been
prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans are accounts
receivable by the cooperative.34
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of
commercial document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private
document under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information
that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in
the preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,35 we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to
the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to
which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things
else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question
is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and
important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines
what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the
accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he
ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the
name of the crime which those acts constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph
236 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the
acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the
falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was
committed with intent to cause such damage.37
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act 38 of falsification
falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash
Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts
appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that
they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure
said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash
Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI
members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of
Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she did not
apply for a loan with the cooperative. 
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of
Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated
therein were actually received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo,
Medallo's credible testimony and her familiarity with the handwriting of
Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo.
Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to
present the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness
account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person. 
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no
evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise
was not an admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or
criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. 
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced
because the loan transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It
has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with
no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and
neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn
Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the
loan to avoid legal prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be
reimbursed once the money is collected from Batulanon.39
The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private
documents and not commercial documents because they are not documents
used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions41 nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or
other commercial law.42Rather, they are private documents, which have been
defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the
intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which
some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. 43
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to
prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein.44 The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden
completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private
document,45 it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged
with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a
private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to
be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity
of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus,
in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba
Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of
July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the
offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days.
The accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work
for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on
the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly
superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop
for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was
found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the
accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas
Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and
by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar,
was held guilty of falsification of a private document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held
Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents
in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.  6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a
duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days.
Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is
entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the
range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four
(4) months.49 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty. 
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private
documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned penalties for each count of the
offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of
P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting
the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was
settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the
money is recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this
judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and executory, the interest
rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa
and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that
may constitute falsification are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
changes its meaning;
 7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy
of an original document when no such original exists, or including in
such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof
in a protocol, registry, or official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for
falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher based on the
Information charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The
records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon
did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by:
lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of
Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under
Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the
name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of
the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or
false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such
representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different
matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it
was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty
of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627
involving the cash voucher of Dennis.50
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315
(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the
same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
(Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)51
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by
misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took
the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for personal
purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of the same amount
drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not
to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company
until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant
was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand.
An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account,
although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the
PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of
conviction, the Court explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very
evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here discussed;
the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of
trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient.
The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively
few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding
the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the
funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find
all of the necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the money for which
the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for safe-
keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the
responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such had
immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping
and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise
of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the
case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a
bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility, might
also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty
of estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal
use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and substituting
his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to
be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant
misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks did
not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the appellant
or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the
corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver
them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.
 xxxx
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the
accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to himself. As we
have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this nature
and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though
authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that
misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not always
amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of
the law to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds
to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation is of a
quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no distinction
between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can
see no reason in the present case why it should not be applied in its
literal sense.
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is
injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in
this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company during
the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well
settled by former adjudications of this court that the disturbance in
property rights caused by the misappropriation, though only
temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning
of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong,
36 Phil., 821.)53
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds
the money for administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no
longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who
is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the
amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by
Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage
was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could
have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive
undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by
Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within
the meaning of Article 315.
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the
applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over
P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying
circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is
found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of private documents and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok
Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until
finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be
imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of
estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to
indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of
P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November
28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per
annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019
JUVY DESMOPARAN A.K.A. "MASYADOR," PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision and Resolution dated March 14, caught one Efrain Baena Mercado (Mercado) using the name and credentials of a
20171 and July 20, 2017,2 respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. certain Aldrin John Z. Catan to apply for a loan. During the investigation,
CEB CR No. 02680, where the CA affirmed the Judgment 3 dated November 6, Mercado revealed that it was Desmoparan who recruited him to submit bogus
2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, 7th Judicial Region, loan applications with CFI.9
Branch 35, Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case No. 21334 which convicted
petitioner Juvy Desmoparan (Desmoparan) of estafa through falsification of In his judicial affidavit, Mercado testified that sometime on March 14, 2012,
commercial documents. Desmoparan approached him at JT's Pocket Billiard Hall and told him that he
has a simple job for him. He alleged that Desmoparan told him that all he
The facts are as follows: needed to do was submit documents to CFI. Desmoparan assured Mercado that
he had already done this twice and was even able to have a check encashed in
On February 27, 2012, Desmoparan applied for a salary loan in the amount of his favor. Mercado further alleged that Desmoparan brought him to a carwash
P105,000.00 from Cebu CFI Community Cooperative -Dumaguete City Branch shop in Larena Drive, Dumaguete City, where he was introduced to a certain
(CFI). He misrepresented himself to be an employee of the City Engineer's "Bossing." Desmoparan told his Bossing that Mercado would be the one to go to
Office, by using the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Chiyenne Mirasol (Mirasol), CFI since he cannot do it anymore as he had already done it twice. Mercado
loan clerk of CFI. When Mirasol asked for his identification card, Desmoparan added that Desmoparan later brought him to a house in Purok Kalubihan,
presented his employee's I.D. from the City Engineer's Office with his picture on Barangay Daro, Dumaguete City, where he saw a number of documents bearing
it, but bearing the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura." To support his application for the mark "CFI," as well as several persons practicing imitation of
loan, Desmoparan submitted the following documents, namely: a) application signatures.10 On cross-examination, Mercado admitted all he has stated in his
for membership form of CFI; b) special power of attorney coupled with interest; judicial affidavit.
c) deed of assignment; d) certification from the City Human Resource Office; e)
certificate of employment from the City Human Resource Office; f) service Desmoparan was eventually apprehended. He was charged with estafa through
record signed by Henrietta N. Zerna; and g) promissory note dated February 27, falsification of commercial documents. The information reads as follows:
2012. All said documents reflected the name of "Rodulfo M. Cordura" as the loan
applicant and debtor.4 That on or about 27 February 2012 in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, JUVY
In order to receive the initial cash advance, Desmoparan also presented his DESMOPARAN a.k.a. "MASYADOR", did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
purported employee's I.D., bearing the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Menerva feloniously falsify the following documents, to wit:
Perocho (Perocho), Cashier/Teller of CFI.5Thus, because of Desmoparan's (1) application for membership of CFI;
misrepresentation, Perocho released to him the cash advances amounting to
P20,000.00 on March 2, 2012, an additional P10,000.00 on March 9, 2012, and (2) special power of attorney coupled with interest;
another P10,000.00 on March 10, 2012. Upon receipt of the said monies,
Desmoparan also signed the name of "Rodulfo Cordura" in all three cash (3) deed of assignment;
vouchers.6
(4) certification from the City Human Resource Office;
However, on March 16, 2012, the real Rodulfo Cordura (Cordura) went to CFI to
verify the information that somebody had fraudulently applied for a salary loan (5) Certificate of Employment;
using his name and qualifications. He identified himself as the real Cordura, a
retired government employee previously connected with the City Engineer's (6) Service Record; and
Office. Cordura informed CFI that he discovered the fraud after he received the
bill for his alleged loan transaction from CFI, through their payroll maker. He (7) a promissory note dated 27 February 2012
told them that he did not apply for any loan nor did he apply for membership by making and causing it to appear that one Rodulfo Cordura applied for a
with CFI. Cordura then requested an investigation and withholding of the salary loan and executed and filed afore-mentioned documents at Cebu CFI
remaining check in the amount of P69,000.00 as part of the salary loan. 7 Community Cooperative - Dumaguete Branch when in truth and in fact, Rodulfo
M. Cordura neither applied for any loan at CFI nor execute and file the afore-
On the same day, Arden Sinco (Sinco), branch manager of CFI,8 and his team mentioned documents and that by virtue of said falsification, false pretenses,
deceit, and fraudulent acts and with intent to cause damage, has been able to
obtain and receive from CFI the loan proceeds/cash advances amounting to a
total of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, on 2 March
2012 and 9 March 2012 and thereafter converted the same amount to his own
personal gain and benefit to the damage and prejudice of CFI in the said amount
of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Subsequently, Desmoparan was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged.12
Trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Mirasol,
Mercado, Perocho, Cordura and Sinco.
On the other hand, Desmoparan did not present any testimonial evidence.
On November 6, 2015, the RTC of Negros Oriental, 7 th Judicial Region, Branch
35, Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case No. 21334, rendered Judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, JUVY DESMOPARAN a.k.a.
"Masyador," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Documents and there being no mitigating and
aggravating circumstances proven in the trial, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and two (2) months of
Prision Correccional as minimum to Nine (9) years of Prision Mayor as
maximum and to pay FORTY THOUSAND (Php40,000.00) PESOS for the amount
he has taken from Cebu CFI Community Cooperative, Dumaguete branch with
legal interest of six (6%) percent from the filing of this case.
SO ORDERED.13
Aggrieved, Desmoparan filed an appeal and sought the reversal of his conviction
before the CA. However, on March 14, 2017, the appellate court denied his
appeal. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated November 6, 2015, of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Seventh Judicial Region, Branch 35,
Dumaguete City, in Crim. Case No. 21334 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that accused-appellant shall suffer indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, eight months and 21 days
of prision mayor, as maximum. The amount of P40,000.00 must earn 6% per
annum computed from finality of the Court's Decision until satisfied.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.14
Desmoparan moved for reconsideration. However, in the assailed
Resolution15 dated July 20, 2017, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,16 raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.17
Desmoparan would like to impress upon this Court that the prosecution failed
to prove that he was the one who falsified the loan documents. He claimed that
the prosecution witnesses admitted that they never saw him fill up the loan
documents. He argued that, assuming that he personally appeared at CFI, the
only documents that he personally signed were the cash vouchers representing
the receipt of cash advances. Desmoparan, however, insisted that cash vouchers
are not commercial documents; thus, he cannot be convicted of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents.
The petition lacks merit.
The elements of the crime of falsification of commercial documents under
Article 172 (1),18 in relation to Article 171, 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 10951, 20 are: "(1) that the offender is a
private individual x x x; (2) that [the offender] committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the [Revised Penal Code]; and, (3) that
the [act of] falsification [is] committed in a x x x commercial document." 21
In the instant case, we likewise find that all the above-mentioned elements were
sufficiently established. First, Desmoparan is a private individual; second, the
acts of falsification consisted in Desmoparan's act of causing it to appear that
Cordura had participated in the act of applying for a loan when, in fact, he did
not do so; and third, the falsification was committed in a loan application, a deed
of assignment, and a promissory note dated February 27, 2012, which are all
commercial documents considering that, in general, these documents or
instruments are "used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate
trade or credit transactions."22 Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions,
while a check is a means of payment used in business, in lieu of money, for
convenience in business transactions. 23
While Desmoparan alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the
perpetrator of the falsified loan documents, we note that he never denied,
however, that he was actually the one who personally came to CFI to apply for a
salary loan using Cordura's name. He also never denied to be the one in
possession of the falsified loan documents which were submitted to CFI to
support the loan application purportedly under Cordura's name. He likewise
never denied that he fraudulently used Cordura's name and qualifications to
apply for the salary loan.
It must be likewise stressed that the loan clerks who processed the loan
transactions were consistent in their testimonies that it was Desmoparan, and
not Cordura, who: (1) personally applied for the salary loan; (2) submitted the
documentary requirements under the name of Cordura; (3) presented an I.D.
with his photo, but bearing the name of Cordura; (4) received the initial cash
advances amounting to a total of P40,000.00; and (5) signed Cordura's name on
the cash voucher. It cannot be said that just because none of the prosecution
witnesses actually saw Desmoparan do the act of falsifying, the latter cannot be
held liable for falsification. Clearly, given the enumerated circumstances, and
considering that Desmoparan had in his possession the falsified loan documents
and had actually took advantage of and profited from them, the presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification.
The absence of a direct proof that Desmoparan was the author of the
falsification is of no moment for the rule remains that whenever someone has in
his possession falsified documents and uttered or used the same for his
advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises. 24
This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so
closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be
proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. 25
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, as in this case, one who is found in
possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be
the forger.26
Corrollarily, after the existence of falsification of commercial documents has
been established, we also find that the falsification of loan documents was a
necessary means to commit estafa.
In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another
(a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive
another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury. 27
In the instant case, Desmoparan used the falsified documents bearing the name
and qualifications of Cordura in fraudulently applying for a salary loan, which
resulted in the eventual release and withdrawing of the cash advance
amounting to a total of P40,000.00 from CFI. Clearly, Desmoparan employed
deceit by falsifying loan documents in order to take hold of the money and,
thereafter, convert it to his own personal use and benefit, resulting in the
damage and prejudice of CFI and Cordura.
It must be emphasized anew that when the offender commits on a public,
official, or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 17128 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another
crime like estafa, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code,29 there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime
may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People,30 we have held that falsification of a commercial document
may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated; damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified
public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the
damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.
In this case, Desmoparan could not have succeeded in getting hold of the money
without falsifying the loan documents bearing the name and qualifications of
Cordura, and make it appear that he is actually the real Cordura. The
falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa, and
falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents
were used to defraud CFI.
PENALTY
Desmoparan is found guilty of the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of commercial documents since the crime of falsification was established to be a
necessary means to commit estafa.
In De Castro v. People,31 citing Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court
held that in the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, the penalty for the graver offense should be imposed in the
maximum period.
However, with the passage of RA 10951, 32 the penalties of some crimes which
are dependent on the value of the subject matter of the crimes have been greatly
affected, and one of these is estafa. The law being more favorable to the
petitioner, the same is given a retroactive effect. Below is the comparison of the
penalty for estafa under the old provisions of the Revised Penal Code and RA
10951.
  Revised Penal Code RA 10951 (August 29, 2017)
ESTAFA Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).
— Any person who shall
defraud another by any of
the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision
correccional in its
maximum period to
prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding
one year for each
additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed
under the provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum
and medium periods, if the
amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos[.]
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — to prision correccional in its
Any person who shall defraud minimum period, if such amount
another by any of the means is over Forty thousand pesos
mentioned hereinbelow shall be (P40,000) but does not exceed
punished by: One million two hundred
thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
1st. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum 4th. By arresto mayor in its
period to prision mayorin its medium and maximum
minimum period, if the amount periods, if such amount does
of the fraud is over Two million not exceed Forty thousand 
four hundred thousand pesos pesos (P40,000)[.] (Emphases
(P2,400,000) but does not exceed supplied.)
Four million four hundred On the other hand, hereunder is the comparison of the penalties of falsification
thousand pesos (P4,400,000), of commercial documents under the old provisions of the Revised Penal Code
and if such amount exceeds the and RA 10951:
latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be Art. 172. Falsification
imposed in its maximum period, by private individual
adding one year for each and use of falsified
ART. 172. Falsification by
additional Two million pesos documents. — The
private individual and use of
(P2,000,000); but the total penalty of prision
falsified documents. - The
penalty which may be imposed correccional in its
penalty of prision
shall not exceed twenty years. medium and
correccional in its medium
maximum periods
and maximum periods and
In such cases, and in connection and a fine of not more
a fine of not more than One
with the accessory penalties than P5,000 pesos
million pesos
which may be imposed and for shall be imposed
FALSIFICATION (P1,000,000)shall be
the purpose of the other upon:
OF COMMERCIAL imposed upon:
provisions of this Code, the DOCUMENTS
penalty shall be termed prision 1. Any private
1. Any private individual who
mayor or reclusion temporal, as individual who shall
     shall commit any of the
the case may be. commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in
falsifications
the next preceding article in
2nd. The penalty of prision enumerated in the next
any public or official
correccional in its minimum and preceding article in any
document or letter of
medium periods, if the amount of public or official
exchange: or any other kind
the fraud is over One million two document or letter of
of commercial document[.]
hundred thousand pesos exchange or any other
(P1,200,000) but does not exceed kind of commercial
Two million four hundred document[.]
thousand pesos (P2,400,000). From the given comparisons, both under the Revised Penal Code and RA 10951,
the imposable penalty for estafa is based on the amount of damage. In this case,
3rd. The penalty of arresto the amount defrauded is Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), representing the
mayorin its maximum period total amount of money actually released and received by Desmoparan from CFI.
As such, the prescribed penalty as provided under paragraph 4, Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 10951, is arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods, since the amount does not exceed Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). Meanwhile, under the old provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is prision correccional, in its
maximum period, to prision mayor, in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), but does not exceed
Twenty-Two Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00); and, if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00). Thus, the penalty for estafa under the new law should be given
retroactive effect, being more favorable to the petitioner.
correccional, as the maximum, and to pay a FINE in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The Court also ORDERS Juvy Desmoparan to pay to Cebu CFI Community
Cooperative - Dumaguete Branch legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the aggregate amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be
reckoned from the finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.

In contrast, for falsification of a commercial document, the penalty of

imprisonment is the same for both Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (2),
of the Revised Penal Code and RA 10951 which is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, albeit, the imposable fine is different. Under the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable fine is not more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00); while under RA 10951, the imposable fine is not more than One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Thus, the penalty of imprisonment in the crime of estafa under RA 10951 is now
lighter than the penalty of imprisonment for falsification of commercial
documents. Applying then the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents,
the penalty for the graver offense should be imposed in the maximum period.
Thus, the penalty for falsification of commercial documents should be imposed
in the maximum period, being the more serious crime than estafa. However, the Republic of the Philippines
penalty of fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) under the old SUPREME COURT
law should be imposed because this is more favorable to the petitioner than the Manila
penalty of fine of not more than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) under the
present law. EN BANC
We, thus, modify the indeterminate sentence imposable on Desmoparan so that
G.R. No. 180314               April 16, 2009
the minimum term should, come from the penalty next lower in degree which
is arresto mayor, maximum, to prision correccional, minimum (4 months and 1
day to 2 years and 4 months), and the maximum term should come from prision NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner, 
correccional, medium, to prision correccional, maximum, in its maximum period vs.
(4 yeeirs, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years). PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of,the Court DECISION
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 02680 dated March 14, 2017 and July 20,
2017, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that the CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon Juvy Desmoparan should be 4
months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to 5 years of prision
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated on 7
August 2007 which found petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of
Falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and its
Resolution2 dated 22 October 2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered
Evidence.
On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
Falsification of Public Documents, defined and punished under paragraph 1 of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto
in Cotabato City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her
official position, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified
her Employee Clearance3 submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y.
Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of claiming her
salary for the months of August and September 2000. 4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking that she be
given the opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a preliminary
investigation in order that her right to due process would not be
violated.5Petitioner further filed an Urgent Motion for Preliminary Investigation
and/or Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest.6
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the
opportunity to be heard before the Office of the Ombudsman as she had waived
her right to be heard on preliminary investigation.7
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held and the
Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order. 9 The parties did not enter any
admission or stipulation of facts, and agreed that the issues to be resolved were
as follows:
1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the Regional
Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, falsified her Employee Clearance,
which she submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of
Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes
of claiming her salary for the months of August and September 2000;
2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official position in
order to commit the crime charged.10
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Subaida K.
Pangilan,11 former Human Resource Management Officer V of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan, former Supply Officer
of the Department of Tourism, ARMM;12 and Rebecca A. Agatep,13 Telegraph
Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a retired government
employee and formerly a Human Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM
which position she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As such, one of her
duties was to receive applications for clearance of Regional Secretaries of the
ARMM. She explained that an Employees Clearance was a requirement to be
submitted to the Office of the Regional Director by retiring employees,
employees leaving the country or those applying for leave in excess of thirty
days. The person applying for clearance shall get a copy of the employees
clearance and shall accomplish the same by having the different division heads
sign it. 
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-petitioner – Norma Pacasum
– to be the former Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT),
ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000, petitioner submitted the original of
an Employees Clearance to her office in compliance with the
memorandum14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by Governor Nur Misuari, directing
all officers and employees to clear themselves of property and money
accountabilities before their salaries for August and September 2000 would be
paid. Upon inspection of the Employees Clearance, she noticed that the
signature of Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said document was not hers.
She said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-in-law, and that the latter’s signature
was very familiar to her. Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied 15 the original
Employees Clearance with the intention of sending the same to her daughter-in-
law for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the signature on top of her
name in the Employees Clearance was hers. There being no messenger
available, she instead called up Laura to come to her office to verify the
signature. Laura, whose office was only a walking distance away, came and
inspected the clearance, and denied signing the same. After she denied that she
signed the clearance, and while they were conversing, the bearer of the
Employees Clearance took said document and left.
Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the person who took the
original of the Employee Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and staff
member of the petitioner. She said that all the signatures 16 appearing in the
Employees Clearance were all genuine except for Laura’s signature.
The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person whose
signature was allegedly imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding
the position of Human Resource Management Officer II of the Department of
Tourism - ARMM. Prior to said position, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT -
ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such, she issued memorandum receipts
(MR) to employees who were issued government property, and received
surrendered office properties from officers and employees of the DOT - ARMM.
She said she knew the accused, as she was their Regional Secretary of the DOT -
ARMM.
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris 17 Batuampar, an officemate
and niece of petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with the Employees
Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar requested her to sign in order to clear
petitioner of all property accountabilities. She refused to sign the clearance
because at that time, petitioner had not yet turned over all the office properties
issued to her. A few days later, she was called by her mother-in-law to go to the
latter’s office and inspect the Employees Clearance submitted by the
representative of petitioner. She went to her mother-in-law’s office and was
shown the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Upon seeing the same, she denied
the signature18 appearing on top of her name. Thereupon, Marie Cris
Batuampar, the representative of petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and
left.
Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-affidavit 19 dated 28 August 2001
regarding the instant case. She issued a certification 20 with a memorandum
receipt21 dated 23 November 1999, signed22 by petitioner. The certification
attested she did not sign petitioner’s Employees Clearance because all the office
properties issued to petitioner had not been turned over or returned to the
Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January 2005,
her last day as Supply Officer, petitioner had not returned anything.
The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep, Telegraph Operator,
Telegraph Office, Quezon City, testified that she had been a telegraph operator
for nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the Telegraph Office in
Commission on Audit, Quezon City. She received two telegrams 23 for
transmissions both dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner and
the other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving said documents, she
transmitted the documents through telegram. The telegram addressed to
petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto, in her residence on 1
June 2005, while that addressed to Ms. Batuampar was transmitted to, and
received in, Cotabato City on 1 June 2005. 24
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered 25 its documentary evidence
consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f,
A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9, to which the accused
filed her objections.26 The trial court admitted all the exhibits on 10 August
2005.27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Regional
Solicitor General, took the stand.
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was appointed by ARMM Regional
Governor Nur Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the
ARMM in 1999. She said she was familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August
2000 issued by Gov. Misuari directing all ARMM officers and employees to
liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before 31 August 2000 in view of
the impending expiration of the Governor’s extended term. At first, she said the
memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet secretary, but later she said
same did not apply to her because she had no cash advances. Only those with
cash advances were required to get an Employees Clearance before they could
receive their salaries. She then instructed her staff to work on her salary. 
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her Employees Clearance
was. Neither did she know if the signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been
imitated or forged. She likewise said that although the Employee Clearance was
in her name, she did not cause Laura’s signature to be affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for the month of August
2000 sometime in said month, because ARMM Executive Secretary Randolph C.
Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance before she could get her
salary because she was re-appointed.28
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of the subject Employees
Clearance.29 When she first saw the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the
signature of Laura was not there. She was able to see the photocopy of the
Employees Clearance again after this case had been filed with the
Sandiganbayan, already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner said it
was not she who placed or caused Laura’s purported signature to be affixed
there. 
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari did not apply to her,
because she had no cash advances and she could receive her salary even
without clearance. At that time, she said the Cashier, Accountant and the
Auditor checked her records and found that she had no cash
advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her
salary. However, she was informed by her staff that her salary could not be
released because the Office of the Governor required a clearance. Her staff
worked on her clearance, the purpose of which was for the release of her salary
for the months of August and September 2000. She was able to get all the
needed signatures except for Laura’s signature. With the refusal of Laura to sign,
her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio and explained the situation.
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I Anna
Isabel G. Aurellano ordering her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor
the original of the Employees Clearance of the DOT-ARMM issued in her name
sometime on 22-23 August 2000.
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her salary, she
believed that an Employees Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she
had this document prepared by her staff. She said her Employees Clearance was
always in the possession of Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris
who showed her the document twice.31
Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General, testified that he was
familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari
because the same was the product of consultation among him, Gov. Misuari and
ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio. He explained that this memorandum
pertained only to outstanding cash advances. He added that an Employees
Clearance was not a requirement and was not sufficient to comply with the
directive contained in the memorandum, because what was required for the
purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice from the Resident Auditors of
the Commission on Audit.
On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its documentary
exhibits32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5, with sub-markings. The prosecution
objected to the purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court
admitted all the defense exhibits.33
On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision convicting
petitioner of the crime charged in the information. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Normallah A.
Pacasum GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the
Information and, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentencing her to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum with the accessories thereof and to pay a
fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) with costs against the accused. 34
The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y.
Pangilan appearing in the Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been
falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on petitioner’s defense denying she
was the one who actually falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the
signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea about the alleged
falsification, because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who
worked for her clearance and the one who submitted the said clearance to the
Office of the Regional Governor of the ARMM. The trial court found said denial
unsubstantiated and ruled that while there was no direct evidence to show that
petitioner herself "actually" falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan,
there were circumstances that indicated she was the one who committed the
falsification/forgery, or who asked somebody else to falsify/forge the subject
signature in her Employees Clearance. The Sandiganbayan added that
considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and profited from the use
of the falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the material author
of the falsification. Despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut said
presumption, failing to show that it was another person who falsified/forged
the signature of Laura Pangilan, or that another person had the reason or
motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could have benefited from the
same.
The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioner’s contention that she did
not stand to benefit from the falsification of her Employees Clearance and from
the submission thereof to the Office of the Regional Governor, because she
allegedly had no existing cash advances. She claimed that an Employees
Clearance was not needed to enable her to draw her salary for the months of
August and September 2000 under the 8 August 2000 Memorandum of Gov.
Misuari, and that the presumption that he who benefits from the falsification is
presumed to be the author thereof does not apply to her. The lower court
explained that the aforementioned memorandum applied to petitioner, she
being an official of the ARMM. It said that the applicability of said memorandum
to petitioner was even admitted by her when she, in compliance therewith,
instructed her staff/assistant secretary to work for her Employees Clearance to
enable her to collect her salary for the month of August 2000. It said that the
fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash advances did not exempt her from
the coverage of the memorandum, because she must show she had no cash
advances and the only way to do this was by obtaining a clearance.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no
probative value in proving its contents and was inadmissible because the
original thereof was not presented by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan did
not agree. It said that the presentation and admission of secondary evidence,
like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was justified to prove the contents
thereof, because despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the
prosecution to petitioner and her assistant secretary to produce the original of
her Employees Clearance, they ignored the notice and refused to present the
original of said document.  Accused.
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Sandiganbayan35 to which the prosecution filed a evidence on her behalf, thus denying her due process.46
Comment/Opposition.36 Subsequent thereto, petitioner filed a Supplement to
Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for New Trial/Reception of
Newly Discovered Evidence.37 Petitioner prayed that her motion for new trial be
granted in order that the testimony of Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the
same being newly discovered evidence. The prosecution filed its Opposition. 38
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion for new
trial, because the evidence sought to be presented did not qualify as newly
discovered evidence.39
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.
In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to
file its Comment on the petition.41 After two motions for extension to file
comment on the petition, which were granted by this Court, the OSP filed its
Comment dated 18 February 2008. 42Petitioner was required43 to file a Reply to
the Comment, which she did on 5 June 2008.44
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for
review on certiorari and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They filed their respective
memoranda on 21 November 2008 and on 5 November 2008. 45
Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in: 
I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged falsification, hence
must be deemed the author thereof, when the evidence on record does
not support, but even contradicts, such a conclusion.
II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash advances hence was
required under the Misuari Memorandum to submit her Employee’s
Clearance to clear herself of these, when there is no evidence to that
effect and the prosecution even admitted so.
III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of the
allegedly forged Employee’s Clearance, in favor of the innocence of the
IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to present additional
Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum dated 8 August 2000,
she was not required to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary, since
what was required under said memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA.
She further contends that since she was not required to file said Employees
Clearance because she had no cash advances, the signature in her Employees
Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was required was a
Credit Notice.
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that under the aforesaid
memorandum, what was required before she could draw her salaries was a
Credit Notice from the COA and not an Employees Clearance. The full text of the
Memorandum47 form the Regional Governor reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR
TO: ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AS STATED
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
1. In view of the impending expiration of the extended term of
the undersigned, it is hereby directed that all outstanding cash
advances be liquidated on or before August 31, 2000. 
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other
emoluments of all ARMM officials/employees with
unliquidated cash advance shall be withheld until they have
settled their accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice is
issued to them by the Commission on Audit. 
3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints brought about by
the drastic cut of our budget, memorandum dated December
 01, 1998 is hereby reiterated. Therefore all releases for
financial assistance is hereby suspended effective
immediately.  Parcasio told her and her secretary that she did not need an Employee
4. For strict compliance.  appointment," when she was working for her Employees Clearance at around
PROF. NUR MISUARI
It is clear from said memorandum that what was required from
officers/employees who had unliquidated cash advances was the corresponding
Credit Notice issued by the COA after they had settled their accounts. There was
indeed no mention of any Employees Clearance therein. Up to this point, we
agree with petitioner. However, on her contention that the signature of Laura
Pangilan in her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," we
disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated or not is the
main issue in this case for falsification.
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice requirement was
effective only starting 1 September 2000 and not before. In the case at bar, the
information charges petitioner not with failure to secure a Credit Notice, but
with allegedly falsifying her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM. The Credit Notice
requirement was therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as regards the release of
salaries prior to 1 September 2000.
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature of Laura Pangilan in
petitioner’s Employees Clearance imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused
the imitation of said signature?
On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said that the
signature in petitioner’s Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an
imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies
his/her signature therein, a prima facie case for falsification is established
which the defendant must overcome.48
Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an Employees Clearance to
draw her salary. She adds that Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of
the ARMM, told her and her secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, that she did not
need an Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed. 49
These arguments are untenable. There was a need for petitioner to file an
Employees Clearance not only for compliance with the Misuari memorandum
but, more importantly, because her term of office was about to end, since her
position was coterminous with the term of Gov. Misuari, the appointing
authority.50 She even admitted that before she received her salary for August,
2000,51 an Employees Clearance was necessary.52 Moreover, her claim that Atty.
Clearance to get her salary does not persuade us. In fact, we find her alleged "re-
August 2000, improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by Gov.
Alvarez,53 whom she claims re-appointed her sometime in the year 2000, when
Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of the ARMM when she had her
Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August 2000? Clearly, her
statement that she did not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-
appointed does not inspire belief.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a
person had in his position a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered
it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is presumed to be the
material author of the falsification. He argues that the Sandiganbayan
overlooked the fact that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner made
use of or uttered the Employees Clearance, because there was no evidence that
she submitted it -- if not, at least caused it to be submitted to the Office of the
Regional Governor. To support such claim, she said there were no "receipt
marks" in the Employees Clearance to show that the Office of the Regional
Governor received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and
distinct from the "falsification" of a public document. The act of "using" falsified
documents is not necessarily included in the "falsification" of a public document.
Using falsified documents is punished under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the Employees Clearance was
consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the
falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents
set forth therein were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of
another was counterfeited.54 It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public
or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or
the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification of a
public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.55 Thus,
the purpose for which the falsification was made and whether the offender
profited or hoped to profit from such falsification are no longer material. 
The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees
Clearance. The fact that the same was circulated to the different division heads
for their signatures is already considered use of falsified documents as
contemplated in Article 172. The lack of the stamp mark "Received" in the
Employees Clearance does not mean that said document was not received by
the Office of the Regional Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty.
Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of Office of the Regional Governor -
ARMM, as contained in the Employees Clearance, to be sufficient proof that the
same was submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. It must be stressed
that the Executive Secretary is part of the Office of the Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by
imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge
about the falsification because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris
Batuampar, who worked for her Employees Clearance.
Petitioner’s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail.
Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and
self-serving evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 56 Denial is
intrinsically weak, being a negative and self-serving assertion. 57
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris
Batuampar, the person whom she instructed to work for her Employees
Clearance. Her failure to present this person in order to shed light on the matter
was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that the defense never intended to
present Marie Cris Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial
order, because the defense never listed her as a witness. 58 Her attempt to
present Ms. Batuampar to help her cause after she has been convicted is already
too late in the day, and Ms. Batuampar’s testimony, which is supposed to be
given, cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as to merit the granting
of her motion for new trial and/or reception of newly discovered evidence.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the
signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her.
We have ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases of forgery, the
prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining such direct
evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on
circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven together
would produce a single network establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.59 We totally agree with the Sandiganbayan, which said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually"
forged the signature of Laura Pangilan in the Employees Clearance in question,
the Court nevertheless finds the following circumstances, obtaining in the
records, to establish/indicate that she was the one who committed the forgery
or who asked somebody else to forge or caused the forgery of the signature of
Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance, to wit –  In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took
1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to work for
her Employees Clearance in compliance with the Memorandum of
ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari and that the forged signature of
Laura Pangilan was affixed on her clearance are strong evidence that
the accused herself either falsified the said signature or caused the
same to be falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris of the
falsified clearance of the accused is possession by the accused herself
because the former was only acting upon the instructions and in behalf
of the latter;
2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to submit
her Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the
months of August and September 2000 is sufficient and strong motive
or reason for her to commit the falsification by imitating the signature
of Laura Pangilan or order someone else to forge it; and 
3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the
falsification as she admitted that she was able to collect her salary for
the month of August 2000 after her falsified Employees Clearance was
submitted and approved by the ORG-ARMM and therefore, she alone
could have the motive for making such falsification. 
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-minded man
would say that the accused – a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM – had no
knowledge of the falsification. It is an established rule, well-buttressed upon
reason, that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, when a person has in
his possession or control a falsified document and who makes use of the same,
the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger or the
one who caused the forgery and, therefore, guilty of falsification. Thus, in People
v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held that – 
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he
made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the
presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is
especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to
have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with
the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v.
Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105
Phil. 1253). 
advantage and profited in the use of the falsified Employees Clearance in
question, the presumption is inevitable that she is the material author of the
falsification. And despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut such
presumption by failing to show that it was another person who forged or
falsified the signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not
she alone, had the reason or motive to commit the forgery or falsification, or
was or could have been benefited by such falsification/forgery. 60
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of
petitioner, convince us to apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one who is found in possession of, and who has used, a forged
document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of falsification. 61 The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is
offered, will thereby prevail.62 A prima facie case of falsification having been
established, petitioner should have presented clear and convincing evidence to
overcome such burden. This, she failed to do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of
the two Pangilans when they failed to report the alleged falsification to the
police or alert the Office of the Regional Governor of said falsification, or tried to
stop petitioner from getting her salaries.  its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be
We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored
on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. 63 The
determination of the credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court, as it
is in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. 64 The Sandiganbayan
has given full probative value to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
So have we. We find no reason to depart from such a rule.
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the
photocopy of petitioner’s Employees Clearance was supposed to have been
obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan should have doubted the
authenticity and probative value of the photocopy of the Employees Clearance.  Here, the accused admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the
Employees Clearance. We agree when it ruled:
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself. The purpose of the rule requiring the
production by the offeror of the best evidence if the prevention of fraud,
because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and
presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the
latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent
or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. Hence, as
long as the original evidence can be had, the Court should not receive in
evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the
absence of any clear showing that the original has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being
inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of
Rule 130, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted "when the original is
in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice." And to warrant
the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as
follows:
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. – If the
document is in the custody or control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of
presented as in the case of loss.
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse
party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the
best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document which
may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in
open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce
the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not
voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may
be admitted.
possession of her assistant secretary, [Marie Cris] Batuampar. So the
prosecution in its effort to produce the original copy of the said Employees
Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G.
Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA
Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas addressed to
accused Normallah Pacasum, and [Marie Cris] Batuampar ordering them to
submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor on or before June 8, 2005, the
original of the Employees’ Clearance in the name of Normallah Alonto Lucman-
Pacasum for the release of her August and September 2000 salary as DOT
Regional Secretary. Notwithstanding receipt of the said telegram subpoena by
her uncle Manso Alonto in her residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused did not
appear before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G.
Aurellano, the original of the said Employees Clearance, much less offered to
produce the same.
Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the
Employees Clearance as evidenced by the photocopy thereof, and despite the
reasonable notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her assistant
secretary to produce the original of said employees clearance they ignored the
notice and refused to produce the original document, the presentation and
admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the questioned Employees
Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof was justified. 65
This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified
document is not, or may no longer be produced in court, a criminal case for
falsification may still prosper if the person wishing to establish the contents of
said document via secondary evidence or substitutionary evidence can
adequately show that the best or primary evidence – the original of the
document – is not available for any of the causes mentioned in Section 3, 66 Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan severely
restricted her time to present evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates,
thus resulting in her failure to present another important witness in the of
person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio. Petitioner was not denied due process. She
was given every opportunity to adduce her evidence. The Sandiganbayan
outlined the proceedings of the case as follows:
After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the parties, the initial
hearing for the reception of defense evidence was scheduled on September 19
and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the morning. However, upon motion of the
prosecution, the Court, in its Order of September 16, 2005, cancelled the setting
as the handling prosecutor, Pros. Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend a 5-day
workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay City on September 19-23, 2005 and
scheduled anew the hearing on November 23 and 24, 2005, both at 8:30 in the
morning. However, for failure of the defense counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to
appear at the November 23, 2005 hearing despite due notice, the Court cancelled
the November 23 and 24 hearings, and moved the same to March 13 and 14,
2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and at the same time directed the said
defense counsel to show cause in writing within five (5) days from receipt of the
Order why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to appear despite
due notice. In compliance with this Order,1awphi1 Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, filed
his Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively, which were both
Noted by the Court in its Resolution of January 19, 2006.
In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13, 2006 hearing and her
continued failure to get a substitute counsel considering that her counsel, Atty.
Rico B. Bolongaita, had already withdrawn from the case since January 16, 2006,
the Court cancelled the March 13 and 14, 2006 hearings and moved the same to
July 3 and 4, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning and designated Atty. Conrado
Rosario of the PAO as counsel de oficio of the accused and directed the accused
upon receipt of the order to immediately confer with said counsel for purposes
of preparing for her defense in the case.
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following Resolution, which reads:
Accused Normallah L. Pacasum’s letter of February 17, 2006 (received by mail
on March 16, 2006) requesting extension of time to engage the services of
counsel is merely NOTED WITHOUT ACTION as the next hearings are scheduled
on July 3 and 4, 2006 and said accused would have more than ample time to
engage the services of counsel of her choice. For this reason, any excuse from the
accused on said settings that she failed to engage the services of counsel or that
her counsel needs more time to prepare will be unacceptable. At all events, this
Court, in its Order of March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado
Rosario of the PAO as a counsel de oficio to represent the accused, with specific
orders to the latter to confer with Atty. Rosario and assist him in preparing for
her defense.
On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for
the accused, that since he was appointed counsel de oficio, the accused has not
communicated with him and therefore he was not ready to present any evidence
for the accused, the Court cancelled the hearing in order to give the defense
another opportunity to present its evidence and reset it to July 4, 2006, the
following day as previously scheduled.
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads – 
"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked for the resetting of the
case on the ground that she just hired a new counsel who thereafter arrived and
entered his appearance as Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit with address at Suite 202
Masonic Building, #35 Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City. With the appearance
of her new counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby discharged as counsel de
oficio of the accused.
"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last chance to present her evidence
on October 9 and 10, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. For repeated
failure of the accused to acknowledge receipt of the notices of the Court, her
waiver of appearance is hereby cancelled and she is ordered to personally
appear in the scheduled hearings of this case.
SO ORDERED.
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not inclined to give favorable
Entry of Appearance, Motion For Postponement of October 9 and 10 action to the Motion for Reconsideration. It must be stressed that the primordial
Hearings stating therein that since his service as new counsel was just engaged reason for the issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered in the presence
by the accused, and that the accused herself cannot also attend the said hearing of the accused in the previous hearing in violation of the Court’s Order for her to
because she is undergoing fasting until October 24, 2006 in observance of personally appear in the hearings of this case and for her indifference to the
Ramadan, he asked to postpone the settings on October 9 and 10, 2006. At the directives of the Court. With the absence anew of the accused, the Court has no
hearing on October 9, 2006, the Court issued the following, which reads –  alternative but to deny the Motion. 

"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for Postponement of October 9 and Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that the counsel sought
10, 2006 Hearing filed by accused Normallah L. Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty. the assurance of the accused (and she promised) to appear before this Court if
Bantreas Lucman, finding the same to be without merit, as this case has been set the motion will be granted, as if the Court owes the accused the favor to appear
for hearing several times and the accused has been given the last chance to before it. The accused is reminded/advised that the issuance of the warrant of
present evidence, the Court hereby denies the motion for postponement.  arrest, she has to voluntarily surrender and appear before the Court or be
arrested and brought to the Court. 
"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused Normallah L. Pacasum in
today’s hearing despite the Order of the Court dated July 4, 2006, canceling her WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
waiver of appearance, and ordering her to personally appear before this Court, as
prayed for by the prosecution, let a Bench Warrant of Arrest be issued against the SO ORDERED.
said accused. The cash bond posted for her provisional liberty is ordered
confiscated in favor of the government. The accused is given thirty (30) days Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of
from notice to explain in writing why final judgment shall not be rendered Prosecution’s Memorandum (And for a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s
against the said bond.  Right to Present Defense Evidence) of the accused dated November 21, 2006,
and the prosecution’s Opposition thereto, the Court issued the following Order,
With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not ready to which reads – 
present its evidence today and tomorrow, the last chance for it to present its
evidence, the Court is constraint to consider the accused’s right to present "This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration
evidence as waived.  of Prosecution’s November 7, 2006 Memorandum (And For a Second Look on
the Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense Evidence)" dated November
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their respective 21, 2006 and the plaintiff’s Opposition thereto dated November 28, 2006.
memoranda. Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before the Court and posted an
SO ORDERED. additional bond of P10,000.00 despite the aforesaid opposition of the
prosecution, in the interest of justice, the Court is inclined to reconsider and give
Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of favorable action to the motion and grant the accused another and last
the above Order dated October 25, 2006, and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion opportunity to present here evidence.
for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest dated October 31, 2006. 
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set for hearing for the
At the hearing of accused’s motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2006, accused’s last chance to present and/or complete the presentation of her evidence
the Court issued the following Order, which reads –  on February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in the Sandiganbayan
Centennial Building in Quezon City.
"When the ‘Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift
Warrant of Arrest’ was called for hearing this morning, only Attorneys Bantuas SO ORDERED.
M. Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras appeared. Accused Normallah L. Pacasum
was absent. 
Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense, the
Court gave her ample opportunity to present her evidence. 67
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In fact, we find that the
trial court was lenient with the petitioner. The failure of the defense to present
Atty. Parcasio was its own doing. The defense failed to prepare its witnesses for
the case. As proof of this, we quote a portion of the hearing when petitioner was
testifying:
ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio would be
(sic) at this time?
A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. Misuari, we have not got
together with the other members of the cabinet of Gov. Misuari, but he lives in
Davao, sir.
Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or ask him to testify in this
case?
A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to clear my name, sir.
CHAIRMAN
Not after this hearing, you should have already done that. Because we already
gave you enough opportunity to present your side, right? You should not be
telling the Court that only after this hearing, you will start looking (for) people
who will, definitely, clear your name. You should be doing that months ago,
correct?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honors.68
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article
171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of
falsification under said paragraph, the followings elements must concur: (1)
that the offender is a public officer, an employee, or a notary public; (2) that he
takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by
counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no
dispute that petitioner was a public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of
the Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused the preparation of
her Employees Clearance (a public document) for the release of her salary for
the months of August and September 2000. Such being a requirement, and she
being a public officer, she was duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit
said document. Were it not for her position and employment in the ARMM, she
could not have accomplished said Employees Clearance. In a falsification of
public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his
official position when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise
intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) he had official custody of
the document which he falsified.69 It being her duty to prepare and submit said
document, she clearly took advantage of her position when she falsified or
caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
Laura Pangilan.lawphil.net
Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find the same proper. The
penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is prision
mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱5,000.00. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the felony, the imposable
penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, or within the range of eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the medium
period of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional or from
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Crim.
Case No. 27483 dated 7 August 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 225696, April 08, 2019
ATTY. BERNARDO T. CONSTANTINO, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a notary public to be found guilty of falsifying a notarial will, the
prosecution must prove that he or she has falsified or simulated the signatures
of the testator or the instrumental witnesses to make it appear that they
participated in the execution of the document when they did not.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the January 19, 2016
Decision2 and June 9, 2016 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
36327. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court November 28,
2013 Judgment4finding Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino (Atty. Constantino) guilty
of falsification of a public document under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal
Code.
On May 27, 2008, an Information was filed against Atty. Constantino and
Teresita C. Saliganan (Saliganan), charging them with falsification of a public
document.5 The Information read:  signed it were Rosalinda Cu (Cu), Dr. Justino Balintona and his wife Mary
That on or about September 9, 2001 in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ATTY.
BERNARDO CONSTANTINO taking advantage of his being a notary public for
Laoag City and Ilocos Norte, together with TERESITA C. SALIGANAN, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause to appear in the LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
executed by Severino C. Cabrales in favor of the accused TERESITA C.
SALIGANAN, known as Doc. No. 15909, Page No. 71, Book No. XXXI, Series of
2001 of the Notarial Register of Atty. BERNARDO CONSTANTINO, a notary
public for Laoag City and Province of Ilocos Norte, that SEVERINO C. CABRALES
participated in the execution of the LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT, when in fact
he did not so participate, and making it appear that the testator Severino
Cabrales and the attesting witnesses, Dr. Eliezer Asuncion, Mary Balintona and
Dr. Justino Balintona acknowledge the Last Will and Testament before Atty.
Bernardo Constantino while in truth they never appeared to acknowledge the
same.6
On June 13, 2008, warrants of arrest were issued against Atty. Constantino and
Saliganan. On September 24, 2008, Atty. Constantino filed a Motion for
Recognizance in Lieu of Bail as he was unable to post the required bond of
P24,000.00.7
In its October 28, 2008 Order, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion. Atty.
Constantino, through his wife Editha, was able to post bail on August 23, 2010.
Saliganan, however, remained at large.8
On arraignment, Atty. Constantino pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thus, trial on the merits ensued.9
According to the prosecution, sometime in June 1998, Severino Cabrales
(Severino), the father of Saliganan, suffered a stroke and was rushed to the
hospital, where he was confined for two (2) weeks. When he was discharged, he
returned to the family home in Laoag City. There, Saliganan stayed and took
care of Severino until his death on December 6, 2003. 10
On February 8, 2005, a Petition for Probate of Severino's alleged Last Will and
Testament was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City.
Upon learning of the probate proceedings, Fernando Cabrales (Fernando), a son
of Severino, secured a copy of the purported Last Will and Testament. He
claimed that the signature in the document was not Severino's. The document
was notarized by Atty. Constantino and registered in Book No. 31, Page No. 71
of Atty. Constantino's Notarial Register, series of 2001. The witnesses who
Balintona (the Balintona Spouses), and Dr. Eliezer John Asuncion (Dr.
Asuncion).11
The Joint Acknowledgment in the Last Will and Testament read:
JOINT ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
BEFORE ME, a notary public for and in the City of Laoag, Philippines, this 9 th day
of September, 2001, personally appeared: 
The testator, SEVERINO CABRALES, with Community Tax Certificate No.
06002287 dated January 2, 2001, issued in Laoag City; 
Witness, DR. JUSTINO G. BALINTONA, with Community Tax Certificate No. _____
dated _____[;] 
Witness, MRS. MARY B. BALINTONA, with Community Tax Certificate No.
06030819 dated April 10, 2001[;] 
Witness, DR. ELIEZER ASUNCION, with Community Tax Certificate No.
08214902 dated January 6, 2001; 
Witness, MRS. ROSALINDA F. CU, with Community Tax Certificate No. 06022789
dated 03, 18, 2001 [;] (sic) 
All known to me to be the same persons who signed the foregoing will, the first
as testator and the last four as instrumental witnesses, and they respectively
acknowledged to me that they signed the same as their own free act and deed.
This Will consists of three (3) pages, including this page of the acknowledgment,
and has been signed on the left hand margin of the first and third pages and
above their respective names on the second page, by the testator and his
witnesses and sealed with my notarial seal.  to leave the document as it was and "not make any erasures or crossing-out on
IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand the, [sic] month, year and
place above written.
[sgd]  Saliganan returned the copy, but Atty. Constantino stated that he did not check
  BERNARDO T. CONSTANTINO
Notary Public12
Fernando immediately spoke to Dr. Asuncion, who told him that Rene Ferrer, Jr.
(Ferrer), Saliganan's son-in-law, had gone to his clinic and asked him to sign the
document. Dr. Asuncion did as asked, having known Ferrer as a member of his
motorcycle club. He also told Fernando that only he, Ferrer, and some patients
were present when he signed the document.13
In his defense, Atty. Constantino alleged that Severino had been of sound mind
and could walk with a cane when he started visiting Atty. Constantino to
prepare his Last Will and Testament. Atty. Constantino had advised him to bring
a listing of his assets and properties, with which Severino complied. 14
Atty. Constantino further alleged that when he asked Severino why he was
executing a will, Severino told him that he wanted his only child, Saliganan, to
have his properties since Fernando was going around claiming to be his son.
Atty. Constantino claimed that Severino had also admitted promising to
bequeath Fernando all his properties in Solsona, Ilocos Norte, provided that
Saliganan approve of it.15
Atty. Constantino further narrated that in the morning of September 9, 2001, he
brought three (3) typed copies of the Last Will and Testament to Severino's
house for signing. Together in the room were Severino, Atty. Constantino, his
wife Editha and son Bernard Christian, the Balintona Spouses, Cu, Saliganan,
and one (1) other person.16
Atty. Constantino stated that Severino's hands were trembling as he attempted
to sign the first page of the document, so he asked Saliganan to hold his wrist to
sign all three (3) copies. The three (3) instrumental witnesses present—the
Balintona Spouses and Cu—then signed the document, after which Atty.
Constantino affixed his signature. Upon seeing a stamp pad nearby, Atty.
Constantino asked Severino if he would like to place his thumbmark on the
documents. Severino agreed and again asked Saliganan to assist him. 17
Addressing the absence of Dr. Asuncion, whose name was indicated as an
instrumental witness, Atty. Constantino assured Severino that only three (3)
witnesses were needed for the document. He then allegedly instructed Severino
it [in] order not to make it dirty." 18 Atty. Constantino took a copy of the
document and gave the other two (2) to Severino.19
On his way out, Atty. Constantino alleged that Saliganan took his copy of the
document, telling him that Dr. Asuncion had already arrived. Sometime later,
if Dr. Asuncion had signed it.20
In its November 28, 2013 Judgment,21 the Regional Trial Court found Atty.
Constantino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of a public
document under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It pointed out that
while only a photocopy of the allegedly falsified document was presented, the
parties nonetheless did not dispute its execution. 22 The trial court, however,
found that the prosecution failed to establish that Severino had not been of
sound mind when the Last Will and Testament was executed. 23
Nonetheless, the trial court found Atty. Constantino liable for making it appear
that Dr. Asuncion appeared before him and witnessed the execution of the Last
Will and Testament. It ruled that Atty. Constantino should have been aware of
the legal consequences to leaving Dr. Asuncion's name on the document despite
his absence.24
Likewise, the trial court cited the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which
prohibited notaries public from notarizing incomplete documents or false
information. It pointed out that removing Dr. Asuncion's name from the
document was easy and could have been accomplished within minutes. Thus, it
did not give credence to Atty. Constantino's defense that he instructed Severino
not to make any markings on the document.25
Moreover, the trial court considered Atty. Constantino's failure to immediately
surrender to authorities as indicative of his guilt, as he only posted bail two (2)
years after warrants of arrest had been issued.26
The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Judgment read: 
WHEREFORE, the accused Atty. Bernardo Constantino is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Document under Article 171 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from two years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ordered to pay a fine of three thousand
pesos (P3,000.00). Costs against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.27
Atty. Constantino appealed before the Court of Appeals. 28
In its January 19, 2016 Decision,29 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court.  Code were duly proven by the evidence on record. 38 However, it requests that
Agreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that Atty. Constantino
could have easily removed Dr. Asuncion's name if he believed in good faith that
only three (3) witnesses were needed. Instead, the Court of Appeals pointed out
that Atty. Constantino made it appear as if Dr. Asuncion were present before
him as a witness. It also noted his testimony that he knew Dr. Asuncion would
still want to sign the document, which was why he gave his copy to Saliganan. It
held that Atty. Constantino should have checked the copy when it was returned
to him.30
The Court of Appeals, likewise, affirmed the trial court's finding that Atty.
Constantino's failure to immediately surrender was a manifestation of his guilt,
as he had no persuasive reason to do so.31
Atty. Constantino moved for reconsideration, but his Motion was denied in the
Court of Appeals June 9, 2016 Resolution.32 Hence, he filed this Petition.33
Petitioner claims that it would have been difficult for him to remove Dr.
Asuncion's name at the time of signing. Due to his muscular dystrophy, he had
to be accompanied by his wife and two (2) sons to climb to the second floor of
the house. Additionally, there was no typewriter, clerk, or typist in Severino's
house for the corrections to be done. Petitioner also alleges that he wanted the
notarization to be made in Severino's residence to honor the testator's wish.
Then and there, he asserts, he notarized the document to avoid going up the
steep stairway again.34
Petitioner argues that precisely due to his physical condition, he has relied on
his secretary to file the office documents. As such, he was not able to check the
Last Will and Testament when Saliganan returned it to his secretary. While he
admits that he had been negligent for failing to cross out Dr. Asuncion's name in
the document, he asserts that it should not be taken against him, but on Dr.
Asuncion, who admitted to signing the document without reading it. 35
Petitioner, likewise, explains that his failure to immediately surrender was due
to his failing health and his wife being abroad to take care of their two (2)
daughters. He alleges that as litigation had started in 2008, Saliganan assured
him on the phone not to worry as she was trying to settle the case as a family
misunderstanding, which was why he did not pay attention to the case. 36
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, claims that petitioner
raises questions of fact improper in a Rule 45 petition. 37Maintaining that there
was no error in the finding of guilt, it asserts that all the elements of the crime of
falsification of a public document under Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal
this Court impose with leniency any penalty it will have ruled due to petitioner's
advanced age and physical condition.39
In rebuttal, petitioner contends that there are recognized exceptions to Rule 45
that apply to this case, considering that his conviction was "overtly based on
conjectures, presumptions[,] and speculations, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt[.]"40
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino
was guilty of falsifying a public document under Article 171(2) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Before this issue can be passed upon, however, this Court must first address the
procedural question of whether the Petition presents questions of fact not
cognizable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 
I
The Constitution guarantees that an accused is presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven.41 Thus, every conviction requires no less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides: 
SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. 
The burden of proof rests with the prosecution. Guilt must be founded on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the
defense.42 Reasonable doubt on the evidence presented will result in an
acquittal. In People v. Capili:43
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed to overcome the presumption of
innocence. Accused-appellant's guilt must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt[;] otherwise, the Court would be left without any other recourse but to
rule for acquittal. Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be
better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged
than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. 44
In criminal cases, courts must evaluate the evidence in relation to the elements
of the crime charged. Thus, the finding of guilt is always a question of fact. 45
The Petition before this Court, however, is one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. Rule 45 mandates that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. 46 Thus, this Court generally gives great respect
to the factual findings of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe
the witnesses' demeanor during trial and assess their testimonies. 47
Considering that criminal cases involve the constitutional right to liberty and
the constitutional guarantee of the presumption of innocence, appeals of
criminal cases before this Court are not necessarily treated in the same manner
as appeals in civil cases. In Ferrer v. People:48
It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case
wide open for review and that it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such
errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are
assigned as errors or not.49
Appeals of criminal cases confer upon the reviewing court full jurisdiction and
render it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment from which an
appeal arose, increase the penalty, and cite the appropriate penal law
provision.50
Thus, this Court may still review the factual findings of the trial court "if it is not
convinced that [such findings] are conformable to the evidence of record and to
its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses." 51 Significant facts and
circumstances may have been overlooked, which, if properly considered, could
affect the result of the case.52
Here, however, the factual findings are not disputed. Severino executed a Last
Will and Testament on September 9, 2001, which was notarized by petitioner.
The Joint Acknowledgment indicated that the Balintona Spouses, Cu, and Dr.
Asuncion were all present as witnesses and personally appeared before
petitioner. This makes it appear that Dr. Asuncion signed the document in the
presence of petitioner when, in reality, he did not. It was later discovered that
Dr. Asuncion signed it after it had been notarized. Neither party disputes this
sequence of events. 
The prosecution's theory, however, is that a falsity in a public document
occurred because petitioner failed to delete Dr. Asuncion's name in the Joint
Acknowledgment. Petitioner's main defense, on the other hand, is that he
ordered the testator, Severino, not to delete Dr. Asuncion's name. This Court is,
thus, confronted with the legal question of whether petitioner, as a notary
public, falsified a public document, punishable under Article 171(2) of the
Revised Penal Code, when he failed to delete Dr. Asuncion's name in the Joint
Acknowledgment upon notarization.
II
Before one can be held criminally liable for falsification of public documents, it
is essential that the document allegedly falsified is a public document. 
Public documents are defined in Cacnio v. Baens53 as "those instruments
authorized by a notary public or by a competent public official with all the
solemnities required by law[.]"54 By this definition, any notarized document is
considered a public document. 
Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, however, provides: 
SECTION 19. Classes of documents. — For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private. 
Public documents are: 
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
   
(b)  Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
   
(c)  Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein. 
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied)  This acknowledgment is embodied in an attestation clause at the end of the
instrument. An attestation clause, in Caneda v. Court of Appeals,62 is: 
Notarization confers a public character upon private documents so that, for the
purposes of admissibility in court, no further evidence is required to prove the . . . that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
document's authenticity.55 The notary public swears to the truth of the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution
document's contents and its due execution. In Antillon v. Barcelon:56 of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been
notary public certifies the due execution and delivery of a document under his observed. It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record
hand and seal he thereby gives such a document the force of evidence.  of the facts that attended the execution of a particular will, so that in case of
failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts
.... may still be proved.63

Indeed, one of the very purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged By this definition, the formalities required by law to prove a notarial will's
before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the authenticity do not pertain to the notarization, but to the attestation and
execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be subscription of the testator and the attesting witnesses. In Caneda, this Court
given in evidence without further proof of their execution and delivery. 57 further explained: 

Thus, notaries public are cautioned to take due care in notarizing documents to
ensure the public's confidence in notarized documents. In Ramirez v. Ner:58
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and
for this reason notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the
elementary formalities in the performance of their duties. Otherwise the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyancing would be
undermined.59
Under the Rules on Evidence, notarized documents are clothed with the
presumption of regularity; that is, that the notary public had the authority to
certify the documents as duly executed. A last will and testament, however, is
specifically excluded from the application of Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court. This implies that when the document being presented as evidence is a
last will and testament, further evidence is necessary to prove its due execution,
whether notarized or not.  instrumental witnesses. Mere mention of their names in the attestation clause
A last will and testament is a "species of conveyance whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree
the disposition of his estate after his death." 60 A notarial will is one that is
"acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the attesting
witnesses[.]"61 Moreover, Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:  171(2) of the Revised Penal Code. The provision reads:
[T]he subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses
is made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates
that the will is the very same instrument executed by the testator and attested
to by the witnesses. 
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare
the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The
attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due
execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it appertains only to
the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it is
left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be
possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of
the testator and the witnesses.64
Hence, an authentic attestation clause must not only contain the names of the
will not accurately represent the fact of their attestation and subscription.
Instead, the instrumental witnesses must also sign the instrument before it is
notarized by the notary public. 
Here, petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article
 

ARTICLE 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the ARTICLE 171. Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclesiastic
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a Minister. — The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.  shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of The due execution of a notarized will is proven through the validity of its
the following acts:  attestation clause. The prosecution must prove that either the testator could not
have authored the instrument, or the instrumental witnesses had no capacity to
. . . .  attest to the due execution of the will. This requires that the notary public must
have falsified or simulated the signatures appearing on the attestation clause. 
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate [.] Here, petitioner was found to have falsely certified in the Joint Acknowledgment
that Dr. Asuncion was an instrumental witness to the execution of Severino's
There is falsification of a public document when the public document is Last Will and Testament since he did not sign it in petitioner's presence. 
simulated "in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine
instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity[.]" 65 Moreover, The trial court and the Court of Appeals, however, disregarded one crucial detail
"[w]hat is punished in falsification of public document is principally the from its finding of facts: Dr. Asuncion signed the Joint Acknowledgment after it
undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly was notarized by petitioner. 
proclaimed therein."66
Based on the findings of the trial court, at the time petitioner notarized the Last
When a notary public falsifies a public document, his or her act effectively Will and Testament, only three (3) witnesses had signed it. The trial court,
undermines the public's trust and reliance on notarized documents as evidence. however, did not make any finding that petitioner had falsified the participation
Thus, he or she is held criminally liable for the offense when the falsity of the three (3) witnesses who attested and subscribed to its due execution. It
committed leads others to believe the document was authentic when it is not.  likewise found that Dr. Asuncion signed the document at the urging of
Saliganan's son-in-law, Ferrer, and that petitioner seemed unaware that Dr.
In falsification of public documents under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Asuncion later signed the document. Dr. Asuncion also admitted that his
Code, the prosecution must prove that these elements exist:  signature was genuine and that he was aware of what he was signing. 

1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.  Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgment before it was
notarized, he cannot be considered as having attested and subscribed to its due
execution at the time of its notarization. Thus, when petitioner certified that the
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.  persons who attested and subscribed to the document were present before him,
there could have been no falsity. It was not petitioner who made it appear that
3. That he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have Dr. Asuncion participated in the execution of the Joint Acknowledgment, but
participated in any act or proceeding. Ferrer and Dr. Asuncion himself. Petitioner, therefore, must be acquitted. 

4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding. 67
Here, the first element has already been proven since both the prosecution and
the defense stipulate that petitioner is a notary public. The second element is
presumed when the alleged falsity committed by the notary public pertains to
the notarization, since only notaries public have the duty and authority to
notarize documents.  against in disallowing notaries public to notarize incomplete documents. Rule
Thus, the elements that remain to be proven by the prosecution are: (1) that
petitioner falsified a document "by causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding"; and (2) that "such person or persons did
not in fact so participate in the proceeding."68
Nonetheless, while petitioner's acts may be inadequate to find him criminally
liable, he may still be liable for administrative sanctions. 
Petitioner's failure to cross out Dr. Asuncion's name when he notarized the Joint
Acknowledgment has allowed Dr. Asuncion to still sign the document despite
not having participated in its due execution. This is the mischief being guarded
XI, Section l(b)(9), in relation to Rule IV, Section 5 69 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, states: 
RULE XI
Revocation of Commission and Disciplinary Sanctions
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. — . . . Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose Manila
appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who: 
THIRD DIVISION
. . . 
G.R. Nos. 174730-37               February 9, 2011
(9) executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV[.]
ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner, 
To be sure, the incidents here occurred in 2001, or before the 2004 Rules on vs.
Notarial Practice was promulgated. While the previous Notarial Law 70 did not PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
contain a provision on false and incomplete certificates, this Court has already
cautioned notaries public from notarizing incomplete documents even before x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
the applicability of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In Bote v. Eduardo:71
G.R. Nos. 174845-52
Respondent [notary public] was . . . negligent when he notarized the deed with
unfilled spaces and incomplete entries, making uncertified and fraudulent PAULINO S. ONG, Petitioner, 
insertions easy to accomplish. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, vs.
routinary act. It is invested with such substantial public interest that only those PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making that document DECISION
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. For this reason,
notaries must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 72
The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan convicting
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The January 19, 2016 Decision and
petitioners Paulino S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and Rosalio S. Galeos (Galeos) of
June 9, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36327
four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
is ACQUITTED of the crime of falsification of a public document, and the bail
bond posted for his provisional liberty is ordered canceled. 
The facts are as follows:
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the
filing of the appropriate administrative action.  Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga,
Cebu on April 16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988
and served as such until 1998.2
SO ORDERED.

On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico

T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and
Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer. 3 Prior to their
permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual employees of the
municipal government.
In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the
year 1993, Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your
knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of
affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on
the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query. 4 The
boxes for "Yes" and "No" to the said query were left in blank by Galeos in his
1994 and 1995 SALN.5 Rivera in his 1995 SALN answered "No" to the question
on relatives in government.6 In their 1996 SALN, both Galeos and Rivera also did
not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same query. 7Ong’s signature
appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the
oath when Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.
In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos,
Regional Director, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Regional Office 7, Cebu City,
it was attested that:
This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to
creation of positions, hiring and issuance of appointments, Section 325 on the
limitations for personal services in the total/supplemental appropriation of a
local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.;
Section 76, organizational structure and staffing pattern; Section 79 on
nepotism; Section 80, posting of vacancy and personnel selection board; Section
81 on compensation, etc. have been duly complied with in the issuance of this
appointment.
This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these
restrictions/requirements was made in accordance with the requirements of
the Civil Service Commission before the appointment was submitted for review
and action.8(Emphasis supplied.)
The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C.
Garcia.
On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed
a letter-complaint9 before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas against
Ong (then incumbent Vice-Mayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty,
nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employeesand Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the
crime of falsification of public documents.
On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the
recommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal
charges be filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public
documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
connection with the Certification dated June 1, 1994 issued by Ong and the false
statements in the 1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera and the 1993, 1994,
1995 and 1996 SALN of Galeos.10
On August 16, 2000, the following Informations 11 were filed against the
petitioners:
Criminal Case No. 26181
That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public
officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance
Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate
intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December
31, 1993, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before
accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are
not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused
very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S.
Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the
mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26182
That on or about the 15th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Naga,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public
officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the
Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with
intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of
Relatives In the Government Service as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused
Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong,
wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the
government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when
in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each
other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong
within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife
being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26183
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Naga,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public
officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance
Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate
intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1995,
filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused
Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making false
statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well
k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is
related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the
mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused
Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26184
That on or about the 1st day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Naga,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public
officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the
Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with
intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of
Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1995, filed by
accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino
S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has
no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the
government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when
in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each
other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong
within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife
being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26185
That on or about the 5th day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Naga,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused, public
officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the
Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with
intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of
Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1996, filed by
accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino
S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has
no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the
government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when
in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each
other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong
within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife
being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26186
That on or about the 3rd day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Naga,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public
officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance
Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate
intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Services, as of December 31, 1994,
filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused
Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well
k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is
related to accused Paulino S. Ong, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the
mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused
Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26187
That on or about the 11th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Naga,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public
officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance
Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating, together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate
intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1996,
filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused
Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well
k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is
related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the
mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused
Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26188
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of
Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of
a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then
Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-Region VII, Cebu City
dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying
therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction
provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Rosalio
S. Galeos, as Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal
Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts, when in truth and in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment
of Rosalio S. Galeos was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service
Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused within
the fourth degree of consanguinity, since the mother of Rosalio S. Galeos is the
sister of the mother of accused, which Certification caused the approval of the
appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, to the detriment of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26189
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of
Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of
a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then
Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region VII, Cebu City,
dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying
therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction
provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Federico
T. Rivera, a Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu,
thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and
in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment of Federico T. Rivera
was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on
Nepotism, as Federico T. Rivera is related to accused within the fourth degree of
affinity, since the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife is the sister of the mother
of accused, which certification caused the approval of the appointment of
Federico T. Rivera, to the detriment of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted to the court a quo, the accused
made the following admissions: (1) Ong was the Municipal Mayor of Cebu at all
times relevant to these cases; (2) Ong is related to Galeos, within the fourth
degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos’ mother, and to
Rivera within the fourth degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the
mother of Rivera’s wife; and (3) Galeos and Rivera were employed as
Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the
Municipal Government of Naga, Cebu at all times relevant to these cases. Ong
likewise admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary
exhibits presented by the prosecutor (copies of SALNs and Certification dated
June 1, 1994) except for Exhibit "H" (Certification dated June 1, 1994 offered by
the prosecution as "allegedly supporting the appointment of Rosalio S.
Galeos"12).13
As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has
been a resident of Pangdan, Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be friends
with Ong, Galeos and Rivera. He knows the mother of Galeos, Pining Suarez or
Peñ aranda Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned "Bining Suarez,"
Canoneo stated that Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining
Suarez is the same person as "Bernardita Suarez." Ong is related to Galeos
because Ong’s mother, Conchita Suarez, and Galeos’ mother, Bernardita Suarez,
are sisters. As to Rivera, his wife Kensiana, 14 is the daughter of Mercedes Suarez
who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez. He knew the Suarez sisters because they
were the neighbors of his grandmother whom he frequently visited when he
was still studying.15
Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their
SALN but did not personally fill up the forms as these were already filled up by
"people in the municipal hall" when they signed them.
Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN, 16 confirmed his signature thereon. When he
was asked if he understood the question "To the best of your knowledge, are
you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to anyone
working in the government?" he answered in the negative. He claimed that the
"X" mark corresponding to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other
entries in his SALN, were already filled up when he signed it. When shown his
SALN for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, Galeos reiterated that they were
already filled up and he was only made to sign them by an employee of the
municipal hall whom he only remembers by face. He also admitted that he
carefully read the documents and all the entries therein were explained to him
before he affixed his signature on the document. However, when asked whether
he understands the term "fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity" stated in
the SALNs, he answered in the negative.17
Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the
Municipal Mayor because when he asked her, the latter told him that Ong was a
distant relative of hers. Rivera added that it was not Ong who first appointed
him as a casual employee but Ong’s predecessor, Mayor Vicente Mendiola. 18
On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal
Mayor of Naga, he did not know that he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact there
are several persons with the surname "Galeos" in the municipality. He signed
Galeos’ 1993 SALN when it was presented to him by Galeos at his office. There
were many of them who brought such documents and he would administer
their oaths on what were written on their SALN, among them were Galeos and
Rivera. He came to know of the defect in the employment of Galeos when the
case was filed by his "political enemy" in the Ombudsman just after he was
elected Vice-Mayor in 1998. As to Rivera, Ong claimed that he knows him as a
casual employee of the previous administration. As successor of the former
mayor, he had to re-appoint these casual employees and he delegated this
matter to his subordinates. He maintained that his family was not very close to
their other relatives because when he was not yet Mayor, he was doing business
in Cebu and Manila. When queried by the court if he had known his relatives
while he was campaigning considering that in the provinces even relatives
within the 6th and 7th degree are still regarded as close relatives especially
among politicians, Ong insisted that his style of campaigning was based only on
his performance of duties and that he did not go from house to house. Ong
admitted that he had been a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. He could no
longer recall those SALN of most of the employees whose oaths he had
administered. He admitted that he was the one who appointed Galeos and
Rivera to their permanent positions and signed their official appointment (Civil
Service Form No. 33) but he was not aware at that time that he was related to
them. It was only after the filing of the case that he came to know the wife of
Rivera. As to the qualifications of these appointees, he no longer inquired about
it and their appointments were no longer submitted to the Selection Board.
When the appointment forms for Galeos and Rivera were brought to his office,
the accompanying documents were attached thereto. Ong, however, admitted
that before the permanent appointment is approved by the CSC, he issues a
certification to the effect that all requirements of law and the CSC have been
complied with.19
On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision
convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the following:
In Criminal Case No. 26181, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26182, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26183, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).1auuphil
In Criminal Case No. 26184, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26185, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26186, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26187, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are
hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26188, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong NOT GUILTY for Violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
and
In Criminal Case No. 26189, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Paulino S. Ong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium as the minimum
penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the
maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.20
In its Resolution21 dated August 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motions for reconsideration of Ong and Galeos. However, in view of the death of
Rivera on August 22, 2003 before the promulgation of the decision, the cases
(Criminal Case Nos. 26182, 26184 and 26185) against him were dismissed.
In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:
1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.
2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONER’S VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD
FAITH AND LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIMES IMPUTED.
3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE
WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION.22
In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful
or false statements in his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive averment
and thus silence or non-disclosure cannot be considered one. And even if they
are considered statements, Galeos contends that they were not made in a
"narration of facts" and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of
law." He also argues that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to
support the finding that he was aware of their relationship at the time of the
execution of the SALN. With the presence of good faith, Galeos avers that the
fourth element of the crime – the perversion of truth in the narration of facts
was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person – is missing. He
also faults the Sandiganbayan for its heavy reliance on the uncorroborated
testimony of the prosecution’s sole witness despite the fact that there are
aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan
erred when:
(a)
. . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.
(b)
IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON
MERELY ADMINISTERING THE OATH IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL
STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.
(c)
. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, … IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE
COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE,
THAT RESPONDENT’S EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONER’S EXHIBIT "8")
REFERS TO OR SUPPORTS THE APPOINTMENT OF FEDERICO T.
RIVERA.23
Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful
statements containing a narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent
of injuring a third person at the time of the execution of the documents. He
contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely administering
the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer
administering the oath to certify the truthfulness and/or veracity of the
contents of the document. Neither can he be made liable for falsification
regarding the letter-certification he issued since there was no evidence adduced
that it was made to support Rivera’s appointment.
In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos
categorically admitted during his testimony that before affixing his signature on
the subject SALN, he carefully read its contents and the entries therein have
been explained to him. Moreover, the admission made by Ong during the pre-
trial under the joint stipulation of facts indicated no qualification at all that he
became aware of his relationship with Galeos and Rivera only after the
execution of the subject documents. The defense of lack of knowledge of a
particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and therefore self-serving, it can be
legally assumed that the admission of that particular fact without qualification
reckons from the time the imputed act, to which the particular fact relates, was
committed. As to mistaken reliance on the testimony of prosecution witness, the
analysis and findings in the assailed decision do not show that such testimony
was even taken into consideration in arriving at the conviction of petitioners. 24
With respect to Ong’s liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN
containing untruthful statements, the Special Prosecutor argues that as a
general rule, it is not the duty of the administering officer to ascertain the truth
of the statements found in a document. The reason for this is that the
administering officer has no way of knowing if the facts stated therein are
indeed truthful. However, when the facts laid out in the document directly
involves the administering officer, then he has an opportunity to know of their
truth or falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless administers the
oath despite the false contents of the document, which are known to him to be
false, he is liable, not because he violated his duty as an administering officer,
but because he participated in the falsification of a document. 25
After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.
Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article
171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts;
(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; and
(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26
In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public
officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to
have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make
or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he
has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. 27Likewise, in
falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. 28
Falsification of Public Document
by making untruthful statements
concerning relatives in the
government service
All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful
statements have been established by the prosecution.
Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local
Government Code has been complied with in the issuance of the appointments"
are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as both require the
application of the rules on relationship under the law of succession. Thus, they
cite People v. Tugbang 29 where it was held that "a statement expressing an
erroneous conclusion of law cannot be considered a falsification." Likewise, in
People v. Yanza,30 it was held that when defendant certified that she was eligible
for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law, which turned out to
be incorrect or erroneous; hence, she may not be declared guilty of falsification
because the law violated pertains to narration of facts.
We disagree.
A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding
the law that applies in a particular case. It is opposed to a finding of fact, which
interprets the factual circumstances to which the law is to be applied. 31A
narration of facts is merely an account or description of the particulars of an
event or occurrence.32 We have held that a certification by accused officials in
the Statement of Time Elapsed and Work Accomplished qualifies as a narration
of facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as it
consisted not only of figures and numbers but also words were used therein
giving an account of the status of the flood control project.33
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a
description of such relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a
particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil
Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what
constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The
question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity
or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners’
assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or
falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government
employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such
information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated
under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to
stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the
employee’s eligibility for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or
restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.
Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he
has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was
related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to
his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to
the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong, 34 it was held that one is guilty of
falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if
he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his
appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding
information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN,
Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such
relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the
disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j)
(Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:
No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is
related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the
appointing power or recommending authority.
Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No.
292 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the CSC
shall disapprove the appointment of a person who "has been issued such
appointment in violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules and regulations."
Among the prohibited appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 38, series of 1993 are appointments in the LGUs of persons who are related
to the appointing or recommending authority within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity.35
The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998 dated December 14, 1998) contain
a similar prohibition under Rule XIII, Section 9:
SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal
governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government
owned or controlled corporations with original charters shall be made in favor
of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the
bureau or office or of the person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the
family referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.
In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives
of the appointing or recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity.
xxxx
The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original,
promotional, transfer and reemployment regardless of status including casuals
and contractuals except consultants. (Emphasis supplied.)
The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a
law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. 36 Permanent
employees employed by local government units are required to file the
following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b)
lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in
government service; (c) financial and business interests; and (d) personal data
sheets as required by law.37 A similar requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of
Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives 38. – It shall be the duty of every
public official or employee to identify and disclose to the best of his knowledge
and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and
frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either
with imprisonment or fine, and, in the discretion of the court of competent
jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office. Such violation if proven in a
proper administrative proceeding shall also be sufficient cause for removal or
dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.
The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos’ negative answer reflected in
his SALN is absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the
fact that they are first cousins but denied having knowledge of such relationship
at the time the subject documents were executed. The Sandiganbayan correctly
rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the fourth
degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong
kinship and extended family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been
working for several years in the municipal government, not to have known of
his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure having ran
and won in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-
Mayor in the 1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same
municipality in 1986 until 1988.
The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no
knowledge that a first cousin (Galeos) was working in the municipal
government and appointed by him to a permanent position during his
incumbency, was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply
unthinkable that as a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that,
he was all the time unaware that he himself appointed to permanent positions
the son of his mother’s sister (Galeos) and the husband of his first cousin
(Rivera). Indeed, the reality of local politics and Filipino culture renders his
defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their relationship) unavailing.
Despite his knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN, Ong
still administered the oath to Galeos and Rivera who made the false statement
under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in finding that Ong connived
with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government
service.
Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to
commit the crime,39 as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which
clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a
crime.40 In this case, Ong administered the oaths to Galeos and Rivera in the
subject SALN not just once, but three times, a clear manifestation that he
concurred with the making of the untruthful statement therein concerning
relatives in the government service.
Falsification by making
untruthful statements
in the Certification re:
compliance with the
prohibition on nepotism
As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have
issued the certification recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos’
appointment although he admitted only the authenticity and due execution of
Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on nepotistic
appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 79 41 of R.A. No.
7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact that the appointee is not
related to him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Having
executed the certification despite his knowledge that he and Rivera were related
to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in fact Rivera was his
cousin-in-law because the mother of Rivera’s wife is the sister of Ong’s mother,
Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful
statement in a narration of facts. He also took advantage of his official position
as the appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to
issue such certification.
The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper
appointing authority in the local government unit, regarding compliance with
the prohibition against nepotism under R.A. No. 7160 cannot be
overemphasized. Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, a head of office or appointing official who issues an appointment
or employs any person in violation of Civil Service Law and Rules or who
commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material facts
concerning other civil service matters, or anyone who violates, refuses or
neglects to comply with any of such provisions or rules, may be held criminally
liable. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 42 we held that mere issuance of
appointment in favor of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or
affinity is sufficient to constitute a violation of the law. Although herein
petitioners were prosecuted for the criminal offense of falsification of public
document, it becomes obvious that the requirement of disclosure of relationship
to the appointing power in the local government units simply aims to ensure
strict enforcement of the prohibition against nepotism.1avvphil
Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:
Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of
its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective
of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition
was intended to be a comprehensive one."  "The Court was unwilling to restrict
and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and
comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must
be nipped in the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As
we said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the
wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to plug the
hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance
with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or
circumvention of the law."43 (Emphasis supplied.)
The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners
for falsification of public documents under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, we find no legal ground to reverse petitioners’ conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is
AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 158694-96               March 13, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs.
TEOFILO G. PANTALEON, JR. and JAIME F. VALLEJOS, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the February 4, 2003 decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 25861-631finding the appellants Teofilo G. Pantaleon, Jr.
(Pantaleon) and Jaime F. Vallejos (Vallejos), former Municipal Mayor and
Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under
Article 217, in relation with Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Sandiganbayan sentenced the appellants to suffer the penalties of reclusion
perpetua and perpetual special disqualification for each count, and ordered
them to pay a fine in the amounts of ₱166,242.72, ₱154,634.27, and ₱90,464.21,
respectively, and to pay the costs.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
This case originated from the joint affidavit-complaints filed by Vice Mayor
Wilma D. Billman (Vice Mayor Billman); Councilors Reynaldo V. Misa
(Reynaldo), Dionisio F. Abinsay (Dionisio), Resty D. Viloria (Resty), Ramon J.
Tamoria (Ramon), Aurelio M. Fastidio (Aurelio), Enrique C. Clarin (Enrique),
and Raymundo V. Navarro (Raymundo), dated December 18, 1998; and Rodolfo
J. Navalta (Rodolfo) dated December 22, 1998, before the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of Zambales, for malversation of public funds through falsification of
public documents, against the appellants, Ken Swan Tiu, and Engineer Rainier J.
Ramos (Engr. Ramos).
The joint affidavit-complaints alleged that the appellants, Ken Swan Tiu, and
Engr. Ramos conspired to illegally disburse and misappropriate the public funds
of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales in the amounts of ₱166,242.72
(under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-328), ₱154,634.27 (under
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-349), and ₱90,464.21 (under
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9804-415), by falsifying the supporting
documents relating to three (3) fictitious or "ghost" construction projects,
namely: (a) the upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc, Nagbayan,
Magsaysay, and San Pablo; (b) the upgrading of barangay roads
in Barangays Looc proper-Casagatan, Nagbayan proper-Angeles, and San Pablo-
Sitio San Isidro; and (c) the construction of market stalls at the public market of
Castillejos.
The affidavit-complaints further alleged that the disbursement vouchers were
not signed by the municipal accountant and budget officer; that the
Sangguniang Bayan did not adopt a resolution authorizing Pantaleon to enter
into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken Swan Tiu; and that no
projects were actually undertaken by the Municipality of Castillejos.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) recommended the filing of an
Information for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents against the appellants and Ken Swan Tiu, and the dismissal of the
complaint against Engr. Ramos.2
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon approved the Joint Resolution
of the OSP, with the modification that the complaint against Ken Swan Tiu be
dismissed for lack of probable cause. 3 The Office of the Ombudsman approved
the Review Action of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.4
The Office of the Ombudsman filed on March 10, 2000 three (3) separate
Informations for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents against the appellants before the Sandiganbayan. The Informations
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25861-63. Criminal Case Nos. 25861-62
refer to the disbursement of public funds in the upgrading of various roads in
the Municipality of Castillejos, while Criminal Case No. 25863 concerns the
disbursement of funds for the construction of market stalls at the Castillejos
Public Market. The accusatory portions of these Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 25861
That on or about 5 January 1998 and 20 February 1998, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Castillejos, Province of Zambales,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, both public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor and
Municipal Treasurer, respectively, both of the Municipality of Castillejos,
Zambales who by reason of their said respective office, are accountable for
public funds or properties, committing the complex crime charged herein while
in the performance of, in relation to and/or taking advantage of their official
positions and functions as such, and conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate,
take or misappropriate public funds of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales
under their charge and custody in the amount of P166,242,72, Philippine
currency, under the check dated 20 February 1998 intended for the simulated
disbursement and payment thereof in favor of La Paz Construction (LPC)
relative to the fictitious contract for the upgrading of the barangay roads in
Barangay Looc, Nagbayan, Magsaysay and San Pablo, Castillejos, Zambales; by
means of falsifying the corresponding disbursement voucher no. 101-9803-328,
certificates of inspection and acceptance, contract between LPC and the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, price quotation, purchase order, and LPC
official receipt number 000999 dated 5 January 1998, to falsely make it appear
that LPC entered into, undertook and completed the said contract and received
the aforesaid amount as payment therefor from the Municipality of Castillejos,
Zambales, when in truth and in fact, LPC neither entered into, undertook and
completed the aforesaid contract nor received from the Municipality of
Castillejos, Zambales the said sum of money or any part thereof, to the damage
and prejudice of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales and the public interest
in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Criminal Case No. 25862
That on or about 23 February 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Castillejos, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public
officers, then being the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively,
both of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales who by reason of their said
respective office are accountable for public funds or properties, committing the
complex crime charged herein while in the performance of, in relation to and/or
taking advantage of their official positions and functions as such, and conspiring
and confederating with one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously appropriate, take or misappropriate public funds of the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales under their charge and custody in the
amount of P154,634.27 Philippine currency, under the check dated 23 February
1998 intended for the simulated disbursement and payment thereof in favor of
La Paz Construction (LPC) relative to the fictitious contract for the upgrading of
the barangay roads in Barangay Looc proper-Casagatan, Nagbayan proper-
Angeles and San Pablo-Sitio Isidro, Castillejos, Zambales; by means of falsifying
the corresponding disbursement voucher no. 101-9803-349, certificates of
inspection and acceptance, contract between LPC and the Municipality of
Castillejos, Zambales, purchase order, and LPC official receipt, to falsely make it
appear that LPC entered into, undertook and completed the said contract and
received the aforesaid amount as payment therefor from the Municipality of
Castillejos, Zambales, when in truth and in fact, LPC neither entered into,
undertook and completed the aforesaid contract nor received from the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales the said sum of money or any part thereof,
to the damage and prejudice of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales and the
public interest in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 25863
That on or about 20 March 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Castillejos, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public
officers, then being the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively,
both of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales who by reason of their said
respective office are accountable for public funds or properties, committing the
complex crime charged herein while in the performance of, in relation to and/or
taking advantage of their official positions and functions as such, and conspiring
and confederating with one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously appropriate, take or misappropriate public funds of the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales under their charge and custody in the
amount of P90,464.21, Philippine currency, under the check dated 20 March
1998 intended for the simulated disbursement and payment thereof in favor of
La Paz Construction (LPC) relative to the fictitious contract for the construction
of market stalls at the public market of Castillejos, Zambales, by means of
falsifying the corresponding disbursement voucher no. 101-9804-415,
certificates of inspection and acceptance, contract between LPC and the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales, price quotation, purchase order, and LPC
official receipt number 000995 dated 20 March 1998, to falsely make it appear
that LPC entered into, undertook and completed the said contract and received
the aforesaid amount as payment therefor from the Municipality of Castillejos,
Zambales, when in truth and in fact, LPC neither entered into, undertook and
completed the aforesaid contract nor received from the Municipality of
Castillejos, Zambales the said sum of money or any part thereof, to the damage
and prejudice of the Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales and the public interest
in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges upon arraignment. The
prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused pendente lite after their
arraignment.8 The Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) granted the motion and
ordered the preventive suspension of the appellants for 90 days. 9 The
appellants filed a motion for reconsideration10 which the Sandiganbayan
denied.11 The appellants filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 145030, assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions of August
16, 2000 and September 12, 2000, respectively. We denied the petition for lack
of merit.12
In the trial on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. 25861-63 that followed, the
prosecution presented the following witnesses: Engr. Ramos, Aurelio, Nida
Naman (Nida), Alberto Domingo (Alberto), Engineer Eduardo Soliven (Engr.
Soliven), Simeon Amor Viloria (Simeon), Ken Swan Tiu, Resty, Vice Mayor
Billman, Enrique, and Reynaldo. The appellants, Quirino Adolfo (Quirino),
Ricardo Abaya (Ricardo), Crisanta Ancheta (Crisanta), and John Baquilat
(Baquilat) took the witness stand for the defense.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Engr. Ramos testified that he was designated as acting municipal engineer of
Castillejos, Zambales by Pantaleon in January 1998; and that he prepared three
(3) programs of work upon the instructions of Vallejos. The first two (2)
programs of work, dated January 5, 1998 and January 14, 1998, respectively,
were for the upgrading of barangay roads; the third, also dated January 5, 1998,
was for the construction of market stalls. He confirmed that the three (3)
signatures affixed in these programs of work belonged to him, to Pantaleon, and
to Vallejos, respectively; and declared that he never implemented any of these
projects. He later discovered that these projects had already been implemented
by the previous municipal engineer; hence, the programs of work and
subsequent disbursements were not really needed. 13
On cross-examination, he stated that he was asked to prepare the programs of
work in March 1998; that he submitted the programs upon completion to
Vallejos who told him that he (Vallejos) would give them to Pantaleon for
approval. He assumed the programs of work were disapproved because nobody
coordinated with him regarding their implementation. 14
On re-direct examination, Engr. Ramos explained that Pantaleon and Vallejos
instructed him to place dates earlier than March 1998 in the three (3) programs
of work, although he prepared them only in March 1998. 15
Aurelio, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Castillejos, testified that the
public market of Castillejos was built after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991;
and that it was renovated by Engr. Clarin during the incumbency of former
mayor Enrique Magsaysay. He declared that no market stall was constructed in
the public market in 1998 and 1999, and no upgrading, excavation, and back
filling of any barangay road likewise took place in 1998 in Castillejos. He added
that no infrastructure project could have been made in January 1998 because it
was an election period.16
On cross-examination, Aurelio declared that he, together with other Sanggunian
members, examined the disbursement vouchers and other documents related to
the projects covered by the program of works after they learned that
disbursements were made to La Paz Construction; that they (Sanggunian
members) filed a case before the Provincial Prosecutor of Olongapo City after
discovering that the purported transactions were anomalous. He stated that La
Paz Construction never entered into a contract with the Municipality of
Castillejos as confirmed by its proprietor, Ken Swan Lee Tiu. He added that the
projects covered by the disbursement vouchers were not among those included
in the approved development plan for the years 1996 to 1998; and that,
surprisingly, the disbursement vouchers indicated that the funds used to cover
these projects were charged from the 20% development fund. 17
Nida, the senior bookkeeper of Castillejos, testified that Pantaleon designated
her as municipal accountant in 1993, and that she occupied the position until
July 1998; as a municipal accountant, she reviewed documents for the
preparation of vouchers. She recalled that she reviewed Voucher Nos. 101-
9804-415, 101-9803-328 and 101-9803-349 only after the indicated amounts
had been paid.
She explained that a voucher is certified by the local budget officer and by the
municipal accountant, and that without her signature, a voucher is defective for
failure to comply with government auditing and accounting rules and
regulations. She also revealed that the following irregularities attended the
issuance of the vouchers:
(a) Martin Pagaduan (Pagaduan), the present municipal accountant,
signed Voucher No. 101-9803-328 (Exh. "A") above her (Nida’s) name
without her authority. Pagaduan was not yet the municipal accountant
at the time of the issuance of the voucher; he was only designated as
municipal accountant on January 1, 1999;
 (b) Pagaduan also similarly signed some of the documents attached to
Voucher No. 101-9803-328, such as the purchase orders (Exh. "A-4 to
A-6") and the request for obligation allotment (Exh. "A-9");
(c) Vallejos wrote the voucher number and filled up the accounting
entry of Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-328 (Exh. "A"). She
should have filled up these entries in her capacity as municipal
accountant. Some of the documents attached to Disbursement Voucher
No. 101-9803-328 (Exh. "A"), such as the purchase request, purchase
order, and request form, were not the documents required by the rules;
(d) Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-349 (Exh. "B") and 101-
9804-415 (Exh. "C") did not bear her (Nida’s) signature. Their voucher
numbers and accounting entries were written and filled up by Vallejos.
In addition, the request for obligation of allotment (Exh. "B-9"and "C-
5") attached to these disbursement vouchers were not signed by the
municipal accountant and by the budget officer;
(e) The contract agreement attached to Disbursement Voucher No. 101-
9803-349 (Exh. "B") was not notarized. No abstract of bids and
authority to enter into a negotiated contract were attached to the
voucher; and
(f) The certificate of acceptance (Exh. "C-7"), attached to Disbursement
Voucher No. 101-9804-415 (Exh. "C"), was undated.
She reiterated that the vouchers were all approved by Pantaleon, although they
did not pass through her office for pre-audit. She likewise explained that the
certification of the accountant and the budget officer were necessary even if the
funds were sourced from the development fund.18
Alberto testified that he had not seen any upgrading of roads in his area since he
was elected barangay captain of Looc, Castillejos, Zambales in 1997. He also
admitted that he signed a document before the Sangguniang Bayan attesting
that Pantaleon did not have any project in his barangay. 19
Engr. Soliven, the Municipal Engineer of Castillejos, narrated that Pantaleon
appointed him municipal engineer on September 16, 1998 as replacement for
Engr. Ramos. He stated that he did not know if there were projects implemented
in the various barangays of Castillejos because he was not yet the municipal
engineer when these projects were planned. He likewise maintained that he
never implemented these projects.20
Simeon, the Municipal Planning Coordinator of Castillejos, testified that he
prepared comprehensive plans and programs for the municipality, and that his
tasks also included the formulation, integration and coordination of different
municipal projects. He stated that he prepared the municipal development plans
for the fiscal years 1997 and 1998, and these plans were approved by the
Sangguniang Bayan. He clarified that the municipal engineer can implement
projects that are not included in the municipal development plan. 21
Ken Swan Tiu (also known as Sonny Tiu, Tiu Ken Swan and Ken Swan Lee Tiu),
owner of the La Paz Construction, admitted that he executed an affidavit dated
January 14, 1999 stating that he did not enter into any negotiated contract with
the Municipality of Castillejos, and that his company never received any
payment from the municipality. He stated that the signatures in the vouchers
were not his, and reiterated that he did not have any transaction with the
Municipality of Castillejos. He added that he has no agent to collect or enter into
transactions in his behalf.22
Resty, a former Sangguniang Kabataan President and incumbent municipal
councilor, declared on the witness stand that he is a resident of Barangay San
Pablo, Castillejos, and that from 1998 to 2000, he did not see any road project
for the upgrading, compacting or improvements of roads in his barangay. He
also stated that he was one of the complainants in the administrative case
against the appellants before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Further, he said
that the vouchers for these projects were not dated.23
Evidence for the Defense
Vallejos, testifying in his defense, narrated that he had been the municipal
treasurer of Castillejos since 1987; and that his principal duties were to collect
taxes and disburse funds. He explained that a disbursement voucher should first
pass through the accounting office, then to the office of the budget officer, and
from there, to the office of the municipal mayor, before going to his office. He
confirmed that he is the last person to sign the voucher.
He clarified that after his office has prepared checks based on the forwarded
vouchers, these vouchers are returned to the accounting office for the creation
of an accounting entry and for the posting of the entry in the general and
subsidiary ledgers. The accounting office then issues an advice that the checks
are ready for encashment.
He refuted the statement of Nida that the disbursement vouchers did not go
through the accounting office for pre-audit. He stated that the signature of the
accountant did not appear in the three (3) vouchers because Nida simply
refused to sign it. He also insisted that the budget officer’s signature likewise did
not appear in the vouchers because she was always out of her office. He
explained that he paid the vouchers despite the absence of the accountant’s
signature because the projects were already completed and the sub-contractor
was already demanding payment and was threatening to sue him if he would
not pay.
He further recalled that the vouchers were suspended after they were
submitted to the Commission on Audit (COA); he was given 90 days to complete
the entries in the vouchers and produce the supporting papers. 24
On cross-examination, he reiterated that he signed the vouchers because the
municipal accountant and budget officer refused, without any valid or legal
reason, to sign them.25
Quirino, the Barangay Captain of Nagbayan, Castillejos, Zambales, testified that
he supervised numerous projects in his barangay during the incumbency of
Pantaleon; that from January to February of 1998, he supervised the back filling
and leveling of the roads in his barangay together with a certain Eduardo
Escobar and Kagawads Lorenzo and Corpuz. He admitted to signing an affidavit
dated July 2, 1999 stating that there were projects done in his barangay; he
merely signed the certification on December 10, 1998 (stating that there were
no projects done by the administration of Pantaleon in his area) because
Kagawads Enrique Clarin and Reynaldo Misa were his compadres. 26
Ricardo declared on the witness stand that he was the barangay captain of
Nagbayan from 1971 to 1986 and subsequently served as councilor for three (3)
terms; that from 1996 to 1998, he saw that there were back filling, grading,
compacting and widening of roads in his area; and that it was Pantaleon and
Baquilat – as mayor and contractor, respectively – who caused the repair of
these roads.
On cross-examination, he admitted that Pantaleon employed him as a casual
employee in 1999 and, as such, had no authority to sign vouchers. 27
Pantaleon, mayor of Castillejos, Zambales, testified that he had served as mayor
for eight and a half years before he was preventively suspended. He explained
that a voucher originates from the accounting office and then goes to the budget
office; from there, it goes to him for his signature, and, finally, to the treasurer
for signature; he signed the vouchers and allowed the treasurer to pay the
amounts stated because the accountant and the budget officer were reluctant to
sign; the signatures of the accountant and budget officer were not important. He
added that he approved the release of the money because the treasurer told him
that there was an appropriation in the approved annual budget. He also insisted
that the owner of La Paz Construction entered into a contact with the
municipality.
He maintained that he physically inspected the projects, and ordered the
treasurer to pay because the project in Nagbayan road had been completed. He
revealed that he received a notice from the Provincial Auditor stating that the
disbursement of funds was irregular due to the lack of signatures of the
accountant and budget officer, and that the vouchers were subsequently
suspended. He then ordered the treasurer to rectify the deficiencies in the
vouchers.28
On cross-examination, he admitted that the Sanggunian did not adopt a
resolution authorizing him to enter into a negotiated contract with La Paz
Construction in the municipality’s behalf. He also stated that the treasurer told
him that the municipal accountant and budget officer asked for a commission
before signing the vouchers, but he did not confront them about the demanded
commission because he did not want to embarrass them. He admitted that he
signed the vouchers despite the absence of the signatures of the accountant and
budget officer.
He also admitted that he entered into a contract with Baquilat without inquiring
if Baquilat was authorized by the La Paz Construction to enter into a contract
with the municipality. He explained that he gave more importance to the
implementation of a project than to its documentation. Since the compacting
and leveling of the road were finished, he believed the municipal accountant and
budget officer would later sign the vouchers.
He confirmed that Baquilat had dealt with the municipality many times as the
representative of La Paz Construction, and he does not know why La Paz
Construction would now deny its link with Baquilat. He also stated that
Baquilat, Aurelio, and the complainants have been his political supporters, but
they now hold personal grudges against him.29
Crisanta, a market vendor in Castillejos, testified that there were market stalls
and drainage constructed in 1998, although she did not know who constructed
them.30
Baquilat declared on the witness stand that he put up a construction business in
1997 after resigning from the Benguit Corporation; and that he had various
contracts with the province of Zambales. He recalled that he collected
₱400,000.00, more or less, from the municipality after completing construction
projects in 1997 and 1998. These projects included the upgrading of the roads
in Barangays Looc, Casagatan, Nagbayan, and San Pablo, as well as the repair of
market stalls in Castillejos. He stated that the authority given to him by Sonny
Tiu, the owner of La Paz Construction, to receive the money in behalf of La Paz
Constructionwas merely verbal; contractors, as a usual practice, rely on verbal
authority. He added that his license as a contractor had been used many times
by other contractors even without his knowledge, and revealed that he had
borrowed the license of Sonny Tiu when he had a contract with the Municipality
of Castillejos. He acted as a subcontractor for the La Paz Construction, but failed
to fully perform his duty as subcontractor because he did not see Sonny Tiu
again. He paid his taxes as a subcontractor, but not Sonny Tiu’s percentage. 31
On cross-examination, he admitted that he received payments through his
secretary from the municipality in behalf of La Paz Construction in 1998 to
1999; and that he received ₱400,000.00, more or less, for the three (3) projects
he did for the municipality.32
The Prosecution’s Rebuttal Evidence
The prosecution presented Vice Mayor Billman, Engr. Clarin, Reynaldo and Ken
Swan Tiu as rebuttal witnesses.
Vice Mayor Billman, the acting Municipal Mayor of Castillejos, testified that
there was no upgrading and improvement of roads in Barangay Nagbayan in
1998 when she was vice mayor.33
Engr. Clarin, an incumbent Municipal Councilor of Castillejos, denied that he
forced Quirino to sign a certification that there were no projects undertaken by
the municipality.34
Reynaldo, testified that he was a municipal councilor in 1998; he admitted that
Quirino was his friend and compadre, but denied that he forced Quirino to sign
any certification.35
Ken Swan Tiu, again testifying for the prosecution, denied that he: (a) lent his
license as a contractor to Baquilat; (b) entered into a contract with the
Municipality of Castillejos; (c) entered into a subcontracting agreement with
Baquilat; and (d) lent official receipts issued to La Paz Construction to
Baquilat.36
On cross-examination, he stated that he had been a contractor since 1992, but
never transacted with the Municipality of Castillejos. He stated that La Paz
Construction lost some receipts in 1994 during the flood; he discovered in 1999
that Baquilat had been using these receipts.37
After trial, the Sandiganbayan set the case for promulgation of decision on July
4, 2002, but later moved the promulgation to August 1, 2002.
Pantaleon and Vallejos filed their separate motions to reopen trial with urgent
motion to defer the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. 38 The
Sandiganbayan denied these motions.39 The Sandiganbayan similarly denied the
omnibus motion for reconsideration that followed. 40
The appellants filed an omnibus motion seeking the reconsideration of the
December 14, 2002 Resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied this motion in its
Resolution dated January 20, 2003. The appellants later on questioned these
resolutions through a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with this
Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 156778-80. This Court, in our resolution dated
February 17, 2003, dismissed the petition.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN RULING
The Sandiganbayan convicted the appellants of the crimes charged in Criminal
Case Nos. 25861-63. It held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
supported by the documentary evidence, established all the elements of the
complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents under Article 217, in relation with Articles 171 and 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. It found unacceptable the testimonies of the appellants and
characterized these as self-serving. The dispositive portion of this decision
(dated February 2, 2003) reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused, TEOFILO G. PANTALEON, JR., and JAIME F.
VALLEJOS, are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION, in three counts, as
defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Articles 48 and 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, and each of said accused is hereby sentenced in Criminal
Case Nos. 25861, 25862, and 25863, respectively, to suffer three times the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and to pay a fine in the amounts of P166,242.72, P154,634.27,
and P90,464.21, respectively, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.41 [Emphasis in the original]
Post-Sandiganbayan Developments
and the Appeal
Vallejos moved on February 17, 2003 to reconsider the decision. 42 Pantaleon, for
his part, moved on February 18, 2003 for a new trial (with prayer to set aside
judgment).43 The Sandiganbayan denied these motions for lack of merit. 44
The records of the case were forwarded to this Court after the appellants filed
their respective notices of appeal. In our Resolution of September 13, 2004, 45 we
transferred the case to the CA for appropriate action and disposition pursuant
to People v. Mateo.46
The records disclose that Pantaleon was granted a conditional pardon on June 8,
2006.47 Pantaleon filed on June 20, 2006 with the CA an urgent motion to
withdraw appeal.48 The CA denied the motion in its Resolution of July 7,
2006.49 CA Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Ronilla-Lontok thereafter returned
the entire records of the case to this Court reasoning out that the CA has no
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Sec.1[b] and [c], Rule X of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. 50 On September 24, 2007, this Court’s First
Division issued a Resolution reinstating the case in its docket. 51
Pantaleon filed with this Court on November 19, 2007 an urgent motion to
withdraw his appeal.52 We granted this motion in our Resolution of December 5,
2007,53 and issued the corresponding entry of judgment on February 8,
2008.54 Thus, this Decision at this point relates solely to appellant Vallejos. In
the discussions that follow, however, we shall still refer to the parties as
"appellants" because of the linkages that exist between them as common
perpetrators of the offenses charged.
In his brief, appellant Vallejos argued, among others, that the Sandiganbayan
erred –
1. in convicting him of the crime charged despite merely occupying a
salary grade (SG) 24 position;
2. in convicting him of the crime charged despite the absence of notice
to restitute from the Provincial Auditor of Zambales;
3. in convicting him of the crime charged despite merely acting
ministerially on the disbursement vouchers in question; and
4. in finding that a conspiracy existed between him and Pantaleon.
THE COURT’S RULING
We DENY the appeal for lack of merit.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property – Presumption
of malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall, otherwise, be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation
of such funds or property, shall suffer:
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than 12,000 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporalin its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal uses.
The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code are the following:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of
the duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for
which he was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.
Appellants are public officers
A public officer is defined in the Revised Penal Code as "any person who, by
direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in
any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official,
of any rank or class."55 Pantaleon and Vallejos were the municipal mayor and
municipal treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Castillejos at the time of
the crimes charged. In short, they were public officers within the meaning of the
term as defined above.
Appellants had the custody and control of funds
or property by reason of the duties of their office
As a required standard procedure, the signatures of the mayor and the treasurer
are needed before any disbursement of public funds can be made. No checks can
be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a
disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any
disbursement and release of public funds require their approval. The appellants,
therefore, in their capacities as mayor and treasurer, had control and
responsibility over the funds of the Municipality of Castillejos.
The appellants were accountable for public funds
The funds for which malversation the appellants stand charged were sourced
from the development fund of the municipality. They were funds belonging to
the municipality, for use by the municipality, and were under the collective
custody of the municipality’s officials who had to act together to disburse the
funds for their intended municipal use. The funds were therefore public funds
for which the appellants as mayor and municipal treasurer were accountable.
Vallejos, as municipal treasurer, was an accountable officer pursuant to Section
101(1) of P.D. No. 1445 which defines an accountable officer to be "every officer
of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or
custody of government funds or property shall be accountable therefor and for
the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law." Among the duties of Vallejos as
treasurer under Section 470(d)(2) of Republic Act No. 7160 is "to take custody
and exercise proper management of the funds of the local government unit
concerned."
Pantaleon, as municipal mayor, was also accountable for the public funds by
virtue of Section 340 of the Local Government, which reads:
Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. — Any officer of
the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or
custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for the
safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of this title. Other local
officials, though not accountable by the nature of their duties, may likewise be
similarly held accountable and responsible for local government funds through
their participation in the use or application thereof.
In addition, municipal mayors, pursuant to the Local Government Code, are
chief executives of their respective municipalities. Under Section 102 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, he is responsible for all
government funds pertaining to the municipality:
Section 102. Primary and secondary responsibility. – (1) The head of any agency
of the government is immediately and primarily responsible for all
government funds and property pertaining to his agency.
The appellants appropriated, took, misappropriated
or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take the public funds
We note at the outset that no less than the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zambales, in its decision of April 3, 2000, already made a finding that the
projects subject of Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-328, 101-9803-349,
and 101-9804-415 were never implemented in 1998.
This finding was corroborated by several witnesses during the trial. Engr.
Ramos, in his testimony of August 22, 2000 and speaking as the municipal
engineer in charge of municipal constructions, stated that the he never
implemented the projects subject of the disbursement vouchers. To directly
quote from the records:
PROSECUTOR JACQUELYN ONGPAUCO-CORTEL
Q: Now, in your stay as acting municipal engineer in Castillejos,
Zambales, what documents did you prepare?
ENGR. RAMOS
A: I prepared three (3) programs of works, namely: the two (2) were
up-grading of barangay roads and the third one was the construction of
the market stall.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you mentioned of three (3) programs of works,
now, showing to you program of work dated January 5, 1998, is this the
one you were referring to?
A: Yes, ma’am. Q: Going back to the sites of the projects Mr. Witness, did you actually
see the sites of the intended projects?
xxx
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Can you please state before this Honorable Court what is the purpose
of this program of work? Q: What did you see?

A: I was instructed to make that program of work but I never
implemented those projects anymore.
xxx
Q: Now, showing to you another program of work, Mr. Witness, dated
January 14, 1998, is this also a part of this program of work which you
mentioned earlier?
A: They were already existing at that time.
Q: What do you mean by that Mr. Witness?
A: The municipal engineer did implement those projects before.
Q: When were these projects actually implemented Mr. Witness?
Before?

A: Yes, ma’am. A: Yes, ma’am.

xxx Q: When?

Q: Can you state before this Honorable Court if this project was A: As I’ve said, they were already existing before I made those programs
implemented? of work.

A: Likewise, ma’am, I never did implement such project. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NARCISO S. NARIO (Chairman)

xxx Q: What were these projects that according to you were already
existing? What are these projects?
Q: Now, showing to you another program of work, Mr. Witness, dated
January 5, 1998, is this the part and parcel of what you have mentioned ENGR. RAMOS
earlier?
A: The upgrading of the barangay roads, Your Honor.
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Upgrading of the barangay roads? What barangays are these?
xxx
A: Barangay Looc proper, Barangay Magsaysay and Barangay San Pablo.
Q: And can you state before this Honorable Court if the project was
implemented in 1998 Mr. witness? Q: What else?

A: No, ma’am. A: And the construction of the market stalls located in the public
market.
xxx
Q: These projects were already existing?
A: Yes, Your Honor. A: None, ma’am.

PROSECUTOR CORTEL
Q: Meaning to say, Mr. Witness, that before they applied, before the
preparation of the programs of works and disbursement of the amount
as indicated thereon, the projects you have mentioned are already
existing?
Q: Going to Voucher No. 101-9803-328 Mr. Witness for the upgrading,
excavation, back filling of barangay roads, Mr. Witness, do you know if
there is upgrading, excavation and back filling of certain barangay
roads in your area?
A: None, ma’am.

ENGR. RAMOS Q: How many barangay roads do you have in that area, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, ma’am. A: We have many barangay roads, ma’am.

Q: And that there is no need for the preparation of this program of work Q: And do you know if in 1998 there is the upgrading, excavation and
and disbursement of another money for that project? back filling of many barangay roads?

A: Yes, ma’am. A: None, ma’am.

xxx Q: Not even one, Mr. Witness.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NARIO A: Yes, ma’am.57 [Emphasis ours]

Q: Now, it’s on the basis of this program of work that the
disbursements, issue voucher, the check and other relevant documents
were paid because of this program of work that you prepared?
A: Yes, Your Honor.56 [Emphasis ours]
Alberto, the Barangay Captain of Looc, also declared on the witness stand
during his September 7, 2000 testimony that no project was undertaken in his
barangay during the tenure of Pantaleon. Resty, a municipal councilor, likewise
testified on September 12, 2000 that there was no upgrading, compacting and
leveling of roads in Barangay San Pablo in 1998.

Aurelio, a Sangguniang Bayan member, likewise testified that no
construction work was undertaken on various barangay roads and in
the public market of Castillejos in 1998:
PROSECUTOR CORTEL
Despite the non-existence of the projects covered by the three (3) disbursement
vouchers, and despite the fact that these vouchers never went through the
accounting office and the office of the local budget officer for pre-audit and
certification, the appellants still signed them. We quote Pantaleon’s admission in
his January 31, 2001 testimony:

Q: But do you know if there is a construction of the market stall, public ATTY. RODOLFO REYNOSO
market done in 1998, Mr. Witness?
Q: Okay. An issue of pre-audit was brought when the accountant
AURELIO FASTIDIO testified earlier that allegedly you did not require them or you just
signed the voucher without requiring the budget officer or the
accountant to affix their signatures, what can you say about that?
A: None, ma’am.
TEOFILO PANTALEON, JR.
Q: In 1999?
A: I asked. When the treasurer came into my office, he asked me about
the non-signatures of the accountant and the budget officer, sir. So I
called up their attention and they were adamant, they were hesitant to
sign. I called up again the treasurer why it is [sic] because they were
asking for a commission as per the treasurer said to me, Your Honor.
xxx
A: Yes, your Honor, because the sub-contractor threatened me for not
paying the vouchers, besides, that will cause injury to him.
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, do you recall where were the funds coming from in
paying the projects?

Q: In other words, Mr. Witness, after informing the accountant and the A: Yes, sir, there were two sources of fund, under the Engineering Office
budget officer that they have not signed the voucher, you already maintenance and other operating expenses, roads and bridges
signed it even without their signature, did I get you right? maintenance, and 20% development funds.

A: Yes, sir. xxx

Q: And you allowed the treasurer to pay? ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NICODEMO T. FERRER:

A: Yes, sir. Q: A while ago, you said that this alleged sub-contractor encashed the
checks issued to him, can you show the encashment made by the
xxx contractor?

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NARIO A: It was in the bank, ma’am.

Q: So despite the absence of the signatures of the accountant and the Q: Where is it now?
budget officer, you went through signing these vouchers? (sic)
A: It was in the Land Bank, ma’am.
TEOFILO PANTALEON, JR.
xxx
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: You said that in the signing of the vouchers, you are the last
x x x58 [Emphasis ours] signatory?

Vallejos, in his testimony of October 18, 2000, likewise admitted signing A: Yes, ma’am.
the disbursement vouchers:
Q: Meaning to say, all the signatories precedent to you must sign first
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO G. PALATTAO before you sign?

Q: In other words, since you considered the refusal of the accountant to A: Yes, ma’am.
sign the vouchers as accompanied by bad faith, you decided to ignore
the requirement of her signature and you allowed payment? Q: Now, in these particular cases, the accountant and the budget officer
did not affix their signatures?
JAIME VALLEJOS
A: Yes, ma’am.
 Q: And despite that fact, you signed the disbursement vouchers? Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Twenty-Seven Centavos
(₱154,634.27)?
A: Yes, ma’am.
A: No, ma’am.
59
x x x  [Emphasis ours]
xxx
Significantly, the appellants did not deny that they allowed the release of the
public funds, but maintained that the money went to Baquilat as representative Q: Now, Exhibit "A" Mr. Witness I would like to point to you a portion
and/or subcontractor of La Paz Construction. This was confirmed by Baquilat wherein the recipient appears to be La Paz Construction, San Marcelino,
himself when he admitted, in his February 8, 2001 testimony, receipt of Zambales in the amount of Two Hundred Forty-Two Pesos [sic]. Do you
₱400,00.00, more or less, from the Municipality of Castillejos for the three (3) know whose signature that is appearing on top of the typewritten name
construction projects he allegedly did in 1998. However, Ken Swan Tiu, the of La Paz Construction?
owner of La Paz Construction, vehemently denied that he contracted with the
Municipality of Castillejos: A: No, ma’am. I don’t recognize this signature and I don’t have any agent
to collect this amount.
PROSECUTOR CORTEL
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, in connection with these cases, do you remember
having received payments from the municipality of Castillejos, Q: Now, what about in Exhibit "B" wherein the recipient appears to be
Zambales? La Paz Construction, whose signature appears on top of the typewritten
name of La Paz Construction?
KEN SWAN TIU
A: Yes, ma’am. The same, I don’t recognize the signature and I don’t
A: No, I did not receive any single centavo from the government of have any transaction with the municipality of Castillejos.
Castillejos.
Q: Now, in connection with Exhibit "C", there also appears a signature
xxx who was a recipient of the amount of Ninety Thousand Four Hundred
Sixty- Five and Twenty-One Centavos (₱90,465.21), whose signature is
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to show to you vouchers which would that?
indicate that the claimant or the payee is La Paz Construction of San
Marcelino, Zambales. Now, Mr. Witness in Exhibit "A", Disbursement A: Yes, ma’am. The same, the signature I don’t recognize and I don’t
Voucher No. 101803-328, do you remember having received the have any agent or collecting agent or any transaction with the officials
amount of One Hundred Sisty Six Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Two of the municipality of Castillejos.
Pesos and Seventy-Two Centavos (P166,242.72)?
xxx
(WITNESS GOING OVER THE VOUCHER SHOWN TO HIM BY THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR) ATTY. REYNOSO

A: No, ma’am. I did not receive any.
Q: In Disbursement Voucher No. 1019803-349 wherein the payee is La
Paz Construction also of San Marcelino, Zambales, do you remember
having received the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six
Q: So in other words, in all transactions from the very beginning that
you have transacted with the municipality, you are the only one who
transacted with the municipality?
A: I don’t have any transaction with the Municipality of Castillejos.
 Q: Even before this alleged incident took place?
A: I said I don’t have any, sir.
xxx
Q: You said that you have not made any contract with the municipality,
did I get you right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You are a witness charging the accused here of an alleged contract
entered into between the accused and your company and you deny did
I get you right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So insofar as you are concerned, there was no contract between you
and the municipality?
60
A: Precisely.  [Emphasis ours]
Ken Swan Tiu likewise testified that Baquilat was not in any way connected with
the La Paz Construction. We quote his June 7, 2001 testimony:
PROSECUTOR CORTEL
Q: Mr. Witness, in his (Baquilat’s) testimony in open court, he declared
that you let him borrow, you lent him your license as a Contractor, is
that true, Mr. Witness?
KEN SWAN TIU
A: No, ma’am. We don’t have any agreement with that, and I am not
lending my own company, my license to them because they have their
own company.
Q: Okay. Mr. Witness, he also declared in open court that you sub-
contracted him in connection with the projects undertaken by then
Mayor Pantaleon in the Municipality of Castillejos, what can you say to
that?
A: No, Ma’am, I don’t have any construction with the government of the
Municipality of Castillejos, and sub-contracting, I don’t have this idea on
my mind because I don’t enter in this construction, Ma’am. (sic)
xxx
ATTY. MARK M. AVERILLA
Q: Is your testimony, Mr. Witness, therefore that you have not entered
into a sub-construction agreement with Mr. John Baquilat pertaining to
that project in Castillejos, Zambales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is it therefore your testimony that Mr. Witness that Mr. John
Baquilat, who testified earlier declaring in open court that you
authorized him to use La Paz Construction as the entity to enter into
contract with the Municipality of Castillejos, that he was lying [sic]?
A: Of course we don’t have any agreement on that, and I don’t have any
contract…
(interruption)
Q: Yes, Sir, so you are saying that he was lying? Is that your testimony?
A: I don’t know, Sir, because I just encountered that there is a sub-
contractor who came out. Actually, in myself, I don’t have any
construction here with the government of Castillejos. How come there
exists a sub-Contractor? [sic].
x x x61 [Emphasis ours]
These testimonies lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants had
deliberately consented to or permitted the taking of public funds by Baquilat
despite the fact that (1) La Paz Construction never entered into a contract with
the Municipality of Castillejos; (2) Baquilat was not an agent, representative or
subcontractor of La Paz Construction; (3) the projects covered by the
disbursement vouchers in question never existed; and (4) the disbursement
vouchers lacked the requisite signatures of the municipal accountant and the
local budget officer. In short, they resorted to machinations and simulation of
projects to draw funds out of the municipal coffers.
The circumstances established during trial and outlined below likewise show
the anomalous circumstances that attended the disbursement of the public
funds.
Pantaleon himself admitted that he was not authorized by the Sanggunian to
enter into a contract with La Paz Construction; however, he and Vallejos
requested Engr. Ramos to prepare three (3) antedated programs of work that
later served as basis for the issuance of the disbursement vouchers. Aurelio also
declared that the projects covered by the subject disbursement vouchers were
charged from the development fund of the municipality, although these projects
were not among those included in the approved projects for the years 1996 to
1998. Nida’s testimony on the irregularities that attended the documents
supporting the vouchers were never rebutted by the defense. These
irregularities were aptly summarized by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
a. All of the three disbursement vouchers were not signed by her;
b. As to the Disbursement Voucher No. 1019802-328, the box in which
she did not sign as municipal accountant, now bears the signature of
Martin Pagaduan without her authority, after the voucher was
disallowed and returned by the Commission on Audit; Pagaduan was
not yet the Municipal Accountant as he was appointed only on January
1, 1999;
c. Required documents – authority to enter into negotiated contract,
plans and specifications, abstract of bids, notarized contracts – were
not attached to the voucher;
d. Voucher number and accounting entries were written by accused
Treasurer Vallejos, not the then municipal accountant (Nida Naman);
e. Also signed by Martin Pagaduan without her authority as municipal
treasurer are the three purported Certificate of Canvass attached to the
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-328;
f. Official Receipt No. 000989 that appears to have been signed by John
Baquilat to acknowledge receipt of the amount covered by check no.
108952 indicated in Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-349 is not
filled up.62
Through the appellant’s explicit admissions, the witnesses’ testimonies, and the
documentary evidence submitted, the prosecution duly established the fourth
element of the crime of malversation. It is settled that a public officer is liable
for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his
custody for his personal benefit, if he allows another to take the funds, or
through abandonment or negligence, allow such taking. 63 The felony may be
committed, not only through the misappropriation or the conversion of public
funds or property to one’s personal use, but also by knowingly allowing others
to make use of or misappropriate the funds. The felony may thus be committed
by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is
imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to
negligence.64
Falsification was a necessary means
to commit the crime of malversation
Article 171, paragraphs (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;
xxx
5. Altering true dates;
xxx
Falsification under paragraph 2 is committed when (a) the offender causes it to
appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or a
proceeding; and (b) that such person or persons did not in fact so participate in
the act or proceeding. In the present case, both testimonial and documentary
evidence showed that Vallejos filled up the spaces for the voucher number and
the accounting entry of Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-328, 101-9803-
349 and 10-9804-415. These items were required to be filled up by Nida as the
municipal accountant. Thus, Vallejos made it appear that the municipal
accountant participated in signing the disbursement vouchers.
The appellants were likewise guilty of falsification under paragraph 5 of Article
171. Engr. Ramos testified that Pantaleon and Vallejos instructed him to place
the dates January 5, 1998 on the first and third programs of work, and January
14, 1998 on the second program of work, although he prepared the programs
only in March 1998. Thereafter, the appellants affixed their signatures on these
programs of work. The projects covered by these programs of work served as Supporting documents attached to Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-328
basis for the issuance of the disbursement vouchers.
a. Purchase Request (Exh. "A-3");
The presence of conspiracy
b. Three Certificates of Canvass (Exh. "A-4 to A-6");
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy does not need to c. Purchase Order showing La Paz Construction as the winning
be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct – before, bidder/contractor (Exh. "A-7");
during, and after the commission of the crime – indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is d. Certificate of Acceptance with regard to the services rendered by La
the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design Paz Construction (Exh. "A-8"); and
of another, as shown by an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the crime.65
e. Request for Obligation Allotment with La Paz Construction as payee
(Exh. "A-9").
The burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy rests on the prosecution, but
settled jurisprudence holds that conspiracy may be proven other than by direct
Supporting documents attached to Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9803-349
evidence.66 In People v. Pagalasan,67 the Court expounded on why direct proof of
prior agreement is not necessary:
a. Purchase Request (Exh. "B-6");
After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the b. Purchase Order showing La Paz Construction as the contractor (Exh.
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, "B-7");
showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy
may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts c. Request for Obligation Allotment with La Paz Construction as payee
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so (Exh. "B-9"); and
that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were in
fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association d. Certificate of Acceptance with regard to the services rendered by La
and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by Paz Construction (Exh. "B-8").
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional Supporting documents attached to Disbursement Voucher Nos. 101-9804-415
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.68
a. Request for Obligation Allotment with La Paz Construction as payee
(Exh. "C-8");
The prosecution’s evidence glaringly shows how the appellants acted in concert
to facilitate the illegal release of public funds. First, the appellants ordered the
b. Three Certificates of Canvass (Exh. "C-4 to C-5");
preparation of the programs of work, with specific instructions to antedate the
submitted programs. Second, they affixed their signatures on the antedated
programs of work. Third, the appellants signed the disbursement vouchers c. Purchase Order showing La Paz Construction as the contractor (Exh.
covering the simulated projects despite knowledge of the absence of the "C-6");
signatures of the local budget officer and the local accountant. Vallejos even
filled up entries in the vouchers that were for the municipal treasurer to fill up. d. Purchase Request (Exh. "C-2"); and
Finally, the appellants affixed their signatures in the following documents
attached to the three (3) disbursement vouchers: e. Certificate of Acceptance with regard to the services rendered by La
Paz Construction (Exh. "C-7").
The appellants’ combined acts therefore indubitably point to their joint purpose
and design. Their concerted actions clearly showed that conspiracy existed in
their illegal release of public funds.
The appellant’s defenses
Vallejos’ contention that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him
because he only occupies a Salary Grade (SG) 24 position cannot shield him
from the Sandiganbayan’s reach. The critical factor in determining the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the position of his co-accused, the municipal
mayor, who occupies an SG 27 position. Under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8249,69 if the position of one or more of the accused is classified as SG 27, the
Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense.
Our ruling in Esquivel v. Ombudsman70 on this point is particularly instructive:
In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs.
Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain
Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is
outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No.
8249 provides that it is only in cases where "none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" that "exclusive original
jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended." Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor
Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls
under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over
Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. 71 [Underscoring and italics in
the original]1awphi1
Vallejos’ claim that it was his ministerial function to sign the disbursement
vouchers also lacks merit. Article 344 R.A. No. 7160 reads:
Sec. 344. Certification and Approval of Vouchers. – No money shall be disbursed
unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has
been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said
appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the
purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of
the department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned,
as to validity, propriety, and legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of
disbursements involving regularly recurring administrative expenses such as
payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water,
telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies
such as GSIS, SSS, LDP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the
DBM and others, approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief
executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed.
xxxx
Thus, as a safeguard against unwarranted disbursements, certifications are
required from: (a) the local budget officer as to the existence and validity of the
appropriation; (b) the local accountant as to the legal obligation incurred by the
appropriation; (c) the local treasurer as to the availability of funds; and (d) the
local department head as to the validity, propriety and legality of the claim
against the appropriation.72 Therefore, Vallejos, as municipal treasurer, could
not authorize the release of the funds without the requisite signatures of the
municipal budget officer and the municipal accountant.
Vallejos also harps on the fact that the Provincial Auditor of Zambales did not
issue a notice to restitute the funds. We find this contention misleading.
Pantaleon testified that the Provincial Auditor issued a notice stating that the
disbursement of the public funds was irregular. Thereafter, the three (3)
disbursement vouchers were suspended by the COA for deficiency in their
supporting papers. Under Section 15.2 of the Manual on Certificate of
Settlement and Balances, "a suspension which is not settled within 90 days from
receipt of the Notice of Suspension, or within such extended period as may be
authorized by the auditor concerned, shall become a disallowance."
According to Pantaleon, he instructed Vallejos to rectify the deficiencies in the
vouchers and its supporting documents; however, he admitted not knowing
whether Vallejos complied with this instruction. Vallejos, for his part, did not
testify on whether or not he corrected and completed the supporting
documents. No proof exists in the record showing that the deficiencies were
ever rectified.
At any rate, demand under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code merely raises
a prima facie presumption that missing funds have been put to personal use.
The demand itself, however, is not an element of the crime of malversation.
Even without a demand, malversation can still be committed when, as in the
present case, sufficient facts exist proving the crime. 73
The Proper Penalty
Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua when the
amount malversed is greater than ₱22,000.00. This Article also imposes the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
Falsification by a public officer or employee under Article 171, on the other
hand, is punished by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00.
Since appellant committed a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed in its maximum period, pursuant to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. This provision states:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, correctly imposed on the appellants the
penalties of reclusion perpetua and perpetual special disqualification for each
count of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents,
and the payment of fines of ₱166,242.72, ₱154,634.27, and ₱90,464.21,
respectively, representing the amounts malversed. The Indeterminate Sentence
Law finds no application since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty to
which the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the February 4, 2003
Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25861-63, insofar as it
found appellant Jaime F. Vallejos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents, as defined and penalized under Article 217 in
relation with Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
We make no pronouncement with respect to appellant Teofilo Pantaleon, Jr.
whose withdrawal of appeal has been previously granted by this Court.
Costs against appellant Vallejos.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128213 December 13, 2005
AVELLA GARCIA, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
In an Information dated March 18, 1992, petitioner Avella 1 Garcia (Avella) was
charged with Falsification of a Private Document, defined and penalized under
Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of the Revised Penal Code. The
accusatory portion reads:
That on or about the month of January, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Abella Garcia, being then in possession of a receipt for Five Thousand Pesos
dated January 21, 1991 issued by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down
payment [sic] of the sale of a house and lot situated at No. 46 P. Gomez St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila by Albert Quijada, Jr. to accused, said accused then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to defraud and
damage Alberto Quijada Jr [sic] made alterations and wrote words, figures and
phrases to the original receipt which completely changed its meaning by making
appear thereon that it was issued on January 24, 1991 in the amount of Fifty
Five Thousand Pesos (₱55,000.00) when in truth and in fact, the said accused
fully well knew that the receipt was only for the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos.
Contrary to Law.2 
Upon arraignment, Avella pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. 3 
The prosecution’s version of the relevant facts is summarized as follows: 4 
Sometime in early October 1990, a verbal agreement was entered into between
Alberto Quijada, Jr. (Alberto) and Avella for the sale of the former’s house and
lot located at 46 P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for the purchase price
of ₱1.2 million pesos.5 On October 23, 1990, an "earnest money" in the amount
of ten thousand pesos (₱10,000) was given to Alberto by Avella. On October 31,
1990, the amount of one hundred and fifty-five thousand pesos (₱155,000) was
delivered by Avella representing this time the downpayment for the house and
lot. A subsequent payment of five thousand pesos (₱5,000) was made on
January 21, 1991. With respect to this last transaction, Avella prepared in her
own handwriting two identical receipts which are faithfully reproduced below: 6 
January 21/91
Pasay City
Received from Abella [sic] Garcia for the amount of five thousand pesos cash
(₱5,000.00) as additional downpayment for the purchase of the property
located at 46 P. Gomez St. Mand. M. Mla. With an area of 308 sq. m. including the
improvements existing there one [sic] covered by T.C.T. # 397670. The total
purchase price for said sale One Million Two hundred thousand only 1.2 M.
(Sgd.)
ALBERTO QUIJADA
(Sgd.)
ALICIA Q. GONZALES
(SISTER)
The two receipts were signed by Alberto and his sister Alicia Q. Gonzales, as
witness. One receipt was given to Alberto, while the other was retained by
Avella.
The relationship between buyer and seller turned sour. Avella filed a complaint
for estafa against Alberto for his failure to execute a deed of sale and deliver the
subject property. Among the evidence she submitted was the copy of the receipt
she prepared on January 21, 1991. However, the receipt appeared to have been
altered in the following manner: 1) the word "fifty" was inserted before the
word "five" on the second line of the receipt to read "fifty five thousand" instead
of "five thousand"; 2) the number "5" was inserted before "5,000.00" on the
third line of the receipt so that it would read "55,000.00"; 3) additional words
were inserted in the last sentence of the receipt which reads, "Now covered by
T.C.T. # 3998 R.D. Mandaluyong MM. the parties agree to execute of [sic] valid
deed of conveyance covering the same sale"; 4) on the date "January 21" the
number 4 was superimposed so that it would read as "January 24" instead; and
5) there now appears the amount of "55,000.00" and below it the word "value"
on the upper left hand corner of the receipt.7  then promised him a bigger sum in the future. Avella then hand wrote two
Thus, the receipt as altered now appears as follows: 8  of ₱5,000. One receipt was her copy while the other was for Alberto. Three days
55,000.00
value
January 24/91
Pasay City
Received from Abella Garcia for the amount of fifty five thousand pesos cash
(₱55,000.00) as additional downpayment for the purchase of the property
located at 46 P. Gomez St. Mand. M. Mla. With an area of 308 sq. m. including the
improvements existing there one covered by T.C.T. # 397670. The total
purchase price for said sale One Million Two hundred thousand only 1.2 M. Now
covered by T.C.T. # 3998 R.D. Mandaluyong MM. the parties agree to
execute of [sic] valid deed of conveyance covering the same sale.
(Sgd.)
ALBERTO QUIJADA
(Sgd.)
ALICIA Q. GONZALES
(SISTER) 
Having noticed the alterations, Alberto instituted a criminal action before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City charging that Avella had made it
appear that he received ₱55,000 when he received only ₱5,000. Needless to
state, the City Prosecutor found that a prima facie case of violation of Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code had been committed by Avella and accordingly filed
the corresponding Information.
Avella, in her defense, admitted that she did in fact alter the receipt but claims
that it was done in the presence and at the request of Alberto. Her account is as
follows:9 
On January 21, 1991, Alberto, along with his sister, came to Avella’s residence in
Mandaluyong City to ask for additional downpayment for the house and lot. At
that time she only had ₱5,000 in cash which she handed over to Alberto and
receipts which was signed by Alberto and his sister, as evidence of the payment
later, on January 24, 1991, Avella called up Mr. Celso Cunanan (Celso), an made. Quoting at length the trial court’s findings, the CA declared that nothing
architect, from whom she asked to borrow ₱50,000. Celso had earlier therein would even remotely indicate that the conclusions were reached
committed to Avella that he would lend her ₱50,000. Celso arrived at her house arbitrarily. The dispositive portion of the CA decision stated:
that evening to give her the money. Already present in the house were Avella,
her sister and Alberto. Celso delivered to Avella ₱50,000 which the latter, in the WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED but with the modification
former’s presence, handed over to Alberto. With respect to the alteration, Avella that the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
explained that Alberto did not have with him his copy of the January 21, 1991 imprisonment ranging from a minimum of Four (4) months and One (1) day
receipt and so he told her to just "add" in her copy the amount of ₱50,000 to of Arresto Mayor, to Three (3) years, Six (6) months and Twenty-One (21) day
make it ₱55,000. Avella acceded to the request and made the changes in front of of Prision Correccional as maximum, plus a fine of Three Thousand Pesos
Alberto while he was counting the money. Avella said she showed the altered (₱3,000.00) and costs.
receipt to Alberto but that he was not able to affix his signature thereon because
he was in a hurry to leave. Avella’s account was corroborated by the testimony Avella now comes before this Court through a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of Celso who declared that all these happened in his presence. 10  of the Rules of Court asking the Court to reevaluate the evidence presented so
that the Court may accept as true her explanations to the alterations. 
Avella further claimed that this case was filed against her in retaliation for the
estafa case she filed against Alberto. As claimed by Avella, she found out that the The plea lacks merit and is denied. 
deed of sale which purportedly transferred ownership of the house and lot to
Alberto was a fake. Upon her request, the National Bureau of Investigation
When the trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
(N.B.I.), Questioned Documents Division, examined the signatures of Mr. Floro
said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, for it is not
Caceres and Mrs. Paciencia Castor Caceres, the transferees of the subject
this Court’s function to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again,
property, contained in the deed of sale. In its report the N.B.I. determined that
except when there is serious ground to believe a possible miscarriage of justice
the questioned signatures and sample signatures of Floro Caceres and Paciencia
would otherwise result. Save in exceptional instances, the Court’s task in an
Caceres were not written by one and the same person. 11 In further support of
appeal via certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
this allegation, she presented an affidavit executed by Richard Hui Quijada,
committed by the CA.16 Other than her plea to interpret the evidence in a
nephew of Alberto, who stated therein that he forged the signatures of the
different light, Avella failed to offer any cogent reason that would persuade this
Spouses Caceres at the behest of his uncle. 12 Additionally, it was claimed that the
Court to alter the findings of the trial court and the CA, which findings are in
notarization of the deed of sale was also fake according to a certification issued
agreement. 
by the Office of the Clerk of Court for the Regional Trial Court of Manila stating
that the lawyer who notarized it, Atty. Mallari, did not notarize any document
for the month of April 1977, which was when the deed of sale was supposedly Nevertheless, while the Court will not touch upon the findings of fact, it should
notarized.13  review the conviction to ensure that the law was properly applied. Under this
premise, the Court now moves on to consider whether errors of law have been
committed.
The trial court found Avella’s account unworthy of belief. The court stated in its
decision that if, by her claim, she made the changes in the receipt while Alberto
was counting the money it would not have taken more than five (5) seconds to The elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the Revised
affix his signature thereon even if he was in a hurry to leave. The trial court, Penal Code are: (1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation
thus, held that the elements of Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of (insertion) on a document; (2) that it was made on a genuine document; (3) that
the Revised Penal Code have been proven beyond reasonable doubt and the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and
sentenced Avella to suffer imprisonment of Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months (4) that the changes made the document speak something false. 17 When these
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to Six (6) Years of prision correccional, as are committed by a private individual on a private document the violation
maximum, and to pay a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000) pesos, plus costs. 14  would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in
addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or
intention to cause the same to a third person.18 
Avella appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA modified the penalty by
lowering it, but affirmed the conviction. 15 The CA was unconvinced by Avella’s
explanations regarding the circumstances under which the alterations were
Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and without
convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private
complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is readily
apparent as it was made to appear that Alberto had received ₱50,000 when in
fact he did not. Hence, Avella’s conviction.
The Court now considers the penalty imposed, as modified by the CA. Article
172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document by a private
individual with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods. Thus, the duration of imprisonment must be between two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, this being
the medium, and four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years,
this being the maximum. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the medium period in the aforementioned range should be
imposed, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. The
sentence of the CA was within these ranges. The correct penalty was imposed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Avella Garcia’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 92-0250 is AFFIRMED along with her sentence to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000) and the costs.  (Butcon), the Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to affix his initial on
Cost de oficio in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185493               February 2, 2011
LtC. ROBERTO K. GUILLERGAN (Ret.), Petitioner,  On April 14, 1989 the AFP Anti-Graft Board filed a complaint 6 against Rio,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the conviction of an accused for an offense other than that
charged in the Information based on a claim that the essential elements of the
offense of which he was convicted are also elements of the offense charged in
the Information.
The Facts and the Case
On June 20, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman indicted petitioner Roberto K.
Guillergan (Guillergan) for estafa through falsification of public documents
before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 22904. 1
The evidence shows that sometime in 1987, petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant
Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), directed Master Sergeant
Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptroller’s Office, to cause the
preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with
supporting time record and book. The agents’ names were copied and, based on
their appointment papers, certified as correct by Guillergan and then approved
by Brigadier General Domingo T. Rio (Rio).2
Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of signatures of the
payees, Guillergan would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon
the "Remarks/Sig" column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and
facilitate the processing of the time record, book, and payrolls. 3
Also on Guillergan’s instruction, the CIAs’ payrolls in Region 6 for 1987, totaling
₱732,000.00, were covered by cash advances payable to Captain Roland V.
Maclang, Jr. (Maclang, Jr.), which advances were issued upon his request as
disbursing officer for that purpose. When ready, Guillergan received the
corresponding cash or checks then turned them over to Rio.4
At the end of 1987, Rio further received ₱787,000.00 in "administrative funds"
to be paid out to contractors for repairs in the men’s barracks, the firing range,
the guesthouse and others. But Rio requested that this "administrative funds"
be re-aligned to "intelligence funds" in order to facilitate clearing. 5
Butcon, Maclang, Jr., Seclon, and Guillergan for violating Articles of War 94 in
relation to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a
resolution7 dated May 24, 1991, recommending the dismissal of the case for lack
of merit. On April 21, 1992, however, the ombudsman investigator issued a
memorandum, recommending the filing of charges of illegal use of public funds
against Rio and the exoneration of the other respondents. In a
memorandum8 dated February 11, 1993, the review panel in the Office of the
Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation.
On June 20, 1995, however, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended
the filing of charges against all the accused before the Sandiganbayan.
Consequently, an Information was filed against them for estafa under Article
315, par. 2(a),9 in relation to Article 17110 of the RPC.
While the case was pending, Rio died, prompting the Sandiganbayan to dismiss
the case against him.11
On January 20, 2006, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts with motion for
judgment12 based on such stipulations. On June 30, 2008, the Sandiganbayan
Second Division rendered judgment,13 finding Guillergan guilty of falsification
penalized under Article 17214 of the RPC and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for 2 years and 4 months as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and
10 days as maximum. The court acquitted the other accused on the ground of
lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can convict Guillergan of violation
of Article 172 of the RPC under an Information that charged him with
estafa in relation to Article 171 of the code; and
2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public documents.
The Court’s Rulings
The Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification by making it
appear in several public documents that ₱1,519,000.00 in AFP funds intended
for the CIAs’ payroll were paid for that purpose when in truth these were just
given to Rio, resulting in damage and prejudice to the government. Although the
charge was estafa in relation to Article 171 of the RPC, the facts alleged in the
information sufficiently made out a case for violation of Article 172 of which
Guillergan was convicted. What is important is that the Information described
the latter offense intelligibly and with reasonable certainty, enabling Guillergan
to understand the charge against him and suitably prepare his defense. 15
What is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in
it.16 Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of his official position; and 3)
that he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done. 17
On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under paragraph
1, Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171;  18 and 3)
the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.19 All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case.
First. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He
was the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. While the Information
said that he took advantage of his position in committing the crime, the
Sandiganbayan found that his work as comptroller did not include the
preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official
custody of the pertinent documents. 20 His official function was limited to
keeping the records of the resources that the command received from Camp
Crame.21 Still, he took the liberty of intervening in the preparation of the time
record, book, and payrolls in question.
Second. The Information alleged that Guillergan committed the offense charged
by "causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate." 22 In People v. Yanson-Dumancas,23 the
Court held that a person may induce another to commit a crime in two ways: 1)
by giving a price or offering a reward or promise; and 2) by using words of
command. In this case, the Sandiganbayan found that Guillergan ordered Butcon
to sign the "receive" portion of the payrolls as payee to make it appear that
persons whose names appeared on the same had signed the document when
they in fact did not.24
Third. There is no dispute that the falsification was committed on the time
record, book, and payrolls which were public documents.
What is more, given that some of the essential elements of Article 171 constitute
the lesser offense of falsification of public documents under Article 172, then
the allegations in the Information were sufficient to hold Guillergan liable under
Article 172.
As a rule, the Court regards as conclusive on it the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan unless these fall under certain established exceptions. 25 Since
none of those exceptions can be identified in this case, the Court must accord
respect and weight to the Sandiganbayan's findings. It had the better
opportunity to examine and evaluate the evidence presented before it. 26 As aptly
pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
There are tell-tales signs that the agents listed on the payrolls did not receive
their salaries. First, x x x Guillergan declared that he personally turned over the
entire amount of [₱1,519,000.00] to Gen. Rio. Second, Butcon’s narration that he
was instructed by Guillergan, to [affix his] initial at the receive portion of the
payrolls. Lastly, according to the records of the case, the office of Guillergan had
no business in processing the payroll of these personnel. x x x
Additionally, the appointment papers from which these payrolls were based do
not reveal any information about the acceptance of the appointments by the
agents. In a letter dated April 14, 1989 of the Anti-Graft Board of the Armed
forces of the Philippines x x x [to Ombudsman Vasquez], it was stated that the
appointment papers of the agents "must" be accompanied by the acceptance of
the agents. These papers "should ordinarily" be attached to the payrolls for
proper clearing purposes. Since there were no acceptance papers presented, it
only suggests that the lists on the payrolls are names of ghost agents. Even
more, the board made a comment that x x x Guillergan denies knowledge of the
persons appointed even if he certified to the correctness of the payrolls.
The only conclusion x x x is the deliberate falsification of the payrolls; causing it
to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate.271avvphi1
The Court finds no error in the decision of the Sandiganbayan that found
Guillergan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Documents
under Article 172 of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Sandiganbayan’s
decision dated June 30, 2008 and Resolution dated January 7, 2004 which found
petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan guilty of violation of Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code in Criminal Case 22904.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8583.  July 31, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FRANCISCO
HILVANO, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official
business early in the morning of September 22, 1952, he designated the
herein Defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his
office. Later, during office hours on that same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre
went to the municipal building; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand having found
Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor, he served written notices to the
corresponding municipal officers, including Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as
Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent mayor. However, Hilvano
refused to yield, arguing that he had been designated by the Mayor. Whereupon
the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary informing the latter
of the controversy. And the said Secretary replied by letter, that under sec. 2195
of the Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor who should discharge
the duties of the Mayor during the latter’s temporary absence. Shown this
official pronouncement, Hilvano still refused to surrender the position. Again
the Vice-Mayor sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by letter
(Exhibit D), replied that the Vice-Mayor had the right to the office.
Notwithstanding such opinion which was exhibited to him — Hilvano declined
to vacate the post, which he held for about a month, appointing some policemen,
solemnizing marriages and collecting the corresponding salary for mayor.
Wherefore Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted — and after trial — was convicted
of usurpation of public authority under Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due
time. The Solicitor-General and Appellant’s counsel agree that the penal
provision applicable to the case is Republic Act No. 379 which amended Art. 177
of the Revised Penal Code to read as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall
knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative
of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.”
It is contended however for the Appellant that he committed no usurpation of
authority because he was a councilor, an official of the Government, and that
such crime may only be committed by private individuals. He cited a decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain of 1880 interpreting the corresponding article of
the Spanish Penal Code, which is the origin of our own Penal Code. But it
appears that in subsequent decisions the same court convicted of the offense of
usurpation certain officials who without proper authority discharged the
functions of other officials, e.g., a municipal judge (Jan. 22, 1890) and a vice-
mayor (teniente de alcalde) who discharged the functions of the alcalde. (Oct.
15, 1891). See Viada 5th Ed. Vol. IV pp. 227-230. 1
There is actually no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private
individuals. For one thing it applies to “any person”; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Furthermore, contrary to Appellant’s assumption that Articles 238-
241 of the Revised Penal Code penalize all kinds of usurption of official
functions by public officers, said articles merely punish interference by officers
of one of the three departments of government (legislative, executive and
judicial) with the functions of officials of another department. Said articles do
not cover usurption of one officer or employee of a given department of the
powers of another officer in the same department. For instance, the exercise by
a bureau employee of the powers of his director.
There is no excuse for Defendant-Appellant. In the beginning he might have
pleaded good faith, invoking the designation by the Mayor; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut after he had been shown the letter of the Executive
Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter
stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully convicted. But the penalty
imposed on him should be modified, in accordance with the recommendation of
the Solicitor General. He is sentenced to an indeterminate term of 4 months of
arresto mayor to two years of prision correccional. So modified, the appealed
judgment is affirmed with costs against Appellant.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 154098 July 27, 2005]
JOSE C. MIRANDA, Petitioners, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, SEC. JOSE D. LINA, in his capacity as Secretary of the
DILG,* and FAUSTINO DY, JR. in his capacity as Governor of the Province of
Isabela,Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
First, the facts.
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda (Mayor Miranda) then the
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months
from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.1 Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro
(Vice Mayor Navarro) filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) on 1 December 1997 which was docketed as OMB-1-97-2312. 2 In
the said Complaint, Vice Mayor Navarro alleged that Mayor Miranda committed
the following acts on 24 November 1997 despite the continuing effectivity of the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order: (a) issued a memorandum
addressed to Navarro advising her that he was assuming his position as City
Mayor;3 (b) gave directives to the heads of offices and other employees; 4 (c)
issued Office Order No. 11-021 which authorized certain persons to start
work;5 and (d) insisted on performing the functions and duties of Mayor despite
Navarrro's requests to desist from doing so without a valid court order and in
spite of the order of Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez directing him to cease from reassuming the
position.6 Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the
felony of usurpation of authority or official functions under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).7
In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the
advice of his lawyer and in good faith. 8 He contended that under Section 63(b)
of the Local Government Code, local elective officials could not be preventively
suspended for a period beyond 60 days. 9 He also averred that, on the day he
reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary
Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he immediately
complied with the same.10 Notably, Mayor Miranda's counter-affidavit also
stated that he left the mayoralty post after "coercion" by the Philippine National
Police.11
On 28 October 1998, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Information against Mayor Miranda for violation of Article 177 of the RPC,
penalizing usurpation of authority. On 20 November 1998, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the Office of Special Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
in light of the manifestations made by prosecution and defense counsel. 12 After
reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Rodrigo V. Coquia (Coquia)
recommended the dismissal of the case in a Resolution dated 14 September
2000.13 Coquia held that Miranda reassumed his office in "good faith" and on
"mistake of fact" due to the "difficult questions of law" involved. 14
Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Ombudsman Desierto) referred Coquia's
resolution to the Ombudsman's Chief Legal Counsel for review. The Chief Legal
Counsel disagreed with Coquia's findings and recommended the filing of the
case against Mayor Miranda.15He pointed out that Mayor Miranda's invocation
of good faith was belied by the fact that he received a memorandum from the
DILG informing him that his view of the preventive suspension period was
untenable and that he should serve out its remaining period. 16 He further noted
that Miranda violated the orders of both the Ombudsman and the
DILG.17 Ombudsman Desierto adopted the Chief Legal Counsel's
recommendation,18 and the case was re-raffled to Special Prosecution Officer
Evelyn T. Lucero. Subsequently, the prosecution filed an amended
Information with the Sandiganbayan,19 to which the petitioner interposed
a negative plea.20
On 28 November 2001, the prosecution filed before the Sandiganbayan a
motion to suspend Mayor Miranda pendente lite based on Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.21 Miranda opposed the motion on the ground that
the offense of usurpation of authority or official functions under Article 177 of
the RPC is not embraced by Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which only contemplates
offenses enumerated under R.A. No. 3019, Title VII, Book II of the RPC or which
involve "fraud upon government or public funds or property."22
In a Resolution dated 4 February 2002, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended Mayor Miranda from office for 90 days. 23 The anti-graft court
held that a violation of Article 177 of the RPC involves fraud "which in a general
sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust
or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an
undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another." 24 It further ruled that
Miranda's act fell within the catch-all provision "x x x or for any offense
involving fraud upon government." 25 Miranda's motion for reconsideration was
denied in the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated 17 June 2002. 26 Hence, the
present petition assailing the Sandiganbayan's orders of preventive
suspension. The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it preventively suspended him on a ground not authorized by
law and raises the following issues: (1) whether Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019
applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or property; and (2)
whether the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves
"fraud upon government or public funds or property" found in Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019.
We rule in the negative.
First. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, provides:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation,
is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. 
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated
from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to
restitute the same to the Government.
The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering
two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and
(2) any offense involving public funds or property. Contrary to the submission
of the petitioner, nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit
Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase
"any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property" is
clear and categorical. To limit the use of "government" as an adjective that
qualifies "funds" is baseless. The word "public" precedes "funds" and
distinguishes the same from private funds. To qualify further "public funds" as
"government" funds, as petitioner claims is the law's intent, is plainly
superfluous. We are bound by the rule that a statute should be construed
reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should
not be given a meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object. R.A. No.
3019, commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, should be
read to protect the State from fraud by its own officials.
Second. We further hold that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it ruled that petitioner's act fell within the catch-all provision "x
x x or for any offense involving fraud upon government. The term "fraud" is
defined, viz.:
An instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp. when involving
misrepresentation: an act of deluding27
It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase "fraud upon government" means "any
instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government." It cannot be read
restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is covered by
the preceding phrase "any offense involving . . . public funds or property." It
ought to follow that "fraud upon government" was committed when the
petitioner allegedly assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to the
Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position.
The dissent opines that fraud upon government is not necessarily an essential
element of the crime of usurpation of authority. The submission may be correct
as a general proposition but general propositions hardly decide a case. In the
case at bar, the issue is whether the alleged acts of usurpation of authority
committed by the petitioner involve "fraud upon government or public funds or
property" as the term is understood under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling
in the affirmative, the Sandiganbayan held:
Let us take a look at the acts complained of as alleged in the Amended
Information dated July 27, 2001:
x x x the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the elected City
Mayor of Santiago City, while under preventive suspension did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly and under pretense of official position,
assume the duties and functions of the Office of the Mayor, issue directives and
memoranda, and appoint certain persons to various positions in the City
Government and perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was
deprived of.
Moreover, in private complainant Amelita S. Navarro's Affidavit of Complaint
dated November 26, 1997, she said: "x x x, he proceeded to his office and started
giving directives to the various heads of office and other employees, the
unexpected acts of respondents had caused serious disruptions in the day to day
affairs of the city government."
Accused's acts therefore in assuming the duties and function of the Office of the
Mayor despite his suspension from said office resulted to a clear disruption of
office and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government as the
employees, as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head of the
Office. This actuation of herein accused constitutes fraud which in general sense
is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust
or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an
undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another (37 Am. Jur. 2d 19 at Sec.
19). Hence, the act complained of against accused herein falls in the catchall
provision "x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon government x x x."
Moreover, the firmly entrenched doctrine which was held by the Highest
Tribunal in a long line of cases is that "x x x under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after
a determination has been made of the validity of the Information x x x." In fact,
as early as 1984 in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383, the
Honorable Supreme Court speaking thru Justice Relova said:
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the
Court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs
and buts about it. x x x
After a perusal of the amended information herein, it clearly appeared that the
same was apparently valid for it conforms to the requirements laid down under
Section 6[,] Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. In fact, accused herein interposed a
negative plea thereto thereby tacitly acquiescing to the validity of the said
Information.
There being no valid ground raised by the accused sufficient enough to warrant
denial of the prayer of the prosecution in its Motion to Suspend
Accused Pende[n]te Lite (sic) and in consonance with the imperious mandate of
the law, the said prayer should be accorded affirmative relief. 28 (Citations
omitted) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan further
held:
Accused in his motion substantially alleged that Article 177 (Usurpation of
Authority and Official Function) of the Revised Penal Code, which is the charge
against herein accused, does not fall under the catchall provision of Section 13
of Republic Act No. 3019 "x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property x x x." He said that the acts complained
of as alleged in the Information do not constitute fraud upon government or
public fund or property.
Though the argument by the accused seems plausible, this Court is still inclined
to uphold its ruling suspending accused pendente lite.The accused argued that
the fraud contemplated in the law is one involving (1) government funds or
property; and (2) public funds or property. This is precisely availing in the case
at bar. The Information in herein case, says: "x x x accused x x x assume the
duties and functions of the Office of the Mayor, issue directives and memoranda
and appoint certain persons to various positions in the city government, and
perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of."
When accused-mayor appointed persons in various positions, he indirectly dealt
with the city's funds as those persons appointed will be given their respective
salaries, benefits and other monetary consideration which will be paid wholly
or mainly out of the city's funds. Additionally, when he performed acts
pertaining to the Office of the Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of vouchers, and payment of
other expenses which is subject to proof, he likewise indirectly dealt with the
funds of the city.
Moreover, as the prosecution said, "when accused Miranda, willfully and
knowingly, during the effectivity of his suspension barged into the City Hall,
issued orders and directives and performed functions as City Mayor, he was
sending the unwritten yet visible message that he was authorized to do and
function as such. x x x." We hold this as a fraud upon government resulting in
the chaos or confusion albeit temporary, as the employees would be in a
quandary whom to follow or obey.
Hence, considering that the charge herein evidently falls within the compass of
the suspension provision invoked by the prosecution, there is no cogent reason
for this Court to depart from its previous ruling. Further, considering the
mandatory tenor of Section 13[,] Republic Act No. 3019, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied.
Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. 29
This Court finds no reason to disagree with the Sandiganbayan. Its
conclusions are amply supported by the record. Additionally, the issue of
whether petitioner committed fraud upon the government or public funds or
property is essentially factual. In a special civil action for certiorari, the only
question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court cannot
correct errors of fact or law which do not amount to grave abuse of discretion. 30
The dissenting opinion, however, says there was no fraud. It holds that "it would
be fraud of public funds if these public officials just collected their
salaries without rendering service to the government." It further asserts that
"fraud upon government" must be read so as to require that malversation of
funds was committed.31 This is a complete volte face from its claim that Section
13 of R.A. No. 3019 covers two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving
fraud upon the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or
property.32 What is more, adopting the dissenting opinion's line of reasoning
would render superfluous the phrase "fraud upon government" as malversation
is subsumed by "any offense involving public funds or property."
Third. We are not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he
reassumed office under an honest belief that he was no longer under
preventive suspension. Petitioner's pretense cannot stand
scrutiny. Petitioner's own affidavit states:33
8. That on November 24, 1997, at that time, (sic) I had already served my single
preventive suspension for a total number of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120)
days more or less counted from July 24, 1997, which far exceeds the allowable
period of 60 days as maximum preventive suspension, for a single suspension
for a local elective official like me as provided for under the Local Government
Code of 1991 (sic) on the same date, November 24, 1997 in good faith and upon
the advise (sic) of my lawyers, I notified both the Ombudsman and DILG of my
intention to assume my office as the duly elected City Mayor of Santiago City;
9. That earlier on November 24, 1997 I started to reassume my office and
functions as City Mayor of Santiago City; surprisingly on the same date,
November 24, 1997 I received a memorandum issued by Undersecretary
Manuel R. Sanchez of DILG instructing me to cease and desist from my plan to
reassume the functions and duties of my office;
10. For less than a week, after November 24, 1997 Vice-Mayor AMELITA
NAVARRO relentlessly harassed and threatened me and my constituents with
bodily harm using the strong arm of the law thru the brute force of the PNP
courteousy (sic) of Undersecretary Manuel R. Sanchez I was constrained to
ceased (sic) from performing my duties and functions to avoid any
possible unfortunate incident that may happen to me and any
constituents; x x x.34(Emphases supplied)Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrà ¿
By petitioner's own admission, he refused to leave his position despite the
memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez and left only a few days after receipt
thereof due to the coercion of the Philippine National Police. This
contradicts his assertion that he immediately complied with the memorandum
of Undersecretary Sanchez.35 Petitioner cannot escape from his own admission.
To be sure, petitioner's honest belief defense is old hat. In the 1956 case
of People v. Hilvano,36 the facts are:
When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official
business early in the morning of September 22, 1952, he designated the herein
defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his office.
Later, during office hours on that same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre went to the
municipal building; and having found Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor,
he served written notices to the corresponding municipal officers, including
Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the
absent mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that he had been
designated by the Mayor. Whereupon the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the
Executive Secretary informing the latter of the controversy. And the said
Secretary replied by letter, that under sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code it was the Vice-Mayor who should discharge the duties of the Mayor
during the latter's temporary absence. Shown this official pronouncement,
Hilvano still refused to surrender the position. Again the Vice-Mayor sought the
opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by letter (Exhibit D), replied that the Vice-
Mayor had the right to the office. Notwithstanding such opinion which was
exhibited to him - Hilvano declined to vacate the post, which he held for about a
month, appointing some policemen, solemnizing marriages and collecting the
corresponding salary for mayor.
Wherefore Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted - and after trial - was convicted of
usurpation of public authority under Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due
time.
In rejecting the defense of the accused Hilvano, we ruled: 37
There is no excuse for defendant-appellant. In the beginning he might have
pleaded good faith, invoking the designation by the Mayor; but after he had
been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the
provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position.
He was rightfully convicted.
Petitioner's excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too flimsy
to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of his
lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of
law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court
instead of taking the law into their own hands.
Fourth. It should be stressed that petitioner was suspended by the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, this suspension is
mandatory if the information is sufficient. Understandably, the dissent argues
that the Amended Information is insufficient in form as it should have
"expressly and clearly stated that Miranda re-assumed office to defraud the
government or that in re-assuming office Miranda committed acts that
defrauded the government"38 and that it is improper to take into account the
petitioner's admissions in his affidavit for this purpose.
With due respect, the dissent is way off-line. The records will show that
petitioner did not file a motion to quash the information or a motion for bill of
particulars before pleading to the information. It is basic that entering a plea
waives any objection the petitioner may have to the validity of the information
except on the following grounds: (1) the information charges no offense; (2) the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (3) the penalty or the
offense has been extinguished; and (4) double jeopardy has
attached.39 Objections to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Amended
Information do not fall among the exceptions to the rule. They fall under the
objection that the information "does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form."40 Needless to state, the petitioner has by his acts acquiesced to the
validity and sufficiency of the Amended Information. It is, thus, incorrect for the
dissenting opinion to peddle the proposition that the petitioner has been
deprived of his constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Worse, it is improper for the dissenting opinion to raise
this issue motu proprio. Under our Rules of Court, it is the petitioner who
should raise this objection in a motion to quash or motion for bill of
particulars before entering his plea.41 The irregular procedure followed by the
dissent would encourage the pernicious practice of "sandbagging" where
counsel foregoes raising a pleading defect before trial where it can be easily
corrected only to raise the defect later in the hope of obtaining an arrest of
judgment or new trial from a sympathetic magistrate. 42 It is precisely this evil
that is addressed by Rule 117, Section 9 of our Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Even assuming for the nonce, that the objection to the sufficiency of the
information was raised in a timely fashion by the petitioner, the dissenting
opinion's arguments still do not convince. The validity or sufficiency of
allegations in an information is determined according to the provisions of
Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz:
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must
be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. 43
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such
particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense
charged. The raison d etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense.44 A perusal of the Amended Information will bear out that
it has hurdled this legal bar. We quote its contents:
That on or about 24 November 1997, in the City of Santiago, Isabela, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being then the elected City Mayor of Santiago City, while under
preventive suspension, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly
and under pretense of official position, assume the duties and function of the
Office of the Mayor, issue directives and memoranda, and appoint certain
persons to various positions in the city government, and perform acts
pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of. 45
Using this test, it cannot be said that the Amended Information failed to
properly apprise the petitioner of the charge against him. The information
charged the petitioner with assuming the duties and performing acts pertaining
to the office of Mayor willfully, unlawfully and knowingly under the pretense of
official position. Moreover, it states some of the specific acts which constitute
usurpation of official functions, namely, issuing directives and memoranda and
appointing certain persons to various positions in the city government. These
allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand. Indeed, even the
petitioner does not complain about their ambiguity. Only the dissent does.
Fifth. The dissenting opinion also contends that the Ombudsman's authority to
preventively suspend local elective officials for 6 months is limited by Section
63(b) of the Local Government Code. Under the latter law, petitioner can only be
suspended for a maximum period of 60 days. It then jumps to the conclusion
that petitioner could not have usurped authority because he reassumed office
after 60 days.46
With due respect, the dissent fails to focus on the proper issue. The issue before
this Court is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the petitioner for 90 days. The validity of
the Ombudsman's order of preventive suspension of the petitioner for 6
months is not the one assailed in the case at bar. The irrelevance of the
suspension order of the Ombudsman notwithstanding, the reliance of the
dissenting opinion on Garcia v. Mojica is inapropos. In Garcia, we held:
Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently
strong to justify the imposition of preventive suspension against petitioner. But
considering its purpose and the circumstances in the case brought before
us, it does appear to us that the imposition of the maximum period of six
months is unwarranted.
On behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General stated during his oral argument
at the hearing that the documents mentioned in respondents' comment (such as
purchase orders, purchase requests, and disbursement vouchers), documents
that show petitioner's guilt, were obtained after petitioner had been suspended.
Even if an afterthought, he claimed they strengthen the evidence of respondents
against petitioner. If the purpose of the preventive suspension was to
enable the investigating authority to gather documents without
intervention from petitioner, then, from respondents' submission, we can
only conclude that this purpose was already achieved, during the nearly
month-long suspension of petitioner from June 25 to July 19, 1999.
Granting that now the evidence against petitioner is already strong, even
without conceding that initially it was weak, it is clear to us that the
maximum six-month period is excessive and definitely longer than
necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case against
petitioner. We must conclude that the period during which petitioner was
already preventively suspended, has been sufficient for the lawful purpose of
preventing petitioner from hiding and destroying needed documents, or
harassing and preventing witnesses who wish to appear against him.
We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily
subscribing to petitioner's claim that the Local Government Code, which
he averred should apply to this case of an elective local official, has been
violated. True, under said Code, preventive suspension may only be imposed
after the issues are joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here,
petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to refute first the
charges against him, and for the maximum period of six months provided by the
Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue, administrative complaints
commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated
under the Local Government Code. Respondents point out that the shorter
period of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to limit the
period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the
President, who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In
contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive
suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a
constitutional body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive
suspension.47 (Emphases supplied)Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrà ¿
Nowhere in Garcia is it stated that the limits provided in the Local Government
Code apply to the Ombudsman. In fact, the Court expressly stated that its
decision was rendered without subscribing to the petitioner's claim that the
Local Government Code had been violated. In fine, the Court only ruled that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in imposing a 6-month
preventive suspension since it was admitted that the documents required were
already obtained by 19 July 1999 or 24 days after the imposition of the
preventive suspension. Therefore, the purpose for which the suspension was
imposed was already served.
The dissenting opinion also cites the case of Rios v. Sandiganbayan48 as basis
for assailing the Ombudsman's order of preventive suspension. Rios is neither
here nor there since the powers of the Sandiganbayan were at issue in that
case, not those of the Ombudsman. It is also worth noting that Rios cited
Section 63 of the Local Government Code as its legal basis. This provision
provides:
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. - 
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed: 
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a
highly urbanized or an independent component city;  involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city
or municipality; or  case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense,
there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of
local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further,
That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective
official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days
within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the
time of the first suspension.
(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official
shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the time he was formally notified of the case against him.
However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or
request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of termination of the case.
It is plain that the provision was only meant as a cap on the discretionary power
of the President, governor and mayor to impose excessively long preventive
suspensions. The Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision and was
not meant to be governed thereby. Indeed, the reason is not hard to distill. The
President, governor and mayor are political personages. As such, the possibility
of extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive
suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to
political pressure given the independence of the office which is protected by no
less than the Constitution. This view was embraced by the Court in Hagad v.
Gozo-Dadole49 and Garcia v. Mojica.50 In Hagad, we held:
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive
suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much
too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63
of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The
two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive
suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of
guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should
performance of duty; (b) that the charges should warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the
suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under
investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60)
days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of
1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it
would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of
culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. 51
In the same vein, we made the following observations in Garcia, viz.:
Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter period of
preventive suspension imposable under the Local Government Code. Political
color could taint the exercise of the power to suspend local officials by the
mayor, governor, or President's office. In contrast the Ombudsman,
considering the constitutional origin of his Office, always ought to be
insulated from the vagaries of politics, as respondents would have us
believe. x x x
It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension
under the Ombudsman Law is "much too repugnant" to the 60-day period
that may be imposed under the Local Government Code. But per J. Vitug,
"the two provisions govern differently." 52 (Emphases supplied)Ï‚rαlαÏ
‰lιbrαrà ¿
There is no reason to reverse this ruling. Our above ruling is in accord with the
intent of the law. It bears emphasis that Senator Pimentel 53 explained during the
Senate deliberations that the purpose of Section 63 of the Code is to prevent
the abuse of the power of preventive suspension by members of the
executive branch, to wit:
The President.54 I recall that in the case of Iloilo City Mayor Ganzon, he
challenged the right of the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, I think, Luis Santos, to suspend him - - 
Senator Pimentel. That is true, Mr. President.
The President. - - contending that under the new Constitution, even the
President does not have that right.
Senator Pimentel. Now, as far as we are concerned, the Senate Committee
is ready to adopt a more stringent rule regarding the power of removal
and suspension by the Office of the President over local government
officials, Mr. President. We would only wish to point out that in a subsequent
section, we have provided for the power of suspension of local government
officials to be limited only to 60 days and not more than 90 days in any one year,
regardless of the number of administrative charges that may be filed against a
local government official. We, in fact, had in mind the case of Mayor Ganzon
of Iloilo where the Secretary of Local Government sort of serialized the
filing of charges against him so that he can be continuously suspended
when one case is filed right after the other, Mr. President.
The President. Can that be done under this new Code?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Senator Pimentel. Under our proposal, that can no longer be done, Mr.
President.55
Verily, Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern preventive
suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created
office and independent from the Executive branch of government. 56 The
Ombudsman's power of preventive suspension is governed by Republic Act No.
6770,57 otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which provides:
SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.  4 February 2002, preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except
when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the
period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided.58 (Emphasis supplied)
The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the
Ombudsman59 was indubitably within the limit provided by its enabling law.
This enabling law has not been modified by the legislature.
The dissenting opinion submits that providing for a six-month limit for the
Ombudsman while keeping the limit for executive officials at sixty days violates
the constitutional proscription against equal protection of the law. In essence, it
avers that there is no substantial distinction between preventive suspensions
handed down by the Ombudsman and those imposed by executive officials. On
the contrary, there is a world of difference between them. The Constitution has
endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from
political pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal
autonomy,60 fixed term of office61 and classification as an impeachable
officer.62 This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case
of Garcia v. Mojica.63Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of
preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act of 1989
requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong;
and (2) that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.64
The dissenting opinion finally points out the possibility of abuse by the
Ombudsman in imposing preventive suspensions. The short reply is that all
powers are susceptible of abuse but that is no reason to strike down the grant of
power. Suffice it to say that the proper remedies against abuse in the exercise of
power are a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure or amendment of the Ombudsman's enabling law by the
legislature, not a contortionist statutory interpretation by this Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED there being no showing
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of
 
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations
SUPREME COURT for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official
Baguio City Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.
THIRD DIVISION
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person
G.R. Nos. 186739-960               April 17, 2013 given the permit, and official receipt number, the said Informations uniformly
read:
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner, 
vs. That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE General Nakar, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both
public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Administrator,
DECISION respectively, of General Nakar, Quezon, taking advantage of their official
position and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring and
confederating with each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
VELASCO, JR., J.: criminally, issue permit to transport (description of forest product) to (person
given the permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008 Decision 1 of the First official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
which convicted Leovegildo R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.
Quezon, of Usurpation of Official Functions penalized under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The Facts The details for each Information are as follows:5

Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his
term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil Criminal Date of Description of Forest Person Given the Official
Case No.
society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view Commission Product Permit Receipt
of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products No.
within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the organizational
meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) 20 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat/ David Villareal Jr. 1623446
Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the marang
Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN,
16 Jan. 2004 600 board ft lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623463
an environmental non-government organization that operates in the
municipalities of General Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During 15 Jan. 2004 100 pcs. malaruhat Francisco Mendoza 1708352
the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests (assorted sizes)
products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to
transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer. 2 15 Jan. 2004 300 cubic m or 3,000 board Edmundo dela Vega 1708353
ft good lumber
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to
transport salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which 15 Jan. 2004 600 board ft good lumber David Villareal, Jr. 1708321
forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred
seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria 15 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft good lumber Romeo Sabiduria 1708322
(Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar. 3
45 12 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 16255216 March 2003 160 pcs sliced lumber Remedios Orozco 1182366
(assorted sizes)
46 09 Jan. 2004 4,000 board ft good lumber Naty Orozco 1623421
(assorted sizes) 10 March 1,500 board ft malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1181996
2003 (assorted sizes)
47 08 Jan. 2004 700 board ft lauan Winnie Aceboque 1623415
11 March 900 board ft sliced lumber Fernando Calzado 1182233
48 05 Jan. 2004 500 board ft lauan Edmundo dela Vega 16230412003 (assorted sizes)

49 07 Jan. 2004 4 x 5 haligi Mercy Vargas 162331413 March 1,408 board ft hard wood Nestor Astejada 1182553
2003 (assorted sizes)
50 06 Jan. 2004 good lumber Mario Pujeda 1623310
20 March 90 pcs. sliced lumber Remy Orozco 1182157
51 21 Oct. 2002 1,000 board ft sliced Conchita Odi 08308252003 (assorted sizes)
lumber
21 March 90 pcs. sliced lumber Rene Francia 1182168
52 21 Oct. 2002 400 board ft sliced lumber Lita Crisostomo 08308262003 (assorted sizes)
53 28 Oct. 2002 450 board ft marang Agosto Astoveza 083082925 March 500 board ft lumber Thelma Ramia 1182179
lumber 2003 (assorted sizes)
54 08 Jan. 2003 300 board ft sliced lumber Edna E. Moises 094394126 March 1 pc. 60 x 75 bed (narra) Roy Justo 1182246
(assorted sizes) 2003 finished product
55 13 Jan. 2003 1,500 board ft sliced Dante Z. Medina 094396414 April 2004 95 pcs. kalap (9 ft.); 6 pcs. Anita Solloza 3651059
lumber (assorted sizes) post (10 ft.) & 500 pcs.
Anahaw
56 16 Jan. 2003 400 board ft sliced lumber Johnny A. Astoveza 0943975
(assorted sizes) 08 April 2004 460 board ft lumber Remy Orozco 3651101
(assorted sizes)
57 27 Jan. 2003 7 pcs sliced lumber & 1 Sonny Leynes 1181827
piece 18 roda 14 April 2004 69 pcs. sliced lumber Dindo America 3651101
(assorted sizes)
58 14 Feb. 2003 2,000 pcs trophy (wood Flordeliza Espiritu 1182033
carvings) 23 April 2003 870 board ft hard lumber Amado Pradillada 3651268
(assorted sizes)
59 17 Feb. 2003 700 board ft sliced lumber Nestor Astejada 1181917
(assorted sizes) 24 April 2003 400 board ft lumber Romy Buendicho 3651237
(assorted sizes)
60 18 Feb. 2003 1,632 board ft hard wood, Arthur/ Lanie 1182207
kisame & sanipa Occeñ a 24 April 2003 400 board ft rattan Emmanuel 3651324
Buendicho
61 20 Feb. 2004 126 pcs lumber Lamberto 1708810
Aumentado 30 April 2004 1,000 board ft good lumber Mylene Moises 3651335
(assorted sizes)
62 3 March 2003 450 board ft hard wood Nestor Astoveza 1182413
(assorted sizes) 30 April 2004 500 board ft sliced lumber Carlito Vargas 3651336
 (assorted sizes) 04 July 2003 Assorted sizes of good Alberto dela Cruz 1247172
Lumber
79 08 May 2003 72 x 78 bed (narra); 3 pcs. Fely Justo 3651519
60 x 75 bed (ling manok) 07 July 2003 Bulukan woods Conchita Ligaya 1247175
& 1 pc. 48 x 75 ed (kuling
manok) finished product 07 July 2003 6 pcs. Haligi Jane Bulagay 1247173

80 12 May 2003 294 board ft lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 365092711 July 2003 700 board ft. cut woods Dominador Aveno 1247452

81 13 May 2003 43 pcs. sliced lumber Amando Lareza 365178314 July 200 800 board ft. cut wood/ Dante Medina 1247180
(assorted sizes) lumber

82 14 May 2003 750 board ft good lumber Wilma Cuerdo 365152916 July 2003 600 board ft. cut lumber Rachelle Solana 1247182

83 15 May 2003 440 board ft lumber Marte Cuballes 365153223 July 2003 1,200 board ft. hard lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247188

84 15 May 2003 214 pcs. 2x6x7 or 1,500 Anneliza Vargas 365153123 July 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1247129
board ft finished product
28 July 2003 959 board ft. cut lumber Necito Crisostomo 1247428
85 26 May 2003 57 pcs. sliced lumber Danny Sanchez 3651585
(assorted sizes) 29 July 2003 600 board ft. lumber Marilou Astejada 1247191

86 27 May 2003 400 board ft cut woods Emy Francia 365139401 Aug. 2003 1,000 board Malaruhat Ruel Ruzol 1247198

87 30 May 2003 300 board ft lumber Daisy Cuerdo 365094305 Aug. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Virgilio Aumentado 1322853

88 30 May 2003 1,000 board ft lumber Lea Astoveza 365116108 Aug. 2003 4.8 cubic ft. Amlang Rosa Turgo 1322862
(assorted sizes) woods

89 05 June 2003 130 pcs. or 1,500 board ft Jose Noly Moises 365180912 Aug. 2003 788 Board ft. cut woods Maria Teresa 1322865
lumber cut woods Adornado

90 06 June 2003 300 board ft lumber Mercy Escaraga 365116925 Aug. 2003 500 board ft. assorted Romy Buendicho 1322929
lumber
91 18 June 2003 800 board ft good lumber Dante Medena 3651749
28 Aug. 2003 2 sala sets Roy Justo 1322879
92 24 June 2003 28 pcs. good lumber Virgilio Cuerdo 1247102
(assorted sizes) 29 Aug. 2003 456 pieces good lumber Marilou Astejada 1323056
(assorted sizes)
93 25 June 2003 190 pcs. good lumber Dante Medina 1247205
(assorted sizes) 03 Sept. 2003 5 cubic ft softwoods Rosa Turgo 1322834
(assorted sizes)
94 02 July 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Dante Medina 1247221
05 Sept. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Agustin Vargas 1323064
95 02 July 2003 105 pcs. fresh cut lumber Emmanuel Lusang 1247167 lumber (assorted sizes)
(assorted sizes)
08 Sept. 2003 80 pcs. wood post Peter Banton 1323124
16 09 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (soft wood) Efifania V. Astrega 132302313 Oct. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Acebaque 1482734
(assorted sizes)
17 11 Sept. 2003 1 forward load (assorted Noling Multi 1323072
species) Purpose Corp. 13 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Bautista 1482740
(assorted sizes)
18 11 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Agustin Vargas 1323071
13 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Lawaan Trinidad Guerero 1482774
19 12 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1323073 (assorted sizes)
(assorted sizes)
16 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Lawaan Federico Marquez 1482782
20 15 Sept. 2003 950 board ft. Malaruhat Edna Moises 1323128
17 Oct. 2003 4,602 board ft. good Nenita Juntreal 1482787
21 16 Sept. 2003 14 pcs. Panel door Roy Justo 1323041 lumber (assorted sizes)

22 17 Sept. 2003 546 board ft. soft woods Mr. Marquez 132295120 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. Malaruhat Belen Ordinado 1482793
(assorted sizes)
23 19 Sept. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Decembrano 1323085
lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria 23 Oct. 2003 66 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1482847
(assorted sizes)
24 22 Sept. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Jeffrey dela Vega 1323095
25 Oct. 2003 1,700 board ft. good Dante Medina 1323277
25 22 Sept. 2003 1 Jeep load hard wood Federico Marquez 1323100 lumber
26 25 Sept. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 132325227 Oct. 2003 1,800 board ft. good Dante Medina 1482951
Marang lumber (assorted sizes)
27 03 Oct. 2003 750 board ft. Malaruhat/ Virgilio Villareal 132325228 Oct. 2003 1,254 board ft. good Jonathan Supremo 1323281
Marang lumber (assorted sizes)
28 02 Oct. 2003 60 pcs. good lumber Nestor Astorza 148266228 Oct. 2003 2,500 board ft. lumber Ramir Sanchez 1483001
(assorted sizes) (assorted sizes)
29 03 Oct. 2003 1,600 board ft. good Virgilio Villareal 148266628 Oct. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Rolando Franela 1323280
lumber (assorted sizes) (assorted sizes)
30 03 Oct. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Amado Pradillada 148281503 Nov. 2003 850 finished products Naty Orozco 1483020
(assorted sizes) (cabinet component,
balusters, door jambs)
31 03 Oct. 2003 1 full load (soft wood) Flordeliza Espiritu 1482867
03 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. good lumber Elizabeth Junio 1483022
32 03 Oct. 2003 6,342 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482716
(assorted sizes) & 6
33 03 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft sticks Joel Pacaiqui 1482717 bundles of sticks

34 07 Oct. 2003 900 board ft. good lumber Mylene Moises 148267010 Nov. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 1483032
(assorted sizes) lumber (assorted sizes)

10 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483033

51 12 Nov. 2003 900 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 148304125 Nov. 2003 70 bundles of Rattan Manuel Buendicho 1483095
(assorted sizes) (assorted sizes)

52 12 Nov. 2003 Mini dump truck good Rizalito Francia 148304228 Nov. 2003 6,542 board ft. finished Nenita Juntareal 1623019
lumber (assorted sizes) products (cabinet and
components)
53 14 Nov. 2003 500 components, 100 pcs Annie Gonzales 1483070
balusters (assorted sizes of 01 Dec. 2003 400 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1623061
stringers, tassels)
01 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Nestor Astejada 1483123
54 14 Nov. 2003 700 board ft. good lumber Winnie Aceboque 1323287
01 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. lumber Belen Ordinado 1623063
55 17 Nov. 2003 1,600 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483072 (assorted sizes)
lumber (assorted sizes)
03 Dec. 2003 500 board ft. Laniti Rosa Turgo 1483125
56 05 Nov. 2003 400 board ft. Tapil & 7 Belen Ordinado 1483023
pcs. 1x10x14 04 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Dante Medina 1483127

57 05 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. lumber Leonardo Aveno 162300304 Dec. 2003 26 pcs. lumber (assorted Nenita Juntareal 1483128
(assorted sizes) sizes) & 2 bundles of sticks

58 05 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 148302705 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1483131

59 07 Nov. 2003 433 bundles of semi-finished Naty Orozco 148303108 Dec. 2003 678 board ft. good lumber Elenor Rutaquio 1623082
products (assorted sizes)

60 08 Nov. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Armando Pradillada 148313408 Dec. 2003 200 board ft. lumber William Rutaquio 1623010
(assorted sizes) (assorted sizes)

61 25 Nov. 2003 30 pcs. sliced lumber Ariel Molina 163205909 Dec. 2003 1,800 board ft. lumber Nestor Astejada 1623090

62 19 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. good Dante Medina 162305312 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
lumber (assorted sizes) lumber (assorted sizes)

63 20 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. good lumber Maria Teresa 132328812 Dec. 2003 One jeep load of good Angelo Avellano 1623099
(assorted sizes) Adornado lumber (assorted sizes)

64 20 Nov. 2003 1,500 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 148308012 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1483147
lumber (assorted sizes)
16 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Malaruhat Jonathan Marcial 1623033
65 21 Nov. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1623057
lumber (assorted sizes) 16 Dec. 2003 650 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1482987

66 25 Oct. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Federico Marquez 132298216 Dec. 2003 1,000 board ft. Malaruhat Dante Medina 1482986
(assorted sizes)
18 Dec. 2003 100 board ft. lumber Aladin Aveno 1322992
67 25 Nov. 2003 500 board ft. Malaruhat Federico Marquez 1483090
87 19 Dec. 2003 780 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 132300012 Feb. 2004 69 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Florencio Borreo 1708694
(assorted sizes)
88 19 Dec. 2003 1,500 board ft. coco Felecita Marquez 1322998
lumber 17 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Ronnie Astejada 1708774
(assorted sizes)
89 22 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. lumber Belen C. Ordinado 1623209
04 Feb. 2004 600 board ft. sliced lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708486
90 29 Dec. 2003 600 board ft. Lawaan Winnie Aciboque 1623211 (assorted sizes)

91 29 Dec. 2003 300 board ft. lumber Yolanda Crisostomo 16232101 March 2004 21 pcs. Lawaan (assorted Atan Marquez 1708878
sizes)
92 30 Dec. 2003 800 board ft. Lawaan Pepito Aumentado 1623215
4 Feb. 2004 563 board ft. sliced lumber Decembrano 1708487
93 20 Nov. 2003 150 board ft. good lumber Francisco Mendoza 1483086 (assorted sizes) Sabiduria
(assorted sizes)
06 Feb. 2004 80 pcs. Buukan (Ugat) Maila S. Orozco 1708547
94 30 June 2003 450 board ft. fresh cut Mylene Moises 1247126
lumber 30 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708534
lumber (assorted sizes)
95 13 July 2001 1 L-300 load of finished Evangeline Moises 9894843-Q
and semi-finished products 29 Jan. 2004 950 board ft. good lumber Leonardo Moises 1708528
(assorted sizes)
96 02 July 2001 96 pcs. good lumber Rollie L. Velasco 9894996-Q
(assorted sizes) 28 Jan. 2004 1,000 board ft. good Pepito Aumentado 1708518
lumber (assorted sizes)
97 07 May 2004 1,500 board ft. babayahin Nemia Molina 200647
lumber 28 Jan. 2004 5, 000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708521
lumber (assorted sizes)
98 19 April 2004 107 pcs. sliced lumber Carlo Gudmalin 1868050
(assorted sizes) 28 Jan. 2004 350 board ft. good lumber Amando Pradillada 1708368
(assorted sizes)
99 5 March 2004 10 pcs. Deadwood Elizabeth Junio 1708899
(Bulakan) 23 Jan. 2004 800 board ft. lumber Pepito Aumentado 1708517
(assorted sizes)
00 2 March 2004 600 board ft. Amalang Roda Turgo 1867608
wood 21 Jan. 2004 1,050 board ft. good Romeo Sabiduria 1708508
lumber (assorted sizes)
01 1 March 2004 149 sliced lumber (assorted Necito Crisostomo 1708891
sizes) 06 April 2004 800 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1868025
(assorted sizes)
02 1 March 2004 80 bundles of rattan Manuel Buendicho 1708890
11 March 300 pieces or 1, 200 board Ernesto Aumentado 1708975
03 23 Feb. 2004 30 pcs. sliced lumber Leonardo Aveno 17088632004 ft. sliced lumber (assorted
(assorted sizes) sizes)
04 13 Feb. 2004 50 pcs. sliced sliced lumber Federico Marquez 170869802 Feb. 2004 7,000 board ft. good Carmelita Lorenzo 1708376
(assorted sizes) lumber
21 08 Jan. 2004 600 board ft. Malaruhat Nestor Astejada 1623451 (assorted sizes)

22 10 Dec. 2003 300 pieces good lumber Francisco Mendoza 162309606 Aug. 2003 1,000 board ft. hardwood Jennifer Nudalo 1322802

23 18 Nov. 2003 6,432 board ft. assorted Naty Orozco 148304825 June 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Roy Justo 1247024
species
26 May 2003 800 board ft. lumber Adelino Lareza 3651096
24 30 Oct. 2003 8,000 board ft. Malauban Ma. Teresa 1483019
Adornado 26 May 2003 Assorted sizes good lumber Rollie Velasco 3651587

25 21 Oct. 2003 1,770 board ft. good Dante Medina 148279623 May 2003 342 sliced lumber (assorted Dolores S. Gloria 3651499
lumber (assorted sizes) sizes)

26 21 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. Malaruhat Leonardo S. Aveno 132327120 May 2003 500 board ft. lumber Marylyn de Loreto/ 3651574
(assorted sizes) Melita Masilang

27 21 Oct. 2003 10,875 board ft. lumber Annie Gonzales 132327302 May 2003 123 pieces sliced lumber Armando Lariza 3651656
(assorted sizes) (assorted sizes)

28 20 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. sliced lumber Bernardo Gonzalvo 148283517 Feb. 2003 70 pieces sliced lumber Efren Tena/ Romeo 1182204
(assorted sizes) Serafines
29 17 Oct. 2003 6,090 board ft. lumber Naty Orozco 1482834
07 Feb. 2003 1 piece narra bed; 1 piece Roy D. Justo 1182060
30 17 Oct. 2003 16 pcs. panel door Roy Justo 1482743 narra panel door; 6 pcs.
(finished product) Refrigerator stand & 1 pc.
Narra cabinet (finished
31 01 Oct. 2003 300 board ft. good lumber Analiza Vargas 1482710 product)
(assorted sizes)
05 Dec. 2002 140 pcs. round poles Lamberto R. Ruzol 0943647
32 01 Oct. 2003 700 board ft. Malaruhat Engr. Mercado 1482760
(assorted sizes) 20 Nov. 2002 500 board ft. lumber Luz Astoveza 0943618
(assorted sizes)
33 30 Sept. 2003 500 board ft. sliced lumber Mylene Moises 1482810
(assorted sizes) 30 Oct. 2002 1,200 board ft. sliced Arceli Fortunado 0830698
lumber (assorted sizes)
34 29 Sept. 2003 800 board ft. good lumber Wennie Acebuque 1482703
(assorted sizes) 04 Oct. 2002 500 board ft. Huling Roy Justo 0830646
Manok
35 15 Sept. 2003 1,500 board ft. malaruhat Decembrano 1323076
lumber (assorted sizes) Sabiduria 27 Sept. 2002 300 board ft. sliced lumber Roy Justo 0830625
(assorted sizes)
36 10 Sept. 2003 200 board ft. good lumber Junier Franquia 1323027
(assorted sizes) 24 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Inna L. 0830771
lumber (assorted sizes) Customerado
37 29 Aug. 2003 600 board ft. good lumber Annaliza Vargas 1322830
23 Sept. 2002 1,000 board ft. sliced Normelita L. 0830610
38 07 Aug. 2003 2,000 board ft. lumber Abilardo dela Cruz 1247200 lumber (assorted sizes) Curioso
 (3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to the payment
55 03 Sept. 2002 2,000 pcs. trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 686642
of Transport Fees levied by the municipality for the use of local public
carvings) Espiritu
roads for the transport of salvaged forest products. Under (a) Section 5,
56 7 March 2002 2,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090549 Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title One Book
carvings) Espiritu II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One,
Book II of R.A. 7160, the municipality is granted the power to create its
57 03 Dec. 2001 10,000 sets trophy (wood Floredeliza D. 090769 own sources of revenue and to levy fees in accordance therewith.
carvings) Espiritu
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber
58 12 Sept. 2001 1,075 board ft of sticks & Lea A. Rivera 7786333 or lumber is denominated "Certificate of Timber Origin" or CTO for logs
1,450 board ft. Bollilo and "Certificate of Lumber Origin" or CLO for lumber; hence, even if
(assorted sizes) accused issued the Transport Permits on his side, a person wanting to
transport the said forest products would have to apply and obtain a
59 07 Oct. 2003 Assorted lumber Roy D. Justo 1482765 CTO or CLO from the DENR. The Transport Permits issued by the
accused were never taken as a substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial agreed to the reason why said permits contain the annotation "Subject to DENR
dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence and submit the case for rules, laws and regulations."
decision based on the documentary evidence and joint stipulation of facts
contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter, the accused and the prosecution (5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused. The Transport
submitted their respective memoranda.6 Permits were issued by accused Sabiduria in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator and his mere issuance is not enough to impute upon the
Ruzol's Defense accused Ruzol any transgression or wrongdoing that may have been
committed in the issuance thereof following the ruling in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309).
As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence based on
following arguments:
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the
issuance of the 221 Transport permits through the Provincial
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he
Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in a
is authorized to issue permits to transport forest products pursuant to
Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.
RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also those
powers that are necessarily implied from the powers expressly granted
as well as those that are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the (7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since
LGU’s efficient and effective governance. The LGU is likewise given they did not act "under the pretense of official position," accused Ruzol
powers that are essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the having issued the permits in his capacity as Mayor and there was no
inhabitants. The general welfare clause provided in Section 16, Chapter pretense or misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of
2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a massive grant of authority that DENR.7
enables LGUs to perform or exercise just about any power that will
benefit their local constituencies. Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved certain
functions and responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And the permits
to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage
and control communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50)
square kilometers.
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December 19, 2008 a
Decision, acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases as follows:
 1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, judgment is hereby
rendered finding him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Two
Hundred Twenty One (221) counts of the offense of Usurpation of
Official Functions as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer for each case a
straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol shall be entitled
to the benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused GUILLERMO M.
SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221 charges. The cash bond posted by
him for his provisional liberty may now be withdrawn by said accused
upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof
subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. The hold
departure procedure issued by this Court dated 16 April 2008 is set
aside and the Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April
2008 including the name of Sabiduria in the Hold Departure List is
ordered recalled and cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to
issue transport permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that such
authority had not been devolved to the local government of General Nakar. 9 To
the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of
the official functions of the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of
Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of the subject permits to
transport, which in turn resolves itself into the question of whether the
authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product
is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Subsidiary Issue:
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs), has the
authority to issue transportation permits of salvaged forest products, the
Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines and in relation to Executive
Order No. 192, Series of 1987 (EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 5 of PD 705 provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management shall have
jurisdiction and authority over all forest land, grazing lands, and all forest
reservations including watershed reservations presently administered by other
government agencies or instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management,
regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and supervision
of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the taking or use of
forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof; the implementation
of multiple use and sustained yield management in forest lands; the protection,
development and preservation of national parks, marine parks, game refuges
and wildlife; the implementation of measures and programs to prevent kaingin
and managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in collaboration with other
bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic classification of lands of the public
domain; and the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife
laws, rules, and regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of sawmills, veneer
and plywood mills and other wood processing plants and conduct studies of
domestic and world markets of forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the country’s environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department
shall have the following functions:
xxxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposal lands, and mineral resources and in the process of exercising
such control the Department shall impose appropriate payments, fees,
charges, rentals and any such revenues for the exploration,
development, utilization or gathering of such resources.
xxxx
(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and
use of the country’s forest, land and mineral resources;
(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection,
conservation, licensing and regulation as provided for by law, where
applicable, of all natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of
service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permittees for the
extraction, exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources products; the implementation of programs and measures
with the end in view of promoting close collaboration between the
government and the private sector; the effective and efficient
classification and sub-classification of lands of the public domain; and
the enforcement of natural resources laws, rules and regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of co-
production, joint venture or production sharing agreements, licenses,
permits, concessions, leases and such other privileges and arrangement
concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the
country’s natural resources and shall continue to oversee, supervise
and police our natural resources; to cancel or cause to cancel such
privileges and arrangement upon failure, non-compliance or violations
of any regulations, orders, and for all other causes which are
furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of
the national interests;
xxxx
(n) Implement measures for the regulation and supervision of the
processing of forest products, grading and inspection of lumber and
other forest products and monitoring of the movement of timber and
other forest products. (Emphasis Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-78) which
mandates that the permittee should secure the necessary transport and other
related documents before the retrieved wood materials are sold to the
buyers/users and/or wood processing plants. 10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the entity
or person concerned to secure a Wood Recovery Permit––a "permit issued by
the DENR to gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken
logs, uprooted, and fire and typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and
branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only be allowed to gather or
recover logs or timber which had already been marked and inventoried by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer. 12 To the
Sandiganbayan, this mandatory requirement for Wood Recovery Permit
illustrates that DENR is the sole agency vested with the authority to regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest products.1âwphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and regulating
salvaged forest products" is not one of the DENR’s functions which had been
devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review
of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which
include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management
and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the devolved
functions of the DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the implementation of
community-based forestry products; (2) management and control of communal
forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; and (3)
establishment of tree parks, greenbelts and similar forest development
projects.13 It also referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992
(DAO 1992-30), which enumerates the forest management functions, programs
and projects of the DENR which had been devolved to the LGUs, as follows: 14
Section 3.1 Forest Management
a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of
regular appropriations, except at least one project per province
that shall serve as research and training laboratory, as
identified by the DENR, and those areas located in protected
areas and critical watersheds;
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except
those areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract
reforestation projects, subject to policies and procedures
prescribed by the DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with
DENR Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other
guidelines that the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of
financing institution(s), if foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand (5,000)
hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned
LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry
projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small
watershed areas which are sources of local water supply as identified
or to be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project
areas, small watershed areas and communal forests, as defined in
Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and
regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging,
smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered
species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming and other
unlawful activities; and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances,
equipment and other implements used in the commission of
offenses penalized under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277,
series of 1987 and other forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside the
devolved areas above mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged forest
products was not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the
correlative authority to issue transport permits remains with the DENR 15and,
thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting exclusivity. As
shall be discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample
authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and
regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law
for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged
with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of
the environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only
government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has
designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it
was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive
prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance,
the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or
"exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192
suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the
exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e., LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily
negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC
of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with
authority to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon them
by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality. 17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 18 the right of the people "to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and maintained, a local
government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at
enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly,
provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural
resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol’s
memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was
in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport were issued
by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the
municipality of General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any
untoward illegal logging in the area.19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and
regulation of salvaged forest products through the issuance of appropriate
permits is a shared responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by the
LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says as much, thus: the "LGUs shall share
with the national government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the environment and natural
resources within their territorial jurisdiction." 20 The significant role of the LGUs
in environment protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum Circular No.
98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU
Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was
promulgated jointly by the DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:
Section 1. Basic Policies
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160 and DENR
Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following basic policies shall
govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU partnership on devolved and
other forest management functions:
1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, protection, proper use and sustainable
development of the country’s environment and natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the forest resources
within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the
LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership
in forest management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important
tools in the holistic and efficient management of forest resources.
Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with other
government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an
integral activity of comprehensive land use planning to determine the
optimum and balanced use of natural resources to support local,
regional and national growth and development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared responsibilities
in the sustainable management of forest land resources, the DENR, in
coordination with DILG, shall enhance the capacities of the LGUs in the
various aspects of forest management. Initially, the DENR shall
coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the management of the
devolved functions. As the LGUs’ capacity in forest management is
enhanced, the primary tasks in the management of devolved functions
shall be performed by the LGUs and the role of the DENR becomes
assistive and coordinative.
 1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation
with the LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional functions and
responsibilities to the local government units, or enter into agreements
with them for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related
functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve
community empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership
and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking
and strengthening the participation of local communities for forest
management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products
is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an
additional measure which was meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate
and monitor forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting
one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts
must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve
respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the government." 21 Hence, if
there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or
regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action
is not to immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to
both by harmonizing them if possible. 22 Accordingly, although the DENR
requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from
promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause,
complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are
invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth by
law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the nature of
transport fees levied by the municipality for the use of public roads. 23 In this
regard, he argues that he has been conferred by law the right to issue subject
permits as an incident to the LGU’s power to create its own sources of revenue
pursuant to the following provisions of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. – Local government units may impose
and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered.
xxxx
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government
units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or
subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other
applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy:
Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall
not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
(Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under his power
and authority as Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation
of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant
to law or ordinance;
xxxx
vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine,
forest, and other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective
property and supply management in the municipality; and protect the funds,
credits, rights and other properties of the municipality. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is
necessary to confer the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the
Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised by
the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance
wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed. 24 Needless to
say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local
revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or
ordinance."25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the authority
of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a
law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the
municipality, which is mandated by law to enact ordinances against acts which
endanger the environment, i.e., illegal logging, and smuggling of logs and other
natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s
Revised Municipal Revenue Code 27 and Municipal Environment Code 28 reveals
that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the permits to transport
may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for the regulation and
transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol
are infirm.
Ruzol’s insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU’s devolved function
to "manage and control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO
1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the
management and control of communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction,
We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance
with the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and efficient
execution. As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGU’s
authority to manage and control communal forests should be "pursuant to
national policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal forest" 30 has a
well-defined and technical meaning.31Consequently, as an entity endowed with
specialized competence and knowledge on forest resources, the DENR cannot be
discounted in the establishment of communal forest. The DILG, on behalf of the
LGUs, and the DENR promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined the following
procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city and
municipal governments shall be governed by the following general procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall undertake
the actual identification and assessment of existing communal forests.
The assessment shall determine the suitability of the existing
communal forests. If these are no longer suitable, then these communal
forests may be disestablished. The Approval for disestablishment shall
be by the RED upon recommendation of the DENR-LGU assessment
Team through the PENRO and the RTD for Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by
the DENR-LGU Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve their
purpose shall be maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where the communal forest is
located shall pass resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the
turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon
receipt of said resolution, the DENR Secretary shall issue an
Administrative Order officially transferring said communal forest to the
concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the
concerned LGU within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the
administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative
Order and turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality,
the LGU to which the communal forest was transferred shall formulate
and submit to the Provincial ENR Council for approval a management
plan governing the sustainable development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management plan, DENR
shall, in coordination with the concerned LGU, undertake a forest resource
inventory and determine the sustainable level of forest resource utilization and
provide the LGU technical assistance in all facets of forest management planning
to ensure sustainable development. The management plan should include
provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal
forests to ensure sustainability.
8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the following
guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned
city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify potential communal forest
areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a
forest land use planning to be undertaken jointly between the DENR
and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall indicate,
among others, the site and location of the communal forests within the
production forest categorized as such in the forest land use plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief
executive shall initiate the passage by the LGU’s sanggunian of a
resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative
Order declaring the identified area as a communal forest. The required
administrative order shall be issued within sixty (60) days after receipt
of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the
city/municipal LGU shall formulate the management plan and submit
 the same to its ENR Council. The management plan shall include
provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the
communal forests to ensure sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a total of
5,000 hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a communal forest,
the following requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of
potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the
concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate,
among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request
to the DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring
the identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these
requirements were complied with. Thus, in the absence of an established
communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar, there was no way
that the subject permits to transport were issued as an incident to the
management and control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned statutory
requirements for the issuance of permits to transport foregoes the necessity of
obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR. As earlier discussed, the
permits to transport may be issued to complement, and not substitute, the
Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as an additional measure in the
regulation of salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking to
transport salvaged forest products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery Permit
from the DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding permit to
transport issued by the LGU.
Main Issue:
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of
Official Functions as defined and penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall
knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative
of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of
committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be
an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government; or second, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public
officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. 32 The former constitutes the
crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the crime of
usurpation of official functions.33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for
issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products under the alleged
"pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such
authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources."34 The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were
attendant in the present case because the authority to issue the subject permits
belongs solely to the DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved and that to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. 36As held by
this Court in People v. Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal
justice system, the accused, during a criminal prosecution, having a stake
interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose
his freedom if convicted and because of the certainty that his conviction will
leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any
person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the
Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The constitutional
presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual
consideration" of every circumstance of doubt proving the innocence of
petitioner. (Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only
logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. 39 As explained by this
Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that "(i)n a
criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the
contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of
command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as
public officers, and therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of
tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a
perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of
position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction
when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainly only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We
find that a careful scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove
that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of
usurpation of official functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the
prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that
can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution
asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the
DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency
vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of
salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare
clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the
records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace
the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the
issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and
independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are
likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false
pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse
not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, 42 this Court enunciated
that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official
functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of
mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention
to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though
technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit
or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious." 44 Good faith is
actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can be
ascertained by relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of good faith but
on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.45
In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan reasoned as
follows:
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under R.A. 7160
to issue the subject permits, why did he have to secure the approval of the
various NGOs, People’s Organizations and religious organizations before issuing
the said permits? He could very well have issued subject permits even without
the approval of these various organizations if he truly believed that he was
legally empowered to do so considering that the endorsement of these
organizations is not required by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with their
endorsement could only mean that he actually knew that he had no legal basis
for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support and
back-up.46 (Emphasis Ours.)
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal basis nor
established doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith is negated when an
accused sought another person’s approval. Neither is there any doctrine in law
which provides that bad faith is present when one seeks the opinion or
affirmation of others.
Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that the
conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but a sign
supporting Ruzol’s good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of
salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal
logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to
transport was not Ruzol’s decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of
the collective decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative
Assembly. As attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the participants
who agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of
General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latter’s authority as local
chief executive.47
The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzol’s good faith is negated by the
fact that if he truly believed he was authorized to issue the subject permits,
Ruzol did not have to request the presence and obtain the permission of PENRO
Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly.48
The graft court’s above posture, however, does not commend itself for
concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to usurp the
official functions of the DENR as averred by the prosecution, he would not have
asked the presence of a DENR official who has the authority and credibility to
publicly object against Ruzol’s allegedly intended usurpation. Thus, the
presence of PENRO Delgado during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not
negate, but strengthens Ruzol’s claim of good faith.
As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the environment is
placed not on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether
in an official or private capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed,
protecting the environment is not only a responsibility but also a right for which
a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest
denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural
resources, each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the
responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by
exercising his authority as municipal mayor––an act which was executed with
the concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental organizations, industry
stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of General Nakar. Admittedly, We
consider his acts as invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes
automatically demand Us to rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the
settled principle that "all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and
not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused."49
Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the unlawful act
for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he issued the subject
permits. What is clear from the records is that Ruzol, as municipal mayor,
intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products within General
Nakar in order to avert the occurrence of illegal logging in the area. We find that
to hold him criminally liable for these seemingly noble intentions would be a
step backward and would run contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging
people to take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and
conservation of our natural resources.
Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and
considering further that this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's
guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions under the RPC, for which
the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary,
We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro
hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259,
finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal
Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable
doubt of the crimes as charged.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise
known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial
Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to
conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was
initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution
advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the
illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. 2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the
Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of
the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to
take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's
messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before
proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and
told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was
one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him
not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required
to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was
instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of
writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he
was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint
he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the
Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the
complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar
Perez."4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance,
Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while
then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as
"Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa
Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of
its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence
alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was
different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its
cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was
presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a
condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1
of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a
prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of  prision correccional minimum as
minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with
all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00
plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but
modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as
minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his
innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias.
An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another
name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known
as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was
with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an
essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that
his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of
Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the
defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law.5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the
statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose.6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat
the clear purpose of the lawmakers.7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was
allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under
which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments
and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7
November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act
to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person
shall use any name different from the one with which he was
christened or by which he has been known since his childhood,
or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames.
 Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply
for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name.
Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new
petition shall set forth the original name and
the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has
been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on
which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the
use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4
August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in
athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from
the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of
the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the
first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered
in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent
court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within
which to register their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and
one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to
obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person
shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias.
The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name
and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper
local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names
other than his original or real name unless the same is or are
duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No.
3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than
True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce
and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for
other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by
Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The pertinent provisions of Act
No. 3883 as amended follow —
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any
written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business
or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary
public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement
or business transactions, any name used in connection with his
business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously
exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is
conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing
a firm name or business name or style without first registering
such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style
in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and
that of any other person having a joint or common interest
with him in such contract, agreement, business transaction, or
business . . . .
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of
different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of
trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names
which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the
Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one
names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless
such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in
the civil register.9
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning,
concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142
when we ruled —
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use
of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu
Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known
in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the
former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After
all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by
both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a
customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact
 that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions
with government offices which required him to explain why he
bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner
could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking
only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the
Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for
naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court,
argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if
naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no
necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only
one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as
the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is
naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name
following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition
for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng
Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt
the name Kheng Chiau Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that
petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable
grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his
petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be
used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition
to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or
substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply
the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by
which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any
sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to
his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained
in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the
Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his
lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead
of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain
a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no
question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no
evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his
second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez"
was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally
required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself
properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a
copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman
could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence
open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does
not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under
which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which
the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as
the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the
legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No.
142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in
favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law
for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner
should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 164368-69               April 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s Joint Resolution dated
July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (Estrada) demurrer
to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.2
THE FACTS
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No.
26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among
other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended Information in
Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then President of the Republic of the
Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively,
taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to office,
i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure
and his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS
‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID
alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his
baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated for joint trial.
Still another Information, this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No.
26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later
consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the
Sandiganbayan issued. 
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in the
Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related cases
(illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada. 3
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and
perjury. The People’s evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the
Sandiganbayan, consisted of: 
A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB)
officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel Curato (Curato)
who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a
numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as
"Jose Velarde" in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and
Curato also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua were
present on that occasion; 
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa
Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza)
transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several
checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account
name "Jose Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit
receipts duly marked in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM")
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL")
 c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN")
d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO")
e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP")
f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ")
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR")
h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS")
i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")
j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")
k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")
(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena
Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later on,
in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these positions
and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No.
0160-62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases, which the
Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October 13,
2003.4 The accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan
Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated
Comment/Opposition to the motions. 6 The Sandiganbayan denied the motions
in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003. 7
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file
a demurrer to evidence in these cases. 8 In its Joint Resolution dated March 10,
2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and
26905.10 His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias)
was anchored on the following grounds11:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only
two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato,
testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use
the name "Jose Velarde";
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was
prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral
Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents
offered by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their
nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following
proper procedures; and 
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated Opposition that
presented the following arguments:12
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was not expressly
prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment considering that as early
as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the use of alias was already prohibited.
Movant is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP
Circular No. 302;
2. Movant’s reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147
[1996]) is misplaced;
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires
publication of the alias and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution
has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict
movant for illegal use of alias; and
4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of illegal use
of alias is not absorbed in plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a Consolidated Reply
Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in this
petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are:
First – the coverage of Estrada’s indictment. The Sandiganbayan found that the
only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described
in the Information – i.e., the testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust
Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the
use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04 February 2000" and
"sometime prior or subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly
committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place prior to or
subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the prosecution’s
procedural tool to guard against any variance between the date stated in the
Information and that proved during the trial in a situation in which time was not
a material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean and cannot be read as a
roving commission that includes acts and/or events separate and distinct from
those that took place on the single date "on or about 04 February 2000 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto." The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use
of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from interpreting the Information any other
way.
Second – the People’s failure to present evidence that proved Estrada’s
commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to
present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA
142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. 13 It
ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the
use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estrada’s case, the Sandiganbayan
noted, the application of the principles was not as simple because of the
complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved – the alias
was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust account made
during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended, 14 and prior to the enactment
of Republic R.A. No. 9160.15
Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde": 
a. Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with Dichavez
and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of the
conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were
the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase,
"Estrada did … represent himself as ‘Jose Velarde’ in several
transactions," standing alone, violates Estrada’s right to be informed of
the nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general
and vague. This phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding
phrase – "and use and employ the said alias ‘Jose Velarde’" – which "is
neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities."
Thus, Estrada’s representations before persons other than those
mentioned in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do
not fall within the "Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities"
specified in the Information. Estrada’s representations with Ortaliza
and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment.
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the principle in the
law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity; it
reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited to the
way it is defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application of
the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by
the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be
construed strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It
ruled that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies,
considers a communication to a third person covered by the privileged
communication rule to be non-actionable. Estrada’s use of the alias in
front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged communication
under R.A. No. 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said: 
Movant’s act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being
absolutely confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank officers who
were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be considered
as ‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account
of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that
movant intended to be known by this name in addition to his real name.
Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to
another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that
the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name
from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142
as amended. 
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be publicly
known by the name "Jose Velarde" is shown by the nature of a
numbered account – a perfectly valid banking transaction at the time
Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust
account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada
the obligation to disclose his real identity – the obligation R.A. No. 6713
imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and
liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713
together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets
including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was under no
obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account
(such as the name he used to open it).
Third – the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said
that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of anonymous
accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a
legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws
that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted
that the prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular
No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 – another confirmation that the opening of a
numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4,
2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in
Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and
R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute should be construed in a
way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the
Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the present case, led it to
conclude that the use of an alias within the context of a bank transaction
(specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers) is
protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the
coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.  Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or
THE PETITION
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the court a quo  gravely erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by
respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was not public
despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua
on 4 February 2000;
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by
respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable
under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under
Commonwealth Act No. 142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an
exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under Commonwealth
Act No. 142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made by the
court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142 were
proper;
5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No.
26565 to the use of the alias "Jose Velarde" by respondent Joseph
Estrada on February 4, 2000;
6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in
departing from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua
v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to the instant case.
THE COURT’S RULING
The petition has no merit. 
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling 
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the
local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of
an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry;
or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil
registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of
this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a
change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority
for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if
different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such
names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for
the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name
and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or
real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil
registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias –
"a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which
he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized
by a competent authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition
to his real name from that day forth … [for the use of alias to] fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended." 18
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to the
enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could
not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly,
claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized
the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.19
Following the doctrine of stare decisis, 20 we are guided by the Ursua ruling on
how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence
to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the application of and the
determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.  ruling.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application of the
Ursua ruling proceeds from Estrada’s position in the government; at the time of
the commission of the offense, he was the President of the Republic who is
required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this argument
sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on the street, on one hand, and
the President of the Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142.
In the first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly,
that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in
fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name
he has used even when he was already the President of the Philippines. Even the
petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown
by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based
on the People’s claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by the Ursua
dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against
the State and in favor of the accused. 21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is
therefore the same whoever the accused may be.  the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be no res
The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling
(Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying Estrada’s motion to quash the
Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the application of Ursua
under the following tenor:
The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves to bring
this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals
(256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to
quash. The term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster Third New
International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an "alias" logically
implies that another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he
will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended information adverts
to "several transactions" and signing of documents with the Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities where the above-mentioned alias was allegedly
employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts
established in the Ursua case where another name was used by the accused in a
single instance without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to be
known from that day by this name in addition to his real name. 22
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non-applicability
– a ruling that binds the parties in the present case. The People thus claims that
the Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it
resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order – a ruling denying a
motion to quash23 – that cannot be given the attributes of finality and
immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or orders that finally
dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a case. 24 The Sandiganbayan
resolution is a mere interlocutory order because its effects would only be
provisional in character, and would still require the issuing court to undertake
substantial proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest. 25 It is basic
remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the control of the court
and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time
before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of Appeals, 27 albeit a civil case,
instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata
effects. Says Perez: 
The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an interlocutory matter,
judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment
determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an
interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for
final adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way
for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their
representatives pending the resolution of the main action for injunction. In
other words, the main issue of whether or not private respondent may be
considered a sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess the
fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the
restraining order was lifted.28
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the
allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations
and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present
demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the
prosecution’s case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecution’s
evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these
differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the
application of Ursua, the leading case in the application of CA 142, and the
change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there
is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan
ruling on the application of Ursua.  necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense
In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s jurisprudential binding effect, the People
also argues in its petition that Estrada’s case is different from Ursua’s for the
following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use
the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estrada’s
use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the
use of the alias "Jose Velarde" was designed to cause and did cause "confusion
and fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it presented
more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as
it was also shown or established that Estrada’s use of the alias was public.  subsequent thereto"; under the liberality principle, the allegations of the acts
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties’ expressed positions,
we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan
Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden
of proof to show that the evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied
the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality
in the use of an alias.
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused its
discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No.
26565 to Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on February 4, 2000. It posits
that there was a main transaction – one that took place on February 4, 2000 –
but there were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or
subsequent thereto; the Information specifically referred to "several
transactions" … "with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." To
the People, the restrictive finding – that the phrase "prior to or subsequent
thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February 2000" – drastically
amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive criminal acts by
removing the plurality of both the transactions involved and the documents
signed with various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship
between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the
additional antecedent of "prior to or subsequent thereto," on the other. It argues
that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto"
into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and totally
unwarranted escape route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least exacting in
satisfying the constitutional requirement that the accused has to be informed of
the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission of the
offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not
was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This
liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time" given in the
complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the commission of the
offense does not need to be proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be
sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within
the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the
action (citing People v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v.
Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense
are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause "prior to or
constitutive of the offense finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of
time. The People thus claims that no surprise could have taken place that would
prevent Estrada from properly defending himself; the information fully notified
him that he was being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just
one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments. 
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature – the right of Estrada to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Under the
provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional right, a
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense in the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the court to pronounce
judgment.30 The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely
stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a
material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. 31
The information must at all times embody the essential elements of the crime
charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the culpability
and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake
his defense.32 In short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as
written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused – the primary reader of and
the party directly affected by the complaint or information – of the charge/s
laid.  raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged,
The heretofore cited Information states that "… on or about 04 February 2000,
or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did]
… willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’
IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde"
which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities."  and the terms of Ursua.
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s reading of the Information, as
this was how the accused might have similarly read and understood the
allegations in the Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken
down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly
states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR
sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila,
Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.  bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence of two other persons
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference
to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to
that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on
February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4,
2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said "on or about February
4, 2000" to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase
"sometime prior or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a surplusage that
has no meaning separately from the "on or about" already expressed. This
consequent uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be
denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence of the use of the "OR"
between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that referred back to February 4,
2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very
different (and would have been clearly in accord with the People’s present
interpretation) had the Information simply used "AND" instead of "OR" to
separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on
various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be
disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of "OR" is the
reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate
Estrada’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him;
the multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims would
result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a
right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information. 
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time in the
Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our above conclusion
were actually alleged in the Information.1avvphi1
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the People’s case, as it
deals a fatal blow on the People’s claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose
Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day
cannot be deemed "habitual," as it does not amount to a customary practice or
use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142
 
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and 
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405, 
and R.A. No. 9160. 
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues. 
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and Curato are
who are not bank officers – Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua – when
Estrada’s signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public"
use of an alias that violates CA No. 142. 
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to premise the
validity of Estrada’s prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking
practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave abuse of
discretion; no banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the opening
of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or
industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally,
that Estrada’s prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated
October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged with
violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere
BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No.
302 is allowed is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an
alias (except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was already
prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in banking
transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was
therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this
point, bank regulations being mere issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail
over the effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship with CA No.
142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is
an exception to CA No. 142’s coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People posits,
is allowed only if the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject
matter, or are at least related with one another. The three laws which the
Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to one another; they
each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a different act, governs a
different conduct, and covers a different class of persons, 33 and there was no
need to force their application to one another. Harmonization of laws, the
People adds, presupposes the existence of conflict or incongruence between or
among the provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present
case.  a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust transactions,
such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits
(simple loans). A trust account, according to the People, may not be considered
a deposit because it does not create the juridical relation of creditor and debtor;
trust and deposit operations are treated separately and are different in legal
contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct from banking and
requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not covered by
deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A.
No. 3591, as amended).  matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the
transaction or communication was privileged in nature was erroneous – a
congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person
who signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other than his
original name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held liable for
violation of CA No. 142, while the bank employees are bound by the
confidentiality of bank transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in
R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405
covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not
prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to other
people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit
and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua. 
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use of an alias
before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the
commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under
pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law
to silence bank officials and employees from reporting the commission of
crimes. The People contends that the law – R.A. No. 1405 – was not intended by
the Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of
crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted,
understood and applied so that right and justice would prevail. 
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the
rule in the law of libel – that mere communication to a third person is publicity –
does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua –
particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable
and the historical reasons we cited above – tells us that the required publicity in
the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of
the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner
or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for
person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words,  the
intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest. 
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose
Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his
intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to
Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to
Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacañ an
where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared
bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the
privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have
intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact
alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The same
holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez,
assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of
Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy,
with no iota of intention of publicity. 
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests, affords
Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act related
to the opening of a trust account – a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers
absolutely confidential in nature.34 We previously rejected, in Ejercito v.
Sandiganbayan,35 the People’s nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy
between bank deposits and trust transactions, when we said:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as
used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor
relationship between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of
the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be understood broadly
and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank.  would have been no need to add the phrase "or invested.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give
encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions
and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized
by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
country. (Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for authorized
loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a
creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank, falls under the
category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of
boosting the economic development of the country.  alias publicly.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust
Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account
covers "deposit, placement or investment of funds" by Urban Bank for and in
behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858, was,
therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it
elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would
encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by bank
in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law. 
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term
"deposits" was intended to be understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking institutions in
the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)1avvphi1
The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of
"deposits." Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that,
generally, the law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those
which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended to apply
only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the word.lawphil.net Otherwise, there
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858. 36
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of
privacy.37 Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as
"Jose Velarde" related to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot
claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato
witnessed the signing. We need not even consider here the impact of the
obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially
significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of
transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate
a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the intent to use the
 
The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development
only because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts
or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be
allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment
against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without
violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post
facto laws.38
We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of these
various laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission
of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the evidence
of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No.
1405 is significant only because Estrada’s use of the alias was pursuant to a
transaction that the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law
guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to the
transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with an
indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no actual frontal clash between
CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates within  
its own sphere, but must necessarily be read together when these spheres CALLEJO, SR., J.:
interface with one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in
relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing  
factor in his indictment.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] of the
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at the totality Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 dismissing the petition
of the circumstances obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" vis-à - for certiorari assailing the finding of the Secretary of Justice that no probable
vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether Estrada’s use of an alias cause exists against private respondent Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen for
when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal; perjury.
we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made
liable for the offense charged based on the evidence the People presented. As The Antecedents
with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the evidence and proof
beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability requires. If the
 
People fails to discharge this burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law
requires that we so declare. We do so now in this review and accordingly find
no reversible error of law in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling. On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a
protest before the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of
Finance against certain importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC), a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The
matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-based refractory bricks from
SO ORDERED. Germany. [2] The case was docketed as Anti-Dumping Case No. I-98.

 
CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 162187
Petitioner,
The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the
Present:
Department of Trade and Industry, to determine if there was a prima facie case
' PUNO, J., Chairman,
for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping Law. Sometime
in February 1997, the BIS submitted its report to the Tariff Commission,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, declaring that a prima facie case existed and that continued importation of
refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry. It adopted the
' CALLEJO, SR., amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the imported
TINGA, and goods. [3]
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997. However,
JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER Promulgated: before it could respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the
VON SPRENGEISEN, parties to settle the matter amicably. A conference ensued between RCP Senior
Respondents. November 18, 2005 Vice President and Assistant General Manager Criste Villanueva and Jesus
Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and General Manager Horst-
x--------------------------------------------------x Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other.
During the conference, the parties agreed that the refractory bricks were
imported by the HTC at a price less than its normal value of DM 1,200, and that
DECISION such importation was likely to injure the local industry. The parties also agreed
to settle the case to avoid expenses and protracted litigation. HTC was required
  to reform its price policy/structure of its importation and sale of refractory
bricks from Germany to conform to the provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its rules
and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and signed a compromise
agreement containing the terms agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia
signed. [4] Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP, delivered the agreement to
HTC at the 9th Floor of Ramon Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas
Boulevard, Manila by Von Sprengeisen's approval. [5]
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised the
agreement by inserting the phrase 'based on the findings of the BIS' in
paragraph 1 thereof. Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement and had the
same delivered to the office of HTC on April 22, 1997 by Lino M. Gutierrez, a
technical assistant of RCP. Gonzales received the agreement and delivered the
same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzales returned, with the
agreement already signed by Von Sprengeisen. [6] Gonzales, who had also
signed, then gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary Public Zenaida P. De
Zuiga notarized the agreement. [7]Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized
Agreement to HTC. [8]
 
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During the
May 9, 1997 hearing before the Commission for the approval of the agreement,
a representative of HTC appeared. He offered no objection to the Agreement.
The Commission submitted its report to the Special Committee which rendered
a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the BIS, the normal value of
the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton. HTC received a
copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC appealed the
decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.
 
In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from Germany anew and
noted that the normal value of the said importation under the decision of the
Special Committee based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton. On
July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate
Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying that such
decision be declared null and void on the following grounds:
 
1. THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTANT
DURING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
2. THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FACTS
NOT AGREED UPON WAS DELIBERATELY AND
SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY THE PROTESTANT IN THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE. [9]
The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC averred therein that
Villanueva violated Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code when he
surreptitiously inserted the phrase 'based on the findings of the BIS' in the
agreement without the knowledge and consent of Von Sprengeisen and despite
their agreement to put behind them the findings of the BIS. Appended to the
motion was an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von Sprengeisen in which he
alleged, inter alia, that sometime in February 1997, the BIS came out with its
Report declaring that the normal value of the magnesite-based refractory bricks
was DM 1,200 per metric ton; before 
HTC could respond to the report, Villanueva invited him to a conference for the
purpose of finding the best solution to the pending case before the Commission;
he and Gonzales attended the meeting during which it was agreed, by way of a
compromise, that the parties will accept the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton
as the normal value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks from Germany;
when he received the draft of the compromise agreement prepared by
Villanueva, he approved the same; subsequently, Villanueva transmitted a
compromise agreement already signed by him to Von Sprengeisen for his
review, approval and signature; believing that the compromise agreement
reproduced the contents of the first compromise agreement, he signed the
second agreement without reading it; when he received, on March 4, 1998, a
copy of the decision of the Tariff Commission based on the compromise
agreement of the parties wherein the committee adopted the findings and
recommendations of the BIS (that the normal value of the shipment was DM
1,200 per metric ton), he was shocked because he never agreed to the use of
such findings for the reformation of its price policies; there was, in fact, an
agreement between him and Villanueva to put behind them the findings of the
BIS; he called up Villanueva at his office but failed to contact him despite several
attempts; suspecting that something amiss happened, he had the draft of the
first compromise agreement retrieved but his secretary failed to locate the
same; it was only sometime later that his secretary found the folder-file
containing the draft and was appalled to discover that Villanueva had
substantially altered the first draft of the compromise agreement; this made him
conclude and confirm his suspicion that Villanueva, thru deceit and fraud,
induced him to sign the compromise agreement to the prejudice of the HTC. [10]
 
The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, Villanueva, in his capacity
as Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed a criminal
complaint for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. Appended thereto was a complaint-affidavit executed by
Villanueva wherein he declared, inter alia, that Von Sprengeisen made the
following false statements in the Urgent Motion, thus:
 
a. [Complainant] was the one who called up his office, inviting
him to a meeting for the purpose of finding the best and
most equitable solution to the case (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
b. RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to put behind them the
findings and recommendations of the Bureau of Import
Services (BIS) with respect to the anti-dumping protest
filed by RCP (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
 
c. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to
him was merely a draft (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
 
d. The phrase 'based on the findings of the Bureau of Import
Services' was inserted in paragraph 1 of the final
Compromise Agreement without his knowledge and
consent (p. 3, Urgent Motion); and
 
e. [Complainant] was the one who surreptitiously inserted the
aforesaid phrase (p. 3, Urgent Motion). [11]
Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the following false
statements in his Affidavit of Merit:
 
a. [Complainant] invited him to a conference for the purpose of
finding the best solution to the case;
 
b. [Complainant and he] agreed to put behind [them] the
findings and recommendation of the BIS submitted to the
Secretary of Finance;
 
c. We agreed to the amount of DM 1,050/ton as the normal
value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks from
Germany;
 
d. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to
him was merely a draft; and
e. Through deceit and fraud, [complainant] induced
[respondent] to sign the final Compromise
Agreement. [12]
 
 
In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that whoever called the other
for a conference was not a material matter. Since the first draft of the
Compromise Agreement transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the
complainant to send to him the hard copy of the Agreement for his signature. He
further narrated that when he received the hard copy of the compromise
agreement, he did not bother to review since he assumed that it contained the
same provisions in the faxed copy. He did not suggest that the phrase 'based on
the findings of the BIS' be inserted in the hard copy of the agreement because he
and Villanueva were at odds on the BIS finding the normal price of the goods
was DM 1,200 per metric ton. He insisted that it would have been senseless of
him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did not make any willful and
deliberate assertion of any falsehood as to any material fact. [13]
Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet found no probable cause for
perjury against the private respondent and recommended the dismissal of the
complaint. Second Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia Dimagiba reviewed the
resolution of Prosecutor Supnet and found probable cause for perjury against
the private respondent for alleging in his Affidavit of Merit 
that he was induced to sign the compromise agreement through fraud and
deceit. According to the Second Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of the
private respondent 'thru deceit and fraud to sign the final Compromise
Agreement was a deliberate assertion of a falsehood, designed as it was merely
to give the BIS the impression that private respondent was misled into agreeing
to the compromise agreement. She further opined that the allegation was
perjurious, considering that the private respondent had sufficient time to pass
upon the Compromise Agreement and could have availed the services of legal
minds who could review the terms and conditions thereof before signing the
same; [14] hence, she recommended the reversal of Prosecutor Supnet's
resolution and the filing of the information. The City Prosecutor approved the
recommendation of the Second Assistant City Prosecutor. Accordingly, an
Information for perjury was filed against the private respondent with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
 
The private respondent appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Justice, who
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor on September 20, 2002.
According to the Justice Secretary, the complainant failed to establish the
materiality of the alleged false assertions and that the said assertions were
willful and deliberate. Moreover, the allegations in the Affidavit of Merit are not
altogether false since the intention of the parties in executing the compromise
agreement was precisely to put behind the ruling of the BIS, despite which the
complainant inserted the condition that the parties would be bound by such
findings and recommendations. [15] The decretal portion of the resolution
reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Manila is hereby REVERSED. The City Prosecutor is directed to
withdraw the information for perjury against respondent
Horst-Kessler von Sprengeisen and to report the action taken
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
 
SO ORDERED. [16]
 
Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the resolution
of the Justice Secretary, alleging therein that grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, was committed in issuing the said
resolution. [17] The private respondent, for his part, sought the dismissal of the
petition alleging that, as found by the Justice Secretary, there was no probable
cause against him for perjury. [18]
 
On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution
of the Justice Secretary. [19]
 
The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
comment on the petition, the parties had agreed to put behind them the findings
and recommendations of the BIS with respect to the anti-dumping protest. The
appellate court stated that its finding is buttressed by the fact that the amount
of DM 1,050 was not mentioned in the first compromise agreement and that,
under such agreement, the HTC obliged itself 'to reform 
its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory products being
imported to and sold in the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of R.A.
No. 7843 and its implementing rules and requirements. The CA emphasized that
it was inclined to believe that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties
when the petitioner inserted the phrase 'based on the findings of the BIS' in the
revised compromise agreement; hence, there could not have been perjury when
the private respondent executed the Affidavit of Merit and the Urgent Motion to
Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment. The CA also agreed with the findings of the
Secretary of Justice that the insertion of the condition in the compromise
agreement that the parties would be bound by the BIS findings and
recommendation gave the private respondent reason to believe that he was
deceived by the petitioner into signing the Agreement; as such, the private
respondent's allegation in his Affidavit of Merit, that he was induced to signing
the Compromise Agreement through fraud and deceit, was not altogether false.
Consequently, the CA ruled, the private respondent did not make any willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood. [20] The appellate court conformed to the
disquisitions of the Secretary of Justice in the assailed resolution and concluded
that the private respondent did not, in the Affidavit of Merit, make a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood. [21]
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court
against private respondent Von Sprengeisen and the Secretary of Justice,
insisting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed
resolution.
 
The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary investigation, he adduced
substantial evidence to prove probable cause for perjury against the private
respondent. He maintains that probable cause does not mean actual and
positive causes; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. He avers that, contrary
to the claim of the private respondent in his Affidavit of Merit, the meeting
between him and Jesus Borgonio, on the one hand, and the private respondent
and HTC Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other, was arranged by the
latter and not by him. As gleaned from the draft and final copies of the
compromise agreement, the parties made express reference to the prima
facie findings of the BIS that the actual export price of HTC was below the fair
market value. By agreeing that such findings of the BIS be included in the
Compromise Agreement, the said private respondent impliedly agreed to such
findings as basis of the price for which HTC would sell the German-made
magnesite-based refractory bricks in the Philippines. The petitioner avers that
the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton was not specifically
mentioned in the compromise agreement was of no importance, considering the
parties' acceptance of such findings is based on R.A. No. 7843. He points out that
the private respondent could not have failed to notice the difference between
the first draft and the final copy of the agreement before signing it because, as
alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his reply affidavit, it took the private respondent
twenty minutes or so after receiving the agreement to review the final draft
before signing it. Moreover, the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate
Judgment signed by the private respondent was filed more than 15 months from
the execution of the compromise agreement and after four months from the
Tariff Commission's approval thereof.
 
The petitioner argues that it is incredible that during the interregnum of 19
months, the private respondent failed to discover the revisions/insertions in the
final draft of the compromise agreement. Considering the premises, the
petitioner submits, the private respondent's filing of the Urgent Motion for and
in behalf of HTC was merely an afterthought, to enable the latter to escape
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the contested phrase in the
final draft of the compromise agreement was necessary although it may not be
in the best interest of HTC. He posits that the falsehoods made by the private
respondent in his Urgent Motion and Affidavit of Merit were material to the
proceedings in the Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff Commission because these
were used to set aside the compromise agreement executed by the parties.
 
In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent avers that the issues
raised by the petitioner are factual, hence, improper in a petition for  parties before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the probative
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The determination of
the existence of a probable cause is primarily an administrative sanction of the
Secretary of Justice. He insists that the findings of the Justice Secretary should
be accorded great respect, especially since the same were upheld by the CA. He
asserts that the petitioner failed to establish in the CA and in this Court that the
Justice Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in her resolution.
 
The petition has no merit.
The pivotal issue in this case is factual ' whether or not, based on the records,
there was probable cause for the private respondent's indictment for perjury.
 
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of a quasi-judicial agency,
as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the Court, unless cogent facts
and circumstances of such a nature warranting the modification or reversal of
the assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted. Thus, the
Court may delve into and resolve factual issues in exceptional cases. The
petitioner has failed to establish that any such circumstance is present in the
case at bar.[22]
The Court finds that the public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolution, and that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed
decision and resolution. If at all the public respondent erred in issuing the
assailed resolution, such is merely an error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, reversible by a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court especially so where, as in this case, the issues before the CA were factual
and not legal. The absence or existence of probable cause in a given case
involves a calibration and a reexamination of the evidence adduced by the
weight thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed the petition
before it.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined
as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean 'actual or positive cause;
nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge. [23]
 
The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting
officers after conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an
offended party. [24] The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the
absence or existence of a probable cause affirmed by the CA is accorded high
respect. However, such finding may be nullified where grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is established. [25]
 
Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn
affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful
statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit
upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.
 
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of
an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this
and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein.
 
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest
concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the
false statement is made. [26]
The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury concludes that one
consideration of policy overshadows all others ' the measures taken against the
offense must not be so severe as to discourage aggrieved parties from lodging
complaints or testifying. [27] As quoted by Dean Wigmore, a leading 19th
Century Commentator, noted that English law, 'throws every fence round a
person accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting witnesses from
oppression or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of having made false
testimony is far paramount to that of giving even perjury its deserts. [28]
 
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or
affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. [29] The
elements of the felony are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed
an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
 
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal purpose. [30]
 
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The
assertion must be deliberate and willful. [31] Perjury being a felony by dolo,
there must be malice on the part of the accused. [32] Willfully means
intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the
alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as
a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to 'knowingly. 'Deliberately
implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. [33] It must appear
that the accused knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its
truth. [34]
 
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as
to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the
truth of a statement is an adequate defense. [35] A false statement which is
obviously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury.
 
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made
by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the
defendant did not believe those statements to be true. [36]
 
Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It
may be proved by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of
mind of the accused may be determined by the things he says and does, from
proof of a motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself, and from other facts
tending to show that the accused really knew the things he claimed not to
know. [37]
 
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory
sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two
statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other evidence
than the contradicting statement. [38] The rationale of this principle is thus:
 
Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under
oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the
falsity of testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave
simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it
would not appear that the testimony charged was false rather
than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements
will simply neutralize each other; there must be some
corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such
corroboration, however, may be furnished by
evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the
declarations of testimony of the accused. [39]
 
 
The term 'material matter is the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which
tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the subject of the
inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credence of any witness who testified.
In this case, a matter is material if it has a material effect or tendency to
influence the Commission in resolving the motion of HTC one way or the other.
The effects of the statement are weighed in terms of potentiality rather than
probability. [40] The prosecution need not prove that the false testimony
actually influenced the Commission. [41]
 
The private respondent did err when he declared, in the motion of the HTC and
his affidavit, that it was the petitioner who invited him to a 
conference. The truth of the matter is that it was Gonzales who did so.
Nonetheless, the issue of who called for a conference is of de
minimis importance because, after all, the parties agreed to meet after having
been prodded by the Chairman of the Commission to settle the case instead of
going through the tribulations and expenses of a protracted litigation. No
adverse inference (related to the merits of their respective contention in this
case) can be ascribed as to whoever called the conference. After all, parties are
even urged to settle cases amicably.
 
Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant City Prosecutor in her
resolution:
 
The allegation that it was complainant who invited respondent
to the meeting may not be a deliberate lie. Respondent may not
have known who arranged the meeting, but as he was able to
 talk to complainant, he presumed that it was complainant who
extended the invitation. Moreover, the identity of the one who
initiated the meeting is not material considering that there was
a meeting of the minds of the Parties. [42]
 
 
The Court also agrees with the contention of the private respondent that the
copy of the first agreement transmitted to him was a fax copy of the draft, and
that, contrary to the allegations of the private respondent, such agreement was
prepared by Borgonia and not by the petitioner. As gleaned from page two of
the agreement, the particulars of the residence certificates of the petitioner and
the private respondent were not typewritten, hence, cannot as yet be notarized.
As claimed by the private respondent, a copy was transmitted to him for his
personal review, and if he found it to be in order, the petitioner and Borgonia
would prepare and sign the agreement and give it back to him for review and
signature, with the particulars of his community tax certificate indicated in the
final copy.
Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or caused to prepare the
compromise agreement subsequently signed by the petitioner and the private
respondent was of prime importance because only such person should be
charged for perjury. The private respondent erroneously stated in his Affidavit
of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner who prepared the
agreement that was signed by the parties. It turned out that it was Borgonia
who prepared the first and the second copies. However, the private respondent
cannot be held liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who prepared the
agreement and not the petitioner. The Court agrees with the following
contention of the private respondent in his counter-affidavit:
 
4.6 While complainant claims that it was not he but Mr.
Borgonia who made the insertions, there is no doubt that,
indeed, the insertions were made into the document.
Since complainant is the signatory to the Compromise
Agreement, it is but natural for one to presume that he
had made the insertions. At the same time, I can not be
expected to know that it was Mr. Borgonia, as claimed by
complainant, who made such insertions. [43]
 
Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the Management Information
Group of RCP, whereas the petitioner was no less than its Senior Vice President
and Assistant General Manager, Borgonia's superior. Unless and until approved
by the petitioner, any agreement prepared by Borgonia was merely a piece of
paper, barren of any legal effect. 'In this case, the compromise agreement
prepared by Borgonia had the petitioner's 
imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness to the agreement. For all legal
intents and purposes, the petitioner had the compromise agreement prepared
under his supervision and control. It cannot thus be concluded that the private
respondent made a deliberate falsehood when he alleged that the agreement
was prepared by the petitioner.
 
The Court is not persuaded by the petitioner's claim that, during the conference,
he and the private respondent agreed that, based on the BIS report, the normal
value of the imported refractory bricks per metric ton was DM 1,200, and that
such report would be used as basis for the revision of the price policy and
structure of HTC.
It bears stressing that, during the conference, the petitioner and the private
respondent had agreed on three aspects of the case: (1) based on the prima
facie findings of the BIS, the normal value of the goods per meter ton was DM
1,200 and that the actual export price of HTC was below the fair market value;
(2) to terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and revise its price policy and
structure for imported refractory bricks to conform to R.A. No. 7843 and rules
and regulations implementing the law; and (3) if HTC fails or refuses to comply
with its undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of execution without need of
demand. However, the petitioner and the private respondent could not have
agreed on such base price; the petitioner insisted on the amount recommended
by the BIS (DM 1,200) while the private respondent insisted on DM 950. There
was an impasse. By way of a compromise, the parties agreed to do away with
the BIS recommended base 
value and agreed for HTC to base the normal value of the importation per metric
ton under R.A. No. 7843 and the rules issued implementing the law. This is
gleaned from the affidavit of Borgonia:
 
 13. During the meeting, Mr. von Sprengeisen suggested that the
value of DM 1,050/ton be applied as the price at which
Hamburg Trading would sell German-made magnesite-based
refractory bricks in the Philippines. Mr. Villanueva did not
agree to the suggested value, as we considered it low. In the
end, both parties decided to base the determination of the
price on the provisions of Republic Act No. 7843 and its
implementing rules and regulations. ' [44]
Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and incorporated therein
the agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent arrived at during
the conference, thus:
1. For the purpose of buying peace and by way of concession in
order to end litigation, the SECOND PARTY undertakes
and commits to reform its pricing policy and structure
with respect to refractory products being imported
interest sold in the Philippines in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act 7843 and its implementing
rules and regulations. [45]
 
If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint, he and the private
respondent had agreed that HTC will use as basis for its price policy and
structural revision, the BIS report, for sure, Borgonia would have incorporated
the said agreement in the first compromise agreement. He did not, and Borgonia
has not offered any explanation for such failure. The petitioner signed the draft
of the agreement without any plaint or revision. It was only in the second
compromise agreement that was later signed by the petitioner and the private
respondent that Borgonia incorporated the phrase  executory. [46]
based on the findings of the BIS. Borgonia and the petitioner made the insertion
on their own, without the a priori consent of the private respondent.
 
The Court is not convinced by the petitioner's contention (and that of Borgonia
in his Affidavit) that the petitioner and the private respondent had agreed to
leave the final determination of the base value or price of importation per
metric ton to a third party (BIS). The private respondent could not have agreed
to the use of the BIS report because, as mentioned, he had strenuously objected
to its use as basis for the revision of its price policy and structure. For HTC to
admit that the BIS finding of DM 1,200 per metric ton was the normal value of
the refractory bricks from Germany for the purpose of resolving the anti-
dumping case is one thing; but for HTC to agree to be bound by the BIS
recommendation for the purpose of revising its price policy and structure is
completely a different matter.
With the petitioner and the private respondent's admission of the prima
facie findings of the BIS, the Commission can prepare its recommendation to the
Special Committee on the protest of the RCP to the HTC importation subject of
the case. Thereafter:
D. The Special Committee shall, within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of the report of the Commission, decide whether the
article in question is being imported in violation of this section
and shall give due notice of such decision. In case the decision
of dumping is in the affirmative, the special committee shall
direct the Commissioner of Customs to cause the dumping
duty, to be levied, collected and paid, as prescribed in this
section, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on such article, and on the articles of the same
specific kind or class subsequently imported under similar
circumstances coming from the specific country.
 
In the event that the Special Committee fails to decide within
the period prescribed herein, the recommendation of the
Commission shall be deemed approved and shall be final and
 
On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the price policy and structure of
HTC, the parties had agreed to accomplish the same in due time. It goes without
saying that the RCP retained the right to object to or protest to the price policy
and structure revision of HTC.
 
The agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent not to be bound by
the base value in the BIS report for the revision of its price policy and structure
is not unexpected because: (1) the findings of the BIS are only prima facie,
meaning to say, not conclusive, and HTC was accorded a chance to base its price
policy and structure on evidence and informations other than those contained
in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of the imported refractory bricks may
fluctuate from time to time, hence, the need for any importer to revise its price
policy and structure from time to time; and (3) the base value to be used by HTC
in revising its price policy would be scrutinized and resolved initially by the
Commission, by the Special Committee and by the Court of Tax Appeals on
appeal.
 
The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent was not
only practical and fair, but in accord with law as well.
 
In fine, the private respondent did not commit any falsehood in the Urgent
Motion and his Affidavit of Merit when he declared that he and the  that complainant-appellee had agreed to such a compromise.
petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to use R.A. No. 7843 and
the rules and regulations implementing the same to determine the base price
for the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.
 
Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the offending phrase before and
after signing the agreement and for a considerable stretch period until HTC filed
its motion. However, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that
such failure of the respondent to object to the offending phrase for such period
of time amounted to an admission that, indeed, the private respondent was
aware of the offending phrase in the Agreement, and to his agreement thereto;
and estopped the private respondent from alleging that he was deceived by the
petitioner into signing the Compromise Agreement. In his appeal to the DOJ, the
private respondent declared that:
 
3.9 True, respondent-appellant may have been remiss and
lacking in circumspect in failing to review the hard copy
Compromise Agreement and notice the insertion. Being in the
trading business, respondent-appellant personally handles
hundreds of documents daily and is on the telephone for most
of the day communicating with suppliers and customers. And
he had no reason to believe that either complainant-appellee
or Mr. Borgonia would make such an insertion, especially after
respondent-appellant had accepted the fax Compromise
Agreement wording and conveyed such acceptance to
complainant-appellee's office. Respondent-appellant also had
to reason to even think that such a surreptitious insertion
would be made; after all, he had a very warm and friendly
meeting with complainant-appellee and Mr. Borgonia and came
out of it with a feeling that he could trust complainant-appellee
(p. 4, Annex 'C').
3.10 Hence, when respondent-appellant alleges that he was
induced to sign the hard copy Compromise Agreement through
fraud and deceit, respondent-appellant honestly believes that
he was misled into signing it. He was misled by the fact that he
had been sent the fax Compromise Agreement by complainant-
appellee, that he had conveyed its acceptability to
complainant-appellee and now requested for the hard copy for
execution, that he had been led to trust that the findings and
recommendation of the BIS were being put behind them and
The transmittal of the hard copy Compromise Agreement,
without any notice or mention by complainant-appellee or
complainant-appellee's office that it contained 
insertions or wording different from the fax Compromise
Agreement, and on respondent-appellant's understanding that
the wording of the hard copy Compromise Agreement would
be exactly the same as the fax Compromise Agreement,
constitutes the fraud or deceit allegedly by respondent-
appellant. [47]
 
In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent explained that:
 
2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the Reply-Affidavits, I
was unable to review the Compromise Agreement
delivered by Mr. Gutierrez on 22 April 1997 as I was busy
with numerous calls and business at the time it was
delivered. Also, I had been led to believe in our meetings
 with Mr. Villanueva and Mr. Borgonia that I could trust
them. So, after having seen the fax Compromise
Agreement and being amenable to it, I trusted that they
would send a genuine hard copy. As it turned out, I was
mistaken. [48]

Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion and signing the Affidavit of
Merit, the private respondent tried for several times to contact the petitioner,
but the latter failed to return his calls. This reinforced the suspicion of the
private respondent that the insertion of the offending phrase was not, after all,
inadvertent but deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice of HTC.
The private respondent may be blamed for putting too much trust and
confidence on the petitioner, but he certainly cannot be indicted for perjury for
lack of probable cause.

The petitioner failed to append to his petition records of the Commission that
the private respondent appeared for HTC, on May 9, 1997, before the
Commission for the hearing on the Compromise Agreement; and showing that
the private respondent did not object thereto.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING , the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED .