 FACTS

On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively.
These appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7
Sec 15 of the Constitution:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.”

A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the
constitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming
1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of
the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was in the position that
“election ban had no application to the CA based on the Commission’s records”. This
hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration together with the
Council’s nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.

The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the
Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly
signed on March 11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement of the ban on
appointments), which implies that the President’s Office did not agree with the
hypothesis.

The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the
“list of final nominees” for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the
Constitution (from Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ
sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after the May elections for
the reason that they apparently did not share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by
the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it
appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of the Council took action
without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On
this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where the
President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive
appointments, the whole article being entitled “EXECUTIVE DEPT”.

On May 12, CJ received from Malacañang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the
RTC mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter,
the Court resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge
Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-
going deliberations. It should be noted that the originals of the appointments for both
judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latter’s
office and had not been transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so
because of the May 7 Malacañang copy of his appointment.

 PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
 The court insisted the prohibition of the president appointing during the election ban, he
cited the provision of Section 15, Article VII, which reads:
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

 RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT

The President expressed the view that "the election-ban provision (Article VII, Sec. 15) **
applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch of
government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT."' He also
observed that further proof of his theory "is the fact that appointments to the judiciary
have special, specific provisions applicable to them" (citing Article VIII, Sec, 4 (1) and
Article VIII, Section 9. In view thereof, he "firmly and respectfully reiterate(d) ** (his)
request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit ** the final list of nominees for the
lone Supreme Court vacancy."

 PROVISION FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The provision subject to statutory construction are Section 15, Article VII and Sections
4(1) and 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution.

 ISSUE

Whether the President can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the
ban in the interest of public service.

 RULING

No. President can’t make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban, thus
Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by His Excellency the
President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch
24, Cabanatuan City

 RATIO (if applicable)

Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments:
(1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations.

Sec. 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably
be deemed to contemplate not only "midnight" appointments — those made obviously
for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making — but also
appointments of the Presidential election.

On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII — allowing
appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided — is much
narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the making of
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the
appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.

Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts
and the restriction on the President's power of appointments, it is this Court's view that,
as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely,
the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can
abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist
only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled
temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent
in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is considered an election
offense.

To the contention that may perhaps be asserted, that Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII
should prevail over Section 15 of Article VII, because they may be considered later
expressions of the people when they adopted the Constitution, it suffices to point out that
the Constitution must be construed in its entirely as one, single instrument.

To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment,

during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court.
This may be the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have
no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important question requiring
expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither
Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.12