Trigger-Happy,

Autonomous, and
Disobedient: Nordbat 2
and Mission Command
in Bosnia

Tony Ingesson · September 20, 2017

I N T RO D U C T I O N

In late 1993, a reinforced Swedish-Danish-

Norwegian mechanized battalion (Nordbat 2)
deployed to Bosnia as part of an ongoing UN
peacekeeping mission, known as UNPROFOR
(United Nations Protection Force).[1] The battalion
was under Swedish command, and with the exception
of a Danish tank company and a Norwegian
helicopter detachment, was comprised of Swedish
former conscripts, led by active-duty officers. The
former conscripts had volunteered to return from
civilian life to serve in a professional capacity. These
Swedish troops, coming from a nation that had not
experienced war for almost 200 years, faced a rigid
UN bureaucracy, an unclear mandate, and the UN-
imposed rules of engagement bordered on the absurd.
[2] However, the Swedes had one thing the others
didn't: a culture of mission command that had grown
and developed for decades.

BA01 was the first of a total of 14 Swedish Bosnia battalions in

the 1990s and a part of Nordbat 2. (Mikael
Persson/Försvarsmakten)

To the surprise of many, even in Sweden, Nordbat 2

quickly established a reputation as one of the most
trigger-happy UN units in Bosnia. The troops and
officers from some of the least belligerent nations in
the world turned out to be quite adept at both using
force and playing the odds in a high-stakes political
game. This article outlines how a well-entrenched
culture of mission command enabled Nordbat 2 to
take on completely new and unexpected situations
with remarkable results. While this culture of mission
command turned out to be a potent force multiplier
and an exceptionally effective strategic asset, it also
had another side: Nordbat 2 on multiple occasions
utterly disregarded orders from its highest political
authorities, to the frustration of the Swedish
government.

In "The Language of Mission Command and the

Necessity of an Historical Approach," Jörg Muth
argues that the U.S. Army needs to understand the
culture of mission command in order to implement
it.[3] This article provides a brief case study of the
tactical and strategic impact of one such culture.
While the events described here occurred over twenty
years ago, they are as relevant as ever to further our
understanding of the strategic role of leadership
culture in mission command.

MISSION COMMAND IN SWEDEN

The culture of mission command in Sweden dates

back to 1943, when senior Swedish army officers
were taking note of the tactical superiority of German
troops fighting Soviets on the Eastern Front. Sweden,
being a small nation with several large and frequently
hostile neighbors, had to prepare to fight an enemy
which possessed overwhelming numerical superiority.
Thus, in order to even out the odds, maximizing
tactical efficiency was an absolute necessity. Later,
during the Cold War, Swedish policy makers found
themselves situated in a geopolitically sensitive
location. Soviet strike aircraft headed for Norway or
the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap
needed to pass directly over Swedish airspace to reach
their targets. Additionally, in the event of a conflict,
the Soviets feared that NATO would use Swedish air
bases to launch attacks against the Soviet mainland.
Consequently, neutralizing Sweden's military capacity
and securing at least parts of its territory was an
obvious strategic objective for the Soviet Union in the
event of a large-scale conflict with NATO.

THE OFFICIAL DOCTRINE

STATED THAT ALL SWEDISH
CITIZENS WERE TO, WITHOUT
EXCEPTION, CONSIDER ANY
ORDER TO SURRENDER TO BE
FALSE, REGARDLESS OF ITS
ORIGIN.

The Swedish Armed Forces were consequently

trained to respond to a massive Soviet invasion force,
which was expected to attack over land (via Finland),
across the Baltic Sea, and by deploying airborne
units. The Swedish Army estimated that a breakdown
of command and control was a likely scenario as the
Soviets would inevitably disrupt communications,
destroy command centers, and seize territory, thereby
isolating segments of the Swedish Army. In order to
cope with this contingency, all units were trained to
engage in what was known as "the free war," (i.e.
autonomous operations against local targets, without
centralized command). The free war was intended as
a last resort, which would only end when the invader
had finally retreated. The official doctrine stated that
all Swedish citizens were to, without exception,
consider any order to surrender to be false, regardless
of its origin. This was even printed in all phone
books, which also contained instructions for the
civilian population in case of war.

ORDERS COULD BE DISOBEYED,

RULES COULD BE BROKEN—AS
LONG AS THE MISSION WAS
SUCCESSFUL.

Considering that all Swedish Army units were

expected to be able to operate autonomously, the
culture of mission command completely permeated
the entire organization. The officers and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs), all the way down to
the lowest-ranking enlisted men, were taught that the
only truly mortal sin was to hesitate. To seize the
initiative and act was the primary imperative. There
was no priority higher than that of achieving the
mission objectives at hand. Orders could be
disobeyed, rules could be broken—as long as the
mission was successful.

The battalion commanders who deployed to Bosnia

to take charge of Nordbat 2 had spent their entire
professional lives in this culture, and their men had
known it since the earliest days of their own military
training. To them, it was as natural as breathing.

B E F O R E T H E D E P LOY M E N T

Colonel Ulf Henricsson was head of the UN UN Battalion

BA01 in the Bosnian Civil War.(Aftonbladet)

The first battalion commander, Colonel Ulf

Henricsson, came from the armor branch. When he
was asked to take charge of a battalion that was
intended to be sent to Bosnia, he immediately set out
to shape the unit in accordance with his own
preferences. Consequently, he wanted a well-armed,
well-protected, mechanized force. While several other
countries preferred to send lightly armed vehicles to
avoid provoking the parties to the conflict,
Henricsson wanted the main infantry fighting vehicle
of the Swedish Army at the time. This vehicle, known
as the Pbv 302, featured a 20mm automatic cannon
and fairly respectable armor for a vehicle of its type.
In addition, Henricsson wanted a Danish tank
company equipped with recently modernized
Leopard main battle tanks. Nordbat 2 also managed
to borrow Finnish Sisu wheeled armored personnel
carriers. Henricsson even decided to bring the latest
portable Swedish anti-tank guided missiles.

This caused some consternation among the political

elites in the country at the time, who insisted that the
deployment would be a peacekeeping mission with
no more than a minimum risk. They most certainly
did not expect any significant confrontations between
Nordbat 2 and the parties to the conflict. Henricsson,
however, had his own set of expectations. He let the
media know he would personally ensure Nordbat 2
brought body bags and that everyone who served
under him would be ordered to write their wills
before departing. When asked by the media,
Henricsson made it clear that his interpretation of the
mission objectives (which he had developed himself
on the basis of the original UN mandate, rather than
taking clues from his political superiors) was that
protection of the civilian population was the highest
priority. In order to achieve this, Henricsson expected
that force might be used, and that losses were a real
possibility.

I N TO T H E F I R E

Shortly after it had been deployed to Bosnia in

December 1993, Nordbat 2 found itself in its first
serious hostile encounter. A Swedish platoon was sent
to relieve a Canadian company which was providing
security for a mostly abandoned hospital compound
in a remote area. As soon as the Canadians left, a
Croatian battalion-sized unit showed up and
promptly mined the only road leading to the
compound, ensuring that the Swedes would be
unable to receive reinforcements.

Then they issued an ultimatum: hand over the three

Muslim nurses, and we will leave you alone. The
Swedish platoon leader, Captain Stewe Simson,
radioed battalion command, and was told that it was
his call to make, since he was the one in charge at the
location. Captain Simson refused to hand over the
nurses and instead ordered his men to prepare for
combat.

Vastly outnumbered and outgunned, Captain Simson

realized that it was unrealistic to expect that his unit
would survive a full-out assault. Nevertheless, he was
determined not to give in. The Croats started to fire
mortar rounds, but the Swedes held their positions.
After a few hours, the Croats issued a new
ultimatum: the nurses could stay if the Croats were
granted free passage to the compound. Again,
Captain Simson refused. The situation remained
tense throughout the night, with the Swedes
maintaining full combat readiness. In the morning,
the Croats negotiated with the Swedes and eventually
left, quietly dropping their ultimatums. Nordbat 2
had shown resolve even in the face of hopeless odds,
achieving a strategically important victory as a result
of a decision made by a platoon commander.[4]

Other incidents followed. When fired at, Nordbat 2

often shot back, frequently disregarding the UN rules
of engagement. Colonel Henricsson made it clear
that he would not respect rules and regulations that
threatened to prevent him from achieving his mission
objectives. When his own government tried to rein
him in, he simply told his radio operator to pretend
that the link was down until he had a fait accompli to
present to Stockholm.

Sergeant Magnus Ernström of Nordbat 2 at the end of October

1993, at the time of the massacre of Stupni Do in Bosnia.
(Unknown Group Member in 2nd Guard, Escort Group
BA01/Försvarsmakten)

In one particularly infamous incident, the Bosnian

Serb Army set up an ambush for the battalion's
Danish tank company. By launching a feint attack
against a remote outpost, the Bosnian Serb Army
lured a detachment from the tank company to drive
straight into a trap. Anti-tank missiles and heavy guns
opened up from concealed positions. Once the Danes
started to take fire, their response was furious. The
detachment commander simply told his crews to
neutralize the anti-tank positions. The Leopard tanks
directed accurate and deadly fire against the Bosnian
Serb Army positions, using up no less than 72 main
gun rounds. One by one, the anti-tank missile
batteries and gun positions fell silent. During the
fight, a Bosnian Serb Army ammunition supply was
hit, resulting in a large explosion. After the
engagement, Nordbat 2 estimated that as many as
150 troops may have been killed, although the
Bosnian Serb Army denied this.

The incident greatly upset the UN regional

command, which threatened to relieve Nordbat 2's
battalion commander and have him sent back to
Sweden. Nevertheless, Nordbat 2 had once again
refused to let the parties to the conflict dictate the
terms of its deployment. In several other incidents,
Nordbat 2 personnel intervened to protect refugees
and took action to prevent the cover-up of ethnic
cleansing operations. On several occasions this took
the form of forcing passage through roadblocks.
During one such event, the battalion commander
himself forced a sentry to remove the anti-tank mines
used to block passage by threatening to blow the
sentry's head off with a heavy machine gun.

During two consecutive rotations, Nordbat 2 upheld

its freedom of movement and initiative in an area of
operations where many other UN outfits felt obliged
to abide by the rules laid down by the parties to the
conflict. The third rotation was the last to make use
of force and the threat of force in a significant
manner. When the fourth rotation deployed, a more
cautious battalion commander in combination with
an intensification of the conflict marked a shift to a
less confrontational stance. The fifth rotation was the
last to serve under UN command. During the final
phases of its deployment, the so-called
Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced the UN-led
peacekeeping force, which was under NATO
command. This heralded a new era during which
NATO enforced the new peace treaty in a manner
unthinkable during the UN years.

T H E L E G A C Y O F N O R D B AT 2

The remarkable history of Nordbat 2 illustrates both

the virtues and perils of having a well-entrenched
culture of mission command in a unit employed in a
complex operational environment. On one hand, it
bred commanders who felt compelled to always act,
and to always put the mission objectives first. This
enabled Nordbat 2 to cope with completely new and
unexpected situations in a hostile and unfamiliar
environment without becoming passive like so many
other UN units. Personnel trained to fight on their
home soil against a Soviet invader suddenly had to
navigate the complex political terrain of the war in
Bosnia. The battalion had to cope with an indecisive
and passive chain of command, and a multitude of
different armed parties to the conflict ranging from
semi-national armies to drug-fueled paramilitary
criminal outfits led by warlords.

NORDBAT 2'S WILLINGNESS TO

BEND OR EVEN BREAK THE
RULES, AND DISREGARD
DIRECT ORDERS...ENABLED IT
TO ACHIEVE ITS MISSION
OBJECTIVES...PROTECT THE
CIVILIANS AT ALL COST.
HOWEVER, THIS ALSO POSES A
CHALLENGE TO THE
TRADITIONAL CIVIL-MILITARY
DILEMMA...

Instead of taking on regular troops in mechanized

combat, Nordbat 2 found itself in a conflict
characterized by ethnic cleansing, massacres,
smuggling and random violence. Nevertheless, it was
able to operate with a surprising degree of
effectiveness.

This can be contrasted with the Dutch peacekeepers

who were deployed in Srebrenica. The Dutch unit
and Nordbat 2 operated under the same regional
command, in the same general area. The Dutch
peacekeepers, representing a professional elite
airborne unit, were more or less helpless for more
than a year inside the Srebrenica enclave because they
were unwilling to initiate any confrontations with the
parties to the conflict, and because they were willing
to be micromanaged by their home government.
Nordbat 2, on the other hand, was something of a
loose cannon, and earned a reputation as a force to be
reckoned with. It even became known as "Shootbat"
for its tendency to return fire, regardless of the formal
rules of engagement.

Nordbat 2's willingness to bend or even break the

rules, and disregard direct orders from both UN
command and its own government, enabled it to
achieve its mission objectives as defined by the first
battalion commander: protect the civilians at all cost.
However, this also poses a challenge to the traditional
civil-military dilemma: on several occasions Nordbat
2 did not accept the control of its civilian leadership.
Accustomed to mission command, Nordbat 2 acted
as it had been taught: rules can be broken as long as it
is done to achieve the mission objectives.

In research on public administration, it has been

argued for decades that political objectives can
frequently be impossible in the sense that they are
contradictory or simply do not provide the necessary
tools to allow lower-level officials to achieve the
policy objectives at hand. In response, these officials
tend to take initiatives of their own and act outside
the boundaries in order to get the job done.[5] This
is exactly what Nordbat 2 did, and what mission
command was originally created to do in a military
context.

The most essential component of mission command

is trust. As long as political leaders can trust the local
commander to make the right choices, mission
command can be an incredibly powerful force
multiplier. Even though Nordbat 2's first battalion
commanders were very unpopular with the Swedish
government for their refusal to take orders from
home, they were nevertheless greeted as heroes upon
their return and remain viewed so to this day. This
meant the Swedish government did not have to deal
with the political fallout of the otherwise failed UN
mission. The Dutch government, for example, was
hard-pressed by public opinion after the massacre at
Srebrenica in the summer of 1995. In 2002, the
entire Dutch government was forced to resign over
Srebrenica, after a detailed report blaming the
government for the failure was released to the public.

Cadets view the sign on the Nordbat 2 school in Vareš and

testify of the city's appreciation of the Swedish UN Federation's
efforts in autumn 1993. (Johan Nordén/Försvarsmakten)

While unrestrained mission command can be an

effective tool, it also requires that political leadership
relinquishes a significant degree of control. Thus, to
be effectively harnessed in complex operational
environments, the culture of mission command is
one that has to be understood and to some extent
shared by the civilian leadership as well as the
military. This approach is clearly not without risk,
but in a life-and-death scenario the basic rule of
mission command remains relevant: it is better to
make a mistake than to do nothing at all.

Tony Ingesson is currently an Assistant Professor of

Political Science at Lund University. His research is
primarily focused on the political impact of tactical-
decision-making and organizational cultures. He has
previously served in the Swedish Army, Air Force and
Navy.

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Header Image: A patrol outside Ribnica north of Vares.

Between October and February, the UN Swedes were
consistently exposed to shelling on this winding
mountain road. (Jonas Lindqvist/Scanpix)

N OT E S :

[1] The events described in this chapter are outlined

in more detail, with complete references to the source
material used, in: Tony Ingesson (2016) The Politics
of Combat: the Political and Strategic Impact of
Tactical-Level Subcultures. Lund: the Faculty of Social
Science and Department of Political Science, pp.
231-282.

[2] Outlining the details of these rules of engagement

requires a fairly lengthy discussion, but suffice it to
say that they made it very difficult to use any sort of
force, even in self-defense.

[3] Muth, Jörg. "The Language of Mission

Command and the Necessity of an Historical
Approach", The Bridge, June 4th 2016.

[4] I argue that this was a strategic victory for two

reasons: first, giving in would have caused a political
scandal in Sweden, which would have undermined
the legitimacy of the whole mission. Second, by
standing up to the Croats, Nordbat 2 started to
establish a reputation as a force to be reckoned with,
which arguably shaped their future interaction in a
manner that facilitated the accomplishment of the
overall mission objectives.

[5] See for example Lipsky, Michael (2010). Street-

Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in
Public Services. 30th Anniversary Edition. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.

Tagged: Bosnia, Mission Command, Sweden,

Yogoslavia, United Nations, Peacekeeping

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