Thomas Wendt

Determining the Third: Reflections on Freud, Schopenhauer, and the Unspoken Variable

Who is the third who walks always beside you? (Eliot, The Waste Land, line 359) [D]eterminism stands firm; for fifteen hundred years attempts to undermine it have been made in vain. They have been urged by certain queer ideas which we know quite well, but dare not call entirely by their name. In consequence of it, however, the world becomes a puppet show worked by wires (motives) without its even being possible to see for whose amusement. If the piece has a plan, then a fate is the director. There is no escape from this absurdity other than the knowledge that the being and essence of all things are the phenomenon of a really free will that knows itself precisely in them; for their doing and acting are not to be delivered from necessity. To save freedom from fate or chance, it had to be transferred from the action to the existence. (Schopenhauer, World, 2: 321) The philosophical thought associated with Sigmund Freud and Arthur Schopenhauer is often labeled determinist, and correctly so. Freud strongly asserts that psychic life is determined by the constant conflict of desire and convention, that human behavior and personality are merely deterrents, vague and ambiguous representations of what one really is, the miniscule amount of psychic material that one is able to present. Similarly, Schopenhauer presents the ideas of will and representation1 as the real essence of an individualwilland that

Some translators prefer to use idea rather than representation as the translation of the German word Vorstellung. I will not comment about the preferable English translation, as my knowledge of German is rudimentary at best; nonetheless, I will continue to use representation, as it seems to be a better choice in reference to Schopenhauer specifically. Idea places a certain amount of agency on the subject. It places the subject in an active position insofar as he or she is consciously involved in the formation of a given idea. Representation, however, places the subject in a passive position; the representation is presented to the subject and projected outward into the world. It may be true that Schopenhauers conception of will and representation allows one to correctly posit that the individual can have an idea of will, but it is more important that the idea has been presented, or represented, by something outside the conscious self. I will use representation unless directly quoting from a text that uses idea.
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which he or she is allowed to know about the willrepresentation.2 One must ask, however, what exactly motivates, or even dictates, the puppeteer? What determines the how, why, where, when, etc. of the act of pulling strings? In other words, the strings determine the puppets movement, the motion of the puppeteers hands determines the movement of the strings, but what determines the puppeteer? What makes him perform the act? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to extend the metaphor backward instead of forwardto discern, in a general sense, the unspoken variable in the human psyche that is pure determination. This agent, this truly free agent, is independent of external force and motivation; it exists only for itself, and, in a sense, is separated from the individual qua individual. It is this third part that determines determinism. What, then, is the third variable that determines the determiner and directs the director of the puppet show? The work of Freud and Schopenhauer allude to these questions but do not go into detail about intricacies. There are ubiquitous and undeniable similarities between these two philosophers work, resulting in much commentary and theoretical writing on the subject in the last century. In order to elucidate the many similarities between the two thinkers, it is necessary to return to the original texts rather than reiterate what has already been said of them. Part of this extension of thought includes seriously considering what motivates motivation and what determines the determiner. This must be done, of course, without slipping into an eternal backward cycle attempting to find the origin of the origin of the origin ad infinitum. Traces of Freudian psychoanalysis are found throughout the history of philosophy, even dating back to the ancients. Specifically in the German tradition, Leibniz and Kant wrote of unconscious thought processes and parts of the mind that are inaccessible to normal

The present essay differentiates between the illusory reality of the individual (or subject) and the real reality or unconscious reality from which access is barred.
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consciousness. Unlike Freud, they were working with a particularly biological model of consciousnessthat is, the difference between waking and sleeping statesresulting in a bodily conception of the unconscious. Schellings work on human freedom and art bears similarities to the Freudian unconscious in that there is a special emphasis on the vast difference between what actually exists and what one is allowed to believe. Schopenhauer also makes this distinction, terming the two parts will and representation, which are often compared to the Freudian unconscious and conscious. The will is that which the individual cannot know except through its representation; it is what representation attempts to hide, to veil in what is called the world. Individual existence, then, becomes a masquerade in which the mask is everything that the individual knows: everything that one can think, speak, and know is merely a disguise, a defense3 against what really is. The theme of the current essay is not to summarize the similarities and differences between Freuds thought and those who came before himthis has been established. Rather, the focus is on the processes that mediate between the two polesbetween the conscious and unconscious, between the will and its representationand how these processes manifest themselves in the subject, resulting in a gap between what the subject thinks he or she knows and what the subject is prevented from knowing, and that which resides in the gap: the third, unspoken variable.

This is not meant to introduce a certain similarity to the Freudian notion of a defense, which functions to protect the ego from that which it cannot incorporate into its reality. Ego defenses and the way in which representation is a defense are similar insofar as they both function to protect the individual from something so real that it is too real, an aspect of the self that the self cannot acknowledgei.e., the indivisible remainder, as Slavoj iek might call it, that is left over from the subject being defined as such. Ego defenses and representation as a defense differ in quantity and quality: the sole function of representation is to veil what is real, the will, whereas ego defenses perform the same function but do so in multiple ways, with some defenses working more efficiently than others in any given situation.
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To conceptualize the will within the framework of the conscious mind is to commit an ironic injustice to the subject; however, this is not to say that the will exists independently of its conscious representation. In fact, will and representation are intrinsically connected and cannot exist exclusively as such: No one can in reality merely will, without willing this or that: a will which does not will something, is not; only through the definite content does the will obtain the possibility of existence, and this content (not to be confused with motive) is, as we have seen, Idea. (Hartmann, 1: 118-119) In this way, will and representation exist in a dialectical relationship, in which each side of the spectrum is dependent on the other: by definition, will needs representation, and representation needs will. Without an object on which to act, the will is empty; and without motivation, which is possibly unconscious, representation is merely a blank signifier. It is also through this dialectical relationship that one gains knowledge of the will. Representation is limited insofar as it is mediated by influences beyond the scope of consciousness; nonetheless, given that the will-in-itself is without knowledge (Schopenhauer, World, 2: 293), the subjects only means of acquiring knowledge of the will is through its dialectical opposite, representation. One of Schopenhauers fundamental theses is that the will we find within us does not, as philosophy previously assumed, proceed first of all from knowledge; that it is not, in fact, a mere modification of knowledge, and thus something secondary, derived, and, like knowledge itself, conditioned by the brain. (ibid) Thus, will is not something that results from the biological function of the body, conditioned by cognitive processes of the brain; rather, will exists prior to the biological, to the physical, and, one might say, to the individual.

Given this preliminary summary of Schopenhauers will, one can easily note the undeniable similarities to the Freudian unconscious.4 One cannot ignore, however, the multitude of differences between these two concepts: It is thus natural to think that the central core of the human personality which Schopenhauer calls will corresponds to Freuds Ucs. or id. However, it would be a mistake to identify the Freudian unconscious with the world-will of Schopenhauer: though the absence of the I of self-consciousness from both may foster the impression of such a correspondence, Freud does not conceive id as having the trans-personal status of Schopenhauer world-will, which stands beyond the possibility of individuation. (Gardner, 380) Gardners point is well taken. The will certainly does not correspond to the unconscious on the level of the individual. Schopenhauers idea of the world-will is something much more universal in scope: it serves as a way of thinking about the primal drive to live, to continue existence. In this way, the world-will has much more in common with the Freudian life drive or pleasure principle. Remaining faithful to Freud,5 the unconscious is completely anti-universal in the sense that it is comprised of the repressed and instinctual material of the individuali.e., one cannot generalize the content and manifestations of the unconscious beyond its individual existence for a single person. One the other hand, the world-will transcends the individual and operates universally on all human life, thus bridging the gap between the individual and the social aspect inherent to human life. This is not to say, however, that the unconscious cannot universally influence the world or that the will only operates socially.6 In fact, the two concepts constantly intermingle with each other, at times emphasizing their similarities and at other times their differences. Such an illustration underscores the multiple ways to formulate this problem on the grounds of binary

A close explication of the Freudian unconscious will follow. One can certainly make a counter-argument from a Jungian perspective. 6 This point is the reason for Schopenhauers distinction between will and world-will: the world-will is nothing more than the individual will applied to the world in which he or she exists.
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oppositions. For example, the opposition between knowledge and will, which is inseparable from the life drive, plays a crucial role in Schopenhauers exposition of the will: [T]he great attachment to life, or rather the fear of death, by no means springs from knowledge, for in that case it would be the result of the known value of life, but that the fear of death has its root directly in the will. (Schopenhauer, World, 2: 498) Schopenhauer sets up an opposition between knowledge and will, or, for the present purposes, between consciousness and unconsciousness: knowledge is merely what the individual knows, whereas will is the driving force behind conscious knowledge to which the individual does not have access.7 Schopenhauer implies a primal drive that influences the individuals desire to continue life, which is then equated to the fear of death. This formulation is in direct opposition with Freudian psychoanalysis: throughout Freudian theory, one finds ubiquitous assertions that the unconscious is the seat of the death drive, which motivates the individual toward non-existence.8 Essentially, Freud extrapolates Schopenhauers will to its logical conclusion, at least according to psychoanalysis: for both Freud and Schopenhauer, the human has a primal fear of death, but Freud elaborates on this point to conclude that the individual possesses a drive toward his or her own death, which is repressed and appears in consciousness as a fear. The individual does not fear death per se; he or she fears the inevitability of death and the necessary split between the knowledge that one will die and the way in which one assumes and wishes for immortality in order to keep living. Schopenhauer thus sets up an opposition between the will and knowledge, or between the irrational and the rational: [T]he will is originally and in itself without knowledge and blind.

Perhaps it would be helpful to cite Lacans distinction between reality and the Real. On a general level, reality is what the individual thinks he or she knows, whereas the Real is what the individual is prevented from knowing; therefore, consciousness always has an illusory quality insofar as an underlying, unknowable realness is constantly at work. 8 See Freuds Beyond the Pleasure Principle
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Knowledge, on the contrary, far from being the origin of that attachment to life, even opposes it, since it discloses lifes worthlessness, and in this way combats the fear of death. (Schopenhauer, World, 2: 466) For Schopenhauer, knowledge is a very dangerous thing. As opposed to Freud for whom the rational part of the mind, consciousness, despite its illusory nature, protects the individuals fragile consciousnessSchopenhauer argues, on the other hand, that rational knowledge is the source of the individuals demise. It is important to remember that the fear of death and the attachment to life are exactly the same feeling; therefore, fear of death allows one to live. In other words, it is the will, the irrational nature inherent to the human, that allows him or her to continue life; rational knowledge is what elucidates the absurdity of life. This assertion is in direct opposition to Freud, who argues that rational consciousness protects the individual from the destructive irrationality of the unconscious. Insofar as knowledge is analogous to the conscious, and the will is analogous to the unconscious, both Freud and Schopenhauer are arguing from a stance of rationality vs. irrationality. They arrive at quite different conclusions, however, on the question of what drives life: for Freud, it is the defensive function of rationality; for Schopenhauer, it is the fear of dying evoked by inherent irrationality. Freud emphasizes the repression of the death drive, which propels the individual toward a state of non-being, as the impetus to live; Schopenhauer emphasizes the fear of non-being as the motivation to continue living. Schopenhauer never quite identifies what exactly motivates life. This identification is always deferred to vague examples of what the motivation might besuch as what motivates a plant to grow. Essentially, such a question is almost impossible to answer; philosophy must give this force an amorphous name such as life drive, pleasure principle, will, or simply the fear of death. It is this bleak and uncertain outlook on life that leads to the following conclusion:

Thus, what are a short postponement of death, a small alleviation of need and want, a deferment of pain, a momentary satisfaction of desire, with the frequent and certain victory of death over them all? Taken as actual causes of movement of the human race, what could such advantages achieve? [] Obviously, all this is not to be explained, if we look for the moving causes outside the figures, and conceive the human race as striving, in consequence of a rational reflection or of something analogous thereto (as pulling strings), after the good things which are presented to it and whose attainment would be an adequate reward for its restless efforts and troubles. If the matter were taken thus, everyone would rather have said long ago Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle,9 and would have passed out. (Schopenhauer, World, 2: 358) As cited at the beginning of the present essay, the theme of the puppet returns: for Schopenhauer, the difference between the puppet and the human is subtle at best. Individual thoughts and behavior are always determined by something other, something that pulls the strings and dictates the motion, literally and metaphorically, of life. Determinism becomes a puppeteer who is indifferent to the audience: [I]t is the blind will appearing as the tendency to life, the love of life, vital energy; it is the same thing that makes the plant grow. This vital energy can be compared to a rope, stretched above the puppet-show of the world of men, on which the puppets hang by means of invisible threads, while they are only apparently supported by the ground beneath them (the objective value of life). But if once this rope becomes weak, the puppet sinks; if it breaks, the puppet must fall, for the ground under it supports it only in appearance. (Schopenhauer, World, 2: 359) According to this formulation, then, the individual is merely an arbitrary aspect of a performance over which he or she has no controla performance that is essentially the entire basis of existence. The individual cannot even be called an agent of the performance, as he or she assumes an entirely passive position with respect to the performance itself. Given that much of Freuds theory is based on the ontological and psychical difference between activity and

The game is not worth the candle. (footnote in original)

passivity,10 one can see how the metaphor of the puppet is integral to Freudian psychoanalysis. It is no surprise that, having read Schopenhauer, Freud was prompted to seriously consider the role of what he would later term repression.11 Repression is defined simply as a withdrawal of energetic cathexis (or of libido, if it is a question of sexual instincts. (Freud, Repression, 112) Repression functions as a defense in that it removes cathexis from a threatening object, thus designating that object, or the idea of the object as threatening, into the realm of the unconscious. More precisely, an idea begins as unconscious and is only allowed access to consciousnessthat is, in a direct manner12if and only if it passes the censor of the ego: In the first phase the mental act in unconscious and belongs to the system Ucs; if upon the scrutiny of the censorship it is rejected, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be repressed and must remain unconscious. (Freud, The Unconscious, 122) Individual reality, then, is mediated by something other than itself; there is something that exists apart from reality but asserts a certain amount of control over reality, dictating what is allowed access and what is barred, and therefore is in relation to it. This third agent is, perhaps for lack of a better adjective, extimate:13 it is at the same time intrinsically connected to, and a separate entity from, the reality that it influences. With reference to Freudian discourse, one can easily indentify the ego as this agential variable between reality and what really is; however, one must remember that the ego is structurally bound within its unconscious

Activity and passivity are crucial concepts in Freuds analysis of human sexuality. See Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. 11 It should be noted that Freud did acknowledge the many similarities between Schopenhauers philosophy and his own, but he denied any serious influence in his own work. It is very difficult to believe, however, that a well-read thinker such as Freud would have anything less than an active interest in Schopenhauers philosophy, which would certainly influence his own. 12 Unconscious thoughts slip into consciousness without censor in the form of symptoms. The difference is that a symptom presents itself in a veiled, symbolic form, such as a slip, a joke, or a dream. 13 Lacan uses this neologisma combination of the words external and intimateto describe the objet petit a, which is so much a part of the subject that it is barred from the definition of the subject as such.
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counterpart, the id. The ego is nothing more than the censoring and self-conscious section of the id, and as such, the ego remains both external and intimate to the individuals real identity. Before engaging in a closer analysis of the unknown variable that determines individual reality, it is necessary to further extrapolate the function of the unconscious with respect to the self-conscious individual. To do so, one must consider the connected disconnect between selfconsciousness and the unconscious, and how this apparent contradiction functions as an alienation from the world in which the individual exists. One must also consider the third part of the opposition between subject and objecti.e., the thing that both mediates and determines. This type of inquiry requires one to seek the origin of consciousness and self-consciousness, and the difference between the two: [W]hen in any particular phenomenon a knowing consciousness is added to that inner being that underlies all phenomena, a consciousness that in its direction inward becomes self-consciousness, then that inner being exhibits itself to this self-consciousness as that which is so familiar and mysterious, and is denoted by the word will. (Schopenhauer, World, 2: 318) Thus, given that the will is wholly irrational, the individual has a relationship to his or her own consciousness that is grounded on misunderstanding, misrecognition, and repression. Selfconsciousness is so familiar that it becomes foreigni.e., it becomes so close to the real reality of the subject that he or she has no other choice than to bar it from subjective knowledge. If one is to remain faithful to the analysis thus far, it is apparent the subject qua subject is not the agent who bars; the agent is something else, something other, which acts upon the subject, putting it in a passive position to the familiar and mysterious. One can only seek knowledge of selfconsciousness by referring to the Other, resulting in further alienation from the self. The relationship, or lack thereof, between the individual and his or her consciousness is one of confusion and ambiguity; nonetheless, the individual is not only compelled to remain
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alive by some inherent drivethe willhe or she also continues to seek clarity through the vain pursuit of direct self-consciousness. Throughout this constant striving, the subject is always repressing the idea that the will, the very same aspect of life that sustains fear of death, is also that which prevents the subjects complete knowledge of itself. Knowledge of consciousness is accumulated indirectly and passively: We can thus only hope to attain our goal by an indirect path. [] Selfconsciousness is thus only a special case of the application of consciousness to a definite object, namely, to the supposed inner cause of mental activity which is denoted by the name Subject. It is not the active subject itself which becomes in the act of self-consciousness the content of consciousness or the object of consciousness, but it is only the idea of the subject, regressively inferred by means of the category of causality from the activity of the subject, that becomes the object of consciousness. (Hartmann, 2: 78) According to Hartmanns analysis, self-consciousness is nothing more than a theoretical application: self-consciousness is merely consciousness attached to the nebulous concept called the subject. Insofar as consciousness is consciousness of something, self-consciousness is consciousness inverted on the selfbut not the self in-itself, the self as interpreted by something other. Again, the subject is alienated from what it really is; it can only refer back to itself through the filter of the Other. In this way, the Other is the agent that mediates the selfconscious subject: without reference to the Other, the subject does not exist as such. Rather, the subject becomes lost in the dilemma of being conscious of something that is not iti.e., it is not able to refer back to itself, as the mediator is absent, resulting in a state of pseudo-subjectivity that operates as a blank signified. In the event that the subject reaches a state that resembles self-consciousness, it is clear that achievement of this state is dependent on the idea of the state; therefore, the idea of self-

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consciousness is also caught within the bounds of illusory reality. Essentially, the prevention of direct self-consciousness operates in a similar manner as repression: [I]t may happen that an affect or an emotion is perceived, but misconstrued. By the repression of its proper presentation it is forced to become connected with another idea, and is now interpreted by consciousness as the expression of this other idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affect unconscious, although the affect was never unconscious but its ideational presentation had undergone repression. (Freud, Unconscious, 126) Through the ideational component of consciousness, which restricts its content to a representation of the real psychical content, repression is able to act in a secondary rather than primary manner. In other words, Freud formulates repression as an act that censors an unconscious thought before it reaches conscious awareness; the thought cannot become conscious unless it passes this censorship. Now, with the introduction of the representation, which is set in opposition to the thought itself, repression functions in the reverse: an idea of the repressed thought can make its way into consciousness and, if found particularly threatening, succumb to the egos repressive force. If one seeks self-consciousness through an indirect route, then it is possible, at least according to Freud, for the representation of self-consciousness to be repressed. This conclusion, however, introduces a major problem to Freudian theory insofar as it implies a regression of the most extreme variety. If self-consciousness were to be repressed, the individual would essentially return to a state of oneness with the worldi.e., the infantile state, in which there is no distinction between self and Other. Instead of regressing to such an extreme, the ego forms a substitute. A substitute-formation essentially performs what its name implies: it forms a conscious substitute for an unconscious thought. The substitute is connected with the unconscious but not in such as way that disturbs the ego; it is a symbolic replacement, a way to release unconscious

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tension without causing trauma. As a substitute, however, it is never mutually exclusive from the original unconscious thought; therefore, potential always exists for the substitute to become too real, thus motivating the ego to take a defensive stance. The result of the extimate nature of the substitute is a very fine distinction between what is conscious and what is unconsciousfor the only actual difference between the two is the extent of cathexis (Freud). Thus, the ego remains obsessively alert: The further the sensitive and vigilant anti-cathexis becomes extended round the substitute which is feared, the more exactly can the mechanism function which is designed to isolate the substitutive idea and to protect it from fresh excitation. Naturally these precautions guard only against excitations approaching the substitutive idea from without through perception, never against instinctual excitation which encounters the substitutive idea from the direction of its connection with the repressed idea. So they begin to operate only when the substitute has successfully taken over representation of what has been repressed, and they can never operate with complete security. (Freud, Unconscious, 132) There is a certain extent of libidinal plasticity implied here: libido is constantly flowing, cathecting and de-cathecting according to the level of threat, and therefore can never reach a state of rest or homeostasis. A substitute is more threatening than a representation due to its proximity to the real thought. Representations operate on a metonymic level, diverting libido away from the thought but still decreasing unconscious tension, whereas substitutes work metaphorically, representing the thought while maintaining a direct libidinal connection with it. The reciprocity between libido and thought/substitute14 is evidentnot only the reciprocal nature involved in the dependence on each other, but also that, to a certain extent, libido is determined by thought/substitute and vice versa. In other words, libido reacts to the threatening power of the thought/substitute by retracting or implementing cathexis, thus forcing the thought to remain out

Thought/substitute represents the distinction between cognitive processes that are conscious (substitutes) and unconscious (thoughts). That is not to say that all conscious thoughts are substitutes for unconscious content; but within this context, they are treated as such.
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of conscious bounds or within consciousness in a less threatening state. Similarly, libidinal investment determines whether thought is unconscious or conscious. This relationship is ambiguous, as it is not clear which agent is the dominant one: thought/substitute or libido. The opposition set up here is essentially between drive and representation. In a similar manner to Schopenhauers conception of the will, libido attempts to externalize itself within the world in its pure form; however, due to the censoring function of the ego, libido ultimately fails, and the result of this libidinal attempt is a secondary representation or substitute. The formulation becomes circular: representation and substitution are determined by libidinal cathexis, libidinal cathexis is determined by the censorship of the ego, censorship of the ego is determined by the extent of threat that the object posesbut one must remember that the threatening nature of an object and/or thought is a perceived threati.e., the representation of a threatand thus, the origin of determination is something that the subject cannot know. The first step in the circle of determination, the potential resolution of the dialectical opposition, falls into the gaps left by the steps in the circle. A similar operation is in effect during the acquisition of self-consciousnessthat is, the fundamental distinction between consciousness of some other thing versus consciousness of the subjective thing, the self. The two categories seem to be mutually exclusive: All belief in an immediate self-apprehension of the Ego in the act of selfconsciousness depends on the same self-delusion as the nave realistic belief in the immediate conscious apprehension of the thing in itself that exists independently of consciousness. Consciousness as such is, consequently, according to its own notion, free from conscious reference to the subject, in that in and for itself it refers only to the object (i.e., not to the external correlate of the object of ideation or the thing in itself, but merely to the represented object which results from the ideational process, and presents itself as content of consciousness), and only becomes self-consciousness by the idea of the subject becoming accidently object to it. (Hartmann, 2: 79)

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Hartmann provides a pseudo-Freudian formulation of self-consciousness that is nothing more than consciousness turned in on the self; it is consciousness that, instead of cathecting to objects in the world,15 merely happens to take the self as its object. The presentation of selfconsciousness as consciousness introjected on the self is sound; however, it is problematic to situate this occurrence as an accident, as there essentially are no accidents in Freudian discourse. There is an underlying reason for everything, be it conscious or unconscious. Within Freudian psychoanalysis, the act of becoming self-conscious must serve some kind of purpose: whether or not the individual is aware of the purpose or impetus toward action is irrelevant. Self-conscious is a means toward establishing oneself as an acting agent in the world. Through selfconsciousness, one becomes separated from the world in which he or she exists, thus enabling the individual to act upon the world as an separate agent. Self-consciousness, then, is a means by which the individual defends against passivity. At the same time, according to Hartmann, self-consciousness is essentially an illusion: one cannot experience self-consciousness as such, given that the act itself implies forcing the self to assume the role of an object. Thus, insofar as self equates to object qua object of consciousness, self is no longer subject; essentially, self ceases to exist. Self-consciousness becomes a sort of self-nihilating act, in which the individual negates his or her subjectivity through the very act of becoming a subject. This certainly cannot be the case for Freudian discourse. It is more advantageous to interpret Hartmanns analysis, which is based on his reading of both Freud and Schopenhauer, as an alternate, perhaps more extreme, way of interpreting the illusory nature of self-consciousness. One must emphasize the notion that the subject is only aware of the representation of self-consciousness, not self-consciousness in itself.

This assertion, of course, assumes that self and world are distinct entities. Psychoanalysis posits that the mature individual is separate from the world but still maintains an intimate relationship with it.
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As such, self-consciousnessan aspect of reality commonly thought of as a primal, basic part of individualityis determined much in the same way as any other aspect of human consciousness: determined, illusory, and biased. One even finds evidence in Freudian theory for the notion that consciousness is determined by the converse of what really isi.e., consciousness is a negation, the binary opposite of its determined influence. The egowhich for Freud, serves as the functional seat of self-consciousnessis comprised wholly of thoughts that oppose their unconscious counterparts: The truth is that it is not only what is repressed that remains alien to consciousness, but also some of the impulses which dominate our ego16 and which therefore form the strongest functional antithesis to what is repressed. (Freud, Unconscious, 139) The subtle irony is that Freud makes an assertion concerning the nature of consciousness, which claims that consciousness, particularly self-consciousness, is influenced by something outside itself, that it is essentially a product the unconscious manufactures as a defense. The conscious mind is an agent of its own defense. The irony is that Freud makes this claim while acknowledging its own potential status as a negation. There is a significant disjunction between consciousness of oneself and consciousness of something other, as indicated by Freuds tacit implication that thoughts concerning others are less biased than thoughts directed toward the self. Any given thought is potentially a negation of the real, unconscious thought; therefore, it is possible to interpret any aspect of consciousness as determined toward its opposite form by an extimate agent.

It is important to remember that Freud distinguishes between consciousness and the ego. The ego belongs to the system consciousness, but parts of it do remain unconscious. Footnote added.
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For Freudian psychoanalysis, negation is much more significant than the mere act of creating a negative counter-statement.17 Negation serves as a linguistic reaction to repressed material and a means of incorporating that material into consciousness: Negation is a way of taking account of what is repressed; indeed, it is actually a removal of repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed. [] Negation only assists in undoing one of the consequences of repression namely, the fact that the subject-matter of the image in question is unable to enter consciousness. The result is a kind of intellectual acceptance of what is repressed, though in all essentials the repression persists. (Freud, Negation, 214) Negation points to the opposition between the unconscious and realityor perhaps between will and representationin that the consciousness of self and others is potentially the negation of something akin to unconscious narcissism.18 In other words, the logic of negation allows for the interpretation that the unconscious exists wholly in-itself and for-itself; therefore, the consciousness of something outside the unconscious, or something that works to counter the unconsciouse.g., system consciousnessis nothing more than a representation in negated form. The ontological implications of such an interpretation are vast: a problem arises concerning the extent to which one can think and speak of the unconscious, and how negation, as an acceptance of the repressed, influences this discourse. The authenticity of reality as such becomes grounded on a very unstable base, which ultimately results in a further ambiguity concerning the categories of subject and object, and the extent to which these oppositions are able to act freely.

The common, almost clich example of negation is Freuds example of an analysand who stated, I had a dream last night about a woman. I dont know who the woman was, but I am certain it was not my mother. The point is that the man was, in fact, dreaming about his mother, and the dream included some form of unacceptable desire directed toward her, resulting in repression. 18 Unconscious narcissism is a bit of a contradiction in terms insofar as narcissism is an ego function, in which libido is inverted onto the ego and the individual takes him- or herself as a love object. The term is used here, however, to display the nature of the unconscious in this formulation as an entity that is only cognizant of itself.
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Freedom of the will, unconscious, and subject is in no way dependent on the individual. With respect to these terms, freedom acts in a manner that is both removed from the psychic entities on which it ostensibly actse.g., will, unconscious, and subjectas well as removed from freedom itself. Freedom is an aspect of the world: it acts objectively on the individual, forcing him or her into the contradictory position of a free, acting agent who is determined by the same freedom that allows action. Such determination has its origin in the Other: [T]he determination required for the willing is not contained in it, because the self-consciousness contains only the willing but not the grounds which determine the willing; the latter are found in the consciousness of other things. (Schopenhauer, Freedom, 18) The extent to which the individual acts according to his or her conscious volition, therefore, is dependent on consciousness on things other than him- or herself; freedom is an illusion created by the idea that an individual is a free agent independent of the Other. Freedom is not located within the subject, as subjectivity does not necessarily imply independence insofar as motivation is sufficient cause to act. Action is only the result of the inconceivable combination of motivation, existence of counter-motivation, influence of the Other, desire of the will, and unconscious desire. Due to the inconceivability of its result, freedom is a concept that turns out to be negative. It signifies merely the absence of any hindrance and restraint. But this restraint, as it manifests power, must be positive. (Schopenhauer, Freedom, 3) Thus, the subject is only free to act insofar as the action is within the acceptable bounds of the world. In this way, the Other censors unconscious content and desire in much the same way as the ego. If consciousness is the consciousness of other things, and these things exert a certain amount of preventative control over the freedom of the will, then these other things influence both self-consciousness and subjectivitytwo aspects

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of the self as separate from the worldwith regard to an individual sense of freedom. In an ostensibly paradoxical shift, self-consciousness is not only dependent on the Other but also on the extent of hindrance the Other exerts on the individual. Such a formulation places freedom and self-consciousness completely outside individual control: the individual is wholly dependent on the Other and is subject to its direction. One must question the extent of agency allowed to the individual and whether he or she is able to consciously will certain actions. The conceptualization of freedom regarding the will points to an ambiguity in the relationship: [F]ree means in accordance with ones own will. Consequently, to ask whether the will itself is free, is to ask whether the will is in accordance with itself. (Schopenhauer, Freedom, 6) Questioning the freedom of the will, then, is counterintuitive: the two terms are synonymous. It is necessary, however, to elucidate the problem of will as an aspect of the individual but also as dependent on the Other. Insofar as the will is defined by pure freedom, it is also defined within the bounds of the Other; therefore, a separation exists between the subject and his or her will, as it is impossible to establish a direct connection between the concept of freedomin its original, empirical meaning derived from actionand the concept of willing. (ibid) Freedom signifies something different from willing in that freedom implies subjective agency, whereas willing is both the origin of freedom and the influence that oxymoronically determines freedom. Willing removes the agency from the subject: it is free by definition but not free in the sense that the subject is able to influence it. Action only occurs if it is in accordance with the will, and thus, the will, as it is free in itself, determines the individuals action from within and from without. One can conclude from the preceding analysis that all aspects of psychic life are determined, which then determine the individuals behavior. The exact causal influence that

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serves as the beginning link in the chain of determinism, however, is much more difficult to discern. This ambiguity results in an insufficient definition of what it means to be selfconscious. Freud and Schopenhauer present conflicting ideas concerning the nature of rationality and irrationality in the conscious self. For Freud, the rational mind serves to defend the individual from reaching a real state of consciousness, in which he or she is able to become cognizant of a true ontological state, free from the protection of ego defenses, whereas for Schopenhauer, the rational mind leads one to think logically about the world, thus revealing its utter absurdity. Self-consciousness always exists in an alienated, indirect manner insofar as it is determined by something other than the subject. One is unable, then, to form any kind of stable relationship to the self; whether self-consciousness is related to the rational or irrational mind is irrelevant in that the individual is always prevented from determining a true existence. It is evident that both Freuds and Schopenhauers philosophies indicate a certain existential conundrum: the individual is trapped in a state somewhere between acceptable knowledge and barred knowledge. Consciousness only exists as it is allowed to exist. Freud attempts to solve this problem through the work of analysis, which essentially seeks to decrease the psychical impact of the gap between the known and unknown. The analyst attempts to evoke relief through language, to bring the analysand to a point at which he or she is able to represent neurosis linguistically, thus leading to a relief of symptoms. Schopenhauers cursory solution is based on representationthe individual is aware of part of his or her will in the form of its conscious representation. Much like the Freudian notion of consciousness, representation allows for an indirect experience of the subjects real nature. Subjectivity and self-consciousness, therefore, are mediated by an extimate agent; the individual exists in a completely passive

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position to the potentiality for self-knowledge. There is something else at work in the binary oppositions of consciousness/unconsciousness and will/representation: a third variable. It is the third variable that exists in the gap between these binaries; the third variable mediates, determines, and essentially asserts power over individual potential to acquire subjective knowledge of the self. As opposed to establishing a direct epistemological link, the subject is always forced to look outside him- or herself to gain knowledge and selfconsciousness, resulting in an alienated, indirect connection between the subject and his or her psychic existence. In a sense, the third variable is not an identifiable entity insofar as one can point to some discrete object as the mediator or the determiner. The third variable is just that: a variable. It is an influence, a force that acts upon objects in a clandestine manner, thus sustaining its own ambiguity; consequently, it remains indiscernible in any kind of concrete sense. Much like Schopenhauers will and Freuds unconscious, one can only conceive of the third variable indirectlyi.e., one can produce knowledge about the third variable, but one is unable to successfully identify it as such. The individual is not only alienated from self-consciousness, the will, and the unconscious, but he or she is also alienated, perhaps even more so, from the variable that mediates and determines these factors.

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Works Cited

Freud, Sigmund. General Psychological Theory. Repression. Ed. Philip Rieff. New York: Collier, 1972. Pages 104-115. ---The Unconscious. Ed. Philip Rieff. New York: Collier, 1972. Pages 116-150. ---Negation. Ed. Philip Rieff. New York: Collier, 1972. Pages 213-217. Gardner, Sebastian. Schopenhauer, Will, and the Unconscious. Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer. Ed. Christopher Janaway. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. 375-421. von Hartmann, Eduard. Philosophy of the Unconscious. Trans. William Coupland. 3 vols. New York: Harcourt, 1931. Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. 2 vols. New York: Dover, 1966. --- On the Freedom of the Will. Trans. Konstantin Kolenda. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985.

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