TEAM CODE: TC-H23

1ST HPNLU NATIONAL VIRTUAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTA

(petition)________ no. of 2020

In The Matter Between

SATYA PRAKASH……………………..........................…………………………PETITIONER.

v.

UNION OF ARYAVARTA .........................................................................................RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S COMPANION
JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ARYAVARTA

-MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-

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 INDEX

Sr. No. TOPIC PAGE NO

1. Table of Contents 2

2. List of Abbreviations 3

3. Index of Authorities 4

4. Statement of Jurisdiction 5

5. Synopsis of Facts 6-7

6. Statement of Issues 8

7. Summary of Arguments 9-10

8. Arguments Advanced 11-26

9. Prayer 27

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER

HC HIGH COURT

HON'BLE HON'BLE

SC SUPREME COURT

SEC STATE ELECTION COMMISSION

SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTER

UPBLEC U.P. LOCAL BODIES & EDUCATIONAL

CASES

U/S UNDER SECTION

V. VERSUS

W.P.(C) WRIT PETITION CIVIL

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

LEGISLATIONS-

1. The Constitution of Aryavarta

2. The Delta Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1976

CASES-

Seria Case Laws Page No.

l No.

1. H.S. Jain & others v. Union of India, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 594 20

2. M/S Sharma Transport vs. Government Of A.P. & Ors 2002 2 SCC 188 13

3. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 22

4. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918. 17,18,19

5. State of Jharkhand vs State of Bihar (2015) 2 SCC 431 26

6. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 1361 14

7. Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India W.P. Civil No. 857 of 2015 14

8. State of Jharkhand v. State of Bihar (2015) 2 SCC 431 26

COMMISSION REPORTS - Sarkaria Commission Report

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioner has filed a Writ Petition U/a 32 of the Constitution of Aryavarta, for the
matters related to Imposition of President's rule under Article 356 of the Constitution. The
respondent maintains that this Hon'ble Supreme Court of Republic of Aryavarta does not
have jurisdiction in this matter under Article 356 of the Constitution of Aryavarta. So this
Hon'ble Court need not entertain this writ petition.
Article 32 of the Constitution of Aryavarta reads as follows:
“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 )
and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other Court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause ( 2 ).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.

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 SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of this Hon’ble Court, the facts of the present matter
are summarized as follows:
1. Aryavarta is a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic having 28 states
and 9 Union Territories. Constitution of Aryavarta provided a federal form of
government wherein powers were divided between the Union and States. Part XI of
the Constitution of Aryavarta contained detailed division of legislative and taxing
powers between Union and States.
2. Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution of Aryavarta in
Article 40 provided that the State shall take steps to organize village Panchayats and
endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to
function as units of self-government. However, Part IV of the Constitution is non-
justiciable. Keeping in view the constitutional mandate, amendments were
incorporated in the Constitution of Aryavarta and Part IX and IX-A were inserted by
73rdand 74thConstitutional Amendments.

3. In Urban Areas, Delta Pradesh had 99 Municipal Councils and 10 Municipal

Corporations till 2017. On 2nd February 2017 issued a notification under section 3(1)
of Delta Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 and notified three urban areas to
have municipal corporations.. The tenure of these Municipal Councils expired on 28th
February 2017. The State Election Commission took up the task of delimiting and
revising the constituencies as per law but the elections could not be held till 2019. The
Provincial government claims that the electoral rolls and records are being updated
due to delimitation of constituencies and therefore, it is not in a position to hold
elections.

4. Delta Pradesh Peoples Party (DPPP) is in opposition in the State and Aryavarta
Peoples Party (APP) is the ruling party in the State. DPPP has alleged that since the
party in power apprehends that it will lose the elections, it is delaying elections which
is against the constitutional mandate. In the alternative, DPPP requested the President
to issue appropriate direction the State for conducing elections. Aryavarta Nationalist
Party (ANP) is in power in the Union which is political adversary of APP. ANP came
to power in 2019 by 2/3rd majority displacing APP.

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5. DPPP filed petition in the High Court claiming that the Provincial government was
bound to conduct elections before the expiry of the tenure of local government and
that non-holding of elections is against the constitutional mandate. It has prayed that
appropriate order/writ/direction be issued to the federal government to dismiss the
Provincial government since the provincial government cannot be carried on in
accordance with the constitution.

6. During the pendency of the petition in the High Court, President of Aryavarta issued a
direction to the State under Article 256 on 11th October 2019 to conduct elections to
the newly constituted Municipal Corporations on or before 31st January 2020 and to
issue the notification, as soon as may be, for the holding the elections. Consequent to
issuance of such notification, Delta Pradesh filed a Suit in the Supreme Court of
Aryavarta claiming that Union could not issue such a direction. Suit was filed in the
month of November 2019 and the Supreme Court issued notice to the Union.
7. Governor of Delta Pradesh wrote to the President of Aryavarta on 01st January 2020
that no tangible steps have been taken by the State till date to conduct elections in
compliance with the direction of the Union and that the state is using dill-delaying
tactics under the garb of preparation/revision of electoral rolls pursuance delimitation
of constituencies.

8. In the meantime, on 01st February 2020, President of Union of Aryavarta issued a

Proclamation under Article 356(1) declaring that government of the State cannot be
carried on in accordance with the Constitution as the State has failed to comply with
the constitutional mandate and there is non-compliance with the directions of the
Union. The Proclamation has been approved by both House of Parliament of
Aryavarta.

9. The Proclamation has been challenged by the chief Minister, Mr. Satya Prakash (who
was serving on the date of issuance of Proclamation) in the Supreme Court. He has
also challenged the constitutionality of the direction issued by the Union to the State
on 11th October 2019. He claims that after the Proclamation under Article 356(1), the
State is under President’s Rule and that there would be conflict of interest in the
matter filed in November 2019 by Delta Pradesh against Union of Aryavarta. He has,
accordingly, prayed that earlier suit filed by the State in month of November 2019 be
clubbed with this matter. Notice has been issued by the Supreme Court to the Union.

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I:
Whether the Direction issued by the President under Article 256 is
constitutionally valid.

ISSUE II:
Whether the President’s Rule imposed on 1st February 2020 was unconstitutional
under Article 356.

ISSUE III:
Whether the present Writ Petition is legally maintainable.

ISSUE IV

Whether the present Writ Petition could be clubbed with the Suit under Article
131 filed in November 2019.

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I:- Whether the Direction issued by the President under Article 256 is
constitutionally valid.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble court that the direction issued by the
President on 11th October 2019 under Article 256 of the Constitution was indeed
constitutionally valid. Article 256 of the Constitution empowers the Union Government
to issue directions to a state so as to ensure compliance with the laws made by
Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that state. The Constitution has
provided this power to the Union Government to ensure proper functioning of the
constitutional machinery in the Union. Firstly, the reason behind the issuance of the
direction under Article 256 was that State failed to hold elections to the Municipal
Councils and Corporations in the State, the term of which expired on 28th February
2017. DPPP wrote a letter to President requesting him to dismiss the provincial
government claiming that the failure of the State to hold elections should be deemed as
failure of constitutional machinery in the State. In the alternative, DPPP requested the
President to issue appropriate direction to the State for conducing elections in the State.
The Union Government therefore issued a direction to the State to conduct elections in
the state before 31st January 2020 and also directed the state to issue the notification for
the same as soon as possible. Secondly, the power to issue direction under article 256 of
the Constitution is inherent in the President therefore it is contended that the direction
issued on 11th October 2019 was constitutionally valid.
ISSUE II:- Whether the President’s Rule imposed on 1st February 2020 was
constitutional under Article 356.

It is humbly submitted that the President’s rule imposed in Delta Pradesh on 1 st

February 2020 was indeed constitutional. Firstly, the imposition of the President’s Rule
was in accordance with the provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution as it was
proclaimed after the President received a report from the Governor, stating the state has
still not complied with the direction issued by the Union for conduct of elections in the
state. Secondly, the non-compliance with the direction issued by the Union under article
256 of the constitution is in itself a ground for the imposition of President's rule in the
State, according to Article 365 of the Constitution. Therefore, the decision to impose
President's rule in the state is all justified and thus it is contended that the president's
rule imposed in the state on 1st February 2020 was constitutional.

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ISSUE III:- Whether the present Writ Petition is legally maintainable?

The present writ petition filed by the petitioner seeks the following:-

1. To declare the direction issued under Article 256 of the Constitution to be

unconstitutional

2. To declare the President's Rule imposed on 1st February to be unconstitutional.

The present writ petition is not at all legally maintainable, firstly because the
constitution empowers the Union Government to issue directions to the State
Government to ensure compliance with the laws made by the Parliament and the Laws
of that state. The state government's failure to hold elections of the Municipal bodies
was surely a failure of the constitutional mandate in the state, thus, Union Government,
while issuing a direction to the State Government was absolutely appropriate and
therefore, the direction thus issued was legally valid. Secondly, the decision of the
President to Impose President's Rule in the state was based on the recommendation of
the Governor, stating that the Government in the state cannot be carried on in
accordance with the constitution for the state continuously defy the constitutional
mandate and refuse to hold elections to the Municipal bodies of the state. Therefore,
President's Rule imposed in the state was constitutional. Also, the petitioner has
approached this Hon'ble court with unclean hands. The Petitioner did not disclose
reason for his continuous failure to hold elections in state and that under equitable
doctrine of unclean hands will apply on the acts of the petitioner. Thus, Petitioner
should be denied all and every relief that he seeks. Thus it is contended that present writ
petition is not legally maintainable at all.

Issue IV:- Whether the present Writ Petition could be clubbed with the Suit under
Article 131 filed in November 2019.

It is humbly submitted that the present Writ petition filed under article 32 and the suit
filed by the petitioner under article 131 cannot be clubbed because both the suits are
under different provisions of the Constitution. The suit filed under Article 131 pertains
only to the disputes between the States and the Union and it cannot be clubbed with the
petition filed under Article 32 which pertains to issuance of writs or for the enforcement
of Fundamental rights. Moreover, the suits under Article 131 cannot be clubbed with
petition under article 32 as the matter has been pending in the Hon'ble Supreme Court
for the reference to a larger bench. Thus, the two petitions cannot be clubbed together.

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE DIRECTION ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT UNDER

ARTICLE 256 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.

1. The direction issued by the President on 11th October 2019 was indeed
constitutionally valid because it complied with the provisions under Article 256 of the
Constitution of Aryavarta. It is the obligation of the Union Government to ensure the
compliance of the laws made by the Parliament any existing laws which apply in that
State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions
to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. In
this particular case, the state Government of Delta Pradesh failed to hold elections for
the Municipal bodies whose term expired on 28th February 2017 and according to the
Section 7(3)(a) of the Municipal Corporations Act, 19761, the elections to such
Municipal corporations or the municipal councils for that matter shall be held
immediately after the expiry of their duration of 5 years. The elections to all these
corporations and councils were delayed by about 3 years in the name of delimitation of 3
Municipal councils to form Municipal Corporations. Such an unjustified delay in the
conduct of elections by the State Government goes against the mandate of the
Constitution as well as the laws existing in the state of Delta Pradesh, therefore, the
issuance of the direction under article 256 of the constitution has been absolutely
necessary and thereby is constitutionally valid too.

2. The contention of the petitioner that the direction issued by the President on
11th October be declared to be unconstitutional is also lawfully invalid. The Government
led by the petitioner failed to conduct elections in the state despite regular intervention
by DPPP i.e. opposition party of the State.

1
7. Duration of Municipal Corporation.- (1) Every Municipal Corporation, save as otherwise provided in this
Act, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.
Explanation. - In this section "first meeting" shall mean the meeting of the newly constituted Corporation held
for the election of its Mayor and Deputy Mayor under section 38 of this Act.
(3) An election to constitute a Corporation shall be completed-
(a) before the expiry of its duration specified in sub-section (1);
(b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution;
Provided that when the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Corporation would have continued is
less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under clause (b) for constituting the
Corporation for such period.

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 Furthermore in the State of Rajasthan v. Union of India2 case, The Apex Court has also
made observation as to the issuance of direction by the President and the obligation of
the state to carry out the direction in the proper manner, which is reproduced below:-

"Articles 256 and 257 mention a wide range of subjects on which the Union Government
may give executive directions to State Governments. Article 73(1) (a) of the Constitution
tells us that the Executive power of the Union extends to all matters on which
"parliament has power to make laws." Article 248 of the Constitution vests exclusively in
the Parliament residuary powers of making laws on any matter not enumerated in the
Concurrent or State Lists. Article 256 of the Constitution covers cases where the
President may want to give directions in exercise of the executive power of the Union to
a State Government in relation to a matter covered by an existing law made by
Parliament which applies to that State. But, article 257(1) imposes a wider obligation
upon a State to exercise its powers in such a way as not to impede the exercise of
executive power of the Union which, as would appear from Article 73 of the
Constitution, read with article 248 may cover even a subject on which there is no
existing law but on which some legislation by Parliament is possible. It could, therefore,
be argued that, although, the. Constitution itself does not lay down specifically when the
power of dissolution should be exercised by the Governor on the advice of a Council of
Ministers in the State, yet if a direction on that matter was properly given by the Union
Government to a State Government, there is a duty to carry it out."

Thus, the state is under the obligation to carry out the direction issued under article 256
by the Union Government and implement the same in a proper manner. The state of
Delta Pradesh in this particular case, failed to implement the direction issued which was
to conduct the elections before 31st January 2020 and to issue the notification relating to
the elections as soon as possible. Therefore, the petitioner's contention that the direction
issued by the President under Article 256 is invalid is not sustainable at all.

3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titled M/S Sharma Transport vs.
Government Of A.P. & Ors 3 has also held that the Direction issued by the President to
the State Government is constitutionally valid. The judgment also observed that:-
"Article 256 provides that the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to

2
AIR 1977 SC 1361
3
2002 2 SCC 188

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 ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply
in that State and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such
directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that
purpose. This Article has application only when any law has been made by Parliament
and the executive power of the State is made subservient to it by requiring it to ensure
compliance with such laws. Where it appears to the Government of India that it is so
necessary to do, directions can be issued."

Therefore, it is contended that the Union Government has all the power to issue direction
under article 256 of the Constitution of Aryavarta for the purposed of ensuring
compliance to the laws made by the Parliament and the laws existing in that state and
that the direction issued on 11th October 2020 was constitutionally valid.

4. Moreover, in the Judgment in the case titled Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of

India4, while indicting the Centre for its inaction and the states which defied the
National Food Security Act, 2013 Supreme Court Justice Madan B. Lokur, drew
attention to article 256 of the Constitution, calling it a forgotten provision in para 1 of
the Judgment thereby recalling its importance in the federal structure of the Government.
The relevant Para portion of the Judgment is reproduced below:-

"1. Our Constitution provides a simple answer to one disturbing question that has
arisen in this case: What can the Government of India do to require the State
Governments and Union Territories to make functional those bodies and authorities
that are mandated by a law passed by Parliament (such as the National Food Security
Act, 2013)? The answer to this is provided in Article 256 of our Constitution –
perhaps a forgotten provision – which reads as follows:

W.P.(C) No. 857 of 2015 Page 1 “256. Obligation of States and the Union – The
executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the
laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State, and the
executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as
may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.” In other
words, the Government of India cannot plead helplessness in requiring State
Governments to implement parliamentary laws."

4
W.P. Civil No. 857 of 2015

13
 Another question that arises is : What remedy does a citizen of India have if the
Government of India does not issue such a direction and the State Government or the
Union Territory does not implement a law passed by Parliament?

5. So, basing on the Decision given by the Apex Court in the Cases referred
supra, it is humbly argued that the direction issued by the President on 11th October
2020 be upheld as constitutional as the same was issued in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution of Aryavarta and that the same is constitutionally valid in
all due respects.

ISSUE II: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S RULE IMPOSED ON 1ST FEBRUARY

2020 CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE 356.

1. The President's rule imposed on 1st February, 2020 in the state of Delta Pradesh was
constitutional because it complied with the provisions under Article 356 of the
Constitution of Aryavarta which is reproduced below:-

356. Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in State:

(1) If the President, on receipt of report from the Governor of the State or otherwise, is
satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried
on in accordance with he provisions of this Constitution, the President may be Proclamation

(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or
any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the
State other than the Legislature of the State;

(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under
the authority of Parliament;

(c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the president to be
necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including
provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this
constitution relating to anybody or authority in the State Provided that nothing in this clause
shall authorize the President to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable

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by a High Court, or to suspend in whole or in part the operation of any provision of this
Constitution relating to High Courts

(2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Proclamation

(3) Every Proclamation issued under this article except where it is a Proclamation revoking
a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the
expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament
Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being a Proclamation revoking a previous
Proclamation) is issued at a time when the House of the People is dissolved or the
dissolution of the House of the People takes place during the period of two months referred
to in this clause, and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the
Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been passed by
the House of the People before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation Shall cease to
operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first
sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a
resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People

(4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of
a period of six months from the date of issue of the Proclamation: Provided that if and so
often as a resolution approving the continuance in force of such a Proclamation is passed by
both Houses of Parliament, the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, continue in force for a
further period of six months from the date on which under this clause it would otherwise
have ceased to operating, but no such Proclamation shall in any case remain in force for
more than three years: Provided further that if the dissolution of the House of the People
takes place during any such period of six months and a resolution approving the
continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no
resolution with respect to the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by
the House of the People during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at
the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its
reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution
approving the continuance in force of the Proclamation has been also passed by the House
of the People

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause ( 4 ), a resolution with respect to the

continuance in force of a Proclamation approved under clause ( 3 ) for any period beyond

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 the expiration of one year from the date of issue of such proclamation shall not be passed by
either House of Parliament unless

(a) a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in the whole of India or, as the case may
be, in the whole or any part of the State, at the time of the passing of such resolution, and

(b) the Election Commission certifies that the continuance in force of the Proclamation
approved under clause ( 3 ) during the period specified in such resolution is necessary on
account of difficulties in holding general elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State
concerned: Provided that in the case of the Proclamation issued under clause ( 1 ) on the
6th day of October, 1985 with respect to the State of Punjab, the reference in this clause to
any period beyond the expiration of two years.

So, it is the discretion of the Governor to recommend the imposition of the President's rule in
the State, and in this case the Governor recommended the President on 1st January 2020 that
the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and that
the State has continuously defied the Constitutional Mandate and refused to hold elections to
the Municipal Bodies in the State. The Apex Court has also held the imposition of the
President's Rule to be constitutional if it complies with the proper grounds of imposition of
the President's Rule by the Governor as laid down in the case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of
India5

The Apex Court has further laid down the grounds on the basis of which the imposition of
President's rule would be considered as proper or improper.

Imposition of President’s Rule in a state would be proper in the following situations:

• Where after general elections to the assembly, no party secures a majority, that
is, Hung Assembly.

• Where the party having a majority in the assembly declines to form a ministry
and the governor cannot find a coalition ministry commanding a majority in the
assembly.

• Where a ministry resigns after its defeat in the assembly and no other party is
willing or able to form a ministry commanding a majority in the assembly.

5
AIR 1994 SC 1918

16
 • Where a constitutional direction of the Central Government is disregarded by the
state Government.

• Internal subversion where, for example, a Government is deliberately acting

against the Constitution and the law or is fomenting a violent revolt.

• Physical breakdown where the Government willfully refuses to discharge its

constitutional obligations endangering the security of the state.

So in this instant case, the President's rule was imposed because the Government led by
the Petitioner failed to comply with the direction issued by the Union Government on
11th October 2017 pertaining to the elections of Municipal Bodies. The Union
Government in that direction instructed the State Government to hold elections to the
Municipal Body elections before 31st January 2020 as well as issue the notification for
the same as soon as possible. The State Government had failed to either issue the
notification declaring the elections in the State or actually holding the elections to the
Municipal Bodies in the State of Delta Pradesh. Thus, the recommendation of the
imposition of the President's Rule by the Governor could be not be held as
Unconstitutional as it was imposed after the recommendation of the Governor of the
State along with a report that was sent by the Governor to the President. Therefore, the
Imposition of the President's rule in the State of Delta Pradesh was in accordance with
the provisions of the Article 356(1) of the Constitution of Aryavarta as well as the proper
grounds laid down in the S.R. Bommai Case(Supra).

2. The contention of the petitioner that the President's rule imposed on 1st February be
declared to be unconstitutional is also lawfully invalid. The Government led by the
petitioner was dissolved constitutionally as it failed to comply with the direction issued
by the Union Government under Article 256 of the Constitution. So, the Petitioner's
contention that their Government was dissolved unconstitutionally does not stand on its
own legs as the petitioner was himself the weaver of the web that he got trapped into.
His failure to conduct Municipal Body elections in the state of Delta Pradesh was the
reason for the imposition of President's rule as it inferred that the government in the state
cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The Hon'ble
in the S.R. Bommai Case (Supra) has also observed as follows:- Para 35 of the S.R.
Bommai case (supra) states:-

17
 "35. The marginal note of Article 356 indicates that the power conferred by that
provision is exercisable 'in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the States.
'While the text of the said article does not use the same phraseology, it empowers the
President, on his being satisfied that, 'a situation has arisen' in which the Government of
the State 'cannot' be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution i.e.
on the failure of the constitutional machinery, to take action in the manner provided in
sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) and Clause (1) thereof. This action he must take on receipt of a
report from the Governor of the concerned State or 'otherwise', if he is satisfied
therefrom about the failure of the constitutional machinery. Article 356(l) confers
extraordinary, powers on the President, which he must exercise sparingly and with great
circumspection, only if he is satisfied from the Governor's report or otherwise that a
situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried out in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."

This Hon'ble Court has held in that case that unless there is a breakdown of the
constitutional machinery in the state, the president's rule should never be imposed.
Further it was held that even if it is being imposed, it should be imposed as a last resort
to restore the constitutional values in the Assembly and in this particular case, the State
failed to execute the Constitutional Mandate and did not conduct elections in the State
for a period of about 3 years so the imposition of the President's rule is justified in all
due respects.

3. Furthermore in the S.R. Bommai case(supra), The Apex Court has also made
observation as to the scope of Article 256 while referring the to the observations made in
"Sarkaria Commission Report" in para 84 & 85 which is reproduced below:-

"84. The expression and its implication have also been the subject of elaborate
discussion in the Report of the Sarmatia Commission on Centre-State Relations. It
will be advantageous to refer to the relevant part of the said discussion, which is quite
illuminating : 6.4.01 A failure of constitutional machinery may occur in a number of
ways factors Which contribute to such a situation are diverse and imponderable. It is,
therefore, difficult to give an exhaustive catalogue of all situations which would fall
within the sweep of the \phrase, "the Government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution". Even so, some instances of what

18
 does and what does not constitute a constitutional failure within the contemplation of
this Article, may be grouped and discussed under the following heads :
(a) Political crisis.
(b) Internal subversion.
(c) Physical break-down.
(d) Non-compliance with constitutional directions of the Union Executive.
It is not claimed that this categorization is comprehensive or perfect. There
can be no water-tight compartmentalization, as many situations of
constitutional failure will have elements of more than one type. Nonetheless, it
will help determine whether or not, in a given situation it will be proper to
invoke this last-resort power under Article 356. "

"85. The Report then goes on to discuss the various occasions on which the political
crisis, internal subversion, physical break-down and non-compliance with constitutional
directions of the Union Executive may or can be said to occur. It is not necessary here to
refer to the said elaborate discussion. Suffice it to say that we are in broad agreement
with the above interpretation given in the Report, of the expression "the Government of
the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution",
and are of the view that except in such and similar other circumstances, the provisions of
Article 356 cannot be pressed into service."

Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in the situations mentioned in the
above referred Judgment, the President's rule can be imposed and that the failure to
comply with the direction issued by the state is a valid ground for imposition of
President's rule.

4. The Allahabad High Court in the case titled H.S. Jain & others v. Union of
India6 has also held that the imposition of President's rule in can be reviewed only and
that too is very limited in its scope. . The judgment also observed in the para 13 that:-

13. So far as the first question relating to judicial review of the proclamation issued
under Article 356 of the Constitution is concerned, undoubtedly the position is that it is
not absolutely beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Judicial review, itself is one of the
basic features of our Constitution. But looking to the provisions as contained under

6
(1997) 1 UPLBEC 594

19
 Article 356 of the Constitution, law has been clearly propounded that the scope of
judicial review is narrow and limited. Article 356 can be invoked in the event of failure
of Constitutional machinery in the State. The phraseology used in the marginal note
"Failure of Constitutional machinery in the State" is elaborated by the contents of clause
(1) of Article 356 when it provides that the President on being satisfied that a situation
has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution, he would be empowered to issue a proclamation,
assuming Executive and Legislative powers of the State to himself, subject to other
provisions as contained under Article 356. It is the subjective satisfaction of the
President, on the basis of the report of the Governor or otherwise, that the Government
of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
The satisfaction of the President is no doubt to be based on some relevant material, may
be in the shape of report of the Governor or otherwise. The adequacy and legal
admissibility of the material cannot be looked into, nor the fact that along with the
relevant material, some irrelevant material was also considered, would vitiate the
satisfaction, so long as there remains some material which would be relevant for the
satisfaction of the President that the Government of the State cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Merit of the decision is out of the
bounds of judicial scrutiny, but the manner in which the decision has been reached can
be scrutinized.

So, basing on the Decision given by the Apex Court & the Allahabad High Court in the
Cases referred supra, it is humbly contended that the President's Rule imposed on 1st
February 2020 be upheld as constitutional.

ISSUE III: WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION IS LEGALLY

MAINTAINABLE?

The present writ petition filed by the petitioner seeks the following:-

1. To declare the direction issued by the President on 11th October 2019 to be

unconstitutional.

2. To declare the President's Rule imposed on 1st February to be unconstitutional.

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 The present writ petition filed by the petitioner is, in no way, maintainable in the present
form.

1. Firstly, the Petitioner seeks that the direction issued by the President on 11th
October 2019 be declared as unconstitutional. As has already been established, the
issuance of directions under Article 256 of the Constitution of Aryavarta is not only the
Power of the Union Government but also an obligation imposed on the Union
Government by the Constitution of Aryavarta to ensure the compliance of the laws made
by the Parliament and the existing laws in the State to which such direction is issued. In
this instant case, the petitioner led government failed to conduct the elections for the
State Municipal Bodies for a period of 3 years. The State used dill-delaying tactics under
the garb of preparation/revision of electoral rolls pursuance delimitation of
constituencies. Such a failure entitles the Union Government to issue directions to the
State Government to conduct elections to the Municipal Bodies in the State of Delta
Pradesh to ensure that Provisions of the Delta Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1976
relating to elections to the Municipal bodies be statutorily implemented. Thus, the
direction so issued in the matter by the Union Government on 11th October 2019 is
legally valid.

Moreover, as has already been discussed in the case laws above, the issuance of direction
is necessary for the compliance of laws by the state and the state cannot merely allege
the direction so issued to be unconstitutional if it goes against the agenda of the State
Government. The Petitioner's continuous failure to conduct elections in the state of Delta
Pradesh, somehow draws a negative inference on the intentions of the petitioner.

Also, in the matter of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation7, The Supreme
Court expanded the scope of article 21 and stated as follows:-

"As we have stated while summing up the petitioners' case, the main plank of their
argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to
livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from
their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their
life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual
correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they
will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to

7
AIR 1986 SC 180

21
consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one
answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred
by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be
extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death
sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the
right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because,
no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the
right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest
way of depriving a person his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of
livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of
its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And
yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established
by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which
alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be
an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and
you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the
rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in
the villages. The motive force which people their desertion of their hearths and homes in
the village s that struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is
the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to
live: Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat,
only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by
Douglas J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty because, it
sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. "Life", as
observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois, (1877) 94 U.S. 113, means something more
than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to
all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with
approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P., [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332.

Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy, provides
that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men
and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Article 41, which
is another Directive Principle, provides, inter alia, that the State shall, within the limits
of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the

22
right to work in cases of unemployment and of undeserved want. Article 37 provides that
the Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any Court, are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country. The Principles contained in Articles 39
(a) and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding and
interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights. If there is an obligation
upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to
work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of
the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide
adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of
his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law,
can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21."

Before this case, the right to life did not include right to livelihood thus it lacked any
enforcement in matters of arbitrary eviction but the Supreme Court interpreted it to
include the right to livelihood under Article 21 which can now be enforced under Article
32. Deducing from that Judgment, we can say that preamble ensures us with the right to
Free and Fair elections and a Right to a Democratic Republic, so the easiest way to
deprive the citizens off their right to Democracy would be to not conduct elections from
time to time and carry on a Government which is based on such evil and unethical
practices. Such activities only endanger the democratic spirit of the Constitution

Thus it becomes necessary to hold elections to the Municipal bodies which is certainly a
constitutional goal and thus the direction so issued by the Union Government in this
regard is constitutionally valid in all due respects. So, it is contended that the direction so
issued was constitutionally valid.

2. Secondly, the petitioner seeks that the president's rule imposed on the 1st February
2020 be declared unconstitutional. As argued earlier in detail, it is only contended that
the President's rule was constitutional in the first place because it was based on the
failure of the state to conduct elections to the Municipal Bodies in the state of Delta
Pradesh despite repeated direction and intervention by the appropriate authorities and
secondly, the declaration of the President's rule did not violate the right of the
petitioner as it was the petitioner whose failure to conduct elections to the municipal
bodies of the state led to the emergence of such a situation which the President
deemed to be a failure to carry on the state government in accordance with the

23
 constitution of Aryavarta. Moreover, it has also been established earlier that the
decision of the President regarding the imposition of the President's rule was based on
the proper reports of the Governor whereby the Governor categorically stated that no
tangible steps have been taken by the State till date to conduct elections in compliance
with the direction of the Union and that the state is using dill-delaying tactics under
the garb of preparation/revision of electoral rolls pursuance delimitation of
constituencies indicating that a situation has arisen and that the state cannot be carried
on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

2. Lastly, with the Application of the Doctrine of Unclean hands, it is argued that the
Petitioner did not reach this Hon'ble Court with Clean Hands. It was the petitioner who
tried to subvert the constitutional Mandate in the first place by not conducting elections
to the Municipal bodies of the state for a period of about 3 years by using dill-delaying
tactics. So doctrine of Unclean Hands, which is an equitable defense that bars relief to a
party who has engaged in inequitable behavior (including fraud, deceit,
unconscionability or bad faith) related to the subject matter of that party's claim, should
apply to the petitioner.

3. Therefore, the present petition does not have any legal backing and the petitioner should
be denied any and every relief that they seek.

4. Thus, it is contended this writ petition should be dismissed due to non-maintainability of

the writ petition in the present form for the sake of protection and delivery of justice.

ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION COULD BE CLUBBED

WITH THE SUIT UNDER ARTICLE 131 FILED IN NOVEMBER 2019.

1. Firstly, the Present Writ petition has been filed by this petitioner under Article 32 of
the Constitution and the petitioner had also filed a suit in this Hon'ble Court under
Article 131 of the Constitution in November 2019. The petitioner contends that the
suit filed in November 2019 under Article 131 be clubbed with the Present Writ
Petition. It is contended by the petitioner that since the imposition of President's Rule
in the State of Delta Pradesh, the State had been under the Control of President, who
acts under the aid and advice of the Union Council of Minister and since the

24
 suit(ibid) is filed against the Union Government itself, the petitioner contends that
there would be a conflict of interest in the litigation of the suit by the Union
Government which could lead to miscarriage of Justice in the suit filed under Article
131. It is contended that this submission of the Petitioner is erroneous as the
President is an independent Authority under the Constitution so there must not arise
the question of integrity of the President. As far as the question of conflict of Interest
is concerned, the President is the authority which represents the state in the suit now
and not the Union Government so the petitioner is mistaken in this regard.
2. Secondly, both, the Suit filed under Article 131 and the present Writ Petition,
have been filed against the direction issued under Article 256 to the State Government of
Delta Pradesh and the parties to both the suit are entirely different now. The suit under
Article 131 was filed on behalf of the State of Delta Pradesh but the present Writ Petition
has been filed by the petitioner in his individual capacity. Thus it is also contended that
both the suits cannot be clubbed because the recognized process of clubbing of suits
requires the parties to both the suits to be same and the cause of actions and this instant
writ petition lacks in fulfilling both the criteria.
3. The respondent also contends that the clubbing of suits is not possible as of now, as
the matter relating to the same nature is Sub-Judice in this very Hon'ble Court. This
Hon'ble Court in the case titled State of Jharkhand vs State of Bihar8 in 2015 has
observed the implication of writ petitions consolidation with article 32. The relevant
portion of the Judgment has been reproduced below:-

"The two-judge bench said:

“The Constitution of India invests this Court with jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, under various provisions of Part V, Chapter V of the Constitution. Such
jurisdiction of this Court is in addition to the jurisdiction created under Art.32 of the
Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

We are unable to agree with the proposition that this Court cannot examine the
constitutionality of a statute in exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction under
Art.131. We, therefore, deem it appropriate that the question is required to be

8
(2015) 2 SCC 431

25
examined by a larger Bench of this Court. We direct the Registry to place the matter
before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders in this regard.”

4. Therefore, the respondent submits that the present Writ Petition cannot be
clubbed with the suit filed under Article 131 of the Constitution in November
2019 for the purposes of protection of Justice and also as the matter is already
Sub-Judice in the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

26
 PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, the Counsels on behalf of the Respondents humbly pray before this Hon'ble Court that
it be pleased to Dismiss the Writ Petition as the Direction issued under Article 256 of the
Constitution of Aryavarta is legally valid and declare that the Order of imposition of
President's rule on 1st February 2020 was Constitutional.

AND/OR

The court may be pleased to pass any other order, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in
the interest of justice, equity and good conscience. And for this, the Respondents as in duty
bound, shall humbly pray.

Respectfully submitted,

Sd/-

COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)

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