939113

research-article2020
JAS0010.1177/0021909620939113Journal of Asian and African StudiesBakare

Original Article
JAAS
Journal of Asian and African Studies

Contextualizing Russia and South

1­–17
© The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0021909620939113
https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909620939113
Look East Policy journals.sagepub.com/home/jas

Najimdeen Bakare
Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) – H-12,
Pakistan

Abstract
Since donning the mantle of authority, President Putin has taken actions which have uninhibitedly been
geared at reasserting Russia’s hegemony around the world. Putin’s Look East policy stems from his schematic
geopolitics, a plan which was formally announced in 2010. Through the prism of Putin’s Look East policy,
the paper contextually analyses Russia–South Asia relations, with reference to India and Pakistan. By cross-
examining Russia’s official foreign policy documents, the paper establishes why South Asia is paramount to
Russia’s economic and geostrategic reassertion. Every new policy has its challenges, and the same holds true
for the Look East policy vis-à-vis South Asia. Premised on the unfolding geopolitics in the region, the paper
surmises that striking a balance between New Delhi and Islamabad will be problematic for Moscow, just as
it has always been for Washington.

Keywords
Putin’s Look East policy, Russia–South Asia relations, Indo-Russia relations, Pakistan–Russia relations,
Russia’s global reassertiveness

Introduction
The end of the Cold War was not just the dawn of a new era; it also precipitated the lifting of ideo-
logical layers and eventually resulted in the renaissance of leadership in the Russian political land-
scape. President Vladimir Putin rose to the pinnacle of power and became the symbol of Russia’s
resurgence in global politics. Since 1999, when he succeeded Boris Yeltsin, Putin has not merely
been reshaping and resetting Russia’s power structure, but has been equally invested in rebuilding
and restoring the glory of an empire that had supposedly collapsed with time (Gel’man and
Starodubtsev, 2016; Kanet, 2007; Leahy, 2000; Stent, 2008; Stratfor, 2014). Putin’s Look East pol-
icy is arguably part of an overarching geopolitical scheme and ‘is largely consistent with historical
Russian (and Soviet) thinking about security interests and foreign policy’ (Oliker et al., 2015: 32).
This geopolitical analysis reckons with Stratfor’s (2012a) assessments of Russia. While historical

Corresponding author:
Najimdeen Bakare, Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology
(NUST) – H-12, Islamabad, 44000, Pakistan.
Email: drnajimdeen.pcs@nipcons.nust.edu.pk
2 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

factors play a significant role in understanding the external actions of Russia, that alone does not
capture the entire picture. Contemporarily, Russia’s political reassertiveness and global influence
over the last several years can be situated in the political re-engineering and reconfiguration that
characterized the country’s post-Cold War political landscape. Defining the landscape without
Putin’s idiosyncrasy, personality cult and domineering leadership style renders any critical study of
modern Russia an incomplete assessment. His personality is heavily written on Russia’s public and
foreign policy on one hand, and is inextricable from the recent Russian economic resurgence and
growth on the other (Aleksashenko, 2012; Hancock, 2007; Myers, 2015; Oliker et al., 2015: 8–9;
Stuermer, 2009; Van Herpen, 2015).
Long before the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was an important player in the east. Its
influence in the region went beyond ideologically supporting the pro-Soviet Union or socialist
governments, but also included diplomatic and socio-economic cooperation. While the end of the
Cold War consequently dwindled the Soviet Union’s influence globally, it also sapped its sway in
the east. However, post-Cold War Russia saw the rise of Putin’s leadership, geared at rewriting
Russian history and at regaining Russia’s lost influence the world over. Interestingly, Putin’s sche-
matic geopolitics and his craving for the east is principally reflected through his Look East policy,
a plan long nurtured but formally announced only in 2010 (Storey, 2015).
Unlike the US ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy or the East Asia Strategy, Putin’s Look East policy is far-
reaching and encompassing, incorporating the breadth of all that comes under the definition of
Asia. This comes amidst the growing pre-eminence of China and at a time when Beijing is hoping
to repeat the Flying Geese Model which is an industrial and technological development model
designed by Kaname Akamatsu, a Japanese economist, in the 1930s, that only came to prominence
in the 1980s. The model encompasses a ‘catching-up’ process of industrialization in latecomer
economies. Launched by Japan in the 1980s to propel and enhance industrial and technological
development amongst Southeast Asian countries, it envisions Japan at the head, as the leader, while
other ‘geese’ follow on the path of industrial and technological development being shown to them
(Fang, 2015: 74–75; Kojima, 2000; Korhonen, 1994: 95; Poon and Rigby, 2017: 105). Russia is
returning to this region even as China entertains hopes of acting as the leader showing the way, and
thus is entering a game of either confrontation or cooperation with other regional and global actors
(Kolotov, 2008; Mankoff, 2015).
Putin’s Look East policy has generated a plethora of writing and discursive geopolitical debates.
Yet, if one is asked to condense the debates and underscore the pivotal themes, it will not be sur-
prising to say that the Look East policy encapsulates Russia’s calculated effort to rebrand itself,
expand its diplomatic and political tentacles, gain more economic clout, look beyond traditional
European markets and, most importantly, mark a niche for a country that needed to reaffirm its
global relevance and regain its lost superpower status.
Ideologically, Putin’s Look East policy should be seen through the lens of three strands within
the competitive kaleidoscopic makeup of the Russian policymaking circle in post-Cold War Russia.
The three strands, namely liberal westernism, fundamental nationalism and pragmatic nationalism,
envision Russia differently, but not without a certain degree of overlap. While the pragmatic
nationalist espouses a balanced vision for Russia’s foreign policy, the other two strands believe
Russia is as relevant as ever and not ill-prepared to rebrand itself and mark a niche in the evolving
globalized world (Charnysh, 2009: 32). President Putin’s Look East policy arguably resonates with
the other two.
  Before the official announcement of Putin’s Look East policy, Russia-eastward policy had
always been primarily Sino-centric. For fear of living in the shadow of China and being a lesser,
dependent partner, Putin’s Kremlin opted for a broader policy that spans from Southeast to South
Asia, up to the Middle East. Since 2010, when Putin’s Look East policy was formally announced,
Bakare 3

it has repeatedly been placing significant emphasis on the ‘exceptional economic growth displayed
by China and India’ (Mahajan, 2018) and has accorded importance to the emerging economies of
the Asia Pacific and South Asian regions (Storey, 2015: 1–10). Countries in these regions consti-
tute a sizeable proportion of the ‘Post-China16’ (PC16) economies identified by George Friedman
(2013). Caught in a cobweb of US and China competition in East and Southeast Asia, Russia’s
strategy in the region transcends mere rivalry of great powers, but aims at maintaining the status
quo: the balance of forces between the major powers, a renewing of ties with traditional allies, and
the creation of a niche for itself in an energy net-importing region (Friedman, 2013). Pundits of
geopolitics would further argue that the impetus for Russia’s Look East policy was Moscow’s bid
to lessen dependence on the west, guard itself against the impact of falling oil prices and seek mar-
kets through multilateral trade deals and cooperation for the pressurized Russian energy and mili-
tary hardware economy (Pant, 2017a).
Adding to the discourse, Alexander Lukin does not dispute the Sino-centrism that has long
shaped Russian relations in the region, though he adds that the relations were predicated on achiev-
ing ‘international order, based on the idea of global multipolarism . . . favoring the current system
of international law’ through a promising international organization like the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) under the banner of the United Nations (UN) (Lukin, 2012: 2).
The vitality of Putin’s Look East policy merits a broader understanding, particularly in two paral-
lel contexts. First, the Look East policy resonates with Russia’s foreign economic policy, which does
not only aim at enabling a favorable economic environment and attendant conditions for Russia, but
also seeks to mark a niche for Russia in the progressively globalized economy. Hence, tapping into
a foreign market (eastern market) that transcends countries once under the Russian sphere of influ-
ence is a calculated move pursued by the Putin administration in an attempt to ensure socio-eco-
nomic and political stability (at home) and maintain considerable high approval among the growing
Russian middle class. Second, given how western powers have a long tradition of engaging coun-
tries the world over – systematically proceeding to serenade semi-autocratic, semi-democratic and
autocratic regimes in different parts of the world – it must be asked whether Russia’s choice to
emulate the actions of others warrants any serious concern. Though Russia, under Putin, strives to
reap the dividends of globalization and reassert Russian influence, looking eastward is likely to
generate some concerns among critics and skeptics, critical of Russia’s global pursuits. Lately, cer-
tain western countries have considered Moscow’s machinations and global outreach as threats to
their sovereign integrity that must be stopped (Berlinger and Dos Santos, 2018; Crerar et al., 2018;
Jamieson, 2018; Volz and Gardner, 2018). This, in turn, gives birth to the question of whether any
containment of Russia is still a possibility (Poghosyan, 2018). While Russia would reject such insin-
uation, recent hegemonic displays by Moscow in Ukraine, Syria, Montenegro and beyond the for-
mer Soviet space raise geopolitical and geostrategic concerns and give one reason to assume that
Moscow is either resurrecting its Cold War status or is bent on redefining its position in the ever-
growing global political landscape (Mahmood and Baloch, 2013: 54).
When looking into the larger canvas of Putin’s Look East policy, it might not be difficult to
fathom that Moscow is reassessing its relationships with several countries in the Middle East,
Southeast and South Asia. Long-established relationships with Syria and Iran have been subjected
to varying degrees of geopolitical stresses. Steering the Syrian crisis by protecting Bashar Asad’s
presidency and supporting Iran’s nuclear program and ambition within the framework of interna-
tional consensus has served to satiate Russia’s Middle East policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation, 2016). Hence, it is pertinent to pay serious attention to Russia’s larger
eastward policy, with the aspect of South Asia demanding closer scrutiny in order to ensure that
events in the region do not pose a great and direct threat to Russia’s national and security interests
(Younus, 2018).
4 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

Why South Asia?

Moscow’s increasing romance with South Asian countries is not an isolated development, but rather
a carefully calibrated policy decision that stems from the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the
Russian Federation to 2020 (Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018) and the Foreign Policy
Concept of the Russian Federation (FPCRF) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
2016). Both documents assert that Russia must respond vociferously to the new threats and risks for
the development of the individual, society and the state and must act as a guarantor of safe national
development through state policy in the field of national security (Presidential Administration of
Russia, 2018). Premised on the NSS, it requires no grand leap of the imagination to understand
Russia’s global behavior, which is arguably geared at consolidating its influence within and beyond
the post-Soviet space. Even though Andrew Kuchins asserted that ‘Russia is currently pursuing a
multi-vectored policy in South Asia in response to shifting geopolitical realities’ (2014: 4), Russia–
South Asia policy should be understood and judged between what Moscow says and does, though
the policy rationale is ‘in full recognition of the fundamentally new geopolitical situation in the
world’ (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, nd). Therefore, Putin’s
Look East policy is one of the manifestations of the Russian Federation’s understanding and response
to global politics, seemingly cognizant of the Russian NSS’s stance asserting that ‘Russia must
implement systemic measures to respond to the changing situation in the world’ (McDermott, 2016).
Like every major power, Russia takes a premium in being one of the players that control and
benefit from major water passages. South Asia is indisputably surrounded by important oceanic
and sea routes (the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea) that are clearly and understandably impor-
tant for Russia’s national interest and security as documented in the Maritime Doctrine of Russian
Federation (Centre for Strategic Assessment and Forecasts, 2001). In a larger context, the increas-
ing pre-eminence of Russia in the region is aimed at overcoming the emerging stagnation in rela-
tions with India; Moscow plans to offer its good offices to prevent any confrontation between India
and China in Asia and the Indian Ocean.
South Asia presents a glaring niche in most of Russia’s official documents. This underwrites the
importance of the region to Russian policymakers and particularly to President Putin, who does not
consider South Asia as a far-flung neighbor, but rather as part of its proximal neighborhood. In
Russia’s strategic calculations, political instability and conflicts in South Asia carry negative rami-
fications not just for the neighborhood, but also for international security and Russian interests in
both the short and long term (Topychkanov, 2013). According to the NSS, President Putin rejects
any insinuation that Russia will take a lukewarm attitude towards global and regional affairs. While
addressing regional issues, the document, under articles 11 and 18, underlines South Asia as one of
the hotspots of global tension, requiring Moscow’s closer attention – and hence Putin’s Look East
policy:

International attention to the long-term perspective will be focused on the possession of energy sources,
including in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and in other areas of the Arctic, in the Caspian
Sea basin and Central Asia. The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflicts in the Middle East, in many
countries in South Asia and Africa, on the Korean Peninsula will continue to harm the international
situation in the medium term.

(Article 11, Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018).

The practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes and provoking intrastate instability and conflicts
is becoming increasingly widespread. In addition to the persisting seats of tension in the Near and Middle
East, Africa, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula, new ‘hot spots‘ are emerging, and zones that are not
Bakare 5

controlled by any states’ authorities are expanding. Territories affected by armed conflicts are becoming
the basis for the spread of terrorism, interethnic strife, religious enmity, and other manifestations of
extremism. The emergence of the terrorist organization calling itself Islamic State and the strengthening of
its influence is the result of the policy of double standards to which some states adhere in the sphere of the
fight against terrorism.

(Article 18, Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018)

Other than India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran were two other Islamic countries within the
neighborhood of South Asia mentioned in the same policy:

The persisting instability in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of all but a few
international contingents poses a major security threat to Russia and other members of the CIS. The
Russian Federation, together with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, other interested States and relying
on the possibilities offered by the UN, CIS, CSTO, SCO and other international organizations will be
consistent in its efforts to resolve as soon as possible the problems this country is facing while respecting
rights and legitimate interests of all ethnic groups living in its territory so that it can enter post-conflict
recovery as a sovereign, peaceful, neutral State with a sustainable economy and political system.
Implementing comprehensive measures to mitigate the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan against
other States, including neighboring countries, as well as eliminate or substantially reduce illicit production
and trafficking of narcotic drugs is an integral part of these efforts. Russia is committed to further
intensifying UN-led international efforts aimed at helping the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and its
neighboring States counter these challenges.

(Article 97, Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018)

The dynamic of post-Cold War and 9/11

The Look East policy exposes the political dynamics in the region in many ways. First, it unveils
that Russia is not a dead polar bear; it remains a formidable player in areas that have undergone a
great deal of US influence. Second, the policy enunciates the strategic motives of Moscow in
instrumentalizing certain countries in the region to leverage the US and the west; this holds particu-
larly true for Indo-Russia relations. Irrespective of the dimensions and intensity in Indo-US rela-
tions since the end of the Cold War, New Delhi will always be prudent and wary of making perilous
decisions that could either undermine Moscow’s interests or jeopardize its strategic cooperation
and interest with the west, particularly Washington. Third, the policy exposes the importance of
some countries to Russia’s commercial interests. Aside from being the top buyer of Russian weap-
ons, New Delhi holds the equally essential status of being the second-largest trade partner of Russia
across the Middle East and South Asia. No country in South Asia comes ahead of India in terms of
trade and commerce with Russia. According to the data of the Ministry of Commerce, Government
of India, the trade volume between India and Russia stands around $8.3bn, which is conspicuously
far behind $132bn trade volume between the US and India (Pant, 2017b; Economic Times, 2019).
Table 1 spells out the figures from 2009–2010 to 2019.
Fourth, the policy re-echoes Lord Palmerston’s understanding of international affairs when in
the 19th century he claimed: ‘states have no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent
interests’ (Kung, 1998: 10). It is true that regardless of the animosity between Pakistan and Russia
at the end of the Afghan war, interests override sentiments. The instrumental role of Pakistan in
purging Russia out of Afghanistan remains an indelible historical fact, yet the unfolding Pakistan–
Russia relations corroborate and underscore Lord Palmerston’s sentiment and demonstrate how
interests shape and reshape relations amongst states.
6 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

Table 1.  India’s total imports from and exports to Russia (in US$m).

Year Total imports Total imports from Total exports Total exports
Russia to Russia
2009–2010 288,372 3566 178,751 980,69
2010–2011 369,769 3600 249,816 1689
2011–2012 489,31 4764 305,964 1778
2012–2013 490,736 4231 300,400 2296
2013–2014 450,199 3894 314,405 2121
2014–2015 448,033 4249 310,338 2097
2015–2016 381,006 4585 262,290 1588
2016–2017 384,357 5552 275,852. 1937
2017–2018 465,581 8574 303,526 2113
2018–2019 514,078 5840 330,078 2390

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Government of India (nd).

Indo-Russia relations
India remains the undisputed ‘big brother’ of the South Asian region in many respects. It also has
a long history of partnership with Moscow. At the dawn of independence, the geopolitical reality
in the region presented India with the premise to ally with the Soviet Union. The nexus of Sino-
Pakistan and Pakistan–US strategic cooperation on the one hand, and the Indian leadership’s dis-
position for socialist agenda and Sino-India unfriendliness on the other, incentivized a perfect
alliance between the Soviet Union and India. This occurred at a time when India claimed to be one
of the forerunners of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which was against global ideological
polarization and imperialism. Over several decades, the Indo-Russian relationship has undoubtedly
demonstrated that the two nations enjoy robust bilateral cooperation. Successive Russian policy
towards the region, especially towards India, demonstrates the depth of the cooperation. For
instance, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid
Brezhnev, believed that ‘Russia had evolved its South Asian policy with India as an epicenter’
(Pramod, 1990: 29). The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and Soviet support for India during the 1971
war between India and Pakistan lend ineffaceable proof of the Indo-Russia ties (Mahajan, 2018;
Mahmood and Baloch, 2013).
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the unceremonious purge of Russia from the region, par-
ticularly the exit from Afghanistan, never amounted to the total evaporation of Russia’s sway in the
same way. Through sustained Indo-Russia relations, Moscow kept its presence alive and hence any
discussion of Putin’s Look East policy is rooted in the annals of the region’s history (Stratfor,
2012b). At the dawn of the 21st century, Indo-Russia cooperation reached a new height in the form
of a strategic partnership that later morphed into a ‘special and privileged partnership’ in 2010
(Sajjanhar, 2016). To embody and embolden the latter, Russia believes India is worthy of accession
to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), despite the unreserved reservations of China and Pakistan
towards New Delhi being granted membership (Jacob, 2018).
Russia is one of the major suppliers of weapons to many countries and India is at the forefront of
its clientele. For time to come, Russia will continue to have a salient preponderance in the Indian
arms market at a rapid scale and to an extent that the US and other weapon exporters would have to
muster sizeable effort to match up with Russia in the Indian arms economy. Therefore, Russia’s
Look East policy and particularly Indo-Russia relations will be shaped by prudence and caution;
losing the Indian market would be tantamount to huge loss and cast a severe impact on the Russian
Bakare 7

defense industry (Stratfor, 2016). Russia has promised New Delhi unadulterated relations irrespec-
tive of the unfolding realities in the region (Joshi, 2017). Indo-Russia cooperation has never been
confined to arms sales; it has always been multifaceted cooperation. Both countries have steadily
worked together at both global and regional levels. At the UN, Russia has been an advocate of
India’s bid for the Security Council’s permanent seat (Jabeen, 2010: 243). Similarly, Russia’s sup-
port for India’s accession to the SCO does not stem from ill-judgment, but it is a part of a larger
strategy to balance the equation of power within the organization – an argument which holds equally
true for Pakistan vis-à-vis its relations with China. While Indo-Russia cooperation also includes col-
laborative efforts to contain conflict in South Asia from escalating beyond the region, Russia, under
the leadership of Putin, believes that the Indo-Russia relations can be upgraded to creating a poly-
centric world (Pant, 2006; Topychkanov, 2013). Such upgrading will, in Russia’s view, pen count-
less opportunities between the two countries and eventually result in the fulfillment of projects such
as the North–South Corridor Project (Russian International Affairs Council, 2018).
An excerpt from the NSS underscores the special status of India to the Russian Federation.
Article 94 of the NSS states: ‘The Russian Federation assigns the privileged strategic partnership
with the Republic of India an important role’ (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015). Article
85 of the FPCRF unequivocally elaborates the partnership as cooperation that matters to the
federation:

Russia is committed to further strengthening its special privileged partnership with the Republic of India
based on shared foreign policy priorities, historical friendship, and deep mutual trust, as well as
strengthening cooperation on urgent international issues and enhancing mutually beneficial bilateral ties in
all areas, primarily in trade and economy, with a focus on implementing long-term cooperation programs
approved by the two countries.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016)

In addition to how the Russian Federation sees India and in the context of Russia and South Asia
relations, article 25 of the FPCRF places India in the bracket of regional powers having the propen-
sity to contribute to global governance and leadership:.

Russia attaches great importance to ensuring the sustainable manageability of global development, which
requires collective leadership from the major States that should be representative in geographic and
civilization terms and fully respect the central and coordinating role of the UN. To these ends, Russia has
been expanding its ties with its partners within the Group of Twenty, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China
and the Republic of South Africa), the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), RIC (Russia, India, and
China) alongside other organizations and dialogue platforms.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016)

Russia will increase cooperation in such multilateral formats as the G8, the G20, RIC (Russia, India, and
China), BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), as well as use the capabilities of other informal
international institutions.

(Article 13, Presidential Administration of Russia, 2018)

Though the two countries have registered a high level of diplomatic and strategic cooperation,
varying degrees of setbacks continue to exert pressure on the evolving relationship; hence the anxi-
ety embedded in headlines such as ‘Relations with Delhi souring’ and ‘Has Russia lost patience
8 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

with India?’ (Soami, 2018; Topychkanov, 2013). Similarly, the withdrawal of New Delhi from an
‘11-year joint program to develop a 5th generation fighter jet with Russia’ came as a huge surprise
for any close observer of India–Russia relations (Gady, 2018). The apprehension feeds on the
growing sentiment and suspicion that the India-centric policy of Russia is dwindling and is further
complicated by the recent developments in Pakistan–Russia relations on the one hand and
Moscow’s renewal of attention towards Afghanistan on the other (Pant, 2017b).

Pakistan–Russia relations
At the earliest stage of its independence, Pakistan was faced with enormous existential threats and,
hence, had to devise an ideological-cum-pragmatic niche in global affairs. For its survival and
strategic positioning, the new state rationally decided to align closely with US global and regional
interests. Pakistan played a significant role in the strategic alliance of Cold War politics through the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The
strategic cooperation was a clear-cut policy meant to safeguard and ensure the survival of Pakistan,
and, by extension, show Soviet Russia the cold shoulder. Pakistan’s choice of a US-led alliance
over the USSR transcended a rational decision; it demonstrated how Pakistan had to respond to the
then – global wave of realpolitik on account of the ideological – bipolar world order. Since the
choice of allying with the US was precipitated by Pakistan’s strategic and existential necessities,
this made Pakistan dependent on the US security umbrella. In return, Pakistan acted as a proxy to
protect US strategic interest and containment policy in South Asia vis-à-vis India–Soviet relations;
and Russia’s incursion into Afghanistan. As the Cold War wound down and the Soviet Union suf-
fered defeat in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategic utility to the US also dwindled, and eventually the
US abandoned its non-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally (Akhtar, 2011: 9; Javaid,
2010: 67). The utility of Pakistan re-emerged as the US sought to advance its policy in the region,
particularly in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. The actualization of that policy demanded
that Pakistan should be an effective and crucial partner in the US-led war on terror (Fair et al.,
2010). Such oscillation in US–Pakistan relations explicates why some political observers dubbed
the relations between the two ‘a marriage of convenience’: momentary, inconsistent and thus a
disenchanted alliance (Kux, 2001; Shakoor, 2001). Ordinarily and understandably, the strategic
alliance between the US and Pakistan in the 1950s, 1960s and even 1970s became an impetus for
Indo-Soviet relations.
Few observers argue that Pakistan’s relations with Russia have always been shaped through the
lens of the US and India (Mahmood and Baloch, 2013). While such an assertion might carry some
semblance of truth, the current unfolding realities (Pakistan–Russia relations) in the region rein-
force the nuance and flexibility in geopolitics. Moscow is redefining its relations with Islamabad
vis-à-vis the compelling realities in Afghanistan – the search for peace in the war-ridden country.
In December 2016, China, Pakistan and Russia held a trilateral meeting with a focus on finding a
mutually acceptable solution to the protracted Afghan conflict (Pant, 2017b). If Pakistan had been
instrumental in shattering the Soviet Union’s image in the region during the 1980s, the same
Pakistan can strategically be useful for Russia’s interest broadly in South Asia and particularly in
Afghanistan. In terms of Pakistan’s strategic importance and its relevance to Russia, Korybko
(2015) referred to Pakistan as the ‘zipper of Pan Eurasian Integration’ – situated in a location that
strategically integrates the three regions of South, Central and West Asia ‘through which the future
of oil supplies of Moscow can be guaranteed’ (Kaushiki, 2019: 49). Other than that, Pakistan has
also strategically approved the use of Gwadar by Russia. Through Gwadar, Pakistan will be con-
nected to Russia through Afghanistan and Central Asia (Kaushiki, 2019: 52). With particular refer-
ence to Afghanistan, Kabulov acknowledged Pakistan as ‘a key regional player to negotiate with’.
Bakare 9

Such acknowledgment further underscores how much Islamabad can contribute to the fulfillment
of Russia’s strategic interest in the region (Kaura, 2018).
Additionally, the recent diplomatic and strategic romance between Islamabad and Moscow is gen-
erating serious concerns within and outside the region, particularly in Washington, as Pakistan–Russia
relations find convergence with larger China’s interest in the region and beyond. This may also be
construed by Washington through the prism of realignment and realization by Islamabad for an alter-
native ally other than Washington, whilst for India, Pakistan–Russia relations herald suspicion and
apprehension that years of exclusive Indo-Russia affability are drawing to a close (Mahajan, 2018).
For Pakistan, Russia’s rebalancing in Asia (Putin’s pivot to Asia – Putin’s Look East policy) is a wel-
come development, especially amidst growing US–Pakistan strained relations. Looking at the flip
side of these strained relations, both Moscow and Islamabad can harness the situation to their advan-
tage in a couple of ways. One, the US–Pakistan strained relations present Russia with an opportunity
to cautiously draw closer to Islamabad. Two, they equally offer Islamabad a relief and a propensity to
act beyond the shadow of Washington. Between the two countries, there has been a gradual upsurge
in the curve of defense cooperation, marking the diversification of the Pakistan–Russia cooperation
which also includes Pakistan’s arms imports from Russia.
In 2014, the two countries inked a defense cooperation agreement during the high-level visit
of the Russian Defense Minister, Sergey Shoygu, to Islamabad. This was soon followed by the
participation of Kalashnikov Concern (a Russian defense manufacturing concern and joint-stock
company) in the trials of the new assault rifle for Pakistan’s infantry. A joint and friendly military
exercise dubbed ‘DRUZHBA – Friendship’ was held in Mineralnye Vody, Russia’s North
Caucasus Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia, in 2017, and in Cherat, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(KP) province of Pakistan, in 2018, and these events made international headlines. In addition to
US-made weapons, Pakistan’s military arsenal now includes Russia’s Klimov RD-93 engine
which is instrumental in the making of JF-17 Thunder aircraft, a multi-role fighter, co-produced
and developed by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation
(PAC/CAC) (Jalalzai, 2017: 43). Originally, the RD-93 engine was one of China’s procurements
from Russia, bound by a clause that requires Beijing to seek Moscow’s permission before re-
exporting to a third country. However, given the depth of Sino-Pakistani relations, Beijing sup-
plied Islamabad with the engine. Even when India categorically protested the deal as a violation
of the end-user agreement between Russia and China, Moscow eventually lifted the clause and
thus the Russia–Pakistan agreement that permits Islamabad to directly buy the Klimov RD-93
engine from Russia for use in its domestically manufactured JF-17 fighter jet (Ansari, 2015;
Gady, 2015; Purushothaman, 2015; Stratfor, 2018). Similarly, the purchase of Russian-made
Mi-35 Attack Helicopters by Pakistan further consolidates its military hardware cooperation with
Moscow (Moskalenko and Topychkanov, 2014: 10). Expanding its military hardware economy
arguably allows Moscow to try to circumvent the pressure of sanctions placed on the Russian
economy following the Crimean annexation.
Cooperation between the two transcends the realm of defense; it also includes other significant
forms of cooperation such as the Pakistan–Russia economic deal signed in 2015. The $2bn deal
was aimed ‘to develop a 1,100-kilometer gas pipeline from Karachi to Lahore – the largest eco-
nomic deal between the two countries since the Soviet Union built the Pakistan Steel Mills in the
1970s’ (Younus, 2018). Two years earlier, in 2013, Moscow had expressed its willingness to
upgrade the same steel mills. In a similar direction, Moscow has been equally interested in the
Muzaffargarh power project with the intent of transforming the station from oil and gas to coal
energy (Azeemi, 2017). At present, the trade volume between Islamabad and Moscow is struggling
to achieve a firmer footing. Alarmingly, Moscow has no place among the top 10 export countries
from Pakistan (Uroos, 2017), though recently, both countries have shown determination to
10 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

Pakistan Russia Trade Stascs Year Imports Exports

700,000 2008 583,846 127,297

2009 321,687 88,827
600,000
2010 156,882 144,337
500,000 2011 165,597 191,512
400,000 2012 246,513 186,192
2013 287,758 205,510
300,000
2014 224,926 187,633
200,000 2015 170,241 160,925
100,000
2016 258,011 144,774
2017 310,938 130,895
0 2018 375.055 157,090
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Imports
Exports

Figure 1.  Pakistan–Russia trade statistics.

Between 2008 and 2009, the direction and volume of trade between the two countries depicts an imbalance in trade
relations, as illustrated by Pakistan incurring a deficit. From 2010 onwards, the record shows relatively better trade rela-
tions, with plenty of room for improvement for the creation of more enabling conditions; however, there is much to be
accomplished in terms of deeper and mutual trade relations. The bar for mutual investment and business projects needs
to be raised at the level of government and the chambers of commerce on both sides.

facilitate greater and deeper economic and commercial cooperation. Figure 1 indicates where trade
between the two countries stands.
Since 2013, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been celebrated as presenting
Pakistan with colossal economic benefits, although, more importantly, the corridor equally under-
pins the importance of Pakistan’s strategic location and capacity to contribute to the global econ-
omy through its transitory vantage point. Other than China, Russia is also cognizant of Pakistan’s
transitory niche and pivotal position in the South Asia neighborhood. Pakistan’s neighbors,
namely Afghanistan and the Central Asian States, are historically – and to date – strategically
important for Russia. This is also true for the part of China that is neighbor to Pakistan. By this
account, Pakistan is the heart of the region, for both Russia and China. It is thus not surprising that
Moscow expresses interest in being part of China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), which will allow
it, by extension, to gain access to the warm waters where Gwadar port is situated (Mustafa and
Zaafir, 2016). Through the participation of Russia in CPEC, Pakistan–Russia cooperation might
eventually be further cemented and consequently lead to the trilateral cooperation of China–
Pakistan-Russia. The eventual alliance of the three carries huge economic and commercial advan-
tages for all parties, as it holds the potential of easing trade barriers between Russia and Pakistan,
increasing the trade volume between the two countries, and in due course bringing Pakistan more
proximal to Russia’s market. Strategically, the question remains whether Pakistan should be wary
of Russia’s resurgent interest in Afghanistan. While the experience of the Cold War between the
two countries might be hard to forget (Topychkanov, 2017), the unfolding reality (new Russo-Pak
romance) could dilute such apprehension, most particularly when both countries are mutually
working to benefit from a peaceful Afghanistan. Considering the mutuality between Islamabad
and Moscow, Pakistan would be benefiting from Moscow’s technology and industrial help;
Bakare 11

Moscow, meanwhile, will be fulfilling its obsession with warm seawaters through Pakistan’s
Gwadar port, if the geostrategic analysis of certain observers is to be considered (Hilali, 2005;
Jamil, 2017; Moskalenko and Topychkanov, 2014). Against this backdrop, Pakistan will be within
the bracket of countries that satiates Russia’s strategic motives. While India is contributing to
Russia’s weapon industry, Pakistan conversely will be fulfilling the strategic and long-term
Russian inclination for warm waters, which dates back to Peter the Great (Girardet, 1985: 27).
Therefore, closer Islamabad–Moscow ties are neither coincidental nor a novel idea attributable to
Putin.
Another strategic issue for Pakistan, other than Gwadar, is the protracted Kashmir conflict. It
remains a matter for further research whether the burgeoning Pakistan–Russia relations can mark
a shift in Moscow–Kashmir policy. On the lingering Kashmir conflict, Pakistan will have to work
arduously to convince Russia not just for a rethink, but on how best the Kashmir conflict can
secure a peaceful resolution. For too long, the position of the Russian foreign ministry has been
that the status quo around the Line of Control (LOC) should be maintained and that neither
Pakistan nor India should lose anything as per the prevailing situation. Even during the Cold War,
the Soviet Union never relented to vetoing UN resolutions aimed at undermining India’s position
on Kashmir (Kaura, 2018: 63). Meanwhile, the recent revocation of articles 370 and 35A of the
Indian constitution exacerbates an already volatile issue (Al Jazeera, 2019; Malek, 2004). While
Moscow might seemingly claim neutrality, its position vis-à-vis the Kashmir conflict is entangled
in Moscow–New Delhi shared economic interest, regarding which there is no indication of
Moscow being desirous of fundamentally jeopardizing the burgeoning economic cooperation.
This offers an explanation as to the difficulty for Moscow to either act as an impartial mediator or
counsel New Delhi for Kashmiri’s freedom and independence. Moscow’s position on Kashmir,
however, exposes its double standards. Elsewhere in Abkhazia – Georgia, Crimea, Donetsk
People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic – Ukraine and Moldova, Russia has been
actively supporting separatism, even though under Russian criminal law, separatism is a criminal
offense (Luhn, 2014).
As aforesaid, a comprehensive picture of Russia–South Asia policy would be wanting without
understanding and judging Moscow between what is said, written and done. Regardless of the lat-
est developments in Pakistan–Russia relations, the following section presents excerpts from offi-
cial Russian documents enunciating Russia’s perspective on Pakistan.
While the NSS has generally marked Pakistan as one of the hotspots of tension, in contrast, the
FPCRF particularly considered Pakistan as a country where a terrorist threat is imminent. It further
elucidated that Russia was not just seriously concerned, but also closely monitors the situation.
Article 15 of FPCRF states:

The global terrorist threat has reached a new high with the emergence of the Islamic State international
terrorist organization and similar groups that have descended to an unprecedented level of cruelty in their
violence. They aspire to create their state and seek to consolidate their influence on a territory stretching
from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean to Pakistan. The main effort in combating terrorism should be aimed
at creating a broad international counter-terrorism coalition with a solid legal foundation, one that is based
on effective and consistent inter-State cooperation without any political considerations or double standards,
above all to prevent terrorism and extremism and counter the spread of radical ideas.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016)

In the interest of the burgeoning relations, both countries would have to mutually cooperate on
issues of terrorism and extremism, given the intersection of development and political stability.
While Russia is critical of seeing conflict in the region transmigrate into the border of Russia, it
12 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

is also imperative for Islamabad to showcase itself as an economic and commerce-friendly coun-
try, where the menace of insurgency and militancy would not constitute a threat to potential
foreign investors. Nonetheless, Putin’s Look East policy presents Pakistan with an opportunity
to reset its foreign policy objectives and interests. The policy accords Pakistan a certain degree
of introspection; if Pakistan has failed to achieve certain national and strategic objectives through
Russia in the past (Hussain, 2012), such failure and miscalculation can be corrected and redeemed
in view of Pakistan’s future approach towards Russia. Therefore, Pakistan should seize the
opportunity of the Look East policy for sustainable Islamabad–Moscow relations. One area of
serious attention should be the resuscitation of the Dushanbe Four Initiative (Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Russia and Tajikistan – PART). With the Look East policy, Pakistan must not only
satiate its national interest, but utilize it to diffuse the perception that Islamabad is regionally and
globally isolated. Working with Russia as a member of the SCO will invariably raise the profile
of Islamabad as a country strategically equipped to help resolve the protracted conflict in
Afghanistan and to facilitate the induction of Russia into the Economic Cooperation Organization
(ECO).

Challenges to the Look East policy

Putin’s Look East policy would not be altogether insulated from the following challenges:

1. Since the Look East policy is geared at competing, rebranding and making some gains for
Russia, it will be confronted by a certain degree of challenge. For instance, at the global
level, Russia has consented to participate in China’s BRI projects, and regionally, Moscow
plans to join the CPEC, the flagship project of the BRI. Regionally, CPEC highlights the
importance of Pakistan and accords the latter huge benefits, though since the inception of
CPEC and its mother project (BRI) India has remained critical of the entire project, consid-
ered as China’s geopolitical and geo-economic strategy to undermine New Delhi’s strategic
interest. The position of Russia is critical in this scenario. While Russia is part of the
Chinese project, one of its very important economic partners (India) is not, though Russia’s
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has implored New Delhi to set apart politics from the eco-
nomic gains BRI or CPEC will be offering (Miglani, 2017).
2. Even when Moscow is part of the Chinese BRI and there are talks of a ‘strategic triangle’
comprising China–India –Russia, it is not unlikely to see the divergence of interest amongst
the three, especially on how best to steer the region. Individual national interest will ever
remain a defining factor that would determine whether these states would pursue a common
or divergent regional policy. Besides, the Look East policy could add to the apprehension
over Russia’s interests in the world. Such fear might not be unfounded, given Russia’s
recent imperialist proclivity in its neighborhood and elsewhere around the world. Therefore,
it is in Russia’s best interest to allay any insinuation of imperialist policy in the region.
3. Moscow needs to come up with a clear-cut policy that is easily and clearly understood by
players in the region; otherwise, the Look East policy will remain a vague policy, short-
term in nature, and with the dubious potential to irritate existing regional equations.
4. Moscow will have to compete harder to convince the eastern (Asian) countries of its friend-
liness and positive intentions for healthy cooperation and development.
5. Countries in the region need to be assured and reassured that Russia will not be making
U-turns. Certain analysis considers the Look East policy as the product of pressure that
Russia is facing. Hence, when the pressure evaporates, would Moscow rescind its commit-
ment to the region? Similarly, under external (third party) pressure, should Pakistan expect
Bakare 13

a new (unfriendly) face of Russia, as was the case with Moscow–Tehran relations where a
third party swayed Moscow against Tehran?
6. Maintaining a deeper connection will have to mature over time. Even after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, former communist countries have not disengaged entirely (in politics,
diplomacy and economy) from Moscow; therefore, there is some degree of influence and
Moscow still weighs amongst these nations. This might be uniquely different in the case of
the non-communist states; Moscow has to deal with that within its Look East policy.
7. As an integral part of the east, South Asia is an important region for Putin’s eastward policy.
The mentioning of South Asia in various Russian strategic documents does not just signal
the importance but equally underlines the strategic niche of the region in Russia’s overall
global objective. Regardless of the dividends the eastward policy presents, one thing is
clear: striking a balance between New Delhi and Islamabad will be as problematic for
Moscow as it has always been for Washington.
8. Given the depth of the US’ and China’s influence in the region, with the Look East policy
Moscow will have to muster more strength and be pragmatic to convince countries that it
can make a difference.

Conclusion
Remaining in the corridor of power and steering the foreign policy of Russia in a particular direc-
tion has greatly influenced Putin’s strategic worldview. The dividends of such foreign policy have
overwhelmingly influenced Russia’s domestic and international politics. On both fronts, Putin’s
political stamina has been strengthened. As a consequence of Moscow’s foreign policy, its econ-
omy is grappling with sanctions imposed by western powers which have increased the urgency to
secure alternative markets. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Russia decided to look eastward and
is romancing the emerging economic powerhouses in the east. Beyond economic and trade rela-
tions, looking eastward is a concerted attempt by Moscow to revive its traditional (ideological)
relationship with the east. In addition to the ideological fraternity that characterized the Cold War
era, the region was a traditional recipient of Russia’s weapons and other forms of facilitation.
For India, Putin’s eastward policy is promising and might deepen the existing multi-vector
nature of Indo-Russia relations. Conversely, the growing Pakistan–Russia ties further prove that
efforts to isolate Pakistan have been less efficacious. Against all odds and amidst determined
efforts to regionally and internationally isolate Pakistan, Islamabad has refused to be cowed;
rather, it has stood tall and resolute, and demonstrated its resilience to weather all forces bent at
undermining its national integrity and interest. Arguably, both Pakistan–China and Pakistan–
Russia relations are indicative of this reality. Though Putin’s Look East policy for South Asia has
been largely reduced to India and Pakistan, it is interesting to note that other countries in the
region have been equally touched by the wave of the policy, most especially the increasing inter-
est of Russia in Afghanistan (Mahajan, 2018). Arguably, India and Pakistan are two important
tools for regional and international players. During the 1950s and 1960s, the US inducted Pakistan
into its strategic realm. The strategic cooperation of the Cold War era helped Washington to con-
solidate its position against Soviet communism in the region. The same is true for the Indo-US
strategic partnership in the post-Cold War era – a partnership tailored to encircle China’s influ-
ence and checkmate the long-standing Indo-Russia relations. It is not unlikely that the Indo-
Russia pact is another strategic calculus meant to counterbalance the US and Chinese interests in
South Asia, respectively. The recent Pakistan–Russia new beginning shares the same motive,
though, more to fill the increasing vacuum in Pakistan–US relations. It is undeniable that more
concerted and consolidated Pakistan–Russia relations will take considerable time to blossom,
14 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

whilst the already cemented Moscow–New Delhi relations will always be a crucial and deciding
factor. In current geopolitics and geo-economics, New Delhi presents a much more valuable part-
ner than Islamabad, and there is no sign of Moscow wanting to alienate India to consolidate its
friendship with Islamabad. Yet, by and large, India and Pakistan both fit well into the strategic
toolbox of regional and international powers.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Najimdeen Bakare https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3257-9718

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Author biography
Najimdeen Bakare is currently teaching at the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS) National
University of Sciences and Technology Islamabad. In addition to observing Great Power politics in the global
south, he is also interested in the politics of European Union and the issues of European Muslims.