US v.
AH CHONG Ah Chong struck the fatal blow in the firm belief that
FACTS: Ah Chong was employed as a cook at an
officer’s quarter in Rizal. One night, at about 10
o'clock, the Ah Cong was suddenly awakened by
someone trying to force open the door of the room.
He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is
there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by
the noise at the door that it was being pushed open
by someone bent upon forcing his way into the
room.
The room was very dark and the defendant, fearing
that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to
his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will
kill you." At that moment he was struck just above
the knee by the edge of the chair which had been
placed against the door.
At that moment he was struck just above the knee
by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful
aggression) which had been placed against the
door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he
kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out,
was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or
muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was playing
a trick on him
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his
employers and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
Note: There had been several robberies not long
prior to the date of the incident, one of which took
place in a house where he was employed as cook
so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
He admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but
said that he did it under the impression that
Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the
door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's
warnings.
Trial court - simple homicide
ISSUE: W/N Ah Chong can be held criminally
liable who, by reason of mistake of fact, killed
his roommate Pascual.
HELD: No. The Court held that there is no criminal
liability under such circumstance, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact
was not due to negligence or bad faith.
The Court explained that Article 1 of the code
indicates that malice, or criminal intent in some
form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense. Since evil intent is in general an
inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on
his part.
the intruder who forced open the door of his
sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he
was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his
charge. In that sense, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief
that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that he cannot be
said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his life or his property.
In conclusion, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such
ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negate a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal;
except in those cases where the circumstances
demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where,
under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code
one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor
incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from
that which he intended to commit.
PEOPLE v. ANTONIO OANIS & ALBERTO
GALANTA
FACTS: Oanis and Galanta were two of those
officers who were instructed to arrest a notorious
criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas,
and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They
were informed that Balagtas is with Irene Requinea
at that time.
They went to the suspected house then proceeded
to Irene’s room where they saw the supposedly
Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door.
Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively
fired at him which resulted to the victim’s death.
The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio
Tecson, an innocent man (Irene’s paramour).
RTC – Homicide through reckless imprudence
Both appealed separately from this judgment
claiming different versions of the tragedy ― each
one blaming the other.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons
of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the
case of U.S. v. Ah Chong.
ISSUE: W/N Oanis and Galanta incur no
criminal liability due to innocent mistake of fact
in the honest performance of their official
duties.
HELD: No. The SC held that in the case U.S. v. Ah
Chong, the maxim ignorantia facti excusat
applies only when the mistake is committed without
fault or carelessness. There is an innocent mistake
of fact committed without any fault or carelessness
if the accused, having no time or opportunity to
make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of
killing.
In the instant case, Tecson was sleeping at that
time. Hence, Oanis and Galanta had ample time
and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end
had been made, as the victim was unarmed,
according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the
only legitimate course of action for them to follow
even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were
instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest
him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance
or aggression is offered by him.
More so, Section 2 (2), Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court specifically provides that, “No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an
arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject
to any greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention.” For that reason, they cannot justify the
incident as part of their honest performance of
their official duties.
The crime is not merely criminal negligence, the
killing being intentional and not accidental. As the
deceased was killed while asleep, the crime
committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia.
ALEXANDER PADILLA v. HON. DIZON
FACTS: Commissioner of Customs, Alexander
Padilla filed an administrative complaint against
Baltazar Dizon, RTC Judge – Pasay for rendering a
manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very
least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance
of the law, in Criminal Case entitled "Pp vs. Lo Chi
Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense
charged. In that decision, the Dizon said that Lo Chi
Fai had no willful intention to violate the law.
The case in which Dizon rendered a decision of
acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was
caught by a Customs guard at the Manila
International Airport while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments
out of the country-- carrying with him foreign
currency and foreign exchange instruments
(380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in
various currency denominations.
An information was filed against him for violation of
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal
sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides
that no person shall take out or transmit or
attempt to take out or transmit foreign
exchange in any form out of the Philippines
without an authorization by the Central Bank.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out
or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such
amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. Tourists and non-resident temporary
visitors bringing with them more than
US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies shall declare their foreign exchange
in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any
person who shall engage in the trading or
purchase and sale of foreign currency in
violation of existing laws or rules and
regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty
of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign
exchange and shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and
1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of
no less than P50,000.00.
He tried to establish that he was a businessman
from Hongkong, and that he had come to the
Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the
country with his business associates, and that he
and his business associates declared all the money
they brought in and all declarations were handed to
and kept by him. Because of the revolution
taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi
Fai was urged by his business associates to
come to Manila to bring the money out of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in
holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
prosecution must establish that the accused
had the criminal intent to violate the law.
HELD: Yes. The SC held that he has shown gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in
holding that to convict the accused for violation of
Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution
must establish that the accused had the criminal
intent to violate the law.
Dizon ought to know that proof of malice or
deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in
offenses punished by special laws, which are
mala prohibita.
In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by
his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot
free. The accused at the time of his apprehension
at the Manila International Airport had in his
possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in
assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange
instruments (380 pieces), without any specific
authority from the Central Bank as required by law.
At the time of his apprehension, he was able to
exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his
possession. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign
currency and foreign currency instruments found in
the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was
apprehended at the airport and the amounts of
such foreign exchange did not correspond to the
foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi
Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations
were declarations belonging to other people.
Judge was DISMISSED from the service.
ARSENIA GARCIA v. CA & PP
FACTS: Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the
1995 senatorial elections, filed a complaint against
Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel
Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and Arsenia Garcia
for violation of Section 27(b).
Within the canvassing period of 1995 senatorial
elections, Aquilino Pimintel, Jr., was informed that
Arsenia Garcia, along with her co-conspirators,
willfully and unlawfully decreased the number of
votes of the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes.
All accused were acquitted due to lack of evidence
except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the
crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section
27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel
in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.
Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the
judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no
motive on her part to reduce the votes of private
complainant.
Pimentel on the other hand contends that good
faith is not a defense in the violation of an election
law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
ISSUE: W/N Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646
is classified under mala in se or mala prohibita.
W/N good faith and lack of criminal intent can
be valid defenses.
HELD: The acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are
mala in se.
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides
that Any member of the board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election or any
member of the board who refuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct
votes or deduct such tampered votes.
It is mala in se crime because it is inherently
immoral to decrease the vote of a candidate. It is
not the purpose of the law to punish unintentional
election canvass errors. However, intentionally
increasing or decreasing the number of votes
received by a candidate is inherently immoral,
since it is done with malice and intent to injure
another individual.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of
the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Good
faith can be a valid defense but it has to be proven.
Garcia admitted that she was the one who
announce that Pimental garnered 1,921 votes
(instead of 6, 921); she likewise admitted she was
the one who prepared the COC though it was not
her duty to do so. Preparing such document even if
it was not her task, manifests an intention to
perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.
As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
petitioner’s concern was to assure accurate, correct
and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to
exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust
deserves not only censure but also the concomitant
sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility
pursuant to the dictates of the law.
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence
should be exercised by the members of the
board of canvassers in canvassing the results
of the elections. Any error on their part would
result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and
its supporting statements of votes prepared by the
municipal board of canvassers are sensitive
election documents whose entries must be
thoroughly scrutinized.
PEOPLE v. FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, &
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA
FACTS: Deceased Bayani Miranda and Pugay
were friends. In a town fiesta, Pugay and Samson
with several drunk companions appeared and
started making fun of Miranda. Not satisfied, Pugay
took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on
the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not
to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him. They were
arrested the same night and barely a few hours
after the incident gave their written statements.
Pugay admitted that he poured the can believing
that it was water. Samson alleged in his statement
that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but
did not see the person who set him on fire
ISSUE: W/N Pugay is not criminally liable for
the reason that he did know that what he
poured was gasoline.
HELD: Still criminally liable. Having taken the can
from under the engine of the ferris wheel and
holding it before pouring its contents on the body of
the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this
flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice
even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to
exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid
every undesirable consequence arising from
any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of
the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General
that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In U.S. vs. Maleza, :
A man must use common sense and exercise due
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is
responsible for such results as anyone might
foresee and for acts which no one would have
performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all
those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed
to all manner of danger and injury.
JASON IVLER v. Hon San Pedro &
EVANGELINE PONCE
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August
2004, Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with
two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for
the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor
C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle.
He pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case
No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved
to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence
ISSUE: W/N Reckless Imprudence is a crime in
itself.
HELD: Yes. Reckless Imprudence is a Single
Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property
are Material Only to Determine the Penalty.
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the
same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who,
by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if
it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this
article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished
by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value
of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.
The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v.
Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in
itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x
x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en
banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939.
Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-
crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article
365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely
methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by
dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an
indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional
crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous
conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second
prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a
quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but
arising from the same reckless act or omission
upon which the second prosecution was based.
PEOPLE v. JULIO GUILLEN
FACTS: Julio Guillen was determined to
assassinate former Pres. Manuel Roxas. He
pondered on ways to assassinate the latter but he
decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity
meeting held at Plaza de Miranda. He went to the
said meeting carrying two hand grenades
concealed in a paper bag which also contained
peanuts. He buried one of those in a pot located
close to the platform and he threw the other one at
Pres. Roxas. However, Gen. Castaneda was able
to kick it away from the platform. The grenade to
the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of
persons who where standing close to the platform.
Fragments of the grenade had injured one Simeon,
who died on the following, and wounded Alfredo
Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested 2 hours after. He admitted the
everything but he justified his action. He was so
determined to kill the President because according
to him President Roxas, instead of looking after the
interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned
for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure.
He was found guilty by the CFI of the crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder.
ISSUE: W/N he was responsible for the death of
Simeon Varela.
HELD: Yes. When Guillen attended the meeting,
carrying with him the hand grenades to assassinate
Roxas, he knew fully well that he could kill or injure
all those people around his main and intended
victim due to the highly explosive nature of
grenade.
He even stated that killing those who surrounded
Roxas was tantamount to killing the President, for
the reason that these people are loyal to the
President. It means that although it was not his
main intention to kill the persons surrounding the
President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also
in order to attain his main purpose of killing the
President.
The SC held that in throwing hand grenade at the
President with the intention of killing him, the
appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable
for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in
accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the incident
of another act performed without malice. (People
vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in
order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it
is necessary that either malice nor intention to
cause injury should intervene; where such intention
exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has
produced even though it may not have been the
intention of the actor to cause an evil of such
gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on
the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held
by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful
act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil.,
232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot
be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs.
Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
People v. ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias
"Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA,
TEODULO ALEGARBES and EUFEMIO
CABANERO, accused, ROLUSAPE
SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO
TIMOTEO BERONGA
FACTS: EDWIN SANTOS:
(Jan 1, 1985) The victims in this case were asked
by one Stephen Lim to drive his car home. Nelson
Tiempo drove the car with Rogelio Presores.
Alfredo Nardo drove the owner-type jeep along with
Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo to aid the group back
to the party after parking the car at Lim’s house.
When they reached the gate, they were met with a
sudden burst of gunfire. The four persons who were
identified as Sabalones, Beronga, Alegarbes, and
Cabanero. This led to the death of Glenn Tiempo
and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries of Nelson
Tiempo (throat), Rey Bolo (right palm and cheek)
and Rogelio Presores (breast).
DEFENSE:
Timoteo Beronga – he attended a cock-derby and
was fetched by his wife
Relatives of Sabalones testified that he was lying
on the lawn while they’re attending the wake of
Junior Sabalones.
He remembered that a month prior to the death of
Nabing Velez, his father, Federico Sabalones, Sr.
and the deceased while matching their fighting
cocks at the Talisay Sports Complex, had an
altercation and the latter slapped his paralytic father
and challenged him to ask one of his sons to
avenge what he had done to him. He came to know
about the incident only after a week.
He did not deny the fact that he was hurt by the
actuation of the deceased for humiliating his father
but it did not occur to him to file a case or take any
action against the deceased because he was too
busy with his business and with his work as a bet
caller in the cockpit.
RTC & CA - two counts of murder and three counts
of frustrated murder
The said appelants accuse the trial court of
engaging in "conjecture" in ruling that there was
aberratio ictus in this case
ISSUE: W/N there was aberratio ictus in this
case
HELD: No, the SC held that the case was better
characterized as error personae or mistake in the
identity of the victims.
The conclusion of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong
persons was based on the extrajudicial statement
of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer
Binghoy. These pieces of evidence sufficiently
show that appellants believed that they were
suspected of having killed the recently slain Nabing
Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate
against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims'
vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the
avenging men of Nabing Velez, appellants opened
fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken
does not diminish their culpability. The Court has
held that "mistake in the identity of the victim
carries the same gravity as when the accused
zeroes in on his intended victim."
PEOPLE v. GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y
SANCHEZ
FACTS: Gines Alburquerque has been suffering
from partial paralysis, walks dragging one leg and
has lost control of the movement of his right arm.
His daughter Pilar became acquainted and had
intimate relations with the deceased Manuel Osma.
Pilas gave birth but Gines did not know that their
relationship had gone to such extremes that he had
to be deceived with the information that she had
gone to her godfather's house in Singalong, when
in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital
for delivery. He learned the truth only when Pilar
returned home with her child.
He wrote letters to Osma entreating the him to
legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at
least, to support her and his child. Although the
deceased agreed to give the child a monthly
allowance by way of support, he never complied
with his promise.
He went to Osma’s office to ask him to marry his
daughter. When Osma refused, Gines whipped out
his penknife. Osma tried to seize him by the neck
and Gines stabbed him on the face. Due to his lack
of control of the movement of his arm, the weapon
landed on the base of the Osma’s neck.
ISSUE: W/N Gines is criminally liable despite
the fact that it was not his intention to kill
Osma.
HELD: Still liable, but the mitigating circumstance
of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as
the death of Osma was appreciated.
Gines emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to
inflict a wound that would leave a permanent scar
on the Osma’s or one that would compel him to
remain in the hospital for a week or two but never
intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate
his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least,
support his daughter. He even stated this intention
in some of his letters to the Osma by way of a
threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the
benefit of his daughter. That the act of Gines in
stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound
at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact
hereinbefore mentioned that he did not have control
of his right arm on account of paralysis and the
blow, although intended for the face, landed at the
base of the neck.
BATACLAN v. MARIANO MEDINA
FACTS: At about 2am, the bus operated by its
owner Mariano Medina and driven by Conrado
Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on
its way to Pasay City, one of the front tires burst
and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a
canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus
but the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the
woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva,
could not get out of the overturned bus. No
evidence to show that the freed passengers,
including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four
passengers trapped inside the vehicle.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of
them carrying a lighted torch, approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce
fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped inside it.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four
passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his
death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name
and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the
present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the
value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan
to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire.
Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to
CA which endorsed the case to SC.
ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the
fire that burned the bus, including the 4
passengers left inside
HELD: The Court held that the proximate cause
was the overturning of the bus because when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on
its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected.
The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and
the conductor themselves, and that because it was
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had
to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch
was to be expected and was a natural sequence of
the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of
its passengers and the call for outside help.
Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through
its driver and its conductor. According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the
road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank
and soaked the area in and around the bus.
The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed
even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor
the conductor would appear to have cautioned or
taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus.
PEOPLE v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO,
EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN
MACANDOG
FACTS: August 4, 1980 - After a barrio fiesta in
Vinzons, Camarines Norte, Edmundo pushed aside
the group of Esmeraldo Quinones, Jr., Zaldi Asis,
and Felix Lukban, and even prompted Zaldi to box.
Fernando brought out his bolo when he saw
Edmundo on the ground, hacked Zaldi but missed.
The group of Quinones was then pursued by the
three accused.
Upon seeing they were no longer being chased,
Quinones invited the other two to his house so that
he could change to his working clothes as a bus
conductor.
While the trio were walking towards the house of
Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside and without a word,
Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his bolo
hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall
down, which resulted in his death.
DEFENSE – They were in their house.
To augment their alibi, they pointed out the
Certificate of Death have shown that the victim’s
death was caused by a vehicular accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that
Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. They
merely relied on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a
prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple
fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was caused
by a vehicular accident.
RTC – Murder
ISSUE: W/N Fernando could be absolved of his
criminal liability given that the victim was
subsequently run over by a vehicle.
HELD: No. The SC held that indeed, after
Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking
perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle.
This finding, however, does not in any way
exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of
Quiñones, Jr.
Art. 4 of RPC provides that criminal liability shall be
incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that
"el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused), the essential requisites of
Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been
committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the
offender.
(first element) The intentional felony committed was
the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan.
That it was considered as superficial by the
physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the
point. What is material is that by the instrument
used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of
the wound, the assault was meant not only to
immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it
was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body:
the head.
(second element) The hacking incident happened
on the national highway where vehicles are
expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle
passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis,
running scared and having barely negotiated the
distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of
people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking
blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was
run over by a vehicle
Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result
therefrom."
In other words, the sequence of events from
Iligan’s assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr.
was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very
short span of time between them, one unbroken
chain of events. Having triggered such events,
Iligan cannot escape liability.
FILOMENO URBANO v. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal.
Urbano went to the elevated portion and saw
Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass.
Javier admitted that he was the one who opened
the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier
on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg
with the back of the bolo, causing a swelling on
said leg.
On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an
amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the
medical expenses of Javier.
On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the
hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions.
The doctor found the condition to be caused by
tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in
his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was
charged with homicide and was found guilty both by
the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based
on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated
that he saw the deceased catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals on November 5, arguing
that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his
own negligence.
Circuit Criminal Court - Homicide
ISSUE: W/N the wound inflicted by Urbano to
Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s
death
HELD: No. Pursuant to this provision “an accused
is criminally responsible for acts committed by him
in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom. The rule is that
the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused.
Javier’s wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3
or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
As the Court previously ruled on Manila Electric Co.
v. Remoquillo:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but
for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.
In simpler terms, if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.
SULPICO INTOD v. CA
FACTS: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos
Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya’s house in Misamis Occidental and asked
him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with
Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a
land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he
would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Intod and
others, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It
turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by
her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.
RTC & CA – Attempted Murder
ISSUE: W/N the crime committed is impossible
crime.
HELD: Yes. Legal impossibility would apply to
those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire
and expectation is to perform an act in violation of
the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the
intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to
a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead
falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. One example
is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
and finds the pocket empty.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner
shoots the place where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in
said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction,
impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility
of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a
defense, but an act penalized by itself.
Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility"
that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal
Code makes no distinction between factual or
physical impossibility and legal impossibility.
Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime
is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that
in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents
physical impossibility which rendered the intended
crime impossible of accomplishment. And under
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.
PEOPLE v. SALADINO
FACTS: Corporal Bartolo Saladino and Private
Anastacia Alejo of the Philippine Constabulary were
resting in the house of Celso Abucay Ilocos Norte,
together with policemen. About midnight they were
suddenly awakened by cries for help. They went
down and were approached by one Felix Pasion
who
reported he had been robbed, one of the robbers
being Luis Bernabe.
The next morning, Saladino and Alejo,
accompanied by the policemen proceeded to the
house of Luis Bernabe. They brought him for
questioning. Bernabe denied the charge. To extract
a confession, Saladino repeatedly boxed and
kicked him in different parts of the body. Bernabe
continued denying his guilt. Saladino got a piece of
wood, two inched thick and one yard long, and
clubbed him several times on the chest, abdomen
and the back.
Then he called on Alejo to take his turn. Alejo
reluctantly whipped Bernabe four times with the
branch of a tree, and then retired to the kitchen.
Saladino again questioned his prisoner and as the
latter would not admit his culpability, he repeated
the severe beating. He tied Bernabe’s wrists
together with a rubber strap He made him stand on
a chair, tied the strap to a beam in the ceiling and
then pushed the chair from under Bernabe with the
result that the latter was left hanging in the air.
Bernabe was cudgeled by Saladino, with the
wooden club.
Saladino was stopped by other policemen but he
ignored them and resumed the maltreatment. He
untied Bernabe and made him sit on a chair. He
kicked the chair when Bernabe still refused to
acknowledge his offense. Bernabe lay motionless.
Saladino ordered two civilians to carry Bernabe
down and told Alejo: “shoot him now and we will
say that he ran away”. Complying with the
corporal’s order Alejo shot Bernabe four times
DEFENSE: Medical expert, on the contrary,
asserted that death was due to the loss of blood
occasioned by the three shots that pierced the body
of Bernabe
ISSUE: W/N Alejo committed an impossible
crime.
HELD: Yes. Bernabe was already dead when shot.
Bernabe died as a consequence of the violent
mauling by Saladino, the latter must be declared
guilty of assassination. So, there was a physical
impossibility of accomplishing Alejo’s intended act.
Anastacio Alejo does not appear to have conspired
with him, and is not liable either as principal or as
accomplice of the murder. But he is guilty as
accessory after the fact for having performed acts
tending to conceal Saladino’s crime by making it
appear that Bernabe had run away.
GEMMA JACINTO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Gemma Jacinto is an employee of
Megafoam International. She received the check
payment of Isabelito Milabo. She deposited the said
check in the account of her sister’s husband
Generoso Capitle.
Later on, Land Bank called to inform that the said
check (Capitle) was dishonored. One employee
Ricablanca relayed the information to Valencia, a
former employee who happens to be Capitle’s
neighbor. She informed Ricablanca that the check
came from Milabo and instructed her to ask Milabo
to replace the check with a cash. She also told
Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it
equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, Jacinto
and Jacqueline Capitle. However, Ricablanca
reported the matter to Dyhengco, the owner.
The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft
against the two and one Jane Doe who was later
identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of
Generoso Capitle
CA: Capitle was acquitted. Valencia’s was reduced
to 4 months arresto mayor medium
ISSUE: W/N Jacinto committed the crime of
qualified theft.
HELD: No. Jacinto unlawfully took the postdated
check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently
dishonored. Hence, she’s guilty of committing an
impossible crime of theft only.
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that
the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with
evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible
of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To
be impossible under this clause, the act intended
by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be
either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts,
even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
In this case, there is factual impossibility. Jacinto
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of
qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Her evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of
unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam
showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.
Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which
was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to
the extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time,
that prevented the crime from being produced.
The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
to be absolutely worthless, because the check was
eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.
US v. PROTASIO EDUAVE
FACTS: Protacio Eduave rushed upon the girl
suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at
least, with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash
in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight
and one-half inches long and two inches deep,
severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.
He was incensed at the girl for the reason that she
had theretofore charged him criminally before the
local officials with having raped her and with being
the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's
querido and was living with her as such at the time
the crime here charged was committed.
The only question is the precise crime of which he
should be convicted. It is contended, in the first
place, that, if death has resulted, the crime would
not have been murder but homicide, and in the
second place, that it is attempted and not frustrated
homicide.
ISSUE: W/N the crime committed by Eduave
was frustrated or attempted.
HELD: It was frustrated murder. The SC held that
the crime committed would have been murder if the
girl had been killed. It is qualified by the
circumstance of alevosia, the accused making a
sudden attack upon his victim from the rear, or
partly from the rear, and dealing her a terrible blow
in the back and side with his bolo. Such an attack
necessitates the finding that it was made
treacherously; and that being so the crime would
have been qualified as murder if death had
resulted.
The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is
clear from the fact that the defendant performed all
of the acts which should have resulted in the
consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from
further acts. A crime cannot be held to be
attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is
prevented, against his will, by some outside cause
from performing all of the acts which should
produce the crime. In other words, to be an
attempted crime the purpose of the offender must
be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which
intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the
moment when he has performed all of the acts
which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has
performed all of the acts which should result in the
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists
from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
The essential element which distinguishes
attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter,
there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous
cause or agency between the beginning of the
commission of the crime and the moment when all
of the acts have been performed which should
result in the consummated crime; while in the
former there is such intervention and the offender
does not arrive at the point of performing all of the
acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped
short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.
In case of frustrated crimes, the subjective
phase is completely passed. Subjectively the
crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the
offender while he was passing through the
subjective phase. The crime, however, is not
consummated by reason of the intervention of
causes independent of the will of the offender.
He did all that was necessary to commit the
crime. If the crime did not result as a
consequence it was due to something beyond
his control.
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA,
EDGARDO RIVERA v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Ruben Rodil, the victim was a former taxi
driver. He stopped driving when a would-be rapist
threatened his life.
Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and
dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented
the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A
heated exchange of words ensued.
The next day, while Ruben went to store to buy
food and to look for his wife, Esmeraldo and his two
brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their
house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and
Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to
the ground.
In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three
times with a hollow block on the parietal area.
Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben.
People who saw the incident shouted: "Awatin sila!
Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand
up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the
back. When policemen on board a mobile car
arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to
their house.
Ruben was rushed to the hospital and the doctor
declared that the lacerated wound in the parietal
area was slight and superficial and would heal from
one to seven days.
DEFENSE: It was Ruben who went to Esmeraldo’s
house and challenged them to come out and fight.
RTC: Frustrated murder
They contended that the fact that the injury
sustained by the victim was superficial and, thus,
not life threatening; hence they’re only liable for
physical injuries or attempted homicide.
ISSUE: W/N the crime committed by the Riveras
was frustrated or attempted.
HELD: It was an attempted murder. The head
wounds sustained by the victim were merely
superficial and could not have produced his death
does not negate petitioners’ criminal liability for
attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the
victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still
criminally liable for attempted murder.
The prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill
Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim
with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground,
unable to defend himself against the sudden and
sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him
three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit
Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit
the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a
lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.
The Riveras, who acted in concert, commenced the
felony of murder by mauling the victim and hitting
him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly
missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If
Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have
died.
RENATO BALEROS JR v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Private complainant Malou was awakened
by the smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed
on her face. The suspect was pinning her down so
she couldn’t move. She continued fighting off her
attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand
got free. With this, she was able to grab hold of his
sex organ which she then squeezed.
Malou roused Marvilou and told her that somebody
attempted to rape her. She discovered that the
suspect fled from her room through an open
window.
At 3pm, Christian and his roommates, Bernard and
Lutgardo were asked by the CIS people to look for
anything not belonging to them in their Unit when
Rommel Montes went inside and found a grey bag.
Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito.
It contained white t-shirt with fraternity symbol, a
Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief, 3 white
T-shirts, an underwear and socks.
They later found out that Renato (Chito) was a
suitor of Malou which she rejected a week ago.
RTC and CA – Attempted Rape
ISSUE: W/N Baleros was guilty of attempted
rape.
HELD: No. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any
of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or
intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the
woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned
article of the same code, rape is attempted when
the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime
of rape by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of
sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the
present case. The next question that thus comes to
the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner,
i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while
on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some
physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this
case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth
in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to
sleep as an overt act that will logically and
necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did
not commence at all the performance of any act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It
cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully
clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to
undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For
what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate
intention, is anybody’s guess.
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Aristotel Valenzuela were sighted outside
SM North EDSA by security guard Lorenzo Lago,
unloading cases of detergent Tide Ultramatic on an
open parking space. Minutes later, Valenzuela
loaded the cartons of detergent while Calderon was
looking into a taxi and procedeed to leave the
parking area. Lago stopped the cab, checked the
cartons, and asked for a receipt but Valezuela and
Calderon reacted a fled-on foot.
Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security
guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon
were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen
merchandise recovered. The filched items seized
from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic,
one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3)
additional cases of detergent, the goods with an
aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.
First brought to SM security office then Baler
Station II. Valenzuela said that he was with a friend
to buy snacks when they heard a gunshot fired by
Lago. Calderon, on the other hand, said that he
was with his cousin when he heard a gunshot fired
by Lago that caused everyone to flee on the
vicinity.
RTC convicted the appellants guilty of
consummated theft. CA affirmed. Petitioner
contends that he was only guilty of frustrated theft
since at the time he was apprehended, he was
never placed in a position to freely dispose the
articles stolen.
ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela was guilty of
consummated theft.
HELD: Yes. The following elements of theft as
provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another;
(3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. There was no need of
an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property to constitute an unlawful taking.
To ascertain whether the theft is consummated or
frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how
exactly is the felony of theft “produced.” Parsing
through the statutory definition of theft under Article
308, there is one apparent answer provided in the
language of the law — that theft is already
“produced” upon the “taking of personal property of
another without the latter’s consent.”
It is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose the property stolen since he has
already committed all the acts of execution and the
deprivation from the owner has already ensued
from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or
consummated.
PEOPLE v. BIENVENIDO SALVILLA,
REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO
CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO CANASARES,
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA
FACTS: On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by
the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at
about noon time. They armed with with homemade
guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the
establishment, they met Rodita Hablero an
employee who was on her way out for her meal
break and announced to her that it was a hold-up.
She was made to go back to the office and there
Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino
Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie and
told the former that all they needed was money.
Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to
get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00
cash.
Severino pleaded with the four accused to leave
the premises as they already had the money but
they paid no heed. Instead, accused Simplicio
Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino after which the latter, his two daughters,
and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept
there as hostages.
Severino was told to produce Php 100,000. In the
meantime, police authorities had surrounded the
premises to negotiate with the accused. The latter
demanded the said amount, a coaster, and some
raincoats. The OIC Mayor offered 50K and
explained that it’s difficult to produce the said
amount. Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco
in going out of the office. When they were out of the
door, one of the accused whose face was covered
by a handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor Caram.
With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the padlocked
door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which
the latter, in turn, gave to one of the accused.
Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back
to the office.
After the negotiation failed to proceed, the police
made their move in assaulting the robbers thus
Mary and Mimmie are injured as well the accused.
RTC – ROBBERY
DEFENSE: The complete crime of larceny
(theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt
requires asportation or carrying away, in addition to
the taking, In other words, the crime of robbery/theft
has three consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the
taking and 3) the carrying away or asportation And
without asportation the crime committed is only
attempted
ISSUE: W/N the accused are guilty of the
consummated robbery.
HELD: Yes. Appellant insists that while the "giving"
has been proven, the "taking" has not for the
reason that neither he nor his three co-accused
touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the
latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident.
The SC held that no; Severino put P20,000.00
inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it to
Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares
took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In
respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram,
Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount
to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the
padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the
amount to one of the hold uppers. The "taking"
was, therefore, sufficiently proved. The money
demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were
within the dominion and control of the Appellant
and his co-accused and completed the taking.
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-
accused had no opportunity to dispose of the
personalities taken. That fact does not affect the
nature of the crime, From the moment the offender
gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit
had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the
unlawful taking is complete
In Pp. v. Quin: The crime is consummated when
the robber acquires possession of the property,
even if for a short time, and it is not necessary that
the property be taken into the hands of the robber,
or that he should have actually carried the property
away, out of the physical presence of the lawful
possessor, or that he should have made his escape
with it.
PEOPLE v. HERNANDO DIO
FACTS: At about noontime Crispulo Alega fetch his
girlfriend, Remedios Maniti. They proceeded to the
Pasay City Public Market. As they were going up
the stairs leading to the Teresa and Sons
Restaurant, Remedios, who was about an arms-
length ahead of Crispulo suddenly heard the
dropping of her folders and other things, being
carried by Crispulo. When she looked back, she
saw a man — later Identified as Danilo Tobias but
still at large — twisting the neck of Crispulo, while
the appellant was holding his (Crispulo's) two
hands.
The appellant and his companion tried to divest
Crispulo of his "Seiko" wrist watch, but Crispulo
resisted their attempt and fought the robbers. At
this juncture, the man who was twisting the neck of
Crispulo stabbed the latter on the left side of his
chest.
Crispulo ran down the stairs followed by Remedies
who shouted for help. When he reached the front of
the Pasay Commercial Bank he fell down and
expired. At the time of his death, the "Seiko" watch
was strapped to his wrist.
The trial court convicted defendant- appellant of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide as
defined and penalized under art. 294, par. 1, of the
revised penal code which is now being contested
since the watch was never taken from the
deceased.
ISSUE: W/N the accused is guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
HELD: Attempted robbery with homicide. The
appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in
their criminal venture of divesting the victim of his
wrist watch so as to constitute the consummated
crime of robbery. Indeed, as adverted to earlier,
when the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch was still
securely strapped to his wrist. The killing of
Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely
incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to carry out
the robbery, which however was not consummated
because of the resistance offered by the deceased.
PEOPLE v. AURELIO LAMAHANG
FACTS: At early dawn on March 2, 1935,
policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his
beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the
City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a
store of cheap goods located on the last named
street.
At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was
sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
Lamahang had only succeeded in breaking one
board and in unfastening another from the wall,
when the policeman showed up, who instantly
arrested him and placed him under custody.
ISSUE: W/N Lamahang was guilty of attempted
robbery.
HELD: No. The SC held that the attempt to commit
an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete
offense; that, which is the beginning of the
execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation.
The fact under consideration does not constitute
attempted robbery but attempted trespass to
dwelling.
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of
execution, if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the
case of robbery, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose
of gain, of some personal property belonging to
another. In the instant case, it may only be inferred
as a logical conclusion that his evident intention
was to enter by means of force said store against
the will of its owner. That his final objective, once
he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to
cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit
any other offense, there is nothing in the record to
justify a concrete finding.
PEOPLE v. FELIPE KALALO, MARCELO
KALALO, JUAN KALALO, & GREGORIO
RAMOS
FACTS: Prior to October 1, 1932, the date of the
commission of the three, the appellant Marcelo
Kalalo and Isabela Holgado, the latter being the
sister of the deceased Arcadio Holgado and a
cousin of the other deceased Marcelino Panaligan,
had a litigation over a parcel of land.
On September 28, 1931, and again on December
8th of the same year, Marcelo Kalalo filed a
complaint against Isabelo, which were both
dismissed. Marcelo Kalalo cultivated the land in
question during the agricultural years 1931 and
1932, but when harvest time came Isabela Holgado
reaped all that had been planted.
On October 1, 1932, Isabela Holgado and her
brother Arcadio Holgado, one of the deceased,
decided to order the said land plowed, and
employed several laborers. Marcelo Kalalo, who
had been informed thereof, proceeded to the place
accompanied by his brothers Felipe and Juan
Kalalo, his brother-in-law Gregorio Ramos and by
Alejandro Garcia, and their other relatives. They
were armed with bolos and they ordered the
laborers to stop working.
On the same morning, Marceino Panaligan ordered
the laborers to continue working. The appellants
arrived and at a remark from Fausta Abrenica,
mother of the Kalalos, about as follows, "what is
detaining you?" they all simultaneously struck with
their bolos, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo slashing
Arcadio Holgado, while the appellants Felipe
Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos slashed
Marcelino Panaligan, inflicting upon them the
wounds which caused their death.
After Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan
had fallen to the ground dead, the appellant
Marcelo Kalalo took from its holster on the belt of
Panaligans' body, the revolver which the deceased
carried, and fired four shots at Hilarion Holgado
who was then fleeing from the scene inorder to
save his own life.
The appellants attempted to prove that the fight,
which resulted in the death of the two deceased,
was provoked by Marcelino Panaligan who fired a
shot at Marcelo Kalalo upon seeing the latter's
determination to prevent Arcadio Holgado and his
men from plowing the land in question.
DEFENSE: self-defense
ISSUE: W/N Marcelo Kalalo is guilty of
attempted homicide.
HELD: Yes. The evidence shows that Marcelo
Kalalo fired four successive shots at Hilarion
Holgado while the latter was fleeing from the scene
of the crime in order to be out of reach of the
appellants and their companions and save his own
life. The fact that the said appellant, not having
contended himself with firing only once, fired said
successive shots at Hilarion Holgado, added to the
circumstance that immediately before doing so he
and his co-appellants had already killed Arcadio
Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, cousin and
brother-in-law, respectively, of the former, shows
that he was then bent on killing said Hilarion
Holgado.
He performed everything necessary on his pat to
commit the crime that he determined to commit but
he failed by reason of causes independent of his
will, either because of his poor aim or because his
intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots,
none of which found its mark. The acts thus
committed by the said appellant Marcelo Kalalo
constitute attempted homicide with no modifying
circumstance to be taken into consideration,
because none has been established.
PEOPLE v. BASILIO BORINAGA
FACTS: Harry H. Mooney, a resident of the
municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with one
Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral.
Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the
construction of the corral. On the morning of March
4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to
Mooney's shop and tried to collect from him the
whole amount fixed by the contract,
notwithstanding that only about 2/3 of the fish corral
had been finished. As was to be expected, Mooney
refused to pay the price agreed upon at that time.
Lawaan warned him that if he did not pay,
something would happen to him, to which Mooney
answered that if they wanted to do something to
him, they should wait until after breakfast, Lawaan
then left with his men, and Mooney, after partaking
of his morning meal, returned to his shop.
On the evening, Mooney was in his neighbor’s
store. He took a seat on a chair facing Perpetua,
and his back to the window. Perpetua saw
Borinaga from the window strike with a knife at
Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife
lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney
was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result
of the force of the blow, but was not injured.
Borinaga ran away towards the market place.
Before this occurred, it should be stated that
Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will
stab this Mooney, who is an American brute." After
the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he
did not hit the back of Mooney but only the back of
the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his
endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the first
attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but
was unable to do so because Mooney and
Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a
flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him away. Again
that same night, Borinaga was overheard stating
that he had missed his mark and was unable to
give another blow because of the flashlight. The
point of the knife was subsequently, on examination
of the chair, found embedded in it.
CFI – frustrated murder
ISSUE: W/N Borinaga is guilty of frustrated
murder.
HELD: Yes.
The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly
evidenced. The attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that murder was in the heart
and mind of the accused. More than mere menaces
took place. The aggressor stated his purpose,
which was to kill, and apologized to his friends for
not accomplishing that purpose. A deadly weapon
was used. The blow was directed treacherously
toward vital organs of the victim. The means used
were entirely suitable for accomplishment. The
crime should, therefore, be qualified as murder
because of the presence of the circumstance of
treachery.
The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that
the author perform all the acts of execution,
attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done
to accomplish the work of the assailant completely.
The cause resulting in the failure of the attack
arose by reason of forces independent of the will of
the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted
from further acts. What is known as the subjective
phase of the criminal act was passed.
VILLAREAL: The prisoner at bar, intending to kill
Mooney, approached him stealthily from behind
and made movement with his right hand to strike
him in the back with a deadly knife, but the blow,
instead of reaching the spot intended, landed on
the frame of the back of the chair on which Mooney
was sitting at the time and did not cause the
slightest physical injury on the latter. The acts of
execution performed by the Sy Pio did not produce
the death of Mooney as a consequence nor could
they have produced it because the blow did not
reach his body; therefore, the culprit did not
perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony. There was lacking the infliction
of the deadly wound upon a vital spot of the body of
Mooney.
The interference of the frame of the back of the
chair which prevented the Sy Pio from wounding
Mooney in the back with a deadly knife, made his
acts constitute an attempt to commit murder; for he
had commenced the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, and did not perform all the
acts of execution which constitute the felony by
reason of a cause or accident other than his own
voluntary desistance.
PEOPLE v. EMELIANO TRINIDAD
FACTS: Emeliano Trinidad, a member of the
Integrated National Police, assigned at Nasigpit
Police Station asked Lolito Soriano for a ride to
Bayugan. He was in uniform an had two firearms.
When they reached the stretch between El Rio and
Afga, Trinidad asked them to drive slowly because
he said the place was dangerous.
All of a sudden, Tan heard two gunshots.
SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. TAN did not
actually see the shooting of LAROA but he
witnessed the shooting of SORIANO having been
alerted by the sound of the first gunfire. Both were
hit on the head. TRINIDAD had used his carbine in
killing the two victims.
Tan got off and hid himself in the bushes. The Fiera
was still running slowly then but after about seven
(7) to ten (10) meters it came to a halt after hitting
the muddy side of the road. TAN heard a shot
emanating from the Fiera while he was hiding in the
bushes.
Minutes after that, TAN hailed a passenger jeepney
and rode on the front seat. After a short interval of
time, he noticed that TRINIDAD was seated at the
back. Apparently noticing TAN as well, TRINIDAD
ordered him to get out and to approach him
(TRINIDAD) but, instead, TAN moved backward
and ran around the jeep followed by TRINIDAD.
When the jeep started to drive away, TAN clung to
its side. TRINIDAD fired two shots, one of which hit
TAN on his right thigh. As another passenger jeep
passed by, TAN jumped from the first jeep and ran
to the second. However, the passengers in the
latter jeep told him to get out not wanting to get
involved in the affray. Pushed out, TAN crawled
until a member of the P.C. chanced upon him and
helped him board a bus for Butuan City.
DEFENSE: In Cagayan
RTC – Murder and Frustrated Murder
ISSUE: W/N Trinidad is guilty of Frustrated
Murder.
HELD: No. The SC held that TRINIDAD can only
be convicted of Attempted Murder. TRINIDAD had
commenced the commission of the felony directly
by overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts
of execution which would have produced it by
reason of causes other than his spontaneous
desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN
was clinging was in motion, and there was a spare
tire which shielded the other parts of his body.
Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and
the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted
on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the
crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not
having performed all the acts of execution that
would have brought about death
 BENJAMIN MARTINEZ v. CA
FACTS: Dean Dongui-is and his wife Freda filed a
complaint for damages against sps Martinez.
Benjamin Martinez, a suitor of Elvisa Basallo, had
been peddling false reports that Dean and Elvisa
had illicit relations; he even told Freda that Elvisa
was Dean’s mistress. This led to a quarrel between
Dean and Freda, and the latter was hospitalized for
her heart ailment. Dean requested Lilibeth to stop
her husband from spreading lies, and she replied
that Elvisa had been her husband’s mistress.
Elvisa also filed a complaint (Art 26 of NCC). She
alleged that on several occasions, petitioner went
to the Shaltene Pawnshop and Pharmacy where
she was employed and accused her of having an
illicit affair with Dean; on one occasion, he held her
hand and forcibly pulled her outside, which caused
her to scratch his face and run after him with a
knife; he also told her husband’s cousin, Willy
Ordanza, that she had an illicit affair with Dean;
Willy, in turn, told her mother-in-law about it;
petitioner relayed the same rumors to her co-
worker, Melba Dacanay, and his wife spread to
people in the Municipality, including Ramil Basallo,
her brother-in-law.
After the spouses filed a motion to dismiss, Dean
went to Tubao Credit Cooperative office to pick up
the dividend certificate of his wife. Dean was just
step away from an L-300 van parked in front of the
said office when Benjamin suddenly emerged from
behind the vehicle and stabbed him on the left
breast. Dean fled to the bank office and was able to
gain entry into the bank. Petitioner ran after him
and upon cornering him, tried to stab him again.
Dean was able to parry the blow with his right hand,
and the bolo hit him on the right elbow. Dean fell to
the floor and tried to stand up, but petitioner
stabbed him anew on his left breast.5 Dean
managed to run to the counter which was
partitioned by a glass. Unable to get inside the
counter, petitioner shouted at Dean: "You kneel
down because I will really kill you now this day”
DEFENSE: Martinez merely defended himself
against Dean’s assault. Less serious physical
injuries – absence of the element of intent to kill. He
advances the argument that the single wound
suffered by the victim was not life threatening and
that the latter was transferred to undergo operation
in another hospital only because the medical staff
where he was first rushed bungled their job. He
makes much of the fact that Dr. Darius R. Pariñas
who issued the Medical Certificate never testified
for the prosecution
RTC – Frustrated Homicide
ISSUE: W/N Martinez is guilty of Frustrated
Homicide.
HELD: No. Frustrated murder under Art 248 in
relation to Art 6 par. 1 of RPC.
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the
latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had
no intention to kill the victim or frustrated or
attempted homicide or frustrated murder or
attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the
victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of
the following: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number
of weapons used in the commission of the crime;
(c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on
the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at
the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the
victim
1. Martinez had more hatred to harbor arising
from the fact that Dean filed a lawsuit
against him and his wife.
2. Martinez was armed with a deadly 14.5-
inch bolo.
3. if it were true that petitioner stabbed Dean
merely to defend himself, it defies reason
why he had to stab the victim three times.
Petitioner’s claim that Dean suffered only a
single non-life-threatening wound is
misleading. Dr. Rimando, who attended to
and operated on Dean, testified that the
victim sustained three (3) stab wounds, two
(2) of which penetrated his heart and lung,
causing massive blood clotting
necessitating operation; the other lacerated
Dean’s his right elbow. The presence of
these wounds, their location and their
seriousness would not only negate self-
defense; they likewise indicate a determined
effort to kill.
4. It has been clearly established that
petitioner ambushed Dean and struck him
with a bolo. Dean was defenseless and
unarmed, while petitioner was deadly
armed.
It cannot be denied that petitioner had the intention
to kill Dean. Petitioner performed all the acts of
execution but the crime was not consummated
because of the timely medical intervention applied
on the victim.
ISIDRO MONDRAGON v. PEOPLE
FACTS: At 5pm, while complainant Serapion
Nacionales was opening the dike of his rice field to
drain the water and prepare the ground for planting,
he heard a shout from afar telling him not to open
the dike. He continued and he heard the same
voice again. When he looked up, he saw Isidoro
Mondragon coming towards him. Nacionales
informed him that he was opening the dike because
he would plant the next morning. Suddenly,
Mondragon tried to hit him who dodged the blow.
Mondragon drew his bolo and struck him on
different parts of his body. Nacionales backed out,
unsheathed his own bolo, and hacked Mondragon
on the head and forearm and between the middle
and ring fingers in order to defend himself.
Mondragon retreated, and Nacionales did not
pursue him but went home instead.
Charged – frustrated homicide
CFI – attempted homicide PEOPLE v. SY PIO aka POLICARPIO DE LA
CRUZ
DEFENSE: the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals do not show that the petitioner had the FACTS: Early in the morning, Sy Pio entered the
intention to kill the offended party store and started firing. The first one shot was Jose
Sy. Tan Siong Kiap, who was in the store and saw
ISSUE: W/N Mondragon is guilty of Attempted
the accused enter and afterwards fire a shot at
Homicide.
Jose Sy, asked the Sy Pio, "What is the idea?"
HELD: No, only for less serious physical injuries. Thereupon Sy Pio turned around and fired at him
The intention of the petitioner to kill the offended also. The bullet fired from Sy Pio's pistol entered
party has not been conclusively shown. The finding the right shoulder of Tan Siong Kiap immediately
of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner had the ran to a room behind the store to hide. From there
intention to kill the offended party is simply the he still heard gunshot fired from Sy Pio's pistol, but
result of an inference from an answer made by the afterwards Sy Pio ran away.
petitioner while testifying in his own behalf.
Sy Pio shot 3 people— before shooting and
The Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner wounding Tan Siong Kiap; one was Ong Pian and
had the intention to kill the offended party when the the other Jose Sy.
petitioner answered in the affirmative the question
Sy Pio: he and his wife worked in Ong Pian’s. the
as to whether he would do everything that he could
relatives of his wife had been asking the latter for
do to stop the offended party from digging the
help, because her father was sick. Defendant-
canal because he needed the water.
appellant asked money from Ong Pian, but the
The intent to kill being an essential element of the latter could only give him P1. His wife was able to
offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said borrow P20 from her employer, and this was sent to
element must be proved by clear and convincing his wife's parents in Cebu.
evidence. That element must be proved with the
Afterwards defendant-appellant was dismissed
same degree of certainty as is required of the other
from his work at the restaurant of Ong Pian, and he
elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill
became a peddler. Ong Pian presented a list of the
should not be drawn in the absence of
sums that defendant-appellant had borrowed from
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
him, and these sums were deducted from the
beyond reasonable doubt.
salary of his wife. Defendant-appellant did not
We hold that the facts brought out in the decision of recognize these sums as his indebtedness, and so
the Court of Appeals in the present case do not he resented Ong Pian's conduct.
justify a finding that the petitioner had the intention
As to Tan Siong Kiap, the confession states that a
to kill the offended party. On the contrary, there are
few days before September 3, 1949, defendant-
facts brought out by the decision appealed from
appellant had been able to realize the sum of P70
which indicates that the petitioner had no intention
from the sales of medicine that he peddled. He laid
to kill, namely: the petitioner started the assault on
his money in a place in his room, but the following
the offended party by just giving him fist blows; the
morning he found that it had disappeared from the
wounds inflicted on the offended party were of
place in which he had placed it. Tan Siong Kiap
slight nature, indicating no homicidal urge on the
and Jose Sy, upon the discovery of the loss of
part of the petitioner; the petitioner retreated and
money, told defendant-appellant that he must have
went away when the offended party started hitting
given the money to his wife, and that nobody had
him with a bolo, thereby indicating that if the
stolen it. After this incident of the loss, the
petitioner had intended to kill the offended party he
defendant-appellant used to hear Tan Siong Kiap
would have held his ground and kept on hitting the
and Jose Sy and other Chinamen say that the
offended party with his bolo to kill him.
money had not been actually stolen, but that he
The element of intent to kill not having been duly lost it in gambling. Because of these accusations
established, and considering that the injuries against him, he nurtured resentment against both
suffered by the offended party were not necessarily Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy.
fatal and could be healed in less than 30 days, We
He nurtured resentment against Tan Siong Kiap
hold that the offense that was committed by the
and Jose Sy.
petitioner is only that of less serious physical
injuries. CFI – frustrated murder
CA – murder
It is lastly contended that the defendant-appellant
should be found guilty only of less serious physical
injuries instead of the crime of frustrated murder as
defendant-appellant admitted in his confession in
the open court that he had a grudge against the
offended party, and that he connived with another
to kill the latter. The intent to kill is also evident
from his conduct in firing the shot directly at the
body of the offended party
ISSUE: W/N Sy Pio is guilty of Frustrated
Murder.
HELD: No, only for attempted murder. He did not
perform all the acts of execution, actual and
subjective, in order that the purpose and intention
that he had to kill his victim might be carried out.
He fired at his victim, and the latter was hit, but he
was able to escape and hide in another room. The
fact that he was able to escape, which appellant
must have seen, must have produced in the mind
of the defendant-appellant that he was not able to
his his victim at a vital part of the body. In other
words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had
not actually all the acts of execution necessary to
kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it cannot
be said that the subjective phase of the acts of
execution had been completed. And as it does not
appear that the defendant-appellant continued in
the pursuit, and as a matter of fact, he ran away
afterwards a reasonable doubt exist in our mind
that the defendant-appellant had actually believed
that he has committed all the acts of execution or
passed the subjective phase of the said acts. This
doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant-
appellant.
PEOPLE v. CEILITO ORITA
FACTS: Complainant Cristina Abayan was 19-yr
old freshman student and Lito Orita was a
Philippine Constabulary soldier.
Early in the morning, Abayan arrived at her
boarding house after her classmates brought her
from a party. She knocked at the door of her
boarding house when a frequent visitor of another
boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck.
Despite pleading for her release, he ordered her to
go upstairs with him.
Since the door which led to the 1st floor was locked
from the inside, they used the back door to the
second floor. With his left arm wrapped around her
neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her
neck, he dragged her up the stairs.
When they reached the second floor, he
commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to
look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He
then pushed her hitting her head on the wall. With
one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself.
He then ordered her to take off her clothes. Scared,
she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty.
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then
mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she
did as told but since she kept moving, only a
portion of his penis entered her.
He then laid down on his back and commanded her
to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis was
inserted into her vagina. When he had both his
hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the next
room and locked herself in. When he pursued her
and climbed the partition, she ran to another room
then another then she jumped out through a
window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18
meters in front of the boarding house and knocked
on the door. When there was no answer, she ran
around the building and knocked on the back door.
When the policemen who were inside the building
opened the door, they found her naked sitting on
the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket
and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two
other policemen rushed to the boarding house
where they heard and saw somebody running away
but failed to apprehend him due to darkness. She
was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital
where she was physically examined.
Her vulva had o abrasions or discharges.
RTC – Frustrated Rape
Orita – there is no crime of frustrated rape.
ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.
HELD: No, it was consummated rape.
Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate
that the attempted and consummated stages apply
to the crime of rape.
•Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
(1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony
(2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will
Attempted crime the purpose of the offender must
be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which
intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the
moment when he has performed all of the acts
which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which acts it is his intention to perform
If he has performed all of the acts which should
result in the consummation of the crime and
voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it cannot
be an attempt.
In the crime of rape, from the moment the
offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ
is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of
the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the
accused may be convicted even on the sole basis
of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did
not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the
victim.
PEOPLE v. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO
FACTS: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-
year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground
floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks
for her 2 children. There she met Primo
Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of
Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic
bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer
located at the second floor.
Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so
she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside
her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose
pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his
knees and his hands holding his penis with his right
hand
Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko
iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her
blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon
aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then
ran out and shouted for help thus prompting
Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who
were living within their compound, to chase the
Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the
barangay officials who detained.
Physical examination yielded negative results as
Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
DEFENSE: Crysthel was in a playing mood and
wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly
pulled him down causing both of them to fall down
on the floor.
RTC - Statutory rape
ISSUE: W/N the rape was a consummated
statutory rape.
HELD: No, it was only an attempted rape.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must
be entered for rape to be consummated, 16 and not
merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the
female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the
female organ or touching the mons pubis of the
pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendum by the
penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most,
it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised
Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape
by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
Chrystel did not feel any intense pain but just felt
"not happy" about what Primo did to her. 25 Thus,
she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko,
aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully
established, the Court had anchored its conclusion
that rape nevertheless was consummated on the
victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-
legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the
vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with
redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer
visible. 26 None was shown in this case.
US v. SEVERINO VALDES Y GUILGAN
FACTS: Around 8-9 AM, a certain Auckback called
Mrs. Lewin to inform her that much smoke was
issuing from the lower floor of her house.
Lewin ordered her servant Paquilino Banalt to look
for the fire. He found kerosene oil placed between a
post of the house, a piece of a jute rag which was
burning. At that moment defendant Valdes was in
the entresol; the other defendant Hugo Labarro wa
cleaning the horses kept in place.
Severino Valdes admitted the it was him who had
set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had been
noticed on the date mentioned. and he also who
had started the several other fires which had
occurred in said house on previous days; that he
had performed such acts through the inducement of
the other prisoner, Hugo Labarro, for they felt
resentment against, or had trouble with, their
masters, and that, as he and his coaccused were
friends, he acted as he did under the promise on
Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such fire
that he should start.
CFI - arson
ISSUE: W/N there is consummated arson.
HELD: No. The crime is classified only as
frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant
performed all the acts conceive to the burning of
said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes
independent of his will, the criminal act which he
intended was not produced.
The offense committed cannot be classified as
consummated arson by the burning of said
inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the
building had yet commenced to burn, although, as
the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene
oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol,
the partition might have started to burn, had the fire
not been put out on time
DANDY L. DUNGO & GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR.
v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Around 3 AM, Marlon Villanueva (the
victim) was brought to ER of JP Hospital. He was
motionless, not breathing, and had no heartbeat.
He was later pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan
noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side
of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms
and legs. He further attested that Villanueva 's face
was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer
running through his body due to lack of oxygen;
and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he
saw large contusions on both legs, which extended
from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the
couplexial portion, or back of the knees.
The Dr. disclosed that two (2) men brought
Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that
they found Villanueva lying motionless on the
ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City,
and brought him to the hospital. When he asked
them where they came from, one of them answered
that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route
to San Pablo City. He questioned them on how they
found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy.
Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men just said
that they were headed somewhere else.
He opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing.
He was familiar with hazing injuries because he
had undergone hazing himself when he was a
student, and also because of his experience in
treating victims of hazing incidents.
Susan Ignacio, owner of the store, testified that she
saw a jeepney with more than twenty (20) persons
arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the
person seated beside the driver of the jeepney. She
saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the
terrace of the resort who looked like they were
praying, and then the lights of the resort were
turned off. Later that evening, at least three (3) of
these persons went to her store to buy some items.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired
about Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by
Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help.
After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a
tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital.
There, he gave a false name to the security guard
as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
RTC - Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of
violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law
The crime of hazing by inducement does not
necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing
by actual participation. Thus, they cannot be
convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily
included in the information. By reason of the
foregoing, the petitioners contend that their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against them has been
violated.
Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a variance
between the, offense charged of "actually
participated in the infliction of physical harm," and
the offense "knowingly cooperated in carrying out
the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat."
ISSUE: W/N the conspiracy of the offenders was
proven
HELD: Yes. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
determine conspiracy, there must be a common
design to commit a felony.94 The overt act or acts
of the accused may consist of active participation in
the actual commission of the crime itself or may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by moving them to execute or implement the
criminal plan.95
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design.
The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of
facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole.96 Responsibility of a conspirator is not
confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts
and offenses incident to and growing out of the
purpose intended.
R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel
provision that introduces a disputable presumption
of actual participation; and which modifies the
concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6
thereof provides that the presence of any
person during the hazing is prima facie
evidence of participation as principal, unless he
prevented the commission of the punishable
acts. This provision is unique because a disputable
presumption arises from the mere presence of the
offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted
by proving that the accused took steps to prevent
the commission of the hazing.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie
evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that
they performed an overt act in the furtherance of
the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they
induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the
petitioners also actually participated in it based on
the prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient
to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.106 Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049,
the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie
evidence due to their presence during the hazing,
unless they prevented the commission of the acts
therein.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an
initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority
or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or
applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating
situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or
otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury. From the said
definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can
be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a
prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or
applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization;
and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed
in some embarrassing or humiliating situations
such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and
other similar tasks or activities or otherwise
subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury.
PEOPLE v. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON
LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT
PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT PILOLA,
appellant
FACTS: At 11:30 PM, Elisa Rolan was inside their
store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito
Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer.
Although already drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon
Lagliba joined them. Edmar had a heated
argument with Julian. Elisa pacified Edmar and
advised them to go home as she was already going
to close up.
Edmar and Odilon left then returned to block
Joselito and Julian. Edmar took off his eyeglasses
and punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted:
“Tama na. Tama na” but she was ignored as they
continued until they reached the end of the street.
Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow
blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped
punches. As Joselito tried to stop the fight, Odilon
pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped
down from his perch. He placed his left arm around
Joselito’s neck, and stabbed him.
Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who were across
the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the
victim and decided to join the fray. Ronnie took a
knife from the kitchen of Teresita and rushed
together with Pilola to the scene and stabbed
Joselito. As Joeslito was stabbed 11 times (6 fatal
stab wounds), he fell in the canal.
Odilon and Pilola fled while Ronnie went after
Julian who ran dear life. When Julian noticed that
Ronnie was no longer running after him, he looked
back and saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow
block and bashed Joselito’s head. Then, Ronnie
got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito
once more before fleing from the scene. Joselito
died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house
and informed his wife and brother of the incident.
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard, saw
Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito and fled
towards the direction of the mental hospital. She
did not see Odilon.
Elisa cross-examination had an inconsistency, she
stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim
(before it was Ronnie)
RTC - Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder qualified by treachery
The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to
prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in
stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for
one to be a conspirator, his participation in the
criminal resolution of another must either precede
or be concurrent with the criminal acts. He asserts
that even if it were true that he was present at the
situs criminis and that he stabbed the victim, it was
Odilon who had already decided, and in fact fatally
stabbed the victim. He could not have conspired
with Odilon as the incident was only a chance
encounter between the victim, the appellant and his
co-accused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the
appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by
direct participation. Elisa could not categorically
and positively assert as to what part of the victim’s
body was hit by whom, and how many times the
victim was stabbed by the appellant. He asserts
that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal
by direct participation.
ISSUE: W/N the conspiracy of the offenders was
proven
HELD: Yes.
Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the
victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the side
of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing
the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join
in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the
victim with their respective knives. The three men
simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon
and the appellant fled from the scene together,
while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to
overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to
where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block
and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All
the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant
before, during, and after the stabbing incident
indubitably show that they conspired to kill the
victim.
The victim died because of multiple stab wounds
inflicted by two or more persons. There is no
evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the
appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was
already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the
time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in
stabbing the victim, the crime was already
consummated.
All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the
appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim;
hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latters
death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice
but is a principal by direct participation.
Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire
with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the
appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a
principal by direct participation. The stab wounds
inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and
accelerated the death of the victim or contributed
materially thereto.