THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL

BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' MARKETING
MANAGERS

Jamal Al-Khatib
University of St. Thomas

Mohammed Y. A. Rawwas
University of Northern Iowa

Ziad Swaidan
University of Houston - Victoria

Richard J. Rexeisen
University of St. Thomas

The present study examines the impact of idealism, relativism and Machiavellianism on the perceived appropriateness of five
opportunistic negotiation tactics (i.e., traditional competitive bargaining, attacking opponent's network, making false promises,
misrepresentation of infonnation, and inappropriate infonnation gathering) using a samplefromthe United Arab Emirates (U AE).
Results indicate that idealism and Machiavellianism are strong predictors of managers' perceptions of the ethical appropriateness
of negotiating tactics. Implications of these results for global firms and marketing executives are discussed and directions for
future research are provided.

46 Journal of Marketing THEORY AND PRACTICE

 INTRODUCTION
Today, multinational firms consider the task of understanding
the ethical mindset of their global partners a major priority and
a must for successfully operating in the global market
(Bagozzi 1995). Oil and recent geopolitical events have placed
the Arab world at the center of attention on the global stage
and have presented many potentially profitable opportunities
in the region for interested western firms. Universities have
also responded to such interest by offering executive seminars
devoted to understanding the mindset of business executives
in the region. For example, the University of Memphis CIBER
designed the GlobalEd Seminars in Business, Culture and
Leadership to broaden cultural and leadership understanding
among executives of international corporations to prepare them
for conducting business in the Arab region (Wang Center for
International Education Business Education and Research
2005). Despite this heightened interest, very limited effort has
been made by social and behavioral scientists to study that part
of the world and its people. Most of the current research is
journalistic in nature and tends to lack any scientific support.
Western executives continue to rely on simplistic formulas
such as "do as the Romans do" when dealing witii their Arab
counterparts (Little 2004).
As international trade and business opportunities grow in the
Arab region, western executives are constantly negotiating
with Arab executives. The negotiation process is plagued with
ethical dilemmas and opportunistic temptations. In a tactical
process, as two parties try to reach agreement, each wanting to
maximize their results, the temptations to use deceptive or
dishonest tactics are undeniable. In fact, negotiation has been
defined as "a process of potentially opportunistic interaction
by which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict,
seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could
otherwise" (Lax and Sebenious 1986, p. 11). Despite the
potential for opportunistic tendencies in the negotiation
exchange, western firms' executives continue to deal with their
counterparts in different Arab countries by regulating their
exchange partners' behavior through governance structures
(e.g., contractual agreements, ownership) that have varying
capacities to respond effectively to disturbances (i.e., ex post
opportunism that occurs during the relationship) (Williamson
1985). Given the considerable resources needed to monitor ex
post opportunism and the opportunity costs in the form of
valuable deals that will not be executed due to opportunistic
behavior (Wathne and Heide 2000; Calfree and Rubin 1993),
it is essential that more research focus on ex ante opportunism
(i.e., opportunism that occurs in early stages ofthe relationship
initiation and during the exchange partner selection stage) so
that global firms can develop the knowledge and expertise
necessary to understand how to screen, select and manage
exchange partners prior (ex ante) to the establishment of the
exchange relationship and any dependencies that may prove
ineffective and costly.
The present study contributes to the global business-to-
business negotiation literature in several ways. First, unlike
prior research that conceptualizes and tests opportunistic
behavior during the exchange relationship (ex post
opportunism), we conceptualize opportunistic negotiation
tactics as an ex ante form of opportunism (opportunistic
behavior exhibited during early stage ofrelationship initiation)
that can be detected and used as an input to the decision
related to whether or not a firm may wish to be involved in an
exchange relationship prior to making any costly commitment.
Second, this paper focuses on the ethical determinants of ex
ante opportunistic negotiation tactics. While opportunism has
been investigated by marketing, management and economics
scholars using variousframeworks(i.e., game theory, principle
agent theory, transaction cost analysis) (e.g., Williamson,
1985; Calfee and Rubin 1993; Wathne and Heide 2000),
opportunism has not been studied as a moral issue by business
ethicists. As Romar (2004, p. 667) suggests
Opportunism represents an important risk to
contemporary business organizations, which is
explored by economists and marketers and not by
business ethicists. Opportunism is an important
moral issue in an increasingly global world;
opportunism, whether by large or small firms or
entire industries, has the potential to have a
significant impact well beyond the boundaries of a
single firm or economy.
Third, as corporations participate in Ae global economy, one
of their challenges is to understand the ethical negotiation
practices of their international partners (Volkema 2004).
Despite the feet that the negotiation literature is rich with
numerous studies prescribing the means for managing
confiicts in the negotiation process, very little attention has
been devoted to the ethically challenging component of the
negotiation process (Robinson, Lewicki and Donahue, 2000).
Little guidance is provided to managers on how to deal
effectively with the ethical component of the negotiation
process. The present study fills this gap in the negotiation
literature by examining the ethical mindset of the business
negotiators using executives from the UAE.
The UAE market is the most progressive and open market in
the Arab region as evidenced by the country's early accession
to the World Trade Organization and the country's sig^iing of
a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with
Washington. In November 2004, UAB agreed to undertake
negotiations toward a Free Trade Agreement (FT A) with the
U.S. These initiatives toward market openness and trade
liberalization make the UAE market an attractive destination
for direct foreign investments by international firms from
around the globe and make it imperative for those interested
firms to understand how to negotiate effectively and efficiently
in this important market.
Fall 2005 47
Fourth, the present research helps firms interested in the
Middle Eastern market to test the external validity of their
code of ethics and the extent to which individual ethical values
facilitate or impede the universal application of a firm's ethical
code. This study assists in this endeavor by examining the
impact of Arab executives' preferred ethical ideology and
Machiavellianism on their perception of unethical negotiation
tactics. Through the present study's exploration of patterns of
Arab executives' negotiation-related ethical beliefs and
orientations, we hope to reveal interesting and significant
differences in the ethical mindset of the Arab executive. By
investigating the impact of these variables on their perceptions
of unethical negotiation practices, global firms' executives can
better understand the ethical mindset of their Arab
counterparts. With this understanding it is then possible to
utilize this knowledge to efficiently and effectively manage the
negotiation process with their counterparts in this important
maricet. Public policymakers and researchers can also benefit
from this study by understanding the external validity and the
degree of ethnocentrism of not only their own code of ethics
but also the validity of a imiversal code of ethics.
Fifth, despite the recent surge in the business ethics research,
the Middle East in general and the Arab-Gulf region in
particular, have been under investigated. A review of major
refereed journal articles in business and negotiation ethics
published between 1995 and 2005 revealed that less than 1%
of the studies published have utilized Arab executives. This
massive neglect of the region by research poses a serious
question about the degree of ethnocentrism of concepts and
dieories developed on the West and their global applicability.
As Curmingham and Green (1984, p. 9-10) correctly observed:
There is also a need for more fundamental research in
international marketing in order to adapt established
marketing concepts to the realities ofthe international
marketplace ... This is essentially a question of
external validity, and research should be encouraged
to determine which marketing principles can be
universally applied and which are basically
ethnocentric (applicable only in the United States Jind
similar countries).
Finally, given the Arab culture's emphasis on trust as the
central theme in all exchange relations (Hofstede 1984), we
propose that relational exchange is a more suitable form of
governance structure in the Arab region than the more
formalized forms. The present study surveys managers from
the UAE on the impact of their preferred ethical ideology
(idealism vs. relativism) and degree of Machiavellianism on
their perceptions of various opportunistic negotiation tactics.
This study has not been conducted, and therefore the study
findings should contribute to the literatures of business ethics.
The remaining sections of the paper review the literature
related to negotiation ethics and its relation to ethical ideology
and Machiavellianism; present research hypodieses, describe
the research methodology, present the results and discussion,
and discuss the managerial implications.
48 Journal of Marketing THEORY AND PRACTICE
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Opportunistic Negotiation Tactics:
Negotiation is a process by which the negotiating parties
interact with one another to reach mutual agreements to
provide terms, conditions, and guidelines for future behavior
(Ghauri and Fang 2001). Negotiation brings two or more
parties together to try to accomplish mutually beneficial
outcomes, while meeting individual goals that may be at odds
with the other parties' goals.
"Negotiations involve serial communication between parties
to exchange information and attempt to influence or persuade
one's counterpart," (Banas and Parks 2002, p. 237). The
negotiation process is plagued with ethical dilemmas. In a
tactical process, as two parties try to reach agreement, each
wanting to maximize his or her results, they may be tempted
to use deceptive or dishonest tactics. Negotiation behaviors
range from the ethical to the unethical. Ethical/appropriate
bargaining in distributive negotiations include exaggerated
demands, hiding one's bottom line, and not being forthcoming
about one's negotiation timeline. More questionable tactics
include false promises/bluffing where die negotiator shows an
intention to perform some act without actually having the
intention to follow through; misrepresenting position, which
takes place when the negotiator distorts his or her acceptable
settlement point in order to convince the opponent to provide
more concessions; attacking the opponent network, when the
negotiator attempts to bring members of the opponent team to
join his or her team; and inappropriate infonnation gathering
tactic, where the negotiator uses bribes or payment to collect
information about the opponent (Lewicki and Robinson 1998).
Several studies have examined the relationship between
negotiation tactics and ethics (Lewicki and Robinson 1998;
Robinson, Lewicki and Donahue 2000; Banas and Parks 2002;
Volkema and Fleury 2002; Elahee and Brooks 2004). Lewicki
and Robinson (1998) suggest that there are a wide range of
negotiation behaviors that vary with respect to perceived
ethicality and appropriateness. At the basic level there is
traditional competitive bargaining, consisting of tactics which
are generally acceptable, such as exaggerating demands and
appearing to be in no hurry to come to an agreement. In
addition, there are more questionable tactics, such as attacking
your opponent's network, making false promises,
misrepresenting information, and gathering inappropriate
information.
In studying business executives' perceptions of unethical
negotiation tactics, Lewicki and Robinson (1998) and
Robinson, Lewicki and Donahue (2000) found that
respondents are generally more accepting of traditional
competitive bargaining tactics and less accepting of the other
more serious and potentially illegal tactics. In contrasting U.S
and Mexican samples, Volkema (1998) reported similar
results. Elahee and Brooks (2004), in examining the role of
trust on Mexican managers' perception of six negotiation
tactics, empirically demonstrated diat there is a negative
relationship between the trust and the likelihood of using
inappropriate negotiation tactics. Ford et al. (1997) compared
the cognitive moral development and the percent of time
allocated to various negotiation tactics of Chinese and U.S.
businesspeople. They concluded that U.S. businesspeople
negotiating with Chinese executives must be aware of a more
collectivist approach to ethics.
Several studies found that demographic factors impact the
perception of the ethicality of negotiation behaviors. It has
been shown that age, gender, and occupation lead to different
perceptions of deception in negotiation (Anton 1990). Women
have been found to be less accepting of unethical deception
tactics than men (Lewicki and Robinson 1998; Robinson,
Lewicki, and Donahue 2000). In addition, nationality has been
shown to cause differences in perception of ethicalness of
negotiation tactics, with subjects from Western Europe and to
a lesser degree the Asian Pacific rim more likely to endorse
ethically marginal tactics than other groups (Robinson,
Lewicki, and Donahue 2000).
Finally, situational factors have also been shown to have an
effect on the perception of appropriate behavior (Volkema and
Fleury 2002). Examples of situational factors include having
a counterpart who comes with a reputation as an unethical
negotiator, being under a time deadline, and dealing with the
likelihood of future business relations with an opponent.
Ethical Ideology and Opportunistic Negotiations Tactics:
Marketing ethics theories suggest that when individuals are
faced with morally questionable situations, they tend to apply
rules that are based on different moral philosophies or
orientations to guide their judgments (Ferrell and Gresham
1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986; Ferrell, Gresham, and Fraedrich
1989; Hunt and Vitell 1992). For example, Ferrell, Gresham,
and Fraedrich (1989) stated that, "moral philosophies provide
standards to judge the act, the actor's intentions, and the
consequences of the act," (p. 56). Similarly, in Hunt and
Vitell's (1986) general theory of marketing ethics, normative
moral philosophy was at the core of their model. These moral
philosophies could be deontological or teleologicai in nature
(e.g. Murphy and Laczniak 1981). While the deontological
moral philosophy focuses on the specific actions or behavior
of the individual, the teleologicai philosophy stresses the
consequences of the action or behavior (Hunt and Vitell 1986).
When faced with an ethically challenging situation, individuals
who subscribe to the deontological philosophy tend to evaluate
the inherent rightness or wrongness of a set of possible
alternatives that he/she considers as possible courses of actions
against predetermined deontological norms or rules that reflect
the individual personal value or behavior. As for those
individuals who subscribe to the teleologicai philosophy, their
evaluations of actions are based on their perception of the
consequences of these actions on various stakeholder groups
and relative to the likelihood for the consequences to occur,
their desirability, and the importance of the impacted group
(Hunt and Vitell 1986; Hunt and Vitell 1992).
Forsyth (1980; 1992) conceptualized two evaluative
dimensions that have long been used to classify an individual's
ethical and moral judgments: idealism and relativism.
Forsyth's (1992) use of idealism and relativism "assumes
individuals can range from high to low in their emphasis on
principles and in their emphasis on consequences (p. 462)."
Idealism refers to the degree to which an individual believes
that the "right" decision can be made in an ethically tenuous
situation. This is essentially the deontological perspective that
embodies concern for others' welfare when evaluating
alternatives. Idealistic individuals believe that there is a
morally correct alternative that will not harm others. Less
idealistic individuals may make decisions irrespective of the
impjict on others.
Relativism, on the other hand, refers to the rejection of
universal rules in making ethical judgments. People who
espouse relativism make decisions on a situation-specific
basis. That is, high relativists evaluate the current situation and
use the evaluation as the basis for making a judgment. Low
relativists, on the other hand, believe that standard rules can be
applied regardless of the issue at hand. Forsyth (1992)
suggested that an individual's ethical ideology should have an
impact on how she/he would handle ethically challenging
situations.
Scholars examining ethical issues in the marketing and
management fields have found that ethical judgments among
business executives and individuals are mediated by their
ethical ideology (Vitell, Nwachukwu, and Barnes 1993;
Tansey, Brown, and H y m a n 1994; Bamett, Bass, and
Brown 1994, 1996; Sin^apakdi et al., 1995; Rao and
Sin^apakdi 1997; Wong 1998; Singhapakdi et al., 1999;
Swaidan, Vitell and Rawwas 2003; Swaidan, Rawwas and Al-
Khatib 2004; Al-Khatib, Stanton and Rawwas 2005).
Examining these constructs, Vitell Nwachukwu, and Barnes
(1993), found that more idealistic and less relativistic members
showed higher levels of honesty and integrity than their less
idealistic and more relativistic counterparts. In addition, those
who exhibited high levels of idealism and low relativism
tended to perceive ethics and social responsibilities as more
important than their less idealistic and more relativistic
counterparts (Singhapakdi et al., 1995).
Examining ethical ideology and judgments regarding
inappropriate negotiation tactics, Banas and Parks (2002)
found that ethical ideology and acceptability of the Self-
Reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies Scale (SINS)
were correlated. The authors hypothesize that, individuals'
ethical judgments as to the appropriateness of negotiation
tactics are mediated by their ethical orientations.
Fall 2005 49
Machiavellianbm and Opportunistic Negotiations Tactics:
Machiavellianism, a personality trait measured along a
continuum, is often examined in relation to ethical decision-
making. A high Machiavellian individual believes it is
appropriate to use any means to accomplish personal and
organizational goals, including manipulation, persuasion, and
deceit (Hunt and Chonko 1984). Hundreds of studies have
investigated Machiavellianism (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, and
Smith 2002). Researchers have also applied this concept to the
business arena with many looking at die level of current and
future business executives (Chonko 1982; Hunt and Chonko
1984; Corzine, Buntzman and Busch 1999). The research
indicates that individuals scoring high on the Mach scale are
likely to behave unethically. For example, Christie and Geis
(1970) found that Machiavellian individuals lie more
plausibly, manipulate others more, are persuaded by others
less, and pay bribes more than non-Machiavellian individuals.
Shapiro, Lewicki, and Devine (199S) found that Machiavellian
individuals tend to engage in deceptive tactics to achieve
personal objectives more often dian non-Machiavellian
individuals. Beu, Buckley and Harvey (2003) reported
significant correlation between Machiavellianism and the
intent to behave unethically. Examining the impact of
personality factors, cognitive moral development, and
demographic factors on unethical intent was die strongest
predictor of unethical intent. It has been found that high Machs
are more likely than low Machs to behave unethically (Beu,
Buckley and Harvey 2003). Machiavellian individuals do not
mind bending the rules to achieve their desired gains. High
Mach managers would not hesitate to take advantage of
personal connections. In summary, current research predicts a
direct relationship between relativism, Machiavellianism, and
an inverse relationship between idealism and the five
questionable negotiation tactics. Based on the above theory,
flndings and discussions, we hypothesize that:
HI a: Marketing managers' idealistic orientation will have
a positive impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of traditional
competitive bargaining.
HJb: Marketing managers' relattvistic orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of traditional
competitive bargaining.
Hlc: Marketing managers 'Machiavellian orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of traditional
competitive bargaining.
H2a: Marketing managers' idealistic orientation will have
a positive impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of attacking the
opponent's network.
H2b: Marketing managers' relativistic orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of attacking the
opponent's network
50 Journal of Marketing THEORY AND PRACTICE
H2c: Marketing managers' Machiavellian orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of attacking the
opponent's network.
H3a: Marketing managers' idealistic orientation will have
a positive impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of false promises.
H3b: Marketing managers' relativistic orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic ojffalse promises.
H3c: Marketing managers 'Machiavellian orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of false promises.
H4a: Marketing managers' idealistic orientation will have
a positive impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of misrepresentation
of position.
H4b: Marketing managers' relativistic orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of misrepresentation
of position.
H4c: Marketing managers 'Machiavellian orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of misrepresentation
of position.
H5a: Marketing managers' idealistic orientation will have
a positive impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of inappropriate
information gathering.
H5b: Marketing managers' relativistic orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of inappropriate
information gathering.
HSc: Marketing managers' Machiavellian orientation will
have a negative impact on their perception of the
opportunistic negotiation tactic of inappropriate
information gathering.
METHODOLOGY
United Arab Emirates (UAE) was selected as the research
setting—and provided the sampling frame—for this study.
There were several reasons for this selection. First, UAE is
relatively wealthy, included in the top seven Middle Eastern
nations in GDP per capita while holding huge oil and natural
gas (Central Intelligence Agency Publications, 2005). UAE is
the commercial gate to the Gulf region. This makes the UAE
an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI)
and an excellent setting for testing our research hypotheses.
Second, the country is in the process of diversifying and
privatizing its economy. As part of the process of accession to
the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign direct
investment is likely to rise in the region, making UAE at the
center of globalization.
Sampling and Data Collection:
The difficulties associated with conducting research in
developing economies necessitated the use of in-country
contacts to identify specific participants (Teagarden et al.,
1995). A sample of 400 UAE marketing executives with
budgetary and personnel responsibilify was identified. Those
identified were pre-notified of the purpose of the research and
given basic procedural instructions. One week later, the survey
instrument was hand-delivered in the morning and picked-up
at the end of the same workday using sealed boxes. This
method resulted in an operational data set of 208 respondents,
for a response rate of 52%. The majority of the sampled
respondents were males who are employed by firms operating
in various sectors of the economy (manufacturing, service and
trade). On average respondents have been serving in their
current positions for four years. Nearly all respondents have a
college or graduate degree. Table 1 provides details on the
demographic profile of the sample.
TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE (N=208)
GENDER:
Male: 69.7 %
Female: 30.3%
Average number of years in Average work experience: S.S
cnrrentjob: 4 years
years
Levet of Education:
7ype of business:
Some College: 2.1% Retail/wholesale (Trade): 78%
College Degree: 85.1% Manufacturing:
Graduate Degree: 12.8% Services: 14%
Measurement of Key Variables
A one-page (front and back) survey was administered to
respondents. The instrument consisted of four major sections.
Machiavellianism was measured in the first part of the survey
using the MACH IV scale. Moral ideologies (i.e., idealism and
relativism) were measured in the second part of the survey
using the EPQ scales. The third portion ofthe survey measured
the opportunistic negotiation tactics using the SINS scale. The
last part of the survey measured the demographics of the
participants. All measures used in this study were developed
by researchers, validated by previous studies, used by many
scholars, and published in scientific journals. Factor analysis
using principle components analysis with varimax rotation was
performed to confirm the underlying dimensionalify of these
scales. As expected, all items loaded on the intended factors
(MACH IV, Idealism, Relativism, and the five dimensions of
the SINS). Table 2 provides a list of constructs used in the
study, number of statements used to measure each construct,
a sample statement from each construct, and the reliability
measurements.
The Self-Reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies
Scale (SINS): The SINS was developed and validated by
Lewicki and his colleagues (Lewicki 1983; Lewicki and
Robinson 1998; Robinson, Lewicki, and Donahue 2000).
SINS was utilized to measure marketing managers'
perceptions ofthe appropriateness of questionable negotiating
tactics and their likelihood of using those tactics. Volkema,
Fleck, and Hofineister-Toth (2004) concluded that the SINS
appears to be a useftil tool in assessing attitudinal differences.
There were many studies that confirmed the predictive validity
of the instrument (e.g., Banas and Parks 2002). Also, SINS
was used successfully by many researchers (e.g., Volkema
1999; 2004; and Volkema, Fleck, and Hofineister-Toth 2004).
The scale contained 16 items representing five dimensions:
traditional competitive bargaiaing, attacking the opponent's
network, making felse promises, misrepresenting of
information, and inappropriate infonnation gathering. The five
dimensions achieved acceptable levels of reliabilities as
measured by Cronbach's alpha (i.e., coefficient alpha ranged
from .71 to .86).
Machiavellianism Scale: Machiavellianism was measured
using the MACH IV scale developed and validated by Christie
and Geis (1970). MACH IV scale was used successfully by
many researchers to explore ethical judgments (e.g., Raybum
and Raybum 1999; Bass, Bamett, and Brown 1999; and
Razzaque and Hwee 2002), and ethical intentions (e.g., Ross
and Robertson 2003). This scale contains 20 items with ten
items worded in a Machiavellian direction and ten items
worded in the opposite direction. Each respondent was asked
to indicate the degree of either agreement or disagreement
with each of the 20 items using a five-point Likert scale where
a 5 indicated strong agreement. Two items of the original scale
were deleted (up front) due to their irrelevance to the culture
of the country under study. The 18-item scale achieved an
acceptable level of reliabilify (coefficient alpha= .71).
Ethical ideology Scales: A person's predominant ethical
ideology or perspective was measured using the EPQ
developed and validated by Forsyth (1980, 1992). EPQ
consists of two scales with each containing ten items; one is
designed to measure idealism, or the acceptance of moral
absolutes, and the second is designed to measure relativism, or
the rejection of universal moral principles. Respondents were
asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with each
item using a five-point Likert format where a 5 indicated
strong agreement with a statement. All questions were worded
in a positive direction. Idealism and relativism scales have
been shown to be both reliable and valid in several studies
(e.g., Sivadas et al. 2003; Kim 2003; Elias 2002). Many
studies used the EPQ successfully to explore ethical awareness
(e.g., Yetmar and Eastman 2000; Sparks and Hunt 1998),
judgments (e.g., Elias 2002; Boyle 2000; Bass, Bamett, and
Brown 1999), and intentions (e.g., Singhapakdi et al. 2000).
The coefficient alpha reliabilities for the Idealism and
Relativism scales were (.84) and (.78) respectively.
Fall 2005 51
 TABLE 2
STUDY MEASURES AND RELUBILITY OF CONSTRUCTS
VARIABLE NUMBER SAMPLE STATEMENT ALPHA
OF ITEMS COEFnCIENT
Idealism 10 A peison should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm .84
another even to a small degree.
Relativism 10 What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another. .78
Mach IV 18 One should take action only when sure it is morally right .71
Traditional Competitive 3 Make an opening demand that is far greater than what you really hope to settle .86
Bargaining (TCB) for.
Attacking Opponent's 3 Threaten to make your opponent look weak or foolish in front of a boss or .71
Network (AON) others to whom he/she is accountable, even if you know that you won't
actually carry out the threat
False Promises (FP) 3 Promise that good things will happen to your opponent if he/she gives you .80
what you want, even if you know that you can't (or won't) deliver these things
when the
other's cooperation is obtained.
Misrepresentation of Position 3 Intentionally misrepresent information to your opponent in order to strengthen .85
(MP) your negotiating arguments or position.
Inappropriate Information 3 Gain information about an opponent's negotiating position by trying to recruit .84
Gathering (IIG) or hire one of your opponent's teammates(on the condition that the teammate

TABLE 3
REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TRADITIONAL COMPETmvE BARGAINING (HI)
F Value =16.420
Significant F = .000
Adjusted R' = .661
Variable II Standardized Beta Ii T-test 1 Significance of T-Test
Idealism (Hla) II -.486 II -4.680 1 .000
Relativism (HIb) II -.099 II -1.273 1 .205
Machiavellianism (HIc) ||-.083 II -.819 1 .414
DepcDdent Variable: Attacking Opponents Network (H2)
F Value = 21.77
Significant F = .000
Adjusted R' = .305
Variable II Standardized Beta T-test Significance of T-Test
Idealism (H2a) II -.301 -2.896 J .004
Relativism (H2b) II .170 2.263 .025
Machiavellianism (H2c) II .229 2.192 .030
Depcadent Variable: False Promises (H3)
F Value = 29.19
Significant F = .000
Adjusted R' = .321
Variable Standardized Beta T-test Significance of T-Test
Idealism (H3a) -.469 -4.762 .000
Relativism (H3b) .118 1.653 1.10
Machiavellianism (H3c) -.142 -1.438 .153
Dependent Variable: Misrepresentation of Information (H4)
F Value = 9.028
Significant F = .000
Adjusted R' = .221
Variable Standardized Beta T-test 1 Significance of T-Test
Idealism (H4a) -.143 -1.240 .217
Relativism (H4b) .032 .384 1.701
Machiavellianism (H4c) .282 2.428 1.016
Dependent Variable: Inappropriate Information Gathering (HS
F Value = 27.175
Significant F = .000
Adjusted R' = .364
Variable II Standardized Beta T-test Significance of T-Test
Idealism (H5a) II -.344 -3.444 .001
Relativism (H5b) II 1251 .725 .087
MarhinvplHiini-im (HSr) II 7^0 nil

52 Joumal ofMarketing THEORY AND PRACTICE

 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
To examine the relationships between employees' preferred
ethical ideology/orientation, Machiavellianism and UAE's
marketing managers' perception of opportunistic negotiation
tactics, five regression models were used (Table 3). Each
equation used the manager's perception of: 1) traditional
competitive bargaining tactics; 2) attacking an opponent's
network; 3) false promises; 4) misrepresentation opposition;
and 5) inappropriate information gathering as a dependent
variable and the idealism, relativism and Machiavellianism as
the independent variables.
The first equation examined the impact of idealism, relativism,
and Machiavellianism on marketing managers' propensity to
engage in traditional competitive bargaining tactics. The three
independent variables explained 66.1 % of the variation on the
equation {F= 16.42,/? < .05). Idealism was the only influential
factor of the three variables {Beta = -.486, p < .05). The
negative Beta indicates that marketing managers in UAE who
possess high levels of idealism are less likely to become
involved in traditional competitive bargaining tactics. This
result supports the hypothesis Hla. Hypotheses Hlb and Hlc
were not supported.
The second equation investigated the determinants of
mariceting managers' engagement in attacking opponents'
network tactics. The three predictive variables explained
30.5% of the variance in the equation {F = 21.77, P < .05).
Idealism was the most influential factor {Beta=-.301 ,/> < .05),
followed by Machiavellianism {Beta = .229, p < .05) and
relativism {Beta = .170,/? < .05). Examining the directions of
the signs of the Beta coefficients indicate, as hypothesized,
that marketing managers exhibiting h i ^ level of idealism, low
levels of relativism, and low levels of Machiavellianism are
less likely to engage in attacking their negotiating opponent's
network. These results confirm hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c.
When examining the role of the independent variables on
managers' tendencies to make false promises, the thr«e
independent variables explained 32.1% of the variance in the
marketing managers' perceptions of the false promises
behavior {F = 29.19, P < .05). Idealism was the only
influential variable in this equation {Beta=-.469,p < .05). The
direction of the beta sign indicates an inverse relationship
between the degree of the respondent's idealistic orientation
and the engagement in actions involving making false
promises to a negotiating partner. That is, idealistic marketing
managers are less likely to be involved in such unethical
behavior. This result supports the hypothesis H3a.
When examining the determinants of marketing managers'
engagements in misrepresentation ofposition to opponents, the
three independent variables explained 22.1% of the variance
in the dependent variable {F = 9.03, P < .05).
Machiavellianism was positively related to the
misrepresentation of information fector {Beta = .282,;? < .05)
indicating that Machiavellian managers tend to engage in such
tactic. This result provides support for hypothesis H4c.
The final equation investigated marketing managers' use of
inappropriate information gathering tactics. Idealism,
relativism and Machiavellianism explained 36.4% of the
variance in the equation {F = 27.18, />< .05). Idealism was
found to be negatively related to the respondents' tendencies
to engage in this tactic {Beta = -.344, p < .05) and
Machiavellianism was found to be positively related to
participants' tendencies to engage in the questionable tactic of
inappropriate information gathering {Beta = .260, p < .05).
These results provide partial support forhypotheses H5a and
H5c.
DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Several factors have been described as predictors of ethical
behavior, including personality variables (Hunt and Chonko
1984), demographics (Volkema 2004), ethical orientation (Al-
Khatib, Vitell, and Rawwas 1997), trust (Al-Khatib, Stanton
and Rawwas 2005), cultural values (Vitell, Nwachukwu, and
Bames 1993), opportunism (Al-Khatib, Stanton and Rawwas
2005) and economic Actors (Ford and Richardson 1994).
Given the presumption of conflicting interests among the
negotiating parties, it has been shown that many negotiators
attempt to seek advantages through opportunistic behavior or
other unethical means (Lewicki et al. 1994).
This study explored the relationship between three
independent variables (i.e., idealism, relativism, and
Machiavellianism) and five dependent variables (i.e.,
traditional competitive bargaining, attacking your opponent's
network, making false promises, misrepresentation of
information, and inappropriate informadon gathering) using a
sample of managersfiromthe UAE. This was the first study to
explore these relationships between the three independent
variables and the five dependent variables using a sample of
marketing managers from the UAE. The findings of current
study are comparable to other ethical studies that used the
three independent variables to explore ethical awareness,
judgments, intentions and behavior. This study found an
inverse relationship between idealism and direct relationships
between relativism, Machiavellianism and the five
questionable negotiations tactics. These results cotifinn the
outcomes of other ethical studies that tested similar
relationships. For example, Kim (2003) found that individuals
with high idealism or low relativism tend to make stricter
ethical judgments. Yetmar and Eastman (2000) found that
relativism is negatively associated with ethical sensitivity.
Raybum and Raybum (1996) found that Machiavellians are
less ethically-oriented than non-Machiavellians. O'Fallon and
Butterfield (2005) in their review of the empirical ethical
decision making literature for the period 1996-2003 concluded
that idealism, relativism, and Machiavellianism revealed fairly
consistent findings over the last two decades of ethical
research. They concluded that idealism was positively related
Fall 2005 53
to ethical decision making, while relativism and
Machiavellianism were negatively associated with ethical
judgments. Our study's results support the extemal validity of
the previous studies conducted in westem cultures.
Forsyth (1992) used both idealism and relativism to classify
people into four different ethical groups. First, absolutists are
individuals with low relativism and high idealism. Absolutists
believe that their actions are moral only if they yield positive
consequences through conformity to moral absolutes. They
believe that deception is always wrong since it violates
fiindamental moral principles. Second, subjectivists are
individtials with high relativism and low idealism.
Subjectivists are those who reject moral mles and base their
moral judgments on personal feelings about their actions. They
believe that deception is a personal matter to be decided upon
by the individual. Third, exceptionists are individuals with low
relativism and low idealism. Exceptionists believe that
conformity to moral mles is desirable, but that exceptions are
permissible. They believe that if deception cannot be avoided,
then it is allowable as long as safeguards are used. Last,
situationists are individuals with high relativism and high
idealism scores. Situationists are those who reject moral mles
while asking if their actions yield the best possible outcome in
a situation.
To gain better understanding of the various types of ethical
ideologies, we classified the sample into four groups using the
median points of the idealism (3.90) and relativism (3.10)
scales (Forsyth 1992). In past researeh we found two studies
(i.e., Vitell et al. 1991 and Rawwas 1996), which used this
scheme to classify respondents. Overall, the UAE managers
were mostly "absolutists" (38.6%) who strictly conform to
moral standards and norms. The second sub-group was the
"subjectivists" (24.8%); individuals belonging to this subgroup
not only reject moral standards, but also base their ethical
judgments on their personal whims. The third group, who hold
the same moral standards as the "absolutists" but who may
bend them somewhat under certain extraordinary
circumstances are the "exceptionists." The "exceptionists"
formed 22.8% of the sample. The fourth group was the
"situationists" (13.9%), who judge ethics by the consequences
of the situation. Most of the individuals in the fourth group are
probably utilitarian who believe that an act is right only if it
produces a greater balance of positive consequences than do
other available alternatives.
The mean score for the idealism scale was 3.77 and for the
relativism scale was 3.03. It is clear that UAE managers are
giving higher weight to idealistic rather than to relativistic
moral philosophies when making their ethical decisions. It is
interesting to note that idealism emerged as the most important
factor in determiningrespondents'perceptions of inappropriate
negotiation tactics that involves one's negotiating opponent
directly (e.g., making false promises, traditional competitive
bargaining). The Machiavellianism constmct manifested its
significant impact on questionable negotiation practices that
54 Journal of Marketing THEORY AND PRACTICE
involves a third party (e.g., inappropriate information
gathering, attacking opponent network and inappropriate
information gathering). These results are consistent with
previous research (Volkema and Fleury 2002) and suggest that
UAE negotiators may be more concemed with face saving in
direct negotiation by employing negotiation tactics that are
less harsh and generally accepted tactics in distributive
negotiation. However, when the tactic involves an indirect
third party, they may act in a more bmtal, opportunistic and
unethical manner. These results can be explained in the
context of the Arab culture. Previous research has shown that
cultures characterized by high power distance and uncertainty
avoidance, such the UAE culture, produce a lack of tmst with
the imfamiliar, and outsiders are viewed with suspicion and
distmst (Volkema 1998; Volkema and Fleury 2002). Second,
in the UAE culture, cell loyalty is of great importance
(Sommer, Welsh, and Gubman 2000). There is a great focus
on tmst and building relationships and doing business with
those people in the inner circle. To the Arab manager,
engaging in behaviors that exploit the "stranger" is
permissible; however, behaviors that exploit colleagues or an
irmer circle member are frowned upon. Given the nature of the
relationship among negotiating parties, the UAE negotiator's
counterpart is an outsider who is not trustworthy and thus
deserves exploitation.
The lack of significant relationship between relativism and the
respondents' perceptions of unethical negotiation practices
fails to support the hypothesized relationship; however, it is
not completely inconsistent with previous researeh findings
linking relativism to the acceptance of questionable ethical
practices (Forsyth 1980; Bamett, Bass, and Brown 1994; and
Bass, Bamett, and Brown 1998). These studies have found that
idealism has a stronger impact than relativism on ethical
judgments. The present study's result suggests that the
individuals' concems for the consequences of actions may be
less influential than their idealistic moral philosophy when
judging questionable negotiation practices.
Since little research has focused on the ethical mindset of Arab
negotiators, the findings from this study can be used to help
multinational companies doing business in the Arab-Gulf
region to become more aware of their host country's ethical
environment. Intemationai managers should also find the
results of this study intriguing and helpful in their dealings
with associates in the UAE.
Given the important role of Machiavellianism in shaping Arab
executives' perceptions of opportunistic negotiation tactics,
coupled with high levels of hostility (the legal environment
favoring local businesses regardless ofjust cause) (Cavusgil,
Deligonul, and Zhang 2004), westemfinmsneed to be cautious
when drafting legal contracts. That is, if westem firms impose
explicit legal contracts on their Arab counterparts, the
counterparts may perceive such action as a means of
controlling them. This can raise the inclination to behave more
opportunistically. Westem firms negotiating in the Arab region
 can promote honesty, enhance trust and curb opportunism by
exhibiting benevolence, moral commitment, and mutual trust
to their Arab coimterparts.
Westem firms negotiating with Arab counterparts can also
curb opportunistic behavior by implementing screening and
selection programs of various types that result in selecting
partners who are not opportunistically inclined or inherently
cooperative (Orbell and Dawes 1993). These selection efforts
should identify the criteria to be used in screening and
selecting future exchange partners. One possible criterion is
the reputation or past behavior in other relationships. Existing
reputation provides disincentive for opportunistic behavior
(Wathne and Heide 2000) and can be useful in judging the
potential exchange partner's willingness, motivation and
ability to behave ethically in the current relationship (Shapiro,
Lewicki, and Devine 1995). However, for this tool to be
effective, westem firms operating in the Arab region should
have information on their negotiating partner's past and
current behavior. Westem firms who have an established
presence in the region may find this information gathering task
manageable; however, for first time movers, the employment
of a local and independent consultant may be a more efficient
way to assess potential partners' reputations. Basic reputation
assessment tools such as a credit rating bureau and better
business bureau can also be useful in this assessment process;
however, in case these databases are not readily available,
local media coverage of legal actions taken or pending against
the negotiating counterpart may be an effective altemative.
Another means of curbing opportunistic tendencies (e.g.,
making false promises) is ex ante verification which involves
the verification of claims or promises before making
commitments that depend on these claims or promises
(Cramton and Dees 1993). Given the long-term ramification of
this opportunistic tactic, it is essential that westem firms
negotiating in the region employ a local agent (i.e., an insider)
who can assist in this verification effort. In a similar manner,
a local agent can be employed to represent the westem firm in
early stages of negotiation to reduce the potential use of
opportunistic tactics used against a third party (i.e.,
inappropriate information gathering, attacking opponent
netwoik and in^propriate infonnation gathering) and resulting
from the Arab culture's distrust of outsiders.
The high emphasis on trust in relationship building in the Arab
region heightens the need to rely on trust-based exchange as
the most effective and efficient negotiation process in the
region. Westem firms operating in the region can enhance
mutual trust by exhibiting to their Arab partners that they are
trustworthy and that they can be trusted. One way to
demonstrate trustworthiness early in the negotiation process is
for the westem firm to ^cilitate the other party's verification
efforts by providing privileged information that is otherwise
not obtainable, thus reducing information asymmetry and
imcertainfy ( e.g., causes of opportunistic behavior). To
demonstrate the ability to trust, western firms need to use a
personalized trust approach suitable for the Arab culture. This
approach may include the creation of more opportunities for
face-to-face meetings over a longer period of time and the use
of preliminary meetings prior to the actual negotiation to
discuss issues of mutual concems, the use of pre-negotiation
social contacts and even gift exchange among the parties
involved (Cramton and Dees 1993).
The strong negative relationship between idealism and the
Arab executives' likelihood of using opportunistic negotiation
tactics indicates that the groimds for ethical dealing is fertile
and underscores the need for multinational corporations, joint
venture partners to Arab firms, and intemational managers
operating in the UAE to codify the desirable and undesir^le
behavioral activities ofthe Arab negotiating partner. Given the
high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance
characterizing the Arab culture, these codification efforts ar«
likely to prove successful. However, such efforts need to be
developed with the Arab culture and past history in mind;
otherwise, any effort to codify behavior is bound to fail.
Moreover, understanding the Arab negotiator's ethical mindset
provides a valuable decision-making tool for firms interested
in this maricet. The strong emphasis that the Arab culture
places on trust as the backbone of all social, organizational and
transactional relationships infiuences both firm-level
perceptions of transaction costs and the preference for foreign
direct investment (FDI) as an entry strategy (Hofstede 1984;
Shane, Venkataraman, and MacMillan 1995). Intemational
firms capable of developing trustworthy relationships with
Arab strategic partners can reduce transaction costs and
increase FDI in the region.
Finally, situational factors such as possibilify of future/long
term business with the negotiating partners, ethicality of the
negotiating counterpart, and the degree of favorabilify of the
negotiation condition, can dramatically affect the negotiator's
perception of the appropriateness of opportunistic negotiation
tactics and the likelihood of their use (Volkema and Fleury
2002). Thus, it is possible for westem negotiators to influence
their Arab counterparts' choice of appropriate negotiation
tactics by discussing long term business opportunities,
exhibiting high ethical standards during the negotiation
process and by understanding the conditions under which their
Arab partners are negotiating. Such understanding can then be
integrated into training programs tailored to each specific
negotiation situation and offered to westem negotiators as part
of their preparation for the negotiation process.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The difficulfy of drawing a true random sample impairs the
generalizability of the specific findings of the current study.
Procurement of data from additional nations in the Middle
East would also add to the appeal of the existing database.
Given the sensitive nature of die topic being investigated and
Fall 2005 55
despite the effort to control for it, social desirability bias may
have been an issue among respondents. Future research should
include measures for controlling such bias and seek methods
of data collection that provide greater levels of respondents
identities confidentiality.
Future research should also investigate negotiation ethics in
Middle Eastem countries with more social, economic and
political problems than are evidenced in the current study. This
will provide a deeper understanding of the impact of
environmental factors (e.g., the civil unrest in Lebanon, the
economic and political hardships in Iraq, and the strong
foreign cultural infiuence on the population ofthe Arab nations
of North Africa) on consumers' ethical beliefe and preferred
ethical ideologies.
REFERENCES
Al-Khatib, Jamal A., Scott J. Vitell, and Mohammed Y.A.
Rawwas (1997), "Consumer ethics: a cross-cultural
investigation," European Journal of Marketing,
31(11/12), 750-767.
, Angela Stanton, and Mohammed Y.A. Rawwas
(2005), "Ethical Segmentation of Consumers in
Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis,"
International Marketing Review. 25(2), 225-246.
Anton, Ronald J. (1990) 'Drawing the Line: An Exploratory
Test of Ethical Behavior in Negotiations',
International Journal of Conflict Management, 1,
265-280.
Bagozzi, Richard P. (1995), "Refiections on Relationship
Marketing in Consumer Markets," Journal of the
Academy of Marketing Science, 23(4), 272-277.
Banas, Joseph T. and Judi M. Parks. (2002), "Lambs among
Lions? The Impact of Ethical Ideology on
Negotiation Behaviors and Outcomes," International
Negotiation, 7,235-260.
Bamett, Tim, Ken Bass, and Gene Brown (1994), "Ethical
Ideology and Ethical Judgment Regarding Ethical
Issues in Business," Journal of Business Ethics,
13(6), 469-480.
and (1996), "Religiosity, Ethical
Ideology, and Intentions to Report a Peer's
Wrongdoing," Journal of Business Ethics, 15(11),
1161-1174.
Bass, Ken, Tim Bamett, and Gene Brown (1998), "The Moral
Philosophy of Sales Managers and its Influence on
Ethical Decision Making," Journal of Personal
Selling & Sales Management, 18(2), 1-17.
56 Jo«r/ia/o/Afarteri/?g THEORY AND PRACTICE
Another avenue of research suggested by this study would be
to empirically investigate how other intervening variables
mediate the impact of cultural values on ethical judgments and
ideologies. For example, what role does national identity play
in shaping the ethical mindset of individuals from different
nations? This can be contrasted with other well established
cultural value approaches (e.g., Hofstede's typology). It would
also be interesting to examine the impact of various levels of
religiosify in the Middle East on ethical conduct. This is
especially important considering the speed at which
modernization is taking place in the countries of the region
and the subsequent possible erosion of religious values at the
individual level. Finally, the roles of trust among exchange
partners as well as their ethical ideologies and their impact on
the individual's perceptions of negotiation practices should be
an interesting and useful area for future research.
and (1999), "Individual Difference
Variables, Ethical Judgements, and Ethical
Behavioral Intentions," Business Ethics Quarterly,
9(2), 183-205.
Beu, Daneille S., M. Ronald Buckley, and MichaelG. Harvey
(2003), "Ethical Decision Making: A Multi-
Dimensional Construct," Business Ethics: A
European Review, 12(1), 88-107.
Boyle, Brett A. (2000), "The Impact of Customer
Characteristics and Moral Philosophies on Ethical
Judgements of Salespeople," Joumal of Business
Ethics, 23(3), 249-267.
Calfee, John E. and Paul H. Rubin (1993), "Nontransactional
Data in Economics and Mtirketing," Managerial and
Decision Economics, 14(2), 163-73.
Cavusgil, S. Tamer, Seyda Deligonul, and Chun Zhang
(2004), "Curbing Foreign Distributor Opportunism:
An Examination of Trust, Contracts, and the Legal
Environment in International Channel
Relationships," Joumal ofIntemational Marketing,
12(2), 7-27.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Publications (2005), The
World Factbook. http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/ factbook/index.html.
Chonko, Lawrence B. (1982), "Are Purchasing Managers
Machiavellian?" Journal of Purchasing and
Materials Management, 18(4), 15-20.
Christie, Richard and Florence L. Geis (1970), Studies in
Machiavellianism, Academic Press, New York.
Corzine, Janice B., Gabriel F. Buntzman, and Edgar T.
Busch, (1999), "Machiavellianism among U.S.
S," Journal of Psychology, 7(1), 72-83.
Cramton, Peter C. and J. Gregory Dees (1993), "Promoting
Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical
Ethics," Business Ethics Quarterly, 3(4), 359-394.
Cunningham, William, and Robert T. Green (1984), "From the
editors," Journal of Marketing, 48(1), 9-10.
Elahee, M o h a m m a d and Charles M. Brooks (2004) "Trust
and negotiation tactics: perceptions about business-
to-business negatiations in Mexico," The Journal of
Business and Industrial Marketing, 19(6), 397-404.
Elias, Rafik Z. (2002), "Determinants of Eamings
Management Ethics among Accountants," Journal of
Business Ethics, 40(1): 33-45.
Ferrell, O.C., and Larry G. Gresham (1985), "A Contingency
Framework For Understanding Ethical Decision
Making In Marketing," Journal ofMarketing, 49(3),
87-96.
_, Larry G. Gresham, and John Fraedrich (1989), "A
Synthesis of Ethical Decision Models for Marketing,"
Journal ofMacromarketing, 9(2), 55-64.
Ford, John B., Michael S. LaTour, Scott J. Vitell and Warren
A. French (1997), "Moral Judgment and Market
Negotiation: AComparisonofChinese and American
Managers,''Journal oflnternational Marketing, 5(2),
57-76.
Ford, Robert C. and Woodrow D. Richardson (1994), "Ethical
Decision Making: A Review of the Empirical
Literature," Journal of Business Ethics, 13(3), 205-
221.
Forsyth, Donelson R. (1980), "A Taxonomy of Ethical
Ideologies," Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 39(1), 175-184.
, (1992), "Judging the Morality of Business Practices:
The Infiuence of Personal Moral Philosophies,"
Journal of Business Ethics, 11(5/6), 461-470.
Ghauri, P. and T. Fang (2001), "Negotiating with the Chinese:
A Socio-Cultural Analysis," Journal of World
Business, 36(3), 303-325.
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna, Kevin McCabe, and V e m o n Smith
(2002), "Using The Machiavellianism Instrument To
Predict Trustworthiness In A Bargaining Game,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, 23(1), 46-66.
Hofstede, Geert (1984), Cultural Consequences: International
Differences in Work-Related Values, Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage Publications.
Hunt, Shelby D. and Lawrence Chonko (1984), "Marketing
and Machiavellianism," Journal of Marketing, 21 (3),
30-42.
and Scott J. Vitell (1986), "A General Theory of
Marketing Ethics," Journal ofMacromarketing, 6( 1),
5-16.
and Scott J. Vitell (1992), "The General Theory of
Marketing Ethics: A Retrospective and Revision," in
Quelch and Smith (eds.) Ethics in Marketing.
Richard D. Irwin: Chicago, Illinois.
Kim, Yungwook (2003), "Ethical Standards and Ideology
Among Korean Public Relations Practitioners,"
Journal of Business Ethics, 42(3), 209-223,
Lax, David A. and James K. Sebenius (1986), The Manager
as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and
Competitive Gain, The Free Press: New York.
Lewicki, Roy J. (1983), "Lying and Deception: A Behavioral
Model with Application to Negotiations," In M.H.
Bazerman and Roy J. Lewicki (Eds.) Negotiating in
Organizations, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 86-90.
_-, and Robert J. Robinson (1998), "Ethical and
Unethical Bargaining Tactics: An Empirical Study,"
Journal of Business Ethics, 17,665-692.
, Joseph A. Litterer, John W. Minton, & David M.
Saunders (1994), Negotiation (2"* ed.). Burr Ridge,
IL: Richard Irwin. Read Chap. 5: "Negotiation
planning and strategy."
Little, Douglas (2004), American Orientalism: The United
States and the Middle East since 1945, The
University of North Carolina Press.
Murphy, Patrick E. and Gene R. Laczniak (1981), "Marketing
Ethics: A Review with Implications for Managers,
Educators, and Researchers," in B.M. Enis and A.J.
Roering (eds.) Review of Marketing. American
Marketing Association, Chicago, IL, 251-266.
O Fallon, Michael J. and Kenneth D. Buttetfield (2005), "A
Review of The Empirical Ethical Decision-Making
Literature: 1996-2003," Journal oiBusiness Ethics,
59^4), 375-413.
Fall 2005 57
Orbell John M., Robyn M. Dawes, (1993), "Social Welfare,
Cooperator's Advantage, and the Option of Not
Playing the Game," American Sociological Review,
58(6), 787-800.
Rao, C.P. and Anusom Singhapakdi (1997), "Marketing
Ethics: A Comparison between Services and Other
Marketing Professionals," Journal of Services
Marketing, 11(6), 409-426.
Rawwas, Mohanuned Y.A. (1996), "Constimer Ethics: An
Empirical Investigation of the Ethical Beliefs of
Austrian Consumers," Journal of Business Ethics
15(9), 1009-1019.
Raybum, J. Michael and L. Gayle Raybum (1996),
"Relationship Between Machiavellianism and Type
A Personality and Ethical-Orientation," Journal of
Business Ethics, 15(11), 1209-1219.
Razzaque, Mohammed A., and Tan P. Hwee (2002), "Ethics
and Purchasing Dilemma: A Singaporean View,"
Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 35(4): 307-326.
Robinson, Robert J., Roy J. Lewicki, and Eileen M. Donahue
(2000), "Extending and Testing A Five-Factor Model
of Ethical and Unethical Bargaining Tactics:
Introducing the SINS Scale," Journal of
Organization Behavior, 21(6), 649-664.
Romar, Edward J. (2004), "Globalizations, Ethics, and
Opportunism: A Confucian View of Business
Relationships," Business Ethics Quarterly, 14(4),
663-678.
Ross, William T. and Diana C. Robertson (2003), "A
Typology of Situational Factors: Impact on
Salesperson Decision-Making About Ethical Issues,"
Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 46(3): 213-234.
Shane, Scott, S. Venkataraman, and Ian MacMillan (1995),
"Cultural Differences In Innovation Championing
Strategies," Journal ofManagement,2l{5), 931-952.
Shapiro, Debra L., Roy J. Lewicki, and P. Devine (1995),
"When Do Employees Choose Deceptive Tactics To
Stop Unwanted Change: A Relational Perspective,"
in Roy J. Lewicki, Blair H. Sheppard, and Robert J.
Bies (Eds.) Research on Negotiation in
Organizations, 5, 155-184, Greenwich, CT: JAI
Press, Inc.
58 Journal of Marketing THEORY AND PRACTICE
Singhapakdi, Anusron, Kenneth L. Kraft, Scott J. Vitell, and
Kumar C. Rallapalli (1995), "The Perceived
Importance of Ethics and Social Responsibility on
Organizational Effectiveness: A Survey of
Marketers," Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science, 23(1), 49-56.
, Scott J. Vitell, C.P. Rao, and David L. Kurtz (1999),
"Ethics Gap: Comparing Marketers with Consumers
on Important Determinants of Ethical Decision-
Making," Journal of Business Ethics, 21 (4), 317-328.
, Somboom Salyachivin, Busaya Virakul, and Vinich
Veerayangkur, (2000), "Some Important Factors
Underlying Ethical Decision Making of Managers in
Thailand," Journal of Business Ethics, 27(3), 271-
284.
Sivadas, Eugene, Susan B. Kleiser, James Kellaris and Robert
Dahlstrom (2003), "Moral Philosophy, Ethical
Evaluations and Sales Manager Hiring Intentions,"
Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management,
23(1), 7-21.
Sparks, John R. and Shelby D. Hunt (1998), "Marketing
Researcher Ethical Sensitivity: Conceptualization,
Measurement, and Exploratory Investigation,"
Journal of Marketing, 62(2), 92-109.
Sommer, Steven M., Dianne H.B. Welsh, and Boris L.
Gubman (2000), "The Ethical Orientation of Russian
Entrepreneurs," Applied Psychology: An
International Review, 49(4), 688-708.
Swaidan, Ziad; Scott J. Vitell; and Mohammed Y.A. Rawwas
(2003), "Consumer Ethics: Determinants of Ethical
Beliefs of African Americans," Journal of Business
Ethics 46(2), 175-186.
Mohammed Y.A. Rawwas and Jamal Al-Khatib
(2004), "Consumer Ethics: Moral Ideologies and
Ethical Beliefs of a Micro-Culture in the U.S.,"
International Business Review. 13(6), 749-761.
Tansey, Richard, Gene Brown, and Michael R. Hyman
(1994), "Personal Moral Philosophies and the Moral
Judgments of Salespeople," Journal of Personal
Selling & Sales Management, 14(1), 59-75.
Teagarden, Mary B., Many A.V. Glinow, David E. Bowen,
Colette A. Frayne, Stephen Nason, Y.P. Huo,, John
Milliman, Maria E. Arias, Mark C. Butler, J.M.
Geringer, Nam-Hyeon Kim, Hugh Scullion, Kevin B.
Lowe, and Ellen A. Drost (1995), "Toward A Theory
of Comparative Management Research: An
Idiographic Case Study of the Best International
Human Resources Management Project," ^ca^/emy of
Management Journal, 38(5), 1261-1287.
, and Maria T.L. Fleury (2002), "Alternative
Negotiating Conditions and tfie Choice of
Negotiation Tactics: A Cross-cultural Comparison,"
Journal of Business Ethics, 36(4), 381-398.
, Denise Fleck, Agnes Hofineister-Toth (2004),
"Ethicality in Negotiation: An Analysis of Attitudes,
Intentions, and Outcomes," International
Negotiation, 9(2): 315-339.

Vitell, Scott J., James R. Lumpkin, and Mohammed Y. A.
Rawwas (1991), "Consumer Ethics: An Investigation
ofthe Ethical Beliefs ofElderly Consumers," Journal
of Business Ethics 10(5), 365-375.
, Saviour L.Nwachukwu, and James H. Bames(1993),
"The Effects of Culture on Ethical Decision Making:
An Application of Hofttede's Typology," Journal of
Business Ethics, 12, 753-760.
Volkema, Roger J. (1998), "A Comparison of Perceptions of
Ethical Negotiation Behavior in Mexico and the
United States," TJie International Journal of Conflict
Management, 9(3), 218-233.
, (1999), "Ethically in Negotiations: An Analysis of
Perceptual Similarities and Differences between
Brazil and the United States," Journal of Business
Research, 45(1), 59-67.
, (2004), "Demographic, Cultural, and Economic
Predictors of Perceived Ethicality of Negotiation
Behavior: A Nine-Country Analysis," Journal of
Business Research, 57(1), 69-78.
Wang Center for International Education Business Education
and Research (2005) "Culture Training for Business
Executives," University of Memphis CIBR.
Wathne, Kenneth H. and Jan B. Heide (2000), "Opportunism
in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and
Solutions," Journal of Marketing, 64(4), 36-51.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of
Capitalism, The Free Press: New York.
Wong, Simon C.K. (1998), "Staff Job-Related Ethics of Hotel
Employees in Hong Kong," International Journal of
Contemporary Hospitality Managemera, 10(3), 107-
115.
Yetmar, Scott A. and Kenneth K. Eastman (2000), "Tax
Practitioners' Ethical Sensitivity: A Model and
Empirical Examination," Journal of Business Ethics,
26(4): 271-288.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Jamal Al-Khatib (Ph.D., University of Mississippi), Professor of Marketing, College of Business, University of St.
Thomas, St. Paul, MN, jaalkhatib@stthomas.edu.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Mohammed Y.A. Rawwas (Ph.D., University of Mississippi), Professor of Marketing, College of Business
Administration, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA, Mohammed.Rawwas@uni.edu

Fall 2005 59
 AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Ziad Swaidan (Ph.D., University of Mississippi), Assistant Professor of Marketing, School of Business Administration,
University of Houston Victoria, Victoria, TX, swaidanz@uhv.edu.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Richard Rexeisen (Ph.D., University of Minnesota), Professor of Marketing, College of Business, University of St.
Thomas, St. Paul, MN, rjrexeisen@stthomas.edu

60 Journal of Marketing THEORY AND PRACTICE