CASE ANALYSIS

1.
Share is when a company issues two share classes. It can consist of Class A
and Class B shares, for example. These shares can differ in terms of voting rights and
dividend payments. When multiple share classes of stock are issued, typically one class
is offered to the general public, while the other is offered to company founders,
executives, and family. The class offered to the general public often has limited or no
voting rights, while the class available to founders and executives has more voting
power and often provides for majority control of the company. Dual-class share
structures give specific shareholders voting control unequal to the amount of equity they
hold in the company. This is to satisfy owners who don't want to give up control of their
company, but do want to tap the public equity markets for financing. Proponents of dual-
class shares say they allow founders to pursue a long-term vision, rather than face
pressure to focus on short-term results. A company or stock with a dual-class structure
has two or more classes of shares with different voting rights. Typically insiders are
given access to a class of shares that provide greater control and voting rights, while
the general public is offered a class of shares with little or no voting rights. Supporters
say these types of structures allow the people who founded and currently run the
company to think long-term, rather than be at the mercy of shorter-term investors who
want to see bigger profits right away.

2.
Alibaba’s partnership structure has the purpose of ensuring that the company is
operated by a group of people who are passionate about the company and are mission-
driven. This aim alone can be the reason why Yahoo! and Softbank are willing to
approve the 28-man partnership structure for this structure as long term strategies that
can ensure the rapid growth of the company in the long run. Also, this structure and
view is supported by Joe Tsai who believes that the partnership structure helps to
preserve the company’s innovative culture even if the initial founders leave the
company, assuring the company of long term strategic goals instead of short term
gains.

3.
Many businesses opt for a dual-class share structure. This structure is
appropriate for a digital business since it demonstrates how to acquire public funds
while maintaining control. In addition, the approach allows investors to work side by side
with innovators and high-growth enterprises, reaping the financial benefits of these
businesses' long-term success. Facebook, Zynga, Groupon, Snapchat, and Alibaba are
examples of companies with a dual-class share structure. Google's stock structure is
one of the most well-known examples of a dual/multiple class stock structure (a
subsidiary of Alphabet Inc.). The large search engine claimed a market capitalization
ranking in the top 30 around the world when it conducted its first public offering (IPO) in
2004.

4.
Based on our opinion, HKEs has a point on why they reject Alibaba. They
justified their reason when they told Alibaba that they are just considering the possible
future loss of generation of companies from China’s new economy if they decide to
revise their rules and regulations. However, with the growth that Alibaba is achieving
now as the time passes by, we also think that HKEx has made a mistake in rejecting
Alibaba. Alibaba is now a successful company even with their listing proposal that was
the mere reason why HKEx rejected the said business. If HKEx just amended their rules
and regulations and considered Alibaba, maybe Alibaba can make a big impact to their
economy.

5.
In our opinion, allowing dual-class share businesses to be listed in Singapore as
a dual-class share structure is a good idea. To increase the number of public funding
possibilities available and to promote the SGX as a home for high-tech,
biopharmaceutical, and life science companies. We believe that the best precaution in
this circumstance is for them to impose a maximum vote limit. We believe that in this
case, the appropriate safeguard is to set a maximum voting gap of 10.1 between shares
with multiple voting rights and ordinary shares, and that existing companies would not
be able to convert to a dual class share arrangement because their owners did not
invest with an understanding of the risks associated with those structures.