Crimes are acts or omissions punishable by law.

Issuance of bouncing check is an “act”

punishable by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Check Law). Failure to immediately
give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death is an “omission” punishable under
Republic Act No. 7610 (Child Abuse Law).
Crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code are called felonies, while those punishable by
special laws may be called offenses. Crimes are generally punishable by the Revised Penal
Code. Other laws, which also punish crimes, are called special laws. RA No. 7610 and BP Blg.
22 are special laws.
Under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, felonies are committed not only by means of deceit
(dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There two kinds of felonies punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, to wit: culpable felonies and intentional felonies. Culpable felony is
committed by means of culpa. Intentional felony is committed by means of dolo. Dolus is
equivalent to malice, which is intent to do an injury to another. Since intentional felony is
committed with malice, it is classified as malum in se. An act is said to be malum in se when it
is inherently and essentially evil, that is immoral in its nature and injurious to its consequences,
without any regard to the fact of it being noticed or punished by law of the state (Black’s Law
Dictionary). Homicide, theft, robbery, estafa, arson, and rape are mala in se or intentional
felonies.
There are three crimes punishable under special laws, to wit: (1) culpable offense; (2) malum in
se; and (3) malum prohibitum.
CULPABLE OFFENSE
An offense committed through imprudence or negligence. Negligence indicates a deficiency of
perception. If a person fails to take the necessary precaution to avoid injury to person or
damage to property, there is imprudence, If a person fails to pay proper attention and to use due
diligence in foreseeing the injury or damage impending to be caused, there is negligence.
Negligence usually involves lack of foresight. Imprudence usually involves lack of skill
(Reyes).
Issuance of a false or fraudulent drug test results through gross negligence is a culpable offense
punishable under RA No. 9165. Causing any undue injury to any party in the discharge of his
official functions through gross inexcusable negligence is punishable under RA No. 3019. RA
No. 9165 and RA No. 3019 are special laws.
OFFENSE MALUM IN SE
Almost all morally wrongful acts or mala in se such as murder, homicide, robbery, theft, perjury,
estafa, arson, falsification, rape, kidnapping, threat, coercion, trespass to dwelling are covered
by the Revised Penal Code. However there are offenses punishable under special laws which
are also considered as mala in se. According to Justice Florenz Regalado, there are now in our
statutes so many offenses punished under special laws but wherein criminal intent is required
as an element, and which offenses are accordingly mala in se although they are not felonies
provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The offender to be held liable for offense malum in se must commit or omit the act with
freedom, intelligence and criminal or evil intent. A crime punishable by special law is
classified as malum in se: (1) if one of its elements shows that it must be committed with malice
or evil intent; or (2) if it is inherently wrong or evil.
1. Element of malice-If the crime punishable by special law must be committed with
malice or criminal intent, it is classified as malum in se. Under Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019, causing any undue injury to any party or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions through
evident bad faith is a crime. Since bad faith is an element of violation of Section 3(e),
lack of malice or criminal intent is a defense. Since violation of Section 3(e) must be
committed with criminal intent or malice, it should be classified as malum in se. In
People v. Montayre, GR No. 87466, April 24, 1992- The petitioner was acquitted of the
crime of violation of Section 3(e) because no criminal intent can be imputed to his having
made the requisition since the same was necessary. In Sesbreña y Ala, GR No. 95393,
May 5, 1992- Petitioners was acquitted of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) for failure
to show that they are investigating prosecutors acted with malice or evident bad faith in
the discharge of their functions.
Using, with intent to defraud, an unauthorized access device is constitutive of the crime of
access device fraud punishable under Section 9(c) of RA No. 8484. Intent to defraud, which is
an element of this crime, presupposes or criminal intent. Access device fraud is malum in se
despite the fact punishable under a special law.
2. Inherently wrong – If the crime punishable by special law is inherently wrong, it is
classified as malum in se. In People v. Sunico, et al. (CA), 50 O.G. 5880 The accused
were charged of the offense of failure to include a voter’s name in the registry list of
voters, which is punishable under special criminal law. There is no clear showing in the
instant case that the accused intentionally, willfully and maliciously omitted or failed to
include in the registry list of voters the names of those voters. Issue: Is the subject
offense punishable under special criminal law malum prohibitum or malum in se? Held:
The acts involved cannot be merely mala prohibita – they are mala in se. The omission
or failure to include a voter’s name in the registry list of voters is not only wrong because
it is prohibited; it is wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter and violates one of
his fundamentals rights.
Hence, for such act to be punishable, it must be shown that it has been committed with
malice. Accused were acquitted.
Highway robbery under Presidential Decree No. 532, and carnapping under RA No. 6539 are
mala in se since they are inherently wrong. In People v. Quijada, GR Nos. 115008-09, July 24,
1996, En Banc The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that the crime of plunder under RA
No. 7080 is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts
are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are
mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they
are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
Malum prohibitum is an act which is (not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its
commission is expressly forbidden by positive law (Black’s Law Dictionary). An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm
that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The State can do this in the exercise of its police power. Illegal possession of
firearm is malum prohibitum.
Most of the acts or omissions punishable by special criminal laws are mala prohibita such as
illegal possession of firearm, issuance of worthless check and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.

A. INTENT TO VIOLATE THE LAW Crime malum in se is committed with malice. On the
other hand, evil intent or malice is not an element of offense classified as malum
prohibitum. It was held in one case that “While it is true that, as a rule and on principles
of abstract justice, men are not and should not e held criminally responsible for acts
committed by them without guilty knowledge and evil intent, the courts have always
recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by
necessity, the great master of things, to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer. In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the enforcement of
the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown.”
However, in offense malum prohibitum, the act must be committed or omitted with intent to
violate the law. In People v. Alger, GR No. L-4690, November 13, 1952- It was held that
homicide (malum in se) and illegal possession of unlicensed firearm (malum prohibitum) are two
different acts with two separate criminal intents, to wit, the desire to take unlawfully the life of a
person, and the willful violation of the law which prohibits the possession, of a firearm without
the required permit. In Sycip, Jr. V. CA and People, GR No. 125059, March 17, 2000- Petitioner
insisted that under PD No. 957, the buyer of a townhouse unit has the right to suspend his
amortization payments, should the subdivision or condominium developer fail to develop or
complete the project in accordance with duly-approved plans and specifications. Given the
findings of the HLURB that certain aspects of private complainant’s townhouse project were
incomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right to suspend payments should not render
him liable under BP Blg. 22. “Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks
Law, are not subject to the Revised Penal Code, but the Code is supplementary to such a law.
We find nothing in the text of BP Blg. 22, which would prevent the Revised Penal Code from
supplementing it. Following Article 11(5) of the Revised Penal Code (on justifying circumstance
of exercise of right), exercise of a right of the buyer-accused under Article 23 of PD No. 957 is a
valid defense to the charges against him.” Author’s Comment: The principal intention of the
accused in this case is to exercise his right to suspend payment under PD No. 957. Accused
has no intention to violate the law.
In U.S. v. Ngan Ping, JGR No. 11425, August 2, 1916- Accused was acquitted of illegal
possession of cocaine because there is no proof that he intended to violate the Opium Law. In
the following cases, accused were not liable for drug related crime because of lack of intent to
violate the law: (a)a police officer, who after confiscating dangerous drugs from accused turp the
plastic bag to his superior officer, is not liable for giving away dangerous drugs; a civilian
informer, who acted as poseur huyer, is not liable for illegal possession of dangerous drug even
though he bought marijuana from the pusher; government witnesses, who made the purchase
of marijuana to secure evidence to convict the violator, is not liable as accomplices.
Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a "state of necessity" is a justifying
circumstance. One, who committed an act prohibited b law under the circumstance of state of
necessity, should not be held criminal 4 liable since he acted without intent to violate the law."
To be held liable for offense malum prohibitum, the offender must commit the prohibited act with
intent to violate the law, the presence of which requires that the act was committed with (1)
freedom, (2) intelligence and (3) intent to perpetrate the prohibited act.
1. Freedom "A" kidnapped the wife of "B," a chemist in PNP laboratory examination. "A"
threatened "B" that his wife would be killed unless he would bring 10 sacks of marijuana from
the laboratory to him. Acting under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of greater injury, "B"
brought to "A" the marijuana as demanded. "B" is not liable for transportation of dangerous
drugs because of lack of freedom. Intent to violate the law is an element of offense punishable
by special criminal law. Intent to violate presupposes that the perpetration of the prohibited act
is voluntary. The intention of "B" is to save the life of his wife and not to violate the law.
One who acts under the compulsion of irresistible force is exempt from criminal liability because
he is acting without freedom. In Idos v. CA, GR No. 110782, September 25, 1998 If a kidnap
victim issued a check to a kidnapper for ransom, it would be absurd to hold the drawer liable
under BP Blg. 22, if the check is dishonored and unpaid. That would go against public policy
and common sense.
2. Intelligence A two-year-old baby in possession of marijuana cannot be held liable for the
offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Intent to violate the law is an element of drug-
related offense. Lack of intelligence by reason of age is equivalent to lack of intent to violate the
law. A baby could not have intended to violate the dangerous drug law. Under Section 6, RA
No. 9344, a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
"offense" shall be exempt from criminal liability.
3. . Intent to Perpetrate the Act Prohibited by Law Act of possessing marijuana plus intent
to perpetrate the prohibited act of possession constitutes illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Offender cannot use the defense of lack of intent to violate the law for
absence of knowledge that marijuana is a dangerous drug. Drug related offense is a
malum prohibitum. Good faith is not a defense. The intent to posses gives rise to the
presumption of intent to violate the law. Law prohibits mere possession of marijuana.
The fact that the offender intentionally perpetrated the act of possession is a showing
that he intended to violate the law.

It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala
prohibita. On grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, courts have always
recognized the power of the legislature, as "the greater master of things, to forbid certain
acts in a limited class of cases and to make their commission criminal without regard to
the intent of the doer. Such legislative enactments are based on the experience that
repressive measures, which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's
knowledge or of his intent are of little use and rarely accomplish their purposes; besides,
the prohibited act is so injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of the person's
intent, it is the crime itself. This, however, does not lessen the prosecution's burden
because it is still required to show that the prohibited act was intentional. Intent to
commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act,
and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for
the malum prohibitum. Intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown.

a. Lack of Evil Intent is Not a Defense – People v. Bayona, GR No. 42288,

February 16, 1935, En Banc- Accused was driving his car on a road in front of an
electoral precinct; accused went inside of the fence surrounding the polling place
because he was called by a friend and merely approached him to find out what
he wanted and had no interest in the election; that there were many people in the
public road in front of the polling place the defendant could not leave his revolver
in his automobile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing
it and thereby incurring in a violation of the law. He was arrested for violation of
election law prohibiting carrying of firearm inside the polling place. Issue: Should
the accused be held liable for election offense despite the fact that there was no
showing of evil intent to intimidate the voters? Held: “The law which the accused
violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate
any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his
automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling
place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act
prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the
voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element
of the offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to
intimidate the voters.” Note: Lack of evil intent is not a defense in offense malum
prohibitum. What is important is that the accused in this case intended to
perpetrate the prohibited act. Thus, it is presumed that he committed the act with
intent to violate the law.
In the following cases, there is no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law: (1)
where a man with a revolver passes along a public road on election day, within the
fifty (50) meter radius of a polling place (prohibited area); (2) where a peace officer in
pursued a criminal in a prohibited area; and (3) where a person, who is living within
fifty meters of a polling place, is cleaning his firearms within his residences on
election day (Bayona, supra).
b. Incidental Intent to Perpetrate the Prohibited Act – In People v. Ayre, GR No.
2293, February 13, 1935, En Banc – Two policemen with their service pistol were
in the polling place because they had been sent there by the chief of police of
 Panitan upon the request of the chairman of the board of inspectors of precinct
No. 4 to detail thereto two policemen for the purpose of maintaining order therein.
Their revolvers were confiscated by representatives of the Department of Interior
Government for violation of election offense. Under the law, it shall be unlawful
for any person to carry firearm within a distance of fifty meters from any polling
place during the days of registration, voting, and counting except only in cases of
riot, affray, or disorder, in which cases peace officers or public officials authorized
to supervise the conduct of election are permitted to bear arms for the purpose of
maintaining order or enforcing the law. In the present case there was no riot,
disorder, or affray in the polling place to which the accused were assigned. Held:
The statutory authority of board of election inspectors to request the necessary
police or constabulary or other peace officers to be present to maintain order, it
impliedly grants these peace officers the right to bear their arms, because it
intends that they should be duly equipped to maintain order, and a policeman
who goes to the polling place upon the request of the board and carries his
revolver for the purpose of maintaining order commits no offense so long as he
carries or uses his revolver solely for that purpose. Author’s Comment: The
intention of the accused is not to violate the law. But merely to fulfill their duty of
maintaining order as requested by the board of election inspectors. Their
intention to perpetrate the act of carrying firearm within the prohibited area is just
an incident to their main intention of maintaining order.

Public prosecutor to present dangerous drug as evidence in court must possess

it; however, his intention to possess is just incidental to his principal intention of
performing his duty to prosecute violator of the law; thus, he is not committing
illegal possession of dangerous drug for lack of intention to violate the law. An
undercover cop to gain the trust of a drug syndicate joined its members in a pot
session of “shabu”; he should not be prosecuted for illegal use of “shabu” since
his intention to use is just an incident to his intention to perform his duty.

Query: “A,” media reporter, discovered that the business of “B” is selling
unlicensed firearms to robbers on installment basis. “A” pretending to be a robber
bought high caliber firearms from “B.” “A” promised to pay “B” immediately after
committing bank robbery. Unknown to “B,” “A” armed with a hidden camera
videoed the sale transaction. The next day “A” went to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to report the illegal venture of “B” and to surrender the
firearm. NBI authorities conducted buy bust operation and apprehended “B.” “A”
videoed also the apprehension of “B.” After two weeks, the illegal business of “B”
was televised. Is “A" liable for illegal possession of firearm considering that this
crime is a malum prohibitum where good faith is not a defense.

c. Knowledge of Perpetration of the Prohibited Act Intent to violate the law

presupposes that the prohibited act is committed with full knowledge.
Knowledge is an element of every crime, whether it is malum in se or malum
prohibitum. The state has the authority to prohibit an act and to punish a person
for committing it. However, the imposition of penalty should not be based only on
the prohibitory character of the act but also on the mind of the actor who
 knowingly perpetrates it despite the prohibition. Example: Sale of dangerous
drugs is malum prohibitum. However, the Supreme Court in several case ruled
that one of the elements of sale of dangerous drug is that the accused knew that
what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.
However, there is a distinction between legal knowledge and factual knowledge. Lack of factual
knowledge is a defense in crimes punishable by special laws while lack of legal knowledge is
not knowledge.
1. Lack of factual knowledge that a prohibited act is committed is a defense. One could
not have committed the act with intent to violate the law prohibiting it without knowledge
the he perpetrated it. Example: Lack of factual knowledge that the recruitment agency
failed to register his name in the POEA is a defense in illegal recruitment undertaken by
the agency’s employee. In People v. Chowdury, JGR Nos. 129577-80, February 15,
2000 -The prosecution failed to prove that appellant was aware of Craftrade’s failure to
register his name with the POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this
knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers
of the agency. A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal
requirements for its operation. The evidence at hand shows that appellant carried out his
duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the
POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the Yapplicants in
its behalf. Appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely
interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment but he
never received money from them. Their payments were received by the agency’s
cashier. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and
managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt appellant’s conscious and activearticipation in the commission of the
crime of illegal Recruitment.

However, there are rulings that state that lack of knowledge is not exempting
circumstance where the crime charged is malum prohibitum.”

2. Legal Knowledge- Lack of legal knowledge that the act committed is prohibited is not a
defense because of the principle of “ignoratia legis non excusat.” Example: Lack of legal
knowledge that marijuana or “shabu” is a dangerous drug is not a defense in violation of
RA No. 9165. In People v. Libag, GR No. 68997, April 27, 1990- One of the elements. Of
the offense is that the accused knowingly delivered at dangerous drug to another. The
prosecution must prove knowledge of the accused, not that he knew that marijuana is
classified as a dangerous drug, but that he knew as marijuana the contents of the plastic
bag he delivered.

B. SPECIFIC INTENT Intent to violate the law is the general intent required to commit an
offense malum prohibitum punishable under special criminal law. However, the act
committed in violation of the law must be coupled with specific intent to constitute
offense. This specific intent can be inferred from the prohibited act. For example if the
prohibited act is possession, the specific intent must be intent to possess it is to give
away intent to donate; if it is issuance, intent to issue. Proof of lack of specific intent is
equivalent to proof of lack of intent to violate the law.
3. Intent to Possess – Possession may be punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
special criminal law. Possession of picklock is a felony while possession of unlicensed
firearm or dangerous drugs is an offense punishable by special law. In possession of
picklock, possession must be accompanied with criminal or evil intent. On the other
hand, in possession of unlicensed firearm or dangerous drugs, mere possession,
even without criminal evil intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession,
provided that it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Showing lack of animus possidendi is proof of lack
of intent to violate the law prohibiting such possession.

Example: “A,” a criminology professor, has a private museum in his house. Some of his
collections are crime instruments such as picklock and unlicensed gun of “Nardong
Susi,” a notorious robber, who is an expert in unlocking safety vault without using a key.
Every semester class, he would invite his students to visit his museum to study the
instruments in committing crimes. Did “A” commit illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm and illegal possession of picklock? (1) “A” committed the crime of illegal
possession of unlicensed firearm. Such crime, which is punishable by special criminal
law, is malum prohibitum. Hence, the mere act of possession coupled with animus
possidendi (intent to possess) constitutes the offense. Lawful cause in possessing the
gun or lack of evil intention is not a defense in a case involving malum prohibitum. (2) “A”
is not liable however for illegal possession of picklock since the third element thereof is
lacking. Possession with lawful cause is a defense in illegal possession of picklock.
Furthermore, such crime is punishable by the Revised Penal Code; hence, it is a malum
in se. Lack of evil intent is a defense. “Actus non tacit reum, nisi mens sit rea.” There can
be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.

1972 Bar Question – The owner and operator of ABC security agency, duly licensed to
operate as security agency, delivered to “X” as regular security guard, an Ithaca .45
caliber pistol for the latter’s use. “X” was later arrested for illegal possession of the
firearm and required to produce his license to possess. “X” told the arresting officer that
as a security guard, the ABC security agency issued the firearm to him and that the
license to possess was in the office of the agency. It turned out that the agency has no
license for the particular firearm. What crime if any was committed by “X?” Answer: X
committed illegal possession of firearm, which is an offense punishable under special
criminal law. It is a malum prohibitum. Lack of knowledge that the firearm delivered to
“X” by security agency has no license is not a defense. Although there was no criminal
or evil intent on the part of what is important is he intended to perpetrate the act
prohibited by law. The possession of “X” in this case is coupled with animus possidendi.
(see contrary view in chowdury case)

a. Lack of animus possidendi – In People v. Dela Rosa, GR No. 84857, January

16, 1998 – Temporary, incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a
firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this
kind of weapon because of lack of animus possidendi. A typical example of such
 possession is where “a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to
examine or hold for a moment or to shoot at some object.”

2002 Bar Question “A” and his fiancée “B” were walking in the plaza when they met a
group of policeman who had earlier been tipped off that “A” was in possession of
prohibited drugs. Upon seeing the policemen and sensing that they were after him, “A”
handed a sachet containing shabu to his fiancée “B,” telling her to hide it in her bag. The
policeman saw “B” placing the sachet inside her handbag. “B” was unaware that “A” was
a drug user or pusher or that what was inside the sachet given to her was shabu. Is she
nonetheless liable under the Dangerous Drugs Act? Answer: No. “B” is not liable
because of lack of animus possidendi on her part. Temporary, incidental, casual, or
harmless possession or control of dangerous drugs cannot be considered a violation of a
statute prohibiting such possession.” “B” did not intend to violate the law.
The question posed in People v. Remereta, 98 Phil. 413, was whether an accused
who stole a firearm could simultaneously be prosecuted for theft and illegal
possession of firearms. It was held: transient possession is not sufficient to convict
one under the latter crime, thus: “While in stealing a firearm the accused must
necessarily come into possession thereof, the crime of illegal possession of firearms
is not committed by mere transient possession of the weapon. Thus, stealing a
firearm with intent not to use but to render the owner defenseless, may suffice for
purposes of establishing a case of theft, but would not justify a charge for illegal
possession of firearm, since intent to hold and eventually use the weapon would be
lacking.”
Where the intention of the accused in possessing unlicensed firearm and explosives
belonging to an NPA commander is to surrender the same to government
authorities, the accused is not liable for illegal possession of firearm. Such
possession as held in People v. Dela Rosa, et al., GR No. 84857, January 16, 1998
was harmless, temporary and only incidental for the purpose of surrendering the
ammunitions to the authorities. Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish
animus possidendi.
b. Presumption of animus possidendi – Proof that accused perpetrated the act
prohibited by law gives rise to presumption of intent to violate the law. Hence, in
cases involving illegal possession of unlicensed firearm or dangerous drugs,
animus possidendi is presumed from that fact of possession. Once the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was in
possession of the prohibited article, the burden of proof is shifted to the latter.
The accused from such proof has now the burden of showing that he was in
possession of the subject matter without animus possidendi. In one case was
held: “The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence
of animus possidendi. A mere uncorroborated claim of the accused that he did
not know that he had a prohibited drug in his possession is insufficient. Any
evasion, false statement, or attempt at concealment on his part, in explaining
how the drug came into his possession, may be considered in determining his
guilt.”
In People v. Lian, GR No. 115988, March 29, 1996, En Banc – The accused
contended that he was on his way to the municipal hall to surrender the firearm when
he met some of his friends. He then forgot about the firearm, until the police officer
unceremoniously seized the same from him, affording him no chance to surrender it
himself. The argument was rejected. Accused failed to establish lack of animus
possidendi. It was held: “The Court finds it hard to believe that accused still had to
hide the firearm in his waist before setting out to surrender it to the authorities when
he could have taken the gun to the town hall in the same bag in which he found it, in
which case it would have been safer and would have avoided detection. In fine, the
indispensable of possession without the necessary authority or license and the
corresponding attendance of animus possidendi have both been convincingly
established by the prosecution to warrant appellant’s conviction.”
In People v. Del Mundo, GR No. 138929, October 2, 2001 - Accused denies
knowledge that the package supposedly left behind by the passenger contained
marijuana. Nevertheless, lack of knowledge cannot constitute a valid defense, for
lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. Where the
crime charged is malum prohibitum. Thus, this Court has uniformly held that the
uncorroborated claim of an accused of lack of knowledge that he had a
prohibited drug in his possession is insufficient. To warrant his acquittal,
accused must show that his act of transporting the package containing marijuana in
his tricycle was done without intent to possess a prohibited drug. Despite his
protestations to the contrary, his reaction to the arrival of the policemen belied his
claim of innocence. If indeed he did not know that the package in his tricycle
contained marijuana, he would not have attempted to flee from the approaching
policemen.
c. Proof of Ownership – When an accused is charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs or unlicensed firearm, the ownership thereof is immaterial.
Possession, which is the essential element of such offense, is different from
ownership. In People v. Jones GR No. 115581, August 29, 1997, accused
argued that she should no be convicted of illegal transportation of prohibited drug
since the packets of heroin found in the black leather jacket, which was in her
possession, did not belong to her, but to a certain Henry Lugoye. It was held: “In
the prosecution for transportation of a prohibited drug, proof of ownership is not a
requisite. The ownership of the subject heroin is immaterial for the purpose of the
charge of transporting prohibited drugs.”

2. Intent to give away In People v. Lacerna, GR No. 109250, September 5, 1997-

Accused in a case involving illegal giving away of dangerous drugs testified that he
gave the plastic bag and the knapsack to co-accused because the latter got into the
taxicab first and because there was more room in the backseat than in the front.
Accused was not convicted of the crime as charged. It was held that: “The phrase
give away’ is commonly defined as ‘to make a present of; to donate, or to make a
sacrifice. By handing the plastic bag to his companion, accused cannot be punished
for giving away marijuana as a gift or premium to another.” In sum, handing over
 dangerous drug must be coupled with specific intent to give away or to donate. Note:
The accused is only liable for illegal possession of dangerous drug.
3. Intent to issue-In case of corporate check where more than one officer are
required to sign check, proof that less than all the required signatories have not
signed the check is a defense. In such a case, there is no intention on the part of the
corporation to issue check.
C. ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME – There are rulings of the Supreme Court that declared a
crime as malum prohibitum simply because it is punishable under a special law.
Fencing under PD No. 1612 is declared as a crime malum prohibitum” despite the fact
that it is inherently wrong. Prior to PD No. 1612, fencers were being prosecuted as
accessories to the crime of theft or robbery. Violation of Trust Receipt Law (PD No. 115)
is declared malum prohibitum,” despite the fact that under the said Decree, its violator
shall be prosecutedecuted for estafa, an intentional felony defined under the Revised
Penal Code. An intentional felony is malum in se.

Whether the crime punishable by special law is classified as malum in se or malum

prohibitum, what is important is that the elements of the crime as defined by law are all
present. Although the offense is a malum prohibitum, the prosecution is not excused
from its responsibility of proving beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
offense.

1. Knowledge – There are rulings that state that lack of knowledge and good faith
are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum
prohibitum.” However, where a particular knowledge is an element of offense
punishable under special criminal law, lack of knowledge is a defense even if it is
malum prohibitum. In a case involving violation of BP Blg. 22, it was held that:
“Although the offense charged is a malum prohibitum, the prosecution is not
thereby excused from its responsibility of proving beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of the offense, one of which is knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds.”

In Dingle v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-75243, March 16, 1987, the accused,
signed the questioned checks in blank together with her husband. But she has no knowledge to
whom and when it was issued much less of the transaction and the fact of dishonor. Accused
was acquitted for lack of knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the y of
his funds.
1996 Bar Examination – Upon a laboratory examination of the fish seized by the police and
agents of the Fisheries Commission, it was indubitably determined that the fish they were selling
were caught with the use of explosives. Accordingly, the three vendors were criminally charged
with the violation of Section 33 of PD No. 704/which makes it unlawful for any person to
knowingly possess, deal in, or sell for profit any fish which have been illegally caught. During the
trial, the three vendors claimed that they bought the fish from a fishing boat which they duly
identified. The prosecution however claimed that the three vendors should nevertheless be held
liable for the offense as they were the ones caught in possession of the fish illegally caught.
On the basis of the above facts, if you were the judge would you convict the three fish vendors?
Explain. Suggested Answer – No. I would not convict the three fish vendors if I were the judge.
Mere possession of such fish without knowledge of the fact that the same were caught with the
use of explosives does not by itself render the seller-possessor criminally liable under PD No.
704. Although the act penalized in said Decree may be a malum prohibitum, the law punishes
the possession, dealing in or selling of such fish only when “knowingly” done that the fish were
caught with the use of explosives: hence, criminal intent is essential. The claim by the fish
vendors that they only bought the fish from fishing boats which they “duly identified,” renders
their possession of such fish innocent unless the prosecution could prove that they have
knowledge that explosives were used in catching such fish, and the accused had knowledge
thereof.”

2. Intent to misappropriate – In People v. Nitafan, GR No. 81559, April 6, 1992

“The offense under PD No. 115 is punished as a malum prohibitum regardless of
the existence of intent or malice.” However, under PD No. 115, the violator of the
trust receipt shall be prosecuted for estafa through misappropriation. Hence, in
this kind of estafa, lack of intent to defraud or misappropriate is a defense. In
Colinares and Veloso v. CA, GR No. 90828, September 5, 2000-the Supreme
Court considered the failure to prove the allegation of intent defraud and
misappropriation in the information in acquitting the petitioners of violation of PD
No. 115. In Pilipinas Bank v. Ong, GR No. 133176, August 8, 2002, the Supreme
Court considered the failure to prove intent to misuse or misappropriate the
goods or their proceeds in acquitting respondents of violation of PD No. 115.

3. Bad faith-In Luciano v. Estrella, GR No. L-31622, August 31, 1970 “The act
punishable RA No. 3019 partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum.” Settled
is the rule that good faith is not a defense in crime malum prohibitum. Despite the
pronouncement in case of Luciano v. Estrella, good faith or lack of malice is a
valid defense in violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019 since “evident bad faith”
is an element of this crime.” In Alejandro v. People GR No. 81031, February
20, 1989 – It was the responsibility of the Bookkeeper to inform the Chief of the
hospital whether or not there was an available fund from the allocated amount for
a given expenditure. If there was, he would issue a certification attached to the
RIV upon its submission for approval to the Chief of the Hospital. It was not;
therefore, really the duty of the Chief of the hospital to verify from the books of
accounts of the hospital whether there was an available fund every time a
disbursement was needed for release. The same rule was also applied to the
Administrative Officer who was required to issue a certification to the effect that
the expenditure was necessary and lawful. To impose criminal liability upon
petitioner who was misled into giving his approval to a particular disbursement on
the basis of the Bookkeeper's certification that there was fund available for said
expenditure would be too harsh and inequitable (even if such fund turned out to
be unavailable). Petitioner's reliance on the correctness of the certifications of the
Bookkeeper and Administrative Officer, which resulted in the application of a
portion of the fund for personnel services to maintenance and other operating
expenses for the hospital, bookkeeper existed. Good faith and lack of malice is a
valid defense to the charge of violation of Sec. 3(e).