Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan: Applications in The History of Physics and Psychology
Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan: Applications in The History of Physics and Psychology
Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan: Applications in The History of Physics and Psychology
ABSTRACT." Kuhnians depict the history of any the history of physics and psychology are used to
scientific discipline as a succession of incommensu- illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of each ac-
rable paradigms. Empirical work done in one para- count.
digm is of little relevance to another, and comparisons
of paradigms on such familiar grounds as experi- Kuhn's Ideas
mental adequacy are said to be inconclusive. Different
According to Kuhn (1962) the history of any science
paradigms do not agree on what constitutes knowl-
reflects two distinct types of activities, which he
edge or the meaning of truth. The recent work of
other philosophers of science, such as Lakatos and called "normal science" and "revolutionary science"
Laudan, however, leads to expectations about the (Krasner & Houts, 1984; Popper, 1970; Weimer &
Palermo, 1973; Williams, 1970). The first of these,
history of a scientific discipline that are quite different
from Kuhn's. In this article, the authors show that normal science, involves long periods of calm in
Lakatos's and Laudan's accounts provide more ve- which the scientific community works to broaden
ridical analyses than popularized Kuhnian versions and deepen the explanatory scope of a theoretical
account based on a single set of fundamental beliefs.
when applied to episodes in the history of physics
For the most part, these beliefs are not questioned.
and psychology. Although different research programs
Revolutionary science occurs during brief periods
(paradigms) have regularly competed in both domains
of chaos, when the fundamental beliefs that previ-
of inquiry, scientific progress in both has been ra-
ously supported normal science are jettisoned and
tional critical experiments have been performed
replaced. To identify these sets of fundamental beliefs,
(that is, programs are not incommensurable), and
research programs themselves evolve in ways not which Pepper (1942)dubbed world hypotheses, Kuhn
used the term paradigm. Paradigms were taken to
predicted by Kuhn's account.
include unique combinations of ontology, episte-
mology, and methodology (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 4-5).
According to Kuhn, the beliefs constituting a
In this article we present a brief review, analysis, paradigm are so fundamental that they are immune
and application of some nonpositivist accounts of from empirical testing (1962, Ch. 3). Experimental
science and scientific change proposed since the failures may lead to the rejection of specific theories,
early 1960s. The individuals most prominently iden- but the paradigm itself remains untouched and thus
tiffed with these accounts are Kuhn (1962), Lakatos directs the construction of new theories. Because
(1970, 1978), and Laudan (1977, 1981a). We will the paradigm determines the way scientists make
show that the view commonly attributed to Kuhn, sense of the world, without it there is nothing about
although heuristically compelling, contains important which to construct theories. The occasional replace-
features that are inaccurate when applied to historical ment of one paradigm by another is, therefore, a
developments in physics, the psychology of learning, cataclysmic event. In a sense, the world of the old
and mediation theory. The account offered by Lak- paradigm is destroyed with it, and a new world is
atos (1970) provides an attractive solution to some born with its successor. This process, which repre-
of the difficulties posed by Kuhn's analysis but has sents the most spectacular type of scientific change,
liabilities of its own. These are remedied by Laudan is called a "scientific revolution." Examples include
(1977), who provided a critical synthesis of the the Copernican revolution, which replaced the world
accounts offered by Kuhn and Lakatos while making of Aristotle with that of Newton, and Einstein's later
a number of original contributions. In this article, replacement of Newton's world.
first Lakatos's ideas are outlined against a backdrop Two remarkable features separate Kuhn's ac-
of Kuhn's position. Next, some difficulties in Laka- count of science from those that preceded it. First,
tos's account are identified, and last, the solutions Kuhn removed experimental evidence from the cen-
offered by Laudan are described. Applications in tral place it occupied in earlier accounts. He denied
768 J u l y 1985 • A m e r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t
Laudan, L. (1984a). Realism without the real. Philosophy of Schaffner, K. (1972). Nineteenth century aether theories. Oxford,
Science, 51, 156-162. England: Pergamon.
Laudan, L. (1984b). Science and values. Berkeley: University of Schefller, I. (1967). Science & subjectivity. Indianapolis: Bobbs
California Press. Merrill.
Levine, M. (1959). A model of hypothesis behavior in discrimi- Skinner, B. E (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental
nation learning set. Psychological Review, 66, 353-366. analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Levine, M. (1963). Mediation processes in humans at the outset Skinner, B. E (1957). Verbal behavior. New York: Appleton-
of discrimination learning. Psychological Review, 70, 254-276. Century-Crotts.
Levine, M. (1975). A cognitive theory of learning: Research on Skinner, B. F. (1968). The technology of teaching. New York:
hypothesis testing. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Manicas, P. T., & Secord, P. F. (1983). Implications for psychology Spence, K. W. (1936). The nature of discrimination learning in
of the new philosophy of science. American Psychologist, 38, animals. Psychological Review, 43, 427-449.
339-413. Spence, K. W. (1937). The differential response in animals to
McGuire, S, (1982). Incommensurability and relativism. Current stimuli varying within a single dimension. Psychological Review,
Perspectives in Social Theory, 3, 161-188. 47, 271-288.
Murray, F. B. (1984). The application of theories of cognitive Spence, K. W. (1940). Continuous versus noncontinuous interpre-
development. In B. Gholson & T. L. Rosenthal (Eds.), Appli- tations of discrimination learning. Psychological Review, 47,
cations of cognitive-developmental theory (pp. 3-18). New York: 271-288.
Academic Press. Spence, K. W. (1956). Behavior theory and conditioning. New
Overton, W. F. (1984). World views and their influence on Haven: Yale University Press.
psychological theory and research: Kuhn-Lakatos-Laudan. In Spence, K. W. (1960). Behavior theory and learning: Selected
H. W. Reese (Ed.) Advances in child development and behavior papers. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
(Vol. 18, pp. 191-226). New York: Academic Press. Stegmuiler, W. (1976). The structure and dynamics of theories.
Overton, W. E, & Reese, H. W. (1973). Models of development: New York: Springer.
Methodological implications. In J. R. Nesselroade & H. W. Suppe, E (1977). The structure of scientific theories (2nd ed.).
Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Methodological Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
issues (pp. 65-86). New York: Academic Press. Suppes, P., & Atkinson, R. C. (1960). Markov learning models
Palermo, D. S. (1971). Is a scientific revolution taking place in for multiperson interactions. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
psychology? Science Studies, 1, 135-155. Press.
Palermo, D. S. (1984). In defense of Kuhn: A discussion of his Tolman, E. C. (1932). Purposive behavior in animals and men.
detractors. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
and behavior (Vol. 18, pp. 259-276). New York: Academic Toulmin, S. (1972). Human understanding. Princeton, N J: Prince-
Press. ton University Press.
Pepper, S. (1942). World hypotheses. Berkeley: University of Trabasso, T. (1963). Stimulus emphasis and all-or-none learning
California Press. of concept identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
Peterson, G. L. (1981). Historical self-understanding in the social 65, 395-406.
sciences: The use of Thomas Kuhn in psychology. Journal for Warren, N. (1971). Is a scientific revolution taking place in psy-
the Theory of Social Behavior, 11, 1-30. chology? Doubts and reservations. Science Studies, I, 407-413.
Popper, K. R. (1957). The aim of science. Ratio, 1, 24-35. Watkins, J. W. N. (1970). Against normal science. In I. Lakatos
Popper, K. R. (1970). Normal science and its dangers. In I. & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge
Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of (pp. 25-38). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
knowledge (pp. 51-58). Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni- Watson, R. I. (1977). Psychology: A prescriptive science. In J.
versity Press. Brozek & R. B. Evans (Eds.), R. L Watson's selected papers on
Reese, H. W. (1962). Verbal mediation as a function of age level. the history of psychology (pp. 95-112). Hanover, NH: University
Psychological Bulletin, 59, 502-509. Press of New England.
Reese, H. W. (1964). Discrimination learning set in Rhesus Weimer, W. B. (1974). The history of psychology and its retrieval
monkeys. Psychological Review, 71, 321-340. from historiography: I. The problematic nature of history.
Reese, H. W. (1968). The perception of stimulus relations: Dis- Science Studies, 4, 235-258.
crimination learning and transposition. New York: Academic Weimer, W. B., & Palermo, D. S. (1973). Paradigms and normal
Press. science in psychology. Science Studies, 3, 211-244.
Reese, H. W. (1972). Acquired distinctiveness and equivalence of White, S. H. (1965). Evidence for a hierarchical arrangement of
cues in young children. Journal of Experimental Child Psy- learning processes. In L. P. Litsitt & C. C. Spiker (Eds.),
chology, 13, 171-182. Advances in child development and behavior (Voi. 2, pp. 187-
Reese, H. W. (1977). Discriminative learning and transfer: Di- 220). New York: Academic Press.
alectical perspectives. In N. Datan & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life- White, S. H. (1970). The learning theory approach. In P. H.
span developmental psychology: Dialectical perspectives on ex- Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's manual of child psychology (3rd
perimental research (pp. 205-252). New York: Academic Press. ed., Vol. 1, pp. 657-701). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Reese, H. W., & Overton, W. E (1970). Models of development Whittaker, E. (1973). A history of the theories of the aether and
and theories of development. In L. R. Goulet & P. B. Baltes electricity. New York: Humanities Press.
(Eds.), Life-span developmentalpsychology (pp. 115-145). New Williams, L. P. (1970). Normal science, scientific revolutions and
York: Academic Press. the history of science. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.),
Restle, E (1955). A theory of discrimination learning. Psychological Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp. 49-50). Cambridge,
Review, 62, 1 I- 19. England: Cambridge University Press.
Restle, E (1958). Toward a quantitative description of learning Zahar, E. (1976). Why did Einstein's programme supersede Lo-
set data. Psychological Review, 65, 77-91. rentz's? In C. Howson (Ed.), Method and appraisal in the
Restle, E (1962). The selection of strategies in cue learning. physical sciences (pp. 21 !-275). Cambridge, England: Cambridge
Psychological Review, 69, 329-343. University Press.
Restle, E (1965), Significance of all-or-none learning. Psychological Zeaman, D., & House, B. J. (1963). An attention theory of
Review, 64, 313-325. retardate discrimination learning. In N. R. Ellis (Ed.), Handbook
Rock, 1. (1957). The role of repetition in associative learning. of mental deficiency (pp. 159-223). New York: McGraw-Hill.
American Journal of Psychology, 70, 186-193.
J u l y 1985 • A m e r i c a n P s y c h o l o g i s t 769