whom he had no children in their almost ten year
In support thereof, respondent
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges
on the validity of the two marriages contracted by
the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose
“death benefits” is now the subject of the
controversy between the two Susans whom he
married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on
certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263,
which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87,
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S.
Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was
on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao),
with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee
and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee
Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with
license.
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM,
[and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life,
Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee
filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying,
inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as “death benefits” which she
(petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.”
Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to
file her answer, prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her
marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage and that she became
aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
where she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action
for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage
presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
–
This is to certify that this Office has no record of
marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are
married in this municipality on June 20, 1969.
Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy
or transcription of Marriage License number from
the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of
Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal
purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor
of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of
the amount which was paid to her in the form of
death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the
amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals,
the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
1
 II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT
CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND
EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. 9 However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These
need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the
two marriages in this case, as the same is
essential to the determination of who is rightfully
entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force
when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a
valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void
ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage.
This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification
issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden
of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid
and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default
before the trial court, petitioner could have
squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings
before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and
chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition,
however, that since the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article
40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of
nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased
and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage
of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan
Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property
regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are
void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal
2
partnership of property, but rather, be governed
by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which
refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships
in a state of concubine, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons,
multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by
the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong
to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions
in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP
Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased
as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said
that she contributed money, property or industry
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said “death benefits” of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And,
respondent, not being the legal wife of the
deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to
unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void for other reasons, like the absence of a
marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code
reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage
is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith
in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants.
In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing
article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the
parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the
wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed
“death benefits” were earned by the deceased
alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case, both parties of the first marriage are
presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of
the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall
go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to
his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan
Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the
Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of
the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first
wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not
been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not
ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished
her status as putative heir of her husband under
the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate
upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a
3
still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir
she has an interest in the husband’s share in the
property here in dispute....” And with respect to
the right of the second wife, this Court observed
that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved
before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only
just and equitable solution in this case would be
to recognize the right of the second wife to her
share of one-half in the property acquired by her
and her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited
decision is premised on the rule which requires a
prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. This is the reason why in the said case,
the Court determined the rights of the parties in
accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the
Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code,
clarified that a prior and separate declaration of
nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That
is, if a party who is previously married wishes to
contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first
marriage void, before he or she could contract
said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies
even if the first marriage is patently void because
the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum
of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be
valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to
present evidence, testimonial or documentary,
that would prove that the marriage from which his
or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues
before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of
the parties in accordance with the applicable laws
and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family
Code connoted that such final judgment need not
be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
4