EXCONDE v. CAPUNO; G.R. No. L-10134.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1957/jun1957/gr_l-10134_1957.html

FACTS: Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil at
Balintawak Elementary School. In March 1949, he attended a boy scout
parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he took control of
the steering wheel which he later lost control of causing the jeep to go
turtle thereby killing two other students, Isidoro Caperina and Amado
Ticzon. Isidoro’s mother, Sabina Exconde, sued Dante Capuno for the
death of her son. Pending the criminal action, the mother reserved her
right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed against
Dante and his dad, Delfin Capuno. It further appears that Delfin Capuno,
father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did
he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know
it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade
upon instruction of his teacher.

ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for

damages.

HELD: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means”, while, on the other hand, gives them the “right
to correct and punish them in moderation”. The only way by which they
can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage which
Delfin failed to prove.

On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law,
“teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody”,
but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not
to any academic educational institution.

MERCADO v. CA, Quisumbing, et, al.; G.R. No. L-14342; May 30, 1960

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1960/may1960/gr_l-14342_1960.html

FACTS
• Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils of the
Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City.
• A ‘pitogo’ (an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank) belonged
to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in turn Benedicto
lent it to Renato Legaspi.
• Renato was not aware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto.
• Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was Benedicto’s, so when Augusto
attempted to get the ‘pitogo’ from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do
so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the
‘pitogo’.
• Augusto resented his remark and pushed Manuel, Jr., which started the
fight.
• After successive blows to Manuel, Jr., Augusto cut him on the right cheek
with a piece of razor.
• Manuel, Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado,
Augusto’s father.

ISSUE: W/N the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible
instead of the father?
o Petitioner: Since the incident occurred in the school during recess
time, through no fault of the father

RULING: NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY.

• Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code:
 o “Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”
• That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents.
• In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and
actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the
teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
• Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to
go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their
parents after school is over.

We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed at
P2,000 are excessive. We note that the wound caused to respondent was
inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common fight between boys in a
grade school. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which
moral damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-
delict has been committed.
It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever
presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it does
not appear that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted the
physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. It does not appear that a
criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. The offender,
Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it does not appear that he had
acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have
considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict
causing physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
2219. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a
quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by
said court indicate that Augusto's resentment, which motivated the
assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene
in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from
Renato." This is, according to the decision appealed from, the reason why
Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who, in turn, also pushed
Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury
caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for
having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from
another boy. After considering all the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to
have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.
PALISOC v. BRILLANTES; G.R. No. L-29025 [October 4, 1971]
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1971/oct1971/gr_29025_1971.html

FACTS: Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were

automotive mechanics students at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In
the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation transpired
between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident,
Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio
was working on a machine with Dominador looking at them. The situation
prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As
a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by
inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused the
latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter died, the
cause of death being “shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The
parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2)
Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher in
charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a member of
the board of directors and former sole proprietor of MTI.

The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-
officials. It stated that the clause “so long as they remain in their custody”
contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where the pupil
lives and boards with the teachers, such that the control or influence on
the pupil supersedes those of the parents., and such control and
responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the father and
mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was based on the dictum in
Mercado v. CA, which in turn based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The
trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in this case, as
defendant Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials at the time of
the incident. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador
together with the defendant?

HELD: The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule

respectively) were held liable jointly and severally with the Virgilio for
damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI
board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not
been properly impleaded as party defendant.

The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their
custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There
is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil
or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the
school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v.
Capuno on which it relied are deemed to have been set aside. The
rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent
to their pupils and students and are called upon to “exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” In this case, the
unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-
students could have been avoided, had said defendants complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm.
Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they cannot
likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the
appellate court was modified, while claim for compensatory damages was
increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim for
exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part
of the said defendants.

AMADORA vs. CA; GR No. L47745; April 15, 1988

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/apr1988/gr_l_47745_1988.html

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was

mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death.
Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of
boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students.
Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court
absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for
the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of
learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in
the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There
was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants
exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school
regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on other other hand
claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD: No.
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody
of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that
the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to
submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the
company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate
purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school
authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the
student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus
immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The
mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection
with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher,
respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school
or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge
even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it
has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing
discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents
have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys
who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that
he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students
and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it
does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been
shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for
none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.
PSBA v. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 84698; February 4, 1992
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/feb1992/gr_84698_1992.html

FACTS
• Carlitos Bautista was a third year commerce student in PSBA. In Aug 30,
1985, he was stabbed while on the 2nd floor of the school, causing his
death. It was established that the assailants were not students of PSBA.
• The parents of Carlitos filed a damage suit against PSBA and its school
authorities for the death of their child.
• Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states
no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the
effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit
of the rule in the afore-stated article.
• RTC dismissed the MTD. CA affirmed. The CA ratiocinated as follows:

Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption

from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned
authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The
law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest
value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new
challenges of progress. Construed in the light of modern day educational
system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in
the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals;
hence, the ruling in the Palisoc case that it should apply to all kinds of
educational institutions, academic or vocational. At any rate, the law holds
the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve
themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180
by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This
can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case.

ISSUE: W/N PSBA and its school authorities are vicariously liable for the
death of Carlitos Bautista inside its premises
HELD: NO, THEY ARE NOT LIABLE. Article 2180, in conjunction with
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This
Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde,
Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In
all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as
earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA,
for whose acts the school could be made liable.

Soliman vs. Tuazon; G.R. No. 66207, May 18, 1992

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/may1992/gr_66207_1992.html

FACTS
• Petitioner Soliman Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against
respondents Republic Central Colleges, R.L. Security Agency, and Solomon,
a security guard at Republic.
• The complaint alleges that one morning, while Soliman was in the
premises of
Republic, as he was still a regular enrolled student, Solomon with intent to
kill
attacked and shot him in the abdomen. It is further alleged that such
wound would have caused his death, were it not for timely medical
assistance, and because of this he may not be able to attend his regular
classes and perform his usual work from three to four months.
• Republic Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Soliman had
no action against it. It averred that it should be free from liability because
it was not the employer of the security guard. Moreover, Article 2180 (7th
paragraph) did not apply, since such holds teachers and heads
responsible only for damages caused by their pupils and
students/apprentices.
• The MTD was granted by the judge. Hence this instant petition.

ISSUES: W/N Republic Central Colleges may be held liable for damages.

HELD: REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR

DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2180 (AS AN EMPLOYER). HOWEVER, IT
MAY BE LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT.

• Under Article 2180 of the NCC, employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business
or industry. Also, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
• There is no basis to hold Republic liable under Article 2180. The
employer of security guard Solomon was R.L. Security Agency Inc. Where
the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its
watchmen or security
guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability
for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to
the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.
• The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer.
• Solomon was neither a pupil nor a student of Republic. Hence, the
provision with regard to the liability of teachers and heads is also not
available to make Republic liable for damages.
• Nevertheless, Republic may be held liable on the basis of an implied
contract
between it and Soliman, because of its obligation to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that
the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of
diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding
to the circumstances of person, time and place.
• Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that
petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the
motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice,
allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractual or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.

Petition GRANTED. Order REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Case REMANDED to the
court a quo for further proceedings.

REGINO vs. PCST; G.R. No. 156109; November 18, 2004

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_156109_2004.html

FACTS: Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer

science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology (PCST). She comes from a very poor family and she was only
able to go to school by means of financial support from her relatives.
During her second semester of school year 2001-2002, she was enrolled in
logic and statistics subjects under Repondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and
Elissa Baladad (her teachers). It was in February 2002 that the college
arranged a fund raising campaign called “Rave Party and Dance
Revolution”. The proceeds of this dance will be used to construct
the school’s tennis and volleyball courts. Everyone was required to buy
at least two tickets priced at 100pesos each. People who bought the
tickets will be given additional points in their test scores but those who did
not buy will not be allowed to take the final exams. Khristine, having no
money and religious restrictions, refused to buy the tickets. Thus on the
examination dates, she was not allowed by her two teachers, Gamurot
and Balalad, to take her final exam on statistics and logic.

The next day, the teacher announced to the whole class that Khristine and
another student was not permitted to take the exam because of the
failure to buy the tickets then subsequently ejected the two from class.
Khristine continued to plead with the teachers to allow her but they kept
their stand and defended their position saying that they were complying
with PCST’s policy. Khristine filed in the RTC as a pauper litigant against
PCST and her two teachers for damages. The respondents filed a
motion to dismiss based on Khristine’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies as they are contending that the case
should’ve been filed in the CHED (commission of higher education)
and not in the RTC. Khristine on the other hand says that prior exhaustion
of administrative remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not
administrative in nature, but one purely for damages arising from
respondents breach of the laws on human relations. The RTC dismissed
the complaint for the lack of cause of action. It said that considering the
case was between a school, two teachers and a student, CHED has
jurisdiction over the case and not RTC. And it dismissed the case for the
lack of cause of action without explaining their ground.

ISSUE/s:
1. W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable
2. W/N the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action

HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case because
the petitioner was not asking for the reversal of the policies of the PCST
neither was she demanding that the school allow her to take the final
examinations (considering that she was already enrolled in a different
school). The acts of the respondent can no longer be reversed and even if
it was reversed, it would not be adequate to redress her grievances. The
Supreme Court also held that the doctrine can only be applied
when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act
upon the matter complained of. Thus in the case at bar, the CHED does
not have the power to award damages to the petitioner. And lastly, the
doctrine cannot be applied when the issue is purely legal and well within
the jurisdiction of the trial court. The petitioner’s action for damages calls
for the application of the Civil Code which falls within the jurisdiction of
the courts.
2. Yes
a. Breach of Action
In the case of Alcuaz v. PSBA, the court characterized the
relationship between the school and the student as a contract, where the
student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one
semester. And in a succeeding case (Non v. Dames), the court ruled that it
is not merely for one semester but an entire period that the student is
expected to complete it. Thus it can be seen that when it comes to the
court, the relationship between the school and the student is contractual
in nature. Being that the relationship is reciprocal, where the school would
be providing the education while the student will be abiding by the rules
and regulations of the school. The terms of the contract are defined at the
moment of its inception- upon enrollment of the student. Thus it is in
practice that the student makes a down payment at the beginning of the
semester and succeeding payments paid before every
preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to pay
their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the school to
deny them the opportunity to take these examinations. In the present
case, the PCST imposed a revenue raising measure in the middle of
the semester. It made the financial contribution of the student as a
condition for the students to take their final examinations which
ultimately is translated to the recognition of their ability to finish the
course. Considering that the fee was not part of the student-school
contract entered into at the start of the year, it cannot be unilaterally
imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees. It should be noted that the
student-school contract is not an ordinary one and is imbued with
public interest considering that it is protected by the constitution and by a
legislative act called the Education Act of 1982.

b. Liability for Tort

In her complaint, Khristine wrote that she was inhumanly
punished by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly
station in life which inculcated feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness
and as a result she was unable to finish her subjects for the second
semester and had to lag her studies for a full year. The acts caused her
extreme humiliation and mental agony and she asks for compensation as
the respondents violated Article 19, 21, and 26 of the Civil Code. The court
held that generally, tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound
by a contract. But in the case of PSBA vs. CA an academic institution may
be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students,
since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. The Respondent
CANNOT use the right to academic freedom as a defense because
according to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses
the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who
may be admitted to study.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders

REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all
deliberate speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No
costs.
MENDOZA vs. SORIANO; G.R. No. 164012, June 8, 2007
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2007junedecisions.php?id=620

Facts: On July 14, 2007, Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth

Avenue, was hit by a speeding FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Macasasa
fled the scene. Soriano was brought by a school bus to East Avenue
Medical Center where he later died.

On August 20, 1997, respondents (Soriano’s wife and daughter) filed a

complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner Mendoza, the
registered owner of the vehicle. In her answer, petitioner maintained that
she was not liable as owner of the vehicle, because she had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family over her employee, Macasasa.

Upon respondents’ motion, the complaint for damages against Macasasa

was dismissed.
After trial, trial court dismissed the complaint. It found Soriano negligent
for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a gap in the island’s fencing
rather the pedestrian overpass. Also, the complainants presented no
evidence to support their allegation of petitioner’s negligence.

CA reversed trial court’s decision.

Issue: Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?

Ruling: Yes. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for
the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the
employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. In this case, petitioner failed to prove that she exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa.
However, Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the
pedestrian overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. Hence, the
reduction by 20% of the damages awarded, based on Article 2179 of the
Civil Code which reads: “When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded”.

Petition denied for lack of merit. Decision of CA affirmed.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., vs. AGANA; G.R. No. 126297; January
31, 2007
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jan2007/gr_126297_2007.html

Facts: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital because
of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Miguel
Ampil, diagnosed her to be suffering from “cancer of the sigmoid.” Dr.
Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital,
performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the
malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating
the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent
of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, to
perform hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over,
completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation
appeared to be flawed. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence
of the surgery.

Two weeks after Natividad returned from the United States to seek further
treatment, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her
vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house
where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish.

Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified,
prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital.
While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of
another foreign object in her vagina — a foul-smelling gauze measuring
1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal
fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to
excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to
remedy the damage.

Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC a complaint for damages
against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City
Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable
for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and
malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.

Pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad died and was duly
substituted by her children (the Aganas). The RTC rendered its Decision in
favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for
negligence and malpractice.

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the case against Dr.
Fuentes with Dr. Ampil liable to reimburse Professional Services, Inc.,
whatever amount the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs.

Issues: Whether or not PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence
of Dr. Ampil.

Held: Yes, PSI is solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil. In
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the court held that private hospitals, hire, fire
and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff.
While ‘consultants’ are not, technically employees, the control exercised,
the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of
the payment of wages. The court held that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians.

In addition to the pronouncement in Ramos vs CA, Its liability is also

anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by
estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence.

Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the “holding out”

theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, imposes
liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but
rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow
misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority
exists.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of Hospital the names and
specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including
those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. It is now estopped from passing all the
blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public
directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence. PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to the public that
Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality
health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that
they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services
for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them,
accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were being
rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants.

Under the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility,

PSI as owner, operator and manager of Medical City Hospital, did not
perform the necessary supervision nor exercise diligent efforts in the
supervision of Drs. Ampil and Fuentes and its nursing staff, resident
doctors, and medical interns who assisted Drs. Ampil and Fuentes in the
performance of their duties as surgeons. Premised on the doctrine of
corporate negligence, the trial court held that PSI is directly liable for such
breach of duty.

In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical
City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing
comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted
into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform
such duty.

It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad
with the assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of
resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude
that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive
knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the
attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. In Fridena v.
Evans, it was held that a corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired
by or notice given to its agents or officers within the scope of their
authority and in reference to a matter to which their authority extends.
This means that the knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital
constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the attending
nurses’ report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing
gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to
oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls, it
also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed. This
renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own
negligence under Article 2176.

PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce

evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil. In neglecting to
offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under the last
paragraph of Article 2180 and, therefore, must be adjudged solidarily
liable with Dr. Ampil.
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS v. SPS. VASQUEZ; G.R. No. 150843; March 14,
2003
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/mar2003/gr_150843_2003.html

FACTS:
•Cathay is a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting
passengers and goods by air. It services the Manila-Hongkong-Manila
course, among many others.
•As part of its marketing strategy, it accords its frequent flyers
membership in its Marco Polo Club. Members enjoy priority for upgrading
of booking without any extra charge whenever opportunity arises. So a
frequent flyer booked in Business Class has priority for upgrading to First
Class if the Business Class Section is fully booked.
•Dr. Vasquez and Maria Vasquez are frequent flyers of Cathay and
are Gold Card members of the Polo Club. On Sept 1996, Vasquezes
with their maid and 2 friends Cruz and De Dios went to HK for pleasure
and business.
•For their return flight on Sept 28, 1996, they were booked on a
Cathay flight at 9:20pm. 2 hours before, they checked in their luggage
and were given their boarding passes, to wit, BUSINESS CLASS for
Vasquezes and 2 friends, ECONOMY for the maid. They went to the BC
passenger lounge.
•Boarding time. They went to the Departure Gate 28, designated for
BC passengers. Dr. Vasquez presented his boarding pass to the
stewardess. It was inserted into an electronic machine reader or
computer. Another ground attendant Chiu assisted. When Chiu glanced at
the monitor, she saw a message that there was a “seat change” from BC to
First Class for the Vasquezes.
•Dr. Vasquez REFUSED the upgrade because they had 2 guests who will be
in the BC and they would be discussing business during the flight. The
stewardess insisted saying that BC is already fully booked and that if they
would not avail, they would not be allowed to take the flight. Vasquezes
acceded and took the First Class Cabin.
•In a letter, the Vasquezes demanded 1M indemnification from Cathay for
“humiliation and embarrassment” caused by its employees and a written
apology from a person from Cathay preferably with a rank of no less than
Country Manager and Mrs. Chiu w/in 15 days.
•Asst. Country Manager Robson informed them that Cathay would
investigate the incident and get back to them within a week’s time.
•No feedback come deadline, so Vasquezes filed a case for
DAMAGES against Cathay. Asked for temperate, moral, exemplary and
atty’s fees.

VASQUEZES’ARGUMENT: When they refused Ms. Chiu, she obstinately,

uncompromisingly and in a loud, discourteous and harsh voice
threatened that they could not board unless they acceded.
•Because he was not assisted by any of the crew in putting up his
luggage, his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was aggravated, causing
him extreme pain on his arm and wrist.
•Overbooking of the BC section constituted bad faith on Cathay.

CATHAY’SARGUMENT: It is a practice among commercial airlines to

upgrade passengers to the next better class of accommodation, whenever
an opportunity arises, such as when a certain section is fully booked.
•When Dr. Vasquez refused, he stood at the entrance of the boarding
apron and blocked other passengers. He shouted. Ms. Chiu thought of
upgrading their 2 other guests but they were not qualified. When she tried
booking them again to BC, it was already fully booked. She POLITELY told
them of such fact.
•Employee acted in GOOD FAITH. None of them shouted, humiliated,
embarrassed, committed any act of disrespect against them. Assuming
there was a breach, they acted in GF negating their liability for
damages.
•If any damage has been suffered, it was DAMNUM ABSQUE
INJURIA, damage without injury. Overbooking that does not exceed
10% is not deliberate and in Bad faith.

RTC: In favor of Vasquezes. The upgrading of passengers was a

pretext to pack as many passengers as possible to maximize its
revenues. Deceit, gross negligence, bad faith present. Nominal—100k
for each plaintiff; Moral—2M each; Exemplary—5M each; Atty’s fees—1M
each.
CA: Deleted exemplary. Reduced awards. There was a novation without
the Vasquezes’ consent and breach.

ISSUES:
WoN Cathay is guilty of breach of contractin upgrading the seats without
Vasquezes’ consent? Y

WoN the upgrade was tainted with fraud or bad faith? N.

HELD:THERE WAS BREACH OF CONTRACT.BUT NO BF/FRAUD, SO NO

DAMAGES.
•A contract of carriage existed between Cathay and the Vazquezes. They
voluntarily and freely gave their consent to an agreement whose object
was the transportation of the Vazquezes from Manila to Hong Kong and
back to Manila, with seats in the Business Class Section of the
aircraft, and whose cause or consideration was the fare paid by the
Vazquezes to Cathay.
•Breach of contract is defined as the “failure without legal reason to
comply with the terms of a contract.”
•In previous cases, the breach consisted in either the bumping off of a
passenger with confirmed reservation or the downgrading of a
passenger’s seat accommodation from one class to a lower class. In
this case, what happened was the reverse.
•In all their pleadings, the Vazquezes never denied that they were
members of Cathay’s Marco Polo Club. They knew that as members of the
Club, they had priority for upgrading of their seat accommodation at no
extra cost when an opportunity arises.
•But, just like other privileges, such priority could be waived. The
Vazquezes should have been consulted first whether they wanted to
avail themselves of the privilege or would consent to a change of
seat accommodation before their seat assignments were given to other
passengers. They clearly waived their priority or preference when they
asked that other passengers be given the upgrade. It should not
have been imposed on them over their vehement objection. By
insisting on the upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of carriage with
the Vazquezes.
•We are not, however, convinced that the upgrading or the breach of
contract was attended by fraud or bad faith.
•Bad faith and fraud are never presumed and are allegations of fact
that demand clear and convincing proof. The Vazquezes were not
induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious words or
deceitful machination or through willful concealment of material facts.
She was honest in telling them that their seats were already given to other
passengers and the Business Class Section was fully booked.
•Neither was the transfer of the Vazquezes effected for some evil or
devious purpose. Needless to state, an upgrading is for the better
condition and, definitely, for the benefit of the passenger.
•We are not persuaded by the Vazquezes’ argument that the overbooking
of the Business Class Section constituted bad faith on the part of Cathay.
oEconomic Regulation No. 7 of the Civil Aeronautics
Board:“...Provided, however, that overbooking not exceeding 10% of the
seating capacity of the aircraft shall not be considered as a deliberate and
willful act of non-accommodation.”
•It is clear from this section that an overbooking that does not exceed ten
percent is not considered deliberate and therefore does not amount to
bad faith. Here, while there was admittedly an overbooking of the
Business Class, there was no evidence of overbooking of the plane beyond
ten percent, and no passenger was ever bumped off or was refused to
board the aircraft.

DAMAGES: Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage

may only be recoverable in instances where the carrier is guilty of fraud or
bad faith or where the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger.
THUS NO MORAL DAMAGES in this case. The deletion of the award for
exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is correct. It is a requisite
in the grant of exemplary damages that the act of the offender must
be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent
manner. The most that can be adjudged in favor of the Vazquezes for Cathay’s
breach of contract is an award for nominal damages under Article 2221
of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, considering that the breach was intended
to give more benefit and advantage to the Vazquezes by upgrading their
Business Class accommodation to First Class because of their valued status as
Marco Polo members, we reduce the award to P5,000.
Singapore Airlines Ltd. vs. Fernandez, GR 142305, Dec. 10, 2003
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/dec2003/gr_142305_2003.html

FACTS:
Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano in the Philippines
and abroad. At the time of the incident she was availing of an educational
grant from the Federal Republic of Germany pursuing a Master’s Degree
in Music major in Voice. She was invited to sing before the King and
Queen of Malaysia on Feb. 3-4, 1991. For this purpose, she took an airline
ticket from Singapore Airlines (SAL) FOR THE Frankfurt-Manila-Malaysia
route. Respondent had to pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe
and rehearse with the pianist. SAL issued ticket for Flight SQ 27 leaving
Frankfurt on Jan. 27, 1991 for Singapore with connections to Manila in the
morning of Jan. 28, 1991. On Jan. 27, 1991 SQ 27 LEFT Frankfurt but
arrived two hours late in Singapore on Jan. 28, 1991. By then, the aircraft
bound for Manila had already left. Upon deplaning in Singapore,
Fernandez approached the transit counter at Changi Airport and was told
by a lady employee that there were no more flights to Manila on that day
and that she had to stay in Singapore, if she wanted, she could fly to HK
but at her own expense. Respondent stayed with a relative in Singapore
for the night. The next day, she was brought back to the airport and
approached a counter for immediate booking but was told by a male
employee: “Can’t you see I am doing something.” She explained her
predicament but was told: “It’s your problem, not ours.”

The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct
flight
to Malaysia on Jan. 29, 1991 through the efforts of her mother and a travel
agency in Manila. Her mother had to travel to Malaysia with the wardrobe
which caused them to incur expenses of ₱ 50,000.

RTC Manila ordered SAL to pay respondent ₱ 50k as actual damages, ₱

250k as
moral damages, ₱ 100k as exemplary damages, ₱ 75k as attorney’s fees
and
costs of suit.

CA affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE: WON SAL broke the contract of carriage

RULING: Yes, when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger,

confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of
carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he be
transported on that flight and on that date. If he does Transportation Law
Case not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of
carriage. A contract of carriage requires common carriers to transport
passengers safely as human care and foresight can provide (Art. 1755,
NCC). In an action for breach of a contract of carriage, the aggrieved party
does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was
negligent. All that is necessary is to prove the existence of the contract
and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier. SAL failed to inform of
the delay in the turnaround aircraft in Frankfurt, neither did it ask if the
respondent and 25 other delayed passengers are amenable to a stay in
Singapore. Even SAL’s manual mandates that in cases of urgent
connections the head office of defendant in Singapore has to be informed
of delays so as to make needed arrangements for connecting passengers.

When respondent conveyed her apprehension in Frankfurt of the

impending delay, she was assured by petitioner’s personnel in Frankfurt
that she will be transported to Manila on the same date. The lady
employee at the counter in Singapore only allowed respondent to use the
phone upon threat of suit, the male employee at the counter marked “
Immediate Attention to Passengers with
Immediate Booking” was rude to her.

Petition is denied. CA decision affirmed.